76174 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 234 / Tuesday, December 6, 2011 / Notices 

Number of 

respondents 

Annual 

responses × Hours per response 

Burden 

hours 

Reporting Burden ..................................................................................... 35 50 58 1,010 

Total Estimated Burden Hours: 1,010. 

Status: New collection. 

Authority: Section 3507 of the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 35, as 

amended. 

Dated: November 23, 2011. 

Colette Pollard, 

Departmental Reports Management Officer, 

Office of the Chief Information Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2011–31259 Filed 12–5–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4210–67–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 

[Docket BOEM–2011–0095] 

Request for Information on the State of 

the Offshore Renewable Energy 

Industry—Auction Format Information 

Request (AFIR) 

AGENCY: Bureau of Ocean Energy 

Management (BOEM), Interior. 

ACTION: Request for information. 

SUMMARY: BOEM invites public 

comment on a proposed set of auction 

formats which may be used to issue 

commercial renewable energy leases on 

the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). 

BOEM is examining several auction 

formats, each designed to efficiently 

issue renewable energy leases to those 

who value them most and are best 

positioned to develop them, while also 

ensuring that the government receives a 

fair return in exchange. BOEM is 

focusing primarily on variations of 

Ascending Clock Auctions and Package 

Auctions formats described in more 

detail below. BOEM is also considering 

a multiple factor auction approach in 

which bidders can earn a discount on 

their bids submitted under one of the 

auction formats noted above, based on 

company-specific attributes deemed 

relevant to the success of their projects. 

The auction format selected for each 

sale area would likely vary based on the 

actual characteristics of that sale. Such 

characteristics could include the size 

and homogeneity of the area to be 

offered. BOEM will hold a workshop to 

help familiarize stakeholders with the 

auction format options and to solicit 

feedback on Friday, December 16, 2011, 

at the South Interior Building in 

Washington, DC. 

DATES: Comments should be submitted 

electronically or postmarked no later 

than January 20, 2012. All written 

comments received during the comment 

period will be made available to the 

public and considered during 

preparation of Proposed Sale Notices 

(PSN) pertaining to the competitive 

leasing of OCS lands to support the 

development of offshore wind energy 

resources. 

ADDRESSES: Potential auction 

participants, Federal, state, and local 

government agencies, tribal 

governments, and other interested 

parties are requested to submit their 

written comments on the contents of 

this AFIR in one of the following ways: 

1. Electronically: http://www.

regulations.gov. In the entry titled 

‘‘Enter Keyword or ID,’’ enter BOEM– 

2011–0095 then click ‘‘search.’’ Follow 

the instructions to submit public 

comments and view supporting and 

related materials available for this 

document. 

2. Written Comments: In written form, 

delivered by hand or by mail, enclosed 

in an envelope labeled ‘‘Comments on 

Offshore Wind AFIR’’ to: Economics 

Division, Bureau of Ocean Energy 

Management, 381 Elden Street, MS 

4050, Herndon, Virginia 20170–4817. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Greg 

Adams, BOEM Economics Division, 381 

Elden Street, MS 4050, Herndon, 

Virginia 20170–4817, (703) 787–1537 or 

greg.adams@boem.gov; or Wright Frank, 

BOEM Office of Renewable Energy 

Programs, 381 Elden Street, HM 1328, 

Herndon, Virginia 20170, (703) 787– 

1325 or wright.frank@boem.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Authority 

This request for information is 

published pursuant to subsection 8(p) of 

the OCS Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1337(p)), 

as amended by section 388 of the Energy 

Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) and the 

implementing regulations at 30 CFR 

585.116, which authorize the Director of 

BOEM to solicit information from 

industry and other relevant stakeholders 

to evaluate the state of the offshore 

renewable energy industry, including 

economic matters that promote or 

detract from continued development. 

The information received may be used 

to evaluate program options to promote 

safe and environmentally responsible 

development in a manner that ensures 

a fair value for use of the nation’s OCS. 

Purpose of the AFIR 

The purpose of this information 

request is to invite public comment on 

the auction format options described in 

this request. Due to the complexities 

associated with lease valuation and 

optimal lease configurations, renewable 

energy leasing will require more diverse 

approaches than the sealed-bid, cash 

bonus approach used to issue offshore 

oil and gas leases. 

The auction formats and their 

specifications are designed to address 

important program objectives, 

including: 

• Fair Return: BOEM is statutorily 

required to obtain a ‘‘fair return’’ for 

leases and grants on the OCS; 

• Economic Efficiency: The lease 

auction process should try to ensure 

that commercial renewable energy 

leases on the OCS are awarded to those 

who value the areas the most; 

• Program Efficiency: The lease 

auction process must be manageable for 

BOEM to administer; 

• Lease Boundary Flexibility: Within 

constraints fixed by BOEM, the auction 

should allow bidders to identify the 

optimal lease areas; 

• Competition: The lease auction 

process must be fair, and encourage 

participation from all interested bidders; 

• Transparency: The lease auction 

process must be an open one in which 

bids are comparable and the reason why 

the winners won is clear; 

• Neutrality: The lease auction 

process must ensure that all bidders are 

treated equally; 

• Simplicity: The lease auction 

process must be easily understood and 

implemented, by both the bidders and 

BOEM; and 

• Consistency: The lease auction 

process should be applicable to the 

issuance of leases in a variety of 

potential renewable energy 

development contexts. 

BOEM contracted with Power 

Auctions LLC to study auction formats 

for issuing renewable energy leases 

(hereinafter, ‘‘Ausubel and Cramton 

(2011a), (2011b), and (2011c),’’ 

respectively). Based on its findings and 

BOEM’s own internal research, BOEM 

has identified several potentially 

suitable auction formats. A more 

comprehensive discussion of these 

auction formats prepared by BOEM 

staff, along with the Power Auctions 

LLC study, can be found on BOEM’s 


jlentini on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 234 / Tuesday, December 6, 2011 / Notices 76175 

Web site at http://www.boem.gov/

Renewable-Energy-Program/RegulatoryInformation/Renewable-Energy-AuctionFormats.aspx. 

Preference for Bidding on the Cash 

Bonus 

Although BOEM has the authority to 

conduct an auction with either the cash 

bonus or operating fee rate as the bid 

variable, the bureau generally prefers 

using the cash bonus. Conducting an 

auction with the bonus bid as the 

variable has a number of benefits. It 

allows straightforward comparison of 

competing offers and tends to award 

leases to developers with good financial 

backing. Because the winning bidders 

would need to pay the bonus bid before 

the lease is issued, it prevents 

undercapitalized bidders from 

committing to a greater payment than 

they can afford. Refer to Section 2.3 in 

Ausubel and Cramton (2011a) for 

further discussion. 

Single Lot Auctions: Simple Ascending 

Clock Auction Format 

In a single lot auction, there is only 

one object of bidding (‘‘lot’’), and the 

entire lease area would be auctioned off 

as a single entity. BOEM could use a 

single lot auction in situations where it 

is expected that only one lease would be 

practical for the available acreage, 

because the area would not be large 

enough to support multiple projects. 

In a single lot auction utilizing an 

ascending clock auction format, BOEM 

would set an initial asking price for the 

single lot, and bidders would indicate 

whether or not they are interested in 

bidding for that lot at that price. If 

BOEM received more than one bid, 

BOEM would increase the asking price, 

which ‘‘ticks’’ up like a clock, until only 

a single bidder is willing to meet the 

announced price. This format enables 

price discovery by the bidders during 

the auction and reduces the guesswork 

required for bidders to value offshore 

leases. 

One complication of the simple 

ascending clock auction is that a tiebreaking procedure is needed when all 

the remaining bidders drop out in the 

same round. Exit bids are one practical 

way of solving this problem in the 

single lot case. An exit bid allows 

bidders who are unwilling to meet the 

next round’s bid price to specify the 

maximum price they would be willing 

to pay short of the new asking price. If 

all remaining bidders drop out from one 

round to the next, the bidder with the 

highest exit bid would prevail. Another 

tie-breaking procedure would be for 

BOEM to incrementally reduce the 

current asking price until one bidder 

bids. In either approach, if the tie 

persists after the tie-breaking procedure, 

the winner could be determined based 

on a random draw. Refer to Section 5.2 

in Ausubel and Cramton (2011c) for 

further discussion. 

Multiple Lot Auctions: Simultaneous 

Ascending Clock Auction Format 

In most lease sales, BOEM expects to 

issue multiple commercial renewable 

energy leases in the same auction. In 

this case, BOEM is considering the use 

of a Simultaneous Ascending Clock 

Auction (SACA). 

In such a lease sale, BOEM would 

divide the entire area offered for leasing 

into smaller lots which would be the 

objects of the bidding. To form the lots, 

BOEM would likely use OCS lease 

blocks (approximately 3 statute miles by 

3 statute miles), aliquots (squares 1/16th 

that size), or some combination of these. 

The auction would enable bidding on 

all of the lots simultaneously. 

BOEM would set a minimum asking 

price for each lot. Bidders would bid on 

the combination of lots they are 

interested in at that price. The bid price 

set by BOEM for contested lots (those 

receiving two or more bids) would 

increase in the next round, while the 

price for uncontested lots (those 

receiving zero or one bid) would remain 

the same in the next round. BOEM 

would publish the announced prices 

and the number of bids on each lot at 

the outset of each round in the auction. 

A lot which is uncontested through 

several rounds may become contested 

because, as the auction proceeds, a 

bidder can shift its bids, for example, 

from a contested lot to an uncontested 

lot. If a bidder submits the only bid on 

a particular lot, the standing price for 

that lot remains unchanged through 

subsequent rounds until an additional 

bid is submitted on that lot at the 

standing bid price, or the auction ends. 

As soon as an uncontested lot receives 

more than one bid, it is treated as a 

contested lot. 

If any bidder finds that it has 

submitted a bid on a contested lot, in 

the next round that bidder can either: 

• Meet the new asking price for this 

lot; 

• Drop its bid for this lot and submit 

a new bid elsewhere; or 

• Drop its bid for this lot and not 

submit a new bid elsewhere. 

The auction ends when no lot has 

more than one bid at the last-announced 

asking price set by BOEM. Because any 

bidder can move a bid from a contested 

lot to another lot, the auction for any 

particular lot is not over until bidding 

has concluded for all lots. The winning 

bidders are those with active bids in the 

final round and they are obligated to 

pay the final round prices for the lots 

they win. 

Bidding in a SACA auction must 

comply with a set of rules that BOEM 

will include in the Proposed and Final 

Sale Notices. For example: 

• A bidder may only bid on 

contiguous lots to form a single lease. 

• Bidders who want to acquire 

multiple lease areas must register for the 

auction as separate bidding entities. 

• Bidders may maintain or reduce the 

number of lots they bid on from one 

round to the next; but they may not 

increase the number of lots they bid on 

from one round to the next. This helps 

to control certain opportunities for 

gaming, and drives the auction towards 

a timely conclusion. 

• A ‘‘bid eligibility rule’’ would 

determine the maximum number of lots 

that a bidder is eligible to bid on in the 

auction in the opening round, or in any 

subsequent round of the auction. 

Bidders’ eligibility is based on the 

amount of money posted as their bid 

deposit. The maximum number of lots 

that a bidder may bid on equals the 

maximum number of lots that would be 

covered by the bidder’s deposit at the 

opening bid price. 

• Bidders may submit an exit bid 

amount for a particular set of lots in any 

round. An exit bid can only win if the 

auction ends in that round, and there is 

no higher bid on any of the lots in the 

set. If any of these conditions is not met, 

the bid is set aside and the bidder exits 

the auction. 

The SACA format provides an 

opportunity for price discovery like the 

ascending clock auction format used to 

bid on a single item. Also, the SACA 

format permits a bidder to identify 

combinations of lots which support its 

particular plan for a commercial 

offshore wind energy project. Refer to 

Section 5 in Ausubel and Cramton 

(2011a) for further discussion of clock 

auctions and Section 5.3.5 in Ausubel 

and Cramton (2011c) (Alternative I) for 

an example of how they work. 

One potential problem with the SACA 

format arises when multiple bidders 

who have submitted bids on the same 

lots simultaneously drop out of the 

auction. In this situation, designing and 

implementing tiebreaking rules becomes 

complex. Under the sample rules 

described above, because bidders may 

not increase the number of lots on 

which they bid from one round to the 

next, large and potentially high-value 

areas in the auction area may go 

unclaimed (hereinafter, ‘‘undersell’’). 

The difficulty of designing effective exit 

bidding rules for multiple lot auctions 

limits their potential effectiveness in 


jlentini on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
76176 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 234 / Tuesday, December 6, 2011 / Notices 

addressing undersell. As a result, it may 

be a challenge to fully achieve program 

goals such as optimal configuration of 

the winning sets of packages and 

ensuring receipt of fair value with the 

SACA format. 

Alternative for Multiple Lot Auctions: 

Package Auctions 

Several variations of the package 

auction format merit consideration for 

leasing packages of lots for offshore 

development of electricity from wind 

resources. Below are brief outlines of 

three such package auction variants. 

More detailed descriptions of these 

auction formats are available on BOEM’s 

web site. A ‘‘package’’ is the 

arrangement of lots that a given bidder 

has selected in a given round of bidding 

paired with the price the bidder is 

willing to pay in that round for that 

arrangement of lots. 

• One variant is a single-phase 

package clock auction where the 

bidding would proceed just like a 

SACA. However, BOEM could select the 

best arrangement of packages from 

earlier rounds of the auction to 

maximize seller revenue, perhaps 

subject to the condition that the 

prevailing bids in the final round are 

included in the winning set of lots. If 

the SACA phase of bidding resulted in 

a significant undersell, BOEM could 

revive early round bids to ‘‘fill in’’ 

undersold areas. 

• A second variant builds on the first 

variation, but allows bidders to add a 

number of additional package bids at 

the conclusion of the SACA phase 

through a supplemental round of sealed 

bidding. BOEM would then consider all 

bid configurations from all the SACA 

rounds and the supplemental round in 

determining the winning set of lots 

based on revenue maximization. Note 

that any time BOEM proposes a sealed 

bidding round, we would consider 

using a ‘‘Second Price Rule,’’ in which 

the winning bidder would only be 

required to pay the amount bid by the 

next highest bidder. This prevents a 

winning bidder from paying more than 

would have been necessary to win. The 

Second Price Rule can also benefit the 

government by discouraging ‘‘bid 

shading.’’ This happens when a bidder 

bids the amount the bidder thinks will 

win instead of the amount the bidder 

thinks the lot is worth, in order to avoid 

overpaying. 

• A third variant would use a nonclock ascending package auction format. 

In this format, bidders would select 

packages and also name the price they 

would pay for those packages. In 

contrast to the clock formats, bidders 

would submit a price at or above the 

minimum required bid increment for 

their desired package in each round, 

and the set of packages with the greatest 

auction revenue would become 

provisional winners at the end of each 

round. The auction would end when 

none of the bids change from one round 

to the next. BOEM would examine all 

the packages submitted and select the 

packages that maximize revenue. 

For each of the auction formats listed 

above, BOEM would need to determine 

what information is given to bidders at 

the outset of each round of the auction. 

For example, bidders could be informed 

of the number of bids for each lot 

submitted in the previous round. 

Bidders in a clock auction (variations 1 

and 2) would also be informed of the 

announced price for each lot, while 

bidders in a non-clock auction 

(variation 3) would be informed of the 

aggregate dollar amount of active high 

bids. 

Theoretical work, including the 

contract study mentioned earlier, 

indicates that a package clock auction 

with a supplemental bidding round is 

the most effective method for improving 

auction efficiency. However, BOEM is 

concerned about designing and using 

this approach in initial sales, given its 

reliance on complex bidding rules and 

solution algorithms, in conjunction with 

the need to prepare and publish these 

complicated bidding rules in a 

transparent manner. 

Expanded details on both the clock 

and non-clock options under 

consideration are available on BOEM’s 

web site, and we encourage comments 

on the more complicated package 

auction alternatives and their 

appropriateness in early auctions. Refer 

to Section 6 in Ausubel and Cramton 

(2011a) for an overview of clock 

auctions and Section 5.3 in Ausubel and 

Cramton (2011c) for a comparison of the 

package clock approaches with 

examples and further explanation of the 

rules. 

Multiple Factor Auctions 

The auction formats described above 

in this notice are considered sufficient 

to meet the agency’s needs in a wide 

variety of contexts. However, in certain 

limited circumstances, BOEM may 

determine that other factors, along with 

cash bids, should be considered in 

determining how it issues leases and, 

indirectly, how much winning bidders 

should pay. For example, as BOEM 

noted in publishing its regulations in 

2009: 

[D]uring the time that [BOEM] has been 

promulgating this rule, the States of 

Delaware, New Jersey, and Rhode Island have 

conducted competitive processes and have 

selected companies to develop wind 

resources on the OCS. We believe that the 

pre-existing State processes are relevant to 

the competitive processes that [BOEM] is 

required to conduct following approval of 

this rule. We intend to do so by using a 

competitive process that considers, among 

other things, whether a prospective lessee 

has a power purchase agreement or is the 

certified winner of a competitive process 

conducted by an adjacent State. 

74 FR 19,663 (Apr. 29, 2009). Therefore, 

in certain circumstances, BOEM will 

consider holding ‘‘Multiple Factor 

Auctions,’’ in which non-financial 

considerations are taken into account at 

the outset. 

If BOEM decides to employ such an 

auction format, it proposes to do so in 

a two-phase auction: A non-monetary 

phase, followed by a second phase using 

one of the standard auction formats 

described above. Prior to the auction, 

BOEM would announce the nonmonetary factors to be considered, and 

the value assigned to each factor. To 

ensure a fair and transparent process 

and to ease the task of implementing the 

auction, BOEM would use a limited 

number of objective, ‘‘yes-no’’ factors. 

Examples of such factors could include: 

• Do you currently hold a firm 

financial commitment for the sale of at 

least 100 MW of power from a proposed 

offshore wind development in the lease 

sale area in the form of either a firm 

purchase power agreement (PPA) that 

has been approved by the state utility 

commission or its equivalent OR an 

ocean renewable energy credit approved 

by the appropriate state agency? 

• Have you completed installation of 

a meteorological measurement tower on 

a BOEM limited lease located within the 

lease sale area? 

Each factor would be assigned a 

percent discount to be applied against 

the amount that winning bidders would 

be required to pay BOEM following the 

auction. Between the non-monetary 

phase and the monetary phase, each 

bidder would be informed of the total 

discount for which it qualifies. To 

encourage competition and balance nonfinancial and financial bidding factors 

in the auction, BOEM is not likely to 

offer a bidder a discount of more than 

25 percent on the basis of non-monetary 

factors. Refer to Ausubel and Cramton 

(2011b) and Sections 3 and 4 in Ausubel 

and Cramton (2011c) for further 

evaluation of multiple-factor 

approaches. 

Comments and Responses Requested 

BOEM is requesting that the public 

and any interested or affected parties 

provide specific and detailed comments 

regarding the auction format 


jlentini on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 234 / Tuesday, December 6, 2011 / Notices 76177 

recommendations described herein and 

in the supporting materials. In addition, 

BOEM is providing the following list of 

questions to which it is seeking 

substantive responses, including 

rationales and explanations for the 

answers provided. 

1. How should we configure and size 

auction lots? Should lots generally 

correspond to an OCS block? What 

characteristics should BOEM take into 

account when sub-dividing a wind 

energy area into lots represented by OCS 

blocks or by OCS blocks grouped into 

zones or project areas? Refer to Sections 

6.1.1 and 7.1 in Ausubel and Cramton 

(2011c) for discussions of lot 

designation. 

2. Should the lots auctioned to a 

single bidder consist of contiguous OCS 

blocks? Refer to Section 6.2.9 in 

Ausubel and Cramton (2011c) for a 

discussion of the contiguous lots rule. 

3. Should each bidding entity be 

limited to bidding on a single 

contiguous set of blocks? 

4. What restrictions should be placed 

on bidders seeking more than one 

package of lots during an auction? 

5. What factors contribute to the size 

of an area needed to support an 

economically viable offshore wind 

energy facility? Should there be an 

established rule-of-thumb used to 

determine the minimum and maximum 

number of OCS blocks needed? Refer to 

Section 4.4 in Ausubel and Cramton 

(2011c) for a discussion of competition 

constraints. 

6. At what asking price per block or 

per acre should BOEM commence the 

auction? In other words, what is an 

appropriate minimum bid per block? At 

what minimum asking price would you 

consider not participating in the 

auction? Refer to Section 6.2.6 in 

Ausubel and Cramton (2011c) for a 

discussion of reserve pricing. 

7. Which of the auction formats 

discussed and referenced in this notice 

do you prefer BOEM use? Does your 

answer differ by location? Which 

features of the auction formats would 

you like to see modified or eliminated? 

8. Do the concerns associated with a 

SACA format (e.g., undersell) justify the 

added complexity of a package auction? 

Refer to Section 5.3 in Ausubel and 

Cramton (2011c) for an example of how 

undersell occurs. 

9. BOEM is considering using a 

‘‘second-pricing rule’’ in certain specific 

contexts, including any auction that 

includes a sealed-bid phase. How 

important is it to you that the auction 

format includes such a second-pricing 

rule? Would you offer your maximum 

value as a bid for all lots of interest 

under a second-price auction 

formulation? Refer to Section 5.3.11 in 

Ausubel and Cramton (2011c) for a 

discussion of winning price 

determination. 

10. What aspects of the auction 

formats discussed in this note concern 

you the most? Which features would 

you like to see retained in practice? 

11. What additional factors should 

BOEM consider in a multiple factor 

auction beyond those enumerated in 

this Information Request? How should 

all of these factors be weighted? Refer to 

Section 4.1.3 in Ausubel and Cramton 

(2011b) and Section 3.2 in Ausubel and 

Cramton (2011c) for a discussion of 

factor design and weighting. 

12. Should lots in desirable locations 

be weighted differently than those of 

equal size in less desirable locations? 

Would this potentially affect your level 

of activity during the auction? For 

example, BOEM could adjust rules such 

that a bidder could expand the number 

of lots bid on if those lots are in an area 

that BOEM had determined is less 

desirable. This is described further in 

the materials available on BOEM’s Web 

site. Refer to Sections 5.3.8 and 6.2.7 in 

Ausubel and Cramton (2011c) for 

discussion of such rules. 

13. Are there auction formats not 

included in this Information Request 

that BOEM should consider? 

Please provide responses to the above 

questions, and/or any comments or 

suggestions on the auction formats and 

activity rules discussed in this 

Information Request and referenced in 

the material at BOEM’s Web site at 

http://www.boem.gov/RenewableEnergy-Program/RegulatoryInformation/Renewable-Energy-AuctionFormats.aspx. 

References 

Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Peter Cramton 

(2011a) ‘‘Auction Design for Wind 

Rights,’’ Report to Bureau of Ocean 

Energy Management. 

Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Peter Cramton 

(2011b) ‘‘Multiple-Factor Auction Design 

for Wind Rights,’’ Report to Bureau of 

Ocean Energy Management. 

Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Peter Cramton 

(2011c) ‘‘Comparision of Auction 

Formats for Auctioning Wind Rights,’’ 

Report to Bureau of Ocean Energy 

Management. 

Dated: November 28, 2011. 

Tommy P. Beaudreau, 

Director, Bureau of Ocean Energy 

Management. 

[FR Doc. 2011–31222 Filed 12–1–11; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4310–MR–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

U.S. Geological Survey 

[USGS–GX12RN000DSA200] 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities: Comment Request 

AGENCY: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 

Interior. 

ACTION: Notice of an extension of an 

information collection (1028–0048). 

SUMMARY: We (the U.S. Geological 

Survey) will ask the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) to 

approve the information collection (IC) 

described below. As required by the 

Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 

1995, and as part of our continuing 

efforts to reduce paperwork and 

respondent burden, we invite the 

general public and other Federal 

agencies to take this opportunity to 

comment on this IC. This IC is 

scheduled to expire on March 31, 2012. 

DATES: You must submit comments on 

or before February 6, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: Please submit a copy of 

your comments to the Information 

Collections Clearance Officer, U.S. 

Geological Survey, 12201 Sunrise Valley 

Drive MS 807, Reston, VA 20192 (mail); 

(703) 648–7199 (fax); or 

smbaloch@usgs.gov (email). Use 

Information Collection Number 1028– 

0048 in the subject line. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: To 

request additional information about 

this IC, contact Jim Dewey at (303) 274– 

8419. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Abstract 

The U.S. Geological Survey is 

required to collect, evaluate, publish 

and distribute publish information 

concerning earthquakes. Respondents 

will have an opportunity to voluntarily 

supply information concerning the 

effects of shaking from an earthquake— 

on themselves, buildings, other manmade structures, and ground effects 

such as faulting or landslides. 

We will protect information from 

respondents considered proprietary 

under the Freedom of Information Act 

(5 U.S.C. 552) and implementing 

regulations (43 CFR part 2), and under 

regulations at 30 CFR 250.197, ‘‘Data 

and information to be made available to 

the public or for limited inspection.’’ 

Responses are voluntary. No questions 

of a ‘‘sensitive’’ nature are asked. We 

will release data collected on these 

forms only in formats that do not 

include proprietary information 

volunteered by respondents. 


jlentini on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES