J-A03038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MARY BUSH 

Appellant

v.

CAMERON ADAMS, LAUREN ADAMS, 

JOSEPH BUSH, ALEXANDER J. 

CHOTKOWSKI, KELLER WILLIAMS, 

JAMES WAGNER AND LAND 

SERVICES USA, INC.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 718 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 

2021-05273-RC

BEFORE: KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM PER CURIAM: FILED MARCH 7, 2023

Mary Bush (“Appellant”) purports to file this pro se appeal from the order 

of the Court of Common Pleas denying her application for a determination of 

finality following the trial court’s dismissal of Cameron Adams, Lauren Adams, 

Joseph Bush, Alexander J. Chotkowski, Esq., Keller Williams, James Wagner, 

and Land Services, USA, Inc. (collectively “Appellees”) from the action and 

dismissing Appellant’s complaint with prejudice. This has been a heavily 

litigated case, Appellant has had her day in numerous courts, and the parties 

deserve finality. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the factual background of this case as follows:

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A03038-23

- 2 -

... [Appellant] brought this action in her decade long quest to gain 

control of the real property located at 1628 Glenside Road, West 

Chester, Pennsylvania (“Property”). [Appellant] believes she has 

been defrauded of her interest in the Property, personalty located 

there and her inheritance from her mother. All claims raised by 

[Appellant] in these proceedings were fully litigated before and 

finally decided before the Orphans’ Court at No. 1509-1720 in a 

guardianship matter involving [Appellant’s] mother, which was 

presided over by the Honorable Katherine Platt.

[Appellant’s] brother, Joseph Bush, a defendant herein, was 

appointed guardian of their mother by Judge Platt. 1 On November 

8, 2019, Judge Platt granted the Guardian permission to sell the 

Property and prohibited [Appellant] from entering the Property; 

coming within fifty yards of the Property line; interfering with 

attempts to prepare the Property for sale; confronting, speaking 

to, or harassing any persons at the Property; videotaping or 

photographing any person on the Property; and/or posting on 

social media any image or name of any person on the Property. 

[Appellant] was also directed to supply the Guardian with a list of 

her personal items on the Property within thirty days and the 

Guardian was directed to arrange for those items to be returned. 

All such personalty was returned on March 3, 2020.

On December 23, 2019, Cameron and Lauren Adams, 

[Appellees] herein, entered into an agreement of sale to purchase 

the Property. On February 19, 2020, Judge Platt struck a lis 

pendens [Appellant] had placed against the Property and 

permitted the sale to close.

[Appellant] placed a lis pendens on the Property during the 

within litigation, which was stricken on September 28, 2021.2

[Appellee] Alexander Chotkowski, is an attorney who 

represented Joseph Bush and another brother, Michael Bush, 

before the Orphans’ Court. The remaining [Appellees] in the action 

____________________________________________

1

In June 2011, Appellant’s mother, Genevieve Bush, was adjudicated 

incapacitated due to cognitive impairment. After Joseph Bush was appointed 

as guardian of Genevieve’s estate, he petitioned the court for leave to sell the 

Property to obtain funds to support Genevieve’s medical care. Appellant 

repeatedly attempted to obstruct the sale of the Property and refused to 

vacate the premises.

2 Genevieve Bush passed away on June 16, 2021.
J-A03038-23

- 3 -

had the misfortune of being involved in the sale of the Property as 

the title company or realtors.

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 3/31/22, at 1-3.

On August 4, 2021, Appellant filed a “Petition for an Emergency 

Preliminary Temporary Restraining Order Preliminary Injunction,” and 

Appellant filed a pro se complaint on August 18, 2021, alleging Appellees 

fraudulently conspired to deprive her of her interest in the Property. Appellant

claimed she had been “denied her home, truck and personal property without 

due process.”

3 Complaint, at 5. Further, Appellant claimed she was the true 

executor and beneficiary of the mother’s will and trust and characterized the 

Orphans’ Court order authorizing the sale of the Property as invalid.

Joseph Bush, Alexander Chotkowski, Esq., Land Services, USA, Inc., 

Cameron and Lauren Adams, all filed motions to dismiss the action pursuant 

to Pa.R.C.P. 233.1.4 Keller Williams and Wagner filed preliminary objections 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant also filed multiple unsuccessful petitions in federal court and the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to attempt to avoid a transfer of the Property.

4 Rule 233.1 provides in pertinent part:

Rule 233.1. Frivolous Litigation. Pro Se Plaintiff. Motion to

Dismiss

(a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se

plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a 

motion to dismiss the action on the basis that

(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims 

which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action against the 

same or related defendants, and

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A03038-23

- 4 -

challenging the legal sufficiency of Appellant’s complaint. The trial court 

issued numerous orders in which it granted each motion to dismiss under Rule 

233.1 as well as Keller Williams and Wagner’s preliminary objections.

On December 16, 2021, the trial court entered an order dismissing the 

final defendant from this lawsuit and enjoining Appellant from filing any

additional pro se litigation regarding challenges to the title of the Property or 

any personal property located there without leave of court.

On January 6, 2022, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the 

December 16, 2021 order. Appellant indicates that on January 7, 2022, she 

was informed by the trial court prothonotary that her notice of appeal was

rejected as there was no final order disposing of all of Appellant’s claims and

dismissing the entire action. On January 11, 2022, Appellant filed an 

application for a determination of finality.

On January 11, 2022, the trial court directed Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

____________________________________________

(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to a 

written settlement agreement or a court proceeding.

(b) The court may stay the action while the motion is pending.

(c) Upon granting the motion and dismissing the action, the court 

may bar the pro se plaintiff from pursuing additional pro se

litigation against the same or related defendants raising the same 

or related claims without leave of court. ...

Pa.R.C.P. 233.1.
J-A03038-23

- 5 -

Instead of filing a concise statement, on January 19, 2022, Appellant filed an 

application for clarification, claiming the prothonotary had rejected her appeal. 

On February 8, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying 

Appellant’s application for a determination of finality. However, the trial court

noted in a footnote that it had entered a final order on December 16, 2021, 

which dismissed the last defendant from the action.

On the same date, the trial court entered an order granting Appellant’s 

motion for clarification in part, directing its prothonotary to refund Appellant’s 

filing fee with the following rationale:

[a] notification that [Appellant] had filed an appeal was received 

in chambers on or about January 7, 2022, which prompted the 

issuance of an Order to file a statement of matters complained of 

on appeal on January 11, 2022. [Appellant] now relates that she 

withdrew the appeal before it was processed. Since there is no 

appeal pending, [Appellant] need not apply with the [1925(b)] 

order.

Order, 2/8/22, at 1. Appellant filed another notice of appeal on March 7, 2022.

Appellant presents the following issues for review:

1. Did the trial court err in refusing to write a final order on 

February 8, 2022 by denying [Appellant’s] application for a 

determination of finality filed on January 10, 2022 as a matter 

of not applying law, rules, and/or by abuse of discretion where 

the lower court’s order of December 16, 2021 does not appear 

as a final order even to the Chester County Prothonotary. The 

December 16, 2021 order just dismissed one defendant 

Alexander Chotkowski and multiple nonparties. It does not 

dispose or address all claims on all parties, and/or all filings 

and failed considering that defendants Adams willfully returned 

in the matter after being dismissed.

2. Did the trial court err as a matter of not applying laws, rules, 

and/or by abuse of discretion by its intentional delayed 

dismissing of every [Appellee] striking [Appellant’s] lis pendens 
J-A03038-23

- 6 -

upon the first dismissal September 7, 2021 by unjustly using 

the nonapplicable Rule 233.1 in an unequal standard. Thus, 

unjustly favoring [Appellees] by ignoring that all [Appellees] 

recently, collectively worked in collaboration to use the last 

hours of a guardian of the estate appointment to financially 

exploit a vulnerable guardianship victim to convert assets for 

themselves.

3. Did the lower court erred as a matter of not applying law, rules 

and/or abuse its discretion by not addressing recent absolute 

evidence of void contracts all [Appellees] admitted to as 

evidence, granting nonparties relief, not granting [Appellant] 

any relief by due process when a court order exists of June 28, 

2021 for the matter be heard in the Court of Common Pleas.

4. Did the lower court as a matter of not applying law, rules, 

and/or by abuse of discretion by failing to address the ex parte 

communications with attorney David due Black and thus failing 

to recuse ignoring his oath of office.

5. Did the lower court as a matter of not applying law, rules, 

and/or by abuse of discretion by failing to set forth the basis of 

its rulings in a timely fashion, thus interfering with [Appellant’s] 

due process and appellate rights.

Appellant’s Brief, at 3-4 (listed verbatim).5

____________________________________________

5 During the pendency of this appeal, Appellant filed a motion for emergency 

relief, seeking to prevent Cameron and Lauren Adams to cease and desist 

from making any changes to the Property or personal property located therein. 

The Adamses filed a reply with a cross-motion seeking sanctions against 

Appellant, claiming her application for relief was a violation of the trial court’s 

order prohibiting Appellant from filing additional claims against the Adamses

to interfere with their use of the Property. 

This Court denied Appellant’s motion for emergency relief with prejudice

and denied the Adamses’ cross-motion without prejudice for the matter to be 

raised before the trial court. After Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, 

this Court entered an order denying the motion for reconsideration, cautioning 

Appellant that “further filings of frivolous applications for relief may result in 

the imposition of sanctions.” Order, 7/13/22, at 1.

Thereafter, Appellant also filed motions seeking the recusal of the 

Honorable Megan McCarthy King and the Honorable Megan Sullivan of this 

Court, citing their previous roles serving in the Chester County district 

attorney's office. Our merits panel denied both recusal motions. Appellant filed 

a motion for reconsideration, which this Court also denied.
J-A03038-23

- 7 -

Before we reach the merits of this case, we must evaluate Appellees’ 

request that this Court quash this appeal as untimely filed. Appellees assert 

that Appellant failed to file a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the 

final order on December 16, 2021. While Appellees note that Appellant filed a 

notice of appeal on January 6, 2022, Appellees claim Appellant withdrew this 

notice of appeal, and thus failed to preserve any issues for appeal. In the 

alternative, Appellees asserted that Appellant waived all her issues by failing 

to file a 1925(b) statement.

As the timeliness of an appeal implicates this Court’s jurisdiction, we 

may not address the merits of an appeal if the appeal is untimely. Porter v.

Nikita Lodging, Inc., 274 A.3d 1272, 1278 (Pa.Super. 2022) (quoting

Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa.Super. 2014)). Our Rules of

Appellate Procedure provide that a notice of appeal “shall be filed within 30 

days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 

903(a). 

While this Court generally may not enlarge the time period to file a 

notice of appeal, our courts “have many times declined to quash an appeal 

when the defect resulted from an appellant's acting in accordance with 

misinformation relayed to him by the trial court.” Always Busy Consulting,

LLC v. Babford & Co., Inc., 247 A.3d 1033, 1041 (Pa. 2021). 

In this case, Appellant did file a timely notice of appeal, but claims it 

was rejected by the trial court prothonotary based its belief that the trial court 
J-A03038-23

- 8 -

had not yet issued a final order even though the last remaining defendant had 

been dismissed on December 16, 2021. 

Our Supreme Court explained that:

[w]e have repeatedly recognized the powers of a prothonotary are 

“purely ministerial in nature.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 630

Pa. 169, 106 A.3d 583, 588 n.9 (2014)[.] ... [“T]he clerk of courts 

and prothonotary are not permitted to interpret statutes or 

challenge court actions.” Id. at 588. These court officers “lack the 

authority to either evaluate the merits of a litigant's pleadings or 

decline to accept a timely notice of appeal.” Id., citing Brown v.

Levy, 621 Pa. 1, 73 A.3d 514, 519 (2013). We noted the 

prothonotary does not operate as an independent reviewer and 

screening officer with respect to court filings, but fulfills a strictly 

administrative function, and is therefore obligated to accept and 

process timely notices of appeal upon receipt in accordance with 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure, notwithstanding any perceived 

defects therein. Id.

Id. (footnotes and some citations omitted).

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court baldly stated that Appellant 

failed to file an appeal within 30 days of its December 16, 2021 order without 

further explanation. The trial court neither acknowledged that Appellant had 

filed a notice of appeal on January 6, 2022 nor discussed whether Appellant 

sought to withdraw her appeal based on correspondence from the trial court

prothonotary indicating the appeal was improper.

As it appears that the trial court prothonotary provided Appellant 

misinformation about the appeal, we find a breakdown in court processes

occurred. Thus, we find Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 6, 
J-A03038-23

- 9 -

2022 from the trial court’s December 16, 2021 order dismissing the final 

defendant from the litigation.

6

To the extent that Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying 

her application for a determination of finality and “refusing to write a final 

order,” we reiterate our conclusion that the trial court’s December 16, 2021 

order dismissing the final defendant from the litigation and dismissing 

Appellant’s complaint with prejudice was in fact a final order. See Pa.R.A.P. 

341 (providing that an order is final if it “disposes of all claims and all parties”). 

As we have deemed this appeal to be timely filed, we may proceed to review 

the merits of Appellant’s arguments.

Appellees Cameron and Lauren Adams also argue that Appellant failed 

to comply with our Rules of Appellate Procedure when she filed an untimely 

Designation of the Contents of the Reproduced Record and subsequently failed 

to include documents identified in the Adamses’ Counter-Designation of the 

Contents of the Reproduced Record.

In similar circumstances, this Court has held that:

[c]ompliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 

2152-2154 regarding contents of reproduced records on appeal is 

mandatory, not directory.” Rosselli v. Rosselli, 750 A.2d 355, 

357 (Pa.Super. 2000). This Court will quash an appeal when the 

appellant's violations substantially impede the appellate process.

Id. at 359-60 (appeal quashed due to appellant's failure to comply 

with the Rules of Appellate Procedure regarding reproduced 

record). However, “when the defects in the reproduced

record are not so serious as to preclude our ability to

properly evaluate and address the substantive arguments

____________________________________________

6 We have amended the caption of this appeal accordingly.
J-A03038-23

- 10 -

advanced by the parties,” then we have declined to quash the 

appeal. Hagel v. United Lawn Mower Sales & Service, Inc.,

439 Pa.Super. 35, 653 A.2d 17, 19 (1995); Kern v. Kern, 892 

A.2d 1, 6 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“[T]his Court quashes appeals for 

failure to conform to the Rules of Appellate Procedure only where 

the failure to conform to the Rules results in the inability of this 

Court to discern the issues argued on appeal.”) (citation omitted).

Fulano v. Fanjul Corp., 236 A.3d 1, 12 (Pa.Super. 2020) (emphasis in 

original).

While Appellant failed to fully comply with her obligations under our 

Rules of Appellate Procedure in filing a proper reproduced record, the defects 

in Appellant’s record are not so serious as to preclude this Court from resolving 

Appellant’s substantive arguments. Thus, we decline to quash the appeal.

Appellant’s remaining claims on appeal involve her attempt to challenge 

the transfer of the Property to Cameron and Lauren Adams. However, we 

agree that the trial court was justified in finding this pro se action to be 

frivolous litigation pursuant to Rule 233.1 as (1) Appellant has raised these

claims in multiple forums in state and federal court against the same 

defendants and (2) these issues have been finally litigated.

Appellant challenged the Orphans’ Court’s decision to grant Joseph 

Bush, as guardian of Genevieve’s estate, permission to sell the Property to 

pay for Genevieve’s medical care in her nursing home.7 After an evidentiary 

hearing, the trial court entered an order on November 8, 2019 permitting 

____________________________________________

7 This Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to appoint Joseph Bush as 

guardian of the Estate and to void previous property transfers from Genevieve 

to Mary which were conducted as a result of Mary’s undue influence. In the 

Matter of Bush, 2726 EDA 2011 and 2746 EDA 2011 (Pa.Super. June 11, 

2012) (unpublished memorandum).
J-A03038-23

- 11 -

Joseph Bush to “accept any bona fide offer representing 95% or more of the 

initial listing price [of $460,000], and sign any documentation necessary to 

effectuate the sale, without further court approval.” Order, 11/8/19, at 1. 

Appellant did not appeal the order authorizing the sale of the Property.

On December 23, 2019, Joseph Bush, as guardian of the Estate, entered 

into a contract with Cameron and Lauren Adams, who agreed to purchase the 

Property for $480,000, which well exceeded the listing price. 

Unwilling to accept that the Property had been lawfully sold, Appellant 

encumbered the Property with lis pendens filings in state and federal court.

After another evidentiary hearing, the Orphans’ Court entered an order on 

February 19, 2020, striking Appellant’s lis pendens against the Property and 

permitting the Adamses to close on the Property. The order noted that “the 

purpose of this filing was to prevent the Guardian from selling Genevieve 

Bush’s house, not to assert a genuine title interest. The property belongs, 

unequivocally, to Genevieve Bush, and the proceeds of the sale are necessary 

to fund her continued care.” Order, 2/19/20, at 2.

At this point, Appellant was provided with two evidentiary hearings at 

which she had the opportunity to present evidence as to why the Property 

should not have sold. This issue was fully litigated before the Orphans’ Court 

which entered an order allowing the sale of the Property to go forward as 

Appellant had not demonstrated a title interest in the Property.

In addition to the instant case, Appellant filed multiple actions in both 

state and federal court, refusing to accept the Orphans’ Court’s ruling and 
J-A03038-23

- 12 -

alleging that Appellees were selling the Property by deceptive means. All of

the courts to which Appellant has presented these arguments (the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit 

Court of Appeals, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court) have denied 

Appellant’s requests for relief. See Bush v. Platt, et al., 54 MM 2021 (Pa. 

July 20, 2021) (denying, inter alia, Appellant’s “Application of Either 

Extraordinary Jurisdiction or King’s Bench Power”); Bush v. Chotkowski, et 

al., C.A. No. 20-2099 (3rd Cir. March 11, 2021) (finding “no substantial 

question is presented on appeal”); Bush v. Chotkowski, et al., 2:20-cv00774-GEKP (U.S. Dist. E.D., May 5, 2020) (dismissing Appellant’s complaint 

for failure to state a claim).

Rule 233.1 was created to address the abuse of the legal system by pro 

se litigants “repeatedly filing new litigation raising the same claims against the 

same defendant even though the claims have been previously adjudicated 

either through settlement or through court proceedings.” Comment to Rule 

233.1. Rule 233.1 provides accountability for pro se litigants that are not 

subject to disciplinary procedures that govern attorneys in the practice of law. 

“The Rule operates to spare potential defendants the need to defend spurious 

claims, first, by allowing the expeditious dismissal of duplicative pro se actions 

and, second, by empowering the trial court to ban the pro se litigant's 

commencement of further actions against such defendants.” Gray v.

Buonopane, 53 A.3d 829, 835 (Pa.Super. 2012).
J-A03038-23

- 13 -

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Rule 233.1 prohibits the 

repetitive pro se litigation in which Appellant has engaged in this case and in 

prior frivolous lawsuits in state and federal court. As a result, we conclude that 

the trial court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s complaint with prejudice 

and prohibiting Appellant from pursuing additional pro se litigation of this 

matter without leave of court.

Further, as Appellant has repeatedly engaged Appellees in unwarranted, 

frivolous, and abusive litigation which state and federal courts have clearly 

found has no merit, we find it appropriate to award all Appellees attorneys’ 

fees pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2744, which provides:

[i]n addition to other costs allowable by general rule or Act of 

Assembly, an appellate court may award as further costs damages 

as may be just, including

(1) a reasonable counsel fee and

(2) damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum in 

addition to legal interest,

if it determines that an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay 

or that the conduct of the participant against whom costs are to 

be imposed is dilatory, obdurate or vexatious. The appellate court 

may remand the case to the trial court to determine the amount 

of damages authorized by this rule.

Pa.R.A.P. 2744. See Winpenny v. Winpenny, 775 A.2d 815, 818 (Pa.Super. 

2001) (finding the appellant’s habitual insistence on raising previously 

litigated issues warranted the imposition of sanctions under Rule 2744).

Given Appellant’s abuse of the court system by filing her repetitive, 

dilatory, obdurate and vexatious claims against Appellees, we impose 
J-A03038-23

- 14 -

attorneys’ fees under Rule 2744 to deter Appellant from filing similar frivolous 

and vexatious litigation in the future. 

Order affirmed. Case remanded for a hearing on the sole and exclusive

question of the assessment of counsel fees consistent with this decision. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/7/2023