IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14th St., NW, Ste. 400 

Washington, D.C. 20005

CATHERINE HINCKLEY KELLEY

1101 14th St., NW, Ste. 400 

Washington, D.C. 20005

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

1050 First St., NE

Washington, D.C. 20463

Defendant. 

Civil Action No: __________________ 

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1. Plaintiffs Campaign Legal Center (“CLC”) and Catherine Hinckley Kelley bring 

this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”

or “Commission”) pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8), challenging as contrary to law the FEC’s

dismissal of their administrative complaint filed against a political committee, Correct the 

Record (“CTR”), and the campaign committee of 2016 presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, 

Hillary for America (“Clinton campaign”), for engaging in a multi-million dollar coordination 

scheme and failing to report coordinated expenditures in violation of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act (“FECA” or “Act”), 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq., and Commission regulations.

2. In the 2016 election cycle, CTR founder and chair David Brock publicly declared 

that the so-called “super PAC” would coordinate many of its activities with the Clinton 

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campaign. Under FECA, coordinated expenditures are considered in-kind campaign 

contributions, subject to reporting requirements, contribution limits, and source restrictions. 

However, despite spending millions of dollars on opposition research, campaign spokesperson

training and booking, video production, and press outreach—at least some portion of which, by 

CTR’s own admission, was conducted in coordination with the Clinton campaign—the Clinton 

campaign never reported receiving in-kind contributions from CTR, and CTR never reported 

making such contributions. 

3. Plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint on October 6, 2016, which the FEC 

designated as Matter Under Review (“MUR”) 7146, alleging there was reason to believe that

CTR and the Clinton campaign had violated FECA’s contribution limits, 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a)(1), its prohibition on contributions to a candidate from union or corporate funds, id.

§ 30118(a) and (b)(2), and its requirement that candidate committees and non-connected political 

committees report and disclose all in-kind contributions made and accepted, id. § 30104(b). See

Admin. Compl., MUR 7146 (Correct the Record) (Oct. 6, 2016), attached hereto as Exhibit A.

4. After reviewing the allegations in plaintiffs’ administrative complaint, the FEC’s

Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) recommended the Commissioners find reason to believe that 

CTR and the Clinton campaign violated FECA by making and accepting, respectively, 

“unreported excessive and prohibited in-kind contributions” in the form of coordinated 

expenditures, and authorize an investigation to determine “the extent” of the unreported in-kind 

contributions. First General Counsel’s Report at 25-26, MURs 6940, 7097, 7146, 7160, and 7193 

(Correct the Record) (Oct. 16, 2018) (“OGC Report”).

1

 

1 The OGC Report is available at https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7146/19044472082.pdf.

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5. On June 4, 2019, the Commission voted on OGC’s recommendation but failed, by 

a vote of 2-2, to obtain the four affirmative votes needed to find “reason to believe” and to 

proceed with an investigation into the alleged violations. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a). The 

Commission subsequently voted 4-0 to dismiss the complaint.

2

6. The Commission’s failure to find reason to believe and its dismissal of plaintiffs’ 

administrative complaint was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. The Commission did not 

even issue a Statement of Reasons or any explanation for the dismissal, without which its 

decision fails to meet the most basic requirement of reasoned decisionmaking. See Orloski v. 

FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

7. Whereas truly independent expenditures may not “pose dangers of real or 

apparent corruption,” the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that coordinated

expenditures function as “disguised contributions”—and that the failure to regulate them as such 

creates an acute risk of corruption and deprives the public of valuable information about the true 

sources of candidates’ financial support. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1976) (per 

curiam).

8. If coordinated expenditures are not subject to contribution limits and source 

restrictions, wealthy interests such as CTR and its donors will continue to procure influence over 

candidates and officeholders by making expenditures at their behest, raising the “danger that 

expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. And without the full and accurate reporting of coordinated expenditures 

 

2

See Amended Certification in MURs 6940, 7097, 7146, 7160, and 7193 (Correct the Record) 

(signed June 13, 2019), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7146/19044472151.pdf. Other 

documents in the MUR file are available on the FEC’s website, at https://www.fec.gov/data/

legal/matter-under-review/7146.

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as in-kind contributions to candidates, voters will not have the campaign finance information

necessary to “place each candidate in the political spectrum,” understand “the interests to which 

a candidate is most likely to be responsive,” or make “predictions of future performance in 

office,” id. at 67—all of which are crucial to casting an informed and meaningful vote.

9. The dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint has undermined FECA’s purposes, 

including its goals of preventing the corruptive impact of large “disguised” contributions and 

providing the electorate with comprehensive disclosure “as to where political campaign money 

comes from and how it is spent by the candidate.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66. 

10. Plaintiffs have suffered as a result, because they, as well as the public, have been

deprived of disclosure about the scale and scope of CTR’s expenditures coordinated with the 

Clinton campaign—which, in turn, has deprived plaintiffs of key information about the sources 

of the Clinton campaign’s financial support, as well as the size and purposes of the campaign’s 

expenditures. This is information to which plaintiffs are legally entitled under FECA, and which

CLC needs for work central to its mission and Ms. Kelley needs to properly evaluate candidates 

for federal office and to cast an informed vote.

11. Accordingly, plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the dismissal of their 

administrative complaint was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. Plaintiffs further seek an 

order requiring the FEC to conform with such declaration within 30 days.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

12. This Court has jurisdiction under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331.

13. Venue in this district is proper pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) and 28 

U.S.C. § 1391(e).

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PARTIES

14. Plaintiff CLC is a nonpartisan 501(c)(3) organization that works to strengthen the 

U.S. democratic process through, among other activities, protecting the public’s right to access 

information about the financing of federal, state, and local election campaigns and the influence 

that campaign money has on governmental decisionmaking. To realize its mission of improving 

democracy and promoting representative, responsive, and accountable government for all 

citizens, CLC engages in litigation, regulatory practice, legislative policy, and public education. 

See CLC, About CLC, https://campaignlegal.org/about.

15. CLC relies on the accurate and complete reporting of campaign finance 

information to carry out activities central to its mission, including research, analysis, and 

reporting about campaign spending and the true sources and scope of candidates’ financial 

support. 

16. A central aspect of CLC’s programmatic work, and a key way it advances its 

organizational mission, involves research regarding the money used to influence elections. 

Disclosure reports filed with the FEC are an important source of campaign finance information, 

which CLC uses for its fact-based legal analysis and evaluation of existing and proposed 

campaign finance laws, as well as to educate the public about the sources and extent of 

candidates’ financial support so that voters can evaluate the full context of the political messages 

they hear. See CLC, Issues: Campaign Finance, https://campaignlegal.org/issues/campaignfinance.

17. CLC also uses this analysis in its active docket of campaign finance cases in 

federal and state courts across the country. 

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18. CLC is involved in litigation regarding campaign contribution limits, disclosure, 

political advertising, enforcement issues, and other campaign finance matters. Since representing 

the legislative sponsors of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act as intervenor-defendants in 

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), CLC has filed amicus briefs in every campaign finance 

case decided by the Supreme Court, including McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014), and 

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

19. In addition, CLC uses its analyses of federal campaign finance disclosure as the 

foundation for its administrative practice at the FEC and before state and local campaign finance 

agencies, and relies on this information when preparing administrative enforcement complaints 

and participating in rulemaking and advisory opinion proceedings.3

20. CLC also uses information obtained from campaign finance disclosure reports in 

preparing testimony or public comment for Congress4or for state and local legislatures and 

agencies,5as well as to produce in-depth research reports and publications,6op-eds, blog posts, 

 

3

See, e.g., CLC, Letter to the FEC re: REG 2014-10 (Party Contribution Limits) (May 19, 

2019), https://campaignlegal.org/document/letter-fec-cromnibus-accounts (urging the FEC to 

issue rules defining permissible uses of funds from certain special-purpose “Cromnibus” 

accounts based on analysis of political party committees’ disbursements from such accounts); 

CLC, Petition for Rulemaking to Revise and Amend Regulations Relating to the Personal Use of 

Leadership PAC Funds (July 24, 2018), https://campaignlegal.org/document/petition-fecrulemaking-revise-and-amend-regulations-relating-personal-use-leadership-pac.

4

See, e.g., Responses to Questions for the Record in Supp. of H.R. 1: Submitted to H. Comm. 

on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019), https://campaignlegal.org/document/congressionaltestimony-support-hr-1-response-questions-record (testimony of Adav Noti, CLC senior director 

of trial litigation and chief of staff).

5

See, e.g., CLC, Comments to Oklahoma Ethics Commission regarding Proposed Rule 

Amendments 2019-01, https://www.ok.gov/ethics/documents/CLC%20Comments%20on%20

Proposed%20Rule%20Amendments.

6

See, e.g., Brendan Fischer & Maggie Christ, CLC, FARA Zombies: How Some Retired 

Politicians Use Leftover Campaign Funds to Advance Their Careers as Foreign Agents (2019), 

https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2019-07/07-25-19%20FARA%20Zombie%20

(Continued...)

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and other commentary through appearances on broadcast media and in interviews for print and 

web publications.7 These communications are directed toward educating policymakers and the 

public about the true sources of money raised and spent to influence elections and the scale of 

candidate campaign spending, whether the money is contributed to or spent by candidates, 

political parties, other political committees, or non-committee individuals or entities. 

21. Similarly, CLC expends significant resources to assist reporters and other 

members of the media in their investigative research into candidates’ financial support, to ensure 

that the public is equipped with the information necessary to evaluate different candidates and 

messages and to cast informed votes. 

22. Many of these press calls and contacts involve questions about the sources and 

amounts of funds being contributed to super PACs supporting specific candidates. This 

information is relevant to an analysis of the interests to which a candidate is likely to be 

responsive. 

23. When inadequate disclosure of federal campaign finance activity makes it 

difficult to ascertain the origin and magnitude of a candidate’s financial support, as occurs when 

a candidate’s fundraising and media operations are illegally outsourced to an “independent”

super PAC without disclosure, reporters often contact CLC for guidance as to whether or where 

they can find the campaign finance information that is not being properly reported. This work 

requires CLC to divert resources and funds from other organizational needs.

 

(...Continued)

Report%20%28final%29.pdf; Brendan Fischer & Maggie Christ, CLC, Dodging Disclosure: 

How Super PACs Used Reporting Loopholes and Digital Disclaimer Gaps to Keep Voters in the 

Dark in the 2018 Midterms (2018), https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/11-29-

18%20Post-Election%20Report%20%281045%20am%29.pdf.

7 For other examples of CLC’s work, see http://www.campaignlegal.org. 

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24. Plaintiff Catherine Hinckley Kelley is CLC’s Director of Policy and State 

Programs. 

25. She is a citizen of the United States and a registered voter and resident of 

Washington, D.C. 

26. As a registered voter, Ms. Kelley is entitled to receive all the information FECA 

requires those engaged in political activities to report publicly, and her informed exercise of the 

vote is impaired when such information is unavailable. She is further entitled to the FEC’s proper 

administration of the federal campaign finance laws. 

27. Ms. Kelley is harmed by the FEC’s failure to require CTR and the Clinton 

campaign to disclose the extent of their coordinated activity because she was deprived of 

campaign finance disclosure information that she has a statutory right to access and that she uses 

to evaluate candidates for federal office.

28. Both plaintiffs rely on information about campaign-related spending to evaluate 

different speakers and messages and to monitor the influence of campaign money on 

officeholders and public policy. 

29. The dismissal of plaintiffs’ administrative complaint has deprived plaintiffs, as 

well as the public, of disclosure information regarding the scale and scope of CTR’s 

expenditures coordinated with the Clinton campaign. 

30. FECA gives each plaintiff a right to access this information, which CLC uses for 

its organizational work and advocacy and Ms. Kelley uses in exercising her right to an informed 

vote. By depriving plaintiffs of access to this information, the dismissal impairs CLC’s ability to 

carry out a central part of its mission and harms Ms. Kelley’s informational interests as a voter.

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31. Defendant FEC is an independent federal agency charged with the administration 

and civil enforcement of FECA. 52 U.S.C. § 30106.

FACTS

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Statutory and Regulatory Definition of “Contribution”

32. Under the Act, a “contribution” is a “gift . . . of money or anything of value made 

by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30101(8)(A)(i). “Anything of value” includes “all in-kind contributions.” 11 C.F.R. 

§ 100.52(d)(1). 

33. In-kind contributions include “the payment . . . of compensation for the personal 

services of another person which are rendered to a political committee without charge for any 

purpose.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(ii).

Coordinated Expenditures Are Deemed In-Kind Contributions

34. Any expenditure made in coordination with a candidate is an in-kind 

“contribution” to such candidate. “[E]xpenditures made by any person in cooperation, 

consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized 

political committees, or their agents shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate.” 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i) (emphasis added).

35. The Supreme Court has endorsed this treatment of “coordinated” spending, 

accepting the proposition that “expenditures controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and 

his campaign might well have virtually the same value to the candidate as a contribution 

and . . . pose similar dangers of abuse.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46.

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36. Because a “coordinated” expenditure is treated as an in-kind contribution to the 

candidate with whom it was coordinated, it is subject to the Act’s contribution limits and source 

restrictions, as well as its related disclosure requirements.

37. In the 2016 election cycle, federal law limited to $2,700 the amount of a 

contribution that a presidential candidate or the candidate’s authorized campaign committee 

could accept from an individual donor or a non-multicandidate political committee. 52 U.S.C 

§ 30116(a)(1)(A); FEC, Contribution limits for 2015-2016 (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.fec.gov/

updates/contribution-limits-for-2015-2016. 

38. FECA also prohibits a corporation or labor union from making a contribution to a 

federal candidate or political committee. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a).

39. Candidates and political committees are prohibited from knowingly accepting any 

contribution, including in-kind contributions in the form of coordinated expenditures, in 

violation of any restriction imposed on contributions under the Act. 11 C.F.R. § 110.9.

40. FECA also requires all political committees to file regular reports with the 

Commission disclosing their receipts and disbursements, including in-kind contributions in the 

form of coordinated expenditures. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(1).

41. For any political committee other than a candidate-authorized committee, such 

reports must include the total amount of contributions, including in-kind contributions, made to 

other political committees. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(4)(H)(i). The report must also identify the

name and address of each political committee that has received a contribution from the reporting 

committee during the reporting period, together with the date and amount of such contribution.

Id. § 30104(b)(6)(B)(i).

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42. Candidate-authorized campaign committees must file reports disclosing all 

contributions received from other political committees, including in-kind contributions in the 

form of coordinated expenditures. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(2)(D). An in-kind contribution in the 

form of coordinated expenditures must be reported as both a contribution received and an 

expenditure made by the candidate. 11 C.F.R. §§ 104.13(a), 109.20(b), 109.21(b). 

43. An in-kind contribution to a candidate from another committee must be itemized 

regardless of its amount as both a receipt and a disbursement. A candidate-authorized committee 

must report each in-kind contribution from a committee as an itemized receipt, and disclose the 

date and amount of the contribution, as well as the name and address of the contributor. 11 

C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4)(ii). The committee must also report an in-kind contribution as an itemized 

disbursement, and disclose the amount and date of the disbursement, the name and address of the 

recipient of the disbursement, and a description of its purpose. Id. § 104.3(b)(4)(i); see also FEC, 

How to report: In-kind contributions, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/

filing-reports/in-kind-contributions.

Definition and Regulation of Coordinated Expenditures

44. FECA defines a coordinated expenditure as one made “in cooperation, 

consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized 

political committees, or their agents.” 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i).

45. FEC regulations define “coordination” in almost identical terms to mean “in 

cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a 

candidate’s authorized committee, or a political party committee.” 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a). 

46. In addition to this broad “coordination” regulation, the Commission has also 

promulgated a regulation pertaining to a subset of coordinated expenditures—those made for 

certain “coordinated communications”—at 11 C.F.R. § 109.21. 

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47. To be a “coordinated communication,” a communication must (1) be paid for by a 

person other than the candidate, as described in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a)(1); (2) satisfy one of the 

“content standards” set forth in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c); and (3) satisfy one of the “conduct 

standards” set forth in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d).

48. The “content standards” set forth in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c) all pertain to “public 

communications,” a term defined by the Commission to mean a communication:

[B]y means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper, 

magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the 

general public, or any other form of general public political advertising. The term 

general public political advertising shall not include communications over the 

Internet, except for communications placed for a fee on another person’s Web site.

Id. § 100.26.

49. The Commission’s “coordinated communication” regulation at 11 C.F.R. 

§ 109.21 thus applies only to expenditures for communications disseminated via media covered

by the definition of “public communication” at 11 C.F.R. § 100.26. Unpaid “communications 

over the Internet” are not “public communications” and thus not covered by the definition of 

“coordinated communications.” Id. § 109.21.

50. But all other types of expenditures, such as expenditures that do not constitute 

communications, are governed by the coordination regulation at 11 C.F.R. § 109.20. Under this 

regulation, any such expenditure will be treated as an in-kind contribution to a candidate if made 

“in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of,” a candidate or 

the candidate’s campaign committee. Id.

FECA’s Regulation of Political Committees

51. Generally, “non-connected” political committees—i.e., those committees that are 

not authorized candidate committees or party committees—may not accept contributions from 

any source that, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000 in a calendar year. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C).

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FECA also prohibits political committees from accepting contributions from corporations or 

labor unions. Id. § 30118(a).

52. However, following court decisions in Citizens United and SpeechNow.org v. 

FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), the FEC created a new class of political 

committees known as “super PACs.” FEC Advisory Op. 2010-11 (Commonsense Ten) at 2-3.

Political committees that “intend[] to make only independent expenditures” but no “monetary or 

in-kind contributions (including coordinated communications) to any other political committee 

or organization” may solicit and accept unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations, 

labor organizations, and other committees. Id.

53. In 2011, pursuant to the stipulated order and consent judgment in Carey v. FEC, 

No. 11-259-RMC (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011), the Commission issued further guidance allowing 

certain political committees to operate as “hybrid” committees that make both independent 

expenditures and campaign contributions from segregated accounts. FEC Statement on Carey v. 

FEC, Reporting Guidance for Political Committees that Maintain a Non-Contribution Account 

(Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-statement-on-carey-fec.

54. A hybrid or “Carey” committee may establish (1) a “non-contribution” bank 

account that accepts contributions in unlimited amounts from individuals, corporations, labor 

organizations and other political committees that may be used only for independent 

expenditures—not for in-kind contributions to candidates; and (2) a separate “contribution” 

account subject to FECA’s contribution limits and source prohibitions for making contributions 

to federal candidates. Id.

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Commission Enforcement Actions

55. Any person may file a complaint with the FEC alleging a violation of FECA. 52 

U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1). Commission regulations specify, in relevant part, that a complaint must 

identify the complainants and be sworn and signed, and that the allegations in a complaint “not 

based upon personal knowledge” should identify the source of the information that “gives rise to 

the complainant’s belief in the truth of such.” 11 C.F.R. § 111.4(b), (d).

56. The Commission, after reviewing the complaint and any responses, then votes on 

whether there is “reason to believe” a violation has occurred, in which case it “shall” investigate. 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2). FECA requires the FEC to find “reason to believe” by at least four 

affirmative votes of the members of the Commission. Id. 

57. The Commission will find “reason to believe” where a complaint “credibly 

alleges” that a FECA violation “may have occurred.” FEC, Statement of Policy Regarding 

Commission Action in Matters at the Initial Stage in the Enforcement Process, 72 Fed. Reg. 

12545 (Mar. 16, 2007). 

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiffs’ Administrative Complaint Against Correct the Record and Hillary for America

58. Plaintiffs filed a sworn administrative complaint on October 6, 2016 asking the 

FEC to find “reason to believe” that Hillary for America violated FECA by failing to report inkind contributions from CTR in the form of coordinated expenditures and compensation for 

personal services, 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b), and by accepting excessive and prohibited contributions 

in violation of FECA’s amount limits, id. § 30116(a)(1), and source restrictions, id. § 30118(a) 

and (b)(2). Likewise, the complaint asked the FEC to find “reason to believe” that CTR violated 

FECA by failing to report its in-kind contributions to the Clinton campaign, 52 U.S.C. 

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§ 30104(b), by making excessive and prohibited contributions that violated FECA’s amount 

limits, id. § 30116(a)(1), and source restrictions, id. § 30118(a) and (b)(2). See Admin. Compl. ¶

112, attached hereto as Exhibit A.

59. Plaintiffs documented how CTR spent millions on opposition research, message 

development, surrogate training and booking, professional video production, and press outreach

for the benefit of the Clinton campaign—and noted that, by its own admission, CTR did at least 

some portion of this in coordination with the Clinton campaign, although CTR has not identified 

which specific activities were in fact coordinated with the campaign. As a result, the complaint 

alleged, there was reason to believe CTR had made, and the Clinton campaign had accepted, 

prohibited and excessive in-kind contributions, likely totaling millions of dollars, and failed to 

disclose them to the public. Admin. Compl. ¶¶ 87-111.

60. The administrative complaint, citing the Washington Post, stated that CTR split 

off from its parent organization, American Bridge, to become a “stand-alone super PAC” in May 

of 2015, Admin. Compl. ¶ 9, and functioned as a “hybrid committee,” id. ¶ 1. 

61. The complaint noted that CTR had announced via press release on May 12, 2015 

that it was a “strategic research and rapid response team designed to defend Hillary Clinton from 

baseless attacks,” and that it would “be allowed to coordinate with campaigns and Party 

Committees” because it would “not be engaged in paid media.” Admin. Compl. ¶ 12. The Wall 

Street Journal similarly reported that “[b]y not making independent expenditures, the group said 

there are no restrictions on its ability to coordinate with Mrs. Clinton’s campaign. The group will 

spend money on activities that can legally be coordinated with a campaign, such as social media, 

the [CTR] spokeswoman said.” Id. ¶ 10. 

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62. The administrative complaint acknowledged that CTR had asserted publicly that

its activities were exempt from the statutes and regulations governing coordination on the ground

that its operations involved unpaid “communications over the Internet” which are exempted from 

the FEC’s rule covering “coordinated communications” at 11 C.F.R. § 109.21. Admin. Compl. 

¶¶ 92-96

63. But the administrative complaint argued that “those rules have no bearing here” 

because this case “involves compensated political committee staffers and contractors” and the 

vast majority of CTR’s activities did not involve communications and “did not take place on the 

Internet at all.” Admin. Compl. ¶ 93.

64. The complaint described how CTR reportedly made expenditures for numerous 

purposes that did not constitute communications or internet activities, including:

a. Paying staff to produce and circulate memos to reporters “detailing 

Republicans’ stance on prescription drugs” on the same day that Clinton announced her 

health care policy. Admin. Compl. ¶ 25.

b. Paying staff to contact reporters by phone and email to offer “off the 

record” story pitches critiquing Clinton’s primary election opponents, even as the Clinton 

campaign was stating publicly that it would not engage in such negative attacks. Admin. 

Compl. ¶ 34.

c. Paying staff to run a “30-person war room” to defend Clinton during 

hearings before the House Select Committee on Benghazi, Admin. Compl. ¶ 28, which 

included “flood[ing] the emails of Washington reporters with a running, blow-by-blow 

critique of Mrs. Clinton’s contentious appearance” before the committee, id. ¶ 29.

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d. Hiring and paying so-called “trackers” who were deployed to discreetly 

record the public events of Clinton’s opponents in the Democratic Party primaries in 

states across the country. Admin. Compl. ¶¶ 16-17.

e. Paying staff to produce and distribute “an extensive prebuttal” memo to 

reporters in advance of a Trump speech and then “pepper[ing] reporters’ inboxes with 

emails at the rate of about one every four minutes during the time Trump was speaking.”

Admin. Compl. ¶¶ 55-56.

f. Contracting with consulting firms to provide “on-camera media training” 

for Clinton supporters, Admin. Compl. ¶ 5; see also id. ¶¶ 15, 33, 39, and to conduct an 

“aggressive surrogate booking program . . . in support of Hillary Clinton,” id. ¶ 51.

g. Commissioning a private polling firm to conduct polls showing that 

Clinton won the Democratic debate. Admin. Compl. ¶ 31.

h. Making expenditures for professional media production, travel expenses, 

and personnel time to conduct “hundreds of interviews” across the country to portray 

Clinton in a positive light for a “Let’s Talk Hillary” video project, and then pitching the

video interviews to reporters. Admin. Compl. ¶ 30.

65. The administrative complaint additionally alleged that compensation paid by CTR

to its staff or contractors to provide services related to these activities would constitute in-kind 

contributions to the Clinton campaign if the services were conducted at the request or suggestion 

of, or otherwise in coordination with, Clinton or her campaign staff. Admin. Compl. ¶¶ 98-99 

(citing 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(ii) and 11 C.F.R. § 100.54). CTR publicly acknowledged that it 

coordinated many of its activities with the Clinton campaign, and therefore, the complaint 

alleged, any such compensation for personal services rendered to the Clinton campaign 

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constituted in-kind contributions, subject to FECA’s reporting requirements and contribution 

source and amount prohibitions. Admin. Compl. ¶ 102.

66. The administrative complaint also noted that CTR reported two small payments

from the Clinton campaign for its services, including a $275,615 payment on June 1, 2015 

described as “research: non-contribution account,” Admin. Compl. ¶ 18, and a $6,346 payment 

on July 17, 2015 described as “Payment for Research Services: Non Contribution Account,” id.

¶ 33; but these payments were dwarfed by CTR’s total reported expenditures in the relevant 

period, and most likely by CTR’s coordinated expenditures, although the total amount of the 

latter is unknown.

67. In light of CTR’s broad range of non-communication expenditures, plaintiffs’ 

administrative complaint alleged that “the vast majority of Correct the Record’s expenditures 

have been for activities like opposition research, message development, surrogate training, 

reporter pitches, media booking, video production, ‘rapid response’ press outreach, and other 

‘earned media,’” and to the extent any such expenditures were “made in ‘cooperation, 

consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of’ Clinton’s campaign committee,” 

they were unreported, excessive in-kind contributions to the campaign. Admin. Compl. ¶ 91

(citing 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i) and 11 C.F.R. § 109.20).

The FEC’s Office of General Counsel Recommends Finding Reason to Believe CTR and the 

Clinton Campaign Violated FECA

68. Plaintiffs were not the only parties to file a complaint alleging coordination 

between CTR and the Clinton campaign. In 2015 and 2016, the Commission received four other 

administrative complaints making related allegations, which were assigned MUR numbers 6940, 

7097, 7160, and 7193. 

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69. For the purposes of its report and analyses, the FEC’s Office of General Counsel 

considered those four complaints together with plaintiffs’ complaint, although the allegations 

made and evidence cited differed across complaints.

70. Based on plaintiffs’ complaint, the respondents’ written replies, and other 

available evidence, OGC recommended that the Commission find reason to believe that CTR

violated 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a), 30118(a), and 30104(b) by making excessive and prohibited inkind contributions to the Clinton campaign and failing to report them; and that the Clinton 

campaign violated 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(f), 30118(a), and 30104(b) by accepting and failing to 

report those contributions. OGC Report at 25.

71. Although CTR and the Clinton campaign argued in written responses that CTR’s 

expenditures were not in-kind contributions because they constituted “communications” that 

were not covered by the FEC’s “coordinated communications” regulation, OGC found to the 

contrary that “CTR raised and spent approximately $9 million on a wide array of activities, most 

of which are not fairly characterized as ‘communications,’ in furtherance of its stated mission of 

working in support of Clinton's candidacy in coordination with [the Clinton campaign].” OGC 

Report at 5. “As such,” OGC concluded, “these payments for CTR’s coordinated activities 

constitute coordinated expenditures and thus contributions to [the Clinton campaign].” Id.

72. As OGC noted, CTR did not dispute “the description or scope of its activities on 

behalf of [the Clinton campaign] as set forth in the MUR 7146 [plaintiffs’] Complaint.” OGC 

Report at 10 n.28. Those undisputed activities, explained OGC, “cannot fairly be described as for 

‘communications,’ public or otherwise, unless that term covers almost every conceivable 

political activity.” Id. at 20.

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73. For example, OGC rejected CTR’s argument that “its contacts to reporters are not 

public communications, and therefore are not in-kind contributions,” instead concluding that 

“paying CTR staffers for this activity—activity that [the Clinton campaign] appeared to depend 

on CTR to conduct—is more akin to a non-coordinated in-kind contribution such as paying for 

personal services rendered to a political committee without charge” than to a communication. 

OGC Report at 23. 

74. Likewise, distinguishing between, on the one hand, payments for the posting of 

poll results on the internet and, on the other, the original payments to conduct the underlying

polling, OGC concluded that the latter payments qualified as coordinated expenditures because 

“[t]he fact that the polling results were subsequently transmitted over the internet does not 

retroactively render the costs of the polling a ‘communication’ cost.” OGC Report at 20. 

75. CTR and the Clinton campaign did not dispute that their activities were 

coordinated, and OGC concluded that “[t]he available information shows that CTR 

systematically coordinated with [the Clinton campaign] on its activities.” OGC Report at 16. 

Among other evidence, OGC cited CTR’s press releases and its representatives’ statements to the 

media, which plaintiffs’ complaint also cited. Id. at 7-8, 16. 

76. To further support its coordination conclusion, OGC’s report additionally cited 

evidence not included in plaintiffs’ complaint or derived from public statements by CTR, 

including internal materials published by WikiLeaks. OGC Report at 12-13. OGC stressed, 

however, that even without such evidence, “the record contains ample evidence, in the form of 

press releases and public interviews with CTR officers, as well as public tweets, as Brock 

referenced in his podcast interview, to support a coordination determination.” Id. at 18.

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77. Thus, according to OGC, the evidence “suggest[ed] that most of CTR’s entire 

range of activity during 2015-16 represents coordinated expenditures and therefore a 

contribution to [the Clinton campaign].” OGC Report at 25. 

The Commissioners Deadlock 2-2 on a Reason to Believe Finding, and Dismiss the Complaint

78. On June 4, 2019, by a deadlocked vote of 2-2, the FEC’s four Commissioners

failed to find reason to believe—and failed to authorize any investigation into the allegations—

that CTR and/or the Clinton campaign had violated 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a), (f), 30118(a), and 

30104(b). See Amended Certification at 1-2, MURs 6940, 7097, 7146, 7160, and 7193 (Correct 

the Record) (signed June 13, 2019). 

79. Also on June 4, 2019, the Commission failed to approve OGC’s recommended 

factual and legal analyses (by a vote of 1-3), failed to dismiss the complaint’s allegations as an 

exercise of the Commission’s prosecutorial discretion under Heckler v. Chaney (by a vote of 0-

2), and, finally, voted to dismiss the complaints and close the file (by a vote of 4-0). Amended 

Certification at 3-4. 

80. By a letter dated June 17, 2019, and received June 19, 2019, the Commission 

notified plaintiffs that it had dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint and closed the file. Notification to 

Campaign Legal Center at 1, MUR 7146 (June 17, 2019).

81. To date, the two Commissioners who forced the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint 

have not issued a Statement of Reasons explaining their votes against finding reason to believe. 

82. The Commission’s failure to issue a Statement of Reasons to explain its dismissal 

of plaintiffs’ complaint, contrary to the recommendation of its General Counsel, contravenes 

circuit authority requiring the Commissioners who decline to proceed to provide an explanation 

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for their vote. Common Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Democratic Cong. 

Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 831 F.2d 1131, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 

83. In the meantime, one of those Commissioners has instead discussed her views on 

this matter with the news media. See Kenneth P. Doyle, Case Against Clinton Campaign Dies 

Because Republicans Vote No, Bloomberg Government (July 22, 2019).

84. A short statement to the press from one of two “declining-to-go-ahead 

Commissioners” does not satisfy these Commissioners’ obligation to issue a written statement of

reasons explaining their votes, see Common Cause, 842 F.2d at 449, nor could it meet the test of

“reasoned decisionmaking” under FECA or the Administrative Procedure Act. See id.; see also

Orloski, 795 F.2d at 161.

COUNT I

(1) Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 84 as if fully set 

forth herein.

(2) As discussed, there was “reason to believe” that CTR made excessive and 

prohibited in-kind contributions in violation of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a) and 30118(a), and failed 

to report these contributions in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b); and that Hillary for America 

accepted excessive and prohibited in-kind contributions in violation of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(f)

and 30118(a), and failed to report these contributions in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b). 

(3) The Commission’s failure to find “reason to believe” these violations occurred 

and its subsequent dismissal of plaintiffs’ administrative complaint was arbitrary, capricious, and 

contrary to law. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A); 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also Orloski, 795 F.2d at 161.

(4) The Commission’s failure to issue a statement of reasons or explanation for the 

dismissal within 60 days is inherently contrary to law because it leaves plaintiffs, and the Court, 

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not only without a “reasoned basis” for the dismissal, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983), but with no reason at all. Absent the written 

explanation required, plaintiffs, as well as the public, are left with no basis for understanding

why the Commission, when presented with evidence that CTR and the Clinton campaign 

engaged in an overt coordination scheme potentially resulting in millions of dollars in illegal, 

unreported, and excessive in-kind contributions, refused to find reason to believe FECA was 

violated and dismissed plaintiffs’ administrative complaint.

REQUESTED RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, by their undersigned counsel, respectfully request that the 

Court grant the following relief:

a) Declare that the Commission’s decision to dismiss plaintiffs’ 

administrative complaint was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law under 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(A);

b) Order the Commission to conform to such a declaration within 30 days, 

see 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C);

c) Award legal fees and costs of suit incurred by plaintiffs; and

d) Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 1 Filed 08/02/19 Page 23 of 24
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Dated: August 2, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Tara Malloy

Paul M. Smith (DC Bar No. 358870)

Tara Malloy (DC Bar No. 988280)

Megan P. McAllen (DC Bar No. 1020509)

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14TH ST. NW, SUITE 400

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-2200

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