No. 15-1455 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

STOP RECKLESS ECONOMIC INSTABILITY CAUSED BY 

DEMOCRATS PAC, TEA PARTY LEADERSHIP FUND, 

ALEXANDRIA REPUBLICAN CITY COMMITTEE, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

AMERICAN FUTURE PAC, 

Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Virginia 

RESPONSE BRIEF OF APPELLEE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

Lisa J. Stevenson Kevin P. Hancock 

Deputy General Counsel – Law Attorney 

 

Kevin Deeley FOR THE APPELLEE 

Acting Associate General Counsel FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

 999 E Street NW 

Harry J. Summers Washington, DC 20463 

Assistant General Counsel (202) 694-1650 

 

August 10, 2015 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

JURISDICTIONAL COUNTERSTATEMENT ................................................. 1 

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ...................................................... 1 

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................... 2 

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................... 2 

A. The Federal Election Campaign Act and Its Contribution 

Limits ............................................................................................... 2 

B. Political Committees ....................................................................... 7 

C. FECA’s Limits on Contributions from PACs to Candidates .......... 7 

D. FECA’s Limits on Contributions from PACs to Political Parties ... 8 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ............................ 10 

A. Appellants’ Claims ........................................................................ 10 

B. Appellant Stop PAC and Former Plaintiffs Niger Innis and 

Niger Innis for Congress ............................................................... 11 

C. Appellant-Intervenor American Future PAC ................................ 13 

D. Appellants Tea Party Leadership Fund and Alexandria 

Republican City Committee .......................................................... 14 

III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S RULING DENYING THE 

POLITICAL COMMITEES’ CLAIMS .................................................. 15 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................................................... 16 

ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................... 18 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................... 18 

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II. THE POLITICAL COMMITTEES’ CLAIMS ARE NOT 

JUSTICIABLE ........................................................................................ 19 

A. Stop PAC Caused Its Own Alleged Injury .................................... 19 

 

B. Because Stop PAC Lacks Standing, American Future PAC’s 

Later Intervention Did Not Revive Stop PAC’s Claims ............... 21 

C. Counts I and II Are Moot Because Stop PAC and American 

Future PAC Are No Longer Subject to the Six-Month 

Period or $2,700 Limit .................................................................. 22 

D. Count III Is Moot Since the Tea Party Fund Can Now 

Contribute the Amounts It Alleged It Wanted to or 

It Is Too Late to Do So .................................................................. 25 

E. The Political Committees Have Alleged No Potential Future 

Harm to Justify the Forward-Looking Relief They Seek .............. 26 

 

III. THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY REJECTED THE 

CLAIMS THE POLITICAL COMMITTEES ASSERT AGAINST 

THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD AND THE $2,700 CONTRIBUTION 

LIMIT (COUNTS I & II) ........................................................................ 27 

IV. THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST 

AMENDMENT (COUNT II) .................................................................. 29 

A. The District Court Correctly Held That the Differences in 

Contribution-Limit Amounts Caused the Political 

Committees No Cognizable First Amendment Injury ................. 29 

 

B. The Six-Month Period Is Closely Drawn to Further 

Important Government Interests .................................................... 33 

 

1. The Six-Month Period Helps Prevent Individuals from 

Using Dummy PACs to Circumvent the $2,700 Limit ....... 34 

a. The Six-Month Period Acts as a 

“Protective Shield” for the $5,000 Limit ................. 34 

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b. Stop PAC and American Future PAC Illustrate 

That a Serious Threat of Circumvention 

Exists Today ............................................................. 39 

2. The Six-Month Period Helps Promote Campaign 

Finance Disclosure .............................................................. 44 

3. The Six-Month Period Is Closely Drawn to the 

Government’s Important Interests ...................................... 45 

V. THE CONTRIBUTION-LIMIT AMOUNTS THAT THE POLITICAL 

COMMITTEES CHALLENGE DO NOT VIOLATE THE FIFTH 

AMENDMENT (COUNTS I & III) ........................................................ 49 

A. FECA Does Not Discriminate Against the 

Political Committees ..................................................................... 49 

B. New PACs Are Not Situated Similarly to 

Multicandidate PACs .................................................................... 51 

C. Because the Political Committees Did Not Suffer a 

Cognizable First Amendment Injury, Rational Basis 

Scrutiny Applies to Their Fifth Amendment Claims .................... 53 

D. The Contribution-Limit Amounts the Political Committees 

Challenge Are Closely Drawn to Important 

Government Interests .................................................................... 54 

1. The $2,700 Contribution Limit Applied to New PACs 

Is Closely Drawn to the Important Government 

Interests of Preventing Circumvention and Promoting 

Disclosure (Count I) ............................................................ 54 

2. The Limits on PAC Contributions to Political Parties 

Are Closely Drawn to Anti-Corruption Interests 

and Allow the Parties to Amass the Resources 

Necessary for Effective Advocacy (Count III) ................... 55 

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 61 

 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases Page 

Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1989) ................................................ 23 

Becton v. Greene Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.R.D. 220 (E.D.N.C. 1963) ....... 21-22 

Black v. Cent. Motor Lines, Inc., 500 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1974) ........................ 21 

Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011) ........................................ 59 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ........................................................... passim 

Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2002) ............................... 18 

Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981)......................................... 3, 30, 50 

Catholic Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409 

(5th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................... 25 

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).......................................... 4, 37, 47 

City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) ..................................................... 26-27 

Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) 

(“Colorado I”) ................................................................................... 30, 47, 55 

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) ..................................... 19 

Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) .............................................................. 22-23 

Doe v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 713 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 2013) ........................ 21 

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) ........................................................... 24 

Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011) ............ 49 

FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) ........................................ 49 

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FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) ........................................................ 4, 33 

FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 

(2001) (“Colorado II”) ........................................................................ 4, 33, 56 

 

FEC v. Machinists Non-Partisan Pol. League, 655 F.2d 380 

(D.C. Cir. 1981) ............................................................................................ 48 

FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) .................................. 22-23 

First Nat’l Bank of Bost. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) ............................ 46-47 

Helton v. AT&T Inc., 709 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2013) .......................................... 26

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) ................................................................... 24 

Hous. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 193 F.3d 838 (4th Cir. 1999) ............................ 21 

Ill. Liberty PAC v. Madigan, 902 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (N.D. Ill. 2012) ........... 53-55 

Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2007) ............................................. 22 

Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368 (6th Cir. 2005) .................................. 24-25 

Libertarian Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 930 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D.D.C. 2013) ............ 43 

Lux v. Judd, 651 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 2011) ......................................................... 23 

Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003).............................................. 24-25 

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) ............ 4, 8, 19, 30, 45, 51, 55-56, 59, 61 

McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) .................................. 39, 45, 47, 60 

Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) ............................................................. 24

N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. 

Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008) ....................................................... 23, 45 

N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999) .................. 4, 46 

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Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) .................................. 3, 30 

Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2011) ....................................... 53, 55 

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) ..................................... 43 

Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2011) ........................................ 4, 45-46 

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) ................................................ 31, 55, 59 

Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d 876 (4th Cir. 2015) .............................................. 26 

Riddle v. Hickenlooper, 742 F.3d 922 (10th Cir. 2014) .................................... 54 

Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) ............................................... 20, 24 

Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2000) ...................................... 24 

Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 1996) ....................... 23 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) ............................. 19 

Stop This Insanity, Inc. Emp. Leadership Fund v. FEC, 761 F.3d 10 

(D.C. Cir. 2014) ...................................................................................... 44, 51 

Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) ............................................................... 24 

U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) ................................... 24 

United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012) ........................... 4, 27 

Van Wie v. Pataki, 267 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2001)................................................ 23 

Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2002) ............................................. 51-52 

Wagner v. FEC, --- F.3d ---, No. 13-5162, 2015 WL 4079575 

(D.C. Cir. July 7, 2015) ..................................................... 4, 32-33, 43, 53, 55 

Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) .......................................... 48 

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Woodhouse v. Me. Comm’n on Gov’tal Ethics and Election Practices, 

 40 F. Supp. 3d 186 (D. Me. 2014) ................................................................ 54 

Statutes and Regulations 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, §§ 102, 

307(a)(1)-(2), (d), 116 Stat. 81 (Mar. 27, 2002) ........................................... 57 

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. 

113-235, Div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. 2130 (Dec. 16, 2014) ................................ 9 

Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-46 .................................... 2 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)(A) ................................................................................ 7 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(11) .................................................................................... 8 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(14)-(15) ............................................................................ 7 

52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(1) .................................................................................. 7 

52 U.S.C. § 30104 ........................................................................................... 4 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(4)(A) .......................................................................... 44 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b) .................................................................................... 44 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(4)(A)(ii) ..................................................................... 44 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a) .................................................................................... 48 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a) ...................................................................................... 3 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A) ...................................................................... 7, 11 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B) ......................................................................... 8-9 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B)-(D) ................................................................... 38 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2)(A) ............................................................................ 8 

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52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2)(B)-(C) ..................................................................... 8 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(4) ........................................................................... 8, 29 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(5) ................................................................................ 39 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8) ................................................................................ 39 

52 U.S.C. §§ 30118-19 ................................................................................... 5 

52 U.S.C. § 30121 ........................................................................................... 5 

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-283, 

§ 112, 90 Stat. 475 (May 11, 1976) .............................................................. 56 

11 C.F.R. § 100.5(a) ........................................................................................... 36 

11 C.F.R. § 102.1(d) .......................................................................................... 36 

11 C.F.R. § 102.7(a) ........................................................................................... 36 

11 C.F.R. § 103.2 ............................................................................................... 36 

11 C.F.R. § 104.1(b) ...................................................................................... 7, 19 

Legislative History 

120 Cong. Rec. H7810 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1974) .......................................... 35-36 

120 Cong. Rec. S4461 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1974) ........................................ 35, 38 

120 Cong. Rec. S18527 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974) ............................................... 37 

148 Cong. Rec. S2153 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) .............................................. 57 

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1057 (1976) ........................................................................... 57 

S. Rep. No. 96-319 (1979), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 946. ................... 37 

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Miscellaneous 

4th Cir. R. 25(a)(1)(D) ....................................................................................... 10 

77 Fed. Reg. 9925-01 (Feb. 21, 2012) ................................................................. 5 

80 Fed. Reg. 5750-02 (Feb. 3, 2015) ............................................................... 5, 7 

Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, http://www.bls.gov 

/data/inflation_calculator.htm ....................................................................... 31 

Editorial Reclassification Table, http://uscode.house.gov/ 

editorialreclassification/t52/Reclassifications_Title_52.html ........................ 2 

FEC Candidate and Committee Viewer, http://www.fec.gov/finance 

/disclosure/candcmte_info.shtml .................................................................. 41 

FEC Press Release, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the 

2011-2012 Election Cycle (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.fec.gov/press 

/press2013/20130419_2012-24m-Summary.shtml. ..................................... 58 

FEC Press Release, Party Committees Raise More Than $1 Billion in 

2001-2002 (Mar. 20, 2003), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2003 

/20030320party/20030103party.html ........................................................... 57 

FECA Amendments, 1979, Hearing Before the Comm. on Rules and 

Admin. U.S. Senate, 96th Cong. 145 (1979) ................................................. 36 

Final Report of the Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 

S. Rep. No. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) .................................... 34, 45 

Matea Gold, Tea Party PACs Reap Money for Midterms, but Spend 

Little on Candidates, Wash. Post (Apr. 26, 2014), 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 

tea-party-pacs-reap-money-for-midterms-but-spend-little-oncandidates/2014/04/26/ 

0e52919a-cbd6-11e3-a75e-463587891b57_story.html ................................ 52 

Reply Br. of the Appellants, Buckley v. Valeo, Nos. 75-436, 75-437, 

1975 WL 171458 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1975) .............................................. 28-29, 38

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JURISDICTIONAL COUNTERSTATEMENT 

This Court lacks jurisdiction over all claims under Article III of the U.S. 

Constitution because appellants lack standing and their claims are moot, as 

explained below. See infra pp. 19-27. Otherwise, the Court would have had 

jurisdiction for the reasons stated in appellants’ jurisdictional statement. 

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

(1) Justiciability. Appellants are political committees that wanted to 

contribute more money than the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) 

permitted to certain federal candidates and political parties last year. The 2014 

elections are over, and FECA either allowed or now allows appellants to contribute 

the amounts they wanted to contribute. Have appellants failed to present an Article 

III case or controversy? 

 (2) First Amendment. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court upheld 

FECA’s requirement that a political committee be registered with the Federal 

Election Commission for six months before it can contribute $5,000 instead of 

$2,700 per election to candidates. Appellants challenge the same six-month 

provision. Should their claims be denied under this directly applicable Supreme 

Court authority given that the six-month period does not significantly burden 

appellants’ rights and is closely drawn to serve important government interests? 

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 (3) Equal Protection. Congress may set contribution limits at levels that 

treat different political actors differently, based on multiple factors including the 

risk of corruption and the recipient’s need for funds to advocate effectively. 

Appellants failed to prove they are situated similarly to committees with the higher 

contribution limits they prefer, and they ask the courts to rewrite Congress’s limits 

based on just one factor. Did the district court correctly hold that their claims fail 

under the intermediate scrutiny that applies? 

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE 

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 

A. The Federal Election Campaign Act and Its Contribution Limits 

The FEC is an independent federal agency that is responsible for 

administering, interpreting, and civilly enforcing the Federal Election Campaign 

Act of 1971 (“FECA”), 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-46 (formerly 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-57).1

 In 

1974, Congress revised FECA in response to the Watergate scandal and the 

“deeply disturbing” reports from the 1972 federal elections of contributors giving 

large amounts of money to candidates “to secure a political quid pro quo.” Buckley 

v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839-

 

1

 Last year, FECA was moved from Title 2 to Title 52 of the United States 

Code. See Editorial Reclassification Table, http://uscode.house.gov/ 

editorialreclassification/t52/Reclassifications_Title_52.html (last visited Aug. 10, 

2015). 

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40 (D.C. Cir. 1975). With that revision, Congress intended to “limit the actuality 

and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial 

contributions.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. To that end, FECA limits contributions to 

candidates for federal office and to political committees. See 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a). FECA also requires candidates and political committees to disclose 

publicly what they spend and receive through reports filed with the FEC. See id. 

§ 30104. 

Shortly after Congress revised FECA, the Supreme Court upheld the new 

law’s contribution limits and disclosure requirements against First and Fifth 

Amendment challenges in the seminal campaign finance ruling Buckley v. Valeo. 

The Court found that a contribution limit only “marginal[ly]” restricts a 

contributor’s First Amendment rights. 424 U.S. at 20-21. The Court therefore 

applied “closely drawn” scrutiny, a form of intermediate (not strict) scrutiny. Id. at 

25. Buckley then upheld FECA’s $1,000 limit on contributions to candidates, 

finding that it furthered the government’s important interests in limiting the risk 

and appearance of corruption. Id. at 23-29. 

Following Buckley, courts including this Court have routinely upheld federal 

and state contribution limits. See, e.g., Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 193-

99 (1981); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390-98 (2000); FEC v. 

Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456-65 (2001) 

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(“Colorado II”); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152-63 (2003); McConnell v. 

FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 133-89 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens 

United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 

F.3d 705, 713-18 (4th Cir. 1999); Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726, 729 (4th Cir. 

2011); United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 615-19 (4th Cir. 2012); Wagner 

v. FEC, --- F.3d ---, No. 13-5162, 2015 WL 4079575, at *2-27 (D.C. Cir. July 7, 

2015). 

The Buckley Court also concluded that when Congress creates a contribution 

limit, it has broad discretion to determine the appropriate amount of that limit. See 

424 U.S. at 30. The plaintiffs in Buckley had argued that the amount of FECA’s 

$1,000 limit was unconstitutionally low. Id. But the Court rejected that claim and 

stated that if Congress decides that “some limit on contributions is necessary, a 

court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as 

well as $1,000.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress’s discretion 

ends, the Court explained, only where a contribution limit becomes so restrictive 

that it prevents candidates or political committees from “amassing the resources 

necessary for effective advocacy.” Id. at 21. 

Today, FECA’s system of limits regulates more than a dozen different types 

of contributions involving individuals, candidates, political parties, other political 

committees including “PACs,” corporations, labor unions, and other groups. See

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52 U.S.C. §§ 30116, 30118-19, 30121. The amounts of those limits vary widely, 

from $21.6 million to zero. Id.; 80 Fed. Reg. 5750-02, 5751 (Feb. 3, 2015); 77 

Fed. Reg. 9925-01, 9926 (Feb. 21, 2012). The chart below lists selected FECA 

contribution limits: 

FECA Contribution Limits 

To Candidate 

Committee 

To Nat’l Party 

Committee 

To State or 

Local Party 

Committee 

To Any Other 

PAC 

From 

“Person” 

(includes 

individuals 

and new 

PACs) 

$2,700* 

(per election) 

$33,400* 

(per year for 

any use) 

Up to 

$334,000* 

(per year for 

particular uses) 

$10,000 

(per year; 

combined 

limit) 

$5,000 

(per year) 

From MultiCandidate 

PAC 

$5,000 

(per election) 

$15,000 

(per year for 

any use) 

Up to 

$150,000 

(per year for 

particular uses) 

$5,000 

(per year; 

combined 

limit) 

$5,000 

(per year) 

From 

National 

Party 

Committee 

$5,000 

(per election) 

$21.6 

million** 

(to 2012 

presidential 

nominee; in 

the form of 

coordinated 

expenditures) 

Unlimited 

(within same 

party) 

Unlimited 

(within same 

party) 

$5,000 

(per year) 

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From 

National 

Party 

Committee 

(cont.) 

From $48,000 

to $2.84 

million** 

(to 2015 

Congressional 

nominees; in 

the form of 

coordinated 

expenditures) 

From State or 

Local Party 

Comm. 

$5,000 

(per election) 

From $48,000 

to $2.84 

million** 

(from state 

parties to 

2015 Congressional 

nominees; in 

the form of 

coordinated 

expenditures) 

Unlimited 

(within same 

party) 

Unlimited 

(within same 

party)

$5,000 

(combined 

limit) 

From 

Candidate 

Committee 

$2,000 

(per election) 

Unlimited Unlimited $5,000 

(per year) 

From Corporation 

Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 

From Labor 

Union 

Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 

From Federal 

Contractor 

Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 

From Foreign 

National 

Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 

*Indexed for inflation 

**Indexed for inflation and adjusted for the relevant jurisdiction’s voting age 

population 

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B. Political Committees 

A political committee is any group of persons whose major purpose is the 

nomination or election of a federal candidate and which has contributed or spent at 

least $1,000 to influence a federal election. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)(A); Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 79. Once a group meets those criteria, it must register as a political 

committee with the FEC, though it may voluntarily register at any time 

beforehand. 11 C.F.R. § 104.1(b). 

There are different types of political committees. Some are associated with 

a candidate or entity; for example, candidates operate political committees called 

“principal campaign committees.” 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(1). Also, political parties 

operate national, state, and local “party committees.” Id. § 30101(14)-(15). 

Political committees that are not associated with any candidate, party, labor union, 

or corporation are “nonconnected” political committees (often called “PACs”). 

C. FECA’s Limits on Contributions from PACs to Candidates 

A contribution from a PAC to a candidate is subject to FECA’s most 

generally applicable contribution limit. It currently limits any “person” from 

giving more than $2,700 per election (primary or general) to a federal candidate. 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A); see also 80 Fed. Reg. at 5751 (adjusting the statutory 

limit of $2,000 to $2,700 for inflation). “Person” includes individuals, PACs, and 

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other “organization[s],” such as partnerships and associations. 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30101(11). 

Of these “persons,” FECA grants only PACs a chance to qualify for a 

special $5,000-per-election limit on contributions to candidates. 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a)(2)(A). To qualify, a PAC must: (1) receive contributions from more 

than 50 persons; (2) contribute to at least five federal candidates; and (3) be 

registered with the FEC for at least six months (the “six-month period”). Id. 

§ 30116(a)(4). A PAC that meets these criteria is called a “multicandidate political 

committee.” Id. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these 

requirements in Buckley. 424 U.S. at 35-36. 

D. FECA’s Limits on Contributions from PACs to Political Parties 

FECA also limits contributions from PACs to political party committees. 

See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B), (D), (a)(2)(B)-(C). These limits are set at higher 

levels than the limits on contributions to candidates or to PACs to allow the parties 

to amass the funds necessary to carry out their important role in the political 

process. See infra pp. 55-61. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality 

of limits on contributions to political parties. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 133-89. 

At the start of this litigation in April 2014, persons and multicandidate PACs could 

contribute the following amounts to party committees: 

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Limits on Contributions 

From PACs to 

Political Parties 

To National Party 

Committee 

To State or Local Party 

Committee 

From “Person” 

(includes individuals and 

new PACs) 

$32,400* 

(per year) 

$10,000 

(per year; combined) 

From Multicandidate 

PAC 

$15,000 

(per year) 

$5,000 

(per year; combined) 

*Adjusted for inflation to $33,400 today. 

 Eight months later, in December 2014, Congress drastically increased the 

amounts that contributors could give to national party committees for certain 

purposes. The national committees may now create up to three new accounts to 

pay for their convention, building-headquarters, and election-related-legal 

expenses. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, 

Pub. L. 113-235, Div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. 2130, 2772-73 (Dec. 16, 2014) (codified 

as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), (a)(9)). Contributors may 

give each of these new accounts up to three times the amount they could 

previously give to a national party committee. Id. As a result, now a person may 

contribute $334,000 annually to a national party committee, and $233,800 annually 

to a Congressional party committee. See id. A multicandidate PAC may now 

contribute $150,000 annually to a national party committee, and $105,000 annually 

to a Congressional party committee. See id. 

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10 

Effect of the 

Dec. 2014 Party 

Limit Increases 

To National Party Committees 

Use of Contribution: Any Convention* Building Legal (Total) 

From “Person” 

(includes individuals 

and new PACs) 

$33,400 

per yr 

$100,200 

per yr 

$100,200 

per yr 

$100,200 

per yr

$334,000 

per yr 

From 

Multicandidate 

PAC 

$15,000 

per yr

$45,000 

per yr

$45,000 

per yr 

$45,000 

per yr 

$150,000 

per yr 

*Account not available to Congressional campaign committees. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. Appellants’ Claims 

Appellants consist of three PACs and one local political party committee 

(collectively, the “Political Committees”). (JA 51, 461.)2

 Their complaint 

challenges the particular amounts of three of FECA’s contribution limits. In 

counts I and II, the Political Committees assert that the First and Fifth 

Amendments bar Congress from requiring PACs to be registered with the FEC for 

at least six months before they can contribute $5,000 (instead of $2,700) per 

election to a candidate. (JA 59-62.) In count III, the Political Committees claim 

that the Fifth Amendment requires Congress to allow multicandidate PACs to 

 

2

 Pursuant to Local Rule 25(a)(1)(D), the FEC has filed the full joint appendix 

in searchable electronic form under option (i) with this brief. The FEC has added 

searchable page numbers to the version of the joint appendix filed by appellants. 

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11 

contribute $33,400 (instead of $15,000) per calendar year to a national party 

committee, and $10,000 (instead of $5,000) per calendar year to state and local 

party committees. (JA 62-63.) 

The Political Committees asked the district court to permanently enjoin the 

FEC from applying the six-month period and lower contribution limits to them. 

They wanted the district court to “requir[e] the FEC to instead apply” the higher 

limits that apply to other types of PACs. (JA 64.) The Political Committees also 

requested a declaratory judgment. (JA 63-64.) 

B. Appellant Stop PAC and Former Plaintiffs Niger Innis and Niger 

Innis for Congress 

Appellant-plaintiff Stop Reckless Economic Instability caused by Democrats 

(“Stop PAC”) is a PAC that registered with the FEC on March 11, 2014. (JA 51, 

144.) Stop PAC asserts counts I and II of the complaint. (JA 59-61.) At the time 

it sued the FEC in April 2014, Stop PAC had met the criteria for becoming a 

multicandidate PAC, except that it had not yet been registered for at least six 

months (hereinafter, a PAC in this situation is referred to as a “new PAC”). (JA 

19, 55.) It alleged that it had contributed $2,600 (the inflation-adjusted maximum 

then allowed under section 30116(a)(1)(A)) to its then co-plaintiff, federal 

candidate Niger Innis. (JA 19-20, 55-58.) Innis was a candidate in the June 10, 

2014 election for the Republican nomination for the U.S. House of Representatives 

in Nevada’s fourth congressional district. (JA 19, 55.) Stop PAC alleged that it 

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wanted to give Innis more than $2,600 (and up to $5,000) for that election, but it 

could not because it was then still a new PAC. (JA 19-20, 55-56.) 

Innis lost the election. (DE 35-1 at 4.) Stop PAC then moved in July 2014 

to amend the complaint and to dismiss Innis and his campaign committee as 

plaintiffs. (DE 35, 36.) Stop PAC’s new allegations stated that it had contributed 

$2,600 each to two additional federal candidates to whom Stop PAC also wanted 

to give in excess of $2,600. (JA 56-57.) Those candidates were Dan Sullivan, a 

candidate in the August 19, 2014 primary election for the Republican nomination 

for U.S. Senate in Alaska, and Joe Heck, a candidate in the November 4, 2014 

general election for U.S. House of Representatives in Nevada’s third congressional 

district. (Id.) The court granted the motions and gave the parties approximately 

two months to conduct discovery. (JA 73, 77-79.) 

On September 11, 2014, the day before discovery concluded, Stop PAC 

became a multicandidate PAC and thus able to contribute $5,000 per election to 

candidates. (Appellants’ and Intervenor-Appellant’s Opening Br. (“PACs’ Br.”) at 

7 (Docket No. 17).) By that point, the primary elections involving Innis and 

Sullivan had already taken place. But nearly two months remained before the 

November 4 general election, and so Stop PAC contributed an additional $1,800 to 

Heck on October 3, using its newly acquired multicandidate status. (Id. at 9.) 

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Eight days after Stop PAC became a multicandidate PAC, on September 19, the 

parties cross-moved for summary judgment. (DE 56-57.) 

C. Appellant-Intervenor American Future PAC 

On October 6, 2014, nearly a month after Stop PAC became a 

multicandidate PAC, and in the midst of summary judgment briefing, American 

Future PAC was allowed by the district court to intervene to also assert counts I 

and II of the complaint. (JA 461-62.) The court also granted the parties a short 

period of discovery relating to American Future PAC. (JA 462.) 

At that point, American Future PAC had been registered with the FEC for 

approximately two months. (DE 50-4 at 3.) The Political Committees did not 

amend their complaint to add any allegations regarding American Future PAC. 

But American Future PAC did state in briefing and other filings that it had 

contributed $2,600 to Tom Cotton’s general election campaign for U.S. Senate 

from Arkansas in August 2014, and that it wanted to give Cotton $2,000 more but 

could not because it was still a new PAC. (DE 50-3 at 2; 56-1 at 7.) 

Approximately four months later, on February 11, 2015, American Future 

PAC became a multicandidate PAC and thus able to contribute $5,000 per election 

to federal candidates. (PACs’ Br. at 12.) 

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D. Appellants Tea Party Leadership Fund and Alexandria 

Republican City Committee 

Appellant-plaintiff Tea Party Leadership Fund (“Tea Party Fund”) is a PAC 

that registered with the FEC in May 2012. (JA 51.) In October 2012, when it was 

still a new PAC, the Tea Party Fund challenged the constitutionality of the sixmonth period in a lawsuit against the FEC in the District of Columbia. See Tea 

Party Leadership Fund v. FEC, No. 12-1707 (D.D.C.). That suit ended after the 

Tea Party Fund and its co-plaintiffs stipulated to a voluntary dismissal with 

prejudice. See id. (DE 50). The Tea Party Fund became a multicandidate PAC in 

November 2012. (See JA 51.) 

In this suit, the Tea Party Fund asserts count III of the complaint with 

appellant-plaintiff Alexandria Republican City Committee (“Alexandria 

Committee”), a local political party committee. (JA 62.) The Tea Party Fund 

contributed $5,000 (the maximum FECA permits annually) to the Alexandria 

Committee in April 2014 and alleged that it wanted to give the Alexandria 

Committee another $5,000 in 2014. (JA 58-59.) The Tea Party Fund also alleged 

that it wanted to contribute $32,400 to the National Republican Senatorial 

Committee (a national party committee), which is in excess of FECA’s applicable 

$15,000 limit. (JA 59.) 

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III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S RULING DENYING THE POLITICAL 

COMMITEES’ CLAIMS 

 On February 27, 2015, the district court granted summary judgment to the 

FEC and denied it to the Political Committees. JA 501-21; see also --- F. Supp. 3d 

---, 2015 WL 867091 (E.D. Va. Feb. 27, 2015). The court first expressed doubt as 

to whether Stop PAC and American Future PAC’s claims were justiciable. There 

were “substantial issues concerning” whether the six-month period injured those 

PACs, the court said, since both could “control the timing of their registrations 

relative to any particular election.” (JA 508-09.) The district court also pointed 

out that Stop PAC and American Future PAC had become multicandidate PACs 

during the litigation and that it was “unclear” whether their claims would qualify 

for the mootness exception for claims that are capable of repetition yet evading 

review. (JA 509-10.) 

Despite its doubts, the district court “assume[d], without deciding,” that it 

had jurisdiction and evaluated the Political Committees’ claims. (JA 501.) First, it 

denied Stop PAC and American Future PAC’s First Amendment claim (count II) 

because those PACs “cannot show that they have suffered a cognizable 

constitutional injury as a result of the [six-month] waiting period.” (JA 510-14.) 

The court explained that Buckley “makes clear” that “restrictions on the size of 

financial contributions” do not violate the First Amendment when “within 

jurisprudential limits not exceeded here.” (JA 513.) 

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 The district court then denied the Political Committees’ equal protection 

claims (counts I and III). (JA 514-17.) The court found that new PACs are not 

situated similarly to multicandidate PACs, such as the Tea Party Fund. (JA 515-

16.) The evidence showed that a new PAC like Stop PAC “is precisely the type of 

instrumentality” that individuals could use to circumvent the $2,700 contribution 

limit to obtain the $5,000 limit reserved for multicandidate PACs, the court found. 

(Id.) In any event, the court concluded, the differences in contribution-limit 

amounts that the Political Committees challenge would survive closely drawn 

scrutiny since they further Congress’s anti-corruption interests. (JA 516-17.) 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

 The district court’s ruling should be affirmed. The Political Committees ask 

this Court to rewrite a portion of FECA’s system of contribution limits to their 

liking because in some cases they cannot contribute as much as other, different 

PACs can. These claims are not justiciable since the Political Committees lack 

standing, and in any event, their claims are now moot. 

But even if their claims were justiciable, they would fail for multiple 

reasons. Chief among those reasons is that the Supreme Court already denied the 

claims the Political Committees make against the six-month period and the $2,700 

contribution limit (counts I and II) nearly 40 years ago in Buckley. 

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The Political Committees’ claims also lack merit because they cannot show 

that the incremental differences in FECA’s contribution limits significantly 

burdened their First or Fifth Amendment rights. Each claim is founded on the 

assumption that a lower contribution limit places a heavy burden on the 

contributor’s speech and association if there is a higher one in place for other 

entities. That assumption is incorrect. Because a contribution is a symbolic act, 

the Court has explained, the contributor’s speech does not perceptibly increase 

with the size of the contribution. Nor does the degree of association with the 

intended recipient materially change. As a result, the district court correctly held 

that the lower contribution-limit amounts that the Political Committees object to do 

not burden their rights significantly more than the higher amounts they admit are 

constitutional. The Political Committees have also not even attempted to prove 

that they are situated similarly to the PACs that have the higher contribution limits 

that they desire. Indeed, the Political Committees ask this Court to strike down 

four-decade-old election laws on the basis of no evidence. 

In any event, each FECA provision at issue is constitutional under the 

intermediate, closely drawn scrutiny that the Political Committees concede applies. 

As the lower court’s review of the evidence demonstrated, FECA’s six-month 

period ensures that the special $5,000 contribution limit is reserved for bona fide

groups of persons, while lessening the risk that individuals could circumvent the 

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general $2,700 limit by labeling themselves a PAC. Also, FECA’s limits on 

contributions from new PACs and multicandidate PACs to political parties 

indisputably further Congress’s interests in lessening the risk and appearance of 

corruption. The higher limits for certain contributions to political parties serve the 

important First Amendment interest of ensuring that the parties can amass the 

resources necessary for effective advocacy and other critical party functions. 

The Political Committees do not dispute that the more deferential closely 

drawn scrutiny applies, but nevertheless they assert that the courts may perfectly 

tailor the amounts of contribution limits on the basis of just one factor. The 

Supreme Court, however, has made clear that Congress has the discretion to 

perform this multi-factored task and that courts have “no scalpel to probe” the 

precise amounts of FECA’s contribution limits. 

ARGUMENT

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This Court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

to the FEC, and the Court may affirm that ruling on any ground supported by the 

record. Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2002). 

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II. THE POLITICAL COMMITTEES’ CLAIMS ARE NOT 

JUSTICIABLE 

The district court was right to doubt its jurisdiction: No Article III case or 

controversy exists here since the Political Committees lack standing or their claims 

are now moot. Even though the district court declined to dismiss this case on 

jurisdictional grounds, this Court can and should do so. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. 

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-110 (1998). 

A. Stop PAC Caused Its Own Alleged Injury 

Stop PAC lacks standing; its claimed injury was “self-inflicted” and thus is 

not “fairly traceable” to FECA. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 

1152-53 (2013); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 228 (finding no standing for 

candidates whose alleged injury was caused by “their own personal ‘wish’ not to 

solicit or accept large contributions”). 

Stop PAC alleges that the six-month period prevented it from contributing 

more than $2,600 to candidates in three 2014 elections. (JA 55-57.) But as the 

district court correctly noted, Stop PAC could “control the timing of [its] 

registration[] relative to any particular election.” JA 508-09; see 11 C.F.R. 

§ 104.1(b). And, as the record shows, Stop PAC’s founders had the idea for their 

PAC early enough to register it more than six months before the first of those three 

elections, Niger Innis’s June 10, 2014 primary election. Stop PAC’s founder and 

chairman, Gregory Campbell, and its treasurer, custodian of records, and attorney, 

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Dan Backer, discussed the idea for Stop PAC at least as early as November 2013 

— seven months before Innis’s election. (JA 145-46, 163.) In fact, Campbell 

testified that creating a PAC like Stop PAC was “something that ha[d] always 

interested” him. (JA 163.) And Backer was aware of the six-month period, since 

he had previously represented the Tea Party Fund in its 2012 lawsuit against the 

FEC challenging that requirement. See supra p. 14. 

Nevertheless, Campbell and Backer waited until March 11, 2014 — just 

three months before Innis’s election — to register Stop PAC. (JA 134, 145-46.) 

Their choice, not FECA, ensured that Stop PAC would be unable to contribute 

more than $2,600 to Innis before June 10 or to Dan Sullivan before his August 19, 

2014 primary election. By contrast, Stop PAC was able to contribute $1,800 in 

excess of $2,600 to the third candidate it supported, Joe Heck, since Stop PAC had 

registered early enough to become a multicandidate PAC before Heck’s November 

4, 2014 election. PACs’ Br. at 9; cf. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 758 

(1973) (holding that plaintiffs’ alleged disenfranchisement was not caused by the 

voter registration waiting period they challenged, but by their “own failure to take 

timely steps to effect their enrollment”). 

Stop PAC does not deny that it could have registered early enough to 

contribute more than $2,600 to Innis and Sullivan. Instead, it claims that even had 

it registered earlier, and no elections occurred during its six-month period, FECA 

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nevertheless would have caused it injury because Stop PAC “reasonably could 

have wished” to make contributions during that time. (PACs’ Br. at 35 (emphasis 

added).) But no such wish is expressed in the complaint. (JA 49-65.) It is a 

plaintiff’s alleged injury “[a]s pled” that determines whether standing exists, not a 

later “shifting characterization” of that injury in briefing or argument. Doe v. Va. 

Dep’t of State Police, 713 F.3d 745, 755 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 

1538 (2014). 

B. Because Stop PAC Lacks Standing, American Future PAC’s 

Later Intervention Did Not Revive Stop PAC’s Claims 

Because Stop PAC lacks standing, the district court never had jurisdiction 

over its claims (counts I and II), including when American Future PAC later 

intervened to assert those claims. This Court, however, has held that “intervention 

is ancillary to the underlying cause of action” and “it is well-settled law that 

intervention presupposes pendency of an action in a court of competent 

jurisdiction.” See Hous. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 193 F.3d 838, 840 (4th Cir. 1999) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Once an “action is terminated, for whatever 

reason, there no longer remains an action in which there can be intervention.” 

Black v. Cent. Motor Lines, Inc., 500 F.2d 407, 408 (4th Cir. 1974). American 

Future PAC’s subsequent intervention therefore “may not be allowed to give life to 

a lawsuit which does not actually exist.” Becton v. Greene Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 32 

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F.R.D. 220, 222-23 (E.D.N.C. 1963) (denying “leave to intervene as plaintiffs in 

an action that admittedly has become moot”). 

C. Counts I and II Are Moot Because Stop PAC and American 

Future PAC Are No Longer Subject to the Six-Month Period or 

$2,700 Limit 

The six-month periods for both Stop PAC and American Future PAC have 

expired. (PACs’ Br. at 7, 12.) Both PACs may now contribute more than $2,700 

and up to $5,000 per election to federal candidates; in fact, Stop PAC did just that 

by contributing a total of $3,400 to Heck. (Id. at 9.) Counts I and II of the 

complaint are therefore moot because it is “impossible for the court to grant” Stop 

PAC or American Future PAC “any effectual relief.” Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 

281, 286 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Stop PAC and American Future PAC’s claims are not capable of repetition 

yet evading review, as they assert. (PACs’ Br. at 35-39.) Like many election law 

claims, counts I and II “evade review” due to the short duration of the six-month 

period. But they are not capable of repetition, since there can be no “reasonable 

expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action 

again.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 735 (2008) (emphasis added; internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 

462 (2007) (same). Stop PAC and American Future PAC admit that neither of 

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them “can ever again be subject to the six-month waiting period.” (PACs’ Br. at 

15.) 

The Supreme Court has applied the same-complaining-party requirement in 

two FECA cases in the last eight years, see Davis, 554 U.S. at 735; Wis. Right to 

Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 462, and yet the Political Committees assert that there is a 

categorical exception to that requirement in election-law cases (PACs’ Br. at 36-

39). The Political Committees have no explanation for Davis and Wisconsin Right 

to Life. (See id.) And they concede that this Court has applied the samecomplaining-party requirement in two recent election-law cases. (Id. at 38-39 

(citing Lux v. Judd, 651 F.3d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 2011); N.C. Right to Life Comm. 

Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 435 (4th Cir. 

2008)).) These rulings highlight that there is no election-law exception to the 

same-complaining-party requirement, as the Second and Ninth Circuits have 

explicitly held. See Van Wie v. Pataki, 267 F.3d 109, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2001) 

(applying same-party requirement in an election law case and distinguishing cases 

the Political Committees cite here); Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1519 n.3 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (finding that an “examination . . . reveals no such categorical exception 

to the usual mootness rules” in election-law cases), overruled on other grounds by 

Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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The Political Committees rely upon a series of cases that are distinguishable 

because they involve plaintiffs who could in fact satisfy the same-complainingparty requirement. (PACs’ Br. at 36-38.) Two of those cases were class actions. 

See Rosario, 410 U.S. at 755 n.4; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 

(1972). In a class action, the certified class’s claims remain capable of repetition 

even when the class representative’s claims do not. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. 

Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398 (1980) (“When . . . there is no chance that the named 

plaintiff’s expired claim will reoccur, mootness still can be avoided through 

certification of a class prior to expiration of the named plaintiff’s personal claim.”); 

see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 336 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 

(acknowledging that Rosario and Dunn have been “limited to their facts” given 

that they were class actions). In other cases relied upon by the Political 

Committees, the plaintiffs were candidates who were capable of being subject to 

the election laws they challenged again if they chose to run in a future election. 

See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726-27 (1974); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 

815-16 (1969); Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 371 (6th Cir. 2005); Majors 

v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 722-23 (7th Cir. 2003); Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 

1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 2000). In the one case the Political Committees cite involving 

PAC plaintiffs, the court found that the PACs would “again be impacted” by the 

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state laws they challenged. Catholic Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. Reisman, 764 

F.3d 409, 423 (5th Cir. 2014).3

 

In contrast here, Stop PAC and American Future PAC concede that they will 

not again be affected by the six-month period. (PACs’ Br. at 15.) Counts I and II 

are therefore moot and not capable of repetition yet evading review. 

D. Count III Is Moot Since the Tea Party Fund Can Now Contribute 

the Amounts It Alleged It Wanted to or It Is Too Late to Do So 

 The Tea Party Fund alleged that it wanted to “immediately contribute an 

additional $5,000” to the Alexandria Committee, “which would bring its total 

contributions to the [Alexandria Committee] for the year 2014 to $10,000.” (JA 

59-60 (emphasis added).) Because 2014 has passed, however, no court can grant 

the Tea Party Fund or Alexandria Committee that relief. The Tea Party Fund 

claims it will supplement the record to show it contributed to the Alexandria 

Committee in 2015 (PACs’ Br. at 10 n.8), but that would not change the 

allegations of the complaint. 

 The complaint also alleges that the Tea Party Fund wants to “immediately 

contribute” $32,400 to the National Republican Senatorial Committee (“NRSC”). 

 

3

 Appellants stress that some of these courts stated (in dicta) that the samecomplaining-party requirement need not be met in an election-law case (see PACs’ 

Br. at 37-38 (citing Catholic Leadership, 764 F.3d at 423-24; Majors, 317 F.3d at 

732; Lawrence, 430 F.3d at 372)), but that out-of-Circuit dicta is inconsistent with 

the Supreme Court’s and this Court’s recent application of that requirement in 

election-law cases. 

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(JA 59.) Because of Congress’s December 2014 party-limit increases, the Tea 

Party Fund can now immediately give that amount plus $72,600 more to the 

NRSC, so long as the NRSC used amounts in excess of $15,000 for its buildingheadquarters or election-related legal expenses. See 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a)(2)(B); see also supra pp. 9-10. The Tea Party Fund has not said it 

would object if the NRSC used part of its proposed $32,400 contribution for these 

purposes. In fact, the Tea Party Fund states in its brief that it is not challenging the 

new, increased limits in this suit because Congress enacted them after it moved for 

summary judgment. (PACs’ Br. at 6 n.5.) That timing, however, does not prevent 

the limit increases from mooting the Tea Party Fund’s claim as it exists today.4

 

E. The Political Committees Have Alleged No Potential Future Harm 

to Justify the Forward-Looking Relief They Seek 

Finally, even assuming the Political Committees were harmed by FECA in 

2014, their complaint does not allege that in the future “there is a ‘real or 

immediate threat that [they] will be wronged again . . . in a similar way.’” Raub v. 

Campbell, 785 F.3d 876, 885-86 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 

 

4

 At the same time, the Political Committees insinuate that they do indirectly 

challenge the December 2014 party-limit increases. (PACs’ Br. at 6 n.5 (“[T]his 

lawsuit does not directly challenge such limits.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 

4 n.2.) The Political Committees raised no arguments attacking the December 

2014 party-limit increases before the district court, however, and so they cannot 

now challenge those increases — directly, indirectly, or otherwise. See Helton v. 

AT&T Inc., 709 F.3d 343, 360 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[B]ecause AT&T failed to raise 

this argument before the district court, it is waived on appeal.”). 

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U.S. 95, 111 (1983)). As a result, they have alleged no injury that could be 

redressed by the permanent injunction and declaration they request. JA 63-64; see 

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-13. 

III. THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY REJECTED THE CLAIMS 

THE POLITICAL COMMITTEES ASSERT AGAINST THE SIXMONTH PERIOD AND THE $2,700 CONTRIBUTION LIMIT 

(COUNTS I & II) 

 Even if justiciable, the Political Committees’ claims fail on their merits. In 

fact, two of those claims (counts I and II) were already denied by the Supreme 

Court in Buckley. This Court must therefore decline the Political Committees’ 

invitation to in effect reverse Supreme Court precedent. See Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 

at 615 (“[W]hen Supreme Court precedent has direct application in a case,” lower 

courts must “leav[e] to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overturning its own 

decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 The Buckley Court upheld the constitutionality of the six-month period (and 

the other two multicandidate PAC qualifying criteria) against both First and Fifth 

Amendment challenges. 424 U.S. at 35-36, 59 n.67. It rejected the argument — 

identical to that asserted by the Political Committees here — that the criteria 

“unconstitutionally discriminate against ad hoc organizations in favor of 

established interest groups and impermissibly burden free association.” Id. at 35; 

cf., e.g., JA 49 (claiming in the complaint that FECA discriminates against “newly 

formed grassroots organizations” in favor of “entrenched institutions”). The Court 

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explained that the application of the $2,700 limit (which was then $1,000) to a new 

PAC’s contributions to candidates for six months did not “undermin[e] freedom of 

association”; instead, the $5,000 limit for multicandidate PACs “enhances the 

opportunity of bona fide groups to participate in the election process.” 424 U.S. at 

35. And the multicandidate PAC qualifying criteria, including the six-month 

period, “serve the permissible purpose of preventing individuals from evading the 

applicable [now $2,700] contribution limitations by labeling themselves 

committees.” Id. at 35-36. The Buckley Court’s ruling affirmed the en banc D.C. 

Circuit, which described the six-month period as a “protective shield,” designed to 

“prevent proliferation of dummy committees.” 519 F.2d at 857-58. 

 The Political Committees cannot distinguish Buckley. They argue that their 

claims are narrower because (1) they attack only the six-month period (as opposed 

to all three multicandidate PAC requirements); and (2) they attack it only as 

applied to new PACs that have satisfied the other two criteria (as opposed to 

groups that are “a front for a single contributor”). (PACs’ Br. at 42-43.) But those 

are exactly the claims Buckley disposed of. The Buckley plaintiffs argued that the 

six-month period discriminates against not single-contributor fronts, but legitimate 

“philosophically motivated groups with widely dispersed members who want to 

respond to an issue as it arises, or who coalesce only near election time[.]” Reply 

Br. of the Appellants, Buckley v. Valeo, Nos. 75-436, 75-437, 1975 WL 171458, at 

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29 

*22 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1975). And despite the Supreme Court’s broader analysis, the 

plaintiffs’ claim was aimed directly at the six-month period. That is clear from the 

D.C. Circuit’s opinion. See 519 F.2d at 857-58 (“[Plaintiffs] ask[] whether there is 

a constitutional violation in the statute’s requirement . . . that a political committee 

be registered for ‘not less than 6 months’ before being entitled to the higher 

($5,000) contribution limit.”). It is also clear from the constitutional question the 

plaintiffs presented: 

Does [52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(4)] violate [First and Fifth 

Amendment] rights, in that it excludes from the definition of 

“[multicandidate] political committee” committees registered 

for less than the period of time prescribed in the statute? 

424 U.S. at 59 n.67 (paragraph 3(h)) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court 

answered that question, “NO.” Id. And therefore so must this Court. 

IV. THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST 

AMENDMENT (COUNT II) 

Even if Buckley had not already decided counts I and II, its reasoning and 

that of later decisions “dictate the result here,” as the district court held. (JA 511.) 

A. The District Court Correctly Held That the Differences in 

Contribution-Limit Amounts Caused the Political Committees No 

Cognizable First Amendment Injury 

 

The Political Committees’ suit does not challenge Congress’s ability to place 

some limits on contributions from new PACs to candidates and from 

multicandidate PACs to political parties. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld 

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these types of contribution limits. See supra pp. 3-4. The claims here are much 

narrower: They seek to fine-tune the amounts of these otherwise constitutional 

limits. See supra pp. 10-11. 

The incremental differences at issue, however, did not place a burden of 

constitutional dimension on the Political Committees’ ability to speak or associate, 

as the district court held. (JA 512-13.) As that court recognized, and as the 

Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, the “‘quantity of communication by [a] 

contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution.’” JA 

513 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 135 

(same); Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 386 (same); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 

Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 628 (1996) (“Colorado I”) (same); Cal. Med., 453 

U.S. at 196 n.16 (same). In contrast to money spent directly on speech, a 

contribution is a “symbolic act” — it affiliates the contributor with the candidate, 

and it serves as the contributor’s “general expression of support for the candidate 

and his views, but it does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.” 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22. Therefore, a contribution limit “permits the symbolic 

expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe 

the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues,” id. at 21 — and that 

remains true whether the limit is set, for example, at $2,700 or $5,000. 

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The Buckley Court denied an attempt to fine-tune the amount of the same 

limit the Political Committees attempt to fine-tune here. The Buckley plaintiffs 

claimed its then-amount of $1,000 was “unrealistically low.” 424 U.S. at 30. The 

Court explained, however, that once Congress “is satisfied that some limit on 

contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 

ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000.” Id. at 30; see also Randall v. Sorrell, 

548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (“[W]e recognize, as Buckley stated, that we have ‘no 

scalpel to probe’ each possible contribution level.”). The $1,000 range that 

Buckley cited amounts to $4,194 in today’s dollars.5

 And yet Stop PAC and 

American Future PAC assert that their temporary inability to give an extra $2,400 

placed a burden of constitutional dimension on their First Amendment rights. It 

did not. 

With the contributions they made, “Stop PAC and American Future were 

able to associate with, express approval of . . . their chosen candidates,” as the 

district court found. (JA 512.) The same is true for the Tea Party Fund, with its 

contribution to the Alexandria Committee. (JA 58.) Had the Political Committees 

been able to contribute a few thousand dollars more, it would not have increased 

 

5

 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, 

http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2015). 

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the amount of their speech or the extent of their association to a significant degree. 

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 30. 

The Political Committees could have increased their speech for, and 

association with, their favored candidates and parties by spending funds to speak 

independently in favor of those candidates and parties. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 

28. They could have also organized volunteer efforts to support them. Id. 

FECA’s contribution limits left plaintiffs free to engage in these and other acts of 

association and speech. Id.; see also Wagner, 2015 WL 4079575, at *20. Yet Stop 

PAC, American Future PAC, and the Tea Party Fund each chose to forego these 

alternative avenues to increase their speech and association. (JA 111-12, 145, 151, 

194, 214-15, 392-93, 430-32, 450-51, 454.) 

The minimal burdens the Political Committees face in being subject to lower 

contribution limits than other entities pale in comparison to those imposed by the 

“prior restraint” laws the Political Committees claim are comparable. (PACs’ Br. 

at 46-49.) Unlike contribution limits, those laws were subject to strict scrutiny 

because they gave government officials open-ended discretion to prospectively ban 

speech based on its content. (See id.) 

 Because Stop PAC and American Future PAC suffered no injury cognizable 

under the First Amendment, count II should be dismissed. See also infra pp. 53-54 

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(discussing the effect of the lack any burden of constitutional dimension on the 

Political Committees’ equal protection claims). 

B. The Six-Month Period Is Closely Drawn to Further Important 

Government Interests 

Even if the application of the $2,700 contribution limit for six months had 

meaningfully burdened the Political Committees’ rights, that application would 

still easily survive constitutional scrutiny. Applying closely drawn scrutiny’s 

“relatively complaisant review,” Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161, courts have routinely 

upheld FECA’s base contribution limits because they limit the risk and appearance 

of corruption, see supra pp. 3-4. As the Political Committees recognize, these anticorruption interests also justify laws that prevent circumvention of the limits on 

contributions to candidates. (PACs’ Br. at 28-29 (citing Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 

456).) And the anti-corruption interests also support laws that promote the 

disclosure of campaign finance information, since disclosure helps “deter actual 

corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions 

and expenditures to the light of publicity.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. 

The six-month period serves these interests. It has also been the law for 

nearly four decades, and so to show that it continues to serve these interests, the 

FEC need only demonstrate that “experience under the present law confirms a 

serious threat of abuse” still exists. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 457; see also Wagner, 

2015 WL 4079575, at *10 (“Of course, we would not expect to find — and we 

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cannot demand — continuing evidence of large-scale quid pro quo corruption . . . 

because such contributions have been banned since 1940.”). That experience, as 

evidenced by the record in this case, confirms that the six-month period is closely 

drawn to prevent circumvention and promote campaign finance disclosure. 

1. The Six-Month Period Helps Prevent Individuals from 

Using Dummy PACs to Circumvent the $2,700 Limit 

a. The Six-Month Period Acts as a “Protective Shield” for 

the $5,000 Limit 

 As the district court held, “there is sufficient government interest in 

preventing the risk of corruption” and the “circumvention of the legislative and 

regulatory systems to justify the limit[] on contributions from new PACs . . . to 

candidates.” (JA 517.) Among the “deeply disturbing” reports of corruption from 

Congress’s Watergate investigation were revelations that the dairy industry used 

hundreds of “dummy” PACs just before the 1972 general election to funnel a $2 

million contribution to President Nixon’s re-election campaign. Buckley, 519 F.2d 

at 839 & nn.35-36; Final Report of the Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign 

Activities, S. Rep. No. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 579-81, 612-15, 736-43 

(1974) (“Watergate Report”). The dairy industry gave $2,500 to each dummy 

PAC, each of which then passed the money on to the Nixon campaign. Watergate 

Report at 615, 738. In return, the White House increased the government’s milk 

price supports. Id. at 612, 1209. 

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 In light of this and other scandals, in 1974 Congress created the generally 

applicable $1,000 limit on contributions from individuals and organizations to 

candidates. See supra pp. 2-3. To avoid equating individuals with “an 

organization of hundreds or thousands,” however, Congress also created a special 

$5,000 limit for contributions to candidates from “broad-based citizen interest 

groups” — which FECA reasonably correlated to the criteria for multicandidate 

political committees. 120 Cong. Rec. S4461 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1974) (statement 

of Sen. Hathaway); see also 120 Cong. Rec. H7810 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1974) 

(statement of Rep. Brademas). 

With this increased limit, Congress sought to enhance the important role that 

“bona fide groups” play in federal elections. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35; 120 Cong. 

Rec. S4461; 120 Cong. Rec. H7810. As Congress recognized, citizens do not 

always have the expertise or resources to identify qualified candidates who share 

their views. 120 Cong. Rec. S4461. Instead, they can contribute to like-minded 

multicandidate PACs that identify and “help elect persons who support the group’s 

views or ideology.” Id. In this way, multicandidate PACs help citizens 

“participate in the most intelligent way in the election process.” Id. Today, 

multicandidate PACs are run by many of the nation’s most well-known advocacy 

groups, including the Natural Resources Defense Council and the National Rifle 

Association, as the Political Committees acknowledge. (PACs’ Br. at 3.) Political 

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party committees are also a type of multicandidate political committee. 120 Cong. 

Rec. H7810. 

Congress enacted the three multicandidate PAC qualifying criteria to reserve 

the $5,000 limit for legitimate groups, and to weed out dummy PACs and those 

“supporting only a single candidate.” FECA Amendments, 1979, Hearing Before 

the Comm. on Rules and Admin. U.S. Senate, 96th Cong. 145 (1979). The sixmonth period in particular is a “protective shield” that works to prevent “two or 

three persons” from “organizing themselves” as a “dummy” multicandidate PAC. 

Buckley, 519 F.2d at 857-58. Starting a PAC is simple — it requires just two 

people, one bank account, and one form. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(a), 102.1(d), 

102.7(a), 103.2. And satisfying the first two multicandidate PAC qualifying 

requirements — obtaining 51 contributors and contributing to five candidates — is 

not significantly more difficult. As Stop PAC and American Future PAC have 

demonstrated, it can be done in just days. See infra pp. 41-42. While those two 

requirements ensure that a multicandidate PAC will have a bare minimum of 

financial support and diverse candidate interest, Congress feared that they would 

not be enough to reserve the $5,000 limit for legitimate groups given how easily 

they can be satisfied. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy predicted that 

“individuals and narrow-based political committees — now limited to [$2,700] 

contributions per candidate — are likely to take on new sources of contributions to 

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their own warchests and new candidate beneficiaries in order to qualify for the 

$5,000 gifts allowed to be made by broad-based committees.” 120 Cong. Rec. 

S18527 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974); see also S. Rep. No. 96-319 at 5 (1979) (“Under 

present law, it is possible for a committee to make de minimis contributions to four 

candidates and $1,000 to a fifth to qualify it for the $5,000 limit available to 

multicandidate committees, although the committee may, in reality, be contributing 

to only one candidate.”). 

The six-month period helps prevent this scenario by deterring individuals 

from circumventing the limit, especially right before an election when the risk is 

highest. “It is well known that the public begins to concentrate on elections only in 

the weeks immediately before they are held,” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 334, and 

it is thus during this time “when the incentives to infuse funds to a candidate are at 

their highest,” as the district court explained (JA 516). As the FEC data relied 

upon by the district court shows, the number of PACs that register increases 

significantly in the months prior to an election. (Id. (citing JA 352-55).) These 

PACs often have fleeting existences — in many cases, they spend large sums of 

money just prior to the election and then cease operating afterwards. (JA 355-56.) 

The six-month period ensures that these fly-by-night, pre-election PACs can make 

only the $2,700 contributions that individuals are permitted to make. 

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In contrast, a PAC that has existed for at least six months is more likely to be 

a bona fide group. After six months, a PAC is more likely to be a known 

commodity to donors and donees. See 120 Cong. Rec. S4461 (statement of Sen. 

Hathaway) (observing that “large citizens’ groups,” deserving of an increased 

limit, “are known by their name and reputation”). As even the plaintiffs in Buckley

noted, a PAC that makes it to six months old is more likely to be “well organized 

and have the finances to remain in continuous operation and contact.” 1975 WL 

171458, at *22. A six-month old PAC is also likely to have more members, more 

contributors, more contributions to candidates, and as discussed below, will have 

publicly disclosed information to the FEC about itself. See infra pp. 44-45. 

The six-month period has continued to serve this anti-circumvention purpose 

in tandem with other anti-circumvention measures that have been enacted since 

Buckley upheld the six-month period. The Political Committees claim that the sixmonth period has become “heavy-handed” in light of those legal developments 

(PACs’ Br. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted)), but none of the provisions 

they cite prevent the type of circumvention at issue here. An individual could label 

herself a committee to give $5,000 instead of $2,700 to a candidate regardless of 

(1) the $5,000 limit on contributions from individuals to PACs; (2) the limits on 

what individuals can contribute to parties; and (3) the $5,000 limit on what PACs 

can contribute to each other. (See id. at 44 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B)-(D), 

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(2)(C).) Additionally, the type of circumvention limited by the six-month period 

involves just one PAC, and so it is not affected by FECA’s “anti-proliferation 

restrictions,” which ensure that a person cannot create a “series of committees that 

will, in turn, contribute to a particular candidate.” (Id. (citing 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a)(5)).) 

Finally, the six-month period complements and bolsters FECA’s earmarking 

provision, which considers a person’s contributions through an intermediary to a 

candidate to be a contribution from the original source in certain cases. See 52 

U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8). As the Political Committees acknowledge, this provision 

existed at the time Buckley upheld the six-month period. (PACs’ Br. at 45.) More 

recently, the Supreme Court found that the FEC’s earmarking regulation would 

help prevent “a scheme in which a donor routes millions of dollars in excess of the 

base limits to a particular candidate,” but the Court specifically distinguished 

smaller-scale circumventions of the base limit. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 

1434, 1456 (2014) (contrasting past FEC enforcement matters with a hypothetical 

scenario involving “200 newly created PACs”). The six-month period effectively 

limits smaller-scale schemes. 

b. Stop PAC and American Future PAC Illustrate That a 

Serious Threat of Circumvention Exists Today 

This Court need look no further than Stop PAC and American Future PAC 

to see that a serious threat of circumvention still exists today. As the district court 

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determined, Stop PAC is “precisely the type of instrumentality that lends itself to a 

circumvention of the contribution limits applicable to individuals.” (JA 515-16.) 

Indeed, both PACs have demonstrated how a candidate’s campaign workers could 

set up a dummy-like PAC just before an election to support their candidate with 

the $5,000 limit in just days were it not for the six-month period. 

Stop PAC was created and operated by two paid employees for the Niger 

Innis campaign. Stop PAC’s chairman, Gregory Campbell, worked for the Innis 

campaign by writing campaign speeches, op-eds, and policy positions. (JA 33, 

216-21, 270-71, 277.) Stop PAC’s attorney and treasurer, Dan Backer, was the 

Innis campaign’s treasurer, attorney, and “compliance czar.” (JA 134-36, 205-07, 

332.) Campbell was a friend of Innis’s, and both Campbell and Backer had 

worked with Innis prior to his campaign. (JA 259, 261, 277-78, 290-94, 301-03, 

307-09.) They created Stop PAC three months before Innis’s election and then 

announced that their PAC wanted to give the Innis campaign $5,000. See supra p. 

20. 

American Future PAC’s chairman, Matt Lenell, performed work for Tom 

Cotton’s Senate campaign, including editing Cotton fundraising communications. 

(JA 106, 469-70, 476-77.) Lenell registered American Future PAC about three 

months prior to Cotton’s election and then announced that his PAC wanted to give 

the Cotton campaign $5,000. See supra p. 13. 

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Both PACs were able to quickly satisfy the first two multicandidate PAC 

requirements with little effort. Stop PAC received contributions from more than 

50 persons and made five contributions within about three weeks of registering. 

(JA 55, 144; see also DE 29-1 at 2.) To do so, Stop PAC hired a vendor that sent 

fundraising emails to potential donors. (JA 146, 165-67.) Campbell had no 

involvement in that process and knew little about how it worked. (JA 165-67.) 

Then, Stop PAC contributed $2,600 to Innis and a much smaller $250 each to four 

other candidates. (JA 55; see also DE 29-1 at 2.) Stop PAC has not reported 

contributing to any candidate since October 2014.6

 

American Future PAC satisfied the first two multicandidate PAC 

requirements approximately two weeks after registering on August 11, 2014. (DE 

50-4 at 3.) Within only nine days, Lenell and his attorney successfully solicited 

contributions from more than 50 persons using e-mails, text messages, and 

Facebook messages. (Id. at 16-17; see also JA 104, 471, 478, 496-500.) They 

asked friends, family, and acquaintances to give contributions of five dollars or 

less specifically for the purpose of satisfying that particular multicandidate PAC 

 

6

 Campaign finance information that PACs report to the Commission can be 

found on the FEC’s website by searching for the PAC’s name at 

http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/candcmte_info.shtml (last visited Aug. 10, 

2015). 

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requirement.7

 (JA 471, 478, 496-500.) Later, American Future PAC received a 

$5,000 donation from a Cotton supporter and contributor. (DE 50-4 at 17.) The 

next day, the PAC contributed $2,600 to Cotton and, a few days later, a relatively 

de minimis $100 to four other candidates. Id. at 10-14. American Future PAC has 

not reported contributing to any candidate since. See supra p. 41 n.6. 

When Stop PAC and American Future PAC had each obtained more than 50 

contributors and contributed to five candidates, both appeared to be prototypical 

examples of the fly-by-night, single-candidate-focused groups that Congress feared 

would circumvent the $2,700 limit. The only thing that prevented these PACs 

from obtaining the $5,000 limit on an election eve was the six-month period. 

The Political Committees put forth no evidence of their own to attempt to 

rebut the FEC’s evidence. Instead, they claim that the district court was required 

to ignore any evidence regarding their particular characteristics. (PACs’ Br. at 25-

28.) But the Political Committees bring as-applied claims (id. at 2, 27, 43, 46), and 

so evidence regarding how the challenged statutes apply to them is not only 

 

7

 For instance, Lenell sent a solicitation on Facebook to a potential contributor 

that stated: “Hey. I need a favor. . . . I’m starting a Political Action Committee and 

I need to get to 51 donors to get standing and join a lawsuit. [W]ill you donate to 

help?” (JA 496.) While this message and other record evidence shows that 

appellants were attempting to construct a constitutional test case, their efforts 

evidence how easy it would be for individuals who were concerned only with 

circumventing the $2,700 limit to start a PAC, obtain more than 50 contributors, 

and make five contributions. 

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relevant, it is central to their case, see, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 

U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (rejecting as-applied challenge to ban on lawyers soliciting 

clients at hospitals based on the “facts in this case” about the plaintiff, which 

“present a striking example of the potential for overreaching” and “demonstrate the 

need for prophylactic regulation in furtherance of the State’s interest”). 

Furthermore, the Political Committees are members of the statutorily 

defined classes that they claim FECA discriminates against, and so evidence 

regarding them exemplifies the relevant characteristics of those groups.8

 Courts 

frequently reject as-applied claims against FECA citing FEC-submitted evidence 

regarding the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Wagner, 2015 WL 4079575, at *14, *24 

(detailing the FEC’s record, including evidence about the plaintiffs, and rejecting 

an as-applied equal protection claim against a FECA contribution limit); 

Libertarian Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 930 F. Supp. 2d 154, 166 (D.D.C. 2013) (relying 

in part upon FEC’s deposition of plaintiff to deny as-applied claim against a FECA 

contribution limit), aff’d mem. in relevant part, No. 13-5094, 2014 WL 590973 

(D.C. Cir. Feb. 7, 2014). The district court properly did the same here. 

 

8

 More precisely, Stop PAC and American Future PAC were members of the 

statutorily defined class that they claim FECA discriminates against (i.e., new 

PACs), but since they no longer are, their claims are moot. See supra pp. 22-25. 

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2. The Six-Month Period Helps Promote Campaign Finance 

Disclosure 

The six-month period also furthers the government’s important interest in 

promoting the disclosure of the sources of campaign funds. See Buckley, 424 U.S. 

at 67. In particular, it ensures that groups seeking multicandidate PAC status 

cannot evade filing at least one disclosure report before becoming eligible to 

contribute $5,000 to candidates. Cf. Stop This Insanity, Inc. Emp. Leadership 

Fund v. FEC, 761 F.3d 10, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding certain solicitation and 

expenditure limits because they preserve the effectiveness of “disclosure 

requirements [that] Appellants are endeavoring to avoid”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 

949 (2015). 

In Buckley, the D.C. Circuit upheld the six-month period in part because 

“[d]uring the waiting period,” new PACs “would be subject to the reporting and 

disclosures provisions” of FECA. 519 F.2d at 858. FECA requires PACs to file a 

disclosure report at least every six months. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(4)(A). In these 

reports, a PAC must reveal most of what it receives and spends, and the identities 

of those who gave it more than $200 in a calendar year. Id. § 30104(b). PACs 

must file disclosure reports more frequently in election years, see, e.g., id. 

§ 30104(a)(4)(A)(ii) (requiring a “pre-election report” disclosing financial activity 

up to 20 days before an election), but even those reports allow a nearly three-week 

pre-election window in which a fly-by-night PAC could form and obtain the 

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$5,000 limit without having first provided any disclosure about who it is or where 

it gets its funds. Cf. Watergate Report at 743 (detailing how the dairy industry’s 

dummy PACs made their contributions “with a minimum of public detection 

before the election [as] all of them took place . . . after the last preelection 

reporting date”). Given the large number of PACs that already register at the 

eleventh hour before an election (JA 352-55), the absence of the six-month period 

would further encourage the last minute proliferation of new PACs with 

undisclosed donors. 

3. The Six-Month Period Is Closely Drawn to the 

Government’s Important Interests 

 

Even if the six-month period were a “significant interference” with political 

association, it would be constitutional because Congress has “employ[ed] means 

closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). This intermediate level 

of scrutiny “‘provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to 

concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the 

political process.’” Preston, 660 F.3d at 741 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 

137). Unlike strict scrutiny, “perfect tailoring is not required,” N.C. Right to Life 

Comm., 524 F.3d at 441, and so Congress need not use “the least restrictive 

means” to achieve its goals, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456-57 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). A provision is not closely drawn only where there is a “substantial 

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mismatch” between Congress’s “stated objective and the means selected to achieve 

it.” Id. at 1446. 

Applying closely drawn scrutiny, courts including this Court have repeatedly 

held that FECA may use bright-line, prophylactic rules to limit the risk of 

corruption and circumvention before they occur. For example, courts have 

routinely upheld contribution limits, see supra pp. 3-4, even though, as Buckley

acknowledged, “most large contributors do not seek improper influence,” 424 U.S. 

at 29. Buckley explained that “[n]ot only is it difficult to isolate suspect 

contributions, but more importantly, Congress was justified in” removing “the 

opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary 

contributions.” Id. at 30; see also, e.g., Preston, 660 F.3d at 736 (upholding statute 

banning contributions by lobbyists as a prophylactic measure to prevent corruption 

and its appearance). For similar reasons, courts have approved the scope of 

FECA’s limits designed to prevent circumvention. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, 

Inc., 525 F.3d at 310 (“The Court has further recognized that the unrelenting and 

imaginative efforts of some political participants to circumvent almost every new 

campaign finance regulation [justifies] prophylactic laws that extend beyond the 

regulation of direct political contributions.”). And the same is true for FECA’s 

disclosure requirements. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bost. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 

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765, 792 n.32 (1978) (“[W]e emphasized in Buckley the prophylactic effect of 

requiring that the source of communication be disclosed.”). 

The six-month period at issue here is also a bright-line, preventive rule 

shaped to eliminate the inherent risk of circumvention and non-disclosure 

presented by new PACs. That length of time is appropriate because six months is 

the longest a PAC may go without filing a disclosure report. See supra p. 44. It 

also approximates the period of time before an election during which candidate 

supporters are most likely to be focused on the upcoming election and motivated to 

form fly-by-night PACs. Id. at 37. As a result, there is no “substantial mismatch” 

between the six-month period and Congress’s legitimate goals. McCutcheon, 134 

S. Ct. at 1446. In fact, the Political Committees’ current ability to contribute 

$5,000 to any federal candidate illustrates just how limited the six-month period is. 

The Political Committees admit that closely drawn scrutiny applies. (PACs’ 

Br. at 23, 30.) Yet they inappropriately demand that the rule at issue here be 

perfectly tailored, while relying on inapposite cases applying strict scrutiny to laws 

regulating direct spending on speech (called “independent expenditures”), not 

contributions. (Id. at 30-31 (citing Colorado I, Citizens United, and National 

Conservative Political Action Committee).) The Political Committees propose that 

instead of using the six-month period to catch “bad apples,” the FEC should 

“identify and target just those committees that have engaged in suspicious 

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behavior.” (Id. at 32.) Closely drawn scrutiny, however, does not require such a 

least restrictive alternative. More fundamentally, the Political Committees’ 

proposal is highly subjective and unworkable. Hundreds of PACs register with the 

FEC during the six months before an election. (JA 352-55.) It took weeks of 

discovery for the FEC to learn that Stop PAC and American Future PAC were 

potentially “bad apples” — and those are powers the FEC normally does not have 

outside of an already-open investigation. Even if they were, there is no guarantee 

that the high-risk nature of any particular PAC would be revealed in time for 

something to be done about it before an imminent election.9

 

In contrast, the six-month period works in a clear, administrable way to 

lessen the risks of circumvention and non-disclosure. Cf. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. 

Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1671 (2015) (“[M]ost problems arise in greater and lesser 

gradations, and the First Amendment does not confine a State to addressing evils in 

their most acute form.”). The rule is therefore closely drawn. 

 

9

 In contrast to many other agencies, the FEC does not have the authority to 

conduct roving investigations based on its own perception that conduct is 

“suspicious.” FEC v. Machinists Non-Partisan Pol. League, 655 F.2d 380, 387-88 

(D.C. Cir. 1981). The vast majority of alleged lawbreaking that it investigates is 

brought to its attention through administrative complaints that any person can file 

with the agency. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a). 

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V. THE CONTRIBUTION-LIMIT AMOUNTS THAT THE POLITICAL 

COMMITTEES CHALLENGE DO NOT VIOLATE THE FIFTH 

AMENDMENT (COUNTS I & III) 

To trigger any level of constitutional scrutiny for their equal protection 

claims, the Political Committees were required to show that they were “treated 

differently from others who were similarly situated.” Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. 

Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 108 (4th Cir. 2011). As the district court found, they 

could not make that showing. (JA 515-16.) But even if they had, their claims 

would still have qualified for nothing more than rational basis scrutiny, since they 

also could not show that the differences in the contribution-limit amounts they 

attack “proceed[] along suspect lines” or “infringe[] fundamental constitutional 

rights.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). Those limit 

amounts are not only rationally related to important government interests but are 

closely drawn to those interests, as the district court concluded. (JA 516-17.) 

A. FECA Does Not Discriminate Against the Political Committees 

The Political Committees cannot show that FECA discriminates against 

either new PACs or multicandidate PACs, because FECA favors all PACs. The 

Political Committees’ claims of discrimination each hinge on their comparison of 

just two of FECA’s numerous contribution limits and other provisions. But as the 

district court recognized, the Supreme Court has explained that an equal protection 

claim against FECA must be examined in the context of how the “statute as a 

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whole” treats the plaintiff. (JA 515.) In California Medical Association v. FEC, 

an association argued that FECA violated equal protection because corporations 

were allowed to contribute more to certain PACs than it could. 453 U.S. at 200. 

The Court denied that claim solely because the association’s “claim of unfair 

treatment ignores the plain fact that the statute as a whole imposes far fewer

restrictions on . . . associations than it does on corporations and unions.” Id. 

Counts I and III here fail for the same reason. FECA favors PACs in several 

ways, as the Political Committees’ own claims illustrate. PACs, along with 

political parties, are the only entities that may qualify to directly contribute $5,000 

per election to federal candidates. See supra pp. 5-6. That reward for a limited 

number of multicandidate committees does not transform the broadly applicable 

$2,700 limit into discrimination, as Buckley held. 424 U.S. at 35. PACs may 

contribute thousands of dollars per election to candidates, and hundreds of 

thousands of dollars annually to political parties, while other groups like 

corporations, unions, federal contractors, and foreign nationals may not contribute 

at all. See supra pp. 5-6. And PACs may receive contributions of unlimited size to 

fund their independent speech, while other groups like political parties and 

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connected political committees may not. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 133-85; Stop 

This Insanity, 761 F.3d at 13-14.10 

B. New PACs Are Not Situated Similarly to Multicandidate PACs 

The Political Committees’ equal protection claims also fail because, as the 

district court held (JA 515-16), the Political Committees did not prove that new 

PACs and multicandidate PACs are similarly situated, as they must. See Veney v. 

Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730-31 (4th Cir. 2002). In fact, as the district court noted, 

the Political Committees’ own complaint stresses how different they are, 

describing new PACs as “grassroots organizations that have spontaneously 

mobilized” and multicandidate PACs as “entrenched” institutions. (JA 515 (citing 

JA 49).) 

 “Spontaneously mobilized” new PACs like Stop PAC and American Future 

PAC are more likely than “entrenched” groups to be dummy PACs focused on a 

single candidate. See supra pp. 34-43. Illustrating the point, Stop PAC and 

American Future PAC (when they were new PACs) differed radically from the Tea 

Party Fund. (JA 515-16.) The Tea Party Fund is a model of the broad-based 

citizen interest groups that Congress intended to have the $5,000 limit. It has 

 

10 The Alexandria Committee is a local party committee, not a PAC. But as it 

candidly admitted in discovery, the contribution limit it challenges does not treat it 

differently from any other local party committee. (JA 435.) The district court was 

therefore correct to dismiss its equal protection claim as well. 

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contributed to dozens of candidates with funds collected from more than 100,000 

contributors. (JA 40, 516.) It is also a well-known group that has been publicly 

scrutinized in part because it has disclosed the millions of dollars it has received 

and spent. See, e.g., Matea Gold, Tea Party PACs Reap Money for Midterms, but 

Spend Little on Candidates, Wash. Post (Apr. 26, 2014) (“The Tea Party 

Leadership Fund has doled out a quarter of a million dollars to eight consulting 

firms.”).11 

The Political Committees do not dispute that the district court accurately 

detailed the material ways in which Stop PAC and the Tea Party Fund differ. 

(PACs’ Br. at 26.) And they do not provide any evidence showing that new PACs 

are situated similarly to multicandidate PACs. Instead, they incorrectly claim that 

the FEC’s evidence about their particular characteristics is irrelevant. Id. at 25-28; 

but see supra pp. 42-43. Even if that were right, the Political Committees’ equal 

protection claims would still fail — it is their burden to show that new PACs and 

multicandidate PACs “are in all relevant respects alike.” Veney, 293 F.3d at 730-

31 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Political Committees offer only their unsupported assertion that new 

PACs and multicandidate PACs must be similarly situated in the “manner 

 

11 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/tea-party-pacs-reap-money-formidterms-but-spend-little-on-candidates/2014/04/26/0e52919a-cbd6-11e3-a75e463587891b57_story.html. 

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Congress deemed relevant” because they both have more than 50 contributors and 

have made five contributions. (PACs’ Br. at 28.) But Congress also deemed a 

PAC’s age to be relevant, as shown by its choice to enact the six-month period. 

See supra pp. 36-39. The FEC’s evidence supports Congress’s judgment, and the 

Political Committees have put forth no evidence of their own to even try to prove 

otherwise. 

C. Because the Political Committees Did Not Suffer a Cognizable 

First Amendment Injury, Rational Basis Scrutiny Applies to 

Their Fifth Amendment Claims 

 Even had the Political Committees proved that FECA discriminated against 

them compared to similarly situated PACs, their equal protection claims would 

have been subject only to rational basis scrutiny. No appellant contends that it is a 

member of a suspect class. And as explained above, the differences in 

contribution-limit amounts that the Political Committees challenge did not 

significantly burden their First Amendment rights. See supra pp. 29-33. 

While some courts have applied closely drawn scrutiny to equal protection 

claims against contribution limits, many of those cases involved plaintiffs who also 

argued that it was unconstitutional to have any limit at all, which the Political 

Committees do not argue here. See Wagner, 2015 WL 4079575, at *25; Ognibene 

v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 177-78 (2d Cir. 2011); Ill. Liberty PAC v. Madigan, 902 

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F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1115-16 (N.D. Ill.), aff’d, No. 12-3305, 2012 WL 5259036 (7th 

Cir. 2012).12 

In any event, the Political Committees’ equal protection claims fail 

regardless of whether rational basis or closely drawn scrutiny applies. 

D. The Contribution-Limit Amounts the Political Committees 

Challenge Are Closely Drawn to Important Government Interests 

The district court correctly concluded that the FEC proved that “there is 

sufficient government interest” to support FECA’s “limits on contributions from 

new PACs . . . to candidates and from multicandidate PACs to parties.” (JA 517.)

1. The $2,700 Contribution Limit Applied to New PACs Is 

Closely Drawn to the Important Government Interests of 

Preventing Circumvention and Promoting Disclosure 

(Count I) 

 The Political Committees’ equal protection claim against the $2,700 limit 

(count I) is identical in substance to its First Amendment claim against the sixmonth period (count II). See supra p. 10. Both claims incorrectly assert that the 

government has no legitimate interest in keeping new PACs from utilizing the 

$5,000 contribution limit reserved for multicandidate PACs. (JA 59-62.) The 

equal protection claim, therefore, fails for the same reasons the First Amendment 

 

12 In other out-of-Circuit cases, the state-defendants apparently did not 

contend, as the FEC does here, that rational basis scrutiny applies. See Riddle v. 

Hickenlooper, 742 F.3d 922, 927-28 (10th Cir. 2014); Woodhouse v. Me. Comm’n 

on Gov’tal Ethics and Election Practices, 40 F. Supp. 3d 186, 194 (D. Me. 2014). 

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claim does. See Wagner, 2015 WL 4079575, at *25 (plaintiff cannot succeed on a 

failed First Amendment claim against contribution limits by repackaging it as an 

equal protection claim); Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 193 n.19 (same); Ill. Liberty PAC, 

902 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (same). 

2. The Limits on PAC Contributions to Political Parties Are 

Closely Drawn to Anti-Corruption Interests and Allow the 

Parties to Amass the Resources Necessary for Effective 

Advocacy (Count III) 

In count III, the Political Committees contend that the amounts of FECA’s 

limits on multicandidate PAC contributions to political parties violate equal 

protection because new PACs may contribute more to parties. (JA 62-63.) These 

limits and their amounts, however, are constitutionally justified. The existence of 

some limit on PAC contributions to parties lessens the risk and appearance of 

corruption, as the Political Committees do not dispute. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 

145. As for “the amount or level” of those limits, Congress was required by the 

First Amendment to ensure that they were high enough to allow recipients to 

“‘amass[] the resources necessary for effective advocacy.’” Randall, 548 U.S. at 

247 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). The increased limit for persons, including 

new PACs, furthers that important interest, and by doing so, it helps the parties to 

perform their important role in federal elections. 

Congress historically has had a “general desire to enhance” the “important 

and legitimate role” of parties in federal elections. Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 618. 

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Unlike PACs, parties “select slates of candidates for elections,” choose “who will 

serve on legislative committees, elect congressional leadership,” and “organize 

legislative caucuses.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 188. And so the Supreme Court has 

said that “Congress is fully entitled to consider the real-world differences between 

political parties and interest groups when crafting a system of national campaign 

finance regulation.” Id. 

Congress has therefore repeatedly enacted contribution limits that favor 

political parties. National parties may receive far larger contributions from 

individuals ($33,400 annually) than PACs can ($5,000 annually). See supra pp. 

5-6. The Supreme Court has said that such differences do not violate equal 

protection. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 187-88. Parties may also contribute millions 

of dollars more to candidates through coordinated spending (up to $21.6 million 

per general election) than multicandidate PACs can ($5,000 annually), see supra

pp. 5-6, and the Court has upheld those limits as well, see Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 

465. 

The differences at issue in this case were also created by Congress to 

enhance the functioning of the parties. Congress first limited contributions to 

parties in 1976. See FECA Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-283, § 112, 90 Stat. 

475 (May 11, 1976). While persons could then give just $1,000 per election to 

candidates, they could contribute $20,000 annually to national parties and $5,000 

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annually to state or local parties. Id. While multicandidate PACs could contribute 

$5,000 per election to candidates, they could give $15,000 annually to national 

parties and $5,000 annually to state or local parties. Id. Congress designed those 

higher limits “to allow the political parties to fulfill their unique role in the political 

process.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1057, at 58 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

946. 

In 2002, Congress further increased the amount persons could contribute 

annually to national parties to $25,000 (indexed for inflation), and to state and 

local parties to $10,000. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 

107-155, §§ 102, 307(a)(1)-(2), (d), 116 Stat. 81 (Mar. 27, 2002). Congress 

increased these limits because in that same legislation it strictly limited the parties’ 

receipt of “soft money,” funds raised outside of FECA’s limits. Id. § 101. At that 

time, soft money accounted for nearly half of all funding for major national 

parties.13 So Congress needed to ensure that the parties could continue to raise 

sufficient funds from other sources. See 148 Cong. Rec. S2153 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 

2002) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“The soft money ban will work because we 

came to a reasonable compromise with regard to raising some of the existing hard 

 

13 FEC Press Release, Party Committees Raise More Than $1 Billion in 2001-

2002 (Mar. 20, 2003), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2003/20030320party/ 

20030103party.html. 

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money contribution limits by modest amounts, and indexing those limits for 

inflation.”). 

Congress’s increase of the limits on what a person could give to party 

committees was the most effective way to ensure the parties could continue to 

amass necessary funds. Individuals make up the vast majority of the persons 

covered by section 30116(a)(1). (See JA 356.) Historically, individuals have 

contributed far more to political parties than have other contributors, including 

multicandidate PACs. (JA 356-57.)14 Allowing persons to contribute more was 

not only effective, but also sufficient to make up for the loss of soft money while 

still limiting the risks of corruption, and so the limits on multicandidate PAC 

contributions to parties remained at their already generous levels. In fact, in the 

2011-12 election cycle, political parties raised more than $1.6 billion.15 

 The Political Committees incorrectly contend that Congress could consider 

only the anti-corruption interests when setting these contribution limits amounts. 

 

14 See also supra p. 57 n.13 (first four appended Tables show that 

multicandidate PACs contributed very little of political parties’ funding before 

2002 when there was no limit on the amount of soft money they could give to 

parties). 

15 FEC Press Release, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the 2011-2012 

Election Cycle (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/ 

20130419_2012-24m-Summary.shtml. At the end of 2014, Congress enacted 

legislation giving the parties even more enhanced abilities to raise funds, as 

individuals and PACs may now contribute hundreds of thousands of dollars per 

year to the parties for certain specific uses. See supra pp. 9-10. 

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(PACs’ Br. at 20, 28-29, 33.) To be sure, the Supreme Court has made general 

statements that those interests are the only “‘constitutionally sufficient 

justification[s]’” for creating broadly applicable contribution limits, as the Political 

Committees point out. (PACs’ Br. at 28 (alternation in original; internal quotation 

marks omitted).)16 But when setting their amounts, Congress was able — and in 

fact required — to consider also whether the limits were high enough to allow the 

parties to raise sufficient funds. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 247. 

 The balance of interests involved in setting the levels of FECA’s different 

contribution limits, which number more than a dozen, varies from limit to limit. 

As a result, the symmetry that the Political Committees demand between FECA’s 

PAC-to-candidate limits and PAC-to-party limits is neither realistic nor 

constitutionally required. Cf. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 188 (“Taken seriously, 

plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments would call into question . . . much of the preexisting structure of FECA.”). Although new PACs may give increased amounts 

to parties, they are not permitted to give elevated amounts to candidates because 

when setting that latter limit in 1974, Congress had a different chief concern: The 

 

16 More particularized contribution limits are also constitutional on the basis of 

other important government interests, where applicable. See Bluman v. FEC, 800 

F. Supp. 2d 281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court) (ban on contributions by 

foreign nationals), summ. aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012); Wagner, 2015 WL 

4079575, at *5-7 (government contractor contribution ban); see also Citizens 

United, 558 U.S. at 341 (limits related to enabling governmental functions). 

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risk of corruption is at its peak when a contribution is made directly to a candidate. 

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452. The Political Committees point out that 

Congress’s selection of the amount of that limit (now $2,700) “indicate[d] its belief 

that contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable risk of 

corruption.” (PACs’ Br. at 49 (quoting McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452).) But the 

same logic does not apply to Congress’s selection of the PAC-to-party limit 

amounts in 2002, a decision primarily motivated by different concerns. See supra

pp. 56-58. It is therefore not “incoherent” or “fundamentally backwards” for 

FECA to allow new PACs to give more to parties than multicandidate PACs can. 

(PACs’ Br. at 20, 33.) Those limits reflect a multi-factored balancing of interests. 

What is fundamentally backwards is the Political Committees’ view that the 

courts can standardize FECA’s many contribution-limit amounts (which range 

from $21.6 million to zero) based on just one consideration — the apparent 

corruption risk presented by the donor. (PACs’ Br. at 28-30.) This approach 

ignores the contribution recipient’s particular corruption risk and advocacy needs. 

It further ignores that democracy benefits from PACs that have grown into broadbased interest groups that can represent the views of citizens during elections. And 

most importantly, it ignores the fact that the Supreme Court has expressly rejected 

the Political Committees’ approach. Under closely drawn scrutiny, Congress’s 

“decision to enact contribution limits” is entitled to deference because Congress 

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61 

“enjoys particular expertise” in weighing the “competing constitutional interests” 

involved. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137. This Court therefore should reject the 

Political Committees’ invitation — contrary to the Supreme Court’s direction — to 

wield a “scalpel to probe” the specific amounts of FECA’s contribution limits. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s ruling should be affirmed. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Deputy General Counsel – Law 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

Harry J. Summers 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

/s/ Kevin P. Hancock 

Kevin P. Hancock 

 Attorney 

 khancock@fec.gov 

FOR THE APPELLEE 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

August 10, 2015 (202) 694-1650 

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04/13/2012 

SCC

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. _______ Caption: __________________________________________________

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Stop R.E.I.D., et al. v. Federal Election Commission 15-1455

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