Karra J. Porter, 5223 

Scott T. Evans, 6218 

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 

257 East 200 South, Suite 1100 

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 

Telephone: (801) 323-5000 

Karra.Porter@chrisjen.com 

Scott.Evans@chrisjen.com 

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

JEREMY JOHNSON, 

 Defendant. 

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

Civil No. 2:15-cv-00439-DB 

District Judge Dee Benson 

 Defendant, by and through counsel, hereby answers the Plaintiff’s complaint as follows: 

FIRST DEFENSE 

 Most or all of the Federal Election Commission’s complaint is based upon illegally 

obtained and inadmissible evidence. Further, this information was provided to the FEC by an 

agency of the United States, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Utah, that was 

operating under a conflict of interest. 

SECOND DEFENSE 

 Material portions of the Federal Election Commission’s complaint are based upon 

information provided to the government by Mr. Johnson in connection with a criminal 

investigation, which information was provided under promises of immunity and confidentiality. 

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THIRD DEFENSE 

 The prosecution of this case is inequitable and a violation of due process because records 

with which Mr. Johnson could defend himself, including emails, have been destroyed by the 

appointed receiver in another case, FTC v. Johnson. The FEC, as part of the United States, is 

bound by the conduct and spoliation of evidence by or on behalf of other agencies of the United 

States, including the Federal Trade Commission and the United States Attorney’s Office. 

FOURTH DEFENSE 

The prosecution of this case is inequitable and a violation of due process because Mr. 

Johnson is unable to access funds with which to meaningfully defend himself due to the 5-yearold FTC v. Johnson litigation, in which Mr. Johnson’s assets have been frozen, seized, and 

disposed of by or on behalf of another agency of the United States. 

FIFTH DEFENSE 

 Upon information and belief, the Federal Election Commission has reviewed privileged 

communications between Mr. Johnson and counsel for Mr. Johnson (either in his personal or 

representative capacity), in which event it should be disqualified from prosecuting this case. 

SIXTH DEFENSE 

 Mr. Johnson is being selectively prosecuted in this lawsuit for improper purposes. 

SEVENTH DEFENSE 

 The Federal Elections Commissions’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations, 28 

U.S.C. § 2462. 

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EIGHTH DEFENSE 

 With respect to the specific paragraphs of the Federal Election Commission’s complaint, 

Defendant hereby admits, denies, or denies for lack of personal knowledge, such paragraphs as 

follows: 

 1-4. Denies. 

 5. Admits that the action seeks civil penalties, a declaratory judgment, a permanent 

injunction, and other relief, but denies that such relief is appropriate or authorized by the Federal 

Election Campaign Act. 

 6. Admits that this Court has jurisdiction over the suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1345. 

 7. Admits that venue is proper in this Court. 

 8. Denies that FEC has “exclusive jurisdiction” over the administration, 

interpretation, and civil enforcement of FECA; the arbiter of interpretation and civil enforcement 

of FECA is actually this Court and such appellate courts as may review the case, and the 

administration of this procedure is actually governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 

the Court’s local rules. Admits that the Commission has certain authority under the cited 

statutes, which speak for themselves and are limited to their terms. 

 9. Admits the first sentence. Denies the reference to “owned or effectively 

controlled” in the second sentence as undefined and inaccurate, and affirmatively alleges that, at 

all times since December 21, 2010, Triple 7, IWorks, and other companies with which Mr. 

Johnson was associated have been wholly controlled by the Federal Trade Commission and the 

receiver appointed at the FTC’s request in FTC v. Johnson. 

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 10. This paragraph asserts a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the 

extent that a response is required, Defendant denies paragraph 10 as inaccurately or incompletely 

paraphrasing the cited statutes. 

 11. This paragraph asserts a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the 

extent that a response is required, Defendant admits that, in part, the Act contains the words 

(partially) quoted, but asserts that the statute speaks for itself and is limited to its terms. 

 12. This paragraph asserts a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the 

extent that a response is required, Defendant admits that the Act authorizes a United States 

District Court to order a defendant who has violated 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a) to pay a civil penalty, 

and in the amount cited, but asserts that the statute speaks for itself and is limited to its terms. 

 13. This paragraph asserts a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the 

extent that a response is required, Defendant denies the first sentence as worded. The statute 

speaks for itself and is limited to its terms. Admits the allegation as to the extent of a civil 

penalty if authorized. 

 14. This paragraph asserts a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the 

extent that a response is required, Defendant admits. 

 15. This paragraph asserts a legal conclusion to which no response is required. To the 

extent that a response is required, Defendant admits that the Act includes the words quoted, but 

denies that a court may grant a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order against 

“any defendant who has violated the Act.” 

 16-17. Denies. 

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 18. With respect to paragraph 18, Defendant is uncertain as to the meaning of “the 

time relevant to this case,” given that the Federal Election Commission has elected not to specify 

dates of Mr. Johnson’s alleged actions. Defendant admits that, during parts of 2009 and 2010, 

his business interests included companies that processed financial transactions for online-poker 

companies, and denies the remaining allegations. 

 19. Admits that in 2009, Mr. Johnson met with John Swallow, who was at the time 

Utah’s Chief Deputy Attorney General and a fundraiser for the Shurtleff campaign. Denies the 

second sentence. 

 20-25. Denies. 

 26. Admits. 

 27-33. Denies. 

 34. Admits that, in 2010, Mr. Johnson met with Harry Reid and Ray Bitar and 

discussed certain online poker issues with them. Mr. Johnson denies that any funds transmitted 

to Harry Reid related to Mr. Reid’s campaign, and that Mr. Johnson was the source of any such 

funds. Admits that, upon information and belief, Full Tilt Poker became a defendant in the cited 

New York case, but lacks personal knowledge as to the allegations or proceedings in that case. 

Denies the remaining allegations. 

 35. Defendant is uncertain as to what “time” the FEC deems “relevant to this case,” 

due to the lack of date specificity in the complaint. Admits that, during parts of 2010, Mr. 

Johnson was a principal in an internet marketing company named IWorks. Denies the second 

sentence for lack of knowledge. Denies the third sentence. Admits the fourth sentence. Admits 

that Johnson was indicted in June 2011 in United States District Court for the District of Utah. 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 17 Filed 10/19/15 Page 5 of 9
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Denies that such indictment (and superseding indictments) were “as a result of IWorks’ allegedly 

unlawful business practices,” except to the extent that the criminal indictment resulted from a 

request for prosecution, and incomplete information provided, by the Federal Trade Commission 

to coerce Johnson into a settlement or afford a strategic advantage in the FTC v. Johnson case. 

 36-45. Denies. 

 46. Denies for lack of knowledge. 

 47. Admits. 

 48. Denies for lack of knowledge. 

 49. Denies that the FEC “conduct[ed] an investigation,” and affirmatively alleges that 

the FEC was unlawfully provided with immunized information by the United States Attorney’s 

Office for the District of Utah. Admits that the Commission’s Office of the General Counsel 

sent Mr. Johnson a letter dated March 11, 2015, which speaks for itself, and that Mr. Johnson did 

not submit a reply. 

 50. Denies for lack of knowledge, but affirmatively alleges that, if the “information 

then available” allegedly “review[ed]” by the Commission included unlawfully obtained and 

inadmissible information or summaries thereof, members of the Commission should have 

disqualified themselves and any subsequent vote was unlawful. 

 51. Admits that the FEC sent Mr. Johnson a letter dated April 20, 2015, which speaks 

for itself, and denies that the FEC “endeavored to correct Johnson’s [alleged] violations through 

informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion, for a period of not less than 30 

days.” 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 17 Filed 10/19/15 Page 6 of 9
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 52. Admits. Mr. Johnson did not waive any statute of limitations or related defenses 

that had already vested. 

 53. Denies for lack of knowledge, and denies that the lawsuit was filed at that time 

because the FEC was “unable to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement[.]” 

 54. Denies. 

 55. Incorporates by reference all responses to paragraphs 1-54. 

 56. Denies. 

 57. Incorporates by reference all responses to paragraphs 1-54. 

 58. Denies. 

NINTH DEFENSE 

 Each and every allegation of the FEC’s complaint not specifically and explicitly admitted 

above is denied. 

TENTH DEFENSE 

 Much of the FEC’s complaint is stated in language that is conclusory and not statutory, 

such as the term “straw buyer.” Further, the complaint fails to set forth any factual allegations 

that would support injunctive or other equitable relief. For these and other reasons, most or all of 

the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

 Mr. Johnson hereby prays for the following relief: 

 1. Dismissal of the complaint with prejudice; 

 2. An order requiring the FEC to return all illegally obtained evidence and to destroy 

all copies thereof; 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 17 Filed 10/19/15 Page 7 of 9
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 3. An award of attorney fees, expenses, and taxable costs against Plaintiff to the 

extent allowed by law, including under the Equal Access to Justice Act and F.R.Civ.P. 54(d); 

 4. All other relief, equitable and otherwise, deemed appropriate by the Court. 

 DATED this 19th day of October, 2015. 

 CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 

 /s/ Karra J. Porter 

 Karra J. Porter 

 Scott T. Evans 

 Attorneys for Defendant 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 17 Filed 10/19/15 Page 8 of 9
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of October, 2015, I electronically filed with the 

Clerk of the Court of the foregoing ANSWER TO COMPLAINT by using the Court’s CM/ECF 

system, which sent notification of such filing to the following: 

Daniel A. Petalas 

Acting General Counsel 

dpetalas@fec.gov 

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Deputy General Counsel – Law 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov

Harry J. Summers 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

Kevin P. Hancock 

Attorney 

khancock@fec.gov 

Attorneys for Plaintiff Federal Election Commission

 /s/ Anne L. MacLeod, Secretary 

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