THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

First Citizens Bank and Trust Company, Inc., 

Respondent, 

v. 

Ronald D. Taylor and Ted D. Smith, Defendants, 

Ex Parte: Smith Family, LLC, WHS Properties, LLC, 

and Wanda H. Smith, Appellants. 

Appellate Case No. 2017-001700 

Appeal From Greenville County 

Charles B. Simmons, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5739 

Submitted February 18, 2020 – Filed July 8, 2020 

AFFIRMED 

Randall Scott Hiller, of Greenville, for Appellants. 

Joey Randell Floyd and Chelsea Jaqueline Clark, both of 

Bruner Powell Wall & Mullins, LLC, of Columbia, for 

Respondent. 
 

THOMAS, J.: Smith Family, LLC, WHS Properties, LLC, and Wanda H. Smith 

(Appellants) appeal a master-in-equity's order based on First Citizens Bank and 

Trust Company, Inc.'s initiation of supplemental proceedings to collect on an order 

of judgment, arguing the master erred in (1) adjudicating a Statute of Elizabeth 

(SOE) claim as part of supplementary proceedings; (2) adjudicating facts without 

the opportunity for Appellants to present evidence; (3) not ruling on whether the 

subject property was exempt; (4) granting a motion to join Appellants; and (5) 

finding subject matter jurisdiction to add parties. We affirm. 

FACTS 

On May 22, 2008, Ronald Taylor and Ted Smith1

 executed a note in favor of First 

Citizens in exchange for a $52,526.07 loan. Taylor and Smith failed to make the 

required payments, and on July 28, 2014, First Citizens filed an action against 

them. By order filed October 1, 2015, the circuit court entered a judgment of 

$74,843.23 against Taylor and Smith. Taylor and Smith appealed to this court, 

which affirmed. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, Op. No. 2016-UP-471 

(S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 9, 2016). 

After an execution was issued on October 27, 2015, and a nulla bona return was 

made to the execution, the matter was referred to the master, and First Citizens 

filed a petition for supplemental proceedings. The master held a hearing on 

January 23, 2017. 

Smith testified he "lived off of" his social security income and had no other sources 

of income or bank accounts. Smith admitted his wife owned an LLC, Smith 

Family, LLC, that had one bank account at United Community Bank (UCB). 

Taylor similarly testified he had no bank accounts and "lived off of" his social 

security income. First Citizens moved for additional discovery, which the master 

granted. 

First Citizens issued subpoenas and motions to compel, seeking documents 

regarding Smith Family, LLC. Smith, on behalf of himself and Appellants, moved 

to quash as to the UCB account belonging to Smith Family, LLC. After a hearing 

and based on documents provided by UCB, the master denied the motion to quash 

by order filed May 22, 2017. On May 24, 2017, Smith and Mrs. Smith were 

deposed. 

1

 Ted Smith is married to Wanda H. Smith, one of the appellants. 
 

 

 

In his deposition, Smith testified he had an accounting degree and an MBA, was 69 

years old, and had worked in banking and the building business until 2008. He 

asserted he set up between fifteen and twenty LLCs during his business career, and 

he had three primary companies at the time he quit in 2008. 

Smith admitted he used the UCB account for personal use, such as to pay bills. He 

also admitted he was a signatory on the account. At the time of his deposition, the 

UCB account had a balance of $380,000. 

Smith testified he was a realtor and a broker-in-charge of two real estate 

companies. He admitted he transferred his personal funds into the Smith Family, 

LLC, including the following four deposits of his money into the UCB account: 

1) March 23, 2016: Inheritance of $15,789.27.2 

2) July 14, 2016: Real estate commission for $16,800. 

3) August 17, 2016: Real estate commission for $20,250. 

4) October 27, 2016: Compensation for managing a project known as the 

"Easley Building" of $28,187.49. 

These deposits totaled $81,026.76. 

Smith also admitted Mrs. Smith purchased silver from the account in February 21, 

2016, for $135,374. The Smiths also purchased gold using money from the 

account. Smith estimated they owned approximately $300,000 in gold and silver 

at the time of the depositions. Smith acknowledged his money was "mixed in 

with" the Smith Family, LLC money. 

Mrs. Smith testified in her deposition that she majored in Art in college, worked 

for a few years in administrative/retail jobs, worked for fifteen years for her 

father's construction company, and then became a stay-at-home mother to the 

Smiths' two children. She testified that throughout the forty-two years of their 

marriage, she never worked for any of her husband's businesses. According to 

Mrs. Smith, she and Smith are now retired, although Smith looks for real estate 

deals. Smith always handled the family finances, and Mrs. Smith was only aware 

of one BB&T bank account. 

2

 $15,664.27 distribution from his mother's estate plus $125 payment from the 

personal representative. 
 

As to Smith Family, LLC, Mrs. Smith testified her husband managed it; she did not 

know where it banked; she did not know what assets it held; she was unaware of 

whether there were corporate records and that the LLC had been subpoenaed; and 

she knew nothing about the purchase of gold and/or silver. She further testified 

Smith had full and exclusive control of all bank accounts of the LLC. Smith 

acknowledged she was the sole owner of the LLC and Smith was the sole manager; 

however, she insisted the money in the LLC was solely hers although she did not 

know where it came from. During cross-examination, she testified the money 

came from earnings she saved while working "since [she] was a teenager." 

Mrs. Smith testified WHS Properties, LLC (WHS), one of the appellants in this 

case, was her company, but she admitted Smith organized it in 2008. Mrs. Smith 

testified WHS owned a shopping center that had been sold; the proceeds were 

transferred to Smith Family, LLC; and WHS was now "closed." She admitted 

Smith suffered financial hardships during the recession in 2008 and 2009. 

Following the depositions, First Citizens moved to join Appellants as parties. First 

Citizens also moved to execute on funds held by Appellants. The master entered a 

consent order prohibiting Smith Family, LLC from selling, disposing of, or 

otherwise transferring the gold and silver. 

A hearing on the motions to join the parties and execute on the funds was held on 

June 23, 2017. First Citizens argued Rhino Realty 1, Fund 1, LLC, changed its 

name to WHS Properties, LLC, in 2008 when Smith closed most of his businesses. 

First Citizens argued the judgment was obtained in 2015; the funds were 

transferred into the Smith Family, LLC account in 2016; and the purchases of gold 

and silver were made in 2016. At the time of the hearing, Smith Family, LLC was 

actively engaged in a project with a church, which obligated Smith Family, LLC to 

build a building. According to First Citizens, Smith was not retired; rather, he was 

actively involved in developing property. Furthermore, First Citizens argued, the 

SOE applied because property was transferred to a third-party, the Smith Family, 

LLC, to avoid the judgment. The master granted the motion to add the parties 

during the hearing and took the other issues under advisement. 

By written order filed July 5, 2017, the master granted the motion to add the 

parties. The master found Smith's deposits totaling $81,026.76 of his personal 

funds into the Smith Family, LLC, bank account constituted "transfers without 

valuable consideration" or in the alternative, fraudulent transfers made with the 

actual intent of defrauding creditors. Thus, the master ordered Appellants to pay 

First Citizens $81,026.76 toward its judgment against Smith. The master declined 
 

to seize or proceed against other assets owned by Appellants, "based upon 

substantive due process rights of these parties . . . [, finding] such relief is more 

appropriately sought through [First Citizens] bringing an independent action 

against them." 

Appellants moved to reconsider, and First Citizens moved to compel payment. By 

order filed August 7, 2017, the master denied the motion to reconsider and held the 

motion to compel in abeyance, stating "[i]n the event that Smith Family, LLC has 

not paid the money . . . this Court will schedule and hear [the motion to compel] as 

soon thereafter as reasonably possible." Appellants filed a motion for supersedeas 

with the master and filed a notice of appeal with this court. By order filed 

September 6, 2017, the master required Appellants to transfer $125,000 in gold to 

First Citizens, after its verification, to be held in a safety deposit box until 

Appellants paid the $81,026.76 by December 31, 2017. The master retained 

jurisdiction over the motion for supersedeas. First Citizens moved to hold 

Appellants in contempt when they failed to comply with the September 6, 2017 

order by allegedly tendering only $91,438.76 worth of gold. By order filed 

October 20, 2017, the master ordered Smith to liquidate the gold within fifteen 

days and pay First Citizens by check to be held by the clerk of court. The master 

held in abeyance First Citizen's request for fees for authentication and 

transportation of the gold. According to First Citizens, the funds are being held by 

the court during the pendency of the appeal. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"A clear and convincing evidentiary standard governs fraudulent conveyance 

claims brought under the Statute of Elizabeth." Oskin v. Johnson, 400 S.C. 390, 

396, 735 S.E.2d 459, 463 (2012). "An action to set aside a conveyance under the 

Statute of Elizabeth is an equitable action, and a de novo standard of review 

applies." Id. at 397, 735 S.E.2d at 463. "On appeal from an action in equity, [the 

appellate court] may find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of 

the evidence." Walker v. Brooks, 414 S.C. 343, 347, 778 S.E.2d 477, 479 (2015). 

"However, this broad scope of review does not require this court to disregard the 

findings at trial or ignore the fact that the [master] was in a better position to assess 

the credibility of the witnesses." Laughon v. O'Braitis, 360 S.C. 520, 524-25, 602 

S.E.2d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2004). 

"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law." Sparks v. Palmetto 

Hardwood, Inc., 406 S.C. 124, 128, 750 S.E.2d 61, 63 (2013) (citing CFRE, L.L.C. 

v. Greenville Cty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 (2011)). "This 
 

 

Court may interpret statutes, and therefore resolve this case, 'without any deference 

to the court below.'" Brock v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 415 S.C. 625, 628, 785 

S.E.2d 198, 200 (2016) (quoting CFRE, 395 S.C. at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881). 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

1. Supplementary Proceedings3 

Appellants argue the master erred in adjudicating the SOE claim as part of a 

supplementary proceeding and making factual findings without the opportunity for 

Appellants to present evidence, which Appellants argue violated their rights to due 

process. Appellants maintain the master erred by adding them as parties to a 

supplementary proceeding, arguing First Citizens was required to file a separate 

action, including pleading the SOE, conducting discovery, and affording 

Appellants a trial. 

There is clear authority to reach assets of a judgment debtor in the hands of a third 

party; however, the issue in this case is whether the supplementary proceedings 

met the statutory requirements governing the procedure to reach the assets, and 

whether this supplementary proceeding provided due process to Appellants. "If a 

judgment is unsatisfied, the judgment creditor may institute supplementary 

proceedings to discover assets." Johnson v. Serv. Mgmt., Inc., 319 S.C. 165, 167, 

459 S.E.2d 900, 902 (Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 324 S.C. 198, 478 S.E.2d 63 (1996). 

"Supplementary proceedings are equitable in nature." Ag-Chem Equip. Co. v. 

Daggerhart, 281 S.C. 380, 383, 315 S.E.2d 379, 381 (Ct. App. 1984). 

"Proceedings supplementary to execution . . . provid[e] for examination of the 

judgment debtor for the purpose of discovering property out of which the judgment 

against him may be satisfied . . . ." Lynn v. Int'l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, 228 

S.C. 357, 362, 90 S.E.2d 204, 206 (1955). 

South Carolina Code Section 15-39-410 provides the court "may order any 

property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in the hands either of 

himself or any other person or due to the judgment debtor, to be applied toward the 

satisfaction of the judgment . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-39-410 (2005) (emphasis 

added). Our code also provides a judgment creditor with the ability to "arrest" 

funds in the hands of a third party if alleged by a creditor to belong to the judgment 

debtor and to hold the funds until the true ownership is decided. S.C. Code Ann. 

§§ 15-39-310 to -320 (2005); see Deer Island Lumber Co. v. Virginia-Carolina 

3

 Like Appellants did in their brief, we combine the first two arguments. 
 

Chem. Co., 111 S.C. 299, 303, 97 S.E. 833, 834 (1919) (describing the ability to 

arrest funds). Section 27-23-10(A), the SOE, provides as follows: 

Every gift, grant, alienation, bargain, transfer, and 

conveyance of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, goods 

and chattels or any of them, or of any lease, rent, 

commons, or other profit or charge out of the same, by 

writing or otherwise, and every bond, suit, judgment, and 

execution which may be had or made to or for any intent 

or purpose to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors and 

others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, 

accounts, damages, penalties, and forfeitures must be 

deemed and taken . . . to be clearly and utterly void . . . . 

S.C. Code Ann. § 27-23-10(A) (2007). Finally, however, Section 15-39-460 

provides: 

If it appears that a person or corporation alleged to have 

property of the judgment debtor or indebted to him 

claims an interest in the property adverse to him or 

denies the debt such interest or debt shall be recoverable 

only in an action against such person or corporation by 

the receiver. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-39-460 (2005) (emphasis added). 

Appellants cite Wannamaker v. Bryant, 165 S.C. 107, 110, 162 S.E. 779, 780 

(1932) (quoting Palmetto Bank & Trust Co. v. McCown-Clark Co., 143 S.C. 98, 

103, 141 S.E. 155, 156 (1928)), in which our supreme court held the court had no 

authority to "summarily dispose of the issue of ownership, or to order property 

claimed by another to be applied towards the satisfaction of an execution against 

the judgment debtor." First Citizens argues Wannamaker is distinguishable. 

In Wannamaker, a wife transferred real estate to her husband to avoid a creditor. 

Id. at 108, 162 S.E. at 779. The creditor filed an action against the husband and the 

wife to set aside the deed, alleging a fraudulent conveyance. Id. Thereafter, the 

creditor filed "proceedings supplementary to the execution." Id. The husband was 

not made a party to the supplementary proceedings. Id. At the hearing in the 

supplementary proceedings, the trial court found the transfer had been made "to 

keep the bank from getting the property." Id. The trial court ordered the property 
was subject to the satisfaction of the creditor's judgment. Id. at 108−09, 162 S.E. 

at 779−80. On appeal, our supreme court reversed, recognizing the husband had 

not been made a party to the supplemental proceedings. Id. at 110, 162 S.E. at 

781. The court noted its judgment was "without prejudice to the right of the 

[creditor] to proceed with his action to set aside the deed . . . ." Id. at 111, 162 S.E. 

at 781. 

Appellants also rely on Palmetto Bank & Trust Co. v. McCown-Clark Co., 143 

S.C. 98, 141 S.E. 155 (1928). In Palmetto Bank, the corporate judgment debtor 

was named as the beneficiary on a life insurance policy of one of its individual 

owners. Id. at 100, 141 S.E. at 155. The corporation denied ownership of the 

funds, stating the individual owner had paid the premiums on the policy, and 

maintained the proceeds belonged to the owner's wife. Id. After supplementary 

proceedings, the circuit court granted judgment in the creditor's favor. Id. at 101, 

141 S.E. at 155. Our supreme court reversed, finding as follows: 

It appears manifestly intended by the [statutes] that a 

third person claiming property rights which have not 

been passed upon in the original action under which the 

execution is issued should not be deprived either of his 

day in court or of the right of trial in the form prescribed 

by law for a regular judicial procedure. No provision 

appears that either expressly or by implication gives 

authority to the court to summarily dispose of the issue of 

ownership, or to order property claimed by another to be 

applied towards the satisfaction of an execution against 

the judgment debtor. Nor can an appearance and return 

to such a rule, when made in obedience to the order of 

the court, be given effect as consent to a mode of trial not 

authorized by the provisions of the statutes. On the other 

hand, it must also be recognized that no limitation is 

imposed upon the discretion of the circuit judge in 

keeping the property within the control of the court, by 

forbidding its transfer or other disposition. 

Id. at 103, 141 S.E. at 156 (emphasis added). The court in Palmetto Bank relied on 

Deer Island, quoting: "It is true the issue of ownership may not be finally 

determined, except the Deer Island Lumber Company shall be heard." Id. (quoting 

Deer Island, 111 S.C. at 302, 97 S.E. at 834). However, in Deer Island, the third 

party (Deer Island Lumber) claiming ownership over the funds alleged to belong to 
 

the judgment debtor moved to intervene in the supplementary proceedings. Deer 

Island, 111 S.C. at 302, 97 S.E. at 833. The judgment debtor appealed a temporary 

injunction restricting a bank from releasing the funds. Id. The circuit court 

appointed a receiver and granted the motion to intervene. Id. On appeal, our 

supreme court affirmed. Id. at 305, 97 S.E. at 834. 

First Citizens distinguishes Palmetto Bank, arguing Appellants did not claim 

ownership of the deposits made by Smith, the judgment debtor. Instead, Smith's 

uncontradicted deposition testimony stated the funds at issue were his own. 

Furthermore, in Wannamaker, the husband was not made a party to the 

supplementary proceedings. Wannamaker, 165 S.C. at 108, 162 S.E. at 779. In 

this case, Appellants were joined and had the opportunity to participate in the 

proceedings. The court in Palmetto Bank prohibited a summary disposition of the 

issue of ownership, which is not the case here. See Palmetto Bank, 143 S.C. at 

103, 141 S.E. at 156. Finally, in Deer Island, the court permitted a motion to 

intervene, implying a continuation of the supplementary proceedings, rather than a 

separate action, could be used to determine ownership of the funds as long as the 

third party alleging ownership had the opportunity to be heard. Deer Island, 111 

S.C. at 302, 97 S.E. at 833. 

In this case, Appellants had the opportunity to dispute the funds belonged to Smith, 

and Smith's own testimony was that the funds at issue were his funds deposited 

into Smith Family, LLC's account. Appellants were on notice and participated 

throughout the proceedings, during discovery, depositions, hearings, and judicial 

review. Appellants could have presented rebuttal evidence and had every 

opportunity to be heard. See Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Comm'n, 376 

S.C. 165, 171, 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) ("The fundamental requirements of due 

process include notice, an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way, and 

judicial review."). As the master found in his order denying Appellants' motion for 

reconsideration, 

In terms of Smith Family, LLC's ability to present 

evidence and testimony, this Court notes that depositions 

were taken in conjunction with the Supplemental 

Proceedings, and Counsel for Smith Family, LLC 

participated in the depositions. Moreover, [Appellants' 

counsel] presented this Court with his arguments and had 

the opportunity to present evidence at the Motions 

hearing on June 23, 2017, if Smith Family, LLC wanted 

to present evidence. However, in light of the prior sworn 
 

 

testimony at the January 23, 2017 Supplemental 

Proceedings hearing, the admissions by Ted D. Smith in 

his deposition, along with the deposition testimony of 

Wanda H. Smith, it is difficult to imagine what, if any, 

evidence or testimony that Smith Family, LLC and/or 

Ted D. Smith could have presented to dissuade this Court 

from finding the deposit of Ted D. Smith's personal funds 

into the bank account of Smith Family, LLC as being 

fraudulent transfers. 

We affirm, finding the master did not err in applying either the SOE or section 15-

39-410 in a supplementary proceeding and there was no due process violation.4 

2. Exemption 

Appellants argue the master erred in finding the funds were transferred in violation 

of the SOE without determining if they were exempt from execution under section 

15-39-410. Appellants maintain the master only has authority over non-exempt 

property and section 15-41-30 provides a minimum exemption of $10,000, which 

was not considered by the master. 

Appellants did not raise this issue to the master at the hearing, the master did not 

rule on it, and Appellants raised it for the first time in their motion for 

reconsideration. Thus, it is not preserved for appellate review. See Stevens & 

Wilkinson of S.C., Inc. v. City of Columbia, 409 S.C. 563, 567, 762 S.E.2d 693, 

695 (2014) ("[A] party cannot use a Rule 59(e)[, SCRCP] motion to advance an 

issue the party could have raised to the [trial] court prior to judgment, but did 

not."); Patterson v. Reid, 318 S.C. 183, 185, 456 S.E.2d 436, 437 (Ct. App. 1995) 

("A party cannot for the first time raise an issue by way of a Rule 59(e) motion 

which could have been raised at trial."). 

3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Joinder of Appellants 

4

 Without citation to authority, Appellants summarily address the master's findings 

that the transfers were fraudulent conveyances. We decline to address this issue. 

See Broom v. Jennifer J., 403 S.C. 96, 115, 742 S.E.2d 382, 391 (2013) ("Issues 

raised in a brief but not supported by authority may be deemed abandoned and not 

considered on appeal."). 
 

 

Appellants argue the master lacked subject matter jurisdiction to add parties to an 

order for discovery of property supplemental to execution of judgment; thus, the 

master erred in granting the motion for joinder. We disagree. 

"Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de 

novo." Deborah Dereede Living Tr. dated Dec. 18, 2013 v. Karp, 427 S.C. 336, 

346, 831 S.E.2d 435, 441 (Ct. App. 2019). "[S]ubject matter jurisdiction refers to 

a court's constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case." Johnson v. S.C. 

Dep't of Prob., Parole, & Pardon Servs., 372 S.C. 279, 284, 641 S.E.2d 895, 897 

(2007). "Stated somewhat differently, 'subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a 

court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in 

question belong.'" Id. (quoting State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 100, 610 S.E.2d 494, 

498 (2005)). "It is well-settled that issues relating to subject matter jurisdiction 

may[ ]be raised at any time." Bardoon Props., NV v. Eidolon Corp., 326 S.C. 166, 

168, 485 S.E.2d 371, 372 (1997). 

A master's authority to determine issues referred to him by the circuit court is a 

question of subject matter jurisdiction, which "may be raised at any time, including 

on appeal." Normandy Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 386 S.C. 393, 403, 688 

S.E.2d 136, 141 (Ct. App. 2009). "Pursuant to Rule 53, SCRCP, a master has no 

power or authority except that which is given to him by the order of reference." 

Bunkum v. Manor Props., 321 S.C. 95, 98, 467 S.E.2d 758, 760 (Ct. App. 1996). 

"When a case is referred to a master, Rule 53(c)[, SCRCP] gives the master the 

power to conduct hearings in the same manner as the circuit court, unless the order 

of reference specifies or limits his powers." Smith Cos. of Greenville, Inc. v. 

Hayes, 311 S.C. 358, 360, 428 S.E.2d 900, 902 (Ct. App. 1993). Rule 69, SCRCP 

provides that "proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment . . . shall be 

as provided by law[,]" and authorizes a judgment creditor to "examine any person . 

. . in the manner provided . . . for obtaining discovery." 

In this case, the circuit court's order of reference ordered Taylor and Smith to 

appear before the master "TO SHOW CAUSE why [their] property should not be 

applied towards satisfaction of the Judgment" and referred the case to the master 

with the authority to "entertain and rule upon all motions necessary to dispose of 

this matter, to include but not limited to, motions to dismiss, motions to appoint 

Receiver, motions to continue the matter, and motions to sell all or certain property 

of judgment debtor in satisfaction of [First Citizen's] debt and has authority to enter 

a Final Order." 
We find the master acted within his subject matter jurisdiction in joining 

Appellants in the supplementary proceedings, in applying the SOE and section 15-

39-410 in determining the ownership of the funds, and in ordering the sale of the 

gold and silver to satisfy the judgment. The type of procedure used, whether a 

supplementary proceeding or a new action, does not affect the master's power to 

hear this type of case. See Gentry, 363 S.C. at 100, 610 S.E.2d at 498 (noting 

"subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine cases of 

the general class to which the proceedings in question belong"). 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the master's order is 

AFFIRMED. 

HUFF and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.