J. A18029/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellant :

:

v. : No. 2062 MDA 2015

:

CODY RYAN RIGG :

Appeal from the Order Entered November 18, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Criminal Division at No. CP-06-CR-0004374-2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., AND STEVENS,* P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2017

The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered November 18, 

2015, granting defendant/appellee Cody Ryan Rigg’s (“Rigg”) motion to 

suppress statements. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court has summarized the history of this case as follows:

On July 7, 2014, Detective Michael Fick, with 

the Berks County District Attorney’s Office, assisted 

with an investigation of child abuse. He was asked if 

he would interview, along with Detective 

[Christopher] Santoro, one Cody Rigg (Defendant) in 

an interview room in the Detective’s Unit on the 

15th floor of the Services Center in Reading, Berks 

County, Pennsylvania. Detective Fick initially went 

over basic information with [Rigg]. The detective 

began a time line to talk to [Rigg] about what had 

happened to an 11 month old girl named [J.F.], who 

was injured somehow. The interview began around 

10:15 am with a break around 11:50 am. [Rigg] 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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asked to record the interview on his phone. The 

detective asked for a copy of the recording; [Rigg] 

agreed to this. [Rigg] left the room to use the 

restroom and was asked to wait in the lobby from 

where he would be retrieved after Detective Fick 

consulted with Sergeant [Harold] Shenk. The 

interviewing continued until 1225 hours and [Rigg] 

was given crackers and water. Detective Fink [sic] 

then advised [Rigg] that they had with [sic] other 

detectives who were doing other interviews and that 

his story was not matching up. At approximately 

1250 hours, [Rigg] admitted that he caused the 

injuries to [J.F.]. [Rigg] then wrote and signed his 

three page statement (Notes of Testimony, 4/16/15, 

pp. 21-30).

[Rigg] was charged by Criminal Information 

with three counts of Aggravated Assault, in violation 

of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1), all felonies. On 

November 3, 2014, [Rigg], through his attorney, 

filed an Omnibus Pre[-]Trial Motion. The hearing 

was held on January 22, 2015; April 16, 2015 and 

concluded on June 29, 2015. [Rigg]’s Motion to 

Suppress Statements was granted on November 18, 

2015. On November 25, 2015, the Commonwealth 

filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court, 

certifying that this ruling terminated or substantially 

handicapped the prosecution of this case.[1] In its 

Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on 

Appeal,[2] the Commonwealth asserts that “the trial 

court erred in suppressing statements pursuant to 

Miranda[

3

] made during a non-custodial interview 

where the defendant was told he was free to leave.”

Trial court opinion, 2/3/16 at 1-2; Docket #42.

 

1

Pa.R.A.P. 311(d); Commonwealth v. Dugger, 486 A.2d 382 (Pa. 1985).

2

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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The trial court, after several evidentiary hearings on Rigg’s 

suppression motion, made the following findings of fact:

1. On July 4th, 2014, Berks County Children & 

Youth Service (CYS) received a report of an 

alleged child abuse victim. The victim was a 

ten (10) month old female (J.F.). The victim 

was treated at the Reading Hospital and then 

transported to Hershey Medical Center. The 

victim suffered from a brain bleed, bruises on 

her face/chin area and bruises on her neck and 

ears.

2. During the investigation Detective Harold 

Shenk and Officer Matthew F. Harley met with 

a CYS case worker Pat Murray to locate 

possible suspects. The Defendant (Cody Rigg) 

was mentioned as a possible suspect.

3. On July 5th Sergeant Matthew F. Harely [sic] 

interviewed [Rigg] at Hershey Medical Center 

and no incriminating statements were made. 

Subsequently on the same day, Sergeant Vega 

also interviewed [Rigg] at his residence and no 

incriminating statements were made.

4. Sergeant Vega scheduled an interview 

appointment with [Rigg] for July 7th, 2014 at 

the Berks County Services Center. [Rigg] 

appeared [at] approximately 10:00 a.m. on 

said date. Detective Fick escorted [Rigg] to 

the front interview room on the 15th floor. 

Detective Fick started to ask basic questions 

(name, date of birth, address).

5. [Rigg] requested that the interview be 

recorded on his cell phone. Detective Fick 

permitted this and requested a copy of the 

recording. [Rigg] agreed and the questioning 

commenced.

6. Detective Fick informed [Rigg] that he was not 

under arrest and he can leave at any time. He 
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advised [Rigg] that he would be going home 

“no matter” what he said. The Detectives also 

handed [Rigg] a “Notification of Non-Arrest” 

form. [Rigg] signed the form at approximately 

10:15 a.m. The Detectives at this point had 

narrowed their forms [sic] to [Rigg] alone. 

Hence they used all of the tactics at their 

disposal to coerce a statement from [Rigg].

7. During the interview the Detective asked 

[Rigg] what happened to J.F. [Rigg] explained 

the events that transpired and said his two (2) 

year old daughter previously kicked J.F. in the 

face and ultimately [Rigg] said he does not 

know exactly what happened to J.F. She was 

just not her normal self and unresponsive. 

[Rigg] brought the issue to the birth mother 

and she called the paramedics.

8. [Rigg] received a break at approximately 

11:50 a.m. The interview resumed at 

approximately 12:00 p.m. Detectives Fick and 

Santoro continued to ask the same questions 

repeatedly to [Rigg]. [Rigg] consistently 

denied knowing how J.F. sustained her injuries. 

The Detectives used multiple aggressive tactics 

(profanity, indirect threat[s], lies about 

witnesses’ statements, etc.) during questioning 

and [it] lasted for several hours.

9. Subsequently, after approximately several 

hours of intense questioning, [Rigg] confessed 

and stated he caused injury to J.F. by shaking 

her and was convinced to write a three (3) 

page statement about his actions. [Rigg] was 

further directed into another room to visually 

record his statements. [Rigg] was arrested 

and charged with three (3) counts of 

Aggravated Assault and one (1) count of 

Endangering Welfare of Children.

10. There was a pre-meditated attempt on the part 

of the police interviewers to take advantage of 
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[Rigg]’s lack of mental capacity to extract 

incriminating statements.

11. The statements of [Rigg] were the product of 

custodial interrogation. In spite of statements 

that [Rigg] was free to leave at any time, this 

court is convinced that those statements were 

false and misleading.

12. There is no reason, whatsoever, in the 

circumstances of this interrogation why the 

police chose not to give [Rigg] his Miranda

warnings.

13. The statements of [Rigg] were involuntary.

“Findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I),” 

11/18/15 at 1-2; Docket #29 (emphasis added). 

The Commonwealth has raised the following issues for this court’s 

review:

A. Did the trial court err in suppressing 

statements obtained as a result of a noncustodial interview?

B. Did the trial court err in suppressing 

statements that were voluntarily made?

Commonwealth’s brief at 4 (capitalization deleted).

When the Commonwealth appeals from a 

suppression order, we follow a clearly defined 

standard of review and consider only the evidence 

from the defendant’s witnesses together with the 

evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the 

context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. 

The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an 

appellate court if the record supports those findings. 

The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, 

are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it 
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is to determine if the suppression court properly 

applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Nester, 709 A.2d 879, 880-881 (Pa. 1998) (citations 

omitted). “The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a 

conclusion of law and, as such, is subject to plenary review.” 

Commonwealth v. Templin, 795 A.2d 959, 961 (Pa. 2002), citing Nester, 

supra. 

Statements made during custodial interrogation are 

presumptively involuntary, unless the accused is first 

advised of . . . Miranda rights. Commonwealth v. 

DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 579 (Pa.Super. 2001), 

appeal denied, 569 Pa. 716, 806 A.2d 858 (2002). 

Custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by 

law enforcement officers after a person has been 

taken into custody or otherwise deprived of [his] 

freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 

supra at 444, 86 S.Ct at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706. 

“The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a 

person in custody is subjected to either express 

questioning or its functional equivalent.” 

Commonwealth v. Gaul, 590 Pa. 175, 180, 912 

A.2d 252, 255 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 939, 

128 S.Ct. 43, 169 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007). Thus, 

“Interrogation occurs where the police should know 

that their words or actions are reasonably likely to 

elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” 

Commonwealth v. Ingram, 814 A.2d 264, 271 

(Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 573 Pa. 671, 821 

A.2d 586 (2003). “In evaluating whether Miranda

warnings were necessary, a court must consider the 

totality of the circumstances . . . .” Gaul, supra.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 888-889 (Pa.Super. 2009), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 30 (Pa.Super. 2008) 

(en banc).
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Whether a person is in custody for 

Miranda purposes depends on whether 

the person is physically denied of [her] 

freedom of action in any significant way 

or is placed in a situation in which [she] 

reasonably believes that [her] freedom 

of action or movement is restricted by 

the interrogation. Moreover, the test for 

custodial interrogation does not depend 

upon the subjective intent of the law 

enforcement officer interrogator. Rather, 

the test focuses on whether the 

individual being interrogated reasonably 

believes [her] freedom of action is being 

restricted.

Commonwealth v. Clayton Williams, 539 Pa. 61, 

74, 650 A.2d 420, 427 (1994) (internal citations 

omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Mannion, 

725 A.2d 196, 202 (Pa.Super. 1999) (en banc) 

(stating whether person is in custody for Miranda

purposes must be evaluated on case-by-case basis 

with due regard for facts involved); Commonwealth 

v. Peters, 434 Pa.Super. 268, 642 A.2d 1126, 1130 

(1994) (en banc), appeal denied, 538 Pa. 668, 

649 A.2d 670 (1994) (stating: “Among the factors 

the court utilizes in determining, under the totality of 

the circumstances, whether the detention became so 

coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of 

a formal arrest are: the basis for the detention; the 

duration; the location; whether the suspect was 

transferred against [her] will, how far, and why; 

whether restraints were used; the show, threat or 

use of force; and the methods of investigation used 

to confirm or dispel suspicions”; fact that defendant 

was focus of investigation is relevant for 

determination of whether defendant was in “custody” 

but does not require per se Miranda warnings).

Williams, 941 A.2d at 30-31 (brackets in original).

When deciding a motion to suppress a confession, 

the touchstone inquiry is whether the confession was 

voluntary. Voluntariness is determined from the 
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totality of the circumstances surrounding the 

confession. The question of voluntariness is not 

whether the defendant would have confessed without 

interrogation, but whether the interrogation was so 

manipulative or coercive that it deprived the 

defendant of his ability to make a free and 

unconstrained decision to confess. The 

Commonwealth has the burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 

confessed voluntarily.

Nester, 709 A.2d at 882 (citations and footnote omitted).

When assessing voluntariness pursuant to the 

totality of the circumstances, a court should look at 

the following factors: the duration and means of the 

interrogation; the physical and psychological state of 

the accused; the conditions attendant to the 

detention; the attitude of the interrogator; and any 

and all other factors that could drain a person’s 

ability to withstand suggestion and coercion.

Id., 709 A.2d at 882 (citations omitted). “The line of distinction between a 

voluntary and an involuntary confession is that at which governing 

self-direction is lost and compulsion propels the confession.” Id. at 884 

(citations omitted).

Before the interview began at 10:15 a.m., Rigg signed a “Notification 

of Non-Arrest” form, acknowledging that he was not under arrest and was 

free to leave at any time. (Notes of testimony, 4/16/15 at 24-25; 

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2.) Detective Fick testified that Rigg appeared to 

understand the form and did not have any questions. (Id. at 25.) Rigg 

asked whether he could record the interview on his cell phone; 
J. A18029/16

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Detective Fick did not object but requested that Rigg make him a copy. (Id.

at 26.) Rigg agreed. (Id.) 

The interview took place on the 15th floor. They sat in a small room, 

approximately 7’ by 6’, at a round table. (Id. at 42.) The door was closed 

but not locked. (Id. at 43.) They took a short, 10-minute break from 11:50 

a.m. to 12:00 p.m., during which Rigg left the room to use the bathroom. 

(Id. at 28, 50-51.) Rigg was not accompanied by law enforcement. (Id.) 

Detective Fick asked him to wait in the lobby area when he was done. (Id.) 

They took a second break at 12:25 p.m., and Detective Fick got Rigg 

some crackers and water. (Id. at 29.) Rigg remained alone in the interview 

room during this second break. (Id. at 58.) Up until this point, Rigg had 

consistently denied knowing anything about J.F.’s injuries. (Id. at 57.) 

Detective Santoro showed Rigg color photographs of J.F. in a body cast and 

told him to “take a look at these and really think about it.” (Id. at 76.) 

Detective Santoro told Rigg, “I don’t want to hear, ‘I didn’t do it.’” (Id. at 

77.) According to Detective Fick, it was during this second break that they 

realized Rigg’s story “wasn’t matching with what the others were obtaining.” 

(Id. at 58.)

When the questioning resumed, Detective Fick told Rigg that “things 

weren’t matching.” (Id. at 59.) However, Rigg continued to deny causing 

the injuries to J.F. (Id. at 59-60.) Detective Santoro testified that, “I pled 

with him if he knew what happened to this child to tell us so that we could 
J. A18029/16

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let the hospital know how the injuries were inflicted.” (Id. at 77.) Finally, 

at 12:50 p.m., Rigg confessed and agreed to make a statement. (Id. at 

60.) 

According to Detective Fick’s testimony, at first, they had no specific 

information that would implicate Rigg. (Id. at 49-50.) Detective Fick 

testified that, “And when we met with [Rigg] initially, I was under the 

impression that we were talking to him and trying to get a timeline. I don’t 

believe that anyone was looking at him at that time like he had any 

involvement in this.” (Id. at 41.) It is clear, however, that as the interview 

progressed, Detectives Fick and Santoro became increasingly aggressive in 

their questioning of Rigg:

[Detective Santoro]: “I walked into that room [at 

Hershey Medical Center]. It broke my heart. We do 

this for a reason. We spent the weekend in here for 

a child we never met before. I know you for the last 

hour. I don’t know if you love this child or reject it. 

You have nothing to do with this child. If you can 

look at this child and not feel something, I don’t 

know. I think you do. Nobody is going to blow 

smoke up our asses and tell us a 2 year old did this. 

It’s bullshit. Bullshit. Now’s the time for us so we 

can tell the doctors and maybe save her life. If this 

child dies and you know what happened, there’s 

gonna [sic] be a big problem. Period. You think 

because ‘I didn’t have anything to do with it but I 

know what happened,’ my opinion is if I could drive 

it home on you, I will. If I could drive it home on 

you, and you will burn.”

Detective Fick then said[,] “if we find out someone 

lied, they’re fucked.”
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Detective Santoro then said, “I met her five minutes 

and it breaks my heart. Now tell us what happened. 

It’s bullshit that you don’t know. You know what 

happened.”

Detective Fick said, “she was under your care.”

Detective Santoro said, “somebody start talking 

because she’s over there running her mouth[,]” 

referring to J.F.’s mother.[4]

Detective Fick said, “she [J.F.’s mother] already told 

us something that doesn’t match.”

Detective Santoro said, “if you did something and it 

was an accident, on that recording, you need to tell 

us because if you walk out of here and we call you 

back in it’s not on there that it was an accident. So 

what happened with the child? Don’t tell me a 

2 year old did this. Don’t tell me you don’t know. 

Again, we have 60 years[’] law enforcement and we 

talk to liars and murderers every day who blow 

smoke up my ass and spend life in prison. We need 

the information to know if this child will survive and 

how things happened so doctors can save her life.”

Detective Fick said, “if you made a mistake, tell us 

so we can help this child. That’s what we’re all here 

for no matter what happened.”

Detective Santoro said, “I can see it all over your 

face that you know what happened[,]” after which 

[Rigg] said, “I don’t know. I feel so bad for this kid.”

 

4

In fact, Detective Santoro testified that while J.F.’s mother was in the 

office, he did not know whether or not she was being interviewed at that 

time. (Notes of testimony, 4/16/15 at 74.)
J. A18029/16

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Rigg’s brief in support of omnibus pre-trial motion, 7/23/15 at 16-17; 

Docket #25 (some brackets in original).5

Detective Fick said, . . . “What went wrong? You 

can’t tell us you don’t know. Here’s what happened: 

you know, or you made a mistake and accidentally 

hurt this child.”

Detective Santoro then said, “or you tried to kill 

her.”

Detective Fick asked, “are you a killer?” which [Rigg] 

denied. Detective Fick then said, “scratch that off 

the table.”

Id. at 17.

Detective Santoro then asked, “who hurt this kid? 

Don’t tell me you don’t know who hurt this child. 

You were there. We talked to people already. These 

marks just don’t appear like in a horror movie. This 

child was injured. This child was hurt. The next 

day, she has marks. The kids didn’t do this. The 

other injuries weren’t from that night. There was a 

full scan of her body. This child has old injuries, 

broken bones that are healing, so you need to start 

running your mouth because if she’s saying you’re a 

killer, then I guess we’ll believe her. Is that what 

you want to do?”

Id.

Detective Santoro said, . . . “Let me take a break 

and give you about 5 to 10 minutes and when we 

come back I don’t want to hear that we don’t know, 

that I have no idea, that’s craziness, that’s insanity.”

 

5

From our review of the recordings, these quotations are substantially 

verbatim. There is no transcript in the record. However, while a word or 

phrase is missing here or there, as a whole, they accurately reflect what was 

being said.
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Detective Fick then offered to bring [Rigg] another 

water into the interview room to which [Rigg] 

responded, “um, sure.” Detective Santoro finished 

with “think about it. Really look at her[,]” referring 

to the photographs of J.F. in the hospital bed.

Id. at 18.

Detectives Fick and Santoro then left Rigg in the interview room alone 

with the photographs of J.F. Rigg was not told he was free to leave. (Id. at 

58-59.) They returned approximately ten minutes later, and the questioning 

resumed. Unfortunately, the third part of the interview, from 12:34 p.m. to 

12:50 p.m., is not available.6 However, Detective Fick testified that, “my 

report indicates when we pushed approximately 12:34, it was at 12:50 is 

when he admitted that he caused the injuries.” (Notes of testimony, 

4/16/15 at 60.) Up until that point, Rigg had consistently denied that he 

hurt J.F. (Id. at 59-60.) Detective Fick testified that they told Rigg that 

“things were not matching” and that he needed to tell them the truth so they 

could help J.F. (Id. at 60-61.) Although Rigg was told he was free to leave 

and could end the interview at any time prior to the start of the interview 

process at 10:15 a.m., it was not repeated until after he confessed. (Id. at 

46, 57, 59, 64, 71.)

Examining the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial 

court that a reasonable person in Rigg’s shoes would not have felt free to 

 

6 Apparently, this portion of the interview was deleted from Rigg’s phone. 

(Notes of testimony, 4/16/15 at 17-18, 33.)
J. A18029/16

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leave, particularly when it became clear to the detectives that Rigg’s story 

was not “matching up.” Detective Fick testified that during the first part of 

the interview, he had no particular reason to believe Rigg was responsible 

for J.F.’s injuries. (Id. at 49.) However, after the second break at 

12:25 p.m., it became apparent that Rigg was not telling them the truth. 

(Id. at 57-59.) It was at this point that Rigg became the prime suspect in 

the investigation. (Id. at 58.)

As set forth above, the questioning intensified, with Detective Fick 

stating, “if we find out someone lied, they’re fucked,” and Detective Santoro 

telling Rigg that, “It’s bullshit that you don’t know.” Detective Santoro 

directed Rigg to look at the photographs of J.F.’s bruised and battered body 

and “when we come back I don’t want to hear that we don’t know, that I 

have no idea, that’s craziness, that’s insanity.” Detective Fick asked Rigg, 

“Want us to bring you another water back in?” No reasonable person in 

these circumstances would feel free to get up and leave, notwithstanding the 

“Notification of Non-Arrest” form that Rigg signed at 10:15 a.m., two hours 

earlier.

In addition, the detectives’ questioning was clearly designed to elicit 

an incriminating response. Despite Rigg’s denials, they repeatedly told him 

that they did not believe his story, that he knew what really happened, and 

that if he did not tell them, he “will burn.” Detective Santoro suggested that 
J. A18029/16

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perhaps Rigg had intentionally tried to kill J.F. This was a custodial 

interrogation and Miranda warnings were required.

Rigg’s confession was not voluntary, but was the result of hours of 

intense police interrogation, including the use of threats and psychological 

coercion. Detective Santoro warned Rigg that, “we talk to liars and 

murderers every day who blow smoke up my ass and spend life in prison.” 

Detective Santoro told Rigg, “you need to start running your mouth because 

if she’s saying you’re a killer, then I guess we’ll believe her [(J.F.’s 

mother)].” They repeatedly told Rigg that unless he told them what 

happened, J.F. could die. The detectives suggested that the purpose of the 

“interview” was not to assign blame, but simply to discover the cause of 

J.F.’s injuries so that information could be passed along to J.F.’s doctors. 

In addition, Rigg had a verbal scale IQ score of 79, which is borderline 

intellectually disabled. (Notes of testimony, 6/29/15 at 32-33.) A verbal IQ 

of 79 is in the 8th percentile. (Id. at 29.) Rigg was classified as learning 

disabled and given an Individual Education Plan. (Id. at 7.) Low IQ is a 

relevant factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession. 

Commonwealth v. Purvis, 326 A.2d 369 (Pa. 1974). Edward Glassic, Jr., 

the Exeter Township School District certified school psychologist, testified 

regarding Rigg’s disability:

So if Cody is being interrogated and he comes 

voluntarily into the police department and they start 

asking him questions. Pretend there is an officer at 

the door. There is an officer over there and an 
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officer sitting right in front of him. And it would be 

very difficult. And let’s say the interrogation goes on 

for two hours. Gets very tense. Cursing, yelling, 

screaming. Things like that. Accusations. Well, if 

you look at Cody’s records, you will find out that he 

is sociable. Polite. He can navigate pretty well in 

the social world. So he is not going to -- he may 

have respect for authority. So he may not leave that 

room. It may not dawn on him that everything that 

he says can and probably will be held against him. 

He might not know the implications of that. It might 

not ever dawn on him that he can get out of that 

room when he is feeling the heat. Get out of dodge 

and go talk to his parents or seek additional help. 

That may never occur to him. Especially under 

stressful circumstances.

Notes of testimony, 6/29/15 at 31.

For these reasons, under the totality of the circumstances, we 

determine that the trial court did not err in finding that the questioning by 

police evolved into a custodial interrogation that was likely or expected to 

elicit a confession; and, therefore, Miranda warnings were required. 

Certainly, once it became clear that Rigg’s version of events was not 

consistent with other information and he was the primary focus of the 

investigation, Miranda warnings were required before police could escalate 

the interrogation by using increasingly aggressive and manipulative tactics. 

During the second break in questioning, when Rigg was essentially told to 

stay in the interview room and examine J.F.’s photographs and warned that, 

“when we come back I don’t want to hear that we don’t know, that I have no 

idea,” a person in Rigg’s situation would reasonably believe that his freedom 

of movement was being restricted by the interrogation. At that point the 
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interrogation became the functional equivalent of an arrest. We do not find 

Rigg’s execution of the “Notification of Non-Arrest” form to be dispositive; 

rather, it is one factor to be considered. Furthermore, Rigg’s confession was 

not the product of a free and unconstrained choice, especially considering his 

low verbal scale IQ of 79. As such, the trial court did not err in suppressing 

Rigg’s statements to police.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/9/2017