### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 27, 200 4
JERR Y B RITT v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham blen Coun ty Nos. 97CR213, 96CR 207, 96CR172 Jam es E. Beckner, Judge

No. E2004-01276-CC A-R3- P C - F iled Dece m ber 20, 2004

The pe titioner, J erry

Britt, entered A lford ple a s in 19 96 to thr e e c ou nts of a tte mpt e d rape of a c hil d and g uilt y p l ea s t o o ne count of possession with intent to s ell or deliver a Schedule I I

controlled substance, one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule I V controlled substanc e, and six counts of delivery of a Schedule I I

controlled substanc e, and r ece ived an e ffe ctive sente nce as a Rang e I , standard offende r of forty -eig ht y ear s in the Department of Corr ection. He appea ls the dismiss al of his petition for writ of err or cor am nobis, arg uing that the trial court should ha ve g rante d him relief ba sed on new ly discovere d evidenc e, the victim’s rec antation testimony . Following our revie w, we a ffirm the or der of the trial court dismi ssing the pe tition. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed
A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH a n d J. C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.
P. Ri c ha rdTa lle y , D a ndri dg e , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Jer

ry B ri tt. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Rachel E. Willis , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and C. Ber keley Be ll, District Attorney

Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
. OP IN ION
P ROCEDURAL HISTORY This is the petitioner’s t hird time befor e this court, and his e x tensive proc edura l history has been suc cinctly

set out in two previous dec isions. S ee Jerry Britt v. S tate, No. E2001- 00864-CCAR3-PC, 2002 W L

31126638 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2002), pe rm. to appea l denied (Tenn. Jan. 27, 2003); J erry

E. Britt v. S tate, No. 03C01-9806-CR-00208, 1999 W L 359000 (Tenn. Crim. App. J une 4, 1999).-2-

On August 26, 1997, the petitioner timely filed a pro s e petition for post-conviction re lief, contending , as this court ea rlier de scribed, “primarily that he wa s denied e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ou ns e l a t hi s g uil ty

ple a he ari ng be c aus e he wa s n ot ad vis e d s pe c if ic a lly of the c on se qu e nc e s o f h is g uil ty ple a .” Jer

ry E. B ri tt, 19 99 WL

35 90 00 , at *1 . T he po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt dis mis se d th is petition on March 30, 1998, without a he aring . On appe al, this court rema nded the c ase f or the pe tit io ner to “have ne w c ou ns e l a pp oin te d a nd

. . . b e g ive n a n e vid e nti ary he ari ng so that he wi ll ha ve th e op po rtun ity

to t ry to p ro ve his a lle g a tio n th a t hi s o ri g ina l tria l c ou ns e l di d n ot p ro pe rl y investigate his case , as we ll as any other a lleg ation that new c ounsel may determine is appropriate.” I d. at *2. Subsequent to the rema nd, the petitioner filed an amende d post-conviction petit ion, asserting that “he r ece ived ineff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel when he enter ed his p leas; that his counsel’s defic ient perf

ormanc e re ndere d his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary ; and that he should be g r a n te d p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f b e c au s e o f

n e w ly d is c o v e r e d e v id e n c e
. ” Je rr y B r itt, 2 0 0 2 WL 3 1 1 2 6 6 3 8 , at* 1

. On M ar ch 1 6 , 2 0 0 1 , t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt co n d u ct ed an ev i d en t i ar y h ea ri n g, at which the vic tim testi fied, re canting her acc usation of sex ual abuse made before the petitioner’s pleas of g uilt. After the hearing , the pos t-conviction court ag ain di smissed the petit ion and this court aff irmed the de cision, concluding t h at t he petitioner “ rec eived e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel and that he ente red his plea

knowing ly , voluntarily , and intellige ntly .” I d. at *13. We further conclude d that “the [p]etit ioner [was] not entitl ed to post-conviction re lief on t h e b as is of newly discovery e vid e nc e ,” id. a t *1 4, dis a g re e ing wi th the pe tit ion e r’ s c la im that the vic tim ’s re c a ntatio n w a s n e wl y discovere d evidenc e:

[A] s the S tate correc tly points out, newly discovere d evidenc e is not g ener ally an appr opriate g round for relief under the Post-Convi ction Procedur e Ac t. See Will iam H. Nec essary , J r., v
. State, No. 03C01-9601-CC-00009, 1999 Tenn. Crim

. App. L EXI S 246, at **17-18 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knox ville, Mar. 16, 1999); Randy Hicks v
. S t a t e , N o
. 0 3 C 0 1

- 9 6 0 8

- C R

- 0 0 2 9 6 , 1 9 9 8 T e n n
. C r i m
. A p p
. LE X IS 253 at **8-9 (T enn. Crim. App., Knoxvil le, Mar. 3, 1998) . More sp e c if ic a lly , th is Cou rt ha s hel d tha t "r e c a nte d tes tim on y a mou nts to no more than a

reque st to relitigate the s ufficie ncy of the e vidence at tr ia l a ndis no t a

pr op e r s ub

je c t of po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f. " Te re sa Deion Smith Harris v. State, No. W 2000-02611-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 604, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., J ackson, June 13, 2001). I d. Following this court’s af firmanc e of the dismi s s a l o f th eame n d e d

p e ti ti o nf o r p ost-conviction relief , the petitioner filed a

petition for writ of error coram nobis on J anuary 21, 2003, arg uing that the victim’s rec antation testimony at the evide ntiary

hearing c onstitut ed newly discovere d evidenc e, requiring the tria l c o u r t t o s e t a s id e h is g u il ty p le a s
. A n e xh ib it

to th e p e ti ti o n w a s th e entire transcript from the Marc h 16, 2001, evidentiary hearing. On April 29, 2004, t he trial c ourt, without-3-

h o l d i n g a h ea ri n g o n t h e c o ra mn o b i s p et i t i o n an d re l y i n g o n t h e tra n s cr i p t o f t h e e v i d en t i ar y h ea ri n g, dismiss ed the pe tition. The petitioner appea ls this di smissal.
AN AL YSI S
T h e tria l c o u r t d is mi s s e d th is p e ti ti o n b e c a u s e it b o th w a s u n ti me ly a n d w ith o u t m e r it

. We concur with both of those determinations, as we will explain.
A writ of e rror

coram nobis is an ex traordina ry reme dy by which the trial court may provide relief from a judgme nt unde r narr ow and limit ed cir cumstance s. State v. Mix on, 983 S.W .2d 661, 666 (Tenn. 1999) . The re medy is available by

statute to a criminal defendan t i n Tenne ssee. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 26 -1 05 (2 00 3) . T his statut e pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art :

Upon a showing by

the d efendant that the de fendant was without fault in failing to present c erta in evidence at the proper t i m e, a writ of er

ror c oram nobis will lie for s u b s e q u e n tly

or new ly discovere d evidenc e re lating to matter s which w e r e li ti g a te d a t th e tria l if th e ju d g e d e te r mi n e s that such evide nce may

have r esulted in a diffe rent judg ment, had it been pre sented at the trial. The issue shall be tried by the court without the interve ntion of a jury , and if the de cision be in favor of the petitioner, the judg ment complained of shall be set aside a nd the defe ndant shall be g rante d a new tria l in that cause
. I d. Reca nted t estimony may qualify as newly discovere d evidenc e. Mix on, 983 S.W .2d at 672. A new tria l should be g rante d on the basis of newly discovere d rec anted testim ony , howeve r, only if: (1) the trial court is r easona bly well satisfied that the testimonyg iven by the materi al wi t n ess was false a nd the new te stimonyis true; (2) the def endant wa s rea sonably

diligent in dis covering the new e vid e nc e , o r w a s su rp ri se d b y the fa lse te sti mon y , o r w a s unable to know of the f

alsity of the testimony

until after the trial; and (3 ) t he jury m i gh t h ave r eac hed a dif fer ent conc lusion had the truth been told.
I d. at 673 n.17 (c itations omitted). The decision to g rant or deny a petition for writ of err or cor am nobis based on new ly

discovere d evidenc e lies within the sound discretion of t h e trial court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105 (2003); State v. Hart, 911 S.W .2d 371, 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

. The pe titioner arg ues the post-conviction court err ed in holding that the victim’s rec antation testimonyat the post-convic tion evidentiary hearing did not c onstitut e new ly discovere d evidenc e. Spe c if ic a lly , h e a sse rt s th a t th e vic tim ’s inc on sis te nt s ta te me nts , e ve n if kn ow n to him prior

to h is-4-

g uiltypleas, c onstitut e new ly discovere d evidenc e bec ause they did not sug g est that she would later rec ant. He a

rg ues it was only afte r he e ntere d into a plea a g ree ment that “any one wa s awa re that the [vi ctim’s] allegations were not true .” We will review these c laims.
I t is clear f

rom the post-convic tion transcript that both the petitioner a nd his trial counsel we re a wa re , p ri or to the pe tit ion e r’ s g uil ty

ple a s, that the vic tim

ha d ma de inc on sis te nt s ta te me nts conce rning her a lleg ations ag ainst the peti t i o n er. Trial counsel testified at the post-conviction he ari ng that th e vic tim

“ ma de c on fl ic tin g state me nts , y e s si r. An d I -- I wa s p re pa

re d to c ro ssexamine her on those. And, certainly , [t he petiti oner] was aware of these . . . c onflicting statements.” I n fac t, the petitioner ag ree d during cross-e x amination at t h e p o st-conviction hea ring that he, too, wa s a wa re of the vic tim ’s inc on sis te nt s ta te me nts : Q. You knew, al s o , that . . . [t he victim] had been g iving [the district attorney ] t rouble in the investig ation of the prose cution?
A. I know what [trial counsel] told me. Q. And what did he te ll y ou?
A. That [the victim] had chang ed – she’d chang ed her story and her te stimoni es wa sn’t [si c] matching up. Q. So y ou knew that was a problem before y ou pled g uilty , that th e s tate w a s h a v in g tr o u b le e v e n w ith [t h e v ic ti m] ?
A. No , s ir . I

did n’ t know it wa s tr ou ble fo r the state . I kn e w i t was – I thought it would help us

. So, y eah, in a way I g uess I thought it was damag ing f

or the state. Y es, sir. Q. Okay . So it’s not re al ly newly discovere d evidenc e. When y ou went to trial and y ou pled g uilty , the fa ct is –
A. I know that her chang ing her story wasn’t new[ly ] di scover ed e vidence. He r t e sti fying – th a t th e se x did n ot h app e n w a s n e wl y discovere d evidenc e. The victim’s testimony

from the post-c onviction hearing w as summarized by this court when we a ff ir me d th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s dis mis sa l of the pe tit ionfo llo wi ng the he ari ng :
Th e vic tim

of the at tem ptedra

pe of a c hil d c ha

rg e s a lso testified at the post-conviction hea ring . She stated that at the time of t h e hearing, she was seve nteen y ear s old and that at the time of the crimes, she was twe lve y ear s old. She testified that i n 1996, she-5- a lle g e d tha t she a nd the Pe tit ion e r h a d e ng a g e d inse xua l in te rc ou rs e on more than one occa sion. She reporte d that neither c ounsel for the Petitioner nor any

lawy er employ ed by counsel intervie wed he r about the alle gations. The victim maintained that if c ounsel had interviewe d her, she would have told him "the truth

. . . . [ t] hat nothing had ever happene d." She stated that by this, she meant that she neve r eng ag ed in sexual intercourse with the Petitioner. The vic tim e xpla ine d, " I t' s g oin g to soundc ra zy , b ut I wa s je a lou s, be c aus e [the Pe tit ion e r] wa s g e tti ng a ll the a tte nti on fr om m y mom
. And I was sitting he re thinking , and I thou gh t , M ay b e Ican do something a

bout i t , an d m ake him go to jail, and I could g et all her a tte nti on ; sh e ' d b e fo c us e d o n me a ndno bo dy els e ." Th e vic tim admitted th at s he had sle pt in a bed with her mother and the Petitioner, but denied that any sexual contact occ urre d. I n addition, the vic tim

a dmi tte d th a t sh e ha d alle g e d th a t he r f a the r h a d s e xua lly abused her while she was with him i n Ore g on, but she maintained that the alleg ations conce rning her father wer e true. She testified that the alleg ations ag ainst her fat h er "got her bac k to Tennesse e with [her] mom," and she stated t hat s he "fig ured if [she said] that ag ain, [she] c ou ld g e t wh a t [she ] w a nte d lik e [she ] d id be fo re ." Th e vic tim a lso ma int a ine d th a t ha d s he be e n c a lle d to te sti fy a t th e Pe tit ion e r' s tria l, sh e wo uld ha ve te sti fi e d tha t sh e a ndthe Pe tit ion e r d id n ot e ng a g e in sexual int erc ourse.
On cr oss-examination, the victim t estified that she made the tape- rec orded te lephone call to the Petitioner beca use she " was trying to confuse him, trick him into say ing what he did .

. . ." She c laimed that she told a doctor and a dete ctive who que stioned her about the case that she had not ha d sexual int erc ourse with the pe titioner. She could not rec all whether

she re ported this information befor e or af ter the petitioner be came incar cer ated.
J erry Britt, 2002 W L

31126638, at **5-6.
On app e a l, this c ou rt c on c ur re d that the vic tim ’s te sti mon y a t the po st- c on vic tio n he ari ng did no t c on sti tut e ne wl y

dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e : [A] s previously noted, the trial court discredited the v i ct i m’s rec antation at the post-c onviction hearing. T he trial c ourt also made the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s c on c e rn ing the vic tim ’s re c a ntatio n:

[C ounsel] , i n d i s cu s s i n g t h e e v i d en ce, said that h e as k ed [the] prosecutor if . . . the victim . . . had-6- retra cted [the alleg ations ag ainst the Petitioner]. And his testimonywas: When I was ha ving that t ra nscribed, . . . [the victim] had made the stateme nt that she lied. That it did not happen.

. . . . I t's just not newly

discovere d evidenc e. All of the things a

bout he r testimony , or potential testimony back the n wer e known at this t ime. Nothing ne w has been disc overe d now. . .

. When she . . . cha ng ed her mind and testified diffe rently on sever al occ asions about diffe rent things, [she] put e very body on notice . . . that her te stimonycould be a ny t h i n g from very strong for c onviction, to ex oneration. But that was not a cha nce that any

body wanted to take

. I d. at *14. The pe tition for wr i t o f er ror c oram nobis, as did the a mended post-c onviction petition, arg ued that the recantation testimony was newly discovere d evidenc e. I n its order denying c oram no bis re lie f, the tr ia l c ou rt fo un d, a s it

ha d f oll ow ing the e vid e nti ary

he ari ng fo r the a me nd e d p os tconviction petition, that the victim’s rec antation was not ne wly discovere d evidenc e:
T h e mo s t s ig n if

ic a n t p r o b le m f

o r th e p e ti ti o n e r is th a t the victim’s alleg ed re cantation is not newly discovere d evidenc e.
T h e v i c t i m ’ s s t a t e m e n t s ab o u t w h a th ap p e n e d h a v e a l w a ys been inc onsistent. . . . She had rec anted be fore t h e g uiltyplea. During the al[l] ocution of the g uiltyplea[,] i t was broug ht out that the victim had said on some occ asions that the petit ioner had not done the things he was a ccuse d of. All of these things were known to the petitioner at time the plea

was e ntere d. The a lleg ed re cantation is not newly discovere d evidenc e.
Further, this issue was raised i n t h e post conviction petition a ndthi s c ou rt

ru le d th e n th a t th e re c a ntatio n w a s n ot n e wl y discovere d evidenc e. Thi s petitioner was a ffor ded a me aning ful op po rtun ity

to p re sen t the r e c a nta tio n is su e a nddu e pr oc e ss require ments were satisfied.-7-

The pe titioner has pre sented the sa me claim in a pe tition for post-conviction relief and a petition for writ of e rror coram nobis that the victim’s statement at the evidentiary hearing, she wa s not sex ually

abused by

the def endant, is new ly

discovere d evidenc e entitling him to re lief. As the post-conviction court succinc tly explained, when the defe ndant pl ed guilty , he and his attorney knew the victim had made c onflicting statements as to what had occ urre d, including at least one c laim that the petitioner ha d not committed the acts she ha d acc used him of. Knowing this, t h e petitioner elec ted to plead g uilty ; and, the fac t that the victim is ag ain say ing that the abuse did not occur is not newly discovere d evidenc e. We conc urre d with this analy sis a ffirming the dismiss al of the amended pe tit ion fo r po st- c on vic tio n re lie f a nd c on tin ue to a g re e
. Th e pe tit ion e r ha s no t pres ent ed n ewl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e ; a nd , th us , h is c or a m no bis pe tit ion is w ith ou t me ri t.
Even if we

acc epted, a r

g u endo , t h at t h e v i ct i m ’s re ca n t at i o n d o es co n s t i t u t e n ew l y discovere d e vid e nc e , the pe tit ion e r ha s an ad de d bur de n be c a us e he ple d g uil ty . T he re are thr e e re a so ns a g uil ty plea c an be se t aside:

“(1) for a ny

fair and just r eason before the sentenc e is imposed, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f); (2) to cor

rec t ma n i fe st injust ice a fter se ntence but before the judgme nt becomes f

inal, Tenn. R. Crim. P. (32)(f) ; ( 3 ) o n c e t h e j u d g m e n ti s f

i n a l , i f t h e p l e a

w a s n o te n t e r e d v o l u n t ar i l y, intelligently , and knowing ly , or was obtaine d throug h the abridgme nt of any rig ht gua

rante ed by

the United States or Te n nessee Constit utions, S t ate v. Mackey , 553 S.W .2d 337, 340-341 (Te nn. 1977); Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-30-203.”
Ne ws ome v. Sta te , 9 95 S.W. 2d12 9, 13 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ) ( qu oti ng Sta te v. An ton io Demonte Ly ons, No. 01C01-9508-CR-00263, 1997 WL 469501, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug . 15, 19 97 )) . T his c ou rt

ha s p re vio us ly

e xpla ine d th a t w he n a

c on vic tio n s te ms f

ro m a g uil ty ple a , " in or de r f or a writ [o f e rr or

c or a m no bis ] t o is su e, th e [pe tit ion e r] w ou ld h a ve to p re se nt n e wl y discovere d evidenc e which would show that his plea was not voluntarily or knowing ly

enter ed." I d. at 134. The f

act that the pe titioner entere d a best intere st Alford plea doe s not chang e his burden or our ana ly sis. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct . 160, 164, 27 L . Ed. 2d 162 (1970) ( holding the sta ndard f or a " best interest" or Alfor d pl ea is "whethe r the ple a re pr e se nts a voluntary and intellige nt choice among the alternative course s of ac tion open to the defe ndant" ). This court previously has concurre d with the findi ng of the post-c onviction court following t h e e v i d e n t i ar y h e ar i n g t h a tt h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s g u i l t y p l e a s w e r e k n o w i n g a n d v o l u n t ar y:

As previously

stated, we conclude that the Petitioner rec eived the ef fec tive assistance of counsel, and ther efor e we conclude that the Petitioner was ade quately informed whe n he ente red his plea . Not-8- on ly did c ou ns e l in fo rm

the Pe tit ion e r o f p ote nti a l pi tf a lls we re he to proce ed to trial, but the trial court also informed the Petitioner at the plea procee ding that "if [he pled] g uiltyto the attempt to commit rape of a c hil d [c ha

rg e s], [h e ] p ro ba

bly [wo uld be re qu ir e d] to se rv e mos t of that se nte nc e wi tho ut be ing re le a se d on [the ] r e le a se elig ibi lit y date." At the conc lusion of the post-conviction hea ring , the trial court found t hat the Petitioner re ceive d eff ective a ssistance of c ounsel and that he ther efor e ente red his plea knowing ly , voluntari l y , and intelligently

. The evidenc e contained in the rec ord befor e us does not p re p o n d er at e a gai n s tt h at fi n d i n g.
J erry Britt, 2002 W L 3 1 1 2 6 6 3 8, at *13. The pe titioner arg ues that if he ha d known about the rec antation bef

ore his g uiltypleas, it would have resulted in a dif fer ent judg ment at t ri al. As t he c ou rt pr e vio us ly

no te d inthe po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng fi nd ing s, the vic tim ’s te sti mon y a t tria l c ou ld have be en “any thing f

rom very strong for conviction, to exoneration. But that wa s not a cha nce that a ny bo dy wante d to tak e .” I d. a t *1 4. Th e pe tit ion e r i s n ot e nti tle d to ha be a s c or pu s r e lie f b e c aus e h e h a s c h a n g e d h i s m i n d a s t o t h e p l e a s o f g u i l t y: [I ]f the plea ag ree ment was ne g otiated in g ood faith, t h er e ar e no alleg ations of fraud or misfeasa nce, and, in a ll other reg ards, the ple a a g re e me nt w a s e nte re d into vo lun tari ly a nd kn ow ing ly , [a de fe nd a nt] cannot [later] complain of that which he had w illingly barg ained f

or previously

. A p etition for the wri t of e rro r c or

am no bis is not i n t en d ed t o re l i ev e a p ar t y o f i t s o wn n egl i gen ce , i gn o ra n ce , o r c h an ge of mind.
Newsome , 995 S.W .2d at 134. Finally , the State ar g ues that the trial c ourt should have spe cifica lly found the pe tit i o ner’ s petition was barr ed by

the statute of limitations, rather tha n s implyfinding the petition was “not timely filed.” The s tatute of limit ations for seeking a writ of err or cor am nobis is one y ear from the date the judg ment become s final in the trial court. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-26-105, 27- 7-103; Mix on , 9 8 3 S. W. 2 d a t 6 7 1

. T h e p e ti ti o n e r c o n c e d e s h is p e ti ti o n w a s f il e d o u ts id e th e o n e-y ear statute of limitations but nonetheless a rg ues t hat due proce ss considerations, as set forth in Workman v. State, 41 S.W .3d 100 (Tenn. 2001) , and State v. Ratliff, 71 S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), require that the statute of limitations be tolled in his case. We respe ctfully disag ree
. I n Workman, our supreme court h el d t h at due process re quired the tolling of the one -y ear statute of limit ations where a petitioner in a capital c ase soug ht a writ of e rror cora m nobis based on n ew l y d i s co v er ed ex cu l p at o ryev i d en ce , co n c l u d i n g t h at t h e p et i t i o n er 's "i n t er es ti n o b t ai n i n g a he ari ng to p re se nt n e wl y

dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e that may e sta bli sh a c tua l in no c e nc e of

a c apit a l of fe ns e far outweig hs any

g overnme ntal interest in pre venting the litigation of stale claims." 41 S.W .3d at 103. Simi larly , this court held in Ratliff that due process required that the statute of limit ations for-9-

bring ing a writ o f c or a m no bis be tol le d in a no nc apit a l c a se wh e re the pe tit ion e r h a d n e wl y discovere d evidenc e in the form of a victim’s re cantation. 71 S.W .3d at 297-98.
Unlike t he si tuations prese nted i n Ratliff and W orkman, the evidenc e the petitioner is rely ing on in this case is not newly discovere d and, in fa ct, he kne w at the t i m e of his pleas of g uiltythe victim had made at least one stateme nt exonerating him. Know ing this, the pe titioner made knowing and volun t ar y

pleas of g uiltyand subseque ntly prese nted an untimely

and unmeritorious claim of newly discovere d evidenc e. We c onclude, there fore , that due proce ss doe s not r equire t h e tol ling of the statut e of

lim itatio ns
. CO NC LU SION
Ba sed upon the for eg oing a uthorities and re asoning , we a ffirm the or der of the trial court dismiss ing the petition.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE