J-S56012-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

CRAIG WAYNE RODNEY 

 Appellant No. 358 MDA 2014 

Appeal from the PCRA Order February 11, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0002927-2009 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*

 

JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 07, 2014 

 Appellant, Craig Wayne Rodney, appeals pro se from the order entered 

February 11, 2014, by the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, 

which denied Rodney’s Post Conviction Relief Act1

 (PCRA) petition. We 

affirm. 

 On February 3, 2010, Rodney entered a nolo contendere plea to one 

count of indecent assault on a person less than 13 years of age, in exchange 

for which all other pending charges were nolle prossed. On May 13, 2010, 

the trial court sentenced Rodney to two and one-half to five years’ 

incarceration. Rodney filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which 

was denied on May 20, 2010. Rodney did not file a direct appeal. 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. §§ 9541-9546 
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 On January 3, 2013, Rodney filed a pro se Motion to Reinstate PCRA 

Rights. Kurt Lynott, Esquire, was appointed to represent Rodney. 

Appointed counsel subsequently filed a Petition to Withdraw and a 

Turner/Finley no-merit letter. On January 14, 2014, the PCRA court filed a 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss Rodney’s PCRA petition as 

untimely and granted counsel permission to withdraw representation. On 

February 11, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed Rodney’s petition. This timely 

pro se appeal followed. 

 Rodney raises four issues on appeal. Preliminarily, we note that on 

March 4, 2014, the PCRA court directed Rodney file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal within 21 days of the 

date of the order. To date, Rodney has failed to comply with court’s order. 

Rule 1925(b)(4)(vii) explicitly states that “[i]ssues not included in the 

Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this 

paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Accordingly, we are constrained to find that 

Rodney’s failure to comply with the PCRA court’s Rule 1925(b) directive 

resulted in waiver2

 of all issues raised on appeal.3 

____________________________________________ 

2 As Rodney’s court appointed counsel was granted permission to withdraw 

representation and Rodney has elected to proceed with this appeal pro se, 

he cannot benefit from the provision in Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(3), permitting an 

appellate court to remand where failure to file a concise statement is 

attributed to per se ineffective assistance of counsel. 

3

 Even if we had not found the claims waived, Rodney would not be entitled 

to relief. His PCRA petition was patently untimely, see 42 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/7/2014 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

§ 9545(b)(1), and he fails to properly plead any exception to the time bar. 

See 42 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). His first claim is of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 

A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (“It is well settled that allegations of ineffective 

assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA.”). In his second claim, consisting of just two 

sentences, he attempts to set forth the after-discovered evidence exception, 

see 42 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), but fails to plead and prove that 

he filed his petition within 60 days when he discovered that the medical 

reports and rape kit “were ruled inconclusive.” Appellant’s Brief, at 11. In 

his third claim, he argues that the police violated his Miranda rights. This 

claim does not come within any of the timeliness exceptions of the PCRA 

and, in fact, would have been found waived in a first, timely filed PCRA 

petition as it could have been raised on direct appeal. See Commonwealth 

v. Elliott, 80 A.3d 415, 427 (Pa. 2013). His fourth claim maintains that his 

sentence is illegal. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 

1999) (“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the 

PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the 

exceptions thereto.”). In actuality, it is a discretionary aspects of sentencing 

claim.