USCA Case #21-5081 Document #1943512 Filed: 04/19/2022 Page 1 of 22 

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

Argued November 15, 2021 Decided April 19, 2022 

No. 21-5081 

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER AND CATHERINE HINCKLEY 

KELLEY, 

APPELLANTS 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET AL., 

APPELLEES 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:19-cv-02336) 

Tara Malloy argued the cause for appellants. With her on 

the briefs was Megan P. McAllen. 

Aria C. Branch argued the cause for appellees. With her 

on the brief was Marc Erik Elias. 

Before: ROGERS and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge 

EDWARDS. 
 

 

 

 

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EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: This case involves an 

action by Appellants Campaign Legal Center and Catherine 

Hinckley Kelley against the Federal Election Commission 

(“Commission” or “FEC”). They contend that the 

Commission’s decision to dismiss their complaint alleging 

violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“Act” or 

“FECA”) during the 2016 presidential election cycle by 

political committee Correct the Record and Hillary Clinton’s 

campaign committee, Hillary for America, was contrary to law. 

Correct the Record and Hillary for America (together, 

“Intervenors”) have intervened as defendants in this suit. 

The matter giving rise to this case is Appellants’ 

disagreement with the Commission’s determination that 

expenditures by Correct the Record, made in coordination with 

the Clinton campaign, were exempt from disclosure as 

coordinated contributions to the campaign under an exception 

for unpaid internet communications. Appellants filed an 

administrative complaint with the FEC charging, inter alia, that 

Correct the Record and Hillary for America violated the Act by 

failing to disclose any of the in-kind contributions Correct the 

Record made to Hillary for America. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 

162-63. The Commission split 2-2 on whether there was reason 

to believe the joint undertaking gave rise to any “unreported[,] 

excessive[,] and prohibited in-kind contributions” from Correct 

the Record to the Clinton campaign and dismissed Appellants’ 

complaint. J.A. 208, 252-55. Appellants then filed a complaint 

in the District Court to challenge the FEC’s dismissal as 

contrary to law. The District Court dismissed Appellants’ 

FECA claim for lack of standing. 

The sole issue before this court is whether Appellants have 

standing to sue. We hold that they do. “The law is settled that 

a denial of access to information qualifies as an injury in fact 

where a statute (on the claimants’ reading) requires that the 
 

 

 

 

 

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information be publicly disclosed and there is no reason to 

doubt their claim that the information would help them.” 

Campaign Legal Ctr. & Democracy 21 v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 

356 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting Env’t Def. Fund v. 

EPA, 922 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 2019)). Were Appellants to 

succeed on the merits of their claim, Correct the Record and 

Hillary for America would be obligated to disclose FECArequired factual information about the amounts of the contested 

coordinated, in-kind contributions. That “information would 

help [Appellants] (and others to whom they would 

communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public office, . . . 

and to evaluate the role that [Correct the Record’s] financial 

assistance might play in a specific election.” FEC v. Akins, 524 

U.S. 11, 21 (1998). 

Contrary to the findings of the District Court, the 

information Appellants seek is not currently known and it 

cannot be gleaned from the disclosures that have already been 

made by Correct the Record and Hillary for America. Correct 

the Record has disclosed its aggregated expenditures publicly, 

but it has not broken down its expenditures to show which were 

coordinated contributions to the Clinton campaign. There is no 

doubt that disaggregation of the existing disclosures would 

reveal the amounts of any coordinated contributions. It is also 

clear that the amounts that Correct the Record contributed to 

the Clinton campaign constitute factual information that is 

subject to disclosure under the statute. See 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30104(b); 11 C.F.R. §§ 104.13(a), (b), 109.20(b), 109.21(b). 

Accordingly, Appellants have demonstrated a 

quintessential informational injury directly related to their 

“interest in knowing how much money a candidate spent in an 

election.” Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir. 

1997) (per curiam). As the Supreme Court made clear in Akins, 

“[t]he ‘injury in fact’ that [Appellants] have suffered consists 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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of their inability to obtain information—[including] campaignrelated contributions and expenditures—that, on [Appellants’] 

view of the law, the statute requires that [Correct the Record 

and Hillary for America] make public.” 524 U.S. at 21. This 

being so, Appellants also easily satisfy the causation and 

redressability requirements of Article III standing. See id. at 25. 

Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s dismissal for lack 

of standing and remand for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Legal Framework 

Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act in 

1971 with the aim of “remedy[ing] any actual or perceived 

corruption of the political process.” Akins, 524 U.S. at 13-14. 

To further this goal, the Act uses three primary mechanisms: 

contribution limits, source restrictions, and disclosure 

requirements. First, it limits the amount a political committee 

can contribute to a candidate for federal office. 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a)(1)(A). A “contribution” under the Act includes any 

“gift . . . of money or anything of value made by any person for 

the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” Id. 

§ 30101(8)(A)(i). Contributions include not only payments 

made directly to a candidate, but also “coordinated” 

expenditures, which are those “made in cooperation, 

consultation[,] or concert with, or at the request or suggestion 

of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or a 

political party committee.” 11 C.F.R. § 109.20. Coordinated 

expenditures are necessarily in-kind contributions, rather than 

direct monetary payments. Accordingly, utilizing political 

committee staff time, office space, or other resources in 

cooperation with a candidate counts as a contribution. See id.; 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i), (ii). This structure is designed to 

“prevent attempts to circumvent the Act through prearranged 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised 

contributions.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per 

curiam). In the 2016 election cycle, political committee 

contributions to candidates were capped at $2,700. Am. Compl. 

¶ 38, J.A. 41. 

Second, the Act restricts political committees from using 

money sourced from unions or corporations to make 

contributions to candidates. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a), (b)(2). This 

ensures that unions and corporations cannot avoid direct 

contribution limits by funneling money to candidates through 

political committees. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 145-

48 (2003). 

Third, in an effort to “expos[e] large contributions and 

expenditures to the light of publicity,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67, 

and ensure that voters “know exactly how a candidate’s 

campaign is financed,” S. Rep. No. 92-229, at 122 (1971), the 

Act imposes comprehensive disclosure requirements. Political 

committees are required to publicly report all expenditures over 

$200. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(5)(A); 11 C.F.R. 

§ 104.3(b)(3)-(4). In addition, they must report contributions – 

in-kind, coordinated, or otherwise – made to any candidate. See 

id. § 30104(b)(4)(H)(i), (6)(B)(i), (iii). A candidate’s 

“authorized committee,” like Hillary for America, must 

disclose all in-kind, coordinated contributions it receives as 

both contributions and expenditures, because these donations 

function as resources spent by the campaign in furtherance of 

the election of the candidate. Id. §§ 30101(6), 30104(b); 11 

C.F.R. §§ 104.13(a), 109.20(b), 109.21(b). Disclosures are 

made regularly in itemized reports to the FEC, and must 

include details like the dates, amounts, and purposes of the 

contributions and expenditures, as well as the name and address 

of a recipient candidate. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b); 11 C.F.R. 

§§ 104.13(a), 109.20(b), 109.21(b). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Of relevance here, certain communications made by 

political committees in concert with a candidate are considered 

in-kind contributions to the campaign. See 11 C.F.R. 

§ 109.21(b). In particular, the Commission has promulgated 

rules designating political committees’ paid communications – 

e.g., paid online advertising – as coordinated campaign 

contributions subject to the aforementioned source, amount, 

and disclosure requirements. In contrast, unpaid internet 

communications – i.e., those communications not placed for a 

fee – are exempt from those requirements. Internet 

Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18589, 18593-95 (Apr. 12, 

2006); see also 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.94(a), 100.155(a)(1) 

(providing that uncompensated internet activity does not 

constitute a contribution or an expenditure). 

The Act provides that any person who believes a violation 

of the Act has occurred may file a complaint with the 

Commission. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1). The Office of General 

Counsel reviews the complaint and any response and 

recommends to the Commission whether there is “reason to 

believe” a violation has occurred. Id. § 30109(a)(2), (3). The 

FEC Commissioners – six total, half from each of the two 

major political parties – then vote on whether there is “reason 

to believe” the Act was violated. Id. §§ 30106(a)(1), 

30109(a)(2). If at least four Commissioners vote yes, the 

Commission will investigate; otherwise, the complaint is 

dismissed. See id. §§ 30106(c), 30109(a)(2). In the event of a 

deadlock, the “declining-to-go-ahead” Commissioners must 

issue a Statement of Reasons to serve as the basis for judicial 

review. Common Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436, 449 (D.C. Cir. 

1988). “Any party aggrieved” by the dismissal of a complaint 

may then seek judicial review. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). 
 

 

 

 

 

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B. Factual Background 

Campaign Legal Center is a non-profit watchdog group 

dedicated to “improving democracy and promoting 

representative, responsive, and accountable government for all 

citizens.” Am. Compl. ¶ 15, J.A. 36. Catherine Hinckley Kelley 

is a registered voter and a director at Campaign Legal Center. 

Together, these Appellants filed an administrative complaint 

with the Commission in October 2016. They alleged that, 

during the run-up to the 2016 presidential election, political 

committee Correct the Record made, and Hillary Clinton’s 

campaign committee Hillary for America accepted, millions of 

dollars in coordinated contributions in violation of the Act. 

Those payments were not disclosed as coordinated in-kind 

contributions by either group. The amount of these alleged 

contributions greatly exceeds the contribution limits in the Act, 

and the payments allegedly violated source restrictions as well. 

The dispute here concerns whether these allegedly 

coordinated expenditures were exempt from disclosure. In the 

leadup to the election, Correct the Record was open about its 

coordination with the Clinton campaign in the media, but 

claimed that its spending was exempt from statutes and 

regulations governing coordination pursuant to the unpaid 

internet exception. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63-66, J.A. 47-48; see also, 

e.g., Matea Gold, How a Super PAC Plans to Coordinate 

Directly with Hillary Clinton’s Campaign, Wash. Post (May 

12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2015/05/12/how-a-super-pac-plans-to-coordinatedirectly-with-hillary-clintons-campaign/. Under Correct the 

Record’s interpretation of the exemption, input costs associated 

with unpaid internet communications – such as the staff time, 

filming, computers, office space, and travel involved in 

producing unpaid internet communications – are exempt from 

disclosure. See Intervenor-Appellees’ Principal and Resp. Br. 
 

 

 

 

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12-13. In line with its interpretation, Correct the Record 

disclosed $9,617,828.28 in total expenditures to the FEC as 

required, but did not designate any of that spending as in-kind 

coordinated contributions to the Clinton campaign. See FEC, 

Correct the Record Financial Summary, 2015-2016, 

https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00578997/?cycle 

=2016. Likewise, the Clinton campaign did not declare any of 

that spending as contributions or expenditures of its own. 

In their administrative complaint to the Commission, 

Appellants challenged Intervenors’ interpretation of the law, 

contending that expenditures by Correct the Record on items 

like “opposition research, message development, surrogate 

training and booking, professional video production, and press 

outreach for the benefit of the Clinton campaign” were not 

exempt under the unpaid internet communications exception. 

FEC Compl. ¶ 5, J.A. 117. Rather, they contended that these 

expenditures should have been reported as coordinated in-kind 

contributions and subject to the spending limitation restrictions 

in the Act. 

The General Counsel of the FEC agreed with Appellants, 

finding that “[Correct the Record] raised and spent 

approximately $9 million on a wide array of activities, most of 

which are not fairly characterized as ‘communications.’” First 

General Counsel’s Report, In re: Correct the Record, MUR 

6940 et al., p. 5 (FEC, Oct. 16, 2018), reprinted in J.A. 188. 

The General Counsel found that: 

the bulk of [Correct the Record]’s reported 

disbursements are for purposes that are not 

communication-specific, including payroll, salary, 

travel, lodging, meals, rent, fundraising consulting, 

computers, digital software, domain services, email 

services, equipment, event tickets, hardware, 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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insurance, office supplies, parking, and shipping in 

addition to payments for explicitly mixed purposes 

such as ‘video consulting and travel’ and 

‘communication consulting and travel.’ 

Id. at 9-10, J.A. 192-93. 

The General Counsel concluded that both the external and 

internal communications of Correct the Record and the Clinton 

campaign evidenced coordination between the two entities on 

these activities. She rejected the argument that the expenditures 

were for unpaid internet communications and therefore 

exempt, reasoning that “[t]he fact that [activities] were 

subsequently transmitted over the internet does not 

retroactively render the costs of [those activities] a 

‘communication’ cost.” Id. at 20, J.A. 203. Accordingly, the 

General Counsel recommended to the Commission that there 

was “reason to believe” that Correct the Record and Hillary for 

America violated FECA by making coordinated contributions 

in excess of the prescribed limits, with funds from 

impermissible sources, and by failing to disclose those 

transactions as coordinated contributions. 

When the Commission received the General Counsel’s 

recommendation, it had only four Commissioners in place 

instead of the six that Congress authorized under FECA. This 

was due to a lack of executive appointments. The four 

Commissioners deadlocked two-two along party lines on the 

vote to decide whether there was “reason to believe” that illegal 

coordination had occurred. As a result, the Commission failed 

to achieve the four votes necessary to proceed. The two 

Republican Commissioners voted against finding there was 

reason to believe a violation occurred and issued a Statement 

of Reasons explaining their controlling decision. See Statement 

of Reasons of Vice Chairman Matthew S. Petersen and 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Commissioner Caroline C. Hunter, In re: Correct the Record, 

MUR 6940 et al. (FEC, Aug. 21, 2019), reprinted in J.A. 256-

73. They agreed with Correct the Record and Hillary for 

America that all “input costs” associated with unpaid internet 

communications are exempt from regulation under the Act. 

The Commission therefore dismissed the administrative 

complaint. 

C. Procedural History 

In August 2019, Appellants filed suit in District Court to 

challenge the Commission’s decision as (1) contrary to FECA, 

and (2) arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative 

Procedure Act. Still short two members, the Commission failed 

to garner the four affirmative votes necessary to defend the 

agency in this action, see 52 U.S.C. §§ 30106(c), 30107(a)(6), 

so the FEC did not enter an appearance in this case. However, 

the District Court, over Appellants’ objection, permitted 

Correct the Record and Hillary for America to intervene as 

defendants. 

At the start of the proceedings in District Court, the 

Intervenors filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court 

initially found that Appellants had standing to bring suit. 

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 466 F. Supp. 3d 141, 150-54 

(D.D.C. 2020). Analyzing whether an informational injury was 

present, the trial judge determined that Appellants “[had] no 

information as to the actual amount of money that, in [their] 

view, should have been considered a contribution or 

expenditure under the Act.” Id. at 151. He further concluded 

that organizational standing existed because Campaign Legal 

Center plausibly alleged it was forced to divert organizational 

resources to obtain the information it was due by law. Id. at 

154. On the merits, the trial judge concluded that the 

Commission’s interpretation of the internet-communications 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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exception was contrary to law and “unduly compromise[d] the 

Act’s purposes.” Id. at 157 (quoting Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 

156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The trial judge noted that, because 

the controlling Commissioners had decided that all 

expenditures for computer equipment, office space, software, 

web hosting, video equipment, placing a poll online, salaries, 

and the like were exempt from regulation as unpaid internet 

expenditures, the FEC determination would mean that “any 

expenditure could be exempted from regulation if it ultimately 

resulted in an unpaid internet communication.” Id. at 149. The 

trial judge said that such an interpretation “creates a loophole 

that effectively vitiates the plain language of FECA.” Id. at 

158. The trial judge further found that the Commission’s 

interpretation was “contrary to law” “because it ignored clear 

evidence of coordinated expenditures between [the Clinton 

campaign] and [Correct the Record] even apart from those 

claimed to be exempt under the internet-communications 

regulation.” Id. at 159. 

At summary judgment, however, the District Court 

“reverse[d] field” and “[came] out the other way” on the issue 

of Appellants’ standing to pursue the FECA claim. Campaign 

Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 507 F. Supp. 3d 79, 82 (D.D.C. 2020). The 

court explained that it had “not sufficiently take[n] account of” 

the decision in Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 

2001). 507 F. Supp. 3d at 85. It described Wertheimer as saying 

that a plaintiff lacks a cognizable informational injury where 

“the plaintiff ‘do[es] not really seek additional facts[,] but only 

the legal determination that’ the facts of which she is already 

aware amount to a legal violation.” Id. at 84 (alterations in 

original) (quoting Wertheimer, 268 F.3d at 1075). The District 

Court then concluded that the information Appellants seek, 

including what portions of the already-disclosed expenditures 

were coordinated, “would not actually entail the disclosure of 

any information other than legal determinations of 
 

 

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coordination” and therefore did not support informational 

standing. Id. at 88. The District Court dismissed the FECA 

claim for lack of standing. Id. at 91. In a separate opinion, the 

District Court dismissed Appellants’ Administrative Procedure 

Act claim as precluded by FECA. Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 

Civ. Action No. 19-2336, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27082, at *3-

10 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2021), reprinted in J.A. 310-17. 

Appellants raised a timely appeal on standing for their 

FECA claim. They do not challenge the District Court’s 

dismissal of their Administrative Procedure Act claim in this 

appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Standard of Review 

This court reviews a District Court decision on standing de 

novo. Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 824 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. 

Cir. 2016). “The plaintiff bears the burden of invoking the 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction, including establishing the 

elements of standing.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 

(1992)). 

B. Standing to Redress Informational Injury 

As noted above, the sole issue before the court is whether 

Appellants have an informational injury sufficient to support 

standing. To succeed, Appellants must show that the legal 

ruling they seek might lead to additional factual information 

that, on their view of the law, FECA requires the Intervenors to 

make public. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21. Intervenors Correct the 

Record and Hillary for America maintain that, because Correct 

the Record has already publicly disclosed all expenditures 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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made during the 2016 election in some form, Appellants would 

not obtain any new factual information if they prevailed on the 

merits. Appellants claim, however, that they still lack access to 

FECA-required information about the amounts, dates, 

recipients, and purposes of any coordinated expenditures and 

contributions Correct the Record made to Hillary for America. 

Appellants argue that if they succeed in this litigation, Correct 

the Record would be required to disaggregate its alreadyreported expenditures to show which portions of those 

expenditures were coordinated contributions and which were 

not. This would provide Appellants with new, pertinent 

information about the amounts Correct the Record contributed 

to the Clinton campaign, information that is currently 

unknown. We agree and therefore find that Appellants have 

established a cognizable informational injury. 

1. The Applicable Law at Issue 

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show “the 

irreducible constitutional minimum” of “injury in fact,” 

causation, and redressability. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. An 

injury in fact must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual 

or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” to suffice. Id. at 

560 (internal quotations omitted). In the FECA context, “[t]o 

carry its burden of demonstrating a ‘sufficiently concrete and 

particularized informational injury,’” the plaintiff must show 

that, in being denied access to the information, “it suffers . . . 

the type of harm Congress sought to prevent by requiring 

disclosure.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory 

Comm’n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 378 (D.C. Cir. 

2017) (quoting Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 989, 992 

(D.C. Cir. 2016)). 

In the seminal case FEC v. Akins, voters contested the 

Commission’s determination that the American Israel Public 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”) was not a “political committee” 

under the definition provided in FECA. 524 U.S. at 15-18. 

Under plaintiffs’ view of the law, AIPAC was a “political 

committee” and thus required under the Act to disclose the 

sources of its contributions and its spending. Id. at 15-16. The 

Supreme Court was clear in holding that because plaintiffs 

“fail[ed] to obtain information which must be publicly 

disclosed pursuant to a statute” under their view of the law, 

they “suffer[ed] an ‘injury in fact.’” Id. at 21 (citing Pub. 

Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)). 

Akins also established that FECA grants voters a 

cognizable interest in information used “to evaluate candidates 

for public office,” including information which reveals “the 

role that [a political committee]’s financial assistance might 

play in a specific election.” Id. For that reason, in Shays v. FEC, 

528 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2008), we recognized that an 

informational injury “no differen[t]” than “the injury deemed 

sufficient to create standing in Akins” is present when a voter 

is denied FECA-required disclosures about coordinated in-kind 

expenditures they believe must be reported as contributions to 

a candidate. Id. at 923 (“Here, as in Akins, Shays’s injury in 

fact is the denial of information he believes the law entitles him 

to.”). 

Voter-related informational injuries of this sort are not 

generalized grievances because, “though widely shared, . . . 

[they are] sufficiently concrete and specific” to each voter to 

constitute an injury in fact. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25. Thus, 

“[t]he fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might make 

the same complaint . . . does not lessen [claimants’] asserted 

injury” where, as in Akins or Shays, the harm is concrete. Id. 

(quoting Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449-50); see also Shays, 528 

F.3d at 923. 
 

 

 

 

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Of course, not every demand for information from the FEC 

is sufficient to establish Article III standing. We have 

recognized that “the nature of the information allegedly 

withheld is critical to the standing analysis.” Common Cause v. 

FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam). The 

information sought must be that for which there is a statutory 

right and which “is related to [the plaintiff’s] informed 

participation in the political process.” Nader v. FEC, 725 F.3d 

226, 230 (D.C. Cir. 2013). “If an organization has simply been 

‘deprived of the knowledge as to whether a violation of the law 

has occurred,’ that ‘injury’ is no more than a generalized 

‘interest in enforcement of the law,’ and does not support 

standing.” Jud. Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 180 F.3d 277, 278 (D.C. 

Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 

418). Thus, plaintiffs seeking information solely “to ‘get the 

bad guys,’ rather than disclose information,” lack the sort of 

injury that sustains standing. Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418. 

In addition, plaintiffs must lack access to the information 

sought; a plaintiff cannot establish injury based on information 

that is already available “from a different source,” disclosure 

of which would only result in “duplicative reporting.” 

Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 

Similarly, if the information sought “would add only a trifle to 

the store of information about the transaction already publicly 

available,” a plaintiff lacks standing. Citizens for Resp. & 

Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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2. Applying the Law to the Facts of this Case 

Turning to the case at hand, FECA clearly gives 

Appellants a statutory right to information about the amounts, 

dates, recipients, and purposes of any coordinated expenditures 

and contributions made by a political committee and received 

by a candidate’s authorized committee. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(b), 

30116(a)(7). And there is no serious dispute that, on 

Appellants’ view of the law, many of Correct the Record and 

Hillary for America’s coordinated expenses that the 

Commission found exempt from disclosure as “unpaid 

internet” expenses should be disclosed as in-kind 

contributions. If Appellants win on the merits, Correct the 

Record would be required to disaggregate its reporting to show 

the actual amounts of various expenditures that were in-kind 

contributions. Appellants would therefore gain access to 

FECA-required information about coordinated contributions 

from Correct the Record to the Clinton campaign. Finally, it is 

clear, as in Akins, “that the information would help 

[Appellants] . . . evaluate candidates for public office.” 524 

U.S. at 21. Accordingly, Appellants claim an injury in fact no 

different than that in Akins. 

Intervenors’ principal argument, with which the District 

Court agreed, is that no “additional factual information” would 

be disclosed if Appellants prevailed on the merits. IntervenorAppellees’ Principal and Resp. Br. 24. Rather, they argue, 

“‘only the legal determination that’ the facts [Appellants] 

already possess[] amount to a legal violation” would result. Id. 

at 30 (quoting Wertheimer, 268 F.3d at 1075). Intervenors 

contend that if Appellants prevail on the merits, Correct the 

Record’s existing entries of expenditures would simply be 

moved from one line to another on the FEC reporting form, 

labeled as in-kind contributions, and described as benefiting 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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the Clinton campaign. This argument mischaracterizes the 

claims and information at stake. 

Appellants’ claim is that some not insignificant portion of 

Correct the Record’s expenditures were coordinated in-kind 

contributions to the Clinton campaign. Appellants do not know 

the amounts, however, because Intervenors have not disclosed 

them. If Appellants won and certain expenditures were found 

not to be exempt as unpaid internet communication expenses, 

Correct the Record would be required under FECA to 

disaggregate the “lump sum” disbursements it has already 

reported for various overhead expenses (such as payroll, 

salaries, travel, lodging, rent, or fundraising) to reveal which 

portion of each expenditure funded coordinated activities. See 

Appellants’ Reply Br. 10. This disaggregation would result in 

disclosure of the numerical amounts of any coordinated 

expenditures that were contributions to the Clinton campaign. 

Those amounts, currently unknown, constitute factual 

information core to Appellants’ established interests in 

knowing “who is funding presidential candidates’ campaigns,” 

Shays, 528 F.3d at 923, and “how much money a candidate 

spent in an election,” Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418. 

An example used by the District Court to suggest that no 

additional factual information would be disclosed if Appellants 

prevail actually illustrates that the opposite is true. In its 

expenditures, Correct the Record has disclosed that its founder 

and chairman David Brock was paid a biweekly salary of 

$4,521.56 in June 2016, described simply as “salary.” Pls.’ 

Opp’n to Correct the Record’s and Hillary for America’s Am. 

Mot. Dismiss Ex. D, ECF No. 27-4. Appellants maintain that 

“there is reason to believe that some portion of [Brock’s] 

paycheck functioned as a disguised contribution to the 

campaign.” Id. at 18. The District Court recognized that if the 

Commission concluded that fifty percent of Brock’s time in a 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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two-week period was spent on coordinated activities, his salary 

payment would need to be disclosed as one non-coordinated 

salary expenditure of $2,260.78 and one in-kind contribution 

of $2,260.78. 507 F. Supp. 3d at 88. But the District Court then 

characterized this disclosure as “nothing more than the ‘fact’ 

of ‘coordination,’ which under Wertheimer is not a fact at all 

but rather a legal conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). 

We disagree. 

The District Court’s analysis ignores that disaggregation 

of Brock’s salary to show which portion was coordinated 

would in fact reveal the numerical amount of Correct the 

Record’s coordinated contribution to the Clinton campaign, 

information political committees are required by statute to 

make public. Appellants do not now know that numerical 

amount, nor did the District Court; the “suppose[d]” fifty 

percent or $2,260.78 that might have been contributed in the 

court’s example is made up; it is but a guess. See id. If 

Appellants prevail, the actual amount of Brock’s salary that 

was a contribution to the Clinton campaign would have to be 

disclosed, along with disaggregated amounts for a myriad of 

other lump sum expenditures Appellants believe involved 

coordinated contributions. There is no doubt that those 

numerical amounts constitute factual information and that 

FECA requires them to be disclosed. 

Intervenors argue that this court’s decision in Wertheimer 

supports their position. They are mistaken because that case is 

not on point. Indeed, the facts in Wertheimer are markedly 

different from the facts in this case. 

The principal holding in Wertheimer is that a plaintiff 

cannot establish injury based on information that is already 

available “from a different source” and that would only result 

in “duplicative reporting.” 268 F.3d at 1075. The plaintiffs in 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Wertheimer argued that coordinated expenditures by political 

parties were contributions to candidates (which was not yet 

established law) and sought disclosure of coordinated 

expenditures by presidential campaigns. Id. at 1071, 1074. But, 

the precise transactions that the plaintiffs sought in Wertheimer 

had already been reported by political parties as coordinated 

expenditures. Id. at 1075 (Garland, J., concurring) (“[P]olitical 

party committees are already required to report and to identify 

such coordinated expenditures . . . in their FECA filings.”). In 

other words, the information sought by the plaintiffs in 

Wertheimer had already been “disaggregated” and marked as 

coordinated in the reports of political parties, so the plaintiffs 

had access to all the information they were seeking. If the 

plaintiffs in Wertheimer had won, they would have obtained 

“the same information from a different source.” Id. at 1075. 

Therefore, Wertheimer would support Intervenors’ position 

only if Correct the Record had disclosed its coordinated 

contributions to the Clinton campaign and designated them as 

such, and Appellants were simply seeking reciprocal disclosure 

from Clinton’s campaign of those same transactions. See id. 

But the information at issue in this case has not been 

disaggregated, nor have the allegedly coordinated 

contributions been disclosed. 

Finally, we reject Intervenors’ argument that Appellants’ 

view of the law would not require disaggregation of existing 

disclosures because Appellants believe “that all of Correct the 

Record’s spending was coordinated.” Intervenor-Appellees’ 

Principal and Resp. Br. 35. This claim is belied by the record. 

Appellants have argued from the start that Correct the Record 

“coordinated many of its activities with the Clinton campaign,” 

noting that “the total amount of [coordinated expenditures] is 

unknown.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68-70, J.A. 48-50 (emphasis 

added). They have at no point argued that all of Correct the 

Record’s expenditures were coordinated under the law, or that 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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none of Correct the Record’s expenditures were exempt from 

disclosure under the internet exception. Therefore, Intervenors’ 

contention that Appellants have attempted to manufacture 

standing by “revamp[ing]” their argument to claim that only 

some portion of Intervenors’ activities were coordinated is 

baseless. Intervenor-Appellees’ Principal and Resp. Br. 33. 

The related concern expressed by the District Court that, if 

Appellants have standing here, a plaintiff “could seemingly 

manufacture standing in nearly every conceivable case” by 

“trimming its sails” and claiming to seek information about 

some proportion of already-disclosed expenditures, instead of 

whether those expenditures as a whole were coordinated, is 

equally misplaced. 507 F. Supp. 3d at 87-88. As discussed 

above, the inquiry from Wertheimer starts and stops with 

examining whether a plaintiff “only seek[s] the same 

information from a different source” such that no “additional 

facts” will result. 268 F.3d at 1074-75. Where, as here, a 

plaintiff demonstrates on the record that additional, statutorilyrequired information would be exposed under plaintiff’s theory 

of the law that would serve an interest Congress sought to 

protect through disclosure, the plaintiff has undoubtedly 

established an informational injury under Akins and Shays. 

This is not an “end-run around Wertheimer,” 507 F. Supp. 3d 

at 87, but a properly pled informational injury. 

Moreover, the District Court failed to consider that 

mischief could easily occur with the approach that it endorsed. 

Were standing denied to those seeking disaggregated 

information that FECA plainly requires be disclosed whenever 

aggregate information is available, then political committees 

and campaigns could simply report information in increasingly 

broad, undifferentiated lump sums. Under the District Court’s 

holding, even if a plaintiff’s view of the law had merit, a 

plaintiff would have no right to seek non-trivial information 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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21 

covered by FECA so long as the information was included as a 

part of some undifferentiated lump sum. There is nothing in the 

law to support this position. Thus, in this case, Appellants have 

no way of knowing what portion of Intervenors’ lump sum 

disclosures consist of coordinated expenses. Such information 

is only known by parties (like Intervenors) who are responsible 

for making disaggregated disclosures under statute. 

Disaggregated FECA-required information cannot be deduced 

from aggregate, lump-sum disclosures of this kind. 

Denying standing in circumstances of the sort raised by 

this case would permit easy workarounds for parties who seek 

to block the standing of persons who may raise legitimate 

requests for information covered by FECA. Moreover, the 

Intervenors’ approach runs contrary to settled law that “a denial 

of access to information qualifies as an injury in fact where a 

statute (on the claimants’ reading) requires that the information 

be publicly disclosed and there is no reason to doubt their claim 

that the information would help them.” Campaign Legal Ctr. 

& Democracy 21 v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 

(per curiam) (quoting Env’t Def. Fund v. EPA, 922 F.3d 446, 

452 (D.C. Cir. 2019)). 

In sum, Appellants have established an informational 

injury in fact. Having done so, Appellants easily satisfy the 

remaining two constitutional standing requirements of 

causation and redressability. As in Akins, Appellants’ injury is 

fairly traceable to the Commission’s decision to dismiss their 

complaint. See 524 U.S. at 25. Should a reviewing court find 

that the Commission’s determinations are contrary to law, the 

agency’s action would be set aside and the case would likely 

redress Appellants’ injury in fact. See id.; see also Shays, 528 

F.3d at 923. 
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III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons given above, we hold that Appellants have 

standing to challenge the Commission’s dismissal of their 

complaint. Appellants have established that, because of this 

dismissal, they lack access to FECA-required information 

concerning money spent by the Clinton campaign. If their 

challenge succeeds, they will likely gain access to that 

information, which will no doubt “help them . . . evaluate 

candidates for public office.” Akins, 524 U.S. at 21. 

Accordingly, the decision of the District Court is reversed and 

the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.