IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48369

In the Interest of: John Doe I and John 

Doe II, Children Under Eighteen (18) 

Years of Age.

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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH AND WELFARE,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

JANE DOE (2020-40),

Respondent-Appellant.

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Filed: January 14, 2021

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 

District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Andrew Ellis, Magistrate. 

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed. 

Anthony Geddes, Ada County Public Defender; Karen L. Jennings, Deputy Public 

Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Peter A. Mommer, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge 

Jane Doe (2020-40) appeals from the judgment terminating her parental rights. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Doe is the mother of the two minor children in this action, born in 2018 and 2019. Doe is 

intellectually disabled and has substance abuse issues. Intelligence testing indicates that Doe’s 

overall thinking and reasoning abilities are lower than 98 percent of others in her age group. Doe’s 

low-cognitive function makes her susceptible to influence by others, which has contributed to her 
substance abuse issues. In combination, these factors led to the removal of the children from Doe’s 

care and the eventual termination of her parental rights. 

Doe’s involvement with the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare arose from a police 

investigation. Officers investigating a hit-and-run accident in a hotel parking lot discovered Doe’s

older child at age nine weeks in one of the hotel rooms where Doe and four other adults were using 

drugs. There was a baggie of methamphetamine an inch from the child’s hand and a tube for 

snorting drugs under his blanket. The child’s diaper bag contained marijuana fragments and a 

baby spoon dusted with methamphetamine. When questioned, Doe told officers that the previous 

night she had used methamphetamine and that the child had suffered seizures, vomiting, stopped 

breathing, and became “wobbly like Jell-O.” Despite believing that the child might die, Doe 

simply patted him on the back a few times to revive him. Doe indicated that she did not seek 

medical attention for the child out of fear that doing so would result in the discovery of her illegal 

activities. Based upon Doe’s drug use in the child’s presence and her failure to seek medical care 

for him, officers removed the child from Doe’s care and arrested her for felony injury to a child 

and various drug offenses. Doe eventually pled guilty to felony injury to a child, resulting in her 

being placed on probation and the entry of a no-contact order between Doe and the child that 

allowed Doe only supervised contact with the child “as permitted” by the Department.

After a shelter care hearing, the magistrate court placed the child into the custody of the 

Department and later approved a case plan for Doe. While the child protection action involving 

the older child was pending, Doe gave birth to the younger child who is the second subject of this 

case. The Department filed an amended petition under the Child Protection Act to include the 

younger child. The magistrate court placed the younger child into the Department’s custody and 

approved an updated case plan. Ultimately, the Department petitioned to terminate Doe’s parental 

rights. After finding clear and convincing evidence that Doe neglected the children and that 

termination is in the children’s best interests, the magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental 

rights.

1

 Doe appeals. 

 

1 The magistrate court also terminated the parental rights of the older child’s father. That 

decision is not at issue in this appeal. The younger child’s father remains unidentified.
II.

ANALYSIS

Doe argues that the magistrate court erred in terminating her parental rights because the 

Department’s reunification efforts were inadequate in light of her intellectual disability. The 

Department responds that Doe waived this argument by failing to identify a specific error by the 

magistrate court, cite pertinent portions of the record, or support her position with relevant legal 

authority. We hold that Doe has failed to show error in the magistrate court’s termination decision.

To obtain review of an issue on appeal, appellants must identify the issue in their initial 

brief and provide supporting arguments along with citations to relevant legal authority. See 

I.A.R. 35; Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 263, 267, 270 P.3d 1048, 1052 

(2012). Assertions of error that are not stated with particularity and supported with relevant legal 

authority are too indefinite for consideration. See I.A.R. 35(a)(6); In re Doe, 166 Idaho 720, 727, 

462 P.3d 1184, 1191 (Ct. App. 2020). General attacks on the findings and conclusions of a trial 

court that lack reference to specific evidentiary or legal errors are insufficient to preserve an issue. 

See Doe, 166 Idaho at 727, 462 P.3d at 1191. In short, a party waives an issue on appeal if either 

argument or authority is lacking. In re Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho 143, 147, 426 P.3d 1243, 1247 

(2018).

At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the magistrate court found that more than 

twenty-three months had elapsed since the removal of the older child from Doe’s care and that 

Doe failed to comply with her case plan and remained unable to recognize safety concerns or

provide basic parenting for the children throughout that period. For example, Doe relapsed on

marijuana within months of the termination hearing, remained unable to recognize cues from the 

children regarding hunger and discomfort, and could not even properly prepare a bottle. The 

magistrate court acknowledged Doe’s love for her children and desire to parent them. However, 

despite this and the “extra lengths” taken by the Department over twenty-three months to reunify 

Doe with the children, Doe was unable to overcome her substance abuse issues and intellectual 

disabilities to improve her parenting. Consequently, the magistrate court found that Doe had 

neglected the children2and that termination is in the children’s best interests. 

 

2 The magistrate court found that Doe neglected the older child under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) 

by failing to comply with the case plan while the child was in the Department’s custody for fifteen 

of the previous twenty-two months and I.C. § 16-2002(3)(a) by leaving him without proper 
Doe’s opening (and only) appellate brief identifies no specific error in the magistrate 

court’s evidentiary rulings, nor a particularized flaw in a factual finding or legal conclusion

supporting the decision to terminate her parental rights. Neither does Doe dispute that her conduct 

and omissions in this case constitute neglect under the relevant statutory definitions. Rather, Doe

challenges the magistrate court’s termination decision with a vague assertion that the Department’s

reunification efforts were inadequate due to her intellectual disabilities. Doe implies that the 

Department’s reunification efforts provided her “no hope for reunification within the time 

allowed.” However, Doe neither describes the reunification efforts she actually received nor where 

she objected to them as inadequate in the proceedings below. Even on appeal, Doe has not 

specified how the Department’s reunification efforts were insufficient, nor what additional efforts

she contends were necessary--other than a conclusory assertion that this case called for more than 

the “usual services.” Conclusory allegations and assertions of fact, without citation to the record 

below, are not sufficient to support an argument on appeal. I.A.R. 35(a)(6); Doe, 166 Idaho at

727, 462 P.3d at 1191. We will not search the record for error. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare 

v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 113, 244 P.3d 247, 257 (Ct. App. 2010). Accordingly, we will not scour 

the record in an attempt to discern where or how Doe believes the Department’s reunification 

efforts came up short. 

Moreover, even if this Court assumed the Department’s reunification efforts were 

inadequate, Doe’s arguments would still not be considered. Doe’s opening brief cites no legal 

authority to support her argument that the allegedly inadequate reunification efforts in her childprotection case are relevant in her termination proceeding. Indeed, the law in Idaho is to the 

contrary. See In re Doe I, 164 Idaho 883, 890, 436 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2019) (observing that a trial 

court’s findings regarding the reasonableness of the Department’s reunification efforts are 

irrelevant in termination proceedings). Nor does Doe cite legal authority establishing her 

intellectual disability as a defense to the magistrate court’s neglect findings. This precludes further 

consideration of the issue. See In re Doe I, 166 Idaho 79, 83-84, 454 P.3d 1162, 1166-67 (2019). 

We will not construct and support Doe’s arguments for her. Doe’s failure to cite supporting 

authority in her appellate brief precludes consideration of the merits of her arguments. See id.

 

parental care and control. With regard to the younger child, the magistrate court found that Doe 

committed neglect only under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(a) by leaving the younger child without proper 

parental care and control.
III.

CONCLUSION

Doe neither identified a specific error by the magistrate court nor cited relevant legal 

authority to support her arguments on appeal. Consequently, we will not consider the merits of 

Doe’s argument that the magistrate court erred by terminating her parental rights because the 

Department’s reunification efforts were inadequate in light of her intellectual disability. 

Accordingly, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed. 

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR.