(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2002 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. BEAUMONT 

ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 02–403. Argued March 25, 2003—Decided June 16, 2003 

A corporation is prohibited from making “a contribution or expenditure 

in connection with” certain federal elections, 2 U. S. C. §441b(a), but 

not from establishing, administering, and soliciting contributions to a 

separate fund to be used for political purposes, §441b(b)(2)(C). Such 

a PAC (so called after the political action committee that runs it) is 

free to make contributions and other expenditures in connection with 

federal elections. Respondents, a nonprofit advocacy corporation 

known as North Carolina Right to Life, Inc., and others (collectively 

NCRL), sued petitioner Federal Election Commission (FEC), challenging the constitutionality of §441b and its implementing regulations as applied to NCRL. As relevant here, the District Court 

granted NCRL summary judgment as to the ban on direct contributions, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 

Held: Applying the direct contribution prohibition to nonprofit advocacy 

corporations is consistent with the First Amendment. Pp. 4–16. 

(a) An attack on the federal prohibition of direct corporate political 

contributions goes against the current of a century of congressional 

efforts to curb corporations’ potentially deleterious influences on federal elections. Since 1907, federal law has barred such direct corporate contributions. Much of the subsequent congressional attention 

to corporate political activity has been meant to strengthen the original, core prohibition on such contributions. Federal Election Comm’n 

v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197. As in 1907, current 

law focuses on the corporate structure’s special characteristics that 

threaten the integrity of the political process. Id., at 209. In barring 

corporate earnings from turning into political “war chests,” the ban 

was and is intended to “preven[t] corruption or the appearance of cor-
2 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. BEAUMONT 

Syllabus 

ruption.” Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political 

Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 496–497. The ban also protects individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union for other 

purposes from having their money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed, National Right to Work, supra, at 

208, and hedges against use of corporations as conduits for circumventing “valid contribution limits,” Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 456, and n. 

18. Pp. 4–8. 

(b) National Right to Work all but decided against NCRL’s position 

that §441b’s ban on direct contributions is unconstitutional as applied to nonprofit advocacy corporations. There, this Court upheld 

the part of §441b restricting a nonstock corporation to its membership when soliciting PAC contributions, concluding that the congressional judgment to regulate corporate political involvement warrants 

considerable deference and reflects a permissible assessment of the 

dangers that corporations pose to the electoral process. 459 U. S., at 

207–211. It would be hard to read this conclusion, except on the 

practical understanding that the corporation’s capacity to make contributions was legitimately limited to indirect donations within the 

scope allowed to PACs. And the Court specifically rejected the argument made here, that deference to congressional judgments about 

corporate contribution limits turns on details of corporate form or the 

affluence of particular corporations. National Right to Work has repeatedly been read as approving §441b’s prohibition on direct contributions, even by nonprofit corporations without great financial resources. Equal significance must be accorded to Federal Election 

Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, on which 

NCRL and the Fourth Circuit have relied. In holding §441b’s prohibition on independent expenditures unconstitutional as applied to a 

nonprofit advocacy corporation, the Court there distinguished National Right to Work on the ground that it addressed regulation of 

contributions, not expenditures. Pp. 8–12. 

(c) This Court could not hold for NCRL without recasting its understanding of the risks of harm posed by corporate political contributions, of the expressive significance of contributions, and of the consequent deference owed to legislative judgments on what to do about 

them. NCRL’s efforts do not unsettle existing law on these points. 

Its argument that Massachusetts Citizens for Life-type corporations 

pose no potential threat to the political system is rejected. Concern 

about the corrupting potential underlying the corporate ban may be 

implicated by advocacy corporations, which, like their for-profit counterparts, benefit from state-created advantages and may be able to 

amass substantial political war chests. Also rejected is NCRL’s ar-
Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 3 

Syllabus 

gument that the application of the ban on direct contributions should 

be subject to strict scrutiny because §441b bars, rather than limits, 

contributions based on their source. When reviewing political financial restrictions, the level of scrutiny is based on the importance of 

the political activity at issue to effective speech or political association, and restrictions on political contributions have long been 

treated as marginal speech restrictions subject to relatively complaisant First Amendment review because contributions lie closer to the 

edges than to the core of political expression. Thus, a contribution 

limit passes muster if it is closely drawn to match a sufficiently important interest. The time to consider the difference between a ban 

and a limit is when applying scrutiny at the level selected, not in selecting the standard of review itself. But even NCRL’s argument 

that §441b is not closely drawn rests on the false premise that the 

provision is a complete ban. In fact, the provision allows corporate 

political participation through PACs. And this Court does not think 

that regulatory burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their 

ability to solicit funds, renders a PAC unconstitutional as an advocacy corporation’s sole avenue for making political contributions. 

See Right to Work, supra, at 201–202. 12–16. 

278 F. 3d 261, reversed. 

SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, 

C. J., and STEVENS, O’CONNOR, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. 

KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. THOMAS, J., 

filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined. 
Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

No. 02–403 

_________________ 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, PETITIONER v. 

CHRISTINE BEAUMONT ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

[June 16, 2003] 

JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Since 1907, federal law has barred corporations from 

contributing directly to candidates for federal office. We 

hold that applying the prohibition to nonprofit advocacy 

corporations is consistent with the First Amendment. 

I 

The current statute makes it “unlawful . . . for any 

corporation whatever . . . to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with” certain federal elections, 90 

Stat. 490, as renumbered and amended, 2 U. S. C. 

§441b(a), “contribution or expenditure” each being defined 

to include “anything of value,” §441b(b)(2). The prohibition does not, however, forbid “the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate 

segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes.” 

§441b(b)(2)(C); see §431(4)(B). Such a PAC (so called after 

the political action committee that runs it) may be wholly 

controlled by the sponsoring corporation, whose employees 

and stockholders or members generally may be solicited 

for contributions. See §§441b(b)(4)(B)–(C); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 
2 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. BEAUMONT 

Opinion of the Court 

197, 200, n. 4 (1982). While federal law requires PACs to 

register and disclose their activities, §§432–434; see Federal 

Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 

U. S. 238, 253–254 (1986), the law leaves them free to make 

contributions as well as other expenditures in connection 

with federal elections, §441b(b)(2)(C). 

Respondents are a corporation known as North Carolina 

Right to Life, Inc., three of its officers, and a North Carolina voter (here, together, NCRL), who have sued the 

Federal Election Commission, the independent agency set 

up to “administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and 

formulate policy with respect to” the federal electoral laws. 

§437c(b)(1). NCRL challenges the constitutionality of 

§441b and the FEC’s regulations implementing that section, 11 CFR §§114.2(b), 114.10 (2003), but only so far as 

they apply to NCRL. The corporation is organized under 

the laws of North Carolina to provide counseling to pregnant women and to urge alternatives to abortion, and as a 

nonprofit advocacy corporation it is exempted from federal 

taxation by §501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 

U. S. C. §501(c)(4).1 It has no shareholders and, although 

it receives some donations from traditional business corporations, it is “overwhelmingly funded by private contributions from individuals.” App. 14. NCRL has made 

contributions and expenditures in connection with state 

elections, but not federal, owing to 2 U. S. C. §441b. In-

—————— 

1Section 501(c)(4)(A) grants exemption to “[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion 

of social welfare, . . . the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively 

to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.” An organization 

“may carry on lawful political activities and remain exempt under 

section 501(c)(4) as long as it is primarily engaged in activities that 

promote social welfare.” Rev. Rul. 81–95, 1981–1 Cum. Bull. 332. 

Unlike contributions to §501(c)(3) organizations, donations to those 

recognized under §501(c)(4) are not tax deductible. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 543 (1983). 
Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

stead, it has established a PAC, the North Carolina Right 

to Life, Inc., Political Action Committee, which has contributed to federal candidates. See North Carolina Right 

to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F. 3d 705, 709 (CA4 1999), 

cert. denied, 528 U. S. 1153 (2000). 

The District Court granted summary judgment to NCRL 

and held §441b unconstitutional as applied to the corporation, both as to direct contributions and independent 

expenditures. 137 F. Supp. 2d 648 (EDNC 2000). A divided Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 

278 F. 3d 261 (2002), relying primarily on Massachusetts 

Citizens for Life, in which this Court held it unconstitutional to apply the statute to independent expenditures by 

Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., a nonprofit advocacy 

corporation in some respects like NCRL. The Court of 

Appeals ruled, first, that the prohibition on independent 

expenditures may not be applied to NCRL. Although the 

panel acknowledged that Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 

unlike NCRL, had a formal policy against accepting corporate donations, see Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, 

at 263–264 (describing this feature of the organization as 

“essential to our holding”), it nevertheless treated NCRL 

as materially indistinguishable from Massachusetts Citizens for Life. 

To the point for present purposes, the Court of Appeals 

went on to hold the ban on direct contributions likewise 

unconstitutional as applied to NCRL. While the majority 

of the divided court recognized that regulation of campaign contributions has received greater deference under 

First Amendment cases than regulation of independent 

expenditures, 278 F. 3d, at 274 (citing Nixon v. Shrink 

Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 386–388 

(2000)), it held the ban on direct contributions unjustified 

as applied to “[Massachusetts Citizens for Life]-type corporations,” which it thought “pose[d] no risk of ‘unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes.’” 278 F. 3d, at 
4 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. BEAUMONT 

Opinion of the Court 

275 (quoting Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 

259). The Court of Appeals reasoned that “[t]he rationale 

utilized by the Court in [Massachusetts Citizens for Life] to 

declare prohibitions on independent expenditures unconstitutional as applied to [the advocacy corporation involved there] is equally applicable in the context of direct 

contributions.” 278 F. 3d, at 275. Judge Gregory dissented from the others on this point, since he saw no way 

to square their conclusion with this Court’s reasoning in 

National Right to Work. 278 F. 3d, at 282. 

After the Fourth Circuit divided 7 to 4 in denying rehearing en banc, the FEC petitioned for certiorari solely as 

to the constitutionality of the ban on direct contributions.2 

Because on that issue the Fourth Circuit is in conflict with 

the Sixth, see Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F. 

3d 637, 645–646 (1997) (upholding a provision of Kentucky 

law analogous to §441b), we granted certiorari, 537 U. S. 

1027 (2002). We now reverse. 

II 

A 

Any attack on the federal prohibition of direct corporate 

political contributions goes against the current of a century of congressional efforts to curb corporations’ potentially “deleterious influences on federal elections,” which 

we have canvassed a number of times before. United 

States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 585 (1957); see 

id., at 570–584; see also National Right to Work, supra, at 

208–209; Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U. S. 385, 402–412 

(1972); United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 113–115 (1948). 

The current law grew out of a “popular feeling” in the late 

19th century “that aggregated capital unduly influenced 

—————— 

2We thus have no occasion to say whether the Court of Appeals correctly held NCRL entitled to the so-called “Massachusetts Citizens for Life 

exception” to the statute’s ban on independent expenditures. 
Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

politics, an influence not stopping short of corruption.” 

Automobile Workers, supra, at 570. A demand for congressional action gathered force in the campaign of 1904, which 

made a national issue of the political leverage exerted 

through corporate contributions, and after the election and 

new revelations of corporate political overreaching, President Theodore Roosevelt made banning corporate political 

contributions a legislative priority. R. Mutch, Campaigns, 

Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign 

Finance Law 1–8 (1988); see Automobile Workers, 352 U. S., 

at 571–575. Although some congressional proposals would 

have “prohibited political contributions by [only] certain 

classes of corporations,” id., at 573, the momentum was “for 

elections ‘free from the power of money,’” id., at 575 (citation 

omitted), and Congress acted on the President’s call for an 

outright ban, not with half measures, but with the Tillman 

Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. This “first federal campaign 

finance law,” Mutch, supra, at xvii, banned “any corporation 

whatever” from making “a money contribution in connection 

with” federal elections, 34 Stat. 864–865. 

Since 1907, there has been continual congressional 

attention to corporate political activity, sometimes resulting in refinement of the law, sometimes in overhaul.3 One 

feature, however, has stayed intact throughout this “careful legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws,” 

National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 209, and much of the 

periodic amendment was meant to strengthen the original, 

—————— 

3See, e.g., Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822; Act of Aug. 19, 

1911, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25; Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, ch. 368, 43 

Stat. 1070; Act of July 19, 1940 (Hatch Act), 54 Stat. 767; War Labor 

Disputes Act, ch. 144, §9, 57 Stat. 167; Labor Management Relations Act, 

1947, §304, 61 Stat. 159; Act of Oct. 31, 1951, Pub. L. 82–248, §21, 65 Stat. 

718; Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 3; FECA 

Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263; FECA Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 

475; FECA Amendments of 1979, 93 Stat. 1339; Bipartisan Campaign 

Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81. 
6 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. BEAUMONT 

Opinion of the Court 

core prohibition on direct corporate contributions. The 

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, for example, broadened the ban on contributions to include “anything of 

value,” and criminalized the act of receiving a contribution 

to match the criminality of making one. Ch. 368, §§302, 

313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074. So, in another instance, the 1947 

Labor Management Relations Act drew labor unions permanently within the law’s reach and invigorated the 

earlier prohibition to include “expenditure[s]” as well. Ch. 

120, §304, 61 Stat. 159; see Pipefitters, supra, at 402. 

Today, as in 1907, the law focuses on the “special characteristics of the corporate structure” that threaten the 

integrity of the political process. National Right to Work, 

459 U. S., at 209; see id., at 207; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 658–659 (1990); 

Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U. S., at 257–258; 

Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 500–501 (1985). As we 

explained it in Austin, 

“State law grants corporations special advantages— 

such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable 

treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets—that enhance their ability to attract capital and 

to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the 

return on their shareholders’ investments. These 

state-created advantages not only allow corporations 

to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but 

also permit them to use ‘resources amassed in the 

economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair advantage 

in the political marketplace.’” 494 U. S., at 658–659 

(quoting Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 

257). 

Hence, the public interest in “restrict[ing] the influence of 

political war chests funneled through the corporate form.” 

National Conservative Political Action Comm., supra, at 
Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

500–501; see National Right to Work, supra, at 207 

(“[S]ubstantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the 

special advantages which go with the corporate form of 

organization should not be converted into political ‘war 

chests’ which could be used to incur political debts from 

legislators”). 

As these excerpts from recent opinions show, not only 

has the original ban on direct corporate contributions 

endured, but so have the original rationales for the law. 

In barring corporate earnings from conversion into political “war chests,” the ban was and is intended to “preven[t] 

corruption or the appearance of corruption.” National 

Conservative Political Action Comm., supra, at 496–497; 

see also First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 

765, 788, n. 26 (1978) (“The importance of the governmental interest in preventing [corruption] has never been 

doubted”). But the ban has always done further duty in 

protecting “the individuals who have paid money into a 

corporation or union for purposes other than the support 

of candidates from having that money used to support 

political candidates to whom they may be opposed.” National Right to Work, supra, at 208; see CIO, 335 U. S., at 

113; see also Austin, supra, at 673–678 (Brennan, J., 

concurring). 

Quite aside from war-chest corruption and the interests 

of contributors and owners, however, another reason for 

regulating corporate electoral involvement has emerged 

with restrictions on individual contributions, and recent 

cases have recognized that restricting contributions by 

various organizations hedges against their use as conduits 

for “circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.” Federal 

Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 456, and n. 18 (2001); see 

Austin, supra, at 664. To the degree that a corporation 

could contribute to political candidates, the individuals 

“who created it, who own it, or whom it employs,” Cedric 
8 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. BEAUMONT 

Opinion of the Court 

Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U. S. 158, 163 

(2001), could exceed the bounds imposed on their own 

contributions by diverting money through the corporation, 

cf. Colorado Republican, 533 U. S., at 446–447. As we 

said on the subject of limiting coordinated expenditures by 

political parties, experience “demonstrates how candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the current 

law, and it shows beyond serious doubt how contribution 

limits would be eroded if inducement to circumvent them 

were enhanced.” Id., at 457. 

In sum, our cases on campaign finance regulation represent respect for the “legislative judgment that the special 

characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation.” National Right to Work, supra, 

at 209–210. And we have understood that such deference 

to legislative choice is warranted particularly when Congress regulates campaign contributions, carrying as they 

do a plain threat to political integrity and a plain warrant 

to counter the appearance and reality of corruption and 

the misuse of corporate advantages. See, e.g., Buckley v. 

Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26–28, 47 (1976) (per curiam). As we 

said in Colorado Republican, “limits on contributions are 

more clearly justified by a link to political corruption than 

limits on other kinds of . . . political spending are (corruption being understood not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder’s 

judgment, and the appearance of such influence).” 533 

U. S., at 440–441 (citation omitted). 

B 

That historical prologue would discourage any broadside 

attack on corporate campaign finance regulation or regulation of corporate contributions, and NCRL accordingly 

questions §441b only to the extent the law places nonprofit 

advocacy corporations like itself under the general ban on 

direct contributions. But not even this more focused 
Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

challenge can claim a blank slate, for Judge Gregory 

rightly said in his dissent that our explanation in National 

Right to Work all but decided the issue against NCRL’s 

position. 

National Right to Work addressed the provision of §441b 

restricting a nonstock corporation to its membership when 

soliciting contributions to its PAC,4 and we considered 

whether a nonprofit advocacy corporation without members of the usual sort could be held to violate the law by 

soliciting a donation to its PAC from any individual who 

had at one time contributed to the corporation. See 459 

U. S., at 199–200. We sustained the FEC’s position that a 

fund drive as broad as this went beyond the solicitation of 

“members” permitted by §441b, and we invoked the history distilled above in holding that the statutory restriction was no infringement on those First Amendment 

associational rights closely akin to speech. Id., at 206– 

209. We concluded that the congressional judgment to 

regulate corporate political involvement “warrants 

considerable deference” and “reflects a permissible 

assessment of the dangers posed by [corporations] to the 

electoral process.” Id., at 207–211 (emphasis added). 

It would be hard to read our conclusion in National 

Right to Work, that the PAC solicitation restrictions were 

constitutional, except on the practical understanding that 

the corporation’s capacity to make contributions was 

legitimately limited to indirect donations within the scope 

allowed to PACs. See, e.g., id., at 208 (reviewing both “the 

—————— 

4Section 441b(b)(4)(A) bars a corporation from soliciting contributions 

to a PAC established by the corporation, except from stockholders or 

other specified categories of persons. Section 441b(b)(4)(C), the specific 

provision at issue in National Right to Work, provides, in relevant part, 

that §441b(b)(4)(A) “shall not prevent a . . . corporation without capital 

stock . . . from soliciting contributions to [a PAC established by the 

corporation] from members of such . . . corporation.” 
10 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. BEAUMONT 

Opinion of the Court 

statutory prohibitions and exceptions”). In fact, we specifically rejected the argument made here, that deference 

to congressional judgments about proper limits on corporate contributions turns on details of corporate form or the 

affluence of particular corporations. In the same breath, 

we remarked on the broad applicability of §441b to “corporations and labor unions without great financial resources, 

as well as those more fortunately situated,” and made a 

point of refusing to “second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared.” Id., at 210. 

Later cases have repeatedly acknowledged, without 

questioning, the reading of National Right to Work as 

generally approving the §441b prohibition on direct contributions, even by nonprofit corporations “without great 

financial resources.” Ibid. In National Conservative 

Political Action Committee, for example, we not only spoke 

of National Right to Work as consistent with “the wellestablished constitutional validity of legislative regulation 

of corporate contributions to candidates for public office,” 

but went on to reaffirm that the Court in that case had 

“rightly concluded that Congress might include, along 

with labor unions and corporations traditionally prohibited from making contributions to political candidates, 

membership corporations, though contributions by the 

latter might not exhibit all of the evil that contributions by 

traditional economically organized corporations exhibit.” 

470 U. S., at 495, 500; see id., at 500 (describing National 

Right to Work as giving “proper deference to a congressional determination of the need for a prophylactic rule”). 

Relying again on National Right to Work, we made a 

similar point in Austin when we sustained Michigan’s ban 

on direct corporate contributions, even though the ban 

“include[d] within its scope closely held corporations that 

do not possess vast reservoirs of capital.” 494 U. S., at 

661. “Although some closely held corporations, just as 
Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

some publicly held ones, may not have accumulated significant amounts of wealth, they receive from the State 

the special benefits conferred by the corporate structure 

and present the potential for distorting the political process. This potential for distortion justifies [the state law’s] 

general applicability to all corporations.” Ibid. 

But National Right to Work does not stand alone in its 

bearing on the issue here, and equal significance must be 

accorded to Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the very case 

upon which NCRL and the Court of Appeals have placed 

principal reliance. There, we held the prohibition on 

independent expenditures under §441b unconstitutional 

as applied to a nonprofit advocacy corporation. While the 

majority explained generally that the “potential for unfair 

deployment of wealth for political purposes” fell short of 

justifying a ban on expenditures by groups like Massachusetts Citizens for Life that “do not pose that danger of 

corruption,” the majority’s response to the dissent pointed 

to a different resolution of the present case. 479 U. S., at 

259. THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s dissenting opinion noted that 

Massachusetts Citizens for Life “was not unlike” the corporation at issue in National Right to Work, which he read 

as supporting the ban on independent expenditures. 479 

U. S., at 269. Without disagreeing about the similarity of 

the two organizations, the majority nonetheless distinguished National Right to Work on the ground of its addressing regulation of contributions, not expenditures. 

See 479 U. S., at 259–260 (“[R]estrictions on contributions 

require less compelling justification than restrictions on 

independent spending”). “In light of the historical role of 

contributions in the corruption of the electoral process, the 

need for a broad prophylactic rule [against contributions] 

was thus sufficient in [National Right to Work].” Id., at 

260. 
12 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. BEAUMONT 

Opinion of the Court 

C 

The upshot is that, although we have never squarely 

held against NCRL’s position here, we could not hold for it 

without recasting our understanding of the risks of harm 

posed by corporate political contributions, of the expressive significance of contributions, and of the consequent 

deference owed to legislative judgments on what to do 

about them. NCRL’s efforts, however, fail to unsettle 

existing law on any of these points. 

First, NCRL argues that on a class-wide basis “[Massachusetts Citizens for Life]-type corporations pose no potential of threat to the political system,” so that the governmental interest in combating corruption is as weak as the 

Court held it to be in relation to the particular corporation 

considered in Massachusetts Citizens for Life. Brief for 

Respondents 19. But this generalization does not hold up. 

For present purposes, we will assume advocacy corporations are generally different from traditional business 

corporations in the improbability that contributions they 

might make would end up supporting causes that some of 

their members would not approve. See Massachusetts 

Citizens for Life, supra, at 260–262.5 But concern about 

the corrupting potential underlying the corporate ban may 

indeed be implicated by advocacy corporations. They, like 

their for-profit counterparts, benefit from significant 

—————— 

5That said, this concern is not wholly inapplicable to advocacy corporations, as “persons may desire that an organization use their contributions to further a certain cause, but may not want the organization to 

use their money to urge support for or opposition to political candidates 

solely on the basis of that cause.” Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 

U. S., at 261. In any event, we have never intimated that the risk of 

corruption alone is insufficient to support regulation of political contributions. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 

652, 658–659 (1990); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Right to 

Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 208 (1982); cf. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 

Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 388–389 (2000). 
Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

“state-created advantages,” Austin, supra, at 659, and may 

well be able to amass substantial “political ‘war chests,’” 

National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 207. Not all corporations that qualify for favorable tax treatment under 

§501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code lack substantial 

resources, and the category covers some of the Nation’s 

most politically powerful organizations, including the 

AARP, the National Rifle Association, and the Sierra 

Club.6 Nonprofit advocacy corporations are, moreover, no 

less susceptible than traditional business companies to 

misuse as conduits for circumventing the contribution 

limits imposed on individuals. Cf. Austin, supra, at 664 

(noting that a nonprofit corporation is capable of “serv[ing] 

as a conduit for corporate political spending”).7 

—————— 

6See http://www.aarp.org/press/disclosure.html (as visited June 

12, 2003) (available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (AARP); 

http://www.give.org/reports/index.asp (as visited June 12, 2003) (available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (National Rifle Association and Sierra 

Club). These examples answer NCRL’s argument that the Massachusetts Citizens for Life exception is “self-limiting.” See Brief for Respondents 27 (“If [a Massachusetts Citizens for Life]-type corporation begins 

generating or receiving substantial business income or business corporation contributions, by definition, it automatically is no longer [a 

Massachusetts Citizens for Life]-type corporation” (citing Massachusetts 

Citizens for Life, supra, at 263–264)). The nonprofit advocacy corporations mentioned (one of which has, in fact, been granted “[Massachusetts Citizens for Life]-type” status by a Court of Appeals, see, e.g., FEC 

v. National Rifle Assn., 254 F. 3d 173, 192 (CADC 2001)) show that 

“political ‘war chests’ ” may be amassed simply from members’ contributions. 459 U. S., at 207. 7NCRL suggests that the Government’s interest in combating circumvention of the campaign finance laws would be sufficiently met by 

allowing limited contributions subject to the earmarking rule of 

§441a(a)(8), which provides that “contributions which are in any way 

earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediate or conduit to 

[a] candidate” are treated as contributions to the candidate (thus 

triggering the disclosure requirements of §434(b)(3)(A)). Brief for 

Respondents 31. We rejected this precise argument, however, in 
14 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. BEAUMONT 

Opinion of the Court 

Second, NCRL argues that application of the ban on its 

contributions should be subject to a strict level of scrutiny, 

on the ground that §441b does not merely limit contributions, but bans them on the basis of their source. Brief for 

Respondents 14–16. This argument, however, overlooks 

the basic premise we have followed in setting First 

Amendment standards for reviewing political financial 

restrictions: the level of scrutiny is based on the importance of the “political activity at issue” to effective speech 

or political association. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 

479 U. S., at 259; see Colorado Republican, 533 U. S., at 

440–442, and nn. 6–7; Nixon, 528 U. S., at 386–388. 

Going back to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), restrictions on political contributions have been treated as 

merely “marginal” speech restrictions subject to relatively 

complaisant review under the First Amendment, because 

contributions lie closer to the edges than to the core of 

political expression. See Colorado Republican, supra, at 

440.8 “While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association . . . , the transformation of contributions into political debate involves 

—————— 

Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 

Comm., 533 U. S. 431 (2001), where we concluded that it “ignores the 

practical difficulty of identifying and directly combating circumvention 

under actual political conditions.” Id., at 462. “The earmarking provision . . . would reach only the most clumsy attempts to pass contributions through to candidates. To treat the earmarking provision as the 

outer limit of acceptable tailoring would disarm any serious effort to 

limit [circumvention].” Ibid. 8Within the realm of contributions generally, corporate contributions 

are furthest from the core of political expression, since corporations’ 

First Amendment speech and association interests are derived largely 

from those of their members, see, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 458–459 (1958), and of the public in receiving information, see, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 777 

(1978). A ban on direct corporate contributions leaves individual members 

of corporations free to make their own contributions, and deprives the 

public of little or no material information. 
Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

speech by someone other than the contributor.” Buckley, 

supra, at 20–21. This is the reason that instead of requiring 

contribution regulations to be narrowly tailored to serve a 

compelling governmental interest, “a contribution limit 

involving ‘significant interference’ with associational rights” 

passes muster if it satisfies the lesser demand of being 

“‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently important interest.’” 

Nixon, supra, at 387–388 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 25); cf. 

Austin, 494 U. S., at 657; Buckley, supra, at 44–45.9 

Indeed, this recognition that degree of scrutiny turns on 

the nature of the activity regulated is the only practical 

way to square two leading cases: National Right to Work 

approved strict solicitation limits on a PAC organized to 

make contributions, see 459 U. S., at 201–202, whereas 

Massachusetts Citizens for Life applied a compelling interest test to invalidate the ban on an advocacy corporation’s 

expenditures in light of PAC regulatory burdens, see 479 

U. S., at 252–255; see also id., at 265–266 (opinion of 

O’CONNOR, J.). Each case involved §441b, after all, and 

the same “ban” on the same corporate “sources” of political 

activity applied in both cases. 

It is not that the difference between a ban and a limit is 

to be ignored; it is just that the time to consider it is when 

applying scrutiny at the level selected, not in selecting the 

standard of review itself. But even when NCRL urges 

precisely that, and asserts that §441b is not sufficiently 

“closely drawn,” the claim still rests on a false premise, for 

NCRL is simply wrong in characterizing §441b as a complete ban. As we have said before, the section “permits 

—————— 

9 Judicial deference is particularly warranted where, as here, we deal 

with a congressional judgment that has remained essentially unchanged 

throughout a century of “careful legislative adjustment.” National Right 

to Work, 459 U. S., at 209; cf. Nixon, 528 U. S., at 391 (“The quantum of 

empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of 

legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised”). 
16 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. BEAUMONT 

Opinion of the Court 

some participation of unions and corporations in the federal 

electoral process by allowing them to establish and pay the 

administrative expenses of [PACs].” National Right to 

Work, supra, at 201; see also Austin, supra, at 660; Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 252. The PAC option 

allows corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite 

possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders 

or members, and it lets the government regulate campaign 

activity through registration and disclosure, see §§432–434, 

without jeopardizing the associational rights of advocacy 

organizations’ members, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 

Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that 

“[c]ompelled disclosure of membership in an organization 

engaged in advocacy of particular beliefs” may violate the 

First Amendment). 

NCRL cannot prevail, then, simply by arguing that a 

ban on an advocacy corporation’s direct contributions is 

bad tailoring. NCRL would have to demonstrate that the 

law violated the First Amendment in allowing contributions to be made only through its PAC and subject to a 

PAC’s administrative burdens. But a unanimous Court in 

National Right to Work did not think the regulatory burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their ability to 

solicit funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional as an advocacy corporation’s sole avenue for making political contributions. See 459 U. S., at 201–202. There is no reason to 

think the burden on advocacy corporations is any greater 

today, or to reach a different conclusion here. 

III 

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 

It is so ordered. 
Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 1 

KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

No. 02–403 

_________________ 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, PETITIONER v. 

CHRISTINE BEAUMONT ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

[June 16, 2003] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment. 

My position, expressed in dissenting opinions in previous cases, has been that the Court erred in sustaining 

certain state and federal restrictions on political speech in 

the campaign finance context and misapprehended basic 

First Amendment principles in doing so. See Nixon v. 

Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 409 

(2000) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting); Austin v. Michigan 

Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 699 (1990) 

(KENNEDY, J., dissenting); Colorado Republican Federal 

Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 

604, 626 (1996) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment and 

dissenting in part). I adhere to this view, and so can give 

no weight to those authorities in the instant case. 

That said, it must be acknowledged that Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 

U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), contains language supporting 

the Court’s holding here that corporate contributions can 

be regulated more closely than corporate expenditures. 

The language upon which the Court relies tends to reconcile the tension between the approach in MCFL and the 

Court’s earlier decision in Federal Election Comm’n v. 

National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197 (1982). 

Were we presented with a case in which the distinction 

between contributions and expenditures under the whole 
2 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. BEAUMONT 

KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment 

scheme of campaign finance regulation were under review, 

I might join JUSTICE THOMAS’ opinion. The Court does not 

undertake that comprehensive examination here, however. And since there is language in MCFL that supports 

today’s holding, I concur in the judgment. 
Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

No. 02–403 

_________________ 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, PETITIONER v. 

CHRISTINE BEAUMONT ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

[June 16, 2003] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, 

dissenting. 

I continue to believe that campaign finance laws are 

subject to strict scrutiny. Federal Election Comm’n v. 

Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 

431, 465–466 (2001) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (Colorado 

II); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. 

Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 640 (1996) 

(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in 

part) (Colorado I). See also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 

Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 427 (2000) (THOMAS, J., 

dissenting). As in Colorado II, the Government does not 

argue here that 2 U. S. C. §441b survives review under 

that rigorous standard. Indeed, it could not. “[U]nder 

traditional strict scrutiny, broad prophylactic caps on . . . 

giving in the political process . . . are unconstitutional,” 

Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 640–641, because, as I have 

explained before, they are not narrowly tailored to meet 

any relevant compelling state interest, id., at 641–644; 

Nixon, supra, at 427–430. See also Colorado II, supra, at 

465–466. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals and respectfully dissent from the Court’s 

contrary disposition.