RECORD NO. 09-50296 

In The 

United States Court of Appeals 

For The Ninth Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v. 

PIERCE O’DONNELL, 

 Defendant – Appellee. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AT LOS ANGELES 

 

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON 

IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL 

Melanie Sloan 

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND 

 ETHICS IN WASHINGTON

1400 I Street, N.W., Suite 450 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 408-5565 

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1, amicus curiae Citizens for Responsibility 

and Ethics in Washington submits this corporate disclosure statement. 

(a) Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington does not have a 

parent company, and is not a publicly-held company with a 10% or greater 

ownership interest. 

(b) Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) is a 

nonprofit, non-partisan corporation, organized under section 501(c)(3) of the 

Internal Revenue Code. Through a combined approach of research, advocacy, 

public education, and litigation, CREW seeks to protect the rights of citizens to be 

informed about the activities of government officials and to ensure the integrity of 

those officials. CREW has an interest in ensuring that the American public can 

discover the true source of elected officials’ campaign funds.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ..........................................................i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... ii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................iv 

STATEMENT OF INTEREST..................................................................................1 

STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT..............................................................................2 

I. THE DISTRICT COURT RULING IS A RADICAL 

DEPARTURE FROM THE WELL-SETTLED MEANING OF 

2 U.S.C. § 441f THAT SERIOUSLY ENDANGERS 

ENFORCEMENT OF FECA................................................................3 

II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FECA 

DEMONSTRATES CLEARLY THAT CONGRESS 

INTENDED SECTION 441f TO PROHIBIT 

REIMBURSEMENTS TO CONDUIT CONTRIBUTORS .................6 

III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S INTERPRETATION IS 

CONTRARY TO ALL PRIOR AUTHORITATIVE 

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACT.................................................12 

IV. TWENTY-TWO STATES HAVE INCORPORATED THE 

LANGUAGE OF SECTION 441f INTO THEIR CAMPAIGN 

FINANCE LAWS AND HAVE INTERPRETED IT TO 

PROHIBIT REIMBURSEMENTS TO CONDUIT 

CONTRIBUTORS ..............................................................................14 

V. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO DEFER ADEQUATELY 

TO THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S 

INTERPRETATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 

441f......................................................................................................16 

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CONCLUSION........................................................................................................18

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page(s) 

CASES 

Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System v. McClellan, 

 508 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2007) .......................................................................17 

Barnhart v. Walton, 

 535 U.S. 212 (2002).......................................................................................17 

Buckley v. Valeo, 

 424 U.S. 1 (1976).............................................................................................8 

California Medical Ass’n v. Federal Election Comm’n, 

 641 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980) .........................................................................18 

Federal Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 

 454 U.S. 27 (1981)...............................................................................3, 17, 18 

Federal Election Comm’n v. Furgatch, 

 869 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1989) ................................................................. 17-18 

Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Haley Congressional Comm., 

 852 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1988) .......................................................................18 

Feiger v. Gonzales, 

 2007 WL 2351006 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007), aff’d, 

 542 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 2008) ................................................................. 13-14 

Goland v. United States, 

 903 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1990) .......................................................................13 

Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 

 508 U.S. 402 (1993).......................................................................................17 

I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 

 480 U.S. 421 (1987).......................................................................................17 

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Latchem v. State, 

 No. A-6417, 1999 WL 587238 (Alaska Ct. App. August 4, 1999)...............15 

Mariani v. United States, 

 212 F.3d 761 (3d Cir. 2000) ..........................................................................13 

Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 

 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) .........................................................................17 

Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 

 341 U.S. 384 (1951).........................................................................................8 

State v. Azneer, 

 526 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1995)........................................................................15 

State v. Palmer, 

 810 P.2d 734 (Kan. 1991)..............................................................................15 

United States v. DeLoach, 

 No. 06-20583-CR-KING-001 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2007).................................4 

United States v. Fannon, 

 No. 3:08-cr-00043-nkm (W.D. Va. May 19, 2009) ........................................4 

United States v. Geneske, 

 No. 2:09-cr-00435-SDW (D. N.J. June 11, 2009)...........................................3 

United States v. Hankin, 

 607 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1979) ..........................................................................13 

United States v. Hsia, 

 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999).......................................................................13 

United States v. Johnston, 

 2008 WL 2544779 (E.D. Mich. June 20, 2008) ............................................13 

United States v. Kanchanalak, 

 192 F.3d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1999).....................................................................13 

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United States v. Noe, 

 No. 3:05cr796-01 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2006)................................................4 

United States v. O’Donnell, 

 No. CR-08-00872-SJO (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2009) ............................................2 

United States v. Pierce-Santos, 

 No. 1:09-cr-00014-EGS (D. D.C. June 3, 2009).............................................3 

United States v. Trie, 

 23 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D. D.C. 1998)..................................................................14 

STATUTES 

2 U.S.C. §§ 431 through 455 .....................................................................................2 

2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)(B) .........................................................................................10 

2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(D)(i) .....................................................................................10 

2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(D)(ii)....................................................................................10 

2 U.S.C. § 441f..................................................................................................passim

18 U.S.C. § 614..........................................................................................................9 

10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-25.........................................................................................15 

Ala. Code § 17-5-15.................................................................................................15 

Alaska Stat. § 15.13.074(b)......................................................................................15 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16-907 ..........................................................................................15 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 91079(c).....................................................................................15 

D.C. Code Ann. § 1-1131.01(e)...............................................................................15 

Del. Code Ann. tit. 15, § 8006 .................................................................................15 

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Fla. Stat. ch. 106.08(5)(a) ........................................................................................15 

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-202 .........................................................................................15 

Ind. Code § 3-14-1-11..............................................................................................15 

Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3)............................................................................1 

Iowa Code § 68A.502 ..............................................................................................15 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-4154(a)...................................................................................15 

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:1505.2(A) .........................................................................15 

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1004(3) .................................................................15 

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 130.031(3).....................................................................................15 

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 294A.112 .....................................................................................15 

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:44A-20.....................................................................................15 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.14...................................................................................15 

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.13(G) ........................................................................15 

R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-25-12.......................................................................................15 

S.D. Codified Laws § 12-27-12 ...............................................................................15 

Wis. Stat. § 11.30(1) ................................................................................................15 

REGULATION 

11 C.F.R § 110.4(b)(2)(i).........................................................................................16 

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OTHER AUTHORITY 

117 Cong. Rec. S29295 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1971)......................................................8 

122 Cong. Rec. S3696 (daily ed. March 17, 1976) ...................................................9 

147 Cong. Rec. S3187 (daily ed. March 30, 2001) .................................................11 

147 Cong. Rec. S3188 (daily ed. March 30, 2001) .................................................11 

1997 Kansas Commission on Governmental Standards and Conduct Op. 

1997-45 (Kan. September 11, 1997)..................................................................15, 16 

1998 Ill. Atty. Gen. Op. 004, 1998 WL 205432 (Ill. A.G.)...............................15, 16 

FEC Advisory Opinion 1984-52..............................................................................17 

FEC Advisory Opinion 1986-41..............................................................................17 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S.1, S. 382, and S. 956 

Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on 

Commerce, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 233-34 (1971).......................................................7 

H.R. 4890, 90th Cong. § 330 (1967) .........................................................................7 

H.R. 10947, 92nd Cong. § 1311 (1971).....................................................................7 

H.R. 18162, 89th Cong. § 211 (1966) .......................................................................7 

Hearing on Campaign Finance Reform Before the Committee on House 

Administration, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-8 (2001).................................................12 

Pub. L. No. 94-283.....................................................................................................9 

Pub. L. No. 93-433.....................................................................................................8 

Pub. L. No. 107-155...................................................................................................9 

S. 569, 90th Cong. § 211 (1967)................................................................................7 

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S. 1827, 90th Cong. § 125 (1967)..............................................................................7 

S. 18880, 90th Cong. § 210 (1967)............................................................................7 

U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section, 

Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses 103 (6th ed. Jan. 1995)..........................14 

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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON 

IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL 

STATEMENT OF INTEREST 

 Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) files this 

memorandum as an amicus curiae in support of the position of the United States. 

CREW is a non-profit corporation, organized under section 501(c)(3) of the 

Internal Revenue Code. Through a combined approach of research, advocacy, 

public education and litigation, CREW seeks to protect the rights of citizens to be 

informed about the activities of government officials and to ensure the integrity of 

those officials. Among its principal activities, CREW monitors the campaign 

finances of elected officials and, where appropriate, files complaints with the 

Federal Election Commission (“FEC”). 

Among CREW’s core beliefs are that no one is above the law and that 

campaign finance law must be applied equally to all. CREW files its brief as an 

entity that monitors compliance with campaign finance laws to ensure that the 

people know the true sources of their elected officials’ campaign funds. Toward 

that end, CREW files its brief to support an interpretation of 2 U.S.C. § 441f that 

safeguards the ability of government agencies to enforce campaign finance laws 

and preserves the historical and common understanding of the provision. 

Both Appellant and Appellee have consented to the filing of this brief. 

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STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT 

 Since 1972, federal law has prohibited the making of a campaign 

contribution “in the name of another person.” 2 U.S.C. § 441f. For thirty-seven 

years this provision has consistently been interpreted by all three branches of the 

federal government as prohibiting an individual from reimbursing a third party for 

a campaign contribution made to a candidate for federal office. The District Court 

below, however, ruled that Section 441 “prohibits only the act of making a 

contribution and providing a false name, not asking others to make contributions in 

their names and reimbursing them for it.” United States v. O’Donnell, No. CR-08-

00872-SJO, slip. op. at 3 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2009). 

The District Court’s ruling represents a radical departure from the wellsettled meaning of Section 441f. If upheld, the ruling would have a disastrous 

impact on the ability of the Department of Justice and the FEC to enforce the 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 through 455 

(“FECA” or “the Act”). Individual contribution limits are meaningless if wealthy 

individuals need only find people willing to act as conduits for contributions to 

federal candidates. Furthermore, Congress never intended to leave a loophole for 

indirect contributions through intermediary donors. The legislative history of 

FECA demonstrates that Congress intended Section 441f to ban reimbursements to 

conduit contributors when the Act was originally passed. More importantly, 

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Congress twice reiterated its understanding that the language of 2 U.S.C. § 441f 

prohibited reimbursements to conduit contributors when it revisited FECA in 1976 

and again in 2002. 

This Court should reject the District Court’s radical departure from the wellsettled meaning of Section 441f and instead accept the interpretation of the 

Department of Justice and the FEC, which has been accepted by the courts in all 

prior cases. Contrary to the District Court, this Court should follow precedent and 

defer to the FEC’s long-standing interpretation of Section 441f. Federal Election 

Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981). 

I. THE DISTRICT COURT RULING IS A RADICAL DEPARTURE 

FROM THE WELL-SETTLED MEANING OF 2 U.S.C. § 441f THAT 

SERIOUSLY ENDANGERS ENFORCEMENT OF FECA. 

The District Court’s ruling is a radical departure from the well-settled 

meaning of 2 U.S.C. § 441f that would seriously interfere with the ability of the 

Department of Justice and the Federal Election Commission to enforce the Act. If 

affirmed, the opinion will call into question several recent convictions under 

Section 441f. See, e.g., United States v. Geneske, No. 2:09-cr-00435-SDW (D. 

N.J. June 11, 2009) (defendant convicted of reimbursing multiple straw donors a 

total of $25,000 for contributions to a candidate for the U.S. House of 

Representatives); United States v. Pierce-Santos, No. 1:09-cr-00014-EGS (D. D.C. 

June 3, 2009) (defendant convicted of reimbursing multiple straw donors a total of 

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$20,000 for contributions to a candidate for federal office); United States v. 

Fannon, No. 3:08-cr-00043-nkm (W.D. Va. May 19, 2009) (defendant convicted of 

serving as a conduit for $8,950 in corporate contributions from the Virginia 

Gamefowl Breeders Association, Inc. to candidates for the U.S. Senate and the 

U.S. House of Representatives). Other significant convictions also would be 

jeopardized. See also United States v. DeLoach, No. 06-20583-CR-KING-001 

(S.D. Fla. July 17, 2007) (defendant convicted of reimbursing six individuals a 

total of $11,000 for contributions to a candidate for U.S. Senate); and United States 

v. Noe, No. 3:05cr796-01 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2006) (defendant convicted of 

reimbursing 24 individuals a total of $45,400 for contributions to a U.S. 

presidential candidate). 

The FEC has consistently sought civil penalties for violations of Section 

441f throughout its existence. Since December 1998, the earliest date that 

information on enforcement cases is available from the FEC website, the FEC has 

obtained almost $5 million in civil penalties from 141 respondents in 36 

enforcement cases involving violations of 2 U.S.C. § 441f.1

 

1

 MUR 5504 - John Karoly, Jr., Karoly Law Office, P.C. (June 29, 

2009)($155,000); MUR 6186 - Mark Leggio (May 21, 2009)($6,000); MUR 5927 

- Joseph A. Solomon (April 13, 2009)($6,400); MUR 5871 - Joseph Restivo 

(September 15, 2008)($25,000); MUR 5871 - Margret Thurber (September 15, 

2008)($9,000); MUR 5871 - Howard T. Talbott (September 15, 2008)($5,000); 

MUR 5871 - Sam Thurber (September 15, 2008)($9,000); MUR 5871 - Donna 

Owens (September 15, 2008)($9,000); MUR 5871 - Sally Perz (September 15, 

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2008)($7,000); MUR 5871 - Betty Shultz (September 15, 2008)($1,500); MUR 

5948 - Critical Health Systems of North Carolina P.C. (January 3, 2008)($3,400); 

MUR 5666 - MZM Inc. and Mitchell Wade (October 31, 2007)($1,000,000); MUR 

5666 - Richard A. Berglund (October 31, 2007)($42,000); MUR 5784 - Morton 

Grove Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (August 29, 2007)($9,000); MUR 5765 - Crop 

Production Services, Inc. (February 8, 2007)($17,000); MUR 5366 - Tab Turner 

(June 21, 2006)($50,000); MUR 5305 - James M. Rhodes, et al. (November 4, 

2005)($148,000); MUR 5386 - International Association of Machinists and 

Aerospace Workers District Lodge 141-M, et al. (October 24, 2005)($151,000); 

MUR 5628 - AMEC Construction Management Inc., et al. (October 

14,2005)($85,000); MUR 5453 - Thomas Willsey (October 11, 2005)($13,000); 

MUR 5305 - Nadine Giudicessi (September 30, 2005)($5,500); MUR 5305 - James 

A. Bevan (September 30, 2005)($5,500); MUR 5398 - LifeCare Holdings, Inc. 

(June 7, 2005)($50,000);MUR 5405 - Apex Healthcare, Inc. and James Chao 

(April 20, 2005)($275,000); MUR 5643 - Carter’s Inc. (March 14, 

2005)($8,000);MUR 5453 - Arthur A. Watson & Co., Inc. (January 15, 

2005)($16,000); MUR 4818 - Edith Susie Beavers (June 24, 2004)($13,500); MUR 

4818 - The Stipe Law Firm (February 2, 2004)($101,000); MUR 4818 - Gene Stipe 

(January 28, 2004)($267,000); MUR 4818 - Larry Morgan (January 14, 

2004)($18,500); MUR 5357 - Centex Construction Group, Inc., et al. (December 

17, 2003)($112,000; $56,000); MUR 4818 - Michael Mass (December 9, 

2003)($30,000); MUR 4931 - Audiovox Corporation, et al. (July 17, 

2003)($620,000); MUR 4931 - Phillip Christopher (July 17, 2003)($130,000); 

MUR 5101 - Yaakov Bender (May 20, 2003)($14,000);MUR 5092 - Lawrence 

Friedman (May 17, 2003)($1,000);MUR 4931 – Auto Sounds Company, Inc.; 

Howard Honigbaum (May 16, 2003)($30,000); MUR 5092 - Steven Graham (May 

14, 2003)($1,000);MUR 5092 - Michael Lazaroff (March 26, 2003)($8,000); MUR 

5187 - Fermin Cuza (December 3, 2002)($188,000);MUR 5187 - Mattel, Inc. 

(December 3, 2002)($94,000);MUR 5187 - Alan Schwartz; AMS Consulting 

Services (December 3, 2002)($195,000); MUR 4931 - Joseph DiFazio (October 

21, 2002)($10,000); MUR 4530-1, 4909 - Pauline Kanchanalak (September 4, 

2002)($25,000); MUR 4530-1, 4909 - Duanget Kronenberg (September 11, 

2002)($20,000); MUR 4530-1, 4909 - Keshi Zhan (November 15, 2001)($12,500); 

MUR 4871 - Rick Riccobono (September 17, 2001)($5,600); MUR 4530-1, 4909 - 

Yah Lin “Charlie” Trie (June 21, 2001)($7,000); MUR 5041 - Wuesthoff 

Memorial Hospital, Inc. (February 21, 2001)($32,000); MUR 5041 - Robert 

Carman (February 21, 2001)($20,000); MUR 5041 - Rebecca Colker (February 21, 

2001)($2,000); MUR 4871 - Broadcast Music, Inc. (February 21, 2001)($19,000); 

MUR 5027 - Mark Nichols (December 11, 2000)($56,000); MUR 5027 - Gregorio 

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II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FECA DEMONSTRATES 

CLEARLY THAT CONGRESS INTENDED SECTION 441f TO 

PROHIBIT REIMBURSEMENTS TO CONDUIT CONTRIBUTORS.

The District Court devoted just one paragraph to the legislative history of 

Section 441f, instead focusing entirely on two statements in the Congressional 

Record made by two separate members of Congress, one in the House and one in 

the Senate, discussing distinct provisions in different bills on different days. The 

complete legislative history of Section 441f spans thirty-six years and 

demonstrates not only that Congress intended to prohibit reimbursements to 

conduit contributors when Section 441f was originally passed, but also that 

Congress has twice ratified its understanding that the language of Section 441f 

effects such a prohibition. 

 

Cervantes (September 5, 2000)($26,000); MUR 4530-1, 4909 - Chien Chuen 

“Johnny” Chung (August 25, 2000)($21,000); MUR 4748 - WPXI, Inc., et al 

(August 23, 2000)($1,000); MUR 4885 - Laredo National Bank, et al. (March 3, 

2000)($30,000); MUR 4928 - MSBDFA Management Group, Inc. (March 1, 

2000)($4,000); MUR 4928 - R. Randy Croxton (March 1, 2000)($750); MUR 

4928 - Stanley W. Tucker (March 1, 2000)($2,300); MUR 4928 - Timothy L. 

Smoot (March 1, 2000)($1,100); MUR 4928 - Catherine D. Lockhart (March 1, 

2000)($750); MUR 4434 - Daniel M. Doyle (January 18, 2000)($4,000); MUR 

4646 - Amy Robin Habie, et al. (January 3, 2000)($50,000); MUR 4884 - Future 

Tech International, Inc., et al (May 25, 1999)($209,000); MUR 4879 - Beaulieu of 

America, Inc. (May 20, 1999)($200,000); MUR 4876 - Cadeau Express, Inc. 

(March 23, 1999)($10,000); MUR 4834 - Howard Glicken (December 15, 

1998)($40,000). 

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Section 441f dates back to 1966 and appears in multiple bills considered by 

Congress in the six-year period that culminated in the passage of the Act in 1972.2

 

Hearings on S. 382, the bill containing the language that ultimately became Section 

441f, demonstrate that Congress was acutely aware of the multiplicity of 

reimbursement schemes that had been used to evade the limits on contributions to 

federal candidates. These included “donations through brothers, sisters, cousins, 

aunts and infant children” as well as schemes in which an “employee gets a cash 

bonus with the understanding that a portion will go to a favored candidate.” 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S.1, S. 382, and S. 956 

Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on 

Commerce, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 233-34 (1971). The subcommittee also heard 

evidence that “a large number of wealthy persons thwart the $5,000 limitation on 

contributions by attributing some of their excessive political gifts to their children, 

infants included.” Id. at 242. After hearing this evidence, Senator Mathias praised 

the bill under consideration for “making some limitations on contributions so that 

rich men can no longer buy elections, either by contributing to their own 

campaigns or by having families and friends contribute inordinate amounts to 

various hidden committees.” Id. at 347. 

 

2

 H.R. 10947, 92nd Cong. § 1311 (1971); S. 569, 90th Cong. § 211 (1967); S. 

18880, 90th Cong. § 210 (1967); S. 1827, 90th Cong. § 125 (1967); H.R. 4890, 

90th Cong. § 330 (1967); H.R. 18162, 89th Cong. § 211 (1966). 

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During the Senate floor debate on S. 382, one of the bill’s principal sponsors 

directly addressed the problem of wealthy individuals using conduit contributors to 

evade the individual contribution limits: “If he is limited to $5,000, what does he 

do? He has no limitation on his own money. He is a man of influence. He wants 

to find $200,000. He finds 40 friends and gives it to them and each of them gives 

back $5,000. Let us close that loophole and go after the man who would bribe the 

election because he is so well fixed.” 117 Cong. Rec. S29295 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 

1971) (statement of Senator Scott). The statements of sponsors are entitled to great 

weight when evaluating the legislative history of a statute. Schwegmann Bros. v. 

Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951). The legislative history of 

the Act shows that when Section 441f was originally enacted Congress was well 

aware that reimbursing conduit contributors to evade the limits on individual 

contributions was a serious problem and intended to close that loophole. 

 Moreover, on two subsequent occasions, Congress has restated its belief that 

the language of Section 441f prohibits the reimbursement of conduit contributors. 

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was substantially amended in 1974 to 

create the Federal Election Commission and to establish civil penalties for 

violations of the Act.3

 Substantial portions of the 1974 Act were found to be 

unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). To correct these 

 

3

 The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-433, 

88 Stat. 1297 (the “1974 Act”). 

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constitutional infirmities, Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act 

Amendments of 1976.4

 The 1976 Act combined the criminal and civil penalty 

provisions of the previous iterations of the statute and transferred the language 

prohibiting contributions in the name of another from 18 U.S.C. § 614 to 2 U.S.C. 

§ 441f. During Senate floor debate on the penalty provisions of the 1976 Act, 

Senator Clark explicitly stated that both the existing law, 18 U.S.C. § 614, and the 

legislation transferring that language to 2 U.S.C. § 441f, prohibited reimbursing 

conduit contributors, a process he referred to as earmarking: 

Mr. President, just as both the present law and S. 3065 provide a 

separate provision against cash contributions so do they also provide a 

separate provision to prohibit the earmarking of contributions. 

Earmarking – where a contribution is funneled through an 

intermediary to a candidate – is a practice which represents a very 

serious threat to the integrity of the contribution limits provided in the 

campaign law. 

122 Cong. Rec. S3696 (daily ed. March 17, 1976) (statement of Senator Clark). 

In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,5

 which 

substantially increased both the criminal and civil penalties for violations of 

Section 441f after a series of conduit contribution schemes came to light following 

 

4

 Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (the “1976 Act”). 

5

 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (“BCRA” or “McCain-Feingold”). 

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the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections.6

 The Senate floor debate on the 

increased penalties for violations of section 441f shows unequivocally that 

Congress has always believed the Section prohibits the reimbursement of conduit 

contributors. 

When offering an amendment to increase the penalties for violations of 

Section 441f, Senator Kit Bond (R-MO) explained: 

Under current campaign finance laws, there is no meaningful 

punishment of campaign violators. Over the last several years, we 

have had hearings, investigations, and read about key figures in 

campaign scandals only to learn later that they walk. It is small 

wonder that abuse occurs on the scale that we have recently 

witnessed. It is a misdemeanor offense to make a campaign 

contribution in the name of another person, knowingly permit your 

name to be used for a contribution or knowingly accept a contribution 

made in the name of another, in other words make an illegal 

contribution through a conduit (2 U.S.C. § 441f). 

Despite this clear prohibition, it came to light that during the 1996 

presidential campaign millions of dollars in illegal donations from 

foreign nations were funneled into party and campaign coffers 

through conduit contributors, some as outrageous as nuns and other 

 

6

 McCain-Feingold made knowing and willful violations of Section 441f involving 

$10,000 or more a felony, punishable by up to 2 years in prison if the amount 

involved was less than $25,000 or up to five years in prison if the amount involved 

was $25,000 or more. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(D)(i). McCain-Feingold also raised 

the criminal fine for knowing and willful violations of Section 441f involving 

$10,000 or more to not less than 300% of the amount of money involved in the 

violation and not more than the greater of $50,000 or 1,000% of the amount of 

money involved in the violation. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(D)(ii). The civil penalty 

for a knowing and willful violation of Section 441f was similarly raised to an 

amount not less than 300% of the amount involved in the violation and not more 

than the greater of $50,000 or 1,000% of the amount involved in the violation. 2 

U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)(B). 

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people of worship. Despite these outrageous abuses, illegal 

contributions totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars flowed with 

impunity. Under the circumstances, the punishments handed out to 

those caught red-handed can barely be considered slaps on the wrist. 

147 Cong. Rec. S3187 (daily ed. March 30, 2001) (statement of 

Senator Bond). 

Senator Bond then provided a series of examples of conduit contribution 

schemes that had been uncovered, including: 

Billionaire James Riady agreed on January 11 of this year to pay an 

$8.6 million fine and plead guilty to unlawfully reimbursing donors to 

the 1992 campaign of President Bill Clinton – but he will serve no jail 

time. 

But for a billionaire, $6 million is like me reaching in my wallet to 

buy lunch at the sandwich shop. Do you think that hurt him very 

much? I do not believe so. For $8.6 million, he has every incentive to 

come back and do his trick again. That is a small price to pay for 

being able to exercise inappropriate, unwarranted and illegal influence 

on a campaign. 

147 Cong. Rec. S3188 (daily ed. March 30, 2001) (statement of Senator Bond). 

Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) reiterated Senator Bond’s arguments during 

hearings on McCain-Feingold in the House of Representatives: 

Conduit contributions are a serious and growing problem. The 

integrity of our campaign finance system rests on public disclosure of 

contributions. When people attempt to avoid disclosure and legal 

contribution limits, the integrity of the system starts to break down. . 

.The current penalties are not deterring this corrosive practice, and 

they are not giving prosecutors the tools they need to crack down on 

this growing problem. . . If we are serious about reforming the 

campaign finance system, we must begin by enforcing the laws 

already on the books. 

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Hearing on Campaign Finance Reform Before the Committee on House 

Administration, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-8 (2001). 

Thus, the complete legislative history of the Act demonstrates Congress has 

always considered Section 441f to prohibit the reimbursement of conduit 

contributors. 

III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S INTERPRETATION IS CONTRARY TO 

ALL PRIOR AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 

ACT. 

The District Court’s ruling that Section 441f does not prohibit the 

reimbursement of conduit contributors cannot be reconciled with every other 

authoritative interpretation of the provision since its 1972 enactment. Every other 

federal court to consider the meaning of Section 441f has accepted the Justice 

Department’s interpretation that the provision prohibits the reimbursement of 

conduit contributors. The Justice Department has adhered to this interpretation of 

Section 441f for decades. 

The District Court devotes one paragraph to two of the prior federal cases 

interpreting section 441f and then dismisses them as unpersuasive because they 

“only described section 441f as pertaining to conduits in passing” and “have not 

actually considered whether section 441f covers indirect contributions or 

reimbursements.” Slip op. at 6. Conspicuously missing from the District Court’s 

discussion of the case law is any mention of the seminal case interpreting the 

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language of Section 441f, United States v. Hankin, 607 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1979). In 

that case, the appellate panel accepted the Justice Department’s interpretation of 

section 441f as prohibiting the reimbursement of conduit contributors. Judge 

Garth, dissenting from the majority’s ruling on the applicable statute of limitations, 

specifically addressed whether the language prohibiting contributions in the name 

of another applied to reimbursements to conduit contributors and concluded that it 

did: 

Critical to Hankin’s prosecution were the undisputed facts that he 

reimbursed the Hilgers and Iacampos for the total amounts of their 

checks. These facts create the inference that Hankin had, in actuality, 

made the contributions himself, “in the name of another,” merely 

using the Hilgers and Iacampos as conduits for his own gift. Mr. 

Hilger was actually “reimbursed” before he had executed his check. 

Hankin at 616 n.4 (Garth, C.J., dissenting). 

Every subsequent federal court to consider the language of Section 441f has 

accepted this interpretation of the statute. See, e.g., Mariani v. United States, 212 

F.3d 761, 775 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d 1037, 1041 

(D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1999); 

Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Johnston, 

2008 WL 2544779 (E.D. Mich. June 20, 2008); Feiger v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 

2351006 at 2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007) (“Contributing money to a candidate in 

one’s own name but using funds provided by someone else is an example of 

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activity that would violate [2 U.S.C. § 441f].”), aff’d, 542 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 

2008); United States v. Trie, 23 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D. D.C. 1998). 

The Department of Justice long has interpreted Section 441f as prohibiting 

reimbursements of conduit contributors: 

Section 441f is violated if a person gives funds to a straw donor, or 

conduit, for the purpose of having the conduit pass the funds on to a 

federal candidate as his or her own donation. A violation also can 

occur if a person reimburses a donor who has already given to a 

candidate, thus in effect converting the donor’s contribution to his or 

her own. 

 

U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section, Federal 

Prosecution of Election Offenses 103 (6th ed. Jan. 1995). Significantly, the Justice 

Department has always considered section 441f to be one of the “core” provisions 

of FECA, violations of which warrant criminal prosecution. This was true even 

when violations of section 441f were misdemeanors. Id. at 96-97. 

IV. TWENTY-TWO STATES HAVE INCORPORATED THE 

LANGUAGE OF SECTION 441f INTO THEIR CAMPAIGN 

FINANCE LAWS AND HAVE INTERPRETED IT TO PROHIBIT 

REIMBURSEMENTS TO CONDUIT CONTRIBUTORS. 

 

The meaning of the language of Section 441f is so well-established that 

twenty-two states have incorporated the same or similar language into their own 

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campaign finance laws.7

 State court rulings and advisory opinions from state 

officials also interpret the adopted language as prohibiting reimbursements. See

Latchem v. State, No. A-6417, 4084, 1999 WL 587238 (Alaska Ct. App. August 4, 

1999); State v. Azneer, 526 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1995); State v. Palmer, 810 P.2d 

734 (Kan. 1991). See also 1998 Ill. Atty. Gen. Op. 004, 1998 WL 205432 (Ill. 

A.G.); 1997 Kansas Commission on Governmental Standards and Conduct Op. 

1997-45, 2 (Kan. September 11, 1997). 

In Azneer, the Supreme Court of Iowa acknowledged that the practice of 

employers making surreptitious political contributions by reimbursing employees 

for contributions to selected candidates was a violation of the state’s prohibition on 

contributions in the name of another: “We think Iowa Code section 56.12 

addresses conduct that is malum prohibitum...It is easy to imagine employers who 

wish to make political contributions without being exposed to any political 

consequences. The practice posed by the facts may well not engender admiration. 

The legislature was obviously prompted to criminalize them.” State v. Azneer, 526 

N.W.2d at 300. 

 

7

 Ala. Code § 17-5-15; Alaska Stat. § 15.13.074(b); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16-907; Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 91079(c); Del. Code Ann. tit. 15, § 8006; D.C. Code Ann. § 1-

1131.01(e); Fla. Stat. ch. 106.08(5)(a); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-202; 10 Ill. Comp. 

Stat. 5/9-25; Ind. Code § 3-14-1-11; Iowa Code § 68A.502; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-

4154(a); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:1505.2(A); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 

1004(3); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 130.031(3); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 294A.112; N.J. Stat. Ann. 

§ 19:44A-20; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.14; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.13(G); 

R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-25-12; S.D. Codified Laws § 12-27-12; Wis. Stat. § 11.30(1). 

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The Kansas Commission on Government Standards spells out its 

interpretation of the prohibition on contributions in the name of another very 

clearly: “If “A” gives money to “B” with the understanding that the money will 

then be contributed to “C,” and “B” then contributes the money to “C,” this would 

be a violation of the law.” 1997 Kansas Commission on Governmental Standards 

and Conduct Op. 1997-45, 2 (Kan. September 11, 1997). Similarly, the Illinois 

Attorney General issued a ruling approving a proposed contribution by a 

subsidiary at the behest of its parent corporation because there was “no suggestion 

of any transfer or reimbursement of funds between the subsidiary and the parent 

corporations related to the contributions. The actual source of the funds in these 

circumstances is not disguised.” 1998 Ill. Atty. Gen. Op. 004, 1998 WL 205432 

(Ill. A.G.). Thus, every federal and state authority that has been called upon to 

interpret Section 441f’s language has reached the same inescapable conclusion: the 

language prohibits the reimbursement of conduit contributors. 

V. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO DEFER ADEQUATELY TO THE 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S INTERPRETATION OF 

THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 441f. 

The FEC, like the Department of Justice, has interpreted Section 441f as 

prohibiting reimbursements to conduit contributors for decades. 11 C.F.R § 

110.4(b)(2)(i). While the FEC regulation interpreting Section 441 was enacted in 

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1989, the FEC had taken the same position in advisory opinions for many years. 

See, e.g., FEC Advisory Opinion 1986-41; FEC Advisory Opinion 1984-52. 

It is well established that courts generally must defer to agency 

interpretations of the statute they are responsible for executing, especially when the 

agency’s interpretation is longstanding and consistently applied. Barnhart v. 

Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002); Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 

402, 417 (1993); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, n.30 (1987); 

Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, C.J., 

dissenting); Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System v. McClellan, 508 F.3d 

1243, 1253-4 (9th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court stated in Barnhart “this Court 

will normally accord particular deference to an agency interpretation of 

“longstanding” duration.” Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 220. The Ninth Circuit has ruled 

that the courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that, like the 

FEC’s interpretation of section 441f, had been in effect and remained consistent for 

over 20 years. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System v. McClellan, 508 

F.3d at 1253-4 (quoting Barnhart). 

The Supreme Court has held the FEC in particular is precisely the type of 

expert agency whose interpretation of its organic statute merits presumptive 

deference. Federal Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 

454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981). Other courts have followed suit. See Federal Election 

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Comm’n v. Furgatch, 869 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1989); Federal Election 

Comm’n v. Ted Haley Congressional Comm., 852 F.2d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 

1988); California Medical Ass’n v. Federal Election Comm’n, 641 F.2d 619, 630 

(9th Cir. 1980). Indeed, the fact that the FEC is “inherently bipartisan... and ... 

must decide issues charged with the dynamics of party politics, often under the 

pressure of an impending election” contributed to the Supreme Court’s conclusion 

that the FEC in particular is entitled to deference. Federal Election Comm’n v. 

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 37. As a result, the FEC’s 

interpretation should only be rejected by the courts if it is “contrary to law.” Id. 

Nevertheless, here the District Court inappropriately failed to defer to the FEC’s 

expertise and experience interpreting the Act. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the above stated reasons, as well as those set forth in the government’s 

brief, this Court should reverse the District Court’s ruling. 

DATED: September 21, 2009 Respectfully submitted, 

 /s/ Melanie Sloan 

Melanie Sloan 

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND 

 ETHICS IN WASHINGTON

1400 I Street, N.W., Suite 450 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 408-5565 (Telephone) 

(202) 588-5020 (Facsimile) 

msloan@citizensforethics.org 

 Counsel for Amicus Curiae

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 

28.1(e)(2) or 32(a)(7)(B) because: 

[ X ] this brief contains [4,590] words, excluding the parts of the brief 

exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), or 

[ ] this brief uses a monospaced typeface and contains [state the number 

of] lines of text, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 

32(a)(7)(B)(iii). 

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 

32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because: 

[ X ] this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using 

[Microsoft Word 2000] in [14pt Times New Roman]; or 

[ ] this brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [state 

name and version of word processing program] with [state number of 

characters per inch and name of type style]. 

DATED: September 21, 2009 /s/ Melanie Sloan 

 Counsel for Amicus Curiae

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CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE 

 I hereby certify that on this 21st day of September, 2009, I caused this Brief 

of Amicus Curiae to be filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court using the 

CM/ECF System, which will send notice of such filing to the following registered 

CM/ECF users: 

 Lawrence Middleton George J. Terwilliger 

 Michael J. Raphael Daniel B. Levin 

 Erik M. Sibler WHITE & CASE LLP 

 OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY 701 Thirteenth Street, NW 

 312 North Spring Street Washington, D.C. 20005 

 Los Angeles, California 90012 

Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 

 Further, on this 21st day of September, 2009,one copy of this Brief of 

Amicus Curiae was sent via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:

Brian O’Neill

JONES DAY

555 West Flower Street, 50th Floor 

Los Angeles, California 90071 

Counsel for Appellee 

DATED: September 21, 2009 /s/ Melanie Sloan 

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

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