### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE D ec em be r 13, 200 5 S es sio n HENRY KE NT SUDBERRY v . ROYAL & SUN ALLIANCE, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Rutherford Coun ty No. 47920 Robert

E. Corlew, Jud ge

No. M2005- 00280-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on Ju ly 27, 2006

Trial court gr anted motion to dismiss tort claims as bar red by statute of limitations where the injury alleg ed wa s loss of employ ment. To the extent the employ ee alleg ed he had a contrac t for continued employ ment, his complaint was not subject t o Tenn. R. Civ. P . 12.02(6) dismissal because the thre e y e ar s tatut e of

lim itatio ns app lie s to c a se s in vo lvi ng los s o f p ro pe rty , in c lud ing c on tr a c tua l rig hts

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in Par t, Re verse d in P art
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., joined.
D a v i d H

. D u n a w a y, L a F o l l e t t e , K n o x v i l l e , f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , H e n r y K e n tS u d b e rr y.
L arr y G. T ra i l , M u rf

re es b o ro , T en n es s ee , fo r t h e a p p el l ee s , R o y al & S u n Al l i an ce , I n v es t i gat ions and I ntellige nce Services, Inc. OP IN ION
Thi s matt e r c o me s to u s a f te r th e tria l c o u rt d is mi s s e d p lain ti f f ’ s a c ti o n a s b arr e d b ythe statute of limitations. The issue on appea l is whether the one (1) y ear statute of limitations of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104( a)( 1), governing personal injury , or t he three (3) y ear statute of limitations of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105, g overning propert y d am age, a pplies to tort claims where the resulting injury

is loss of employ ment. Mr. Sudberry

broug ht suit against numerous def endants c laiming that their alleg edly tortious c on du c t caus e d the los s of Mr . Sudb e rry ’s job a t N iss a n. Ac c or din g to M r. Sudbe rry ’s c omp la int , he is a 54 y ear

old man who had been employ ed by Nissan for a

pproxi mately

18 y ear s befor e he w as wrong fully

terminated, a s a re sult of defe ndants’ ac tions, on Dece mber 12, 2000.-2-

This suit arose out of Mr. Sudber ry ’s wo rk ers’ compensation claim involvi ng injuries susta i n ed while e mploy ed by Nissan. Appar ently , Nissan’s wor kers’ compensation carrier, de fe nd a nt R oy a l & Sun Al lianc e (“ Roy a l” ), hir e d d e f e n d an t I nv e sti g a tio ns a ndI nte lli g e nc e Se rv ic e s, I nc. (“ I nvestig ations”) to investig ate Mr. Sudber ry ’s claim. Ac cordi n g to the complaint, the defe ndants, composed of Roy al, I nvestig ations, various Nissan employ ees, and a phy sician, soug ht to have Mr. Sudber

ry fired for viol ation of company rules while knowing there wer e in fact no such violations. Mr. Sudberry ’s employ er, N issan, is not a party to this l awsuit. Plai n t i ff alleg es defe ndants conspire d to have Mr. Sudber ry fired “in order to r etaliate ag ainst [hi m] for [his] having filed a w orker s’ compensation claim and in order to allow the pl aintiff to be r eplac ed by a y oung er employ ee and/or other e mploy ees w ho wer e not as ve sted with em p l o y m en t rig hts as [Mr. Sudberry ].”
Acc ording to plaintiff’s complaint, the def endants’ be h av i o r amounts t o “a tortious interfe renc e and/or

an intentional interfe renc e with an e mploy ment rel at i o n s h ip” betwe en Mr. Sudberry an d Ni ssan. I n addition, plaintiff alleg es the de fendants placed him in a “ false lig ht,” reta liated ag ainst him for filing a w orker ’s compensation claim, and violated Te nn. Code Ann. § 47- 50 -4 09 , w hic h p ro hib its pr oc ur e me nt o f b re a c h o f c on tr a c t.
Whil e it is not entirely clea r, Mr. Sudberry

appea rs to alleg e alternative theories of re covery or, at lea st, alternative c hara cterizations of his employ ment relationsh i p with Nissan. He a lleg ed both: ( 1) that he had mere expectancy of continued e mploy ment with Nissan and, alternatively , (2) that he had a

contra ct of c ontinued employ ment with Nissan. Specific ally , reg arding his future pr os pe c ts w ithNi ssan, Mr . Su db e rry a lle g e s th e fo llo wi ng in h is c omp la int : Based up on the length of the P laintif f’s em ployme nt and the P laintif f’s w ork rec ord, the P laintif

f b elieved that he had a s ecurejob until his retire ment or un le ss h e c omm itt e d s omea c t or omi ssi on that pr ov ide d a g oo d c aus e to t e rm inate him from his employ ment. The Plaintiff had p l an ned to re main with his employ er until he retired . . . . [t ]he Pl aintiff, . . . had an expressed a n d/or otherwise an implied contract of c ontinue d e m plo ym e nt wi th his e mpl oy e r, a nd thePla int if f h a d a pr op e rty int e re st in his labor and the rig ht to work at his position wit hout unjusti fied interf ere nce by the Def endants. (e mphasis added)

. Mr. Sudberry alleg es that, due to the defe ndants’ tortious a ctions, he lost his job with Nissan, resulting in loss of wag es, i nability to acc rue additional pension benef its and los s of insuranc e. Mr. Sudbe rry ma int a ins that his los s of e mpl oyme nt, a nd de fe nd a nts ’ a c tio ns , e xac e rb a te d h is d ia be te s, c au s e d s e v e r e e m o t i o n a l d i s tr e s s , a n d d a m a g e d h i s s t a n d i n g i n t h e c o m m u n i t y.
Mr . Su db e rry

fi le d h is c omp la int

on F e br ua ry 26 , 2 00 3, more thantw o y e ars a ft e r h is termination. The tria l court granted defendants’ motions to dismi ss finding that the one-y ear period of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 g overne d and that plaintiff’s action was time ba rre d. Mr. Sudberry-3-

appea ls and arg ues that his claim alleg es a tort ag ainst property and, consequently , that the three (3) y e ar p e ri odin T e nn . Co de An n. § 2 8- 3- 10 5 g ov e rn s.

I. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW
A T e nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e du re12 .0 2( 6) mot ion to d ism iss fo r f a ilu reto s tate a

c la im tests the l eg al suffic iency of the c omplaint its elf. W illis v. De pt. of Corr ections , 113 S.W .3d 706, 71 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Do e v . S un dq uis t , 2 S.W. 3d91 9, 92 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . T he stand ard of app e llate revie w o f a d i s missal under Rule 12.02(6) r equire s that we take the fa ctual alleg ations in the complaint as true. W

ill is , 11 3 S.W. 3d a t 71 0. Th e tria l c ou rt sh ou ld g rant a mot ionto d ism iss on ly “whe n it appear s that the plaintiff can prove no set of fac ts in support of the claim that would entitled th e p lain ti f

f to relief.” W

ill is , 113 S.W .3d at 710. The issue pr esente d to us involves the interpre tation and application of statu t es of lim itations. S ince r eview of the trial court’s int e rp re tatio n o f a

statut e of

lim itati on s is a qu e sti on of la w, ou r r e vie w i s de novo , w ith ou t a presumption of corr ectne ss. Fahrner v. SW Manufacturing, Inc. , 48 S.W .3d 141, 144 (Tenn. 2001)

. II. A N A L Y SIS
Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 28-3- 104(a) (1) p r o v id e s th at ac tions for “injuries to the pe rson” must be commence d within one y ear afte r the c ause of

action ac crue d

. W h en the ac tion is for “injuries to personal

. . . property ,” Te nnessee Code Annotated § 28- 3-105(1) provides the pe riod is three ( 3) y ear s. The par t i es ap p ea r t o ag ree that the ac tion accr ued upon Mr. Sudber

ry ’s te rm inatio n. Th e qu e sti on the n is wh e the r h is a c tio n is fo r i nju ry to M r. Sudbe rry ’s pr op e rty or to h i mp e r s o n a l l y.
I n o rd e r t o ma

ke thi s d e te rmin a tio n, we mus t lo ok to the “ g ra vame n” of

thec omp la int

. Gunter v. Laboratory Corporati on of American , 1 21 S.W. 3d63 6, 63 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Tip’s Package S to r e , I n c . v . Co m m e rc ia l I

n s
. M a n a g e r s , Inc. , 8 6 S

. W

. 3d 543, 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). F or pu rp os e s o f d e c idi ng wh ic h s tatut e of lim itatio n a

pp lie s, the“ g ra va me n” of thec omp la int

is determined o n the basis of the c laimed damag e. Gunter , 1 21 S.W. 3da t 64 1- 42 ; Tip’s Package Sto re , 8 6 S. W.3 d at 55 1. Th us , a lth ou g h M r. Sudbe rry ha s a lle g e d v ari ou s c aus e s o f a c tio n, that is not the determinative fac tor. The a pplicability

of either statute of limitation at issue here in must be determined by

the type of injury

alleg ed b ecause the le g islature has de fined the limitations period of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-3-104 and 105 by ref ere nce to the injury

sustained.
O u r Su p r e me Co u rt in Gu nter v. Laboratory Corporation of America , su

pr a , h a s r e c e ntl y reiter ated how w e ar e to distinguish i njuries t o the person under the one-y ear period of T enn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 f

rom injuries to property

under Te nn. Co d e Ann. § 28-3-105. It is clear that our courts hav e h i s t o ri cally

described “injuries to the pe rson” in Te nn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 104 as encompa ssing more than simply bodily injury

. Gunter , 1 21 S.W. 3da t 64 2; Tip ’s Pa c k ag e Sto re , 86 S.W .3d at 551.W hi l e i t i s t r ue t hat an i ndi vi dual has a “ propert y i nt er es t i n h i s l abor, ” L a d d v. R o a n e H o si ery , 556 S. W

. 2d 1 75 8, 760 ( T enn
. 197 7), t hi s i s t he t y pe of r i gh t an i ndi vi dual ha s by vi r t ue of bei ng a pers on, not by vi r t ue of a s peci al le g a l statu s, su c h a s a p a rty to a c o n tra c t.

M r. W eb er al so b rought a ret al i t o ry dis charge cl ai m unde r t he T enness ee H um an R i ght s A ct , T enn. C o d e A nn. 2 § 4 -2 1 -3 1 1 , w h ic h is go v e rn e d b y a o n e -yea r lim itatio n p e rio d

. W eber , 938 S. W

. 2d a t 390. -4- I nclusion of the phra se “injuries to the person” in T enn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 is intende d to provide a limitations period for a ctio n s broug ht for injuries ca used by invasion of rig hts that “inher e in man as a rational being ” or rig hts that oneis entitled to bysimplybeing a per son in the ey es of the la w. Gunter , 1 2 1 S

. W

. 3 d at6 4 2 (q u o t i n g Brown v. Dunston , 219 Tenn. 291, 409 S.W.2d 36 5, 36 7 (196 6) . T he se ri g hts aredis tin g uis he d f ro m rig hts that e xist b y

virtueof

pr op e rty owner ship or contra ct. Gunter , 1 2 1 S

. W

. 3 d at 6 4 2 (q u o t i n g Brown v. Dunstan , 219, 409 S.W .2d 365, 367 (1966).
I n this case, the injury from which all other alleg ed damag es flow is the t ermination of Mr. Sudberry ’s employ ment. I f Mr. Sudb er ryhad a c ontrac t for continued e mploy ment or for e mpl oyme nt f

or a de fi nit e te rm

that had no t y e t e xpir e d, the n h is i nju ry ari se s b y virtueof los ing his contra ct rig ht, which is property . I f, on the other hand, Mr. Sudber

ry did not have a c ontrac t of c on tin ue d e mpl oyme nt, the n h is i nju ry do e s n ot ari se fr om a los s o f a pr op e rty or c on tr a c tua l in te re st a n d i s a p e r s o n a l i n

j u r y. 1
This c onclusion is supported by the Tenne ssee Supre me Court’s dec ision in W eber v . Moses , 938 S.W .2d 387 (Tenn. 1986) , wher ein the Court decided w hich statute of limitations gove rns when the tort of reta liation is alleg ed resulting in the loss of a job. I n W

eber , th e plaint if

f a lle g e d th a t hi s employ er terminated his employ ment contra ct bec ause the plaintiff hired a black woman. Id . at 389. The e mploy ment contra ct at issue provide d that it could be terminate d by either party upon written notice. Id

. at 388. There afte r, t he plainti ff sued his employ er f or, among other thing s, the tort of 2 reta liatory

discharg e. Id . at 393. The c ourt in W eber found that the statute of

limit ations for the tort of re taliatory

discharg e is g overne d by the g ener al tort statute of limitations of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104, whic h is one y ear
. Id . at 393.
I n rea ching this conclusion, the W eber court favor ably cited the Court of A ppeals de cision in He a d r i ck v . Union Carbide Corp. , 825 S.W .2d 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). I n Headrick , the plaint if f f ile d a re ta liatory

dis c ha rg e c la im a lle g ing sh e los t he r job be c aus e sh e fi le d f or wo rk e rs ’ compensation benefits. Id . at 425. She claim ed l o s t wa ges as a result of losing her job. Id

. We believe the rea soning in Headrick is a pp lic ableto the iss ue be fo reus : To d e te r mi n e th e r e a l p u rp o s e o f th e c laim , th e c o u rt mu s t lo o k to th e b asis for damag es. Dunstan , 4 09 S.W. 2da t 36 7; Bl an d v. Sm ith , 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 37 7 (1 95 5)

. Pla int if

f a sse rt s he r dis c ha

rg e de prive d h e r o f w a g e s to wh ic h s he wo uld oth e rw ise be e nti tle d a s w e ll a s u ns pe c if ie d “ da ma g e s. ” Au tho ri ties ind ic a te damag es in reta liatory

discharg e claims are f

or injuries per sonal to the employ ee.-5-

I n C l a n t on v. Cain-Sloan Co. , 677 S.W .2d 441 (Tenn. 1984) , the court said an employ ee at-will, like plaintiff, has an a ction for r etaliatory discharg e when the employ er dischar ges the e mploy ee f or filing a wor

kers’ compensation claim. The court did not alter the definition of an at-will employ ee, however , and at -wil l e m plo ye e s hir e d for an i nde finit e te r mm ay be disc har ge d forany r e as on o rno reason . 6 77 S.W. 2da t 44 3. To arg ue that plaint if f’ s dis c ha rg e da ma g e d a

pr op e rty int e re st i n h e r continu ing e mpl oyme nt u nd oe s th e me a nin g of a t- wi ll e mpl oyme nt. To s o ho ld woul d e ndow pla int iff with apr ope r ty int e r e st in he re m plo ym e nt th at she did no t p os se ss
. Cain-Sloan rec og nizes the t ort of re taliatory discharg e, not as a w ay to insure employ ment but as a means to gua rd ag ainst retaliation for a sse rt ing statut ory ri g hts to wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts. Ac c or ding ly, with out a pr ope r ty int e r e st in e m plo ym e nt , th e e m plo ye e ’s dam ag e s for disc har ge m ust be pe r so nal . I n Brown v. Dunstan , 409 S.W .2d 365, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court distinguished pe rs on a l in

jurie s f ro m pr op e rty

da ma g e s a s f

oll ow s: [I ]tis then our conc lusion that the phrase “ injuries to the person” as used in the instant statute is to be construed c omprehe nsively and as c o n te mp lati n g it s ap p li c a ti o n to a c ti o n s in v o lv in g in ju r ie s th a t are other than phy sical. Its purpose is to include within t h at p er i od of limit ation actions broug ht for injuries r esulting f rom invasions of rig hts that inhere in man a s a rational being , that is, rights to which one is e n ti tl e d b y r e a s o n o f b e in g a p e r s o n in th e e y e s o f the law. Such r ig h ts , o f

c o u r s e , ar e to b e d is ti n g u is h e df r o m th o s e w h ic h acc rue to a n individual by rea son of some pec uliar status or by virtue o f a n i n t e r e s tc r e a t e d b y c o n tr a c to r p r o p e rt y.
I n a re taliatory

discharg e ca se, the employ er uses the threat of unemploy ment to deter an employ ee f

rom rec eiving benef

its to which the employ ee is e ntitled merely by being an employ ee injure d on the job. Ac co rd i ng ly , “the invasion of rights” in a re ta liatory

dis c ha rg e is p e rf

or c e pe rs on a l.
Id . at 425-26, (e mphasis added) . The Court in Headrick also noted t h at d am ages f or re taliatory discharg e we re tre ated a s persona l injury damag es for

fede ral tax purposes. Id . at 426. Thus, in deciding whether Tenne ssee Code A nnotat ed § 2 8 -3-105 applies to a tort action wher e the a lleg ed injury

is l o s s o f em ploy ment, the determinative consideration is whether theW e ar e n ot pe r s u ade d by pl ai n t i f f ’ s a r g u men t t h at t h e t h r ee ( 3) y ea r per i od of T en n
. Code An n
. § 28- 3- 105 3

a u to m a tica lly a p p lies to a n y c la im o f ind u c e m e n t o f b re a c h o f co n tra c t an d un la w ful inte rfe re n c e w ith a b u sin e ss. F irst, i t i s c l ea r t h at t h e ca u s e of a ct i on doe s n ot de t er mi n e t h e appl i ca bi l i t y of a l i mi t at i on pe r i od. T h e s t at u t es a t i s s u e pr ov i de lim itatio n s p e rio d s b y r e fer e n c e to w h a t is d a m a g e d

. W e m u st d o lik e w ise

. F u rth e r, n o n e o f th e c a se s c ited b y p la intiff
a p p e a r to d isc u ss th e sta tute o f lim itatio n s w h e re the a lleg e d ly to rtio u s a c t i n te rfe re d w ith a n e m p lo ym e n t re la tio n sh ip tha t wa s te rm ina b le a t will o r o f an ind e finite tim e p e rio d

. See Car r ut her s Ready

- M i x, Inc. v . C em en t M a sons Loc al U ni on , 77 9 F.2d 32 0 , 32 4 (6t h C i r. 1 9 8 5 ) (i nvo l ved act i o n by s ub co nt ract o r agai nst uni o n whi ch was al l eged l y t ry i ng to ge t ge n e ra l co n tr a c to r s t o b o yc o tt the su b c o n tra c to r) ; H a rv e y v . M a rtin , 714 F. 2d 650, 651 ( 6t h Ci r
. 1983) (e m p lo ym e n t re la tio n sh ip a t i ssu e w ith U .S . P o sta l S e rv ic e su b je c t t o c ivil se rv ic e ); Sm i t h v. Ros ent hal Col l i ns G r oup, LLC , 340 F. Supp2 d 86 0, ( W

. D

. T enn
. 200 4) ( pl ai nt i f f al l ege d an i ndependen t Co nt r act or’ s Agr eement wi t hout f ur t her d e ta il); Edw ar ds v . Tr ave l er s Ins ur ance of H ar t f or d, Conn. , 563 F. 2d 105 , 115

- 16 ( 6t h Ci r
. 197 7) ( al l ege d i nt er fer enc e w ith a tto rn e y/c lien t re la tio n sh ip ); Col l i ns v . G r ee ne Count y Bank , 91 6 S. W

. 2d 94 1, 94 7 ( T enn
. C t

. A pp
. 195 5) ( al l ege d inte rfe re n c e w ith b u sin e ss r e la tio n sh ip a n d fi n a n c ia l b a c k ing ); Lyne v. P r i ce , No

. W 2000- 00870- CO A- R3- CV , 2002 W L 1 4 1 7 1 7 7 , (T e n n . C t. A p p . Ju n e 2 7 , 2 0 0 2 ) (in v o lve d in te n tio n a l in te rfe re n c e w ith e m p lo ym e n t re la tio n sh ip ter m ina b le at wi l l but d i d not ad d res s st at ut e o f l i m i t at i o ns i ss ue).

-6- plaintiff had a

contra ct for c ontinued or future employ ment, i.e. , whether the contra ct of e mploy ment is f or a de fi nit e te rm

or te rm ina blea t w ill

. 3 We f ind that w here the employ ment relationship i s for a definite term, i.e. not terminable at will, then an intere st in an employ ment contra ct is damag ed ther eby trig g ering the three (3) y ear p er i o d o f T enn. C ode Ann. § 28- 3-105. Other wise, if the e mploy ment relationship i s not for a definite term and/or is terminable at will then no property interest in future employ ment exis ts to be damag ed thus falling under injury to the person pur suant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 3-104.
As dis c us se d e arl ie r, thi s a pp e a l is fr om an o rd e r g ranti ng thede fe nd a nts ’ m oti on to d ism iss

. Con se qu e ntl y , w e mus t re g ard a ll fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns in the c omp la int a s true a nd c on str ue the m in the light most favo rable to Mr. Sudberry . Whil e the de fendants’ arg ued that Mr. Sudber ry ’s e mpl oyme nt w a s te rmin able a t w ill , th e reis n oth ing in the re c or d at th is s ta g e re g ard ing theba sis for this arg ument. I n his complaint, Mr. Sudberry alleg ed that he ha d an express or implied contra ct with Nis s an for c ontinued employ ment. We, theref ore, c onstrue the a lleg ation of “c ontinued e mpl oyme nt” to m e a n th a t N iss a n o r M r. Sudbe rry c ou ld n ot t e rm inate this c on tr a c t at w ill

. Consequently , Mr. Sudberry alleg ed, at least as an alternative theory of re covery , that the ac tions of defe ndants deprive d him of his contra ct of continued employ ment with Nissan, which is an injury t o p r o p e rt y. Since the Mr. Sudberry

alleg ed that his contra ct with Nissan was one for c ontinued employ ment, we f

ind, for purpose s of the motion to dismiss only , that he alleg ed dama g es caused by loss of a contra ct and this claim i s subject t o the three (3) y ear limit ations period of Te nn. Code An n. § 2 8- 3- 10 5. Di smi ssa l of thi s p art of plaint if f’ s c la im is re ve rs e d. Of

c ou rs e , th e de fe nd a nts ma y late r atte mpt

to e sta bli sh that Mr

. Sudbe rry ha d no c on tr a c t f or c on tin ue d e mpl oyme nt, a nd , if they are succe ssful, his claims would be subject to dismissal because they wer e not fil ed within the one-y ear statute of limitations.-7-

To the extent that Mr. Sudberry plead alternative claims that are based upon an employment relationship of an indefinite term or terminable at will, such claims are g overne d by the one ( 1) y ear period of T enn. Code Ann. § 28- 3-104. Dismissal as to those claims is affirmed.
III . C ONCL US I ON
T h e j u d g ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed in part, a nd reve rsed r ever sed in part, and the matter is re manded. Costs are assessed a g ainst appellee s, Roy al & Sun Alliance, Investig ations and In t e l l i g e n c e S e r v i c e s , In c
. , f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

____________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE