J-S58034-17 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ALFRED STOUDT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 427 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 13, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0000690-2014

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ALFRED STOUDT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 428 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 13, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0002416-2002

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 27, 2017

Appellant, Alfred Stoudt, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, following revocation of 

his probation. We affirm and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

At Docket CP-06-CR-0002416-2002 (“2416-02”), 

[Appellant] pled guilty to three counts of Theft By 
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Deception-False Impression on [October 21, 2002].[1] 

Judge Ludgate, now retired, sentenced Appellant to not 

less than nine (9) nor more than twenty-three (23) 

months’ incarceration, and fourteen (14) years’ probation. 

No further action was needed on this docket for several 

years. 

In 2015, Appellant was arrested on new charges related to 

sexual offenses. On March 31, 2015, at Docket CP-06-CR0000690-2014 (“690-14”), [Appellant] pled guilty to two 

charges, indecent assault and stalking.[2] As pursuant to 

the Commonwealth’s procedure with sexual offenses, 

sentencing was deferred until the Pennsylvania Sexual 

Offender Assessment Board could evaluate Appellant. On 

July 16, 2015, [at docket 690-14, the court] sentenced 

[Appellant] to 364 to 729 days’ incarceration to be 

followed by five (5) years’ probation. [Appellant] was 

found not to be a sexually violent predator. 

Appellant’s new conviction resulted in a violation of the 

terms of his probation, which had been imposed at 2416-

02. On September 21, 2015, following Appellant’s 

admission to his probation violation, [the court] sentenced 

him to an additional seven (7) years’ probation, to 

commence at the expiration of the five (5) years’ probation 

given at 690-14. 

Once paroled from his sentence of incarceration at 690-14, 

Appellant violated the terms of his parole and probation. A 

[Gagnon II] hearing was held and Appellant admitted 

these violations on June 23, 2016. In an attempt to avoid 

a state sentence, Appellant was sentenced in two parts. At 

part one of the stalking charges [Appellant] was 

incarcerated for a period of 77 days to 23 months, which 

was a time served sentence. At part two of the stalking 

charges, [Appellant] received three years’ probation 

consecutive to part one. 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a)(1).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(8), 2709.1(a)(2), respectively.
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The instant matter began on November 30, 2016[,] and 

was based on averments that Appellant had failed to 

comply with a special condition of his parole/probation, 

failure to comply with sex offender treatment. A formal 

[Gagnon II] hearing was held for this matter on February 

13, 2017. After hearing testimony, [the court] found that 

Appellant was in violation of the terms of his parole and 

probation. Resultant from this finding, at 690-14 part 1, 

Appellant’s parole was revoked and [Appellant] was 

recommitted to serve the maximum sentence originally 

imposed or until such time as [Appellant] could present a 

suitable parole plan. Additionally, at part two of the 

stalking charges, [Appellant] was sentenced to a period of 

incarceration of one (1) to three (3) years. Concurrent 

with this period of incarceration, at 2416-02, [the court] 

sentenced Appellant to a period of incarceration of one (1) 

to three (3) years. 

Following sentencing, a timely [post-sentence] motion was 

filed on both dockets. [The court] denied both motions on 

February 27, 2017. Appellant then [timely] filed two 

appeals, one for each docket, on [March 8, 2017]. 

Subsequently, Appellant [timely] filed two concise 

statements of errors pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed May 4, 2017, at 1-2 unpaginated). This Court sua 

sponte consolidated Appellant’s appeals on March 23, 2017. On June 22, 

2017, Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief. 

As a preliminary matter, appellate counsel seeks to withdraw her

representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 

1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 602 Pa. 

159, 978 A.2d 349 (2009). Anders and Santiago require counsel to: 1) 

petition the Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough 

review of the record, counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are 
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wholly frivolous; 2) file a brief referring to anything in the record that might 

arguably support the appeal; and 3) furnish a copy of the brief to the 

appellant and advise him of his right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se 

brief to raise any additional points the appellant deems worthy of review. 

Santiago, supra at 173-79, 978 A.2d at 358-61. Substantial compliance 

with these requirements is sufficient. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 

A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa.Super. 2007). “After establishing that the antecedent 

requirements have been met, this Court must then make an independent 

evaluation of the record to determine whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly 

frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Palm, 903 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa.Super. 

2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Townsend, 693 A.2d 980, 982 

(Pa.Super. 1997)). 

In Santiago, supra, our Supreme Court addressed the briefing 

requirements where court-appointed appellate counsel seeks to withdraw 

representation: 

Neither Anders nor McClendon[3]requires that counsel’s 

brief provide an argument of any sort, let alone the type of 

argument that counsel develops in a merits brief. To 

repeat, what the brief must provide under Anders are 

references to anything in the record that might arguably 

support the appeal. 

* * *

Under Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by 

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3 Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981). 
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counsel’s examination and assessment of the record and 

counsel’s references to anything in the record that 

arguably supports the appeal. 

Santiago, supra at 176, 177, 978 A.2d at 359, 360. Thus, the Court held: 

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed 

counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a 

summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations 

to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set 

forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and 

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal 

is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. 

Id. at 178-79, 978 A.2d at 361. 

Instantly, appellate counsel filed a petition for leave to withdraw. The 

petition states counsel performed a conscientious review of the record and 

concluded the appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel also supplied Appellant 

with a copy of the withdrawal petition, the brief, and a letter explaining 

Appellant’s right to proceed pro se or with new privately-retained counsel to 

raise any additional points Appellant deems worthy of this Court’s attention. 

In her Anders brief, counsel provides a summary of the facts and 

procedural history of the case. Counsel refers to facts in the record that 

might arguably support the issues raised on appeal and offers citations to 

relevant law. The brief also provides counsel’s reasons for concluding that 

the appeal is frivolous. Thus, counsel has substantially complied with the 

requirements of Anders and Santiago. 
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Appellant has filed neither a pro se brief nor a counseled brief with 

new privately-retained counsel. We will review the issues raised in the 

Anders brief: 

WHETHER APPELLANT’S SENTENCE TO BE RECOMMITTED 

TO SERVE THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE ORIGINALLY 

IMPOSED FOLLOWED BY A SENTENCE OF NOT LESS THAN 

ONE NOR MORE THAN THREE YEARS TO THE BUREAU OF 

CORRECTIONS FOR CONFINEMENT IN A STATE 

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY WAS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE, 

CLEARLY UNREASONABLE, AND CONTRARY TO THE 

FUNDAMENTAL NORMS UNDERLYING THE SENTENCING

CODE GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, NAMELY 

THE TECHNICAL NATURE OF THE VIOLATIONS AS WELL AS 

APPELLANT’S ADVANCED AGE AND HEALTH 

CONDITIONS[?]

WHETHER THE SENTENCING COURT ERRED AND ABUSED 

ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT’S POST 

SENTENCE MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF SENTENCE, 

WHERE SUCH DENIAL WAS CONTRARY TO THE GENERAL 

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE SENTENCING CODE, IN 

THAT THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC, THE GRAVITY OF 

THE OFFENSE AS IT RELATES TO THE IMPACT ON THE 

LIFE OF THE VICTIM AND THE COMMUNITY, AND 

APPELLANT’S INDIVIDUAL REHABILITATIVE NEEDS WERE 

NOT CONSIDERED WHERE LESS RESTRICTIVE MEANS TO 

UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SENTENCING CODE ARE

AVAILABLE GIVEN APPELLANT’S ADVANCED AGE AND 

HEALTH CONDITIONS AS WELL AS THE TECHNICAL 

NATURE OF THE VIOLATION[?]

(Anders Brief at 7). 

When reviewing the outcome of a revocation proceeding, this Court is 

limited to determining the validity of the proceeding, the legality of the 

judgment of sentence imposed, and the discretionary aspects of sentencing. 

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1031, 1033-34 (Pa.Super. 2013) 
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(en banc) (explaining that, notwithstanding prior decisions which stated our 

scope of review in revocation proceedings is limited to validity of 

proceedings and legality of sentence, we unequivocally hold that this Court’s 

scope of review on appeal from revocation sentencing also includes 

discretionary sentencing challenges). 

Appellant argues the court ignored the sentencing factors set forth at 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), which requires the court to consider the protection 

of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life 

of the victim and on the community, and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. 

Specifically, Appellant insists the court ignored the rehabilitative needs of an

87-year-old man with numerous medical problems. Appellant contends staff 

at his treatment facility told him that if he could not afford to pay for 

treatment, then he should not attend treatment sessions. Appellant admits 

this misunderstanding resulted in a technical violation, but he maintains his 

attendance at treatment sessions over a six-month period shows his 

willingness to engage in rehabilitation. Appellant submits the court violated 

fundamental fairness under the Sentencing Code, which creates a 

substantial question regarding the appropriateness of the sentence. 

Appellant asserts he does not meet the standard required for a 

sentence of total confinement under the three prongs of 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9771(c). Appellant states he did not commit a new crime, his age and 

medical conditions indicate he is unlikely to commit a new crime, and 
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imprisonment for an ill, elderly man is not essential to vindicate the court’s 

authority. Appellant complains the court abused its discretion when it 

resentenced Appellant following revocation of probation. As presented, 

Appellant’s issues challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence.4 See 

Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super. 2002) (explaining 

claim that sentence is manifestly excessive challenges discretionary aspects 

of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536 

(Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 653, 676 A.2d 1195 (1996) 

(stating allegation court ignored mitigating factors challenges discretionary 

aspects of sentencing). 

When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant 

must invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a 

separate concise statement demonstrating that there is a substantial 

question as to the appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing 

Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). This Court must evaluate what constitutes a substantial 

question on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825 

(Pa.Super. 2007). A substantial question exists “only when the appellant 

advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were 

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4 Appellant preserved this claim in his motion for modification of sentence

and counsel included a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) in her

Anders brief. 
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either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or 

(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process.” Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa.Super. 2000). 

A claim of excessiveness can raise a substantial question as to the 

appropriateness of a sentence under the Sentencing Code, even if the 

sentence is within the statutory limits. Mouzon, supra at 430, 812 A.2d at 

624. Bald allegations of excessiveness, however, do not raise a substantial 

question to warrant appellate review. Id. at 435, 812 A.2d at 627. Rather, 

a substantial question exists “only where the appellant’s Rule 2119(f) 

statement sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence violates 

either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the 

Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing

process....” Id. See, e.g., Cartrette, supra (indicating claim that 

revocation court ignored appropriate sentencing factors raises substantial 

question). An allegation that the sentencing court failed to consider a 

specific mitigating factor, however, does not necessarily raise a substantial 

question. Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994 (Pa.Super. 2001) 

(holding claim that sentencing court ignored appellant’s rehabilitative needs 

failed to raise substantial question). 

In the context of probation revocation and resentencing, the 

Sentencing Code provides, in pertinent part: 

§ 9771. Modification or revocation of order of 

probation
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(a) General rule.—The court may at any time 

terminate continued supervision or lessen or increase the 

conditions upon which an order of probation has been 

imposed. 

(b) Revocation.—The court may revoke an order of 

probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions 

of the probation. Upon revocation the sentencing 

alternatives available to the court shall be the same as 

were available at the time of initial sentencing, due 

consideration being given to the time spent serving the 

order of probation.

(c) Limitation on sentence of total 

confinement.—The court shall not impose a sentence of 

total confinement upon revocation unless it finds that:

(1) the defendant has been convicted of another 

crime; or 

(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it 

is likely that he will commit another crime if he is not 

imprisoned; or 

(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the 

authority of the court. 

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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(a)-(c). “The reason for revocation of probation need 

not necessarily be the commission of or conviction for subsequent criminal 

conduct. Rather, this Court has repeatedly acknowledged the very broad 

standard that sentencing courts must use in determining whether probation 

has been violated.” Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1041 

(Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 631 Pa. 710, 109 A.3d 678 (2015). 

“[T]he revocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the 
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sound discretion of the trial court and that court’s decision will not be 

disturbed on appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. MacGregor, 912 A.2d 315, 317 (Pa.Super. 

2006). Following the revocation of probation, the court may impose a 

sentence of total confinement if any of the following conditions exist: the 

defendant has been convicted of another crime; the conduct of the 

defendant indicates it is likely he will commit another crime if he is not 

imprisoned; or, such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the 

court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c). 

Pursuant to Section 9721(b), “the court shall follow the general 

principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is 

consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it 

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the 

rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “[T]he 

court shall make as part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time 

of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence 

imposed.” Id. Nevertheless, “[a] sentencing court need not undertake a 

lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence....” 

Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal 

denied, 608 Pa. 661, 13 A.3d 475 (2010). Rather, “the record as a whole 

must reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the crime 

and character of the offender.” Id. See also Commonwealth v. Carrillo-
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Diaz, 64 A.3d 722 (Pa.Super. 2013) (explaining where revocation court 

presided over defendant’s no contest plea hearing and original sentencing, 

as well as his probation revocation hearing and sentencing, court had 

sufficient information to evaluate circumstances of offense and character of 

defendant when sentencing following revocation). 

Here, the court explained its revocation sentencing rationale as 

follows:

Appellant claims that the [c]ourt erred and abused its 

discretion because of the technical nature of the violations 

and Appellant’s advanced age and health conditions. 

However, the record is clear that [the court] considered 

such factors among several others. [The court] stated:

I have taken into account — I’ve been the judge on 

this case since it started so I’m well familiar with the 

general background of the case, the disposition of 

the case, I was the judge when the violations from 

last summer were adjudicated and I’m here today in 

the continuing saga. I’ve taken into account the 

information that I have received both from the 

testimony that was heard [at the February 13, 2017 

Gagnon II hearing] and from Appellant. 

By this statement, [the court] included [its] previous 

knowledge of the case and [its] prior decisions made in 

sentencing. Additionally, by taking into account 

[Appellant’s] testimony [the court] considered his 

advanced age and health conditions. [Appellant] only 

moments before, in his allocution, made statements about 

his poor hearing and use of a pacemaker. The [c]ourt did 

not believe it necessary to repeat this testimony. Also, the 

[c]ourt, having just completed the formal [Gagnon II] 

hearing, was well aware of the technical nature of the 

violations, which [the court] considered during sentencing. 

(Trial Court Opinion, supra, at 3-4 unpaginated) (internal citations omitted). 
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We see no reason to disrupt the court’s analysis. See MacGregor, supra. 

Additionally, Appellant’s complaint that the sentencing court did not 

adequately consider specific mitigating factors (his age and medical 

conditions) and his bald claim of sentence excessiveness arguably do not 

raise substantial questions meriting review. See Mouzon, supra; Berry, 

supra. Nevertheless, we observe the revocation court presided over 

Appellant’s original sentencing on docket number 690-14, and his first 

violation of probation (“VOP”) under docket number 2416-02. During the 

Gagnon II hearing on February 23, 2017, the Commonwealth presented 

evidence of Appellant’s technical VOP for failure to attend sex offender 

treatment. The court stated it was familiar with the general background of 

the case and took into account Appellant’s testimony about his age and 

health conditions. The court subsequently revoked Appellant’s probation and 

resentenced him under both dockets. The record as a whole makes clear the 

revocation court considered the facts of Appellant’s case and his character 

per Section 9721(b), and set forth adequate reasons to justify the VOP 

sentence. See Carrillo-Diaz, supra; Crump, supra. The record also 

confirms the court imposed a sentence of total confinement consistent with 

Section 9771(c). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c). See also Commonwealth 

v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247 (Pa.Super. 2006) (holding record evidenced 

that court imposed sentence of total confinement following revocation of 

appellant’s probation to vindicate court’s authority, where appellant had not 
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complied with previous judicial efforts such as drug court, had not “been 

putting anything into” court-imposed rehabilitation efforts, and it was 

important for appellant to appreciate seriousness of his actions; record as 

whole reflected court’s reasons for sentencing as well as court’s 

consideration of circumstances of appellant’s case and character); 

Commonwealth v. Cappellini, 690 A.2d 1220 (Pa.Super. 1997) (holding 

appellant’s continued drug use as well as his resistance to treatment and 

supervision, was sufficient for court to determine appellant would likely 

commit another crime if not incarcerated); Commonwealth v. Aldinger, 

436 A.2d 1196 (1981) (explaining sentence of total confinement was proper 

where record reflected appellant had violated probation by using drugs; 

court considered circumstances giving rise to revocation proceeding and 

appellant’s character). Following our independent review of the record, we 

conclude the appeal is wholly frivolous.5 See Palm, supra. Accordingly, we 

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5 The record showed Appellant pled guilty to indecent assault, a Tier II 

offense under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act 

(“SORNA”), which required him to report as a sex offender for twenty-five 

(25) years. We are aware of our Supreme Court’s recent decision that held

SORNA violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and 

Pennsylvania Constitutions, and this Court’s recent decision that held

unconstitutional the sexually violent predator designation under SORNA 

because it required additional fact-finding after trial. See Commonwealth 

v. Muniz, ___ Pa. ___, 164 A.3d 1189 (2017); Commonwealth v. Butler, 

___ A.3d ___, 2017 PA Super 344 (filed October 31, 2017). These recent 

decisions, however, do not affect the present case, because Appellant’s 

guilty plea to indecent assault and the imposition of SORNA reporting 

requirements occurred after the effective date of SORNA, Appellant was not 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed; counsel’s petition to withdraw is 

granted. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/27/17

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

designated as a sexually violent predator, the Tier II classification for the 

offense is defined by statute and requires no additional fact-finding after 

trial.