2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-6-2014

Barry Shelley v. Somerset County Jail

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 14-1292

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Recommended Citation

"Barry Shelley v. Somerset County Jail" (2014). 2014 Decisions. Paper 1140.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-1292

___________

BARRY E. SHELLEY,

Appellant

v.

SOMERSET COUNTY JAIL; WARDEN, SOMERSET COUNTY JAIL

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-04-cv-00001)

District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 3, 2014

Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 6, 2014)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

 

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Pro se appellant Barry Shelley appeals the District Court’s order enforcing a 

settlement agreement with defendants Somerset County Jail and Timothy Mapes, the 

jail’s warden. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s order.

Shelley initiated the case in 2004, filing a complaint in the District Court alleging 

that the defendants failed to protect him from another prisoner in violation of his rights 

under the Eighth Amendment. In 2008, after various proceedings not relevant here, the 

District Court appointed counsel to represent Shelley. Magistrate Judge Pesto held a 

series of settlement conferences with the parties, and on April 19, 2011, the defendants 

agreed to pay Shelley $5,000 in exchange for his withdrawing his failure-to-protect 

claim. After those terms were apparently agreed to, however, Shelley made the

additional request that Somerset County waive the $3,420 in fines that he owed. Counsel 

for defendants promised to look into this, and the conference ended. On August 21, 

2012, counsel for the defendants informed the Magistrate Judge that they would pay the 

agreed-upon $5,000 to Shelley and also pay to discharge his $3,420 in fines. Along with 

this letter, counsel forwarded a release to Shelley.

For reasons that are not entirely clear, Shelley refused to sign the release. Due to 

her unhappiness with this decision, Shelley’s counsel requested, and was granted, leave 

to withdraw. The defendants then filed a motion seeking to enforce what they perceived 

to be a binding settlement agreement. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Shelley had 

agreed to settle the case, and thus recommended that the District Court grant the motion. 

Shelley objected, claiming that he had not authorized his attorney to settle and had 
3

actually asked her to request a jury trial, and that a written agreement had never been 

signed. The District Court overruled the objections and approved and adopted the report 

and recommendation. The Court concluded that an oral settlement agreement was fully 

enforceable and that the parties had reached an agreement at the April 19, 2011 

settlement conference. Therefore, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice and 

ordered the defendants to pay over $5,000 for Shelley and $3,420 to cover the fines. 

Shelley then filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

The validity and enforceability of a settlement agreement is governed by state 

contract law. See Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir.

2009); Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1032-33 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1991). Under 

Pennsylvania law, “the test for enforceability of an agreement is whether both parties 

have manifested an intention to be bound by its terms and whether the terms are 

sufficiently definite to be specifically enforced.” Channel Home Ctrs. v. Grossman, 795 

F.2d 291, 298-99 (3d Cir. 1986). The first of those questions is factual in nature, and the 

Court will review the District Court’s factual determinations for clear error. Tiernan, 923 

F.2d at 1031 n.5. The second involves a legal conclusion, which the Court will review de 

novo. Am. Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 585.

Here, the District Court, adopting the finding of the Magistrate Judge, see Ross v. 

Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 789 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013), concluded that the parties agreed to settle 

the case at the April 19, 2011 settlement conference. This was not clearly erroneous. In 

their filings in the District Court, counsel for defendants and former counsel for Shelley 
4

both represented that Shelley had agreed at the conference to settle his claim for $5,000; 

crucially, the Magistrate Judge, who was present throughout the negotiations, agreed with 

counsels’ recollection. See Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason, Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489-92 (7th 

Cir. 2002) (magistrate judge’s recollection of terms of oral settlement sufficient for 

enforcement).1 While Shelley apparently added an extra term — the discharge of his 

fines — after the agreement had been reached, he “cannot now seek to invalidate the 

agreement by asserting essential terms of the agreement after settlement negotiations 

were complete.” Storms ex rel. Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 558 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

2001).

On appeal, Shelley argues that the agreement is not enforceable because it was 

never reduced to writing and because he had told his counsel that he wanted to proceed to 

trial. These arguments are not persuasive. First, it is well established that “[w]here the 

parties have agreed on the essential terms of a contract, the fact that they intend to 

formalize their agreement in writing but have not yet done so does not prevent 

enforcement of such agreement.” Mazzella v. Koken, 739 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. 1999). 

Second, while Shelley contends that he wished to take his claim to trial, there is no 

 

1 We recognize that the Magistrate Judge, in a contemporaneous minute entry, described 

the settlement as “tentative.” However, given the deference we accord judges in 

interpreting their own statements, see generally In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 718 

F.3d 236, 244 (3d Cir. 2013), and the Magistrate Judge’s subsequent, more detailed 

factual findings, we are satisfied that the Magistrate Judge meant merely that the parties 

still planned to memorialize their agreement, not that no binding agreement had been 

reached. See generally Mastroni-Mucker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 976 A.2d 510, 522 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 2009) (enforcing an oral contract containing similar terns).
5

suggestion that he expressed this desire at the settlement conference. See, e.g., Am. 

Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 582 (explaining that the relevant inquiry is objective, not 

focused on the “inner, subjective intent of the parties”). (Shelley’s claim that he would 

resolve his case only via trial is also belied by his appellate brief, in which he asks the 

Court to remand the case “for settlement and/or trial.”). In any case, Shelley has 

provided us with no basis to conclude that the Magistrate Judge’s recollection of 

conference is clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Gevas v. Ghosh, 566 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 

2009).

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.2 

 

2 At the very end of his appellate brief, Shelley states that if the Court “cannot see 

plaintiff’s points named,” he wishes to voluntarily dismiss his appeal. Because of the 

condition that Shelley placed on this “motion” — that is, the request becomes effective 

only if this Court determines that Shelley’s appeal lacked merit — the defendants were 

required to file a response brief and we were required to review the parties’ arguments. 

Accordingly, Shelley’s request is not “in the interest of justice or fairness,” Am. Auto 

Mfrs. Ass'n v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 31 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1994), and we deny it, 

see Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (denying Rule 42(b) 

motion because it was not presented until after briefing was completed and the Court had 

invested time in reviewing the appeal).