alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1657 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1657

   To direct the Secretary of Defense to notify members of the Armed 
   Forces and State military departments of exposure to potentially 
                  harmful materials and contaminants.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 19, 2009

 Mr. Schrader introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To direct the Secretary of Defense to notify members of the Armed 
   Forces and State military departments of exposure to potentially 
                  harmful materials and contaminants.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. NOTIFICATION OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF EXPOSURE TO 
              POTENTIALLY HARMFUL MATERIALS AND CONTAMINANTS.

    (a) Notification Required.--In the case of a member of the Armed 
Forces who is exposed to a potentially harmful material or contaminant, 
as determined by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary shall, as soon 
as possible, notify the member, and in the case of a member of a 
reserve component, the State military department of the member, of the 
member's exposure to such material or contaminant and any health risks 
associated with exposure to such material or contaminant.
    (b) In-Theater Notification.--If the Secretary of Defense 
determines that a member of the Armed Forces has been exposed to a 
potentially harmful material or contaminant while that member is 
deployed, the Secretary shall notify the member of such exposure under 
subsection (a) while that member is so deployed.
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*Joseph Ferone, Appellant.

*People*v. *Perone,*120 App. Div. 323, affirmed.

(Submitted June 14, 1909;

decided October 19, 1909.)

Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered June 28,1907, which affirmed a judgment of the Court of General Sessions of the Peace in the city of New York rendered upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of murder in the second degree and an order denying a motion for a new trial.

*George M. Curtis*for appellant.

*Wm. Travers Jerome, District Attorney {Robert S. Johnstone*of counsel), for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

We have examined all of the exceptions taken on behalf of the defendant as to the charge, the requests to charge, the rulings on the admission and exclusion of evidence, and find no reversible error.

We are precluded from an examination of the facts by the unanimous affirmance of the judgment by the Appellate Division.

The judgment of conviction should be affirmed.

Cullen, Ch. J., Gray, Edward T. Bartlett, Werner, Willard Bartlett and Hiscook, JJ., concur; Chase, J., absent.

Judgment of conviction affirmed.
§ 2551.24 What are a sponsor's responsibilities for securing community participation? Cross Reference
Link to an amendment published at 89 FR 70542 , Aug. 30, 2024.
( a ) A sponsor shall secure community participation in local project operation by establishing an Advisory Council or a similar organizational structure with a membership that includes people: ( 1 ) Knowledgeable of human and social needs of the community;
( 2 ) With an interest in the field of community service and volunteerism;
( 3 ) Capable of helping the sponsor satisfy its administrative and program responsibilities including fund-raising, publicity, and meeting or exceeding performance measures;
( 4 ) With an interest in, and knowledge of, the range of abilities of older adults; and
( 5 ) Of a diverse composition that reflects the demographics of the service area.
( b ) The sponsor determines how such participation shall be secured, consistent with the provisions of paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(5) of this section.
[64 FR 14115, Mar. 24, 1999, as amended at 83 FR 64645, Dec. 17, 2018]
§ 2400.1 Purposes. ( a ) The purposes of the James Madison Memorial Fellowship Program are to: ( 1 ) Provide incentives for master's degree level graduate study of the history, principles, and development of the United States Constitution by outstanding in-service teachers of American history, American government, social studies, and political science in grades 7-12 and by outstanding college graduates who plan to become teachers of the same subjects; and
( 2 ) Strengthen teaching in the nation's secondary schools about the principles, framing, ratification, and subsequent history of the United States Constitution.
( b ) The Foundation may from time to time operate its own programs and undertake other closely-related activities to fulfill these goals.
#### Jay, receiver, etc. v. De Groot *et al.*

*■ Parties—death of a party pending an appeal—revivor.*

Pending an appeal from an order denying the petition of a creditor that a receiver assign to him a certain mortgage under foreclosure in the action, the mortgagor died, and his representatives were not brought in as parties .to the appeal: *Held,,*that the proper course was to order the hearing of the appeal to stand over, to enable the appellant to bring before the court the proceedings in revivor; and if such proceedings had not been regularly taken, to enable the appellant to bring the representatives of the deceased party before it in regular form.

Appeal by the Equitable Insurance Company from an order of the special term denying the petition of said company, for an order that the receiver assign a certain mortgage of William H DeGroot, under foreclosure in this action, to said company. Pending the appeal DeGroot died.

*Joshua M. Van Cott,*for Equitable Ins. Co., appellant.

*L. S. Chatfield,*for respondent.

Davis, P. J.

The head-note contains the substance of the opinion. The hearing was ordered to stand over to enable the appellant to bring the representatives of DeGroot before the court.

*Ordered accordingly.*
Case 1:10-cv-02040-RWR -JWR -CKK Document 6 Filed 12/09/10 Page 1 of 1
§ 411.93 Ongoing medical and mental health care for sexual abuse and sexual harassment victims and abusers. ( a ) Care provider facilities must offer ongoing medical and mental health evaluations and treatment to all UCs who are victimized by sexual abuse or sexual harassment while in ORR care and custody.
( b ) The evaluation and treatment of such victims must include, as appropriate, follow-up services, treatment plans, and, when necessary, referrals for continued care following their transfer to or placement in other care provider facilities or their release from ORR care and custody.
( c ) The care provider facility must provide victims with medical and mental health services consistent with the community level of care.
( d ) Care provider facilities must ensure that female UC victims of sexual abuse by a male abuser while in ORR care and custody are offered pregnancy tests, as necessary. If pregnancy results from an instance of sexual abuse, care provider facility must ensure that the victim receives timely and comprehensive information about all lawful pregnancy-related medical services and timely access to all lawful pregnancy-related medical services. In order for UCs to make informed decisions regarding medical services, including, as appropriate, medical services provided under § 411.92, care provider facilities should engage the UC in discussions with family members or attorneys of record in accordance with § 411.55 to the extent practicable and follow appropriate State laws regarding the age of consent for medical procedures.
( e ) Care provider facilities must ensure that UC victims of sexual abuse that occurred while in ORR care and custody are offered tests for sexually transmitted infections as medically appropriate.
( f ) Care provider facilities must ensure that UC victims are provided access to treatment services regardless of whether the victim names the abuser or cooperates with any investigation arising out of the incident.
( g ) The care provider facility must attempt to conduct a mental health evaluation of all known UC-on-UC abusers within seventy-two (72) hours of learning of such abuse and/or abuse history and offer treatment when deemed appropriate by mental health practitioners.
---

EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q (the
Report) of Wescorp Energy Inc. (the Company) for the quarter ended March 31,
2009, each of Douglas Biles, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and
Terry Mereniuk, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of the undersigneds knowledge and
belief: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained
in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.

|Dated: May 15, 2009 | /s/Douglas Biles                                                 
|------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------
|                    | Douglas Biles, Chief Executive Officer
      (Principal Executive
|                    | Officer)                                                         
|                    |                                                                  
|                    |                                                                  
|Dated: May 15, 2009 | /s/Terry Mereniuk                                                
|                    | Terry Mereniuk, Chief Financial Officer                          
|                    | (Principal Accounting Officer)                                   

---
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1762 

To repeal section 10(f) of Public Law 93–531, commonly known as the 

‘‘Bennett Freeze’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 26, 2009 

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK of Arizona introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To repeal section 10(f) of Public Law 93–531, commonly 

known as the ‘‘Bennett Freeze’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF THE BENNETT FREEZE. 

4 Section 10(f) of Public Law 93–531 (25 U.S.C. 

5 640d–9(f)) is repealed. 

Æ 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with BILLS
§ 264.77 How will we determine if a State met its Contingency Fund expenditure requirements? ( a ) States receiving contingency funds for a fiscal year must complete the quarterly TANF Financial Report. As part of the fourth quarter's report, a State must complete its annual reconciliation.
( b ) The TANF Financial Report and State reporting on expenditures are subject to our review.
#### Edward P. Reehil et al., as Executors of Edward Reehil, Deceased, Appellants, *v.*John F. Fraas, Respondent.

Appeal — erroneous order of Appellate Division reversing judgment of Trial Term “ on questions of law only ” — when exceptions to remarks of counsel not reviewable in Court of Appeals.

Where an order of tlie Trial Term was reversed by the Appellate Division “on questions of law only,” and none of the exceptions presents reversible error, the order of the Appellate Division must be reversed and judgment of the Trial Term affirmed.

Exceptions to the remarks of counsel in summing up aré addressed to the discretion of the trial court and the Appellate Division, an'd iaise no question of law for review by this court. The Appellate Division', in such case, could have reversed on the facts. .

*Beehil*v. *Bracts,*129 App. Div. 563, reversed.

(Argued December 7, 1909;

decided December 17, 1909.)

Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered *65December 30, 1908, which reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiffs entered upon a verdict and an order denying a motion for a new trial and granted a new trial.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained through the negligence of an employee of the defendant.

*Henry M. Dater*and *George F. Elliott*for appellants.

*Theodore H. Lord*and *Lyman A. Spalding*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

Bone of the defendant’s exceptions to rulings upon evidence, or upon instructions to the jury, presents error, justifying the reversal of the judgment by the Appellate Division. Hence, as the order appealed from states that the reversal was “on questions of law only,” it must be reversed and the judgment of the Trial Term affirmed. The errors principally insisted upon by the appellant below and respondent here, and which are discussed in the opinion below, relate to exceptions taken by the defendant to the remarks of the plaintiffs’ counsel in summing up his case to the jurors. These exceptions were addressed to the discretionary powers of the trial court and of the Appellate Division, and they raise no question of law for review by this court. If counsel exceed the limits, set by good faith, or by fair dealing, in their comm'ents on the testimony, the facts, or the incidents of the trial, the broad powers of the Appellate Division enable that court to order a new trial, if it is considered that the verdict has been unduly affected and that the rights of a party have been prejudiced. Hpon the theory of the reasoning in the prevailing opinion below, the court should have reversed upon the facts; in which case a new trial would follow, which, presumably, would be freed from the objections pointed out.

The order appealed from should be reversed and the judgment of the Trial Term affirmed, with costs in both courts to the appellants.

Cullen, Oh. J., Gray, Haight, Yann, Werner, Willard Bartlett and Hisoock, JJ., concur.

Ordered accordingly.
* Pursuant to 5th CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the

limited circumstances set forth in 5th CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-40812

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JESUS HERNANDEZ-PEREZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. M-98-CR-103-1

April 13, 1999

Before JOHNSON, DUHE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jesus Hernandez-Perez (“Hernandez”) appeals his sentence imposed

by the district court pursuant to his guilty plea conviction for

entering the United States without the Attorney General’s consent after

previously having been convicted and deported. Hernandez contends that

the court’s imposition of a sixteen level increase to his base offense

level under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) of the Sentencing Guidelines was based on

an unconstitutionally vague definition of “aggravated felony.” 

Although Hernandez made a written objection to the probation

officer’s recommendation for the sixteen level increase, he withdrew his
2

objection at the sentencing hearing. The withdrawl of an objection

constitutes the waiver of that objection by the defendant. See United

States v. Musquiz, 45 F.3d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). Because “waived

errors are entirely unreviewable,” Hernandez has effectively eliminated

his only claim on appeal. Id.

Even if Hernandez had not waived his claim of unconstitutional

vagueness, however, we would review it only for plain error as he did

not raise the issue at his sentencing hearing. See United States v.

Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1996). Under this standard, we

are not able to conclude that Hernandez has shown that a clear or

obvious error affected his substantial rights. See United States v.

Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-63 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

AFFIRMED.
§ 75.415 Required certifications. Required certifications include: ( a ) To assure that expenditures are proper and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Federal award and approved project budgets, the annual and final fiscal reports or vouchers requesting payment under the agreements must include a certification, signed by an official who is authorized to legally bind the non-Federal entity, which reads as follows: “By signing this report, I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief that the report is true, complete, and accurate, and the expenditures, disbursements and cash receipts are for the purposes and objectives set forth in the terms and conditions of the Federal award. I am aware that any false, fictitious, or fraudulent information, or the omission of any material fact, may subject me to criminal, civil or administrative penalties for fraud, false statements, false claims or otherwise. (U.S. Code Title 18, Section 1001 and Title 31, Sections 3729-3730 and 3801-3812).”
( b ) Certification of cost allocation plan or indirect (F&A) cost rate proposal. Each cost allocation plan or indirect (F&A) cost rate proposal must comply with the following: ( 1 ) A proposal to establish a cost allocation plan or an indirect (F&A) cost rate, whether submitted to a Federal cognizant agency for indirect costs or maintained on file by the non-Federal entity, must be certified by the non-Federal entity using the Certificate of Cost Allocation Plan or Certificate of Indirect Costs as set forth in appendices III through VII, and appendix IX. The certificate must be signed on behalf of the non-Federal entity by an individual at a level no lower than vice president or chief financial officer of the non-Federal entity that submits the proposal.
( 2 ) Unless the non-Federal entity has elected the option under § 75.414(f), the Federal Government may either disallow all indirect (F&A) costs or unilaterally establish such a plan or rate when the non-Federal entity fails to submit a certified proposal for establishing such a plan or rate in accordance with the requirements. Such a plan or rate may be based upon audited historical data or such other data that have been furnished to the cognizant agency for indirect costs and for which it can be demonstrated that all unallowable costs have been excluded. When a cost allocation plan or indirect cost rate is unilaterally established by the Federal Government because the non-Federal entity failed to submit a certified proposal, the plan or rate established will be set to ensure that potentially unallowable costs will not be reimbursed.
( c ) Certifications by non-profit organizations as appropriate that they did not meet the definition of a major non-profit organization as defined in § 75.414(a).
( d ) See also § 75.450 for another required certification.
§ 79.4 Investigation. ( a ) If an investigating official concludes that a subpoena pursuant to the authority conferred by 31 U.S.C. 3804(a) is warranted— ( 1 ) The subpoena so issued shall notify the person to whom it is addressed of the authority under which the subpoena is issued and shall identify the records or documents sought;
( 2 ) The investigating official may designate a person to act on his or her behalf to receive the documents sought; and
( 3 ) The person receiving such subpoena shall be required to tender to the investigating official, or the person designated to receive the documents, a certification that— ( i ) The documents sought have been produced;
( ii ) Such documents are not available and the reasons therefor; or
( iii ) Such documents suitably identified, have been withheld based upon the assertion of an identified privilege.
( b ) If the investigating official concludes that an action under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act may be warranted, the investigating official shall submit a report containing the findings and conclusions of such investigation to the reviewing official.
( c ) Nothing in this section shall preclude or limit an investigating official's discretion to refer allegations directly to the Department of Justice for suit under the False Claims Act or other civil relief, or to defer or postpone a report or referral to the reviewing official to avoid interference with a criminal investigation or prosecution.
( d ) Nothing in this section modifies any responsibility of an investigating official to report violations of criminal law to the Attorney General.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

      In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of 21st Century
Holding Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, James G. Jennings, III, Chief
Financial Officer of 21st Century Holding Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of 21st Century Holding Company.


By: /s/ James G. Jennings, III
------------------------------
   James G. Jennings, III
   Chief Financial Officer
§ 79.16 Disqualification of reviewing official or ALJ. ( a ) A reviewing official or ALJ in a particular case may disqualify himself or herself at any time.
( b ) A party may file with the ALJ a motion for disqualification of a reviewing official or an ALJ. Such motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit alleging personal bias or other reason for disqualification.
( c ) Such motion and affidavit shall be filed promptly upon the party's discovery of reasons requiring disqualification, or such objections shall be deemed waived.
( d ) Such affidavit shall state specific facts that support the party's belief that personal bias or other reason for disqualification exists and the time and circumstances of the party's discovery of such facts. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of the representative of record that it is made in good faith.
( e ) Upon the filing of such a motion and affidavit, the ALJ shall proceed no further in the case until he or she resolves the matter of disqualification in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section.
( f ) ( 1 ) If the ALJ determines that a reviewing official is disqualified, the ALJ shall dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
( 2 ) If the ALJ disqualifies himself or herself, the case shall be reassigned promptly to another ALJ.
( 3 ) If the ALJ denies a motion to disqualify, the authority head may determine the matter only as part of his or her review of the initial decision upon appeal, if any.
Exhibit 32.1

March 14,
2012
Via EDGAR
Securities and Exchange Commission
Judiciary Plaza
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549

Ladies
and Gentlemen:

In
connection with the Annual Report of MV Oil Trust (the "Trust") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, not in its individual capacity but solely as the trustee of the Trust, certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to its knowledge:



The
above certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350) and is not being filed as part of the
Form 10-K or as a separate disclosure document.

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUSTCOMPANY, N.A.
Trustee for MV Oil TrustBy:

/s/ MIKE ULRICH Mike Ulrich Vice President


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