AIR AMERICA

UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND

Ground Crew...............................................................................................2

The Airmen’s Bond....................................................................................5

Pre-Flight Checklist....................................................................................7

Rescue Flights: Expressions of Gratitude....................................21

Final Flights...................................................................................................29

Flights Yet Taken.........................................................................................47

Last Flights: In Memorium...................................................................57
2 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND

3

The History Staff in the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence fosters understanding of 

the Agency’s history and its relationship to today’s intelligence challenges by communicating 

instructive historical insights to the CIA workforce, other US Government agencies, and the 

public. CIA historians research topics on all aspects of Agency activities and disseminate their 

knowledge through publications, courses, briefings, and Web-based products. They also work 

with other Intelligence Community historians on publication and education projects that 

highlight interagency approaches to intelligence issues. Lastly, the CIA History Staff conducts 

an ambitious program of oral history interviews that are invaluable for preserving institu-

tional memories that are not captured in the documentary record.

The Historical Collections Division (HCD) of the Office of Information Management Services is responsible for executing the CIA’s Historical Review Program. This program seeks to 

identify, collect, and review for possible release to the public significant historical information. 

The mission of HCD is to: • Provide an accurate, objective understanding of the information and intelligence that has 

helped shape the foundation of major US policy decisions.

• Improve access to lessons learned, presenting historical material to emphasize the scope 

and context of past actions.

• Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts and 

effects arising from past decisions,

• Uphold Agency leadership commitments to openness, while protecting the national secu-

rity interests of the US,

• Provide the American public with valuable insight into the workings of their Government.

The symposium, “Air America: Upholding 

the Airmen’s Bond,” comes on the heels of 

a decades-long effort to declassify approxi-

mately 10,000 CIA documents on the airline. 

These papers—many of which have never 

been seen by the public or scholars outside 

of the CIA—will join the History of Aviation 

Collection (HAC) at the Eugene McDermott 

Library at The University of Texas at Dallas.

It is a special honor that the Civil Air Trans-

port (CAT) and Air America associations, 

whose members are former employees of 

the airline and their relatives, asked the CIA to 

give these papers to UT Dallas. The decision 

reflects the strong relationship that already 

exists between the CAT and Air America 

associations and the library’s Special Collec-

tions staff. In 1985 the HAC became the official repository of the Civil Air Transport/Air 

America Archives and CAT/Air America survivors raised $15,000 for a large memorial 

plaque featuring the names of the 240 em-

ployees who lost their lives as civilians during 

their service in Southeast Asia. In 1987 the 

plaque was dedicated at McDermott Library 

during a solemn ceremony.

The History of Aviation Collection is consid-

ered one of the finest research archives on 

aviation history in the U.S. It comprises: • 18,000-20,000 cataloged books • 4,000-plus magazine and periodical titles • 500,000 photographs and negatives • 2,000 films • 4,000 boxes of archived materials

In 1963 George Haddaway, founder and 

managing editor of Flight magazine, donated 

his files and a collection of rare first edition 

aviation books to UT Austin. In 1978 the mil-

lion-item collection of Vice Admiral Charles 

E. Rosendahl was added to the HAC but fa-

cilities in Austin were inadequate to properly 

hold it. The collection moved to UT Dallas 

because it had considerable space in its new 

McDermott Library.

In an effort to relieve the library’s Special 

Collections of its growing artifacts and to 

provide better public access, UT Dallas made 

a long-term loan of most of the Rosendahl 

artifacts to launch the Frontiers of Flight Mu-

seum at Love Field in Dallas. 

The prominence of the Rosendahl holdings 

attracted members of the CAT/Air America 

associations to select the HAC for their official archives and memorial. This prestige 

further boosted the HAC’s significance and 

research value to students and scholars and 

prompted additional significant donations.

Upon the death of WWII hero Gen. James H. 

“Jimmy” Doolittle in 1993, the library received 

his personal correspondence, film and pho-

tographs and copies of his scientific research 

papers, as well as his desk, chair, uniform, and 

Medal of Honor. This represents the only ma-

jor collection of the general’s memorabilia 

and personal files outside federal facilities 

such as the Library of Congress.

Now with the newly declassified CIA docu-

ments, the History of Aviation Collection 

has strengthened its position as holding the 

premier archive on Civil Air Transport and 

Air America.

The History of Aviation Collection at The University of Texas at Dallas
4 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND

5

Quietly and courageously throughout the 

long and difficult Vietnam War, Air America, a secretly owned air proprietary of 

the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 

remained the indispensable instrument of 

CIA’s clandestine mission. This legacy is 

captured in a recent CIA Director’s state-

ment that the Agency’s mission is to “ac-

complish what others cannot accomplish 

and go where others cannot go.” While 

some of Air America’s work may never be 

publicly acknowledged, much of the compa-

ny’s critical role in wartime rescue missions 

can now be revealed. This joint symposium 

with the CIA and The University of Texas at 

Dallas provides a forum for the release of 

thousands of pages of heretofore unavail-

able documents on Air America’s relation-

ship with the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Moreover, the symposium brings together 

many Air America veterans, a number of 

men rescued by Air America, and the CIA 

“customers” who often placed their lives 

and missions in the hands of this once-se-

cret air proprietary.

Air America crews were not required to 

monitor military emergency radio calls, fly 

to the location of military personnel in dis-

tress, or place their lives at risk of enemy 

ground-fire and possible capture. They re-

ceived no extra compensation for rescue 

work and sometimes lost wages for their 

efforts. However, in their flying community 

it was enough to know that a downed avia-

tor was in trouble and that airmen should 

always come to the aid of other airmen. It 

was simply the Airmen’s Bond.

The Airmen’s Bond Keith Woodcock Donated Courtesy of the Air America Association Board The Airmen’s Bond depicts the heroism of an Air America UH-34D crew conducting the rescue of two US Air Force A1E attack aircraft pilots. Overhead, a “Raven” forward air controller flying an O-1 observation plane directs two Air America-piloted T-28Ds in strafing runs against advancing Communist forces. The rescue takes place on the Plaine des Jarres, a critical Communist supply route in the high plateau of north-central Laos. From 1964 to 1965, when the US military had few SAR aircraft in the region, Air America rescued 21 American pilots.
6 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 7
8 UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND

9

31 January 1947

CAT makes its first official flight. A C-47 piloted by Frank 

Hughes and Doug Smith takes off from Shanghai to Canton.

8 September 1948CAT inaugurates its first scheduled flight from Shanghai to Nanking-Wuchang-Chengchow-Sian-Lanchow.24 September 1948CAT’s first international flight. A C-46 airlifts 4,482 pounds of tin from Kunming to Haiphong.

1 March 1949According to Aviation Week, CAT is the world’s second largest air cargo carrier.

16 January 1950

The city of Mengtze, China falls to Communist forces. 

Bob Buol, Jose Jawbert and Lincoln Sun are captured.

10 July 1950

CAT Incorporated (CATI) and Airdale Incorporated 

are organized under the laws of the State of 

Delaware. Airdale Incorporated was to be a 

holding company for CAT Incorporated.

15 September 1950

CAT begins Operation Booklift, a massive airlift 

operation in Korea to support UN forces

29 November 1952Norman Schwartz and Robert Snoddy are shot down and killed while flying a covert mission over China to pick up a Chinese Agent.

6 May 1953CAT begins a six week emergency drop to support French troops in French Indochina.

26 March 1959

Air America, Incorporated created by 

change of name of CAT Incorporated. September 1960 Air America begins airlift to General Phoumi 

at Savannakhet, Laos, flying in 1,000 tons a month.20 December 1960Fourteen USMC H-34 helicopters delivered to Air America.

February 1961

Air America directed to take over United States 

Marine Corps operations in Udorn, Thailand.

9 March 1961

President John F. Kennedy directs the CIA to run a secret 

war in Laos. Air America becomes intimately involved. 22 May 1964 T-28 program begins. Air America pilots 

fly Laotian T-28s in support of Search and Rescue operations.November 1964First large-scale search and rescue effort of the Indochina war.

2-5 August 1965Gulf of Tonkin Incident

August 1966

LS 85 established. Located on top of Phou Pha Thi mountain, 

the United States set up a Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) 

station used to guide air strikes on North Vietnam.

28 April 1967Second defense of Lima Site 36.

12 January 1968Air America’s first and only air-to-kill. Four North Vietnamese AN-2 Colts approached Site 85. Two of the aircraft attacked while the other two circled off in the distance. An Air America Bell 212 was asked to assist. Faster than the Colts, the Air America helicopter flown by Ted Moore, flew next to one of the aircraft while his flight mechanic, Glenn Woods, fired on the AN-2 with his AK-47. After downing the first plane they caught up to the second plane, shooting it down in the same manner.11 March 1968Lima Site 85 falls. Air America helicopter crews fly to the site repeatedly to evacuate personnel.

June 1971

Battle for Skyline Ridge begins. Air 

America airlifts troops, supplies, and 

conducts Search and Rescue missions.

17 December 1971

Plaine des Jarres (PDJ) falls.

Mid-December 1974The North Vietnamese launches a winter-spring offensive against Phuoc Long Province to test the United States willingness to respond to this peace agreement violation.

1 March 1975

North Vietnam launches Campaign 275, the all out invasion 

of the Central Highlands. Within two weeks, South Vietnam 

President Thieu orders the Highlands abandoned.

23 March 1975

Air America evacuates key personnel from Hue and Quang Nhai.

28 March 1975

Evacuation of Da Nang begins.

21 April 1975

South Vietnamese President Thieu resigns.

28 April 1975

North Vietnamese offensive against 

Saigon begins with an air strike on 

Tan Son Nhut air base.

29 April 1975

Ambassador Martin orders the emergency evacuation of Saigon. 

Air America helicopters evacuate personnel to aircraft carriers 

off shore throughout the day. The last helicopter out, piloted by 

Robert Caron with crew member O. B. Harnage, takes off from 

atop the Pittman Hotel.

5 May 1975

CIA Director William Colby stated: “The withdrawal from Vietnam draws to a conclusion Air America’s operational activities . . . 

Air America appropriately named has served its country well.” 2 June 2001

Director, Central Intelligence George Tenet issues a commendation to Air America personnel.

1947 [ [2001 [ [

AIR AMERICA
10 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 11 • In 1970, Air America had 80 airplanes and 

was "The World’s Most Shot at Airline."

• Air America lost 240 pilots and crew 

members to hostile fire.

• Captain Weldon "Big" Bigony, a native of 

Big Spring, Texas, was one of the first pi-

lots hired by CAT.

• In July 1950 the CIA formed the Pacific 

Corporation (not its original name) and 

a month later purchased CAT to use in 

clandestine missions to fight communism 

in the Asia theater. The price was under a 

million dollars—a real bargain for a com-

pany with a book value of three or four 

times that amount.

• Before the fall of Dien Bien Phu to the 

Viet Minh on 7 May 1954, CAT pilots flew 

682 airdrop missions to the beleaguered 

French troops.

• Following the signing of the Geneva 

Accord on 21 July 1954, it also supplied 

C-46s for Operation Cognac, during which 

they evacuated nearly 20,000 civilians 

from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

• During 1970, Air America airdropped or 

landed 46 million pounds of food stuffs—

mainly rice—in Laos. Helicopter flight 

time reached more than 4,000 hours 

a month in the same year. Air America 

crews transported tens of thousands of 

troops and refugees.

• In Vietnam, according to Robbins, AAM 

had about 40 aircraft and served about 

12,000 passengers a month, among whom 

were USAID (U.S. Agency for Interna-

tional Development) people, missionaries, 

military personnel, correspondents, gov-

ernment officials and nurses.

• Air America took on a greater and great-

er burden of support for military opera-

tions, as reflected in its contracts with the 

Department of Defense, which increased 

from about $18 million in 1972 to over 

$41 million in 1973.

• During the final weeks of the war, AAM 

helicopter crews evacuated some 41,000 

American civilians, "customers," diplomat-

ic personnel, AAM personnel, and South 

Vietnamese civilians from Saigon before 

advancing North Vietnamese communist 

forces arrived.

• Air America aircraft carried all sorts of 

cargo and equipment, food, mail, ce-

ment, roofing material, sedated animals, 

and gasoline.

INTRODUCED IN 1964: SAR MISSIONS 

FOR THE US MILITARY

The first occasion to rescue a downed US 

military pilot came on 6 June 64, when US 

Navy Lieutenant Charles F. Klusmann was 

shot down in his RF-8A Crusader from the 

USS Kitty Hawk over the north-eastern corner of the Plaine des Jarres, that is near Khang 

Khay in the Ban Pha Ka (LS-40) area. • With North Vietnamese troops more and 

more pressing their invasion of the South 

in the early seventies, Air America was 

ever more called upon to help evacuate 

refugees. As the South Vietnamese Min-

ister of Labor said in his Citation dated 

12 June 72: “In addition, during the past 

two years, Air America has participated 

in major refugee movements. A total of 

14,717 Vietnamese refugees who were in 

Cambodia during the year 1970, and sub-

sequently arrived in Vung Tau, were trans-

ported from Vung Tau by Air America to 

Bao Loc and Ham Tan, South Vietnam for 

relocation. Later, in 1972, Air America 

again participated in refugee movements. 

A total of 1,317 refugees were flown by 

Air America from Quang Tri to Phuoc 

Tuy, and 4,324 refugees were transported 

from Hue to Ban Me Thuot and Vung Tau 

City. Since that time additional relocations 

have been possible through the support 

rendered by Air America.”

Evacuation from the Pittman Building • The most famous evacuation flown by Air 

America on 29 April 75 was one from the 

Pittman Building at Saigon, although most 

people who saw the world famous photo 

taken by UPI photographer Hubert van Es 

probably thought that it was a US military 

helicopter on top of 

the US Embassy—

it wasn’t.

• At the end, during 

this dramatic evac-

uation of Saigon, 

more than 7,000 

refugees — 1,373 

Americans, 5,595 

South Vietnam-

ese, and 85 

third-countr y 

n a t i o n a l s — 

were airlifted to the 

40 ships of the U.S. fleet lying before 

the coast of South Vietnam.

• Air America’s crews did a tremendous job 

in hauling more than 1,000 passengers to 

the Embassy, the DAO, or to the ships.

• Air America was supposed to have 28 

helicopters that day, out of which six 

were stolen by Vietnamese, one had 

rocket damage, one out of service for an 

engine change, and four were conducting 

evacuations in Can Tho. David B. Kendall 

had to ditch his helicopter alongside the 

ship Blue Ridge.
12 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 13 The War in Laos

When President Kennedy decided in 1961 

to forcefully resist rising communist aggres-

sion against the remote but strategically 

located Kingdom of Laos, the CIA and Air 

America were ready. Flying in a mountain-

ous land-locked country with few roads, 

continually shifting weather conditions and 

virtually no navigational aids, Air America 

crews routinely conducted hazardous re-

supply missions to hundreds of government 

outposts. This aerial lifeline provided essen-

tial assistance to the Royal Lao and U.S.-

directed forces battling North Vietnamese 

and Pathet communist troops.

Air America crews became expert in the 

terrain and unique flying conditions of Laos, 

but they were not immune to enemy ground 

fire and the perils of being shot down over 

enemy-controlled territory. They soon creat-

ed their own search and rescue (SAR) force, 

comprised of UH-34D helicopters and T-28D 

attack aircraft, and began to respond to their 

own emergencies. As more U.S. military aircraft began flying missions over Laos (and 

later North Vietnam), Air America also took 

on the primary responsibility for rescuing all 

downed U.S. aviators. In 1964-1965, when the 

U.S. military had few SAR aircraft in the re-

gion, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) reports that 

Air America rescued 21 American pilots. 

Although the USAF did not continue to pub-

lish further statistics on Air America rescues 

and the CIA never tracked such data, anecdot-

al information and occasional formal letters 

of commendation suggest that Air America 

crews saved scores of American airmen. One 

such letter, written by Major General DeWitt 

R Searles, USAF, stated “I wish to convey my 

personal appreciation and commendation to 

two of your helicopter crews for their ex-

ceptional aerial skill in the rescue of the crew 

members of an RF-4C, Bullwhip 26, on 20 

January 1972.” General Searles went on to 

name Lee Andrews, Nicki Fillipi, Ron Anderson, John Fonberg, William Phillips, and Bob 

Noble for their “truly outstanding” efforts. 

“In spite of a known 37MM high threat area 

and small arms fire,” said the general, “these 

crew members disregarded their own personal safety to perform a heroic rescue. The 

quick response to the distress call and actual 

recovery in near record time were unques-

tionably instrumental in saving the lives of 

the USAF RF-4C crew members.” 

In order to more fully understand these 

events, Donald Boecker, a U.S. Navy pilot 

shot down over northern Laos in 1965, will 

share the stage with one of his rescuers, Air 

America pilot Sam Jordan. 

In early 1968 Air America pilot Ken Wood and 

his flight mechanic Loy “Rusty” Irons carried 

out one of the most unusual and daring res-

cues of the entire Vietnam War. Project “Heavy 

Green” was a top secret U.S. Air Force radar 

bombing facility located at Lima Site 85, a milehigh Laotian mountaintop a mere 120 miles 

from downtown Hanoi. The military program 

was manned by sixteen Air Force technicians 

working under cover as civilian employees of 

the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. On the 

evening of 10 March 1968 the North Viet-

namese launched a furious mortar, rocket, and 

artillery attack on Site 85’s CIA operations 

area and the Air Force facilities. Concurrently, 

a sapper team climbed the steep western cliffs 

just below the radar buildings. In a pre-dawn 

attack the sappers surrounded the technicians 

and used automatic weapons fire and rocketpropelled grenades in an attempt to destroy 

the facility and kill all of the Americans. 

Wood and Irons, responding to a signal from 

a military survival radio, flew to Site 85 and 

courageously hovered over a group of radar 

technicians trapped on the side of the cliff 

below the radar facility. Irons quickly dropped 

a hoist to the men and pulled them aboard 

the unarmed and unarmored Huey helicop-

ter. After forty-one years of secrecy, the CIA 

is now acknowledging Air America’s role in 

the rescue of the “Heavy Green” members 

- Stanley Sliz, Richard Etchberger, Willie Hus-

band, and John Daniel. Etchberger, who 

heroically defended his injured com-

rades until they were placed on the 

helicopter, was mortally wounded by 

enemy fire as the Huey withdrew. The 

communist assault on Site 85 resulted 

in the single greatest ground loss of 

U.S. Air Force personnel for the en-

tire Vietnam War. Ten “Heavy Green” 

technicians remain unaccounted for 

from this attack. 

Chief Master Sergeant Richard Etch-

berger was secretly and posthu-

mously honored in late 1968 with 

the Air Force Cross. In a recent 

development, however, the Pen-

tagon is reviewing Etchberger’s 

actions for possible award of the 

Congressional Medal of Honor. 

CIA also acknowledges the 

actions of two paramilitary 

officers at Site 85. Howard 

Freeman and John Woody 

Spence, working and living 

at an operations area sev-

eral hundred yards below the radar buildings, 

faced the communist barrage with great courage and determination. At first dawn, heedless to the presence of enemy soldiers and 

the continuing risk of mortars, rockets, and 

artillery fire, Freeman led a rescue party of 

Hmong irregulars to the radar facility. While 

searching for the technicians he came un-

der enemy gunfire and suffered a serious leg 

wound. Armed only with a shotgun and some 

phosphorous grenades, Freeman defended his 

team until forced to withdraw. In honor of his 

heroic actions Howard Freeman was award-

ed CIA’s Intelligence Star. At the operations 

area Woody Spence suffered a severe hearing loss during the bombardment, but continued to maintain critical radio communications 

throughout the North Vietnamese as-

sault. He also declined 

Symposium Overview 

by Dr. Tim Castle

An Air Combat First Keith Woodcock Donated Courtesy of Marius Burke and Boyd D. Mesecher Known as “Site 85,” the US radar facility perched atop a 5,800-foot mountain in northeast Laos—less than 150 miles from Hanoi—was providing critical and otherwise unavailable all-weather guidance to American F-105 fighter-bombers flying strike missions against Com- munist supply depots, airfields, and railroad yards in North Vietnam. An Air Combat First captures one daring action by Air America pilot Ted Moore and flight mechanic Glenn Woods responding to a North Vietnamese air attack on the site which gained them—and Air Amer- ica—the distinction of having shot down an enemy fixed-wing aircraft from a helicopter—a singular aerial victory in the entire history of the Vietnam War.
14 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 15

evacuation from his post until sensitive equip-

ment and documents were properly safe-

guarded. Mr. Spence was honored with the 

CIA’s Certificate of Distinction. 

Air America flight mechanic Rusty Irons, former CIA paramilitary officer Woody Spence, and Heavy Green technician John Daniel 

will provide their recollections of this singu-

lar rescue. 

The Laos panel provides a remarkable op-

portunity to hear from both perspectives—

the rescuers and the rescued. The Fall of South Vietnam

The swift collapse of the South Vietnam-

ese government in March and April 1975 

caught many by surprise. According to an 

official U.S. Air Force history “USAF airlift 

planes and personnel had long since been 

withdrawn from South Vietnam, and the 

only reliable airlift available in the coun-

try was Air America. The helicopters and 

smaller aircraft of this company were in-

valuable for removing people from remote 

locations.” While all of their work in South 

Vietnam was extremely challenging in this 

time of great political and military chaos—

manifested in ever decreasing levels of se-

curity—Air America’s efforts in Da Nang 

and Saigon are especially noteworthy. 

“Da Nang was a shambles when we arrived,” recalled Air America pilot Marius 

Burke. “Aircraft, tanks, trucks, etc., were 

abandoned all over the area. The aircraft ap-

parently were out of fuel.” No matter, Burke 

and other Air America personnel got down 

to the risky business of moving evacuees to 

safe areas. Operating out of perilous landing 

sites and hand-pumping fuel from 50-gal-

lon drums into helicopters that could not 

be shut down, Air America responded to 

increasingly urgent requests from CIA and 

State Department officers. All the while Air 

America personnel were constantly receiv-

ing a mix of pleas, verbal threats, and some-

times gunfire from agitated South Vietnam-

ese government officials, military personnel, 

and local citizens determined to find a way 

out of the city.

In Saigon, the final refuge for all fleeing the 

North Vietnamese invasion, Air America 

faced enormous challenges. Initial evacua-

tion planning did not anticipate the almost 

total disintegration of the Vietnamese secu-

rity forces and the chaos that quickly en-

gulfed the city and panicked the local and 

expatriate population. 

CIA officers, determined to get “at risk” 

Vietnamese out of Saigon, directed some 

of these individuals to drive out into the 

countryside. One Air America pilot de-

scribed 28 April 1975 as follows, “Our cus-

tomer ‘Max’ rode with us. Our mission was 

lifting Vietnamese from various locations 

in the Vietnam Delta to a U.S. Navy ship 

located just offshore of the mouth of the 

branch of the Mekong river on which Can 

Tho is located. Our method as arranged by 

the customer was to extract people from 

various random pickup points. This method 

worked very well and attracted little, if 

any, attention.”

On 29 April 1975 an Air America heli-

copter pilot spent the entire day shuttling 

passengers to various evacuation points. 

Arriving at the Embassy tennis courts his 

aircraft was filled with people and he flew 

to the USS Blue Ridge, “offloaded, refu-

eled and went back to Saigon whereupon I 

landed at the Embassy roof and picked up 

another load heading for the Blue Ridge. 

Arriving at Blue Ridge it had a full deck 

so I was landed on a ship called Fireball. I 

returned to Saigon after refueling on Fire-

ball and picked up another Embassy roof 

load this time going to the Fireball again 

and refueling.” The pilot made many more 

roundtrips that day and finally landed on 

the USS Duluth at about 1900. 

Air America fixed wing aircraft were also a 

critical means of evacuation. But the ever 

present danger of being overwhelmed by 

desperate Vietnamese civilians and mili-

tary personnel required skill, courage, and 

sometimes deception. A C-47 pilot report-

ed that on 29 April 1975 he departed Tan 

Son Nhut airfield with 33 passengers (Air 

America employees and families, mixed 

VN, Chinese, American and Filipino) plus 

a crew of two.” Shortly after takeoff a fire 

developed in the right engine and the aircraft was forced to land at Con Son island. 

Fourteen of the passengers were then ferried by Air America helicopters to nearby 

ships. Surrounded by hordes of Vietnam-

ese arriving from the mainland, the crew 

decided “it was not feasible to top off our 

fuel due to the possibility of being mobbed 

by VN evacuees if the airplane appeared to 

be preparing for departure. With the aircraft apparently disabled no one bothered 

us.” Eventually the aircraft was repaired 

and, with a speedy departure, was soon on 

its way to Brunei with the remaining Air 

America employees. 

One of the most iconic photographs of the 

Vietnam War was taken on 29 April 1975, 

just hours before the jubilant North Viet-

namese Army seized the South Vietnamese 

capital. The image, captured by Dutch pho-

tographer Hubert Van Es, shows scores of 

people climbing a narrow wooden ladder in 

the frantic hope that they would be rescued 

by a small helicopter perched on a rooftop 

just above them. Standing near the helicop-

ter a tall man leans forward with his hand 

extended to the frantic crowd. Released by 

United Press International with a mistaken 

caption that identified the location as the 

U.S. Embassy in Saigon, the picture instantly 

became a withering symbol of America’s 

ignominious departure from Indochina. In 

fact, the Bell 204 helicopter belonged to 

Air America. The landing pad, one of thirteen rooftop evacuation points selected in 

consultations between Air America and a 

Special Working Group at the U.S. Embassy, 

was located atop CIA employee living quarters at the Pittman Apartments on Gia Long 

Street. And, the man reaching out to those 

on the ladder was CIA air operations officer 

O.B. Harnage. 

Through all the years of U.S. involvement 

in Southeast Asia, Air America pilots and 

their support personnel accepted the grave 

danger and extreme flying challenges with 

great alacrity. Called upon one last time in 

the final days before the collapse of the 

South Vietnamese government, Air Ameri-

ca personnel braved the Saigon skyline to 

carry thousands of evacuees to the safety 

of nearby countries and U.S. ships in the 

South China Sea. They conducted them-

selves in the finest tradition of their motto 

“Anything, Anytime, Anywhere, Profession-

ally.” In praise of their efforts, U.S. Air Force 

investigators concluded “Only God knows 

the numbers of sorties which Air America 

flew in the final month in Vietnam. [We]...

estimate that over 1,000 were flown, perhaps many more.”

The South Vietnam panel includes Air 

America pilots Marius Burke and Ed Adams, 

former CIA officer Robert Grealy, and not-

ed academic and USAF combat rescue pilot, 

Dr. Joe Guilmartin. 
16 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 17

As a helicopter pilot, I was involved in Air 

Force rescue operations in Southeast Asia 

very near the beginning. I flew my first combat sortie over Laos in early October of 1965, 

a staging flight by a pair of H-43s to Lima 20 

where we refueled, then on to Lima 36 north 

of the Plaine des Jarres where we pulled alert 

for two days. Our billeting arrangements 

were provided courtesy of Air America and 

were organized by the Customer, Mike, a tall 

rawboned fellow whose personal weapon of 

choice was a BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle), 

a fact I discovered one afternoon when he 

went charging off into the jungle to recover an 

Air America Helio pilot who was said to have 

gone down short of the runway—incorrectly 

as it turned out. Mike also provided local intelligence. Air America pilots and kickers gave 

us tips on the weather and flying techniques 

to deal with it. Our logistic support was also 

provided by Air America: fifty-five gallon 

drums of JP-4 brought in by Caribou and an 

occasional maintenance man and replacement 

parts flown up from Udorn by Porter or Helio when our helicopters broke. 

The H-43 was a marginal operation: no armor, no armament beyond our personal M16s, no self-sealing tanks and a radius of action of only seventy-five miles. It was good 

to know that other Americans were flying in 

our area of responsibility. 

Mercifully, I was never called upon to attempt 

a combat rescue in the H-43 before my unit 

received its definitive equipment, Sikorski 

HH-3E “Jolly Greens” with self-sealing tanks, 

a thousand pounds of Titanium armor plate 

and a hydraulic rescue hoist with 250 feet of 

cable. We still had no armament beyond our 

personal M-16s, but at some point the powers that be provided us with the services of 

an Air Commando A-1 squadron at Udorn to 

provide search capability and fire support, as 

indeed they did and to good effect. I and my 

fellows were well aware that our Air America 

comrades-in-arms had made combat rescues, 

above and beyond their contractual obligations with at least nominally unarmed H-34s 

and none of the advantages that our specialized equipment gave us. 

Whatever problems Air America had, a lack 

of aggressiveness in coming to the aid of a 

distressed airman was not among them. I 

have vivid recollections of a pickup in late 

1965 toward the end of dry monsoon. I and 

my crew were “high bird”—backup helicopter; we always committed in pairs, another 

advantage Air America rarely enjoyed—when 

a Royal Lao Air Force T-28 pilot bailed out off 

the northeast end of the Plaine des Jarres. 

I watched with mounting frustration as the 

low bird aircraft commander dithered, refusing to go in for the pickup before our A-1s 

arrived without specific authorization. The 

survivor had gone down in an area of low 

hostile activity; but as we had learned, orbiting aircraft soon attract the enemy. While I 

was screwing up my guts to jump my chain of 

command and commit, an Air America H-34 

appeared out of nowhere, swooped in for 

the pickup, made it, and departed, no fuss, no 

muss, no bother. 

I left Southeast Asia in July of 1966, not to 

return for another nine and a half years. In 

the interim, I taught combat rescue tactics as 

an instructor pilot and in the classroom and 

wrote about them as an analyst and historian. Along the way I came to the conclusion 

that in terms of demands on pilot and crew, 

combat rescue is the limiting case in aerial 

warfare. Raw courage and superior stick and 

rudder skill—or should I say cyclic and collective skill?—are essential, but not enough. 

Unlike delivering ordnance or cargo, the objective is human life, and contributing one 

more downed aircraft to the enemy scorecard, however admirable in terms of courage, 

is counter-productive in the extreme. At the 

same time, a failure of will or excess of caution that leads to a missed pickup is just as 

bad, particularly in its psychological impact 

and never more so than when the objective 

of the failed rescue was a fellow aviator. The 

successful rescue crew must walk a fine line 

between courage and caution. 

The conceptual challenges of combat rescue 

are daunting as well. Beyond keeping on top 

of the aircraft—better still, ahead of the aircraft—in four-dimensional space, the fourth 

dimension being time, the rescue crew must 

keep apprised of the situation on the ground: 

the survivor or survivors’ medical condition, 

their proximity to enemy forces and the 

capabilities and limitations of those forces, 

not to mention mundane but essential parameters such as the wind, density altitude 

and terrain factors. That is surely the limiting case in situational awareness and span 

of control. Finally, the rescue crew rarely has 

the luxury of knowing critical mission parameters, including the survivor’s location, prior 

to launch. More often than not, planning and 

execution are of necessity done on the fly. 

Success requires a special kind of airmanship, 

one that Air America pilots, crews and support personnel repeatedly demonstrated. 

I next operated in the same airspace as 

Air America during the final hours of the 

Vietnam War, in the 29 April 1975 Saigon 

evacuation. To make good the lack of Marine 

Corps H-53s—one of two CH-53 squadrons 

that participated in the 12 April Phnom Penh 

evacuation had returned to Hawaii—and 

twelve Air Force H-53s, ten Special Operations CH-53s and two Rescue HH-53s were 

deployed from Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, to 

the attack carrier USS Midway. As the senior 

Jolly Green, I led the two HH-53s. 

Backing up a month and a half, after the war 

in Laos had closed down in 1974, Air America retained a presence in South Vietnam, notably in the form of some twelve UH-1B/D 

“Hueys” plus an additional sixteen H models 

on loan from the Army operating in support 

of the ICCS (International Commission for 

Control and Supervision), the Embassy, the 

CIA and USAID. That wasn’t much given the 

enormity of the task that was to be thrust 

upon Air America. More critical still, when 

The Airmen’s Bond: A Rescue Pilot’s Perspective

by Dr. Joe Guilmartin

Professor, Ohio State University

Anything, Anywhere, 

Anytime, Professionally.

—Air America’s Slogan
18 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 19

the situation turned critical, Air America had 

only seventy-seven pilots, including fixedwing pilots, in country.1

Beginning in early March as the South Viet-

namese military position crumbled in the 

face of a massive North Vietnamese inva-

sion backed by heavy armored forces op-

erating under an umbrella of surface-to-air 

missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery, Air 

America Huey crews helped to evacuate 

US personnel from locations up country in 

the face of conditions that approached total 

chaos. The extraction of the last Americans 

from Da Nang on 29 March was particularly 

perilous. It was clear at this point, or should 

have been, that South Vietnam was doomed 

and that the re- maining Americans and 

friendly foreign nationals 

would have to be evac-

uated, along with South 

Vietnamese deemed 

to be particularly at 

risk in the event of 

a communist victo-

ry. Concrete plans 

had been undertaken in support 

of a helicopter 

evacuation using 

Marine Corps 

helicopters to 

shuttle evacu-

ees from the 

main collec-

tion point in the old 

MACV compound at Tan Son Nhut 

Airport to US Navy ships standing off the 

coast. Potential evacuees were billeted in 

scattered locations around Saigon, and Air 

America personnel working in conjunc-

tion with military members of the Defense 

Attaché Staff had marked out rooftop 

helipads suitable for use by Air America 

Hueys as a means of moving evacuees to 

the collection point. The problem was the 

Ambassador. The Honorable Graham Martin, utterly committed to the South Vietnamese cause, exhausted and in ill health, 

obstinately refused to abandon hope in a 

negotiated settlement and resisted taking 

overt steps in support of an evacuation to 

avoid causing panic. Even after the South 

Vietnamese Army had fought and lost its 

final battle, at Xuan Loc on the eastern ap-

proaches to Saigon, on 20 April, the Am-

bassador equivocated. Not until late in the 

morning of the 29th, in the wake of a North 

Vietnamese air strike on Tan Son Nhut Airport the day before and an avalanche of 

communist rockets that hit Tan Son Nhut 

shortly after midnight, did the Ambassador 

give the order to execute. 

Aside from headlines and photographs, the 

Saigon Evacuation received only cursory 

attention from the American news media. 

David Butler of NBC Radio was the only 

American media bureau chief in Saigon 

when the city fell, and while his account 

of the evacuation is both accurate and ex-

emplary it did not appear in print for ten 

years.

2

 Media coverage left the impression 

that while the evacuation was chaotic—

photos of Vietnamese climbing over con-

certina wire to get into the Embassy for 

evacuation were coin of the realm—

it was unopposed. 

It was not, as testified to by a widelypublished but inadequately-captioned 

photo showing a Soviet-manufactured 

SA-7 heat-seeking missile passing 

through the rotor plane of a Marine 

Corps CH-53. From my own recollection 

of radio traffic at the time, confirmed by 

subsequent research, a North Vietnamese 

57mm anti-aircraft battery was firing at 

the incoming stream of helicopters from 

offshore Navy decks at around 1500, only 

to be silenced by a strike by a flight of Air 

Force “Iron Hand”, anti-radiation F-4 fighterbombers. There were three active SA-2 radar-guided surface-to-air missile sites to the 

north and northeast of the city, and while 

they never fired, they were in place.

3

 There 

is no doubt that the North Vietnamese infil-

trated SA-7 teams into the city and at least 

a limited number of 12.7mm heavy machine 

guns on anti-aircraft mounts as well. I say 

this advisedly as Jolly Green gunners si-

lenced at least two 12.7mm positions and 

perhaps three on our run in to the DAO 

compound at about 2130. Helicopters de-

scending into the compound from the east 

were fired at throughout the operation by 

a 37mm battery to the west that, providen-

tially, was unable to depress far enough for 

a successful engagement. 

Into this cauldron stepped Air America, under 

circumstances that were anything but favorable. For openers, between communist rocket 

fire and an over-zealous fire marshal who re-

located the only refueling truck, there was no 

fuel. In consequence, the Hueys were limited to 

three 

to five shuttle runs 

between rooftop helipads and the DAO 

Compound or Embassy before flying out 

to sea to refuel on Navy ships. Of twentyeight Hueys that should have been available, 

six had been stolen by Vietnamese, one was 

hit by rocket fire, one was out of service for 

an engine change and four had been sent to 

evacuate Can Tho to the south. During the 

course of the day, accidents and mischance 

reduced the number of available Hueys to 

thirteen.

4

 Throughout the day and into the 

evening—the Ambassador’s delayed decision 

ensured that the evacuation would go on 

into the night—Air America Hueys flown by 

a single pilot shuttled across the city, carrying 

as many as a dozen evacuees in an aircraft 

rated for eight passengers. It was perhaps Air 

America’s finest hour. Loading up evacuees, 

many of them panicked and of uncertain 

identity, from ad hoc pads, and in some cases 

unsurveyed rooftops, without any semblance 

of ground control entailed a constant risk of 

being overloaded or interference with the 

flight controls, and that was only the begin-

ning. Nor was it all rotary wing: in early afternoon, an Air America supervisor brought 

out what he estimated as over 150 evacuees 

on a C-46, no doubt a veteran of the Hump 

airlift, dodging debris and abandoned aircraft 

on take off. 

3 Author’s recollection. On our initial run-in to the DAO compound at about 1500 hours, my RHAW (for Radar 

Homing and Warning) scope displayed radar emissions from three SA-2 sites, all well within range. 

4 Leary, Last Flights, 10-11. 

1 William M. Leary, “Last Flights: Air America and the Collapse of South Vietnam”, The George Jalonick II and Dorothy 

Cockrell Jalonick Memorial Distinguished Lecture Series (Dallas: The University of Texas at Dallas, August 13, 2005, 

published by the Special Collections Department of the Eugene McDermott Library), 3. 

2 David Butler, The Fall of Saigon: Scenes from the Sudden End of a Long War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

1985). 
20 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 21

Just how many evacuees made it out who 

would have been left behind were it not for 

Air America Huey crews and their support 

personnel is beyond reconstruction. The official total of evacuees brought out to the 

fleet by helicopter is 7,815, a figure that is 

surely low.5 Of those evacuated by military 

helicopter, a substantial number would never 

have made it to the collection points without Air America. How many is a matter of 

speculation, but the number is surely well 

over a thousand and excludes those brought 

directly to Navy ships. It is perhaps fitting that 

the iconic photographic image of that awful occasion is that of an Air America Huey 

crew loading Vietnamese refugees from an 

improvised helipad atop the roof of the CIA 

deputy station chief ’s apartment.6

John F. Guilmartin, Jr.

Columbus, Ohio

5 Ray L. Bowers, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: Tactical Airlift (Washington, DC: The Office of Air 

Force History, 1983), 644, n. 31. How the figure was derived is not specified, but was apparently on the basis of 

numbers reported to ABCCC (Airborne Battlefield Communications, Command and Control), the airborne control agency, by military helicopter pilots. If that is the case, it is surely low. As the evacuation progressed, frequencies 

became saturated and it was clear that ABCCC wasn’t controlling. Many crews simply stopped reporting. 

6 Fox Butterfield with Kari Haskell, “Getting it Wrong in a Photo”, The New York Times (April 23, 2000), 5. Note: Please see the DVD for a complete list of Expressions of Gratitude.

AN-2 Throttle

On 12 January 1968, recognizing the threat posed by "Site 85," 

the People’s Army of Vietnam vowed to destroy it. On 12 January 

1968, four North Vietnamese AN-2 Colt biplanes headed for Site 

85. One pair began low-level bombing and strafing passes while the 

other pair circled nearby. Air America pilot Ted Moore was flying an 

ammunition-supply run to the site in his unarmed UH-1D “Huey” 

helicopter when he saw the biplanes attacking and took chase of 

the first Colt. Flight mechanic Glenn Woods pulled out his AK-47 

rifle and began firing at the lumbering biplane. The pursuit was 

relentless, continuing for more than 20 minutes until the second 

Colt (hit by ground fire) joined the first in an attempt to escape 

 back into North Vietnam. Both attacking Colts suffered severe 

 bullet damage and crashed before reaching the border. Fearing 

 a similar fate, the two unengaged Colts retreated 

unharmed. This throttle is from one of the downed AN-2s 

recovered after the battle.
22 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 23
24 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 25
26 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 27
28 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 29
30 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 31

Air America had fallen on hard times as Viet-

nam welcomed the Year of the Rabbit at the 

beginning of 1975. The airline that had been 

secretly owned by the Central Intelligence 

Agency since 1950 was a far cry from the 

giant air complex of the late 1960s and early 

1970s. In 1970, the airline operated a fleet of 

146 aircraft that included Boeing 727s, DC6s, C-46s, C-47s, C-123s, Twin-Beech Volpars, 

Pilatus Porters, Helio Couriers, and a variety 

of helicopters. It employed over 500 pilots, 

primarily in Southeast Asia. In June 1974, 

however Air America shut down its opera-

tions in Laos, where it had been serving as a 

paramilitary adjunct to the native forces that 

were fighting the CIA's "Secret War." Three 

months later, the CIA confirmed an earlier 

decision to sell the air complex, setting the 

date for its demise as June 30, 1975. Morale 

among Air America employees was at low 

ebb, as pilots and technical personnel left in 

large numbers, anticipating the company's 

closure. Meanwhile, flying continued, primarily helicopter operations for the International Commission of Control and Supervision 

(ICCS) -the agency created to monitor the 

peace agreement of 1973 -and the U.S. Agen-

cy for International Development (USAID). 

But the end was clearly in sight, both for the 

airline and for the country. In the summer of 

1974, the U.S. House of Representatives had 

voted a sharp reduction in aid to South Viet-

nam. Shortly thereafter, President Richard M. 

Nixon had been forced to resign in the wake 

of the Watergate scandal. An evacuation 

plan for South Vietnam -initially labeled TAL-

ON VISE but later changed to FREQUENT 

WIND -was in place, with U.S. Ambassador 

Graham Martin in charge. In the fall of 1974, 

Vice Admiral George P. Steele, commander 

of the Seventh Fleet, had met with Martin 

to review the plan. "'Do not worry, Admiral," 

Martin had reassured Steele, “I will initiate 

the evacuation in good time. I understand 

the necessity for doing so." 

In mid-December 1974, the North Viet-

namese launched a winter-spring offensive 

against Phuoc Long province. The purpose of 

the operation was less to acquire control of 

territory in the south than to test the will-

ingness of the United States to respond to 

a blatant violation of the peace agreement. 

There was little alarm in the U.S. Intelligence 

community to the fighting in Phuoc Long. A 

National Intelligence Estimate on December 

23 forecast that Hanoi would avoid the "risks 

and losses" of a major offensive and work to 

achieve its goals though a "political-military 

campaign." An all-out offensive, the intel-

ligence community believed, would not be 

likely before early in 1976. 

Not for the first time in the Vietnam War, the 

intelligence crystal ball proved cloudy. Phuoc 

Binh City fell to the NVA on January 7, 1975, 

the first provincial capital to pass into the 

hands of northern forces since the ceasefire of 1973. As it was clear that Washington 

would not act, the Politburo in Hanoi ap-

proved a plan for widespread attacks in the 

south in 1975, followed by a general upris-

ing in 1976. The offensive would begin in the 

long-contested Central Highlands. 

Campaign 275 opened on March 1, 1975. 

Within two weeks, the NVA offensive had 

made such progress that President Thieu orFinal Flights: 

Air America and the Collapse of South Vietnam, 1975

by William M. Leary

dered the Central Highlands abandoned. 

At the same time, NVA forces were pouring south of the DMZ, heading from Hue 

and Da Nang. Marius Burke, the senior 

Air America pilot at Da Nang, had only 

four helicopters to meet the growing 

airlift demands caused by the NVA 

offensive. On March 23, Air America 

evacuated key personnel from Hue 

and Quang Nhai. On the 25th, while 

engaged in the evacuation effort, an Air 

America helicopter was fired on by suppos-

edly friendly South Vietnamese troops. It took 

hits in the rotor blade spar and engine but 

managed to limp back to Da Nang. Clearly, 

Burke reported to Saigon, the situation had 

reached "a critical state," and that panicking 

South Vietnamese troops posed as great -if 

not greater-danger than the NVA. 

That same day, a meeting was held at CIA 

headquarters in Washington to discuss Air 

America's ability to respond to the increas-

ing demands for air service. Paul Velte, Air 

America's chief executive officer, reviewed 

the company's equipment status for his CIA 

superiors. Air America owned and operated 

12 Bell 204B/205 helicopters, civilian mod-

els of the military's UH-1B/D Hueys. In ad-

dition, the company had on loan from the 

military 16 UH-l Hs. Eleven of the "bailed" 

Hueys were on the ICCS lease, while 5 were 

on a USAlD lease. Three of the 11 ICCS he-

licopters were currently in use for the com-

mission's diminishing requirements, while 

the other 8 were in flyable storage. It would 

be difficult to place these 8 Hueys back in 

service because spare parts for them came 

from the Department of Defense and were 

not available on short notice. 

The most immediate problem, however, was 

not aircraft but pilots. Air America, Velte ex-

plained, had 77 pilots, both rotary wing and 

fixed wing, including supervisors. The rotary 

wing pilots were flying 120 hours a month, 

the maximum allowable under the USAID 

contract. Also, the contract called for two pi-

lots per helicopter. Because of the company's 

uncertain future, pilots and technical person-

nel were in the process of leaving for other 

jobs. The first thing to be done, Velte said, was 

to clarify the identity of the new contractor. 

Current employees could then apply for jobs 

with the replacement company. Personnel 

agreeing to stay with Air America until June 

30 would be offered special bonuses. Also, 

contractual restraints for two pilots and 120 

hours should be lifted. While there measures 

might not completely solve the problem, they 

certainly would help. Velte then told his su-

periors that he would leave shortly for South 

Vietnam to assess the situation and take all 

necessary action. 

Frank Snepp, the CIA's principal analyst in 

Saigon, had become increasingly concerned 

about the rapidly deteriorating military situa-

tion. Government defenses in the northern half 

of the country, he told Station Chief Thomas 

Polgar on March 25, were nearing total col-

lapse. ''The entire complexion of the Vietnam 

War," he observed, "has altered in a matter 

of weeks, and the government is in imminent 
32 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 33

danger of decisive military 

defeat." Polgar, however, re-

fused to become alarmed. 

He agreed with Ambas-

sador Martin's policy of 

encouraging the Saigon 

government to continue 

resistance in hopes of 

securing a negotiated settle-

ment. Above all, Americans must not give any 

indication that they considered the situation 

hopeless. As refugees poured into Da Nang, 

Burke prepared for the worst. He cut person-

nel to a minimum, with one pilot and Filipino 

flight mechanic per aircraft. He asked for vol-

unteers who would be willing to remain and 

face the hazards of the final evacuation. His 

four helicopters would be kept fully fueled and 

ready for immediate departure. 

The evacuation of Da Nang began on 

March 28. By the morning of the 29th, 

Burke reported, the city was "a shambles," 

with abandoned aircraft, tanks, trucks, and 

other vehicles scattered about. In the midst 

of the evacuation effort, a World Airways 

Boeing 727 appeared overhead. Burke tried 

to contact the pilot to warn him not to land, 

but did not get a response. As soon as the 

727 set down, it was engulfed by a swarm 

of ARVN and civilian refugees. The run-

way on which it had landed -17-Left -was 

soon littered with bodies and overturned 

vehicles. Burke again attempted to contact 

the airplane and direct it to 17-Right, which 

looked clear, but heard nothing. 

By the time the 727 taxied to the front of 

the control tower, both runways had be-

come unusable. "It looked hopeless," Burke 

reported. The only option was to use a 

taxiway. The aircraft started to roll, narrowly missing a stalled van on the side of 

the taxiway. A motorcycle struck the left 

wing, and the driver was hurled into the 

infield. Somehow, the 727 struggled into 

the air after plowing through various small 

structures at the end of the field. As Dep-

uty Ambassador Wolf Lehmann later com-

mented about this incident, the attempted 

evacuation by 727 was "irresponsible, ut-

terly irresponsible, and should never have 

taken place.'' 

The sudden collapse of South Vietnam's 

military forces caused American military 

authorities to review their evacuation plans. 

The original scheme, published on July 31, 

1974, had contained four options. Evacu-

ation would be conducted (1) by com-

mercial airlift from Saigon's Tan Son Nhut 

airport, (2) by military aircraft from Tan 

Son Nhut, (3) by sealift from ports serving 

Saigon, and (4) by helicopters to U.S. Navy 

ships standing offshore. It now seemed that 

detailed planning for the helicopter option 

should go forward. 

Air America obviously would be a crucial 

part of any emergency helicopter evacua-

tion from downtown Saigon. Rooftops that 

might be used for the evacualion could not 

support the heavy Marine Corps aircraft. 

Only Air America could do the job. Fol-

lowing discussions with Var M. Green, vice 

president for Vietnam, and Chief Pilot Carl 

Winston, Air America agreed to take 13 

UH-1 Hs out of flyable storage. With a to-

tal of 28 helicopters, Air America pledged 

to have 24 of them available at any given 

time. Because of the shortage of pilots, 

many of these helicopters would have to 

be flown by a single pilot. ''This was risky," 

the U.S. Air Force account of the final 

evacuation observed. "but Air America was 

accustomed to such risks and expressed 

no reservations about that aspect of the 

Saigon air evacuation." 

On April 7, veteran helicopter pilot Nikki 

A. Fillipi began a survey of 37 buildings in 

downtown Saigon to assess their viability 

as helicopter landing zones (HLZs). The 

survey led to the selection of 13 HLZs. 

Fillipi then supervised crews from the Pa-

cific Architect & Engineering company in 

removing obstructions that might interfere with safe ingress/egress to the HLZs. 

An "H" was painted on the rooftops to 

mark the skids of Air America's helicop-

ters, indicating that aircraft could land or 

take off in either direction with guaranteed 

rotor clearance. During his meetings with 

the Special Planning Group that would be 

charge of the helicopter evacuation, Fillipi 

emphasized that three requirements had 

to be met if Air America was to complete 

its assigned tasks in the evacuation plan. 

The Air America ramp had to be secured; 

helicopters needed a safe supply of fuel; 

and, to avoid confusion, Air America had to 

maintain its own communication network, 

linking with Marine Corps helicopters only 

through UHF guard frequency. He was 

assured that all three requirements 

would be met. 

CEO Velte arrived in Saigon on April 7. 

He consulted with Fillipi on the evacu-

ation planning to date. He then con-

tacted military authorities and asked if 

they could provide additional pilots to 

allow double crewing of the helicop-

ters for the emergency. He received a 

sympathetic response, and a message 

was sent to CINPAC. Requesting the 

temporary assignment of 30 Marine 

Corps helicopter pilots so that each 

Air America aircraft would have a 

copilot. When Ambassador Martin 

saw the cable, however, he "hit the 

ceiling," and sent a "flash" message 

canceling the request. 

Martin’s precipitous action was characteristic of what was becoming an increasingly 

bizarre attitude on the part of the U.S. Em-

bassy as the NVA drew closer to Saigon. 

Even Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was 

becoming concerned with Martin's actions. 

"Faced with imminent disaster," Kissinger 

later wrote, "Martin decided to go down 

with the ship. He was reluctant to evacuate 

any Americans lest this contribute to the 

disintegration of the south. "I considered 

Martin's stonewalling dangerous," Kissinger 

recalled. On April 9 he told Ben Bradlee, ex-

ecutive editor of the Washington Post, that 

"we've got an Ambassador who is maybe 

losing his cool." 

The military's efforts to press Martin were 

proving fruitless. On April 12, the 9th Ma-

rine Amphibious Brigade sent a delegation 

to consult with the ambassador on the 

evacuation plan. Martin told them that he 

would not tolerate any outward signs that 

the United States intended to abandon 
34 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 35

The late William M. Leary, Ph.D., served as 

the E. Merton Coulter Professor of History, 

Emeritus, at the University of Georgia. Dr. 

Leary was considered the world’s foremost 

specialist on Air America. His 2005 lecture 

was central to the McDermott Library’s Civ-

il Air Transport-Air America Collection and 

Memorial located on the third floor of Mc-

Dermott Library. Leary has written histories 

of the China National Aviation Corp., Civil 

Air Transport and the U.S. Air Mail Service. 

In 1995 he received the Central Intelligence 

Agency Studies in Excellence Award for an 

Outstanding Contribution to the Literature 

of Intelligence. He served as the Charles 

A. Lindbergh Professor of Aerospace His-

tory at the National Air and Space Museum, 

Washington D.C. in 1996-97.

South Vietnam. All planning would have to 

be conducted with the utmost discretion. 

General Carey, the Marine commander, 

upon receiving this information, flew to 

Saigon the next day to see Martin. 'The 

visit," Carey reported, "was cold, non-pro-

ductive and appeared to be an irritant to 

the ambassador." 

The military situation continued 

to worsen as North Vietnam-

ese forces encircled the capital. 

On April 21, President Thieu 

resigned. That same day, the 

Marines established a forward headquarters at the 

DAO. The DAO complex, 

together with Air America 

area across the street, were 

designated as the main de-

parture points for a heli-

copter evacuation to the 

fleet. A battalion-sized 

security force would 

guard the DAO com-

plex, while a battalion 

command group and 

one company would 

be sent to the Air 

America area. 

The Defense Attache also sent a 

message to Washington, requesting permis-

sion to bring a platoon of marines to Tan 

Son Nhut at once to control the growing 

crowd of fixed-wing evacuees. Lest Ambas-

sador Martin's sensitivities be upset about 

the presence of additional U.S. military 

personnel, Air America helicopters were 

used on April 25 to bring in 40 marines, 

dressed in civilian clothes, from the U.S.S. 

Hancock, standing offshore. Once inside 

the DAO complex, they were able to don 

their combat gear. 

When I arrived at the office on Mar 1975 

Captain Winston asked me if I would go to 

Nha Trang as temporary Scr as E. G. Adams 

was absent on leave. There was trouble ex-

pected at Da Nang and someone was need-

ed at Nha Trang to coordinate commo, traffic, 

etc. between Saigon and Da Nang. I returned 

home for my suitcase and departed by aircraft for Nha Trang. On my arrival, I checked 

into the Pacific house.

The Con Gen at this time was processing 

their Vietnamese employees for evacuation 

to Saigon. Most of these people had arrived 

from other places, I.E. Pleiku, Kontum, etc. They 

were being ticketed at the Con Gen building. 

The next day Da Nang started to evacuate 

and the city panicked. Capt. Burke was at Da 

Nang, and had 3 or 4 choppers. I spent the 

next 2 days trying to get fuel and radio re-

lay for the choppers at Da Nang. We had to 

keep 2 Volpars in orbit to relay from Burke 

to me, and I relayed to Saigon. The Con Gen 

at Da Nang, Mr. Francis had been on board 

Burke’s chopper but when they landed at 

Marble Mountain the Con Gen got off and 

talked to the Vietnamese region command-

er’s aide. The Con Gen told Burke that the 

region commander was going to commit 

suicide and he, the Con Gen, had to go to 

him. The Con Gen departed in a Vietnamese 

chopper. This later caused considerable con-

cern at the U.S. embassy until the Con Gen 

finally got a message through that he was safe 

on board a ship heading South. The choppers 

were shuttling to Cu Le Re Island. I sent a 

steel fuel container with 500 gallons of Jp to 

the island by caribou. The first night of the Da 

Nang fall, passengers came into Nha Trang by 

chopper and fixed wing. One French teacher 

had been picked up by a chopper and moved 

to the island. He came to Nha Trang by Vol-

par. I interviewed him along with a CBS pho-

tographer who had been on board Mr. Daly’s 

World Airways 727. He got off and could not 

get back on. He said he ran to the tower and 

called for help. One of our choppers landed 

and picked him up. I put these people on a 

flight to Saigon.

The second day we were requested to send 

the choppers back to Da Nang to look for 

the Con Gen also an A40b customer was on 

board a barge at Da Nang and was request-

ing water be dropped as the Vietnamese on 

the barges had no food or water. I asked 

for a caribou and a40b sent plastic contain-

ers from Saigon. There was one drop made 

which I believe was unsuccessful as the con-

tainers broke on impact with the water. 

Evacuation of Nha Trang Rvn March/April 1975

On April 28, as the situation around Saigon 

continued to worse, Velte learned that Gen-

eral Carey had decided not to provide a se-

curity force for the Air America ramp at Tan 

Son Nhut. This came as a shock. Only the 

previous week, Carey had assured Velte that 

he would send marines to secure the ramp. 

Velte asked the ambassador to intervene and 

reverse the decision, emphasizing that the 

security of the Air America area had been 

a prerequisite for the company's successful 

participation in any emergency evacuation 

plan. There was no immediate response from 

the embassy. 
36 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 37

T h e 

next day another 

attempt was made to drop water, this 

time canteens tied together with floatation. 

This attempt aborted due to heavy rains in 

the area which apparently solved the water 

problem to some extent. The Da Nang Con 

Gen later arrived at Cam Ranh Bay and was 

flown to Nha Trang. He had a long talk with 

Mr. Spears, the Nha Trang Con Gen and then 

departed for Saigon by Volpar. At Nha Trang 

there seemed to be a sense of panic building 

up. Everyone seemed to be tense. I came out 

of the Pacific house to go to the airport on 

my second morning, and a mob had material-

ized in front of the Con Gen gate all wanting 

to be manifested to Saigon when I saw this 

I returned to my room, got my suitcase and 

from then on I slept at the airport.

I was concerned about fuel as always. The 

fuel truck would stop servicing at the first 

sign of trouble. I called Saigon for empty 

drums which they sent, however, they were 

too dirty and could not be used as we had 

no way of cleaning them. I then requested 

fuel drums from the Con Gen. He got some 

for me and we started filling them for later 

use. I then Started trying to find a place to 

store fuel for use by the choppers in case 

we lost our fuel at Nha Trang the a40b re-

gional representative told me that he had a 

place near Cam Ranh at the province chief ’s 

compound which was the most secure place 

possible. I started dispatching choppers with 

fuel drums. we got 20 drums there in the 

first day. The next day the first chopper arrived with fuel and the “secure” place was 

abandoned. The fuel could not be loaded 

back aboard choppers so we planned on 

using it ASAP. We used about 3 drums and 

the other 17 drums were stolen. 

At the time I moved to the airport called in 

the ten employees and recommended they 

sleep at the airport. They all moved in and 

pa&e gave me matresses and sheets. They 

also gave us c-rat ions and other canned 

food. I sent manny down to pick up these 

items. The chopper pilots were all sleep-

ing at the pacific house] I planned on being 

able to fly down to the Con Gen pad and 

pick up the crews in case of trouble. All the 

time I was a Nha Trang we were dispatch-

ing items of equipment not needed and also 

employees and their dependents. This was 

hampered by the Con Gen not allowing me 

space on the aircraft. I finally started getting 

an aircraft for my own use. 

The following events occurred on the day 

that Nha Trang was evacuated and not nec-

essarily in this order: 

1. Woke up at about 5:30 and called to the 

pacific House to see if someone could 

bring coffee and breakfast. 

2. A 40b customer across the way came 

over and told me the Viet Cong were 

only about 12 miles up the road and the 

evacuation was going this day. He said 

he was now destroying his papers and 

equipment. He told me I could have any-

thing I needed. He was gone by 10:30 and 

abandoned his office and warehouse.

3. Con Gen had not informed me of their 

plans to evacuate. I got a call and they 

asked me to get all available aircraft from 

Saigon. This I did and also requested a 

C-46 for my own use.

4. Vietnamese started arriving at the airport looking for rides. I went out and put 

a new lock on the AAM gate and locked 

it as the guard was not on the job.

5. I previously had requested barbed wire 

to help control crowds. I never received 

this wire. We placed chains across to keep 

vehicles out of the operations area.

6. The Pol driver told me that he was on 

his last tank of gas and would not be get-

ting anymore. He said he would stay on 

the job until all fuel was gone if I would 

promise his family a ride to Saigon. I did 

this and he worked as he promised.

7. A mob had gathered by the time the first 

airplane arrived. They were already get-

ting unruly. I talked to some Vietnamese 

marines who spoke English. They were 

armed and were there to get a ride to 

Saigon. They agreed to stay and control 

the crowd if they were promised a ride. 

They stayed all day and did an outstand-

ing job. Late in the afternoon, however 

they left unannounced and all control was 

gone. DC-6s of Birdair came in all day. 

When one was on the ground I would 

call in a C-46 and load company cargo 

and pax. This worked most of the day. 

8. VNAF helicopters started departing. Two 

had a mid-air just above the ground and 

crashed into the revetments. 

9. Had two Vietnamese employees who did 

not want to go to Saigon. I borrowed 

money and paid them their final pay. One 

was a male radio operator and the other 

was the one-armed cleaning woman. All 

other employees and dependents were 

sent to Saigon. 

10. I put the finance records into the bag-

gage compartment of a helicopter. This 

insured that we would not lose them. 

11. Two days before, I surveyed the roof 

of the pacific house for a chopper pad. 

This was prepared but on the day of 

evacuation the Vietnamese breached 

the fence and crowded the roof pad so 

it was only used for a couple of trips. 

Another pad had been prepared in the 

parking lot at the Con Gen this was 

used all day with armed U.S. Marines 

controlling the mob. 

12. Two times during the day while AAM 

choppers were shuttling personnel from 

the Con Gen pad to the airport I made 

the choppers shut down as our mob at 

the airport was getting enormous. Each 

time Mr. Spears became frantic and called 

me to have the choppers keep shuttling 

as the mob at the Con Gen was getting 

uncontrollable. 

13. Chopper pilots reported small arms 

in different areas of the town. One re-

ported the prison gates were open and 

the prisoners were looting the prison. I 

could hear firing from different locations 

all day. 

14. VNAF aircraft started shuttling military 

and their dependents across the run-

way from AAM. This finally spilled over 

to our operation when vehicles full of 

Vietnamese started coming to our aircraft for rides. 

15. Air Vietnam quit coming into the city 

due to the 

mobs so hun-

dreds of Viet-

namese came 

to our end of 

the field. This 

compounded 

our already 

e n o r m o u s 

problem. 

16. The last 2 

DC-6 aircraft came 

in and were 

completely 

mobbed. I had a 

Caribou and C-47 sneak in while they 
38 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 39

were on the ground. They were com-

pletely mobbed. I got all the employ-

ees left on the caribou and decided it 

was time for me to go. The mechanics 

pulled me into the door as the mob 

was trying to hold my legs. As the airplane was taking off I saw hundreds of 

people walking down the taxiway to-

ward AAM. 

17. A flying tiger DC-8 was dispatched from 

Saigon. However, by the time he arrived 

overhead Nha Trang was airborne and 

my opinion was that it was unwise for 

the (DC-8) to land. A 14-foot step had 

to be found for people to board and 

this would have been impossible to do 

with the huge unruly mob. 

18. Once during the day just when a DC-6 

was loaded and taxiing for takeoff, the 

tower said the field was closed. It was 

determined that someone in Saigon had 

ordered this. The field was later opened 

after repeated calls to Saigon. 

19. We got out all of our employees and most 

of our important parts and equipment. 

20. The Vietnamese radio operator agreed 

to stay on the job and call us when possi-

ble. He called one time the day following 

the evacuation and said that everything 

was quiet downtown and at the airfield. 

We never heard from him again. 

It is my opinion that all the evacuations AAM 

participated in were caused by the embassy 

personnel ordering Vietnamese evacuated, 

thereby creating panic among the Vietnam-

ese people. 

Captain Edward Reid, Jr.

Air America, Inc.

In early April 1975 the AAM SVND evacu-

ation contingency plans were fairly well fi-

nalized. These plans included coordination 

with the DAO evacuation command center 

(ECC) AAM Captain Filippi was the primary 

coordinator between AAM and ECC. AAM 

captain Marius Burke was the man assigned 

to organize and formalize the AAM employ-

ee evacuation plans, as would relate to get-

ting the foreign employees from their living 

quarters to the AAM TSN compound for 

onward evacuation out of Vietnam. In my job 

capacity, I had dealings with all factions of the 

company/ evacuation/ contingency plans. 

In my support to Captain Filippi AAM pro-

vided the technical assistance to the setting 

up of an alternate flight watch facility at an 

office nearby the DAO ECC. AAM would 

provide the primary vhf/am and vhf/fm ra-

dios if and when the AAM operations func-

tion could not operate. We also provided the 

DAO ECC with our ICCS colored Dayglo 

green paint, so that they could paint the let-

ter H on their designated roof tops. These 

LZ pads were to be utilized for all the U.S. 

mission personnel pickup points in the case 

of an evacuation. 

Captain Filippi also brought a group of three 

U.S. Marines to my office on or about 25 

April. The Marine officer in charge was in-

terested primarily in the perimeter security 

of the AAM compound. He stated that he 

would be the officer responsible for provid-

ing security of our facility and that upon the 

evacuation of our AAM compound, his U.S. 

marine group would destroy (blow up) the 

AAM facilities. We discussed the weak points 

in our perimeter, such as the company pas-

senger terminal building and gates. Also we 

agreed that the rolling gates utilized across 

our southwest taxiway entrance was a weak 

point that would be difficult to seal off from 

refugees and/or armed desperate Vietnamese 

military personnel. It was decided that AAM 

would use metal conex containers to barri-

cade the taxiway and place a double row of 

concertina wire on top of them to stem in-

filtration. This would be done after our fixed 

wing aircraft had departed or if the airport 

conditions prevented our fixed wing aircraft 

from taking off. In preparation we later posi-

tioned about 10 conexs near the taxiway and 

some 4 rolls of concertina wire. The terminal 

building would be planned to be blocked on 

the ramp side by vehicles and the entrance 

gate from the street to our employee vehicle 

parking lot was to be barricaded by the 2 

Isuzu buses operated by AAM. The Marine 

officer said he would 

like me to make the 

necessary preparations 

and he would return 

in a few days to see 

what progress we had 

made. He nor any of 

the other marines 

ever visited me again 

and I heard nothing further about 

their plans. 

Major (USAF) Cook 

was the man in 

DAO who pro-

vided me with 

the 300 fuel 

drums and one 

each Esso refueler of 

AVGAS and one of JP4. He told me that 

DAO EEC would also have an Esso re-

 AIR AMERICA SVND EVACUATION SUMMARY 
40 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 41

fueler of JP4 parked in the DAO com-

pound area. 

We in AAM also doubled our delivery 

service of Esso Mogas to ensure that we 

would have maximum fuel for our genera-

tors and vehicles. 

In addition we obtained an extra potable 

water trailer from PA&E and serviced it as 

a standby. 

We also purchased about 425 cases of mili-

tary “C” rations from PA&E in case we needed 

food for our employees. In this same purchase 

were numerous cases of other canned foods 

that PA&E had for sale. All of this was stored 

in our supply area for possible issue/use. 

I had several informal meetings with the third 

country national (TCN) employees. I strong-

ly recommended that they double up in their 

living quarters outside the airfield. Captain 

Burke and I made several flights together in 

April, along with the designated spokesman 

of the Filipinos and Chinese employees. Our 

purpose was to determine which TCNs lived 

where in town and which rooftops were the 

most suitable for use. We formally identified 

3 rooftops around the area of Truong Minh 

Giangtroung Minh KY for the balance of the 

TCN employees. Those who were not rea-

sonably close to these rooftops, were told 

to move in closer. These rooftops (LZ pads) 

were then designated for each employee, by 

location, for pickup. A name and address list 

of all foreign employees was given to Captain 

Burke for planning purposes. The majority of 

our helicopter pilots were given area famil-

iarization flights so that they knew all the 

DAO and employee pickup pads. 

A vhf/am and vhf/fm (portable) radio was 

given to the Chinese employees in Cholon 

and the same was provided to the TCN 

group or Filippinod. These radios would en-

able them to have radio contact with the 

AAM TSN operations office and with com-

pany aircraft as may be required. Each LZ 

was given a radio call sign. Mr. P.Y. Lin act-

ing manager of supply and Mr. Sam Talapian 

foreman of electronics was designated as 

the TCN group spokesman. In addition we 

proceeded to paint the AAM Dayglo green 

H on those approved rooftops.

About the middle of April, Captain Burke and 

I became more concerned about the overall 

war situation around Saigon and we recom-

mended that all TCN employees move into 

the warehouse type buildings behind the former Citca hangars which was within the AAM 

compound. A number of the TCN employees 

started to move into those rooms. About 23 

or 24 April, I insisted that all TCNs move to 

those buildings, and I was assured by Mr. P.Y. 

Lin that all those employees living in Cholon 

would be moved to the Citca buildings by 

the night of 26 April, as the security of the 

Cholon area was quite questionable. 

On the morning of 29 April when we were 

preparing to evacuate all TCNs, I was given 

a name list of three TCNs that were still 

housed in town. There were 7 Chinese in 

Cholon and 11 Filipinos in the Troung Minh 

Giang area. Eventually the AAM helicopters 

picked up all the Filipinos and 6 of the Chi-

nese. I had talked by radio at 1500l with P. 

Y. Lin and confirmed that the six Chinese in 

Cholon would go to the Chinese hospital 

and get out the seventh Chinese employee, 

Mr. W. A. Peng then they were all to proceed 

to any of the alternate rooftop LZ pads for 

pickup by using their portable vhf/fm radio. In 

the end result, I learned a few days later that 

W.A. Peng did not get evacuated. The reason 

why is unknown to me at this writing. I sug-

gest that P. Y. Lin make a statement on why 

they did not or could not get Peng out. 

In retrospect I would say that AAM evacu-

ation plans went fairly smooth and that we 

were very fortunate that only one employ-

ee failed to get out of Vietnam and none of 

our employees were injured. All of this is in 

spite of the fact that the U.S. Marines never 

arrived in the AAM compound, to secure/ 

destroy it. 

I went by AAM helicopter, from my living 

quarters (259 Troung Quoc Duong) to 

AAM TSN at about 0930l on Tuesday 29 

April 1975. 

We operated from AAM TSN until about 1230l 

at which time CEO gave the order to evacu-

ate the AAM compound, due to lack of secu-

rity (no U.S. Marines) and VNAF penetrating 

our area with cars, Hondas, local dependents, 

e t c . 

CEO said we 

were to regroup at the DAO ECC.

Prior to abandoning the AAM area, CEO ap-

proved the dispatching of AAM fixed wing 

aircraft to carry the non-essential employees 

to friendly countries. We proceeded to load 

all such employees and launched the aircraft 

ASAP. In a short period of time, we had all 

those employees that were present and some 

unknown locals Who infiltrated our groups, 

on the fixed wing aircraft and airborne. 

I might mention that it was very difficult to 

control the boarding of passengers and to 

determine who was AAM employee or de-

pendents, because we had very little help 

at the aircraft entrance doors. I don't know 

who, if anyone did authorize the departure 

of some of the Americans, i.e. Charlie Mey-

ers, Harvey Kohler, Dick Fisher, George Keller, 

etc. on the fixed wing aircraft. We could have 

really utilized those Americans to control 

passenger loading, the taxiway gates and the 

refueling problem. 

Shortly after arriving at AAM TSN I was noti-

fied that VNAF pilots were stealing our GFE 

UH-1H helicopters from the ICCS ramp. To 

the best of my knowledge they stole 5 UH1H aircraft from the ICCS/as ramp and one 

AAM 204b helicopter from the AAM ramp 

itself. These VNAF people were well armed 

and desperate. 

With the incoming rockets and VNAF infil-

trating our ramp area, there was no time 

to collect or destroy essential records. We 
42 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 43

were hopeful that we could rescue the 

AAM compound and operate from it, once 

the marines arrived to secure the area. It 

was planned and I was so briefed by DAQ 

and the U.S. Marines that the AAM com-

pound would be secured by the U.S. ma-

rines and upon our departure, they would 

destroy (blow up) the AAM facilities. Un-

fortunately for all concerned, the U.S. Ma-

rines did neither. 

Upon arrival at the DAO ECC Dick Wengen-

roth, Stan Huster, Ron Lietchy, Paul Disciullo 

and myself assisted the AAM helicopter pi-

lots with their arrivals and departures, at the 

DAO tennis court pads. 

AAM Captain Filippi told me that we need-

ed to obtain JP-4 fuel for the helicopters and 

he asked me where was the DAO fuel truck. 

I explained that I knew DAO USAF Major 

Cook had an Esso truck as part of the DAO 

ECC planning but I was not involved in their 

(DAO) planning. Not knowing where the 

DAO truck was positioned, Dick Wengen-

roth and myself took a DAO truck and hot-

wired the ignition and proceeded to drive 

around the DAO building 5000 compound 

but were unable to find the JP-4 truck. Then 

I asked Captain Fillppi to obtain a few U.S. 

Marines from ECC and we could go to the 

AAM ramp and bring out some of the 225 

drums of JP-4 we had there. Captain Filippi 

could apparently get no U.S. Marines des-

ignated for this assignment. So I went and 

got one of the AAM pilots to fly over the 

DAO area, with Dick Wengenroth and my-

self searching for the JP-4 truck. We spot-

ted it at the lot around the corner of the 

BX stop and shop building. We returned to 

the ECC and attempted to locate the JP-4 

truck ignition keys. No one knew where the 

keys were, so we flew to the BX LZ pads 

and walked to the lot where the JP-4 truck 

was parked. The lot gate had a padlock on 

it which we broke off. Within about 20 min-

utes we had hotwired the JP-4 truck ignition 

wires, but the truck battery was so weak the 

engine would not start. We considered tow-

ing the JP-4 truck using a nearby tow truck, 

but as the JP-4 truck was a hydromatic if we 

could not start the JP-4 truck engine, then 

we would not be able to pump the JP-4 

from the truck. We then returned to DAO 

ECC by AAM helicopter. We could not find 

any DAO vehicles with a large enough bat-

tery to suit the JP-4 truck needs. So again we 

flew to the BX LZ pads with the thought of 

taking the battery from nearby Isuzu bus and 

use it for the JP-4 truck. This time Stan Hus-

ter accompanied Chuck Wengenroth and 

myself. We switched the batteries, only to 

find out the bus battery was dead. We then 

went back to DAO ECC and again request-

ed Capt. Filippi to provide us with a few U.S. 

Marines so that we could obtain JP-4 fuel 

drums or the standby Esso JP-4 truck from 

the AAM compound. As we again could not 

get any U.S. Marines, for security we elected 

not to re-enter the abandoned AAM com-

pound for fuel. Later while listening to the 

AAM helicopter pilots talking to the AAM 

om at DAO by radio, it was readily evident 

that our pilots were carefully monitoring 

their fuel onboard and programming their 

roof top pickups of people, to enable refu-

eling at the U.S. ships off Vung Tau, where 

the majority of their passengers were being 

taken. The AAM helicopter pilots did a great 

job in fuel management as well as some “can 

do” flying. 

As best I recall the U.S. military helicopters 

started arriving at the DAO BX LZ pads 

about 1500l. The majority of their passen-

gers were local refugees who had been 

programmed out by prior USAF C-141 

and C-130. 

At about 1615l CEO instructed some of 

us to use one of the two AAM helicopters 

at DAO and proceed to the U.S. ships. This 

group along with myself was dropped off at 

the U.S.S. Vancouver, LPD-2. This group of 

AAM employees consisted of Stan Huster, 

Paul Disciullo, Ron Leitchy, Capt. Chester 

Folck, Dick Wengenroth, E. L. Angeles, Vic 

Ballesteros and later we were joined by 

Ed Twifford. The Vietnamese flight me-

chanic with us on n47004 helicopter 

was Mr. Can (I believe) and he was 

taken to the refugee side of our ship 

and I never saw him again. 

Our ship, the U.S.S. Vancouver, finally 

sailed for Subic Bay Philippines on 1 

May about 1915l, and we arrived in 

Philippines about 2130l on 3 May. 

Although we were all processed 

through U.S. and Philippine cus-

toms and immigration by about 

2330l the same night at cubic 

point naval base gym, we were returned 

to the U.S.S. Vancouver for the night because 

the weather at Manila eliminated us from fly-

ing there that night. 

On the morning of 4 May we were flown to 

manila by U.S. military helicopter and sent 

to the Carlton hotel to check in with CEO 

and VP. We arranged our own flight book-

ings and flew from Manila to Hong Kong the 

same afternoon and checked into the prearranged rooms at the Hong Kong Sheraton 

hotel about 1650l. We reported to the AAM 

offices at the peninsula hotel on the morning 

of 5 May.

B.D. Mesecher. 

Director—Technical Services

Air America, Inc. 
44 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 45

I want to thank the Air America pilots for 

rescuing me from the rooftop of the Ameri-

can Embassy in Saigon in the early evening of 

30 April 1975. I had served in Vietnam from 

1 November 1972 to that last day in April 

1975. My name then was Joan Fritz.

Before I was rescued, I had the pleasure of 

working with the Air America pilots on the 

radio. About a week before Saigon fell, I was 

asked to work in the office that coordinated 

with the Air American pilots. The chief there, 

O.B., had broken his glasses and could not 

read; and it was too late for him to get new 

prescription glasses. So, I became his eyes. 

He taught me to work the radio and write 

down the tail numbers of planes when they 

took off and landed. O.B. had, among other 

duties, the responsibility of preparing and 

checking over many different lists involving 

Vietnamese and other personnel scheduled 

to be rescued and ferried out of the country. 

I recognized the importance of his work, and 

I was happy to be able to assist him.

One rather comical part of my rescue oc-

curred when the chopper pilot took a map 

out and started looking at it over the water. 

I did not want to ask him if he knew where 

he was going, so I more tactfully asked him 

whether he had ever landed on an aircraft 

carrier before. He said that he had done so a 

few times, and I was greatly relieved to hear 

the news! The Air America chopper flew me 

to the U.S.S. Hancock. While safely aboard 

the U.S.S. Hancock, I observed some other 

non-Air America helicopters landing on the 

deck of the carrier. Apparently there was 

not room to accommodate all of these he-

licopters, so after the passengers and pilots 

exited them, the helicopters were pushed 

overboard. (No, they didn’t sink the Air 

America choppers!) I was aboard the aircraft carrier for about six days before we 

arrived at Subic Bay in the Philippines.

As I flew out of Saigon on that Air America 

chopper, I remember thinking to myself, this 

is the end of the movie. And I thought then – 

and I continue to think today – about all the 

men and women who served in Vietnam in 

any capacity over the years. Supporting U.S. 

efforts in Vietnam was a sometimes painful 

but ultimately great experience 

for me. I am grateful that I can 

finally give my long-overdue, 

heartfelt Thank You to the Air 

America pilots for my rooftop 

rescue. My colleagues at CIA 

and I honor you for what you 

did for all of us, and we will 

never forget.

 Sincerely,

 Joan Peterson

A Belated Thank You to the Pilots of Air America

“

“
46 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 47

Note: With the declassification of thousands of pages of Air America Corporate and CIA 

formerly-classified documents, historians will be able to read and review information previ-

ously not available, allowing a more rounded and fuller history of Air America. An example of 

this is the following article written by Larry D. Sall, Ph.D., Dean of Libraries at The University 

of Texas at Dallas. Dr Sall reviewed declassified accident report files including the only known 

hijacking of an Air America plane. This is not only a fascinating article but an example of the 

stories to be written with the release of these documents. Also included in this section are 

some examples of the various documents that have been released to the public.
48 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 49

About 5:30 on the afternoon of June 20, 

1964, a Civil Air Transport C-46, Flight B-908, 

took off from Suinan Airport at Taichung on 

the island of Taiwan with 52 passengers and a 

crew of five. Less than 15 minutes later, all on 

board perished when Flight B-908 crashed 

into a rice paddy a few miles north of the 

Suinan airfield. In just released files from the 

Central Intelligence Agency, the story of this 

tragic event is detailed. According to news-

paper accounts at the time, this was the first 

crash of a scheduled domestic flight that Civil 

Air Transport had experienced. 

Why did the CIA maintain files on this Tai-

wanese accident? What could have been its 

interest in such a tragedy that it felt com-

pelled to keep such extensive files? The an-

swer to both questions is straight forward; 

CAT was owned by the CIA and had been 

since the Korean War. CAT was an asset to 

the agency, used to maintain a presence and 

an influence in East Asia. When not operat-

ing during the day as a civilian airline, the CIA 

used CAT’s personnel and equipment for 

clandestine missions. 

CAT was established following World War II 

in China by General Claire Chennault and 

his associate Whiting Willauer to provide air 

transport in China, a country wracked by civil 

war and the devastation left by the Japanese 

invasion. When the Korean Conflict began, 

there was a serious absence of American 

airlift capacity in that part of the world, so 

seeking a solution to the problem, the CIA 

purchased CAT under the cover of a private 

corporation. Thus the CIA came to be operating a civilian airline in Asia and so needed 

to be closely involved in the investigation of 

the crash of Flight B-908. 

Both the Taiwanese authorities and the 

American authorities carefully studied the 

circumstances leading to the crash and its 

aftermath. Among the first questions were: 

what were the conditions at the time of the 

crash and could they have been a contribut-

ing factor? The flight took off in daylight, in 

clear weather over flat terrain, and according 

to eyewitnesses the takeoff appeared entirely 

normal. As Flight B-908 flew past the airfield, 

the pilot indicated everything was normal 

and said he would see the tower personnel 

the next day.

Taking off to the south and heading on a 

round island route with its next stop sched-

uled to be Taipei, the plane made a 180-de-

gree turn to the east and headed north when 

suddenly it veered sharply to the west and 

began a steep descent from an altitude of 

approximately 1500 feet. Flight B-908 struck 

the ground at an angle of about 30 degrees 

with its nose and left wing down. The C-46 

was destroyed by the impact with only the 

tail section remaining more or less intact. The 

wreckage was scattered over a 200-300 me-

ter square area in a rice paddy and a ditch.

Farmers working nearby heard the plane de-

scending and saw it crash. The consensus was 

that the plane was fully intact before impact; 

there was no sign of smoke or fire prior to 

impact, and the engines did not sound un-

usual. First on the scene were the farmers 

who could find no sign of survivors; they 

also reported that fire broke out in some 

The Crash of Civil Air Transport Flight B-908

By Larry D. Sall, Ph.D., 

Dean of Libraries at The University of Texas at Dallas

places in the wreckage, but these fires did 

not spread and soon died out. When the lo-

cal police arrived shortly after the crash, they 

took charge of the scene. Chinese Civil Avia-

tion Authorities did not reach the area until 

about twelve hours later. CAT personnel arrived soon after and were kept from handling 

the remains or wreckage while the Chinese 

officials pursued their initial investigation.

In its own report CAT noted that the “sud-

den transition from normal climbing flight in 

the direction of Taipei to a sharp turn to the 

left and diving into the ground almost certainly establishes only two possible causes: 

a. A sudden and major mechanical trouble 

which made it impossible for the pilots 

to control the aircraft.

b. Sudden incapacitation or restraint of 

both pilots which rendered them unable 

to control the aircraft through some act 

of other aircraft occupants.”

After an exhaustive investigation of the 

plane’s mechanical condition, both prior to 

and following the crash, the only significant 

questions were the condition of two control 

cables found broken following the crash, a 

claim that the left engine was over speeding 

at the time of the crash, and the condition 

of the pilots. CAT’s analysis of the propel-

ler hubs and gears indicated both propellers 

were set at the proper pitch, and other clues 

including reports from people on the ground 

found no indication that either engine was 

performing outside of expected parameters. 

The broken control cables were sent to labo-

ratories in the United States for analysis. The 

normal stress on the cables when functioning 

was about 20 pounds while the cables them-

selves were rated to handle 1000 pounds. 

Also it was noted that during the crash the 

cables had cut into the fuselage. While after 

their initial investigation Chinese officials re-

garded the broken cables as contributing fac-

tors, further tests indicated the cables broke 

during the crash when subjected to extreme 

stress. Also, even if the cables had broken in 

flight, according to CAT the two onboard 

pilots would have been able to control the 

aircraft with little difficulty. In addition CAT’s 

report stated that had an engine over accel-

erated, as was initially suspected by the local 

authorities, both pilots would have had no 

trouble dealing with that issue either.

Upon discovering that pilot Bengee Lin’s body 

was not strapped into his seat, the Chinese 

authorities initially believed that the he had 

behaved in an overconfident manner that 

could have led to the crash. This was further 

investigated by CAT. The crash was so 

violent that the pi-

lot’s seat was com-

pletely torn apart, 

which CAT felt 

explained why 

the pilot’s body 

was not found 

with the seat. 

Also both 

pilots were 

e x t r e m e ly 

competent 

and expe-

rienced.

So if there was no 

“sudden and major mechani-

cal trouble,” what might have caused 

the “sudden incapacitation or restraint of 

both pilots?” The two pilots, Bengee Lin, the 

Pilot in Command, and M. H. Kung, Second in 

Command, had extensive C-46 experience. 

Pilot Bengee Lin had 17 years of flight ex-

perience, having logged 11,881 hours, 4,914 

of them in a C-46. M.H. Kung had been a 
50 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 51

professional pilot for 19 years with 13,074 

hours logged of which 9,270 were in a C-46. 

Both pilots were in good physical condition 

according to their most recent examinations, 

and both were regarded as mentally healthy. 

The likelihood that both would collapse simultaneously would have been remote in 

the extreme.

If the pilots were not incapacitated by individual physical maladies, and mechanical problems had been ruled out, that left 

the most troubling possibility: the pilots 

had been rendered “unable to control the 

aircraft through some act of other aircraft 

occupants.” The likelihood that this was the 

case became stronger when two .45 caliber 

automatic pistols were found in the wreckage. The hammer was found in the cocked 

position with the carriage forward on one of 

the pistols. Two radar manuals were found in 

the debris the day after the crash. The inside 

pages of both manuals had been hollowed 

out in the shape of a .45 caliber automatic. 

Neither pistol was found with the manuals.

Lt. Tseng Yang, an engineering officer in the 

Chinese Navy, had checked out the manuals 

from the library of the Chinese Navy’s Peng 

Hu Ship Building Yard No. 2. Also, two pistols 

had been reported missing from the Armory 

of the Peng Hu Ship Building Yard No. 2. 

What was Lt. Tseng’s story? He was listed as 

a passenger on Flight B-908 along with a civilian companion, Wang Tseng Yee. On June 

17 a civilian, Wang Tseng Yee, made reservations for himself and Lt. Tseng Yang to fly the 

following day to Makung/Taipei. However, on 

the 18th Lt. Tseng changed the reservation 

to June 20th. That day Lt. Tseng checked in 

about 3:30 p.m. in the afternoon wearing his 

navy uniform and with no checked luggage.

One conclusion can be drawn immediately; Lt. Tseng had no intent of returning the 

manuals to the library as they had been 

ruined before being taken on the plane. Lt. 

Tseng would also have had access to both 

the pistols and the manuals, immediately 

pointing suspicion at him. Because both Lt. 

Tseng and Wang Tseng Yee had booked the 

flight for each other, the circumstantial case 

against them as co-conspirators is extremely 

strong. During the investigation of the crash 

site, while the victim’s bodies were being recovered, one body with its abdomen ripped 

open was found near the pilots’ bodies. It 

was passenger Wang’s body, and according to 

the medical examiner, the nature of Wang’s 

injuries indicated he was standing at the moment of impact. 

The Chinese medical examiner, Dr. W. S. 

Cheng, noticed “a small hole at the right side 

of the face” of Pilot Bengee Lin in a photograph made by the Chinese security division 

at the crash site. He also observed that “approximately from that hole a large part of 

the front of the face and skull was thrown 

open and to the left and upward.” Dr. Cheng 

also reported that following the cremation 

of Co-pilot M. H. Kung, a three-inch spike 

was found in the ashes. The source of the 

spike was unknown.

It appears from the evidence that for reasons unknown, Lt. Tseng and passenger 

Wang attempted to take control of Flight 

B-908 shortly after takeoff. In that attempt 

the pilots were incapacitated; possibly Pilot Bengee Lin was shot and Co-pilot Kung 

was stabbed. In any event, both pilots were 

rendered incapable of flying the plane, and 

it crashed. What the motive of the alleged 

hijackers may have been is not clear. That 

they were suicidal is a remote possibility, 

but a more likely possibility was that they 

wanted to take the plane to the Chinese 

Mainland which was just across the Taiwan 

Straits from Taichung. In any event, 55 innocent people died as a result of this act 

of terror, including 19 Americans, a Korean 

flight attendant, and 35 Chinese people. 
52 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 53
54 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 55
56 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 57

So ends the last 

sentence of the final 

paragraph of a saga that 

may have an epilogue, but 

never a sequel.
58 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 59

On Sunday the 30th of June 1974 the last 

flight schedule was published at the Air 

America Udorn, Thailand Base. Two Volpar 

Beech aircraft flown by Berl King and Jim 

Rhyne were being ferried to Saigon, Vietnam. 

Both King and Rhyne are aviation icons. This 

faded mimeographed schedule must surely 

hang framed on many an ex-employee’s wall 

as it does mine. 

C.J. Abadie, the Air America Vice President 

for Northern Thailand, asked his Assistant 

Richard Ford to write an appropriate com-

mentary to be printed on the last flight 

schedule for this last day of operations in the 

Thailand/Laos region, 

“So ends the last sentence of the final para-

graph of a saga that may have an epilogue, 

but never a sequel. It has been to each participating individual an experience which 

varied according to their role and perspec-

tive. However, there is a common bond of 

knowledge and satisfaction of having taken 

part in something worthwhile, and with just 

a slight sense of pity for those lesser souls 

who could not, or would not, share in it. 

This last flight schedule is dedicated to those 

for whom a previous similar schedule repre-

sented an appointment with their destiny.” 

Air America continued to fly the custom-

er’s requirements in Vietnam. Those operations came to an inglorious end in April 

of 1975. These events were recorded by 

film and have been viewed by the entire 

world for the last 34 years. This was a sad 

end to this saga that should have conclud-

ed much differently. 

Civil Air Transport (CAT) began USG con-

tract operations in Vientiane Laos in 1957. 

This division of CAT became Air America in 

1959. The purpose of this aviation company 

in the Kingdom of Lao at the time was largely 

humanitarian. CAT/Air America aircraft flew 

many missions to drop food (rice) to Lao and 

Hmoung in northern Laos after a bad harvest. In 1961 the company added rotor wing 

(helicopter) aircraft based in Udorn which 

greatly increased operational capabilities. 

Short field Takeoff/Landing (STOL) aircraft 

had also been added to the fleet. These types 

of specialized aircraft required exceptionally 

skilled pilots, loadmasters, and maintenance 

support. Operations control, area security 

information specialists, and logistical capabil-

ity developed to support flight operations in 

a very difficult and often dangerous environ-

ment. Navigation aids, landing strip and HLZ 

development, and weather forecasting services were rudimentary at best. 

The ability of the CAT/Air America man-

agement to find, train, and control what we 

knew to be a very unusual (the term crazy is 

often used) team of employees for so many 

years, is now acknowledged as absolutely 

astounding. Over forty nationalities, worked, 

played, and often bled together. “Their indi-

vidual experiences varied according to their 

role and perspective.”

There were heroes and villains of course, 

as in any form of quasi-military human en-

deavor. But for those who toiled throughout 

the CAT/Air America, SAT, and Air Asia sys-

tem, as well as our brothers in direct govern-

ment service - the ‘Customers”, Continental 

Air Services (brand ‘X’) who were involved 

throughout this part and place of American 

Why We Care History, - who would have imagined that after 

nearly four decades that “common bond” re-

mains so much a part of our lives. This bond 

is as solid and viable today as it was then, is 

now, and forever will be. - (except, of course, 

for those same lesser souls, who cannot or 

will not understand why.) 

As civilian veterans of a very sad and misun-

derstood conflict in South Asia, we have not 

fared well in the media, or in some literature. 

Even though company aircraft and crews 

rescued more than 150 downed U.S. airmen, 

provided food and medical aid to thousands 

of refugees, assisted our primary customer’s 

directed Lao and Hmong forces in holding 

down 2 crack NVA divisions until 1974 when 

they were released to participate in the final 

siege of Saigon that ended the war, very few 

knew or cared. But we knew that we had 

“taken part in something worthwhile.”

The continued myths of customer/Air America participation in drug trafficking are still 

being found and published by unknowing and 

uncaring writers. The silly ‘Air America’ movie 

advanced this agenda by those who seek to 

savage the reputation of this great country, 

our customers, and our fellow workers. 

So why do we care? Our fraternity—The 

CAT/Air America associations exists large-

ly because we see and believe it is proper 

and necessary to meet periodically; to ac-

cess our mutual place in history, learn of our 

consequences, and celebrate the lives of our 

friends and associates—our family, and particularly those who have gone before. We 

should continue to build and strengthen this 

legacy which history will receive from us. It is 

our ‘epilogue’.

Over the years there was never a concen-

trated effort to refute these fables. We 

now 

see that it is 

possible and entirely proper 

to stand up and confront those who would 

tarnish our history. Though the efforts of 

the Central Intelligence Agency who has 

provided the materials, and the McDermott Library at The University of Texas at 

Dallas, who has archived the true and ac-

curate records for the unbiased students 

of history, we are greatly appreciative. We 

also are grateful that the Vietnam Center 

at the Texas Tech University that also pro-

vides excellent resources to serious stu-

dents of history. This association is proud 

that so many of our members have con-

tributed their personal accounts.

CAT/Air America associations are indebted 

to the McDermott Library where our Me-

morial plaque is located. It is our ‘Wall’ and 

provides a place for quiet and respectful con-

templation of the lives of our brothers whose 

names were on the flight schedule of destiny. 

“And God will raise you up on eagle’s wings, 

bear you on the breath of dawn, make you 

shine like the sun, and hold you in the palm 

of His hand.”

And hear the piper, 

L. Michael Kandt, 

Chaplain and General Secretary 

Air America Association, Inc.

Earthquake's Final Flight by Jeffrey W. Bass Donated Courtesy of the Fairchild Corporation
60 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 61

Robert P Abrams

25 October 1964 

James H Ackley

MIA

Rizal S J AlaMarches

13 November 1965 

Alfredo J Alor

19 May 1972

Prinya Ashavanond

1 October 1967 

Timoteo Bagnot

8 March 1969 

Howland D Baker

12 September 1964 

John M Bannerman

23 November 1972 

Paul C Barrow

15 April 1967 

Nai Bay

4 October 1963 

William H Beale Jr

6 April 1962 

John W Beardsley

10 March 1970 

Wallace H Bell

13 October 1962 

Edmund J Benkert

28 November 1967 

David W Bevan

13 August 1961 

Roelf Bijil

17 November 1967 

Gerald A Booth

17 July 1969 

Howard H Boyles Jr

MIA

Earle E Bruce Jr

8 August 1967 

Wallace Bufford

6 May 1954 

Lawrence R Buol

26 May 1956 

William P Cagney

26 July 1962 

Antonio C Calderon

17 June 1967 

James C Campbell

18 June 1968 

Reynaldo Castillo

8 September 1972 

Pablo C Castro

12 March 1963 

Jack W Cavill

MIA

Montano L Centeno

27 July 1969 

Prasit Chaichana

9 February 1973 

W K Chan

29 July 1948 

Ampol Chan Aium

24 December 1967 

W H “Jimmy” Chang

9 December 1950 

Yung Kung Chang

20 June 1964 

Johnny Y H Chang

14 January 1966 

Banching Chanluachai

11 June 1971 

K V Chen

8 November 1949 

N C Chen

20 June 1964 

C K Chen

20 June 1964 

H S Chen

20 June 1964 

Ching Ching Chen

20 June 1964 

Vivian Chen

16 February 1968 

JoSeptemberh C Cheney

5 September 1963 

Chudchai Chewcherngsuk

MIA

Suthi Chimpaibul

23 November 1972 

Duong Chinh

20 March 1968 

H G Cho

20 June 1964 

H Y Choi

20 June 1964 

C C Chou

20 June 1964 

Herbert W Clark

2 June 1971 

Terry D Clark

7 April 1973 

Kevin N Cochrane

10 April 1970 

Benjamin F Coleman

25 July 1972 

John J Cooney

8 August 1967 

Romeo B Crisologo

9 April 1966 

Robert N Crone

12 February 1969 

Ernesto M Cruz

10 January 1971 

Cecelio Daque

14 January 1973 

Ralph S Davis

19 August 1969 

Eugene H Debruin

MIA

Victor Dejamco

20 April 1966 

The CAT/Air America Memorial Plaque 

Gerald C Delong

10 April 1970 

Rafael A DeVera

24 July 1962 

Charles T Dieffenbach

22 July 1964 

Reggie Dimaculangan

22 December 1967 

Carlos Dominguez

30 March 1971 

Clarence N Driver

MIA

Jean H Dubuque

16 July 1960 

Bernardo L Dychitan

7 December 1968 

Wayne W Esminger

6 March 1966 

Darrel A Eubanks

13 August 1961 

Frank Farthing

11 January 1967 

Roberto O Finney

2 December 1972 

Norwood N Forte

13 August 1961 

Benjamin A Franklin

11 January 1967 

William J Fraser

7 December 1968 

Vincente B Garza

MIA

William J Gibbs

13 May 1969 

Norman A Grammer

14 August 1969 

John Grover

25 July 1972 

Joel M Gudahl

27 August 1972 

Nguyen van Hahn

16 January 1972 

Y S Har

29 July 1948 

Truett H Harper

6 March 1970 

Robert Hartle

28 April 1972 

Howard F Heinrich

4 February 1962 

Robert Heising

9 December 1950 

Charles C Heritage

27 November 1968 

Charles G Herrick

5 September 1963 

Billy K Hester

10 April 1970 

Fu Shuyong Ho

13 September 1967 

Emmons B Hodgkins Jr

25 November 1968 

Paul Holden

7 June 1967 

D M Hoskins

18 June 1972 

Kenneth A Houp

17 March 1971 

Jack T Houston

5 December 1967 

Tsuan ho Hsieh

27 December 1963 

T H Hu

20 June 1964 

Quang Huang Du

11 July 1964 

Hua Ming Huang

16 October 1968 

Throng Lien Huynh

12 August 1971 

Alfredo Joco

31 July 1966 

Norman R Jones

8 November 1949 

Charles D Jones

5 March 1965 

K C Kan

20 June 1964 

Niram Kasorphon

3 July 1973 

Howard W Kelly

16 January 1969 

Throngkham Khammanephet

27 August 1972 

Souphang Khamphanh

2 March 1969 

Thanom Khanthaphengxay

25 July 1972 

Paul Y H King

16 February 1968 

George Kirkland

22 July 1973 

Mu Shuen Kung

20 June 1964 

Manu Latoi

18 April 1974 

Thi Mau Le

5 September 1965 

Xuan Duc Le

4 February 1962 

Hsu Chiu Lee

4 February 1962 

Z T Lee

17 August 1963 

C Y Lee

20 June 1964 

Ruby Lee

20 June 1964 

Robert E Lee

5 May 1968 

V L Lee Jr

27 July 1974

Arthur Leonard

1 December 1969

John S Lewis

13 August 1961 

Richard H Lieberth

12 October 1965 

Benji Lin

20 June 1964 

Herbert Liu

27 December 1963 
62 AIR AMERICA UPHOLDING THE AIRMEN’S BOND 63

Nicholas B Loss

11 December 1967 

Justin G Mahony

27 September 1965 

Feliciano C Manalo

16 July 1972 

Abdul H Marchecar

6 December 1972 

Bruce C Massey

23 March 1967 

Charles H Mateer

30 May 1961 

Milton N Matheson

16 January 1969 

L T Mau

5 April 1969 

Patrick F McCarthy

7 December 1968 

Charles J McCarthy

23 November 1972 

James B McGrovern

6 May 1954 

Roger B McKean

10 April 1970 

William L Meek

31 December 1973 

Jon Christian Merkel

18 February 1970 

Charuk Milindre

17 July 1963 

Robert S Moore

3 December 1972 

Vincent Morales

1 July 1968 

Harry E Mulholland

29 April 1971 

Jon Charles Murray

25 November 1968 

Thomas J Murray

4 March 1969 

Frank Muscal

3 October 1965 

Caferino B Nabung

11 July 1961 

Kenekeo Narissack

MIA

Gideon A Newton

17 July 1963 

Edward Norwich

19 July 1949 

Charles L Osterman

7 April 1973 

Norman M Owens

22 October 1967 

John L Oyer

27 September 1965 

Cornelio N Pascual

18 August 1964 

W A Peng

MIA

Phanomphom Phochan

24 December 1967 

Hua Khan Phuoc

31 December 1966 

Nguyen Thi Phuoc

5 April 1969 

Lowell Z Pirkle

3 August 1967 

Lester M Porter

25 November 1968 

Harvey B Potter

2 March 1970 

Billy P Pratt

22 September 1971 

Prasit Promsuwan

MIA

Gerald I Prudhomme

17 July 1963 

William P Pruner

14 January 1966 

Lloyd Randel

24 April 1972 

James A Rasmussen

18 February 1962 

Kosoom Ratanakosoom

24 December 1967 

James E Rausch

12 June 1972 

William E Reeves

27 August 1972 

Baltazar Reyes

25 November 1968 

Frederick J Riley

27 November 1962 

George L Ritter

MIA

Hury D Rogers

10 April 1970 

Valeriano P Rosales

7 April 1973 

Coonrang Samburan

17 February 1972 

Albert Sandoval

24 August 1964 

Roger J Sarno

13 August 1961 

Meiko Sase

11 April 1969 

Praves Satarsakij

27 August 1972 

Khamphonh Saysongkham

MIA

Alexander Scandalis

5 July 1965 

The CAT/Air America Memorial Plaque (cont.)

Norman A Schwartz

3 December 1952 

Welcome A Scott

30 September 1960 

Pratheep Sermsakul

11 October 1971 

K H Shia

20 June 1964 

K H Shih

20 June 1964 

Buncha Sirisapya

4 July 1969 

Milton E SMarcht

10 April 1970 

Franklin D Smith

12 October 1965 

Thomas C Smith

22 February 1969 

Wilson P Smith

15 March 1973 

Robert C Snoddy

3 December 1952 

Louis B Soha

9 October 1956

B Somchai

23 November 1972 

R Somphone

16 February 1966 

Khamouth Sousadalay

4 February 1972 

Sampas Sreesuraj

6 January 1968 

Somboon Sripa

6 January 1968 

Herbert S Strouss

4 February 1962 

William J Sullivan

12 April 1962 

Eduardo T Sunga

26 November 1968 

Betty Tang

16 February 1968 

Narong Tantilohakul

17 July 1963 

Clyde T Tarbet

29 July 1948 

James Tate

26 June 1967 

Nguyen Van Thai

14 January 1966 

Prasidhi Thanee

MIA

Frank G Thorsen

32 July 1973 

Trikit Thuttanon

2 June 1971 

Yik Chiu To

MIA

S L (Eddie) Tong

26 November 1960 

Nit Tongkorn

24 December 1967 

Jaime Torres

19 March 1967 

Vichit Tovira

18 June 1968 

Roy F Townley

MIA

Earl Trager

7 December 1969 

T B Trai

22 June 1969 

Leon M Tucker

21 September 1966 

B Y Van

20 June 1964 

Tu Van

28 August 1972 

George A Varney

6 April 1962 

George A Verdon

17 July 1963 

Boumy Vongachak

28 December 1970 

S C Wang

2 June 1971 

Arnold Weir

1 April 1949 

Edward A Weissenback

MIA

T W Wen

9 December 1950 

H C Weng

20 June 1964 

Leonard I Wiehrdt

8 April 1972 

John W Wilmont Jr

19 May 1966 

Walter L Wizbowski

30 May 1961 

K S Wong

26 November 1960 

Glen R Woods

14 August 1969 

Aubrey A Wooten

17 July 1963 

Morimitsu Yazima

20 June 1962 

C Youthipana

22 July 1966

L S Yu

27 December 1963 

Chaveng Yuphaphin

25 November 1968
64 AIR AMERICA