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i 

65–808 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–37] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUESTS FOR 

U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 5, 2011 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

BEN RUNKLE, Professional Staff Member 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, April 5, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Requests for U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Africa Command ..................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, April 5, 2011 ............................................................................................ 35 

TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2011 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUESTS FOR U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Ham, GEN Carter F., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command ....................... 6 

McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command ..................................................................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Ham, GEN Carter F. ........................................................................................ 67 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 39 

McNabb, Gen. Duncan J. ................................................................................. 43 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Hanabusa ................................................................................................... 103 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 108 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 108 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 107 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FOR U.S. TRANSPORTATION 

COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 5, 2011. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:23 p.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

I apologize for our tardiness. We had a vote and then a suspicious package, and I didn’t think they were ever going to let us 

back. 

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive 

testimony from the commanders of the United States Transportation Command and the United States Africa Command on the 

posture of their respective commands. Although these are two combatant areas that sometimes fly beneath the radar, this hearing 

cannot be more relevant than it is today. 

In AFRICOM’s [the United States Africa Command’s] area of responsibility, U.S. forces have been conducting active military operations against forces loyal to Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi in 

an effort to prevent a massacre of the civilian population of Libya. 

Although this humanitarian intervention is motivated by a noble 

impulse, there is a strong possibility of a strategic stalemate 

emerging in Libya. I fear we may find ourselves committed to an 

open-ended obligation through our participation in NATO [North 

Atlantic Treaty Organisation] operations, and that poses real opportunity costs, given the volatility of other unstable, more strategically important countries in the region. 

Beyond Libya, this weekend, as many as 1,000 civilians were 

massacred in the Ivory Coast, as that nation’s political standoff escalated violently. This brutality could be an ominous foreshadowing 

of future events in the Sudan, as the southern portion of that wartorn country becomes an independent nation in July. Further east, 

Somalia continues to be a source of instability, hosting both Al 

Qaeda and affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist organization and the various piracy networks that have intensified attacks in the Gulf of 

Aden and beyond over the past several years, recently killing four 

American citizens aboard a private yacht. 
2 

Just as it was virtually impossible to foresee the United States 

becoming militarily involved in Libya, at least at last year’s posture 

hearings, this Congress may be called upon to fund a number of 

possible contingency operations or humanitarian missions in 

AFRICOM’s AOR [area of responsibility]. I think when we made 

New Year’s resolutions this year, we did not foresee Egypt, Libya, 

all of the other things that are happening. 

Wherever U.S. forces may operate over the next year, 

TRANSCOM [the United States Transportation Command] will be 

charged with getting them there, sustaining them throughout their 

operations, and getting them home to their families. As General 

Omar Bradley famously said, amateurs talk strategy and professionals talk logistics. The events of the past 18 months are an instructive example as to the relevance of that quote today. Not only 

did TRANSCOM have to respond to the surge of forces in Afghanistan while they simultaneously orchestrated the drawdown of 

forces in Iraq, but they also had to respond to the devastating 

earthquake in Haiti. 

Things have not gotten any easier for the men and women of 

TRANSCOM, as they are now supporting combat operations in 

Libya, in addition to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are 

working desperately to assist the people of Japan following the horrific earthquakes of the past month. 

What they do is not easy, and it oftentimes goes unnoticed, but 

the capabilities of TRANSCOM are truly unique among nations. 

We are fortunate to be joined here today by two officers with long 

and distinguished records of service to their Nation: General Duncan McNabb, Commander of U.S. Transportation Command, and 

General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Africa Command. 

Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before us here today, and 

thank you for your lifetime of service to our Nation. And please 

convey our thanks to those who serve with you in your combat 

areas. We look forward to hearing your testimony today. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, General McNabb, General Ham. Appreciate you being 

here to testify this afternoon. Look forward to your comments and 

your answers to our questions. 

Two very important commands within the military. Transportation Command, first, does an amazing job of what the chairman 

referred to as ‘‘logistics.’’ You know, you can imagine all the capabilities we have and where we would like them, but General 

McNabb is the one who has to make sure that those two things 

match up. And it is not an easy job, when you consider our interests throughout the world and where we have had to move our 

equipment in recent years. You do an outstanding job, as do the 

men and women who serve in the Transportation Command. We 

appreciate that. We have the C–17s [Boeing Globemaster III mili-
3 

tary transport aircraft] out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord and 

McChord Air Force Base who are a big part of that, so we are very 

proud of what they do, as well. 

Going forward, I think, in this hearing, a number of issues we 

are going to be interested in, but, in particular, as we figure out 

how to downsize in Iraq, move equipment out of there, how does 

that work in terms of getting it back to the States or getting it 

back to where we want it based? How is that process progressing? 

What contingencies do you have in place if, for some reason, sometime in the next 7 to 8 months, it turns out that we are going to 

be leaving more equipment there than we expected? If the Iraqis 

make a request that we are able to grant for a continued U.S. presence of some, you know, very limited scope, I would anticipate, but, 

still, that will complicate the transportation of that equipment. 

And then, second, of course, the ongoing challenge of providing 

for the warfighter in Afghanistan. And there are many logistical 

challenges. We bring a lot of our equipment in through Pakistan, 

not always a very stable place. Other countries to the north of Afghanistan also have their challenges, as we have heard. So I would 

be interested in your feelings about how we are doing on that and 

what the major challenges are going forward and how we can better make sure that we get the equipment to Afghanistan that we 

need. 

In AFRICOM, as the chairman mentioned, you have a fair number of challenges in that region. I think the best way to summarize 

them is ‘‘instability.’’ Certainly, there is a lot of political unrest in 

a number of nations across the top of Africa, to varying degrees, 

from Tunisia and Egypt and Libya and Morocco. And then, also, 

further down in the Ivory Coast, there are major challenges right 

now. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has an ongoing challenge, particularly in the eastern Congo, with maintaining stability. 

And that instability can have a very real impact on our national 

security interests. Al Qaeda is present both as, you know, AQAP, 

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, over close to Somalia, and then 

Al Qaeda in the land of the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, which is 

throughout the sort of Mali-Mauritania area. And they feed on instability—vast, ungoverned spaces, where they can operate without 

people being able to control them. 

So AFRICOM has a strong interest not just, you know, in Libya, 

where we are very aware of what is going on, but throughout the 

continent in trying to figure out how we combat political unrest, 

combat poverty, which drives instability, to make sure that these 

unstable, ungoverned areas don’t become a threat to us and that 

we can help make sure that the continent is a more peaceful and 

prosperous place for those who reside there. 

So I appreciate the opportunity to have this hearing today. I look 

forward to your testimony, gentlemen. 

With that, I will yield back to the chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General McNabb. 
4 

Your full testimonies, without objection, will be inserted in the 

record, so you may tell us whatever you feel most appropriate. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF, 

COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

General MCNABB. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, and 

distinguished members of this committee, it is my distinct privilege 

to be here today with you, representing more than 145,000 of the 

world’s finest logistics professionals. 

Throughout 2010 and continuing today, the U.S. Transportation 

Command team of Active Duty, Guard, Reserves, civilians, merchant mariners, and commercial partners accomplish incredible 

feats in the face of historic challenges. 

We have a saying at U.S. Transportation Command, ‘‘We view 

our success through the eyes of the warfighter.’’ We have always 

been about support to the six regional combatant commands and 

their joint task force commanders. Working with the Defense Logistics Agency, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the combatant command staffs, our log-nation and trans-nation teams have provided 

unparalleled logistics superiority to the regional combatant commanders. 

From the Services in the Joint Forces Command getting the 

forces ready to go, to the TRANSCOM team delivering the force, 

to the theater commanders receiving the force, this is the best overall performance I have seen in almost 37 years of service. 

Sitting next to me is one of our finest warfighters and my good 

friend, General Carter Ham. I was proud to support him as he commanded military operations over the skies of Libya in Operation 

Odyssey Dawn. And I look forward to continuing to support him as 

he takes AFRICOM to new and even higher levels. It is he and the 

other commandant commanders that I am always supporting, and 

we view our success through their eyes. 

I feel blessed to be the custodian of one of the Nation’s greatest 

asymmetric advantages: our strategic ability to move. Since taking 

command of U.S. Transportation Command in the fall of 2008, I 

have been amazed to see some of the unique capabilities inherent 

in this command. 

First and foremost is the power of the total-force team. Nobody 

matches up our Active Duty force with our Guard and Reserve 

partners like the U.S. Transportation Command. When we called 

for volunteers to help relieve some of the suffering in Haiti last 

January, the men and women of the Guard and Reserves stepped 

up in huge fashion. This included a Contingency Response Group 

from the Kentucky Guard that was just coming up to speed. During 

the surge of forces into Afghanistan, we relied heavily on activated 

C–5 [Lockheed Galaxy military transport aircraft] and C–17 crews, 

maintainers, and aerial porters, and they were crucial to meeting 

President Obama’s deadline to complete the plus-up by 31 August 

of last year. Most recently, we saw their patriotism in action in responding rapidly to the air refueling requirements in support of the 

Libyan operations. 

I am also in awe of the power of the U.S.-flag fleet in the air, 

on the seas, and over land. The U.S.-flag maritime fleet and their 
5 

outstanding merchant mariners stepped up during our historic 

surge last year into Afghanistan and out of Iraq, and we didn’t 

have to activate one ship for either operation. And they delivered. 

They continue to be key to supplying our forces in Afghanistan, 

whether coming up through Pakistan or over the Northern Distribution Network. In the air, our commercial partners have continued to meet the demands of the surge in Afghanistan and, most recently, responded brilliantly to bringing Americans home from 

Japan following the recent earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear incident. 

We know the combatant commanders around the world depend 

on us to deliver the forces and their sustainment day-in and dayout, from resupply of the South Pole, to air-dropping food, water, 

and ammo to a forward operating base in Afghanistan, to delivering fuel to our fighters and bombers enforcing the Libyan no-fly 

zone, U.S. TRANSCOM delivers. If we do this right, our 

warfighting commanders do not worry about their logistics lifeline. 

This is what the Secretary of Defense intended when he made 

U.S. TRANSCOM the distribution process owner, or DPO, in 2003. 

He gave the DPO influence over the entire supply chain, from factory to foxhole. And we constantly look for more effective solutions 

for the warfighter while also being good stewards of the taxpayers’ 

dollar. Since its inception, the DPO has realized over $5.3 billion 

in savings, and we are still counting. Last year alone, that savings 

was $1.7 billion. 

A big part of the savings is taking advantage of lower-cost surface transportation whenever possible. When we match surface to 

air and commercial to military modes of transportation, we are 

leveraging our enterprise to maximum advantage for both the 

warfighter and the taxpayer. We recently saved over $110 million 

a month moving lifesaving Mine Resistant All-Terrain vehicles to 

our forces in Afghanistan using a combination of commercial surface and military air. We continue to look for every opportunity to 

use multimodal operations throughout our global enterprise. 

My final callout is to the power of the interagency and the joint 

team. President Obama, in ordering the plus-up of forces in Afghanistan and drawdown in Iraq, set a very tight timeline for our 

execution. We knew we would need some help increasing capacity 

on our existing supply lines and help in establishing new supply 

routes. 

We took our recommendations to the interagency, and the whole 

of government came through with excellent results. The National 

Security Council, ambassadors around the world, the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Maritime Administration, the combatant commands, and the log-nation and transnation teams came together to make logistics magic. 

This was at a time when we were asked to expand quickly and 

redirect flow due at an earthquake in the Caribbean that devastated Haiti, which the chairman alluded to; a volcanic eruption 

that shut down European airspace for 3 weeks; a coup in the country where we have our main passenger trans-load operation; the 

Deep Horizon oil spill in the gulf; and the worst floods in Pakistan 

history during the last month of the plus-up. And we still closed 

everything by 31 August that the President had asked us to do. 
6 

And our operations continue today at record-breaking pace. We 

continue to support our forces in Afghanistan and the drawdown in 

Iraq. We pivoted the transportation enterprise rapidly to support 

General Ham in the implementation of the no-fly zone over Libya. 

And we moved out urgently to help with disaster relief in Japan 

and provide immediate responses to the nuclear incident with special equipment and nuclear specialists from the United States. 

I could not be more proud of the men and women of the United 

States Transportation Command. I have flown with our aircrews 

and loaded and moved containers with our stevedores. I have 

walked through the pallet holding areas with our aerial porters in 

Afghanistan and explored the cargo holds of our Ready Reserve 

Fleet with our merchant mariners. Daily, I am amazed and humbled by what our people accomplish. 

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, and all members of this 

committee, thank you for your continued superb support of U.S. 

TRANSCOM and our men and women in uniform. It is my distinct 

honor and privilege to appear before you today to represent the 

men and women who are the U.S. Transportation Command and 

to tell you their story. 

Again, thank you for taking my written statement for the record, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General McNabb can be found in the 

Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General Ham. 

STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. 

AFRICA COMMAND 

General HAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, 

and members of the committee. And thanks for the opportunity to 

discuss with you today the accomplishments of the men and women 

of United States Africa Command. 

I would like to introduce to the committee Command Chief Master Sergeant Jack Johnson, the command’s senior enlisted leader. 

He and I have only just begun our service together at Africa Command, but I see already that he is exactly the right person to lead 

several important initiatives and to ensure our service members 

and their families are well-trained and well-supported. 

And I am indeed honored to appear alongside General McNabb, 

a highly distinguished airman and joint force leader. 

This is a historic time for United States Africa Command. We 

have completed a complex, short-notice operational mission in 

Libya and have now transferred control of that mission to NATO. 

The situation in Libya in the conduct of Operation Odyssey Dawn 

highlights some important matters about Africa. 

First, this event illustrates the dynamics of the African politicalmilitary environment, one that has seen the growing threat of 

transnational extremists in Somalia, election crises, coups, the 

Southern Sudanese referendum, the scourge of the Lord’s Resistance Army, to name just a few of the challenges to security on the 

continent. 

In order for Africa Command to reduce threats to our citizens 

and interests both abroad and at home, we need to contribute to 
7 

operations, programs, and activities that help African states provide for their own security in a manner that is consistent with the 

rule of law and international norms. And we must continue our efforts to enhance regional stability through partnership, not only 

with African states, but also sustained, reliable support to African 

regional organizations. 

Africa Command’s programs are designed to help prevent conflict 

while simultaneously ensuring that the command is prepared to respond decisively to any crisis when the President so directs, as 

demonstrated in our conduct of Operation Odyssey Dawn. 

Secondly, building the coalition to address the situation in Libya 

was greatly facilitated through the benefits of longstanding relationships and interoperability, this time within NATO. This is the 

kind of regional approach to security that U.S. Africa Command 

seeks to foster on the continent. 

U.S. Africa Command’s priority efforts remain building the security capacity of our African partners. We incorporate regional cooperation in pursuit of interoperability in all our programs, activities, and exercises so that our African partners are postured to 

readily form coalitions to address African security challenges as 

they arise. 

Everything U.S. Africa Command has accomplished is the result 

of the professionalism and dedication of the uniformed and civilian 

women and men of the command and our many teammates from 

across the U.S. Government. Their dedicated efforts are a testament to the American spirit and determination and reflects our 

commitment to contributing to the wellbeing and security of the 

people of Africa. 

Our guiding principles are, first, that a safe, secure, and stable 

Africa is clearly in the best interest of the United States and, secondly, that we seek to help Africans find solutions to African challenges. 

I am cognizant that the command is only able to accomplish its 

missions with the enduring support of this committee. And I thank 

you for that and invite you to come visit us at our headquarters 

or, better yet, come see us at work in Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, I would welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Ham can be found in the Appendix on page 67.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General McNabb, the ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, the response to the earthquake in Japan, and the President’s decision to engage combat forces in Libya are undoubtedly 

straining the mobility force. 

Have you reached or are you approaching any redlines in mobility capabilities? What areas of operations concern you the most? 

And are there any additional resources or assets that could alleviate the stress on the forces and reduce your operational risk? 

General MCNABB. Sir, right now, I think one of the things that 

hits me is our ability to pivot the transportation enterprise and expand it and contract it using our U.S.-flag carriers and our total 

force. At this point, we have gotten tremendous support from our 

Guard and Reserve. A lot of them have volunteered to help wherever they can. 
8 

What I would do next, if we ended up—if that is not enough to 

handle what we are being asked to do worldwide, is then I would 

have to mobilize some folks. And, at this time, we do not think we 

have to do that, at the present level. 

What we have been able to do is, as we have looked at kind of 

the urgent requirements that we had for Libya and the urgent requirements we had for Japan, we basically stayed in very good, 

close contact with CENTCOM [United States Central Command], 

and we looked for ways or things that we could slow down that 

they could take a little risk in, primarily sustainment. 

A decision was made by General Petraeus and General Mattis to 

increase the sustainment stocks in Afghanistan, and that gave us 

a little bit of room to be able to say, ‘‘Can we slow this down a little 

bit until we take care of these emergencies? And then we will get 

right back to you.’’ That is the same way we handled Haiti. 

And so, the ability to mix and match is one of the things that 

I think we bring to the table. 

At this time, I will say that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet has 

stepped up to anything that we have asked. I would say that, this 

last couple of weeks, I didn’t quite understand how much spring 

break affects excess capacity, but I will say that that one hit us 

pretty hard. Next to Christmas and Thanksgiving, spring break is 

the busiest time for our carriers who are out there. So as we 

brought—on the order of departure, the voluntary departure coming out of Japan, in support of Admiral Willard, getting them back 

to the States and getting seats back to their homes was something 

that was worked very closely with NORTHCOM [United States 

Northern Command] and with TRANSCOM as we worked through 

that. 

Right now, I think that, as the Libyan operation unfolds, we are 

watching that carefully. Obviously, if that expands in any way, 

that would be one where we would be looking to say, do we have 

enough? Right now, we don’t see that. 

Obviously, there are some other places where there is turmoil. I 

will bring the Ivory Coast, you can bring Yemen. All of those operations, we work with CENTCOM or with AFRICOM to sit down 

and say, ‘‘Okay, how are we going to do this together,’’ doing lot 

of what-ifs. 

At this point, I am looking forward to Afghanistan and Iraq, 

making sure that we can meet the timelines coming out of Iraq. As 

Congressman Smith asked me about how do we do that, I would 

say that, coming down from 130,000 to 50,000, that that work with 

General Austin and his people in Iraq, the Army Materiel Command under General Dunwoody, really that team has worked superbly, bringing out the extra equipment through Kuwait and 

through Jordan, getting it washed up, and then putting it on commercial vessels. That is what I was mentioning, that we didn’t have 

to activate any ships to do that. 

I am confident that that system is working well. And, in fact, 

making sure which stuff we will leave there, which stuff that we 

will bring home, which stuff will we send to Afghanistan was what 

we went through last year. But I will tell you, the team, I think, 

did a superb job. And my portion was just moving it, which was 

not the hardest part of all of that. 
9 

When I think about Afghanistan, I would say that we have found 

the power of intermodal operations that I had mentioned, being 

able to take it by surface to ports much closer to Afghanistan, and 

then just jumping the last part using airlift. We are looking for 

that same capability to be able to bring stuff out of Afghanistan. 

In other words, same way: bring it out by air to a port nearby, and 

then bring it by surface mode from there. 

We would like to get dual—be able to go both directions on the 

Northern Distribution Network. Right now, we can only take stuff 

in. Some countries have not given us permission to bring stuff out 

of Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network. So the 

interagency and the whole team is working that. 

I continue to look to say, I would like to make sure that I have 

lots of options—the Northern Distribution Network, the Pakistan 

LOC [line of communication]. Working with General Kayani and 

the Pak [Pakistan] military, we are trying to make sure we do everything we can to make the Pak LOC as smooth as possible. 

But our ultimate ace in the hole is air. And we are trying to 

make sure we have taken full advantage of that, working very 

closely with General Petraeus and his team there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General MCNABB. So, sir, I think that kind of puts it in a nutshell, but I think we are getting there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Ham, despite the numerous briefings we have received 

from the administration regarding our military operations in Libya, 

I think many areas of uncertainty still remain. One question I have 

is where AFRICOM fits into the command and control structure of 

NATO enforcement of the no-fly zone and attacks on regime ground 

targets. 

General, does AFRICOM have a clear role in the chain of command or targeting boards of Operation Odyssey Dawn, or are you 

liaising with NATO’s Joint Task Force Unified Protector, at this 

point? 

And what has the reaction of Libya’s African neighbors been to 

our intervention there? Will this operation affect our partnership 

efforts in the region—in particular, Operation Enduring Freedom 

Trans Sahara and our efforts against Al Qaeda in the Maghreb? 

General HAM. Chairman, first of all, on the command and control 

side, at present, with the transition of the operation from U.S. 

AFRICOM to NATO, NATO now has the full operational control of 

the forces that are actually conducting missions over Libya. So U.S. 

AFRICOM is presently in a supporting role to Admiral Stavridis, 

Admiral Locklear, General Bouchard in their efforts. So I don’t, at 

present, have an operational responsibility. 

There is always the potential for some U.S. unilateral military 

missions. One could think of, for example, a personnel recovery of 

a downed pilot or something like that. And if that were to occur, 

then that would fall to U.S. Africa Command to execute those responsibilities. 

Sir, with regard to the regional reaction, it is—frankly, it is 

mixed, as we see that particularly play out in the African Union. 

Many members, many states in Africa have voiced their support for 

the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, the imposi-
10 

tion and the execution of those responsibilities. But, frankly, there 

are other states who did not agree with that U.N. [United Nations] 

Security Council resolution. 

I think, frankly, as we proceed, I am going to have the responsibility, as I engage with our African partners, of just having a very 

frank discussion about what U.S. Africa Command’s role was, why 

we did what we did, and just be as truthful and forthright as I can, 

just to try to maintain the great relationships that we have with 

most African states as we move forward. 

But your point is valid. There is an impact and there will be an 

impact within the region. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My first question on the Transportation Command, if you could 

play out a little bit, General McNabb, how things are going in 

terms of the logistical challenges in Afghanistan that I asked about 

earlier, working through Pakistan and some of the other areas. Are 

we able to get what we need in? I know there are major movements 

now of equipment for the Afghan National Security Force. How is 

that working, and what are the challenges going forward? 

General MCNABB. Sir, we presently take in about 35 percent, and 

everything that is high-value we take in by air. Sometimes that is 

just that short hop that I was mentioning before from a port that 

is close in, sometimes that is all the way from the States, depending on the nature of the stuff going in. 

It is about—on the surface side, it ends up being about 45 percent coming through the Pakistan LOC and about 55 percent of the 

surface move coming through the Northern Distribution Network. 

So we have actually adjusted more of the flow to the north, but we 

don’t have—we are not able to bring military equipment through 

the NDN [Northern Distribution Network]; we can only bring that 

through the Pakistan LOC, which gets to your question about FMS 

[foreign military sales] for the ANA [Afghan National Army]. 

We have been working with the Pakistan military to make sure 

that we—I have stressed to them how important it is to maintain 

the velocity going through the Pakistan LOC. I continue to work 

with them to say—we can identify if there is any pilferage or attacks and show them where that is taking place and work with 

them to respond quickly. We still are at less than about 1 percent 

pilfered rate on the Pak LOC. And so I would say that—of course, 

if it is your stuff, the 1 percent is way too much. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

General MCNABB. So we continue to work that hard with Task 

Force Guardian, which General Petraeus and General Mattis put 

together. 

General Thurman made sure—he is the Army Forces Command—he made sure the discipline of what goes on the ground is 

maintained. From my standpoint, I say, if it is really important to 

you, we put that on the air. 

Mr. SMITH. And has the security situation in terms of the Pakistan route gotten better or worse? I know there were concerns 

about attacks against our supply line coming through Pakistan. 

What is the update on that? 
11 

General MCNABB. Sir, it has gone—it has kind of gone—there 

are periods where it goes a little higher. I will say, in December 

of ’08 was the time when all of us very much worried that we did 

not have the Northern Distribution Network at that time. It was 

11 percent, was the pilferage and attack rate on it. 

Since then, it has come down below 1 percent, pretty much, for 

calendar years. But to give you a sense, in July of last year, when 

the floods were all happening and things started to get stacked up, 

that is when—you slow down the velocity, that is when you become 

more vulnerable. We went up to about 2 percent during that 

month. But, overall, for the last year, it was less than 1 percent. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

General MCNABB. But, again, we keep working at that and making sure that we are looking for every possible way that we can 

smooth that. A lot of it is just maintaining the velocity on there so 

it doesn’t slow down and become vulnerable. 

Mr. SMITH. Right, and create a bigger target. Thank you. 

General Ham, just a quick question about Africa. I mentioned 

that stability is a main challenge there, and in making sure that 

we do what we can to help create a more stable atmosphere, there 

is a strong interagency approach that is necessary—State Department, USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], in particular, and elsewhere. I have done a trip across Africa to a variety 

of different countries a couple years ago, and I know that that is 

critical to being able to be successful, is to leverage your assets in 

cooperation with the State Department. 

Can you talk to us a little bit about how that interagency process 

works country to country in Africa and how you see that as part 

of your mission there? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir, absolutely. With the design of United 

States Africa Command, there was a recognition, I think, early on 

that the problem set that you just identified was key, that it is 

about instability, and it does require a whole-of-government approach to advance U.S. interests on the continent. And, with that 

in mind, the command headquarters was designed as—or, with a 

considerable amount of interagency support. 

So we look at our headquarters in Stuttgart, which is, not surprisingly, overwhelmingly Department of Defense, but we have 12 

other Government agencies who are represented at some pretty 

senior levels, to include a deputy to the commander, who is a very 

experienced and senior foreign service officer, former ambassador. 

We have senior representatives from USAID, from Treasury, from 

Commerce and many other organizations to help us look at the 

challenges, the security challenges, in Africa through more than 

just a military lens. 

And that helps us, first of all, better define the problem so that 

we can then, in concert with our interagency partners, bring to 

bear, you know, ideally, the whole of government, the various assets that different branches bring, to help African states build the 

secure environment that they need to build. Our aspect of that is, 

again, very largely weighted toward the military, but the other aspects of government are key. 

The second point, Congressman, that I would say is we work 

very, very closely with the chiefs of mission in the countries. And, 
12 

of course, they are the senior Americans in each of those countries. 

We make sure that all of our efforts are nested with the Ambassador and with the country team, which are inherently interagency. 

And we think that that works to our best effect. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you both very much for your testimony, 

your long service, and your stellar performance. 

I have a lot of questions about our Libyan involvement, which I 

believe is both unconstitutional and illegal. But these are policy 

questions, and I know yours is not to reason why, yours is but to 

do and die. So I will avoid the temptation to ask you questions 

which you cannot answer by yielding my time to our most junior 

member here at gavel fall, which was Mr. West. 

Mr. WEST. Well, thank you, Mr. Bartlett. 

And, also, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member. 

And, Generals, it is good to see you. 

And, General Ham, always great to see you. 

First of all, General McNabb, strategic maneuverability has always been the great thing about our force and our country. But 

what I would like to do is look out ahead maybe about 5 years. And 

when you look at the fact that we are moving more so from a forward-deployed type of military force more so to a power-projection 

or a forceable-entry type of force, what do you see are the challenges, you know, 5 years and beyond, for the Transportation Command? Because I know one of the things I am very concerned about 

is our C–17 fleet. 

General MCNABB. Well, Congressman, thanks for that. I couldn’t 

agree more with the value of the strategic mobility capability. And 

I would say that we are being pushed, especially as you think 

about global operations and we think about how we are headed as 

a department. 

I will tell you first and foremost, that new tanker was my number-one acquisition priority. And the fact that the tanker allows us 

to put global-on-global mobility reach in power is what that is all 

about. And that new tanker will allow us to make sure that we can 

extend out and we can really change the way we do our concept 

of operations and be much more efficient in that. So that is huge. 

And the faster we can get the tanker on board, the better, from my 

standpoint. 

Right now, we do some things by brute force. For instance, do 

trans-load using C–17s, moving pallets and people, and that is not 

what C–17s do best. They do air assault or airdrop. And that has 

been—that has grown a lot as we have gotten into Afghanistan. We 

have gone from 2 million pounds of airdrop in 2005 to 60 million 

pounds last year, and we are headed toward 100 million pounds of 

airdrop. And what that allows us to do is to get out there to the 

forward operating bases and make sure they get what they need 

without having to put convoys at unnecessary risk. 

I think that we are pushing very hard to be able to have some 

of these intermodal/multimodal locations, places like Rota, places 

like Souda, places like—or Souda Bay, places like Camp Lemonier 
13 

in Djibouti. As I look to the Pacific, the same thing—Guam, Singapore, Diego Garcia. And if I have those places where I can get large 

stuff into and then have theater response, whether that is the joint 

high-speed vessel, whether that is C–17s or 130s [Lockheed C-130 

Hercules military transport aircraft] doing airdrop, or whether that 

is even as we look at hybrid airships, if we can get to the point 

where we can get that stuff to these major ports by surface and 

then have options for the theater commanders out there depending 

on the nature, we really will have gone a long way. 

That is the part that I am looking at now, because that is big 

dollar savings and it is also very, very fast. That includes not only 

our float prepositioning but what do we preposition on the land. So 

you can imagine giving those options to the theater commanders 

out there, and I think that will be very useful to them. 

So those are the things that I am looking at and really asking 

all the theater commanders, is, where do you want me to look at 

those intermodal locations, and let’s work those now. The investments in places like Diego Garcia, like in Rota, like in Souda Bay, 

have already paid big dividends for us. And we are finding that the 

power of that has actually increased the velocity into the 

warfighter, because, oftentimes, in those small places, it is not the 

number of airplanes, it is what we can get in the throughput into 

those small bases. And that is where the C–17, as you mentioned, 

has really, really played well. 

I get to fly the C–17, and I will tell you, it is an awesome airplane. When I go fly with those young guys at Altus and those 

young instructors—and, you know, I have 5,600 hours—they will 

come over and put their arm around me and say, ‘‘Come over here, 

son. Let me show you how we fly this airplane.’’ And so they really 

have taken this and taken it to a whole different level. 

So, lots of great opportunities. The C–5M is performing very well; 

that is the re-engined C–5s. And as we get the C–130Js on board 

and the C–130 Avionics Modernization Program on the C–130H 

models, you know, you have really set us up with modern airplanes 

that we can really throw in there very quickly and really can make 

a difference. 

Mr. WEST. Well, thank you, sir. 

And if I could ask one other question. 

General Ham, you know, as we sit back, as Ranking Member 

Smith talked about the unrest and the political instability in Africa, do you see an encroachment of any Al Qaeda type of elements? 

And, also, I would like to get your assessment of China’s interventions into the African continent, as well. 

General HAM. Thanks, Congressman. 

If I could take the second piece first, the Chinese are very active 

across the continent, but primarily in an economic way. And I am 

learning more about that as I get further into the command. And 

I would note that tomorrow would be 4 weeks, so I have a lot yet 

to learn about this. But I see the Chinese influence primarily in an 

economic vein, with construction, with oil, and the like. 

Your first point about Al Qaeda and, more broadly, violent extremist organizations in Africa is, indeed, the number one security 

challenge that we face in Africa, and I would say most notably in 

East Africa, where we see the efforts of al-Shabaab in Somalia at-
14 

tempting to expand their reach more regionally, with linkages with 

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen and, potentially, 

linkages with Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. 

All of those, I think, pose a very, very real strategic concern to 

the United States, our people, and our interests, both abroad and 

at home. So I take that as our number one mission and our number 

one area of emphasis. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for your distinguished service. 

I wanted to follow up a little on the interagency question, because I think, over the years, we have acknowledged that the military operations and interface probably will always overshadow, to 

a certain extent, in many of the areas in which we are engaged, 

we are involved. 

Are there some metrics, are there some areas that you are really 

looking at to see whether, in fact, that has changed dramatically, 

and what has really contributed to that change? Are we, in fact, 

seeing that military operations or the activities per se are really 

not getting in the way of some of the diplomatic efforts that we 

have had ongoing? 

General HAM. Yes, ma’am, I think for us in Africa Command, the 

operations in Libya were certainly a different nature, a different 

type of the operation, in that those were certainly an overwhelmingly military aspect of the U.S. application of power. More commonly throughout Africa, U.S. Africa Command is operating in a 

supporting role, in most cases supporting chief-of-mission initiatives or Department of State-led initiatives. It is principally 

through Department of State authorities that building partner capacity—security institution building is done through State authorities; though DOD [the Department of Defense], through U.S. Africa 

Command, has a supporting role in that regard. A good example 

is the development of forces from Uganda, Burundi, who operate in 

the African mission in Somalia under a State Department program 

that U.S. Africa Command supports. 

So I think we have the balance about right, in terms of who is 

in charge. The Department of Defense, and, again, through U.S. Africa Command, we bring a lot of capacity and a lot of ability to enable those programs, but, by and large, we are doing so in support 

of others. And that seems to me to be about right for most of the 

programs in Africa. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. Are you checking in, I guess, fairly frequently to be sure that everybody agrees, I think, that that balance, where it is appropriate—obviously, there are areas that you 

pointed out, of course, where the balance is not appropriate. But 

I think one of the—I think it was the trips that I took, actually, 

with our ranking chairman, where, despite the fact that we talked 

about how important it was, in fact, the people who were engaged 

in this effort didn’t feel that they had the same seat at the table. 

General MCNABB. I think that is a very real concern, and it is 

something that I would tell you that I will take a look at, as I get 

my feet under me in this new command. 
15 

I will, as I have told Assistant Secretary Carson of the Africa Bureau of State Department, that most of the time when I come back 

to D.C., I will make an effort to see him, as he has pledged to come 

see me on the continent or in Germany. I think it is very, very important that we have that very strong linkage to make sure that 

all of the assets of the Government get a voice, and an important 

voice, as we move forward. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, sir. 

May I just—you noted, I think, two areas in which you are reaching out to military families, particularly in Stuttgart, I think, 

where they have had some questions and some problems. How else 

are you able to make certain that our military families feel that 

they have the support that they need in that command? 

And some of those are accompanied, I believe. And the majority, 

I suspect, are probably not accompanied, certainly in Djibouti, 

where we have some forces there. 

General HAM. Yes, ma’am, the quality of life for our service 

members who are at the headquarters in Stuttgart and in our service component commands who are largely based in Europe, with 

one here in the U.S., those families have excellent support. 

I do worry more so about the small contingents that are either 

in our embassies, kind of separated away, that the military service 

members and families have the programs that they need. But, generally, that is pretty good. 

And at places like Camp Lemonier, which is a pretty large deployment of unaccompanied service members, again, thanks to this 

committee, they actually have a very good quality of life. It is never 

as good as being separated, but it is quite good. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Generals, thank you for being here today. 

And, General Ham, I am very familiar that the Southern Command is located in Miami. And we know that the people of my 

birthplace, Charleston, South Carolina, have a keen interest in the 

potential of AFRICOM being located in Charleston. And we would, 

if my colleagues, Congressman Tim Scott, Congressman Jim Clyburn, were here, they would want to make a few points to you. 

And that is that Charleston is the transportation hub for the 

United States Transportation Command, as well as the primary 

seaport for container traffic between the United States and the 

South Atlantic. The Charleston Air Force Base provides all the 

strategic airlift support for Africa for our Government, to include 

embassy support. SPAWAR–Charleston [Space and Naval Warfare 

Systems Command—Charleston] is the leading provider for command, control, and communications for EUCOM’s [United States 

European Command’s] role in Africa. 

The relationships for the Charleston medical community, which 

would be so helpful in the event of an emergency in Africa; the 

Medical University of South Carolina is located in Charleston, a 

world-class facility. We know that most of the rapid deployment 

forces that would be used in an African operation include special 

operations that are in the southeastern part of the United States. 
16 

Charleston is the hub for all military transportation, airlift, sealift, 

and prepositioning to Africa. 

And then there is an extraordinary cultural linkage. I had the 

privilege of visiting in Monrovia, Liberia, and the great cultural association of West Africa to Charleston is very clear. It is a shared 

culture. In fact, we have the same accents, and I felt right at home 

when I was visiting with the people in Monrovia. And then I found 

out, to my pleasant surprise, that the diocese of the African American Methodist Church for South Carolina is actually South Carolina and Liberia, and it sponsors the AME [African Methodist Episcopal] university there in Monrovia. 

And so, with that in mind, the decision, Secretary Gates has indicated, to be made for moving Africa Command or retaining it 

won’t be considered until next year. But when the decision is made, 

what are the considerations that will be made as to quality of life 

or dependents’ access to schools, jobs, medical care? What do you 

see? 

General HAM. Well, Congressman, first, I would say I have only 

had the opportunity to visit Charleston once, but it was just a few 

years ago, and it was indeed a very enjoyable visit to a great city. 

As you mentioned, the Secretary of Defense has asked me to take 

a look at and provide a recommendation back to him as to where 

the stationing of the Africa Command headquarters should be. And 

he has essentially asked me to start from a clean sheet of paper 

and look at the factors that you have identified: Security, suitability, quality of life, the transportation nodes, accessibility to the 

area of responsibility, a whole host of requirements that we would 

like to station our headquarters. 

And so that process has begun, and we will look at, first of all, 

to make sure we have the methodology right, and then we will look 

at a wide variety of locations to see which we think would make 

the—be most suitable for the command to accomplish its missions. 

But it will take us a little bit of time to do that study. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, you indicated you have visited Charleston 

once. You are welcome back, obviously. And you will see such a 

symbiotic relationship with West Africa to the low country of South 

Carolina. And the people there are very proud of the shared culture, but then, obviously, all the other features that I told you. And 

I know that if Congressman Scott were here, or Congressman Clyburn, they would want to make that point. 

And, General McNabb, as my final question, with regard to refitting railcars, what is the status of refitting old railcars as opposed 

to buying new? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir, our Surface Deployment and Distribution Command has been looking at that and have basically decided 

that refurbishing old probably makes the most sense from a business case. 

Right now, we have been asked by OSD [Office of the Secretary 

of Defense] to take a look and say, okay, given everything going on, 

what should that number be, 4,000, 5,000, you know, where should 

that be in there? And, right now, they are doing that study with 

OSD. 

Mr. WILSON. And to conclude, there is a bit of history there, too. 

Where retrofitting occurs in South Carolina is in the community of 
17 

Hamburg, South Carolina. It was the site of the first scheduled 

railroad in the world, between Charleston and Hamburg in 1832. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And to Mr. Wilson, I would comment that when I have been to 

South Carolina, Charleston, I have enjoyed myself in that area. 

But I would also point everyone out—or point everyone to the 

fact that I live in the Atlanta, Georgia, area, which is the transportation hub of the Southeast. We have the world’s busiest airport; 

it is high-capacity. We have approximately—quite a few military 

aviation facilities. We have one of the country’s largest diaspora 

communities from Africa; superb infrastructure to support the military’s communication needs; world-class educational institutions— 

Georgia Tech, Emory, the Atlanta University Center. High quality 

of life for personnel who were assigned—or who would be assigned 

to that area. 

And I think that it would be a great thing. I know that Ambassador Andrew Young is very much interested in AFRICOM choosing to locate its headquarters in Atlanta, and I certainly join in 

that desire. If not Atlanta, then someplace in Georgia would be 

great. 

But I want to also congratulate you, General Ham, for your new 

assignment. Four weeks in, I know that you are still trying to get 

adjusted. And it seems like you came in at a time of great action 

going on in Africa, with the Libyan situation, we have the situation 

in the Ivory Coast. 

Now, I understand that President Gbagbo has resigned and is 

asking for U.N. assistance, or U.N. protection actually. And that is 

good, that he will be moving on. 

I would like to ask you, are U.S. personnel or equipment taking 

part in the U.N. operations in the Ivory Coast? 

General HAM. Congressman, we are not. We are in very close 

dialogue with the U.S. Embassy and also with the French, who 

have a large presence in Coˆte d’Ivoire. As we typically do in the 

U.S. military, we plan for possible contingencies. And as the chairman mentioned, you know, the security situation in Coˆte d’Ivoire 

had been deteriorating for some period of time, so we looked at a 

whole range of possible military actions that might be necessary. 

But we have—the people at the Embassy are present. The Ambassador has asked for a small coordinating team just to maintain 

communications, and we have got that available to him, as well. 

Your information is probably a little more current than mine, 

but, as I was departing the Pentagon to come over here, we were 

at the situation where Mr. Gbagbo had indicated his apparent willingness to turn himself over, but that had not yet been accomplished by the time I left. But, hopefully, that will be accomplished 

and a calm returned to Abidjan and to the country. It is sorely 

needed. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

And would you also update us on the progress toward increasing 

the professionalism and accountability of the forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo? 
18 

General HAM. Yes, sir. It is an ongoing effort. We have trained 

one battalion. We think that one battalion will perform pretty well. 

But we think there is more that we can and should be doing to 

help Congo become a more professional military force, subordinate 

to civil control and responding under international norms. 

But initial indications are pretty good, I think, but there is still, 

certainly, some work to be done. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

General McNabb, I had questions, but Congressman Wilson kind 

of threw me off track there, so I will get back to you at some point 

in the future. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to the Nation. 

Mr. FORBES. [Presiding.] Thank you. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Kline for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And with all apologies to my colleagues from South Carolina and 

Georgia, most everybody knows that Minneapolis-St. Paul is roughly the transportation center of the entire world. 

General McNabb, I have a copy of the letter that you sent to Mr. 

Babbitt, the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] administrator, 

where you were expressing some concerns about a proposed rule 

that will affect crew rest for our commercial partners. 

Could you briefly outline what your concerns are and what impact this rule might have on our ability to move troops and personnel? 

General MCNABB. Sure. Yes, Congressman, actually, Mr. Babbitt 

did come out—Administrator Babbitt did come out and visit with 

me at TRANSCOM, also visited with the Air Mobility Command. 

And we chatted about what this impact would have on our Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet, especially the nonscheduled carriers—so, the legacy carriers, kind of a separate issue—but the nonscheduled carriers that primarily do the charter work not only for us but for others. 

As I mentioned to him, I said, safety is paramount. There is no 

question that that—— 

Mr. KLINE. Yes, sir, but what would the impact be? What is your 

concern here? 

General MCNABB. Sir, the biggest concern has to do with, as you 

get modern airplanes, when you think about—basically, one size 

doesn’t fit all. When you talk about regional carriers, they are 

doing a number of landings, versus long international legs, they 

have different levels of fatigue, and they require different approaches. 

When you talk about the nonsecurity carriers, they are taking 

stuff directly from the United States and, ideally, with modern airplanes, going all the way to Afghanistan, not stopping on the way; 

it is taking advantage of that. 

Ideally, I have been pushing hard for the modern airplanes that 

have the longer range. That increases velocity. It also means we 

don’t have to worry about stopping in some of those locations. It 

allows this thing to go very rapidly. 

So I asked them to, you know, take a look at that, take a look 

at better crew rest facilities, better operational risk-managementtype things that say, let’s look at this kind of unique part of this 
19 

mission, and make sure that we enhance safety but look at all the 

ways that we can do that. 

Mr. KLINE. So if I may interrupt again just for a minute, this 

proposed rule would take away that flexibility. And what I am trying to get at, the impact would be, we would move fewer troops, 

it would take more time, we could move less equipment. What 

would the impact of this rule be? 

General MCNABB. Well, certainly, it is time, and, certainly, it is 

dollars. And what I am probably the most—what I want to make 

sure is our U.S.-flag fleet stays competitive. And if we don’t take 

full advantage of modern airplanes, especially on the international 

market, we will find ourselves not in that market. And I am very 

worried about that, because I depend on those. 

Mr. KLINE. I am, too, General. Thank you very much. If there is 

anything this committee can do, I trust you will communicate that 

to us. 

General Ham, I want to go back to the command structure for 

Operation Unified Protector. And I have a little thing here from 

Admiral Stavridis, I think, NATO, sort of a command structure 

outline. And it says that we have, apparently, Lieutenant General 

Jodice, American; Vice Admiral Rinaldo Veri—in fact, I should put 

my glasses on, I am sorry—an Italian; and we have a Canadian 

lieutenant general, and they are reporting to Admiral Stavridis, 

Supreme Allied Commander Europe. 

You should have lobbied for a title like that. 

The question is, do you see your relationship as the commander 

of AFRICOM as the same as General Mattis’ is to General 

Petraeus and Admiral Stavridis? We are trying to fit—the chairman asked you about that relationship, and you said that there 

might be a uniquely American operation where, presumably, you 

insert yourself into this chain of command and take U.S. forces and 

use them for, in your example, it was a pickup of a downed pilot 

or something else. 

I am just—help me understand what your relationship is to 

this—I know you don’t have this—but to this command structure 

that I just described, which is a NATO command structure. 

General HAM. Sir, it is quite analogous to what you described in 

Afghanistan, where in Afghanistan Admiral Stavridis, in his NATO 

role, overseeing General Petraeus, a NATO commander, supported 

by General Mattis, a United States geographic combatant commander. And so that relationship is very similar to what we have 

here. 

I do not have a day-to-day operational role, but Libya is in the 

area of responsibility of U.S. Africa Command, so we have, obviously, an enduring interest. And when Operation Unified Protector 

is complete, when the alliance decides that its missions have been 

accomplished, then Libya is still in Africa Command’s area of responsibility. So I remain very closely connected with Admiral 

Stavridis, Admiral Locklear, and, indeed, the Canadian, General 

Bouchard, who is a very competent commander. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thanks very much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 
20 

The chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs. Castor, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Generals. 

General McNabb, I think many of the personnel in U.S. Transportation Command are something of unsung heroes. I mean, they 

do it all, from the intricate and complex delivery of supplies across 

the globe, to air refueling, to deployment and redeployments, and 

then you have the disaster response and all of the aeromedical assignments that you have. I don’t think you get enough kudos, so 

my hat is off to all of the personnel in U.S. Transportation Command. 

General MCNABB. Thank you, ma’am. 

Mrs. CASTOR. I know that one of the primary issues for 

TRANSCOM has been the ongoing saga of the KC–X air refueling 

tanker. And we have finally reached a point now where we can all 

move ahead and they can focus on actually engineering and building those aircraft. 

How do you keep the KC–X on time and on budget? 

General MCNABB. Yes, ma’am. Well, first of all, obviously, the 

Air Force will—you know, I depend on the Air Force, in their organize, train, and equip role, to be able to be overseeing that and 

making sure that it stays on time and on budget. 

Mrs. CASTOR. But can you bring some added attention to General 

Schwartz and the Air Force? And I want to hear whether or not 

you have the ability to do that. 

General MCNABB. Yes, ma’am. And I think that, you know, right 

now, they have made that—that was their number-one acquisition 

priority, just like it was mine. 

I really do appreciate the tremendous support on both sides of 

the Hill on getting us that new tanker. And I am absolutely excited 

about what it will bring. 

I think that the fact that it is, you know, primarily off the shelf, 

in general, taking advantage of what is already commercial market, making sure that we are not asking for things that are beyond 

the reach in technology—I mean, a lot of the things that usually 

will drive something to increase cost or a delay in time, most of 

that stuff has been worked out. So I am pretty excited about that. 

And it seems to me, as long as we keep a stable program, that 

we will be able to deliver that on time. And, you know, hopefully, 

we will be cranking those out at 15-plus a year, and then we can 

begin to replace those old 135s [Boeing C-135 Stratolifter military 

transport aircraft] that have done such a great job. 

Mrs. CASTOR. Yeah, the mechanics that have worked on—that 

continue to work on some of the Eisenhower-era tankers are magicians, I think, sometimes. 

What role has TRANSCOM played in support of the humanitarian relief to the earthquake victims in Japan? Could you give us 

a quick summary on that and whether or not it has placed stress 

on our mobility system? 

General MCNABB. Yes, ma’am. We have had 512 sorties, moved 

about 306 packs into there to help. Primarily, those were those radiological teams and other teams that went in. Moved—— 
21 

Mrs. CASTOR. Are these teams and assets, are they in that area? 

Could you distinguish, how far are you having to travel? Do you 

have the ability to respond with assets that are close-in? 

General MCNABB. Well, certainly, Admiral Willard is using his 

own forces that are already in-theater. And you have seen them. 

You have seen the amphibious groups. You have seen the Marines 

come up from Kadena. You have seen the Seventh Fleet, the naval 

assets come in. Obviously, we have a number of airmen that are 

over there at different bases, like Yokota and Misawa, and he is 

taking full advantage of all of that. 

Where he has asked us to help is the stuff coming from the Continental United States or for emergency movement in-theater that 

they can’t handle themselves. We have moved, for instance, crash 

rescue teams, the Fairfax rescue team from here, the L.A. crash 

rescue team. And this is not only to go into the rubble but also dog 

teams that deployed with them. We moved emergency generators, 

a planeload, 65 emergency generators, as the generators were 

taken out by the tsunami, for the nuclear plant. We also moved a 

planeload of boron to neutralize the radioisotopes. 

So we have been doing things like that, kind of the emergency, 

‘‘This is stuff that we need from the States.’’ A lot of radiological 

teams, whether they were survey teams or chemical, biological, radiological teams, we brought those on. 

And, basically, what Northern Command, Admiral Winnefeld, did 

when this came up, said, ‘‘Here are the teams that they might 

need.’’ We leave that to Admiral Willard. I make sure that I have 

airplanes that are on standby alert and air refueling assets to take 

it as soon as it is identified. And, once it is identified, we go pick 

them up and take them. 

We also did the—aided in the voluntary departure of all of the 

U.S. people—— 

Mrs. CASTOR. Has it provided any kinks in your ability to complete missions anywhere else? 

General MCNABB. Ma’am, the only thing that we had a bit of discussion on is how quickly they needed to move the voluntary departure. We decided that we would do that all commercial. We went 

to our U.S.-flag carriers, like you were mentioning. Spring break 

did have a play, because there wasn’t excess capacity. And they basically responded very quickly. That allowed us to keep the T-tail 

supporting General Ham in AFRICOM, General Petraeus and General Mattis in CENTCOM, at the same time of having those T-tails 

available to take any of that emergency nuclear response stuff immediately in there. 

So, again, our commercial partners really stepped up magnificently and, by the time it was over, brought out about 5,000 passengers, over 400 pets. And then we also got commercial tickets on 

the scheduled missions that were coming out of Japan to get the 

folks home. And then we worked with NORTHCOM to get them to 

their final destination. 

Mrs. CASTOR. Thank you very much. 

General MCNABB. You are very welcome, ma’am. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 
22 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, General McNabb, thanks for the job that you are 

doing as the commanding general for U.S. Transportation Command. 

A question about Afghanistan, and that is—you mentioned that 

you want to get the C–17 more in its primary mission, as you define it, to do the airborne drops for logistical support. But I understand that there have been some problems with accuracy, getting 

that inside the drop zone. Could you respond to that? 

General MCNABB. Sir, I think you are probably talking about the 

Precision Airdrop System, where we drop it at 10,000 or 15,000 

feet, and it has a GPS [Global Positioning System] receiver and a 

square chute, and it comes in. And the biggest issue with that was 

the terrain and the winds. And, obviously, it has got to be able to 

keep up with those kinds of things. So we have worked with industry to make sure that we continue to drive in the accuracy that 

they need on the ground. 

Because of the conditions, primarily we have been able to do Visual Flight Rule-type drops, low-altitude, low-cost, using disposabletype chutes. That has been the primary amount that we have done. 

And normal container delivery system, that is the primary way 

that we have been doing that. 

I actually got to fly an airdrop, 40 bundles, where we dropped 

from a C–17 that we dropped up in the mountains at night. They 

use the night-vision goggles. They have worked out very well with 

the folks on the ground. And when you are coming in at 1,000 to 

2,000 feet, the accuracy rule is within the standards that they 

need. 

So we have been, you know, the 93 to 94 percent accuracy on 

putting the stuff on target. We are even looking at doing low-altitude, high-speed airdrop, much like the special operators do. The 

C–17 and the 130J are stressed to be able to do that, and that is 

where you would come in at 250 knots at 300 feet. But we have 

to make sure we design—and we are really looking for, you know, 

an ability to size this and keep the cost down. But it obviously has 

to do with the parachute and the opening shock. 

Those are the kind of things that we continue to work to say, can 

we do it as cheap as possible, depending on the threat, all the way 

to putting a precision airdrop that, ideally, we would like to recover 

and reuse. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

And, General Ham, thanks for your service to our country. And 

congratulations on your recent command for—taking over U.S. Africa Command. 

First of all, can you just share with me what the rationale was 

for putting it at Stuttgart, Germany, when Central Command was 

your predecessor? And it deals with an area geographically further 

away than Africa, and yet, they are in Florida. 

General HAM. Yes, sir. Africa had been divided between European Command, which had the bulk of Africa; Central Command, 

which had the Horn of Egypt and the Horn of Africa; and Pacific 

Command, which had the island nations and Madagascar. So there 

actually were three geographic combatant commands, previously, 

that divided the continent. 
23 

But the majority was in European Command. And so, when the 

decision was made to stand up Africa Command as a separate geographic command, the bulk of the resources were already in Stuttgart, the facilities were already in Stuttgart. So, for purposes of 

getting the command off to an expeditious start, that seemed to 

make a lot of sense. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I understand. 

Now, in the situation in Ivory Coast right now, where you have 

a constitutionally elected government that is not being permitted 

to assume the government and you have a president-elect there 

that has not been allowed to assume his position in the government, that there has not been a peaceful transfer of power, were 

there any communications between that president-elect and you 

and your command in reference to any assistance? 

General HAM. No, sir. Only through the U.S. Embassy. But it 

was specifically focused on U.S. missions, for example, planning for 

a noncombatant evacuation. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I see. So there was virtually no communication 

whatsoever from that constitutionally elected government that was 

not able to assume power to provide any assistance whatsoever? 

General HAM. Sir, not with Africa Command, to the very best of 

my knowledge. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, you know, how would you define your mission in Africa? Because if you cannot influence that situation in 

any way, you know, tell me how you define your mission. 

General HAM. Sir, in Coˆte d’Ivoire, there was already a very 

large United Nations presence, and focused on this clearly. There 

were efforts under way, through a variety of international and regional organizations, to try to seek a solution to this other than 

through the application of military force. My sense is that proceeded. Over the past couple of days, as violence escalated, we saw 

the United Nations take a more forceful role. And I think that is 

what perhaps compelled Mr. Gbagbo to decide that it was time to 

change. 

I think the best role that Africa Command plays in these situations is to try to prevent them, to try to work with the militaries 

and security forces of African states so that they are loyal to their 

duly elected and constituted government, which is not something 

we saw play out in this situation, where we had forces loyal to both 

the duly elected president and to the man who would not relinquish power. 

So I think we can be more preventive, rather than the application of military power, to displace—the application of U.S. military 

power to displace someone in an African state. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Generals, for being here. 

General McNabb, I was wondering, because of others who have 

testified before us, there always seems to be this interesting relationship between the National Guard and Reserves as making up 

your force. Do you also have that combination? 

General MCNABB. Yes, ma’am. 
24 

Ms. HANABUSA. And do you know what your numbers are, in 

terms of how many are Active and how many of the Reserves or 

National Guard supplement you? 

General MCNABB. It is about 60 percent in the Guard and Reserve and about 40 percent in the Active would be a, you know, 

rough, depending on what weapons system and—of course, you 

have a great team out there in Hawaii. 

General Wong and his team have been superb in figuring out 

new ways that we can take full advantage of the total force, sharing airplanes and figuring out the best way to use the Guard and 

Active Duty. That has really been very positive. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. Thank you for saying that. 

I am really curious about whether you have had any problems 

with, I think it is Article 10—or, I mean Title 10 and Title 32. Because, as you know, the Guard really is a State function, reports 

and appointed by the adjutant general, as appointed by the Governor. And how do you work out the chain of command, I guess, 

for lack of a better description? 

General MCNABB. Certainly, when they are flying a Federal mission, obviously they get paid for that. And when they do that, they 

come on to our orders, and then they use our normal chain of command. 

They do some Guard missions in which they stay under the Governors’ command and control. I would say that, for especially on 

the mobility side, I am very, very happy with how that all works. 

But it is fairly simple, given the fact that we give them a mission, 

they fly it, and they get paid for that. It works out well overall, and 

it is a little easier for us, especially on the airlift side. 

Tanker, the same way. For the most part, any time that we have 

had a national emergency, I have never once had a governor say, 

well, I am holding the tankers back, or the 130s, or the C–17s— 

not once. They always know that this is part of this. 

Where we really get into—you really see the value is for a domestic disaster like Katrina. And, at that point, you know, how do 

we make sure that we are using not only the Guard bureau but our 

support to NORTHCOM, and making sure that that all comes together. And I would say that that has gone very well. We saw that 

in Haiti, really some very, very good work in making sure that 

General McKinley, as the National Guard Bureau chief, and us 

working through that. It really has not been a problem. 

Ms. HANABUSA. You testified earlier about Japan and the 

amount of support that you have had to coordinate. Does any of 

that support correlate to the respective Guard units and/or Reserve 

units? 

General MCNABB. We definitely had some of the people flying the 

missions. But they are flying there, they are flying back, and it is 

a specific mission in which they are doing that. 

The rest of them, I am not sure how much of the Guard would 

be on those chemical, biological, and radiological teams that 

NORTHCOM, you know, has that we move. I would have to get 

that for the record for you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 103.] 
25 

Ms. HANABUSA. Have you also had occasion to call into service, 

like, commercial planes or commercial ships or anything like that? 

And what is the process that you would go through to do that? 

General MCNABB. Yes, ma’am. In fact, we have a very robust 

process. And, in fact, if we can go first to our commercial industry, 

our U.S.-flag fleet, that is what I will do, if that can handle it, because they can do it cheaper than we can do for the military side. 

So I try to focus the military on places where the threat or the 

conditions require military-type lift. And if commercial can do it, I 

will turn to them first. They have really helped us tremendously 

on the surge into Afghanistan, bringing the equipment out of Iraq. 

All of that has been done commercial, which is good for—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. How are they cheaper? I am curious. 

General MCNABB. Pardon me? 

Ms. HANABUSA. How are they cheaper? 

General MCNABB. Well, if you look at fully burdened cost and 

you say, okay, here is how much it costs me to take a pallet of stuff 

on a C–17 versus a 747–400 freighter, you know, you look at the 

efficiencies that they have in the commercial world, it ends up 

being, you know, a cheaper way to do that. That frees the C–17 to 

go do airdrop. 

So when I sit there and I think about that, that has been one 

of the real powers that I have seen in TRANSCOM, is the use of 

both the air and the maritime industry wherever possible. And 

what has allowed us to handle a lot of these surges that you all 

have asked about, is the fact that we have brought the U.S.-flag 

fleet to bear. We basically contract with them. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And it is U.S.-flagged. 

General MCNABB. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

General McNabb, General Ham, I represent Robbins Air Force 

Base. And just to the south of me, I have Moody, and just to the 

West, I have Fort Benning; just to the east, I have Stewart. Both 

of your—the Air Force and the Army are extremely important to 

us. And as you look for additional commands, I think Georgia will 

be—you will find open and welcome arms there. 

I want to ask a question. The joint future theater lifter, is that 

going to be a vertical lift craft? 

General MCNABB. Congressman, we are looking at all parts. 

Vertical lift is one of them. One is fixed-wing, which Air Mobility 

Command had brought in kind of a, you know, a much more modern C–17, –130-type aircraft. 

We also are looking at airships under that, to say, you know, 

how does that fit in to the overall enterprise that we have. And 

what we are trying do is sort that out. And I will say, we are going 

to look at, you know, what does it cost per pound delivered, and 

then how does that fit in to the rest of the fleets that we have. And 

I will use surface, I will use rail, we will use trucks, I will look at 
26 

airships, you know, and we will just see how that will fit in to the 

rest of those. 

Vertical lift is one of those ways. Vertical lift, in the past, has 

been probably the most expensive way. So when we think about 

ways that we can help General Petraeus and General Mattis, one 

of the things is, if I can free up his vertical lift assets to go do the 

operational-type missions that only they can do, by doing whether 

it is airdrop or air land, that is what I try to do. Because, historically, that is just a much more expensive way. 

When I look for the future, that may change, those dynamics, as 

technology takes over. And I think that is what we are looking for. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

Just looking at the history of things, it never made sense to me 

why we canceled the F–22 [Lockheed Martin/Boeing Raptor fifthgeneration fighter aircraft] before the F–35 [Lockheed Martin 

Lightning II fifth-generation fighter aircraft] is ready. And the 

tanker, it takes us a decade to get through that. And now we have 

the C–17 and stopping the purchase of the C–17. 

And, of all the decisions that I have seen—and, again, I don’t 

pretend to think that I know as much as you do, General. But, of 

all the decisions I have seen made, the one that I question the 

most, as far as our abilities going forward, is cancelling the C–17. 

And it is not manufactured in my district. I mean, it is not. But 

this is my question: If we cancel the C–17 buying altogether, knowing the history of the procurements and that it may be 20 years 

before there is an alternative to the C–17 that actually works—we 

have already paid for the technology costs of the plane—you know, 

what alternatives do you see for future airlift production if our last 

remaining wide-body military production program shuts its doors 

and closes? 

And how would we replace those aircraft if we end up in a situation where they do come under fire and we do actually start to lose 

some of them? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. Sir, I will tell you the C–17 has performed magnificently, and it really has changed the way we did 

airlift. Because it can swing between strategic and theater roles, 

and, as you mentioned, it has been tremendous. 

Right now, we are set to have 222 C–17s. I would say that, when 

we did the MCRS [Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study], 

we figured we need about 300—it was 304—large strategic 

airlifters. And, right now, that was made up of C–17s, C–5Ms, 

which were re-engined, and C–5As that had the Avionics Modernization Program on there. And what I basically—from 

TRANSCOM’s standpoint, we need about 32.7 million ton-miles. 

And as the Air Force looks at what is the best mix of those airplanes, that is where the C–17/C–5 mix came up. 

From my standpoint, one of the things that I am very excited 

about is, as we get the new tanker—and, right now, I use C–17s 

in ways that I would rather be using the new multi-role tanker 

in—and that will free up C–17s to do some of the other work. I 

think that is going to be a positive all by itself. And it is one of 

those things that folks don’t realize the impact that we have on 

having to use C–17s to trans-load from our Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
27 

both cargo and packs, because I can’t take them all the way forward. 

When I think about the future—and, you know, you make a very 

good point. One, I think they are planning to make sure that they 

keep the tooling. I mean, I think that gives you a hedge. The other 

portion I would say is, we look at these new—as you mentioned, 

as we look at the new study, what are the other things that we 

need to do, and then, again, how will that mix and match? 

When I first was working as a major on the C–17 and talking 

about when we needed it, at that point we were going to buy 210 

C–17s to replace the C–141 [Lockheed Starlifter strategic airlifter] 

fleet. We are at 222 now. I would say, we have the numbers. Most 

of the places that we go now, I would just say that we are not impacted by the numbers of airplanes; it is, how many airplanes can 

I get in there? And so that tends to be where I look at the C–17 

fleet. It is versatile, and it has been superb. 

The other portion where I think we are doing better than ever 

is using our Civil Reserve Air Fleet—again, modern airplanes—and 

making sure that we are using those to max advantage so, again, 

we free up the fleet to make sure that they do that. 

But I do understand your concern. And, I mean, I would say that 

I have the same concern, to make sure that we have hedged those 

bets and we have options to be able to bring that back if we need 

to. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, my concern is that we start finding stress fractures and other things, that it takes us longer to repair them, and, 

at the same time, we can’t bring new equipment in. 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, sir. Thank both of you. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from Guam is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would also like to welcome General McNabb and General 

Ham. Thank you for your testimonies. 

Well, earlier, you heard my colleagues speak about the great attributes of their States. Well, I represent the beautiful island of 

Guam. And if I were to tell you about all the advantages of living 

on a tropical island, it would take all day, so we will put it off for 

another time. But Guam is the home of Andersen Air Force Base 

and Naval Base. 

I have two questions for you, General McNabb. The first is for 

you, in reference to ship repairs in U.S. shipyards. In a May 2004 

report to Congress, MSC [Military Sealift Command] assured Congress that it was firmly committed to conducting the maximum 

amount of repair work practicable in domestic shipyards and ensuring that MSC ships are repaired in foreign shipyards only when 

directed by operational necessity and allowed by law. 

How does TRANSCOM ensure that operational necessity exists 

before authorizing repairs in foreign shipyards? 

An annual report to Congress indicates that there are still a tremendous amount of ships being repaired in Hong Kong or Singapore. So what more can be done to comply with congressional intent? Could you answer that for me? 
28 

General MCNABB. Yes, ma’am. One of the things that Military 

Sealift Command does, not only do they take care of our surge 

ships, they also take care of the Navy fleet. And the ships that they 

have forward, for instance, in the Pacific, are primarily under the 

Chief of Naval Operations’ hats. In other words, it is support of the 

Navy. 

The ships that they take care of for me are the large, mediumspeed RO/RO [roll-on/roll-off] ships that we would activate if we 

can’t, you know, get the commercial lift to be able to do that. And 

right now, we haven’t had to be activating, you know, these large 

ships because the commercial capability has been there. 

I know that they are committed to using Guam. I know Admiral 

Buzby, the MSC commander, has, I believe, talked with you and 

gone through this with you, and it had to do with the drydock, I 

think, there in Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. That is correct. 

General MCNABB. And so, whatever we can do to get that drydock up, because right now that is the constraint, you know, as I 

understand it, the big constraint in ’11. We do $40 million. Guam 

is probably the place that we do—he does most of the work. But 

not under my—you know, not under my umbrella. It is really 

under the CNO’s [Chief of Naval Operations’] umbrella. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I see. Well, I am very concerned, because we 

have, well, about 350 workers, employees there. It is a private 

shipyard. And, you know, it was one of the things that I fought for 

a few years ago, ‘‘Buy America.’’ 

General MCNABB. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So I want to be sure that that is being carried 

out. 

Now, my final question is also for you, General McNabb, and it 

is in regards to rotating aircraft support on Guam. A rotating aircraft, which in the past has been called the Patriot Express, helps 

to enhance morale and welfare for service members in Guam by offering them flights to, say, Japan or Hawaii. 

What steps is TRANSCOM taking with either the Navy or the 

Air Force to bring back this capability to Guam? And can you explain to me what is necessary to revisit this issue and validate the 

requirements for this important capability? 

General MCNABB. Yes, ma’am. On the Patriot Express, what we 

have done with that—and that primarily was to move the U.S. 

military members around, and their families, when they are moving back and forth. It also has the other benefit that, if you have 

it, then there are space-available opportunities for dependents and 

families, which I think is one of the real advantages to that. 

We have actually increased the number of Patriot Express missions, adding back Korea, adding back Misawa, adding back 

Iwakuni. And the promise that I have had with the commanders 

in those areas is that you have to make sure you fill those airplanes, because we have to break even at the end of all of this. 

Guam is slated to be—and I will have to get you whether it is 

next year—it may even be—it is probably ’12, but it might even be 

’11. But we said, especially as the Marines would come down there 

and we got an additional number of military folks on Guam, then 
29 

it will make sense to have Patriot Express come in there, rather 

than the normal commercial traffic. 

So right now I have told them that is what we want to do as soon 

as we have enough military presence on Guam, and then we will 

get the Patriot Express coming in. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So what you are saying, then, is that, by 2011, 

possibly, or ’12, this capability will be returned. 

General MCNABB. Yes, ma’am. And I will get you the exact date, 

because it had to do with the movement of the Marines coming 

down. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am sitting here listening to some of my colleagues, and I feel 

like I have gone through a time warp, back when earmarks were 

okay, the monster earmark requests going on for General Ham to 

move his command. So I will refrain from doing that. 

General McNabb, the requirement under the QDR [Quadrennial 

Defense Review] for some 330-plus planes includes 111 C–5s, of 

some configuration. The list I have is 36 C–5As that either have 

or will go through the AMP [Avionics Modernization Program] program and 52 Bs and Cs that have gone through both engines and 

the AMP program. 

Where are the other 23—or what are the other 23? 

General MCNABB. Sir, right now, we are asking for—the MCRS– 

2016 [Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016] said we 

needed 32.7 million ton-miles, which equates to about 301 total big 

airplanes. That is 222 C–17s, 52 C–5Ms, and 27 C–5As. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. So you would be supportive of—I suspect, 

of that 23 that are missing off that list, they are parked someplace 

and may never get off the ground again. And we are maintaining 

airplanes that, in a commercial venue, you would never do, for a 

variety of reasons. 

General MCNABB. Sir, what we were hoping for is the ability to, 

as we bring on the additional C–17s, that we can put them at 

places like McChord and Charleston, take our older C–17s and replace some of those old C–5As at some of the different bases. That 

will get them new airplanes, it will extend the service life on our 

C–17s—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Speaking of the service life, the operational tempo 

that you are currently experiencing, I don’t necessarily—none of us 

hope it is over the next 5 or 6 years, but—— 

General MCNABB. Right. 

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. Given that each plane has a set useful life of some period of time, what impact does this current operational tempo have on that fleet? Will it last until 2025, 2030, 

whenever it is we will decide to replace the C–17? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir, we bought the C–17s for 30,000 

hours, and we plan to do 1,000 hours a year. So, basically, 30 years 

is what we were trying to get out of that asset. 

I would say that we were overflying that, especially early on in 

OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] and OEF [Operation Enduring 
30 

Freedom]. In fact, this committee and the Congress helped us with 

that. We said we need about 7 to 10 airplanes to make up that— 

you know, to get the flying hours back down. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. In your analysis, you have addressed 

that operational tempo issue with respect to the life of that fleet. 

General MCNABB. But if we keep—you know, we may have to address it again if we just keep—you know, we stay at this tempo. 

But, as I mentioned before, we are using a lot of commercial—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. I understand that. But, at some point in 

time, if you come back to us and say, ‘‘We need C–17s,’’ it is going 

to be a whole lot more expensive, at that point in time, depending 

on what the circumstances are. 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. General Ham, congratulations on the new command. 

Just a quick inference. When Gates was here last week, he said 

that one of the core missions of NATO that he would support would 

be the search and rescue. And maybe I misunderstood you to say 

that was an ad hoc thing that may occur, but it seemed to me that 

we were going to provide the search and rescue for the Libyan 

work. Did I misunderstand that? 

General HAM. No, sir. You understood it correctly. It falls under 

the category of what we call ‘‘unique U.S. military capabilities.’’ 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

General HAM. And we thought we were the best suited to do 

that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Are those your assets? 

General HAM. For the most part, they are, yes, sir—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

General HAM [continuing]. With our Special Operations Command Africa. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. 

Your budget request for 2012 is $289 million. How much out of 

hide is this Libyan operation going to cost you, assuming it goes 

past September or October 1st? 

General HAM. Congressman, financially, it won’t affect the headquarters very much. But where the cost is borne is with our service 

components, in this case particularly the Air Force and Navy service component commands for AFRICOM, who have sortied ships, 

aircraft, and personnel at a rate higher than they were anticipating 

to do. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. So they will have to figure out some way 

to pay for that. That is not necessarily your responsibility. 

General HAM. That is correct, sir. That burden will, through the 

service component commands, fall back to the Services. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

One of the advantages that we were told about AFRICOM was 

that you would, in effect, create long-term relationships between 

the mil-to-mil kind of things that would go on in these developing 

countries. 

Given it is a relatively young command still, at this point in 

time, are you experiencing the kind of opportunity or availability 

to send the folks back to the same countries on enough of a basis 
31 

so that we are building relationships there that can be used in a 

crisis if we need them? 

General HAM. I am just learning about this, but in my first two 

trips to the continent, which were, admittedly, far too short, but to 

Djibouti and to Kenya, I, in fact, found exactly that circumstance, 

where U.S. service personnel had been back for repetitive assignments. And in those two cases, the Djiboutians and the Kenyans 

were very welcoming of that, because it is people they know and 

understand. 

I think there is probably more that we can do in the future, and 

I will look to do just that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Thanks, gentlemen. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Generals. 

We are down now—it is two to two, and you have a much deeper 

bench than we do. So I am going to be very quick on just a couple 

of follow-up questions. 

General McNabb, if I could follow up on a question that Mr. 

Kline asked. If the FAA goes forward with the rule on crew rest 

requirements, will it affect TRANSCOM’s ability to execute the 

mission? 

General MCNABB. Sir, as Mr. Babbitt went through it, he said 

that he would consider what I was worried about, which is that one 

size doesn’t fit all, and our nonscheduled carriers are a bit unique, 

and to make sure that we have built in the proper safety program 

for them. 

If they do the one-size-fits-all, it will impact us in how quickly 

we can do it, velocity, and it will also drive up the cost for our U.S. 

carriers fairly dramatically, to the point where I, again, start worrying about the competitiveness they will have in making sure that 

they can take advantage of modern airplanes. 

That is probably my biggest concern. And I do think, between 

ORM [Operational Risk Management] and crew rest facilities and 

making sure that we look at what their mission is like, it is a little 

different than the legacy carriers. And I just hope that they will 

consider that there is a difference there. 

Mr. FORBES. Can I just drill down on that question just a little 

bit more? I am aware of the Air Force Institute of Technology study 

that found that up to 70 percent of the missions flown for you by 

the civilian carriers may be impacted, depending on how the rule 

is implemented. That seems substantial to us, given how much you 

rely on them. 

Can you just put that in context for us so the committee has a 

good feel of where that falls? 

General MCNABB. Sure. When we set up our concept of ops and 

how we are going to base airplanes, especially when you talk to a 

far-off place like Afghanistan, and if you have to drive in some additional crew rest and changing crews, it drives in some perplexity 

into the system, that becomes a little bit tougher to manage. 

Right now, we have that—you know, we have been driving very 

hard to get those modern airplanes. And, like I said, if 70 percent 

are affected, it means that they would have to have additional 

stops, they would have to lay in additional crews. The circadian 

rhythm, you know, the issue with making sure that if they are— 
32 

you know, as you are traveling around the world, Afghanistan is 

12 hours out from here. So if you have—you know, when you think 

about the domestic here in the U.S., they don’t have to deal with 

a 12-hour change in circadian rhythm every day. 

So what we have to do is make sure that we think through all 

of those parts to the puzzle and make sure that one size doesn’t 

necessarily fit all. Fatigue will affect everybody, but you need to 

come up with programs that adjust to that reality. 

I have flown lots of missions and, you know, have 5,600 hours. 

I will say that there is a big difference from flying four to six sorties in the U.S., very quick stops, dealing with air traffic, all of the 

problems that you have on the ground, versus flying a one-hop on 

the same crew duty day and going all the way, for instance, to 

Incirlik and stopping for the night. I would just say the fatigue 

level is different and it takes different approaches, is my recommendation. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

General Ham, just a couple questions for you. Just a few weeks 

ago, I had the privilege of being over at your command. And I had 

just gotten back from visiting several of the countries in Africa. 

And one of the things on every briefing that you would find is that 

there would be a host of arrows that would be drawn from all of 

the different operations that are going on, some of them by State 

Department, some of them by DOD. 

And the question that always puzzles me is, who is managing all 

the arrows? Who is the one authority that is making sure that we 

are not overlapping and that those missions are all coordinating in 

the right fashion? Can you shed a little bit of light on that for me, 

as we see that overlap between State and DOD and all the various 

operations that we have going on in Africa? Who is ultimately managing that to make sure the jointness is done right? 

General HAM. Yes, sir. While there isn’t, you know, an overarching command that is in fact directing that, this is our interagency process at work. And each of us who participates in that 

has a responsibility. 

So me, at Africa Command, certainly Assistant Secretary Carson 

at State, the folks at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

USAID and other agencies, what I think we have to do is make 

sure we have a forum through which the most senior folks can collaborate and make sure that we have, in fact, synchronized our efforts to the highest degree possible. 

My sense is probably a bit the same as yours, at least my initial 

blush at this, is that at least within the military side I am not sure 

that that is quite as tightly wound as it perhaps ought to be. And 

it is something that I would like to take a look at, as I begin my 

tenure. 

Mr. FORBES. And if you do take a look at that, if you would give 

us that information back as you examine it. 

Just two other quick questions. One of the other concerns I had 

was, in talking to the various players over there, one of the things 

we consistently heard from the State Department was, ‘‘Defense 

doesn’t do anything unless we okay it.’’ That gave some of us just 

a little bit of concern as to the role that the State Department had 

and the role that the Department of Defense had. 
33 

Can you tell us and explain a little bit about those two functions 

and how they are collaborating? 

General HAM. Yes, sir, certainly. We would all agree that it is 

far better when State and Defense agree on a way ahead in a particular—in any particular matter. 

Mr. FORBES. That is given. I—— 

General HAM. But sometimes that is just not the case. 

Mr. FORBES. Right. 

General HAM. But we have a mechanism, again, through our 

interagency process, through the national security staff, for the 

various departments to bring forward matters where there is, perhaps, some disagreement on the way ahead. 

I am confident that, again, as I am able to get started in this 

command and build the relationships with Secretary Carson and 

with others in the interagency, that those times will be few and far 

between where we will have very strong disagreement. 

But where we do, I don’t feel any reservation whatsoever about 

saying, ‘‘I am sorry; I just can’t get to agreement on this. We need 

to take it into the interagency deliberative process to have disagreements adjudicated.’’ We know how to do that; we do it all the 

time in our Government. And I am very comfortable inside that 

process. 

Mr. FORBES. Last question: What are the authorities granted to 

the U.S. chiefs of mission regarding combatant command activities 

in the countries to which they are posted? And do you believe that 

these authorities are sufficient? 

General HAM. Sir, in general, they are. I mean, clearly, the chief 

of mission is the senior American representative, the representative of the President in those countries. And so our efforts are 

nested with the chief of mission. 

There may be some very unique circumstances where there 

would be a military effort that might require an authority other 

than the chief of mission. Those are probably addressed in a—not 

in an open session. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Well, I think we have had all of our questions. Thank you so 

much for your service to our country and for your patience today 

and for sharing your experience and expertise with us. 

And this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 5, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 5, 2011 

(39) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Requests for U.S. Transportation Command 

and U.S. Africa Command 

April 5, 2011 

Good afternoon. The House Armed Services Committee meets 

today to receive testimony from the commanders of the United 

States Transportation Command and the United States Africa 

Command on the posture of their respective commands. 

Although these are two combatant commands that sometimes fly 

beneath the radar, this hearing could not be more relevant than it 

is today. In AFRICOM’s area of responsibility (AOR), U.S. forces 

have been conducting active military operations against forces loyal 

to Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi in an effort to prevent a massacre of the civilian population of Libya. Although this humanitarian intervention is motivated by a noble impulse, there is a 

strong possibility of a strategic stalemate emerging in Libya. I fear 

we may find ourselves committed to an open-ended obligation 

through our participation in NATO operations—and that poses real 

opportunity costs, given the volatility of other unstable, more strategically important countries in the region. 

Beyond Libya, this weekend as many as one thousand civilians 

were massacred in the Ivory Coast as that nation’s political standoff escalated violently. This brutality could be an ominous foreshadowing of future events in the Sudan, as the southern portion 

of that war-torn country becomes an independent nation in July. 

Further east, Somalia continues to be a source of instability, 

hosting both the Al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist organization, and the various piracy networks that have intensified attacks 

in the Gulf of Aden and beyond over the past several years, recently killing four American citizens aboard a private yacht. 

Just as it was virtually impossible to foresee the United States 

becoming militarily involved in Libya at last year’s posture hearings, this Congress may be called upon to fund a number of possible contingency operations or humanitarian missions in 

AFRICOM’s AOR. 

Wherever U.S. forces may operate over the next year, 

TRANSCOM will be charged with getting them there, sustaining 

them throughout their operations, and getting them home to their 

families. As General Omar Bradley famously said, ‘‘Amateurs talk 
40 

strategy. Professionals talk logistics.’’ The events of the past 18 

months are an instructive example as to the relevance of that quote 

today. Not only did TRANSCOM have to respond to the surge of 

forces in Afghanistan while they simultaneously orchestrated the 

drawdown of forces in Iraq, but they also had to respond to the 

devastating earthquake in Haiti. 

Things have not gotten any easier for the men and women of 

TRANSCOM, as they are now supporting combat operations in 

Libya in addition to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are 

working desperately to assist the people of Japan following the horrific earthquakes of the past month. What they do is not easy and 

it oftentimes goes unnoticed, but the capabilities of TRANSCOM 

are truly unique among nations. 
41 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Requests for U.S. Transportation Command 

and U.S. Africa Command 

April 5, 2011 

General McNabb, General Ham, welcome. We have two separate 

subjects before us: The posture of U.S. Transportation Command 

and the posture of U.S. Africa Command. Welcome to you both. I 

look forward to your testimony. 

Let me start with TRANSCOM. With the challenges on materiel 

distribution routes inside Pakistan growing because of insurgent 

attacks, border delays, weather, road conditions, labor issues, theft 

and pilferage, what options is TRANSCOM considering regarding 

the Northern Distribution Network? In light of increased requirements for transport into Afghanistan, I’d also like to hear how 

TRANSCOM is ensuring a steady flow of equipment retrograding 

out of Iraq and Kuwait at the same time. 

Previously, the Air Force had stated that the minimum number 

of strategic airlift assets required was 316. Recently, the Air Force 

has reassessed that number and has concluded they now have an 

excess to need in regard to strategic airlift. I am interested in hearing what TRANSCOM’s position is on what the appropriate number of strategic airlift assets are and what level of risk that assumes. 

Turning to AFRICOM next, events of recent weeks have certainly 

put Africa at the forefront of our minds. The ongoing NATO operation in Libya, and before that, the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt 

(although technically not in AFRICOM’s area of responsibility) are 

just the most recent reminders that turbulence on the continent 

can have international implications. General Ham, I want to commend you and the command on your performance in the Libya operation before you passed responsibility over to NATO. 

Looking beyond Libya, AFRICOM’s challenge is how to develop 

the military-unique portions of the larger inter-agency process that 

translates broad U.S. national interests on the continent into a policy appropriate across a widely diverse geo-political landscape, and 

then execute it with austere resources. It is clear that we have an 

interest in the wellbeing and stability of the continent. Global poverty, which affects hundreds of millions in Africa, is a major destabilizing force. 

Developing countries are more likely to become mired in destabilizing conflicts, or worse, become havens or recruiting grounds for 

terrorists. Violent extremists have footholds stretching from the 

Maghreb to Somalia and points both north and south. International 

crime, including narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, trade in 

illegal weapons, and piracy destabilize countries and regions. Unchecked pandemics could spread across borders and oceans and 
42 

threaten entire populations and local conflicts can ignite wider conflagrations and destabilize entire regions. 

There are any numbers of examples of war, or poverty, or human 

suffering in Africa. The ongoing conflict in Coˆte d’Ivorie and the 

fragile state of affairs in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 

that is held together by a huge peacekeeping operation are but two 

illustrations. But we do not possess unlimited capability or an unlimited mandate. 

Therefore, AFRICOM’s approach, to largely work in concert with 

our African partners to identify mutual areas for security cooperation, is a proactive way to address national security concerns and 

prevent future conflicts in Africa. With American assistance, our 

African partners can professionalize their militaries, become more 

accountable to the people they protect, and strengthen the civilian 

governance structures that control them. In that way, they become 

more able to deal with the security challenges we share. 

Without a robust inter-agency process in Africa, AFRICOM’s efforts will never reap their true potential return so I hope you’ll 

take the time today to discuss how you are building the security 

capacity of our partners within the framework of the inter-agency 

process. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 5, 2011 

(103) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA 

General MCNABB. Congresswoman Hanabusa, the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) teams deployed to Japan by USNORTHCOM were all 

active duty teams. None of those particular teams were comprised of National 

Guard or Reserve personnel. [See page 24.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 5, 2011 

(107) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Following a briefing and demonstration last year on nuclear weapon 

transportation, I became concerned over some potential vulnerabilities. 

a. How does TRANSCOM, NNSA and DoD share, synthesize, and evaluate potential threat information for transportation operations? 

b. What evaluations have been conducted into air transportation of nuclear weapons and materials? 

c. What is the process for identifying and examining options for incorporating new 

technologies or equipment in improving the safety or security of nuclear weapons 

and materials while in transit? At what interval are these analyses conducted? 

General MCNABB. USTRANSCOM’s primary forum to evaluate threats to air 

transport of nuclear weapons is the Headquarters Air Mobility Command (AMC) 

Threat Working Group (TWG). The TWG provides integrated risk assessments in 

support of Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) missions and makes mission execution recommendations to senior leadership that mitigate threat and security 

vulnerabilities. Membership includes AMC Directorates, 18th Air Force, Air Force 

Office of Special Investigation, U.S. Transportation Command, Defense Intelligence 

Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. It is mandatory for this group to meet for every 

PNAF mission. Additionally, the TWG members work very closely with Headquarters Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Directorate in supporting multiple agencies’ nuclear forums. Specifically, AMC has supported the 2009 

Air Transportation Study, conducted in accordance with the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 09 and sponsored by National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) and Secretary of the Air Force. AMC has also provided assistance to the Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff (NSS) during their 

recent assessment of movement operations, including the PNAF. AMC Nuclear Operations Division is an active participant with the NNSA in the semi-annual Nuclear Transportation Working Group. Additionally, AMC was actively engaged in 

the October 2010 Nuclear Weapons System Steering Group’s Operational Safety Review of the PNAF program. This review is sponsored by the Air Force Safety Center 

and conducted once every five years under the provisions of DoD Nuclear Weapon 

System Safety Program Manual, and Air Force Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules. 

Air Mobility Command maintains a robust inspection program through the Inspector General. AMC conducts a Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) on AMC’s sole 

PNAF-certified unit on an 18-month inspection cycle in accordance with Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSI) Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections. To obtain certification, an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI) is conducted prior to the unit performing its nuclear mission. In addition to the CJCSI 

18-month requirement, units receive a Limited NSI (LNSI) during the period between the 18-month inspection intervals. This results in a unit receiving an NSI or 

LNSI approximately every nine months at the very least, half of which are required 

to be no- or minimal-notice. 

AMC’s 62D Airlift Wing (AW) at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA is the sole 

PNAF-certified unit in the Air Force to conduct logistical air transport of nuclear 

weapons and related material. Since certification, the 62 AW has successfully 

passed every NSI or LNSI. Additionally, AMC Safety conducts Nuclear Surety Staff 

Assistance Visits on an 18-month cycle as required by Air Force Nuclear Surety 

Staff Assistance Visit (NSSAV) Program. This program allows functional experts 

from across the AMC staff to examine the processes in place at the 62 AW with respect to its nuclear mission. Furthermore, AMC has also implemented a Functional 

Expert Visit (FEV) program for the interim period between formal inspections. AMC 

Nuclear Operations Division leads the FEV programs and is able to provide subject 

matter expert review/focus on areas specified or requested by the 62 AW. These 

quarterly FEVs are conducted with a small footprint of two-to-four staff personnel 

and serve to continually maintain the highest state of proficiency required of this 

critical nuclear mission. 
108 

Through each of the agencies, assessments, inspections and evaluations, options 

for new technologies are discovered and examined. Specifically, the 2009 Air Transportation Study, the Nuclear Transportation Working Group, and the Nuclear 

Weapons System Steering Group’s Operational Safety Review all examine the use 

of new technologies to improve the efficiency, safety and security of nuclear weapons 

transportation. In addition, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters (DASD/NM) sponsors the Security Policy Verification Committee 

Technology Working Group, which gathers quarterly to address technology which 

would enhance the safety and security of weapons transport. Also, the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, as directed by DASD/NM, conducts red team exercises to 

address current tactics and policy as well as new technologies. 

Mr. TURNER. Have operations in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn impacted 

your ability to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq? 

General MCNABB. USTRANSCOM was challenged providing concurrent emerging 

support to Japan relief, Operation ODYSSEY DAWN and Presidential support—all 

while maintaining normal passenger and cargo operations to Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Over 95% of all personnel move into and out of theater on commercial carriers, 

and our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) partners performed without any interruption of support. Passenger rotations continued, ensuring that all Relief in Place/ 

Transfers of Authority (RIP/TOA) remained on schedule to meet US Forces-Afghanistan requirements. 

Specifically addressing cargo support to Afghanistan and Iraq, the 

USTRANSCOM team partnered with USCENTCOM to prioritize all cargo and manage warfighter expectations during this period of heavy lift. As we synchronized and 

prioritized cargo movements with USCENTCOM to ensure that no RIP/TOA was delayed, we experienced some backlog of sustainment cargo as a result of concurrent 

operational requirements. USCENTCOM mitigates the risk of sustainment cargo 

delay by maintaining sufficient days of supply in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. With regard to ship repairs facilities on Guam, I understand the 

dry dock at our shipyard is only capable, right now, to do limited repairs. However, 

even before the incident with the dry dock a significant number of pre-positioned 

ships were being sent to Singapore or Hong Kong for repairs. What more can be 

done to comply with the law requiring ships to be repaired in American shipyards? 

What is the operational necessity for some of the repairs in foreign shipyards? The 

annual report is not clear on this point. 

General MCNABB. Overseas shipyard repair of naval vessels, including Military 

Sealift Command (MSC) vessels, is a matter under the cognizance of the Department of the Navy. 

Prior to the incident that placed the Guam Shipyard drydock out of service earlier 

this year, MSC had repair work done in Singapore on two T–AKE Class (dry cargo 

and ammunition) vessels. These were not prepositioning vessels. The repair work 

was emergency repairs requiring the vessels to be drydocked. At the time that these 

vessels were repaired in Singapore, the Guam Shipyard drydock was not certified 

to lift the T–AKE class ships. The drydock has now been refloated, but it has not 

yet been certified to resume repair work. Nearly all shipyard work, with the exception of voyage repairs, performed on government-owned prepositioning ships is done 

within the Continental United States during periodic overhaul periods after their 

cargo is discharged at U.S. military installations. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

Ms. GIFFORDS. TRANSCOM’s mission requires a massive energy footprint. To 

their credit each of the Services pro-actively developed strategic processes to make 

energy informed decisions. Recently, as part of the DoD efficiencies the Air Force 

stated it would annually save $750 million dollars due to Air Mobility Command’s 

due to reduced energy consumption generated via the Air Force Energy Plan. The 

Navy’s ‘‘Green Hornet’’ Program successfully completed test flights using a 50/50 

bio-fuel blend, is a perfect example of developing sustainable alternatives to current 

energy sources. Finally the Marines Corp’s 3rd Battalion 5th Marines employment 

of the Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB) in Afghanistan has been instrumental in demonstrating the utility of renewable in the battlefield. 

1. Does TRANSCOM have a published Operational Energy strategy? 

2. What is TRANSCOM’s approach to energy efficiency, renewable and alternative 

fuel technologies? 
109 

3. Can you describe the strategic impact of access to a scalable bio-fuel on 

TRANSCOM’s global roles and responsibilities? 

General MCNABB. Our service components, with their statutory role of organizing, 

training, and equipping forces, retain the primary responsibility for improving efficiency and reducing energy consumption. USTRANSCOM does not have a separate 

Operational Energy strategy document but incorporates Operational Energy considerations in our 2011 Strategic Plan. 

One illustration of our encouragement of the service components’ efforts was our 

recent investment of $172 million into Air Mobility Command’s aviation fuel efficiency initiatives, which are projected to yield $237 million in savings and cost 

avoidance through the FYDP. Additionally, Air Mobility Command has certified a 

number of mobility aircraft on alternative fuels and continues to aggressively explore possibilities in this area. USTRANSCOM’s 2011 Strategic Plan directs that 

‘‘wherever possible, the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise must recognize and rapidly apply technological advances that reduce fuel consumption and enhance joint operations.’’ Regarding process improvement in this area, 

USTRANSCOM is committed to identify ecologically-aware deployment and distribution concepts that improve performance while reducing energy consumption 

and costs. We are currently in the concept development phase of identifying ways 

to inventory USTRANSCOM’s global supply chain carbon footprint and thereby find 

ways to reduce it in the future. A highly-successful example is our detailed planning 

and execution of multi-modal contingency operations—efficiently combining sealift, 

ground movement, and airlift of equipment—at Rota, Spain and elsewhere. These 

multi-modal operations not only reduce fuel consumption, they are considerably 

more cost-effective than reliance upon a single mode of movement (such as airlift) 

alone. 

At this time, no bio-fuels are available in sufficient production quantities that 

would provide a truly viable alternative to the fossil fuels currently in use, nor does 

USTRANSCOM own or manage bulk petroleum assets. However, if a scalable biofuel was developed that met stringent jet and maritime fuel use specifications and 

could be mass-produced, at competitive cost, in quantities needed to support sustained combat operations as well as worldwide petroleum war reserve stockage requirements, USTRANSCOM would use such energy sources to accomplish our global 

mobility mission. 

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