ypp

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of t

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 3

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 

Syllabus 

MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION E

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

No. 02ñ1674. Argued September 8, 2003óDecided De

2003* 

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), w

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), the 

tions Act of 1934, and other portions of the United State

most recent of nearly a century of federal enactments 

purge national politics of what [is] conceived to be the 

fluence of ëbig moneyí campaign contributions.î Un

Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 572. In enacting BC

sought to address three important developments in the y

óóóóóó 

*Together with No. 02ñ1675, National Rifle Association 

eral Election Commission et al., No. 02ñ1676, Federal 

mission et al. v. McConnell, United States Senator, et al., 

McCain, United States Senator, et al. v. McConnell, Unite

tor, et al., No. 02ñ1727, Republican National Committee et 

Election Commission et al., No. 02ñ1733, National Righ

mittee, Inc., et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., 

American Civil Liberties Union v. Federal Election Com

No. 02ñ1740, Adams et al. v. Federal Election Commiss

02ñ1747, Paul, United States Congressman, et al. v. Fe

Commission et al., No. 02ñ1753, California Democratic 

Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02ñ1755, Americ

of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et 

Election Commission et al., and No. 02ñ1756, Chamber of 

the United States et al. v. Federal Election Commission 

appeal from the same court. 
ìissue ads,î and the disturbing findings of a Senate inve

campaign practices related to the 1996 federal elections

With regard to the first development, prior to BCRA

closure requirements and source and amount limitat

only to so-called ìhard moneyî contributions made for t

influencing an election for federal office. Political part

dates were able to circumvent FECAís limitations by 

ìsoft moneyîómoney as yet unregulated under FECAó

activities intended to influence state or local election

purpose activities such as get-out-the-vote (GOTV) driv

party advertising; and for legislative advocacy adverti

if they mentioned a federal candidateís name, so long 

not expressly advocate the candidateís election or def

gard to the second development, parties and candidates 

FECA by using ìissue adsî that were specifically inte

election results, but did not contain ìmagic words,î 

Against Jane Doe,î which would have subjected the a

restrictions. Those developments were detailed in a 

Committee Report summarizing an investigation into 

eral elections, which concluded that the soft-money loo

to a meltdown of the campaign finance system; and dis

tial reforms, including a soft-money ban and restriction

sue advocacy by nonparty groups. 

Congress enacted many of the committeeís proposals 

tle I regulates the use of soft money by political parties

and candidates; Title II primarily prohibits corporation

from using general treasury funds for communication

tended to, or have the effect of, influencing federal elect

and Titles III, IV, and V set out other requirements. E

challenging BCRAís constitutionality were filed. A th

trict Court held some parts of BCRA unconstitutiona

others. The parties challenging the law are referred to 

tiffs, and those who intervened in support of the law a

defendants. 

Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in pa

251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 251 F. Supp. 2d 948, affirmed in part 

in part. 

JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE OíCONNOR delivered 

opinion with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, conclu

statuteís two principal, complementary featuresóCong

plug the soft-money loophole and its regulation of 

communicationsómust be upheld in the main. Pp. 23ñ
(a) In evaluating ß323, the Court applies the less 

dard of review applicable to campaign contribution 

Buckley and its progeny. Such limits are subject on

drawnî scrutiny, see 424 U. S., at 25, rather than to s

because, unlike restrictions on campaign expenditure

limits ìentai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the 

ability to engage in free communication,î e.g., id., at 2

ver, contribution limits are grounded in the important 

interests in preventing ìboth the actual corruption t

large financial contributions and the eroding of public 

the electoral process through the appearance of corru

Federal Election Commín v. National Right to Work Com

197, 208. The less rigorous review standard shows pro

to Congressí ability to weigh competing constitutional i

area in which it enjoys particular expertise, and provid

ficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns abo

tion of regulations designed to protect the political proc

Finally, because Congress, in its lengthy deliberatio

BCRAís enactment, properly relied on Buckley and its pro

cisis considerations, buttressed by the respect that the L

Judicial Branches owe one another, provide additional po

for adhering to the analysis of contribution limits the Co

tently followed since Buckley. The Court rejects plaint

that the type of speech and associational burdens that 

are fundamentally different from the burdens that 

Buckleyís contribution limits. Pp. 24ñ32. 

(b) New FECA ß323(a)ówhich forbids national par

and their agents to ìsolicit, receive, . . . direct . . . , or sp

. . . that are not subject to [FECAís] limitations, prohib

porting requirements,î 2 U. S. C. A. ßß441i(a)(1), (2)ód

the First Amendment. Pp. 32ñ52. 

(1) The governmental interest underlying ß323(a

the actual or apparent corruption of federal candidat

holdersóconstitutes a sufficiently important interest to 

bution limits. That interest is not limited to the eliminat

quo, cash-for-votes exchanges, see Buckley, supra, at 2

also to ìundue influence on an officeholderís judgment, an

ance of such influence,î Federal Election Commín v. Colo

can Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 441 (Colora

interests are sufficient to justify not only contribution lim

but also laws preventing the circumvention of such limit

While the quantum of empirical evidence needed to s
Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 391, the idea that large 

to a national party can corrupt or create the appearance 

of federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel 

ble, see, e.g., Buckley, supra, at 38. There is substanti

these cases to support Congressí determination that s

tions of soft money give rise to corruption and the appe

ruption. For instance, the record is replete with examp

party committeesí peddling access to federal candidat

holders in exchange for large soft-money donations. Pp

(2) Section ß323(a) is not impermissibly overbro

subjects all funds raised and spent by national parti

hard-money source and amount limits, including, e.g., f

purely state and local elections in which no federal offi

The record demonstrates that the close relationship be

officeholders and the national parties, as well as the m

parties have traded on that relationship, have made 

money contributions to national parties suspect, rega

those funds are ultimately used. The Governmentís st

in preventing corruption, and particularly its appeara

sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to nation

FECAís source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Pp. 

(3) Nor is ß323(a)ís prohibition on national partie

directing soft-money contributions substantially over

prohibitionís reach is limited, in that it bars only soft-m

tions by national party committees and party officers a

official capacities; the committees themselves remain 

hard money on their own behalf or that of state commit

and local candidates and to contribute hard money to 

tees and candidates. Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively t

tation banís overbreadth is demonstrated by ß323(e), 

federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited a

money from individual donors under certain circumsta

ferences between ßß323(a) and 323(e) are without cons

nificance, see National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 2

Congressí reasonable and expert judgments about nat

teesí functions and their interactions with officeholders. 

(4) Section 323(a) is not substantially overbroad w

the speech and associational rights of minor parties, ev

latter may have slim prospects for electoral success. It 

to require that all parties and candidates follow the s

signed to protect the electoral processís integrity. Buck

at 34ñ35. A nascent or struggling minor party can 
(5) Plaintiffsí argument that ß323(a) unconstitu

feres with the ability of national committees to associ

and local committees is unpersuasive because it hing

naturally broad reading of the statutory terms ìspend,î 

rect,î and ìsolicit.î Nothing on ß323(a)ís face prohibits 

officers from sitting down with state and local party 

candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend 

long as the national officers do not personally spend, r

or solicit soft money. Pp. 51ñ52. 

(c) On its face, new FECA ß323(b)ówhich prohibit

cal party committees from using soft money for activ

federal elections, 2 U. S. C. A. ß442i(b)óis closely drawn 

important governmental interest of preventing corrupti

pearance. Pp. 52ñ66. 

(1) Recognizing that the close ties between feder

and state party committees would soon render ß323(a

tion measures ineffective if state and local committ

available as a conduit for soft-money donations, Cong

ß323(b) to prevent donors from contributing nonfederal 

committees to help finance ìFederal election activity,î 

fined to encompass (1) voter registration activity during 

before a federal election; (2) voter identification, GOTV

campaign activity ìconducted in connection with an ele

a [federal] candidate . . . appears on the ballotî; (3) an

municationî that ìrefers to a clearly identified [feder

and ìpromotes,î ìsupports,î ìattacks,î or ìopposesî such 

and (4) the services of a state committee employee w

more than 25% of his or her compensated time to ìact

nection with a Federal election,î 2 U. S. C. A. ßß431(20

activities that fall within this definition must be fund

money. ß441i(b)(1). The Levin Amendment carves out 

to this general rule, allowing state and local party com

for certain federal election activitiesónamely, act

within categories (1) and (2) above that either do n

clearly identified candidate for Federal office,î or, if 

broadcast communications, refer ìsolely to a clearly ide

date for State or local office,î ßß441i(b)(2)(B)(i)ñ(ii)ówit

ratio of hard money and so-called ìLevin funds.î Le

subject only to state regulation, but for two additiona

First, no contributor can donate more than $10,000 per 

gle committeeís Levin account. ß441i(b)(2)(B)(iii). Secon

funds and the allocated portion of hard money to pay f
committees to solicit the hard-money portion. ßß44

441i(b)(2)(C). Pp. 52ñ55. 

(2) In addressing soft-money contributions to stat

Congress both drew a conclusion and made a prediction

from the record that soft moneyís corrupting influence 

self into the political process not only through national 

tees, but also through state committees, which functio

nate avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces

evidence shows that both candidates and parties alrea

who have reached their direct contribution limit to d

committees. Congressí reasonable prediction, based on 

campaign finance regulation, was that donors would re

by directing soft-money contributions to state comm

purpose of influencing federal candidates and elections

eral candidates would be just as indebted to these co

they had been to those who had formerly contributed t

parties. Preventing corrupting activity from shifting 

state committees and thereby eviscerating FECA clear

an important governmental interest. Pp. 55ñ57. 

(3) Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that, even if 

a legitimate interest, its restrictions are so unjustifiabl

and overbroad that they cannot be considered ìclose

match the Governmentís objectives. Pp. 57ñ66. 

(i) Section 323(b) is not substantially overbro

ß323(b) captures some activities that affect state camp

federal offices, these are the same activities that were c

FECís pre-BCRA allocation rules, and so had to be fun

hard money because they affected both federal and s

As a practical matter, BCRA merely codifies the FECís 

gime principles while justifiably adjusting the applicab

order to restore the efficacy of FECAís longstanding 

contributions to state and local committees for the pu

encing federal elections. By limiting its reach to ìFeder

tivities,î ß323(b) is narrowly focused on regulating cont

directly benefit federal candidates and thus pose the g

corruption or its appearance. The first two categorie

election activityîóvoter registration efforts and voter 

GOTV, and generic campaign activities conducted in co

a federal electionóclearly capture activities that confer 

benefit on federal candidates by getting like-minded 

polls. If a voter registration drive does not specifically m

eral candidate, state committees can take advantage 
the third category of ìFederal election activity,î ìpubli

tion[s]î that promote or attack a federal candidate, d

the election in which that candidate is participating, 

ß323(b)ís contribution caps to such communications is 

to the anticorruption interest it is intended to address. 

gressí interest in preventing circumvention of ß323(b)ís 

tions justifies the requirement of the fourth category of 

tion activityî that federal funds be used to pay any 

party employee who spends more than 25% of his or her 

time on activities connected with a federal election. Pp. 

(ii) The Levin Amendment does not unjustifiab

sociation among party committees by forbidding tran

funds among state parties, transfers of hard money to f

able federal portion of Levin expenditures, and joint 

Levin funds by state parties. While preserving parties

freedom is important, not every minor restriction on 

wise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitution

See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 450, n. 11. Given the de

terconnected regulatory scheme at issue here, any asso

dens imposed by the Levin Amendment restrictions 

weighed by the need to prevent circumvention of the e

Pp. 63ñ65. 

(iii) The evidence supporting the argument th

Amendment prevents parties from amassing the resour

engage in effective advocacy is speculative. The histor

finance regulation proves that political parties are e

flexible in adapting to new restrictions on their fundra

Moreover, the mere fact that ß323(b) may reduce the m

to state and local parties to fund federal election activi

inconsequential. The question is not whether the amo

over previous election cycles is reduced, but whether th

so radical as to drive the sound of the recipientís voice b

of notice. Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 397. If state o

can make such a showing, as-applied challenges rem

Pp. 65ñ66. 

(d) New FECA ß323(d)ówhich forbids national, st

party committees and their agents to ìsolicit any fund

or direct any donationsî to ß501(c) tax exempt organ

make expenditures in connection with a federal election

political organizations ìother than a political committee

trict, or local committee of a political party, or the au

paign committee of a candidate for State or local office,
circumvention measure. Absent this provision, nation

local party committees would have significant incentiv

their formidable fundraising apparatuses, including th

access to federal officeholders, into the service of lik

exempt organizations that conduct activities benefitin

dates. All of the corruption and the appearance of cor

dant on the operation of those fundraising apparatuses 

Plaintiffsí argument that ß323(d)ís solicitations ba

squared with ß323(e), which allows federal candidates a

ers to solicit limited soft-money donations to tax-exe

tions engaged in federal election activities, is not p

ß323(d)ís solicitation restriction is otherwise valid, it is 

unconstitutional by the mere fact that Congress chose n

the activities of another group as stringently as it mig

National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 210. Furthermo

ence between the two provisions is explained by the fact 

party officers, unlike federal candidates and officeho

free to solicit soft money on behalf of nonprofit organiz

individual capacities. Given ß323(e)ís tight content

amount restrictions on soft-money solicitations by fede

and officeholders, as well as the less rigorous standa

ß323(e)ís greater solicitation allowances do not render ß

tation restriction facially invalid. Pp. 67ñ71. 

(2) Section 323(d)ís restriction on donations 

ß501(c) or ß527 organizations is a valid anticircumven

insofar as it prohibits donations of funds not already r

pliance with FECA. Absent such a restriction, state a

committees could accomplish directly what the antis

strictions prevent them from doing indirectlyóraising 

soft money to launder through tax-exempt organization

federal election activities. Although the ban raises ove

cerns if read to restrict donations from a partyís federal 

funds already raised in compliance with FECAís source

disclosure limitationsóthese concerns do not require t

challenge be sustained, given this Courtís obligation 

statute, if possible, in such a way as to avoid constitutio

see, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62. Because t

not compel the conclusion that Congress intended ìdon

clude donations from a partyís hard-money account, a

the constitutional infirmities such an interpretation wo

Court narrowly construes ß323(d)ís ban to apply only t

funds not raised in compliance with FECA. Pp. 71ñ73. 
fer, or spendî soft money in connection with federa

U. S. C. A. ß441i(e)(1)(A), and limits their ability to d

and local elections, ß441i(e)(1)(B)ódoes not viola

Amendment. No party seriously questions the const

the general ban on soft-money donations directly to 

dates and officeholders and their agents. By severing t

link to the soft-money donor, the ban is closely drawn 

corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal c

officeholders. The solicitation restrictions are valid a

tion measures. Even before BCRAís passage, federal c

officeholders solicited donations to state and local part

tax-exempt organizations, in order to help their own, a

partyís, electoral cause. See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 

centives to do so will only increase with Title Iís restr

raising and spending of soft money by national, state, 

ties. Section 323(e) addresses these concerns while a

the individual speech and associational rights of feder

and officeholders. Pp. 74ñ77. 

(f) New FECA ß323(f)ówhich forbids state and loc

or officeholders to raise and spend soft money to fund 

ìpublic communicationsî that promote or attack federal 

U. S. C. ß442i(f)óis a valid anticircumvention provision

places no cap on the funds that such candidates can spe

tivity, but, rather, limits only the source and amount of 

that they can draw on to fund expenditures that direct

eral elections. And, by regulating only contributions 

ìpublic communications,î the section focuses narrowly 

money donations with the greatest potential to corrupt 

the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and 

Plaintiffsí principal arguments against the sectionó(1) 

nition of ìpublic communicationsî as communications th

attack a clearly identified federal candidate is unco

vague and overbroad; and (2) that soft-money contribu

and local candidates for ìpublic communicationsî do n

appear to corrupt federal candidatesóare rejected. Pp. 

2. Several plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that BCR

ceeds Congressí Election Clause authority to ìmake o

governing federal elections, U. S. Const., Art. I, ß4, and 

stitutional federalism principles by impairing the State

regulate their own elections. In examining federal A

Amendment infirmity, the Court focuses on whether St

officials are commandeered to carry out federal regula
upon States or state officials. And, because it does not 

empt state legislation, Title I leaves States free to enfo

restrictions on state electoral campaign financing. M

this Court has policed the absolute boundaries of Cong

power, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 

no reason to believe that Congress has overstepped its El

power in enacting BCRA. Indeed, as already found, Ti

drawn to match Congressí important interest in preventi

tion or the appearance of corruption of federal candida

holders. That interest is sufficient to ground Congressí 

Elections Clause power. Pp. 79ñ80. 

3. Also rejected is the argument that BCRA Title I 

protection by discriminating against political parties in 

cial interest groups, which remain free to raise soft m

voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and bro

tising (other than electioneering communications). Fi

tually favors political parties in many ways, e.g., by a

committees to receive individual contributions substan

ing FECA limits on contributions to nonparty politica

More importantly, Congress is fully entitled to conside

real-world differences between parties and interest 

crafting a campaign finance regulation system, see Nat

Work, 459 U. S., at 210, including the fact that parties h

and power in the legislature vastly exceeding any int

Taken seriously, plaintiffsí equal protection argumen

into question not just BCRA Title I, but much of FECA

structure. Pp. 82ñ85. 

4. Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed insofa

ßß323(e) and 323(f) and reversed insofar as it invalid

323(b), and 323(d). P. 82. 

5. The District Courtís judgment is affirmed to the 

upheld the disclosure requirements in amended FECA 

jected the facial attack on the provisions relating to do

or more, but reversed to the extent that it inval

ß304(f)(5). Pp. 82ñ95. 

(a) BCRA ß201 comprehensively amends FECA ß3

quires political committees to file detailed periodic fin

with the FEC. The narrowing construction adopted in 

ited FECAís disclosure requirement to communications 

vocating the election or defeat of particular candidates. 

a new term, ìelectioneering communication,î which enc

ìbroadcast, cable, or satellite communicationî that clear
targeted to the relevant electorate. 2 U. S. C. A. ß

BCRA also amends ß304 to provide disclosure requirem

sons who fund electioneering communications (and 

amends FECA ß316(b)(2) to extend those requiremen

tions and labor unions). 

Plaintiffs challenge the new termís constitutionalit

to both disclosures and expenditures, arguing primarily 

drew a constitutionally mandated line between express 

so-called issue advocacy, and that speakers have an in

Amendment right to engage in the latter category of 

ever, a plain reading of Buckley and Federal Election C

sachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (MCFL), s

express advocacy restriction is a product of statutory i

not a constitutional command. Both the concept of exp

and the class of magic words were born of an effort to a

tional problems of vagueness and overbreadth in the 

the Buckley Court. Consistent with the principle th

tional rule should never be formulated more broadly tha

the facts to which it is to be applied, Buckley and MCFL 

to the statutory language before the Court and in no way 

tutional boundary that forever fixed the permissible scop

regulating campaign-related speech. The notion that the 

ment erects a rigid barrier between express and issue 

cannot be squared with this Courtís longstanding recogn

presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfu

electioneering speech from a true issue ad. Buckleyís exp

line has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or 

ruption, and Congress enacted BCRA to correct the flaw

nally, because the components of new FECA ß304(f)(3)

ìelectioneering communicationî are both easily underst

tively determinable, the vagueness objection that persua

ley Court to limit FECAís reach to express advocacy is in

Pp. 82ñ88. 

(b) With regard to plaintiffsí other concerns about 

phrase ìelectioneering communication,î the District C

rejected their submission that new FECA ß304 unn

quires disclosure of the names of persons who contribu

more to the individual or group paying for the comm

erred in finding ß304(f)(5) invalid because it mandates 

executory contracts for communications that have not y

cause the important state interests identified in Buck

the electorate with information, deterring actual co
Buckley amply supports application of FECA ß304ís 

quirements to the entire range of ìelectioneering com

Buckley also forecloses a facial attack on the new ß304 

requires disclosure of the names of persons who contrib

more to segregated funds or spend more than $10,000 

year on electioneering communications. Under Buckley

proof, the evidence here did not establish the requisi

probability of harm to any plaintiff group or its mem

from compelled disclosure. However, the rejection of th

lenge does not foreclose possible future challenges to pa

cations of that disclosure requirement. 

This Court is also unpersuaded by plaintiffsí cha

FECA ß304(f)(5)ís requirement regarding the disclosur

contracts. The new provision mandates disclosure onl

son makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 in 

year to pay for electioneering communications. Given 

short time frames in which such communications are 

terest in assuring that disclosures are made in time to 

vant information to voters is significant. Yet fixing th

filing disclosure statements based on the date when 

bursements exceed $10,000 would open a significant loo

the advance disclosure requirement, for political sup

avoid preelection disclosures about ads slated to run d

paignís final weeks simply by making a preelection do

less than $10,000, with the balance payable after the 

record contains little evidence of any harm that might 

requirementís enforcement, and the District Courtí

about such harm cannot outweigh the public interest in 

disclosure before an election actually takes place. Pp. 8

6. The District Courtís judgment is affirmed insofar a

plaintiffs advanced no basis for finding unconstitutiona

which amends FECA ß315(a)(7)(C) to provide that disb

electioneering communications that are coordinated wit

or party will be treated as contributions to, and expend

candidate or party, 2 U. S. C. A. ß441a(a)(7)(C). That p

fies the scope of ß315(a)(7)(B), which provides that 

made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or co

at the request or suggestion of a candidate or party con

butions. BCRA pre-empts a possible claim that the t

tureî in ß315(a)(7)(B) is limited to spending for expr

Because Buckleyís narrow interpretation of that term 

statutory limitation on Congressí power to regulate fed
treats other coordinated expenditures. Pp. 96ñ97. 

7. The District Courtís judgment is affirmed to the 

upheld the constitutionality of new FECA ß316(b)(2), an

the extent that it invalidated any part of that section

extends to all ìelectioneering communicationsî FECA ß

strictions on the use of corporate and union general trea

U. S. C. A. ß441b(b)(2). Because those entities may stil

administer segregated funds, or PACs, for such commu

provision is a regulation of, not a ban on, expression. B

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). This Courtís consideratio

claim that the expanded regulation is both overinclusi

inclusive is informed by the conclusion that the distin

express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy is not co

compelled. Thus, the Court examines the degree to 

burdens First Amendment expression and evaluates w

pelling governmental interest justifies that burden. P

not carried their burden of proving that new FECA 

overbroad. They argue that the justifications that ad

port regulation of express advocacy do not apply to sign

ties of speech encompassed by the electioneering co

definition. That argument fails to the extent that issue 

during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal 

general elections are the functional equivalent of expr

The justifications for regulating express advocacy app

those ads if they have an electioneering purpose, which 

jority do. Also rejected is plaintiffsí argument tha

ß316(b)(2)ís segregated-fund requirement is underinclus

does not apply to print or Internet advertising. The r

flects that corporations and unions used soft money to 

tual torrent of televised election-related ads during th

riod. Congress justifiably concluded that remedial le

needed to stanch that flow of money. Finally, ß304(f)(

excludes news items and commentary from the electi

munications definition, is wholly consistent with Firs

principles as applied to the media. Pp. 97ñ103. 

8. The District Courtís judgment is affirmed to the 

upheld new FECA ß316(c)(6), as limited to nonprofit en

not so-called MCFL organizations. BCRA ß204, 

ß316(c)(6), 2 U. S. C. A. ß441b(c)(2), extends to nonprofi

the prohibition on the use of general treasury funds to 

tioneering communications. This Court upheld a simi

in Beaumont, supra, except as it applied to organizat
union, and do not accept contributions from those en

479 U. S., at 264. The same constitutional objection to 

pre-BCRA restrictions to such organizations necessaril

equal force to FECA ß316(c)(6). That ß316(c)(6) does n

exempt MCFL organizations is not a sufficient reason to 

This Court presumes that the legislators were fully a

provision could not apply to MCFL-type entities, and th

concedes that it does not. As so construed, the provis

valid. Pp. 103ñ106. 

9. Because this Court has already found BCRA ß20

contract disclosure requirement constitutional, plaintiff

a similar disclosure requirement in BCRA ß212, which 

ß304(g), 2 U. S. C. A. ß434, is essentially moot. Pp. 106ñ

10. The District Courtís judgment is affirmed to the 

invalidated BCRA ß213, which amends FECA ß315(d)

political parties to choose between coordinated and in

penditures during the postnomination, preelection 

U. S. C. A. ß441a(d)(4). That provision places an un

burden on the partiesí right to make unlimited indepen

tures. Although the category of burdened speech is li

pendent expenditures for express advocacyóand ther

tively smallóit plainly is entitled to First Amendme

The governmental interest in requiring parties to avoi

words is not sufficient to support the burden imposed 

The fact that the provision is cast as a choice rather tha

prohibition on independent expenditures does not mak

tional. Pp. 107ñ114. 

11. The District Courtís judgment is affirmed to the 

rejected plaintiffsí challenges to BCRA ß214, which 

ß315(a)(7)(B)(ii), 2 U. S. C. A. ß441a(a)(7)(b)(ii)

ß315(a)(7)(B)(i) long has provided that expenditures 

trolled by or coordinated with a candidate will be treate

tions to the candidate. BCRA ß214(a) extends that ru

tures coordinated with political parties; and ßß214 (b) 

the FEC to promulgate new regulations that do not ì

ment or formal collaboration to establish coordination,

ß441a(a) note. FECA ß315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is not overbro

cause it permits a finding of coordination in the abse

existing agreement. Congress has always treated expen

after a wink or nod as coordinated. Nor does the a

agreement requirement render ß315(a)(7)(B)(ii) unco

vague. An agreement has never been required under ß3
constitutional challenge for almost three decades. P

provided no evidence that that the definition has ch

speech, and have made no attempt to explain how an 

quirement would prevent the FEC from engaging in w

will be intrusive and politically motivated investigation

this facial challenge to BCRA, plaintiffsí challenge to ßß

is not ripe to the extent that they allege constitutional 

the FECís new regulations rather than the statute. Pp. 

THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Cour

to miscellaneous BCRA Title III and IV provisions, co

the District Courtís judgment with respect to these pr

be affirmed. Pp. 2ñ11. 

1. The plaintiffsí challenges to BCRA ß305, ß307, an

aire provisions are nonjusticiable. Pp. 2ñ8. 

(a) The McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to cha

ß305, which amends the federal Communications Ac

quirement that, 45 days before a primary or 60 days be

election, broadcast stations sell air time to a qualified 

their ìlowest unit charge,î 47 U. S. C. ß315(b). Section 

ment, in turn, denies a candidate the benefit of that ch

fied circumstances. 47 U. S. C. A. ßß315(b)(2)(A), (

McConnellís testimony that he plans to run ads critica

nents and had run them in the past is too remote tem

isfy the Article III standing requirement that a plaintif

an ìinjury in factî that is ìactual or imminent,î Whitmo

495 U. S. 149, 155, 158, given that the lowest unit charg

is not available until 45 days before a primary, that Se

nellís current term does not expire until 2009, and that, 

earliest day he could be affected by ß305 is 45 days be

Republican primary election. Pp. 2ñ4. 

(b) The Adams and Paul plaintiffs lack standing 

BCRA ß307, which amends FECA ß315(a)(1) to increase 

inflation certain contribution limits. Neither injury a

Adams plaintiffs, a group of voters, voter organization

dates, is sufficient to confer standing. First, their asser

deprives them of an equal ability to participate in the el

based on their economic status does not satisfy the 

quirement that a plaintiffís alleged injury be an invasion 

and particularized legally protected interest, Lujan v

Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560, since political ìfree tradeî d

sarily require that all who participate in the political m

so with exactly equal resources, e.g., MCFL, 479 U. S.
they do not wish to solicit or accept the large campaign 

BCRA permits does not meet the standing requirement 

leged injury be ìfairly traceableî to ß307, see Lujan, s

since their alleged inability to compete stems not from 

tion, but from their own personal choice not to solicit o

contributions. Also inadequate for standing purpose

plaintiffsí contention that their congressional campaig

interest advocacy involve traditional press activities, su

contribution limits, together with FECA ß315ís individ

contribution limitations, impose unconstitutional editor

them in violation of the First Amendmentís Freedom 

Clause. These plaintiffs cannot show the requisite sub

hood their requested relief will remedy their alleged 

see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United Stat

ens, 529 U. S. 765, 771, since, even if the Court were t

BCRA ß307ís increases and indexes, as they ask, both F

bution limits and an exemption for institutional news 

remain unchanged. Pp. 4ñ8. 

(c) The Adams plaintiffs lack standing to challenge 

ìmillionaire provisions,î BCRA ßß304, 315, and 316, w

for a series of staggered increases in otherwise applic

tion-to-candidate limits if the candidateís opponent spe

ing amount of his personal funds, and eliminate the co

penditure limits in certain circumstances. Because th

allege the same injuries that they alleged with regard t

they fail to state a cognizable injury that is fairly trace

Additionally, none of them is a candidate in an electi

the millionaire provisions, and it would be purely conj

sume that any of them ever will be. P. 8. 

2. The District Courtís decision upholding BCRA ß31

of FECA ß318(a) to include mandatory e

communications-disbursements disclosure is affirmed 

inclusion bears a sufficient relationship to the importan

tal interest of ìshed[ding] the light of publicityî on cam

ing, Buckley, 424 U. S., at 81. Assuming, as the Cou

FECA ß318 is valid both to begin with and as amen

ß311ís amendments other than the electioneering-co

inclusion, the latter inclusion is not itself unconstitution

3. BCRA ß318ówhich forbids individuals ì17 years o

to make contributions to candidates and politica

U. S. C. A. ß441kóviolates the First Amendment righ

see, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
tion, see Buckley, 424 U. S., at 20ñ22, the Court appli

scrutiny to such a limitation, asking whether it is justi

ficiently important interestî and ìclosely drawnî to a

sary abridgment of the First Amendment, see e.g., p

(joint opinion of STEVENS and OíCONNOR, JJ.). The Gove

scant evidence for its assertion that ß318 protects agai

by conduitói.e., donations by parents through their min

circumvent contribution limits applicable to the paren

more convincing case of the claimed evil, this interest 

attenuated for ß318 to withstand heightened scrutiny

Missouri, 528 U. S., at 391. Even assuming, arguendo

ment advances an important interest, the provision is 

as shown by the Statesí adoption of more tailored appro

11. 

4. Because the FEC clearly has standing, the Court 

dress whether the intervenor-defendants, whose pos

identical to the FECís, were properly granted interven

to, inter alia, BCRA ß403(b). See, e.g., Clinton v. City of 

U. S. 417, 431ñ432, n. 19. P. 11. 

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the Courtís opinion with res

Title Vóß504 of which amends the Communications A

require broadcasters to keep publicly available records 

related broadcasting requests, 47 U. S. C. A. ß315(e

that the portion of the judgment below invalidating ß5

violative of the First Amendment must be reversed. Pp

1. Section 504ís ìcandidate requestî requirementsó

broadcasters to keep records of broadcast requests ìm

behalf of any . . . candidate,î 47 U. S. C. A. ß315(e)(1)(A

They are virtually identical to those contained in a long

regulation. The McConnell plaintiffsí argument that 

ments are intolerably burdensome and invasive is rejec

has consistently estimated that its regulation imposes 

see a comparatively small additional administrative bu

ver, the ß504 requirement is supported by significant 

interests in verifying that licensees comply with their 

allow political candidates ìequal time,î 47 U. S. C. ß315

such time at the ìlowest unit charge,î ß315(b); in evalu

they are processing candidate requests in an evenhand

help assure broadcasting fairness, ß315(a); in makin

aware of how much candidates spend on broadcast 

U. S. C. A. ß434; and in providing an independently co

data for verifying candidatesí compliance with BCRAí
regulation unconstitutional, it cannot strike down BCR

didate requestî provision, which simply embodies the r

statute, thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal i

2. Because ß504ís ìcandidate requestî requirements 

tional, its ìelection messageî requirementsówhich serv

ernmental interests and impose only a small incremen

requiring broadcasters to keep records of requests (ma

to broadcast ìmessage[s]î that refer either to a ìlegally 

didateî or to ìany election to Federal office,î 4

ßß315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii)ómust be constitutional as well. P

3. BCRA ß504ís ìissue requestî requirementsów

broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by any

cast ìmessage[s]î related to a ìnational legislative issue 

portance,î 47 U. S. C. A. ß315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or a ìpolitical 

tional importance,î ß315(e)(1)(B)ósurvive the McCon

facial challenge. These recordkeeping requirements s

help determine whether broadcasters are fulfilling the

under the FCCís regulations to afford reasonable oppor

discussion of conflicting views on important public issu

they too heavily favor entertainment, discriminating 

affairs broadcasts. The plaintiffsí claim that the above

tory language is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad 

sive, given that it is no more general than language 

used to impose other obligations upon broadcasters a

comparable to other BCRA language upheld in th

Whether the ìissue requestî requirements impose dispro

ministrative burdens will depend on how the FCC inter

plies them. The parties remain free to challenge the 

interpreted by the FCCís regulations, or as otherwise a

out the greater information any such challenge will l

the Court cannot say that the provisionsí administrativ

so great, or their justifications so minimal, as to wa

them facially unconstitutional. Similarly, the argumen

sue requestî requirement will force the purchasers to 

mation revealing their political strategies to opponents 

that BCRA ß504 is facially unconstitutional, but the pla

free to raise this argument when ß504 is applied. Pp. 9ñ

STEVENS and OíCONNOR, JJ., delivered the opinion of t

respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which SOUTER, G

BREYER, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the o

Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, in whi
and in which THOMAS, J., joined with respect to BCRA ßß

316, 319, and 403(b). BREYER, J., delivered the opinion 

with respect to BCRA Title V, in which STEVENS, OíCON

and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion co

respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, dissenting with res

Titles I and V, and concurring in the judgment in part and 

part with respect to BCRA Title II. THOMAS, J., filed an o

ring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BC

318, concurring in the result with respect to BCRA ß318, 

the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect 

II, and dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I, V, and ß

opinion SCALIA, J., joined as to Parts I, IIñA, and IIñB. 

filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and 

part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which REH

joined, in which SCALIA, J., joined except to the extent th

holds new FECA ß323(e) and BCRA ß202, and in whic

joined with respect to BCRA ß213. REHNQUIST, C. J., fil

dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, in whic

KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion disse

spect to BCRA ß305, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., 
y p, p

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 

_________________ 

Nos. 02ñ1674, 02ñ1675, 02ñ1676, 02ñ1702, 02ñ1727, 02ñ1

02ñ1740, 02ñ1747, 02ñ1753, 02ñ1755, AND 02ñ1

_________________ 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1674 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1675 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET AL., APP

02ñ1676 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

JOHN MCCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1702 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, E

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1727 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1733 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPE

02ñ1734 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 
, , 

02ñ1740 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1747 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ET AL., APP

02ñ1753 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CON

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1755 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED 

ET AL., APPELLANTS 

02ñ1756 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

[December 10, 2003] 

JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE OíCONNOR de

opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Title

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 20

116 Stat. 81, contains a series of amendments 

eral Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 8

as amended, 2 U. S. C. A. ß431 et seq. (main ed

2003), the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Sta

óóóóóó 

* JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BR

opinion in its entirety. 
United States Code, 18 U. S. C. A. ß607 (Supp

U. S. C. A. ßß510ñ511, that are challenged in th

In this opinion we discuss Titles I and II of B

opinion of the Court delivered by THE CHIEF JU

p. ___, discusses Titles III and IV, and the opi

Court delivered by JUSTICE BREYER, post, p. __

Title V. 

I 

More than a century ago the ìsober-minded 

advocated legislation that would prohibit polit

butions by corporations in order to prevent 

aggregations of wealth, from using their corpo

directly or indirectly,íî to elect legislators 

ìëvote for their protection and the advanceme

interests as against those of the public.íî Unit

Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 571 (1957) 

Root, Addresses on Government and Citizens

Bacon & J. Scott eds. 1916)). In Rootís opinio

islation would ìëstrik[e] at a constantly growing 

has done more to shake the confidence of the p

of small means of this country in our political 

than any other practice which has ever obtaine

foundation of our Government.íî 352 U. S., a

Congress of the United States has repeated

legislation endorsing Rootís judgment. 

BCRA is the most recent federal enactment d

purge national politics of what was conceived 

óóóóóó 

1The parties to the litigation are described in the findin

trict Court. 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 221ñ226 (DC 2003) (per 

the sake of clarity, we refer to the parties who challenged 

District Court as the ìplaintiffs,î referring to specific plain

where necessary. We refer to the parties who intervened 

the law as the ìintervenor-defendants.î 
tions. Id., at 572. As Justice Frankfurter expl

opinion for the Court in Automobile Workers, th

enactment responded to President Theodore Roo

for legislation forbidding all contributions by c

ìëto any political committee or for any politica

Ibid. (quoting 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1906)). In his a

sage to Congress in December 1905, Presiden

stated that ìëdirectors should not be permitted t

holdersí moneyíî for political purposes, and he re

that ìëa prohibitioníî on corporate political co

ìëwould be, as far as it went, an effective method 

the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts.íî 3

352. The resulting 1907 statute completely ba

rate contributions of ìmoney . . . in connection 

federal election. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat

gress soon amended the statute to require the p

sure of certain contributions and expenditures a

ìmaximum limits on the amounts that congress

dates could spend in seeking nomination an

Automobile Workers, supra, at 575ñ576. 

In 1925 Congress extended the prohibition o

tionsî ìto include ëanything of value,í and made 

of a corporate contribution as well as the givin

contribution a crime.î Federal Election Com

tional Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 

(citing Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, ßß3

Stat. 1070, 1074). During the debates prec

amendment, a leading Senator characterized ì

ent hold on political parties which business in

certain organizations seek and sometimes obt

son of liberal campaign contributionsíî as ì

great political evils of the time.íî Automobi

supra, at 576 (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 9507ñ95

We upheld the amended statute against a con

challenge, observing that ì[t]he power of C
corruption being clear, the choice of means t

presents a question primarily addressed to th

of Congress.î Burroughs v. United States, 290 

547 (1934). 

Congressí historical concern with the ìpoliti

alities of wealthî and their ìuntoward conseq

the democratic process,î Automobile Workers

577ñ578, has long reached beyond corpora

During and shortly after World War II, Congr

to the ìenormous financial outlaysî made by s

in connection with national elections. 352 U. 

Congress first restricted union contributions in 

Act, 18 U. S. C. ß610,2 and it later prohibited 

tributions in connection with federal election

gether.î National Right to Work, supra, at 209 

Labor Disputes Act (Smith-Connally Anti-Stri

144, ß9, 57 Stat. 167). Congress subsequentl

that prohibition to cover unionsí election-relat

tures as well as contributions, and it broadene

age of federal campaigns to include both pr

general elections. Labor Management Relation

óóóóóó 

2The Hatch Act also limited both the amount politic

could expend and the amount they could receive in contrib

July 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767. Senator Bankhead, i

amendment from the Senate floor, said: 

ì ëWe all know that money is the chief source of corru

know that large contributions to political campaigns not 

political party under obligation to the large contributors

pay in the way of legislation, but we also know that 

money are used for the purpose of conducting expensi

through the newspapers and over the radio; in the pub

sorts of literature, true and untrue; and for the purpose 

expenses of campaigners sent out into the country to 

ganda, both true and untrue.í î United States v. Automobil

U. S. 567, 577ñ578 (1957) (quoting 86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (194
supra, at 578584. During the consideratio

measures, legislators repeatedly voiced thei

regarding the pernicious influence of large 

contributions. See 93 Cong. Rec. 3428, 3522 (1

Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. 

80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1947); H. R. Rep

78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945). As we noted in a 

opinion recalling this history, Congressí ìcarefu

adjustment of the federal election laws, in 

advance, step by step,í to account for the part

and economic attributes of corporations and la

zations warrants considerable deference.î Nat

to Work, 352 U. S., at 209 (citations omitted). 

In early 1972 Congress continued its stead

ment of the national election laws by enacting 

Stat. 3. As first enacted, that statute required 

of all contributions exceeding $100 and of expe

candidates and political committees that spent 

$1,000 per year. Id., at 11ñ19. It also prohibite

tions made in the name of another person, id., 

by Government contractors, id., at 10. The l

the earlier prohibition on the use of corporate 

general treasury funds for political contrib

expenditures, but it expressly permitted corpo

unions to establish and administer separate 

funds (commonly known as political action com

PACs) for election-related contributions and ex

Id., at 12ñ13.3 See Pipefitters v. United State

385, 409ñ410 (1972). 

óóóóóó 

3As a general rule, FECA permits corporations and un

contributions to their PACs from their shareholders or 

not from outsiders. 2 U. S. C. ßß441b(b)(4)(A), (C); see Fe

Commín v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 1

1 (1982). 
FECAs passage did not deter unseemly fund

campaign practices. Evidence of those pra

suaded Congress to enact the Federal Election 

Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263. R

constitutional challenge to the amendments, t

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circui

them as ìby far the most comprehensive . . . re

lation [ever] passed by Congress concerning the 

the President, Vice-President and members of 

Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821, 831 (1975) (en 

curiam). 

The 1974 amendments closed the loophol

allowed candidates to use an unlimited number 

committees for fundraising purposes and ther

cumvent the limits on individual committeesí r

disbursements. They also limited individu

contributions to any single candidate to $1,00

tion, with an overall annual limitation of $25,

contributor; imposed ceilings on spending by 

and political parties for national convention

reporting and public disclosure of contributio

penditures exceeding certain limits; and esta

Federal Election Commission (FEC) to adm

enforce the legislation. Id., at 831ñ834. 

The Court of Appeals upheld the 1974 a

almost in their entirety.4 It concluded that th

compelling interest in preserving the integ

electoral process provided a sufficient basis for 

the substantive provisions of the Act. Id., at 

óóóóóó 

4The court held that one disclosure provision was unc

vague and overbroad. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821, 832 

(en banc) (per curiam) (invalidating 2 U. S. C. ß437a (19

V)). No appeal was taken from that holding. Buckley 

U. S. 1, 10, n. 7 (1976) (per curiam). 
butions facilitated access to public officials

 an

methods of evading the contribution limits th

abled contributors of massive sums to avoid 

Id., at 837ñ841.6 

óóóóóó 

5The Court of Appeals found: 

ìLarge contributions are intended to, and do, gain 

elected official after the campaign for consideration of the 

particular concerns. Senator Mathias not only describes 

the corollary, that the feeling that big contributors gain 

ment produces a reaction that the average American has 

role in the political process.î Buckley, 519 F. 2d, at 8

omitted). 

The court also noted: 

ìCongress found and the District Court confirmed that s

tions were often made for the purpose of furthering busin

interests by facilitating access to government officials 

governmental decisions, and that, conversely, elected 

tended to afford special treatment to large contributors. S

93ñ689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4ñ5; Findings I, ¶¶108, 110, 1

at 838, n. 32. 

Citing further evidence of corruption, the court explaine

ìThe disclosures of illegal corporate contributions in 

the testimony of executives that they were motivated by t

that this was necessary as a ëcalling card, something that 

in the door and make our point of view heard,í Hearin

Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activiti

1st Sess. 5442 (1973) (Ashland Oil Co.óOrin Atkins, Ch

response to pressure for fear of a competitive disadvanta

result,í id. at 5495, 5514 (American AirlinesóGeorge S

chairman); see Findings I, ¶105. The record before 

replete with specific examples of improper attempts to o

mental favor in return for large campaign contributions. 

I, ¶¶159ñ64.î Id., at 839, n. 37. 6The court cited the intricate scheme of the American 

ers, Inc., as an example of the lengths to which contrib

avoid their duty to disclose: 

ìSince the milk producers, on legal advice, worked on 

per committee, they evolved a procedure, after consultati

ber 1970 with Nixon fund raisers, to break down [the
contribution and expenditure limitations on 

that they should be viewed as regulations 

rather than speech. Id., at 840ñ841 (citing Un

v. OíBrien, 391 U. S. 367, 376ñ377 (1968)). T

however, concluded that each set of limitat

seriousóthough differentóconcerns under 

Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14

(per curiam). We treated the limitations on can

individual expenditures as direct restraints on 

we observed that the contribution limitations, 

imposed only ìa marginal restriction upon th

torís ability to engage in free communication.î 

21. Considering the ìdeeply disturbing examp

ruption related to candidate contributions discu

Court of Appealsí opinion, we determined th

contributions served an interest in protecting 

rity of our system of representative democrac

26ñ27. In the end, the Actís primary purpos

the actuality and appearance of corruption res

large individual financial contributionsîóp

constitutionally sufficient justification for 

contribution limitation.î Id., at 26. 

We prefaced our analysis of the $1,000 lim

expenditures by observing that it broadly en

every expenditure ìërelative to a clearly ident

date.íî Id., at 39 (quoting 18 U. S. C. ß608(e)(1

óóóóóó 

donation] into numerous smaller contributions to hundre

tees in various states which could then hold the money 

dentís reelection campaign, so as to permit the produ

independent reporting requirements without disclosure.î 

n. 36. 

The milk producers contributed large sums to the Ni

ìin order to gain a meeting with White House officials 

ports.î Ibid. 
that phrase to apply only to communicatio

express terms advocate the election or defeat 

identified candidate for federal office.î 424 U

44. We concluded, however, that as so nar

provision would not provide effective protect

the dangers of quid pro quo arrangements, b

sons and groups could eschew expenditures tha

advocated the election or defeat of a clearly 

candidate while remaining ìfree to spend as m

want to promote the candidate and his views.î 

We also rejected the argument that the expend

were necessary to prevent attempts to circu

Actís contribution limits, because FECA alrea

expenditures controlled by or coordinated with 

date as contributions, and we were not pers

independent expenditures posed the same risk 

apparent corruption as coordinated expenditur

46ñ47. We therefore held that Congressí inte

venting real or apparent corruption was ina

justify the heavy burdens on the freedoms of 

and association that the expenditure limits imp

We upheld all of the disclosure and reporti

ments in the Act that were challenged on app

Court after finding that they vindicated three 

interests: providing the electorate with releva

tion about the candidates and their supporter

actual corruption and discouraging the use of 

improper purposes; and facilitating enforcem

prohibitions in the Act. Id., at 66ñ68. In order 

overbreadth problem, however, we placed the 

rowing construction on the term ìexpenditu

disclosure context that we had adopted in the 

the expenditure limitations. Thus, we con

reporting requirement for persons making expe

more than $100 in a year ìto reach only fun
defeat of a clearly identified candidate. Id., 

note omitted). 

Our opinion in Buckley addressed issues tha

related to contributions and expenditures by i

since none of the parties challenged the pro

contributions by corporations and labor unions. 

however, that the statute authorized the use o

and union resources to form and administer 

funds that could be used for political purposes. 

29, n. 31; see also n. 3, supra. 

Three important developments in the year

decision in Buckley persuaded Congress th

legislation was necessary to regulate the role th

tions, unions, and wealthy contributors play 

toral process. As a preface to our discussion of 

provisions of BCRA, we comment briefly on th

importance of ìsoft money,î the proliferation of 

and the disturbing findings of a Senate invest

campaign practices related to the 1996 federal e

Soft Money 

Under FECA, ìcontributionsî must be made 

that are subject to the Actís disclosure require

source and amount limitations. Such funds ar

ìfederalî or ìhardî money. FECA defines the te

bution,î however, to include only the gift or 

anything of value ìmade by any person for the 

influencing any election for Federal office.î 

ß431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Donations mad

the purpose of influencing state or local el

therefore unaffected by FECAís requirements a

tions. As a result, prior to the enactment of BC

law permitted corporations and unions, as w

viduals who had already made the maximum 

contributions to federal candidates, to contribu
parties for activities intended to influence sta

elections. 

Shortly after Buckley was decided, quest

concerning the treatment of contributions i

influence both federal and state elections. 

literal reading of FECAís definition of ìcontribu

have required such activities to be funded 

money, the FEC ruled that political parties 

mixed-purpose activitiesóincluding get-o

drives and generic party advertisingóin par

money.7 In 1995 the FEC concluded that the p

also use soft money to defray the costs of ìlegis

cacy media advertisements,î even if the ads me

name of a federal candidate, so long as they 

pressly advocate the candidateís election or de

Advisory Op. 1995ñ25. 

óóóóóó 

7 In 1977 the FEC promulgated a rule allowing parti

their administrative expenses ìon a reasonable basisî betw

containing funds raised in compliance with FECA and 

taining nonfederal funds, including corporate and union 

CFR ß102.6(a)(2). In advisory opinions issued in 1978 

FEC allowed parties similarly to allocate the costs of vote

and get-out-the-vote drives between federal and nonfed

FEC Advisory Op. 1978ñ10; FEC Advisory Op. 1979ñ

F. Supp. 2d, at 195ñ197 (per curiam). 

In 1990 the FEC clarified the phrase ìon a reasona

promulgating fixed allocation rates. 11 CFR ß106.5 (1991

tions required the Republican National Committee (RN

cratic National Committee (DNC) to pay for at least 6

purpose activities (65% in presidential election years) wi

their federal accounts. ß106.5(b)(2). By contrast, th

required state and local committees to allocate similar 

based on the ratio of federal to nonfederal offices on the 

ß106.5(d)(1), which in practice meant that they could expe

tially greater proportion of soft money than national p

mixed-purpose activities affecting both federal and state 

251 F. Supp. 2d, at 198ñ199 (per curiam). 
amount of soft money raised and spent by th

political parties increased exponentially. Of th

partiesí total spending, soft money accounted fo

million) in 1984, 11% ($45 million) in 1988

million) in 1992, 30% ($272 million) in 1996

($498 million) in 2000.8 The national parties 

large amounts of their soft money to the sta

which were allowed to use a larger percent

money to finance mixed-purpose activities u

rules.9 In the year 2000, for example, the natio

diverted $280 millionómore than half of 

moneyóto state parties. 

Many contributions of soft money were d

larger than the contributions of hard money p

FECA. For example, in 1996 the top five cor

money donors gave, in total, more than $9 mil

federal funds to the two national party comm

the most recent election cycle the political pa

almost $300 millionó60% of their total soft-m

raisingófrom just 800 donors, each of which co

minimum of $120,000.11 Moreover, the larges

donors often made substantial contributions t

ties.12 Such practices corroborate evidence ind

many corporate contributions were motivated 

for access to candidates and a fear of being 

óóóóóó 

8 1 Defs. Exhs., Tab 1, Tbl. 2 (report of Thomas E. Mann

Fellow, Brookings Institution (hereinafter Mann Expert 

F. Supp. 2d, at 197ñ201 (per curiam). 9Mann Expert Report 26; 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 441 (Kolla

10Id., at 494 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 11Mann Expert Report 24. 12 In the 2000 election cycle, 35 of the 50 largest soft-

gave to both parties; 28 of the 50 gave more than $10

parties. Mann Expert Report Tbl. 6; see also 251 F. Su

(Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 785, n. 77 (Leon, J.). 
contributors, rather than by ideological supp

candidates and parties.13 

Not only were such soft-money contribution

signed to gain access to federal candidates, bu

in many cases solicited by the candidates 

Candidates often directed potential donors to 

mittees and tax-exempt organizations that co

accept soft money. For example, a federal leg

ning for reelection solicited soft money from a s

advising him that even though he had alread

uted the legal maximumî to the campaign com

could still make an additional contribution to 

gram supporting federal, state, and local candi

party.14 Such solicitations were not uncommon

óóóóóó 

13A former chief executive officer of a large corporation e

ìBusiness and labor leaders believe, based on their ex

disappointed Members, and their party colleagues, may 

vor them because they have not contributed. Equally, 

fear that if they refuse to contribute (enough), competing 

do contribute generously will have an advantage in gain

and influencing key Congressional leaders on matters of 

the company or union.î App. 283, ¶9 (declaration of Gera

United Airlines (hereinafter Greenwald Decl.)). 

Amici Curiae Committee for Economic Development 

business leaders attest that corporate soft-money cont

ìcoerced and, at bottom, wholly commercialî in natu

ì[b]usiness leaders increasingly wish to be freed from 

system in which they fear the adverse consequences of r

the coffers of the major parties.î Brief for Committee 

Development et al. as Amici Curiae 28. 14See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., 

J.). 15See id., at 479ñ480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842ñ8

One former party official explained to the District Court: 

ì ëOnce youíve helped a federal candidate by contributing h

his or her campaign, you are sometimes asked to do 

candidate by making donations of hard and/or soft mon
enabled parties and candidates to circumve

limitations on the source and amount of contr

connection with federal elections. 

Issue Advertising 

In Buckley we construed FECAís disclosure 

ing requirements, as well as its expenditure 

ìto reach only funds used for communication

pressly advocate the election or defeat of a cle

fied candidate.î 424 U. S., at 80 (footnote omi

result of that strict reading of the statute, the u

sion of ìmagic wordsî such as ìElect John Smit

Against Jane Doeî marked a bright statutory 

rating ìexpress advocacyî from ìissue advocacy

at 44, n. 52. Express advocacy was subject 

limitations and could be financed only using h

The political parties, in other words, could n

money to sponsor ads that used any magic 

corporations and unions could not fund such 

their general treasuries. So-called issue ads, o

hand, not only could be financed with soft 

could be aired without disclosing the identity 

other information about, their sponsors. 

While the distinction between ìissueî and ex

cacy seemed neat in theory, the two categorie

tisements proved functionally identical in im

spects. Both were used to advocate the electio

of clearly identified federal candidates, even 

so-called issue ads eschewed the use of mag

óóóóóó 

tional party committees, the relevant state party (ass

accept corporate contributions), or an outside group that 

doing an independent expenditure or issue advertisemen

candidateís campaign.í î Id., at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 16 Id., at 532ñ537 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875ñ879 (
urged viewers to vote against Jane Doe an

condemned Jane Doeís record on a particular i

exhorting viewers to ìcall Jane Doe and tell he

think.î17 Indeed, campaign professionals testifi

most effective campaign ads, like the most eff

mercials for products such as Coca-Cola, shou

avoid the use of the magic words.18 Moreover, 

sion that such ads were specifically intende

election results was confirmed by the fact that 

of them aired in the 60 days immediately p

federal election.19 Corporations and unions 

dreds of millions of dollars of their general fund

these ads,20 and those expenditures, like soft-m

óóóóóó 

the former chair of one major advocacy organizationís PA

is foolish to believe there is any practical difference b

advocacy and advocacy of a political candidate. What se

advocacy and political advocacy is a line in the sand draw

day.íî Id., at 536ñ537 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Tany

Opening Remarks at the American Assn. of Political Con

General Session on ìIssue Advocacy,î Jan. 17, 1997, p. 2)

2d, at 878ñ879 (Leon, J.) (same). 17Id., at 304 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment 

dissenting in part); id., at 534 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id

(Leon, J.). 18 It is undisputed that very few adsówhether run b

parties, or interest groupsóused words of express advoca

(Henderson, J.); id., at 529 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 874 

the 1998 election cycle, just 4% of candidate advertisemen

words; in 2000, that number was a mere 5%. App. 1

Jonathan S. Krasno, Yale University, & Frank J. Sorauf, 

Minnesota, pp. 53ñ54 (hereinafter Krasno & Sorauf Expe

1 Defs. Exhs., Tab 2, pp. 53ñ54). 19251 F. Supp. 2d, at 564, and n. 6 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (c

Kenneth M. Goldstein, University of Wisconsin-Madison

16; see 3ñR Defs. Exhs., Tab 7); Tr. of Oral Arg. 202ñ203

F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.). 20The spending on electioneering communications clim
FECA. Indeed, the ads were attractive to or

and candidates precisely because they we

FECAís reach, enabling candidates and their 

work closely with friendly interest groups to 

called issue ads when the candidates thems

running out of money.21 

Because FECAís disclosure requirements did 

to so-called issue ads, sponsors of such ads 

misleading names to conceal their identity. ì

Better Medicare,î for instance, was not a gra

ganization of citizens, as its name might sugge

instead a platform for an association of drug m

ers.22 And ìRepublicans for Clean Air,î which 

the 2000 Republican Presidential primary, w

an organization consisting of just two individu

ers who together spent $25 million on ads supp

favored candidate.23 

óóóóóó 

cally during the last decade. In the 1996 election cycle, 

million was spent on multiple broadcasts of about 100 ad

cycle (1997-1998), 77 organizations aired 423 ads at a 

tween $270 and $340 million. By the 2000 election, 130 

over an estimated $500 million on more than 1,100 differ

out of every three dollars spent on issue ads in the 20

attributable to the two major parties and six major intere

at 303ñ304 (Henderson, J.) (citing Annenberg Public P

Issue Advertising in the 1999ñ2000 Election Cycle 1ñ15 (

after Annenberg Report); see 38 Defs. Exhs., Tab 22); 25

at 527 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same); id., at 879 (Leon, J.) (sa

21Id., at 540 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting internal AF

randum from Brian Weeks to Mike Klein, ìElectronic B

Senator,î (Oct. 9, 1996), AFL-CIO 005244); 251 F. Sup

(Leon, J.) (same). 22The association was known as the Pharmaceutical 

Manufacturers of America (PhRMA). Id., at 232 (per curia

23 Id., at 232ñ233. Other examples of mysterious gr

ìVoters for Campaign Truth,î ìAretino Industries,î ìM

Common Sense Mining Laws,î ìAmerican Seniors, Inc
about the sponsorship of socalled issue ads, 

indicates that candidates and officeholders oft

former Senator confirmed that candidates a

knew who their friends were and ìsometimes 

that corporations or individuals make donatio

est groups that run ëissue ads.íî24 As with 

contributions, political parties and candidate

availability of so-called issue ads to circumve

limitations, asking donors who contributed thei

quota of hard money to give money to nonpro

tions to spend on ìissueî advocacy.25 

Senate Committee Investigation 

In 1998 the Senate Committee on Governme

issued a six-volume report summarizing the re

extensive investigation into the campaign prac

1996 federal elections. The report gave partic

tion to the effect of soft money on the Americ

system, including elected officialsí practice o

special access in return for political contribution

The committeeís principal findings relating 

cratic Party fundraising were set forth in the 

report, while the minority report primarily 

óóóóóó 

Family Voices,î App. 1355 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert R

and the ìCoalition to Make our Voices Heard,î 251 F. Su

(Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Some of the actors behind these g

acknowledged that ì ëin some places itís much more effec

ad by the ëCoalition to Make Our Voices Heardí than it is 

by ëthe men and women of the AFLñCIO.í î Ibid. (Koll

(quoting report of David B. Magleby, Brigham Young Un

(hereinafter Magleby Expert Report), App. 1484ñ1485). 24 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 518ñ519 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 25 Id., at 478ñ479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing declarat

Hickmott, Senior V. P., Smith-Free Group, ¶8 (hereina

Decl.); see 6ñR Defs. Exhs., Tab 19, ¶8). 
however, on certain central propositions. T

that the ìsoft money loopholeî had led to a ìm

the campaign finance system that had been in

keep corporate, union and large individual co

from influencing the electoral process.î26 O

stated that ìthe hearings provided overwhe

dence that the twin loopholes of soft money 

issue advertising have virtually destroyed ou

finance laws, leaving us with little more tha

legal rubble.î27 

The report was critical of both partiesí meth

ing soft money, as well as their use of those 

concluded that both parties promised and provi

access to candidates and senior Government 

exchange for large soft-money contributions. T

tee majority described the White House coffe

warded major donors with access to Presiden

and the courtesies extended to an internationa

man named Roger Tamraz, who candidly ack

that his donations of about $300,000 to the D

state parties were motivated by his interest in 

Federal Governmentís support for an oil-line pr

Caucasus.29 The minority described the p

óóóóóó 

26S. Rep. No. 105ñ167, vol. 4, p. 4611 (1998) (hereinafte

Report); 5 id., at 7515. 27 3 id., at 4535 (additional views of Sen. Collins). 28 1 id., at 41ñ42, 195ñ200. The report included a memo

ten by the DNC finance chairman suggesting the use of 

coffees and ìovernightsî to give major donors ìquality t

President, and noted that the guests accounted for $2

contributions. Id., at 194, 196. 29 2 id., at 2913ñ2914, 2921. Despite concerns about T

ground and a possible conflict with United States foreign 

ests, he was invited to six events attended by the Pres

2920ñ2921. Similarly, the minority noted that in exchan
grams, Team 100 and the Republican Eag

promised ìspecial access to high-ranking 

elected officials, including governors, senators, 

sentatives.î30 One fundraising letter recite

chairman of the RNC had personally escorted 

appointments that ìëturned out to be very sig

legislation affecting public utility holding comp

made the donor ìëa hero in his industry.íî31 

In 1996 both parties began to use large amo

money to pay for issue advertising designed t

federal elections. The Committee found such 

problematic for two reasons. Since they accom

same purposes as express advocacy (which cou

be funded only with hard money), the ads enab

corporations, and wealthy contributors to 

protections that FECA was intended to provi

ver, though ostensibly independent of the cand

ads were often actually coordinated with, and 

by, the campaigns.32 The ads thus provided a 

evading FECAís candidate contribution limits. 

The report also emphasized the role of stat

parties. While the FECís allocation regime 

national parties to use soft money to pay for u

the costs of both generic voter activities and i

tising, they allowed state and local parties to 

óóóóóó 

Kojimaís contribution of $500,000 to the 1992 Presiden

and his wife had been placed at the head table with Presi

Bush. Moreover, Kojima received several additional mee

President, other administration officials, and United St

officials. 4 id., at 5418, 5422, 5428. 30The former requires an initial contribution of $

$25,000 for each of the next three years; the latter re

contributions of $15,000. 5 id., at 7968. 31 Id., at 7971. 32 1 id., at 49; 3 id., at 3997ñ4006. 
reason, national parties often made substantia

of soft money to ìstate and local political par

neric voter activitiesí that in fact ultimately 

federal candidates because the funds for a

purposes remain[ed] under the control of th

committees.î The report concluded that ì[t]he 

soft money thus allow[ed] more corporate, unio

and large contributions from wealthy individu

system.î34 

The report discussed potential reforms, inclu

on soft money at the national and state party 

restrictions on sham issue advocacy by nonpar

The majority expressed the view that a ban on 

of soft money by national party committees w

tively address the use of union and corpora

treasury funds in the federal political proces

required that candidate-specific ads be funded 

money.36 The minority similarly recommended 

nation of soft-money contributions to political p

individuals, corporations, and unions, as well 

addressing candidate advertisements masqu

issue ads.î37 

II 

In BCRA, Congress enacted many of the c

proposed reforms. BCRAís central provisions a

to address Congressí concerns about the increa

soft money and issue advertising to influen

elections. Title I regulates the use of soft mone

óóóóóó 

33 Id., at 4466. 34 Ibid.

35 Id., at 4468ñ4470, 4480ñ4481, 4491ñ4494. 36 Id., at 4492. 37 6 id., at 9394.
ily prohibits corporations and labor unions 

general treasury funds for communications t

tended to, or have the effect of, influencing the 

federal elections. 

Section 403 of BCRA provides special rules 

challenging the constitutionality of any of the 

sions. 2 U. S. C. A. ß437h note (Supp. 2003). E

actions were filed promptly after the statute 

effect in March 2002. As required by ß403, th

were filed in the District Court for the Distric

bia and heard by a three-judge court. Section 4

the District Court to advance the cases on the 

to expedite their disposition ìto the greate

extent.î The court received a voluminous recor

by the parties and ultimately delivered a decis

ied in a two-judge per curiam opinion and thre

lengthy opinions, each of which contained exte

mentary on the facts and a careful analysis o

issues. 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (2003). The th

reached unanimity on certain issues but differe

Their judgment, entered on May 1, 2003, held 

of BCRA unconstitutional and upheld oth

F. Supp. 2d 948. 

As authorized by ß403, all of the losing p

direct appeals to this Court within 10 days. 2 

ß437h note. On June 5, 2003, we noted probab

tion and ordered the parties to comply with a

briefing schedule and present their oral argu

special hearing on September 8, 2003. 539 U. 

simplify the presentation, we directed the p

lenging provisions of BCRA to proceed first on 

whether or not they prevailed on any issue in 

Court. Ibid. Mindful of ß403ís instruction th

dite our disposition of these appeals to the grea

possible, we also consider each of the issue
III 

Title I is Congressí effort to plug the soft-m

hole. The cornerstone of Title I is new FEC

which prohibits national party committees 

agents from soliciting, receiving, directing, o

any soft money. 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i(a) (Supp. 

short, ß323(a) takes national parties out of the 

business. 

The remaining provisions of new FECA ß

reinforce the restrictions in ß323(a). New FE

prevents the wholesale shift of soft-money infl

national to state party committees by prohib

and local party committees from using such 

activities that affect federal elections. 2 

ß441i(b). These ìFederal election activit[ies],î 

new FECA ß301(20)(A), are almost identical to 

purpose activities that have long been regulate

FECís pre-BCRA allocation regime. 2 

ß431(20)(A). New FECA ß323(d) reinforces 

money restrictions by prohibiting political p

soliciting and donating funds to tax-exempt or

that engage in electioneering activities. 2 

ß441i(d). New FECA ß323(e) restricts federal 

and officeholders from receiving, spending, o

soft money in connection with federal elections 

their ability to do so in connection with stat

elections. 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i(e). Finally, 

óóóóóó 

38The national party committees of the two major po

are: the Republican National Committee (RNC); the De

tional Committee (DNC); the National Republican Senat

tee (NRSC); the National Republican Congressiona

(NRCC); the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee 

the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (

F. Supp. 2d, at 468 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 
tional, state, and local party committees by 

state and local candidates from raising and sp

money to fund advertisements and other publi

cations that promote or attack federal cand

U. S. C. A. ß441i(f). 

Plaintiffs mount a facial First Amendment c

new FECA ß323, as well as challenges based o

tions Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, ß4, principles 

ism, and the equal protection component of the 

ess Clause. We address these challenges in tur

A 

In Buckley and subsequent cases, we hav

restrictions on campaign expenditures to clos

than limits on campaign contributions. See, e

Election Commín v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. ___, ___ 

op., at 14); see also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 

PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 387ñ388 (2000); Buckley, 4

19. In these cases we have recognized that c

limits, unlike limits on expenditures, ìentai[l] o

ginal restriction upon the contributorís ability t

free communication.î Id., at 20; see also, e.g., 

supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14); Shrink Missour

386ñ388. In Buckley we said that: 

ìA contribution serves as a general expres

port for the candidate and his views, bu

communicate the underlying basis for th

The quantity of communication by the 

does not increase perceptibly with the size 

tribution, since the expression rests solely 

differentiated, symbolic act of contributing

the size of the contribution provides a ver

dex of the intensity of the contributorís sup

candidate. A limitation on the amount 

person may give to a candidate or campaig
communication, for it permits the symbolic 

of support evidenced by a contribution but 

any way infringe the contributorís freedom 

candidates and issues. While contributio

sult in political expression if spent by a c

an association to present views to the 

transformation of contributions into polit

involves speech by someone other than th

tor.î 424 U. S., at 21 (footnote omitted). 

Because the communicative value of large co

inheres mainly in their ability to facilitate th

their recipients, we have said that contribu

impose serious burdens on free speech only if 

low as to ìpreven[t] candidates and political 

from amassing the resources necessary for effe

cacy.î Ibid. 

We have recognized that contribution limit

ìmore heavily on the associational right than 

to speak,î Shrink Missouri, supra, at 388, sinc

tions serve ìto affiliate a person with a cand

ìenabl[e] like-minded persons to pool their 

Buckley, 424 U. S., at 22. Unlike expendit

however, which ìpreclud[e] most associations 

tively amplifying the voice of their adherents

tion limits both ìleave the contributor free t

member of any political association and to as

ally in the associationís efforts on behalf of c

and allow associations ìto aggregate large sum

to promote effective advocacy.î Ibid. The ìov

of dollar limits on contributions is ìmerely 

candidates and political committees to raise fu

greater number of persons.î Id., at 21ñ22. Thu

bution limit involving even ìësignificant in

with associational rights is nevertheless valid i
sufficiently important interest. Beaumont, su

(slip op., at 15) (quoting Shrink Missouri, sup

388).39 

Our treatment of contribution restrictions re

than the limited burdens they impose on Fi

ment freedoms. It also reflects the importa

interests that underlie contribution limitsói

preventing ìboth the actual corruption threaten

financial contributions and the eroding of p

dence in the electoral process through the ap

corruption.î National Right to Work, 459 U. S., 

also Federal Election Commín v. Colorado 

Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 440ñ

(Colorado II). We have said that these intere

implicate ìëthe integrity of our electoral proces

less, the responsibility of the individual citiz

successful functioning of that process.íî Nation

Work, supra, at 208 (quoting Automobile W

U. S., at 570). Because the electoral process 

ìmeans through which a free society dem

translates political speech into concrete go

action,î Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 401 (B

concurring), contribution limits, like other 

aimed at protecting the integrity of the proce

benefit public participation in political debate

óóóóóó 

39 JUSTICE KENNEDY accuses us of engaging in a sleig

conflating ìunseemly corporate speechî with the speec

parties and candidates, and then adverting to the ìcor

rationale as if it were the linchpin of the litigation.î Post

concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is in

principles set forth here and relied upon in assessing T

same principles articulated in Buckley and its progeny th

of contributions to candidates, parties, and political co

subject to less rigorous scrutiny than direct restraints 

including ìunseemly corporate speech.î 
bution limits, there is no place for a strong p

against constitutionality, of the sort often 

accompany the words ëstrict scrutiny.íî I

(BREYER, J., concurring). The less rigorous s

review we have applied to contribution limits 

ìclosely drawnî scrutiny) shows proper defere

gressí ability to weigh competing constitution

in an area in which it enjoys particular expert

provides Congress with sufficient room to ant

respond to concerns about circumvention of 

designed to protect the integrity of the political 

Our application of this less rigorous degree 

has given rise to significant criticism in the pa

dissenting colleagues. See, e.g., Shrink Mi

U. S., at 405ñ410 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting); i

420 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Colorado Republi

Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Commín

604, 635ñ644 (1996) (Colorado I) (THOMAS, J., 

We have rejected such criticism in previous ca

reasons identified above. We are also mindful 

that in its lengthy deliberations leading to the e

BCRA, Congress properly relied on the recogn

authority contained in Buckley and its progeny. 

tions of stare decisis, buttressed by the respe

Legislative and Judicial Branches owe to on

provide additional powerful reasons for adhe

analysis of contribution limits that the Court 

tently followed since Buckley was decided. Se

South Carolina Public Railways Commín, 502 U

(1991).

40 

óóóóóó 

40Since our decision in Buckley, we have consistently 

rigorous scrutiny to contribution restrictions aimed at the 

corruption and the appearance of corruption. See, e.g., 42

36 (applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECAís $1,000 limit 
ß323s restrictions have only a marginal imp

ability of contributors, candidates, officeho

parties to engage in effective political speech. 

539 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). Complex a

sions may be, ß323, in the main, does little 

regulate the ability of wealthy individuals, co

and unions to contribute large sums of money t

federal elections, federal candidates, and fed

holders. 

Plaintiffs contend that we must apply strict 

ß323 because many of its provisions restrict no

tributions but also the spending and solicitati

raised outside of FECAís contribution limits

purposes of determining the level of scrutiny, 

vant that Congress chose in ß323 to regulate co

on the demand rather than the supply side. 

National Right to Work, supra, at 206ñ211 (u

provision restricting PACsí ability to solicit fu

relevant inquiry is whether the mechanism 

implement the contribution limit, or to prevent 

tion of that limit, burdens speech in a way th

óóóóóó 

contributions to a candidate and FECAís $5,000 limit on 

tions to a candidate); id., at 38 (applying less rigorou

FECAís $25,000 aggregate yearly limit on contributions 

political party committees, and political committees); Ca

cal Assn. v. Federal Election Commín, 453 U. S. 182, 1

(plurality opinion) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to F

limit on contributions to multicandidate political comm

tional Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 208ñ211 (applying 

scrutiny to antisolicitation provision buttressing an ot

contribution limit); Colorado II, 533 U. S. 431, 456 (2001) 

rigorous scrutiny to expenditures coordinated with a ca

eral Election Commín v. Beaumont, 539 U. S.___, ___ (200

14ñ15) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to provisions int

vent circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits)
not the case here. 

For example, while ß323(a) prohibits natio

from receiving or spending nonfederal money, 

prohibits state party committees from spendi

eral money on federal election activities, nei

sion in any way limits the total amount of mo

can spend. 2 U. S. C. A. ßß441i(a), (b) (Su

Rather, they simply limit the source and 

amount of donations. That they do so by proh

spending of soft money does not render them e

limitations.41 

Similarly, the solicitation provisions of ß

ß323(e), which restrict the ability of national 

mittees, federal candidates, and federal offic

solicit nonfederal funds, leave open ample op

for soliciting federal funds on behalf of entitie

FECAís source and amount restrictions. Ev

which on its face enacts a blanket ban on pa

tions of funds to certain tax-exempt organizati

theless allows parties to solicit funds to the org

federal PACs. 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i(d). As for th

zations that cannot or do not administer PA

remain free to donate federal funds directly 

ganizations, and may solicit funds expressly fo

pose. See infra, at 72ñ73 (construing ß323(d)ís 

on donations by parties to apply only to donat

party committeeís nonfederal or soft-money acc

as with ß323(a), ß323(d) places no limits on oth

endorsing tax-exempt organizations or any res

solicitations by party officers acting in their 

óóóóóó 

41 Indeed, Congress structured ß323(b) in such a way a

vidual, corporate, and union donations to state committe

eral elections from federal source and amount restrictions
Section 323 thus shows due regard for the 

solicitation is characteristically intertwined wi

tive and perhaps persuasive speech seeking 

particular causes or for particular views.î Sch

Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 

The fact that party committees and federal can

officeholders must now ask only for limited doll

or request that a corporation or union contrib

through its PAC in no way alters or impairs t

message ìintertwinedî with the solicitation. 

National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 

795 (1988) (treating solicitation restriction th

fundraisers to disclose particular information a

based regulation subject to strict scrutiny becau

sarily alter[ed] the content of the speechî). And 

chill such solicitations, as was the case in Schau

restriction here tends to increase the dissemin

formation by forcing parties, candidates, and offi

solicit from a wider array of potential donors. As 

limits on contributions, therefore, ß323ís spe

solicitation restrictions have only a marginal 

political speech.

42 

óóóóóó 

42 JUSTICE KENNEDYís contention that less rigorous scr

only to regulations burdening political association, rather 

speech, misreads Buckley. In Buckley, we recognized tha

limits burden both protected speech and association, 

generally have more significant impacts on the latter. 42

22. We nevertheless applied less rigorous scrutiny to FE

tion limits because neither burden was sufficiently weight

Congressí countervailing interest in protecting the int

political process. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Governm

U. S. 377, 388 (2000) (ìWhile we did not [in Buckley] att

[the] distinctions between the speech and association 

scrutiny for contribution limits, we did make it clear that 

tions bore more heavily on the associational right than on 
burdens that ß323 imposes are fundamental

from the burdens that accompanied Buckleyís c

limits, and merit the type of strict scrutiny w

plied to attempts to regulate the internal p

political parties. E.g., California Democrat

Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 573ñ574 (2000). In m

argument, plaintiffs greatly exaggerate the eff

contending that it precludes any collaborat

national, state, and local committees of the sam

fundraising and electioneering activities. We 

the provisions in that way. See infra, at 51ñ5

323 merely subjects a greater percentage of co

to parties and candidates to FECAís source a

limitations. Buckley has already acknowledge

limitations ìleave the contributor free to becom

of any political association and to assist person

associationís efforts on behalf of candidates.î 4

22. The modest impact that ß323 has on th

committees within a party to associate with 

does not independently occasion strict scrutin

this is to suggest that the alleged association

imposed on parties by ß323 have no place i

Amendment analysis; it is only that we accou

in the application, rather than the choice, of th

ate level of scrutiny.43 

óóóóóó 

to speak. We consequently proceeded on the understa

contribution limitation surviving a claim of associationa

would survive a speech challenge as well, and we held 

satisfied by the contribution limits under review.î (citat

It is thus simply untrue in the campaign finance con

ìburdens on speech necessitate strict scrutiny review.î Po

43 JUSTICE KENNEDY is no doubt correct that the associat

imposed by a particular piece of campaign-finance regu

times be so severe as to warrant strict scrutiny. Ibid. I

interpretation of ß323(a), however, see infra, at 46ñ47, 
ous scrutiny applicable to contribution limits 

the constitutionality of new FECA ß323. Beca

challenged provisions of ß323 implicate diff

Amendment concerns, we discuss them separ

are mindful, however, that Congress enacted 

integrated whole to vindicate the Governmentí

interest in preventing corruption and the app

corruption. 

New FECA ß323(a)ís Restrictions on Nati

Committees 

The core of Title I is new FECA ß323(a), whi

that ìnational committee[s] of a political party 

solicit, receive, or direct to another person a co

donation, or transfer of funds or any other thin

or spend any funds, that are not subject to the 

prohibitions, and reporting requirements of th

U. S. C. A. ß441i(a)(1) (Supp. 2003). The proh

tends to ìany officer or agent acting on behal

national committee, and any entity that is 

indirectly established, financed, or maintain

trolled by such a national committee.î ß441(a)(

The main goal of ß323(a) is modest. In la

simply effects a return to the scheme that was 

Buckley and that was subverted by the crea

FECís allocation regime, which permitted th

parties to fund federal electioneering efforts wi

nation of hard and soft money. See supra, at 

óóóóóó 

present such a case. As JUSTICE KENNEDY himself ackno

ìsignificant interferenceî with ìprotected rights of as

subject to less rigorous scrutiny. Beaumont, 539 U. S., 

op., at 15); see post, at 28. There is thus nothing incon

decision to account for the particular associational burden

ß323(a) when applying the appropriate level of scrutiny. 
able to use vast amounts of soft money in the

elect federal candidates. Consequently, as lo

directed the money to the political parties, d

contribute large amounts of soft money for use 

designed to influence federal elections.

44 New 

designed to put a stop to that practice. 

1. Governmental Interests Underlying N

ß323(a) 

The Government defends ß323(a)ís ban o

partiesí involvement with soft money as ne

prevent the actual and apparent corruption 

candidates and officeholders. Our cases have 

that the prevention of corruption or its appear

tutes a sufficiently important interest to just

contribution limits. We have not limited that int

elimination of cash-for-votes exchanges. In B

expressly rejected the argument that antibr

provided a less restrictive alternative to FECA

tion limits, noting that such laws ìdeal[t] with on

blatant and specific attempts of those with mon

óóóóóó 

44The fact that the post-1990 explosion in soft-money 

federal electioneering was accompanied by a series of e

gress to clamp down on such uses of soft money (culminat

in BCRA) underscores the fact that the FEC regulatio

more than Congress, in enacting FECA, had ever inte

Cantor, Congressional Research Service Report for Congre

Finance Legislation in the 101st Congress (1990) (9 bi

limit the influence of soft money introduced); J. Cantor, C

Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 102nd Co

(10 such bills introduced); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Co

paign Finance Legislation in the 103rd Congress (1993

Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Leg

104th Congress (1996) (18 bills); see also 251 F. Supp. 2

(per curiam) (discussing legislative efforts to curb soft m

and subsequent Congresses). 
speaking of improper influence and opport

abuseí in addition to ëquid pro quo arrangements

recognized a concern not confined to bribery of 

cials, but extending to the broader threat from 

too compliant with the wishes of large contributo

Missouri, 528 U. S., at 389; see also Colorado II

at 441 (acknowledging that corruption exten

explicit cash-for-votes agreements to ìundue infl

officeholderís judgmentî). 

Of ìalmost equalî importance has been th

mentís interest in combating the appearance or 

of corruption engendered by large campaign con

Buckley, supra, at 27; see also Shrink Missour

390; Federal Election Commín v. National C

Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 496ñ

Take away Congressí authority to regulate the 

of undue influence and ìthe cynical assumption 

donors call the tune could jeopardize the wil

voters to take part in democratic governance

Missouri, 528 U. S., at 390; see also id., at 40

J., concurring). And because the First Amen

not require Congress to ignore the fact that ì

donors, and parties test the limits of the cu

Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 457, these interests 

sufficient to justify not only contribution li

selves, but laws preventing the circumventi

limits, id., at 456 (ì[A]ll Members of the Court 

circumvention is a valid theory of corruptionî). 

ìThe quantum of empirical evidence needed 

heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judg

vary up or down with the novelty or the plausi

justification raised.î Shrink Missouri, supra, a

idea that large contributions to a national par

rupt or, at the very least, create the appearanc

tion of federal candidates and officeholders 
placed strict dollar limits and source restricti

tributions that individuals and other entities 

national, state, and local party committees for t

of influencing a federal election. The prem

these restrictions has been, and continues 

contributions to a federal candidateís party in 

candidateís campaign threaten to createóno 

would a direct contribution to the candidateó

obligation. See Buckley, supra, at 38 (uphold

$25,000 limit on aggregate yearly contribution

didate, political committee, and political party 

as a ìquite modest restraint . . . to prevent eva

$1,000 contribution limitationî by, among ot

ìhuge contributions to the candidateís politi

This is particularly true of contributions to na

ties, with which federal candidates and officeho

a special relationship and unity of interest. 

affiliation has placed national parties in a uniq

ìwhether they like it or not,î to serve as 

spending on behalf of those who seek to produc

officeholders.î Colorado II, supra, at 452; see 

Missouri, supra, at 406 (KENNEDY, J., dissen

spondent] asks us to evaluate his speech cl

context of a system which favors candidates 

holders whose campaigns are supported by 

usually funneled through political partiesî 

added)). As discussed below, rather than resis

the national parties have actively embraced it. 

The question for present purposes is whethe

money contributions to national party commit

corrupting influence or give rise to the app

corruption. Both common sense and the amp

these cases confirm Congressí belief that they 

forth above, supra, at 11ñ13, and n. 7, the FEC

regime has invited widespread circumvention 
encing federal elections. Under this system

union, and wealthy individual donors have b

contribute substantial sums of soft money to t

parties, which the parties can spend for the s

pose of influencing a particular candidateís f

tion. It is not only plausible, but likely, that 

would feel grateful for such donations and t

would seek to exploit that gratitude.45 

The evidence in the record shows that cand

donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-m

hole, the former to increase their prospects of e

the latter to create debt on the part of officeho

the national parties serving as willing inte

Thus, despite FECAís hard-money limits on di

butions to candidates, federal officeholders hav

asked donors to make soft-money donations 

and state committees ìsolely in order to as

campaigns,î including the officeholderís own. 2

2d, at 472 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declarati

Randlett, CEO, Dashboard Technology ¶¶6ñ9 (

Randlett Decl.), App. 713ñ714); see also 251 F

at 471ñ473, 478ñ479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., 

(Leon, J.). Parties kept tallies of the amou

money raised by each officeholder, and ìthe 

óóóóóó 

45 JUSTICE KENNEDY contends that the pluralityís observ

rado I that large soft-money donations to a political pa

threat of corruption ìestablish[es] thatî such contribu

corrupting. Post, at 17ñ18 (citing Colorado I, 518 U. S. 6

618 (1996)). The cited dictum has no bearing on the 

Colorado I addressed an entirely different questionónam

Congress could permissibly limit a partyís independent e

and did so on an entirely different set of facts. It also ha

evidentiary record frozen in 1990ówell before the soft-mo

of the 1990ís. See Federal Election Commín v. Colorad

Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1451 (Colo. 19
political committees often affect[ed] the amoun

mittees g[a]ve to assist the Memberís campaig

474ñ475 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Donors often 

their contributions be credited to particular 

and the parties obliged, irrespective of whethe

were hard or soft. Id., at 477ñ478 (Kollar-Kote

at 824, 847 (Leon, J.). National party comm

teamed with individual candidatesí campaign 

to create joint fundraising committees, which e

candidates to take advantage of the partyís hig

bution limits while still allowing donors to g

preferred candidate. Id., at 478 (Kollar-Kotelly

847ñ848 (Leon, J.); see also App. 1286 (Krasn

Expert Report (characterizing the joint fundr

mittee as one ìin which Senate candidates in e

soft money for use in their own racesî)). Eve

participating directly in the fundraising, fed

holders were well aware of the identities of 

National party committees would distribute lis

tial or actual donors, or donors themselves w

their generosity to officeholders. 251 F. Supp. 

488 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (ì[F]or a Member not t

identities of these donors, he or she must act

such knowledge, as it is provided by the nation

parties and the donors themselvesî); id., at 853

J.). 

For their part, lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy 

alike all have candidly admitted donating 

sums of soft money to national committees not 

cal grounds, but for the express purpose of sec

ence over federal officials. For example, a form

and partner at a lobbying firm in Washing

stated in his declaration: 

ìëYou are doing a favor for somebody by 
Ordinarily, people feel inclined to recipro

Do a bigger favor for someoneóthat is, wr

checkóand they feel even more compelled 

cate. In my experience, overt words 

exchanged about contributions, but peop

understandings.íî Id., at 493 (Kollar-K

(quoting declaration of Robert Rozen, par

& Young ¶14; see 8ñR Defs. Exhs., Tab 33)

Particularly telling is the fact that, in 1996 

more than half of the top 50 soft-money donor

stantial sums to both major national parties, le

for no other conclusion but that these donors w

influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than 

any particular ideology. See, e.g., 251 F. Supp. 

510 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing Mann Expert R

óóóóóó 

46Other business leaders agreed. For example, the ch

board and CEO of a major toy company explained: 

ì ëMany in the corporate world view large soft money dona

of doing business. . . . I remain convinced that in some 

publicized cases, federal officeholders actually appear 

themselves and the party cheaply. They could have gott

money, because of the potential importance of their de

affected business.í î 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 491 (Kollar-Kotell

declaration of Alan G. Hassenfeld, CEO, Hasbro, Inc., 

Defs. Exhs., Tab 17). 

Similarly the chairman emeritus of a major airline opined

ì ëThough a soft money check might be made out to a p

labor and business leaders know that those checks open th

offices of individual and important Members of Cong

Administration. . . . Labor and business leaders belie

experience and with good reasonóthat such access g

opportunity to shape and affect governmental decisions a

ability to do so derives from the fact that they have given 

money to the parties.í î 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 498 (Koll

(quoting Greenwald Decl. ¶12, App. 283ñ284, ¶10); 251 F

858ñ859 (Leon, J.) (same). 
parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, 

sense at all unless the donor feels that he or sh

access.íî (quoting declaration of former Sen. Da

¶15, App. 175)).47 

The evidence from the federal officeholdersí 

is similar. For example, one former Senator de

influence purchased by nonfederal donations as 

ìëToo often, Membersí first thought is n

right or what they believe, but how it will 

raising. Who, after all, can seriously cont

$100,000 donation does not alter the way 

aboutóand quite possibly votes onóan 

When you donít pay the piper that finance

paigns, you will never get any more mone

piper. Since money is the motherís milk 

you never want to be in that situation.íî 2

2d, at 481 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting de

former Sen. Alan Simpson ¶10 (hereinaft

óóóóóó 

47Even more troubling is evidence in the record show

tional parties have actively exploited the belief that 

purchase influence or protection to pressure donors into m

butions. As one CEO explained: 

ì ë[I]f youíre giving a lot of soft money to one side, the oth

For many economically-oriented donors, there is a risk in 

one side, because the other side may read through FEC 

have staff or a friendly lobbyist call and indicate that 

interests before a certain committee has had their contri

other side noticed. Theyíll get a message that basically 

sure you want to be giving only to one side? Donít you 

friends on both sides of the aisle?í If your interests are su

from the other side of the aisle, you need to fear that you 

penalty if you donít give. . . . [D]uring the 1990ís, it beca

more acceptable to call someone, saying you saw he gave 

so he should also give to you or the personís opponent.í 

(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Randlett Decl. ¶12, App. 715)

2d, at 868 (Leon, J.) (same). 
(same). 

See also id., at 489 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (ìëThe 

those who contribute to political parties do so f

reasons, to gain access to influential Members 

and to get to know new Members.î (quoting 

Decl., Exh. A, ¶46)). By bringing soft-money 

federal candidates and officeholders together, ì

thus necessarily the instruments of some c

whose object is not to support the partyís messag

party candidates across the board, but rather t

specific candidate for the sake of a position on 

issue, or even to support any candidate who wil

to the contributors.î Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 45

Plaintiffs argue that without concrete evid

instance in which a federal officeholder h

switched a vote (or, presumably, evidence o

instance where the public believes a vote was 

Congress has not shown that there exists real 

corruption. But the record is to the contrary

dence connects soft money to manipulations of 

tive calendar, leading to Congressí failure to en

other things, generic drug legislation, tort r

tobacco legislation. See, e.g., 251 F. Supp. 

(Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 852 (Leon, J.); Ap

(declaration of Sen. John McCain ¶¶5, 8ñ11 (

McCain Decl.)); App. 811 (Simpson Decl. ¶10) 

from the tobacco industry to Republicans scutt

legislation, just as contributions from the trial 

Democrats stopped tort reformî); App. 805 (de

former Sen. Paul Simon ¶¶13ñ14). To claim 

actions do not change legislative outcomes su

derstands the legislative process. 

More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of cor

narrowly. Our cases have firmly established 
ple cashforvotes corruption to curbing undu

on an officeholderís judgment, and the appeara

influence.î Colorado II, supra, at 441. M

ìdeeply disturbing examplesî of corruption ci

Court in Buckley, 424 U. S., at 27, to justify F

tribution limits were not episodes of vote b

evidence that various corporate interests had 

stantial donations to gain access to high-level g

officials. See Buckley, 519 F. 2d, at 821, 839ñ

nn. 5ñ6, supra. Even if that access did not se

influence, it certainly gave the ìappearance of 

ence.î Colorado II, supra, at 441; see also 51

838. 

The record in the present case is replete w

examples of national party committees peddlin

federal candidates and officeholders in exchan

soft-money donations. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, 

(Kollar-Kotelly, J.). As one former Senator put 

ìëSpecial interests who give large amou

money to political parties do in fact achiev

jectives. They do get special access. Sittin

and House Members have limited amoun

but they make time available in their s

meet with representatives of business and 

wealthy individuals who gave large sums t

ties. These are not idle chit-chats about t

phy of democracy. . . . Senators are press

benefactors to introduce legislation, to am

tion, to block legislation, and to vote on legi

certain way.íî Id., at 496 (Kollar-Kotelly, 

declaration of former Sen. Warren Rudma

inafter Rudman Decl.), App. 742); 251 F. S

858 (Leon, J.) (same). 

So pervasive is this practice that the six nat
nities for access to wouldbe softmoney do

increased prices reflecting an increased leve

For example, the DCCC offers a range of don

starting with the $10,000-per-year Business 

gram, and going up to the $100,000-per-yea

Finance Board program. The latter entitles t

bimonthly conference calls with the Democr

leadership and chair of the DCCC, complimen

tions to all DCCC fundraising events, two priv

with the Democratic House leadership and ran

bers, and two retreats with the Democratic H

and DCCC chair in Telluride, Colorado, and H

Massachusetts. Id., at 504ñ505 (Kollar-Kote

also id., at 506 (describing records indicating 

offered meetings with President in return for 

tions); id., at 502ñ503 (describing RNCís var

programs); id., at 503ñ504 (same for NRSC); 

503 (same for DSCC); id., at 504 (same for NR

larly, ìthe RNCís donor programs offer greate

federal office holders as the donations grow l

the highest level and most personal access off

largest soft money donors.î Id., at 500ñ50

further, that the RNC holds out the prospect 

officeholders to attract soft-money donations a

ages officeholders to meet with large soft-mon

accord, id., at 860ñ861 (Leon, J.). 

Despite this evidence and the close ties that 

and officeholders have with their parties

KENNEDY would limit Congressí regulatory inte

the prevention of the actual or apparent qu

corruption ìinherent inî contributions made 

contributions made at the express behest of, an

tures made in coordination with, a federal offi

candidate. Post, at 8ñ10, 15. Regulation of 

donation or expenditureóregardless of its size
potential impact on a candidates election, its v

candidate, or its unabashed and explicit intent 

influenceówould, according to JUSTICE KENNE

be out of bounds. This crabbed view of corru

particularly of the appearance of corruptio

precedent, common sense, and the realities 

fundraising exposed by the record in this litigat

JUSTICE KENNEDYíS interpretation of the Fi

ment would render Congress powerless to ad

subtle but equally dispiriting forms of corrupti

troubling to a functioning democracy as class

quo corruption is the danger that officeholders 

óóóóóó 

48 In addition to finding no support in our recent cases, 

rado II, 533 U. S., at 441 (defining corruption more broa

pro quo arrangements); Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., a

JUSTICE KENNEDYís contention that Buckley limits Cong

lating contributions to a candidate ignores Buckley itse

upheld FECAís $25,000 limit on aggregate yearly con

candidates, political committees, and party committees o

tion that FECAís $1,000 limit on candidate contributi

meaningless if individuals could instead make ìhuge co

the candidateís political party.î 424 U. S., at 38. Likew

nia Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Commín, 453 U. S. 

upheld FECAís $5,000 limit on contributions to multicand

committees. It is no answer to say that such limits were 

means of preventing individuals from using parties 

committees as pass-throughs to circumvent FECAís $1

individual contributions to candidates. Given FECAís 

ìcontribution,î the $5,000 and $25,000 limits restricted 

source and amount of funds available to parties and pol

tees to make candidate contributions, but also the source a

funds available to engage in express advocacy and nu

noncoordinated expenditures. If indeed the First Amend

ited Congress from regulating contributions to fund t

otherwise-easy-to-remedy exploitation of parties as pass-t

a strict limit on donations that could be used to fund can

butions) would have provided insufficient justification f

broad legislation. 
cies, but according to the wishes of those who 

large financial contributions valued by the o

Even if it occurs only occasionally, the potent

undue influence is manifest. And unlike str

for-votes transactions, such corruption is nei

detected nor practical to criminalize. The bes

prevention is to identify and to remove the 

The evidence set forth above, which is but a s

the reams of disquieting evidence contained in 

convincingly demonstrates that soft-money co

to political parties carry with them just such te

JUSTICE KENNEDY likewise takes too narrow 

the appearance of corruption. He asserts that 

transactions with ìinherent corruption potent

he again limits to contributions directly to 

justify the inference ìthat regulating the condu

the appearance of real corruption.î Post, at 1

view, however, Congress is not required to ign

cal evidence regarding a particular practice 

conduct in isolation from its context. To be 

political favoritism or opportunity for influen

insufficient to justify regulation. Post, at 12ñ

record demonstrates, it is the manner in wh

have sold access to federal candidates and o

that has given rise to the appearance of undu

Implicit (and, as the record shows, sometimes 

the sale of access is the suggestion that money 

óóóóóó 

49At another point, describing our ìflawed reason

KENNEDY seems to suggest that Congressí interest in r

appearance of corruption extends only to those contr

actually ìcreate . . . corrupt donor favoritism among . . . 

Post, at 16. This latter formulation would render Congre

stemming the appearance of corruption indistinguish

interest in preventing actual corruption. 
unabashedly admit that they are seeking to pu

such influence. It was not unwarranted for C

conclude that the selling of access gives rise to 

ance of corruption. 

In sum, there is substantial evidence to su

gressí determination that large soft-money co

to national political parties give rise to corrupt

appearance of corruption. 

2. New FECA ß323(a)ís Restriction on Spe

Receiving Soft Money 

Plaintiffs and THE CHIEF JUSTICE contend t

is impermissibly overbroad because it subject

raised and spent by national parties to FE

money source and amount limits, including, fo

funds spent on purely state and local elections 

federal office is at stake.50 Post, 2ñ5 (REHNQ

dissenting). Such activities, THE CHIEF JUST

pose ìlittle or no potential to corrupt . . . fed

dates or officeholders.î Post, at 5 (dissentin

This observation is beside the point. Section 

the remainder of ß323, regulates contributions

ties. As the record demonstrates, it is the clo

ship between federal officeholders and the na

ties, as well as the means by which parties hav

that relationship, that have made all large 

contributions to national parties suspect. 

óóóóóó 

50 In support of this claim, the political party plaintiffs 

2001, the RNC spent $15.6 million of nonfederal fund

nonfederal amount raised that year) on purely state and 

activity, including contributions to state and local candida

to state parties, and direct spending. See Tr. of Oral 

(statement of counsel Bobby R. Burchfield); 251 F. Supp. 2

(Henderson, J.); id., at 464ñ465 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., 

J.). 
tion between the national party committees an

officials who control them.íî 251 F. Supp. 2d, 

(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Mann Expert Repo

national committees of the two major parties a

by, and largely composed of, federal officeh

candidates. Indeed, of the six national commi

two major parties, four are composed entirely 

officeholders. Ibid. The nexus between natio

and federal officeholders prompted one of Title 

to conclude: 

ìBecause the national parties operate at t

level, and are inextricably intertwined with 

ficeholders and candidates, who raise the 

the national party committees, there is a cl

tion between the funding of the national 

the corrupting dangers of soft money on 

political process. The only effective way 

this [soft-money] problem of corruption is 

tirely all raising and spending of soft mo

national parties.î 148 Cong. Rec. H409 

2002) (statement of Rep. Shays). 

Given this close connection and alignment o

large soft-money contributions to national 

likely to create actual or apparent indebtedn

part of federal officeholders, regardless of how 

are ultimately used. 

This close affiliation has also placed nationa

a position to sell access to federal officehol

change for soft-money contributions that the 

then use for its own purposes. Access to fed

holders is the most valuable favor the nat

committees are able to give in exchange for 

tions. The fact that officeholders comply by don

valuable time indicates either that officeho
selves, without regard to their end use, or th

committees are able to exert considerable c

federal officeholders. See, e.g., App. 1196ñ11

Report of Donald P. Green, Yale University) (ìO

to legislative office, public officials enter an e

in which political parties-in-government cont

sources crucial to subsequent electoral success 

tive power. Political parties organize the legi

cuses that make committee assignmentsî); 

(Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report) (indicating 

holdersí re-election prospects are significantly 

by attitudes of party leadership). Either way

money donations to national party committee

to buy donors preferential access to federal o

no matter the ends to which their contribution

tually put. As discussed above, Congress ha

grounds to regulate the appearance of undu

associated with this practice. The Governme

interests in preventing corruption, and in par

appearance of corruption, are thus sufficien

subjecting all donations to national parties to 

amount, and disclosure limitations of FECA.51 

óóóóóó 

51The close relationship of federal officeholders and 

their parties answers not only THE CHIEF JUSTICEís co

ß323(a), but also his fear that our analysis of ß323ís rem

sions bespeaks no limiting principle. Post, at 6ñ7 (dissen

As set forth in our discussion of those provisions, the r

strates close ties between federal officeholders and the s

committees of their parties. That close relationship ma

local parties effective conduits for donors desiring to co

candidates and officeholders. Thus, in upholding ßß323(b

we rely not only on the fact that they regulate contribu

fund activities influencing federal elections, but also that 

contributions to or at the behest of entities uniquely posit

as conduits for corruption. We agree with THE CHIEF 
Directing Soft Money 

Plaintiffs also contend that ß323(a)ís pro

national partiesí soliciting or directing soft-mo

butions is substantially overbroad. The reach o

tation prohibition, however, is limited. It bars 

tations of soft money by national party commit

party officers in their official capacities. The 

remain free to solicit hard money on their own 

well as to solicit hard money on behalf of state 

and state and local candidates.52 They also can 

hard money to state committees and to cand

accordance with FEC regulations, furthermore

national parties are free to solicit soft mon

individual capacities, or, if they are also offici

parties, in that capacity. See 67 Fed. Reg. 4908

This limited restriction on solicitation follow

from the prohibition on national committeesí re

money. The same observations that led us to a

latter compel us to reach the same conclusion 

óóóóóó 

Congress could not regulate financial contributions to 

show hosts or newspaper editors on the sole basis that t

conferred a benefit on the candidate. Post, at 7 (dissenting 

52Plaintiffs claim that the option of soliciting hard m

and local candidates is an illusory one, since several S

state and local candidates from establishing multiple 

counts, which would preclude them from establishing sepa

for federal funds. See Cal. Fair Pol. Practs. Commín Ad

91ñ448 (Dec. 16, 1991), 1991 WL 772902; Colo. Const., 

ß2(3); Iowa Code ß56.5A (Supp. 2003); and Ohio Rev

ß3517.10(J) (Anderson Supp. 2002). Plaintiffs maintain 

combines with these state laws to make it impossible for s

candidates to receive hard-money donations. But the cha

considering is a facial one, and on its face ß323(a) permit

The fact that a handful of States might interfere with th

Congress has chosen for such solicitations is an argumen

addressed in an as-applied challenge. 
favorably to a donation made at its request re

whether the recipient is the committee itself 

entity. This principle accords with common 

appears elsewhere in federal laws. E.g., 

ß201(b)(2) (prohibition on public officials ìdema

seek[ing] . . . anything of value personally or fo

person or entity . . .î (emphasis added))

ß2635.203(f)(2) (2003) (restriction on gifts to 

ployees encompasses gifts ì[g]iven to any oth

including any charitable organization, on th

designation, recommendation, or other specifica

employeeî). 

Plaintiffs argue that BCRA itself demon

overbreadth of ß323(a)ís solicitation ban. Th

particular to ß323(e), which allows federal can

officeholders to solicit limited amounts of soft m

individual donors under certain circumstances

2 U. S. C. A ß441i(a) with ß441i(e) (Supp. 2

differences between ßß323(a) and 323(e), ho

without constitutional significance. We have 

that ìthe ëdiffering structures and purposesí 

entities ëmay require different forms of regulat

to protect the integrity of the electoral process,

Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 210, and we respec

decision to proceed in incremental steps in t

campaign finance regulation, see Federal Electi

v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S

n. 11 (1986) (MCFL); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 

differences between the two provisions reflec

reasonable judgments about the function pla

tional committees and the interactions betwe

tees and officeholders, subjects about which M

Congress have vastly superior knowledge. 
The McConnell and political party plainti

that ß323(a) is substantially overbroad and 

stricken on its face because it impermissibly in

speech and associational rights of minor part

the Libertarian National Committee, which, ow

slim prospects for electoral success and the fac

receive few large soft-money contributions from 

sources, pose no threat of corruption compara

posed by the RNC and DNC. In Buckley, we 

similar argument concerning limits on contr

minor-party candidates, noting that ìany atte

clude minor parties and independents en mas

Actís contribution limitations overlooks the fa

nor-party candidates may win elective office 

substantial impact on the outcome of an elec

U. S., at 34ñ35. We have thus recognized th

vance of the interest in avoiding actual or ap

ruption is not a function of the number of le

given party manages to elect. It applies as 

minor party that manages to elect only one of i

to federal office as it does to a major party whos

make up a majority of Congress. It is therefore 

to require that all parties and all candidates 

same set of rules designed to protect the inte

electoral process. 

We add that nothing in ß323(a) prevents 

from pooling resources to start a new national p

at 5 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). Only when a

tion has gained official status, which carries 

nificant benefits for its members, will the pros

ß323(a) apply. Even then, a nascent or strugg

party can bring an as-applied challenge if ß323(

it from ìamassing the resources necessary f

advocacy.î Buckley, supra, at 21. 
Finally, plaintiffs assert that ß323(a) is uncon

because it impermissibly interferes with the 

national committees to associate with state 

committees. By way of example, plaintiffs p

Republican Victory Plans, whereby the RNC a

cert with the state and local committees of a giv

plan and implement joint, full-ticket fundr

electioneering programs. See App. 693, 694ñ69

tion of John Peschong, RNC Western Reg. P

(describing the Republican Victory Plans)). T

parties assert that ß323(a) outlaws any parti

Victory Plans by RNC officers, including me

down at a table and engaging in collective deci

about how soft money will be solicited, rec

spent. Such associational burdens, they arg

great for the First Amendment to bear. 

We are not persuaded by this argument 

hinges on an unnaturally broad reading of 

ìspend,î ìreceive,î ìdirect,î and ìsolicit.î 2 

ß441i(a) (Supp. 2003). Nothing on the face 

prohibits national party officers, whether acti

official or individual capacities, from sitting 

state and local party committees or candidates 

advise how to raise and spend soft money. As 

national party officer does not personally spe

direct, or solicit soft money, ß323(a) permits a 

of joint planning and electioneering activity. 

defendants, the principal drafters and propon

legislation, concede as much. Brief for 

Defendants Sen. John McCain et al. in 

1674 et al., p. 22 (ìBCRA leaves parties and 

free to coordinate campaign plans and activiti

messages, and fundraising goals with one anot

FECís current definitions of ß323(a)ís terms are 

with that view. See, e.g., 11 CFR ß300.2(m) (2
added)); ß300.2(n) (defining direct as to as

who has expressed an intent to make a contrib

make that contribution . . . including through a 

intermediaryî (emphasis added)); ß300.2(c) (lay

factors that determine whether an entity will 

ered to be controlled by a national committee). 

Given the straightforward meaning of this 

JUSTICE KENNEDY is incorrect that ì[a] natio

mere involvement in the strategic planning of 

for a state ballot initiativeî or its assistance in 

a state partyís Levin-money fundraising effo

finding that the officers are in ìëindirect cont

state party and subject to criminal penalties. P

Moreover, ß323(a) leaves national party commi

entirely free to participate, in their official capa

state and local parties and candidates in sol

spending hard money; party officials may also 

money in their unofficial capacities. 

Accordingly, we reject the plaintiffsí First A

challenge to new FECA ß323(a). 

New FECA ß323(b)ís Restrictions on State and 

Committees 

In constructing a coherent scheme of campa

regulation, Congress recognized that, given th

between federal candidates and state party c

BCRAís restrictions on national committee act

rapidly become ineffective if state and local 

remained available as a conduit for soft-m

tions.53 Section 323(b) is designed to foreclos

óóóóóó 

53Even opponents of campaign finance reform acknowl

prohibition of soft money donations to national party com

would be wholly ineffective.î The Constitution and Cam

Hearings on S. 522 before the Senate Committee on Rule
curbing state committees ability to use large 

contributions to influence federal elections. T

ß323(b) is a straightforward contribution reg

prevents donors from contributing nonfedera

state and local party committees to help finan

election activity.î 2 U. S. C A. ß441i(b)(1) (S

The term ìFederal election activityî encomp

distinct categories of electioneering: (1) voter r

activity during the 120 days preceding a regul

uled federal election; (2) voter identification, 

vote (GOTV), and generic campaign activit

ìconducted in connection with an election in w

didate for Federal office appears on the ballo

ìpublic communicationî55 that ìrefers to a cle

fied candidate for Federal officeî and ìprom

ports,î ìattacks,î or ìopposesî a candidate for 

and (4) the services provided by a state com

ployee who dedicates more than 25% of his or 

ìactivities in connection with a Federal 

ßß431(20)(A)(i)ñ(iv). The Act explicitly exclu

categories of activity from this definition: publi

cations that refer solely to nonfederal candidat

óóóóóó 

stration, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 301 (2000) (statement 

Burchfield, Partner, Covington & Burling). 54Generic campaign activity promotes a political party 

specific candidate. 2 U. S. C. A. ß431(21). 55A public communication is ìa communication by m

broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspap

outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone 

general public, or any other form of general public poli

ing.î ß431(22). 56So long as the communication does not constitute v

tion, voter identification, GOTV, or generic campa

ß431(20)(B)(i). 
conventions; and the cost of grassroots campa

als like bumper stickers that refer only to s

dates. ß431(20)(B). All activities that fall 

statutory definition must be funded with ha

ß441i(b)(1). 

Section 323(b)(2), the so-called Levin A

carves out an exception to this general rule. A 

on the pre-BCRA regime that permitted partie

certain activities with a mix of federal and 

funds, the Levin Amendment allows state and 

committees to pay for certain types of feder

activity with an allocated ratio of hard money 

fundsîóthat is, funds raised within an annu

$10,000 per person. 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i(b)(2). 

the $10,000 cap and certain related restrictions 

circumvention of that limit, ß323(b)(2) leaves re

such contributions to the States.58 

The scope of the Levin Amendment is lim

ways. First, state and local parties can use L

to fund only activities that fall within categor

(2) of the statuteís definition of federal election 

namely, voter registration activity, voter id

drives, GOTV drives, and generic campaign a

U. S. C. A. ß441i(b)(2)(A). And not all of thes

qualify: Levin funds cannot be used to pay for 

ties that refer to ìa clearly identified candidate 

officeî; they likewise cannot be used to fund 

communications unless they refer ìsolely to 

identified candidate for State or loc

óóóóóó 

57Unless the contribution is earmarked for federal ele

ß431(20)(B)(ii). 58The statute gives the FEC responsibility for setting 

ratio. ß441i(b)(2)(A); see also 11 CFR ß300.33(b) (20

allocation ratios). 
Second, both the Levin funds and the alloca

of hard money used to pay for such activiti

raised entirely by the state or local committee 

them. ß441i(b)(2)(B)(iv). This means that a 

committee cannot use Levin funds transferred 

party committees to cover the Levin funds p

Levin Amendment expenditure. It also means 

party committee cannot use hard money trans

other party committees to cover the hard-mone

a Levin Amendment expenditure. Furthermor

committees, federal candidates, and federal o

generally may not solicit Levin funds on 

state committees, and state committees may 

up to raise Levin funds. ß441i(b)(2)(C). They 

ever, jointly raise the hard money used to m

expenditures. 

1. Governmental Interests Underlying N

ß323(b) 

We begin by noting that, in addressing the 

soft-money contributions to state committees

both drew a conclusion and made a prediction. 

sion, based on the evidence before it, was th

rupting influence of soft money does not insi

into the political process solely through nat

committees. Rather, state committees func

alternate avenue for precisely the same 

forces.59 Indeed, both candidates and parties 

óóóóóó 

59One former Senator noted: 

ì ëThe fact is that much of what state and local partie

elect federal candidates. The national parties know it; t

know it; the state and local parties know it. If state and 

can use soft money for activities that affect federal elect

problem will not be solved at all. The same enormous ince

the money will exist; the same large contributions by 
butions to donate to state committees.

 There 

as much evidence as there was in Buckley that 

tions have been made with the intentóand 

some cases the effectóof gaining influence o

officeholders.61 Section 323(b) thus promotes an 

óóóóóó 

unions, and wealthy individuals will be made; the feder

who benefit from state party use of these funds will know 

their benefactors are; the same degree of beholdenness a

will arise; the same distortions on the legislative process w

the same public cynicism will erode the foundations of ou

except it will all be worse in the publicís mind becaus

reform was undercut once again by a loophole that allo

into the system.í î 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 467 (Kollar-Kotell

Rudman Decl. ¶19, App. 746). 60 E.g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (ì ëIt 

common for the RNC to put interested donors in touch 

state parties. This often occurs when a donor has reach

federal dollar limits to the RNC, but wishes to make add

butions to the state partyí î (quoting declaration of Tho

RNC Chief Counsel ¶68, App 308)); see also Colorado II

458 (quoting Congressman Wayne Allardís Aug. 27, 199

letter informing the recipient that ì ëyou are at the limit of 

directly contribute to my campaign,í î but ì ëyou can fur

campaign by assisting the Colorado Republican Partyí î)

2d, at 454 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (ì ëBoth political partie

spending soft money with its accompanying hard money m

their state parties to work smoothly, for the most pa

officials readily acknowledge they are simply ëpass thr

vendors providing the broadcast ads or direct mailí î (quo

Expert Report 37, App. 1510ñ1511.)). 61The 1998 Senate Report found that, in exchange for 

donation to state Democratic committees and candida

arranged meetings for the donor with the President and 

officials. 1 1998 Senate Report 43ñ44; 2 id., at 2907ñ2

7519. That same Report also detailed how Native Americ

operated casinos made sizable soft-money contributions t

cratic committees in apparent exchange for access and in

at 44ñ46; 2 id., at 3167ñ3194; see also McCain Decl., Exh

The Busy Back-Door Men, Time, Mar. 31, 1997, p. 40)). 
ence that softmoney donations to political part

have. 

Congress also made a prediction. Having b

the hard lesson of circumvention by the entir

campaign finance regulation, Congress knew 

money donors would react to ß323(a) by scramb

another way to purchase influence. It was ìne

nor implausible,î Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., 

Congress to conclude that political parties wou

ß323(a) by directing soft-money contributors t

committees, and that federal candidates would 

indebted to these contributors as they had be

who had formerly contributed to the national p

ìmust accord substantial deference to the pred

ments of Congress,î Turner Broadcasting Sys

FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 665 (1994), particularly wh

those predictions are so firmly rooted in relev

and common sense. Preventing corrupting ac

shifting wholesale to state committees and th

cerating FECA clearly qualifies as an importa

mental interest. 

2. New FECA ß323(b)ís Tailoring 

Plaintiffs argue that even if some legitima

might be served by ß323(b), the provisionís rest

unjustifiably burdensome and therefore canno

ered ìclosely drawnî to match the Governm

tives. They advance three main contentions in 

this proposition. First, they argue that the p

substantially overbroad because it federalize

that pose no conceivable risk of corrupting or a

corrupt federal officeholders. Second, they arg

Levin Amendment imposes an unconstitutiona

the associational rights of political parties. F

argue that the provision prevents them from am
address these points in turn. 

a. ß323(b)ís Application to Federal Election 

Plaintiffs assert that ß323(b) represents a ne

pervasive federal regulation of state-focused ele

activities that cannot possibly corrupt or appea

federal officeholders and thus goes well beyon

concerns about the corruption of the federa

process. We disagree. 

It is true that ß323(b) captures some act

affect state campaigns for nonfederal offices. 

are the same sorts of activities that already w

by the FECís pre-BCRA allocation rules, and t

be funded in part by hard money, because 

federal as well as state elections. See 11 C

(2002). As a practical matter, BCRA merely 

principles of the FECís allocation regime while 

time justifiably adjusting the formulas applica

activities in order to restore the efficacy of FE

time statutory restrictionóapproved by the 

eroded by the FECís allocation regimeóon co

to state and local party committees for the 

influencing federal elections. See 2 U. S. C. ß

441a(a)(1)(C); see also Buckley, 424 U. S., at 38 

FECAís $25,000 limit on aggregate contribution

dates and political committees); cf. Californ

Assn. v. Federal Election Commín, 453 U. S. 

(upholding FECAís $5,000 limit on contribution

candidate political committees). 

Like the rest of Title I, ß323(b) is premised o

judgment that if a large donation is capable o

federal candidate in the debt of the contributor

threat of corruption or the appearance of corr

we explain below, ß323(b) is narrowly focused 

ing contributions that pose the greatest risk of 
that can be used to benefit federal candidat

Further, these regulations all are reasonab

with various temporal and substantive limi

signed to focus the regulations on the impo

corruption interests to be served. We con

ß323(b) is a closely-drawn means of counterin

ruption and the appearance of corruption. 

The first two categories of ìFederal electio

voter registration efforts, ß301(20)(A)(i), and v

fication, GOTV, and generic campaign activitie

in connection with a federal election, ß30

clearly capture activity that benefits federal 

Common sense dictates, and it was ìundispu

that a partyís efforts to register voters sympath

party directly assist the partyís candidates 

office. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 460 (Kollar-Kotelly

equally clear that federal candidates reap 

rewards from any efforts that increase the num

minded registered voters who actually go to 

See, e.g., id., at 459 (ìë[The evidence] shows q

that a campaign that mobilizes residents of a 

publican precinct will produce a harvest of vo

publican candidates for both state and federal 

campaign need not mention federal candidate

direct effect on voting for such a candidate. . . 

campaign activity has a direct effect on federa

(quoting Green Expert Report 14)). Representa

four major congressional campaign committee

that they ìëtransfe[r] federal and nonfederal 

state and/or local party committees foríî both 

óóóóóó 

62Since voter identification is a necessary precondition 

program, the findings regarding GOTV funding obvious

equal force to the funding of voter identification efforts. 
efforts have a significant effect on the election 

candidates.íî 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 459, 461 

omitted). 

The record also makes quite clear that fed

holders are grateful for contributions to stat

parties that can be converted into GOTV-type e

id., at 459 (quoting a letter thanking a Califo

cratic Party donor and noting that CDPís vot

tion and GOTV efforts would help ìëincrease t

of Californian Democrats in the United States 

and ìëdeliver Californiaís 54 electoral votesíî to 

cratic presidential candidate). 

Because voter registration, voter identificat

and generic campaign activity all confer substa

fits on federal candidates, the funding of suc

creates a significant risk of actual and appar

tion. Section 323(b) is a reasonable response t

Its contribution limitations are focused on th

voter registration activity that is most likely t

election prospects of federal candidates: ac

occurs within 120 days before a federal electi

the voter registration drive does not 

mention a federal candidate, state committee

advantage of the Levin Amendmentís higher c

limits and relaxed source restrictions. 2 

ßß441i(b)(2)(B)(i)ñ(ii) (Supp. 2003). Similarly, 

bution limits applicable to ß301(20)(A)(ii) activ

only those voter identification, GOTV, and ge

paign efforts that occur ìin connection with an 

which a candidate for a Federal office appe

ballot.î 2 U. S. C. A. ß431(20)(A)(ii). Appro

implementing this subsection, the FEC has c

excluded all activity that takes place during th
more, state committees can take advantage o

Amendmentís higher contribution limits to 

ß301(A)(20)(i) and ß301(A)(20)(ii) activities t

specifically mention a federal candidate. 2 

ßß441i(b)(2)(B)(i)ñ(ii). The prohibition on the 

money in connection with these activities i

closely drawn to meet the sufficiently impo

ernmental interests of avoiding corruptio

appearance. 

ìPublic communicationsî that promote or at

didate for federal officeóthe third category 

election activity,î ß301(20)(A)(iii)óalso undoub

a dramatic effect on federal elections. Such 

prime motivating force behind BCRAís passa

1998 Senate Report 4535 (additional views of S

(ì[T]he hearings provided overwhelming eviden

twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue 

have virtually destroyed our campaign fin

leaving us with little more than a pile of legal r

explained below, any public communication tha

or attacks a clearly identified federal candid

affects the election in which he is participa

record on this score could scarcely be more 

óóóóóó 

63With respect to GOTV, voter identification, and other 

paign activity, the FEC has interpreted ß323(b) to apply 

activities conducted after the earliest filing deadline for 

federal election ballot or, in States that do not conduct pr

January 1 of even-numbered years. 11 CFR ß100.24(a)(1

activities conducted outside of those periods are comp

from regulation under ß323(b). Of course, this facial chal

present the question of the FEC regulationsí constitution

fact that the statute provides this basis for the FEC 

narrow ß301(20)(A)(ii) further calls into question plaint

facial overbreadth. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U

(1973). 
tions, as carefully defined in ß301(20)(A)(iii), 

directly federal candidates, we hold that ap

ß323(b)ís contribution caps to such communicat

closely drawn to the anticorruption interest it 

to address.64 

As for the final category of ìFederal electio

ß301(20)(A)(iv), we find that Congressí inter

venting circumvention of ß323(b)ís other restric

fies the requirement that state and local pa

federal funds to pay the salary of any employe

more than 25% of his or her compensated tim

ties in connection with a federal election. In t

of this provision, a party might use soft money 

the equivalent of a full-time employee engaged 

electioneering, by the simple expedient of d

federal workload among multiple employees. 

have suggested no reason for us to strike down 

óóóóóó 

64We likewise reject the argument that ß301(20)(A)(iii) 

tionally vague. The words ìpromote,î ìoppose,î ìattack,î 

clearly set forth the confines within which potential p

must act in order to avoid triggering the provision. 

ìprovide explicit standards for those who apply themî 

person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity 

is prohibited.î Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 

(1972). This is particularly the case here, since actions ta

cal parties are presumed to be in connection with electio

See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 79 (noting that a general req

political committees disclose their expenditures raised 

problems because the term ìpolitical committeeî ìneed on

organizations that are under the control of a candidate 

purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candid

a political committeeís expenditures ìare, by definiti

relatedî). Furthermore, should plaintiffs feel that they 

guidance, they are able to seek advisory opinions for clari

U. S. C. ß437f(a)(1), and thereby ìremove any doubt there 

the meaning of the law,î Civil Service Commín v. Letter 

U. S. 548, 580 (1973). 
sional determination of the need for [this] p

rule.î National Conservative Political Action C

U. S., at 500. 

b. Associational Burdens Imposed by 

Amendment 

Plaintiffs also contend that ß323(b) is unco

because the Levin Amendment unjustifiab

association among party committees by forbid

fers of Levin funds among state parties, transf

money to fund the allocable federal portion o

penditures, and joint fundraising of Levin fun

parties. We recognize, as we have in the past, 

tance of preserving the associational freedom 

See, e.g., California Democratic Party v. Jones

567 (2000); Eu v. San Francisco County Demo

tral Comm., 489 U. S. 214 (1989). But not e

restriction on partiesí otherwise unrestrained 

associate is of constitutional dimension. See C

533 U. S., at 450, n. 11. 

As an initial matter, we note that state and l

can avoid these associational burdens altoget

going the Levin Amendment option and electin

federal election activities entirely with hard m

in any event, the restrictions on the use, tr

raising of Levin funds are justifiable anticir

measures. Without the ban on transfers of L

among state committees, donors could readily 

the $10,000 limit on contributions to a commit

account by making multiple $10,000 donations 

committees that could then transfer the donat

committee of choice.65 The same anticircumv

óóóóóó 

65Any doubts that donors would engage in such a seem

scheme are put to rest by the record evidence in Buckl
Without this restriction, state and local comm

organize ìall handsî fundraisers at which 

corporate, or union donors could make large 

donations to be divided between the committe

case, the purpose, if not the letter, of ß323(b)(2

limit would be thwarted: Donors could make la

contributions at fundraisers, which would pro

means for corrupting federal officeholders. 

delicate and interconnected regulatory schem

here, any associational burdens imposed by 

Amendment restrictions are far outweighed by 

prevent circumvention of the entire scheme. 

Section 323(b)(2)(B)(iv)ís apparent prohibit

transfer of hard money by a national, state, or 

mittee to help fund the allocable hard-money p

separate state or local committeeís Levin ex

presents a closer question. 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i

(Supp. 2003). The Government defends the re

necessary to prevent the donor committee, pa

national committee, from leveraging the transfe

money to wrest control over the spending of th

committeeís Levin funds. This purported inter

particularly given the fact that ß323(a) alre

attempts by national parties to engage in suc

See 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i(a)(2) (extending ß323(

tions to entities controlled by national party c

However, the associational burdens posed by 

money transfer restriction are so insubstantial 

minimis. Party committees, including nati

committees, remain free to transfer unlimited h

óóóóóó 

n. 6, supra (setting forth the Court of Appealsí findin

the efforts of milk producers to obtain a meeting with 

officials). 
and local party committees can thus dedicate 

grownî hard money to their Levin activities w

on outside transfers to defray the costs of o

money expenditures. Given the strong anticir

interest vindicated by ß323(b)(2)(B)(iv)ís restric

transfer of Levin funds, we will not strike down 

provision based upon such an attenuated claim 

tional infringement. 

c. New FECA ß323(b)ís Impact on Part

to Engage in Effective Advocacy 

Finally, plaintiffs contend that ß323(b) is 

tional because its restrictions on soft-money co

to state and local party committees will prevent 

engaging in effective advocacy. As Judge Ko

noted, the political partiesí evidence regarding 

of BCRA on their revenues is ìspeculative and 

on any analysis.î 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 524. If th

campaign finance regulation discussed above p

thing, it is that political parties are extraordin

ble in adapting to new restrictions on their 

abilities. Moreover, the mere fact that ß323(b) 

the relative amount of money available to stat

parties to fund federal election activities is lar

sequential. The question is not whether ß323

the amount of funds available over previous 

cles, but whether it is ìso radical in effect as 

the sound of [the recipientís] voice below the 

tice.î Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 397. If i

or local parties can make such a showing, 

challenges remain available. 

We accordingly conclude that ß323(b), on 

closely drawn to match the important gov

interests of preventing corruption and the app

corruption. 
for, and Donations to, TaxExempt Organization

Section 323(d) prohibits national, state, and 

committees, and their agents or subsidiaries

licit[ing] any funds for, or mak[ing] or dire

donationsî to, any organization established un

of the Internal Revenue Code66 that makes ex

in connection with an election for federal offic

political organizations established under ß527 

a political committee, a State, district, or local 

of a political party, or the authorized campaign 

of a candidate for State or local office.î67 2 

ß441i(d) (Supp. 2003). The District Court struc

provision on its face. We reverse and upho

narrowly construing the sectionís ban on do

apply only to the donation of funds not raised 

ance with FECA. 

1. New FECA ß323(d)ís Regulation of Solicita

The Government defends ß323(d)ís ban on s

to tax-exempt organizations engaged in politi

as preventing circumvention of Title Iís limits o

tions of soft money to national, state, and 

óóóóóó 

66Section 501(c) organizations are groups generally e

taxation under the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U. S. C. ß

include ß501(c)(3) charitable and educational organizatio

ß501(c)(4) social welfare groups. 67Section 527 ìpolitical organizationsî are, unlike ß5

organized for the express purpose of engaging in par

activity. They include any ìparty, committee, associa

other organization (whether or not incorporated) organi

ated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly acc

butions or making expendituresî for the purpose of ìi

attempting to influence the selection, nomination, or a

any individual for Federal, State, or local public office.

ß527(e). 
history of Congress efforts at campaign fina

well demonstrates that ìcandidates, donors, a

test the limits of the current law.î Colorado II

at 457. Absent the solicitation provision, nati

and local party committees would have signifi

tives to mobilize their formidable fundraising a

including the peddling of access to federal of

into the service of like-minded tax-exempt or

that conduct activities benefiting their candida

the corruption and appearance of corruption at

the operation of those fundraising apparatu

follow. Donations made at the behest of party 

would almost certainly be regarded by par

donors, and federal officeholders alike as ben

party as well as its candidates. Yet, by so

óóóóóó 

68The record shows that many of the targeted tax-exe

tions engage in sophisticated and effective electioneering 

the purpose of influencing federal elections, including wag

campaigns promoting or attacking particular candidates 

ing large-scale voter registration and GOTV drives. 

during the final weeks of the 2000 presidential campaign

National Voter Fund registered more than 200,000 peopl

GOTV hotline, ran three newspaper print ads, and made 

mailings. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 348ñ349 (Henderson, J.). 

reports that the program turned out one million addit

American voters and increased turnout over 1996 am

groups by 22% in New York, 50% in Florida, and 140% 

Ibid. The effort, which cost $10 million, was funded prim

million contribution from an anonymous donor. Id., 

cross-examination of Donald P. Green, Yale University 1

see I Defs. Refiling Trs. on Pub. Record); 251 F. Supp. 2d

lar-Kotelly, J.) (same); id., at 851 (Leon, J.) (same); see a

(Henderson, J.) (stating that in 2000 the National Aborti

ductive Rights Action League (NARAL) spent $7.5 milli

lized 2.1 million pro-choice voters (citing declaration o

Gallagher, Exec. V. P., NARAL, 8, App. 271ñ272, ¶24)); 

2d, at 522 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same). 
avoid FECAs sourceandamount limitations, 

its disclosure restrictions. See 251 F. Supp. 

(Henderson, J.) (citing various declarations dem

that, prior to BCRA, most tax-exempt organi

not disclose the source or amount of contributi

521 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same). 

Experience under the current law demons

Congressí concerns about circumvention are 

hypothetical. Even without the added incenti

by Title I, national, state, and local parties alr

unregulated soft-money donations to tax-exemp

tions for the purpose of supporting federal ele

activity. See, e.g., 3 1998 Senate Report 4013 (ì

to direct contributions from the RNC to nonpr

the senior leadership of the RNC helped to rais

many of the coalitionís nonprofit organization

5983 (minority views) (ìTax-exempt ëissue 

groups and other conduits were systematica

circumvent federal campaign finance lawsî); 2

2d, at 517 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 848 (Leo

ties and candidates have also begun to take a

so-called ìpolitician 527s,î which are little mor

money fronts for the promotion of particular 

ficeholders and their interests. See id., at 5

Kotelly, J.) (ìëVirtually every member of Con

formal leadership position has his or her 

group. . . . In all, Public Citizen found 63 curren

of Congress who have their own 527síî (quo

Citizen Congress Watch, Congressional Le

Money Accounts Show Need for Campaign F

form Bills, Feb. 26, 2002, p. 6)); 251 F. Supp. 

850 (Leon, J.). These 527s have been quite su

raising substantial sums of soft money from 

interests, as well as from the national parties 

See id., at 519ñ520 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (findi
to the top 25 politician 527 groups and that th

the single largest contributor to politician 

(citing Public Citizen Congress Watch, supra, 

251 F. Supp. 2d, at 850 (Leon, J.) (same). Giv

tighter restrictions on the raising and spend

money, the incentives for parties to exploit suc

tions will only increase. 

Section 323(d)ís solicitation restriction is clo

to prevent political parties from using tax-exem

zations as soft-money surrogates. Though phr

absolute prohibition, the restriction does no

than subject contributions solicited by parties 

regulatory regime, leaving open substantial op

for solicitation and other expressive activity in 

these organizations. First, and most obvious

restricts solicitations only to those ß501

ìmak[ing] expenditures or disbursements in 

with an election for Federal office,î 2 

ß441i(d)(1) (Supp. 2003), and to ß527 organizat

by definition engage in partisan politica

ß441i(d)(2); 26 U. S. C. ß527(e). Second, part

free to solicit hard-money contributions to 

federal PAC, as well as to ß527 organizations t

qualify as federal PACs.69 Third, ß323(d) allow

endorse qualifying organizations in ways other 

óóóóóó 

69Notably, the FEC has interpreted ß323(d)(2) to perm

trict, and local party committees to solicit donations to ß

tions that are state-registered PACs, that support only 

candidates, and that do not make expenditures or disb

connection with federal elections. 11 CFR ß300.37(a)(3)(iv

agency determined that this interpretation of ìpolitical co

least with respect to state, district, and local committees

tent with BCRAís fundamental purpose of prohibiting so

being used in connection with federal elections. 67 Fe

(2002). 
respect to ß501(c) organizations that are proh

administering PACs, parties can solicit hard-m

tions to themselves for the express purpose of 

these organizations. See supra, at 72ñ73. Fina

ß323(a), ß323(d) in no way restricts solicitation

officers acting in their individual capacities. 2 

ß441i(d) (extending restrictions to solicitations 

tions made by ìan officer or agent acting on be

such party committeeî (emphasis added)). 

In challenging ß323(d)ís ban on solicitation

renew the argument they made with respect 

solicitation restrictions: that it cannot be sq

ß323(e), which allows federal candidates and o

to solicit limited donations of soft money to 

organizations that engage in federal election 

Compare 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i(d) with ß441i(e)

ß323(d)ís restrictions on solicitations are other

they are not rendered unconstitutional by the 

that Congress chose not to regulate the activ

other group as stringently as it might have. S

Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 210; see also Ka

Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 656ñ657 (1966). In any 

difference between the two provisions is fully e

the fact that national party officers, unlike fed

dates and officeholders, are able to solicit sof

behalf of nonprofit organizations in their ind

pacities. Section 323(e), which is designed to 

date the individual associational and speech 

candidates and officeholders in lending person

to nonprofit organizations, also places tigh

source, and amount restrictions on solicitati

money by federal candidates and officeholde

those limits, as well as the less rigorous stan

view, the greater allowances of ß323(e) do 

ß323(d)ís solicitation restriction facially invalid. 
Section 323(d) also prohibits national, state

party committees from making or directing 

tio[n]î to qualifying ß501(c) or ß527 organi

U. S. C. A. ß441i(d) (Supp. 2003). The Govern

defends the restriction as an anticircumventio

We agree insofar as it prohibits the donat

money. Absent such a restriction, state and 

committees could accomplish directly what the 

tation restrictions prevent them from doing 

namely, raising large sums of soft money 

through tax-exempt organizations engaging 

election activities. Because the party itself 

raising and collecting the funds, the potential 

tion would be that much greater. We will 

Congressí reasonable decision to close that loo

ticularly given a record demonstrating an alre

practice of partiesí making such donations. 

F. Supp. 2d, at 517ñ518 (Kollar-Kotelly); id., 

(Leon, J.). 

The prohibition does raise overbreadth conce

to restrict donations from a partyís federal ac

funds that have already been raised in comp

FECAís source, amount, and disclosure limita

ties have many valid reasons for giving to 

organizations, not the least of which is to asso

selves with certain causes and, in so doing, to d

the values espoused by the party. A compl

donations prevents parties from making even t

expression of supportî that a contribution 

Buckley, 424 U. S., at 21. At the same time, 

parties from donating funds already raised in 

with FECA does little to further Congressí g

venting corruption or the appearance of co

federal candidates and officeholders. 

The Government asserts that the restrictio
to gain control over a taxexempt groups s

Even if we accepted that rationale, it would at 

a dollar limit, not a flat ban. Moreover, any 

concerns over capture are diminished by the fa

restrictions set forth in ßß323(a) and (b) apply 

party committees, but to entities under their c

2 U. S. C. A. ß441i(a)(2) (extending prohibiti

tional party committees to ìany entity that is 

indirectly established, financed, maintained, o

by such a national committeeî (emphasi

ß441i(b)(1) (same for state and local party comm

These observations do not, however, require 

tain plaintiffsí facial challenge to ß323(d)ís d

striction. ìWhen the validity of an act of the 

drawn in question, and . . . a serious doubt of c

ality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that thi

first ascertain whether a construction of the 

fairly possible by which the question may b

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932); see 

Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 331 (1988); New York v. 

U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). Given our obligati

constitutional problems, we narrowly constru

ban to apply only to donations of funds not rai

pliance with FECA. This construction is cons

the concerns animating Title I, whose purpose 

the soft-money loophole. Though there is little 

history regarding BCRA generally, and almost 

ß323(d) specifically, the abuses identified in 

Senate report regarding campaign finance p

volve the use of nonprofit organizations as c

large soft-money donations. See, e.g., 3 1998 

port 4565 (ìThe evidence indicates that the 

loophole is fueling many of the campaign abu

gated by the Committee. . . . Soft money also s

funds parties used to make contributions to 
related activities); id., at 45684569 (descri

ìegregious exampl[e]î of misuse a $4.6 million 

nonfederal funds by the RNC to Americans f

form, which the organization spent on ìdirec

phone bank operations to counter anti-Republ

tisingî). We have found no evidence that Co

concerned about, much less that it intended 

donations of money already fully regulated 

Given Title Iís exclusive focus on abuses rela

money, we would expect that if Congress mean

restriction to have this dramatic and cons

questionable effect, it would say so explicitly

there is nothing that compels us to conclude th

intended ìdonationsî to include transfers of fed

and because of the constitutional infirmitie

interpretation would raise, we decline to read 

that way. Thus, political parties remain free 

direct donations of money to any tax-exempt o

that has otherwise been raised in compliance w

New FECA ß323(e)ís Restrictions on Federal 

and Officeholders 

New FECA ß323(e) regulates the raising an

of soft money by federal candidates and office

U. S. C. A. ß441i(e) (Supp. 2003). It prohib

candidates and officeholders from ìsolicit[ing], 

direct[ing], transfer[ing], or spend[ing]î any so

connection with federal elections. ß441i(e)(1)(

limits the ability of federal candidates and offic

solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend soft 

connection with state and local elections. ß441i

óóóóóó 

70Section 323(e)(1)(B) tightly constrains the ability of 

dates and officeholders to solicit or spend nonfederal mon

tion with state or local elections. Contributions cannot e
admits of a number of exceptions. For instan

candidates and officeholders are permitted 

speak, or be a featured guestî at a state or 

fundraising event. 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i(e)(3). Se

specifically provides that federal candidates 

holders may make solicitations of soft money 

organizations whose primary purpose is not to 

ìFederal election activit[ies]î as long as the 

does not specify how the funds will be spent, 2 

ß441i(e)(4)(A); to ß501(c) organizations who

purpose is to engage in ìFederal election act

long as the solicitations are limited to individu

amount solicited does not exceed $20,000 pe

individual, 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i(e)(4)(B); and 

organizations for the express purpose of carryi

activities, again so long as the amount solicit

exceed $20,000 per year per individual, 2 

ß441(e)(4)(B). 

No party seriously questions the constitu

ß323(e)ís general ban on donations of soft m

directly to federal candidates and officehol

agents, or entities established or controlled by t

on the narrowest reading of Buckley, a reg

stricting donations to a federal candidate, re

the ends to which those funds are ultimately pu

óóóóóó 

analogous hard-money contribution limits or come fro

sources. In effect, ß323(e)(1)(B) doubles the limits on wh

can contribute to or at the behest of federal candidates a

ers, while restricting the use of the additional funds to 

related to federal elections. If the federal candidate or 

also a candidate for state or local office, he or she may s

and spend an unlimited amount of nonfederal money in co

that election, subject only to state regulation and the req

such solicitation or expenditures refer only to the relevan

office. 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i(e)(2). 
Such donations have only marginal speech a

tional value, but at the same time pose a 

threat of corruption. By severing the most 

between the soft-money donor and the federal 

ß323(e)ís ban on donations of soft money is clo

to prevent the corruption or the appearance of 

of federal candidates and officeholders. 

Section 323(e)ís restrictions on solicitations a

as valid anticircumvention measures. Large 

donations at a candidateís or officeholderís behe

to all of the same corruption concerns posed b

tions made directly to the candidate or o

Though the candidate may not ultimately cont

funds are spent, the value of the donation to th

or officeholder is evident from the fact of the 

itself. Without some restriction on solicitatio

candidates and officeholders could easily avo

contribution limits by soliciting funds from la

and restricted sources to like-minded organi

gaging in federal election activities. As the rec

strates, even before the passage of BCRA, fed

dates and officeholders had already begun 

donations to state and local parties, as well as 

organizations, in order to help their own, as w

partyís, electoral cause. See Colorado II, 533 U

(quoting fundraising letter from a Congressm

ing to contributor that ìëyou are at the limit o

can directly contribute to my campaign,í bu

further help my campaign by assisting the C

publican Partyíî); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 479ñ4

Kotelly, J.) (surveying evidence of federal of

soliciting funds to state and local parties); 

(Leon, J.) (same); id., at 518 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) 

evidence of federal officeholdersí soliciting fun

profits for electioneering purposes); id., at 849 
solicitations to taxexempt organizations, 

increase with Title Iís restrictions on the r

spending of soft money by national, state, 

parties. 

Section 323(e) addresses these concerns whil

dating the individual speech and associationa

federal candidates and officeholders. Rather th

outright ban on solicitations to tax-exempt org

ß323(e)(4) permits limited solicitations of soft 

U. S. C. A. ß441i(e)(4). This allowance acc

individuals who have long served as active m

nonprofit organizations in both their official a

ual capacities. Similarly, ßß323(e)(1)(B) an

preserve the traditional fundraising role of fed

holders by providing limited opportunities 

candidates and officeholders to associate with 

and local colleagues through joint fundraising a

U. S. C. A. ßß441i(e)(1)(B), 441i(e)(3). Given t

exceptions, as well as the substantial threat of 

or its appearance posed by donations to or at th

federal candidates and officeholders, ß323(e) 

constitutional. We accordingly uphold ß323

plaintiffsí First Amendment challenge. 

New FECA ß323(f)ís Restrictions on State Cand

Officeholders 

The final provision of Title I is new FECA 

U. S. C. A. ß441i(f) (Supp. 2003). Section 323(

prohibits candidates for state or local office, 

local officeholders, from spending soft mon

ìpublic communicationsî as defined in ß301(

i.e., a communication that ìrefers to a clearly 

candidate for Federal office . . . and that p

supports a candidate for that office, or attacks o

candidate for that office.î 2 U. S. C. A. 
munications made in connection with an electi

or local office which refer only to the state or 

date or officeholder making the expenditure 

other candidate for the same state or l

ß441i(f)(2). 

Section 323(f) places no cap on the amoun

that state or local candidates can spend on a

Rather, like ßß323(a) and 323(b), it limits only 

and amount of contributions that state and l

dates can draw on to fund expenditures th

impact federal elections. And, by regulating 

butions used to fund ìpublic communication

focuses narrowly on those soft-money donation

greatest potential to corrupt or give rise to the 

of corruption of federal candidates and officehol

Plaintiffs advance two principal argumen

ß323(f). We have already rejected the first argu

the definition of ìpublic communicationsî in 

ß301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague and 

See supra, 62, n. 64. We add only that, pla

JUSTICE KENNEDYís contrary reading notwi

post, at 34, this provision does not prohibit a st

candidate from advertising that he has receive

officeholderís endorsement.71 

The second argument, that soft-money contr

state and local candidates for ìpublic commun

not corrupt or appear to corrupt federal can

nores both the record in this litigation and 

óóóóóó 

71See 148 Cong. Rec. S2143 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement 

gold) (Section 323(f) does not prohibit ìspending non-fed

run advertisements that mention that [state or local can

been endorsed by a Federal candidate or say that they i

position of a named Federal candidate, so long as those a

do not support, attack, promote or oppose the Federal can
valid contribution limits. The proliferation of 

ads has driven the soft-money explosion. P

sought out every possible way to fund and pro

ads with soft money: They have labored to 

under the FECís allocation regime; they have 

transferred soft money from national to state 

mittees to take advantage of favorable alloca

and they have transferred and solicited fun

exempt organizations for production of such ad

not upset Congressí eminently reasonable pred

with these other avenues no longer available

local candidates and officeholders will becom

conduits for the soft-money funding of sham i

tising. We therefore uphold ß323(f) agains

First Amendment challenge.72 

óóóóóó 

72 JUSTICE KENNEDY faults our ìunwillingnessî to confro

Iís entirety . . . look[s] very much like an incumbency pro

citing ß323(e), which provides officeholders and candidate

opportunities to solicit soft money than ßß323(a) and (d) 

officers. Post, at 23ñ24. But, ß323(e) applies to both offi

candidates and allows only minimally greater opportuniti

tion out of regard for the fact that candidates and officeh

party officers, can never step out of their official roles. Su

42 U. S. C. A. ß441i(e). Any concern that Congress might 

cally pass campaign-finance regulation for self-serving 

into account by the applicable level of scrutiny. Congre

concrete evidence that a particular type of financial 

corrupting or gives rise to the appearance of corruption 

chosen means of regulation are closely drawn to addres

apparent corruption. It has done so here. At bottom, JUS

has long disagreed with the basic holding of Buckley an

that less rigorous scrutinyówhich shows a measure of 

Congress in an area where it enjoys particular experti

assess limits on campaign contributions. Colorado II, 53

(THOMAS, J., dissenting) (joining JUSTICE THOMAS for th

that ìBuckley should be overrruledî (citation omitted))

souri, 528 U. S., at 405ñ410 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). 
Several plaintiffs contend that Title I exceed

Election Clause authority to ìmake or alterî 

erning federal elections, U. S. Const., Art. I, 

impairing the authority of the States to regulat

elections, violates constitutional principles of 

In examining congressional enactments fo

under the Tenth Amendment, this Court has 

attention on laws that commandeer the State

officials in carrying out federal regulatory sc

Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898 (1997); N

United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992). By contra

BCRA only regulates the conduct of private 

imposes no requirements whatsoever upon Sta

officials, and, because it does not expressly pre

legislation, it leaves the States free to enforce 

restrictions on the financing of state electoral 

It is true that Title I, as amended, prohibits 

raising tactics that would otherwise be perm

the laws of various States, and that it may the

an indirect effect on the financing of state ele

paigns. But these indirect effects do not ren

unconstitutional. It is not uncommon for fed

prohibit private conduct that is legal in some S

e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyer

tive, 532 U. S. 483 (2001). Indeed, such conflict i

in areas of law that involve both state and f

cerns. It is not in and of itself a marker of co

infirmity. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 

Of course, in maintaining the federal system 

by the Founders, this Court has done more 

prevent Congress from commandeering the S

have also policed the absolute boundaries of co

power under Article I. See United States v. M

U. S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 

(1995). But plaintiffs offer no reason to believ
ing BCRA. Congress has a fully legitimate inter

taining the integrity of federal officeholders and 

corruption of federal electoral processes through 

it has chosen. Indeed, our above analysis tu

finding that those interests are sufficient to s

Amendment scrutiny. Given that finding, we 

clude that those interests are insufficient to g

gressí exercise of its Elections Clause power. Se

supra, at 607 (respect owed to coordinate br

mands that we invalidate a congressional enac

upon a plain showing that Congress has exceede

tutional boundsî). 

C 

Finally, plaintiffs argue that Title I violate

protection component of the Due Process Cla

Fifth Amendment because it discriminates aga

cal parties in favor of special interest groups 

National Rifle Association (NRA), American Civ

Union (ACLU), and Sierra Club. As explain

BCRA imposes numerous restrictions on the 

abilities of political parties, of which the soft-

is only the most prominent. Interest group

remain free to raise soft money to fund voter r

GOTV activities, mailings, and broadcast 

(other than electioneering communications). 

clude that this disparate treatment does not 

Constitution. 

As an initial matter, we note that BCRA actu

political parties in many ways. Most obvio

committees are entitled to receive individual co

that substantially exceed FECAís limits on co

to nonparty political committees; individual

$25,000 to political party committees wherea

give a maximum of $5,000 to nonparty politic
contribute to candidates by making coordinat

tures, and those expenditures may greatly 

contribution limits that apply to other dono

U. S. C. A. ß441a(d) (Supp. 2003). 

More importantly, however, Congress is fully 

consider the real-world differences between po

ties and interest groups when crafting a syst

paign finance regulation. See National Right to 

U. S., at 210. Interest groups do not select slat

dates for elections. Interest groups do not dete

will serve on legislative committees, elect co

leadership, or organize legislative caucuses. 

parties have influence and power in the legis

vastly exceeds that of any interest group. As a 

hardly surprising that party affiliation is the p

by which voters identify candidates, or that par

have special access to and relationships with 

ficeholders. Congressí efforts at campaign fina

tion may account for these salient differenc

seriously, appellantsí equal protection argum

call into question not just Title I of BCRA, but m

pre-existing structure of FECA as well. W

reject those arguments. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of t

Court insofar as it upheld ßß323(e) and 323(f). 

the judgment of the District Court insofar as it 

ßß323(a), 323(b), and 323(d). 

IV 

Title II of BCRA, entitled ìNoncandidate 

Expenditures,î is divided into two subtitles: ìE

ing Communicationsî and ìIndependent and C

Expenditures.î We consider each challenged 

these subtitles in turn. 
The first section of Title II, ß201, comp

amends FECA ß304, which requires political 

to file detailed periodic financial reports with 

The amendment coins a new term, ìelectione

munication,î to replace the narrowing cons

FECAís disclosure provisions adopted by thi

Buckley. As discussed further below, that c

limited the coverage of FECAís disclosure requ

communications expressly advocating the 

defeat of particular candidates. By contrast

ìelectioneering communicationî is not so limi

defined to encompass any ìbroadcast, cable, 

communicationî that 

ì(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate 

office; 

ì(II) is made withinó 

ì(aa) 60 days before a general, special

election for the office sought by the candida

ì(bb) 30 days before a primary or prefe

tion, or a convention or caucus of a politica

has authority to nominate a candidate, fo

sought by the candidate; and 

ì(III) in the case of a communication which 

candidate other than President or Vice P

targeted to the relevant electorate.î 2 

ß434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003).73 

New FECA ß304(f)(3)(C) further provides that 

óóóóóó 

73BCRA also provides a ìbackupî definition of ìelecti

munication,î which would become effective if the prim

were ìheld to be constitutionally insufficient by final judic

support the regulation provided herein.î 2 U. S. C. A. ß4

We uphold all applications of the primary definition an

have no occasion to discuss the backup definition. 
received by 50,000 or more persons in the distr

the candidate seeks to represent. 2 

ß434(f)(3)(C). 

In addition to setting forth this definitio

amendments to FECA ß304 specify significant 

requirements for persons who fund electioneeri

nications. BCRAís use of this new term is no

limited to the disclosure context: A later section 

(BCRA ß203, which amends FECA ß316(b)(2

corporationsí and labor unionsí funding of ele

communications. Plaintiffs challenge the const

of the new term as it applies in both the disclos

expenditure contexts. 

The major premise of plaintiffsí challenge to 

of the term ìelectioneering communicationî is t

drew a constitutionally mandated line betwe

advocacy and so-called issue advocacy, and th

possess an inviolable First Amendment right t

the latter category of speech. Thus, plaintiff

Congress cannot constitutionally require discl

regulate expenditures for, ìelectioneering c

tionsî without making an exception for those ìc

tionsî that do not meet Buckleyís definition 

advocacy. 

That position misapprehends our prior decisi

express advocacy restriction was an endpoint o

interpretation, not a first principle of constitu

In Buckley we began by examining then-

ß608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which restrict

tures ìërelative to a clearly identified candidat

found that the phrase ìërelative toíî was im

vague. 424 U. S., at 40ñ42. We concluded that 

ness deficiencies could ìbe avoided only b

ß608(e)(1) as limited to communications th

explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat 
express advocacy, such as vote for, elect, s

ëdefeat,í [and] ëreject,íî id., at 44, n. 52, and thos

eventually gave rise to what is now known as 

wordsî requirement. 

We then considered FECAís disclosure pro

cluding 2 U. S. C. ß431(f) (1970 ed., Supp. 

defined ìëexpenditur[e]íî to include the use o

other assets ìëfor the purpose of . . . influencing

election. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 77. Finding th

biguity of this phraseî posed ìconstitutional 

ibid., we noted our ìobligation to construe the 

that can be done consistent with the legislatur

to avoid the shoals of vagueness,î id., at 77ñ7

omitted). ìTo insure that the reachî of the 

requirement was ìnot impermissibly broad, we 

ëexpenditureí for purposes of that section in the 

we construed the terms of ß608(e)óto reach 

used for communications that expressly ad

election or defeat of a clearly identified candida

80 (footnote omitted). 

Thus, a plain reading of Buckley makes cle

express advocacy limitation, in both the expen

the disclosure contexts, was the product of st

terpretation rather than a constitutional comm

narrowly reading the FECA provisions in Buck

óóóóóó 

74We then held that, so construed, the expenditure rest

advance a substantial government interest, because 

express advocacy did not pose a danger of real or appare

and the line between express advocacy and other election

ties was easily circumvented. Concluding that ß608(e)(1)

Amendment burden was not justified, we invalidated 

Buckley, 424 U. S., at 45ñ48. 75Our adoption of a narrowing construction was consis

vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. See Broadrick, 413 

Grayned, 408 U. S., at 108ñ114. 
suggested that a statute that was neither vagu

broad would be required to toe the same expre

line. Nor did we suggest as much in MCFL, 47

(1986), in which we addressed the scope of ano

expenditure limitation and confirmed the un

that Buckleyís express advocacy category was a 

statutory construction.

76 

In short, the concept of express advocacy an

comitant class of magic words were born of a

avoid constitutional infirmities. See NLRB 

Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 500 (1979) (cit

v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (

have long ìrigidly adheredî to the tenet ìëneve

late a rule of constitutional law broader than 

by the precise facts to which it is to be applie

States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 21 (1960) (citatio

for ì[t]he nature of judicial review constrains 

sider the case that is actually before us,î Jam

Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U. S. 529, 547 (19

mun, J., dissenting). Consistent with that pr

decisions in Buckley and MCFL were specific t

tory language before us; they in no way drew 

tional boundary that forever fixed the permissi

provisions regulating campaign-related speech. 

Nor are we persuaded, independent of our 

that the First Amendment erects a rigid barri

óóóóóó 

76The provision at issue in MCFLó2 U. S. C. ß441b (

quired corporations and unions to use separate segregated 

than general treasury moneys, on expenditures made ì

withíî a federal election. MCFL, 479 U. S., at 241. We note

had limited the statutory term ìëexpenditureíî to words of 

cacy ìin order to avoid problems of overbreadth.î 479 U. S

held that ìa similar constructionî must apply to the expendi

before us in MCFL and that the reach of 2 U. S. C. ß441b 

constrained to express advocacy. 479 U. S., at 249 (emphasi
notion cannot be squared with our longstandi

tion that the presence or absence of magic wo

meaningfully distinguish electioneering spee

true issue ad. See Buckley, supra, at 45. I

unmistakable lesson from the record in this li

all three judges on the District Court agreed, is 

leyís magic-words requirement is functionally 

less. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 303ñ304 (Henderson

534 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875ñ879 (Leon

only can advertisers easily evade the line by esc

use of magic words, but they would seldom ch

such words even if permitted.77 And although 

ing advertisements do not urge the viewer to 

against a candidate in so many words, they 

clearly intended to influence the election.78 

óóóóóó 

77As one major-party political consultant testified, ìëit 

visable to use such clumsy words as ìvote forî or ìvote ag

F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.) (quoting declaration 

Bailey, founder, Bailey, Deardourff & Assoc., 1ñ2, App. 

explained: ì ëAll advertising professionals understand t

effective advertising leads the viewer to his or her ow

without forcing it down their throat.í î 251 F. Supp

(Henderson, J.). Other political professionals and acad

that the use of magic words has become an anachronism

531 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Raymond 

Pres., Strother/Duffy/Strother ¶4, 9 Defs. Exhs., Tab 40); 

Pp. Vol., Tab 7); App. 1334ñ1335 (Krasno & Sorauf Exper

also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.); id., at 532 (K

J.); id., at 875ñ76 (Leon, J.). 

78 One striking example is an ad that a group called 

Reformî sponsored during the 1996 Montana congress

which Bill Yellowtail was a candidate. The ad stated: 

ìWho is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values bu

at his wife. And Yellowtailís response? He only slapped 

nose was not broken.í He talks law and order . . . bu

convicted felon. And though he talks about protecting chi

tail failed to make his own child support paymentsóthen 
tive effort to combat real or apparent corru

Congress enacted BCRA to correct the flaws 

the existing system. 

Finally we observe that new FECA ß304(f)(3)

of ìelectioneering communicationî raises no

vagueness concerns that drove our analysis 

The term ìelectioneering communicationî appl

to a broadcast (2) clearly identifying a candid

eral office, (3) aired within a specific time per

targeted to an identified audience of at least 5

ers or listeners. These components are both ea

stood and objectively determinable. See Grayn

Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108ñ114 (1972). Thus, 

tutional objection that persuaded the Court in 

limit FECAís reach to express advocacy is sim

site here. 

BCRA ß201ís Disclosure Requirements 

Having rejected the notion that the First A

requires Congress to treat so-called issue advo

ently from express advocacy, we turn to plain

concerns about the use of the term ìelectione

municationî in amended FECA ß304ís disclo

sions. Under those provisions, whenever a

makes disbursements totaling more than $10

any calendar year for the direct costs of pro

airing electioneering communications, he m

statement with the FEC identifying the per

tions and all persons sharing the costs of th

ments. 2 U. S. C. A. ßß434(f)(2)(A), (B), and 

óóóóóó 

child support enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail. Tell h

family values.î 5 1998 Senate Report 6305 (minority view

The notion that this advertisement was designed purely 

issue of family values strains credulity. 
or labor unions segregated account,

 or by a 

vidual who has collected contributions from 

statement must identify all persons who 

$1,000 or more to the account or the individual 

calendar year. ßß434(f)(2)(E), (F). The stateme

filed within 24 hours of each ìdisclosure dat

defined to include the first date and all subseq

on which a personís aggregate undisclosed e

electioneering communications exceed $10,00

calendar year. ßß434(f)(1), (2) and (4). Another 

further provides that the execution of a contrac

disbursement is itself treated as a disburseme

poses of FECAís disclosure requirements. ß434

In addition to the failed argument that BCR

ments to FECA ß304 improperly extend to bo

and issue advocacy, plaintiffs challenge amen

ß304ís disclosure requirements as unnecessa

quiring disclosure of the names of persons who 

$1,000 or more to the individual or group tha

communication, and (2) mandating disclosure o

contracts for communications that have not yet 

District Court rejected the former submission b

the latter, finding invalid new FECA ß304(f

governs executory contracts. Relying on BC

ability provision,80 the court held that invalida

óóóóóó 

79As discussed below, infra, at 97ñ103, BCRA ß203 bar

and labor unions from funding electioneering commun

money from their general treasuries, instead requiring t

lish a ìseparate segregated fundî for such expenditures. 

ß441b(b)(2). 80Section 401 of BCRA provides: 

ìIf any provision of this Act or amendment made by th

the application of a provision or amendment to any pers

stance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of 

amendments made by this Act, and the application of t
of BCRAs amendments to FECA ß304 uncon

251 F. Supp. 2d, at 242 (per curiam). 

We agree with the District Court that the 

state interests that prompted the Buckley Cour

FECAís disclosure requirementsóproviding th

with information, deterring actual corruption a

any appearance thereof, and gathering the dat

to enforce more substantive electioneering re

apply in full to BCRA.81 Accordingly, Buckley 

ports application of FECA ß304ís disclosure re

to the entire range of ìelectioneering communic

the authors of the District Courtís per curia

concluded after reviewing evidence concerning 

purported ìissue adsî to influence federal electi

ìThe factual record demonstrates that th

the present law not only permits corporati

bor unions to fund broadcast advertisemen

to influence federal elections, but permits 

so while concealing their identities from 

BCRAís disclosure provisions require thes

tions to reveal their identities so that th

able to identify the source of the fund

broadcast advertisements influencing ce

tions. Plaintiffsí disdain for BCRAís disc

óóóóóó 

and amendment to any person or circumstance, shall not 

the holding.î 2 U. S. C. A. ß454 note. 81The disclosure requirements that BCRA ß201 added 

are actually somewhat less intrusive than the compar

ments that have long applied to persons making indepen

tures. For example, the previous version of ß304 req

making independent expenditures to identify donors wh

more than $200. 2 U. S. C. ß434(c)(2)(C) (2000 ed.). Th

requirement in the amendments applies only to donors 

more. 2 U. S. C. A. ßß434(f)(2)(E), (F) (Supp. 2003). 
lenge BCRAs restrictions on electioneerin

cations on the premise that they should b

to spend corporate and labor union gener

funds in the sixty days before the federal e

broadcast advertisements, which refer to f

didates, because speech needs to be ëunin

bust, and wide-open.í McConnell Br. at 

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. 

(1964)). Curiously, Plaintiffs want to pr

ability to run these advertisements while 

hind dubious and misleading names like: 

tion-Americans Working for Real Changeí 

business organizations opposed to organ

ëCitizens for Better Medicareí (funded by t

ceutical industry), ëRepublicans for Clean A

by brothers Charles and Sam Wyly). Find

51, 52. Given these tactics, Plaintiffs never 

rily answer the question of how ëuninhibi

and wide-opení speech can occur when or

hide themselves from the scrutiny of the vo

McConnell Br. at 44. Plaintiffsí argument 

down BCRAís disclosure provisions does n

the precious First Amendment values tha

argue are trampled by BCRA, but ignore

peting First Amendment interests of indi

zens seeking to make informed choices in t

marketplace.î 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 237. 

The District Court was also correct that B

closes a facial attack on the new provision in 

requires disclosure of the names of persons c

$1,000 or more to segregated funds or indiv

spend more than $10,000 in a calendar year 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 4

Buckley recognized that compelled disclosures m

an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to 

support of a particular cause. Nevertheles

rejected the contention that FECAís disclosu

ments could not constitutionally be applied to 

ties and independent candidates because th

mentís interest in obtaining information from s

was minimal and the danger of infringing t

substantial. In Buckley, unlike NAACP, we 

evidence that any party had been exposed t

reprisals or physical threats as a result of the 

disclosures. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 69ñ70. W

edged that such a case might arise in the futur

and addressed the standard of proof that w

apply: 

ìWe recognize that unduly strict requireme

could impose a heavy burden, but it does 

that a blanket exemption for minor parti

sary. Minor parties must be allowed suff

bility in the proof of injury to assure a fair 

tion of their claim. The evidence offered 

óóóóóó 

82 NAACP v. Alabama arose out of a judgment holding t

contempt for refusing to produce the names and address

bers and agents in Alabama. The NAACP ìmade an u

showing that on past occasions revelation of the identit

and-file members ha[d] exposed these members to econ

loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and oth

tions of public hostility.î 357 U. S., at 462. We thought it 

the compelled disclosure would ìaffect adverselyî the N

membersí ability ìto pursue their collective effort to foster 

they admittedly have the right to advocate.î Id., at 462

these circumstances, we concluded that Alabamaís inte

mining whether the NAACP was doing business in t

plainly insufficient to justify its production order. Id., at 4
closure of a partys contributors names w

them to threats, harassment, or reprisals 

Government officials or private parties.î Id

A few years later we used that standard to reso

partyís challenge to the constitutionality of t

Ohioís disclosure requirements. We held tha

Amendment prohibits States from compelling 

that would subject identified persons to ìthrea

ment, and reprisals,î and that the District Cou

had established a ìreasonable probabilityî of suc

Brown v. Socialist Workers í74 Campaign Com

459 U. S. 87, 100 (1982). 

In this litigation the District Court applie

evidentiary standard and foundóconsistent 

conclusion in Buckley, and in contrast to that 

that the evidence did not establish the requis

óóóóóó 

83We stated: 

ìThe District Court properly applied the Buckley test 

this case. The District Court found ësubstantial evid

governmental and private hostility toward and harassmen

Workers Party (SWP)] members and supporters.í Appelle

proof of specific incidents of private and government ho

the SWP and its members within the four years preced

These incidents, many of which occurred in Ohio and 

States, included threatening phone calls and hate mail, t

SWP literature, the destruction of SWP membersí pr

harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of sho

office. There was also evidence that in the 12-month peri

22 SWP members, including 4 in Ohio, were fired because 

membership. Although appellants contend that two of th

were not politically motivated, the evidence amply suppor

Courtís conclusion that ëprivate hostility and harassment 

members make it difficult for them to maintain emplo

District Court also found a past history of Government h

the SWP.î Brown v. Socialist Workers í74 Campaign Com

U. S. 87, 98ñ99 (1982) (paragraph break omitted). 
members. The District Court noted that some 

expressed such concerns, but it found a ìlack 

evidence about the basis for these concerns.î 2

2d, at 247 (per curiam). We agree, but we not

our refusal to recognize a blanket exception 

parties in Buckley, our rejection of plaintiffsí 

lenge to the requirement to disclose individual 

not foreclose possible future challenges to parti

cations of that requirement. 

We also are unpersuaded by plaintiffsí challe

FECA ß304(f)(5), which requires disclosure o

contracts for electioneering communications: 

ìContracts to disburse 

ìFor purposes of this subsection, a pers

treated as having made a disbursement if 

has executed a contract to make the disbur

U. S. C. A. ß434(f)(5) (Supp. 2003). 

In our view, this provision serves an importa

the District Court did not advance. BCRAís a

to FECA ß304 mandate disclosure only if a

person makes disbursements totaling more th

in any calendar year to pay for electioneering c

tions. Plaintiffs do not take issue with the use 

amount, rather than the number or dates of 

identify the time when a person paying for ele

communications must make disclosures to the 

do they question the need to make the content

disclosure statements available to curious vo

vance of elections. Given the relatively short t

in which electioneering communications are 

interest in assuring that disclosures are mad

and in time to provide relevant information t

unquestionably significant. Yet fixing the d

filing disclosure statements based on the dat
nificant loophole if advertisers were not requ

close executory contracts. In the absence of th

ment, political supporters could avoid 

disclosures concerning ads slated to run durin

week of a campaign simply by making a preele

payment of less than $10,000, with the balan

after the election. Indeed, if the advertiser wa

that balance until the next calendar year then

the balance did not itself exceed $10,000, the 

might avoid the disclosure requirements comple

The record contains little evidence identifyin

that might flow from the enforcement of ß304

vanceî disclosure requirement. The District C

lated that disclosing information about cont

have not been performed, and may never be 

may lead to confusion and an unclear record 

the public will evaluate the forces operating in 

cal marketplace.î 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 241 (p

Without evidence relating to the frequency of n

ance of executed contracts, such speculation 

weigh the public interest in ensuring full disclo

an election actually takes place. It is no doub

ß304(f)(5) will sometimes require the filing o

statements in advance of the actual broadcast o

tisement.84 But the same would be true in the 

an advance disclosure requirement, if a televis

insisted on advance payment for all of the ads c

contract. Thus, the possibility that amended 

óóóóóó 

84We cannot judge the likelihood that this will occur, 

contains little if any description of the contractual pr

commonly govern payments for electioneering communi

does the record contain any evidence relating to JUSTI

speculation, post, at 39ñ40, that advance disclosure may 

an advertiser. 
is as much a function of the use of disburseme

than the date of an ad) to trigger the disclosu

ment as it is a function of ß304(f)(5)ís treatmen

tory contracts. 

As the District Court observed, amended F

disclosure requirements are constitutional be

ìëd[o] not prevent anyone from speaking.íî Ib

Brief for FEC in Opposition in No. 02ñ582 

p. 112). Moreover, the required disclosures ì

have to reveal the specific content of the adve

yet they would perform an important function 

ing the public about various candidatesí suppo

election day.íî 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 241 (quotin

FEC in Opposition, supra, at 112) (emphasis i

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Di

insofar as it upheld the disclosure requir

amended FECA ß304 and rejected the facial at

provisions relating to donors of $1,000 or mo

verse that judgment insofar as it invalida

ß304(f)(5). 

BCRA ß202ís Treatment of ìCoordinated Comm

as Contributions 

Section 202 of BCRA amends FECA ß315

provide that disbursements for ìelectioneering 

cation[s]î that are coordinated with a candida

will be treated as contributions to, and expen

that candidate or party. 2 U. S. C. A. ß44

(Supp. 2003).85 The amendment clarifies the s

óóóóóó 

85New FECA ß315(a)(7)(C) reads as follows: 

ìif ó 

ì(i) any person makes, or contracts to make, any disb

any electioneering communication (within the meani

434(f)(3) of this title); and 
generally that expenditures made by any pers

eration, consultation, or concert, with, or at the 

suggestion of î a candidate or party will consti

butions. 2 U. S. C. ßß441a(a)(7)(B)(i)ñ(ii). In 

construed the statutory term ìexpenditureî to 

spending for express advocacy. 424 U. S., at 40

52 (addressing 18 U. S. C. ß608(e)(1) (1970 ed.

which placed a $1,000 cap on expenditures ìër

clearly identified candidateíî). BCRA ß202 p

possible claim that ß315(a)(7)(B) is similarly li

that coordinated expenditures for communic

avoid express advocacy cannot be counted a

tions. As we explained above, see supra, at 83

leyís narrow interpretation of the term ìexpen

not a constitutional limitation on Congress

regulate federal elections. Accordingly, there i

why Congress may not treat coordinated dis

for electioneering communications in the sa

treats all other coordinated expenditures. We 

judgment of the District Court insofar as it 

plaintiffs had advanced ìno basis for finding 

unconstitutional.î 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 250. 

BCRA ß203ís Prohibition of Corporate a

Disbursements for Electioneering Communicatio

Since our decision in Buckley, Congressí po

hibit corporations and unions from using fun

óóóóóó 

ì(ii) such disbursement is coordinated with a can

authorized committee of such candidate, a Federal, S

political party or committee thereof, or an agent or offici

candidate, party, or committee; 

such disbursement or contracting shall be treated as a c

the candidate supported by the electioneering communi

candidateís party and as an expenditure by that cand

candidateís party. . . .î 2 U. S. C. A. ß441a(a)(7)(C). 
the election or defeat of candidates in federal el

been firmly embedded in our law. The ability 

administer separate segregated funds authorize

ß316, 2 U. S. C. A. ß441b (main ed. and Supp. 

provided corporations and unions with a cons

sufficient opportunity to engage in express advo

has been this Courtís unanimous view,86 an

challenged in this litigation. 

Section 203 of BCRA amends FECA ß316(b)(2

this rule, which previously applied only to ex

cacy, to all ìelectioneering communicationsî cov

definition of that term in amended FECA ß30

cussed above. 2 U. S. C. A. ß441b(b)(2) (Sup

Thus, under BCRA, corporations and unions m

their general treasury funds to finance ele

communications, but they remain free to or

óóóóóó 

86We have explained: 

ìThe statutory purpose of ß441b . . . is to prohibit co

expenditures by corporations or labor organizations in co

federal elections. 2 U. S. C. ß441b(a). The section, how

some participation of unions and corporations in the fed

process by allowing them to establish and pay the a

expenses of ëseparate segregated fund[s],í which may b

political purposes.í 2 U. S. C. ß441b(b)(2)(C). The Act 

operations of such segregated funds, however, by makin

for a corporation to solicit contributions to a fund establis

persons other than its ëstockholders and their families and 

or administrative personnel and their families.í 

ß441b(b)(4)(A).î National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 201ñ

87The amendment is straightforward. Prior to BCRA, 

made it ìunlawful . . . for any corporation whatever, 

organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in con

certain federal elections. 2 U. S. C. ß441b(a) (2000 ed.). B

FECA ß316(b)(2)ís definition of the term ìcontribution or 

to include ìany applicable electioneering communication.î 

ß441b(b)(2) (Supp. 2003). 
Because corporations can still fund electioneeri

nications with PAC money, it is ìsimply wron

the provision as a ìcomplete banî on expres

than a regulation. Beaumont, 539 U. S., at __

op., at 15). As we explained in Beaumont: 

ìThe PAC option allows corporate politica

tion without the temptation to use corpora

political influence, quite possibly at odds w

timents of some shareholders or members, 

the government regulate campaign activi

registration and disclosure, see [2 U. S. C.] 

without jeopardizing the associational righ

cacy organizationsí members.î Id., at ___ 

16) (citation omitted). 

See also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com

U. S. 652, 658 (1990). 

Rather than arguing that the prohibition on 

general treasury funds is a complete ban that 

a prior restraint, plaintiffs instead challenge th

regulation on the grounds that it is both ove

underinclusive. Our consideration of plaintiff

is informed by our earlier conclusion that the 

between express advocacy and so-called issue 

not constitutionally compelled. In that ligh

examine the degree to which BCRA bur

Amendment expression and evaluate whether 

ling governmental interest justifies that burd

657. The latter questionówhether the state 

compellingóis easily answered by our prio

regarding campaign finance regulation, which 

respect for the ëlegislative judgment that the s

acteristics of the corporate structure require p

careful regulation.íî Beaumont, supra, at ___ 

8) (quoting National Right to Work, 459 U. S., a
corrosive and distorting effects of immense agg

wealth that are accumulated with the help of th

form and that have little or no correlation to 

support for the corporationís political ideas.î Au

at 660; see Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., a

tional Right to Work, supra, at 209ñ210. Moreo

cases have recognized that certain restriction

rate electoral involvement permissibly hed

ìëcircumvention of [valid] contribution limits.íî 

supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7) (quoting Colorado I

at 456, and n. 18.) 

In light of our precedents, plaintiffs do not c

the Government has a compelling interest in 

advertisements that expressly advocate the 

defeat of a candidate for federal office. Nor d

tend that the speech involved in so-called issue 

any more core political speech than are words 

advocacy. After all, ìthe constitutional guaran

fullest and most urgent application precisely to 

of campaigns for political office,î Monitor Patrio

401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971), and ì[a]dvocacy of the 

defeat of candidates for federal office is no less 

protection under the First Amendment than the 

of political policy generally or advocacy of the 

defeat of legislation.î Buckley, 424 U. S., at 4

plaintiffs argue that the justifications that 

support the regulation of express advocacy do n

significant quantities of speech encompassed by 

tion of electioneering communications. 

This argument fails to the extent that the 

broadcast during the 30- and 60-day periods 

federal primary and general elections are the 

equivalent of express advocacy. The justificat

regulation of express advocacy apply equally t

during those periods if the ads are intended t
percentage of issue ads that clearly identified 

and were aired during those relatively brief 

time spans but had no electioneering purpose 

of dispute between the parties and among th

the District Court. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, a

(Henderson, J.); id., at 583ñ587 (Kollar-Kotelly

796ñ798 (Leon, J.). Nevertheless, the vast maj

clearly had such a purpose. Annenberg Rep

App. 1330ñ1348 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert R

F. Supp. 2d, at 573ñ578 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); i

827 (Leon, J.). Moreover, whatever the precise 

may have been in the past, in the future corpo

unions may finance genuine issue ads during 

frames by simply avoiding any specific referenc

candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for t

a segregated fund.88 

We are therefore not persuaded that plai

óóóóóó 

88As JUSTICE KENNEDY emphasizes in dissent, post, 

assume that the interests that justify the regulation 

speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine is

premise that apparently underlies JUSTICE KENNEDYís 

mission is a conclusion that the two categories of speech 

less entitled to the same constitutional protection. If th

JUSTICE KENNEDY must take issue with the basic holdi

and, indeed, with our recognition in First Nat. Bank of Bos

435 U. S. 765 (1978), that unusually important interests 

regulation of corporationsí campaign-related speech. In Be

Buckley, among other cases, for the proposition that ì[p

integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, an

the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a 

the wise conduct of the governmentí are interests of the h

tance.î 435 U. S., at 788ñ789 (citations and footnote omitte

tion of the individual citizenís confidence in government,î 

equally important.î Id., at 789. BCRAís fidelity to those im

it apart from the statute in Bellottióand, for that matter, 

statute banning the distribution of anonymous campa

struck down in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commín, 514 U. S
ß316(b)(2) is overbroad. See Broadrick v. Okla

U. S. 601, 613 (1973). Even if we assumed that 

inhibit some constitutionally protected corp

union speech, that assumption would not ìjus

iting all enforcementî of the law unless its ap

protected speech is substantial, ìnot only in a

sense, but also relative to the scope of the la

legitimate applications.î Virginia v. Hicks, 53

___ (2003) (slip op., at 5ñ6). Far from establ

BCRAís application to pure issue ads is substan

in an absolute sense or relative to its applicat

tion-related advertising, the record strongly su

contrary conclusion. 

Plaintiffs also argue that FECA ß316(b)(2)ís 

fund requirement for electioneering commun

underinclusive because it does not apply to ad

the print media or on the Internet. 2 

ß434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. 2003). The records develo

litigation and by the Senate Committee ade

plain the reasons for this legislative choice. 

found that corporations and unions used sof

finance a virtual torrent of televised election-

during the periods immediately preceding fe

tions, and that remedial legislation was neede

that flow of money. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 569ñ5

Kotelly, J.); id., at 799 (Leon, J.); 3 1998 Sen

4465, 4474ñ4481; 5 id., at 7521ñ7525. As 

Buckley, ìreform may take one step at a time, 

itself to the phase of the problem which seems 

to the legislative mind.î 424 U. S., at 105 (inte

tion marks and citations omitted). One might 

argue that the electioneering communication d

underinclusive because it leaves advertising 

advance of an election entirely unregulated. 

amply justifies Congressí line drawing. 
requirement is underinclusive, some plainti

that it unconstitutionally discriminates in fav

companies. FECA ß304(f)(3)(B)(i) excludes fro

nition of electioneering communications any ìc

tion appearing in a news story, commentary, 

distributed through the facilities of any b

station, unless such facilities are owned or co

any political party, political committee, or can

U. S. C. A. ß434(f)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003). Plain

this provision gives free rein to media compa

gage in speech without resort to PAC mone

304(f)(3)(B)(i)ís effect, however, is much nar

plaintiffs suggest. The provision excepts news 

commentary only; it does not afford carte blanc

companies generally to ignore FECAís provis

statuteís narrow exception is wholly consistent 

Amendment principles. ìA valid distinction 

between corporations that are part of the med

and other corporations that are not involved in 

business of imparting news to the public.î A

U. S., at 668. Numerous federal statutes have 

distinction to ensure that the law ìdoes not 

prevent the institutional press from reportin

publishing editorials about, newsworthy even

(citations omitted); see, e.g., 2 U. S. C. ß431(

empting news stories, commentaries, and edit

FECAís definition of ìexpenditureî); 15 U. S. 

1804 (providing a limited antitrust exemption 

pers); 47 U. S. C. ß315(a) (excepting newsc

interviews, and news documentaries from the r

that broadcasters provide equal time to can

public office).89 

óóóóóó 

89 In a different but somewhat related argument, one s
that it upheld the constitutionality of FECA ß3

the extent that it invalidated any part of ß31

reverse the judgment. 

BCRA ß204ís Application to Nonprofit Corporat

Section 204 of BCRA, which adds FECA 

applies the prohibition on the use of gener

funds to pay for electioneering communications 

profit corporations.90 Prior to the enactment 

óóóóóó 

contends that political campaigns and issue advocacy 

activities, and that BCRA therefore interferes with speaker

the Freedom of the Press Clause. U. S. Const., Amdt. 1. 

District Courtís conclusion that this contention lacks merit. 90The statutory scheme is somewhat complex. In its p

ing with ìRules Relating to Electioneering Communica

ß203(c)(2) (adding FECA ß316(c)(2)) makes a blanket 

designated nonprofit organizations, which reads as follows

ìException 

ìNotwithstanding paragraph (1), the term ëapplicable 

communicationí does not include a communication by a se

organization or a political organization (as defined in sec

of Title 26) made under section 434(f)(2)(E) or (F) of th

communication is paid for exclusively by funds provide

individuals who are United States citizens or nationa

admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 

Title 8). For purposes of the preceding sentence, the t

directly by individualsí does not include funds the source 

entity described in subsection (a) of this section.î 

ß441b(c)(2) (Supp. 2003). 

BCRA ß204, however, amends FECA ß316(c) to excl

communicationsî from that exception. New FECA ß31

that the ß316(c)(2) exception ìshall not apply in the case 

communication that is made by an organization 

ß316(b)(2). 2 U. S. C. A. ¶441b(c)(6)(A). Subparagraph (B

the term ìtargeted communicationî for the purpose of th

including all electioneering communications. The pa

judges on the District Court have assumed that am

ß316(c)(6) completely canceled the exemption for nonprofi
tions, to pay for their express advocacy from 

funds rather than from their general treasu

recent decision in Federal Election Commín v. 

539 U. S. ___ (2003), confirmed that the requir

valid except insofar as it applied to a sub-

corporations described as ìMCFL organizatio

fined by our decision in MCFL, 479 U. S. 238 (1

constitutional objection to applying FECAís 

fund requirement to so-called MCFL organizat

sarily applies with equal force to FECA ß316(c)(

Our decision in MCFL related to a carefu

category of entities. We identified three feat

organization at issue in that case that were ce

holding: 

ìFirst, it was formed for the express purp

moting political ideas, and cannot engage 

activities. If political fundraising events ar

denominated as requests for contributions 

used for political purposes, including dire

tures, these events cannot be considered b

tivities. This ensures that political resou

political support. Second, it has no shar

other persons affiliated so as to have a clai

sets or earnings. This ensures that person

óóóóóó 

set forth in ß316(c)(2). 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 804 (Leon, J.) 

completely cancels out the exemption for all nonprofit 

provided by Section 203î). 91 ì[A] unanimous Court in National Right to Work did 

regulatory burdens on PACs, including restrictions on t

solicit funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional as an adv

tionís sole avenue for making political contributions. See 

201ñ202. There is no reason to think the burden on adv

tions is any greater today, or to reach a different con

Beaumont, 539 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16). 
tive for disassociating with it if they disag

political activity. Third, MCFL was not 

by a business corporation or a labor union, 

policy not to accept contributions from su

This prevents such corporations from serv

duits for the type of direct spending tha

threat to the political marketplace.î Id., at 

That FECA ß316(c)(6) does not, on its fa

MCFL organizations from its prohibition is not 

reason to invalidate the entire section. If a 

limiting construction ìhas been or could be pla

challenged statuteî to avoid constitutional co

should embrace it. Broadrick, 413 U. S., at 61

424 U. S., at 44. Because our decision in the 

was on the books for many years before BCRA w

we presume that the legislators who drafted ß31

fully aware that the provision could not valid

MCFL-type entities. See Bowen v. Massachuset

879, 896 (1988); Cannon v. University of Chicag

677, 696ñ697 (1979). Indeed, the Governmen

cedes that ß316(c)(6) does not apply to MCFL or

As so construed, the provision is plainly valid. 

494 U. S., at 661ñ665 (holding that a segregat

quirement that did not explicitly carve out an M

tion could apply to a nonprofit corporation th

qualify for MCFL status). 

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Co

ing ß316(c)(6) as so limited is affirmed. 

BCRA ß212ís Reporting Requirement for $1,000 E

Section 212 of BCRA amends FECA ß304 to 

disclosure requirement, FECA ß304(g), which 

persons making independent expenditures of 

more during the 20-day period immediately pr

election. Like FECA ß304(f)(5), discussed 
bursement as the functional equivalent of a p

the goods or services covered by the contract.

lenging this provision, plaintiffs renew the ar

rejected in the context of ß304(f)(5): that th

constitutional right to postpone any disclo

after the performance of the services purchas

expenditure. 

The District Court held that the challeng

ß304(g) was not ripe because the FEC has iss

tions ìprovid[ing] Plaintiffs with the exact re

seekîóthat is, specifically declining to ìrequire 

of independent express advocacy expenditur

their ëpubli[c] disseminat[ion].íî 251 F. Supp. 

and n. 85 (per curiam) (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 404

(codified at 11 CFR ßß109.10(c), (d) (2003))). 

certain that a regulation purporting to limit t

circumstances in which a speech-burdening sta

enforced can render nonjusticiable a facial chal

(concededly broader) underlying statute. Never

need not separately address the constitut

ß304(g), for our ruling as to BCRA ß201, see su

óóóóóó 

92New FECA ß304(g) provides: 

ìTime for reporting certain expenditures 

ì(1) Expenditures aggregating $1,000 

ì(A) Initial report 

ìA person (including a political committee) that makes 

make independent expenditures aggregating $1,000 or m

20th day, but more than 24 hours, before the date of an 

file a report describing the expenditures within 24 hours. 

ì(B) Additional reports 

ìAfter a person files a report under subparagraph (A

shall file an additional report within 24 hours after e

person makes or contracts to make independent expen

gating an additional $1,000 with respect to the same elec

which the initial report relates.î 2 U. S. C. A. ß434 (Supp. 
BCRA ß213ís Requirement that Political Par

Between Coordinated and Independent Expend

Nominating a Candidate 

Section 213 of BCRA amends FECA ß315(d)(4

certain limits on party spending during the p

tion, preelection period.93 At first blush, t

ß315(d)(4)(A) appears to require political partie

straightforward choice between using limited 

expenditures or unlimited independent expe

óóóóóó 

93New FECA ß315(d)(4) reads as follows: 

ìIndependent versus coordinated expenditures by party 

ì(A) In general 

ìOn or after the date on which a political party nomin

date, no committee of the political party may makeó 

ì(i) any coordinated expenditure under this subsection w

the candidate during the election cycle at any time after 

independent expenditure (as defined in section 431(17) 

with respect to the candidate during the election cycle; or 

ì(ii) any independent expenditure (as defined in secti

this title) with respect to the candidate during the electio

time after it makes any coordinated expenditure under t

with respect to the candidate during the election cycle. 

ì(B) Application 

ìFor purposes of this paragraph, all political committe

and maintained by a national political party (includin

sional campaign committees) and all political committe

and maintained by a State political party (including an

committee of a State committee) shall be considered t

political committee. 

ì(C) Transfers 

ìA committee of a political party that makes coordin

tures under this subsection with respect to a candida

during an election cycle, transfer any funds to, assign 

make coordinated expenditures under this subsection to

transfer of funds from, a committee of the political party t

or intends to make an independent expenditure with r

candidate.î 2 U. S. C. A. ß441a(d)(4) (Supp. 2003). 
Court concluded that the provision placed an 

tional burden on the partiesí right to make 

independent expenditures. 251 F. Supp. 2

(Henderson, J.); id., at 650ñ651 (Kollar-Kotelly

805ñ808 (Leon, J.). In the end, we agree with t

sion but believe it important to identify certai

ties in the text of ß315(d)(4) that affect our ana

issue. 

Section 315 of FECA sets forth various lim

contributions and expenditures by individua

parties, and other groups. Section 315(a)(

ìcontributionsî by parties to $5,000 per can

U. S. C. A. ß441a(a)(2). Because ß315(a)(7) trea

tures that are coordinated with a candidate a

tions to that candidate, 2 U. S. C. A. ß441(a

2003), the $5,000 limit also operates as a cap 

coordinated expenditures. Section 315(d), ho

vides that, ì[n]otwithstanding any other provi

with respect to limitations on expenditures or 

on contributions,î political parties may mak

turesî in support of their candidates under 

keyed to the voting-age population of the candi

State or, in the case of a candidate for Pre

voting-age population of the United States. 2 

ßß441a(d)(1)ñ(3) (main ed. and Supp. 2003).94 

óóóóóó 

94After exempting political parties from the general con

expenditure limitations of the statute, 2 U. S. C. A. ß441

ß315(d) imposes the following substitute limitations on pa

ì(2) The national committee of a political party may 

expenditure in connection with the general election cam

candidate for President of the United States who is affilia

party which exceeds an amount equal to 2 cents mult

voting age population of the United States (as certified 

tion (e) of this section). Any expenditure under this para

in addition to any expenditure by a national committee 
$33,780 to $67,650 for House of Representat

and from $67,650 to $1.6 million for Senate r

rado II, 533 U. S., at 439, n. 3. We held in Colo

parties have a constitutional right to make 

independent expenditures, and we invalidated 

the extent that it restricted such expenditures. 

of that decision, ß315(d) applies only to coor

penditures, replacing the $5,000 cap on contri

out in ß315(a)(2) with the more generous limit

scribed by ßß315(d)(1)ñ(3). We sustained th

application in Colorado II, supra. 

Section 213 of BCRA amends ß315(d) by ad

paragraph (4). New ß315(d)(4)(A) provides th

party nominates a candidate for federal offi

choose between two spending options. Unde

option, a party that ìmakes any independent e

(as defined in section [301(17)])î is thereby b

making ìany coordinated expenditure under t

tion.î 2 U. S. C. A. ß441a(d)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2

phrase ìthis subsectionî is a reference to subse

óóóóóó 

party serving as the principal campaign committee of a 

office of President of the United States. 

ì(3) The national committee of a political party, or a St

of a political party, including any subordinate committ

committee, may not make any expenditure in connec

general election campaign of a candidate for Federal off

who is affiliated with such party which exceedsó 

ì(A) in the case of a candidate for election to the office 

of Representative from a State which is entitled to only 

tative, the greater ofó 

ì(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of 

certified under subsection (e) of this section); or 

ì(ii) $20,000; and 

ì(B) in the case of a candidate for election to the officer o

tive, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner in any other St

2 U. S. C. ßß441a(d)(2)ñ(3). 
expenditure is not a complete prohibition of 

nated expenditure: Although the party cannot t

tage of the increased spending limits under ß

(3), it still may make up to $5,000 in coordinat

tures under ß315(a)(2). As the difference betw

and $1.6 million demonstrates, however, that 

cant cost to impose on the exercise of a co

right. 

The second option is the converse of the fir

vides that a party that makes any coordinated e

ìunder this subsectionî (i.e., one that exceeds t

$5,000 limit) cannot make ìany independent e

(as defined in section [301(17)]) with respect to 

date.î 2 U. S. C. A. ß441a(d)(4)(A)(ii). Secti

defines ìëindependent expenditureíî to mea

coordinated expenditure ìexpressly advocating 

or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.î 2 

ß431(17)(A).95 Therefore, as was true of the f

the partyís choice is not as stark as it initial

The consequence of the larger coordinated exp

óóóóóó 

95As amended by BCRA, ß301(17) provides: 

ìIndependent expenditure 

ìThe term ëindependent expenditureí means an expe

personó 

ì(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a cle

candidate; and 

ì(B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with or 

or suggestion of such candidate, the candidateís autho

committee, or their agents, or a political party committee 

2 U. S. C. A. ß431(17) (Supp. 2003). 

The version of the definition prior to its amendment b

included the phrase ìexpressly advocating the election 

clearly identified candidate.î 2 U. S. C. ß431(17) (200

definition had been adopted in 1976, presumably to reflec

ing construction that the Court adopted in Buckley. Fe

Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 475. 
ture, but the forfeiture of the right to make i

expenditures for express advocacy. As we expla

discussion of the provisions relating to ele

communications, supra, at 83ñ87, express advo

sents only a tiny fraction of the political comm

made for the purpose of electing or defeating 

during a campaign. Regardless of which opt

choose, they remain free to make independen

tures for the vast majority of campaign ads tha

use of a few magic words. 

In sum, the coverage of new FECA ß315(d)

more limited than it initially appears. A party 

to spend more than $5,000 in coordination wit

nee is forced to forgo only the narrow catego

pendent expenditures that make use of magic 

while the category of burdened speech is relat

it plainly is entitled to First Amendment prot

Buckley, 424 U. S., at 44ñ45, 48. Under ß3

political partyís exercise of its constitutionall

right to engage in ìcore First Amendment expr

at 48, results in the loss of a valuable statut

that has been available to parties for many 

survive constitutional scrutiny, a provision tha

consequences must be supported by a meaning

mental interest. 

The interest in requiring political parties t

use of magic words is not such an interest. 

Buckley that a $1,000 cap on expenditures th

only to express advocacy could not be justified 

of avoiding circumvention of contribution lim

venting corruption and the appearance of cor

cause its restrictions could easily be evaded: 

persons and groups eschew expenditures that 

terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearl

candidate, they are free to spend as much as th
same is true in this litigation. Any claim that a 

on independent express advocacy serves a stro

ment interest is belied by the overwhelming ev

the line between express advocacy and othe

election-influencing expression is, for Congres

functionally meaningless. Indeed, Congress e

new ìelectioneering communication[s]î prov

cisely because it recognized that the express ad

was woefully inadequate at capturing comm

designed to influence candidate elections. In l

recognition, we are hard pressed to conclud

meaningful purpose is served by ß315(d)(4)ís b

partyís right to engage independently in expres

The Government argues that ß315(d)(4) nev

constitutional because it is not an outright ban 

independent expenditures, but rather offers 

voluntary choice between a constitutional r

statutory benefit. Whatever merit that argum

have in the abstract, it fails to accoun

ß315(d)(4)(B), which provides: 

ìFor purposes of this paragraph, all politi

tees established and maintained by a nat

cal party (including all congressional cam

mittees) and all political committees estab

maintained by a State political party (inc

subordinate committee of a State committ

considered to be a single political comm

U. S. C. A. ß441a(d)(4)(B) (Supp. 2003). 

Given that provision, it simply is not the cas

party committee can make a voluntary and i

choice between exercising its right to engage in 

ent advocacy and taking advantage of the incre

on coordinated spending under ßß315(d)(1)ñ(3

the decision resides solely in the hands of the 
and national parties to its chosen spending op

one thing to say that Congress may require a 

mittee to give up its right to make independe

tures if it believes that it can accomplish more 

dinated expenditures. It is quite another thin

to say that the RNC must limit itself to $5,00

nated expenditures in support of its presidenti

if any state or local committee first makes an i

expenditure for an ad that uses magic words

result undermines any claim that new ß31

withstand constitutional scrutiny simply becau

as a voluntary choice rather than an outright 

on independent expenditures. 

The portion of the judgment of the District C

dating BCRA ß213 is affirmed. 

BCRA ß214ís Changes in FECAís Provision

Coordinated Expenditures 

Ever since our decision in Buckley, it has b

that expenditures by a noncandidate that are 

by or coordinated with the candidate and his 

may be treated as indirect contributions subjec

source and amount limitations. 424 U. S., at 

óóóóóó 

96Although the District Court and all the parties to this 

dorse the interpretation set forth in the text, it is not clear 

graph (B) should be read so broadly: The reference to ìa St

ìthe Statesî suggests that Congress meant to distinguish 

mittees associated with the party for each State (which wou

together by State, with each grouping treated as a single 

purposes of the choice) and committees associated with a 

(which would likewise be grouped together and treated 

political committee). We need not resolve the interpretiv

ever, because even under the more limited reading a local 

tee would be able to tie the hands of a state committee 

committees in the same State. 
tures made by any person in cooperation, cons

concert, with, or at the request or suggestion 

date, his authorized political committees, or th

shall be considered to be a contribution to such 

2 U. S. C. A. ß441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003). Sec

of BCRA creates a new FECA ß315(a)(7)(B)(ii) t

the same rule to expenditures coordinated w

tional, State, or local committee of a political 

U. S. C. A. ß441a(a)(7)(B)(ii).97 Sections 214

direct the FEC to repeal its current regulatio

promulgate new regulations dealing with ì

communicationsî paid for by persons other t

dates or their parties. Subsection (c) provid

óóóóóó 

97The italicized portion of the following partial quota

ß315(a)(7) was added by ß214 of BCRA: 

ìFor purposes of this subsectionó 

ì(A) contributions to a named candidate made to any 

mittee authorized by such candidate to accept contrib

behalf shall be considered to be contributions made to suc

ì(B)(i) expenditures made by any person in cooperation

or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a 

authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be 

be a contribution to such candidate; 

ì(ii) expenditures made by any person (other than a 

candidateís authorized committee) in cooperation, con

concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a national, 

committee of a political party, shall be considered to be 

made to such party committee . . . .î 2 U. S. C. A. ß441

2003). 

98Pre-BCRA FEC regulations defined coordinated ex

include expenditures made ì[a]t the request or suggestio

date or party; communications in which a candidate or pa

control or decision-making authority over the content, tim

mode, intended audience, volume of distribution, or 

placementî; and communications produced ì[a]fter subst

sion or negotiationî with a party or candidate, ìthe resu

collaboration or agreement.î 11 CFR ß100.23(c)(2) (2001). 
collaboration to establish coordination. 2 

ß441a(a) note. 

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Congress may 

same coordination rules to parties as to candid

argue instead that new FECA ß315(a)(7)(B)

implementing regulations are overbroad and 

tionally vague because they permit a finding o

tion even in the absence of an agreement. Plai

out that political supporters may be subjected 

liability if they exceed the contribution limits w

ditures that ultimately are deemed coordinat

they stress the importance of a clear definition 

nationî and argue any definition that does no

the presence of an agreement cannot provide t

guidanceî that the First Amendment demands

Chamber of Commerce of the United States et 

lant in No. 02ñ1756, p. 48. As plaintiffs rea

that argument reaches beyond BCRA, calling 

tion FECAís pre-existing provisions governin

tures coordinated with candidates. 

We are not persuaded that the presence of an 

marks the dividing line between expenditure

coordinatedóand therefore may be regulated 

contributionsóand expenditures that truly are 

ent. We repeatedly have struck down limitat

penditures ìmade totally independently of the 

and his campaign,î Buckley, 424 U. S., at 

ground that such limitations ìimpose far 

straints on the freedom of speech and associati

limits on contributions and coordinated expen

at 44, while ìfail[ing] to serve any substantial 

tal interest in stemming the reality or app

corruption in the electoral process,î id., at 47ñ4

Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 613ñ614 (striking dow

expenditure made by party officials prior to no
nominees). We explained in Buckley: 

ìUnlike contributions, . . . independent ex

may well provide little assistance to the 

campaign and indeed may prove counter

The absence of prearrangement and coor

an expenditure with the candidate or his 

only undermines the value of the expendi

candidate, but also alleviates the danger 

ditures will be given as a quid pro quo fo

commitments from the candidate.î 424 U. 

Thus, the rationale for affording special pr

wholly independent expenditures has nothing 

the absence of an agreement and everything to 

functional consequences of different types of ex

Independent expenditures ìare poor sources of l

a spender because they might be duplicative 

productive from a candidateís point of view.î 

533 U. S., at 446. By contrast, expenditures m

ìwink or nodî often will be ìas useful to the c

cash.î Id., at 442, 446. For that reason, Co

always treated expenditures made ìat the 

suggestion ofî a candidate as coordinated.99 2 

ß441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003). A supporter e

comply with a candidateís request or suggesti

óóóóóó 

99Contrary to plaintiffsí contention, the statutory frame

significantly different at the time of our decision in B

relevant provision, 18 U. S. C. ß608(e)(1), treated as co

expenditures ìauthorized or requested by the candidate

added.) And the legislative history, on which we relied fo

differentiating individual expenditures that are contribu

those treated as independent expenditures,î described as 

an expenditure made by a supporter ì ëcompletely on his 

at the request or suggestion of the candidate or his agen[

at 46ñ47, n. 53 (quoting S. Rep. No. 93ñ689, p. 18 (1974)). 
would be virtually indistinguishable from 

contributio[n],íî Colorado II, supra, at 444ñ4

fore, we cannot agree with the submission that 

ß315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is overbroad because it permit

of coordination or cooperation notwithstandi

sence of a pre-existing agreement. 

Nor are we persuaded that the absence of an 

requirement renders ß315(a)(7)(B)(ii) uncons

vague. An agreement has never been required 

a finding of coordination with a candid

ß315(a)(7)(B)(i), which refers to expenditures 

cooperation, consultation, or concer[t] with, 

request or suggestion ofî a candidate. Con

precisely the same language in new ß315(a)

address expenditures coordinated with partie

longstanding definition of coordination ìdel

reach in words of common understanding.î 

Johnson, 390 U. S. 611, 616 (1968). Not surprisi

fore, the relevant statutory language has surviv

constitutional challenge for almost three decades

that fact does not insulate the definition from 

tional scrutiny, it does undermine plaintiffsí cla

language of ß315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is intolerably vag

tiffs do not present any evidence that the def

chilled political speech, whether between cand

their supporters or by the supporters to the gen

See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 52

874 (1997) (noting risk that vague statutes ma

tected expression). And, although plaintiffs spe

the FEC could engage in intrusive and polit

vated investigations into alleged coordination, 

even attempt to explain why an agreement r

would solve that problem. Moreover, the on

plaintiffs have adduced regarding the enforcem

coordination provision during its 27-year histo
different sides of the political aisle. Such meag

does not support the claim that ß315(a)(7)(B)(i

ter ëarbitrary and discriminatory application.í

supra, at 41, n. 48 (quoting Grayned v. City o

408 U. S., at 108ñ109). We conclude that FE

tion of coordination gives ìfair notice to those t

is directed,î American Communications Assn. v. 

U. S. 382, 412 (1950), and is not unconstitutional

Finally, portions of plaintiffsí challenge to B

focus on the regulations the FEC has promulg

ß214(c). 11 CFR ß109.21 (2003). As the Dis

explained, issues concerning the regulations 

propriately raised in this facial challenge to 

must be pursued in a separate proceeding. Thu

with the District Court that plaintiffsí ch

ßß214(b) and (c) is not ripe to the extent that 

constitutional infirmities are found in the im

regulations rather than the statute itself. 

The portions of the District Court judgmen

plaintiffsí challenges to BCRA ß214 are affirmed

V 

Many years ago we observed that ì[t]o say th

is without power to pass appropriate legislat

guard . . . an election from the improper use o

influence the result is to deny to the nation 

particular the power of self protection.î Bu

United States, 290 U. S., at 545. We abide by t

tion in considering Congressí most recent effor

the ill effects of aggregated wealth on our politi

We are under no illusion that BCRA will be th

gressional statement on the matter. Money, 

will always find an outlet. What problems wil

how Congress will respond, are concerns for a

In the main we uphold BCRAís two principal, c
of electioneering communications. Accordingly

in part and reverse in part the District Court

with respect to Titles I and II. 

It is 
y p, p

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 

_________________ 

Nos. 02ñ1674, 02ñ1675, 02ñ1676, 02ñ1702, 02ñ1727, 02ñ1

02ñ1740, 02ñ1747, 02ñ1753, 02ñ1755, AND 02ñ1

_________________ 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1674 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1675 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET AL., APP

02ñ1676 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

JOHN MCCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1702 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, E

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1727 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1733 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPE

02ñ1734 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 
, , 

02ñ1740 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1747 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ET AL., APP

02ñ1753 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CON

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1755 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED 

ET AL., APPELLANTS 

02ñ1756 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

[December 10, 2003] 

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opi

Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV.* 

This opinion addresses issues involving mi

Title III and IV provisions of the Bipartisan 

óóóóóó 

* JUSTICE OíCONNOR, JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE KENNEDY

SOUTER join this opinion in its entirety. JUSTICE STEV

GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join this opinion, except w

BCRA ß305. JUSTICE THOMAS joins this opinion with res

ßß304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b). 
discussed below, we affirm the judgment of t

Court with respect to these provisions. 

BCRA ß305 

BCRA ß305 amends the federal Communica

1934 (Communications Act) ß315(b), 48 Sta

amended, 86 Stat. 4, which requires that, 45 da

primary or 60 days before a general election

stations must sell a qualified candidate the ì

charge of the station for the same class and 

time for the same period,î 47 U. S. C. ß315(b

305ís amendment, in turn, denies a candidate 

of that lowest unit charge unless the candidat

written certification to the broadcast statio

candidate (and any authorized committee of the 

shall not make any direct reference to anothe

for the same office,î or the candidate, in the m

scribed in BCRA ß305(a)(3), clearly identifies 

the end of the broadcast and states that she 

the broadcast. 47 U. S. C. A. ßß315(b)(2)(A), 

2003). 

The McConnell plaintiffs challenge ß305. 

that Senator McConnellís testimony that he p

advertisements critical of his opponents in the 

that he had run them in the past is sufficient 

standing. We think not. 

Article III of the Constitution limits the ìjud

to the resolution of ìcasesî and ìcontroversies

ment of the ìbedrockî case-or-controversy requ

that plaintiffs must establish that they have 

sue. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997)

occasions, we have reiterated the three require

constitute the ìëirreducible constitutional mi

standing. Vermont Agency of Natural Resource

States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 771 (2000
concrete, distinct and palpable, and actua

nent.î Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

plaintiff must establish ìa causal connection b

injury and the conduct complained ofóthe injur

ëfairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the 

and not . . . th[e] result [of] some third party no

court.íî Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S

561 (1992) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. We

Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41ñ42 (1976)). Third

must show the ìësubstantial likelihoodí that th

relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.î Ste

at 771. 

As noted above, ß305 amended the Communi

requirements with respect to the lowest unit 

broadcasting time. But this price is not availab

fied candidates until 45 days before a primary 

60 days before a general election. Becau

McConnellís current term does not expire unti

earliest day he could be affected by ß305 is 45 

the Republican primary election in 2008. T

injury in fact is too remote temporally to satisfy 

standing. See Whitmore, supra, at 158 (ìA 

injury must be certainly impending to constitu

factî (internal quotation marks and citations om

also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 102 (198

tiff seeking injunctive relief must show he is ìëi

in danger of sustaining some direct injuryí as [

the challenged conduct). Because we hold that 

nell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge ß305

the District Courtís dismissal of the challeng

ß305. 

BCRA ß307 

BCRA ß307, which amends ß315(a)(1) of t
added, 90 Stat. 487, increases and indexes f

certain FECA contribution limits. The Adam

plaintiffs challenge ß307 in this Court. Both 

tend that they have standing to sue. Again, we 

The Adams plaintiffs, a group consisting 

organizations representing voters, and candid

two injuries, and argue each is legally cogn

established by case law outlawing electoral dis

based on economic status . . . and upholding t

an equally meaningful vote . . . .î Brief for 

Adams et al. in No. 02ñ1740, p. 31. 

First, they assert that the increases in h

limits enacted by ß307 deprive them of an equ

participate in the election process based on the

status. But, to satisfy our standing requiremen

tiffís alleged injury must be an invasion of a co

particularized legally protected interest. Luja

560. We have noted that ì[a]lthough standing 

depends on the merits of the plaintiffís cont

particular conduct is illegal, . . . it often turns 

ture and source of the claim asserted.î Wart

422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975) (internal quotation 

citations omitted). We have never recognized a 

comparable to the broad and diffuse injury asse

Adams plaintiffs. Their reliance on this Cou

rights cases is misplaced. They rely on case

nondiscriminatory access to the ballot and a si

vote for each voter. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish

709 (1974) (invalidating a statute requiring a b

fee fixed at a percentage of the salary for the o

because it unconstitutionally burdened the rig

Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 66

(1966) (invalidating a state poll tax because i

denied the right to vote). 

None of these plaintiffs claims a denial of e
allege a curtailment of the scope of their part

the electoral process. But we have noted that 

ëfree tradeí does not necessarily require that a

ticipate in the political marketplace do so w

equal resources.î Federal Election Commín v. 

setts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 257 

also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 48 (1976) (p

(rejecting the asserted government interest of 

the relative ability of individuals and groups t

the outcome of electionsî to justify the burden 

presented by expenditure limits). This claim o

the Adams plaintiffs is, therefore, not to a lega

ble right. 

Second, the Adams plaintiffs-candidates co

they have suffered a competitive injury. Their 

ìdo not wish to solicit or accept large campaig

tions as permitted by BCRAî because ì[t]hey b

contributions create the appearance of unequal 

influence.î Adams Complaint ¶53. As a result

that BCRA ß307 puts them at a ìfundraising 

tage,î making it more difficult for them to 

elections. See id., ¶56. 

The second claimed injury is based on the sa

as the first: BCRA ß307ís increased hard m

allow plaintiffs-candidatesí opponents to r

money, and, consequently, the plaintiffs-candi

ity to compete or participate in the electoral 

diminished. But they cannot show that th

injury is ìfairly traceableî to BCRA ß307. 

supra, at 562. Their alleged inability to com

not from the operation of ß307, but from the

sonal ìwishî not to solicit or accept large con

i.e., their personal choice. Accordingly, the Ad

tiffs fail here to allege an injury in fact tha

traceableî to BCRA. 
the Freedom of Press Clause of the First A

They contend that their political campaigns 

interest advocacy involve traditional press ac

that, therefore, they are protected by the Fi

mentís guarantee of the freedom of press. The 

tiffs argue that the contribution limits impose

ß307, together with the individual and poli

committee contribution limitations of FECA ß3

unconstitutional editorial control upon cand

their campaigns. The Paul plaintiffs argue t

posing economic burdens upon them, but no

institutional media, see 2 U. S. C. ß431(9)(B)(i) 

ìany news story, commentary, or editorial 

through the facilities of any broadcasting statio

per, magazine, or other periodical publication, 

facilities are owned or controlled by any poli

political committee, or candidateî from the d

expenditure), BCRA ß307 and FECA ß315 

freedom of the press. 

The Paul plaintiffs cannot show the ìësubsta

hoodí that the requested relief will remedy [th

injury in fact,î Stevens, 529 U. S., at 771. Th

Paul plaintiffs seek is for this Court to strik

contribution limits, removing the alleged disp

rial controls and economic burdens imposed on 

ß307 merely increased and indexed for inflat

FECA contribution limits. This Court has n

adjudicate a challenge to the FECA limits i

because challenges to the constitutionality of F

sions are subject to direct review before an app

banc court of appeals, as provided in 2 U. S. C. 

in the three-judge District Court convened p

BCRA ß403(a). Although the Court has jur

hear a challenge to ß307, if the Court were to s

the increases and indexes established by BCR
cause both the limitations imposed by FEC

exemption for news media would remain unc

ruling in the Paul plaintiffsí favor, therefore, 

redress their alleged injury, and they accor

standing. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better En

523 U. S. 83, 105ñ110 (1998). 

For the reasons above, we affirm the Dist

dismissal of the Adams and Paul plaintiffsí ch

BCRA ß307 for lack of standing. 

BCRA ßß304, 316, and 319 

BCRA ßß304 and 316, which amend FECA 

BCRA ß319, which adds FECA ß315A, collecti

as the ìmillionaire provisions,î provide for 

staggered increases in otherwise applicable co

to-candidate limits if the candidateís opponen

triggering amount of his personal funds.1 The 

also eliminate the coordinated expenditure lim

tain circumstances.2 

In their challenge to the millionaire prov

Adams plaintiffs allege the same injuries that t

with regard to BCRA ß307. For the reason

above, they fail to allege a cognizable injury th

traceableî to BCRA. Additionally, as the Dis

noted, ìnone of the Adams plaintiffs is a cand

election affected by the millionaire provisionsó

which an opponent chooses to spend the trigger

óóóóóó 

1To qualify for increased candidate contribution limits

tion personal funds amount,î which depends on expen

candidate and her self-financed opponent, must exceed 

amount.î 2 U. S. C. A. ßß441a(i)(1)(D), 441añ1(a)(2)(A) (Su

2 If the ìopposition personal funds amountî is at least 

ìthreshold amountî in a Senate race, or exceeds $350,000 

Representatives race, the coordinated party expenditure 

apply. ßß441a(i)(1)(C)(iii), 441añ1(a)(1)(C). 
y p

F. Supp. 2d 176, 431 (DC 2003) (case below) (

J., concurring in judgment in part and dissent

(quoting Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560). We affirm 

Courtís dismissal of the Adams plaintiffsí chall

millionaire provisions for lack of standing. 

BCRA ß311 

FECA ß318 requires that certain comm

ìauthorizedî by a candidate or his political 

clearly identify the candidate or committee o

authorized, identify the payor and announce 

authorization. 2 U. S. C. A. ß441d (main ed. 

2003). BCRA ß311 makes several amendmen

ß318, among them the expansion of this id

regime to include disbursements for ìelectione

municationsî as defined in BCRA ß201. 

The McConnell and Chamber of Commerc

challenge BCRA ß311 by simply noting that 

with all of the ìelectioneering communicationsî 

of BCRA, is unconstitutional. We disagree. 

BCRA ß311ís inclusion of electioneering comm

in the FECA ß318 disclosure regime bears 

relationship to the important governmental 

ìshed[ding] the light of publicityî on campaign 

Buckley, 424 U. S., at 81. Assuming as we 

FECA ß318 is valid to begin with, and that FE

valid as amended by BCRA ß311ís amendments 

the inclusion of electioneering communication

lenged inclusion of electioneering communicat

itself unconstitutional. We affirm the Distr

decision upholding ß311ís expansion of FECA 

include disclosure of disbursements for ele

communications. 
BCRA ß318, which adds FECA ß324, prohibi

als ì17 years old or youngerî from making cont

candidates and contributions or donations 

parties. 2 U. S. C. A. ß441k (Supp. 2003). The 

and Echols plaintiffs challenge the provision; 

that ß318 violates the First Amendment rights 

We agree. 

Minors enjoy the protection of the First A

See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 

School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 511ñ513 (1969). 

on the amount that an individual may cont

candidate or political committee impinge on th

freedoms of expression and association. Se

supra, at 20ñ22. When the Government burden

to contribute, we apply heightened scrutiny. S

25ñ26 (joint opinion of STEVENS and OíCONNO

contribution limit involving even ësignificant in

with associational rights is nevertheless valid i

the ëlesser demandí of being ëclosely drawní 

ësufficiently important interest.íî (quoting Fede

Commín v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. ___, ___ (2003) 

15)). We ask whether there is a ìsufficiently 

interestî and whether the statute is ìclosely 

avoid unnecessary abridgment of First Amend

doms. Ante, at 25ñ26; Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25

ernment asserts that the provision protects a

ruption by conduit; that is, donations by paren

their minor children to circumvent contribu

applicable to the parents. But the Governm

scant evidence of this form of evasion.3 Perha

óóóóóó 

3Although some examples were presented to the Distr

F. Supp. 2d 176, 588ñ590 (2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), non

to this Court. 
of such activities by ß320 of FECA, which pr

person from ìmak[ing] a contribution in the n

other personî or ìknowingly accept[ing] a c

made by one person in the name of another,î 

ß441f. Absent a more convincing case of the c

this interest is simply too attenuated for ß3

stand heightened scrutiny. See Nixon v. Shrin

Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 391 (2000) (

tum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy 

judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will 

down with the novelty and plausibility of the j

raisedî). 

Even assuming, arguendo, the Government a

important interest, the provision is overinclu

States have adopted a variety of more t

proachesóe.g., counting contributions by min

the total permitted for a parent or family unit, 

lower cap on contributions by minors, and 

contributions by very young children. Witho

whether any of these alternatives is sufficient

we hold that the provision here sweeps too br

therefore affirm the District Courtís decisio

down ß318 as unconstitutional. 

BCRA ß403(b) 

The National Right to Life plaintiffs argu

District Courtís grant of intervention to the 

defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

24(a) and BCRA ß403(b), must be reversed b

intervenor-defendants lack Article III standing

however, that the Federal Election Commission 

standing, and therefore we need not address th

of the intervenor-defendants, whose position h

tical to the FECís. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of 

524 U. S. 417, 431ñ432, n. 19 (1998); Bowshe
U. S. 54, 6869, n. 21 (1986) (reserving the q

another day). 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Dist

judgment finding the plaintiffsí challenges to B

ß307, and the millionaire provisions nonjustici

ing down as unconstitutional BCRA ß318, and 

BCRA ß311. The judgment of the District Cour
Nos. 02ñ1674, 02ñ1675, 02ñ1676, 02ñ1702, 02ñ1727, 02ñ1

02ñ1740, 02ñ1747, 02ñ1753, 02ñ1755, AND 02ñ1

_________________ 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1674 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1675 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET AL., APP

02ñ1676 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

JOHN MCCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1702 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, E

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1727 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1733 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPE

02ñ1734 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, ET AL., APP

02ñ1740 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 
, 

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1747 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ET AL., APP

02ñ1753 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CON

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1755 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED 

ET AL., APPELLANTS 

02ñ1756 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

[December 10, 2003] 

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the 

respect to BCRA Title V.* 

We consider here the constitutionality of ß

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 200

amending the Communications Act of 1934. T

requires broadcasters to keep publicly availabl

politically related broadcasting requests. 47 

ß315(e) (Supp. 2003). The McConnell plai

include the National Association of Broadcas

that ß504 imposes onerous administrative bur

óóóóóó 

*JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE OíCONNOR, JUSTICE SOUTER

GINSBURG join this opinion in its entirety. 
First Amendment. For similar reasons, the th

on the District Court found BCRA ß504 uncon

on its face. 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 (DC 20

riam) (case below). We disagree, and we r

determination. 

I 

BCRA ß504ís key requirements are the follow

(1) A ìcandidate requestî requirement calls 

casters to keep records of broadcast requests ì

on behalf ofî any ìlegally qualified candidate 

office.î 47 U. S. C. A. ß315(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 2003

(2) An ìelection message requestî requireme

broadcasters to keep records of requests (made 

to broadcast ìmessage[s]î that refer either to 

qualified candidateî or to ìany election to Fed

ßß315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii). 

(3) An ìissue requestî requirement calls for 

ers to keep records of requests (made by anyon

cast ìmessage[s]î related to a ìnational legisl

of public importance,î ß315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or ot

lating to a ìpolitical matter of national im

ß315(e)(1)(B). 

We shall consider each provision in turn. 

II 

BCRA ß504ís ìcandidate requestî require

virtually identical to those contained in a regu

the Federal Communications Commission (FC

gated as early as 1938 and which with slight m

the FCC has maintained in effect ever since

ß73.1943 (2002); compare 3 Fed. Reg. 1692 (193

ß36a4); 13 Fed. Reg. 7486 (1948) (47 CFR 
ß3.590(d)); 19 Fed. Reg. 5949 (1954); 23 Fed. 

(1958); 28 Fed. Reg. 13593 (1963) (47 CFR 

43 Fed. Reg. 32795 (1978) (47 CFR ß73.1

Fed. Reg. 210 (1992) (47 CFR ß73.1943). Se

Brief in Opposition to Motion of Appellee Nat

ciation of Broadcasters for Summary Affirma

02ñ1676, pp. 9ñ10 (hereinafter Brief Opposing 

Affirmance). 

In its current form the FCC regulation requ

cast licensees to ìkeepî a publicly available 

requests for broadcast time made by or on 

candidate for public office,î along with a notati

whether the request was granted, and (if gran

tory that includes ìclasses of time,î ìrates ch

when the ìspots actually aired.î 47 CFR 

(2002); ß76.1701(a) (same for cable systems). T

lation-imposed requirements mirror the sta

quirements imposed by BCRA ß504 with minor 

which no one here challenges. Compare 47 CF

with 47 U. S. C. A. ß315(e)(2) (see Appendix, inf

The McConnell plaintiffs argue that these re

are ìintolerabl[y]î ìburdensome and invasive.

Appellants/Cross-Appellees Senator Mitch 

et al. in No. 02ñ1674 et al., p. 74 (hereinafte

McConnell Plaintiffs). But we do not see how 

be so. The FCC has consistently estimated th

didate requestî regulation imposes upon each 

additional administrative burden of six to sev

work per year. See 66 Fed. Reg. 37468 (20

18090; 63 Fed. Reg. 26593 (1998); id., at 103

Reg. 18492 (1992); see also 66 Fed. Reg. 29

(total annual burden of one hour per cable sys

burden means annual costs of a few hundred 

most, a microscopic amount compared to the 

lions of dollars of revenue broadcasters receiv
Perhaps for this reason, broadcasters in the p

strongly oppose the regulation or its extension

17 Fed. Reg. 4711 (1952) (ìNo comments adv

adoption of the proposed rule have been receive

Reg. 32794 (1978) (no adverse comments). 

1992, ìCBSî itself ìsuggest[ed]î that the can

ìinclude a record of all requests for time.î 5

206 (1992); cf. 63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998) (FC

suaded that the current retention period [tw

overly burdensome to licenseesî). 

In any event, as the FCC wrote in an analogo

broadcaster recordkeeping requirements ìësimp

the territory.íî 40 Fed. Reg. 18398 (1975). B

must keep and make publicly available numero

See 47 CFR ß73.3526 (2002) (general descripti

recordkeeping requirements for commercial st

also ßß73.1202, 73.3526(e)(9)(i) (retention of a

comments and suggestions [including letters 

received from the public regarding operation 

tionî for three years); ß73.1212(e) (sponsorship 

tion records, including the identification of a 

entityís executive officers and board-level mem

sponsoring ìpolitical matter or matter involvi

cussion of a controversial issue of public im

ß73.1840 (retention of station logs); ß73.1942 

broadcast records); ß73.2080 (equal employm

tunities records); ßß73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12

programs that have provided the stationís m

cant treatment of community issues during th

three month period,î including ìbrief narrative 

[the issues, and] time, date, duration, a

ßß73.3526(e)(11)(ii), (iii) (reports of childrení

and retention of records sufficient to substantia

ance with the commercial limits on childrení

mingî); ß73.3613(a) (network affiliation 
reports); ß73.3613(c) ([m]anagement consult

mentsî); ß73.3613(d) (ì[t]ime brokerage ag

Compared to these longstanding recordkeepi

ments, an additional six to seven hours is a sma

very large bucket. 

The McConnell plaintiffs also claim that the 

requestsî requirement fails significantly to f

important governmental interest. Brief for 

Plaintiffs 74. But, again, we cannot agree. Th

pointed out that ì[t]hese records are necessar

political candidates and others to verify tha

have complied with their obligations relating 

their facilities by candidates for political office

to the ìequal timeî provision of 47 U. S. C. ß

Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998). They also help the 

mine whether broadcasters have violated thei

to sell candidates time at the ìlowest unit c

U. S. C. ß315(b). As reinforced by BCRA, the 

requestî requirements will help the FCC, t

Election Commission, and ìthe public to evalua

broadcasters are processing [candidate] requ

evenhanded fashion,î Brief Opposing Summ

mance 9, thereby helping to assure broadcastin

47 U. S. C. ß315(a); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 

U. S. 367, 390 (1969). They will help make 

aware of how much money candidates may be 

spend on broadcast messages. 2 U. S. C. A. ß43

and Supp. 2003); see ante, at 87ñ93 (joint 

STEVENS and OíCONNOR, JJ.) (hereinafter join

And they will provide an independently comp

data for purposes of verifying candidatesí comp

the disclosure requirements and source lim

BCRA and the Federal Election Campaign Act 

U. S. C. A. ß434; cf. Adventure Communicatio

Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, 191 F. 
Reg. 49493 (1998) (FCC finding record retentio

provides public with ìnecessary and adequate a

We note, too, that the FCCís regulatory a

broad. Red Lion, supra, at 380 (ìbroadî manda

broadcasters operate in public interest); Natio

casting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 

(same). And we have previously found broad 

tal authority for agency information demands 

lated entities. Compare United States v. Morto

338 U. S. 632, 642ñ643 (1950); Oklahoma Press 

Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 209 (1946); Dono

Steer, Inc., 464 U. S. 408, 414ñ415 (1984). 

THE CHIEF JUSTICE suggests that the Gover

not made these particular claims. But it h

succinctlyófor it has cross-referenced the relev

tory rules. Compare post, at 12ñ13 (opinion 

QUIST, C. J.), with Brief Opposing Summary 

Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs 73ñ74; Brief for 

in No. 02ñ1674 et al., pp. 132ñ133. And s

through cross-reference was necessary given 

dural requirement that the Government set for

page brief all its arguments concerning each 

BCRA provisions here under contest. 251 F. S

186ñ188. 

In sum, given the Governmentís reference 

year-old FCC regulation and the related consid

have mentioned, we cannot accept the argume

constitutionality of the ìcandidate requestî pro

evidentiary support. The challengers have m

tempt to explain away the FCCís own contrary 

and the mass of evidence in related FCC r

proceedings. E.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 189 (1992); cf. s

5; ante, at 117ñ118 (joint opinion) (upholdi

coordination provision based, in part, on prior 
ent record, find the longstanding FCC regulatio

tutional, we likewise cannot strike down the 

requestî provision in BCRA ß504; for the la

embodies the regulation in a statute, thereby b

agency attempt to repeal it. 

III 

BCRA ß504ís ìelection message requestî re

call for broadcasters to keep records of request

any member of the public) to broadcast a ìmes

ìa legally qualified candidateî or ìany election 

office.î 47 U. S. C. A. ßß315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii) (S

Although these requirements are somewhat br

the ìcandidate requestî requirement, they serv

same purposes. A candidateís supporters or 

account for many of the requests to broadcast ì

about a ìcandidate.î Requests to broadcas

about an ìelectionî may include messages tha

candidate or another, along with other message

be more neutral. 

Given the nature of many of the messages, 

ing can help both the regulatory agencies and 

evaluate broadcasting fairness, and determine 

of money that individuals or groups, supporte

nents, intend to spend to help elect a particular 

Cf. ante, at 100ñ101 (joint opinion) (upholdin

restrictions on all election-time advertising tha

candidate because such advertising will of

message of support or opposition). Insofar as 

is to broadcast neutral material about a ca

election, the disclosure can help the FCC carr

statutory functions, for example, determining 

broadcasting station is fulfilling its licensing o

broadcast material important to the commun

public. 47 U. S. C. ß315(a) (ìobligation . . . to 
on issues of public importance); 47 CFR ß73.1

ßß73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (recordkeeping re

for issues important to the community). 

For reasons previously discussed, supra, at 4

the basis of the material presented, we cann

these requirements will impose disproportiona

trative burdens. They ask the broadcaster to 

mation about the disposition of the request, an

tion identifying the individual or company req

broadcast time (name, address, contact inform

the requester is not an individual, the names 

officials). 47 U. S. C. A. ß315(e)(2) (Supp. 200

as the ìrequestî is made by a candidateís ìsupp

ìcandidate requestî regulation apparently a

quires broadcasters to keep such records. 43 

32794 (1978). Regardless, the information sh

readily available, for the individual requesting 

must provide it to the broadcaster should the 

accept the request. 47 CFR ß73.1212(e) (2002). 

have previously pointed out, the recordkeepi

ments do not reach significantly beyond 

recordkeeping rules, for example, those requi

casting licensees to keep material show

pliance with their license-related promises 

cast material on issues of public importance

ßß73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (recordkeeping re

for issues important to the community); sup

(collecting regulations); Office of Communicatio

Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F. 2d 1413, 

(CADC 1983) (describing FCC rules, in force du

1981, that required nonentertainment program

specific areas and mandated publicly availa

detailing date, time, source, and description to 

ate compliance). If, as we have held, the ìca

questî requirements are constitutional, supra
governmental interests and impose only a s

mental burden, must be constitutional as well. 

IV 

The ìissue requestî requirements call for broa

keep records of requests (made by any mem

public) to broadcast ìmessage[s]î about ìa natio

tive issue of public importanceî or ìany politica

national importance.î 47 U. S. C. A. ßß3

(e)(1)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2003). These recordkeepi

ments seem likely to help the FCC determin

broadcasters are carrying out their ìobligation

reasonable opportunity for the discussion of 

views on issues of public importance,î 47 CF

(2002), and whether broadcasters are too heav

entertainment, and discriminating against 

devoted to public affairs, see ibid.; 47 U. S. C ß

Lion, 395 U. S., at 380. 

The McConnell plaintiffs claim that the sta

guageóìpolitical matter of national importan

tional legislative issue of public importanceîó

tutionally vague or overbroad. Brief for 

Plaintiffs 74ñ75. But that language is no m

than the language that Congress has used to im

obligations upon broadcasters. Compare 47 

ß315(e)(1)(B) (Supp. 2003) (ìpolitical matter 

importanceî) and ß315(e)(1)(B)(iii) (ìnational 

issue of public importanceî) (both added by B

with 47 U. S. C. ß315(a) (ìobligation . . . to ope

public interestî and to afford reasonable oppo

discussion of ìissues of public importanceî); 

(FCC disclosure requirements relating to an

programî or ìdiscussion of any controversial is

CFR ß73.1212(e) (2002) (ìpolitical matter or . 

versial issue of public importanceî); and 9 Fed. 
(joint opinion) (noting that the experience u

standing regulations undermines claims of chil

And that language is also roughly comparab

language in BCRA that we uphold today. E.

61ñ62, and n. 64 (joint opinion) (upholding 2 

ß431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2003) (ìpublic communi

refers to a clearly identified candidate for Fe

. . . and that promotes or supports a candida

office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for th

ante, at 117ñ118 (upholding 2 U. S. C. A. ß441a

(Supp. 2003) (counting as coordinated disburse

are made ìin cooperation, consultation, or conc

at the request or suggestion of [a political part

challenge and noting that an ìagreementî is no

for precision). 

Whether these requirements impose dispr

administrative burdens is more difficult to say. 

hand, the burdens are likely less heavy than 

other FCC regulations have imposed, for ex

burden of keeping and disclosing ì[a]ll written 

and suggestionsî received from the public, inclu

e-mail. 47 CFR ßß73.1202, 73.3526(e)(9) (200

supra, at 4ñ5. On the other hand, the burden

heavier than those imposed by BCRA ß504ís o

sions, previously discussed. 

The regulatory burden, in practice, will dep

the FCC interprets and applies this provision

has adequate legal authority to write regulation

limit, and make more specific, the provision

linguistic reach. 47 U. S. C. ß315(d). It has of

rated regulatory burdens by interpretation in 

and there is no reason to believe it will not do s

14 FCC Rcd. 4653, ¶25 (1999) (relaxing the rec

requirements in respect to cable systems that 

than 5,000 subscribers); 14 FCC Rcd. 1112
a station rather than requiring licensees to se

tocopies of the files to candidates upon telephon

The parties remain free to challenge the pro

interpreted by the FCC in regulations, or as 

applied. Any such challenge will likely prov

information about the provisionsí justificatio

ministrative burdens. Without that addition

tion, we cannot now say that the burdens are 

the justifications so minimal, as to warrant 

provisions unconstitutional on their face. 

The McConnell plaintiffs and THE CHIEF JU

one final claim. They say that the ìissue r

quirement will force them to disclose informati

reveal their political strategies to opponents, pe

to a broadcast. See post, at 14ñ15 (dissentin

We are willing to assume that the Constituti

some form of protection against premature d

campaign strategyóthough, given the First A

interest in free and open discussion of campaign 

make this assumption purely for argumentís s

theless, even on that assumption we do not see 

ß504 can be unconstitutional on its face. 

For one thing, the statute requires disclosur

addresses, and the fact of a request; it does 

disclosure of substantive campaign content

U. S. C. A. ß315(e)(2) (Supp. 2003). For an

statutory words ìas soon as possible,î ß315(e

seem to permit FCC disclosure-timing rules 

avoid any premature disclosure that the C

itself would forbid. Further, the plaintiffs d

toóand our own research cannot findóany spe

tion of such a ìstrategy-disclosureî problem ari

the past 65 years in respect to the existing FCC 

requestî requirement, where the strategic pro

be expected to be more acute. Finally, we toda
advance disclosureon a similar BCRA prov

ante, at 94 (joint opinion). Thus, the ìstrategy 

argument does not show that BCRA ß504 is 

tional on its face, but the plaintiffs remain fr

this argument when ß504 is applied. 

V 

THE CHIEF JUSTICE makes two important ar

response to those we have set forth. First, h

we ìapproac[h] ß504 almost exclusively from t

tive of the broadcast licensees, ignoring the i

candidates and other purchasers, whose s

association rights are affected.î Post, at 11 

opinion). THE CHIEF JUSTICE is certainly 

emphasizing the importance of the speech i

candidates and other potential speakers, but w

ignored their First Amendment ìperspective.î 

To the contrary, we have discussed the spea

ests together with the broadcastersí interests b

two sets of interests substantially overlap. Fo

the speakersí vagueness argument is no differe

broadcastersí, and it fails for the same reason

fact that BCRA ß504ís language is just as d

precise as other language that we today up

supra, at 10. 

We have separately discussed the one and o

related claim advanced on behalf of candidate

speakers) that differs from the claims set fo

broadcasters. See supra, at 11ñ12. This is the 

the statuteís disclosure requirements will req

dates to reveal their political strategies to oppo

just said, and we now repeat, that BCRA ß

applied, in a significant number of cases, with

ing any such political-strategy disclosureóeith

disclosure in many cases will not create any s
sure only after any such risk disappears, or both

Moreover, candidates (or other speakers) w

affects adversely in this way (or in other ways) 

to challenge the lawfulness of FCC implement

tions and to challenge the constitutionality 

applied. To find that the speech-related inter

didates and others may be vindicated in an 

challenge is not to ìignor[e]î those interests. 

Second, THE CHIEF JUSTICE says that ìthe G

in its brief, proffers no interest whatever to su

as a whole,î adding that the existence of ìp

unchallenged agency regulations imposing sim

sure requirementsî cannot ìcompel the conc

ß504 is constitutional,î nor somehow ìrelieve t

ment of its burden of advancing a constitutio

cient justification for ß504.î Post, at 12ñ13 

opinion). 

Again THE CHIEF JUSTICE is correct in sayi

mere existence of similar FCC regulation-im

quirementsóeven if unchallenged for at least 

cannot prove that those requirements are con

But the existence of those regulations means th

read beyond the briefs in this case before ho

requirements unconstitutional. Before eval

relevant burdens and justifications, we mu

become acquainted with the FCCís own view of 

We must follow the Governmentís regula

references to the relevant regulatory records, r

regulatory conclusions, and the FCCís enforcem

ence. We must take into account, for example

hood that the reason there is ìnothing in the 

indicates licensees have treated purchasers unf

at 13 (REHNQUIST, C. J., dissenting), is that 

decades similar FCC regulations have made 

treatment unlawful. And, if we are to avoid 
agency records and related experience before h

similar statutory provision unconstitutional on 

Even a superficial examination of those relev

materials reveals strong supporting justificat

lack of significant administrative burdens. An

tional burden that the statute, viewed facial

upon interests protected by the First Amendm

slight compared to the strong enforcement-re

ests that it serves. Given the FCC regulation

history, the statutory requirements must surv

attack under any potentially applicable First A

standard, including that of heightened scrutiny

That is why the regulations are relevant. T

the brevity of the Governmentís discussion her

determinative. That is why we fear that 

JUSTICEís contrary view would lead us into a

nateóand at present unjustifiedórevolution in 

cations law. And that is why we disagree with 

The portion of the judgment of the District C

dating BCRA ß504 is reversed. 

It is s
Title 47 U. S. C. A. ß315(e) (Supp. 2003), as a

BCRA ß504, provides: 

ìPolitical record 

ì(1) In general 

ìA licensee shall maintain, and make a

public inspection, a complete record of a 

purchase broadcast time tható 

ì(A) is made by or on behalf of a legal

candidate for public office; or 

ì(B) communicates a message relating 

litical matter of national importance, incl

ì(i) a legally qualified candidate; 

ì(ii) any election to Federal office; or 

ì(iii) a national legislative issue of pu

tance. 

ì(2) Contents of record 

ìA record maintained under paragrap

contain information regardingó 

ì(A) whether the request to purchase 

time is accepted or rejected by the license

ì(B) the rate charged for the broadcast 

ì(C) the date and time on which the c

tion is aired; 

ì(D) the class of time that is purchased

ì(E) the name of the candidate to whi

munication refers and the office to which 

date is seeking election, the election to 

communication refers, or the issue to 

communication refers (as applicable); 

ì(F) in the case of a request made by, o

of, a candidate, the name of the can

authorized committee of the candidat

treasurer of such committee; and 

ì(G) in the case of any other request, t
and phone number of a contact person fo

son, and a list of the chief executive 

members of the executive committee or o

of directors of such person. 

ì(3) Time to maintain file 

ìThe information required under this 

shall be placed in a political file as soon 

and shall be retained by the licensee for 

not less than 2 years.î 

Title 47 CFR ß73.1943 (2002) provides: 

ìPolitical file. 

ì(a) Every licensee shall keep and permi

spection of a complete and orderly recor

file) of all requests for broadcast time ma

behalf of a candidate for public office, toget

appropriate notation showing the dispositi

the licensee of such requests, and the charg

any, if the request is granted. The ëdisp

cludes the schedule of time purchased, whe

tually aired, the rates charged, and the cla

purchased. 

ì(b) When free time is provided for use b

half of candidates, a record of the free tim

shall be placed in the political file. 

ì(c) All records required by this paragra

placed in the political file as soon as p

shall be retained for a period of two year

as possible means immediately absen

circumstances.î 
Nos. 02ñ1674, 02ñ1675, 02ñ1676, 02ñ1702, 02ñ1727, 02ñ1

02ñ1740, 02ñ1747, 02ñ1753, 02ñ1755, AND 02ñ1

_________________ 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1674 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1675 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET AL., APP

02ñ1676 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

JOHN MCCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1702 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, E

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1727 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1733 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPE

02ñ1734 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, ET AL., APP

02ñ1740 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 
, 

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1747 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ET AL., APP

02ñ1753 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CON

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1755 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED 

ET AL., APPELLANTS 

02ñ1756 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

[December 10, 2003] 

JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring with respect to B

III and IV, dissenting with respect to BCRA Tit

and concurring in the judgment in part and di

part with respect to BCRA Title II. 

With respect to Titles I, II, and V: I join in f

sent of THE CHIEF JUSTICE; I join the opinion 

KENNEDY, except to the extent it upholds new 

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (

ß202 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform A

(BCRA) in part; and because I continue to b

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per cu

wrongly decided, I also join Parts I, IIñA, and 

opinion of JUSTICE THOMAS. With respect to Ti

IV, I join THE CHIEF JUSTICEís opinion for 
I cannot avoid adding to the many writings a fe

my own. 

This is a sad day for the freedom of speech. 

have imagined that the same Court which, with

four years, has sternly disapproved of restric

such inconsequential forms of expression as v

pornography, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition

234 (2002), tobacco advertising, Lorillard Tob

Reilly, 533 U. S. 525 (2001), dissemination of ille

cepted communications, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 53

(2001), and sexually explicit cable programm

States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 52

(2000), would smile with favor upon a law that 

heart of what the First Amendment is meant 

the right to criticize the government. For that 

most offensive provisions of this legislation ar

We are governed by Congress, and this legislat

its the criticism of Members of Congress by th

most capable of giving such criticism loud voic

political parties and corporations, both of the 

and the not-for-profit sort. It forbids pre-electi

of incumbents by corporations, even not-for-pro

tions, by use of their general funds; and forbid

party use of ìsoftî money to fund ìissue adsî t

bents find so offensive. 

To be sure, the legislation is evenhanded: 

prohibits criticism of the candidates who oppos

of Congress in their reelection bids. But a

knows, this is an area in which evenhanded

fairness. If all electioneering were evenhande

ited, incumbents would have an enormous 

Likewise, if incumbents and challengers are lim

same quantity of electioneering, incumbents a

In other words, any restriction upon a type o

speech that is equally available to challengers 
Beyond that, however, the present legislation 

prohibition certain categories of campaign spee

particularly harmful to incumbents. Is it acc

you think, that incumbents raise about thre

much ìhard moneyîóthe sort of funding ge

restricted by this legislationóas do their challe

FEC, 1999ñ2000 Financial Activity of A

and House Campaigns (Jan. 1, 1999ñDec. 31, 

modified on May 15, 2001), http://www.fe

051501congfinact/tables/allcong2000.xls (all In

terials as visited Dec. 4, 2003, and available 

Courtís case file). Or that lobbyists (who seek 

incumbents) give 92 percent of their money 

contributions? See U. S. Public Interest Rese

(PIRG), The Lobbyistís Last Laugh: How K 

byists Would Benefit from the McCain-Fein

paign Finance Bill 3 (July 5, 2001), http://ww

democracy/democracy.asp?id2=5068. Is it an ov

you suppose, that the so-called ìmillionaire 

raise the contribution limit for a candida

against an individual who devotes to the ca

challengers often do) great personal wealth, 

raise the limit for a candidate running against 

ual who devotes to the campaign (as incumben

a massive election ìwar chestî? See BCRA ßß30

319. And is it mere happenstance, do you est

national-party funding, which is severely lim

Act, is more likely to assist cash-strapped challe

flush-with-hard-money incumbents? See A. Gi

D. Breaux, The Financing Role of Parties, in 

Finance in State Legislative Elections 195ñ200 

son & S. Moncrief eds. 1998). Was it unintend

chance, that incumbents are free personally 

some soft money and even to solicit it for othe

tions, while national parties are not? See 
I wish to address three fallacious propos

might be thought to justify some or all of the p

this legislationóonly the last of which is ex

braced by the principal opinion for the Court

which underlie, I think, its approach to these ca

(a) Money is Not Speech 

It was said by congressional proponents of t

tion, see 143 Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997) (rema

Boxer), 145 Cong. Rec. S12612 (Oct. 14, 1999) 

Sen. Cleland), 147 Cong. Rec. S2436 (Mar. 19

marks of Sen. Dodd), with support from the la

see, e.g., Wright, Politics and the Constitution

Speech?, 85 Yale L. J. 1001 (1976), that since t

tion regulates nothing but the expenditure of 

speech, as opposed to speech itself, the burden 

is not subject to full First Amendment scrutin

ernment may regulate the raising and spendi

paign funds just as it regulates other forms 

such as burning draft cards, see United States 

391 U. S. 367 (1968), or camping out on the Na

see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violenc

288 (1984). That proposition has been endorse

the two authors of todayís principal opinion: ìT

use oneís own money to hire gladiators, [an

ëspeech by proxy,í . . . [are] property rights . . . 

to the same protection as the right to say 

pleases.î Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Governmen

U. S. 377, 399 (2000) (STEVENS, J., concurri

today, however, that view has been categorically 

our jurisprudence. As we said in Buckley, 424 

ìthis Court has never suggested that the depe

communication on the expenditure of mone

itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to 

exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendm
attitude toward regulating the financing of 

ìexacting scrutinyî test of Buckley, see ibid., is 

in any majority opinion, and is not observed 

from which I dissent) frustrates the fundamen

of the First Amendment. In any economy o

even the most rudimentary principles of divisi

effective public communication requires the 

make use of the services of others. An author m

novel, but he will seldom publish and distribute 

A freelance reporter may write a story, but he 

edit, print, and deliver it to subscribers. To a g

bent on suppressing speech, this mode of o

presents opportunities: Control any cog in th

and you can halt the whole apparatus. Licen

and it matters little whether authors are still fr

Restrict the sale of books, and it matters little 

them. Predictably, repressive regimes hav

these principles by attacking all levels of the 

and dissemination of ideas. See, e.g., Printing 

14 Car. II, c. 33, ßß1, 4, 7 (punishing printers

and booksellers); Printing Act of 1649, 2 Acts 

nances of the Interregnum 245, 246, 250 

authors, printers, booksellers, importers, and b

response to this threat, we have interpreted 

Amendment broadly. See, e.g., Bantam Books, I

van, 372 U. S. 58, 65, n. 6 (1963) (ìThe constitu

antee of freedom of the press embraces the ci

books as well as their publication . . .î). 

Division of labor requires a means of me

change, and in a commercial society, that me

plied by money. The publisher pays the aut

right to sell his book; it pays its staff who pr

semble the book; it demands payments from 

who bring the book to market. This, too, pres

tunities for repression: Instead of regulating 
suppress their ability to coordinate by regulatin

of money. What good is the right to print book

right to buy works from authors? Or the right 

newspapers without the right to pay delivery

right to speak would be largely ineffective if 

include the right to engage in financial transa

are the incidents of its exercise. 

This is not to say that any regulation of 

regulation of speech. The government may ap

commercial regulations to those who use money 

if it applies them evenhandedly to those who 

for other purposes. But where the government 

money used to fund speech as its legislative 

acting against speech as such, no less than if 

geted the paper on which a book was printed or 

that deliver it to the bookstore. 

History and jurisprudence bear this out. Th

examples derive from the British efforts to ta

after the lapse of licensing statutes by which th

first regulated. The Stamp Act of 1712 impos

all newspapers, including an additional tax for 

tisement. 10 Anne, c. 18, ß113. It was a respon

vorable war coverage, ìobvious[ly] . . . designed t

publication of those newspapers and pamph

depended for their sale on their cheapness and 

ism.î F. Siebert, Freedom of the Press in Eng

1776, pp. 309ñ310 (1952). It succeeded in killing 

mately half the newspapers in England in its fir

at 312. In 1765, Parliament applied a similar 

Colonies. 5 Geo. III, c. 12, ß1. The colonial A

placed exactions on sales and advertising revenu

at 2s. per advertisement, which was ìby any st

excessive, since the publisher himself received 

to 5s. and still less for repeated insertions.î A. 

Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War 
these taxes as grievous incursions on the free

press. See, e.g., 1 D. Ramsay, History of the 

Revolution 61ñ62 (L. Cohen ed. 1990); J. Adam

tation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1765), rep

Life and Works of John Adams 445, 464 (C. 

1851). See generally Grosjean v. American Pr

U. S. 233, 245ñ249 (1936); Schlesinger, supra, at 

We have kept faith with the Foundersí t

prohibiting the selective taxation of the press. 

lis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commír 

460 U. S. 575 (1983) (ink and paper tax); Gros

(advertisement tax). And we have done so whet

was the product of illicit motive or not. See M

Star & Tribune Co., supra, at 592. These pre

cases belie the claim that regulation of money u

speech is not regulation of speech itself. A tax 

paperís advertising revenue does not prohibit a

saying anything; it merely appropriates part o

nue that a speaker would otherwise obtain. Th

step short of totally prohibiting advertising 

which would be analogous to the total prohibi

tain campaign-speech contributions in th

cases. Yet it is unquestionably a violation o

Amendment. 

Many other cases exemplify the same princi

attack upon the funding of speech is an a

speech itself. In Schaumburg v. Citizens fo

Environment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980), we struc

ordinance limiting the amount charities could 

solicitors. In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Memb

State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105 (199

unconstitutional a state statute that approp

proceeds of criminalsí biographies for paym

victims. And in Rosenberger v. Rector and 

Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995), we held 
funds to speakers on the basis of viewpoint. M

perhaps, is our famous opinion in New York T

Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), holding that 

tisements in a newspaper were entitled to 

Amendment protection: 

ìAny other conclusion would discourage 

from carrying ëeditorial advertisementsí o

and so might shut off an important out

promulgation of information and ideas by p

do not themselves have access to publis

tiesówho wish to exercise their freedom 

even though they are not members of the 

effect would be to shackle the First Amend

attempt to secure ëthe widest possible disse

information from diverse and antagonisti

Id., at 266 (citations omitted). 

This passage was relied on in Buckley for the 

restrictions on the expenditure of money for 

equivalent to restrictions on speech itself. 42

16ñ17. That reliance was appropriate. If deny

tion to paid-for speech would ìshackle the Fi

ment,î so also does forbidding or limiting the r

for speech. 

It should be obvious, then, that a law li

amount a person can spend to broadcast his pol

is a direct restriction on speech. That is no dif

a law limiting the amount a newspaper can pa

rial staff or the amount a charity can pay its lea

is equally clear that a limit on the amount a ca

raise from any one individual for the purpose 

is also a direct limitation on speech. That is n

from a law limiting the amount a publisher 

from any one shareholder or lender, or the 

newspaper can charge any one advertiser or cus
Another proposition which could explain at le

the results of todayís opinion is that the First A

right to spend money for speech does not includ

to combine with others in spending money 

Such a proposition fits uncomfortably with the 

words of our Declaration of Independence: ìA

support of this Declaration, . . . we mutually 

each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sac

(Emphasis added.) The freedom to associate 

for the dissemination of ideasónot just by 

speaking in unison, but by pooling financial re

expressive purposesóis part of the freedom of s

ìOur form of government is built on the p

every citizen shall have the right to engage 

expression and association. This right was 

in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rig

cise of these basic freedoms in America ha

ally been through the media of political a

Any interference with the freedom of a par

taneously an interference with the freedom 

herents.î NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

ìThe First Amendment protects political 

as well as political expression. The co

right of association explicated in NAACP v

357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958), stemmed from 

recognition that ë[e]ffective advocacy of b

and private points of view, particularly co

ones, is undeniably enhanced by group a

Subsequent decisions have made clear tha

and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee ë

associate with others for the common adva

political beliefs and ideas,îí . . . .î Buckley

15. 
tivities protected by the First Amendment i

sponding right to associate with others in pursu

variety of political, social, economic, educationa

and cultural ends.î Roberts v. United States J

U. S. 609, 622 (1984). That ìright to associate 

suitî includes the right to pool financial resourc

If it were otherwise, Congress would be em

enact legislation requiring newspapers to be s

torships, banning their use of partnership o

form. That sort of restriction would be an ob

tion of the First Amendment, and it is incom

why the conclusion should change when what i

the pooling of funds for the most important 

perennially threatened) category of speech

speech. The principle that such financial assoc

not enjoy full First Amendment protection th

existence of all political parties. 

(c) Speech by Corporations Can Be Abri

The last proposition that might explain at le

todayís casual abridgment of free-speech righ

that the particular form of association known a

tion does not enjoy full First Amendment pro

course the text of the First Amendment does n

application in this fashion, even though ì[b]y 

the eighteenth century the corporation was 

figure in American economic life.î C. Cooke, C

Trust and Company 92 (1951). Nor is there a

reason why First Amendment rights should no

corporate associationsóand we have said so. I

Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (197

unconstitutional a state prohibition of corpor

designed to influence the vote on referendum pro

said: 

ì[T]here is practically universal agreem
tect the free discussion of governmental aff

speakers here were not corporations, no 

suggest that the State could silence the

speech. It is the type of speech indispensa

sionmaking in a democracy, and this is n

because the speech comes from a corpora

than an individual. The inherent worth of 

in terms of its capacity for informing the 

not depend upon the identity of its sourc

corporation, association, union, or individu

776ñ777 (internal quotation marks, footnote

tions omitted). 

In NAACP v. Button, supra, at 428ñ429, 431, w

the NAACP could assert First Amendment rig

own behalf, . . . though a corporation,î and tha

ties of the corporation were ìmodes of expr

association protected by the First and 

Amendments.î In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. P

Commín of Cal., 475 U. S. 1, 8 (1986), we held 

tional a state effort to compel corporate spe

identity of the speaker,î we said, ìis not decisi

mining whether speech is protected. Corpor

other associations, like individuals, contrib

ëdiscussion, debate, and the dissemination of i

and ideasí that the First Amendment seeks to f

in Buckley, 424 U. S. 1, we held unconstitutio

limitation upon independent corporate expendit

The Court changed course in Austin v. Michi

ber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990), uphold

prohibition of an independent corporate exp

support of a candidate for state office. I dissen

case, see id., at 679, and remain of the view 

error. In the modern world, giving the governm

to exclude corporations from the political debat
most significant segments of the economy an

passionately held social and political views. 

associateówho pool their financial resource

poses of economic enterprise overwhelmingly d

corporate form; and with increasing frequency

tion is chosen by those who associate to defen

mote particular ideasósuch as the American 

ties Union and the National Rifle Association

these cases. Imagine, then, a government tha

suppress nuclear poweróor oil and gas exp

automobile manufacturing, or gun ownershi

libertiesóand that had the power to prohibi

advertising against its proposals. To be sur

viduals involved in, or benefited by, those in

interested in those causes, could (given enough 

political action committees or other associatio

their case. But the organizational form in w

enterprises already exist, and in which they 

quickly and most effectively get their messag

the corporate form. The First Amendment doe

view permit the restriction of that political sp

the same holds true for corporate electoral spe

didate should not be insulated from the mo

speech that the major participants in the ec

major incorporated interest groups can generat

But what about the danger to the political sy

by ìamassed wealthî? The most direct threa

source comes in the form of undisclosed favors 

to elected officialsówhich have already been cr

and will be rendered no more discoverable by 

tion at issue here. The use of corporate wealth 

vidual wealth) to speak to the electorate is 

ìdistortî electionsóespecially if disclosure re

tell the people where the speech is coming 

premise of the First Amendment is that the 
of considering both the substance of the speech 

to them and its proximate and ultimate sour

premise is wrong, our democracy has a mu

problem to overcome than merely the influence 

wealth. Given the premises of democracy, ther

thing as too much speech. 

But, it is argued, quite apart from its effec

electorate, corporate speech in the form of cont

the candidateís campaign, or even in the form o

ent expenditures supporting the candidate, en

obligation which is later paid in the form of gre

to the officeholder, or indeed in the form of vo

ticular bills. Any quid-pro-quo agreement for v

of course violate criminal law, see 18 U. S. C

actual payoff votes have not even been claime

favoring the restrictions on corporate speech. I

denied, however, that corporate (like noncorpo

will have greater access to the officeholder, a

will tend to favor the same causes as those w

him (which is usually why they supported him

the nature of politicsóif not indeed human n

how this can properly be considered ìcorruptio

appearance of corruptionî) with regard to corp

and not with regard to other allies is beyond 

Bill of Rights had intended an exception to the 

speech in order to combat this malign procli

officeholder to agree with those who agree wit

to speak more with his supporters than his op

would surely have said so. It did not do so, 

cause the juice is not worth the squeeze. Ev

(and private affluent) influences are well enou

(so long as adequate campaign-expenditure 

rules exist) by the politicianís fear of being p

ìin the pocketî of so-called moneyed interests. 

mental benefit obtained by muzzling corporat
that corporate speech can contain. That, at l

assumption of a constitutional guarantee which 

that Congress shall make no law abridging the 

speech. 

But let us not be deceived. While the Go

briefs and arguments before this Court focu

horrible ìappearance of corruption,î the most 

floor statements during the debates on this 

pertained to so-called attack ads, which the C

surely protects, but which Members of Cong

gized to ìcrack cocaine,î 144 Cong. Rec. S86

1998) (remarks of Sen. Daschle), ìdrive-by s

id., at S879 (remarks of Sen. Durbin), and ìair 

143 Cong. Rec. 20505 (1997) (remarks of Se

There is good reason to believe that the ending 

campaign ads was the principal attraction of 

tion. A Senate sponsor said, ìI hope that we wi

our attention to be distracted from the rea

handóhow to raise the tenor of the debate in o

and give people real choices. No one benefits 

tive ads. They donít aid our Nationís political d

at 20521ñ20522 (remarks of Sen. McCain). 

the body that ì[y]ou cut off the soft money, yo

to see a lot less of that [attack ads]. Prohibit 

corporations, and you will see a lot less of th

demand full disclosure for those who pay for 

you are going to see a lot less of that . . . .î 147 

S3116 (Mar. 29, 2001) (remarks of Sen. McCain

e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. S2117 (Mar. 20, 2002) (

Sen. Cantwell) (ìThis bill is about slowing the 

It is about slowing political advertising and m

the flow of negative ads by outside interest g

not continue to permeate the airwavesî); 143 

20746 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Boxer) (ìThes

issues ads are not regulated at all and mention 
accountability. It is brutal. . . . We have an opp

the McCain-Feingold bill to stop that . . .î); 145 

S12606ñS12607 (Oct. 14, 1999) (remarks of 

stone) (ìI think these issue advocacy ads are a 

I think all of us should hate them. . . . [By p

legislation], [w]e could get some of this poison 

televisionî). 

Another theme prominent in the legislative d

the notion that there is too much money spe

tions. The first principle of ìreformî was 

should be less money in politics.î 147 Cong. 

(Apr. 2, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Murray). ìTh

amounts of special interest money that flood o

system have become a cancer in our democr

Cong. Rec. S2151 (Mar. 20, 2002) (remarks of 

nedy). ì[L]arge sums of money drown out the 

average voter.î 148 Cong. Rec. H373 (Feb. 13

marks of Rep. Langevin). The system of campa

is ìdrowning in money.î Id., at H404 (rema

Menendez). And most expansively: 

ìDespite the ever-increasing sums spen

paigns, we have not seen an improveme

paign discourse, issue discussion or voter 

More money does not mean more ideas, 

stance or more depth. Instead, it means m

voters complain about most. More 30-se

more negativity and an increasingly longe

period.î 148 Cong. Rec. S2150 (Mar. 20

marks of Sen. Kerry). 

Perhaps voters do detest these 30-second spots

suspect they detest even more hour-long camp

interruptions of their favorite entertainmen

ming. Evidently, however, these ads do persu

or else they would not be so routinely used b
that it is not the proper role of those who go

judge which campaign speech has ìsubstanceî a

(do you think it might be that which is least d

incumbents?) and to abridge the rest. 

And what exactly are these outrageous sum

away in determining who will govern us? A 

pared for Congress concluded that the total 

hard and soft money, spent on the 2000 feder

was between $2.4 and $2.5 billion. J. Cantor, C

for Congress, Campaign Finance in the 20

Elections: Overview and Estimates of the Flow 

(2001). All campaign spending in the Uni

including state elections, ballot initiatives, a

elections, has been estimated at $3.9 billion 

Nelson, Spending in the 2000 Elections, in Fin

2000 Election 24, Tbl. 2ñ1 (D. Magleby ed. 20

was a year that ìshattered spending and c

records,î id., at 22. Even taking this last, larg

the benchmark, it means that Americans spent 

as much electing all their Nationís officials, 

federal, as they spent on movie tickets ($7.8 bil

a fifth as much as they spent on cosmetics an

($18.8 billion); and about a sixth as much as 

on pork (the nongovernmental sort) ($22.8 bi

U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economi

Tbl. 2.6U (Col. AS; Rows 356, 214, and 1

www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/206u.csv. If our de

drowning from this much spending, it cannot sw

* * * 

Which brings me back to where I began: Th

is about preventing criticism of the governmen

say for certain that many, or some, or even 

Members of Congress who voted for this legisla

not to produce ìfairerî campaigns, but to mute 
stipulate that all those who voted for the Act be

were acting for the good of the country. There r

problem of the Charlie Wilson Phenomenon, n

Charles Wilson, former president of General M

is supposed to have said during the Senate hea

nomination as Secretary of Defense that ìwha

General Motors is good for the country.î* Thos

even giving them the benefit of the greatest go

inclined to believe that what is good for them 

the country. Whether in prescient recognit

Charlie Wilson Phenomenon, or out of fear o

fashioned, malicious, self-interested manipula

fundamental approach of the First Amendment 

assume the worst, and to rule the regulation 

speech ëfor fairnessí sakeí simply out of bound

494 U. S., at 693 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). Ha

doned that approach to a limited extent in B

abandon it much further today. 

We will unquestionably be called upon to 

further still in the future. The most frighteni

in the lengthy floor debates on this legislation 

lowing assurance given by one of the cospons

tors to his colleagues: 

ìThis is a modest step, it is a first step, it 

tial step, but it does not even begin to 

some ways, the fundamental problems tha

the hard money aspect of the system.î 148 

S2101 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. F

óóóóóó 

* It is disillusioning to learn that the fabled quote is ina

son actually said: ì[F]or years I thought what was good fo

was good for General Motors, and vice versa. The diffe

exist.î Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed 

Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1953). 
retention of power, and, under a Constitutio

quires periodic elections, that is best achiev

suppression of election-time speech. We have 

merely the second scene of Act I of what prom

lengthy tragedy. In scene 3 the Court, having 

most of the First Amendment weaponry that B

intact, will be even less equipped to resist the i

writing of the rules of political debate. The f

tion campaign laws, which are already (as toda

show) so voluminous, so detailed, so comple

ordinary citizen dare run for office, or even c

significant sum, without hiring an expert adv

field, can be expected to grow more volumi

detailed, and more complex in the years to 

always, always, with the objective of reducing 

sive amount of speech. 
Nos. 02ñ1674, 02ñ1675, 02ñ1676, 02ñ1702, 02ñ1727, 02ñ1

02ñ1740, 02ñ1747, 02ñ1753, 02ñ1755, AND 02ñ1

_________________ 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1674 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1675 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET AL., APP

02ñ1676 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

JOHN MCCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1702 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, E

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1727 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1733 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPE

02ñ1734 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, ET AL., APP

02ñ1740 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 
, 

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1747 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ET AL., APP

02ñ1753 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CON

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1755 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED 

ET AL., APPELLANTS 

02ñ1756 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

[December 10, 2003] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring with respect 

Titles III and IV, except for BCRA ßß311 and 3

ring in the result with respect to BCRA ß318, 

in the judgment in part and dissenting in pa

spect to BCRA Title II, and dissenting with 

BCRA Titles I, V, and ß311.* 

The First Amendment provides that ìCon

make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speec

theless, the Court today upholds what can o

scribed as the most significant abridgment of th

of speech and association since the Civil W

óóóóóó 

* JUSTICE SCALIA joins Parts I, IIñA, and IIñB of this opi
of 2002 (BCRA), directly targets and constricts 

cal speech, the ìprimary object of First Amen

tection.î Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Governmen

U. S. 377, 410ñ411 (2000) (THOMAS, J., dissentin

ìthe First Amendment íhas its fullest and m

applicationí to speech uttered during a campaig

cal office,î Eu v. San Francisco County Democr

Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Mon

Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971)), our du

proach these restrictions ìwith the utmost skep

subject them to the ìstrictest scrutiny.î Shrin

supra, at 412 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). 

In response to this assault on the free exchan

and with only the slightest consideration of th

ate standard of review or of the Courtís traditi

protecting First Amendment freedoms, the 

placed its imprimatur on these unprecedented r

The very ìpurpose of the First Amendment [is] 

an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which 

ultimately prevail.î Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 

U. S. 367, 390 (1969). Yet today the fundament

that ìthe best test of truth is the power of the 

get itself accepted in the competition of th

Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (191

J., dissenting), is cast aside in the purported 

preventing ìcorruption,î or the mere ìappearanc

tion.î Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26 (1976) (p

Apparently, the marketplace of ideas is to be ful

to defamers, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 37

(1964); nude dancers, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, In

560 (1991) (plurality opinion); pornographers, 

Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234 (2002); fl

United States v. Eichman, 496 U. S. 310 (1990

burners, Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. ___ (2003). 

Because I cannot agree with the treatmen
(hereinafter joint opinion) to speech that is in

to the effective and intelligent use of the p

popular government to shape the destiny of mo

trial society,î Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. 

(1940), I respectfully dissent. I also dissent fro

BREYERís opinion upholding BCRA ß504. I join 

JUSTICEís opinion in regards to BCRA ßß304

316, 319, and 403(b); concur in the result as t

dissent from the opinion as to ß311. I also fully 

JUSTICE KENNEDYís discussion of ß213 and joi

tion of his opinion. Post, at 37ñ38. 

I 

A 

ì[C]ampaign finance laws are subject to stric

Federal Election Commín v. Beaumont, 539 U. 

(2003) (slip op., at 1) (THOMAS, J., dissenting

Title I must satisfy that demanding standard 

were (incorrectly) conceived of as nothing m

contribution limitation. The defendants do n

tempt to defend Title I under this standard, a

reason: The various restrictions imposed by 

much less narrowly tailored to target only co

problematic donations than even the contributi

Shrink Missouri. See 528 U. S., at 427ñ430 (T

dissenting); see also Colorado Republican Fe

paign Comm. v. Federal Election Commín, 518 

641ñ644 (1996) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (Colora

as I have previously noted, it is unclear why 

laws [that] bar precisely the quid pro quo arr

that are targeted hereî and ìdisclosure lawsî a

restrictive means of addressing [the Governme

est in curtailing corruption.î Shrink Missour

428. 

The joint opinion not only continues the erro
tion ceilings, but also builds upon these err

panding the anticircumvention rationale beyo

Admittedly, exploitation of an anticircumvent

has a long pedigree, going back at least to Bu

Buckley upheld a $1,000 contribution ceiling a

combat both the ìactuality and appearance of c

424 U. S., at 26. The challengers in Buckley 

both that bribery laws represented ìa less 

means of dealing with ëproven and suspected q

arrangements,íî id., at 27, and that the $1,00

tion ceiling was overbroad as ìmost large cont

not seek improper influence over a candidateís 

an officeholderís action,î id., at 29. The Court r

first argument on the grounds that ìlaws maki

the giving and taking of bribes deal with onl

blatant and specific attempts of those with mon

ence governmental action,î id., at 27ñ28, and r

second on the grounds that ìit [is] difficult to 

pect contributions,î id., at 30.1 But a broadly d

ery law2 would cover even subtle and general 

influence government officials corruptly, elim

óóóóóó 

1The Court also rejected an overbreadth challenge, r

ìCongress was justified in concluding that the interest in 

against the appearance of impropriety requires that the o

abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary 

be eliminated.î Buckley, 424 U. S., at 30. But this jus

inextricably intertwined with the Courtís concern over th

isolating suspect contributions. If it were easy to is

contributions, and if bribery laws could be quickly a

enforced, then there would be no ìopportunity for abuse in

process,î ibid., and hence no need for an otherwise overb

tion ceiling. 2Arguably, the current antibribery statute, 18 U. S. C. 

enough to cover the unspecified other ìattempts . . . to 

ernmental actionî that the Buckley Court seemed worrie

U. S., at 28. 
deter actual quid pro quos and would, in all 

eliminate any appearance of corruption in the s

Hence, at root, the Buckley Court was conc

bribery laws could not be effectively enforced 

quid pro quos between donors and officeholde

only rational reading of Buckley is that it ap

$1,000 contribution ceiling on this ground. 

then, however, having at least in part conc

individual contribution ceilings were necessary 

easy evasion of bribery laws, proceeded to uph

rate contribution limitation, using, as the on

tion, the ìprevent[ion] [of] evasion of the $1,00

tion limitation.î Id., at 38. The need 

circumvention of a limitation that was itse

circumvention measure led to the upholding 

significant restriction on individualsí freedom o

The joint opinion now repeats this process. N

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) 

U. S. C. A. ß441i(a) (Supp. 2003), is intended 

easy circumvention of the (now) $2,000 contri

ing. The joint opinion even recognizes this, rely

on evidence that, for instance, ìcandidates 

alike have in fact exploited the soft-money lo

former to increase their prospects of election an

to create debt on the part of officeholders, w

tional parties serving as willing intermediaries

36. The joint opinion upholds ß323(a), in p

grounds that it had become too easy to circu

$2,000 cap by using the national parties as go-b

And the remaining provisions of new FEC

upheld mostly as measures preventing circum

other contribution limits, including ß323(a), an

(ß323(b)); ante, at 66ñ69 (ß323(d)); ante, at 7

ante, at 77ñ78 (ß323(f)), which, as I have 

plained, is a second-order anticircumvention 
telling, as it upholds ß323(f) only because of 

eminently reasonable prediction that . . . stat

candidates and officeholders will become the ne

for the soft-money funding of sham issue a

Ante, at 78 (emphasis added). That is, this Co

a third-order anticircumvention measure bas

gressí anticipation of circumvention of these s

anticircumvention measures that might possib

point in the future, pose some problem. 

It is not difficult to see where this leads. Ev

limits, and there will always be behavior not 

the law but at its edges; behavior easily chara

ìcircumventingî the lawís prohibition. Hen

regulation will again expand to cover new for

cumvention,î only to spur supposed circumven

new regulations, and so forth. Rather than 

never-ending and self-justifying process, I wo

that the Government explain why proposed spe

tions are needed in light of actual Governmen

and, in particular, why the bribery laws are not 

B 

But Title I falls even on the joint opinionís t

Court has held that ì[t]he quantum of empiric

needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny o

judgments will vary up or down with the n

plausibility of the justification raised.î Shrin

528 U. S., at 391. And three Members of today

have observed that ìthe opportunity for corru

sented by ì[u]nregulated ësoft moneyí contribut

best, attenuated.î Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 616 

BREYER, J., joined by OíCONNOR and SOUTER, JJ

observation is quite clearly correct. A donation t

party is a clumsy method by which to influence a 

as the party is free to spend the donation howeve
the candidate. And, a softmoney donation to a p

of even less benefit to a candidate, ìbecause of l

tions on how the money may be spent.î Brief fo

in No. 02ñ1674 et al., p. 43. It follows that the 

bear an especially heavy empirical burden in jus

I. 

The evidence cited by the joint opinion doe

this standard and would barely suffice for any

than rational-basis review. The first category 

opinionís evidence is evidence that ìfederal o

have commonly asked donors to make soft-m

tions to national and state committees solely 

assist federal campaigns, including the officeho

Ante, at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

extent that donors and federal officeholders ha

rated so that donors could give donations to 

party committee ìfor the purpose of influencin

tion for Federal office,î the alleged soft-money 

in actuality a regular ìcontributionî as alrea

and regulated by FECA. See 2 U. S. C. ß4

Neither the joint opinion nor the defendants p

dence that enforcement of pre-BCRA law has p

impossible, ineffective, or even particularly diffi

The second category is evidence that ìlobby

and wealthy individualsî have ìdonat[ed] 

sums of soft money to national committees not 

cal grounds, but for the express purpose of sec

ence over federal officials.î Ante, at 37. Even 

the cited evidence consists of nothing more 

allegations of wrongdoing), it is unclear wh

bribery laws could not address this problem. 

ther the joint opinion nor the defendants point 

that the enforcement of bribery laws has been 

ineffective. If the problem has been clear and w

as the joint opinion suggests, I would expect t
The third category is evidence characterized 

opinion as ìconnect[ing] soft money to manip

the legislative calendar, leading to Congress

enact, among other things, generic drug legis

reform, and tobacco legislation.î Ante, at 40

evidence for this is no stronger than the ev

there has been actual vote buying or vote sw

soft money. The joint opinionís citations to th

not stand for the propositions that they claim

stance, the McCain declaration does not provi

dence of any exchange of legislative action for d

any kind (hard or soft).3 Neither do the Simpso

declarations, with perhaps one exception effe

dressed by JUSTICE KENNEDYís opinion.4 See p

19. In fact, the findings by two of the Dist

judges confirm that the evidence of any qu

corruption is exceedingly weak, if not nonexi

251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 349ñ352 (DC 2003) (Hen

concurring in judgment in part and dissenting i

óóóóóó 

3 Indeed, the principal contents of Senator McCainís d

his complaints that several bills he supported were 

Senator also suggests, without evidence, that there ha

connection between the defeat of his favored policy 

certain soft-money donors. See, e.g., App. 393ñ394, ¶10 (

Sen. John McCain ¶10) (noting Democratic ìparliamenta

deviceî used to block one of Senator McCainís proposed a

the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate governance bill). The possi

favored policy outcomes lost due to lack of public suppo

the opponents of the amendment honestly believed it wou

the public, does not appear to be addressed. 4Former Senators Simpson and Simon both seem to h

response as Senator McCain, see n. 3, supra, in having 

interests voted down, and similarly do not consider alte

nations for the failure of their proposals. See App. 811, 

tion of former Sen. Alan Simpson ¶11); App. 805, ¶14 (

former Sen. Paul Simon ¶14). 
opinion is properly described as at best, [the M

Congressí] personal conjecture regarding the im

money donations on the voting practices of th

and former colleagues.î Id., at 852 (Leon, J.). 

The joint opinion also places a substantial 

weight on the fact that ìin 1996 and 2000, mor

of the top 50 soft-money donors gave substant

both major national parties,î and suggests th

ìleav[es] room for no other conclusion but tha

nors were seeking influence, or avoiding retalia

than promoting any particular ideology.î A

(emphasis in original). But that is not nece

case. The two major parties are not perfect 

opposites, and supporters or opponents of cert

or ideas might find substantial overlap betwe

parties. If donors feel that both major parties 

eral agreement over an issue of importance to 

unremarkable that such donors show suppo

parties. This commonsense explanation surely 

joint opinionís too-hasty conclusion drawn fr

tively innocent fact. 

The Court today finds such sparse evidence 

This cannot be held to satisfy even the ìrelative

sant reviewî of Beaumont, 539 U. S., at ___ (

14), unless, as it appears, the Court intends 

entirely its role.5 

II 

The Court is not content with ìbalanc[ing] 

Amendment freedoms,î Shrink Missouri, 528 U

(THOMAS, J., dissenting), in the context of the 

óóóóóó 

5Because there is not an iota of evidence supporting 

mentís asserted interests in BCRA ß318, I concur in the C

sion that this provision is unconstitutional. 
thought to be mere contribution limits. The Co

upholding virtually all of Title II, proceeds to d

for limitations on expenditures, which constitu

expression ëat the core of our electoral process 

First Amendment freedoms,íî Buckley, 424 U

(quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 32 (

dayís holding continues a disturbing trend: the 

crease in the level of scrutiny applied to restrict

political speech. See Buckley, supra, at 16 (Fi

ment requires ìexacting scrutinyî); Shrink Miss

at 387 (applying ìBuckleyís standard of 

Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14) (refere

tively complaisant reviewî).6 Although this tre

obvious in the review of contribution limits, 

reached what even this Court today would 

recognize as a direct restriction on core polit

limitations on independent expenditures. 

A 

Of course, by accepting Congressí expansi

constitutes ìcoordinationî for purposes of trea

ditures as limitations, the Court can pretend t

fact, still only restricting primarily ìcontributio

not say much about this illusion. I have alread

how the language used in new FECA ß315(a)

even under Buckleyís framework, overly bro

stricts fully protected speech. See Feder

Commín v. Colorado Republican Federal Campa

533 U. S. 431, 467ñ468 (2001) (THOMAS, J., 

(Colorado II). The particular language used, ìe

made by any person . . . in cooperation, cons

concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, 

óóóóóó 

6The joint opinion continues yet another disturbing tre

cation of a complaisant level of scrutiny under the gu

scrutiny.î See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. ___ (2003). 
ß()(), pp

differenceî from ìa purely independent one.î 

(THOMAS, J., dissenting).7 And new FECA ß3

although using the neutral term ìcoordinated,î c

the purpose of ìclarif[ying] the scope of the pre

section, ß315(a)(7)(B),î ante, at 95 (joint opinion

should be read to be as expansive as the overly 

guage in ß315(a)(7)(B). Hence, it too is unconstit

B 

As for ßß203 and 204, the Court rests its 

another vast expansion of the First Amendm

work described in Buckley, this time of the Cou

than Congressí, own making. In Austin v

Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 659ñ660 

Court recognized a ìdifferent type of corruption

ìëfinancial quid pro quoíî: the ìcorrosive and 

effects of immense aggregations of wealth that a

lated with the help of the corporate form and tha

or no correlation to the publicís support for the c

political ideas.î The only effect, however, that th

aggregationsî of wealth will have (in the cont

pendent expenditures) on an election is that th

used to fund communications to convince vote

certain candidates over others. In other words

sive and distorting effectsî described in Aust

corporations, on behalf of their shareholders, wi

convince voters of the correctness of their ide

ently, winning in the marketplace of ideas is 

sign that ìthe ultimate goodî has been ìreach

óóóóóó 

7This is doubly so now that the Court has decided th

constitutional need for the showing even of an ìagreemen

transform an expenditure into a ìcoordinated expen

hence into a contribution for FECA purposes. Ante, at 1

opinion). 
test of truth by having the thought . . . get its

in the competition of the market.î Abrams, 250 U

(Holmes, J., dissenting). It is now evidence of ì

This conclusion is antithetical to everything fo

First Amendment stands. See, e.g., First Na

Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 790 (1978) (ì[T]

advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly 

suppress itî); Kingsley Intíl Pictures Corp. v. 

Univ. of N. Y., 360 U. S. 684, 689 (1959) (ì[I]n t

ideas [the Constitution] protects expression w

quent no less than that which is unconvincingî). 

Because Austinís definition of ìcorruptionî is 

ble with the First Amendment, I would overt

and hold that the potential for corporations an

influence voters, via independent expenditure

convincing these voters to adopt particular vie

form of corruption justifying any state regulat

pression. Without Austinís peculiar variation 

tion,î ßß203 and 204 are supported by no com

ernment interest. The joint opinion does not 

that these provisions address quid pro quo 

And the shareholder protection rationale is 

availing. The ìshareholder invests in a corpor

own volition and is free to withdraw his investm

time and for any reason,î Bellotti, supra, at 

Hence, no compelling interest can be found in 

óóóóóó 

8The National Rifle Association (NRA) plaintiffs comp

that ì[a]s a measure designed to prevent official corrup

the quid pro quo or the ëgratitudeí variety, Title II . . . m

sense than a bribery statute requiring corporations to 

bribes using funds from PACs.î Brief for Appellants NR

02ñ1675, pp. 24ñ25. And, regarding the appearance 

ìDefendantsí own witnesses concede that the publicís perc

is not affected in the slightest by whether they are pu

general treasury funds or with PAC money.î Id., at 25. 
general treasury, especially where, in othe

ìequally important and controversial corporat

are made by management or by a predetermin

age of the shareholders.î Ibid. 

C 

I must now address an issue on which I differ 

my colleagues: the disclosure provisions in B

now contained in new FECA ß304(f). The 

evidence indicates that Founding-era America

attempts to require that anonymous authors r

identities on the ground that forced disclosure v

ëfreedom of the press.íî McIntyre v. Ohio Electio

514 U. S. 334, 361 (1995) (THOMAS, J., concurrin

this Court has explicitly recognized that ìthe 

having anonymous works enter the marketpla

unquestionably outweighs any public interest i

disclosure as a condition of entry,î and thu

authorís decision to remain anonymous . . . is a

the freedom of speech protected by the First Am

Id., at 342. The Court now backs away from th

allowing the established right to anonymous s

stripped away based on the flimsiest of justificati

The only plausible interest asserted by the de

justify the disclosure provisions is the interes

ing ìinformationî about the speaker to the pub

have already held that ì[t]he simple interest i

voters with additional relevant information do

tify a state requirement that a writer make sta

óóóóóó 

9The fact that the Founders located the right to anonym

the ìfreedom of the pressî is of no moment, as ìit makes li

in terms of our analysis, which seeks to determine only 

First Amendment, as originally understood, protect

writing.î McIntyre, 514 U. S., at 360 (THOMAS, J., concurr
course, Buckley upheld the disclosure requi

expenditures for communications using words 

advocacy based on this informational interest. 

at 81. And admittedly, McIntyre purported to 

Buckley. McIntyre, supra, at 355ñ356. But th

McIntyre distinguished Buckleyóone, that the 

of ìan expenditure and its use, without more, 

less information [than a forced identification of 

of a pamphlet,]î 514 U. S., at 355; and two, th

date elections, the ìGovernment can identify a 

state interest in avoiding the corruption that m

from campaign expenditures,î id., at 356óare 

implausible. The first is simply wrong. The r

oneís political expenditures for independent c

tions about candidates can be just as revea

revelation of oneís name on a pamphlet for a no

election. See also id., at 384 (SCALIA, J., dissen

second was outright rejected in Buckley itself

Court concluded that independent expenditur

create any substantial risk of real or apparent 

424 U. S., at 47. Hence, the only reading of Mc

remains consistent with the principles it contai

overturned Buckley to the extent that Buckle

disclosure requirement solely based on the go

interest in providing information to the voters. 

The right to anonymous speech cannot b

based on the interests asserted by the defendan

thus hold that the disclosure requirements of 

are unconstitutional. Because of this conclus

called advance disclosure requirement of ß201 

falls as well.10 

óóóóóó 

10BCRA ß212(a) is also unconstitutional. Although the 

challenge the advance disclosure requirement of ß212(a)
I have long maintained that Buckley was 

decided and should be overturned. See Color

U. S., at 465; Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 41

I, 518 U. S., at 640. But, most of Title II sho

held unconstitutional even under the Buckley 

Under Buckley and Federal Election Commín v. 

setts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) 

is, or at least was, clear that any regulation 

speech beyond communications using words 

advocacy is unconstitutional. Hence, even und

opinionís framework, most of Title II is uncon

as both the ìprimary definitionî and ìbackup d

ìelectioneering communicationsî cover a signif

ber of communications that do not use words 

advocacy. 2 U. S. C. A. ß434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. 200

óóóóóó 

disclosure of communications using express advocacy, 

porting requirement is unconstitutional for the same reas

is unconstitutional. Consequently, it follows that the a

sure provision is unconstitutional. 

BCRA ßß311 and 504 also violate the First Amendmen

ing any television or radio advertisement that satisfies th

ìelectioneering communicationî to include the identity o

and even a ìfull-screen view of a representative of the pol

tee or other person making the statementî in the case o

advertisement, new FECA ß318, ß311 is a virtual carbon c

at issue in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commín, 514 U. 

(the only difference being the irrelevant distinction betw

pamphlet and a television or radio advertisement). And 

has the precise flaws of ß201, but also sweeps broadly as 

any ìmessage relating to any political matter of nationa

including . . . a national legislative issue of public import

both ßß311 and 504 should be struck down. 11The Court, in upholding most of its provisions by co

the ìexpress advocacyî limitation derived by Buckley is n

tionally mandated line, has, in one blow, overturned e

Appeals that has addressed this question (except, perha

Clifton v. FEC, 114 F. 3d 1309, 1312 (CA1 1997); Vermon
ous language any expenditure . . . relative t

identified candidate.íî 424 U. S., at 41. The C

that the ìuse of so indefinite a phrase as ëre

candidate fails to clearly mark the boundar

permissible and impermissible speech.î Ibid. 

Court read the phrase to mean ìadvocating the 

defeat of a candidate.î Id., at 42 (interna

marks omitted). But this construction did no

the vagueness inquiry. As the Court observed: 

ì[T]he distinction between discussion of 

candidates and advocacy of election or defe

dates may often dissolve in practical 

Candidates, especially incumbents, are inti

to public issues involving legislative pro

governmental actions. Not only do candi

paign on the basis of their positions on var

issues, but campaigns themselves genera

public interest.î Ibid. 

The Court then recognized that the constituti

raised by the provision ìcan be avoided only 

ß608(e)(1) as limited to communications th

explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat 

date.î Id., at 43. 

The joint opinion argues that Buckley ad

narrow reading only to avoid addressing a con

question. ì[T]he concept of express advocac

óóóóóó 

Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F. 3d 376, 387 (CA2 2000); FE

Action Network, Inc., 110 F. 3d 1049, 1064 (CA4 1997)

Commerce v. Moore, 288 F. 3d 187, 193 (CA5 2000); Iowa 

Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F. 3d 963, 968ñ970 (CA8 1

for Responsible Govt. State Political Action Comm. v. D

F. 3d 1174, 1187 (CA10 2000). The one possible exceptio

Circuit. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F. 2d 857, 862ñ863 (19
avoid constitutional infirmities, concludes the 

ion after examining the language of Buckley. A

This ignores the fact that the Court then struc

expenditure limitation precisely because it w

row: 

ìThe exacting interpretation of the statutor

necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagu

undermines the limitationís effectiveness 

hole-closing provision by facilitating circum

those seeking to exert improper influence u

didate or officeholder. It would naively und

the ingenuity and resourcefulness of p

groups desiring to buy influence to believ

would have much difficulty devising expend

skirted the restriction on express advocacy 

or defeat but nevertheless benefited the 

campaign. Yet no substantial societal int

be served by a loophole-closing provision 

check corruption that permitted unscrupul

and organizations to expend unlimited sum

in order to obtain improper influence over 

for elective office.î 424 U. S., at 45. 

Far from saving the provision from constituti

the Court read the provision in such a way as to 

its unconstitutionality. If there were some pos

regulation of communications without words 

advocacy were constitutional, the provision wo

have been read to include these communicatio

constitutional question addressed head on.12 

óóóóóó 

12After all, the constitutional avoidance doctrine counse

constructions of statutes to ìavoid decision of constitution

not to deliberately create constitutional questions. Un

Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 373 (1971); se
Buckley is far from mandated by the text; it i

highly strained reading. ìë[A]ny expenditure 

to a clearly identified candidate,íî id., at 41

better read to cover, for instance, any expendi

advertisement aired close to an election that i

to influence the votersí decisions and ha[s] th

standard apparently endorsed by the joint 

being sufficiently ìequivalentî to express a

justify its regulation. Ante, at 99ñ100. By d

adopting a strained and narrow reading of th

text and then striking down the provision in q

being too narrow, the Court made clear that re

nonexpress advocacy was strictly forbidden. 

This reading is confirmed by other portions 

and by other cases. For instance, in limiti

disclosure provisions to expenditures involvi

advocacy, the Court noted that it gave such a 

interpretation ì[t]o insure that the reach of [th

provision] is not impermissibly broad.î 424 U

(emphasis added). If overbreadth were a conc

iting the scope of a disclosure provision, it 

equally a concern in the limitation of an act

expenditures. And, in MCFL, the Court argu

nated any ambiguity remaining in Buckley whe

itly stated that the narrowing interpretation

Buckley were necessary ìin order to avoid p

overbreadth.î MCFL, 479 U. S., at 248. The 

ionís attempt to explain away MCFLís un

language is unpersuasive. The joint opinion 

that the MCFL Court ìheld that a ësimilar c

must apply to the expenditure limitation,î as if 

óóóóóó 

States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 

408 (1909). 
original). The fact that the MCFL Court said th

establish anything, of course; adopting a narro

tion of a statute ìin order to avoid problem

breadth,î 479 U. S., at 248, is perfectly consis

holding that, lacking the narrowing constr

statute would be overly broad, i.e., unconstituti

The defendantsí principal argument in respon

ìit would be bizarre to conclude that the C

permits Congress to prohibit the use of c

union general treasury funds for electionee

tisements, but that the only standard that 

stitutionally use (express advocacy) is one 

the vast majority (88.6 percent) of adv

that candidates themselves use for elec

Brief for FEC et al. in No. 02ñ1674 et al., 

phasis in original). 

The joint opinion echoes this, stating that t

advocacy line ìcannot be squared with our lo

recognition that the presence or absence of m

cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneer

from a true issue ad.î Ante, at 86. First, the 

the ìmagic wordsî does differentiate in a mean

between categories of speech. Speech cont

ìmagic wordsî is ìunambiguously campaig

Buckley, supra, at 81, while speech without the

not. Second, it is far from bizarre to suggest t

tially regulable) speech that is in practice im

differentiate from fully protected speech mu

protected. It is, rather, part and parcel of Fi

ment first principles. See, e.g., Free Speech Co

U. S., at 255 (ìThe Government may not supp

speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech

speech does not become unprotected merely 

resembles the latter. The Constitution requi
to that fundamental category of artistic and e

speech not for its own sake, but only because it 

tinguishable, practically, from speech intended 

See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S

(1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 

(rejecting suggestion that ìthe constitutional pro

free press applies only to the exposition of ideasî 

between the informing and the entertaining is 

for the protection of that basic right,î noting tha

one manís amusement, teaches anotherís doctr

principle clearly played a significant role in Bu

see 424 U. S., at 42 (after noting that ìthe dis

tween discussion of issues and candidates and 

election or defeat of candidates may often dissolv

cal application,î holding that the ìexpress advo

dard must be adopted as the interpretation of t

language in FECA). The express-advocacy line 

to ensure the protection of the ìdiscussion of 

candidates,î not out of some strange obsession o

to create meaningless lines. And the joint opi

the point when it notes that ìBuckleyís expre

line, in short, has not aided the legislative effor

real or apparent corruption.î Ante, at 86ñ87. 

not draw this line solely to aid in combating re

ent corruption, but rather also to ensure the p

speech unrelated to election campaigns.13 

Nor is this to say that speech with words 

óóóóóó 

13This very case is an excellent example of why such a bri

necessary. The Court, having ìrejected the notion that the 

ment requires Congress to treat so-called issue advocacy d

express advocacy,î ante, at 87ñ88, proceeds to uphold s

restrictions on speech that is, in every sense of the wor

related speech. The Court abandons the bright-line rule, an

political speech of virtually any kind to the risk of regulation 
claims. Ante, at 99. The Court in Buckley rec

informational interest that justified the impo

disclosure requirement on campaign-related s

424 U. S., at 81. This interest is not impl

regard to speech that is unrelated to an election 

Hence, it would be unconstitutional to imp

disclosure requirement on non-election-relat

And, as ìthe distinction between discussion of 

candidates . . . may often dissolve in practical a

id., at 42, the only way to prevent the unjustif

ing of nonelection speech is to impose the regu

on speech that is ìunambiguously campaign r

at 81, i.e., speech using words of express advoca

speech that uses words of express advocacy i

under the same standard, strict scrutiny, a

forms of speech. The only difference is that, u

ley, there is a governmental interest suppo

regulation of those using words of express ad

present in other forms of speech. 

* * * 

The chilling endpoint of the Courtís reaso

difficult to foresee: outright regulation of the p

of the rationales offered by the defendants, and 

reasoning employed by the Court, exempts 

ìThis is so because of the difficulty, and perha

bility, of distinguishing, either as a matter of 

stitutional law, media corporations from [non

porations.î Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 796 (Bu

concurring). Media companies can run pr

editorials as easily as nonmedia corporations 

advertisements. Candidates can be just as 

media companies as they can be to corporatio

ions. In terms of ìthe corrosive and distorting 

wealth accumulated by corporations that has 
political ideas, Austin, 494 U. S., at 660, ther

tinction between a media corporation and a 

corporation.14 Media corporations are influen

is little doubt that the editorials and commenta

can affect elections. Nor is there any doubt 

companies often wish to influence elections. 

think that the New York Times fervently hop

endorsement of Presidential candidates wi

influence people. What is to stop a future Con

determining that the press is ìtoo influential

the ìappearance of corruptionî is significant w

organizations endorse candidates or run ìs

ìbiasedî news stories in favor of candidates or p

even easier, what is to stop a future Congres

cluding that the availability of unregulated med

tions creates a loophole that allows for easy ì

tionî of the limitations of the current campa

laws?15 

óóóóóó 

14Chief Justice Burger presciently commented on preci

in First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 7

(citations omitted): 

ìIn terms of ëunfair advantage in the political processí 

domination of the electoral process,í it could be argued th

conglomerates as I describe pose a much more realistic t

interests than do appellants and similar entities not r

cerned with shaping popular opinion on public issues

Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, [418 U. S. 241 (1974)]

for example, we noted the serious contentions advanced t

the growth of modern media empires ëhas been to place i

the power to inform the American people and shape p

418 U. S., at 250.î 15 It appears that ìcircumventionî of the campaign fin

exploiting media exemptions is already being planned 

plaintiffs in this litigation. See Theimer, NRA Seeks S

Outlet, Washington Post A09 (Dec. 7, 2003) (reporting th

looking to acquire a broadcast outlet and seeking to be 
challenged opinions such as Miami Herald Pub

v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), are in peril. 

Court noted that ì[c]hains of newspapers, nat

papers, national wire and news services, 

newspaper towns, are the dominant features 

that has become noncompetitive and enormous

and influential in its capacity to manipula

opinion and change the course of events.î I

Despite expressing some sympathy for those ar

legally created ìright of accessî to encourage 

viewpoints in the media, the Court struck down 

noting that these laws acted both to suppress 

to ìintru[de] into the function of editorsî by 

with ìthe exercise of editorial control and judg

at 257ñ258. Now, supporters of such laws need 

that the pressí ìcapacity to manipulate popul

gives rise to an ìappearance of corruption,î 

when this capacity is used to promote a partic

date or party. After drumming up some evide

regulating media outlets in their issuance o

would be upheld under the joint opinionís re

result considered so beyond the pale in Mia

Publishing that the Court there used it as a 

absurdum against the right-of-access law being 

óóóóóó 

news organization). 16Given the quality of the evidence the Court relies u

Title I, the evidence should not be hard to come by. See 

ston, Fox Chief on Hot Seat, Roll Call (June 12, 2003) (

such as House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas) 

CNN as the ëCommunist News Networkí and the ëClint

workíósuggesting they only presented the liberal viewpoi

former President Clintonî); Jones, Fox News Moves from 

to the Mainstream, Shorenstein Center, Harvard (Dec. 1

ing Al Gore as describing Fox News and the Washington T

and parcel of the Republican Partyî). 
that would prevent Congress from imposing th

Doctrine, not just on radio and television broad

on the entire media. See Red Lion Broadc

U. S., at 369 (defining the ìfairness doctrine

quirement that discussion of public issues be 

. . . and that each side of those issues must be 

coverageî). 

Hence, ìthe freedom of the press,î described 

the greatest bulwarks of liberty,î 1 J. Elliot, 

the Federal Constitution 335 (___ ed. 1876) (de

Rhode Island upon the ratification of the Con

could be next on the chopping block. Althou

opinion does not expressly strip the press of Fi

ment protection, there is no principle of law o

would prevent the application of the Courtís 

in that setting. The press now operates at t

Congress. 

óóóóóó 

17See also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law

151 (1769) (ìThe liberty of the press is indeed essential to 

a free stateî). 
Nos. 02ñ1674, 02ñ1675, 02ñ1676, 02ñ1702, 02ñ1727, 02ñ1

02ñ1740, 02ñ1747, 02ñ1753, 02ñ1755, AND 02ñ1

_________________ 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1674 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1675 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET AL., APP

02ñ1676 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

JOHN MCCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1702 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, E

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1727 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1733 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPE

02ñ1734 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, ET AL., APP

02ñ1740 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 
II.* 

, 

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1747 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ET AL., APP

02ñ1753 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CON

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1755 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED 

ET AL., APPELLANTS 

02ñ1756 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

[December 10, 2003] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgm

and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA T

The First Amendment guarantees our citizen

to judge for themselves the most effective me

expression of political views and to decide for 

which entities to trust as reliable speakers. 

portions of Titles I and II of the Bipartisan 

Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA or Act) constrain th

óóóóóó 

* THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins this opinion in its entirety. J

joins this opinion except to the extent it upholds new 

and BCRA ß202. JUSTICE THOMAS joins this opinion w

BCRA ß213. 
preference for speaking through parties and org

And they provide safe harbor to the mainstr

suggesting that the corporate media alone suffi

ate the burdens the Act places on the rights an

of ordinary citizens. 

Todayís decision upholding these laws purp

to follow Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (p

and to abide by stare decisis, see ante, at 27 (jo

of STEVENS and OíCONNOR, JJ. (hereinafte

majority)); but the majority, to make its dec

must abridge free speech where Buckley did no

did not authorize Congress to decide what 

forms the national political dialogue is to take

todayís decision, the Court surpasses Buckleyís 

expands Congressí regulatory power. In so d

places discrete and respected First Amendmen

with new, amorphous, and unsound rules, r

dismantle basic protections for speech. 

A few examples show how BCRA reorders sp

and codifies the Governmentís own preferences 

speakers. BCRA would have imposed felony p

on Ross Perotís 1996 efforts to build the Ref

Compare Federal Election Campaign Act of 19

ßß309(d)(1)(A), 315(a)(1)(B), and 323(a)(1) (pro

up to five yearsí imprisonment, any individual 

over $25,000 annually to a national party), wit

By Perot, The Houston Chronicle, Dec. 13, 

(reporting Perotís $8 million founding contribu

Reform Party). BCRA makes it a felony for 

mental group to broadcast an ad, within 60 

election, exhorting the public to protest a Con

impending vote to permit logging in national f

BCRA ß203. BCRA escalates Congressí discrim

favor of the speech rights of giant media corpo

against the speech rights of other corporations, 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 65

(1990) (first sanctioning this type of discriminatio

To the majority, all this is not only valid und

Amendment but also is part of Congressí ì

provement of the national election laws.î Ante

should make no mistake. It is neither. It is t

tion of an assumption that the mainstream m

can protect freedom of speech. It is an effort b

to ensure that civic discourse takes place only t

modes of its choosing. And BCRA is only the be

its congressional proponents freely admit: 

ìThis is a modest step, it is a first step, it i

tial step, but it does not even begin to 

some ways, the fundamental problems tha

the hard money aspect of the system.î 148 

S2101 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. F

Id., at S2097 (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (ì[P

legislation . . . will whet peopleís appetite for 

at S2101 (statement of Sen. Boxer) (ì[T]his 

the be-all or the end-all, but it is a strong sta

S2152 (statement of Sen. Corzine) (ì[T]his sho

will not be the last time campaign finance re

bated on the Senate floor. We have many more 

campaign finance issues to exploreî); id., at S2

ment of Sen. Torricelli) (ìMake [BCRA] the beg

reform, not the end of reformî); id., at H44

2002) (statement of Rep. Doggett) (ìMr. Ch

[BCRA] has any defect, it is that it does too lit

muchî). 

Our precedents teach, above all, that Gover

not be trusted to moderate its own rules for sup

speech. The dangers posed by speech regulatio

the Court to insist upon principled constitution

a rigorous standard of review. The majority 
With respect, I dissent from the majority 

holding BCRA Titles I and II. I concur in the j

to BCRA ß213 and new FECA ß323(e) and co

judgment in part and dissent in part as to BC

202, and 214. 

I. TITLE I AND COORDINATION PROVI

Title I principally bans the solicitation, recei

and spending of soft money by the national p

FECA ß323(a), 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i(a) (Supp. 200

bans certain uses of soft money by state p

FECA ß323(b)); the transfer of soft money fro

parties to nonprofit groups (new FECA ß323(d)

tation, receipt, transfer, and spending of soft 

federal candidates and officeholders (new FEC

and certain uses of soft money by state candi

FECA ß323(f)). These provisions, and the other 

with which this opinion is principally concern

out in full, see Appendix, infra. Even a cursor

the speech and association burdens these l

makes their First Amendment infirmities obvio

Title I bars individuals with shared b

pooling their money above limits set by C

form a new third party. See new FECA ß32

Title I bars national party officials from 

directing soft money to state parties for us

ballot initiative. This is true even if no fe

appears on the same ballot as the state init

new FECA ß323(a). 

A national partyís mere involvement in t

planning of fundraising for a state ballo

risks a determination that the national pa

cising ìindirect controlî of the state party. 

termination is made, the state party mu

federal regulations. And this is so even if 
posed or is so certain of election that the on

terest is in the state and local campaigns

FECA ß323(a). 

Title I compels speech. Party officials w

engage in activity such as fundraising 

speak magic words to ensure the solicitatio

interpreted as anything other than a soli

hard, not soft, money. See ibid. 

Title I prohibits the national parties f

any sort of funds to nonprofit entities, eve

regulated hard money, and even if the par

sponsor the interest groupís exploration of a 

issue in advance of the partyís addition o

platform. See new FECA ß323(d). 

By express terms, Title I imposes multip

forms of spending caps on parties, cand

their agents. See new FECA ßß323(a), (e), 

Title I allows state parties to raise quasi

Levin funds for use in activities that mig

federal election; but the Act prohibits natio

from assisting state parties in developin

cuting these fundraising plans, even when 

seek only to advance state election interest

FECA ß323(b). 

Until todayís consolidated cases, the Court h

but two principles to use in determining the 

campaign finance restrictions. First is the ant

rationale. The principal concern, of course, is 

ment for a quid pro quo between officeholder

dates) and those who would seek to influence 

Court has said the interest in preventing cor

lows limitations on receipt of the quid by a c

officeholder, regardless of who gives it or of th

the donor or officeholder. See Buckley, 424 U
laws that classify on the basis of the speakers c

union identity under the corporate speech rati

Court has said that the willing adoption of the 

by corporations and unions justifies regula

differently: Their ability to give candidates qu

subject not only to limits but also to outright 

electoral speech may likewise be curtailed. 

494 U. S., at 659ñ660; Federal Election Commín 

Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 201ñ211 (19

The majority today opens with rhetoric that 

conflation of the anticorruption rationale with 

rate speech rationale. See ante, at 3ñ6 (heark

to, among others, Elihu Root and his advocacy 

use of corporate funds in political campaign

conflation appears designed to cast the speech 

here as unseemly corporate speech. The effort, 

unwarranted, and not just because money is no

evil the majority thinks. Most of the regulatio

notably all of the Title I soft money bans and 

coordination provisions, do not draw distinction

corporate or union status. Referring to th

speech rationale as if it were the linchpin o

when corporate speech is not primarily at issu

force to the Courtís analysis. Instead, the foc

on Buckleyís anticorruption rationale and 

Amendment rights of individual citizens. 

A. Constitutionally Sufficient Interes

In Buckley, the Court held that one, and only 

est justified the significant burden on the right 

tion involved there: eliminating, or prevent

corruption or the appearance of corruption stem

contributions to candidates. 

ìIt is unnecessary to look beyond the Ac

purposeóto limit the actuality and appear
tributionsin order to find a constitutio

cient justification for the $1,000 contribu

tion.î 424 U. S., at 26. 

See also ibid. (concluding this corruption in

sufficiently ìsignificantî to sustain ìclosely dr

ference with protected First Amendment rights

In parallel, Buckley concluded the expendit

tions in question were invalid because they 

vance that same interest. See id., at 47ñ48 (ì

pendent expenditure ceiling thus fails to 

substantial governmental interest in stemming 

or appearance of corruption in the electoral pr

also id., at 45, 46. 

Thus, though Buckley subjected expenditur

strict scrutiny and contribution limits to le

review, it held neither could withstand co

challenge unless it was shown to advance the 

tion interest. In these consolidated cases, unl

is to be repudiated, we must conclude that the 

further that interest before considering wheth

closely drawn or narrowly tailored. If the int

advanced, the regulations cannot comport with 

tution, quite apart from the standard of review. 

Buckley made clear, by its express langua

context, that the corruption interest only jus

lating candidatesí and officeholdersí receipt of w

call the ìquidsî in the quid pro quo formula

Court rested its decision on the principle tha

finance regulation that restricts speech withou

proof of particular corrupt action withstand

tional challenge only if it regulates conduct p

monstrable quid pro quo danger: 

ìTo the extent that large contributions are 

cure a political quid pro quo from current 

tial office holders, the integrity of our syste
See also id., at 45 (ì[A]ssuming, arguendo, 

independent expenditures pose the same dange

or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do l

butions . . .î). That Buckley rested its decision o

pro quo standard is not a novel observation. W

this was the case: 

ìThe exception [of contribution limits bei

under the First Amendment] relates to the 

of undue influence of large contributions 

date: ëTo the extent that large contribution

to secure a political quid pro quo from curr

tential office holders, the integrity of our 

representative democracy is undermined.

Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair 

Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 297 (1981) (quotin

supra, at 26ñ27). 

See also Federal Election Commín v. Beaumon

___ (2003) (furthering this anticorruption 

by upholding limits on contributions given 

candidates); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govern

528 U. S. 377 (2000) (same). 

Despite the Courtís attempt to rely on lan

cases like Shrink Missouri to establish that th

defining corruption is broader than conduct th

a quid pro quo danger, see ante, at 43, n. 48, in 

the Court in fact upheld limits on conduct poss

pro quo dangers, and nothing more. See als

For example, the Shrink Missouri Courtís dis

of what was at issue there and quid pro quo, in 

only that it used the term quid pro quo to ref

corrupt, vote-buying exchanges, as opposed to i

that possessed quid pro quo potential even if 

undertaken. Thus, the Court said: 

ì[W]e spoke in Buckley of the perception of 
tributions to candidates for public office 

source of concern ìalmost equalî to quid p

probity.î 528 U. S., at 390 (citations omitte

Thus, the perception of corruption that the m

asserts is somehow different from the quid pro 

tial discussed in this opinion, was created by a

featuring quid pro quo potentialócontributions 

a candidate. 

In determining whether conduct poses a qu

danger the analysis is functional. In Buckley

confronted an expenditure limitation prov

capped the amount of money individuals coul

any activity intended to influence a federal elec

reached to both independent and coordinate

tures). See 424 U. S., at 46ñ47. The Court con

though the limitation reached both coordinate

pendent expenditures, there were other valid F

sions that barred coordinated expenditures. 

limit at issue only added regulation to indepen

ditures. On that basis it concluded the pro

unsupported by any valid corruption interest

duct to which it added regulation (independe

tures) posed no quid pro quo danger. See ibid. 

Placing Buckleyís anticorruption rationale in 

of the federal legislative power yields the foll

Congressí interest in preventing corruption 

basis for regulating federal candidatesí and of

receipt of quids, whether or not the candidat

holder corruptly received them. Conversely

requires the Court to strike down campaign fin

lations when they do not add regulation to 

apparent quid pro quo arrangements.î Id., at 4

The Court ignores these constitutional bou

effect interprets the anticorruption rational

regulation not just of ìactual or apparent qu
will from or influences a Member of Congress

that there is any quarrel between this opini

majority that the inquiry since Buckley has be

certain conduct creates ìundue influence.î S

40ñ41. On that we agree. The very aim of Buc

dard, however, was to define undue influence b

to the presence of quid pro quo involving the o

The Court, in contrast, concludes that acce

more, proves influence is undue. Access, in 

view, has the same legal ramifications as actua

ent corruption of officeholders. This new d

corruption sweeps away all protections for spe

in its path. 

The majority says it is not abandoning our c

way, but its reasoning shows otherwise: 

ìMore importantly, plaintiffs conceive of 

too narrowly. Our cases have firmly estab

Congressí legitimate interest extends b

venting simple cash-for-votes corruption 

ëundue influence on an officeholderís judgm

appearance of such influence.í [Feder

Commín v. Colorado Republican Federal 

Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 441 (2001) (Co

Many of the ëdeeply disturbing examplesí of 

cited by this Court in Buckley to justify F

tribution limits were not episodes of vote 

evidence that various corporate interests 

substantial donations to gain access to hig

ernment officials. Even if that access did 

actual influence, it certainly gave the ëap

such influence.í Colorado II, supra, at 44

[Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821, 838 (CAD

ìThe record in the present case is re
g 

in exchange for large soft-money donation

F. Supp. 2d 176, 492ñ506 (DC 2003) (Kol

J.)].î Ante, at 40ñ41. 

The majority notes that access flowed from 

lated conduct at issue in Buckley and its pro

uses that fact as the basis for concluding that 

dling by the parties equals corruption by the 

That conclusion, however, is tenable only by a 

subtle shift, and one that breaks new ground: 

ity ignores the quid pro quo nature of the reg

duct central to our earlier decisions. It rel

solely on the fact that access flowed from the co

To ignore the fact that in Buckley the mon

was given to candidates, creating an obvious q

danger as much as it led to the candidates als

access to the donors, is to ignore the Courtís co

Buckley that show quid pro quo was of central 

to the analysis. See 424 U. S., at 26ñ27, 45. T

also ignores that in Buckley, and ever since, 

contributions that have been subject to congres

were not general party-building contribution

only contributions used to influence particula

That is, they were contributions that flowed to 

candidateís benefit, again posing a quid pro q

And it ignores that in Colorado II, the party sp

that which was coordinated with a particular 

thereby implicating quid pro quo dangers. In 

ways the majority breaks the necessary teth

quid and access and assumes that access, a

demonstrates corruption and so can support 

See also ante, at 47 (ì[L]arge soft-money d

national party committees are likely to buy don

ential access to federal officeholders no matter 

which their contributions are eventually putî). 
sense an officeholder favors someone or that so

influence on the officeholder. There is no basi

in fact, to say favoritism or influence in gen

same as corrupt favoritism or influence in par

equating vague and generic claims of favoritis

ence with actual or apparent corruption, the C

a definition of corruption that dismantles 

Amendment rules, permits Congress to suppres

the absence of a quid pro quo threat, and mo

the rationale that is Buckleyís very foundation. 

The generic favoritism or influence theory art

the Court is at odds with standard First A

analyses because it is unbounded and suscep

limiting principle. Any given action might be 

any given person, so by the Courtís reasoni

loyalty of the purest sort can be prohibited. T

remaining principled method for inquiring 

campaign finance regulation does in fact regul

tion in a serious and meaningful way. We are 

to a congressional conclusion that certain cond

favoritism or influence. 

Though the majority cites common sense as 

tion for its definition of corruption, see ante, a

the context of the real world only a single d

corruption has been found to identify political 

successfully and to distinguish good political 

ness from badóthat is quid pro quo. Favo

influence are not, as the Governmentís theor

avoidable in representative politics. It is in th

an elected representative to favor certain polic

necessary corollary, to favor the voters and c

who support those policies. It is well unders

substantial and legitimate reason, if not the o

to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to

date over another is that the candidate will 
Democracy is premised on responsiveness. Qu

corruption has been, until now, the only a

conduct that represents the bad form of resp

and presents a justiciable standard with a rela

limiting principle: Bad responsiveness may 

strated by pointing to a relationship between 

and a quid. 

The majority attempts to mask its extension 

under claims that BCRA prevents the appeara

ruption, even if it does not prevent actual corru

some assert that any donation of money to a po

is suspect. See ante, at 40ñ42. Under Buckle

that Congress has a valid ìinterest in stemmin

ity or appearance of corruption,î 424 U. S., 

however, the inquiry does not turn on whethe

sons assert that an appearance of corrupt

Rather, the inquiry turns on whether the Legi

established that the regulated conduct has in

ruption potential, thus justifying the inference 

lating the conduct will stem the appearance of r

tion. Buckley was guided and constrained by th

In striking down expenditure limits the Court 

did not ask whether people thought large electi

tures corrupt, because clearly at that time ma

including a majority of Congress and the Pre

See id., at 25 (ìAccording to the parties and 

primary interest served . . . by the Act as a w

prevention of corruption and the appearance 

tionî). Instead, the Court asked whether the G

had proved that the regulated conduct, the ex

posed inherent quid pro quo corruption potenti

at 46. 

The Buckley decision made this analysis eve

upholding contribution limitations. It stated t

actual corrupt contribution practices had not b
corruption that is inherent in a regime of large 

financial contributions.î Id., at 27 (discussin

tions to candidates). See also id., at 28, 30. T

quo nature of candidate contributions justified 

sion that the contributions pose inherent cor

tential; and this in turn justified the conclusion 

regulation would stem the appearance of real co

From that it follows that the Court today 

ask, as it does, whether some persons, even M

Congress, conclusorily assert that the regulat

appears corrupt to them. Following Buckley

instead inquire whether the conduct now pro

herently poses a real or substantive quid pro q

so that its regulation will stem the appearance 

quo corruption. 

1. New FECA ßß323(a), (b), (d), and (

Sections 323(a), (b), (d), and (f), 2 U. S. C. A

(b), (d), and (f) (Supp. 2003), cannot stand beca

not add regulation to conduct that poses a de

quid pro quo danger. They do not further Bu

ruption interest. 

The majority, with a broad brush, paints 

aimed at limiting contributions possessing fed

holder corruption potential. From there it w

ß323ís remaining provisions as necessary comp

ensure the national parties cannot circumven

prohibitions. The broad brush approach fail

when the provisions are reviewed under Buck

definition of corruption potential. 

On its face ß323(a) does not regulate federal 

or officeholdersí receipt of quids because it doe

late contributions to, or conduct by, candidate

holders. See BCRA ß101(a) (setting out 

ß323(a): National parties may not ìsolicit, receiv
The realities that underlie the statute, furth

not support the majorityís interpretation. Bef

enactment, parties could only use soft money 

dateís ìbenefitî (e.g., through issue ads, which 

now admit may influence elections) independ

candidate. And, as discussed later, ß323(e) v

hibits federal candidate and officeholder solicita

money party donations. See infra, at 31. Sec

therefore, only adds regulation to soft money p

tions not solicited by, or spent in coordinati

candidate or officeholder. 

These donations (noncandidate or officehold

soft money party donations that are independe

do not pose the quid pro quo dangers that p

basis for restricting protected speech. Thoug

ernment argues ß323(a) does regulate federal 

and officeholdersí receipt of quids, it bases its a

this flawed reasoning: 

(1) ì[F]ederal elected officeholders are i

linked to their political parties,î Brief 

lees/Cross Appellants FEC et al. in No. 02ñ

p. 21; cf. Colorado Republican Federal 

Comm. v. Federal Election Commín, 518 U. 

(1996) (Colorado I) (KENNEDY, J., concurri

ment and dissenting in part). 

(2) All party receipts must be connect

must create, corrupt donor favoritism am

officeholders. 

(3) Therefore, regulation of party rece

regulation of quids to the partyís officehold

The reasoning is flawed because the Go

reliance on reasoning parallel to the Colorad

rence only establishes the first step in its cha

that a party is a proxy for its candidates genera
out: 

dates generally, all moneys the party receive

candidate solicited-soft money donations, or 

used in coordinated activity) represent quids 

partyís candidates and officeholders. The Go

analysis is inconsistent with what a majority 

tices, in different opinions, have said. 

JUSTICE THOMASí dissent in Colorado II, 53

476ñ477, taken together with JUSTICE BREYE

announcing the judgment of the Court in 

rebuts the second step of the Governmentís 

JUSTICE THOMAS demonstrated that a gen

candidate corruption linkage does not exist. As 

ìThe dearth of evidence [of such corruption

prising in light of the unique relationship 

political party and its candidates: ëThe ve

political party is to influence its candidate

issues and, if the candidate takes office or i

his votes.í If coordinated expenditures h

this aim, the achievement ëdoes not . . . co

subversion of the political process.îíî C

supra, at 476ñ477 (citations omitted). 

JUSTICE BREYER reached the same conclusio

corrupting effect general party receipts coul

particular candidates, though on narrower gr

concluded that independent party conduct lack

quo corruption potential. See Colorado I, 51

617ñ618; id., at 617 (ìIf anything, an independ

expenditure made possible by a $20,000 do

controlled and directed by a party rather than 

would seem less likely to corrupt than the 

much larger) independent expenditure made 

that donorî); id., at 616 (ì[T]he opportunity for 

posed by [soft money] contributions is, at best, 
g )

These opinions establish that independent p

ity, which by definition includes independent 

spending of soft money, lacks a possibility for q

corruption of federal officeholders. This must 

more true of a partyís independent receipt and 

soft money donations neither directed to nor so

candidate. 

The Governmentís premise is also unsuppo

record before us. The record confirms that 

party contributions, without more, do not crea

quo corruption potential. As a conceptual mat

party contributions may engender good will f

didate or officeholder because, as the Govern

ì[A] Member of Congress can be expected to fee

temptation to favor those persons who have 

ëteam,íî Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants F

No. 02ñ1674 et al., p. 33. Still, no Member o

testified this favoritism changed voting behavio

The piece of record evidence the Governmen

ward on this score comes by way of deposition 

from former Senator Simon and Senator Fein

251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 482 (DC 2003) (Kollar-K

Senator Simon reported an unidentified coll

cated frustration with Simonís opposition to 

that would benefit a party contributor on the gr

ìëweíve got to pay attention to who is buttering 

and testified he did not think there was an

ìëthisíî (i.e., ìdonors getting their wayî) was w

islation passed. See App. 805. Senator Fe

testified an unidentified colleague suggested 

the legislation because ìëthey [i.e., the donor] j

[i.e., the party] $100,000.íî 251 F. Supp. 2d, a

lar-Kotelly, J.). 

That evidence in fact works against the G
g y g, 

one would have expected under the Governme

That necessarily undercuts the inference of cor

Government would have us draw from the evide

Even more damaging to the Governmentís 

from the testimony is the absence of testimon

Senator who allegedly succumbed to corrupt in

himself solicited soft money from the donor i

Equally, there is no indication he simply f

company with his vote because it had, witho

volvement from him, given funds to the party t

belonged. This fact is crucial. If the Senator h

been the solicitor of the soft money funds in qu

incident does nothing more than confirm tha

efforts at campaign finance reform ought to be 

conduct that implicates quid pro quo relations

if there was some evidence that the officehold

solicited funds from the donor could the Court 

from this episode that general party contributio

as quids, inspiring corrupt favoritism among p

bers. The episode is the single one of its type 

the record and does not seem sufficient basi

incursions into settled practice. Given the Go

claim that the corrupt favoritism problem is w

its inability to produce more than a single in

porting to illustrate the point demonstrates t

ment has not fairly characterized the general 

Members towards soft money donors from whom 

not solicited. 

Other aspects of the record confirm the Gove

not produced evidence that Members corruptl

money donors to their party as a per se ma

testimony from which the Government woul

Court infer corruption is testimony that Me

rewarded by their parties for soliciting soft m
about how Members feel about a partys soft mo

from whom they have not solicited. Indeed, 

dence on this point again cuts against the Gove

ìëAs a Member of the Senate Finance Co

experienced the pressure first hand. On s

sions when we were debating important 

needed a police escort to get into the Finan

tee hearing room because so many lobb

crowding the halls, trying to get one las

make their pitch to each Senator. Senator

knew which lobbyist represented the i

which large donor. I was often glad that I 

amount of soft money fundraising I did a

take PAC contributions, because it wo

tremely difficult not to feel beholden to th

otherwise.íî Id., at 482 (testimony of form

Boren; see 6ñR Defs. Exhs., Tab 8, ¶8). 

Thus, one of the handful of Senators on who

ernment relies to make its case candidly admi

sure of appeasing soft money donors derive

Membersí solicitation of donors, not from th

otherwise giving to their party. 

In light of all this, ß323(a) has no valid ant

interest. The anticircumvention interests the G

offers in defense of ßß323(b), (d), and (f) must al

the interests asserted to justify ß323(a). Any 

vention interest can be only as compelling as t

justifying the underlying regulation. 

None of these other sections has an indepen

fying interest. Section 323(b), for example, a

tion only to activity undertaken by a state pa

District Court two of the three judges found a

particular state and local parties exist prima

ticipate in state and local elections, that they 
their voter registration and Get Out The Vo

activities, in particular, are directed primarily a

local elections. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, a

(Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in pa

senting in part); id., at 837ñ840 (Leon, J.). The

taken together with BCRAís other, valid p

barring coordination with federal candidates or 

ers and their soft money solicitation, demon

ß323(b) does not add regulation to conduct th

danger of a federal candidateís or officeholderí

quids. 

Even ß323(b)ís narrowest regulation, which 

party soft money funded ads that (1) refer t

identified federal candidate, and (2) either 

attack any candidate for the office of the clearly 

federal candidate, see new FECA ß301(20)(A)(i

constitutional test. The ban on conduct that b

uteís own definition may serve the interest o

candidate suggests to the majority that it is c

poses quid pro quo danger for federal candidat

holders. Yet, even this effectóconsidered aft

the coordination and candidate-solicited fund

elsewhere prohibited by BCRA ßß202 and 214(

FECA ß323(a)óposes no danger of a federal ca

officeholderís receipt of a quid. That conduct i

ent from an individualís independent expend

ring to and supporting a clearly identified cand

this poses no regulable danger. 

Section 323(d), which governs relationships b

national parties and nonprofit groups, fails 

reasons. It is worth noting that neither the rec

own experience tells us how significant these f

fers are at this time. It is plain, however, tha

Amendment ought not to be manipulated to p

gress to forbid a political party from aiding oth
crete issues. One of the central flaws in BC

Congress is determining what future course the 

ideas and the expression of views must follow. 

to foreclose new and creative partnerships for 

illustrated here, is consistent with neither the 

nor principles of our Free Speech guarantee, w

that the people, and not the Congress, decide w

of expression are the most legitimate and effect

The majorityís upholding ß323(d) is all the m

tling because of the way it ignores the Act a

wrote it. Congress said national parties ìshal

any funds for, or make or direct any donations 

nonprofit organizations that engage in feder

activity or to ß527 political committees. The C

ever, reads out the word ìanyî and construes 

ìfundsî and ìdonationsî to mean ìsoft money 

ìsoft money donations.î See ante, at 72 (ìThi

tion is consistent with the concerns animati

whose purpose is to plug the soft-money looph

Courtís statutory amendment may be consiste

anti-soft-money rationale; it is not, however, 

with the plain and unavoidable statutory tex

has given us. Even as construed by the Court

it is invalid. 

The majority strains to save the provision 

must seem to it an unduly harsh First Amen

does so by making a legislative determinatio

chose not to make: to prefer hard money to 

within the construct of national party relation

nonprofit groups. Congress gave no indication 

ence to regulate either hard money or soft in t

Rather, it simply proscribed all transfers of 

tween the two organizations and all efforts by t

parties to raise any money on the nonprofit gro

The question the Court faces is not which part 
transfers altogether. The answer, as the maj

nizes, is no. See ante, at 71 (ì[P]rohibiting p

donating funds already raised in compliance 

does little to further Congressí goal of prevent

tion or the appearance of corruption of federal 

and officeholdersî). 

Though ß323(f) in effect imposes limits on 

contributions, it does not address federal can

officeholder contributions. Yet it is the possib

eral officeholder quid pro quo corruption pot

animates Buckleyís rule as it relates to Acts o

(as opposed to Acts of state legislatures). See 4

13 (ìThe constitutional power of Congress 

federal elections is well establishedî). 

When one recognizes that ßß323(a), (b), (d)

not serve the interest the anticorruption rat

templates, Title Iís entirety begins to look very 

an incumbency protection plan. See J. Miller

Politics 84ñ101 (1999) (concluding that regula

ing election fundraising and spending constrai

ers more than incumbents). That impression i

by the fact that Congress exempted its officeh

the more stringent prohibitions imposed on par

Compare new FECA ß323(a) with new FEC

Section 323(a) raises an inflexible bar against 

solicitation, in any way, by parties or part

Section 323(e), in contrast, enacts exceptions 

for federal officeholders (the very centerpiece 

corruption), and allows them to solicit soft 

various uses and organizations. 

The law in some respects even weakens the 

of federal candidates and officeholders. Under 

officeholders were understood to be limited to 

hard money by their campaign committees. Se

ßß431, 441a (setting out the pre-BCRA FEC
y 

source and amount restrictions, so long as the 

ers direct that money on to other nonfederal 

See new FECA ß323(e)(1)(B). The majorityís ch

tion of this weakening of the regime as ìt

strain[ing]î candidates, ante, at 73, n. 70, is a 

ample of its unwillingness to confront Con

interest or the persisting fact that the regulat

First Amendment freedoms. The more lenien

accorded to incumbency-driven politicians tha

officials who represent broad national constitue

render all the more suspect Congressí claim th

sole purpose is to stop corruption. 

The majority answers this charge by statin

ous, that ìß323(e) applies to both officeholders 

dates.î Ante, at 78, n. 72. The controlling poin

is the practical burden on challengers. That t

tion applies to both incumbents and challenger

establishes that it burdens them equally in t

Name recognition and other advantages held 

bents ensure that as a general rule incumbe

advantaged by the legislation the Court today u

The Government identifies no valid ant

interest justifying ßß323(a), (b), (d), and (f). 

nature of the restrictions imposed by these 

makes one all the more skeptical of the Cour

tion of the interests at stake. These provisi

stand under the First Amendment. 

2. New FECA ß323(e) 

Ultimately, only one of the challenged Title 

satisfies Buckleyís anticorruption rationale an

Amendmentís guarantee. It is ß323(e). This 

the sole aspect of Title I that is a direct and 

regulation of federal candidatesí and officehold

of quids. Section 323(e) governs ìcandidate
g , y 

indirectly established, financed, maintained or 

by or acting on behalf of 1 or more candidates 

als holding Federal office.î 2 U. S. C. A. ß44

2003). These provisions, and the regulations 

limit candidatesí and their agentsí solicitat

money. The regulation of a candidateís recei

furthers a constitutionally sufficient interest. 

cult, however, is the question whether regu

candidateís solicitation of funds also furthers t

if the funds are given to another. 

I agree with the Court that the broader 

regulation does further a sufficient interest. T

of a solicited gift is a quid both to the recip

money and to the one who solicits the paymen

ing his request). Rules governing candidate

holdersí solicitation of contributions are, theref

tions governing their receipt of quids. This reg

under Buckleyís anticorruption rationale. 

B. Standard of Review 

It is common ground between the majorit

opinion that a speech-suppressing campai

regulation, even if supported by a sufficient G

interest, is unlawful if it cannot satisfy our 

standard of review. See ante, at 24ñ27. In B

applied ìclosely drawnî scrutiny to contribut

tions and strict scrutiny to expenditure limitat

pare 424 U. S., at 25, with id., at 44ñ45. A

backdrop, the majority assumes that becau

applied the rationale in the context of contri

expenditure limits, its application gives Congr

Court the capacity to classify any challenged 

finance regulation as either a contribution or 

ture limit. Thus, it first concludes Title Iís regu
28. 

scrutiny. 

ìComplex as its provisions may be, ß323, i

does little more than regulate the ability 

individuals, corporations, and unions to 

large sums of money to influence federa

federal candidates, and federal officeholder

Though the majorityís analysis denies it, T

namics defy this facile, initial classification. 

Title Iís provisions prohibit the receipt of fu

most instances, but not all, this can be defined 

bution limit. They prohibit the spending of fu

most instances this can be defined as an expend

They prohibit the giving of funds to nonprofit g

this falls within neither definition as we have e

it. Finally, they prohibit fundraising activit

parties dispute the classification of this regu

challengers say it is core political association

Government says it ultimately results only in 

contribution receipts). 

The majorityís classification overlooks these 

characteristics and exchanges Buckleyís subs

formulaic caricature of it. Despite the parti

majorityís best efforts on both sides of the 

ignores reality to force these regulations into 

two legal categories as either contribution or e

limitations. Instead, these characteristics se

cate Congress has enacted regulations that 

contribution nor expenditure limits, or are perh

once. 

Even if the laws could be classified in broa

only contribution limits, as the majority is inc

that still leaves the question what ìcontribu

can include if they are to be upheld under Buc
28. 

limits must be confined to the narrow categor

gifts that are directed, in some manner, to a c

officeholder. Any broader definition of the ca

tradicts Buckleyís quid pro quo rationale an

Buckleyís language, which contemplates limits 

butions to a candidate or campaign committee 

terms. See 424 U. S., at 13 (applying less exac

to ìcontribution . . . limitations in the Act p

individuals from contributing more than $2

single year or more than $1,000 to any single ca

an election campaignî); id., at 45 (ì[T]he c

limitationsí [apply a] total ban on the givin

amounts of money to candidatesî). See also id

The Court, it must be acknowledged, both 

and on other occasions, has described contribu

due some more deferential review in less th

terms. At times it implied that donations 

parties would also qualify as contributions wh

tion too would be subject to less exacting revie

at 23ñ24, n. 24 (ì[T]he general understandin

constitutes a political contribution[:] Funds pr

candidate or political party or campaign comm

directly or indirectly through an intermediary c

contributionî). See also Federal Election Comm

mont, 539 U. S., at ___ (2003) (slip op

(ìë[C]ontributions may result in political ex

spent by a candidate or an associationíî). 

These seemingly conflicting statements are 

ciled by reference to Buckleyís underlying ra

applying less exacting review. In a similar

imperative, sense proper application of the s

review to regulations that are neither contr

expenditure limits (or which are both at once) 

determined by reference to that rationale. 
25. 

45.Ü 

review applies to Government regulations th

cantly interfereî with First Amendment rights 

tion. But any regulation of speech or associat

creating ìmarkedly greater interferenceî than 

nificant interference receives strict scrutiny. U

and ill advised though it may be, Buckley unavo

forth this test: 

ìEven a ëìsignificant interferenceî with 

rights of political associationí may be sust

State demonstrates [1] a sufficiently impo

est and [2] employs means closely drawn t

necessary abridgment of associational 

Cousins v. Wigoda, [419 U. S. 477, 4

NAACP v. Button, [371 U. S. 415, 438 (196

v. Tucker [364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960)].î 4

ìThe markedly greater burden on basic fr

ferring to ëthe freedom of speech and a

caused by [expenditure limits] thus cann

tained simply by invoking the interest in 

the effectiveness of the less intrusive c

limitations. Rather, the constitutionality 

penditure limits] turns on whether the go

interests advanced in its support satisfy t

scrutiny applicable to limitations on 

Amendment rights of political expression.î 

óóóóóó 

ÜSee also Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, 

___ (2003) (slip op., at 14) (ì[T]he basic premise we hav

setting First Amendment standards for reviewing poli

restrictions [is that] the level of scrutiny is based on the 

the ëpolitical activity at issueí to effective speech or pol

tionî); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 56
with relative accuracy, but then denies it. Com

ìThe relevant inquiry [in determining t

scrutiny] is whether the mechanism adop

plement the contribution limit, or to prev

vention of that limit, burdens speech in a 

direct restriction on the contribution itself 

ante, at 28ñ29, with: 

ìNone of this is to suggest that the alleg

tional burdens imposed on parties by ß3

place in the First Amendment analysis. It 

we account for them in the application, r

the choice, of the appropriate level of scrut

at 31. 

The majorityís attempt to separate out how 

speech rights and burdens on associational r

the standard of review is misguided. It is not e

Buckleyís unconventional test. Buckley, as sh

quotations above, explained the lower standar

by reference to the level of burden on associati

and it explained the need for a higher standar

by reference to the higher burdens on both a

and speech rights. In light of Buckleyís ration

light of this Courtís ample precedent affirmin

dens on speech necessitate strict scrutiny revi

U. S., at 44ñ45 (ì[E]xacting scrutiny [applies

tions on core First Amendment rights of polit

sionî), ìclosely drawnî scrutiny should be emplo

review of a law that burdens rights of assoc

only where that burden is significant, not 

óóóóóó 

(ìWe can think of no heavier burden on a political partyís 

freedom. Proposition 198 is therefore unconstitutiona

narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interestî). 
ley, it was right first to say we must determin

nificant a burden BCRAís regulations plac

Amendment rights, though it should have sp

the rights implicated are those of association

denial of that analysis flatly contradicts Buckley

The majority makes Buckleyís already aw

imprecise test all but meaningless in its app

one is viewing BCRA through Buckleyís lens, 

jority purports to do, one must conclude the 

markedly greater associational burdens than 

cant burden created by contribution limita

unlike contribution limitations, also creates 

burdens on speech itself. While BCRA conta

contribution limitations, which significantly bu

ciation, it goes even further. The Act entirely r

nature of relations between national political 

their candidates, between national political p

state and local parties, and between nation

parties and nonprofit organizations. 

The many and varied aspects of Title Iís 

impose far greater burdens on the association

the parties, their officials, candidates, and citiz

regulations that do no more than cap the amou

persons can contribute to a political candidate 

tee. The evidence shows that national parties 

tradition of engaging in essential associationa

such as planning and coordinating fundraising 

and local parties, often with respect to electio

not federal in nature. This strengthens the 

that the regulations now before us have unp

impact. It makes impossible, moreover, th

conclusionówhich the Courtís standard of re

mination necessarily impliesóthat BCRAís 

regulations will not much change the nature of 

between parties, candidates, nonprofit group
mistaken for words uttered in their official 

mistaken for soliciting prohibited soft, and 

money. Few interferences with the speech, 

and free expression of our people are greate

tempts by Congress to say which groups can 

advocate a cause, or how they must do it. 

Congress has undertaken this comprehensive 

of association and speech rights in the name o

contribution limitations. Here, however, as 

ì[t]he markedly greater burden on basic freed

by [BCRAís pervasive regulation] cannot be 

simply by invoking the interest in maximizin

tiveness of the less intrusive contribution l

Id., at 44ñ45. BCRA fundamentally alters, a

burdens, protected speech and association thro

society. Strict scrutiny ought apply to review o

tutionality. Under strict scrutiny, the co

scheme, for the most part, cannot survive. Th

acknowledged by the Government, which fa

argue that strict scrutiny could be met. 

1. New FECA ß323(e) 

Because most of the Title I provisions discu

do not serve a compelling or sufficient interes

dard of review analysis is only dispositive with 

new FECA ß323(e). As to ß323(e), 2 U. S. C. 

(Supp. 2003), I agree with the Court that thi

withstands constitutional scrutiny. 

Section 323(e) is directed solely to federal 

and their agents; it does not ban all solicitatio

dates, but only their solicitation of soft mone

tions; and it incorporates important exceptions 

(candidates may receive, solicit, or direct fund

ply with hard money standards; candidates m
limited funds to organizations not involved w

election activity; and candidates may solicit or 

$20,000 per individual per year for organizatio

with certain federal election activity (e.g., G

registration)). These provisions help ensure th

is narrowly tailored to satisfy First Amendme

ments. For these reasons, I agree ß323(e) is val

2. New FECA ßß323(a), (b), (d), and (

Though these sections do not survive even th

of serving a constitutionally valid interest, it i

as well to examine the vast overbreadth of the 

of Title I, so the import of the majorityís holdi

understood. Sections 323(a), (b), (d), and (f), 2 

ßß441i(a), (b), (d), and (f) (Supp. 2003), are no

tailored, cannot survive strict scrutiny, and can

considered closely drawn, unless that phrase is 

all meaning. 

First, the sections all possess fatal overbr

regulating conduct that does not pose quid pr

gers, they are incursions on important catego

tected speech by voters and party officials. 

At the next level of analytical detail, ß323(

broad as well because it regulates all nation

whether or not they present candidates in fe

tions. It also regulates the national partiesí 

and direction of funds in odd-numbered years 

state and local elections are at stake. 

Likewise, while ß323(b) might prohibit some 

conduct that would otherwise be undertaken 

tion with a federal candidate, it reaches beyon

considerable range of campaign speech by the s

on nonfederal issues. A state or local party mi

say: ìThe Democratic slate for state assemb

President Bushís tax policy . . . . Elect the Repu
Section 323(b) encompasses this essential s

prohibits it equally with speech that poses a fe

holder quid quo pro danger. 

Other predictable political circumstances fu

onstrate ß323(b)ís overbreadth. It proscribes 

soft money for all state party voter registra

occurring within 120 days of a federal electio

vagaries of election timing, not any real interes

corruption, will control whether state parties 

nonfederally regulated funds on ballot efforts. 

reaching contradicts important precedents tha

the need to protect political speech for campai

to ballot measures. See generally Citizens Ag

Control, 454 U. S. 290 (1981); First Nat. Bank 

Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978). 

Section 323(b) also fails the narrow tailori

ment because less burdensome regulatory op

available. The Government justifies the prov

attempt to stop national parties from circumv

soft money allocation constraints they faced 

prior FECA regime. We are told that otherw

tional parties would let the state parties spen

their behalf. If, however, the problem were a

allocation rates, Congress could have made any 

transferred by a national party to a state part

the allocation rates that governed the nation

similar use of the money. 

Nor is ß323(d) narrowly tailored. The pro

scribing any solicitation or direction of funds, p

parties from even distributing or soliciting 

money (i.e., hard money). It is a complete b

category of speech. To prevent circumvention 

tion limits by imposing a complete ban on cont

to burden the circumventing conduct more se

the underlying suspect conduct could be burden
not implicate federal elections. The provisio

any transfer to a ß527 organization, irre

whether the organization engages in feder

activity. This is unnecessary, as well, sinc

enacted a much narrower provision in ß323(a

vent circumvention by the parties via contr

organizations. Section 323(a)(2) makes ìany en

directly or indirectly . . . controlled byî the natio

subject to the same ß323(a) prohibitions as 

themselves. 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i (Supp. 2003). 

Section 323(f), too, is not narrowly tailored or 

to it. It burdens a substantial body of speech 

sion made entirely independent of any federal 

The record, for example, contains evidence o

Attorney General Pryorís reelection flyers sho

ture of Pryor shaking hands with President 

stating: ìBush appointed Pryor to be Al

chairman of the George W. Bush for President 

A host of circumstances could make such 

advisable for state candidates to use without 

nation with a federal candidate. Section 323

rates no distinguishing feature, such as an 

coordination, to ensure First Amendment prote

is not swept up within its bounds. 

Compared to the narrowly tailored effort 

which addresses in direct and specific terms fed

datesí and officeholdersí quest for dollars, the

cast a wide net not confined to the critical ca

federal candidate or officeholder involvement. 

not narrowly tailored; they are not closely d

flatly violate the First Amendment; and even 

encompass some speech that poses a regulab

quo danger, that little assurance does not justif

a regime which silences so many legitimate vo

protected sphere. 
1. 

Other BCRA Title II sections require analysi

the provisions of Title I, for they, too, are regu

principally operate within the ambit of Buckle

ruption principle. BCRA ßß202 and 214 are t

provisions. They involve the Actís new definit

dination. BCRA ß213 is another. It institu

system in which the parties are forced to choo

two different types of relationships with their c

I agree with the majority that ßß214(b) and 

merit our review because they are not now justi

ante, at 118. I disagree, however, with the maj

that ß214(a), ß214ís sole justiciable provision, is 

can I agree that ß202 is valid in its entirety. 

Section 214(a) amends FECA to define, as h

contributions to a political party, expenditures 

ual makes in concert with the party. See an

This provision, in my view, must fall. As the 

cussion of Title I explains, individual contribu

political parties cannot be capped in the soft 

text. Since an individualís soft money contrib

party may not be limited, it follows with even g

that an individualís expenditure of money, 

with the party for activities on which the p

spend unlimited soft money, cannot be capped. 

This conclusion emerges not only from an 

Title I but also from Colorado I. There, JUSTIC

opinion announcing the judgment of the Cour

political parties had a constitutional right to 

independent advocacy on behalf of a candidate

604 (1996). That parties can spend unlimited 

on this activity follows by necessary implicatio

cal partyís constitutional right to spend mone

cacy independent of a candidate is burdened by 
party to refrain from coordinating with an 

engaging in advocacy even if the individual is a

pendently of the candidate. 

Section 202 functions in a manner similar to 

tion of ß214(a). It directs that when persons 

tioneering communications,î see new FECA ß

U. S. C. A. ß434(f)(3) (Supp. 2003), in a coordi

ion with a candidate or a party, the coordinate

cation expense must be treated as a hard mone

tion by the person to that candidate or party

court erroneously believed it needed to determi

ß304ís definition of electioneering communic

itself unconstitutional to assess this provision

statutory definition may lead to an unconstitut

under one application, it may lead to a co

result under another. Compare infra, at 35ñ3

38, with infra, at 63ñ66. It is unhelpful to talk 

the definition being unconstitutional or co

when the only relevant question is whether, a

by a substantive prohibition, here ß202, the 

leads to unconstitutional results. The other Ti

sions that employ ß304ís electioneering com

definition are analyzed below, within the con

corporate speech rationale and the disclosure 

Section 202, however, must be judged under t

ruption rationale because it does not distinguis

to corporate or union status, and it does not inv

sure requirements. Section 202 simply limits 

of all ìpersons.î 

Section 202 does satisfy Buckleyís anticorrup

ale in one respect: It treats electioneering comm

expenditures made by a person in coordinat

candidate as hard money contributions to that 

For many of the same reasons that ß323(e) is 

in this single way, is valid: it regulates conduct 
2. 

request. 

Insofar as ß202 regulates coordination with 

party, however, it suffers from the same flaws 

Congress has instructed us, as much as possib

any infirm portions of statutory text from the 

see BCRA ß401. Following that instruction, I 

hold ß202ís text as to its candidate coordination 

(the first clause of new FECA ß315(a)(

U. S. C. A. ß441a(a)(7)(C)(ii) (Supp. 2003), but 

its text that applies the coordination provision 

parties. 

This provision includes an ìadvance contract

well. That aspect of the provision, on its own

invalid, for many of the reasons discussed 

respect to the advance disclosure requirement

in BCRA ßß201 and 212. See infra, at 38ñ39. 

The final aspect of BCRA that implicate

anticorruption rationale is ß213, the forced ch

sion. The majority concludes ß213 violates th

tion. I agree and write on this aspect of the ca

out that the sectionís unlawfulness flows no

unique contours of the statute that settle how m

cal parties may spend on their candidateís cam

ante, at 109ñ113, but from its raw suppression 

tionally protected speech. 

Section 213 unconstitutionally forces the 

surrender one of two First Amendment righ

firmed that parties have a constitutionally pro

to make independent expenditures in Colorad

tinue to believe, moreover, that even under 

political party has a protected right to make 

expenditures with its candidates. See Colora

U. S., at 466ñ482 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). 
ties play in the electoral process and in stab

representative democracy. ìThere can be little 

the emergence of a strong and stable two-part

this country has contributed enormously to 

effective government.î Davis v. Bandemer, 47

144ñ145 (1986) (OíCONNOR, J., concurring in 

This role would be undermined in the absence 

ability to coordinate with candidates. Cf. 

supra, at 629 (parties can ìgive effect to their 

by selecting and supporting candidatesî) (KE

concurring in judgment and dissenting in par

213ís command that the parties abandon 

Amendment right or the other offends the C

even more than a command that a person choo

a First Amendment right and a statutory right. 

II. TITLE II PROVISIONS 

A. Disclosure Provisions 

BCRA ß201, which requires disclosure of ele

communications, including those coordinated 

party but independent of the candidate, does n

tially relate to a valid interest in gathering 

compliance with contribution limits or in deterr

tion. Contra, ante, at 89. As the above analys

demonstrates, Congress has no valid interest in 

soft money contributions that do not pose qu

corruption potential. In the absence of a val

imposing such limits the effort here to ensure 

with them and to deter their allegedly corrup

cannot justify disclosure. The regulation do

tially relate to the other interest the major

however. See ibid. This assures its constitutio

that reason, I agree with the Courtís judgmen

the disclosure provisions contained in ß201 of T

one exception. 
aspect of the provision requiring those who 

tracted to speak to disclose their speech in adv

my view, unconstitutional. Advance disclosu

real burdens on political speech that post hoc 

does not. It forces disclosure of political strat

vealing where ads are to be run and what thei

likely to be (based on who is running the a

provides an opportunity for the ad buyerís op

dissuade broadcasters from running ads. Se

Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees Nationa

Life Committee, Inc., et al. in No. 02ñ1733 et a

46, and nn. 42ñ43. Against those tangible add

dens, the Government identifies no addition

uniquely served by advance disclosure. If C

tended to ensure that advertisers could not 

disclosure laws by running an ad before the e

paying for it afterwards, see ante, at 93ñ94, the

should simply have required the disclosure up

ning of the ad. Burdening the First Amendm

by requiring advance disclosure is not a cons

acceptable alternative. To the extent ß201 r

vance disclosure, it finds no justification in i

nating interests and imposes greater burden

First Amendment permits. 

Section 212, another disclosure provision

incorporates an advance disclosure requirem

plaintiffs challenge only this advance disclosu

ment, and not the broader substance of this se

majority concludes this challenge is not ripe. I 

The statute commands advance disclosure. 

has issued a regulation under ß212 that, by 

does not implement this particular requirem

68 Fed. Reg. 404, 452 (2003) (to be codified 

ß109.10(c)(d)). Adoption of a regulation tha

implement the statute to its full extent does no
1. 

ute is ambiguous and the agency interpretat

relied upon to avoid a statutory obligation tha

tain or arguable. The failure of the regulat

point to require advance disclosure is of n

Contra, 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 251 (per curiam). T

of ß212 is an issue presented for our determin

ripe; and the advance disclosure requireme

reasons given when discussing the paralle

under ß201, is unconstitutional. Contra, an

(declining to address the ripeness question in 

majorityís rejection of the challenge to advanc

ß201). 

B. BCRA ß203 

The majority permits a new and serious in

speech when it upholds ß203, the key provision 

that prohibits corporations and labor unions 

money from their general treasury to fund ele

communications. The majority compounds the 

in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 49

(1990), and silences political speech central t

discourse that sustains and informs our dem

cesses. Unions and corporations, including nonp

rations, now face severe criminal penalties for b

advocacy messages that ìrefe[r] to a clearly iden

date,î 2 U. S. C. A. ß431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. 20

election season. Instead of extending Austin 

new and vibrant voices, I would overrule it and 

campaign finance jurisprudence to principles 

with the First Amendment. 

The Government and the majority are right 

thing: The express-advocacy requirement, wit

magic words, is easy to circumvent. The G
will prevent what it calls sham issue ads tha

to the same effect as their more express co

Ante, at 78, 85ñ87. What the Court and the G

call sham, however, are the ads speakers find 

tive. Unlike express ads that leave nothing to 

nation, the record shows that issues ads are p

almost all candidates, even though politicia

corporations, can lawfully broadcast express ad

choose. It is a measure of the Governmentís 

protected speech that it would label as a sham 

communication sophisticated speakers choose b

the most powerful. 

The Governmentís use of the pejorative label 

obscure ß203ís practical effect: It prohibits a m

nication technique favored in the modern polit

for the very reason that it is the most potent

Government would regulate it for this reason g

prove the illegitimacy of the Governmentís pu

majorityís validation of it is not sustainable 

cepted First Amendment principles. The prob

the majority uses Austin, a decision itself unfai

First Amendment precedents, to justify ban

greater range of speech. This has it all bac

protected speech is being suppressed, that must 

of the inquiry. 

The majorityís holding cannot be reconciled 

Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1

invalidated a Massachusetts law prohibiting 

business corporations from making expenditur

purpose ofî influencing referendum votes on iss

not ìmaterially affectî their business interests. 

Bellotti was decided in the face of the same ar

which the majority now relies. Corporate pa

the Government argued in Bellotti, ìwould exer

influence on the outcome of a referendum vot
immense aggregations of wealth were facilit

ìunique state-conferred corporate structure.î A

U. S., at 660. With these ìstate-created advan

at 659, corporations would ìdrown out othe

viewî and ìdestroy the confidence of the pe

democratic process.î Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 78

rejected these arguments in emphatic terms: 

ìTo be sure, corporate advertising may in

outcome of the vote; this would be its pu

the fact that advocacy may persuade the e

hardly a reason to suppress it: The Consti

tects expression which is eloquent no les

which is unconvincing.í Kingsley Intíl Pic

v. Regents, 360 U. S., at 689. . . . ë[T]he c

government may restrict the speech of som

of our society in order to enhance the relat

others is wholly foreign to the First Amen

Buckley, 424 U. S., at 48ñ49.î Id., at 790ñ7

Bellotti similarly dismissed the argumen

prohibition was necessary to ìprotec[t] corpo

holdersî ìby preventing the use of corporate r

furtherance of views with which some shareh

disagree.î Id., at 792ñ793. Among other pro

statute was overinclusive: 

ì[It] would prohibit a corporation from su

opposing a referendum proposal even if its 

ers unanimously authorized the contribu

penditure. . . . Acting through their power 

board of directors or to insist upon prote

sions in the corporationís charter, shareh

mally are presumed competent to protect 

interests. . . . [M]inority shareholders gen

access to the judicial remedy of a deriva

challenge corporate disbursements . . . . 
pelling interest under the circumstances o

we find ëno substantially relevant correlati

the governmental interest asserted and th

fortí to prohibit appellants from speakin

794ñ795. 

See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 

(providing analogous protections to union memb

Austin turned its back on this holding, not b

Bellotti Court had overlooked the Governmentís 

combating quid pro quo corruption, but beca

majority decided to recognize ìa different type 

tion,î Austin, 494 U. S., at 660, i.e., the same 

and distorting effects of immense aggregations 

ibid., found insufficient to sustain a similar 

just a decade earlier. Unless certain narrow 

apply, see Federal Election Commín v. Massach

zens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), 

tion extends even to nonprofit corporations o

promote a point of view. Aside from its disrega

dents, the majorityís ready willingness to equ

tion with all organizations adopting the corpor

a grave insult to nonprofit and for-profit c

alike, entities that have long enriched our civic 

Austin was the first and, until now, the on

Court had allowed the Government to exercise 

to censor political speech based on the speaker

identity. The majorityís contrary contention 

incorrect. Contra, ante, at 96ñ97 (ìSince our 

Buckley, Congressí power to prohibit corpor

unions from using funds in their treasuries 

advertisements expressly advocating the electio

of candidates in federal elections has been firm

ded in our lawî). I dissented in Austin, 494 U

and continue to believe that the case represen
debate. Two of my colleagues joined the dissen

a member of todayís majority. Ibid. (OíCO

SCALIA, JJ.). See also id., at 679 (SCALIA, J., di

To be sure, Bellotti concerns issue advocac

Austin is about express advocacy. This distinct

to have accounted for the position of at least tw

of the Court. See 494 U. S., at 675ñ676 (B

concurring) (ìThe Michigan law . . . prohibits c

from using treasury funds only for making i

expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, 

date in state elections. A corporation remains 

use general treasury funds to support an ini

posal in a state referendumî (citation omitted))

(STEVENS, J., concurring) (ì[T]here is a vast 

between lobbying and debating public issues 

hand, and political campaigns for election to p

on the otherî). The distinction, however, bet

pendent expenditures for commenting on issu

one hand, and supporting or opposing a candid

other, has no First Amendment significance 

Austinís arbitrary line. 

Austin was based on a faulty assumption. 

JUSTICE STEVENSí proposal that there is ìvas

between lobbying and debating public issues 

hand, and political campaigns for election to p

on the other,î ibid., there is a general recognitio

discussions of candidates and issues are quite 

twined in practical terms. See, e.g., Brief for 

Defendants Senator John McCain et al. in No. 02

p. 42 (ìë[The] legal . . . wall between issue advocacy 

cal advocacy . . . is built of the same sturdy mat

emperorís clothing. Everyone sees it. No one b

(quoting the chair of the Political Action Comm

of the National Rifle Association (NRA))). T

Austinís repudiation of Bellotti on the ground t
from providing a rationale for expanding Aust

dence in these consolidated cases calls for its 

tion. Just as arguments about immense aggr

corporate wealth and concerns about protec

holders and union members do not justify a b

ads, they cannot sustain a ban on independe

tures for express ads. In holding otherwise, Au

a substantial amount of political speech underg

created a species of covert speech incompatib

free and open society. Nixon v. Shrink Mi

ernment PAC, 528 U. S., at 406 (KENNEDY, J., dis

The majority not only refuses to heed the 

experience but also perpetuates the conflict Au

with fundamental First Amendment principle

foresaw that ìthe distinction between discussio

and candidates and advocacy of election or defe

dates may often dissolve in practical applic

U. S., at 42; see also id., at 45. It recognized th

discussion of public issues which also are camp

readily and often unavoidably draws in cand

their positions, their voting records and ot

conduct.íî Id., at 42, n. 50. Hence, ìë[d]iscussio

issues, and as well more positive efforts to influ

opinion on them, tend naturally and inexorab

some influence on voting at elections.íî Ibid. 

over Austinís oppositeóand falseóassumptio

press advocacy is different, the majority igno

and elevates a distinction rejected by Buckl

terms. 

Even after Buckley construed the statute then 

Court to reach only express advocacy, it invalid

on independent expenditures, observing that 

of the election or defeat of candidates for fede

no less entitled to protection under the First A

than the discussion of political policy general
48. Austin defied this principle. It made the i

ble content-based judgment that commentary 

dates is less deserving of First Amendment 

than discussions of policy. In its haste to reaf

today, the majority refuses to confront this ba

between Austin and Buckley. It once more dim

First Amendment by ignoring its command th

ernment has no power to dictate what topics 

may discuss. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N. 

Serv. Commín of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530 (1980). 

Continued adherence to Austin, of course, 

justified by the corporate identity of the speake

does this argument fail to account for Bellotti, 4

777 (ìThe inherent worth of the speech in t

capacity for informing the public does not depen

identity of its source, whether corporation, 

union, or individualî), but Buckley itself w

ì[t]he First Amendmentís protection against go

abridgment of free expression cannot properly 

depend on a personís financial ability to engag

discussion.î 424 U. S., at 49; see also id., at 4

Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). 

tion for broadcast media companies, moreover, 

First Amendment problems worse, not better. 

494 U. S., at 712 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (ìA

ent ground for invalidating this statute is the 

emption for media corporations. . . . All corpor

municate with the public to some degree, wheth

business or not; and communication is of partic

tance for nonprofit corporationsî); see also id., 

(SCALIA, J., dissenting) (ìAmassed corporate w

regularly sits astride the ordinary channels of in

much more likely to produce the New Corruptio

of one point of view) than amassed corporate we

generally busy making money elsewhereî). In 
yp

our duty to say so. 

I surmise that even the majority, along wit

ernment, appreciates these problems with Aust

why it invents a new justification. We are no

ìthe government also has a compelling intere

lating federal elections from the type of corrup

from the real or apparent creation of political d

for Appellees/Cross-Appellants FEC et al. in N

et al., p. 88. ì[E]lectioneering communication

with the general treasury funds of labor unions 

rations,î the Government warns, ìendea[r] th

to elected officials in a way that could be perce

public as corrupting.î See 251 F. Supp. 2d, 

(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (stating the Governmentís p

This rationale has no limiting principle. W

accept it, Congress would have the authority 

even pure issue ads, because they, too, could e

sponsors to candidates who adopt the favore

Taken to its logical conclusion, the alleged G

interest ìin insulating federal elections from . . 

apparent creation of political debtsî also con

Buckley. If a candidate feels grateful to a face

sonal corporation for making independent ex

the gratitude cannot be any less when the m

from the CEOís own pocket. Buckley, howe

down limitations on independent expenditur

jected the Governmentís corruption argum

evidence of coordination. See 424 U. S., at 51

ernmentís position would eviscerate the lin

expenditures and contributions and subject b

same ìcomplaisant review under the First Am

Federal Election Committee v. Beaumont, 539 U

(slip op., at 14). Complaisant or otherwise, we 

authority to the Legislature to do with the Fi

ment as it pleases. Since Austin is inconsiste
2. 

ß

held unconstitutional. 

Even under Austin, BCRA ß203 could not 

parties agree strict scrutiny applies; ß203, how

from narrowly tailored. 

The Government is unwilling to characteriz

ban, citing the possibility of funding electione

munications out of a separate segregated f

option, though, does not alter the categorical n

prohibition on the corporation. ì[T]he corpor

corporation is prohibited from speaking.î A

U. S., at 681, n. (SCALIA, J., dissenting). Wh

allowsópermitting the corporation ìto serve a

der and treasurer of a different association of 

that can endorse or oppose political candidate

speech by the corporation.î Ibid. 

Our cases recognize the practical difficulti

tions face when they are limited to com

through PACs. The majority need look no fu

MCFL, 479 U. S. 238, for an extensive list of hu

have to confront: 

ìUnder [2 U. S. C.] ß432 [(1982 ed.)], [M

appoint a treasurer, ß432(a); ensure tha

tions are forwarded to the treasurer with

days of receipt, depending on the amount 

tion, ß432(b)(2); see that its treasurer ke

count of every contribution regardless of a

name and address of any person who mak

bution in excess of $50, all contributions re

political committees, and the name and add

person to whom a disbursement is made re

amount, ß432(c); and preserve receipts 

bursements over $200 and all records for t

ßß432(c), (d). Under ß433, MCFL must f
, 

deposit boxes, or other depositories, ßß

must report any change in the above i

within 10 days, ß433(c); and may dissolve 

filing a written statement that it will no lon

any contributions nor make disbursement

it has no outstanding debts or obligations, ß

ìUnder ß434, MCFL must file either m

ports with the FEC or reports on the follow

ule: quarterly reports during election ye

election report no later than the 12th da

election, a postelection report within 30 da

election, and reports every 6 months duri

tion years. ßß434(a)(4)(A), (B). These re

contain information regarding the amount 

hand; the total amount of receipts, detaile

ferent categories; the identification of ea

committee and candidateís authorized o

committee making contributions, and a

making loans, providing rebates, refunds

or interest or any other offset to operatin

tures in an aggregate amount over $200

amount of all disbursements, detailed by 

categories; the names of all authorized o

committees to whom expenditures aggreg

$200 have been made; persons to whom 

ments or refunds have been made; the tota

contributions, operating expenses, outstan

and obligations, and the settlement term

tirement of any debt or obligation. ß434(b

tion, MCFL may solicit contributions for i

segregated fund only from its 

ßß441b(b)(4)(A), (C), which does not includ

sons who have merely contributed to or ind

port for the organization in the past.î Id., a
quirements. Rather, they create major disinc

speech, with the effect falling most heavily 

entities that often have the most difficulty b

costs of compliance. Even worse, for an organi

has not yet set up a PAC, spontaneous speech 

to a clearly identified candidate for Federal offic

impossible, even if the groupís vital interests 

ened by a piece of legislation pending before C

the eve of a federal election. See Brief for 

Chamber of Commerce of the United States e

02ñ1756 et al., p. 37. Couple the litany of adm

burdens with the categorical restriction limi

solicitation activities to ìmembers,î and it is ap

PACs are inadequate substitutes for corporatio

ability to engage in unfettered expression. 

Even if the newly formed PACs manage to at

bers and disseminate their messages against t

odds, they have been forced to assume a fa

while doing so. As the American Civil Liber

(ACLU) points out, political committees are r

minute detail because their primary purpose 

ence federal elections. ìThe ACLU and thousan

organizations like it,î however, ìare not creat

purpose and therefore should not be required to 

if they were.î Reply Brief for Appellant ACLU 

1734 et al., p. 15. A requirement that coerces c

to adopt alter egos in communicating with the p

itself, sufficient to make the PAC option a fals

many civic organizations. Forcing speech t

artificial ìsecondhand endorsement structure 

the value of the voice of nonprofit corporate s

[because] PACís are interim, ad hoc organiza

little continuity or responsibility.î Austin, 49

708ñ709 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). In con

sponsoring organizations ìhave a continuity, 
709. 

public at large to evaluate their . . . credibilit

The majority can articulate no compelling j

for imposing this scheme of compulsory ventri

the majority is concerned about corruption an

of the political process, it makes no sense to 

corporate message and, under threat of crimina

to compel the corporation to spread the blame t

intermediary. 

For all these reasons, the PAC option cann

the Governmentís argument that the provision 

test of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., id., at 657ñ6

479 U. S. 238; see also United States v. Playboy 

ment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 826 (2000) 

purpose and design of a statute is to regulate 

reason of its content, special consideration or lat

accorded to the Government merely because t

somehow be described as a burden rather th

suppressionî). 

Once we turn away from the distraction o

option, the provision cannot survive strict scrut

the primary definition, ß203 prohibits unions a

tions from funding from their general treasury 

cast, cable, or satellite communication whichó 

ì(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate 

office;

ì(II) is made withinó

ì(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or 

election for the office sought by the candi

ì(bb) 30 days before a primary or prefe

tion, or a convention or caucus of a pol

that has authority to nominate a candid

office sought by the candidate; and 

ì(III) in the case of a communication which 
President, is targeted to the relevant ele

U. S. C. A. ß434f(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003). 

The prohibition, with its crude temporal and 

proxies, is a severe and unprecedented ban o

speech. As discussed at the outset, suppose a 

tors want to show their constituents in the log

try how much they care about working famili

pose a law, 60 days before the election, that w

the environment by allowing logging in natio

Under ß203, a nonprofit environmental group 

unable to run an ad referring to these Senato

districts. The suggestion that the group coul

fund a PAC in the short time required for effec

pation in the political debate is fanciful. F

already discussed, moreover, an ad hoc PAC w

as effective as the environmental group itself 

credibility with the public. Never before in our 

the Court upheld a law that suppresses spe

extent. 

The group would want to refer to these Sena

by name or by photograph, not necessarily 

election is at stake. It might be supposed the h

Senators have had an impeccable environmenta

the environmental group might have no previo

ent interest in expressing an opinion on their c

Or, the election might not be hotly contested 

the districts, so whatever the group says wou

practical effect on the electoral outcome. Th

refer to candidates and officeholders is importa

it allows the public to communicate with them 

common concern. Section 203ís sweeping appro

take into account this significant free speec

Under any conventional definition of overbrea

to meet strict scrutiny standards. It forces ele
contend with faceless and nameless opponents a

their broadcast, as the NRA well puts it, to a w

politicians who threaten the environment must 

to as ìëHe Whose Name Cannot Be Spoken.íî 

for Appellants NRA et al. in No. 02ñ1675 et al., 

In the example above, it makes no difference 

to the Court that the bill sponsors may have 

known ideological biases that revealing the

would provide essential instruction to citizens 

the policy benefits them or their community. 

make any difference that the names of the bi

perhaps through repetition in the news medi

come so synonymous with the proposal that r

these politicians by name in an ad is the mo

way to communicate with the public. Sectio

comprehensive censor: On the pain of a felony 

ad must not refer to a candidate for federal o

the crucial weeks before an election. 

We are supposed to find comfort in the know

the ad is banned under ß203 only if it ìis targ

relevant electorate,î defined as communication

be received by 50,000 or more persons in the 

district. See 2 U. S. C. A. ß434(f)(3)(C) (Supp. 

Orwellian criterion, however, is analogous to 

constitutional under any known First Amendm

that would allow a speaker to say anything he 

long as his intended audience could not hear 

Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 762ñ765 

cussing the ìFirst Amendment right to receive 

and ideasî (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

purpose of issue ads is to urge the public to 

attention to the candidateís platform on th

issues. By banning broadcast in the very dis

the candidate is standing for election, ß203 sh

mation at the heart of the First Amendmen
responsible judgment at the voting booth. 

In defending against a facial attack on a s

substantial overbreadth, it is no answer to say 

rations and unions may bring as-applied chal

case-by-case basis. When a statute is as out o

ß203, our law simply does not force speakers to 

the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) 

ing their rights through case-by-case litigation

v. Hicks, 539 U. S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 

instead ìabstain from protected speech,î they 

only themselves but society as a whole, which 

of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.î Ibid

least of the ill effects of todayís decision is tha

breadth doctrine, once a bulwark of protecti

speech, has now been manipulated by the Cour

but a shadow of its former self. 

In the end the Government and intervenor

cannot dispute the looseness of the connectio

ß203 and the Governmentís proffered interest in 

corruption. At various points in their briefs, th

pretense that the electioneering ban bears a cl

to anticorruption purposes. Instead, they defe

the ground that the targeted ads ìmay infl

ìlikely to influence,î or ìwill in all likelihoo

effect of influencingî a federal election. Se

Appellees/Cross-Appellants FEC et al. in N

et al., pp. 14, 24, 84, 92ñ93, 94; Brief for 

Defendants Senator John McCain et al. in N

et al., pp. 42ñ43. The mere fact that an ad m

fashion or another, influence an election is an 

reason for outlawing it. I should have thought 

elections to be the whole point of political speec

strict scrutiny nor any other standard the 

adopted to date permits outlawing speech on 

that it might influence an election, which mi
3. 

, gp

ance of corruption. Settled law requires a rea

connection between end and means. The 

causation the majority endorses today is ant

the concept of narrow tailoring. 

As I would invalidate ß203 under the primary 

it is necessary to add a few words about the ba

sion. As applied in ß203, the backup definitio

corporations and unions from financing from th

treasury funds 

ìany broadcast, cable, or satellite com

which promotes or supports a candidate for 

or attacks or opposes a candidate for tha

gardless of whether the communication ex

vocates a vote for or against a candidate) 

also is suggestive of no plausible meaning 

an exhortation to vote for or against a spe

date.î 2 U. S. C. A. ß434f(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. 20

The prohibition under the backup has much 

imprecision as the ban under the primary 

though here there is even more overbreadth. 

primary definition, the backup contains no t

geographic limitation. Any broadcast, cable, 

communicationsónot just those aired within 

blackout period and received by a certain segm

populationóare prohibited, provided they 

ìsupport,î ìattack,î or ìopposeî a candidate. T

showing that such a permanent and ubiquitous 

meets First Amendment standards for the r

between means and ends. 

The backup definition is flawed for the furt

that it is vague. The crucial wordsóìprom

port,î ìattack,î ìopposeîóare nowhere define
4. 

eral Election Campaign Act that Buckley held t

stitutionally vague. Cf. 424 U. S., at 39ñ44 (ì

may make any expenditure . . . relative to a cle

fied candidate during a calendar year which, w

to all other expenditures made by such person 

year advocating the election or defeat of such 

exceeds $1,000íî). 

The statutory phrase ìsuggestive of no plau

ing other than an exhortation to vote for or 

specific candidateî cannot cure the overbreadt

ness of the backup definition. Like other key t

provision, these words are not defined. The la

ance presents serious problems of uncertainty. 

bleî means something close to ìreasonable in 

totality of the circumstances,î speakers will b

with an insufficient degree of protection and 

result, engage in widespread self-censorship 

severe criminal penalties. 

Given the statuteís vagueness, even defen

experts disagree among themselves about whet

ads fall within the prohibition. Hence, people 

intelligence must necessarily guess at [the bac

tionís] meaning and differ as to its application

v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926)

reasons, I would also invalidate the ban on ele

communication under the backup definition. 

Before concluding the analysis on Title II, it i

to add a few words about the majorityís analy

The majority attempts to minimize the da

under ß203 by construing ß204 (the Wellsto

ment) to incorporate an exception for MCFL-ty

tions. See MCFL, 479 U. S. 238. Section 20

does no such thing. As even the majority co
5. 

tions from its prohibition. Ante, at 105. A

normally presume that legislators would not d

enact an unconstitutional statute, that pres

inapplicable here. There is no ambiguity rega

ß204 is intended to accomplish. Enacted to su

Snowe-Jeffords Amendment that would have 

precisely this exception for MCFL corporations

written to broaden BCRAís scope to include issu

groups. See, e.g., App. to Brief for Appellants 

in No. 02ñ1675 et al., pp. 65a, 67a (Sen. 

(ì[I]ndividuals with all this wealthî will ìmak

money contributions to these sham issue ads 

these . . . organizations, which under this lo

operate with impunityî to run ìpoisonous ads.î 

amendment that . . . make[s] sure . . . this 

doesnít get [through]î). Instead of deleting 

Jeffords Amendment from the bill, however, th

Amendment was inserted in a separate section 

severability. 

Were we to indulge the presumption tha

understood the law when it legislated, the 

Amendment could be understood only as a fr

lenge to MCFL. Even were I to agree with th

interpretation of ß204, however, my analysis 

remains unaffected. The First Amendment p

right of all organizations, not just a subset 

engage in political speech. See Austin, 494 U. 

701 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (ìThe First A

does not permit courts to exercise speech s

authority denied to legislaturesî). 

Title IIís vagueness and overbreadth demon

gressí fundamental misunderstanding of the Fi

ment. The Court, it must be said, succumbs t
direct campaign contributions by corporations 

It then uses this rhetorical momentum as its 

uphold the Act. The problem, however, is th

ban on electioneering communications cove

commentaries on political issues and is far rem

laws prohibiting direct contributions from cor

union treasuries. The severe First Amendmen

this ban on independent expenditures requ

stronger justifications than the majority offers. 

ley, supra, at 23. 

The hostility toward corporations and unions 

the majority opinion is inconsistent with the 

neutrality the First Amendment demands of 

ment actors, including the members of this Cour

tions, after all, are the engines of our moder

They facilitate complex operations on which t

prosperity depends. To say these entities cann

public to pending political issues that may th

countryís economic interests is unprecedented. 

also an established part of the national econom

They, too, have their own unique insights to co

the political debate, but the lawís impact on the

severe. The costs of the majorityís misplaced con

the ìcorrosive and distorting effects of immen

tions of wealth,î Austin, supra, at 660, moreover

most heavily on budget-strapped nonprofit en

which many of our citizens rely for political c

and advocacy. These groups must now choo

staying on the sidelines in the next election or es

PAC against their institutional identities. PACs 

construct sanctioned by Congress. They are not 

the means of communication chosen and prefe

citizenry. 

In the same vein the Court is quite incorrect 

that the mainstream press is a sufficient pallia
cal process. The Court should appreciate th

contribution diverse groups and associations m

intellectual and cultural life of the Nation. It 

permit Congress to foreclose or restrict those g

participating in the political process by cons

applicable to the established press. 

CONCLUSION 

The First Amendment underwrites the free

periment and to create in the realm of thought 

Citizens must be free to use new forms, and n

for the expression of ideas. The civic discourse 

the people and the Government may not pr

means used to conduct it. 

The First Amendment commands that Con

make no law . . . abridging the freedom of sp

command cannot be read to allow Congress to 

the imprisonment of those who attempt to est

political parties and alter the civic discourse. 

istic society is filled with voices expressing new 

ent viewpoints, speaking through modes and m

that must be allowed to change in response to th

of an interested public. As communities have 

technology has evolved, concerted speech not o

come more effective than a single voice but also 

the natural preference and efficacious choice 

Americans. The Court, upholding multiple law

press both spontaneous and concerted speech, le

free than before. Todayís decision breaks fait

tradition of robust and unfettered debate. 

For the foregoing reasons, with respect, I d

the Courtís decision upholding the main featur

I and II. 
Act. 

BCRA ß101(a), 116 Stat. 81, which sets forth 

ß323, 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i (Supp. 2003), provides

ìSEC. 323. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL 

ì(a) NATIONAL COMMITTEES.ó 

ì(1) IN GENERAL.óA national commit

litical party (including a national congres

paign committee of a political party) may 

receive, or direct to another person a contr

nation, or transfer of funds or any oth

value, or spend any funds, that are not su

limitations, prohibitions, and reporting re

of this Act. 

ì(2) APPLICABILITY.óThe prohibition 

by paragraph (1) applies to any such nation

tee, any officer or agent acting on behalf of 

tional committee, and any entity that is dir

directly established, financed, maint

controlled by such a national committee. 

ì(b) STATE, DISTRICT, AND 

COMMITTEES.ó 

ì(1) IN GENERAL.óExcept as provide

graph (2), an amount that is expended o

for Federal election activity by a State, dis

cal committee of a political party (includin

that is directly or indirectly established

maintained, or controlled by a State, distr

committee of a political party and an offic

acting on behalf of such committee or entit

association or similar group of candidates 

local office or of individuals holding State 

fice, shall be made from funds subject to 

tions, prohibitions, and reporting requirem
(A) IN GENERAL.Notwithstandin

or (ii) of section 301(20)(A), and subject t

graph (B), paragraph (1) shall not app

amount expended or disbursed by a State, 

local committee of a political party for an 

scribed in either such clause to the 

amounts expended or disbursed for such 

allocated (under regulations prescribed b

mission) among amountsó 

ì(i) which consist solely of contributi

to the limitations, prohibitions, and re

quirements of this Act (other than amount

in subparagraph (B)(iii)); and 

ì(ii) other amounts which are not su

limitations, prohibitions, and reporting re

of this Act (other than any requirements 

section). 

ì(B) CONDITIONS.óSubparagraph (A

apply ifó 

ì(i) the activity does not refer to a cle

fied candidate for Federal office; 

ì(ii) the amounts expended or disbur

for the costs of any broadcasting, cable, 

communication, other than a communica

refers solely to a clearly identified candida

or local office; 

ì(iii) the amounts expended or disbu

are described in subparagraph (A)(ii) are 

amounts which are donated in accordance 

law and which meet the requirements o

graph (C), except that no person (including 

established, financed, maintained, or co

such person) may donate more than $1

State, district, or local committee of a pol

in a calendar year for such expenditures o
(iv) the amounts expended or dis

made solely from funds raised by the Sta

district committee which makes such exp

disbursement, and do not include any fun

to such committee fromó 

ì(I) any other State, local, or distr

tee of any State party, 

ì(II) the national committee of 

party (including a national congressiona

committee of a political party), 

ì(III) any officer or agent acting o

any committee described in subclause (I) or 

ì(IV) any entity directly or indir

lished, financed, maintained, or controll

committee described in subclause (I) or (II)

ì(C) PROHIBITING INVOLVEM

NATIONAL PARTIES, FEDERAL CAN

AND OFFICEHOLDERS, AND STATE 

ACTING JOINTLY.óNotwithstanding su

(other than subsection (e)(3)), amounts 

authorized to be spent under subparagr

meet the requirements of this subparagr

the amountsó 

ì(i) are not solicited, received, dire

ferred, or spent by or in the name of any 

scribed in subsection (a) or (e); and 

ì(ii) are not solicited, received, 

through fundraising activities conducted j

or more State, local, or district committees 

litical party or their agents, or by a State, l

trict committee of a political party on be

State, local, or district committee of a pol

or its agent in one or more other States. 

ì(c) FUNDRAISING COSTS.óAn amount 

person described in subsection (a) or (b) to 
and disbursements for a Federal election ac

be made from funds subject to the limitat

bitions, and reporting requirements of this 

ì(d) TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS.óA 

State, district, or local committee of a pol

(including a national congressional campai

tee of a political party), an entity that is 

indirectly established, financed, maintain

trolled by any such national, State, distr

committee or its agent, and an officer or a

on behalf of any such party committee or e

not solicit any funds for, or make or direc

tions toó 

ì(1) an organization that is described 

501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19

empt from taxation under section 501(a) o

(or has submitted an application for deter

tax exempt status under such section) and 

expenditures or disbursements in connecti

election for Federal office (including expe

disbursements for Federal election activity)

ì(2) an organization described in section 

Code (other than a political committee, a 

trict, or local committee of a political pa

authorized campaign committee of a ca

State or local office). 

ì(e) FEDERAL CANDIDATES.ó 

ì(1) IN GENERAL.óA candidate, indiv

ing Federal office, agent of a candidate or 

ual holding Federal office, or an entity dir

directly established, financed, main

controlled by or acting on behalf of 1 or m

dates or individuals holding Federal office, 

ì(A) solicit, receive, direct, transfer

funds in connection with an election for Fe
less the funds are subject to the limitatio

tions, and reporting requirements of this A

ì(B) solicit, receive, direct, transfer

funds in connection with any election oth

election for Federal office or disburse fund

tion with such an election unless the fundsó 

ì(i) are not in excess of the amount

with respect to contributions to candidates 

cal committees under paragraphs (1), (2)

section 315(a); and 

ì(ii) are not from sources prohibited 

from making contributions in connection w

tion for Federal office. 

ì(2) STATE LAW.óParagraph (1) does n

the solicitation, receipt, or spending of fund

dividual described in such paragraph wh

also a candidate for a State or local offic

connection with such election for State or lo

the solicitation, receipt, or spending of fu

mitted under State law and refers only to 

or local candidate, or to any other candid

State or local office sought by such candida

ì(3) FUNDRAISING EVENTS.óNotw

paragraph (1) or subsection (b)(2)(C), a c

an individual holding Federal office m

speak, or be a featured guest at a fundra

for a State, district, or local committee of 

party. 

ì(4) PERMITTING CERTAIN SOLICITA

ì(A) GENERAL SOLICITATIONS

standing any other provision of this subsec

dividual described in paragraph (1) may m

eral solicitation of funds on behalf of any o

that is described in section 501(c) of th

Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from t
and 

application for determination of tax exe

under such section) (other than an entity w

cipal purpose is to conduct activities d

clauses (i) and (ii) of section 301(20)(A)) 

solicitation does not specify how the fun

should be spent. 

ì(B) CERTAIN SPECIFIC SOLICITAT

addition to the general solicitations perm

subparagraph (A), an individual describe

graph (1) may make a solicitation explicit

funds for carrying out the activities d

clauses (i) and (ii) of section 301(20)(A), or 

tity whose principal purpose is to conduct 

ties, ifó 

ì(i) the solicitation is made only to i

ì(ii) the amount solicited from any 

during any calendar year does not exceed $

ì(f) STATE CANDIDATES.ó 

ì(1) IN GENERAL.óA candidate for St

office, individual holding State or local o

agent of such a candidate or individual ma

any funds for a communication described 

301(20)(A)(iii) unless the funds are subject 

tations, prohibitions, and reporting requi

this Act. 

ì(2) EXCEPTION FOR 

COMMUNICATIONS.óParagraph (1) sha

to an individual described in such parag

communication involved is in connection w

tion for such State or local office and ref

such individual or to any other candidate fo

or local office held or sought by such ind

both.î 
activity to FECA ß301, 2 U. S. C. A. ß431

2003), which provides as follows: 

ì(20) FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY.ó 

ì(A) IN GENERAL.óThe term ëFederal 

tivityí meansó 

ì(i) voter registration activity during 

that begins on the date that is 120 days 

date a regularly scheduled Federal elect

and ends on the date of the election; 

ì(ii) voter identification, get-out-the-vo

or generic campaign activity conducted in 

with an election in which a candidate for 

fice appears on the ballot (regardless of 

candidate for State or local office also app

ballot); 

ì(iii) a public communication that r

clearly identified candidate for Federal off

less of whether a candidate for State or lo

also mentioned or identified) and that p

supports a candidate for that office, or att

poses a candidate for that office (reg

whether the communication expressly a

vote for or against a candidate); or 

ì(iv) services provided during any m

employee of a State, district, or local com

political party who spends more than 25 

that individual's compensated time during 

on activities in connection with a Federal e

ì(B) EXCLUDED ACTIVITY.óThe ter

election activityí does not include an amoun

or disbursed by a State, district, or local co

a political party foró 

ì(i) a public communication that refers 

clearly identified candidate for State or lo
described in subparagraph (A)(i) or (ii); 

ì(ii) a contribution to a candidate for St

office, provided the contribution is not de

pay for a Federal election activity describ

paragraph (A); 

ì(iii) the costs of a State, district, or lo

convention; and 

ì(iv) the costs of grassroots campaign 

including buttons, bumper stickers, and 

that name or depict only a candidate for St

office.î 

Title 2 U. S. C. A. ßß441b(a) and (b)(1)ñ(2) (S

as amended by BCRA ß203, provide: 

ì(a) It is unlawful for any national bank, 

poration organized by authority of any l

gress, to make a contribution or expendit

nection with any election to any political 

connection with any primary election or p

vention or caucus held to select candidates 

litical office, or for any corporation whate

labor organization, to make a contribution 

ture in connection with any election at w

dential and vice presidential electors or a 

Representative in, or a Delegate or Reside

sioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or 

tion with any primary election or political 

or caucus held to select candidates for any 

going offices, or for any candidate, political 

or other person knowingly to accept or r

contribution prohibited by this section, or 

or any director of any corporation or an

bank or any officer of any labor organizat

sent to any contribution or expenditure by 

ration, national bank, or labor organizat
(b)(1) For the purposes of this section th

bor organizationî means any organization o

or any agency or employee representation 

or plan, in which employees participate 

exists for the purpose, in whole or in part

with employers concerning grievances, lab

wages, rates of pay, hours of employmen

tions of work. 

ì(2) For purposes of this section and secti

Title 15, the term ìcontribution or expen

cludes a contribution or expenditure, as t

are defined in section 431 of this title, a

cludes any direct or indirect payment, d

loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, o

ices, or anything of value (except a loan of 

national or State bank made in accordan

applicable banking laws and regulations 

ordinary course of business) to any cand

paign committee, or political party or orga

connection with any election to any of the 

ferred to in this section or for any applicab

eering communication, but shall not inclu

munications by a corporation to its stockh

executive or administrative personnel and 

lies or by a labor organization to its me

their families on any subject; (B) nonpar

tration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by 

tion aimed at its stockholders and execu

ministrative personnel and their familie

labor organization aimed at its members 

families; and (C) the establishment, adm

and solicitation of contributions to a sepa

gated fund to be utilized for political pur

corporation, labor organization, members

zation, cooperative, or corporation with

stock.î 
Nos. 02ñ1674, 02ñ1675, 02ñ1676, 02ñ1702, 02ñ1727, 02ñ1

02ñ1740, 02ñ1747, 02ñ1753, 02ñ1755, AND 02ñ1

_________________ 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1674 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1675 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET AL., APP

02ñ1676 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

JOHN MCCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1702 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, E

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1727 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1733 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPE

02ñ1734 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, ET AL., APP

02ñ1740 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 
, 

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1747 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ET AL., APP

02ñ1753 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CON

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1755 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED 

ET AL., APPELLANTS 

02ñ1756 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

[December 10, 2003] 

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting with 

BCRA Titles I and V.* 

Although I join JUSTICE KENNEDYís opinio

write separately to highlight my disagreemen

Court on Title I of the Bipartisan Campaign Re

2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, and to dissent from 

opinion upholding ß504 of Title V. 

I 

The issue presented by Title I is not, as the 

plies, whether Congress can permissibly reg

óóóóóó 

* JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE KENNEDY join this o

entirety. 
seek to eliminate corruption in the politic

Rather, the issue is whether Congress can 

regulate much speech that has no plausible co

candidate contributions or corruption to ach

goals. Under our precedent, restrictions on p

tributions implicate important First Amendm

and are constitutional only if they are ìclosely 

reduce the corruption of federal candidates or 

ance of corruption. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U

27 (1976) (per curiam). Yet, the Court gloss

breadth of the restrictions, characterizing Title 

as ìdo[ing] little more that regulat[ing] the 

wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions 

ute large sums of money to influence federa

federal candidates, and federal officeholders.î 

(joint opinion of STEVENS and OíCONNOR, JJ.)

in reality, Title I is much broader than the Co

regulating a good deal of speech that does no

potential to corrupt federal candidates and offi

dissent. 

The lynchpin of Title I, new FECA ß323(a

national political party committees from ìs

ìreceiv[ing],î ìdirect[ing] to another person,î a

[ing]î any funds not subject to federal regulat

those funds are used for nonelection related a

U. S. C. A. ß441i(a)(1) (Supp. 2003). The Cour

that such a restriction is justified because un

ìdonors have been free to contribute substant

soft money to the national parties, which the 

spend for the specific purpose of influencing a 

candidateís federal election.î Ante, at 36. A

ì[i]t is not only plausible, but likely, that candid

feel grateful for such donations and that do

seek to exploit that gratitude.î Ibid. But the C

the point. Certainly ìinfusions of money into [c
vative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497 

be regulated, but ß323(a) does not regulate onl

given to influence a particular federal election; 

all donations to national political committees

the use to which the funds are put. 

The Court attempts to sidestep the unp

breadth of this regulation by stating that the 

tionship between federal officeholders and th

partiesî makes all donations to the national p

pect.î Ante, at 45. But a close association w

especially in the realm of political speech, is n

gate for corruption; it is one of our most trea

Amendment rights. See California Democra

Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 574 (2000); Eu v. San 

County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S

(1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn

208, 214 (1986). The Courtís willingness to imp

tion on the basis of a relationship greatly infr

ciational rights and expands Congressí ability 

political speech. And there is nothing in t

analysis that limits congressional regulation 

political parties. In fact, the Court relies in p

closeness rationale to regulate nonprofit org

Ante, at 47ñ48, n. 51. Who knows what associa

deemed too close to federal officeholders nex

donation to an organization has no potential t

federal officeholder, the relationship between 

holder and the organization is simply irrelevant

The Court fails to recognize that the nation

parties are exemplars of political speech at a

government, in addition to effective fundraisers 

candidates and officeholders. For sure, nation

party committees exist in large part to elect fed

dates, but as a majority of the District Court 

also promote coordinated political messages a
promote, even in offyear elections, state and 

dates and seek to influence policy at those 

increase public participation in the electoral p

251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 334ñ337 (DC 2003) (p

(Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in pa

senting in part); id., at 820ñ821 (Leon, J.). In

national political parties exist primarily for the 

expressing ideas and generating debate. Ap

(declaration of Stephen L. Dasbach et al. ¶11 

Libertarian Party)). 

As these activities illustrate, political pa

foster speech crucial to a healthy democracy, 2

2d, at 820 (Leon, J.), and fulfill the need for l

individuals to ban together and promote a po

losophy, see Jones, supra, at 574; Eu, supra, at 

political parties engage in pure political speec

little or no potential to corrupt their federal 

and officeholders, the government cannot cons

burden their speech any more than it could 

speech of individuals engaging in these same 

E.g., National Conservative Political Action Com

at 496ñ497; Citizens Against Rent Control/C

Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 297ñ

Buckley, 424 U. S., at 27. Notwithstanding 

citation to the numerous abuses of FECA, 

definition of ìexacting scrutiny,î the means 

Congress, restricting all donations to national 

matter the purpose for which they are given o

are not ìclosely drawn to avoid unnecessary ab

associational freedoms,î id., at 25. 

BCRAís overinclusiveness is not limited 

political parties. To prevent the circumvention 

on the national partiesí use of nonfederal fu

extensively regulates state parties, primarily 

tions, and state candidates. For example, 
prohibits state parties from using nonfederal 

general partybuilding activities such as voter r

voter identification, and get out the vote for s

dates even if federal candidates are not mentio

U. S. C. A. ßß441i(b), 431(20)(A)(i)ñ(ii) (Supp. 2

FECA ß323(d) prohibits state and local poli

committees, like their national counterparts, f

ing and donating ìany fundsî to nonprofit or

such as the National Rifle Association or th

Association for the Advancement of Color

(NAACP). See 2 U. S. C. A. ß441i(d). And, 

ß323(f) requires a state gubernatorial candida

by federal funding restrictions when airing a te

that tells voters that, if elected, he would 

Presidentís policy of increased oil and gas 

within the State because it would harm the en

See 2 U. S. C. A. ßß441i(f), 431(20)(A)(iii) 

ìpublic communication[s] that refe[r] to a clearl

candidate for Federal office (regardless of whe

didate for State or local office is also mentione

fied) and that . . . attacks or opposes a candid

officeî). 

Although these provisions are more focused o

that may affect federal elections, there is scant 

the record to indicate that federal candidate

holders are corrupted or would appear corrupt

tions for these activities. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, 

416, 422 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgm

and dissenting in part); id., at 779ñ780, 791 (L

also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 

óóóóóó 

1The Court points out that state parties may use Le

certain activities. Levin funds, however, are still federal r

speech, even if they are less onerous than the restricti

national parties. 
ity opinion) (noting that the opportunity for 

posed by [nonfederal contributions for state ele

out-the-vote, and voter registration activities] 

attenuatedî). Nonetheless, the Court conc

because these activities benefit federal cand

officeholders, see ante, at 59 or prevent the cir

of pre-existing or contemporaneously enacted r

see ante, at 57, 67, 71, 78, it must defer to the 

judgments of Congress,íî ante, at 57 (quot

Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S

(1994)). 

Yet the Court cannot truly mean what it say

per editorials and political talk shows ben

candidates and officeholders every bit as muc

neric voter registration drive conducted by a s

there is little doubt that the endorsement 

newspaper affects federal elections, and federal 

and officeholders are surely ìgrateful,î ante, 

positive media coverage. I doubt, however, 

would seriously contend that we must defer t

judgment if it chose to reduce the influence 

endorsements in federal elections.3 See Mia

óóóóóó 

2 Ironically, in the Courtís view, Congress cannot be tr

cise judgment independent of its partiesí large donors 

voting decisions because donations may be used to furthe

reelection campaigns, but yet must be deferred to whe

comprehensive regulatory regime that restricts election-r

It seems to me no less likely that Congress would crea

favor its Membersí reelection chances, than be corrupted 

of money to its political parties, which may in turn be u

portion of the Membersí reelection campaigns. 3The Courtís suggestion that the ìclose relationshipî be

officeholders and state and local political parties in some 

the media from its rationale is unconvincing, see ante

(THOMAS, J., concurring in part, concurring in result 
(holding unconstitutional a state law that requir

pers to provide ìright to replyî to any candida

personally or professionally assailed in order t

the ìabuses of bias and manipulative reporta

press). 

It is also true that any circumvention rat

mately must rest on the circumvention itself lea

corruption of federal candidates and officeho

Buckley, 424 U. S., at 38 (upholding restriction

donated to national political parties ìfor the 

influencing any election for a Federal officeî b

were prophylactic measures designed ìto preve

of the contribution limit on candidates). A

speech that is not sifted through federal reg

cumvents the regulatory scheme to some deg

other, and thus by the Courtís standard would 

holeî in the current system.4 Unless the C

óóóóóó 

dissenting in part), particularly because such a relatio

proved with minimal evidence. Indeed, although the Co

that local political parties have a ìclose relationshipî 

candidates, thus warranting greater congressional reg

unaware of any evidence in the record that indicates that 

parties have any relationship with federal candidates. 4BCRA does not even close all of the ìloopholesî that cu

Nonprofit organizations are currently able to accept, with

unlimited donations for voter registration, voter identifica

out-the-vote activities, and the record indicates that such 

already receive large donations, sometimes in the millions 

these activities, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 323 (DC 2003) (H

concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (n

NAACP Voter Fund received a single, anonymous $7 mi

for get-out-the-vote activities). There is little reason why 

to these nonprofit organizations, no matter the purpose 

money is used, will deserve any more protection than t

vides state parties if Congress decides to regulate the

knows what the next ìloopholeî will be. 
a rationale dependent on circumvention alone 

By untethering its inquiry from corruption or 

ance of corruption, the Court has removed the 

of our campaign finance precedent and has f

place it with any logical limiting principle. 

But such an untethering is necessary to 

analysis. Only by using amorphous language 

a federal interest, however vaguely defined, ex

Court avoid the obvious fact that new FECA ßß

(d), and (f) are vastly overinclusive. Any ca

nance law aimed at reducing corruption will al

affect federal elections or prohibit the circum

federal law, and if broad enough, most laws wi

reduce some appearance of corruption. Indee

cisely because broad laws are likely to nominal

legitimate interest that we require Congress t

restrictions; requiring all federal candidates to 

their campaigns would surely reduce the app

donor corruption, but it would hardly be constit

allowing Congress to rely on general princip

affecting a federal election or prohibiting the 

tion of existing law, the Court all but elim

ìclosely drawnî tailoring requirement and 

judicial review. 

No doubt Congress was convinced by the man

the current system that something in this ar

done. Its response, however, was too blunt. M

abuses described by the Court involve donation

made for the ìpurpose of influencing a federa

and thus are already regulated. See Buck

Congress could have sought to have the exist

tions enforced or to enact other restriction

ìclosely drawnî to its legitimate concerns. Bu

not be able to broadly restrict political speech 

ion it has chosen. Todayís decision, by not re
for political speech having little or nothing 

corruption or the appearance of corruption. 

II 

BCRA ß504 amends ß315 of the Communicat

require broadcast licensees to maintain and disc

of any request to purchase broadcast time that ì

or on behalf of a legally qualified candidate 

officeî or that ìcommunicates a message rela

political matter of national importance,î incl

munications relating to ìa legally qualified 

ìany election to Federal office,î and ìa nationa

issue of public importance.î BCRA ß504; 47 

ß315(e)(1) (Supp. 2003).5 This section differs 

óóóóóó 

5Section 315(e), as amended by BCRA ß504, provides: 

ìPolitical record 

ì(1) In general 

ìA licensee shall maintain, and make available for pub

a complete record of a request to purchase broadcast time 

ì(A) is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified candid

office; or 

ì(B) communicates a message relating to any politi

national importance, includingó 

ì(i) a legally qualified candidate; 

ì(ii) any election to Federal office; or 

ì(iii) a national legislative issue of public importance. 

ì(2) Contents of record 

ìA record maintained under paragraph (1) shall contai

regardingó 

ì(A) whether the request to purchase broadcast time 

rejected by the licensee; 

ì(B) the rate charged for the broadcast time; 

ì(C) the date and time on which the communication is a

ì(D) the class of time that is purchased; 

ì(E) the name of the candidate to which the commun

and the office to which the candidate is seeking election, 

which the communication refers, or the issue to which th

tion refers (as applicable); 
licensees to disclose requests to purchase broa

rather than requiring purchasers to disclose 

bursements for broadcast time. See, e.g., BCRA 

Court concludes that ß504 ìmust survive a fa

under any potentially applicable First Amend

dard, including that of heightened scrutiny.î 

(opinion of BREYER, J.). I disagree. 

This section is deficient because of the ab

sufficient governmental interest to justify di

mere requests to purchase broadcast time, 

purchases themselves. The Court approaches ß

exclusively from the perspective of the broadcas

ignoring the interests of candidates and other 

whose speech and association rights are affect

See, e.g., ante, at 5 (noting that broadcasters ar

numerous recordkeeping requirements); ante, a

that this Court has recognized ìbroad go

authority for agency information demands from 

entitiesî); ante, at 8ñ9 (ì[W]e cannot say tha

quirements will impose disproportionate adm

burdensî). An approach that simply focuses 

the administrative burden is justifiable is 

Because ß504 impinges on core First Amendme

is subject to a more demanding test than me

óóóóóó 

ì(F) in the case of a request made by, or on behalf of, a 

name of the candidate, the authorized committee of the c

the treasurer of such committee; and 

ì(G) in the case of any other request, the name of th

chasing the time, the name, and phone number of a cont

such person, and a list of the chief executive officers or m

executive committee or of the board of directors of such pe

ì(3) Time to maintain file 

ìThe information required under this subsection shall 

political file as soon as possible and shall be retained by t

a period of not less than 2 years.î 
sentially whether there is any conceivable rea

port ß504. See ante, at 8 (discussing the ways i

disclosure ìcan helpî the FCC and the public); 

(noting that the ìrecordkeeping requirements 

to help the FCCî enforce the fairness doctrine). 

Required disclosure provisions that deter c

ally protected association and speech rights ar

heightened scrutiny. See Buckley, 424 U. S., a

applying heightened scrutiny, we first ask w

Government has asserted an interest sufficien

the disclosure of requests to purchase broa

Ibid.; see ante, at 89 (joint opinion of ST

OíCONNOR, JJ.) (concluding that the impor

interests the Buckley Court held justified FEC

sure requirements apply to BCRA ß201ís dis

quirement). But the Government, in its brief, 

interest whatever to support ß504 as a whole. 

Contrary to the Courtís suggestion, ante, at 7 

BREYER, J.), the Governmentís brief does not 

present interests sufficient to support ß504. 

paragraphs that the Court relies on provide the 

ìAs explained in the governmentís brie

tion to the motion for summary affirmance 

sue filed by plaintiff National Association 

casters (NAB), longstanding FCC regulati

disclosure requirements with respect to t

ship of broadcast matter ëinvolving the dis

controversial issue of public importance.í 

73.1212(d) and (e) (2002); see 47 C. F. R. 

(2002) (same standard used in disclosure 

governing cablecasting). By enabling view

teners to identify the persons actually resp

communications aimed at a mass audie

regulations assist the public in evaluatin
(Identification of the source of advertising 

quired . . . so that the people will be able 

the arguments to which they are being subj

ìThe range of information required to b

under BCRA ß504 is comparable to the 

mandated by pre-existing FCC rules. C

U. S. C. 315(e)(2)(G) (added by BCRA ß50

C. F. R. 73.1212(e) and 76.1701(d) (2002). 

do not attempt to show that BCRA ß50

ments are more onerous than the FCCís lo

rules, nor do they contend that the p

agency regulations are themselves uncon

See generally 02ñ1676 Govít Br. in Opp. 

NAB for Summ. Aff. 4ñ9. Because BCRA 

sentially a codification of established a

lenged regulatory requirements, plain

Amendment claim should be rejected.î Br

et al. in No. 02ñ1674 et al., pp. 132ñ133; an

While these paragraphs attempt to set forth a j

for the new Communications Act ß315(e)(1)(B)

below, I fail to see any justification for BCRA 

entirety. Nor do I find persuasive the Cour

Governmentís argument that pre-existing un

agency regulations imposing similar disclosu

ments compel the conclusion that ß504 is con

and somehow relieve the Government of its 

advancing a constitutionally sufficient justi

ß504. 

At oral argument, the Government counse

that one of the interests supporting ß504 in 

stems from the fairness doctrine, Tr. of Ora

which in general imposes an obligation on l

devote a ìreasonable percentageî of broadca

issues of public importance in a way that reflec
367 (1969). Assuming, arguendo, this latterda

should be considered, I think the District Cou

noted that there is nothing in the record tha

licensees have treated purchasers unfairly. 2

2d, at 812 (Leon, J.). In addition, this inte

wholly unconnected to the central purpose of B

is not at all similar to the governmenta

in Buckley that we found to be ìsufficiently 

to outweigh the possibility of infringement,î 4

66. 

As to the disclosure requirements involving ìa

matter of national importanceî under the new 

cations Act ß315(e)(1)(B), the Government su

the disclosure enables viewers to evaluate th

transmitted.6 First, insofar as BCRA ß504 r

porting of ìrequest[s for] broadcast timeî as we

broadcasts, it is not supported by this goal. Re

do not mature into actual purchases will have 

but the information may allow competitors or 

to obtain information regarding organizational 

strategies of purchasers. Second, even as to 

themselves, in this noncandidate-related context

a far cry from the Government interests endors

ley, which were limited to evaluating and preven

tion of federal candidates. Ibid.; see also McIn

Elections Commín, 514 U. S. 334, 354 (1995). 

As to disclosure requirements with respect to 

under the new Communications Act ß315(e)(1

ß504 significantly overlaps with ß201, which is 

upheld by this Court, ante, at 87ñ95 (joint 

óóóóóó 

6Communications relating to candidates will be covere

Communications Act ß315(e)(1)(A), so, in this context, 

sider, for example, the plaintiff-organizations, which 

to use the broadcast medium to convey a message esp

organizations. 
g 

of information, including the amount of each di

and the elections to which electioneering comm

pertain. While I recognize that there is this ov

imposes a different burden on the purcha

Amendment rights: as noted above, ß201 is 

purchasersí disclosure of disbursements for ele

communications, whereas ß504 requires broa

seesí disclosure of requests for broadcast time b

ers. Not only are the purchasersí requests, 

never result in an actual advertisement, sub

disclosure requirements, but ß504 will undoub

in increased costs of communication because th

will shift the costs of the onerous disclosure 

keeping requirements to purchasers. The G

fails to offer a reason for the separate burden 

ent overlap. 

The Government cannot justify, and for that 

not attempted to justify, its requirement that 

for] broadcastî time be publicized. On the re

this Court, I cannot even speculate as to a go

interest that would allow me to conclude that 

sure of ìrequestsî should be upheld. Such discl

inter alia, allowing candidates and political 

opportunity to ferret out a purchaserís politic

and, ultimately, unduly burdens the First A

freedoms of purchasers. 

Absent some showing of a Government inte

by ß504 and in light of the breadth of disclo

quests,î I must conclude that ß504 fails to s

Amendment scrutiny. 
Nos. 02ñ1674, 02ñ1675, 02ñ1676, 02ñ1702, 02ñ1727, 02ñ1

02ñ1740, 02ñ1747, 02ñ1753, 02ñ1755, AND 02ñ1

_________________ 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1674 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1675 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET AL., APP

02ñ1676 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

JOHN MCCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1702 v. 

MITCH MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENAT

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, E

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1727 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1733 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPE

02ñ1734 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, ET AL., APP

02ñ1740 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 
RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN

APPELLANTS 

02ñ1747 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ET AL., APP

02ñ1753 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CON

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ET AL., APPE

02ñ1755 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED 

ET AL., APPELLANTS 

02ñ1756 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET 

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

[December 10, 2003] 

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting with respect to 

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, writing for the Court

that the McConnell plaintiffs lack standing t

ß305 of BCRA because Senator McConnell 

affected by the provision until ì45 days before t

can primary election in 2008.î Ante, at 4. I a

suaded that Article IIIís case-or-controversy r

imposes such a strict temporal limit on our j

By asserting that he has run attack ads in th

óóóóóó 

* JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE BREYER join this o

entirety. 
ß305 will adversely affect his campaign strate

McConnell has identified a ìconcrete,î ìëdist

ìëactualíî injury, Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. 

(1990). That the injury is distant in time does 

illusory. 

The second prong of the standing inquiryów

alleged injury is fairly traceable to the defend

lenged action and not the result of a third p

pendent choicesÜóposes a closer question. S

does not require broadcast stations to charge a 

higher rates for unsigned ads that mention the 

opponent. Rather, the provision simply perm

to charge their normal rates for such ads. So

may take advantage of this regulatory gap 

pricing schemes that discriminate between the 

that Senator McConnell has run in the past and 

strictly comply with ß305. It is also possibl

that instead of incurring the transaction costs 

candidatesí compliance with ß305, stations will 

charge the same rates for attack ads as for all 

paign ads. In the absence of any record ev

stations will uniformly choose to charge Sena

nell higher rates for the attack ads he propose

2008, it is at least arguable that his alleged in

traceable to BCRA ß305. 

Nevertheless, I would entertain plaintiffsí c

ß305 on the merits and uphold the section. 

ßß201, 212, and 311, ß305 serves an importan

stitutionally sufficientóinformational purpose. 

ß305ís disclosure requirements largely overla

ß311, and plaintiffs identify no reason why an

already in compliance with ß311 will be harm

óóóóóó 

Ü Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560ñ561 (1
Indeed, I am convinced that the important go

interest of ëshed[ding] the light of publicityí on 

financing,î invoked above in connection with ß3

9 (opinion of REHNQUIST, C. J.), would suffice t

legislative provision expressly requiring all 

attack ads to identify themselves in their ads. 

seeks to achieve the same purpose indirectly

drawing a statutory benefit, does not render th

any less sound. 

Finally, I do not regard ß305 as a constitut

pect ìviewpoint-based regulation.î Brief 

lants/Cross-Appellees Senator Mitch McConn

No. 02ñ1674 et al., p. 67. Like BCRAís other 

requirements, ß305 evenhandedly regulates sp

on its electioneering content. Although t

reaches only ads that mention opposing can

applies equally to all such ads. Disagreement 

opponent obviously expresses a ìviewpoint,î 

treats that expression exactly like the opp

sponse. 

In sum, I would uphold ß305.