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INSTITUTE

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Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

ARMS CONTROL AND PROLIFERATION

 CHALLENGES

TO THE RESET POLICY

Stephen J. Blank

November 2011

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-508-9
iii

FOREWORD

This monograph was presented at the Strategic 

Studies Institute (SSI)-Carnegie Council conference 

connected with the Council’s U.S. Global Engagement Program. In this case, the engagement in question is with Russia, and this monograph specifically 

addressed the issues of how those aspects of the reset 

policy with Moscow that concern arms control and 

proliferation are proceeding. It duly addresses the 

question of whether further reductions in strategic 

offensive weapons are likely anytime soon, i.e., is it 

possible to go beyond the parameters in the recently 

signed and so-called New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START) treaty with respect to reductions. Other critical issues involve the issues of missile defenses 

that Moscow vehemently opposes and the question of 

tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wishes to 

have Russia reduce. The asymmetries in force structures and in strategic orientations of the two or three 

main actors, the United States, NATO, and Russia, 

will make it difficult to move forward on these issues 

quickly.

At the same time, a key component of the reset 

policy is to obtain Russian assistance in stopping, if 

not reversing, Iranian and North Korean proliferation. 

Here, it appears that the reset policy has reached the 

limit of its utility, for Russia maintains a highly ambivalent and ambiguous policy with respect to Iran and 

the Six-Party Talks on North Korea have reached an 

impasse. This monograph analyzes Russia’s posture 

on these issues and suggests alternative courses of 

action for the United States to undertake with regard 

to Russia in order to advance U.S. goals, particularly 

with respect to the Korean issue.
iv

This is the first publication to come out of the conference, and this series of publications continues SSI’s 

mandate and past record of publishing timely and 

substantive contributions to the debate on critical national security issues as well as its record of academic 

outreach with leading institutions of higher learning, 

research, and debate on these selfsame issues of national security.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic 

Studies Institute’s resident expert on the Soviet bloc 

and the post-Soviet world since 1989. Prior to that he 

was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, 

Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; and taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and at the University of 

California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial 

Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in Asia, coeditor of 

The Soviet Military and the Future, and author of The 

Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many articles and 

conference papers on Russia, the Commonwealth of 

Independent States, and Eastern European security issues. Dr. Blank’s current research deals with proliferation, the revolution in military affairs, and energy and 

security in Eurasia. His two most recent books are 

Russo-Chinese Energy Relations: Politics in Command, 

London, UK: Global Markets Briefing, 2006; and Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for 

Indo-American Strategic Cooperation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005. 

Dr. Blank holds a B.A. in history from the University 

of Pennsylvania, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in history 

from the University of Chicago.

vii

SUMMARY

This monograph was presented at the Strategic 

Studies Institute (SSI)-Carnegie Council conference 

connected with the Council’s U.S. Global Engagement Program. In this case, the engagement in question is with Russia, and this monograph specifically 

addressed the issues of how those aspects of the reset 

policy with Moscow that concern arms control and 

proliferation are proceeding. It duly addresses the 

question of whether further reductions in strategic 

offensive weapons are likely anytime soon, i.e., is it 

possible to go beyond the parameters in the recently 

signed and so-called New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START) treaty with respect to reductions. Other critical issues involve the issues of missile defenses 

that Moscow vehemently opposes and the question of 

tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wishes 

to have Russia reduce. 

Therefore, this analysis delves deeply into Russia’s 

strategic posture with regard to the questions of why 

it needs and prioritizes nuclear weapons and what it 

thinks about the necessity for retaining large numbers 

of them (relatively speaking) to meet the security challenges posed not only by the United States and NATO, 

but also China. Based on this analysis, which takes into 

account the asymmetries in force structures and in 

strategic orientations of the two or three main actors, 

the author argues that the United States, NATO, and 

Russia will find it difficult to move forward on these 

issues quickly and achieve large-scale nuclear reductions or strategic harmony in the foreseeable future.

At the same time, a key component of the reset 

policy is to obtain Russian assistance in stopping, if 
viii

not reversing, Iranian and North Korean proliferation. 

Here, it appears that the reset policy has reached the 

limit of its utility, for Russia maintains a highly ambivalent and ambiguous policy with respect to Iran. 

As a result, we are possibly reaching a political dead 

end regarding Iran. Meanwhile, the Six-Party Talks on 

North Korea have reached an impasse. 

This monograph analyzes Russia’s posture on 

these issues and suggests alternative courses of action 

for the United States to undertake with regard to Russia in order to advance U.S. goals, particularly with 

respect to the Korean issue. The approaches suggested 

by the author regarding the impasse over Korea place 

this issue in a broader regional setting and take into 

account the fact that this issue is fully implicated in 

and involves the fast-changing dynamics of the overall international situation in Northeast Asia, e.g., the 

Rise of China and Russo-Chinese partnership there. It 

suggests far-reaching and innovative measures for the 

United States to take that would possibly break the 

logjam over Korea, but also would enable the United States to uphold a viable strategic equilibrium in 

Northeast Asia under conditions of dramatic change 

there.
1

ARMS CONTROL AND PROLIFERATION 

CHALLENGES

TO THE RESET POLICY

INTRODUCTION

The so-called New Start Treaty between Russia and 

the United States entered into force in February 2011. 

Consequently, this treaty constitutes a baseline for all 

future bilateral, if not multilateral, efforts at arms control and nonproliferation involving these two powers, 

including President Barack Obama’s long-term commitment to reaching nuclear zero. Moreover, due to 

the saliency of the issues of tactical nuclear weapons 

(TNW) and missile defenses in any future negotiation, 

this treaty possesses great importance for the future 

architecture of European security as well. The same 

holds true as Russia and the United States reduce their 

nuclear arsenals in the context of China’s unceasing 

rise in military power that causes anxiety for both 

these states. Therefore, the treaty and subsequent 

arms control developments will possess considerable 

or even greater significance for Asian security, especially from Russia’s standpoint.1

Finally, this treaty is the most important and impressive manifestation of what the two governments 

view as the success of the Obama administration’s reset policy since 2009. Certainly, it is the most tangible 

expression of bilateral cooperation under that policy 

framework. So if something happened to the treaty 

and the new regime it postulates, the reset policy 

would likely fall apart. Yet, despite its importance, the 

success of the reset policy, and of future bilateral or 

multilateral accords on arms control and nonproliferation, is by no means guaranteed. Indeed, one thing 
2

both sides, as well as external observers, agree about 

is the very fragility of the reset policy.2 And it is quite 

likely that if this policy were to falter, it would also diminish chances for further reductions in strategic arsenals among all nuclear powers, not just Russia and 

the United States. Thus the reasons for this fragility 

and the consequences for arms control and future cooperation on nonproliferation issues must be clarified.

There are many reasons for this fragility. Already 

by February 2011, discordant notes on European security were being heard in the European-Russian dialogue, a large part of whose current agenda is connected to issues of missile defenses and TNW, indicating 

substantive differences of outlook on key questions 

and continuing mutual mistrust.3

 Moreover, Russian 

governmental figures like Foreign Minister Sergei 

Lavrov now say that the the test of Russian relations 

with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

and of NATO’s “sincerity” is progress towards creating a joint missile defense system on Russia’s terms.4

This posture is analogous to Moscow’s similar statements that the success of the new treaty depends on 

the United States not building its missile defense system, for Russia has already formally stated that such 

construction, if it continues, represents grounds for 

withdrawal from the treaty. Some may believe that 

these positions are merely negotiating tactics. But they 

also suggest a continuing Russian resort to the Soviet 

tactic of endless demands based on a sense that Moscow can keep pushing at no cost to divide NATO and 

induce Western concessions, while also attempting 

to browbeat or intimidate the West into concessions. 

They also suggest Moscow’s continuing obsession 

with being able to intimidate Europe with the unimpeded threat of nuclear strikes against key European 
3

targets and its linked belief in the possiblity of using 

nuclear weapons in a warfighting role, however circumscribed that role might be. Nevertheless, Russia’s 

positions on these particular issues are hardly the only 

reasons for concern over the fragility of the reset policy, arms control, and progress on nonproliferation. 

Beyond those policy differences and the longstanding mutual suspicion between Moscow and the 

West as a whole (not just Washington), there exist 

substantial domestic constituencies in both the United 

States and Russia who are still driven by fundamental 

mistrust of each other. While those parties could not 

stop ratification of the treaty, major strategic issues still 

divide Russia and the United States as much as they 

unite them. For example, 39 Republican Senators cautioned the Obama administration about allowing Russia undue influence over the U.S. (and NATO) missile 

defense program.5

 And Republican Senate leaders are 

now attempting to force the administration to lock in 

$85 billion for nuclear modernization programs.6 One 

could easily find analogous constituencies in Russian 

politics.

What drives these state-to-state, or NATO-Russia, 

and intrastate domestic struggles are deep-rooted fears 

of each other, as well as continuing regional rivalries. 

Apart from the fate of arms control in the future, the 

potential for major regional rivalries in Eurasia, or unforeseen events like the NATO air operation against 

Libya that began in March 2011, have the potential to 

undermine, disrupt, and even possibly rupture the reset relationship. Apart from consideration of trends in 

arms control policy, we must remember Abraham Lincoln’s observation that “I claim not to have controlled 

events, but confess plainly that events have controlled 

me.” Thus issues unrelated to the arms control agenda 
4

can seriously compromise the capability of both Russia and the United States to move forward on that 

agenda as happened in 2001-09 and before that in the 

1970s and 1990s. Indeed, it has generally been the case 

that while Moscow and Washington have been able 

to find agreement on issues of bilateral arms control, 

previous efforts at détente in the 1970s, 1990s, and 

2001-09 have faltered largely due to rivalries over regional security questions in Eurasia. Today because so 

many of those issues remain unresolved and new ones 

like the NATO operation in Libya frequently crop up 

on the international agenda, the potential for discord 

remains strong. 

This is especially the case as major bilateral disputes over missile defenses, TNW, and Eurasian security have only been temporarily suppressed but not 

resolved, while both sides’ gains from the reset are 

of dubious durability. Furthermore, as Libya shows, 

Russia remains unwilling to accept the bottom line 

of U.S. national security policy, i.e., American leadership and (the intermittent) promotion of a global 

democratic order (which Russia regards as efforts at 

a unilateralist hegemony).7 Likewise, the gains for the 

United States may not be lasting either. As of this writing, there is no sign of lasting progress in Afghanistan, even though the United States killed Osama Bin 

Laden on May 2, 2011 (local time), and U.S. plans for 

remaining there after 2014 already arouse Russian 

suspicions.8 Moreover, both Iranian and North Korean proliferation continue unabated, calling into question the profitability and sustainability for the United 

States of the reset policy.
5

RUSSIA’S AMERICAN OBSESSION

Meanwhile, in Russia’s case it is even fair to call its 

fears about U.S. power, policies, and proclivities obsessions concerning U.S. objectives. Russian journalist 

Leonid Radzikhovsky has said, “The existential void 

of our politics has been filled entirely by anti-Americanism” and that to renounce this rhetoric “would be 

tantamount to destroying the foundations of the state 

ideology.”9

 Similarly, Fedor Lukyanov, Editor of Russia in Global Affairs, writes that: 

The mentality of Russian politics is such that relations 

with the United States remain at the center of universal 

attention and virtually any problems are seen though 

an American prism. This is partially a reflection of 

inertia of thinking which is finding it hard to break 

with perceptions of Cold War times. It is partially a 

demonstration of a hidden desire to have a sense of 

our own significance. There is still a desire to compare 

ourselves specifically with the only superpower.10

Lukyanov also notes that both the United States 

and Russia see the other as being a power in decline.11

And at least one Russian writer boasts that Russia 

bears primary responsibility for frustrating American unilateralism by shaping blocking coalitions that 

restrained and ultimately foiled U.S. designs.12 Such 

thinking validates the contention by Kari Roberts, a 

Canadian scholar, that, “It appears as though the common themes in Russian foreign policymaking continue to be how Russia views itself vis-à-vis the U.S. and 

its pragmatic approach to identifying and tackling 

foreign policy problems.”13 For example, there is good 

reason to see Russia’s Iranian policy as being closely 

tied to its perceptions of U.S. policies.
6

Concurrently, in Russia (if not the United States) 

issues connected to nuclear weapons make for major 

manifestations of political theater, and in both countries these issues are utilized for scoring points for or 

against parties in power regardless of the truth.14 In 

the Russian case, this appears not just in overt and 

covert domestic political struggles, but also in the 

widespread, ingrained, and wholly unsubstantiated 

conclusion that the United States is essentially Russia’s enemy and trying to suppress it, if not break it 

up, and that U.S. politics, like Russian politics, is essentially a matter of dictating to smaller powers and 

endless conspiracies, either mainly against Russia or 

within the U.S. Government. After all, that is the elite’s 

own experience of Russian politics. And this habit of 

Russian projection of domestic phenomena and values onto the “other,” i.e., the main enemy, the United 

States, dates back to Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin. 

This projection process institutionalizes what can only 

be called political or nuclear paranoia in the realm of 

threat assessment and political analysis, as well as the 

personal predilections of Vladimir Putin and many 

other figures.15 As this writer has observed elsewhere, 

Russian elites still officially subscribe to a watered 

down version of a Leninist threat paradigm that links 

together supposed internal “enemies” of the regime 

with outside powers, and this paradigm is regularly 

invoked by Russian authorities whenever problems 

manifest themselves.16

Indeed, it is not too much to say that there is a 

deeply held elite obsession with the United States as 

an exemplar enemy and potential partner, yet which 

is simultaneously regarded as being an a priori hostile 

power. This obsession with status, sovereignty, etc., 

and the U.S. attitude towards Russia, which is often 
7

perceived to be the mainspring of the overall U.S. international policy, contrasts sharply with the growing 

relative indifference in U.S. elite circles and U.S. society at large to Russia and its affairs.17 Thus Richard 

Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the 

Ronald Reagan administration wrote about the U.S.-

Russian relationship that:

In fact, that relationship has declined in importance to 

the point where it makes little difference whether the 

Russians have more nuclear weapons or fewer than 

they do now. The calculations of the consequences of a 

nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia, a proper obssession during the Cold War, are no 

longer relevant, and despite President Obama’s overblown claims, the New START Treaty is of no substantial benefit.18

This argument infuriates Russian elites, but there 

actually is considerable truth to it, as anyone observing the level of U.S. interest in Russia would quickly 

find out.

Another way of articulating this problem is to note 

that it is the fundamental nature of the Russian domestic political system, and a fact heightened by its 

juxtaposition to the U.S. and European systems, that 

drives the dynamic of hostility in East-West relations 

and fosters a situation where Russian thinking about 

security takes its cognitive and policy points of departure from what the German philosopher Carl Schmitt 

called the presupposition of conflict.19 On a regular basis, the glaring asymmetries in the two sides’ domestic 

political systems engender long-lasting perceptions 

based on mutual or reciprocal suspicion among powerful domestic constituencies that then try to obstruct 

meaningful progress in arms control or in overcoming 
8

outstanding differences on regional security issues in 

Eurasia. Consequently, any effort to determine not just 

Russia’s posture but its evolving perspectives must 

take into account both the competing security orientations of the two states and the so-called values gap 

that fuels the mistrust, in order to understand Russian 

thinking to determine where accords can be reached 

or differences bridged and where they cannot be so 

resolved.

Meanwhile despite the treaty and the supposed 

bonhomie generated by the bilateral rapprochement, 

in 2010-11 the supposed U.S./NATO threat still drives 

Russian planning. We see this in many different expressions of Russian policy. For example, Dmitri 

Trenin has written that: 

To demonstrate how seriously the Kremlin views that 

issue of U.S. missile defense capabilities, look at Russia’s national security strategy, released in May (2009). 

The document calls a U.S. first-strike capability, which 

is attainable once the United States builds a seamless 

global missile defense system, the most serious external military threat to Russia. Short of an actual first 

strike, a shift in the strategic balance would allow the 

United States to blackmail Russia politically. This may 

be paranoia, but there are reasons for it. In a situation 

when the United States and Russia are not allies, or 

even strategic partners, nuclear deterrence has become 

the unique pillar of Moscow’s strategic independence 

vis-à-vis Washington.20

Similarly Dmitri Suslov also argues that Moscow 

considers the United States a “potential enemy” and 

seeks to maintain nuclear parity with it by any means 

and a quantitative advantage in TNW to include AngloFrench nuclear forces, which it also regards as hostile. 

Indeed, he observes that Russia is now discussing de-
9

veloping new types of nuclear missiles to compensate 

for the creation of missile defense elements within the 

NATO framework in Bulgaria, Romania, the Eastern 

Mediterranean, and Poland.21 In a similar vein, it is not 

unusual to find in the Russian press analyses purporting to argue that despite the visible denuclearization 

of the U.S. arsenal, Washington still has plans that it 

is developing for a preemptive nuclear strike against 

Russia.22

By the same token, we find exceptionally well-connected analysts like Sergei Karaganov, Director of the 

Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, claiming that 

those pursuing nuclear zero are either motivated to or 

are unwittingly preparing trouble for Russia. Thus he 

writes that: 

It is obvious that the philosophy of mutual confrontation has not been overcome and has even received 

an energetic fillip as a result of the disarmament talks 

[this was before the treaty-author], although we do not 

actually threaten each other. We no longer have the 

contradictions whose resolution might envisage war, 

and we have many common interests. The professional ‘disarmers’ who have become more lively as a result 

of the treaty’s success are ready to draw us into new 

disarmament races which will open new “Pandora’s 

boxes.” The American coalition of antinuclear dreamers and cold cynics, who were seeking to convert the 

United States’ nonuclear superiority into political influence through the reduction of its nuclear arms that 

were cheapening it, has failed to launch movement 

toward a “nuclear zero.” In addition, it turns out that 

it will not be possible to maintain even this superiority 

because of budget deficits in America.23

We also see this threat assessment in the new effort to create a force to keep the United States at bay. 
10

President Dmitry Medvedev has recently decreed the 

creation of a new joint aerospace defense strategy and 

force structure combining existing air forces, antiaircraft, and ballistic missile defense (BMD) units with 

Russia’s early warning system and space control assets that is to be organized by the end of 2011.24 The 

subsequent creation of this new aerospace defense 

force (Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona or VKO) 

with 70,000 new officers can only reinforce that threat 

perception, since it is precisely a NATO/U.S. air-space 

attack that is the scenario most dreaded by Russian 

planners. 

In fact, Russian military leaders openly state that 

in the context of the concurrent negotiations that led 

to the treaty and its aftermath and Russia’s defense 

reform that began in 2008, the role of the Strategic 

Rocket Forces (SRF) will actually grow despite the reductions in numbers.25 Moreover, beginning in 2009 

the Russian military began to modernize its nuclear 

arsenal with new systems, prolong existing ones, develop its command control capabilities, etc. In that 

context, the chief claim of the new RS-12 and RS-24 

(Yars) missile systems is that they have independently 

targeted warheads and can evade (or so it is claimed) 

any Western missile defense, an attribute that allegedly fulfills former President Putin’s earlier promise of 

asymmetric measures against U.S. missile defenses.26

Simultaneously Russia is pursuing an agreement with 

the Obama administration that would give it access to 

U.S. technology for interceptors designed to destroy 

enemy missiles on impact.27

Although critics of the administration’s policy 

point to this effort that is consonant with the administration’s efforts to loosen export controls, reset with 

Russia, and move towards nuclear zero as a perfect 
11

storm; it is equally, if not even more, illustrative of the 

schizophrenic Russian atittude that while the United 

States is its main enemy, it also is the purveyor of 

the most desired and needed Russian defense technologies. Therefore, a reset or detente-like policy with 

America is needed.28 Even after the treaty was signed, 

prominent defense commentators like Mikhail Barabanov wrote that the role of nuclear deterrence in 

Russian relations with the United States will actually 

grow because:

The U.S. will never view Russia as a friend even in 

principle, because existence of other powerful countries is in principle unacceptable to America as the 

world hegemon, as they limit Washington’s claims for 

world supremacy by the very fact of their existence. 

There are two such countries now, namely Russia and 

China. Actually this very fact is the main reason for 

tensions in the U.S.’ relations with Russia and China 

under any regimes.29

Other arguments along this line, e.g., a recent commentary by Retired General M. A. Gareyev, President 

of the Academy of Military Sciences, typically contend 

that geopolitical pressures from the United States and 

China will only grow, that future wars may not be confined to local or regional theaters, and that “regarding 

security, Russia has never been in such a crunch as 

in the early 21st century since, perhaps, 1612.” This is 

a rather bizarre and even hysterical threat perception 

for a World War II veteran.30 Nevertheless, such analyses are all too visible in Russian public commentary 

on defense and security issues.

Meanwhile, this fear of such a U.S. and allied aerospace attack has been a major, though hardly the only, 

cause of both a dramatic increase in defense spending 
12

with these systems being a priority after nuclear weapons, and the termination of Russia’s defense reform 

of 2008-11. The Russian press frequently comments 

about the potential for U.S. aerospace attack both by 

existing weapons and new ones in design like the X37B Orbital Aircraft.31 Increasingly Russian military 

writers see the air and space attack from the United 

States and/or NATO as an integrated operation, as in 

Libya and Kosovo, and regard it as the primary operational threat to Russia.32 Since Russian analysts and 

officials regard U.S. conventional precision-strike capabilities as being strategic ones in their impact, they 

are not only striving to build an integrated aerospace 

defense against them but to use the treaty process, 

both in 2009-10 and in the future, as a means of reducing the threat.33

Indeed, so great is the perception of threat (before 

Libya) that Russia, in complete contradiction to the 

earlier defense reform’s stated goals of reducing a 

bloated army and officer corps, created this new aerospace defense with 70,000 new officers at double pay, 

even as it sharply raises procurement targets. A new 

justification for this rise in defense spending, though it 

was planned no later than 2010, is the NATO intervention or air operation in Libya that officials from Premier Putin on down now claim justifies this immense 

expansion of defense spending. Thus a report on a 

recent visit to the defense plant in Votkinsk observed 

that:

Putin pointed out that the enormous sums being invested in the State Defence Order are being diverted 

from other areas. And these sacrifices have to be justified. The state-of-the-art technologies that will emerge 

in the OPK will subsequently cross over into civilian 

sectors. And the events surrounding Libya also leave 
13

the premier in no doubt regarding the necessity for 

and timeliness of the reinforcement of Russia’s defense might. All too readily do the United States and 

its allies decide to employ armed force against sovereign states, Putin stressed.34

This argument also suggests that the Libyan operation will exact substantial costs upon the new reset policy of the Obama administration and Russo-American 

relations. All this is happening even as Russia cannot 

stop the insurgency that is inflaming the entire North 

Caucasus, and as its economy as a whole stagnates. 

Nor does it want to even study counterinsurgency to 

deal with this threat or the equally serious potential 

one of insurgency in Central Asia, as its response to 

ethnic pogroms in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 illustrates.35

Clearly, Russia also sees nothing wrong with missile defenses that can presumably take out the U.S. 

nuclear capability despite years of argumentation 

against BMD. But this new branch of the armed forces 

also shows the expectation of what Russian military 

writers believe would be the decisive first strike by 

U.S. and Allied forces, namely a conventional aerospace and missile attack supported by space-based 

or space-traversing assets.36 Therefore, this enduring 

mistrust and melange of asymmetric cognitive approaches between Washington and Moscow are not 

simply a matter of differing ideas about the future 

trajectory of arms control and nonproliferation discussions. Rather, they continue to reflect and to express 

a fundamental clash of values that does not preclude 

negotiated treaties on arms control—which, after all, 

date back to 1963—but which seriously impedes the 

process of reaching such accords. 
14

One major consequence of this presumption of 

hostility that impedes, though it does not prevent, the 

reaching of accords with Moscow is that deep-rooted 

belief of the Russian leadership that due to this presumption of hostility, Russia must remain wedded 

to a posture of mutual assured destruction, mutual 

deterrence, and an almost literal and crude argument 

in favor of the offense-defense reaction described in 

earlier generations of writing on these subjects. From 

Russia’s standpoint, the only way it can have security 

vis-à-vis the United States given that presupposition 

of conflict is if America is shackled to a continuation 

of the mutual hostage relationship based on mutual 

deterrence that characterized the Cold War, so that it 

cannot act unilaterally. To the degree that both sides 

are shackled to this mutual hostage relationship, Russia gains a measure of restraint or even of control over 

U.S. policy. For as Patrick Morgan has observed, this 

kind of classic deterrence “cuts through the complexities of needing to have a full understanding of or dialogue with the other side. Instead it enables a state, in 

this case Russia, to “simplify by dictating, the opponent’s preferences.”37 (Italics in the original.) Thanks 

to such a mutual hostage relationship, Russian leaders 

see all other states who wish to attack them or even to 

exploit internal crises like Chechnya as being deterred. 

Therefore, nuclear weapons remain a critical component in the ensuring of strategic stability and, as less 

openly stated, in giving Russia room to act freely in 

world affairs.38

Russian Chief of Staff General Nikolai Makarov 

warned that: 

The factor of parity should be accompanied by the 

factor of stability, if the U.S. missile defense begins to 
15

evolve; it will be aimed primarily at destroying our 

nuclear missile capabilities. And then the balance of 

force will be tipped in favor of the United States....

With the existing and maintained parity of strategic 

offensive means, the global missile defense being 

created by the U.S. will be able to have some impact 

on the deterrence capabilities of the Russian strategic nuclear force already in the medium term....This 

may upset the strategic balance of force and lower the 

threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Although 

missile defense is a defensive system, its development 

will basically boost [the] arms race.39

Neither is this just rhetoric. A recent article also 

points out that current Russian nuclear programs aim 

to overcome or even neutralize U.S. missile defenses.

The impression is that the Kremlin no longer believes 

in America’s military omnipotence. Russia responded 

to the ultimatum with a maiden flight of its latest T-50 

fighter and rearmament of its antiaircraft defense 

system with T-400 Triumph complexes. (This may be 

referring to what we call the S-400 SAM-author). To 

all appearances, Triumphs are ASAT weapons also 

capable of intercepting and destroying inbound ballistic warheads. Continuation of Bulava missile tests 

was proclaimed as well. Work on the missile will be 

brought to its logical end, sooner or later. Specialists 

are even working on a concept of the future strategic 

bombers that will replace TU-95s and Tu-160s one fine 

day.40

Since Moscow rigorously adheres to this mutual 

hostage concept, it cannot trust the United States, 

and any unilateral U.S. advance in defenses must be 

compensated by greater Russian offensive and defensive capabilities. For example, as noted above, missile 

defenses should lead Russia to procure missiles that 
16

can evade any defense. The following citations demonstrate this deep-rooted belief in the mutual hostage 

relationship, deterrence of the enemy, and the actionreaction process regarding armaments among the 

Russian political and military leadership. First, Lavrov told an interviewer in February 2007 that:

Our main criterion is ensuring the Russian Federation’s security and maintaining strategic stability as 

much as possible. . . . We have started such consultations already. I am convinced that we need a substantive discussion on how those lethal weapons could 

be curbed on the basis of mutual trust and balance of 

forces and interests. We will insist particularly on this 

approach. We do not need just the talk that we are no 

longer enemies and therefore we should not have restrictions for each other. This is not the right approach. 

It is fraught with an arms race, in fact, because, it is 

very unlikely that either of us will be ready to lag behind a lot.41

Here Lavrov signaled Russia’s unwillingness to 

leave a mutually adversarial relationship with America and its presupposition of mutual hostility as reflected in both sides’ nuclear deployments. Similarly, 

Alexei Arbatov then ridiculed the George H. Bush 

administration’s view, stated by Ambassador Linton 

Brooks, the former U.S. arms control negotiator, that 

because the two sides are no longer adversaries, detailed arms control talks are no longer necessary, as 

either naiveté or outright hypocrisy.42

Since then Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has stated that:

Issues of strategic offensive and defensive arms are 

inextricably linked. To deny this relationship is meaningless because it is the essence of relations between 
17

the countries that have the appropriate potential in 

both areas. An augmented capacity of one of the parties in the realm of missile defense is automatically 

echoed in the form of plans and decisions of the other 

party in the realm of strategic offensive arms. And 

not even obliquely, but in the most direct way what is 

happening in the field of missile defense and U.S. relations with its East European allies on this topic has an 

impact on our START follow-on negotiations. Without 

recognition of the relationship between strategic and 

offensive defensive arms, there can be no such treaty, 

it cannot take place.43

Likewise, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov 

told the Munich Security conference in February 2010: 

It is impossible to speak of reducing nuclear potentials 

in earnest while a state that possesses nuclear weapons is developing and deploying systems of defense 

against means of delivery of nuclear warheads that 

other states possess. It is like the sword and shield 

theory, where both are continuously developing with 

the characteristics and resources of each of them being 

kept in mind.44

Putin’s late 2009 remarks in Vladivostok fit right 

into this outlook. 

The problem is that our American partners are developing missile defenses, and we are not, . . . But the 

issues of missile defense and offensive weapons are 

closely interconnected. . . . There could be a danger 

that having created an umbrella against offensive 

strike systems, our partners may come to feel completely safe. After the balance is broken, they will do 

whatever they want and grow more aggressive.45
18

And this outlook has continued since the treaty 

was signed. As part of its ratification process, the 

Duma formally stated that both parties to the treaty 

accept that strategic offensive wapons and defenses 

are interrelated and that this relationship becomes 

more important as reductions in offensive systems occurs.46 Similarly, Ivanov, speaking at the 2011 Munich 

Security conference stated that the creation of missile 

defenses leads to the development of strategic offensive weapon and thus a new arms race. Any efforts to 

buld a shield inevitably lead to comparable efforts to 

build a sword.47

REGIONAL SECURITY IN EURASIA IN 

RUSSIAN THINKING

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that 

many Russian writers rightly attribute the persistence 

of deep mistrust despite our being 20 years past the 

end of the Cold War to the frozen mentality of deterrence and/or the mentality of a containment policy.48

Thanks to all these factors that go into Russian thinking about arms control and nuclear weapons, the 

linkages between competing regional security policies and programs in Eurasia, and the two states’ orientations to those issues, are invariably linked with 

with the agenda of arms control and nonproliferation negotiations, to cite some obvious examples. The 

current discussions on connecting Russia to the U.S. 

and NATO missile defense programs or the linkage 

between progress on the Conventional Armed Forces 

in Europe (CFE) treaty negotiations and the issue of 

TNW—including all of Russia—testifies to the abiding, if not growing, importance of these regional and 

strategic linkages.
19

In particular, for the Russian Federation this linkage between regional security and strategic agendas 

has become a paramount feature of overall Russian 

thinking about Russian security in both Europe and 

Asia. As Jacob Kipp has written: 

For Russia, which inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal, but has faced a serious change in its international 

position, the nuclear equation is, in fact, shaped by 

Russia’s status as a regional power in a complex Eurasian security environment, where nuclear issues are 

not defined exclusively by the U.S.-Russian strategic 

nuclear equation but by security dynamics involving 

interactions with Russia’s immediate periphery. On 

the one hand, Russia’s security responses have been 

shaped by a post-Soviet decade of sharp internal political crises, economic transformation, social instability, 

demographic decline, and the collapse of conventional 

military power. The impact of these developments has 

been uneven across Russia, leading to very distinct security environments which have demanded regional 

responses. The initial focus of security concerns for 

both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation 

was primarily upon European security. This was the 

primary focus of the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition 

and the place where its militarization was most evident.49

Consequently, despite the treaty and the evident 

satisfaction of both parties with the current course of 

policy, the problems stemming from this fundamental 

disparity between them have not been overcome, and 

the reset policy is therefore subject to reversal, particularly if issues of regional security in Eurasia lead 

one or both sides to revert back to the presupposition 

of a conflicted relationship. If we are to understand 

the cognitive mainsprings of Russian thinking and security policy, we must further clarify this point of the 
20

nexus between regional and global security in Russian 

thinking and policy.

Fedor Lukyanov, like many others, has observed 

that while Russia has lost its global perspective, it seeks 

to retrieve it.50 Andrei Tsygankov further amplifies this 

observation by stating that although Russia seeks to 

remain a regional power in Europe, the Caucasus, and 

Central and East Asia, it acts globally. In other words, 

it uses its geographical location astride several key 

Eurasian regions to force itself into both regional balances and thus leverage itself into being accepted as a 

global actor. To the extent that it feels itself excluded, 

as it did by the United States, from participating in 

key regional security fora, policies, or institutions, it 

pursues a policy of resistance using, among other instruments of power, its nuclear weapons.51 As a result, 

and following Kipp’s remarks above, from Russia’s 

standpoint there can be no purely regional crisis in 

the key regions where it is situated or where it deems 

itself to have important interests. Consequently, the 

potential for any crisis to escalate, even against its 

participants’ intentions, creates the ever-present possibility of a global crisis, if not conflict, where nuclear 

arms provide either the background music or are the 

primary instrumental soloists.52

This inherent linkage from the regional to the 

global level also shapes Russian approaches to the future agenda of arms control. Apart from the perceived 

linkages from regional to strategic level issues in 

Moscow’s perspective, several prospective issues for 

future negotiations are intrinsically linked in Russian 

eyes. For example, the United States (and NATO) have 

long since argued that the next round of arms control 

treaty negotiations deal with the issues of TNW in Europe. Moscow has equally consistently rejected that 
21

stance, saying that countries owning or possessing 

TNW must first remove them to their home territory 

before any such talks could begin, thereby leaving Europe denuded of them. But now, according to Deputy 

Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, Russia argues that, although it has repeatedly called on other nuclear states 

to remove TNW from abroad and leave them at home, 

restrict maneuvers with them on the territory of nonnuclear states, and disassemble structures for their 

prompt deployment abroad, “nonstrategic nuclear 

weapons grow increasingly outside NATO and Russia.” In his words North Korea, Pakistan, Israel, and 

China are Russia’s neighbors and their TNW, particularly China’s, provide a threat.53 While Ivanov’s 

remarks should enlighten us concerning what Russia 

regards as its real strategic borders, what also is noteworthy that here is the announcement again, even if 

implicitly, that China and Israel are potential enemies 

and Pakistan is both a potential enemy and a proliferation threat. 

Beyond the fact that this statement reflects a comparable presupposition of conflict with regard to all 

these states from Moscow’s standpoint, Ivanov’s remarks also reflect Moscow’s posture that in any future round of arms control talks all nuclear states, not 

least China, should be at the table.54 Makarov too has 

advocated bringing all nuclear powers to the table in 

the next negotiating round.55 The Foreign Ministry has 

followed suit, saying the five major nuclear powers 

must join the next round of arms reductions talks.56

Thus progress on TNW must somehow take account 

of the growing threat Russia perceives from China’s 

increasing TNW threat, as well as its steadily developing conventional missiles and forces.57 Other analogous linkages may well exist with regard to Russian 
22

perspectives on arms control issues. Again, for example, as Sam Nunn has argued, if there is to be success 

on curbing proliferation of nuclear (and chemical and 

biological) weapons, multilateral cooperation is essential. Thus other nuclear states must be fully committed partners.58 Therefore, virtually every conceivable 

issue will play into the agenda of any future multilateral arms control negotiation, allowing any of those 

states to obstruct nonproliferation measures to secure 

its nuclear agenda, making cooperation on nonproliferation even more complicated than it has been in the 

past.

Ivanov’s remarks fall into a broader context, namely that of the developing or growing Russian anxiety 

about Chinese military power and Russia’s lack of 

anything near an adequate conventional response to 

it. There are multiplying signs of this anxiety and of 

Russia’s efforts to reposture its conventional forces to 

deal with it. But of course, ultimately the TNW and 

other nuclear systems are the great equalizer in this 

theater, i.e., the Russian Far East (RFE).59 By the time 

Moscow published its new defense doctrine in 2010, it 

had begun to consider the rise of China, not only as an 

example that could be emulated but also as a potential 

threat to the RFE. Thus the doctrine not only reiterated the by now long-standing invocation of a NATO 

threat, it also added new threats that appear to be focused, albeit without saying so, on China. Specifically, 

the 2010 doctrine cites a “show of military force with 

provocative objectives in the course of exercises on the 

territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation or its allies” and “stepping up the activities of 

the armed forces of individual states (groups of states) 

involving partial or complete mobilization and the 

transitioning of these states’ organs and military command and control to wartime operating conditions.”60
23

Commentators here and abroad interpreted this 

language as pointing to the Russian perception of 

an increased potential Chinese threat based on the 

modernization of the Chinese armed forces and on 

exercises in 2009 that seemed to presage a possible 

mission directed against the RFE.61 Indeed, in 2009 

commanders for the first time began to speak publicly, 

undoubtedly with Moscow’s assent, about a genuine 

military threat from China.62 So while one motive for 

the Vostok-2003, and possibly the more recent Vostok 

-2010, exercise may be connected with the need to 

defend energy deposits in the RFE, a second motive 

clearly had to do with the rise of China.63

Vostok-2010 ended with a simulated tactical nuclear weapon strike on China to repel a ground invasion 

of Russia. Meanwhile, the extensive American coverage of China’s new stealth Fighter, the J-20 and its 

naval construction program, including advanced antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), overlooks the fact that 

all these capabilities could be used against Russia as 

well. China has its own TNW, as well as thousands of 

conventional and nuclear missiles that could easily be 

targeted on Russia. As Kipp observed in 2010:64

A year ago, informed Russian defense journalists still 

spoke of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] as a mass 

industrial army seeking niche advanced conventional 

capabilities. Looking at the threat environment that 

was assumed to exist under Zapad 2009, the defense 

journalist Dmitri Litovkin spoke of Russian forces 

confronting three distinct types of military threats: “an 

opponent armed to NATO standards in the GeorgianRussian confrontation over South Ossetia last year. In 

the eastern strategic direction Russian forces would 

likely face a multi-million-man army with a traditional approach to the conduct of combat: linear deployments with large concentrations of manpower and 
24

firepower on different axis. In the southern strategic 

direction Russian forces expect to confront irregular 

forces and sabotage groups fighting a partisan war 

against ‘the organs of Federal authority,’ i.e., Internal 

troops, the border patrol, and the FSB [Federal Security Service].”65 By spring of this year, a number of 

those involved in bringing about the “new look” were 

speaking of a PLA that was moving rapidly towards 

a high-tech conventional force with its own understanding of network-centric warfare.66 Moreover, the 

People’s Liberation Army conducted a major exercise 

“Stride-2009” which looked like a rehearsal for military intervention against Central Asia and/or Russia 

to some Russian observers.67

Beginning in 2009, overt discussions of the potential Chinese military threat began to surface in the 

military press. These statements were deliberately 

planned to call attention to Chinese military prowess.68 And they all pointed to the threat of an invasion, 

not just by a large, multi-million man army, but also, 

as Roger McDermott observes, to the example derived 

from China’s military modernization that has led China to an informatizing, if not informatized, high-tech 

capable military in just over a decade.69 In a dilapidated and remote theater that is an economy of force 

theater with vast distances, inadequate infrastructure, 

and a declining industrial and manpower base:

In the first instance, in any military conflict the Russian VVS (Air Forces) cannot guarantee air superiority against the Chinese. Moreover, they do not possess sensor-fused cluster munitions, though in theory 

their surface-to-surface missiles (SSM’s) could deliver 

cluster munitions depending on whether the missile troops remained intact long enough. Faced with 

an advancing PLA division or divisions’ early use of 

TNW would present a viable option.70
25

In this context, what is particularly telling about 

Russia and China’s relations regarding the Arctic and 

Pacific energy deposits is the new trend in Russian naval policy; Russia’s new plans for naval construction, 

especially in the RFE, also have access to the Arctic 

in mind.71 Indeed, experts see the primary direction 

or mission of four new directions for the fleet and 

its new modernization program as being the protection of Russia’s access to oil, gas, and other mineral 

reserves or deposits on Russia’s continental shelf. All 

in all, 36 submarines and 40 surface ships are to be 

added by 2020.72 But beyond this primary mission and 

the other three directions for future naval construction, these plans betray a reorientation of Russia’s naval emphasis to the Asia-Pacific and to a new emphasis on meeting the challenge posed by China’s naval 

buildup.73 This naval construction is supposed to help 

Russia compensate for its vast conventional inferiority 

in numbers and quality vis-à-vis China in the RFE.74

Here we should understand that Russia’s forces, 

particularly those in the North and the Far East may 

be deployed on a “swing basis” where either the Fleet 

or air forces in one theater move to support the fleet or 

air forces in the other. Russia has carried out exercises 

whereby one fleet moves to the aid of the other under 

such a concept.75 Likewise, Russia has rehearsed scenarios for airlifting ground forces from the North to 

the Pacific in order to overcome the “tyranny of distance” that makes it very difficult for Russia to sustain 

forces in Northeast Asia. And the revival of regular 

air patrols over the oceans have clearly involved the 

Pacific-based units of the long range aviation forces as 

well as some of the air forces based in the north and 

Arctic that fly in the areas around Alaska.76 Indeed, 
26

nuclear exercises moving forces or targeting weapons from the north to the Pacific or vice versa have 

also occurred.77 To the degree that Arctic missions 

become part of the regular repertoire of the Russian 

armed forces, they will also to some degree spill over 

into the North Pacific. This all preceded Vostok-2010. 

Since then, China’s military program has continued 

apace. Consequently, new Chinese developments like 

the conventional Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 

(IRBM) DF-16, the new ASBM, etc. threaten not just 

the United States and its allies but also a whole range 

of Russian military targets deep into Russia.78

RUSSIA’S FORCE MODERNIZATION AND 

POSITIONS ON THE NEW NUCLEAR AGENDA

The foregoing perspectives are essential to understanding of Russian thinking as we discuss possibilities 

for future arms control negotiations involving Russia. 

In February-March 2011, Russian spokesmen outlined 

Russia’s positions on almost all the outstanding issues 

for a future arms control negotiation. Russia’s positions concerning the evolving nuclear agenda as well 

as its ongoing weapons program reflect its assessment 

not only of the situation created by the new treaty but 

also its assessment of current or future threats and 

longstanding Russian policy objectives. 

First of all, Russia is currently undertaking its 

newest in a series of long-term defense modernization projects. The State Armament Program submitted to Medvedev and the Duma for 2011-20 now totals 

20.7 trillion rubles ($646 billion), of which 19.4 trillion 

rubles goes to the needs of the Ministry of Defense. 

Of that total, 79 percent will go to the acquisition and 

purchase of high-tech armaments (including nuclear 
27

weapons, which remain a priority). This represents a 

tripling of the current 2006-15 program that supposedly provides for delivery of 1,300 models of equipment 

and armament, of which 220 require modernization or 

creation of new capacities.79 Within this new program, 

which also entails the comprehensive modernization of the entire machine tool sector along with the 

high-tech sector, the state order (Goszakaz) for 2011 

will go up by a third to 1.5 trillion rubles in 2011 and 

then another third by 2013 to 2 trillion rubles.80 Right 

now, there is a serious debate regarding the nuclear 

sector. Many defense industry sectors possess the 

ambition to virtually double ICBM (intercontinental 

ballistic missile) production through 2020 by modernizing production lines and producing heavy liquidpropellant missiles and are spending nearly 77 billion 

rubles towards these ends.81 Russia aims to modernize 

its quantitative arsenal to conform to the new treaty’s 

requirements. Furthermore, because it maintains that 

the United States has not definitively settled upon a 

missile defense model (which is strange given the administration’s policy), it allegedly needs to modernize 

qualitatively to have designs that can counter space 

weapons, a set of weapons that Moscow apparently 

fully believes the United States intends to create.82

Therefore, one way to meet these demands is to 

create a heavy liquid-propelled ballistic missile, an issue that has touched off a major debate among missile 

designers with First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin supporting it, and Yuri Solomonov, a 

famous missile designer at the Moscow Institute of 

Thermal Technology, opposing it. In opposition to 

the calls for this new missile are the designers of the 

Topol-M, Yars, and Bulava solid propellant systems. 

In other words, Russia’s nuclear program, although 

work has started on the liquid-propellant system, is in 
28

the throes of a debate, so its final outcome and prognosis remain somewhat unclear at this time.83 Despite 

this as yet unresolved debate, the current expectation is that the ultimate design will copy that of the 

Satan (SS-18) ICBM and be insensitive to the effect of 

an electromagnetic (EMP) impulse, launchable from a 

silo even after a missile has hit it, and capable of carrying a large complex of defense penetration aids so 

that it can evade missile defenses and deliver a 10-

ton combat payload to any point in the world. It also 

will include 10 individually-guided warheads of the 

megaton class, i.e., it will be a multiple independently 

targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV).84 These plans date 

back at least to 2008 when it was first announced that 

the new RS-24 would be MIRVed.85

Meanwhile Deputy Defense minister Vladimir 

Popovkin is moving forward and outlining a huge 

Russian conventional and nuclear rearmament program through 2020. 

Popovkin said Russia plans to develop a new liquidfueled heavy ICBM to carry up to ten warheads, and 

having a service life of up to 35 years. Former RVSN 

[Russian Strategic Missile Forces] Commander General-Lieutenant Andrey Shvaychenko talked about a 

new liquid heavy missile as far back as late 2009, and 

the issue’s been debated in the Russian military press 

since. Popovkin said the Defense Ministry plans to accept the Bulava SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic 

missle] and the first two Borey-class SSBNs [ship, submersible, ballistic, nuclear] this year. There will be 4-5 

Bulava launches this year. Recall [that] to date only 

7 of 14 Bulava tests have been successful. Addressing 

the missile’s past failures, Popovkin said there were 

many deviations from the design documentation during production. He also said Russia plans to build 

eight SSBNs to carry Bulava by 2020. He was unclear 

if this includes the first two Borey-class boats.86
29

It is clear that this construction program contemplates, not just deterrence, but a war using nuclear 

weapons, albeit in what is possibly a restricted number of contingencies but clearly premised on a U.S./

NATO attack. Indeed, as Popovkin said in another 

interview, the first priority is the strategic deterrent, 

which includes nuclear weapons, early warning, and 

missile and aerospace defense (i.e., the new VKO 

force).

The first priority [is] the strategic deterrent force. They 

have two components: the strategic nuclear forces, as 

well as a system of missile warning, missile defense 

and aerospace defense. The second priority [is] a long 

list of high-precision weapons, whose use is based on 

information support from space. Third - automated 

command and control systems [ACCS]. In the next 2 

or 3 years, [it is proposed] to link all species of ACCS 

in a single management system. Modernize it so it was 

with an open architecture and it allows you to build 

the capacity in any direction.87

Finally, as part of the nuclear program the General Staff commissioned research institutes to determine how many nuclear warheads are needed for a 

guaranteed retaliatory strike against a potential enemy, presumably to confirm the General Staff’s earlier 

insistence on 1,500 warheads as an irreducible minimum under present circumstances.88 These studies 

and building programs obviously have a great deal of 

bureaucratic muscle and financing behind them, so in 

practical terms it will be very difficult to win Russian 

assent to large reductions in strategic forces until and 

unless other nuclear powers, including but in addition 

to the United States, also agree to them. This makes 

attaining the goal of nuclear zero anytime soon a very 

dubious proposition.
30

However, beyond this set of considerations, there 

are also other reasons for suspecting that, despite the 

effort to complete a huge conventional upgrading of 

the Russian military, Russia in 2015-20 will continue 

relying much more on nuclear weapons and nuclear 

deterrence. Basically, it has already become clear that 

defense industry, which has never been able to provide the armed forces with its requirements, has again 

failed as of 2010. Recent articles make the extent of this 

failure very clear. Specifically: 

Last year, for example, they did not get a single nuclear submarine cruiser, although the Yuri Dolgoruky

with 12 Bulava missiles on board and a multirole 

Yasen-class nuclear submarine were to have been commissioned at the very least, and only 5 out of 11 communications and reconnaissance satellites were sent 

into space. Nor did the fleet get a project 20380 corvette. Only six out of nine Yak-130 aircraft planned for 

delivery were received and just 78 out of 151 BMP-3 

infantry fighting vehicles.89

Yet, typically, nobody received a public reprimand 

for this confirming that “nonfulfillment of the Army’s 

orders in the defense industry has become the norm for 

our country.”90 Under the circumstances, the planned 

modernization of the forces’ armaments remains an 

equally dubious proposition. But, in turn, that raises 

the question of how the military is to fulfill President 

Medvedev’s 2008 directive that by 2020 Russia should 

have:

A guaranteed nuclear deterrent system for various 

military and political circumstances must be provided 

by 2020. . . . We must ensure air superiority, precision 

strikes on land and sea targets, and the timely deployment of troops. We are planning to launch large-scale 
31

production of warships, primarily, nuclear submarines with cruise missiles and multi-purpose attack 

submarines. . . . We will also build an air and space 

defense network.91

Furthermore, the planned conventional modernization also seemed to imply an interest in exploring 

the possibilities for more sophisticated conventional 

means of deterrence. Thus former Deputy Defense 

Minister and current Duma member Andrei Kokoshin 

called the Severodvinsk class of fourth generation nuclear powered but conventionally armed submarines a 

non-nuclear deterrent, suggesting this interest in nonnuclear forms of deterrence and of a concept of deterrence “ladders,” some or most of which would only 

require the use or display of conventional systems.92

Absent sufficient capabilities of this kind, Russia will 

have little choice but to rely predominantly on nuclear 

deterrence against the United States (NATO), China, 

and potential proliferators in its vicinity. Yet as Medvedev and Defense Minister Serdyukov have publicly 

said, Moscow will not even be able to reach the treaty’s limits for nuclear weapons by 2020, forcing it both 

to modernize its existing arsenal, i.e., MIRVs, extend 

existing weapons past that date, and hope for the best 

regarding conventional systems until 2020.93 Therefore, the already visible failure of Russia’s modernization project adds another to a long series of question 

marks that must be put against the idea of obtaining 

serious nuclear reductions in the foreseeable future.

Indeed, Kokoshin has said that nuclear deterrence 

will remain the keystone of Russian defense for the future, that there are no conceivable alternatives to nuclear deterrence even in the distant future (i.e., the presupposition of hostility with both the West and China, 
32

not to mention everyone else cited here, will continue 

till then). Therefore Russia must continue modernizing its land, sea, and air-based nuclear weapons and 

its tactical and operational-tactical nuclear systems, 

too.94

RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE NEW TREATY

Russian perceptions of where it stands as a result 

of the new treaty also represent an obstacle to progress because they are firmly ensconced in the matrix 

of the mutual hostage and presumption of hostility 

mentioned above. Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly 

Antonov, who negotiated the treaty, calls it the gold 

standard for future treaty negotiations.95 He and his 

colleagues certainly regard it favorably but largely 

because it reduced the U.S. threat and strengthened 

Russia’s relative position, not that it enhanced international security. Lavrov echoed Antonov’s description of the treaty.96 Serdyukov stated that not only 

does the treaty provide a guaranteed level of deterrence adequate to Russia’s security; it allows Russia to 

update 70 percent of strategic carriers and warheads 

or 90 percent of those belonging to the Strategic Missile Troops, while America must reduce its arsenal. 

Like Lavrov, he said that if the United States continues to build missile defenses, the treaty allows Russia 

to make “an adequate response, i.e., withdraw from 

the treaty.”97 Medvedev’s national security advisor, 

Sergei Prikhodko, voiced his approval of the clauses 

limiting deployed delivery vehicles and launch systems and the incorporation of heavy bombers into 

those categories that limit U.S. breakout potential, a 

key Russian demand.98
33

Other commentators cheered the reduction of inspection visits to each other’s facilities, which they regarded as burdensome and as a means of transmitting 

intelligence data to Washington. Therefore, they also 

cheered the elimination of the requirement for transmitting remote telemetry of test launches of news missiles for the same reasons. Russia also secured exemption for monitoring for road-mobile Topol land-based 

ICBMs. Getting the United States to count some conventional carriers as strategic ones, equating them to 

nuclear weapons in line with Russian assessments of 

those systems, is another positive outcome from Russia’s point of view. Yet Russia’s capabilities for building up its arsenal were not affected. At the same time, 

of course, the treaty was a compromise and reflected 

some American gains, namely, safeguarding the missile defense program and on verification.99 Similarly, 

Ruslan Pukhov, a noted defense commentator, observes that these benefits for Russia, along with the 

overall reduction of both sides’ nuclear potential, is 

very beneficial for Russia and that, “It is obvious that 

this is not very beneficial for the U.S. on the whole.”100

Likewise, Alexei Arbatov argues that the treaty limits both U.S. nuclear and conventional strategic forces 

and gives Russia means of leverage upon the United 

States.101 For these reasons, given the Russian sense of 

having won or at least prevailed in the negotiations, it 

is hardly surprising that Antonov said further disarmament is contingent upon both sides implementing 

the treaty (presumably with the hidden implication 

that should the United States build defenses, Russia 

might exercise its option for withdrawal).102 Unfortunately, it is precisely these Russian gains that have 

aroused the ire of Republican opponents of the treaty 

in the United States and underscores the continuing 
34

bilateral mistrust that could yet poison the reset policy 

and future arms control talks, not to mention progress 

towards a nuclear zero.

Finally, in advance of a new round of negotiations, 

there is a decided difference in the contending approaches of Russia and the United States. As recently 

reported in connection with Deputy Foreign Minister 

Ryabkov’s recent visit to the United States: 

While U.S. officials have focused publicly on a nuclear 

treaty that would cover reducing the numbers of not 

just strategic arms but also shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons, Ryabkov talked first about turning to 

the control of conventional arms in Europe and reaching some predictability of forces on the continent. He 

said shaping the military relationships on the ground, 

where Russia has vastly fewer troops and less equipment, would relate to the future of nuclear disarmament. He [Ryabkov] talked about the difficulty of finding the correct “platform” for any future agreements, 

saying that weapons in outer space, non-nuclear strategic weapons, other nuclear nations and missile defenses also have to be considered.103

This last impediment to future reductions and 

progress to nuclear zero is hardly insurmountable in 

and of itself. But added to the existing obstacles, and 

to the pressure of unforeseen events like Libya, all of 

these obstacles to further reductions represent serious 

obstructions to negotiations toward that end. For example, in earlier statements Ryabkov also heightened 

the importance of serious efforts to settle regional conflict that upset stability globally.104
35

PROLIFERATION

The two outstanding and unresolved issues of 

nuclear proliferation, Iran and North Korea, also pose 

significant challenges to any enduring Russo-American reset policy, let alone amity and genuine cooperation on international security. Indeed, the two governments’ divergent approach to these issues reflects 

wide conceptual and perceptual gaps between them. 

It is safe to say that for almost 20 years, proliferation 

has become a virtual obsession of U.S. policymakers 

who, nonetheless, have little to show for this obsession. Indeed, we went to war in Iraq over this issue, 

only to entrap ourselves. We see proliferation as jeopardizing the global and regional nuclear order, threatening U.S. allies in the Middle East and East Asia, and 

deterring our ability to project conventional military 

power throughout the world. But we do not really focus on the regional security dynamics of these issues 

in the way that Moscow does. Instead, Russia views 

these issues primarily as regional security challenges 

or in that context where the linkages discussed above 

between regional security in key areas and Russian 

national security assume mounting importance. Given Russia’s ambitions to challenge the United States 

regionally through the formation of counterbalances 

to it, the result is a set of contending issues where Russia sees us as threatening principles and interests that 

it deems central to its security.

Moscow firmly opposes adding new members to 

the nuclear club and regards proliferation as a threat. 

Therefore it has worked with Washington to eliminate “loose nukes” and to discourage new states in 

the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or 

former Warsaw Pact members from expanding earlier 
36

nuclear programs. It has steadily (at least rhetorically) 

claimed that it is seeking to channel Iran’s nuclear program into one supervised by the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA).105 Russia has also established 

controls over foreign economic operations with nuclear materials, special non-nuclear materials and corresponding technologies, as well as dual-use goods and 

technology, principally as a component of the policy 

of nonproliferation. The Export Control Law, adopted 

in 1999, has locked in the term “Export Control” specifically for this sphere. The 1995 Law on national regulation of foreign trading activities described Export 

Control as the full set of measures for the implementation of a “transfer procedure” for agreed-upon goods, 

technologies, and services. The 1999 law codified this 

term as “foreign trading, investment, and other activities, including production cooperation in the field 

of the international exchange of goods, information, 

work, services, and results of intellectual activities, 

including exclusive rights to them (intellectual property).” This means not only the export of goods and 

technologies abroad, but also their transfer to a foreigner within the territory of the Russian Federation. 

In January 1998, the Russian government introduced 

rules for “all-encompassing control” (catch-all).106

Nonetheless, Moscow has repeatedly stated that 

on nonproliferation issues it follows its own interests. 

While Russia regards proliferation as a threat, it comes 

fifth in Russia’s new defense doctrine after a whole 

series of U.S.-inspired threats like NATO enlargement 

and missile defenses. Moreover, the doctrine explicitly states that Russia expects that by 2020 it will be 

living in a proliferated world.107 In early 2002, Defense 

Minister Sergei Ivanov outlined Russian thinking and 

policy concerning proliferation. 
37

Russia scrupulously adheres to its international obligations in the sphere of non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons, means of their delivery, and corresponding technologies. The key criteria of Russian 

policy in this sphere are our own national security, the 

strengthening of our country’s international positions 

and the preservation of its great power status.108

Therefore, Russia evaluates proliferation issues not 

according to whether the regime is democratic or not, 

but on the basis of whether a country’s nuclearization 

would seriously threaten Russia and its interests.109 In 

commenting on President Putin’s June 2007 proposal 

to let the Americans jointly manage the Russian missile defense radar at Gabala, Azerbaijan, Chief of Staff 

General Yuri N. Baluyevsky stated that Washington’s 

claim that Russia now admitted to an Iranian threat 

was a misinterpretation. While Russia never denied a 

global threat of nonproliferation of missiles and nonproliferation, “we insist that this trend is not something catastrophic, which would require a global missile defense system deployed near Russian borders.”110

More recently, Serdyukov stated that, “We don’t share 

all the West’s views on the capacities of the Iranian 

nuclear program.”111 Likewise, Lavrov and his Deputy 

Sergei Ryabkov state that though sanctions might become inevitable if Iran does not comply with the IAEA 

regarding enrichment of uranium; Iran represents no 

threat to Europe or America. Moreover, Moscow has 

no evidence of its planning a military nuclear program that would justify missile defenses.112 Moscow’s 

continuing opposition to U.S. missile defenses partly 

stems from that outlook.

Accordingly, Moscow tends to view American 

policy towards nonproliferation in jaundiced fash-
38

ion, displaying a visible Schadenfreude when North 

Korea tested missiles and then a nuclear weapon in 

July and October 2006.113 Or Russian officialdom often 

views Washington’s insistence on nonproliferation 

controls as mainly an effort to pressure competitors in 

the nuclear and arms markets.114 Russia’s new defense 

doctrine openly says that the number of states having nuclear weapons will increase.115 While this might 

be regarded as a negative trend, it is certainly strange 

to concede proliferation in advance of the fact. At the 

same time, Russian leaders also publicly say that this 

is mainly a U.S., not necessarily a Russian, concern. 

Alexei Arbatov’s 2009 analysis of Russian thinking 

about proliferation represents the most detailed explication of Russia’s approach. As Arbatov notes: 

For Russia the acquisition of nuclear weapons and 

ballistic missiles by India and Pakistan and the prospects of further proliferation are adding some new elements to a familiar and old threat, rather than creating a dramatic new one, as is the case with the United 

States. The USSR and Russia have learned to live with 

this threat and to deal with it on the basis of nuclear 

deterrence, some limited defenses (like the Moscow 

BMD system and national Air Defenses) and through 

diplomacy, which is used to avoid direct confrontation (and still better, to sustain normal relations) with 

new nuclear nations.116

Other analysts confirm that Russia responded to 

Indo-Pakistani proliferation in a low-key manner and 

that Russian elites still regard America as the only or 

most likely potential adversary.117 Instead, Moscow 

regards vertical proliferation (qualitative improvement) as opposed to horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons to new states with greater alarm than 
39

does the United States. Russia’s posture thus reverses 

America’s that takes greater alarm at horizontal proliferation.118

So while nuclear and missile proliferation are serious Russian security issues, not least because of 

Russia’s geographical proximity to all existing and 

potential proliferators, Russia does not profess undue alarm at this trend. Unlike America, it advances 

no claim to be a global “policeman,” does not deploy 

military sites or armed forces abroad (except in some 

post-Soviet states) and does not employ its forces in 

serious combat operations. In fact, Russia’s greatly reduced conventional power capabilities, coupled with 

its expansive geopolitical ambitions, are leading it to 

become a major exporter of sensitive nuclear technologies to would be proliferators as it seeks to reduce 

U.S. influence in world politics.119 Thus it avoids challenging other countries, including actual or potential 

nuclear and missile-capable regimes. Due to Russia’s 

vulnerability and lack of reliable security protection 

and commitments from other nations, its nonproliferation stance is much more cautious and flexible than 

that of the United States. Indeed, it sees the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran as 

potential partners, not enemies, and therefore will not 

categorically oppose their programs, as does Washington. 

Moreover, given Russia’s post Cold War weakness, 

it has been forced to confront other security threats 

that are incomparably more urgent to it than proliferation. These threats, as listed by Arbatov, comprise:

• The instability and bloody conflicts across the 

post-Soviet space and in the North Caucasus 

of Russia proper (which has a 1,000 kilometer 

(km) common border with the volatile South 

Caucasus).
40

• NATO’s continuous extension to the east 

against strong Russian objections.

• Continuing stagnation of Russian armed forces 

and defense industries and Russia’s growing 

conventional and nuclear inferiority to the 

United States and NATO.

• The threat of expanding Muslim radicalism in 

the Central Asia (7,000 km of common border 

with Russia).

• The scary growth of economic and military 

power of China (5,000 km of common border 

with Russia).

• The United States plans to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe.120

Arbatov further observes that: 

There is a broad consensus in Russia’s political elite 

and strategic community that there is no reason for 

their nation to take U.S. concerns closer to heart than 

its own worries - in particular if Washington is showing neither understanding of those problems of Russia, nor any serious attempts to remove or alleviate 

them in response for closer cooperation with Russian 

on non-proliferation subjects. 121

Finally, Iran is an extremely important geopolitical 

partner of Russia’s, a growing “regional superpower” 

that balances out the expansion of Turkey and the 

increasing U.S. military and political presence in the 

Black Sea/Caspian region and Middle East, and simultaneously contains Sunni Wahhabism’s incursions 

in the North Caucasus and Central Asia.122 Russia also 

views Iran as the dominant regional power in the 

neighborhood who can project power into the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Therefore, 
41

Moscow values Iran’s refraining from doing just that 

by its pro-Iranian policies.123 Likewise, Russia does 

not take the proliferation threat nearly as seriously as 

does the United States and its allies in Europe and the 

Middle East.124 Consequently it views the current situation in Iran and North Korea quite differently than 

does the United States.

Iran.

For the United States, Iran is the primary test case 

of Russian support for nonproliferation, and the current administration, like its predecessor, has invested 

enormous time and effort in obtaining Russian support. The administration evidently believes that America needs Russian support to curb Iran’s proliferation 

threat and obviously this dictates some concessions to 

Russia in return for its support of U.S. efforts. According to administration spokesmen like Michael McFaul 

of the National Security Council, if Russia wanted 

an adversarial relationship with the United States on 

Iran, there are many things that it could do to but has 

not done to worsen the U.S. situation there.125 President Obama has voiced his optimism that the United 

States, with Russian (and Chinese) cooperation will 

secure “tough, strong sanctions” on Iran.126

Despite the reset policy’s gains whereby Russia 

has refrained from selling Iran the S-300 and voted for 

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 

1964 imposing sanctions on Iran, this ongoing crisis 

underscores the divergent perspectives between Moscow and Washington. But it also demonstrates how 

Russia utilizes the Iranian issue as part of its approach 

to the United States. Thanks to the reset policy, the 

administration has at least for now substantially al-
42

tered the correlations between U.S.-Russia and RussoIranian relations by demonstrating to Moscow that it 

can make gains with the United States in return for 

more distancing from Iran. Clearly, Russia’s decision 

made in September 2010 to cancel the sale of the S-300 

anti-air missile to Iran closely correlates with the improvement of Moscow’s ties to Washington.127 Thus 

in September 2010, Moscow invoked the United Nations (UN) sanctions resolution for which it voted as 

grounds for terminating the sale of the S-300 and even 

returning the money paid for it to Iran, despite the fact 

that it could have exempted such sales and stay within 

the language of the resolution.128 Indeed, earlier Russian and Chinese pressure had led the United States 

to weaken its originally intended list of sanctions directed against Iran.129 So, clearly, the administration’s 

belief that it had an understanding with the Russian 

government was validated by the decision to terminate the sale of the S-300. As a result, the administration may well argue that its stance is justified by Russia’s termination of the sale of the S-300 to Iran.130

As Arbatov also observes, unlike America, Russia does not view North Korea and Iran as potential 

enemies. Iran is a major consumer of Russian arms, 

which helps the military-industrial sector to survive, 

given many years of limited defense orders for the 

Russian armed forces. Finally, Iran is an extremely 

important geopolitical partner of Russia’s, a growing 

“regional superpower” that balances out the expansion of Turkey and the increasing U.S. military and 

political presence in the Black Sea/Caspian region 

and Middle East, and simultaneously contains Sunni 

Wahhabism’s incursions in the North Caucasus and 

Central Asia.131 Russia also views Iran as the dominant 

regional power in the neighborhood who can project 
43

power into the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian 

Gulf. Therefore, Moscow, by its pro-Iranian policies, 

values Iran’s refraining from doing so.132 Likewise, 

Russia does not take the proliferation threat nearly as 

seriously as does the United States and its allies in Europe and the Middle East.133

For example, diplomat Gleb Ivashentsov, then Director of the Second Asia Department in the Russian 

Foreign Ministry, told a Liechtenstein Colloquium on 

Iran in 2005 that: 

Iran today is probably the only country in the greater 

Middle East that, despite all of the internal and external difficulties, is steadily building up its economic, 

scientific, technological, and military capability. 

Should this trend continue, Iran—with its seventy 

million population, which is fairly literate, compared 

to neighboring states, and ideologically consolidated, 

on the basis of Islamic and nationalist values; with a 

highly intellectual elite, with more than eleven percent 

of the world’s oil and eighteen percent of natural gas 

reserves; with more than 500,000 strong armed forces 

and with a strategic geographic position enabling it 

to control sea and land routes between Europe and 

Asia—is destined to emerge as a regional leader. This 

means that the Islamic Republic of Iran will be playing 

an increasing role in resolving problems not only in 

the Middle East and Persian Gulf area but also in such 

regions that are rather sensitive for Russia as Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Caspian region. This is 

why dialogue with Iran and partnership with it on a 

bilateral and regional as well as a broad international 

basis is objectively becoming one of the key tasks of 

Russia’s foreign policy.134
44

Similarly Matthew Kroenig has more recently 

written that:

In fact, Russia and China have not been willing to 

authorize tough sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, not primarily because they have important economic interests in country as many analysts believe, 

but because they are not particularly threatened by 

Iran’s nuclear development. Russia and China are not 

currently operating military forces in the Middle East 

and, given the degradation of Russia’s military since 

the end of the Cold War and China’s military modernization focusing on a Taiwan Straits contingency, 

it is very unlikely that these countries will have the 

capability to do so for the foreseeable future. For this 

reason, they do not need to worry that nuclear proliferation in Iran will constrain the military freedom 

of action. They might be concerned that Iran could 

attack them in the bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear strike, 

or provide nuclear weapons to terrorists who might 

target them, but such scenarios are extremely unlikely. 

In sum, Beijing and Moscow have very little to fear 

from nuclear proliferation in Iran. They are unwilling 

to place serious pressure on Tehran and are willing to 

continue economic relations with the country, given 

that many strategic thinkers in Russia and China believe that what is bad for Washington must be good 

for Moscow and Beijing, some foreign officials undoubtedly welcome Iranian nuclear development as a 

means of tying down the United States. 135

Yet Iran still defies the IAEA, enriches uranium, 

and builds new nuclear centers.136 Nonetheless, in 

August 2010 Moscow completed the Bushehr reactor 

and opened it to production, lest it lose Iranian cooperation and the huge sums invested there. Bushehr’s 

opening underscores the continuing unilateralism of 

Russia’s Iran policy and the limited scope or cooperation with Washington on that issue. 
45

Neither have Iran’s sharp polemics on the S-300 nor 

Moscow’s threat of sanctions should Iran fail to accept 

enrichment outside Iran and IAEA monitoring led to 

any sign that Moscow will support truly meaningful 

sanctions on Iran. Indeed, when after the June 2010 

UNSC resolution, the United States and the European 

Union (EU) imposed their own further sanctions on 

Iran, Moscow called those new sanctions “unacceptable” and warned again that the use of force could 

lead to disaster.137 In mid-July, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko and Iranian Oil Minister Masoud 

Mirkazemi jointly announced a 30-year road map for 

bilateral cooperation in oil and gas.138 The large deals 

mapped out as part of that partnership include cooperation on the transportation, swaps, and marketing of natural gas; sales of petroleum products and 

petrochemicals, and Russia’s establishment of a $100 

million liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant to supply 

remote regions of Iran.139 Shmatko made it clear that 

Russia would not accept sanctions other than those of 

the UNSC, that those sanctions did not apply to this 

new deal, and that Russia would not be hindered by 

the existing sanctions in drawing up energy cooperation plans with Iran. Indeed, he saw no limits to bilateral energy cooperation. Russia also apparently was 

involved in May in trying to broker an Irano-TurkishBrazilian deal to swap low-enriched uranium fuel for 

higher enriched fuel for medical reactors.140

Despite warnings to Iran, Moscow still formally 

opposes “paralyzing sanctions,” the only kinds that 

make sense. Medvedev speaks of “smart sanctions” 

and clarified to Washington the limits of what Russia will support to meet the twin objectives of inducing Iran to stop enrichment and weaponization; and 

second, to advance Russian interests.141 Moreover, the 
46

smart sanctions that Moscow now advocates would 

not amount to an arms or energy embargo on Iran. 

Even now Lavrov and Ryabkov state that though sanctions might become inevitable if Iran does not comply 

with the IAEA regarding enrichment of uranium, Iran 

represents no threat to Europe or the United States. 

Moreover, Moscow has no evidence of Iran planning 

a military nuclear program that would justify missile 

defenses.142 Similarly, Andranik Migranyan, Director 

of the Kremlin-backed Institue for Democracy and Cooperation in New York said that Russian cooperation 

with the United States on further sanctions against 

Iran is “highly unlikely.” He further stated that for the 

United States to get Russian support Moscow would 

have to be “duly compensated,” i.e., bribed, by ceasing NATO enlargement, missile defense deployments, 

the rearming of the Georgian Army, “blunt and unceremonious interference” in the internal affairs of the 

new republics, and any assistance to political forces 

who are hostile to Russia.143 In other words, Russia 

will distance itself from Iran to the degree that Washington guarantees it undisputed hegemony in the CIS 

and Eurasia. Most recently, Russia now objects to the 

publication of a new UN report on Iran describing 

Iranian violations of UN sanctions resolutions against 

it.144

While Russia professes to oppose Iranian nuclearization (and supports the plan to bring Iranian nuclear 

spent fuel to Russia), it has been a prime supporter 

of the process, exporting scientists and technologists 

to Iran throughout the 1990s and providing major assistance for Iran’s conventional weapon, space, and 

missile programs.145 Some recent reports actually allege the existence of a long-term high-level Russian 

program to smuggle weapons clandestinely into Iran, 
47

using the Algerian and Syrian governments, Kurdish 

terrorists, and members of Russian organized crime 

in Spain.146 Moreover, many Russians have persuaded 

themselves that Washington owes Moscow something 

in regard to Europe and the Middle East.147

Clearly, it seems that key sectors like the energy 

and arms sectors in Moscow are impeding any effort 

to cooperate with Washington. This bears out what we 

have said above. In particular, we see a time-honored 

Russian negotiating tactic. As Vladimir Socor writes:

First, Moscow approved the sanctions resolution after almost two years of procrastination, watering it 

down and leaving the S-300 issue ambiguous. During 

this time the Obama Administration saw its leeway in 

Eurasia constrained by the quest for Russian support 

against Iran. In the next stage (now) implementation 

turns out to be subject to a Russian “mechanism” yet 

to be defined (to be negotiated). Classically Russia 

makes a deal cashing in a quid-pro-quo, only to start 

negotiating again for the deal’s implementation subject to some other quid-pro-quo. In the third stage, it 

will be up to Russia’s president to list the sanctionsbanned weapons, and by the same token, to omit certain items, leaving Russia free to deliver these to Iran. 

Thus the Kremlin will ultimately interpret the UN Security Council resolution on the S-300’s and not only 

on this issue.148

It is not difficult to decipher what quid-pro-quos 

Moscow now seeks. According to Fedor Lukyanov:

There will be no automatic agreement by Russia to 

toughen the sanctions. In Moscow’s opinion, it has already gone very far as it is; . . . But Russia’s support of 

the sanctions in May and generally the marked change 

in position in the last six months are above all the result of the “exchange” of the Iranian question for no 
48

deployment of missile defense in Eastern Europe. For 

Moscow to go further, a new understanding is needed, 

although at this point it is unclear on what. A great 

deal depends on the ratification of the START treaty; if 

its ratification in the US Senate fails, that will have an 

effect on all the related topics, including Iran.149

This is now an urgent question, as Iran claims to 

have obtained S-300 missiles and is moving ahead 

on its satellite and nuclear programs to the best of its 

ability.150 Although Russia has denied selling or transferring these missiles, as has Ukraine; if these claims 

are true, the missiles could only have come from Russia and/or through the support of some third party 

like Belarus and Ukraine, which Russia has used in 

the past to sell abroad weapons with which it did not 

want to be publicly associated. Moreover, it is clear 

to any observer that Russia’s arms sales program is 

riddled with massive corruption that could conceivably allow for such sales to occur.151

This outlook should not have eluded U.S. commentators for, as John Parker observes in his masterful study of Russo-Iranian relations: 

No matter how much Russia and the United States 

might share security concerns over Iran’s nuclear program and expanding influence in the Middle East, a 

common approach by Washington and Moscow was 

always undercut by Russia’s rivalry with the United 

States other interests in Iran, and the historical approach to dealing with that country.152

That historical approach, as Parker demonstrates, 

is one that recognized that Russia must always have 

close relations with Iran as a neighbor, even though it 

could ultimately represent a threat to Russia because 
49

of its missile and nuclear programs. Indeed, already in 

1993, Moscow recognized that those programs could 

represent a threat to its territory, neighbors, and vital interests.153 This is one reason why the Russian 

government has continued to sell Iran weapons after 

1992: precisely because it recognized that Iran had the 

potential to disrupt the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 

even possibly Afghanistan, Moscow realized that it 

had to blend arms sales with close monitoring by its 

security service in regard to Iranian activities.154 Economic calculations to keep defense industry markets 

and preserve that sector, in addition to Russia’s longstanding and probably not unfounded belief that if it 

did not sell weapons to Iran, Europe and the United 

States would do so, also drive Moscow’s large arms 

sales program to Iran. Therefore, arms sales to Iran 

have always been an arrow in Moscow’s quiver to 

prevent Iran from pursuing a policy of interference in 

the border regions, and it has succeeded handsomely 

from Russia’s point of view.155 To openly renege on 

outstanding contracts, e.g., the S-300 surface to air 

missile, would not only cause financial losses and Iranian anger and distrust of Russian promises, it could 

also open the door to Iranian retaliation. Therefore, 

Russia has found it difficult to take Western concerns 

seriously.

Indeed, if we understood Russian policy correctly, 

we would not invest misplaced hopes in them. Russian commentary on the recent oil and gas and nuclear 

energy agreements indicates this. First, it appears that 

one reason why Russia finally finished the Bushehr 

project is because of its fears that Iran might conclude 

a deal with other providers of peaceful nuclear energy, 

e.g., Japan.156 This determination not to allow others to 

replace Russia in Iranian calculations fully comports 
50

with 20 years of policy delineated by Parker. Second, 

Russian official and expert commentary on Bushehr 

reveals Moscow’s stance on Iran quite clearly. Officials and experts say this collaboration represents a 

diplomatic victory for Russian diplomacy, carries no 

risks for Russia, shows Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear 

energy, supposedly keeps Iran in the nonproliferation 

regime thereby saving the Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT) even as it advances Russia’s standing and interests, recovers Russia’s reputation as a stable and 

reliable partner of Iran, is a purely economic deal with 

no political significance, yet also shows that Moscow 

can independently defy the United States with impunity (obviously a contradiction here), and can lead to 

future deals, as Iran has proposed a consortium for 

joint assembly of nuclear fuel.157

Even if we take the termination of the S-300 sale 

into account, it does not change the analysis. Moscow 

repeatedly warned Iran that its noncooperation was 

endangering the sale of the weapon; moreover, it came 

under substantial pressure from both Israel and the 

United States, and it was widely believed that selling 

the S-300 to Iran would trigger an Israeli air strike, the 

last thing Moscow wants.158 As we have shown above, 

the gains it might make from selling the missile were 

negligible and the costs high, not least the costs of not 

getting what it wants from Washington. Nonetheless, it has left the door open for future collaboration 

with Iran on arms sales and other issues if it negotiates with the United States, EU Three, and Russia in a 

5 + 1 framework.159

Even if this termination of the S-300 enraged Iranian elites, from Moscow’s standpoint, the recent energy deals clearly stabilized Russo-Iranian relations 

while removing Russia from collaboration beyond 
51

a certain point with Washington, showing that the 

“U.S. reset with Russia on Iran is the shakiest leg of 

its Iran policy.”160 It also suggests that Russia wants 

to tie the United States down with Iran, while it advances on other fronts and keeps raising the ante for 

its cooperation as it improves its ties to Iran at U.S. 

expense.161 Nonetheless, both Russian and foreign 

analysts acknowledge that the apparent turn towards 

restoring or at least restabilizing ties to Iran comes 

at the expense of the reset policy and could mark its 

symbolic end.162 Clearly, the road to Tehran does not 

lead through Moscow.163

Obviously Russia’s robust economic interests in 

Iran and the nuclear, energy, and defense industry 

lobbies that benefit from those interests greatly influence Moscow’s policies. But beyond those lobbies, 

Russia’s fundamental strategic interests lie in promoting Irano-U.S. hostility, not cooperation. Official 

Russian statements advocate strengthening Iran’s role 

as a legitimate actor in a Middle East security system 

even as Iranian leaders threaten to destroy Israel and 

promote state-sponsored terrorism. Foreign Minister 

Lavrov went beyond this and said that Iran should 

even be invited to participate in any security system 

for the Black Sea region!164 Moscow’s recent call for a 

nuclear free Middle East is, in this connection, essentially a propaganda stunt. This call is directed explicitly against Israel, whose assumed nuclear program 

has never been seen by Middle Eastern governments 

as a threat requiring them to do anything.165 However, 

since Iran’s program went into high gear Moscow has 

offered 13 Arab states nuclear reactors to advance its 

economic, political, and strategic interests in the Middle East, hardly a contribution to nonproliferation.166

Indeed, Moscow has been feverishly trying to sell 
52

reactors abroad, even to potential proliferators like 

Myanmar, for years.167

For over a decade, Russian pundits and officials 

have openly stated that they want Iran to be a partner 

of Russia and not the United States, lest the United 

States consolidate its position as the leading foreign 

power in the Middle East, where Moscow still desperately desires to be seen as a great power capable of 

influencing regional policy. Irano-American hostility 

precludes such consolidation and permits Russia to 

exercise influence by supporting the maintenance of 

a system of controlled tension there. Second, Iranian 

rapprochement with the West undermines Russia’s 

use of the energy weapon to subvert European security 

institutions and governments because large quantities 

of Iranian gas and oil would then be shipped to Europe. An Iranian reorientation to the West would also 

likely stimulate foreign investment to and access from 

Central Asia through Iran to the Persian Gulf and the 

Indian Ocean, allowing the free flow of Central Asian 

energy to the entire world, bypassing Russia and undermining its ability to control Eurasian energy flows. 

Recent Russian statements confirm this assessment. Even though Moscow is quite unhappy with 

Iranian stonewalling, it refuses to support the idea 

of extending sanctions, still calls for negotiating with 

Iran in order to ease the burden of sanctions upon 

Iran, and rejects “unilateral” (i.e., Western and U.S.) 

sanctions on Iran. Key figures like Prime Minister 

Putin and NATO ambassador Dmitry Rogozin deny 

that Iran has shown signs of having a military nuclear 

program. Meanwhile, Russia’s arms sales agency, Rosoboroneksport, still holds out the possibility of selling nonsanctioned weapons to Iran.168 While RussoIranian relations have eroded due to the sanctions and 
53

Russia’s tougher line, formally Iran still holds out, as 

does Russia, prospects for renewed cooperation. Indeed, though Medvedev calls Iran’s policy unreasonably tough and has warned that it is getting closer to 

producing nuclear weapons, his government seems 

not to have gotten that message, and even he calls energy cooperation with Iran promising.169 And Lavrov 

has added that sanctions have run their course and 

that “any new proposals would basically be aimed at 

suffocating the Iranian economy.”170 So presumably 

Moscow will oppose further sanctions against Iran. 

In other words, Moscow has again tried to have its 

cake and eat it too. Therefore, the presumption that 

we can expect any genuinely serious cooperation from 

Moscow beyond the present limit regarding Iran that 

brings Iran to halt its program is unfounded, even 

mischievous. Certainly we cannot expect that the 

Russian government will accept any linkage between 

arms control issues and Iran, as it has already rejected 

that stance.171 But we can probably expect linkage to 

getting America to retreat further in Eurasia, whether 

it is missile defense or the integration of those borderlands into the West.

Korea.

The other proliferation threat is North Korea. Moscow’s regional calculus and effective power to help us 

here is limited and very different from its role vis-àvis Iran. Yet it might offer possibilities for the United 

States to advance its interests, if Washington plays 

its cards right. Neither Washington nor Moscow has 

much, if any, leverage over North Korean policy. Indeed, the DPRK possibly could disintegrate from internal failure even as it possesses nuclear weapons or 
54

alternatively it could, through miscalculation or deliberate policy, trigger war. Already in September 2010, 

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin, 

Moscow’s delegate to the Six-Party Talks, said that the 

Korean peninsula was on the brink of war, something 

nobody else has said in public.172

Today the Six-Party process is moribund, if not 

dead. China has made a proposal to resume negotiations first between the two Korean states, followed 

by a DPRK-U.S. negotiation, and then resumption of 

the full Six-Party Talks. But Seoul has yet to approve 

this plan formally or renounce its demand for North 

Korean apology for sinking its ship (the Cheonan) last 

year or for initiating firing on Yeonpyeong island in 

November 2010.173 Most recently, Russian diplomatic 

observers appeared to pour cold water on any resumption of the Six-Party Talks because of what looks like 

insuperable divergences between Seoul and Pyongyang that would preclude even their meeting anytime 

soon.174 Even before this period, several observers 

had begun to criticize the Six-Party process for failing 

to achieve its task, but that criticism has only grown 

since then.175 Indeed, Niklas Swanstrom of Sweden’s 

Institute for Development and Policy flatly says the 

process is dead.176 This stagnation of the Six-Party process preceded the latest Korean crisis generated by the 

announcement that North Korea has a uranium enrichment plant much more sophisticated than anyone 

believed (probably greatly assisted by foreign powers) and North Korea’s shelling of the South Korean 

island of Yeonpyeong in November 2010. But the process’ stagnation was visible even before the Cheonan

incident of March 2010 when North Korea torpedoed 

a South Korean ship. North Korea is also reportedly 

preparing a third nuclear test.177 Since previous tests 
55

have led to ruptures in the process and to UN resolutions imposing sanctions on North Korea (which 

apparently surprised Pyongyang), another test, especially in the current climate, will likely further delay if 

not kill the resumption of Six-Party Talks.

While many reasons exist for this stagnation, because of this apparent breakdown of the process all 

these reasons have combined to bring about the growing intransigence of the major parties. Indeed, China’s 

aforementioned proposal reflects the inutility of previous structures like the Six-Party process. This intransigence strongly suggests that, absent a major change 

in one of the key participants’ policies, no change is in 

sight even though continuation of this impasse promises no relief of the current crisis for any of the six 

parties. But without major changes, the next crisis is 

liable to be much more dangerous, as South Korea has 

now publicly announced that it will retaliate in force 

against new attacks.178 And the advent of this uranium 

enrichment plant opens up the possibility for North 

Korea to begin building many more nuclear bombs.179

Thus there is good reason for mounting concern. 

North Korea, too, now talks of the situation as being 

on the brink of war, and South Korea has pledged retaliation for any future Northern provocations.180 The 

current crisis reminds us of the dangers that are constantly present in the area and of the many reasons 

for vigilance regarding North Korea. Even though the 

succession of Kim Jong Un has so far progressed without incident, we cannot take the enduring stability of 

North Korea for granted. 

This is more than the habitual warning of many observers that North Korea will or should collapse. Many 

signs point to a genuine possibility of internal ferment 

within North Korea even apart from a possible suc-
56

cession crisis. The outbreak of a major domestic crisis, 

whether or not it is tied to foreign challenges, could 

destabilize North Korea and lead to very grave and 

unforeseen crises.181 For example, while many argue 

that incidents like the Cheonan affair may be driven 

by the exigencies of the succession issue in North Korean politics, i.e., the need to elicit military support for 

the heir; succession to Kim Jong-Il, as many experts 

know, could quite easily trigger internal and/or external clashes in and around the DPRK that could easily drag the outside powers into conflict, and North 

Korean military risk taking on this scale ranks high 

among those possible contingencies.182 In addition, 

many signs point to a genuine possibility of internal 

ferment within North Korea even apart from the succession crisis. 

All this occurs in the context of the apparent ascendancy of North Korean hardliners and the military. 

Given the looming succession crisis and inflation, 

along with this ascendancy of anti-reform and pronuclear elements, this hardening policy line undermines prospects for a more accommodating foreign 

policy even if Pyongyang returns to the Six-Party 

Talks. Beyond the regime’s efforts to clamp down at 

home lies the fact that many indicators point to what 

Soviet historians might have called a revolutionary 

crisis in North Korean society. Defections, corruption, 

riots when the 2009 currency reform was introduced, 

jailbreaks, the breaking of the regime’s information 

monopoly, and a precarious food situation are all hallmarks of a potential that could erupt if there is a break 

in leadership or elite cohesion. Alternatively, elites 

who lose out may defect or seek to overturn that result. Indeed, the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have already confidentially discussed uni-
57

fication scenarios.183 Meanwhile, the present impact 

of these trends that commingle decline and domestic 

hardening undermines prospects for a more accommodating foreign policy even if Pyongyang returns to 

the Six-Party Talks. 

Second, foreign discussions concerning Pyongyang’s motives for precipitating the crises of 2010 also 

are deeply disturbing. The many media commentaries 

attempting to ascertain North Korea’s motives usually 

divide into the following explanations, some of which 

may overlap as being multiple causes for its behavior. Analyses focusing on domestic determinants of 

the DPRK’s actions claim that that the regime is acting because it needs to get the military’s support for 

Kim Jong Un in the current succession. The price for 

this support is to conduct aggressive moves against 

the United States and South Korea and demonstrate, 

e.g., through the enrichment facility, that North Korea will never renounce nuclear weapons.184 That denouement, in turn, vitiates any prospect for resuming 

the Six-Party Talks because from Washington’s, if not 

Tokyo’s and Seoul’s, viewpoints, this North Korean 

stance means there is nothing to talk about in these 

negotiations.

The assessments that emphasize foreign policy 

drivers claim (and there is no necessary contradiction 

between them and the analyses stressing domestic 

factors) that North Korea is employing its habitual 

tactics to force the United States to take it seriously 

and engage it in bilateral negotiations and possibly 

also is simultaneously trying to induce South Korea to 

restore elements, if not all, of the Sunshine Policy and 

economic transfers to the North.185 While it is impossible to determine conclusively which of these analyses of the DPRK’s motives is correct, and what is the 
58

primary driver of North Korea’s actions, the conclusions that can be drawn from these assessments are 

extremely disturbing. North Korea has continued not 

just to develop nuclear weapons, but also to conduct a 

highly risk acceptant policy. This risk acceptant policy 

is not merely illustrated in the three provocations of 

2010 but in its transfer of missiles and proliferation capabilities abroad. Such policies also include the sale of 

nuclear reactors to Syria and missiles to proliferators. 

Indeed, by 2007 North Korea had established itself as, 

“the Third World’s greatest supplier of missiles, missile components and related technologies.”186 U.S. diplomats also believe that North Korea furnished Iran 

with 19 missiles based on a Russian design for submarine based missiles called R-27 that North Korea calls 

BM-25 missiles. These nuclear capable missiles enable 

Iran to reach European capitals including Moscow.187

But they also allow the DPRK to attack much further 

into Asia or the Pacific than has hitherto been believed.

North Korea’s risk-acceptant behavior appears 

to be premised on the belief that not only will Russia and China ultimately restrain the United States 

from imposing truly serious punishments (be they 

sanctions or worse) upon North Korea, but that the 

United States will be unable or unwilling to use its full 

power to strike back at North Korea for these risky 

moves. Neither will Russia or China be able to exercise any decisive restraining leverage upon North Korea. Therefore, North Korea can behave provocatively 

at what it believes to be a minimum or at least manageable risk. While this behavior has allowed North 

Korea to get nuclear weapons without paying what it 

considers to be an unbearable price, it also exposes its 

supposed “backers” to the consequences of these great 

risks taken in disregard of their interests and without 
59

their knowledge or acceptance of the risks for them in 

that behavior.188 Yet until now, Russian and Chinese 

behavior has allowed North Korea to keep on behaving in this provocative manner. As a result, North Korea has repeatedly been able to outmaneuver the other 

five members of the process to the point where U.S. 

officials have publicly charged that China’s refusal 

to exercise a decisive restraining pressure upon the 

DPRK, in fact, means that China has become North 

Korea’s enabler, a charge that rankles China deeply.189

China may have retracted its position somewhat in 

trying to induce a return to some agreeable forum for 

negotiations. But it is quite unlikely that in the present 

configuration, North Korea will renounce its nuclear 

weapons. Its demands that the United States cease its 

“hostile policy” essentially amount to an abandonment of South Korea, not denuclearization.190

Yet, as of now nothing seems likely to alter Pyongyang’s calculation of the costs it incurs by acting this 

way, including the most recent crises. Indeed, at least 

some Russian experts believe that it is impossible to 

scare North Korea with sanctions.191 In that case, what 

then can the other parties do to it, especially if Beijing 

stands behind it as seems to be the case now? Furthermore, in conjunction with the likelihood that further 

incidents along the lines of the Cheonan incident might 

be in the offing, this kind of behavior could easily ignite the conflagration that Moscow, if not other capitals, most fear.

Under the circumstances, the fact that the military 

appears to be the strongest faction in North Korean 

politics, and one that must be appeased by provocative international behavior to cement the succession, 

or even, as some analysts suggest, that it may to some 

degree be acting on its own, raises many great threats 
60

to regional security.192 If aggressive and defiant international behavior is the price of legitimacy at home, 

we can expect many more crises, especially as North 

Korea has long acted on the belief that the only way 

to get Washington’s or Seoul’s attention is to create a 

major crisis, and it may well believe it can take risks 

with impunity. But under present conditions, the domestic politics of the United States and South Korea 

(as well as probably Japan) preclude any generosity 

on their part to North Korea or quick return to the sixparty talks absent guarantees of denuclearization and 

an end to provocations, which are no less impossible 

for North Korea to give due to its domestic politics. Indeed, so far the United States, Japan, and South Korea 

have, not unexpectedly, been unwilling to return to 

the talks without apologies for Cheonan or guarantees 

of denuclearization.193

Consequently, the intersection of the main players’ 

domestic politics and regional threat perceptions work 

together to frustrate anything but a deepening cycle 

of provocations and resistance. Equally plausible is 

the fact that North Korean leaders may think they can 

take greater risks than are warranted and miscalculate 

the outcome. A similar danger may occur in the United States and South Korean governments if their domestic politics make it impossible for them to ignore 

further North Korean provocations. In either case, it is 

pretty clear that in fact nobody can truly control North 

Korea’s behavior or is willing to. Russia certainly has 

no leverage on it, and China’s attitude has been less 

than helpful from Washington’s point of view.194

Likewise, there is no reason to believe that this 

risk-acceptant and provocative behavior will stop 

even if new sanctions are imposed. First of all, North 

Korea needs the revenues it gains from proliferation, 
61

which are vital to its economic survival. Second, as 

many analysts have argued, China remains unwilling 

to bring to bear its full weight to truly implement the 

existing UN imposed sanctions. So, new sanctions cannot achieve much in any case.195 More sanctions, even 

if they are passed by the UN, only make it harder to 

return to the Six-Party process, and not only because 

we cannot really count on their full implementation. 

Since North Korea demands an end to sanctions that 

ban its arms trade as a precondition of returning to 

the talks, any new sanctions probably only strengthen its resolve not to rejoin the process. Meanwhile, 

North Korea clearly intends to continue these missile 

sales despite UN resolutions and other international 

mechanisms to block them, such as the Proliferation 

Security Initiative. If such blatant risk taking continues unabated, there are real chances that Pyongyang 

could miscalculate its adversaries’ response and end 

up with a much greater crisis than it had bargained 

for. 

Beyond this assessment, Michael O’Hanlon has 

identified a series of other dangers that could easily grow out of the current situation on the Korean 

peninsula. These are the dangers of proliferation 

either to terrorists or other states. In the case of collapse, control over nuclear materials could easily deteriorate, enabling possessors of those materials to 

sell them abroad to the highest bidder. On the other 

hand, should North Korea keep on going as a nuclear 

power, its capabilities could either weaken deterrence 

among the members of the U.S. Asian alliance system, 

or even start a war entailing missile strikes on South 

Korea, Japan, or even possibly the United States. Lastly, a nuclear North Korea could engender a “nuclear 

domino effect,” leading Japan, South Korea, and pos-
62

sibly other states to contemplate going, or to actually 

go, nuclear.196

The primary causes for the present situation reside first in the fundamental incompatibility of the 

DPRK and U.S. positions; second, in some of the inherent problems of the Six-Party mechanism; third, 

in the evolving disparities in the positions of the participants; and fourth in the greatly transformed Asian 

strategic environment since 2003 when the talks began. While North Korea now says it is prepared to 

return to the talks, it also states that it will not give 

up its nuclear weapons under any conditions. Indeed, 

it has been saying this since 2009, if not earlier.197 It is 

likely that this remains the case, suggesting that the 

U.S. demand for an irrevocable prior commitment to 

complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament 

(CVID) of its nuclear weapons (the old Bush policy) 

is a nonstarter and thus an exercise in futility. Indeed, 

analysts like the Russian Korea expert, Georgy Toloraya, have openly argued that if the talks are about 

denuclearization first and other issues subsequently, 

then they will be futile, as North Korea will simply 

refuse to play a serious part.198

According to Toloraya: 

The usefulness of the Six Party Talks seems to North

Koreans to have been exhausted. Further down the 

road they would have to discuss—and probably be 

pressed for concessions on something really tangible, 

such as their reprocessed fissile materials and actual 

nuclear weapons. That, most likely, formed no part of 

their calculations, at least at the early stage of searching for a strategic compromise with the West. Understandably, North Koreans became frustrated, as their 

tangible gains from the multiparty process were marginal. They did not come much closer to getting sub-
63

stantial security guarantees, and even the largely symbolic (and easily reversible) “delisting” of the DPRK

as a terrorist state caused much controversy in the 

US and elsewhere, and led to demands for new concessions from it in return. North Koreans saw that as

a breach of trust. Modest economic assistance was

indeed promised when the accord was sealed, but

only Russia carried out its obligations (200 thousand 

tons of heavy oil), while other countries either totally 

abstained (Japan) or dragged their feet. The DPRK

felt that its concessions were not fully recognized and 

valued. “Hawks” in Pyongyang might also have suspected that concessions were perceived in the West 

as a sign of weakness and testimony to their pressing

need to normalize relations. No one was impressed, 

at least to the extent that North Koreans had probably 

expected, with the actual opening of its nuclear program and even the disabling of some objects, though 

such things were unimaginable just a few years ago.199

Thus Pyongyang has announced that its agenda 

for resuming negotiations focuses on the following 

clear set of goals;

• Recognition of its status as a de facto nuclear 

weapon state or, failing that, preventing efforts 

to disarm its nuclear weapons,

• Convincing Washington and others that they 

have no choice but to normalize relations with 

North Korea as a nuclear state,

• Maximizing all the material benefits to be 

gained through negotiations while conceding 

nothing on its nuclear program,

• Convincing the international community and 

UNSC to lift existing sanctions and impose no 

new ones,

• Shifting discussion of the Six-Party Talks from 

denuclearization to a “peace regime” based on 
64

ending or attenuating the U.S. alliances with 

Japan and South Korea.200

Consequently, its conditions for rejoining the process are completely antithetical to the U.S. position 

that demands an advance commitment, much like 

the Bush administration did to complete, verifiable, 

and irreversible nuclear disarmament and has shown 

no interest in a preceding peace settlement. Pyongyang’s demands and defiant assertion that it will not 

denuclearize therefore run straight into Washington’s 

counter demand that it will not recognize the DPRK as 

a nuclear weapons state, and that it must reenter the 

negotiations without any preconditions and denuclearize to avoid further sanctions. Indeed, even China 

agrees that a peace treaty to the Korean War cannot be 

signed until the North denuclearizes.201 Thus at best, 

an impasse appears to be the foreseeable future of the 

Six-Party process, even if it somehow resumed soon.

This impasse alone could suffice to torpedo any 

early resumption of the Six-Party process. But in the 

context of the added crises of November 2010, the domestic constraints on key actors in the wake of U.S. 

elections, the collapse of the Sunshine Policy, North 

Korea’s succession, and the recent attacks and provocations against the South, it is difficult to see the point 

of resuming them, let alone how this resumption 

might come about. Yet under the circumstances the 

stagnation of the Six-Party process could quite conceivably lead to renewed crises, especially as North 

Korea thinks it has to provoke ever-new crises to get 

its views heard. Indeed, the Six-Party process has 

functioned until now largely as a mechanism for crisis management. But clearly the process is not working or managing crises and could break down. This is 
65

not altogether surprising inasmuch as the process has 

contained within it the seeds of such an outcome from 

its inception. 

A second cause for the failure of the talks lies in 

the inherent practical and theoretical difficulties in arranging any truly coherent multilateral consensus, let 

alone a unity of views and actions on an issue touching on all six participants’ vital national interests.202

Inasmuch as all efforts to make progress on or even 

resolve the North Korean issues take place within an 

environment of multiple triangular and bilateral relationships among the participants, the problems of 

mutual coordination are inherently very difficult.203

Beyond these considerations, the record of multilateral security institutions in Asia is not particularly 

encouraging. Michael Wesley points out that multilateral Asian security institutions have done poorly 

in adapting their original function to changing power 

realities, notably rising powers’ demands, and in any 

case the Six-Party process has yet to become an accepted multilateral security organization rather than 

a crisis management or a somewhat ad hoc organization.204 Indeed, the abundant evidence of the competitive approaches of the six parties to regional security 

in Northeast Asia, particularly in the now dynamic 

evolution of this region with a rising China, a seemingly declining America, and a threatening North Korea, underscores the difficulty in using the Six-Party 

process to find a multilateral harmony over the issues 

on its agenda.205

Third, now there is an added problem of emerging 

different conceptions of what the Six-Party process is 

supposed to achieve. China, for example, is retreating 

from the idea that the talks should aim to denuclearize North Korea and serve rather as a means to reduce 
66

tensions. When Kim Jong-Il visited China in August 

2010, the Chinese press and Kim Jong-Il both stressed 

that the purpose of the talks was to reduce or even 

prevent tensions on the peninsula, not arrange for denuclearization or a peace treaty for the Korean War.206

If this concept of the talks is allowed to gain credence, 

North Korea will become a nuclear state de facto and 

possibly de jure but will remain an outlaw state in 

many real ways and thus an obstacle rather than a contributor to regional security because the United States, 

ROK, and Japan will not currently accept North Korea 

as a nuclear state. Nor will they accept upending the 

Six-Party Talks to serve an agenda that only benefits 

Beijing and Pyongyang at their expense.

Even if Russia and China are correct to argue that 

denuclearization can only come about as a result of a 

long-term process of confidence-building and mutual 

security guarantees, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo 

were in no mood to hear this argument even before 

November 2010 and the events of that month. Since 

then, North Korean generated crises and the U.S. 

elections virtually preclude any movement to meet 

Beijing and Moscow, let alone Pyongyang, halfway. 

Japan has publicly stated its belief that this is not an 

auspicious time to reconvene the talks, and South Korea and Washington agree with this. South Korea is 

demanding an apology for the recent shelling of Yeonpyeong, and the United States still insists on a prior 

commitment to denuclearization as a precondition for 

resuming the Six-Party Talks.207

Since the end of 2010, this apparent breakdown of 

the process due to all these reasons has fostered the 

growing intransigence of the major parties. Thus there 

is good reason for mounting concern. This intransigence strongly suggests that, absent a major change 
67

in one of the key participants’ policies, no change is 

in sight even though continuation of this impasse 

promises no relief of the current crisis for any of the 

six parties. Without major changes, the next crisis is 

liable to be much more dangerous, as South Korea has 

now publicly announced that it will retaliate in force 

against new attacks.208 And, as noted above, the advent of the uranium enrichment plant opens up the 

possibility for North Korea to begin building many 

more nuclear bombs.209 In addition, North Korea now 

talks of the situation as being on the brink of war, 

and South Korea has pledged retaliation for any future Northern provocations.210 More recently, it was 

reported that South Korea might gain support from 

the United States to lengthen the reach of its missiles 

and is exploring options for returning U.S. TNW to 

South Korea. While this was denied, there are political 

figures in the ROK who now openly advocate returning those missiles that were removed with the end of 

the Cold War in 1991.211

THREATS TO RUSSIA

The threats from further impasse or deterioration 

of the Korean situation to Russia are numerous and 

underappreciated in the West. For example, since the 

Cheonan incident in 2010, the United States has sought 

more options with which to punish North Korea, even 

if it does not seek war against it. That incident also 

has led South Korea to consult even more closely with 

both the United States and Japan on a coordinated 

response, thereby marginalizing Russia and isolating 

China.212 Beyond that, the fallout from this incident 

forced Russia to enter into very intense and close consultations with China even though it has no real influence over the other actors.213 But because both China 
68

and Russia share the view that the greater danger is 

instability on the Korean peninsula, China failed to act 

this time against North Korea; it and Russia have been 

in some measure isolated, while the United States 

and its allies have grown closer and more demanding. They are still in no hurry to resume the Six-Party 

process without prior North Korean concessions.214

Not only does this isolate China and Russia, it also 

deprives Russia of its minimal means of influencing 

regional events and preserves the regional bipolarity 

in Northeast Asia that could more easily lead to a conflict against its interests. Asian observers even believe 

that China’s failure to act contributed to Washington’s 

decision to move naval vessels closer to China.215 We 

could therefore see more provocative behavior from 

North Korea and a hardening of U.S. positions that 

would merely intensify the existing polarization between Washington and Pyongyang, as well as that between Washington and Beijing, and increase mistrust, 

suspicion, etc. 

The current situation also offers other dangers to 

Russia, e.g., marginalization. Clearly, nobody has considered it seriously as a partner in the diplomacy revolving around this crisis. South Korea and the United States approached China and Japan to coordinate 

regional and allied responses, isolating Russia even 

though China failed to act. Consequently, Russia unilaterally stepped into the breach, conducting its own 

investigation of the incident and desperately scrambling to save the Six-Party process or figure out some 

other process through which it can play a role commensurate with its ambitions. The Russian investigation challenged South Korea’s view, saying the ship 

sank due to an explosion caused by its own navigational errors, but this investigation was not released, 

lest Russia’s position be further eroded.216
69

Whatever problems these trends cause for the 

other five powers, arguably this impasse most injures 

Russia as a participant in the larger Korean peace 

process. Since this process not only aims to deal with 

the DPRK’s nuclear proliferation, but also to chart a 

path toward an overall peace for Korea and to create new multilateral frameworks for Northeast Asia, 

the longer this impasse lasts, the more Russia suffers. 

This is not just because Russia is the chairman of the 

working group on a new multilateral security system 

for Northeast Asia, although that is serious enough. 

The current impasse threatens Russian interests in 

many ways. First, Russia confronts an explosive situation and potential crisis of immense magnitude on its 

doorstep where it has little or no influence over many 

of the main actors, not least Pyongyang. This crisis, 

which it can do little to manage or control, has enormous potential consequences for Russia. A recent article in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ journal, International Affairs, stated (incidentally quoting a Chinese 

analyst, Zhou Feng): 

Indeed, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, which 

is in close proximity to our Far Eastern borders, is 

explosive and fraught with the most unpredictable 

consequences. Peace is very fragile here. No one can 

guarantee that it will not collapse as a result of a clash 

between the two Koreas with the involvement of other 

countries in the conflict and the use of weapons of 

mass destruction. “The aggravation of the North Korean nuclear issue is one of the long standing problems 

leading to new ones. This issue cannot be expected to 

be settled easily because difficulties have emerged in 

relations among large East Asian states. The settlement process can subsequently lead to a redistribution 

of roles of large states on the Asian political field—that 

is a new regional security problem.217
70

That restructuring of the Asian political order could 

easily ensue at Russia’s expense, given its visibly relative weakness there, and it could ensue by means over 

which Russia has little or no influence, even if they are 

not violent means. While Moscow has long since said 

that it does not fear the unification of the two Koreas 

and might actually welcome that outcome, it could 

only do so if it happened through a peaceful process, 

not war.218

This potential restructuring of the Asian state 

system also has profound implications for RFE that 

Moscow already sees as a major security problem due 

to its relative poverty, isolation from European Russia, and vulnerability to a host of foreign influences, 

particularly a Chinese economic takeover.219 Failure to 

move forward on the Korean issues, if it leads to war 

or the stagnation of regional economic development, 

threatens Russia’s domestic development program for 

the RFE. As Gleb Ivashentsov, Moscow’s Ambassador 

to Seoul has said: 

In no other region are internal and external interests 

of Russia so interconnected as in Northeast Asia. For 

the future of Russia as a great power to a great extent 

depends on the economic, technological, and social 

uplift of Siberia and the Russian Far East. To achieve 

that aim we need the absence of external threats. By 

Russia’s view such guarantees could be best provided 

by promoting positive relations with her neighbors.220

Therefore Russia desperately wants to prevent a 

war breaking out over Korea either by U.S. and ROK 

attacks upon the North, or if the North was to attack 

South Korea or Japan. Moscow’s reaction to the Cheonan incident, its professed skepticism as to whether 

North Korea actually sank the ship, insistence on 
71

conducting its own investigation, readiness to cooperate with China to avert escalation of the crisis by all 

means, and insistence on returning to the table all indicate its anxiety lest this crisis engender a breakdown 

of the negotiation process or actual conflict.221

That conflict could quickly escalate even to the nuclear level and only end with a hostile power (either 

the United States or China) occupying North Korea 

and its border with Russia. It is not certain that Russia 

could stay out of such a war, and the consequences 

for it would, under almost every imaginable circumstance, be very severe. No outcome here is acceptable 

to Russia, but its means of preventing these possible 

outcomes are decidedly limited. At the same time, 

conflict in the Korean peninsula also undermines any 

hope of developing the RFE with foreign assistance, 

since Russia cannot do so alone. Absent such development all talk of Russia as a great Asian power remains 

just that, talk.

Beyond preventing a war Russia has several other 

objectives regarding Korea that are now at risk due 

to the current impasse. Primarily, it seeks to obtain 

lasting acknowledgement of its status as a great Asian 

power that can participate in and is necessary for establishing a regional Asian-Pacific security system. Indeed, it publicly regards its participation in these talks 

as a touchstone of the international recognition and 

acknowledgment of that status. Therefore, it takes its 

standing in the Six-Party process very seriously. Russia’s exclusion from the efforts in the 1990s to deal with 

North Korea’s nuclearization were widely resented 

and taken as a sign of its marginality in Asia, much 

to Russia’s anger. Prominent U.S. Asia expert Lowell 

Dittmer actually referred to the Russia of this time as 

a diplomatic nonentity.222 Not surprisingly, foreign, if 
72

not domestic, observers also seriously questioned the 

notion that Russia was a great power or entitled to 

claim such a status that every Russian politician believes to be Russia’s birthright.223

Moreover, continuing impasse prevents Russia 

from recovering any true economic influence as a 

large-scale energy provider to both Koreas and essentially cedes the field to China, if not other players, as 

states who might gain economic influence over North 

Korea. Moscow intends to use its ability to supply 

both Koreas with energy both to ensure its place in the 

settlement, and unite them with Russia in an enduring economic-political association. Once the Six-Party 

agreement of February 2007 took shape, ITAR-TASS

reported comments by a foreign policy expert that 

Russia could create the conditions needed to implement “a series of major multilateral projects with the 

participation of both North Korea and Russia,” including oil and gas transit, electricity transfers, and 

the so-called TKR-TSR project connecting a TransKorean railway with Russia’s Trans-Siberian railway, 

the centerpiece of Russian transport policy for Asia.224 

Significantly, this source saw these projects as benefiting not just Moscow and Pyongyang, but also Seoul.225 

Both the ROK and Russia also eagerly wish to construct a Russian gas pipeline through both Koreas, 

complete with a petrochemical industrial park and a 

LNG plant. That should begin in 2010, be completed 

in 2015, and ship 7.5 million tons of gas (measured in 

LNG) annually for 30 years, 20 percent of the ROK’s 

annual import of natural gas.226 The cost of this socalled natural gas pipeline (PNG) project is enormous.

If it succeeds, this will be a super-size economic cooperation project worth over $100 US Billion, covering 
73

the purchasing price of natural gas (US $90 Billion), 

construction costs for the petrochemical industrial 

park (US$ 9 Billion), and construction costs for the 

PNG through North Korea. (US$3 Billion) This project 

will represent a typical energy development project 

promoted by the Lee-Myung Bak government.227

The opportunity to provide North Korea, and 

through it South Korea, with reliable sources of energy is essential if Russia is to be a meaningful presence 

in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia’s regional 

security order. Indeed, energy supplies might be the 

only way Russia can play a major role in any Korean 

peace process. Even that might not be enough as we 

have seen how little Russia actually contributes to the 

Six-Party Talks. In 2007-08, there was even speculation that Russia is wearying of the Six-Party Talks due 

both to North Korea’s obstreperous behavior but also 

because the bilateral talks between the United States 

and North Korea had sidelined it and Japan, relegating them to a lower status in the talks.228 In the RussoJapanese foreign ministers talks in December 2009, 

Foreign Minister Lavrov dismissed such talk, paradoxically and unintentionally suggesting Russia’s 

fears of any bilateral U.S.–DPRK deal.229 Naturally, 

Russian analysts are at pains to refute such arguments, 

constantly invoking Russia’s importance to the talks, 

its constructive plans for a settlement, etc.230 Nevertheless despite its rancor at these characterizations, the 

fact remains that Russia is far from being a major factor at these talks whereas the United States and China 

are the players whose role is decisive to their outcome.

Consequently, the collapse of the Six-Party process 

is a major loss for Russia because it delays and minimizes Russia’s chances to count for something serious 

in the Korean security equation and puts its overall 
74

Asian policy at considerable risk. Not surprisingly, 

it has consistently counseled moderation towards 

North Korea, been very cautious about sanctions even 

though President Medvedev considers North Korea 

a greater threat than Iran, and has steadfastly argued 

for resuming the Six-Party Talks despite North Korea’s provocative nuclear and missile tests. Moscow 

has steadily argued against military action, hinted 

that sanctions might be lifted if the DPRK rejoined the 

talks, suggested that the IAEA become involved with 

this issue, and proclaimed its willingness to provide 

economic assistance.231 But it is Washington and Beijing, not Moscow, that will decide the issue of the talks 

for Pyongyang, signifying Russia’s limited power to 

influence events here.

The breakdown of those talks also nullifies the 

discussions that Moscow sponsored about creating a 

multilateral security mechanism for Northeast Asia as 

part of the 2007 agreements, a long-standing point in 

Soviet and Russian foreign policy.232 As Georgy Toloraya writes:

Russia sees a multiparty diplomatic process as essential for attaining the aforementioned objectives. 

The eventual creation of a regional (or sub-regional) 

system of security and cooperation in Northeast Asia 

would benefit Russia, as it would enable it to have a 

greater say in the area and create more opportunities 

to promote its own interests, including economic ones. 

Russia aspires to become a “Eurasian bridge” which 

would speed up the development of its Far Eastern regions and facilitate its deeper integration in the Asian 

economic space, and its development as an “Asian 

energy-power.”233
75

Absent such a mechanism, Moscow finds it harder 

to play a role in Northeast Asia as an independent 

competitive actor. Nonetheless, Moscow keeps devising formulas for regional conflict resolution because 

it now publicly admits to anxiety about the future 

security equation. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei 

Borodavkin, Moscow’s representative to the Six-Party 

Talks, announced that Russia’s discussions with the 

other five parties led it to formulate a draft on “Guiding 

Principles for Peace and Security in Northeast Asia.” 

Borodavkin admitted that existing conflicts in Korea 

and Afghanistan worsened in 2009. Consequently, 

“We proceed from the assumption that one of the 

most important prerequisites and components of the 

denuclearization process is the formation of regional 

common security institutions which would be based 

on the principle of equal security to all parties.”234

Such calls underscore Moscow’s less than equal status here that makes the success of such plans unlikely. 

But Borodavkin further underscored Russia’s genuine 

alarm about Korea by stating that the aggravation of 

Asian conflicts, together with the global economic 

crisis have created a situation where, “Under current 

circumstances, peace, and security in the region is a 

priority task because we believe that neither nuclear 

deterrence nor military deterrence may ensure security in this sub-region and in the entire world.”235 That 

is, further North Korean provocations might push one 

or another actor over the edge, and Russia cannot do 

anything to stop it. Indeed, Moscow even deployed its 

new S-400 SAM to the RFE from fears that North Korea might launch more missiles that either go awry or 

worse, provoke a major conflict in Northeast Asia.236

For Borodavkin, this danger means Russia must participate more actively in the region, and its activity has 
76

become more substantive, focused on economic integration.237

Thus even though Moscow has indicated its willingness as part of the reset policy to cooperate with 

Washington on curbing proliferation, it has a very 

different posture and outlook regarding the two most 

outstanding proliferation issues currently on the international agenda. If the reset policy is not to be undone due to the confluence of regional security and 

proliferation issues that challenge both sides’ ability 

to find common ground, something more is needed. 

Or to put it bluntly, the U.S. policy of “strategic patience” in regard to North Korea, which boils down to 

making no moves until Pyongyang concedes to Washington’s agenda, must be amended, if not reversed. 

In Iran’s case, too, something must be done because 

Iran, despite foreign pressures, and the U.S. effort at 

engaging it, shows no sign of slowing down or renouncing its quest for nuclear weapons. In the Iranian 

case, while some have argued that the United States 

should accept deterrence of a nuclear Iran our allies, 

particularly Israel and Saudi Arabia, cannot and will 

not accept that strategy. For them, a nuclear Iran is 

an existential threat of the highest order and an intelligent approach will realize that Iran cannot therefore 

(especially given the current turmoil in the Middle 

East) be allowed to gain usable nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A sound U.S. policy approach that considers the 

regional dimensions of the reset policy, as well as the 

limited utility to date of Russian cooperation on proliferation issues, should understand that more of the 
77

same, especially in Korea, is an abdication of responsibility, not an answer to the problems confronting any 

U.S. administration’s efforts to advance the national 

interest. In plain English, the U.S. 20-year obsession 

with proliferation has led to a virtually complete strategic and policy failure. Far from reducing it, we are, 

in fact, managing proliferation. India and Pakistan 

have gone nuclear, other nuclear powers are modernizing their arsenals, nothing has stopped Iran, the 

war in Iraq to terminate its alleged proliferation was 

a disaster, and North Korea has nuclear weapons and 

is testing nuclear weapons of ever greater range and 

capability. As one recent account observes: 

Despite many rhetorical compliments, the Six-Party 

Talks have revealed their limit as a framework to 

resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. North Korea quadrupled nuclear capabilities during the talks, 

conducted two nuclear tests, built up uranium enrichment capabilities and secretly provided Syria with an 

upgraded version of the 5MWEe reactor at Yongbyon. 

Compared to the mid-1990s, the amount of plutonium 

the DPRK possesses has increased form 7-12.5kg to 

28.5-49 kg at the end of 2007. The possible number of 

nuclear warheads has also increased from 1-5 to 5-20 

or so depending on various criteria and technologies. 

This is the end result of the Six-Party Talks.238

It also appears that in both Iran and North Korea’s 

cases, they can still count on Moscow and Beijing to 

mitigate any sanctions policy and obstruct the outcome of any diplomatic pressure on them to yield nuclear weapons as part of a political process. Furthermore, in the wake of current trends in the Middle East, 

it appears that the U.S. position and perception of its 

reliability are eroding. In the Far East, if we look at the 

Russian position in a perspective that includes the sit-
78

uation on the Korean peninsula, mounting concern is 

also warranted. Though Russia has been a vital player 

in Asia since the 1858 treaty of Aigun with China if 

not earlier, Russian and foreign observers acknowledge that in East Asia, it confronts marginalization as 

a significant, not to mention great, power. Confirming 

this bleak assessment and expanding it is the shocking 

(at least it should be shocking to Moscow and other 

observers) fact cited by a U.S. Army colonel who leads 

officers on tours of Asian think tanks that Chinese, 

Japanese, South Korean, and Mongolian think tanks 

unanimously told his group in 2010 that Russia would 

soon play no role in East Asian security.239 While Russia has essentially had to mortgage the development 

of the RFE to China because of its own systemic failures, at the same time there is ample evidence that its 

military increasingly vocally and publicly perceives a 

mounting Chinese military threat in addition to the 

potential of China’s economy to subordinate Russia 

to its ambitions. In short, in the larger Asian arena of 

which the Korean question is a major, but not exclusive, part, Russia confronts the genuine prospect and 

threat of its marginalization as an independent sovereign, great power actor. That is a nightmare scenario 

for Russia, yet it appears incapable of doing what is 

needed to reverse that trend.240

The United States will not benefit from that outcome, but China will. Indeed, this trend completes the 

strategic reversal in Asia that has negated the fundamental strategic principles of U.S. policy there going 

back to the Open Door Notes of 1898. We no longer 

have a Russo-Japanese contest of hegemony in Asia in 

rivalry to the United States, with the prize being domination of China. China’s rise transforms the regional, 

if not global, equation and forces new approaches to 
79

regional security issues upon us. Moreover, Russia’s 

failure to develop on its own or to escape the condition its leaders now perceive of being isolated from 

everyone in Asia only redounds to China’s benefit and 

jeopardizes the overall balance or equilibrium in East 

Asia.241

Historically it was the United States, not China, 

that defined the parameters of Russian power in Asia. 

In that context, the satellization of Russia is a blow to 

a strategy that has lasted since 1898 when John Hay 

formulated the Open Door policy. Allowing China to 

usurp that role and downgrade Russia as a factor in 

Asia signifies our strategic fecklessness. Washington 

assumed its role beginning in 1898 with the proclamation of the Open Door policy. In 1905 Theodore Roosevelt mediated the Portsmouth Treaty that ended the 

Russo-Japanese war. The Washington Conference of 

1921 redefined the new post-World War I status quo 

in East Asia and strove to limit the reach of Soviet 

and Japanese revisionism in China.242 Franklin Delano 

Roosevelt’s recognition of the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (USSR) in 1933 was clearly a measure to balance Japan, which had broken that balance, by raising 

the specter of amity with the Soviet Union, and was 

understood as such by the USSR, which was gravely 

threatened by Japanese imperialism.243 Likewise, Soviet participation in the Pacific War in 1945 was only 

possible through massive U.S. logistical assistance 

to Moscow that enabled it to move its forces from 

Central Europe to the RFE and then into Manchuria, 

Mongolia, and Korea. Similarly, it was U.S. forces that 

stopped the North Korean and Chinese offensives in 

the Korean War, and then subsequently engineered 

the conversion of China into an American partner and 

the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1978 that stopped aggressive Soviet policies in East Asia.
80

Thus Washington upheld first a regional and then 

simultaneously a global balance until the 1990s, when 

it began to forget its history. Geopolitically, the strategy rested on upholding Chinese independence against 

all imperialisms (the open door) keeping Japan and 

Russia separated and hostile, and preventing or at 

least containing any Sino-Russian alliance or domination of either one by the other. Hence, our continuing support for Japan’s position regarding the Kurile 

Islands.244 Accordingly, some of our leading experts 

have warned that the greatest possible threat facing 

Washington could be a Sino-Russian alliance. Therefore, signs of such an alliance must be disquieting as 

this collusion could also betoken the first tangible and 

successful example of regional balancing against U.S. 

preponderance.245 Indeed, adding to our disarray is the 

fact that we have completely neglected Russia as a potential partner in Asia, even as the reset policy openly 

stated the need for such partnerships in Europe, the 

Middle East, and Central Asia. Meanwhile, Russia returned the favor by refusing to discuss its Asian policy 

and threats to its security with the West.246

Given the now visible strategic linkage between 

the reset policy, Asia’s strategic transformation, and 

the urgency of North Korean proliferation, we have 

the means and motive to revive our well-conceived 

strategic tradition since China is intent on defending 

North Korea and blocking the United States there, 

and the U.S. military strategy now accepts Russia as 

a potential partner in East Asia.247 Moreover, the Russian press, and therefore the Russian government, 

have noticed that acceptance too.248 But to implement 

this strategy, we, our allies, and Russia must take coordinated and reciprocal steps. A strategy based on 

Chinese weakness is inconceivable. The clear and 
81

present danger is not a Russian-Chinese alliance, but 

rather a Chinese-dominated partnership with Russia 

and North Korea as junior partners that menace an increasingly apprehensive Japan and South Korea. This 

generates the need for prior agreement on the basis of 

intense consultations with Japan and South Korea on 

vital issues facing them. First, the United States must 

formulate an initiative towards Russia that helps bring 

it over to the U.S. side in the Six-Party Talks on Korea. 

This entails the much greater U.S. engagement with 

Pyongyang that the DPRK wants. While conservatives 

and Republicans will oppose this, their policy of isolating North Korea has failed principally because the 

DPRK can count on Sino-Russian policy to reduce any 

cost to Pyongyang or its provocative behavior. Ultimately, there is no way out of this issue except by a negotiated settlement or war as we cannot simply count 

on North Korea yielding to pressure or collapsing. In 

any case, China blocks and mitigates any successful 

employment of pressure upon the DPRK, and Russia 

supports it for now.

Here we must remember that this process is not 

merely about North Korean disarmament. Rather it is 

about creating a new, legitimate, and enduring, peaceful order in Northeast Asia in which all the parties can 

participate securely. Even if we believe or know for 

sure that North Korea will collapse, we must treat 

it as if it is a durable and ultimately legitimate state 

capable of making and implementing commitments 

made to other players. The notion that we do not negotiate with “evil,” while popular, contradicts any 

notion of sound diplomacy aimed at preventing war, 

possibly the greatest evil in world politics. Moreover, 

the earlier widespread belief that North Korea’s collapse is only a matter of time has not been borne out. 
82

Despite withering crises, the regime has survived and 

is currently undergoing a succession transition. While 

its leadership transition may be a major source of its 

provocative behavior, it is also clear that no external 

source has much influence over it, thus North Korea 

has gained a certain measure of stability. Moreover, 

its possession of nuclear weapons increases its interlocutors’ interest in its stability, not its disintegration. 

Likewise, the idea that China will exercise pressure on 

our behalf on North Korea is another unsound idea 

that has failed to materialize. Therefore, Washington 

should seek to reshape the East Asian order that would 

duly emerge there to its advantage and not Beijing’s. 

Absent a coherent or viable allied approach, North 

Korea will end up as China’s economic protectorate as 

will Russia’s Asian provinces, thus undermining any 

hopes for stability in Northeast Asia for a long time. 

This logic reinforces our prior point that we cannot 

count on a North Korean collapse and must seriously 

engage it.

Meanwhile, Russia benefits greatly by having an 

American option with which to counter China and 

while it would not be an ally or even a full partner 

with us, that offer could appreciably distance it from 

its lockstep identification with China’s Korea policy. 

For example, a U.S. guarantee that it and/or its allies 

will underwrite the cost of providing North Korea 

with Russian energy as part of any subsequent accord 

would certainly play very well in Moscow. Such an 

initiative might also make North Korea sit up and take 

notice that 3+3 bipolarity in the talks had changed to 

4+2 against it, where China does not relish being left 

alone with North Korea. Moreover, only direct engagement with North Korea allows the United States 

to shape the future of the two Korean states in positive 
83

ways without leaving the field to a Russo-Chinese alliance dominated by Beijing, with Pyongyang as another Chinese satellite. That approach would play well in 

South Korean politics and also grant Seoul a greater 

say in what happens to or in North Korea than would 

otherwise be the case. Meanwhile, Russia could then 

add its leverage to a U.S. plan to engage North Korea directly within the Six-Party framework, as China 

and others have recommended. Then it might be possible to resume negotiations with North Korea under 

conditions acceptable to the other parties and with 

the promise of an expanded direct U.S. engagement 

that is essential to any lasting peace process. This 

program might also make the Six-Party process a real 

rather than fictitious vehicle for actually restructuring 

Northeast Asian security.

The second prong of this strategy relates to RussoJapanese relations that are now at an impasse. Moscow 

apparently thinks it can bully Japan into accepting 

the postwar settlement of the Northern Territories or 

Kurile Islands and simultaneously induce large-scale 

Japanese investment in Russia, even as it insults Japanese sensitivities and refuses to reform its economy 

to attract more investment. Thus, Moscow plays to its 

domestic galleries, sends cabinet ministers to the Kurile Islands, and is even launching a development plan 

and military buildup there.249 Meanwhile Japanese 

experts doubt that Russian energy fields there can be 

developed on sufficiently large a scale to fulfill Moscow’s expectations of huge East Asian markets for its 

energy (which Japan does not now need even after its 

earthquake and collapse of the Fukushima reactor).250

Japan’s domestic politics also inhibit its government 

from relaxing its claim to all four of the Kurile Islands 

and certainly U.S. support for this position adds to 
84

its inflexibility.251 But, in fact, Japan clearly has no viable answer to Russia’s chauvinistic policy other than 

to impede investment in Russia.252 Though Japanese 

businesses would like to invest in Russia if they could 

guarantee profitability, they will not do so until Russia changes its policies nor will the government encourage them until the territorial issues are settled.253

Here, too, there must be a U.S. initiative. We would 

probably be doing Japan a service if we persuade it to 

accept Putin’s resurrection of Khrushchev’s 1956 offer 

of two of the four Kurile islands as the best it will get 

for now because the dangers posed by a nuclear North 

Korea and a rising China that defends it outweigh the 

benefits of domestic posturing for otherwise unattainable territories.254 Nonetheless, it is the only proposal 

that has any chance of succeeding of normalizing Russo-Japanese relations. It, too, would give Russia a Japanese option for investing in the RFE and completing 

a pipeline to the Pacific coast that would free it from 

excessive, even unilateral dependency on China’s energy market. Meanwhile, this would reduce Japanese 

and U.S. fears of a Sino-Russian alliance. On the diplomatic front, these initiatives, especially if they are 

coordinated with our allies, would reduce China’s 

unilateral ability to rearrange East Asia’s balance of 

power to its benefit and help bring about a solution 

to two current long-lasting problems, the urgent one 

of finding a way to reduce the North Korean nuclear 

threat, while bringing North Korea into some sort of 

durable, legitimate regional order and second, the 

abnormal relationship between Russia and Japan. Absent such initiatives, Russia will almost certainly incline toward China. Indeed, there are those who claim 

that Russia has agreed with China’s position on the 

disputed Diaoutyi Islands with Japan in order to gain 
85

Chinese support for its position on the Kurile Islands, 

thus essentially forming a diplomatic anti-Japanese alliance.255 This kind of bloc is precisely the threat that 

we have worked to prevent since 1949, and it should 

not be allowed to form because too many observers 

here are too complacent about Sino-Russian relations 

to notice their trend lines.

The key benefits to Russia of these moves would 

not just be that it no longer need rely exclusively on 

China as its gateway into Asian diplomacy or that it 

must face a potential Chinese military threat alone. 

Such initiatives would unlock possibilities as well for 

Russia to undertake successfully what is the essential 

precondition for its success in Asia, reinvestment, with 

large-scale foreign help in Siberia and the RFE. But 

for these U.S. and allied initiatives to succeed, Russia 

cannot just be a passive recipient that pockets these 

reforms and happily exploits them. It, too, must act to 

attract these initiatives and give Washington, Tokyo, 

and Seoul lasting reasons for believing that they will 

succeed. Russia must allay the heavy burden of past 

suspicions arousing out of its policies. To make itself 

worthy of partnership and to survive as a great Asian 

power, Russia must change its policies to keep pace 

with the huge changes occurring there. Obviously, the 

success of these initiatives is predicated upon Russia 

altering its present diplomatic stance over time in response to those foreign invitations. But the changes 

that Russia must make to gain from these offers, survive, and even flourish as an independent Asian power go deeper than that.

The changes that must occur relate to the opening up of the RFE, if not Russia, as a whole to foreign 

investment. The sums required to develop the RFE’s 

blighted infrastructure and its resource base are astro-
86

nomical and will not be forthcoming unless and until 

Russia can guarantee, as China has done since 1978, 

the security and profitability of foreign investment 

without being expropriated by local or central governing elites’ capricious whims, either local or central. 

Essentially, this means no more Khodorkovsky cases 

and no more Magnitsky affairs, to cite only two of the 

most outstanding examples of governmental raiding 

of businesses in Russia. Only if Russia changes its laws 

and policies to ensure that property owners’ rights’ 

will be legally defended and subjected to exclusively 

legal processes during disputes can it attract the investments it needs to develop Russia as a whole, and 

the RFE in particular. We should not shy away from 

indicating our awareness that these changes entail 

profound and hopefully lasting changes in Russian 

politics and economics. But they are the only changes 

that can allow Moscow to realize its twin desires to rebuild the RFE and play a meaningful independent role 

in East Asia. A Russia capable of such a role would 

add to, rather than detract from, the regional balance 

there. 

A Russian failure to make these moves, which 

we must admit is quite likely, essentially means renouncing those foreign policy objectives and the RFE 

becoming by default a Chinese economic colony. Indeed, as Russian leaders know and say, development 

is the precondition for any successful policy in Asia.256

If Russia fails to become “a worthy economic partner” 

for Asia and the Pacific Rim, Deputy Prime Minister 

and Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin warned that, 

“China and the Southeast Asian countries will steamroll Siberia and the Far East.”257 China would then 

also steamroll Russia in Central Asia. Similarly, Putin 
87

warned local audiences in 2000 that if Russia failed 

to reform, then they would end up speaking Chinese, 

Japanese, and Korean.258 Russian leaders clearly know 

what will happen if China is the only significant investor in the RFE.

A U.S. initiative treating Russia as a serious East 

Asian partner, engaging in a real dialogue on security threats there, and a strong public expression of 

U.S. willingness to invest in the RFE in return for real 

guarantees of that investment, and to encourage concurrent Japanese and South Korean investment there 

could well elicit a favorable Russian response. But 

this means a fundamental change in Russian policy 

whose scope and far-reaching implications cannot 

and should not be underestimated. Therefore, it is 

quite possible that the Russian government will fail, 

as it has since 1970, to seize the opportunity in East 

Asia. The Russo-Chinese partnership has been largely 

an anti-American and anti-liberal affair since its inception.259 It continues because it reinforces the nature 

of Russia’s economic and political system that has led 

it to the brink of marginalization in Asia but which 

rewards its leaders handsomely. The reform of that 

system and of the accompanying mentalities and even 

pathological economic and political behaviors that accompany it are not only in the U.S. and its allies’ interests. Above all, they are in the interests of Russia’s 

people. Insofar as Asia is concerned, they are in the 

interest of the Russian state because otherwise only 

China will be interested in the RFE. Should that situation come to pass, China, but not Russia will benefit 

from that outcome.

These initiatives should be followed up at the relevant levels of the U.S. Army. For example, U.S. Forces 

Korea (USFK) and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) need 
88

to continue and, if necessary, intensify their review of 

all possible contingencies that could occur on the Korean peninsula and do so through games, conferences, 

exercises, etc. both alone and with Japan and the ROK. 

These actions could include both civilian experts and 

military leaders and forces where appropriate. Beyond 

that and in view of the Pentagon’s statement that it 

sees Russia as a partner in the Asia-Pacific region, it 

is worth considering inviting Russian civilian experts 

and military officials and commanders to participate 

where feasible in these exercises and actions.260

The United States should launch these initiatives 

because it needs help in Asia to balance a rising and 

increasingly aggressive China. While anti-liberalism 

may benefit Russia’s leaders who stand to be further 

enriched from sell-offs of Russian material and political resources to China and the accompanying bribes, it 

neither benefits their successors, the Russian state, or 

its people. Washington should make the offer out of a 

deep consideration of its evolving national interest in 

East Asia. But should it launch these initiatives to no 

avail due to Russia’s refusal to accept them, it will still 

be able, with its allies, to cope with strategic trends 

in East Asia. However, if Russia should fail to rise to 

the opportunity that now might be offered to it, Russia’s interests will not be at stake. Rather, its survival 

as a great independent Asian power will be at risk for 

that issue is now on the table. Even if Moscow does 

not fully realize this fact, we should realize it and extend these offers to Russia for that is the most we can 

do. But in Asia, as elsewhere, Russia’s future is in its 

hands. 

On the other hand, in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, there is no sign that Russia, let alone China 

will support further diplomatic efforts directed against 
89

Iran. In earlier works, this author has argued strongly 

on behalf of an engagement strategy directed towards 

Iran and North Korea.261 But Iran has contemptuously rejected that engagement when it was offered. 

This left the effort to enlist Russian and Chinese support against Iran. But that policy line has apparently 

reached the limit of its usefulness and with it any real 

hope for a diplomatic or purely political resolution of 

the problem. As Iran moves forward despite the obstacles the United States, Europe, and Israel, have put 

before it narrows further any hope for a nonmilitary 

answer to the problem. Covert action and sabotage 

might succeed, but again they may also fail to arrest 

or reverse Iran’s determined program for nuclear 

weapons and the generation of an insurgency across 

the Middle East; that is, in fact, the current situation. 

While the regional trends within the Northeast 

Asian environment require continuing resort to creative political means backed up by strong deterrent 

capabilities and allied unity, the conditions presently 

obtaining in the Gulf and Middle East increasingly 

suggest that such measures will only have limited success at best. It is by no means inconceivable that we 

could approach a situation where direct application 

of force to cripple, if not destroy, Iran’s nuclear program, either launched by the United States or by Israel 

(who, as we said, cannot accept in any way a nuclear 

Iran bent on its destruction) becomes the only possible solution to the threat of Iranian nuclearization. 

But for that to be avoided, we need to induce or obtain 

a change in Moscow’s, if not Beijing’s, perception of 

the stakes and, more of the same, to judge from recent 

Russian actions and statements, is not the answer to 

that problem.
90

Therefore we need a stronger awareness of how regional dynamics affect not only Russian policy, but the 

overall reset policy as a whole. Only on that basis can 

it succeed in realizing its progenitors’ hopes. These examples from both sides’ domestic, foreign, and defense 

policies, but with emphasis here on Russian perspectives, underscore the fragility of efforts like the reset 

policy and the all-encompassing need on all sides for 

sober statecraft removed from the mythologies and realities of the Cold War or from the new mythologies of 

the Post-Cold War period. Putin might complain that 

episodes like Libya have become stable or recurring 

events in U.S. national security policy, but Russia, too, 

is a country that has been at war since 1994 and with 

few, if any positive, results as the tension with Georgia and the endless and failing war against insurgency 

in the North Caucasus show us.262 Those conflicts, too, 

have lasting consequences beyond Russia’s borders. 

Both states’ progress towards international security 

requires more than blaming others. Instead, it requires 

a deeper understanding of just how interrelated the 

effects of crisis, policy, and war are in today’s world 

and a more sober appreciation of the risks that even 

local crises, be they expected or not, can provide to the 

wider global environment.

ENDNOTES 

1. I have addressed this issue in Stephen Blank, “The Military 

Dimension of Russo-Chinese Relations,” Forthcoming.

2. Marcin Kaczmarski, The Fragile ‘Rest’ The Balance and the 

Prospects for Changes in Russian-US Relations, Warsaw, Poland: 

Centre for Eastern Studies, 2011, available from www.osw.waw.pl.
91

3. Andrew Monaghan, “From Lisbon to Munich: Russian 

Views of NATO-Russia Relations,” Research Report, Washington, DC: NATO Defense College, February, 2011.

4. Moscow, Interfax, in English, March 23, 2011, Open Source 

Center, Central Eurasia, (Henceforth FBIS SOV), March 23, 2011.

5. “GOP Senators Wary of Russian Influence on European 

Missile Defense,” Global Security Newswire, April 15, 2011, available from www.nti.org.

6. Elaine M. Grossman, “GOP Leaders Aim to Enforce 

Obama’s Nuclear Modernization Promises,” Global Security Newswire, May 10, 2011, available from www.nti.org.

7. Kaczmarski.

8. Ahmed Rashid, “How the US Intends to End the War With 

the Taliban,” Financial Times, April 19, 2011, p. 9.

9. Cited in Cathy Young, “From Russia With Loathing,” New 

York Times, November 21, 2008, available from www.nytimes.com.

10. Fedor Lukyanov, “Political No-Road Map,” Moscow, Russia, Gazeta.ru, in Russian, April 3, 2008, FBIS SOV, April 3, 2008; 

Tsypkin cites analogous examples of this, Mikhail Tsypkin, "Russian Politics, Policy-Making and American Missile Defense," International Affairs, Vol. LXXXV, No. 4, 2009, pp. 784-787.

11. Fedor Lukyanov, “Russian Dilemmas in a Multipolar 

World,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. LXIII, No. 2, Spring/

Summer 2010, p. 28.

12. Timofei Bordachev, “Multipolarity, Anarchy, and Security,” in Ivan Krastev et al., What Does Russia Think? London, UK: 

European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, p. 63, available 

from www.ecfr.eu.

13. Kari Roberts, “Jets, Flags, and a New Cold War?” International Journal, Vol. LXV, No. 4, Autumn, 2010, p. 962.

14. Tsypkin, pp. 784-787.
92

15. Ibid., pp. 784-797.

16. For a comprehensive discussion of the national security 

strategy, see my previous work, Stephen Blank, “No Need to 

Threaten Us, We Are Frightened of Ourselves: Russia’s Blueprint 

for a Police State,” in Stephen J. Blank and Richard Weitz, eds., 

The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary 

Fitzgerald, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 2010, pp. 19-150.

17. This does not contradict the uproar over the arms control 

treaty because the key issue for the Republican opposition was 

missile defenses, which they regard with almost theological veneration. While they are innately suspicious of Russia, it is seen as 

much less of a problem than Islamic terrorism or China and, as a 

result, gets far less attention.

18. Richard Perle, “Yes, Nukes: the Global Zero Utopia,” 

World Affairs, March-April, 2011, p. 52.

19. I discussed this previously in Stephen Blank, “Russia 

and Nuclear Weapons,” in Stephen J. Blank, ed., Russia’s Nuclear 

Weapons, Past, Present, and Future, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011.

20. “Missile Defense Could Be the Silver Bullet, “Moscow 

Times, November 3, 2009.

21. Dmitry Suslov, “From Parity to Reasonable Sufficiency: 

Russian-U.S. Relations; How to Break the Vicious Circle,” Russia 

in Global Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 4, October-December 2010, pp. 51-

52.

22. Igor Dzhadan, “The Doctrine of Preemptive Retaliation,” 

Moscow, Russia, Agentstvo Politicheskikh Novostey, in Russian, October 21, 2009, FBIS SOV, October 21, 2009.

23. Sergey Karaganov, “Forward From Rest,” Moscow, Russia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, in Russian, February 17, 2011, FBIS 

SOV, February 17, 2011.
93

24. Pavel Felgenhauer, “The US Threat Dominates Russian 

Defense Spending and Foreign Policy Decisions,” Eurasian Daily 

Monitor, February 10, 2011.

25. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, January 11, 2009, 

FBIS SOV, January 11, 2009.

26. Ibid.; Alexander Osipovich, “Russia Tests ICBM Designed 

to Overcome Missile Shield,” August 28, 2008, available from 

www.defensenews.com.

27. “Russia Seen Pursuing U.S. Missile Shield Tech,” Global 

Security Newswire, March 24, 2011, available from gsn.nti.org/gsn/

nw_20110324_9650.php.

28. Ibid.

29. Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN Online, in English, November 3, 2010, FBIS SOV, November 3, 2010.

30. Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN Online, in English, March 

28, 2011, FBIS SOV, March 28, 2011.

31. Ivan Karev, “Examination By Experts,” Moscow, Russia, 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kuryer Online, in Russian, May 12, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, June 1, 2010; General Anatoly Kornukov (Ret.), “Test 

of Orbital Aircraft Leads to Militarization of Space,” Moscow, 

Russia, Interfax-AVN Online, in Russian and English, April 23, 

2010, FBIS SOV, April 23, 2010.

32. Colonel I. M. Kruptsov, “Bor’ba s Giperzvukovym 

Letal’nymi Apparatami (GZLA): Novaya Zadacha I Trebovaniia k Sisteme Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoi Oboroni (VKO)” (“The 

Struggle Against Hypersonic Flying Machines: The New Task 

and Demand for a System of Aero-space Defense),” Voynnaya 

Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1, 2011, pp. 10-17.

33. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, December 24, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, December 24, 2010; Oleg Zegonov, “Obama’s Nuclear 

Doctrine Opens Pandora’s Box,” Moscow, Russia, www.infox.ru, 

in Russian, April 6, 2010, FBIS SOV, April 19, 2010; Moscow, Russia, RIA Novosti, in Russian, April 29, 2010, FBIS SOV, April 29, 
94

2010; Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN Online, in English, July 15, 

2010, FBIS SOV, July 15, 2010.

34. Mikhail Sergeyev and Igor Naumov, “Vladimir Putin’s 

Golden Mace, Premier prepared to Spend R20 Trillion on Rearming Army and Navy,” Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN Online, in 

Russian, March 21, 2011, FBIS SOV, March 27, 2011.

35. Felgenhauer.

36. Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN Online, in English, January 

26, 2011, FBIS SOV, and January 26, 2011, indicates Defense Minister Sedyukov’s open statement that Russia is continuing to build 

its own missile defense system.

37. Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003 p. 66.

38. Moscow, Russia, Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey Internet 

Version, in Russian, September 10, 2008, FBIS SOV, September 10, 

2008.

39. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, March 22, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, March 22, 2010.

40. Andrei Uglanov, “What is Behind Washington’s Ultimatum?” Moscow, Russia, Argument Nedeli in Russian, March 10-17, 

2010, Johnson’s Russia List, March 17, 2010.

41. “Interview with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 21-28, 2007, available from www.mid.ru.

42. Arbatov, Russia and the United States—Time To End the Strategic Deadlock, p. 2.

43. Ryabkov, Interview, FBIS SOV February 25, 2010.

44. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, February 6, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, February 6, 2010.

45. “Putin Says Russia Will build Weapons to Offset planned 

US Missile Defences,” December 29, 2009, available from www.

guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/29/nuclear-weapons-russia.
95

46. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, January 21, 2011, 

FBIS SOV, January 21, 2011.

47. Moscow, Russia, Interfax in English, February 5, 2011, FBIS 

SOV, February 5, 2011.

48. Suslov, pp. 51-64; Mikhail Troitsky, “Containment Must 

Be Overcome: Long Cycles of Russian-U.S. Relations,” Russia in 

Global Affairs, Vol. VII, No. 4, October-December, 2010, pp. 40-50.

49. Jacob Kipp, “Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat That 

Dare Not Speak Its Name,” in Stephen J. Blank, ed., Russia’s Nuclear Weapons, Past, Present, and Future, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011, forthcoming.

50. Lukyanov.

51. Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Russia’s Power and Alliances in 

the 21st Century, Politics, Vol. XXX, No. 4, October, 2010, made 

available in manuscript from by the author.

52. Kipp, “Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat That Dare 

Not Speak Its Name.”

53. “New START Enters Into Force,” Global Security Newswire, 

February 7, 2011, available from www.nti.org.

54. On Pakistan, see Alexei Arbatov, “Terms of Engagement: 

WMD Proliferation and US-Russian Relations,” paper prepared 

for the U.S. Army War College Conference “US and Russia: PostElections Security Challenges,” Carlisle, PA, March 6-7, 2008, in 

Stephen J. Blank, ed., Prospects for U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009, pp. 147-149.

55. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in Russian, April 12, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, April 12, 2010.

56. Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN Online, in English, February 7, 2011, FBIS SOV, February 7, 2011; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, 

in English, August 2, 2010, FBIS SOV, August 2, 2010.
96

57. “Power Posturing—China’s Tactical Nuclear Stance 

Comes of Age,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 12, 2010, available from www4.janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey.

58. Steven Andreasen, Malcolm Chambers, and Isabelle Williams, NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Is a New Consensus Possible?

London, UK: Royal United Services International, 2010, p. 9, 

available from www.rusi.org.

59. Kipp, “Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat That Dare 

Not Speak Its Name.”

60. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” February 5, 

2010, FBIS SOV, February 9, 2010, available from www.kremlin.ru.

61. Roger McDermott, “Russian Military Doctrine Looks 

East,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 23, 2010; Jacob Kipp, “Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat That Dare not Speak Its 

Name,” Paper Presented to the Conference Strategy and Doctrine 

in Russian Security Policy, Washington, DC: National Defense 

University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, June 28, 2010.

62. Skokov.

63. Alekseev.

64. Kipp, “Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat That Dare 

not Speak Its Name”; Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional 

Armed Forces, Reform and Nuclear Posture to 2020,” Paper Presented to the Conference Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Fort 

Lesley J. McNair, June 28, 2010.

65. Dmitri Litovkin, “Ucheniia Popali v Seti,” Izvestiya, September 28, 2009, cited in Ibid.

66. A. Kondrat’ev, “Nekotorye Osobennosti Realizatsii Kontseptsii Setsentricheskaia Voina’ v Vooruzhennykh Silakh KNR,” 

Zarubezhnoe Voyennoe Obozreniye, No. 3, March 2010, pp. 11-17, 

cited in Ibid.

67. “Ucheniia,” Zarubezhnoye Voennoye Obozreniye, No. 8, July 

31, 2009; and Aleksandr Khramchikhin, “Starye Osnovy Novoi 
97

Doktriny,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kuryer, Bo. 6, February 17, 

2010, p. 5, cited in Ibid.

68. Simon Saradzhyan, “The Role of China in Russia’s Military Thinking,” International Relations and Security Network, May 

4, 2010, available from www.isn.ethz.ch; Kipp.

69. Kipp, “Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat That Dare 

not Speak Its Name”; McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed 

Forces, Reform and Nuclear Posture to 2020.”

70. Ibid.

71. FBIS SOV, November 28, 2010; “Reforma Flota.”

72. Mikhail Lukanin, “Navy Prepares to Defend Russian Oil,” 

Moscow, Russia, Trud, November 24, 2010, FBIS SOV, November 

28, 2010; “Reforma Flota: Glavnaya Ugroza na Dalnem Vostoke,” 

Voyennoye Obozreniye,” December 10, 2010, available from topwar.

ru/2646-reforma-flota-glavnaya-ugroza-na-dalnem-vostoke.html.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Dmitri Litovkin, “We Didn’t Send Him For a Star: A Skif 

Flew From the North Pole to Kanin Nos,” Moscow, Russia, Izvestiya Moscow Edition in Russian, September 13, 2006, FBIS SOV, 

September 13, 2006.

76. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, May 5, 2008, FBIS 

SOV, May 5, 2008; Yuri Gavrilov, “Long-Range Aviation Inhabits Arctic Skies,” Moscow, Russia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, 

May 15, 2008, FBIS SOV, May 15, 2008; Moscow, Russia, IRARTASS, in English, March 20, 2008, FBIS SOV, March 20, 2008.

77. Litovkin, “We Didn’t Send Him For a Star”; Moscow, Russia, Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, April 9, 2008.

78. Wendell Minnick,”China Ramps Up Missile Threat With 

DF-16,” March 21, 2011, available from www.defensenews.com.
98

79. Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN, Online, in Russian, December 13, 2010, FBIS SOV, December 13, 2010; Moscow, Russia, RIANovosti, Online, in Russian, December 8, 2010, FBIS SOV, December 

8, 2010; Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, December 13, 

2010, FBIS SOV, December 13, 2010; Moscow, Russia, RBK Online, 

December 14, 2010, FBIS SOV, December 14, 2010.

80. Moscow, Russia, RIA-Novosti Online, in Russian, December 8, 2010, FBIS SOV, December 8, 2010.

81. Dmitriy Litovkin, “Successors to the ‘Topol’ Have Appeared,” Moscow, Russia, Izvestiya Online, in Russian, March 24, 

2011, FBIS SOV, March 25, 2011.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Mark A Smith, A Russian Chronology, July-September 

2008, London, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre Advanced 

Research Assessments Group, 2008, p. 25, available from www.

da.mod.uk/arag.

86. “Popovkin Details the GPV,” February 25, 2011, available 

from russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/tag/vladimir-popovkin/.

87. Yuri Gavrilov, “To Arms! First Deputy Defense Minister 

Vladimir Popovkin Revealed Plans to Re-equip the Army,” Moscow, Russia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, July 2, 2010, available 

from russiadefence.englishboard.net/t1294-interview-with-vladimirpopovkin.

88. Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN Online, in English, March 4, 

2011, FBIS SOV, March 4, 2011.

89. “Supreme Commander in Chief’s Five Tasks. New People 

Are Needed to Fulfill Them,” Moscow, Russia, Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, in Russian, March 21, 2011, FBIS SOV, March 30, 2011.

90. Ibid.
99

91. President Dmitry Medvedev, cited in “Russia Ready for 

Meaningful Military Reform. Again. Really,” available from www.

moscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2008/09/27.

92. Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN Online, in Russian, March 

24, 2011, FBIS SOV, March 28, 2011; Alexander Vladimirovih 

Muntyanu, Yuri Anatolyevich Pechatnov,” Problems of Developing a Strategic Deterrence Mechanism,” Moscow, Russia, Yubileynyy Straticheskaya Stabilnost’, in Russian, August 12, 2010, FBIS 

SOV, August 12, 2010.

93. Krasnoyarsk, available from www.NuclearNo.rui, in Russian, March 8, 2010, FBIS SOV, March 14, 2010; Moscow, Russia, 

Interfax, in Russian, January 26, 2011, FBIS SOV, February 3, 2011; 

“Remarks of Linton Brooks, National Defense University Foundation and National Defense Industrial Association Forum with 

Frank Miller and Linton Brooks, on Next Steps in U.S.-Russian 

Arms Control,” Washington, DC, May 3, 2011.

94. Jacob W. Kipp, “A Long Way to Zero; Moscow Remains 

Reluctant to Take the Next Step,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, February 11, 2011.

95. Moscow, Russia, Ekho Moskvy Radio, in Russian, February 

7, 2011, FBIS SOV, February 8, 2011.

96. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, In English, March 1, 2011, FBIS 

SOV, March 1, 2011.

97. Viktor Litovkin, “War of Resolutions,” Moscow, Russia, 

Nezavisiamyoye Voynnoye Obozreniye,” in Russian, December 29, 

2010, FBIS SOV, January 6, 2011; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, December 24, 2010, FBIS SOV, January 4, 2011.

98. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, April 2, 2010, FBIS 

SOV, April 2, 2010.

99. “Arms Fitting,” Moscow, Russia, Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 

in Russian, December 17, 2009,” Johnson’s Russia List, December 

18, 2009.
100

100. “Russia Seeks to Avoid Past Mistakes at Arms Cuts Talks 

With US-Expert,” Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN, December 23, 

2009, Johnson’s s Russia List, December 23, 2009.

101. “Interview With Aleksey Arbatov,” Moscow, Russia, Izvestiya Online, in Russian, January 30, 2011, FBIS SOV, January 30, 

2011.

102. Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN Online, in Russian, February 7, 2011, FBIS SOV, February 8, 2011.

103. Walter Pincus, “Russia’s Ryabkov on U.S.-Russia Relations: ‘We Can Offer Tangible Results, And We Will Do More in 

the Future’,” Washington Post, January 31, 2011, available from 

www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-ryabkov-on-us-russia-relations-we-can-offer-tangible-results-and-we-will-do-more-in-the-future/2011/01/31/ABkrC6Q_story.html.

104. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, April 20, 2010, FBIS 

SOV, April 20, 2010.

105. Dmitry Trenin and Alexey Malashenko, Iran: A View 

From Moscow, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, pp. 20-21.

106. Alexei Arbatov, “Terms of Engagement: WMD Proliferation and U.S.-Russian Relations,” paper prepared for the U.S. 

Army War College conference, “U.S. and Russia: Post-Elections 

Security Challenges, Carlisle, PA, March 6-7, 2008, in Stephen J. 

Blank, ed., Prospects for US-Russian Security Cooperation, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009, pp. 

147-149.

107. The doctrine may be found at the president’s website, 

“Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” February 5, 2010, 

available from www.kremlin.ru; also available in FBIS SOV, February 9, 2010.

108. Federal News Service, Official Kremlin International 

News Broadcast, “Without a Strong Army Russia Has No Future,” Interview With Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, “ February 

22, 2002, Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
101

109. Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Global Security Norms,” 

Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, p. 65.

110. RIA Novosti, June 21, 2007.

111. “Russia Says It Wants “Equal” Involvement in Missile 

Shield,” Global Security Newswire, October 25, 2010, available from

www.nti.org.

112. Moscow, Russia, RIA Novosti, in Russian, March 10, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, March 10, 2010; “UN to Address Sanctions Against 

Iran ‘soon’ - Russia’s Lavrov,” RIA Novosti, April 29, 2010; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, April 21, 2010, FBIS SOV, April 

21, 2010.

113. As discussed earlier in Stephen Blank, ““Russia Unfazed 

by North Korean Nuclear Test,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 

13, 2006; Stephen Blank, “Russia Turns the Other Cheek on North 

Korean Missile Launch,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 7, 2006.

114. Trenin, “Russia and Global Security Norms,” pp. 65-70; 

Moscow, Russia, Interfax, December 1, 2005, FBIS SOV, December 

1, 2005.

115. FBIS SOV, February 9, 2010. 

116. Arbatov, pp. 147-149.

117 . Mikhail Pogorely, “Prospects for Russia-US Cooperation 

in Preventing WMD Proliferation,” Mikhail Tsypkin, ed., Russia’s 

Security and the War on Terrorism, London, UK: Routledge, 2008, p. 

74.

118. Ibid., pp. 74-76.

119. Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer 

and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 

Press, 2010, pp. 148-149.

120. Arbatov, pp. 147-149.

121. Ibid.
102

122. Ibid.

123. Thomas E. Graham, “The Friend of My Enemy,” The National Interest, No. 95, May-June, 2008, pp. 36-37.

124. Arbatov, pp. 147-149; Matthew Kroenig, Beyond Optimism 

and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation, Managing the Atom Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 2009-

14, Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center, November 2009, pp. 34-35. 

125. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press 

Briefing, July 6, 2009, available from www.whitehouse.org. 

126. Remarks by President Obama and President Medvedev 

at Joint Press Conference, June 24, 2010, available from www.

whitehouse.gov?the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-medvev-russia-joint-press-conference.

127. Trenin and Malashenko. 

128. “Russia Signs Decree To Ban S-300 Air Defense Missiles 

To Iran,” September 22, 2010, available from www.allheadlinenews.

com/articles/7019988162.

129. David Crawford, Richard Boudreaux, Joe Lauria, and Jay 

Solomon, “ U.S. Softens Sanction Plan Against Iran,’ Wall Street 

Journal, March 22, 2010, p. 4; “Insiders See Iran Sanctions Plan Watered Down,” Global Security Newswire, March 25, 2010, available 

from www.nti.org.

130. “U.S. Fears Chinese Companies Are Breaking Iran Sanctions,” BBC News, October 18, 2010, available from www.bbc.co.uk/

news/world-us-canada-11567740.

131. Ibid.

132. Graham.

133. Arbatov, pp. 147-149; Matthew Kroenig, Beyond Optimism 

and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation, Managing the Atom Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 2009-

14, Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center, November 2009, pp. 34-35. 
103

134. Remarks of Ambassador Gleb A. Ivashentsov, Second 

Department for Asia Director, Russian Foreign Ministry,” Iran’s 

Security Challenges and the Region, Liechtenstein Colloquium Report, I, Liechtenstein and Princeton, NJ, 2005, p. 39.

135. Ibid.

136. “Nuclear Watchdog Says Iran Boosts Nuclear Work,” Reuters, September 6, 2010.

137. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, July 20, 2010, FBIS 

SOV, July 20, 2010; Shiraz, Khabar-e-Jonub, in Persian, July 19, 

2010, FBIS SOV, July 27, 2010; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, July 14, 2010, FBIS SOV, July 14, 2010; Moscow, Russia, ITARTASS, in English, July 14, 2010, FBIS SOV, July 14, 2010.

138. Vladimir Socor, “Loopholes Opening in US, EU Sanctions on Iran,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 30, 2010; Vladimir Socor, “Moscow-Tehran Oil and Gas Roadmap to Circumvent Sanctions on Iran,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 14, 2010.

139. Vladimir Radyuhin, “The Russian Iranian Road Map,” 

Chennai, The Hindu, July 27, 2010.

140. Beirut, Al-Manar TV Online, in English, July 14, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, July 14, 2010; Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, 

July 14, 20910, FBIS SOV, July 14, 2010; Vladimir Radyuhin, “The 

Russian-Iranian Road Map,” Chennai, the Hindu Online, in English, July 27, 2010, FBIS SOV, July 27, 2010;Vladimir Socor, “Moscow Uses Anti-Iran Sanctions as Bargaining Leverage on Washington,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 21, 2010.

141. Remarks by President Obama and President Medvedev 

at Joint Press Conference, June 24, 2010.

142. Moscow, Russia, RIA Novosti, in Russian, March 10, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, March 10, 2010; “UN to Address Sanctions Against 

Iran ‘Soon’ - Russia’s Lavrov,” RIA Novosti, April 29, 2010; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, April 21, 2010, FBIS SOV, April 

21, 2010.

143. David J. Kramer, “Resetting the U.S.-Russian Relationship: It Takes Two,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, 

January, 2010, pp. 69-70.
104

144. “Russia Could Delay Release of U.N. Report on Iran,” 

Global Security Newswire, May 13, 2011, available from www.nti.

org.

145. Moscow, Russia, Novaya Gazeta Ponedelnik, in Russian, 

March 16-22, 1998, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Arms 

Control, (Henceforth FBIS TAC) 98-076, March 17, 1998.

146. “Global Alternative: The Logical Conclusion of a Major Failure of Russian Intelligence,” Moscow, Russia, in Russian, 

November 9, 2009, FBIS SOV, November 9, 2009, available from 

www.forum.msk.ru.

147. David Ignatius, “What a ‘Reset’ Can’t Fix,” Washington 

Post, July 5, 2009, available from www.washingtonpost.com.

148. Vladimir Socor, “Moscow Uses Anti-Iran Sanctions As 

Bargaining Leverage on Washington,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 

21, 2010.

149. FBIS SOV, July 29, 2010.

150. “Iran Says It Has S-300 Missiles,” Associated Press, Moscow Times, August 5, 2010, p. 3.

151. For further information, see Stephen Blank, New Trends 

in Russian Arms Sales, Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 

2010.

152. Jon W. Parker, Persian Dreams: Moscow and Tehran Since 

the Fall of the Shah, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009, p. xi.

153. Ibid., pp. 135, 146, 307-308, for example.

154. Ibid. I discussed this back in 1992 in Stephen Blank, “Russia and Iran in a New Middle East,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 

III, No. 4, Fall 1992, pp. 124-127.

155. Parker.

156. Igor Kryuchkov, “Japan May Replace Russia in Iranian 

Nuclear Crisis,” Moscow, Russia, Gazeta Online, in Russian, February 26, 2010, FBIS SOV, February 26, 2010.
105

157. Fedor Lukyanov, “Looking Back,” Moscow, Russia, 

Gazeta.ru, August 19, 2010, FBIS SOV, August 23, 23010; Moscow, 

Russia, Interfax, in English, August 23, 2010, FBIS SOV, August 

23, 2010; Tehran, IRNA, in Persian, August 29, 2010, FBIS SOV, 

August 29, 2010; Nasser Karini, “Iran Proposes Joint Assembly of 

Nuclear Fuel,” Philadelphia Inquirer, August 27, 2010; “Bushehr Is 

Purely Economic, Not Political Issue-Analyst,” August 23, 2010, 

available from www.russiatoday.com; “Russian Pundits Ponder 

Consequences of Launch of Nuclear Station in Iran,” BBC Monitoring from Ekho Moskvy, August 21, 2010; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, 

in English, August 20, 2010, FBIS SOV, August 20, 2010; Moscow, 

Russia, RIA Novosti, in Russian, August 23, 2010, FBIS SOV, August 23, 2010; “Experts Debate Possibility of Iran Attack,” Global 

Security Newswire, August 18, 2010, available from www.nti.org; 

“Russia: Nuclear Plant Shows Iran’s right to Peaceful Nuclear Energy,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, August 19, 2010, available 

from www.rferl.org; Open Source Center, “Stated Bushehr Opening Likely Effort to Stabilize Russia-Iran Relations,” FBIS SOV 

August 18, 2010; Marie Jego “Iran Inaugurates Bushehr Its First 

Nuclear Plant Despite Sanctions,” Paris, LeMonde.fr, in French, 

August 22, 2010, FBIS SOV, August 23, 2010.

158. Dmitry Medvedev, “Priority Tasks for Russian Diplomacy,” International Affairs (Moscow), No. 5, 2010, p. 20; “Russia 

May Nix S-300 Sale to Iran,” August 19, 2010, available from www.

upi.com.

159. Anna Smolchenko, “Russia To Reimburse Iran Over Missile Deal,” October 7, 2010, available from www.defensenews.com.

160. Victor Kostev, “The Great Chess Game of the Middle 

East, “ Asia Times Online, August 30, 2010, quoting M.K. Bhadrakumar, available from www.atimes.com.

161. Ibid.

162. Lukyanov, FBIS SOV, August 23, 2010; Zvi Magen and 

Ephraim Azulay, “Bushehr After All,” Tel-Aviv, Institute for national Security Studies, in English, August 25, 2010, FBIS SOV, 

August 25, 2010.
106

163. Jeffrey Mankoff, “The Road to Tehran Does Not Lead 

Through Moscow, Russia,” New York: Council on Foreign Relations, September 12, 2009, available from ww.cfr.org/publications/20194/road_to_tehran_does_not_lead_through_moscow.html. 

164. Moscow, Russia, Vremya Novostey, in Russian, September 11, 2006, FBIS SOV, September 11, 2006; Transcript of Russian 

Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Interview to Turkish 

Media, Moscow, Russia, May 29, 2006, available from www.mid.

ru.

165. Joseph Longa, “Then and Now: Arab Reactions to the 

Israeli and Iranian Nuclear Programs,” Nuclear Scholars Initiative: 

Project on Nuclear Issues, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 2009, pp. 36-41.

166. Riyadh, “Putin Opens Saudi-Russian Economic Forum, 

“SPA, Internet Version, February 12, 2007, FBIS SOV, February 

12, 2007; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, February 12, 2007, 

FBIS SOV, February 12, 2007; Moscow, Russia, Vesti TV, in Russian, February 12, 2007, FBIS SOV, February 12, 2007; Cairo, AlAkhbar in Arabic, February 27, 2007, FBIS SOV, February 27, 2007.

167. For further information, see Stephen Blank, “Russia’s 

Proliferation Pathways,” Strategic Insights, January, 2009.

168. “Iran Nuclear Talks Should Cover Easing Sanctions,” 

Reuters, January 20, 2011; “Russia Against Iranian Sanctions,” 

People’s Daily Online, January 20, 2011; “Russia has no Grounds 

to Suspect Iran of Seeking to Possess nuclear Weapons-Putin,” 

Interfax, December 2, 2010; “Russian Diplomat Says Iranian Nuclear Programme No Cause for Concern,” Interfax December 16, 

2010; “Russia Sees No Real Nuclear threat From Iran,” February 

22, 2011; “Russia Sees No Alternative to Diplomatic Settlement of 

Iranian Nuclear Problem,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, available from www.mid.ru, February 28, 2011; 

Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN Online, in English, February 28, 

2011, FBIS SOV, February 28, 2011; Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN 

Online, in English, March 10, 2011, FBIS SOV, March 10, 2011; 

Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, January 25, 2011, FBIS SOV, 

January 25, 2011; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English February 5, 

2011, FBIS SOV, February 5, 2011; Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN 

Online, in English, February 3, 2011, FBIS SOV, February 3, 2011.
107

169. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, January 17, 2011, FBIS SOV, 

January 18, 2011; “’Iran nearing nuclear bombs’ Russia warns,” 

BBC News, July 12, 2010; Ilya Arkhipov and Henry Meyer, Russian President Medvedev Says Iran Nuclear Stance `Unreasonably Tough’,” Bloomberg, December 22, 2010.

170. “Russia Seeks New Strategy For Iran Talks,” Global Security Newswire, February 7, 2011, available from www.nti.org.

171. Boris Yunanov, “Weapons Without Linkages, Russia Will 

Not Support New Sanctions Against Iran,” Moscow, Russia, Vremya Novostey, in Russian, July 15, 2009, FBIS SOV, July 15, 2009.

172. Andrew Osborn, “North and South Korea On the Brink 

of War, Russian Diplomat Warns,” telegraph.co.uk, September 

24, 2010, available from www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/

northkorea/8020972/North-and-South-Korea-on-the-brink-of-war-Russian-diplomat-warns.html.

173. Sunny Lee, “China Proposes Seoul Lead Nuclear Talks,” 

Asia Times Online, April 15, 2011, available from www.atimes.com.

174. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in Russian, May 6, 2011, FBIS 

SOV, May 6, 2011.

175. Balbina Hwang; Michel O’Hanlon, “Defense Issues and 

Asia’s Security Architecture,” Michael J. Green and Bates Gill, 

eds., Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the 

Search for Community, New York: Columbia University Press, 

2009, p. 281.

176 . Niklas Swanstrom, “Artillery Exchange on the Korean 

Peninsula,” Institute for Security and Development, Policy Brief, No. 

44, November 23, 2010, available from www.isdp.eu.

177. Kim Se-Jeong, “Japanese Media Allege NK Preparing 

Nuke Test,” Korea Times, November 17, 2010, available from www.

koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/11/113_76532.html.

178. “South Korea Vows Retaliation Against Any Further Attack,” Reuters, November 29, 2010.
108

179. Siegfried S. Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea's 

Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,” Stanford, CA: Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, November 

24, 2010, available from iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23035/Yongbyonreport.pdf.

180. “South Korea Vows Retaliation Against Any Further Attack.” 

181. “Not Waiving, Perhaps Drowning,” The Economist: 

Briefing: North Korea, May 29, 2010, pp. 23-25; Rudiger Frank, 

Currency Reform and Orthodox Socialism in North Korea, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network (NAPSNET), Policy 

Forum Online, December 3, 2009; “N. Korea Backtracks as 

Currency Reform Spells Riots,” Chosun Ilbo, English Edition, December 15, 2009, available from english,chosun.com/site/data/

html_dir/2009/12/15/2009121400361.html; Captain Jonathan Stafford, USA, “Finding America’s Role in a collapsed North Korean 

State,” Military Review, January-February, 2008, p. 98; “N. Korea’s 

Currency Reform “a Bid To Cement Power,” The Chosun Ilbo English Edition, December 2, 2009; available from english.chosun.com/

site/daa/html_dir/2009/12/02/20091202200656.html.

182. “CIA Chief Panetta Says North Korea’s Kim Preparing 

Succession”; Sanger and Shanker.

183. “South Korea Vows Retaliation Against Any Further Attack.”

184. E.g., Sue Pleming, “Gates Says Kim Jong-Il’s Son Seeks 

Military ‘Stripes’,” Reuters.com, August 13, 2010.

185. Sangsoo Lee and Christopher O’Hara, “Yeonpyeong on 

Fire and Enriched Uranium,” Stockholm, Sweden: Institute for 

Security and Development, Policy Brief, No. 45, November 26, 

2010, available from www.isdp.eu.

186. Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008, p. 57.
109

187. William J. Broad, James Glantz, and David E. Sanger, 

“Iran Fortifies Its Arsenal With the Aid of North Korea,” New York 

Times, November 29, 2010, available from www.nytimes.com.

188. Yongho Kim and Myungchul Kim, “North Korea’s RiskTaking vis-à-vis the U.S. Coercion,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIX No. 44, Winter, 2007, pp. 81-82.

189 . “North Korea, China in ‘Consensus’ on Crisis,” Global 

Security Newswire, December 9, 2010, available from www.nti.org.

190. Evans J. R. Revere, “The North Korea Nuclear Problem: 

Sailing Into Uncharted Waters,” American Foreign Policy Interests,” 

No. 32, 2010, pp. 183-184.

191. Moscow, Russia, Ekho Moskvy News Agency, in Russian, 

May 20, 2010, FBIS SOV, May 20, 2010.

192. Sangsoo Lee and O’Hara.

193. “U.S., Allies Remain Opposed to Nuclear Talks With 

North Korea,” Global Security Newswire, December 7, 2010, available from www.nti.org.

194. For a study of Russian policy in Korea, see Stephen Blank, 

“Russia and the Six-Party Process in Korea,” Korea Economic Institute, ed., Tomorrow’s Northeast Asia, Washington, DC, Vol. XXI, 

2011, pp. 207-226.

195. Andrei Lankov, “The North Korean Issue: What Can Be 

Done?” Nicole Finnemann and Korea Economic Institute, eds., 

Navigating Turbulence in Northeast Asia: The Future of the U.S.-ROK 

Alliance, Washington, DC: 2010, pp. 80-85.

196. O’Hanlon, p. 281.

197. Ralph A. Cossa, “The Sino–U.S. Relationship: Respecting Each Other’s Core Interests,” American Foreign Policy Interests, 

Vol. XXXII, No. 5, 2010, pp. 272-273.

198. Georgy Toloraya, “Russia and the North Korean Knot,” 

2010, available from www.japanfocus.org/georgy-toloraya-3345.
110

199. Georgy Toloraya, “The New Korean Cold War and the 

Possibility of Thaw,” available from www.japanfocus.org/georgytoloraya-3258.

200. Revere, pp. 183-184.

201. “North Korea Says No Plans To Abandon Nuclear Weapons,” RIA Novosti, Northeast Asian Peace and Security Network 

(NAPSNET), April 21, 2010; “US Says Won’t Accept Nuclear N. 

Korea,” Agence France Presse, NAPSNET, April 21, 2010; “North 

Korea Must Rejoin Nuke Talks to Escape Sanctions, U.S. Envoy 

Says,” Global Security Newswire, January 14, 2010, available from 

www.nti.org; “No End to Korea War Until North Scraps Arms: 

China,” Reuters, October 17, 2007.

202. John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: the Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

203. Gilbert Rozman, “U.S. Strategic Thinking on the Japanese-South Korean historical Dispute,” Gilbert Rozman, ed., U.S. 

Leadership, History, and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia, New 

York and Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 

151.

204. Michael Wesley, “Asia-Pacific Institutions,” William T, 

Tow, ed., Security Relations in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global 

Nexus? New York and Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 

Press, 2009, pp. 49-66.

205. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: 

Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization, New York and 

Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties 

Caught between North Korea and the United States (Strategic Thought 

in Northeast Asia), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd Ed., 2010; 

Michael J. Green and Bates Gill, eds., Asia’s New Multilateralism: 

Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community, New York: 

Columbia University Press, 2009.

206. “DPRK Top Leader Kim Jong-Il Hopes for Early Resumption of Six-Party Talks, Xinhua, in Chinese, August 30, 2010, 
111

Open Source Center, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China, 

(Henceforth FBIS CHI), August 30, 2010.

207. “U.S., Allies Remain Opposed to Nuclear Talks With 

North Korea.” 

208. “South Korea Vows Retaliation Against Any Further Attack,” Reuters, November 29, 2010.

209. Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex.”

210. “South Korea Vows Retaliation Against Any Further Attack.” 

211. Julian Borger, “South Korea Considers return of US tactical nuclear weapons,” November 22, 2010, available from www.

guardian.co.uk; “S. Korea Not Mulling Return of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Gov’t,” Yonhap News Agency, February 28, 2011,

available from english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/02/28/62/

0401000000AEN20110228007400315F.HTML; Hwang Doo-Hyong, 

“Rep. Chung calls for redeployment of tactical nukes to S. Korea,” 

Yonhap News Agency, March 29, 2011, available from english.

yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/03/30/52/0301000000AEN20110330

000400315F.HTML.

212 . Dan De Luce, “US Weighs New Options Against North 

Korea: Gates,” June 5, 2010, available from www.yahoo.com; Glenn 

Kessler, “Pyongyang Tests U.S. ‘Patience’,” Washington Post, May 

27, 2010, p. 12.

213. Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: Reset under Medvedev: 

Zapad-Politik and Vostok,” Comparative Connections, Vol. XII, No. 

2, July 15, 2010.

214. Hyung-A Kim, “Re-Igniting the Cold War in Asia,” 

East Asia forum, July 31, 2010, available from www.eastasiaforum.

org/2010/07/31/re-igniting-the-cold-war-in-asia/.

215. Ibid.
112

216. Seoul, Korea, Hankoryeh Online, in English, July 27, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, July 27 2010; Seoul, Korea, Joongang Daily Online, in 

English, July 28, 2010, FBIS SOV, July 28, 2010; Seoul, Korea, Yonhap, in English, August 4, 2010, FBIS SOV, August 4, 2010.

217. M. Nikolaev, “The Asia-Pacific Region and Russia’s National Security,” International Affairs (Moscow, Russia), Vol. LVI, 

No. 3, 2010, pp. 68-69.

218. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in Russian, September 24, 2007, 

Open Source Center Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central 

Eurasia, (Henceforth FBIS SOV), September 24, 2007.

219. Ibid., pp. 71-77.

220. Address by H.E. Mr. Gleb A. Ivashentsov, Ambassador 

of Russia to the Republic of Korea at the 5th Jeju Peace Forum, 

Jeju, South Korea, August 13, 2009, available from www.russianembassy.org/Press20090813_chej.htm.

221. Jacob W. Kipp, “Moscow Seeks Room to Maneuver As 

Crisis on the Korean Peninsula Intensifies,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 

June 18, 2010; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, May 20, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, May 20, 2010; Moscow, Russia, Ekho Moskvy Radio, in 

Russian, May 20, 2010, FBIS SOV, May 20, 2010; Moscow, Russia, 

Interfax-AVN Online, in Russian, June 8, 2010, FBIS SOV, June 8, 

2010; Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, June 4, 2010, FBIS 

SOV, June 4, 2010; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, June 2, 

2010, FBIS SOV, June 2, 2010; Seoul, Korea, The Korea Times Online, 

in English, June 7, 2010, FBIS SOV, June 7, 2010.

222. Lowell Dittmer, “The China Factor in Japanese-Russian 

Relations,” International Symposium, 2003: Talking Papers, Organizing Committee for International Symposium, 2003, p. 39.

223. Freedman, pp. 22-35, Iver B. Neumann, “Russia as a 

Great Power,” Jakob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil 

Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg, and Christer Pursainen, eds., Russia as 

a Great Power: Dimensions of Security Under Putin, London, UK: 

Routledge, 2005, pp. 13-28.
113

224. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in Russian, February 13, 

2007, FBIS SOV February 13, 2007.

225. Ibid.

226. Jae-Nam Ko, “Review of Korea-Russia Summit Talks and 

Future Prospects,” Korea and World Affairs, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, Winter, 2008, p. 442.

227. Ibid.

228. Joseph Ferguson, “U.S.-Russia Relations: Weathering the 

Storm,” Comparative Connections, April, 2008.

229. Stenograma Vystupleniya I Otvetov Ministra Inostrannykh 

Del Rossii S.V. Lavrova Na Voprosy SMI v Khode Sovmestsnoi PressKonferentsiii Po Itogam Peregovorov s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del 

Yaponii K. Okadoi, Moscow, Russia, 28 Dekabr’ya 2009 Goda, December 28, 2009, available from www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/A4B0E5CBD7934B02C325769A004DD828.

230. Georgy Toloraya, “Russian Policy in Korea in a Time of 

Change,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XXI, No. 1, 2009, 

pp. 67-84.

231. Jun Kee Baek, “Medvedev’s Russia, a “Revisionist Power’ Or an ‘Architect of a new World Order”? The Evolution of Ideational Factors and Its Cases,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 

Vol. XXI, No. 4, December, 2009, pp. 477-481; Moscow, Russia, 

Interfax-AVN Online, in English, December 17, 2009, FBIS SOV, 

December 17, 2009; CEP20091223950097, Beijing, Xinhua, in English, December 23, 0837 GMT2009, FBIS SOV, December 23, 2009; 

Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, December 11, 2009, FBIS 

SOV December 11, 2009; Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in Russian, 

December 23, 2009, FBIS SOV, December 23, 2009.

232. Paradorn Rangismaporn, “Russian Perceptions and Policies in a Multipolar East Asia Under Yeltsin and Putin,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. IX, No. 1, 2009, pp. 230-234; 

Toloraya, “Russian Policy in Korea in a Time of Change,” pp. 77-

79.
114

233. Ibid, p. 79.

234. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, December 18, 

2009, FBIS SOV, December 18, 2009.

235. CEP20091223950184, Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in 

English. December 23, 2009 1325 GMT, FBIS SOV, December 23, 

2009.

236. “Russia Deploys S-400 Air Defense Systems in Far East,” 

RIA Novosti, August 26, 2009, available from en.rian.ru/mlitary_

news/20090826/155930246.html.

237. CEP20091223950194, Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in 

English, 1339 GMT, December 23, 2009, FBIS SOV, December 23, 

2009.

238. Cheon Seongwheun, “Changing Dynamics of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula,” Pacific Focus, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, April 2011, pp. 57-58.

239. As stated at the Korea Economic Institute conference, October 22, 2010, American University, Washington, DC.

240. This proposal is further outlined in Stephen Blank, “The 

End of Russian Power in Asia?” Forthcoming in Orbis.

241. Thus the Vostok-2010 exercise postulated as its operating premises, U.S.-Japanese-South Korean and Chinese attacks 

against Russia.

242. Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in 

the Far East 1921-1931, New York: Atheneum, 1965.

243. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign 

Policy, 1932-1945: With a New Afterword, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 75-81; Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union 

and the Threat from the East: Moscow, Russia, Tokyo and the Prelude to 

the Pacific War: 1933-41 Vol. 1 (Studies in Soviet History & Society), 

New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992.
115

244. David M. Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic 

Offensive in Manchuria, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Library, 1984, pp. 9-43.

245. David Kerr, “The Sino-Russian Partnership and U.S. 

Policy Toward North Korea, “From Hegemony to Concert in 

Northeast Asia,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. XXXXIX, 

No.3, September, 2005, pp. 411-437; Constantine Menges, China 

the Gathering Threat, Bill Gertz, Foreword, Nashville, TN: Nelson 

Current, 2005; Robert Jervis, “U.S. Grand Strategy: Mission Impossible,” Naval War College Review, Summer 1998, pp. 22-36; Richard 

K. Betts, “Power, Prospects, and Priorities: Choices for Strategic 

Change,” Naval War College Review, Winter 1997, pp. 9-22; John C. 

Gannon, “Intelligence Challenges Through 2015,” available from 

odci.gov/cia/publicaffairs/speeches/gannon_speech_05022000.htmls.

246. Kipp, “Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat That 

Dare Not Speak Its Name.”

247. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael 

G. Mullen, The National Military Strategy of the United States: Redefining America’s Military Leadership, Washington, DC, 2011, p. 13; 

Sunny Lee, “Russia Emerging from the Cold,” Asia Times Online, 

February 11, 2011, available from www.atimes.com.

248. “New U.S. National Military Strategy: The United States 

Sees Russia As an Asian Partner,” RIA Novosti, February 10, 2011, 

cited in Johnson’s Russia List, February 10, 2011.

249. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in Russian, February 4, 

2011, FBIS SOV, February 4, 2011; “Dmitry Medvedev Discussed 

Economic Development and Security in the Kuril Islands With 

Ministries of Defense and Regional Development,” President of 

Russia, February 9, 2011, available from www.kremlin.ru.

250. Paul J. Saunders, Russia’s Role in Asian Security: a U.S.Japan Dialogue, Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2010, pp. 19-

21; Shoichi Itoh, “Russia’s Energy Diplomacy Toward the AsiaPacific: Is Moscow’s Ambition Dashed?” Tabatra Shinichiro, ed., 

Energy and Environment in Slavic Eurasia, Hokkaido, Japan: Slavic 

Research Center, 2008, pp. 33-67.
116

251. “U.S. Pledges Support For Japan In Stand-Off With Russia Over Kuril,” RTT News, November 1, 2010, available from 

www.rttnews.com/Content/GeneralNews.aspx?Id=1465028&SM=1. 

252. Tokyo, Japan, JIJI Press, in English, February 4, 2011, FBIS 

SOV, February 4, 2011.

253. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, October 26, 

2009, FBIS SOV, October 26, 2009; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in 

English, October 22, 2009, FBIS SOV, October 22, 2009; Tokyo, 

Nikkei Telecom, in English, October 17, 2009, FBIS SOV, October 17, 2009; Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, August 14, 

2009, FBIS SOV, August 14, 2009; Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in 

English, September 16, 2009, FBIS SOV, September 16, 2009; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, December 28, 2009, FBIS SOV, 

December 28, 2009.

254. “Kuril Islands Dispute Between Russia and Japan,” BBC 

News, November 1, 2010, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/

world-asia-pacific-11664434.

255. “Russia Notified China Prior to Medvedev Visit to Kunashiri Island,” Vienna, Austria, UIN Hatsu Konfidensharu, in 

Japanese, December 31, 2010, FBIS SOV, January 31, 2011; “China-Russia ‘Tie-up’ Tests Japan Over Territorial Disputes,” Japan 

Today, available from www.japantoday.com/category/commentary/

view/china-russia-tie-up-tests-japan-over-territorial-disputes. 

256. Sergei Lavrov “The Rise of Asia and the Eastern Vector 

of Russia’s Foreign Policy,” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3, 

July-September, 2006, pp. 70, 77.

257. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, Presidential Bulletin, in English, August 21, 2001, FBIS SOV, August 21, 2001, “Asia and the 

Russian Far East: The Dream of Economic Integration,” AsiaInt 

Special Reports, November, 2002, pp. 3-6, available from www.

Asiaint.com.

258. See www.president.kremlin.ru/events/50.html, cited in Aleksandr’ Lukin, “Russia’s Image of China and Russian-Chinese 

Relations,” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Center for 

Northeast Asia Policy Studies, 2001, p. 13, available from www.

brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/lukinwp_01.pdf.
117

259. “Yeltsin Okays Russian Foreign Policy Concept,” Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (Henceforth CDPP), Vol. XLV, 

No. 17, May 26, 1993, p. 15; Yuri S. Tsyganov, “Russia and China: 

What is in the Pipeline,” in Gennady Chufrin, ed., Russia and Asia: 

The Emerging Security Agenda, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 

Press for SIPRI, 1999, pp. 301-303.

260. Mullen, p. 13; Sunny Lee, “Russia Emerging from the 

Cold.”

261. As discussed earlier in Stephen Blank, “Prospects for 

Russo-American Cooperation in Halting Nuclear Proliferation,” 

Stephen J. Blank, ed., Prospects for U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009, pp. 169-284.

262. See Stephen Blank, “Georgia: The War Russia Lost,” Military Review, November-December, 2008, pp. 39-46.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil