UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

____________________________________ 

 ) 

INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) No. 14-5249 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) MOTION FOR 

 ) SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE 

 Appellee. ) 

___________________________________ ) 

APPELLEE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE 

 Appellee Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) 

respectfully moves for summary affirmance of the decision below, which granted 

judgment to the Commission and found the claims so insubstantial in light of 

previous Supreme Court decisions that a statutory three-judge court provision was 

inappropriate. Mem. Op. and Order, Civ. No. 14-1500 (CKK) (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 

2014) (Docket Nos. 23 and 24) (attached as Exhibits 1 and 2). Independence 

Institute asserts that the definition in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 

(“BCRA”) of an “electioneering communication” (“EC”) is unconstitutionally 

overbroad as applied to a particular advertisement that Independence Institute 

wished to distribute before the November 2014 elections. It also challenges the 

statutory disclosure requirements for ECs as applied to its proposed advertisement. 

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Pursuant to a special judicial review provision in BCRA, Independence 

Institute asked the district court to convene a three-judge court to decide its claims 

and filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Shortly after Independence 

Institute filed its preliminary-injunction motion, the parties agreed to a suggestion 

by the district court to consolidate briefing for that motion with briefing on the 

merits. Mem. Op. at 1; Joint Stipulation of the Parties and Order of the Court as to 

the Scope of Pl.’s Allegations and Claims, Civ. No. 14-1500 (CKK) (D.D.C. Sept. 

10, 2014) (Docket No. 14) (“Joint Stipulation and Order”). The district court 

reviewed the case to determine whether it presented a “substantial claim,” found 

that Independence Institute’s “challenge is clearly foreclosed by Supreme Court 

precedent,” Mem. Op. at 6 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), denied 

Independence Institute’s application for three-judge court, and awarded judgment 

to the Commission. 

The Supreme Court has twice upheld BCRA’s disclosure requirements for 

ECs and has explicitly rejected the argument, upon which Independence Institute’s 

claims are premised, that the EC disclosure requirements must be limited to 

communications that constitute express candidate advocacy or the functional 

equivalent of such advocacy. Given those directly applicable rulings, which 

include the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 

(2010), Independence Institute’s claims plainly fail. Because no benefit would be 

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3

gained from further briefing and argument on these issues, this Court should 

summarily affirm the district court’s decision. 

LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

I. THE FEC AND THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT 

 The Commission is the independent agency of the United States government 

with exclusive jurisdiction over the administration, interpretation, and civil 

enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“the Act” or “FECA”), 52 

U.S.C. §§ 30101-30146 (formerly 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-457), including the 

amendments added by BCRA.1

 FECA requires certain periodic and event-driven 

disclosures of information about the sources and financing of election-related 

communications. See generally id. § 30104 (2 U.S.C. § 434). These requirements 

“enable[] the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to 

different speakers and messages.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371. 

II. BCRA’S DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTIONEERING 

COMMUNICATIONS 

BCRA defines a narrow category of “electioneering communications,” 

which are broadcast, cable, or satellite communications that refer to a clearly 

                                                           

1

 Effective September 1, 2014, the provisions of FECA that were codified in 

Title 2 of the United States Code were recodified in a new title, Title 52. See

Editorial Reclassification Table, 

http://uscode.house.gov/editorialreclassification/t52/Reclassifications_Title_52.ht

ml. To avoid confusion, this submission will indicate in parentheses the former 

Title 2 citations. 

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identified candidate for federal office, are publicly distributed within 60 days 

before a general election or 30 days before a primary election, and are targeted to 

the relevant electorate. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A) (2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)); 11 

C.F.R. § 100.29(a)(2). The statute requires that any entity that spends over 

$10,000 to produce or distribute an EC must file a statement with the Commission 

disclosing certain information about the sources and financing of the 

communication. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1), (2)(A) (2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1), (2)(A)). 

The statement must identify, in relevant part, the person making the EC 

disbursement and the amount and date of the disbursement. The statement must 

also disclose certain information about the sources of the funds used to pay for the 

EC disbursement. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(2)(E)-(F) (2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(E)-(F)). 

As relevant here, if the EC is financed by a corporation, the corporation must 

report “the name and address of each person who made a donation aggregating 

$1,000 or more to the corporation . . . for the purpose of furthering electioneering 

communications.” 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9). If the disbursement is made out of a 

“segregated bank account established to pay for electioneering communications,” 

however, the corporation making the EC need only identify those individuals who 

contributed $1,000 or more to the account itself. 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(7)(ii). 

The Supreme Court has twice upheld BCRA’s definition of “electioneering 

communication” and the statutory disclosure requirements that apply to such 

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communications. In both instances, the Court made clear that such disclosure 

requirements need not be limited to communications that contain express candidate 

advocacy or the functional equivalent of such advocacy. 

First, in a portion of McConnell v. FEC joined by eight Justices, the Court 

upheld BCRA’s EC definition and disclosure requirements on their face and 

concluded that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), “amply supports application of 

[the Act’s] disclosure requirements to the entire range of electioneering 

communications.” 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003); see Mem. Op. at 17 (quoting 

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196). As the court below explained, “McConnell

forthrightly ‘rejected the notion that the First Amendment requires Congress to 

treat so-called issue advocacy differently from express advocacy.’” Mem. Op. at 

17 n.15 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194). 

Second and more recently, in Citizens United, eight Justices again 

reaffirmed the part of McConnell that upheld BCRA’s EC disclosure requirements 

on their face, and further upheld those disclosure requirements as applied to certain 

“commercial advertisements” that “only attempt[ed] to persuade viewers to see [a] 

film” and that contained no candidate advocacy. 558 U.S. at 366-71; Citizens 

United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 280 (D.D.C. 2008) (explaining that Citizens 

United’s proposed ads “did not advocate Senator Clinton’s election or defeat”). 

The Court rejected Citizens United’s contention that the First Amendment prevents 

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such requirements from being applied to communications that lack express 

candidate advocacy or the functional equivalent of such advocacy. 558 U.S. at 

368-69. And the Court held that “the public has an interest in knowing who is 

speaking about a candidate shortly before an election” and that “informational 

interest alone” was a sufficient basis for upholding the EC disclosure requirements 

as applied to Citizens United’s proposed advertisements. Id. at 369. 

III. APPELLANT INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE 

Appellant Independence Institute is a Colorado nonprofit corporation that 

“‘conducts research and educates the public on various aspects of public policy —

including taxation, education policy, health care, and justice policy.’” Mem. Op. at 

2 (quoting Compl. ¶ 2). Independence Institute alleged that it planned to produce 

and distribute a radio advertisement that would clearly mention Colorado Senator 

Mark Udall, who was a candidate in the November 2014 general election, within 

60 days of that election. See id. at 2-3 & n.2 (describing the proposed 

advertisement and quoting its script). The proposed advertisement would have met 

the statutory definition of an EC if it had been distributed as Independence Institute 

intended and accordingly it would have triggered the disclosure requirements for 

such communications. Mem. Op. at 3. 

 

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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

Independence Institute challenges the constitutionality of the EC definition 

and disclosure requirements as applied to the radio advertisement that it intended 

to run. It asserts that the EC disclosure requirements cannot constitutionally be 

applied to its proposed advertisement because the communication lacks express 

advocacy or the functional equivalent thereof, and also lacks a “pejorative” 

description of a federal candidate. Mem. Op. at 3. 

Independence Institute invoked a special judicial review provision that 

provides for a three-judge court to decide substantial constitutional challenges to 

BCRA, and for such decisions to be directly appealable to the Supreme Court. 52 

U.S.C. § 30110 note (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 437h note), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 

Stat. 81, 113-14; Feinberg v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 522 F.2d 1335, 1338-39 

(D.C. Cir. 1975) (explaining that a “single district judge need not request that a 

three-judge court be convened [under applicable statutes] if a case raises no 

substantial claim”). It also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and, in the 

interest of expediting final resolution of this case, the parties agreed to consolidate 

briefing on that motion with briefing on the merits. Mem. Op. at 3-4. The parties 

further stipulated, and the Court ordered, that “‘this case presents an as-applied 

challenge to 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1)-(2) based upon the content of the 

Independence Institute’s intended communication, and not the possibility that its 

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donors will be subject to threats, harassment, or reprisals.’” Id. at 4 (quoting Joint 

Stipulation and Order at 1). 

The Commission opposed Independence Institute’s application for a threejudge court and claims on the merits. The district court agreed with the 

Commission that Independence Institute’s “claims are foreclosed by clear United 

States Supreme Court precedent, principally by Citizens United.” Mem. Op. at 2 

(citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-71). The court concluded that “[t]his 

dispute can be distilled to the application of the Supreme Court’s clear instructions 

in Citizens United,” and that Independence Institute “seeks the same relief that has 

already been foreclosed by Citizens United.” Id. at 6-7. The court thus denied 

Independence Institute’s application for a three-judge court and preliminaryinjunction motion, entered judgment for the Commission, and dismissed the action. 

Id. at 6-7. 

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STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

This Court reviews the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. 

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 726 F.3d 208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 

2013); see Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(explaining that where question presented is “whether the caselaw reviewing and 

interpreting Federal Election Campaign Act amendments disposes of this 

constitutional challenge,” the Court’s “review is de novo”). 

Summary affirmance is appropriate where “[t]he merits of the parties’ 

positions are so clear as to warrant summary action,” Hassan v. FEC, No. 12-5335, 

2013 WL 1164506, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 11, 2013) (per curiam), and “no benefit 

will be gained from further briefing and argument of the issues presented.” 

Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc., v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per 

curiam) (granting summary affirmance). 

ARGUMENT 

Independence Institute contends that BCRA’s EC disclosure requirements 

are unconstitutional as applied to its proposed radio advertisement because the 

advertisement lacks express candidate advocacy or the functional equivalent of 

such advocacy. Mem. Op. at 3. As the district court correctly held, this case is 

“foreclosed by clear United States Supreme Court precedent,” including Citizens 

United, in which the Supreme Court “in no uncertain terms . . . rejected the attempt 

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to limit BCRA’s disclosure requirements to express advocacy and its functional 

equivalent.” Id. at 2, 6 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369).2

 

The Supreme Court in McConnell facially upheld BCRA’s EC statutory 

definition and disclosure requirements. 540 U.S. at 194, 201-02, 207-08. The EC 

definition was not limited to “communications expressly advocating the election or 

defeat of particular candidates,” and the Court rejected the notion that its decision 

in Buckley had established a “constitutionally mandated line” between express 

candidate advocacy and issue advocacy. Id. 189-90. The Court in Buckley had 

construed the statutory term “expenditure” narrowly to avoid invalidating FECA’s 

regulation of “expenditures” on vagueness grounds and thus limited the term to 

encompass only “expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate 

the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.” 424 U.S. 

at 44 (footnote omitted). In McConnell, the Court explained that unlike FECA’s 

definition of “expenditure,” BCRA’s EC definition did not raise any vagueness 

                                                           

2

 With the passage of the November 2014 elections, Independence Institute’s 

challenge to the constitutionality of BCRA’s EC provisions as applied to the 

particular advertisement described in its complaint appears to be moot: the 

proposed advertisement no longer appears to meet the statutory definition of an 

EC. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A) (2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)) (defining ECs as 

communications that, inter alia, refer to a current federal candidate and that are 

publicly distributed within 60 days before a general election or 30 days before a 

primary election in which that candidate is seeking office). Nevertheless, 

Independence Institute’s challenge appears to fall within the “exception to 

mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review.” FEC v. Wis. 

Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 461-464 (2007); see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 2, 127 (attached 

as Exhibit 3). 

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concerns; on the contrary, its elements “are both easily understood and objectively 

determinable.” 540 U.S. at 194. The Court thus rejected the McConnell plaintiffs’ 

argument that “Congress cannot constitutionally require disclosure of . . . 

‘electioneering communications’ without making an exception for those 

‘communications’ that do not meet Buckley’s definition of express advocacy,” 

because Buckley’s “express advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory 

interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional law.” Id. at 190; see Mem. Op. 

at 17-19 (explaining that in light of McConnell, Independence Institute “cannot 

rely on Buckley to argue that the Constitution requires limiting disclosures [for 

ECs] to express advocacy and its functional equivalent”). 

The Court in McConnell held that BCRA’s disclosure requirements for ECs 

are constitutional because they serve the important governmental interests of 

“providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and 

avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more 

substantive electioneering restrictions,” and “d[o] not prevent anyone from 

speaking.” 540 U.S. at 196, 201 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Mem. Op. 

at 17 (“‘[T]he important state interests that prompted the Buckley Court to uphold 

FECA’s disclosure requirements . . . apply in full . . . to the entire range of 

‘electioneering communications’.’”) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196). 

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In 2010, the Supreme Court in Citizens United revisited, inter alia, the Act’s 

disclosure requirements for electioneering communications. Citizens United, a 

nonprofit corporation, sought to distribute a film about then-Senator Hillary 

Clinton, who at the time was a candidate in the Democratic Party’s 2008 

Presidential primary elections. 558 U.S. at 319-20. Citizens United also sought to 

distribute several advertisements promoting the film. Id. at 320. 

In a portion of the opinion that eight Justices joined, the Court reaffirmed the 

part of McConnell that upheld BCRA’s electioneering communication disclosure 

requirements on their face, and further upheld those disclosure requirements as 

applied to both Citizens United’s movie and its proposed “commercial 

advertisements” that “only attempt[ed] to persuade viewers to see the film” and 

that contained no advocacy. 558 U.S. at 366-71; see Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 

2d at 280 (explaining that Citizens United’s proposed ads “did not advocate 

Senator Clinton’s election or defeat; instead, they proposed a commercial 

transaction — buy the DVD of The Movie”). Even though the “ads only 

pertain[ed] to a commercial transaction,” the Supreme Court held that “the public 

has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an 

election” and the government’s “informational interest alone” was a sufficient 

basis for upholding the constitutionality of the EC disclosure provision as applied 

to the promotional ads. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369. Like Independence 

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Institute, Citizens United had argued that the EC disclosure requirements “must be 

confined to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy.” Id. at 

368. The Supreme Court explicitly “reject[ed] this contention.” Id. at 369. 

The court below correctly recognized that the Supreme Court’s 

“unambiguous language” in Citizens United forecloses this challenge. Mem. Op. 

at 7. It also thoroughly considered and correctly rejected each of appellant’s 

attempts to avoid the Supreme Court’s explicit holding in Citizens United. 

First, the district court properly concluded that the Supreme Court’s holding 

that the EC disclosure requirements need not be limited to communications that are 

the functional equivalent of express advocacy was binding precedent. Mem. Op. at 

8-11. Independence Institute had “relie[d] heavily on one opinion from the 

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 

F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2014), which states that Citizens United’s discussion of 

disclosures was dicta.” Mem. Op. at 8. The district court clarified that 

“[n]othwithstanding its comment regarding dicta, the Seventh Circuit panel agrees

that, as a result of the Supreme Court’s discussion of disclosures in Citizens 

United, the express-advocacy limitation does not apply to the disclosure system 

established by BCRA.” Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added). The court below further 

explained that “[g]iven that the Supreme Court did not determine that the Hillary 

advertisements were the equivalent of express advocacy, its refusal to import the 

USCA Case #14-5249 Document #1524325 Filed: 11/25/2014 Page 13 of 19
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express advocacy limitation to the disclosure context was not dicta but a holding 

— a holding that ultimately encompasses the facts in this case.” Id. at 10. All 

Courts of Appeals addressing the issue have held that “Citizens United’s language 

forecloses the suggestion that disclosure requirements must be limited to express 

advocacy and its functional equivalent.” Id. at 10-11 (citing Nat’l. Org. for 

Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2011); Vt. Right to Life Comm., 

Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 132 (2d Cir. 2014); Human Life of Wash., Inc. v. 

Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010)).3

 The district court further noted 

that Independence Institute apparently “abandoned this argument in its Reply.” Id.

at 8 n.8. 

Second, the district court correctly recognized that Independence Institute’s 

tax status is immaterial. Mem. Op. at 11-12. Independence Institute had attempted 

                                                           

3

 See also Free Speech v. FEC, 720 F.3d 788, 795-96, 798 (10th Cir. 2013) 

(explaining that in Citizens United, the Supreme Court “found that disclosure 

requirements could extend beyond speech that is the ‘functional equivalent of 

express advocacy’ to address even ads that ‘only pertain to a commercial 

transaction’” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2288 (2014); Real Truth 

About Abortion v. FEC, 681 F. 3d 544, 551-52 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Citizens 

United’s holding that “mandatory disclosure requirements are constitutionally 

permissible even if ads contain no direct candidate advocacy and ‘only pertain to a 

commercial transaction’” (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369)), cert. denied, 

133 S. Ct. 841 (2013); Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 484 

(7th Cir. 2012) (“Whatever the status of the express advocacy/issue discussion 

distinction may be in other areas of campaign finance law, Citizens United left no 

doubt that disclosure requirements need not hew to it to survive First Amendment 

scrutiny.”).

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to distinguish Citizens United based on the fact that Independence Institute is 

organized under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, whereas Citizens 

United is a section 501(c)(4) organization. Id. As the district court explained, 

“nothing in Citizens United’s discussion of disclosures of contributions cabins the 

Supreme Court’s holding to certain types of organizations,” Independence 

Institute’s argument that there should be a distinction “has no basis” because 

neither type of organization is obligated by federal tax law to disclose their donors, 

and Independence Institute failed to cite any “authority that such a distinction 

would be required by the First Amendment.” Mem. Op. at 11-12; see 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6104(d)(3)(A). 

Third, the district court properly found that the EC disclosure requirements 

may constitutionally apply to Independence Institute’s proposed advertisement 

regardless of whether it is express candidate advocacy or issue advocacy. Mem. 

Op. at 12-14. As the district court explained, the Supreme Court in Citizens United 

“refused to draw a line between express advocacy and issue advocacy in the BCRA 

disclosure context” and “stated that whether an electioneering communication is 

express advocacy or issue advocacy does not determine whether BCRA’s 

disclosure requirement can be lawfully applied.” Id. at 12-13. Even if an 

advertisement lacks express candidate advocacy, the Supreme Court recognized 

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16

that “the public interest still supports disclosure of ‘who is speaking about a 

candidate.’” Id. at 13. 

Fourth, the district court correctly noted that the “perjorative” tone of the 

advertisements at issue in Citizens United was immaterial to the Supreme Court’s 

holding in that case and thus properly rejected Independence Institute’s argument 

that Citizens United’s “clear conclusion with respect to BCRA’s disclosure 

requirements ought to be limited to advertisements, like the ones before the 

Supreme Court in that case, which spoke ‘pejoratively’ about a candidate.” Mem. 

Op. at 14. As the district court explained, “the text of the opinion does not even 

hint that” the Supreme Court’s holding regarding EC disclosures was limited to 

facially perjorative (or complimentary) advertisements. Id. at 15-16. 

Finally, the district court accurately determined that the alternative, preCitizens United decisions on which Independence Institute attempted to rely “do 

not suggest a different outcome from Citizens United.” Mem. Op. at 16; see id. at 

16-21 & n.17 (explaining that neither the Supreme Court decision in Buckley, nor 

this Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), 

nor the Supreme Court’s decision in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 

449 (2007), support Independence Institute’s constitutional arguments); see supra 

pp. 10-11. 

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 In sum, the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United clearly forecloses 

Independence Institute’s claims here. This lawsuit thus “is not so much an asapplied challenge as it is an argument for overruling a [Supreme Court] precedent.” 

Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 157 (D.D.C.) (three-judge 

court), aff’d, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010). 

The district court properly denied Independence Institute’s application for a 

three-judge court and granted judgment to the Commission. Three judge-courts 

need not be convened “if a case raises no substantial claim or justiciable 

controversy” and “[c]onstitutional claims may be regarded as insubstantial if they 

are ‘obviously without merit,’ or if their ‘unsoundness so clearly results from the 

previous decisions of [the Supreme Court] as to foreclose the subject and leave no 

room for the inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject of 

controversy.’” Feinberg, 522 F.2d at 1338-39 (citations omitted); see Schonberg v. 

FEC, 792 F. Supp. 2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 2011) (per curiam) (applying Feinberg to 

BCRA § 403(a)). This is precisely the sort of case this Court had in mind in 

Feinberg. 

There is no reason for this Court to provide full briefing and oral argument 

on Independence Institute’s attempt to relitigate the issues squarely resolved by 

eight Justices in Citizens United. 

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CONCLUSION 

The district correctly identified Independence Institute’s claims as 

insubstantial and this Court should summarily affirm that decision. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Deputy General Counsel – Law 

Kevin Deeley 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

/s/ Erin Chlopak

Erin Chlopak (D.C. Bar No. 496370) 

Acting Assistant General Counsel 

Michael A. Columbo (D.C. Bar No. 476738) 

Attorney 

November 25, 2014 FOR THE APPELLEE 

 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

 999 E Street, N.W. 

 Washington, D.C. 20463 

 (202) 694-1650

USCA Case #14-5249 Document #1524325 Filed: 11/25/2014 Page 18 of 19
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

____________________________________ 

 ) 

INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) No. 14-5249 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 ) 

 Appellee. ) 

___________________________________ ) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on November 25, 2014, I electronically filed the FEC’s 

Motion for Summary Affirmance with the Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the D.C. Circuit by using the Court’s CM/ECF system, and I will 

cause four paper copies to be hand-delivered to the Court pursuant to Circuit Rule 

27(b). Service was made on the following through CM/ECF: 

Allen Dickerson, adickerson@campaignfreedom.org 

Center for Competitive Politics 

124 S. West Street 

Suite 201 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

/s/ Erin Chlopak

Erin Chlopak (D.C. Bar No. 496370) 

Acting Assistant General Counsel 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

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