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S. HRG. 111–1083 

OVERSIGHT OF THE 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

NOVEMBER 17, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Ranking 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Florida 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

BRUCE H. ANDREWS, General Counsel 

ANN BEGEMAN, Republican Staff Director 

BRIAN M. HENDRICKS, Republican General Counsel 

NICK ROSSI, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on November 17, 2010 ...................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Rockefeller ........................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Hutchison ............................................................................ 3 

Statement of Senator Dorgan ................................................................................. 4 

Statement of Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................... 5 

Statement of Senator Isakson ................................................................................. 6 

Prepared statement submitted by Hon. Johnny Isakson from Pamela 

Robinson, U.S. Army veteran, Atlanta, Georgia ........................................ 25 

Statement of Senator Klobuchar ............................................................................ 6 

Statement of Senator McCaskill ............................................................................. 7 

Statement of Senator Johanns ............................................................................... 21 

Statement of Senator LeMieux ............................................................................... 31 

Statement of Senator DeMint ................................................................................. 33 

WITNESSES

Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. John S. Pistole by: ................

Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV ............................................................................ 37 

Hon. Byron L. Dorgan ...................................................................................... 38 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 40 

Hon. Mark Pryor ............................................................................................... 41 

Hon. Claire McCaskill ...................................................................................... 44 

Hon. Tom Udall ................................................................................................ 45 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 47 

Hon. Mark Begich ............................................................................................. 48 

Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison ............................................................................. 50 

Hon. John Ensign ............................................................................................. 53 

Hon. John Thune .............................................................................................. 55 

Hon. Johnny Isakson ........................................................................................ 56 

Hon. David Vitter ............................................................................................. 61 

Hon. Mike Johanns .......................................................................................... 62 

Letter, dated October 29, 2009 to Kevin J. Janet, FOIA Officer, TSA–20, 

from Grant H. Willis ............................................................................................ 63 

Letter, dated November 25, 2009 to Grant H. Willis, Jones Day, from Kevin 

J. Janet, FOIA Officer, Freedom of Information Act Office .............................. 64 

Letter, dated November 15, 2010 to the Honorable Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, from Eric D. Miller ...................... 65 

Letter, dated November 16, 2010 to Adam Duffy from Diana Sauder of Durango, Colorado .................................................................................................... 66 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SR– 

253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order. 

My opening statement. And then, as I explained to the distinguished witness, I have to go rescue the healthcare bill in the Finance Committee, where it’s going to be assaulted on all sides. And 

so, Byron Dorgan will take over, as he should. 

So, my statement: Turn on the TV, pick up the newspaper—in 

the past 48 hours, there have been a steady stream of stories about 

airport screening procedures—on pat-downs, full-body scanners, 

and comments from spouses in all directions. 

I appreciate peoples’ concerns. I understand that there’s a frustration. I realize some of these screening procedures appear 

invasive. Our witness and I had a terrific long session at the beginning of this week, and we went into a lot of this. 

The new pat-down procedures embody the enormously difficult 

task—unavoidably difficult task—impossible task—of balancing the 

need to protect the public and the need to maintain their privacy. 

How do you do that on a pat-down? Well, one of my first questions 

for you, Mr. Pistole—who—I think, you’re doing a—Mr. Pistole, 

you’re doing a great job—concerns these procedures and how you 

came to develop the new security regulations. I do recognize the 

threat that we face. 

I used to chair the Senate Intelligence Committee. I’m still a 

member. I can tell you that the threats are, as we indicated the 

other day in our conversation, extremely real and extremely ongoing. And it’s evolving every day. And they only haven’t—something 

hasn’t happened because the intelligence has been so good. And 

that won’t always be the case. So, we’ve had a kind of a lucky run, 

here. But, we can’t expect that to last. We face a deadly and determined enemy who seeks to do us harm—enemy from without, 

enemy from within. It’s easy to put together a package, stick it in 

2 

underwear, in shoes, whatever, and—you never know. But, the 

problem is, you always have to know. TSA always has to know. 

So, consider the events of this last year. A terrorist boarded a 

plane bound for America on Christmas Day. He carried a deadly 

explosive onboard. Should have gone off, didn’t go off. Federal 

agents uncovered a plot to bomb multiple subway stations in Washington, D.C. The terrorist’s goal: to kill as many people as possible. 

Again, good intelligence gathering prevented this from happening. 

It should have happened. It didn’t happen. We were lucky. Good intelligence. 

Authorities recently disrupted a plot to blow up planes over the 

U.S. using bombs hidden in cargo. Again, excellent intelligence 

stopped this plot, which should have worked, from moving forward. 

But, we cannot be complacent, therefore. Our transportation system remains a prime terrorist target, not just air—transportation, 

too, all forms. We must continue to bolster our defenses against a 

determined enemy, who will not relent, will not go away, and, in 

fact, will increase. And as terrorist methods evolve, therefore so 

must the TSA’s. 

TSA has massive responsibilities and multiple missions. They 

move a half a billion people through the U.S. aviation system every 

year, screen billions of pounds of domestic and foreign cargo as best 

as they can, protect our ports and our diverse public transportation 

systems, all of this with the prospect of not enough money to do 

the job that they would like to do. I do not doubt the difficulty of 

their mandate, but the agency must remain, somehow, wellresourced. We’re not talking theology or ideology here, we’re talking about protecting the American people. Gets to be a very different deal, sort of like FISA. A lot of Democrats didn’t like FISA. 

They said it invaded privacy too much. Well, maybe a whole lot of 

really bad things didn’t happen because there is FISA. And so, we 

have to just go back and forth on these things. 

The agency must remain well-resourced, as I indicated, and they 

must remain nimble in their response to new and emerging 

threats. We must take appropriate action to close any security loopholes, while making sure our global transportation system continues to move people, freight, goods, faster and faster, and in an 

effective manner. 

I continue to have concerns about general aviation. We discussed 

that. General aviation has gotten off pretty easy. I don’t like going 

out to Dulles Airport and just walking right onto an airplane. Not 

a pat-down. Forget it. They don’t even look at me. 

So, clearly, the existing system of international cargo security 

needs a fresh look, which I know TSA and DHS have started to do. 

We must also incorporate new technology that will make it harder for terrorists to exploit our transportation systems. 

It’s complicated, is it not, Senator Lautenberg? 

And, as I’ve already stated, but I think it’s important enough to 

say again, the balance between security and privacy, it always 

faces you, haunts you, Director Pistole; it haunts you. It’s a delicate 

one. I believe TSA is committed to achieving this balance, to the 

extent that it can. I would urge all of us to consider that these procedures are in place to protect us from a very real risk. They’re not 

there just for the doing of it. 

3 

In the coming weeks, I’ll be working with my colleagues in Congress to make sure that TSA has the resources it needs to address 

key security concerns. That’s going to be tough in this atmosphere. 

But, on this committee we have to sort of gather ourselves together 

to decide this is important. 

I thank you for being here, today, very much. I think you’re 

doing a terrific job. You have been at the helm of TSA for only several months now, and I know it has been a demanding time for 

you. So, I look forward to hearing your thoughts, which I won’t, because I won’t be here. And I explained that to you. So, I apologize 

for that. 

And so, I will vacate the chair, turn to my Co-Chair, Senator 

Hutchison, and ask Senator Dorgan if he will assume the chair. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS 

Senator HUTCHISON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And certainly I 

will look forward to working with you on the reauthorization of the 

Transportation Security Agency. 

Well, Mr. Pistole, the last time you were here, we said this is 

going to be a tough job. I know you’re finding out. And I agree with 

so much of what the Chairman said. Your job is just enormous. We 

are looking now at the cargo issue, an area in which this committee 

has been very active in trying to assure the security and contents 

of cargo, which is in so many of our passenger planes, as well as 

cargo planes bringing goods into our country. We’ve been active, 

but we have not been able to address that to our satisfaction. And 

now, with the situation with Yemen, it’s very clear that, once 

again, we dodged a bullet, if you will. But, we’ve got to have procedures. And I hope that we are going to be working with the foreign 

countries, where there are gateways into America through aviation, 

to beef up security. And I know that our committee is going to be 

very active in that area. 

Second, we’re going to have to have intelligence gathering to do 

that, when we are at risk of so many airplanes coming into our airports with cargo—sometimes cargo only, sometimes in the passenger planes. We’ve got to have intelligence gathering that should 

be part of either your cooperation or direct control. Of course, 

you’re from the FBI, so you understand that need. 

In addition, you’ve got to be hearing the outcry about the 

invasive uses of pat-downs now in the airports. There has to be a 

way that you can figure out how to do what’s necessary—because 

we all see people in the airports going through with long skirts and 

lots of cover-up possibilities, and that’s what you’re trying to address, and we understand that—there has got to be a way; however, for a privacy concern to be addressed, because it’s a legitimate concern. And I know that you’re aware of it, but we’ve got to 

see some action. And I know the Secretary is aware, as well. I’ve 

heard her say that she is concerned about the privacy issues. But, 

I think we’ve got to do more. The outcry is huge. 

And I will just end by saying that—well, I have two more things 

to say. One is, I’ve also mentioned before that I’m concerned about 

our ports, which are also entries into America, and our trains, our 

4 

surface transportation. We’ve got to make sure that we’re doing everything we can before the originality of our enemy comes forth, 

rather than always playing catchup, which is what we seem to do. 

And it’s good that we learn from the past, that we learn from the 

mistakes, that we learn from the new iterations of the plots. However, we’ve got to start anticipating, through intelligence, what 

they’re up to, before it happens. 

The last thing I will mention is that it’s my understanding that 

you haven’t made any decision about changing the Federal law that 

prohibits screeners from striking. I hope that you—with all that’s 

on your plate—will not try to change what is the law in this country. I think if you did decide to go the other way, that there would 

be an upheaval in Congress, and there would be great efforts to 

prevent it from happening. I don’t think that’s a fight that we want 

right now, when we should be concentrating on all these other 

issues that both the Chairman and I have mentioned. 

So, with that, I’m glad you’re here. I appreciate your being here. 

And I think that, in your short time, you are getting your hands 

around this. But, our job is to have oversight, and tell you what 

we think needs to be a priority, and hope to work with you on that. 

Thank you very much. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA 

Senator DORGAN [presiding]. Senator Hutchison, thank you very 

much. 

We are going to begin some votes here in the Senate, I believe, 

at 11 o’clock today. We have only one witness: Mr. Pistole. And 

what I would like to do—I want to make a couple of comments, 

then call on colleagues for 2 minutes or so for opening statements, 

if they choose. And then we’ll hear the testimony from Mr. Pistole. 

Senator DORGAN. I want to just mention that the history of all 

of this goes back to the hijacking and the determination, with 

metal detectors, to keep guns out of airplanes, because airplanes 

were being hijacked, particularly to Cuba, but other places, as well. 

And then we saw the growth of the terrorist threat, creating a shoe 

in the form of a bomb, or arming a shoe as a bomb, and then fashioning liquids that could be used as a bomb in air, then a bomb 

disguised as underwear, or an underwear carrying a bomb, and 

now various more sophisticated things on the freight system on airplanes. And so, we’ve evolved with a series of threats, trying to respond to the threats to make sure that we have safety in the skies. 

I think—I mean, I have a series of questions about the freight 

side and about general aviation, about the work to make certain 

that those who work at airports are properly screened. But, I think 

this—the most recent issue of full-body imaging and law-enforcement-style pat-downs with intimate touching, or what is described 

as intimate touching—I think those are very legitimate questions. 

As you know, the law-enforcement-style pat-downs were just initiated, nationwide, in October. So, we’ve only—it has only been a 

month. Not surprising to me that there’d be a lot of concern and 

anger by some, and protests by others, about this. And I think it’s 

important for us to have a pretty full and complete discussion 

about, what does this mean? I would ask the question—and I will, 

5 

Mr. Pistole—have you had that type of pat-down that many Americans are now protesting? And has your staff had that pat-down? 

And perhaps, have U.S. Senators had that pat-down? And what’s 

the impression of all of that? 

We must make sure that people don’t get on airplanes with 

bombs and blow that plane out of the sky and kill a bunch of people. I understand all that. The question is, how do we do that in 

a way that doesn’t go to the nth degree to invade people’s privacy 

and do things that most people would find unacceptable, as they 

try to get on a plane and get through an airport process. 

So, these are important issues, and we appreciate your being 

here to be able to discuss them with you today. Your job is a tough 

one. You and your agency must succeed. We insist that you succeed, and want to make sure that we do everything we can to help 

you succeed on behalf of the interests of the safety of the American 

people. 

Let me call on my colleagues for, if it’s appropriate for them, two 

minute opening statements, so that we can get to the witness as 

quickly as is possible. 

Senator Lautenberg. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Pistole, congratulations go to you and your team for the 

good work done with the cargo coming from Yemen. And although 

these packages were addressed to Chicago synagogues, investigators now believe the bombs were meant to blow up mid-flight, over 

the East Coast. 

But, vulnerabilities in our system remain. And just 65 percent of 

cargo on international passenger flights bound for the U.S. are 

screened—well short of the 100-percent-screening mandate for 

cargo on passenger aircraft. Right now, DHS receives cargo manifest information from cargo—only aircraft—just 4 hours before arrival. That means that we may not learn about a bomb until it’s 

well within our borders. And Robert Bonner, former Administrator 

of U.S. Customs, has said it makes sense to have the cargo information pre-departure, so you cannot only deny entry on arrival, but 

can potentially deny access to the airplane. So, while we want to 

strengthen aviation security in the United States—and my colleagues have talked about the humiliation that accompanies a patdown; we’ve got to talk about that at more length—there are clearly areas that we can identify. 

So, too often when we think of TSA, we think only of aviation 

security. But, we were reminded, last month, when the FBI arrested a man who was plotting to bomb four Metro rail stations in 

Northern Virginia. And one of the most important transit facilities 

is the D.C. Metro system, carrying a million passengers a day. And 

we can’t make any mistakes. Passenger and rail transit systems 

are prime targets for terrorists throughout the world, as we’ve seen 

in London, Madrid, Mumbai, and Russia. So, we need to devote 

more attention, more resources to securing our surface transportation networks against these threats. The threat’s real, and we 

can’t afford to be anything less than vigilant about it. 

6 

And, once again, Mr. Pistole, congratulations on a job well done 

so far. 

Thank you. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Lautenberg, thank you very much. 

Senator Johanns. 

Senator JOHANNS. Mr. Chairman, I’m going to submit any comments I have in writing, so hopefully we can expedite the process 

to get to the witness. 

Thank you for the opportunity. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Johanns, thank you very much. 

Senator Isakson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also won’t make 

an opening statement. 

But, through you, I’d like to make a request of Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison. And that is that, although 

this is an open hearing, which is appropriate, I think, at some 

point in time in the near future, we should have the Administrator 

and the Committee, in a classified setting, to understand the information that has led up to the changes in the procedures at the airports. And I would make that request, through you, to the Chairman and Ranking Member. 

Senator DORGAN. That request is noted. 

I might note that this committee has, on a previous occasion— 

it has been some long while now—had a closed hearing in which 

secret material was presented to us about transportation security. 

Senator Klobuchar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thanks very much, Chairman Dorgan. 

I endorse Senator Isakson’s idea here. I think it’s very important. 

Obviously, there are some things—why some of these procedures 

were implemented—some things that we’re not going to be able to 

talk about in public, for security reasons. I appreciate that. 

I wanted to, first, again thank you for the role that TSA played 

in securing our Nation. Certainly these recent incidences with the 

bombs being sent to synagogues illustrated the importance of this 

screening. And I’m eager to work with my colleagues. I know work 

is going on right now. I know that Secretary Napolitano—and 

changes have been made in terms of countries that can no longer 

send in this cargo, which I appreciate. But, also, I’ve supported 

stronger screening in the future, and, both with this committee and 

Judiciary, look forward to working on these issues. 

I want to say a few words on passenger screening, at my own 

risk, given the calls that have been coming in to our office on these 

screenings. I appreciate the steps forward that you’ve made. I have 

been a fan of the Advanced Imaging Technology. One, I think it’s 

going to show things that we didn’t know about before. That’s very 

important, and is a deterrent to some of these activities. Second, 

as someone who has a hip replacement, I’ve been patted down in 

front of my constituents on every single flight I’ve taken, and I 

7 

kind of welcome this Advanced Imaging Technology, where you 

don’t have to have a pat-down. So, I hope in your remarks you will 

discuss the rollout of that Advanced Imaging Technology so that 

people do have a choice in airports. I know they have them in ours 

now, in Minneapolis; if they want to go to the line with the advanced imaging technology, they can do that. If they want to have 

this pat-down, which we know we need some education out there, 

with the public, about what it is and what’s happening, so they’re 

not caught off guard when they’re at the airport. And then, the fact 

that they’re always offered a private screening, I think, is something that also has to be out there, because clearly people are going 

to feel uncomfortable with this. But, I think they have to understand that this is being done for their best interests and their safety, given some of the terrorist activity that we’re seeing across the 

country. 

So, I want to thank you for your work. 

Senator DORGAN. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator McCaskill. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator MCCASKILL. You know, TSA is always in a ‘‘damned if 

you do, damned if you don’t’’ mode. I certainly appreciate that the 

American public demands safety and security on our commercial 

airplanes. And there is a price we pay for that, and that is sometimes an uncomfortable price for the American flying public. 

I have gone on, in other committees and in this committee, about 

the ridiculous notion that I couldn’t take my mascara on an airplane. And I understand that this is obviously much more serious 

to many Americans, in terms of intrusiveness. 

But, I think we can do a better job on public education. And, like 

Amy, I have had my love pats every single flight I have taken, 

which is at least twice a week for the last 4 years of my life, because I have a knee replacement. So, I am wildly excited about the 

notion that I can walk through a machine instead of getting my 

dose of love pats. 

So, I think we’ve got to work on this, make sure that the traveling public has choices, make sure they understand the risks that 

we’re trying to address. And then I think we can—the majority of 

Americans, I think—I hope—will become supportive of the measures that TSA is trying to do to keep us safe. 

I want to take the remaining time in my opening statement to 

congratulate the Department of Homeland Security. We have a 

tendency, in this process, to focus on the failures of government, 

and there have been some real successes. I think the way the 

H1N1 virus was handled, I think—while many Americans were 

very frightened for a number of weeks, I think that a good job was 

done there. And I think, between Homeland Security and our intelligence community, we should all be thanking the public servants 

that protected us from another explosion in midair, in terms of the 

incident at Yemen. And the intelligence community is—are the unsung heroes in this country. And this Administration has made a 

huge commitment to the intelligence community, and continuing to 

make sure that we have the right kind of intelligence and that we 

8 

have it at the right time. So, congratulations on keeping—continuing to try to keep America safe. 

And I’ll look forward to listening to your testimony today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator McCaskill, thank you very much. 

I know what Senator McCaskill meant, but I’m sure, Mr. Pistole, 

you will want to deny that there is any love-patting going on. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator DORGAN. But, I understood the—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I’m just used to being—having the pat-down 

at TSA. I was being silly, but I think everybody understood. I 

hope—— 

Senator DORGAN. I understand. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I hope they understood. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Pistole, you are reasonably new to this job, 

and I know you’ve had to hit the ground running, and this committee really appreciates that work. 

So, why don’t you proceed. My understanding is, you have a 

slightly longer opening statement, by necessity. And this committee 

understands that. Why don’t you proceed. And your entire statement will be made a part of the record. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Chairman Dorgan—I appreciate your 

indulgence—and Ranking Member Hutchison, and distinguished 

members of the Committee. It is an honor to be here in my first 

oversight hearing with this committee since being sworn in on July 

1 as the TSA Administrator. 

As we begin this busy travel season next week, I would like to 

take just a moment to address the traveling public, and all those 

who are focusing on this issue right now, to make sure they know 

that the core mission of TSA, Homeland Security—really, the U.S. 

government—is to keep the traveling public safe. 

Over the past year, we have seen further attempts by terrorists 

to attack subways, and aviation—both cargo and passenger. And as 

we talk about aviation and being informed by the latest intelligence, we know the terrorist intent is still there, as we’ve seen 

manifested. We know their capabilities, in terms of the concealment, and the design of improvised explosive devices. 

So, we are using technology and protocols to stay ahead of the 

threat and keep you safe. We’re continuing to deploy advanced imaging technology at more airports. And I want to be clear that AIT 

is the best available technology today. We’re always looking at improved technology—and I’ll talk a little bit about the Automated 

Target Recognition, if there’s an interest in that—to try to enable 

us to detect the next generation of nonmetallic explosive devices 

that terrorists are using. AIT is safe for travelers, crew members, 

and our workforce. And that has been validated through a number 

of studies, whether it’s by Johns Hopkins or FDA or the National 

Institute of Standards and Technologies. 

We have protections in place to ensure that we respect the privacy of travelers. For example, on the pat-downs, those who want 

to have a private screening are allowed to do that. So, the use of 

9 

AIT remains optional for travelers, but the requirement for screening—equivalent screening—is not. We need to ensure, for everyone, 

for all the traveling public, that when they get on that plane, they 

have the high confidence that everybody else on that flight has 

been adequately screened. 

And, by the way, everybody else on that plane must make sure 

I’ve been adequately screened or you’ve been adequately screened. 

So, that is what we come down to in this balance between privacy 

and security. And I’ll talk more about that in response to questions. 

So, we’ve adjusted our pat-down policy to simply be using techniques that are informed by the latest intelligence, going back to 

Christmas Day, in what we’ve seen with the cargo plot—again, the 

concealment and design of PETN—in ways that challenge our social norms and, I would add, from extensive covert testing by GAO, 

by the DHS Inspector General, and by our own Office of Inspection 

in TSA. I would want to go into a classified setting to go into details about how they get through security and what we need to do 

to address that. And that’s what we have done, in some part. And 

again, we’d ask that we’d be able to go, at some point, into a closed 

setting to discuss that in more detail. 

We’ve also been informed by what other countries’ airport authorities around the world are doing. All of you have traveled to 

many places and have seen, and perhaps experienced, the type of 

pat-down that may be referred to as ‘‘love pats,’’ or whatever else. 

But, the bottom line is that we are consistent with many countries—for example, throughout Europe—and less invasive than 

some countries around the world, as we know. 

So, we need to have an effective pat-down, coupled with the best 

technology, to resolve anomalies discovered during the screening 

process. We believe that the AIT is the best technology today. 

Those who opt-out of that advanced imaging technology need to receive the same type of screening, as I said. 

The bottom line is, few people in the overall scheme of things, 

will actually receive those pat-downs. Now, we’ve heard some examples. And obviously, there’s a vocal group out there who’ve experienced this for the first time and, rightfully so, are raising some 

concerns such as, ‘‘What’s behind this?’’ The bottom line is, we— 

the Transportation Security Officers, in particular—are trying to 

work in partnership with the traveling public to say, ‘‘We want to 

ensure that you’re safe on this flight. Work with us in a partnership to provide the best possible security.’’ That’s what it comes 

down to. 

One of the things that helps is just people being informed as they 

go through, whether it’s to walk through metal detectors or advanced imaging technology, to make sure they know what the protocols are. With advancing imaging technology, you obviously have 

to take things out of your pockets. You ‘‘divest,’’ as we say. You 

have to take everything out or it will show up as an anomaly. A 

lot of people don’t know that. So, that’s part of the education process. It’s on me and the agency to help inform travelers. And we’re 

doing that. 

We’ve seen some public attempts to dissuade travelers from 

using AIT, and that’s understandable. The analogy I use is if there 

are two flights going to the same place at the same time, and you 

10 

have the option of getting on one that you know has been thoroughly screened, and you have another flight where there’s no 

screening—you can just get on that and go, there are no lines or 

anything, I think everybody will want to opt for the screening, with 

the assurance that that flight is safe and secure. I know flight 

crews obviously prefer that, and I know I would prefer that. 

So, the workforce is fully trained in the new technology and the 

new screening procedures, and I expect them to act professionally 

at all times, and treat all passengers with dignity and respect. I, 

similarly, ask all passengers to remember that our officers are 

there to keep you safe, and they need your cooperation to do so. Security is a shared responsibility. And during the holiday travel season, indeed at all times, the cooperation between TSA and traveling public is essential. 

I appreciate the kind words about the timely intelligence and 

international cooperation that we—and I use the collective ‘‘we’’ 

here, the law enforcement and intelligence communities—used, 

with aviation authorities, on the recent cargo plot. I went to 

Yemen, 5 days after the plot was discovered, to assess what they 

were doing. We sent a team of TSA security screening experts to 

work with the Yemeni authorities. I met with the Deputy Prime 

Minister and their Minister of Transport to say, ‘‘What are you 

doing? How can we work with you? This goes to your point, Senator 

Hutchison. We asked ‘‘What are your current protocols, processes? 

And what can we do, in terms of capacity-building, in terms of 

training techniques, tactics, and technology?’’ So, we’ve taken specific steps, which I’ll be glad to get into, in response to questions. 

I go into considerable detail in my written statement on that plot. 

We continue to work with our international partners on a number of issues relating to both passenger and cargo flights. And 

again, there is a lot more we can talk about in that regard. 

I want to briefly update you all on my review of TSA’s surface 

transportation program priorities, because that is a significant 

issue that we are addressing. We continue to work with surface 

transportation providers, particularly passenger rail and mass 

transit, to close vulnerability gaps with a risk-based intelligencedriven process. We want to target grant funds on high-risk critical 

infrastructure and on operational counterterrorism deterrents. TSA 

has expanded its Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response 

Teams (VIPR), has increased the number of surface inspectors, and 

has begun a successful mobile screening program with the New 

York City Police Department in the New York City subways. 

The air cargo plot and the recently disrupted plot against the 

transit system here in D.C. show that our enemies are constantly 

evolving their methods and tools and tactics. At TSA, we are reshaping our approach to security so that everyone recognizes that 

we are one part of the continuum of national security for the 

United States. 

To accomplish this, I have interconnected three priorities for 

TSA. One is to have the TSA counterterrorism focus on intelligence 

and cutting-edge technology. The second is supporting the TSA 

workforce. And the third is strengthening TSA’s partnerships with 

stakeholders in the traveling public. 

11 

With that, Chairman Dorgan and Ranking Member Hutchison, 

I’d be glad to take questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I am honored to appear before you and this 

Committee for the first time since my confirmation as the Assistant Secretary of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 

I appreciate the vote of confidence you gave me in June when you reported my 

nomination favorably from the Committee. I look forward to our dialogue today and 

your thoughts about how we can improve transportation security. 

Before sharing with you my priorities for leading TSA through the next stage of 

its development as it matures into a truly high-performance, world-class organization, I want to update you on our efforts to address recent, serious threats to transportation, to our fellow citizens, and to our economy. 

Air Cargo Packages from Yemen 

Almost 3 weeks ago, the global counterterrorism community disrupted a potential 

attack when individuals in Yemen with ties to al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula 

attempted to conceal and ship explosive devices in cargo on board aircraft that traveled through several foreign nations, and ultimately was bound for the United 

States. 

This episode began on the evening of October 28 with a call I received from John 

Brennan, the President’s top counterterrorism advisor, informing me of a credible 

terrorist threat. Later that evening, President Obama directed U.S. intelligence and 

law enforcement agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, to take 

steps to ensure the safety and security of the American people, and to determine 

whether these threats were part of any additional terrorist plots. 

We worked through the night, the next day, and the following weekend, staying 

in close contact both with our colleagues within the U.S. government and with our 

international partners and key allies. TSA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) immediately took additional measures to enhance existing protocols for 

screening inbound cargo, including temporarily grounding all packages originating 

from Yemen destined for the United States. With constant communication and sharing of information, we were able to disrupt this plot before it did any harm. 

After the initial response, we took a number of additional steps. In the days immediately following the attempted plot, at the direction of President Obama and 

Secretary Janet Napolitano, we deployed a team of security inspectors to Yemen to 

provide assistance and guidance to the Government of Yemen with their cargo 

screening procedures. I leveraged a previously planned trip to speak to the Aviation 

Security (AVSEC) World Conference in Germany to interact directly with my counterparts from Europe and elsewhere, as well as International Air Transport Association (IATA) Director General Giovanni Bisignani and Jim Marriott of the International Civil Aviation Organization, about the common transportation security 

threats we all face, and the common and cooperative actions we could take to address security vulnerabilities. 

To get a firsthand view of the challenges we face, from Germany I flew to Yemen 

to receive briefings from, and express my gratitude to, the TSA inspectors we deployed there. I also met with Yemen Deputy Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimi, and 

government officials from Yemen’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation and Ministry of Interior to discuss the threat with them. In addition, I spoke with our new 

U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, Gerald M. Feierstein, a seasoned specialist in Near 

East and South Asian Affairs who has served overseas in eight postings, and as a 

senior official in the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. These on-the-ground meetings with TSA staff and key government officials 

provide crucial context as we work to understand how to best address possible 

vulnerabilities within the transportation system. 

Our collective actions to address cargo security continued as Secretary Napolitano 

spoke on November 2 with leaders of the international shipping industry, including 

UPS, DHL, FedEx, and TNT, about enhancing air cargo security. During the call, 

Secretary Napolitano underscored her commitment to partnering with the shipping 

12 

industry to strengthen cargo security through enhanced screening and preventative 

measures, including terrorism awareness training for shipping industry personnel. 

Following her call with shipping industry leaders, Secretary Napolitano spoke 

with IATA Director General Bisignani about the Department’s continued collaboration with our private sector partners and international allies to secure the global 

supply chain through a layered security approach that is designed to identify, deter, 

and disrupt threats. The Secretary also reiterated her commitment to ongoing coordination with the airline and shipping industries to uphold TSA security standards, including the vetting of personnel with access to cargo, employee training, and 

cargo screening procedures. 

Security of the air cargo supply chain is critical, and we are developing security 

enhancements in close coordination with industry because we understand the value 

of air cargo to our country’s economy. Together, FedEx, UPS, DHL, and TNT employ 

more than one million employees around the world, and own or operate more than 

1,700 aircraft. Each of these companies has operations in more than 200 countries. 

In 2008, air merchandise trade comprised almost 30 percent of U.S. exports by 

value, totaling almost $390 billion, and almost 20 percent of U.S. imports by value, 

totaling over $417 billion. Combined, that represents more than $800 billion of U.S.- 

international merchandise trade. 

As we continue to address the threat to air cargo, we are analyzing information 

and gathering intelligence on the packages intercepted from Yemen, and we have 

issued additional directives to the airline industry on the non-acceptance, or extra 

screening, of high-risk packages on passenger and cargo flights. Specifically, on November 8, Secretary Napolitano announced that: 

• the ban on air cargo from Yemen will continue and has been extended to all 

air cargo from Somalia; 

• no high-risk cargo will be allowed on passenger aircraft; 

• toner and ink cartridges weighing 16 ounces or more will be prohibited on passenger aircraft in both carry-on bags and checked bags on domestic and international passenger flights inbound to the United States, as well as certain inbound international air cargo shipments; and 

• all cargo identified as high risk will go through additional and enhanced screening, including inbound international mail packages, which must be screened individually and certified to have come from an established postal shipper. 

With our colleagues at CBP, we are working collaboratively with industry and our 

international partners to expedite the receipt of cargo manifests for international 

flights to the United States prior to departure in order to more effectively identify 

and pre-screen items based on risk and current intelligence. We are also working 

with our international and private sector partners on the expansion of layered detection systems, including technology and other measures, to find ways to strengthen security that also maintain the critical flows of global commerce that are so important to our economic recovery. We will keep you informed of our progress. 

Threats to Mass Transit 

Another recent case highlights the importance of mass transit security. On October 27, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested a Pakistan-born naturalized U.S. citizen for attempting to assist others whom he believed to be members 

of al Qaida in planning multiple bombings at Metrorail stations in the Washington, 

D.C., area. During a sting operation, Farooque Ahmed allegedly conducted surveillance of the Arlington National Cemetery, Courthouse, and Pentagon City Metro 

stations, indicated that he would travel overseas for jihad, and agreed to donate 

$10,000 to terrorist causes. A Federal grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia, returned 

a three-count indictment against Ahmed, charging him with attempting to provide 

material support to a designated terrorist organization, collecting information to assist in planning a terrorist attack on a transit facility, and attempting to provide 

material support to help carry out multiple bombings to cause mass casualties at 

D.C.-area Metrorail stations. 

While the public was never in danger, Ahmed’s intentions provide a reminder of 

the terrorist attacks on other mass transit systems: Madrid in March 2004, London 

in July 2005, and Moscow earlier this year. Our ability to protect mass transit and 

other surface transportation venues from evolving threats of terrorism requires us 

to explore ways to improve the partnerships between TSA and state, local, tribal, 

and territorial law enforcement, and other mass transit stakeholders. These partnerships include measures such as Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response 

(VIPR) teams we have put in place with the support of the Congress. As Secretary 

Napolitano stated in her speech at the International Association of Chiefs of Police 

13 

Annual Conference just 2 days before Ahmed’s arrest, ‘‘Today’s threats put state, 

local, tribal and territorial law enforcement around the country on the front lines 

of our counterterrorism effort in unprecedented ways.’’ We are expanding our outreach and coordination with these frontline law enforcement entities to better protect vital transportation assets. 

Priorities for TSA 

In addition to dealing with these recent serious threats, I have been very busy 

in my new position. I came to TSA after more than 26 years at the FBI—a time 

that included playing a role in the United States’ investigation and response to the 

terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. That experience has informed my priorities 

as TSA Administrator. 

Our enemies are observant, patient, stealthy, and ruthless. They constantly evolve 

their methods and tools—and it is our job to stay ahead of them. My job is to lead 

TSA through the next stage in its development as this young agency matures into 

a high-performance, world-class organization. To defeat our enemies, we have to do 

our job better and smarter, and reshape our security approach so everyone recognizes what it is: one part of a continuum that comprises the national security mission of the United States. 

To make that happen, I have three basic priorities at TSA. I want to: 

• improve TSA’s counterterrorism focus through intelligence and cutting-edge 

technology; 

• support the TSA work force; and 

• strengthen TSA’s relationships with stakeholders and the traveling public. 

All of these priorities are interconnected and are vital to TSA’s mission. 

Improving TSA’s Counterterrorism Focus Through Intelligence and Cutting-Edge 

Technology. A key lesson I took from 9/11 and from my years at the FBI is that 

one of the best tools we possess in our effort to combat terrorism is accurate and 

timely intelligence. It is with this in mind that I begin my day at TSA with an intelligence briefing with my senior staff—we are constantly honing our counterterrorism focus by working with DHS and our Federal partners to better operationalize 

this intelligence. The importance of accurate and timely intelligence has consistently 

been validated in my tenure at TSA to date. 

For example, through better watchlisting capabilities and the implementation of 

our Secure Flight program, we continue to improve our efforts to prevent known or 

suspected terrorists from boarding flights. Under Secure Flight, TSA uses name, 

date of birth, and gender to vet airline passengers against terrorist watch lists up 

to 72 hours before those passengers are permitted to board planes. Passengers who 

are potential watch list matches are immediately identified for appropriate notifications and coordination. 

Secure Flight vets 100 percent of passengers flying on U.S. airlines domestically 

and internationally, as well as passengers on many foreign airlines, and we are 

working hard toward fully implementing the program for remaining covered foreign 

air carriers by the end of 2010. Secure Flight currently vets over 99 percent of all 

airline passenger travel to, from, and within the U.S. I particularly would like to 

thank this committee for the strong support that you have provided to TSA and Secure Flight to enable us to reach this stage. 

Even the best intelligence, however, does not always identify in advance every individual who would seek to do us harm. So we also rely on the security expertise 

of our frontline personnel—Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), Federal Air 

Marshals, explosive specialists, and Behavior Detection Officers, among others—to 

help prevent terrorists from harming Americans. 

That reliance means that valuable intelligence must be distributed widely and 

rapidly to the field. One way we are improving this process is through the extension 

of secret-level security clearances to a greater number of TSA employees. This 

change significantly enhances TSA’s ability to leverage the best intelligence and elevate our security practices across the board. 

In addition to the improved use of intelligence, effective technology also is an essential component of our arsenal to detect and deter threats against our nation’s 

transportation systems. TSA is deploying a range of next generation equipment— 

bottled liquid scanners, Advanced Technology X-Ray systems, and Explosive Trace 

Detection (ETD) units—to enhance our efforts. 

On December 25, 2009, Northwest Airlines Flight 253 passenger Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab tried and failed to detonate concealed explosives. This event illustrates the fact that despite decades of advances in screening and significant reforms 

following 9/11, our global security network still faces an ever-evolving threat. Currently, the most effective technology for detecting small threat items concealed on 

14 

passengers, such as explosives used by Abdulmutallab, is Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT). AIT safely and effectively screens passengers for both metallic and 

non-metallic threats, including weapons and explosives, without physical contact. As 

of today, TSA has deployed 385 AIT machines to 68 airports nationwide, and our 

goal is to have nearly 1,000 AIT machines deployed by the end of calendar year 

2011. 

While we are rapidly deploying AIT machines, we also are exploring enhancements to it, such as Automated Target Recognition (ATR), or auto-detection software. This capability would make screening more efficient and would eliminate 

most privacy concerns about the technology. Ongoing ATR testing is designed to ensure effective detection with minimal false alarms. 

While AIT has an important role in the future of aviation security, it is just one 

of the technologies we are exploring. For example, we also are working on long-term, 

technology-based solutions for screening liquids, aerosols, and gels that will distinguish between materials that present a threat and those that do not. In addition, 

we currently have dozens of qualified technologies for use in air cargo screening and 

are working with DHS and our industry partners to develop new technologies. 

New technology provides only part of the picture for the future of checkpoint 

screening. It is important that we continue to discuss what the future holds, but 

the outlines are clear: new technologies must be developed that can be assimilated 

into an airport environment and rapidly identify and respond to emerging threats. 

The DHS Science and Technology Directorate, TSA, the Department of Energy, and 

the National Laboratories are working closely together to accelerate our ability to 

move to that future checkpoint. 

New technology platforms should be capable of being upgraded with additional 

functionality as they are developed, including functionality developed by those who 

did not manufacture the original equipment. We seek screening equipment solutions 

that provide both better performance and a better screening experience for the public. The bottom line is that future screening solutions must focus on providing the 

best possible security for travelers in a targeted, intelligence-driven way that provides greater scrutiny to those who need greater scrutiny, and not using the same 

approach for everybody. 

Supporting the TSA Workforce. An intelligence-driven agency using sophisticated 

technological tools to root out terrorists and deter potential attacks will not succeed 

without a professional, highly trained, fully engaged, and respected work force. As 

I stated above, the men and women of TSA are on the front line in detecting and 

defeating the terrorist threat. Since becoming the Administrator for TSA, I have 

logged thousands of miles to meet with them. I have been impressed by their professionalism, work ethic, and enthusiasm. I have listened carefully to their suggestions 

on improving operations and opportunities, and have learned from their insights. I 

also have challenged them to hold themselves to the highest standards of hard 

work, professionalism, and integrity that already are intrinsic parts of TSA’s fabric. 

I also am working to hone the workforce development strategy and to develop an 

environment of continuous learning for TSA employees that will help them meet 

both individual and organizational goals. As we continue to implement new technology to meet emerging threats, TSA routinely evaluates, updates, and upgrades 

its technical training curriculum. Over the next few months, technical training priorities include an update to procedures at the passenger screening checkpoint and 

support for the deployment of new technologies such as Advanced Imaging Technology. Over the next few years, our technical training portfolio will expand and enhance individual and team performance through the introduction of an assortment 

of skills and knowledge building courses, delivered using a variety of techniques. 

We are also working on improving the training for the Transportation Security 

Inspector (TSI) work force. Along with revision of the TSI Basic Course on multimodal training, we are developing and delivering additional courses targeted to specific transportation modes. TSA also recently expanded the Surface Transportation 

Training Center located in Pueblo, Colorado, which I visited in July. This is an impressive facility that is significantly improving the training we are able to provide. 

Through these efforts, we are finding opportunities to integrate elements that not 

only enhance technical skills, but also contribute to the professional development of 

the TSA workforce. 

In addition, we are engaged in efforts to address and resolve workplace issues. 

The Ombudsman at TSA is one of many avenues through which TSA employees 

may raise workplace issues and concerns to see them resolved. As I travel around 

the country meeting with employees, I have invited employees to raise issues and 

concerns to me directly, and I have learned that many employees also place great 

value in established communications channels, such as the National Advisory Council, the Idea Factory, and local Employee Advisory Councils. Nevertheless, I also 

15 

know from my experience at the FBI that an effective Ombudsman program is a 

valuable resource for unfiltered, candid feedback on the state of the workplace environment, and I am committed to its advisory role to me and the rest of the TSA 

leadership team. 

Strengthening TSA’s Relationships with Stakeholders and the Traveling Public. 

Supporting and improving our commitment to our workforce will help TSA function 

better internally. But as an organization with millions of interactions with the public every day, we also need to deepen and broaden our relationships with our government colleagues both here and abroad, with transportation and related stakeholders, and with the traveling public. 

This already has been a landmark year for improving security through collaboration. We are working to take it to the next level. 

Following the attempted December 25 terrorist attack, at the President’s direction 

and led by Secretary Napolitano, the United States engaged governments around 

the world at five regional summits on five continents, in a renewed effort to 

strengthen international aviation security. The International Air Transport Association and the Airports Council International engaged the world’s aviation industry 

to complement this significant effort. This impressive showing of global cooperation 

reminded us that aviation security is a shared responsibility. We all face a similar 

threat environment that evolves as quickly as we can develop mitigation measures. 

To improve security, we have to continue to work together. It is through information 

sharing, development of best practices, and continual evaluation of risk that we will, 

together, as one community, continue to mitigate the threat. 

In working to thwart the air cargo plot, our excellent relationships with our overseas counterparts were crucial. In early October, before the cargo plot emerged, Secretary Napolitano and I attended the International Civil Aviation Organization 

(ICAO) Assembly in Montreal with our partners from the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration. At that meeting we built on our excellent working relationships with our colleagues from other countries and discussed 

our joint efforts to strengthen the global aviation system. For me, it was the first 

opportunity to meet many of these foreign leaders, and these contacts already have 

proven to be invaluable. After the cargo plot emerged, I worked with these foreign 

colleagues quickly and efficiently, and saw a number of them when I was at the 

AVSEC conference in Germany. 

In the spirit of our commitment to engage the international community, last week 

the United States hosted an ‘‘Advanced Imaging Technology Policy Summit’’ to continue the discussions around AIT. Approximately 30 countries attended and discussed a wide range of policy questions, including deployment strategy, safety, privacy, legal issues, and checkpoint configuration. 

The cargo plot also illustrates our need to strengthen the relationships we have 

with our private sector partners and stakeholders; we cannot do effective security 

without their proactive partnership and collaboration. Our collaboration with the 

world’s major air cargo companies has been outstanding, and we are continuing to 

build that relationship and those with other private sector partners. 

Our nation’s security also is a shared responsibility with our neighbors and our 

colleagues in U.S. government agencies. So we are encouraging our citizens, our 

communities, and our transportation security and law enforcement partners across 

the United States to remain vigilant and continue to build a national culture of preparedness and resiliency. As you know, Secretary Napolitano has launched an expanding ‘‘If You See Something, Say Something’’ public awareness campaign. This 

simple and effective program was started by the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority to raise public awareness of indicators of terrorism, crime, and 

other threats and to emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activity to 

the proper transportation and law enforcement authorities. I have joined Secretary 

Napolitano in three separate events to partner with transportation sectors in the 

‘‘If You See Something, Say Something’’ campaign—we met with Amtrak during a 

multi-stop train tour through New York City, Newark, NJ; Philadelphia, and Washington in early July, and with the general aviation community at Oshkosh in late 

July. Earlier this week, Secretary Napolitano and I launched the campaign at airports in the National Capital Region. 

Conclusion 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today to speak 

with you about recent threats and TSA’s ongoing efforts to ensure the safety and 

security of the transportation domain. I look forward to your questions. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Pistole, thank you very much for your testimony and your description of what your agency is doing. 

16 

I’d like to ask just a couple of questions. One is the issue of background screening for workers who work in and around the airport. 

All of us who travel see a lot of people that are serving in different 

ways on the airport grounds, and I know that they are screened for 

background screening. There’s a current process for that screening, 

as I understand it, which involves, in large part, the private sector, 

and you are preparing to begin to change that. I don’t—maybe you 

could describe to us what that change might be, how you’re proceeding, and why it is necessary. 

My understanding is—the information I’ve received is that the 

aviation workers pay about a third of the cost of port workers that 

are screened by the federal government, whereas aviation workers 

are screened with a private-sector system that is working. So, tell 

me what you’re doing here. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sir, there are several issues here, Senator, and 

you’ve hit on two key issues. How do we harmonize, within the 

U.S. government, background checks that are done for workers at 

critical sensitive areas, whether it’s ports, whether it’s airports, 

whatever it may be that exposes people to risk? In the aviation sector, obviously we do thorough background checks on anybody who 

has access to the sterile area at an airport. At cargoes and ports, 

there are different processes and protocols and payments. It’s 

something that I’m working closely with Commissioner Alan Bersin 

at CBP, because we have the most overlap—and then with the U.S. 

Coast Guard, in terms of, ‘‘How do we harmonize this? How do we 

provide, basically, one-stop shopping?’’ So, we’re not there yet, but 

I would hope to be able to report back, after the first of the year, 

some good progress in that area. 

Senator DORGAN. Yes, I mean, I’m—the reason I ask the question 

is, if it is accurate, as I’ve been told, that the aviation side costs 

one-third of what the port side costs, if you harmonize in circumstances where you get to what we’re doing with the port side, 

and move from the private sector to the public sector and triple the 

costs, that probably is not the right approach. And I would like to 

get from you an analysis, if you would, of the efficiency and effectiveness of the aviation side at this point. My understanding is, 

that has worked fairly well. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator DORGAN. Let me ask about the pat-down checks. And 

you, I think, have properly acknowledged there’s reason from people to be concerned and express their—that concern publicly. You 

explained precisely why it is necessary for us to have advanced 

screening and imaging technology, and so on. 

First of all—and I don’t mean this in a humorous way—but, have 

you been subject to the law enforcement-style advanced pat-down 

that was implemented nationally in October? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I insisted that I receive 

that pat-down before I ordered that it be deployed nationwide. 

Also, Secretary Napolitano, Deputy Secretary Lute, other senior 

members of Homeland Security, received that pat-down to not just 

see, but experience what that involves, so we would know before 

we rolled that out. 

Senator DORGAN. And your impression? 

Mr. PISTOLE. That it is thorough. 

17 

Senator DORGAN. I understand that. But, your impression, beyond the fact that it was thorough. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, the whole purpose is—— 

Senator DORGAN. Was it—did it make you uncomfortable? I 

mean, what was your—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator DORGAN.—impression, as a person? 

Mr. PISTOLE. It was more invasive than what I was used to. Of 

course what is in my mind, from almost 27 years at the FBI and 

all the counterterrorism work since 9/11, is, ‘‘What are the plots 

out there? How are we informed by the latest intelligence and the 

latest technology? And what do we need to do to assure the American people that, as they travel, we are being thorough.’’ So, yes, 

it is clearly more invasive. The purpose of that is to, obviously, detect those type of devices that we had not seen before, for example, 

last Christmas. I am very sensitive to and concerned about people’s 

privacy concerns, and I want to work through that, as best we can. 

The bottom line is, we need to provide for the best possible security. 

Senator DORGAN. My understanding is that the October change 

went from using the back of a hand—gliding across a person—to 

a different approach. You might describe that, number one. And— 

well, go ahead and describe that, if you would. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, the back of the hand is still used in some aspects. I would prefer not to go into specific detail in an open hearing. 

Senator DORGAN. All right. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I don’t want to give a roadmap to anybody to say, 

‘‘OK, here’s exactly what the technique is.’’ And so, ‘‘How can we 

defeat that?’’ We’ve just seen the ingenuity, the creativity of al 

Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, particularly, with these last three 

attempts. I’d be glad to go into detail. 

Senator DORGAN. OK. 

Mr. PISTOLE. And obviously, any member who has not experienced that pat-down, but would like to do that—I would not offer 

but an experienced, qualified security officer would be glad to do 

that. 

Senator DORGAN. All right. 

And then the issue of full-body imaging. Most of us have seen— 

whether it’s Newsweek magazine or Time magazine or on the Internet—the full-body imaging is very explicit. Would—you would 

agree with that, I assume. And then the question is, what kind of 

protection have you developed so that someone who has had a reasonably explicit photograph taken of them through this full-body 

imaging—that it’s not going to be moved around, and that there’s 

going to be a privacy relationship they can count on? 

Mr. PISTOLE. We’ve implemented a number of privacy protocols 

to ensure that those types of things you describe do not happen. 

For one, the security officer who is viewing the image—again, it’s 

not a photograph, it’s an image, with the face blurred. What I’ve 

seen, by the way, on some of the news reports, is not accurate. 

Some of these very graphic displays are not what the security officer is seeing. So, I’m not sure where those are coming from. 

18 

Senator DORGAN. They have photoshopped them a little, have 

they? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I’m not sure where they’re getting those. 

Senator DORGAN. All right. 

Mr. PISTOLE. There’s a little bit of more detail—quite a bit more, 

actually—on some of those I’ve seen. 

Senator DORGAN. All right. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So, the officer who sees the image never sees the 

person. The officer who sees the person never sees the image. And 

the machines are specifically disabled. The functions are disabled, 

in terms of any retention, storage, or ability to transmit those images. Of course, cell phones, cameras, or anything like that, are not 

allowed in that screening room. So, we believe we’ve implemented 

adequate privacy protections, if you will. 

That being said, I’m also very interested in the next generation 

of advanced imaging technology, which is the automated target recognition, which basically has a stick figure, or a blob, if you will. 

These are two options—where, through automated target algorithms, an anomaly, wherever that might be on the body, would 

show up as a box, at the armpit, groin, whatever it may be. Then 

the pat-down would just focus on that area. So, that is the next 

generation. The only concern I have is that there is currently a 

high rate of false positives with that technology so we’re working 

through that. But, we are currently testing that today. We have 

been for several months. It’s in use in Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam. But, a high rate of false positive results in more pat-downs. 

So, we’re trying to stay away from that. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Pistole, I will send you some additional 

questions. 

Thank you very much for your responses—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN.—and for being here. 

Senator Hutchison. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I think I’m, first of all, going to say to Senator Isakson that I 

think we should have a classified hearing. So, we will work on 

scheduling that. 

Senator ISAKSON. I would welcome that. Thank you. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Certainly, we’ll talk to Senator Rockefeller. 

I believe he will agree. 

I want to talk, now, on cargo. I’d like to ask you, first, is it feasible for all cargo operations—a cargo plane that does not have passengers—to be screened in the same—with the same specificity as 

our passenger processes? And, second, do we have practical solutions? And what I’m getting at is, there are now imaging machines 

that are used on the border for trucks for crossing the border. Are 

those technologically feasible to be used for air cargo? And is it, 

also, an affordable option that would be a common sense option? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So, in response to your first question, it is not practical, at this point, to screen 100 percent of air cargo worldwide, if 

that’s the question. We do screen, of course, 100 percent of all air 

cargo on passenger flights in the U.S., as of August, based on the 

9/11 Act. And we screen what we describe as 100 percent of highrisk cargo coming into the U.S. on passenger flights. 

19 

That being said, there is still a lot of cargo out there. There’s almost 9 billion pounds of cargo that come into the U.S. every year, 

about two-thirds on cargo flights, the other one-third on passenger 

flights. The challenge becomes, those packages not coming from 

known shippers, the large companies that either government and/ 

or the actual cargo companies have relationships with. For example, take the two packages coming out of Yemen. An individual 

goes to a freight forwarder that then sends it to Dubai. That’s 

where the U.S. cargo carrier picks it up. The challenge is, in that 

supply chain, whether he can assure, with 100-percent confidence, 

that packages have been properly screened. And, frankly, we can’t 

do that right now. So, what we’re doing is working with the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, which just passed a security declaration last month in Montreal, at their triennial meeting. I was there, as well as Secretary Napolitano, and 190 countries 

signed off on this security declaration, mostly focused on passengers, but also some on cargo. 

We’re also working with the International Air Transport Authority, IATA, which deals with over 230 airlines around the world. Everybody—all the businesses—have the same interest to make sure 

that their flights are safe and secure. It’s, ‘‘How do we best accomplish that?’’ 

And so, ICAO and IATA are actually working on capacity development issues with some of these countries that perhaps don’t have 

the same screening capabilities that we have in the U.S. That’s 

part of our challenge. 

Senator HUTCHISON. And are you working on more of your personnel being stationed in areas where there would be a priority? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, we are, Senator. We have over 100 TSA employees who are forward-deployed around the world, to act as inspectors, if you will, to work with host governments and aviation 

authorities for that very purpose. 

Also, on the second part of your first question, we do have small, 

medium, and large aperture X-ray and advanced technology X-ray 

to look at cargo. It is just more of a challenge than it is with passengers. The larger the palette or the skids, and the more compact, 

the more difficult it is to discern. Now, we also, at least in the U.S., 

use explosive-trace technology detection equipment, perhaps K–9s, 

but that is not a consistent standard around the world. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Let me just talk a little bit about the collective bargaining issue. And when I was talking about strikes, the 

reality is, if you have collective bargaining, it may not be the open 

strike, but it is the slowdown, the sick-outs—that sort of thing, 

which is a virtual strike. And my question is, where are you in this 

process? Is it something that you’re looking at seriously, or have 

you decided that other priorities are more important? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, obviously, one of the priorities that for the 

confirmation process was to deal with the issue, as I was asked to 

do an independent assessment of whether collective bargaining 

made sense for the TSA workforce. My one caveat that I laid out 

at that hearing, as you recall, and what I’ve stuck to, is, whatever 

the issues are, there cannot be adverse impact on security. So, I 

conducted an internal assessment. I’ve done a review. And I am 

close to announcing a decision on that. I will say that has been 

20 

complicated a little bit by a decision, last Friday by the FLRA, 

which ordered TSA to hold an election for exclusive union representation, but not collective bargaining. 

It’s somewhat of a confusing opinion, frankly. So, our experts are 

going back and working with other human capital experts and the 

FLRA, —their counsel to say, ‘‘OK, so what does that mean? How 

can we inform the work force?’’ But, I would say, I’m hoping, within 

the next 30 days, to make an announcement about where I believe 

we should be going in that regard. 

Senator HUTCHISON. So, the Federal Labor Relations Board is ordering TSA to have an election for—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. The decision basically says that we should have an 

election for exclusive representation with one bargaining unit, one 

union, but not for purposes of collective bargaining, just for purposes of representation. Again, frankly, that doesn’t make a whole 

lot of sense. So, we’re working through that, and I’m confident that 

we have a good way forward. 

Senator HUTCHISON. I’m glad you think it doesn’t make a lot of 

sense. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Hutchison, thank you very much. 

Senator Lautenberg? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pistole, the Department of Homeland Security requires 

manifest information to be provided 24 hours prior to loading for 

all maritime cargo that’s entering our ports. But, the cargo entering our country by air—the manifests only have to be provided 4 

hours prior to arrival of the material to the airport. That could be 

too late to stop something happening before it enters our airspace. 

Is—would it be feasible to ask that a longer amount—a longer time 

be allowed to—before the cargo gets aboard an airplane? 

And this is challenging and—look, the primary thing that we’re 

concerned about, obviously, is the security. But, what might it do 

to the efficiency of commerce around the world if we say, ‘‘OK, you 

want—you’re going by air because you want a quick arrival.’’ 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. On the other hand, what happens if we 

said, ‘‘Well, OK, give us 24-hour notice of anything?’’ Have we 

looked at that part of the question? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, Senator Lautenberg, we have. We’ve worked 

very closely, particularly with CBP and Commissioner Bersin, and 

we’ve had a number of discussions on ‘‘How can we work with industry to get more advance notification without unduly affecting 

the bottom line for the cargo carriers?’’ The cargo carriers have 

been very open and receptive to looking for opportunities. But, the 

bottom line is, the more advance notification that goes to CBP— 

TSA doesn’t actually get that; it goes to CBP—the better informed 

we can be, and the key is, ‘‘What action do we take?’’ So, if there’s 

a high-risk package that has been identified coming from—you 

name the place in the world—what action can we take with that 

additional information? Let’s say it’s 8 hours. Let’s say it’s 24 

hours. Can CBP and TSA then communicate with that freight forwarder to say, ‘‘OK, we’re concerned about that package. Don’t put 

it on the plane?’’ That’s the key. 

21 

Senator LAUTENBERG. As we saw in the recent cargo bombing 

threat, information-sharing—key to foiling this plot—but, both the 

GAO and the National Security Council recently released reports 

finding that TSA needs to improve and expand its communication 

with passenger rail and mass transit agencies. What actions has 

TSA taken to meet the recommendations of GAO and the National 

Security Agency? 

Mr. PISTOLE. There are a number of issues that we are addressing in the whole surface transportation arena, Senator. As you so 

well articulated, we’ve seen threats from Madrid and Mumbai and 

London and Moscow, and in the attempt last year by Najibullah 

Zazi, in New York City, and in the one, just last month, that my 

colleagues at the Joint Terrorism Task Force so well disrupted here 

in D.C. The key is, ‘‘How do we best engage State and locals, who 

have that first response and first prevention responsibility?’’ And 

it’s in three ways. One is through the grants that we can allocate. 

One is through training. And that means training for, for example, 

additional VIPER teams and K–9s and things like that, or there is 

the actual hiring of officers, as we did, in terms of a grant to New 

York City last year, where they hired 120-plus officers—the only officers they were able to hire last year—specifically for New York 

City’s subway, with over 450 subway stops. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So, those are the type of things we’re doing. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, the Department recently completed 

an assessment of the nation’s passenger rail and mass-transit system and found a significant security risk. And yet, surface transportation security has traditionally made up a very small percentage of TSA’s overall budget. Agencies are currently reviewing their 

budget needs for the Fiscal Year 2012 budget. Will the budget request for TSA reflect a—more sensitivity to the need for rail and 

transit security? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I hope so. Because when we look at the 

number of people that are traveling by rail and see what—how inviting a target it was in other places in the world, that we can’t 

continue to neglect—‘‘neglect’’ is a strong word—to not focus more 

attention on the security in these transit systems. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I agree, Senator. And my only other comment on 

that is, of course, the TSA budget, in terms of surface, does not reflect the large multiples of that in transportation security grant 

money. There is actually more that shows up because it goes 

through FEMA, but doesn’t show up in the TSA budget. But, you’re 

absolutely right. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Johanns. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE JOHANNS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA 

Senator JOHANNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Director, under what circumstances would a passenger be 

subjected to both advanced imaging and then the law-enforcementstyle pat-down? 

22 

Mr. PISTOLE. The advanced imaging technology is an option; people can opt out of that. Just for context, we actually deployed the 

first AIT in the fall of 2007. 

Senator JOHANNS. Yes, but—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. This is not something that just happened overnight, 

but there’s just a lot of public interest in it now. 

Senator JOHANNS. Let me clarify my question. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator JOHANNS. I’ll get to—let’s assume the passenger goes 

through the advanced imaging—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. OK. 

Senator JOHANNS.—doesn’t object to it, and says, ‘‘Fine.’’ Under 

what circumstances would you then subject that passenger to the 

second—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. So, if—— 

Senator JOHANNS.—pat-down? 

Mr. PISTOLE.—when the person in the advanced imaging technology or the walk-through metal detector alarms—if the alarm 

goes off, alerts—there’s something that needs to be addressed. The 

person may get an opportunity to go through a second time. And 

if it still alarms, then that’s when the person would be asked to 

submit to a pat-down. 

Senator JOHANNS. So, if a passenger were subjected to both—no 

alarm went off, no suspicion—would that be arbitrary, on the part 

of your people? 

Mr. PISTOLE. To have a pat-down? 

Senator JOHANNS. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, it would be a very rare instance for somebody 

to have a pat-down if there wasn’t some type of alarm. 

Senator JOHANNS. I’m wondering why I got both, a few weeks 

ago. I did use my Senate ID and was subjected to both. Now, I 

didn’t object to going through the advanced imaging. Some do, 

some don’t. How would you answer that question? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Senator, I’d have to look into that. And if you went 

through advanced imaging technology and there were no alarms, in 

almost all instances, you would not be subject to a pat-down. There 

is a very, very small percentage that is done as random, so we can 

be unpredictable to the terrorists, even if they think everything is 

good. But, that is such a very, very small number, I would be surprised. But, I will look into it and get back with you. 

Senator JOHANNS. Mr. Director, I’ve often wondered, as this has 

kind of developed over time, at what point there’s a tipping point 

with the American public. You know, ‘‘Take off your belt. Take off 

your coat. Take off your shoes. Take out your liquids.’’ On and on. 

And now, advanced imaging and, as you acknowledge, a very intrusive pat-down if you choose not to do that. Does that worry you— 

that maybe we’re at a point here where this is not a vocal minority—that people just think you’ve overstepped? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I am sensitive to that, Senator. I know the threats 

are real. And so, what it comes down to is, ‘‘How do we—and I believe that reasonable people can disagree—strike the balance between privacy and security?’’ So, we all agree that everybody wants 

to be secure on that flight. Where we don’t necessarily agree is, 

‘‘What is the proper balance between that security and privacy?’’ 

23 

So, yes, I am concerned about that, and I want to make sure we 

can address those privacy issues by affording people private screening, at their request, and to do all those things that address those 

concerns while, again, giving the highest level of confidence that 

everybody on every flight has been screened in a way so that they 

feel comfortable that everybody else on that flight is safe. 

Senator JOHANNS. Well, let’s examine that a little bit, because as 

I think about cargo in the belly of the airplane—passenger airplane—if you were to follow kind of the same approach, what you 

would do is, you would send it through advanced imaging of some 

kind for packages. If you saw something suspicious, or an alarm 

went off in that package, you would open up the package and you 

would examine that. Do we do that today? 

Mr. PISTOLE. With cargo? 

Senator JOHANNS. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. We use either X-ray, advanced technology Xray, explosive-trace detection, K–9s, or physical inspection of packages. We do all those on cargo. And when I say ‘‘we,’’ we do about 

half, and then there are 1,140 certified cargo security partners 

around the country, private businesses, that do that off airport 

grounds, so we don’t have a bottleneck at the airport. And they 

then deliver that cargo in a secure fashion to the airport for delivery. 

Senator JOHANNS. Every package? 

Mr. PISTOLE. That goes on a passenger plane in the U.S., yes. 

Senator JOHANNS. OK. What’s your next step on this? I must 

admit, I get the impression that you’re expressing your understanding. I’m thinking nothing’s going to change. 

Mr. PISTOLE. If your question is, ‘‘Do I understand the sensitivities of people?’’—yes. If you’re asking, ‘‘Am I going to change the 

policies?’’—no. Because I think that being informed by the latest intelligence, the latest efforts by terrorists to kill our people in the 

air, no, I’m not going to change those policies. 

Senator JOHANNS. OK. So, for all those listening in, it’s still 

going to be the same. It will be the intrusive pat-down, and it will 

be the—or the advanced imaging. Or both. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, again, people have the option to opt out of 

AIT, in which case they would receive a thorough pat-down. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. If the alarm—— 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Johanns, would you yield on that 

point? 

Senator JOHANNS. Yes. 

Senator DORGAN. I think that Mr. Pistole testified that the increase in advanced technology will, he hopes, lead them to a point 

where the advanced imaging technology will give stick figures rather the—rather than the full-body impression. Is that correct? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. That’s the next generation that we’re looking 

at. Again, with high false positives that we’ve seen in our testing, 

we’re not there yet. 

Senator JOHANNS. How far away is that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I would like to say months, but, again, it’s all technology-driven, so there’s a huge incentive, as you can imagine, to 

private businesses, to get this, as best they can, perfect, I’d like to 

24 

say. But, of course, nothing’s perfect, in that regard. So, there’s a 

huge incentive for them to do that, and there are a number of companies that are competing to do that. So, we are working on it very 

closely. 

If you go out to Reagan Airport, just south of the airport, there’s 

a Transportation Security Integration Facility where we test all of 

our equipment before we deploy it. And, I’d invite you to come out 

there and see what we’re doing with the ATR—the Advanced Target Recognition software. 

The nice thing about that is, from a budgetary standpoint, and 

just for a practicality, it’s really a software modification to the existing hardware. So, we don’t go out and buy all new hardware and 

things. It can be used in a software modification. 

So, to answer your question a little bit more fully, I see us in an 

interim period right now where we’re using the best techniques and 

tactics, given the intelligence, enabled by the best technology. My 

hope is that the technology will improve. Perhaps someday, not 

only do we have the stick figures; but people can walk through, 

they can take liquids through again, they can keep shoes on, and 

they don’t have to take their computers out of their briefcases, and 

things like that. Those are all things that I would like to build to, 

recognizing the creativity of the terrorists that we’ve seen, with the 

toner cartridges, and knowing that they can put the explosive there 

and they can put it in a lot of other places. 

Senator JOHANNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Johanns, thank you very much. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, following up on Senator Johanns’ comment, this is the automated imaging recognition picture—this is a 

little small—which was given to me, which clearly addresses the 

privacy issue in its entirety. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator ISAKSON. What you are saying is that the square, or the 

red outlined area, which is an area of concern which would be subject to a pat-down—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Correct. 

Senator ISAKSON.—that you’re having a number of false positives 

on that right now? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Correct. Yes. 

Senator ISAKSON. But, if that is worked out, then people would 

be going through these screens, without worrying about privacy, 

whether they’re a child or an adult, because—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator ISAKSON.—you see a stick figure. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator ISAKSON. And they wouldn’t be subjected to a pat-down 

unless there came out an area of recognition by the machine, is 

that correct? 

Mr. PISTOLE. If the algorithm shows—and that box, as you say, 

shows on that part of the body where there’s an anomaly, that part 

of the body would then be subject to the pat-down, whether it’s the 

bottom of the foot, the armpit, the small of the back, the groin, 

whatever it may be. Just that area. 

25 

Senator ISAKSON. OK. It looks like technology can be a solution 

to the privacy issue. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Oh, I think so. I’m very hopeful in that regard. 

Senator ISAKSON. Technology is not a solution, however, to one 

issue, and that is good communication with the public—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator ISAKSON.—which I think TSA and the Department of 

Homeland Security need to pay attention to, because some of the 

outrage has been in response to some of the comments that have 

been made. 

I want to ask unanimous consent to submit to the record a 3- 

page statement by Ms. Pamela Robinson of Atlanta, Georgia. 

Senator DORGAN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAMELA ROBINSON, 

U.S. ARMY VETERAN, ATLANTA, GEORGIA

I am a Diamond Member on Delta Airlines. I fly approximately 200,000 miles 

year to date 2010. This is my written testimony requested by the Office of Senator 

Johnny Isakson, United States Senator—Georgia November 15, 2010. 

On Wednesday, November 10, 2010, I was returning home from a business conference in San Francisco, California USA to Atlanta, Georgia, USA. I was traveling 

on Delta Flight 2880 departing at 12 p.m. I arrived at the San Francisco airport 

around 10:40 a.m. After checking in at the Delta counter, I proceeded through security. I placed all my belongings and shoes on the belt, and proceeded through the 

metal detector. 

The TSA agent told me to remove my top because it was too wide at the bottom. 

I pulled the top off my shoulder to show her that there was only a slip under the 

top. She allowed me through the metal detector, which did NOT signal. There was 

no machine for further scanning between the metal detector and this open area. Another female agent told me to go through the area with plastic walls until I stepped 

out on a black plastic mat and a chair. 

The female TSA agent told me stand on this black mat and stated that she would 

be performing a pat-down from the waist down. She would rub her hand inside my 

‘‘inner thigh’’ in my groin area. I felt disgusted and stated, ‘‘I don’t think so. You 

will not touch me like that.’’ She then tried to convince me by continuing to describe 

how she was now going to ‘‘pat’’ my entire body down with her hands. I felt sick 

just hearing her describe how she thought I was going to stand there and allow her 

to molest me in front of the public. She stated that I could go to a private room. 

I stated that I am not going into a private room to be molested either. She needed 

to find another way other than touch my vagina. 

The TSA agent called over a male first-level supervisor. He said that I had to let 

her do it. I stated that I would not be touched like that. He got on a walkie-talkie 

and called another supervisor. I waited 10–15 minutes before anyone let me know 

what was going on. While we were waiting, I told the agent, ‘‘This is nothing against 

you. This is not your fault. You are just doing your job and what you are told, but 

this is wrong.’’ 

Since I was standing on the dirty floor, I asked, ‘‘Can I put my shoes on?’’ The 

TSA agent covered my belonging with her arm and abruptly stated, ‘‘Do not touch 

anything’’ as if I were a criminal. Everyone passing through security was watching 

with looks of fear on their faces as to say, ‘‘That could be me.’’ I was so embarrassed. 

The agent stated that I could sit in the chair, but I said ‘‘I don’t want to sit in the 

chair, I’m fine.’’ 

After 10–15 minutes, a second-level TSA female supervisor walked up and asked 

the agent, ‘‘Did the metal detector signal.’’ The TSA agent responded, ‘‘No.’’ There 

was silence as people continued to watch. I looked at the supervisor and said, ‘‘The 

metal detector did not go off, the first agent said my top was too loose.’’ I showed 

the agent my slip underneath the same way I showed the first agent. Since this was 

the problem, I said ‘‘Fine, I will take off my top down to my slip and go back 

through the metal detector.’’ The supervisor looked at me from head to toe and said, 

‘‘It is not your top, your pants legs are too wide.’’ I responded, ‘‘Are you [expletive 

deleted] kidding me? Have you lost your mind?’’ Then I stated, ‘‘fine I will take off 

my pants right here so you can see I have nothing on me, but you will not rub your 

26 

hand in my crotch.’’ She stated, ‘‘That will not be necessary’’ She continued, ‘‘If you 

don’t let the agent do this, you will not board the plane and will have to leave the 

airport.’’ I could not believe what I was hearing. I had no other way to get back 

to Atlanta from San Francisco and I was prevented from touching my belongings 

to call anyone. Nor was I able to call the police because they would be the people 

to escort me from the airport. I felt helpless and [expletive deleted]. 

I still would not allow the agent to touch my vagina or anywhere near it. I stated, 

‘‘At anytime I feel uncomfortable, I would stop this.’’ I had to stop it four to five 

times. The agent did not fully explain what she was going to do and my immediate 

reaction was to stop her hand from touching me in areas that were inappropriate 

for anyone to touch that is not intimate with me or my doctor for medical reasons. 

The agent went behind me while the supervisor stood there and everyone in the 

security area was watching and with an open hand touched my head with both 

hands in which I pulled away because it felt disgusting. She then rubbed her open 

hand down my neck, back and butt. Her hands never left my body. She then took 

her hand and tried to rub it in the inside of my thighs to my vagina, but I would 

not let her. The supervisor then said, ‘‘Can you get up there.’’ (Meaning my vagina) 

and the agent said no. The supervisor said to me, ‘‘If she can not get there [between 

your legs], you will have to leave the airport.’’ I could not believe what I was hearing. I said, ‘‘this is as wide as my legs will open.’’ The agent moved on and began 

to feel inside my waist band of my pants. I stopped her again when she tried to 

put her hand inside the waistband of ‘‘my underwear’’ and I yelled, Ok you are 

going too far! She stopped for a moment. The supervisor was still standing there 

and passengers were still watching as this occurred. We also stood in silence. 

I thought we were through until the agent then tried to feel my crotch again from 

the front but then stopped, because I pulled away. Then she tried to rub her entire 

hand on my breast and then lift my breast when 1 pushed her hand away and 

stopped this sexual assault. I began to walk toward my belongings and the agent 

said ‘‘I need to test my gloves to clear you.’’ The supervisor said, ‘‘We [TSA employees] also feel this is way too invasive’’ She gave me a complaint form and said; ‘‘I 

am giving these to passengers to file a complaint.’’ 

She wanted to file a complaint to the molesting organization and their affiliates. 

When I looked up the supervisor was gone and I do not know where the agent was 

I just wanted to get the hell out of there. 

My gate for my flight was immediately on the right hand side after security. I 

did not care about the flight or my first class seat. I immediately grabbed my cell 

phone and went online to get Senator Isakson’s number. I called his office and asked 

if he was in Georgia this week. He was but was returning to D.C. on Monday. (I 

had met with Senator Isakson years ago when I took my then high school-aged son 

to visit Washington to show him the capital and how Congress works to offset what 

he was learning in school. When I returned to Georgia, I received a very kind letter 

from the Senator’s office thanking me for my visit and that if I ever needed any 

help to let him know. I have never asked for anything but when I am in D.C., I 

stop by to visit and talk with the staff to stay in touch or sometimes I run into Senator Isakson during flights to D.C.) 

I reached his Georgia office and the staff was very responsive to my request as 

I was in tears and had to fly home frustrated, [expletive deleted] and in shock. I 

needed a meeting immediately. Toni Brown helped me get a meeting on Monday, 

November 15, 2010 with Tricia Chastain, State Director and Michael Quiello, D.C. 

staffer for Senator Isakson. I shared this same experience with them as described 

in this testimony. Michael Quiello asked me to put it in writing for the hearing on 

Wednesday, November 17, 2010. 

I already knew there was a hearing as I have spent the past week crying and 

dealing with the lingering psychological affects of sexual molestation. I have written 

President Obama to stop the molestation, I have sent tweets, and I have told everyone in my network, I have scanned every possible television outlet. I have done 

these things because I cannot go to the police or any law enforcement because this 

was the law. I am not a pilot or flight attendant protected by a union. I am a United 

States American who creates jobs and keeps the airline industry flying and for this, 

I am molested and told this will protect me from the terrorists! 

Finally, I shared with Tricia that my grandmother turns 90 years old on Thanksgiving Day and I ‘‘was’’ going to surprise her by flying to Ohio on Thanksgiving Day. 

Because of this incident, I will not fly until this molestation stops. The thought of 

returning to any airport makes me sick to my stomach and I want to vomit. I will 

not return to the airport until the molestation stops. I am very concerned that the 

children. The children will be psychologically damaged for life; while the ‘‘adults’ 

stood by and watched our children being molested in public. This is wrong. This molestation must stop immediately. 

27 

My constitutional rights in this country died when TSA passed this insane policy 

to molest their own citizens. 

Senator ISAKSON. Ms. Robinson is a businesswoman, a Diamond 

traveler on Delta Airlines, and this testimony illustrates how Secretary Napolitano’s statement the other day that, ‘‘Well, if you 

don’t like it, there are other ways to travel,’’ was sort of insensitive 

to the American business public. This woman was going to a meeting in San Francisco. There is no other alternative to get to San 

Francisco, other than 2 and a half days by rail, or 3 days by car, 

from Atlanta, Georgia. So, air travel is essential. And the comments by a rational person like Ms. Robinson, I think, need to be 

looked at to understand what Senator Johanns and the other Senators and I are dealing with on a daily basis, because the traveling 

public is significantly upset. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator ISAKSON. The whole—the 9/11 Commission, in 2007, 

asked TSA to develop a CrewPASS program for the flight crews so 

they could expeditiously go through security in a safe and secure 

manner. It’s my understanding that, in Columbia, South Carolina; 

and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, you have two—had two areas where 

you’ve been testing that for 2 years. 

Mr. PISTOLE. And BWI. 

Senator ISAKSON. Right, yes, and BWI. Well, what’s taken so 

long to implement that at the airports around the country? 

Mr. PISTOLE. That’s one of the questions I asked when I first 

came on as administrator, in July. I think we have made good 

progress, especially recently, to the point where I am hoping to be 

able to announce something, here in the very near future, as to 

some significant improvements in that regard, using CrewPASS. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I flew three times Monday, getting from 

Atlanta to Savannah to Charlotte to Washington, and rode with 

crew members on two of the three flights from two different airlines, and the first thing they raised was the CrewPASS issue, 

which is important to them. And I think anything you can do to 

expedite that process would be appreciated. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, I think we have a good way forward, Senator. 

Senator ISAKSON. My last question and/or comment is this: other 

than the pat-down, the biggest amount of feedback I get are young 

children—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator ISAKSON.—particularly if they’re subjected to a patdown. But, if they go through the machine—X-ray machine—one is 

the sensitivity of privacy, the other is the sensitivity of the amount 

of radiation they’re exposed to. Has TSA done sufficient testing, in 

your judgment, to ensure that that—exposure to that radiation 

over time is not a problem? 

Mr. PISTOLE. First, Senator, one thing that I did not do a good 

job of communicating is that children 12 and under are exempted 

from the enhanced pat-down. So, that’s one issue. It’s because of 

concerns about dealing with children. 

Senator ISAKSON. That’s a good decision. 

Mr. PISTOLE. As far as the radiation exposure, I would again, 

defer to what those independent studies did, looking at all types of 

populations, including children, pregnant women, elderly, and 

28 

things like that, which found that the exposure is well within safety standards. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Administrator. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Isakson, thank you. 

Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. Thank you. 

Just following up on Senator Isakson’s line of questions about the 

advanced imaging technology. Senator Bob Bennett and I had a bill 

to expand the use of that technology. And I had mentioned, in my 

opening, that I think that this is very good option, as Senator Isakson had stated. We need to keep improving the technology. But, 

where are we in terms of the rollout? How many airports are they 

in? What’s the maximum amount that we now plan to put in the 

airports? 

Mr. PISTOLE. We have approximately 385 of the advanced imaging technology machines deployed in approximately 70 airports 

right now. What we have been authorized and funded for is around 

490 by the end of the year. So, we are looking at another 100 or 

so by the end of the year, and then, another 500 to get us up to 

1,000 by the end of next year. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So, that’s what we’re building toward. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And are—is the plan to have them in—I assume, all the major airports, already in there—but, are you going 

to get to, like, Fargo, for instance—that airport? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. So, that’s—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. 

Mr. PISTOLE.—obviously done on a—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE.—an airport-by-airport basis. We try to be riskbased—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE.—and intelligence-driven, and—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I understand. 

Mr. PISTOLE.—a number of factors. And ability for the airport to 

actually physically install in the space, and things like that. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. On to the pat-down. Could you describe the decisionmaking process that went into strengthening the 

pat-down method, without revealing things you can’t reveal? 

Mr. PISTOLE. So, in a general way, when I came on as Administrator, in July, I looked at what we were doing to address the 

threat posed by the 12/25 Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber 

and I also was informed by several GAO reports, DHS Inspector 

General reports, and our own TSA Office of Inspections. All three 

entities do covert testing. And, without going into too much detail, 

one of the things they found as a common denominator was, that 

when the covert tester was able to get through security, it was 

largely because we were not being thorough enough in our patdowns. 

So, the intelligence, coupled with the repeated covert testing, led 

me to conclude that we needed to be more thorough, to be more 

consistent with partners around the world, recognizing that we are 

29 

an interdependent system, as we saw on 12/25. If Abdulmutallab 

had been detected overseas and never would have made it here, obviously that would have helped. So, those are the issues. And I’d 

be glad to go into more detail in a closed setting. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Sure. And do you believe these will be permanent now, these changes? Or, you know, is it something you adjust when you see new—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, we’re always trying to evolve our techniques 

and technology, as informed by intelligence, and are always aware 

that we don’t want to just focus on yesterday’s threat. So, what we 

are working very closely with, as part of the intel and law enforcement communities, are, ‘‘What do we see as tomorrow’s threats, 

and how can that inform our judgments and actions today, in terms 

of what technology we need?’’ So, that’s all part of that process. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And then, I—Senator Isakson talked to you 

about the crew issue, and I know you’re working on that. Just in 

terms of education, what do think could be done, especially with 

the holidays coming up, to inform the public? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. I would just make an appeal 

to the American people to go to the TSA website to see what the 

latest practices, protocols, procedures are, and to be the best-informed travelers possible, especially when we’re talking about perhaps once-a-year travelers, those going home, just for the holidays. 

The better informed they can be, the better partnership we can 

have to provide that best possible security. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. Very good. And then, just quick questions about the screening. Do you feel that 2013 is a reasonable 

deadline for the 100-percent screening? And what is—could you 

talk about the present alternative right now, the risk-based approach? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. When we’re talking about international 

air—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I’m talking about the cargo screening. 

Mr. PISTOLE.—the international air cargo coming to the U.S., we 

really divide it into two categories: known shippers and the trusted 

shippers and the known supply chain, and those who are unknowns, such as the individual packages and things. We have a 

very close relationship with the major cargo shippers, and they are 

working very closely with us to identify high-risk packages. Again, 

it’s in their best interest not to have high-risk packages on their 

flights. The year 2013 is a challenge, but that is what we are working toward to ensure we can do that. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. Very good. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I’d like to talk a little bit about cargo and 

the capability of airports around the world to screen appropriately. 

What’s the plan for high-risk cargo inspections for countries that 

don’t have screening capabilities? I mean, we have—I mean, unfortunately, the people who want to harm our country are not operating under a flag or a sovereign nation, they are everywhere in 

the world, and they move continually, which is why we have to 

have the investment in intelligence. It seems like, to me, that 

30 

they’re going to begin to try to pinpoint those countries that have 

no capability of screening, other than visual. And so, what is the 

plan on how we deal with those? And there are a number of those 

countries, I understand. Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. PISTOLE. There are, Senator. For example, when I was in 

Yemen, 2 weeks ago, to look at what they are doing in terms of 

cargo screening, I found that they used the X-ray machine pretty 

much exclusively. It’s not a modern, advanced technology X-ray 

machine where you can see two-dimensional and things like that. 

No explosive trace detection. No, or very limited, physical inspection. No K–9s. So, you’re right, it is uneven around the world. 

What I see as the best way forward is what we do here in the 

U.S., working with the private sector in terms of a trusted screening facility. The certified cargo screening program that we have 

here has 1,140 or so private companies doing over 50 percent of the 

screening of cargo going on U.S. passenger flights. I think that’s 

one of the models. We’re working with ICAO and IATA towards capacity development for those very countries that you allude to that 

don’t have the ability right now to do that type of screening. 

For example, in Yemen, we sent a team there to work with them 

to train and equip them in practices and protocols, we also took explosive trace detection equipment and left it with them, in terms 

of building capacity, to do those very things you describe. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I loathe the notion that we would 

have to buy screening equipment for other countries. But, I’m very 

worried about the preponderance of countries out there that are not 

taking this seriously and have not made this a priority, because 

that is the weakest link. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I agree, Senator. And I think what we will probably 

see—just from a private-sector business-risk model—is that they 

may likely not pick up packages that they assess as being high risk 

from certain areas of the world. And so, that will be the fallout, I 

think, from this. That’s an extreme measure of risk management, 

but it’s effective. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE.—I think that may be what we see. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What about the other cargo measures? We 

have spent an awful lot of time in this hearing talking about air. 

But, what are the security measures that we’re increasing in the 

other cargo venues, particularly maritime, where you—when you 

have remote ability to detonate, the damage that could be done— 

frankly, rail, maritime, any of that—what—can you give the Committee some reassurances that we’re making progress on those 

fronts? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, I can reassure the Committee we’re making 

some progress. I would also want to manage expectations that 

there are clearly still some gaps and vulnerabilities. Of course, 

Customs and Border Protection has the lead, in terms of maritime 

and 24-hour notification, and then the Coast Guard has the lead 

in the port security. TSA has a role, but it’s, frankly, a somewhat 

limited role, secondary or tertiary to CBP and Coast Guard. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, this might be one that we’d want to 

talk to the Secretary about, because I—I know it has got to be frustrating, because, you know, you move one direction to try to really 

31 

address any gaps we have, and then it’s—and then there’s—another one opens up, and you move there, and then you’ve taken 

your eye off the first one. But, I do think that we’ve got to be sophisticated about the weakest links that we have in this. And 

clearly, I think, cargo—frankly, non-air cargo, may in fact be— 

along with those countries that aren’t screening—are two places 

that we need to be all hands on deck. 

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator DORGAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator LeMieux? 

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator, good to be with you again. 

I want to talk to you about the subject I know a lot of my colleagues have spoken to you about, which is this pat-down and what 

Americans are dealing with at airports across the country. 

You and I spoke, before you were confirmed, about maybe relying 

more on behavioral evaluation, doing more of what other countries, 

like Israel, do. I’m, frankly, bothered by the level of these patdowns. I’ve seen them firsthand in airports in Florida. I wouldn’t 

want my wife to be touched in the way that these folks are being 

touched. I wouldn’t want to be touched that way. And I think that 

we have to be focused on safety, but there’s a balance. Now, you’re 

going forward with more of these advanced imaging technology machines, which I think are fine and appropriate. And, although 

they’re invasive, there’s not a physical touching to them—you have 

procedures in place to keep that person, who’s looking at the imaging, in another room, and there are some protections there. But, I 

also understand that you would like to do everything possible to 

keep American people safe. But, there are limits. There has to be 

a balance here. What can we do to right this balance? I think we’ve 

gone too far afield. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Senator, I think there are a number of issues here. 

And one is that one is that people who would receive this pat-down, 

almost exclusively, would be as a result of some alarm, either 

through the walk-through metal detector or the advanced imaging 

technology. So, a very, very small number of people would receive 

a pat-down as a random or not as a result of alarm. So, that’s first. 

The second is, simply being informed by the intelligence that 

we’ve talked about—the GAO, the IG inspections, covert testing, 

which we could talk about in a classified setting, we know that 

there are additional things that we could be doing to detect things. 

And based on pat-downs and AIT, we have detected dozens and 

dozens of, let’s say, artfully concealed objects that could pose a risk 

to aviation. So, for me, it comes down to that balance, as you say, 

and the fact that everybody wants to be secure on that flight, 

knowing that you’ve been screened, I’ve been screened, everybody’s 

been screened properly, and we have confidence. And yet, we want 

to ensure the best possible privacy. So, how can we do that? And 

I think we do that with AIT. And if we move to ATR, with the stick 

figure, I think that will really go a long way. 

32 

So, how do we achieve that balance? In the final analysis, I think 

reasonable people can disagree as to what that proper balance is. 

If we take those two flights that I mentioned earlier—one, you 

have the option to be screened, and you know everybody else has 

been screened, and another flight, where there’s no screening, and 

you go to the same place—I think almost everybody will get on that 

flight that had been properly screened. So, in my job, as Administrator, I just try to find that balance. I recognize the invasiveness 

of it. I also recognize that the threats are real. The stakes are high, 

and we must prevail. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Well, and I appreciate the work you’re doing. 

I know it’s a difficult balance to strike. What I would hope for with 

the advancement in technology, without getting into anything 

that’s confidential—you know, when you see little kids, or you see 

senior citizens who are traveling domestically in this country, 

maybe have never been outside of this country before, we know 

that the chance that they are a terrorist is very, very, very slim. 

No one wants to talk about profiling, because that’s a scary word— 

but, we know that if you’re a man who’s 18 to 40, and you’ve been 

traveling around the world, there’s a much higher chance that you 

would fall within that group of folks who could be a danger to this 

country than the rest of those folks. I mean, I would love to see 

a world where we had some kind of identification that when you 

went and they checked my driver’s license, they would know my 

travel history, and you could screen people based upon the likelihood that they’re a terrorist, and not just because they are walking 

onto an airplane. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Someone who’s traveling between Minneapolis 

and Fort Lauderdale, that has never left the country and never had 

a criminal record—there is a very good chance that they’re not concealing some kind of plastic explosive in their underwear. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. And, to your point, Senator, I would restate 

the fact that, because we are trying to be a risk-based, intelligencedriven organization, the children 12 and under will not be subject 

to these pat-downs. We’re working with pilots on their issues. 

They’re in charge of the aircraft, so why do they go through the 

same type of screening? We are really trying to be as best informed 

about each individual traveler, similar to the Israeli model. We’re 

using behavior detection extensively. We’re picking up some good 

finds there. The bottom line is how to do that without profiling, as 

you say. And there’s a dynamic tension there between safety, security, and privacy. And so, how do we resolve that dynamic tension 

while ensuring the bottom line is that that flight is secure? 

Senator LEMIEUX. I appreciate your comments and your good 

work. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator LeMieux, thank you very much. 

Senator DeMint. 

33 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Pistole. I appreciate the professionalism you’re showing here today. And, frankly, I’ve heard most 

of the questions that I wanted to ask. 

One of the things that Senator LeMieux was hitting at is the 

idea of whether we are going to continue to evolve and use common 

sense? And, particularly, I want to make sure that we’re not overly 

concerned with being so politically correct that we would ignore 

high-risk targets as—and you mentioned the Israeli model. 

We particularly appreciate you looking at ways to transition this 

technology that allows you to see things you need to see, and not 

see things you don’t. Transition into something that’s more animated. I think that would give people a lot of comfort. And then, 

looking at the, you know, rational-age thing. 

I think if Americans know we’re—that we’re not just setting up 

rules—my concern is that your job is to keep people safe, not to 

keep them comfortable. And that can just—that can get out of control over time. And we need to make sure that travel, by air and 

other ways, is—continues to be a good experience. But, you seem 

to be trying to draw the best balance there, and that’s very important. And evolving the technology as well as the personnel and the 

behavioral aspects of this is a pretty good package. And I think if 

you can keep us up to date on what you’re doing, not just on hearings, but periodically, a memo or something, in ways—like you’ve 

asked today, that Americans partner with TSA and stay more informed. Because, if they haven’t traveled in a year and they run 

into this, it’s a pretty stunning thing. And we’re getting hundreds 

of calls. And so, they want us to be on top of this. 

Apparently you’re doing what you can to try to modify this in a 

way that seems reasonable to people and to keep them safe. You’ve 

got a very tough job. But, I mostly just want to thank you for what 

you’re doing. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator DeMint. I appreciate that. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Pistole, just one final question. 

Thank you very much, Senator DeMint. 

We have had four events, really, that have been kind of defining 

events since we began much more enhanced screening after 9/11. 

One dealt with shoes. One dealt with underwear. One dealt with 

liquids. One dealt with cartridge toners. And so on. And so, each 

event reflects an offense by someone trying to commit—this case, 

murder. I mean, they want to get a bomb on an airplane. And then, 

you’re involved in defense; we are involved in defense. And I guess 

the question I would ask you—we’ve ramped up the defense a lot. 

I mean, that’s what this discussion’s all about today. Tell me about 

the threat level. It appears to me the threat level continues to increase. You increase our defensive capabilities. Where are we, relative to where we were a few years ago? Is the offense ahead of 

the defense? The defense is way out there ahead of the offense? 

What’s your sense? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, Senator, obviously, the operational tempo of al 

Qaeda and its affiliates, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula, has 

increased, as you’ve indicated. There are other groups around the 

world that are also interested in committing attacks, not only in 

34 

the U.S., but in Europe. You may have seen the Germans increase 

their level of security this morning in response to a current threat 

stream that we’d need to go into closed session about. 

The way I look at this construct for TSA and Homeland Security 

is that we are on a continuum for the national security mission of 

the United States. At the one end, we have all the offensive actions 

of the military, whether in the tribal areas—Pakistan, Afghanistan—working with other countries, wherever it may be. 

And hopefully there is some intelligence because of somebody 

who is detained on the battlefield said, ‘‘Yes, there’s some current 

plotting against the U.S.’’ That may not work. 

And so, then we look at those other agencies, CIA and NSA, for 

HUMINT and SIGINT and those things that hopefully will inform 

us about plots that may be taking place here in the U.S. 

That may not happen. And so, my former colleagues at the FBI, 

the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, hopefully they or the 750,000 to 

800,000 State and local police officers, sheriffs, deputies, will be informed because they see something, say something—there is a 

threat—somebody sees something that’s out of whack. But, that 

may not be the case. 

And so, when it comes down to TSA, you’re absolutely right, we 

are on the last lines of defense for the U.S. government. And 

whether it is a behavior detection officer, whether it’s an explosive 

specialist doing the swabbing of hands and picking up of trace residue, whether it’s a security officer, through the AIT or the patdown—if somebody, such as Abdulmutallab, gets through all that 

and is able to get on that plane, then we’re really down to the Federal Air Marshals, which is part of TSA, to be that last line of defense, or maybe armed pilots onboard. There are obviously concerned crew and passengers. For the U.S. government, it really 

comes down to that construct. 

Senator DORGAN. What I was trying to ask is, the passenger 

that’s taking a flight in this country today, they know—just by 

reading the newspapers and seeing the actions you’re taking, they 

know that the threats have increased. But, also, your activities 

have increased to respond to the threats. Should they feel there is 

slightly less risk, the same risk, or more risk? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Hopefully, they would see all the actions we’re taking as deterrence to any putative terrorist. So, somebody who is 

planning an attack on aviation particularly, would see these actions as a way of moving them, unfortunately, to a softer target. 

We’ve done so much to harden the targets of aviation, and yet— 

and yet—they have done all these types of attacks. So, I hope it’s 

a deterrent. That’s the bottom line. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Hutchison. 

Senator HUTCHISON. I do just have one more. 

This rather high-profile person, Mr. Tyner, who left the San 

Diego airport after refusing to undertake the full body scan, now 

it’s being reported that he is being investigated and that he may 

face up to a $10,000 fine. Is that the procedure? Are you investigating him? 

Mr. PISTOLE. There are two parts to that. I’ve learned that TSA 

has the administrative authority to fine people who try to smuggle 

items on planes, prohibited items, things like that. That has been 

35 

fairly common—several thousand times—where that has happened. 

I’m not aware of any instance where somebody who has passively 

refused screening has ever been fined. So, it is being reviewed. I 

don’t want to prejudge anything, but I do not anticipate anything 

coming from that, other than working with the public, to say, 

‘‘Look, this is for your safety, security. Work with us. This is a 

partnership here.’’ 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, I agree with you that it should be considered a partnership. And, in general, I have found, and mostly 

I hear, that the TSA employees are very aware of the privacy 

issues. They are sympathetic and are handling it very well. But, is 

it the policy of the agency not to fine someone who decides they do 

not want to be screened, and therefore, they leave? 

Mr. PISTOLE. The policy is silent as to that issue, so it comes up 

for a decision. And so, when all the facts are at hand, when I’m 

briefed on all the facts, then I’ll make a decision on that. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, I would hope that we wouldn’t go 

overboard if someone decides that they have the right to their privacy, and therefore, they walk out without injury to anyone. I can’t 

see that that would be a fine offense. 

Mr. PISTOLE. No, again, I am trying not to preview too much, because I would just like to make sure I have all the facts. But, I 

agree completely with you on that, Senator. Again, the fines, historically, have been primarily for people who have tried to smuggle 

items onboard. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Actually—correct. 

Mr. PISTOLE. And that’s not this situation. 

Senator HUTCHISON. All right. Thank you very much. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Pistole, thank you very much for your testimony. And thanks for the work that you do and your agency does. 

And I want to mention that we will talk to the Chairman, and 

I expect that he would agree and want to have a classified briefing 

by you and the agency in the near future. 

This hearing’s adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(37) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV 

TO HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. The Yemen air cargo threat incident has underscored the need to set 

up additional ‘‘tripwires’’ such as customer identity and accountability mechanisms 

to make it harder for terrorists to use international commerce as a means of attack. 

What responsibilities do shipping companies such as UPS, FedEx and their agents 

and subcontractors have to make sure customers who drop off packages bound for 

the U.S. are actually who they say they are? Are current protocols sufficient? If not, 

does TSA plan on increasing the identification verification requirements? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) requires all cargo carriers to inspect cargo accepted from shippers to ensure that the cargo does not pose 

a threat to the aircraft, its crew, and passengers. TSA does not require all cargo 

carriers to validate the shipper identity. TSA is aware that several air carriers have 

applied additional security measures such as identification checks for shippers as 

part of their security measures to protect their business operations. 

TSA believes that validating shipper identification is one layer of an effective 

strategy to mitigate the security risk for air cargo. TSA is currently working with 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection to test the feasibility of using shipment data 

to target elevated risk cargo. TSA will assess the effectiveness of this approach and 

will modify its security requirements accordingly. TSA is also working closely with 

the air cargo industry to develop and share best practices for enhancing air cargo 

security. 

Question 2. In February of 2010, the agency announced that it would reconsider 

the weight threshold it put forward under its original LASP proposal and stated it 

would release the new LASP requirements in the fall of 2010. The new LASP still 

has not been released. What is the status of this effort? 

Answer. In response to the public comments received after issuing the Large Aircraft Security Program Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in October 2008, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is modifying the rulemaking proposal to 

take public comments into account and evaluate the feasibility/effectiveness of certain criteria, including aircraft weight, vetting of crew and passengers, and securing 

the aircraft. Currently, the Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) 

is being prepared, and TSA expects the SNPRM to be released in mid–2011. 

Question 3. The SAFE Port Act of 2006 included a mandate that DHS conduct 

pilot tests for the physical access component of the TWIC program, including card 

reader technologies and requisite security operations. TSA did not begin this pilot 

testing until 2009. Pilots are underway at seven locations, with multiple facilities 

and vessels participating in each venue. Until the analyses are performed, and the 

rules issued, workers will continue to show their TWIC card to gain access to a facility. What progress has TSA made with the card reader pilot program, and is TSA 

committed to finalizing the pilots and moving forward with broad deployment of the 

readers? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has completed Initial 

Technical Testing which evaluated the technical capability of the Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) readers, documented environmental and 

reader specification conformance testing, and gathered and reported baseline operational and environmental data from participants. The Early Operational Assessment that provides for start-up learning curve and evaluates the technical performance of TWIC readers at test sites is underway or complete at all but four sites. 

The System Test & Evaluation which evaluates the operational and technical impact of installing and using TWIC readers at a variety of maritime facilities and 

vessels once readers/users achieve steady-state operation and includes an assessment of reader effectiveness, suitability, and supportability is complete at five sites. 

TSA anticipates completing the Reader Pilot in early calendar year (CY) 2011. 

Under the current plans, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) estimates the NoVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Oct 13, 2011 Jkt 070643 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\70643.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
38 

tice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) should be published by the end of CY 2011 

and a final rule published by the end of CY 2012. 

Question 4. Is there a concern that in the absence of full TWIC card reader deployment, the use of TWIC as a ‘‘flash-pass’’ rather than a biometric card presents 

security risks at ports—especially those ports that traffic in especially hazardous 

cargo? 

Answer. At this time there is no requirement for ports and facilities to use readers and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) reader pilot 

program has not been completed. The existing regulation requires visual verification 

of a TWIC in reducing security risks at Maritime Transportation Security Act 

(MTSA) regulated vessels and facilities. In the interim to fully leverage the security 

benefit of the TWIC, the Coast Guard has added an electronic TWIC handheld reader capability to existing MTSA and law enforcement programs to verify compliance 

with the TWIC requirements during vessel and facility compliance exams and/or security spot checks on a case by case basis. 

Question 5. Some passenger and freight rail carriers have indicated that they do 

not have established relationships with their surface transportation security inspectors which creates confusion when a inspectors shows up for an inspection. Additionally, these groups have also stated the inspectors are inconsistent with their inspection efforts and seem to lack a focus. Finally, the GAO and some surface transportation inspectors have criticized the TSA for requiring some surface transportation 

inspectors to perform aviation-related duties, despite the fact that they do not have 

such expertise. How is TSA addressing these concerns? 

Answer. Surface inspector relationships with rail agencies depend on a number 

of factors, including the size of the agency and whether or not they are located in 

a high-threat urban area and/or transport toxic inhalation hazardous (TIH) materials. Further, the surface inspection program is driven by the level of risk, which 

generally results in a focus on passenger rail agencies in high threat urban areas 

with large riderships and freight rail entities that carry TIH materials. The inspectors have worked closely with the top 100 mass transit/passenger rail agencies and 

all of the Class I freight railroads since 2006, conducting voluntary security assessments to include Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) reviews 

and Security Action Items (SAI), and performing regulatory inspections. Not all passenger rail agencies have large riderships and many short-line freight railroads do 

not carry TIH, so there will be some agencies/railroads that have minimal interaction with surface inspectors. 

All Transportation Security Administration (TSA) inspectors are firmly grounded 

in developing depth of mode expertise. It is only after three or 4 years of extensive 

qualification that inspectors receive an orientation in another mode. All inspectors 

must have domain awareness to recognize security violations; however, inspectors 

will specialize in one mode in order to ensure deep subject matter expertise. 

Question 6. The Center for National Response operated by the West Virginia National Guard in Gallagher, WV is a unique facility for training first responders in 

both disaster response and disaster recovery for highway, rail, transit, accidents or 

attacks in very close to real time simulations. Can you tell me more about TSA’s 

efforts to coordinate both training and response with state and local organizations 

like the CNR? 

Answer. As a matter of policy, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

encourages those who may be involved with terrorist attack response to take full 

advantage of training opportunities, such as those offered by the Center for National 

Response (CNR). For example, since 2006, TSA, through the Federal Transit Security Grant Program, has awarded more than $115 million to transit systems nationwide for training front-line employees, and an additional $13 million has been 

awarded to conduct both table-top and full-scale security exercises. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BYRON L. DORGAN TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. In response to a question during the hearing on proposed TSA 

changes to the current aviation worker background screening process, you noted 

that the agency’s work in this area is part of an ongoing effort to harmonize background checks for aviation workers, maritime workers and others with a goal of creating ‘‘one-stop shopping’’ for background checks. Can you please expand on the 

agency’s long-term plans with regard to aviation worker vetting and what specific 

role TSA will play in the process beyond receiving biometric and biographic data on 

39 

prospective employees and conducting security threat assessments on those individuals? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is currently preparing 

a proposed rule that will consolidate and harmonize existing transportation worker 

vetting programs, to the extent possible under law, and include new populations of 

persons that must be vetted. This rule is known as the ‘‘Standardized Vetting, Adjudication, and Redress Services Rulemaking’’ (TSA Universal Rule) and is intended 

to expand the extent to which TSA can determine that Security Threat Assessment 

(STAs) for different modes of transportation are comparable, reducing the need for 

redundant STAs and fees. 

Question 2. Do you intend to assume any of the functions in the aviation worker 

background screening process currently performed by the private sector either in the 

short term or in the long term as you transition to the more ‘‘harmonized’’ approach 

outlined during the hearing? 

Answer. As part of the long term rulemaking effort, the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) is reviewing the security threat assessment processes to identify areas for standardization across transportation workers, including aviation 

workers. The review includes all aspects of the security threat assessment process 

including data and fee collection, information submission, identity and immigration 

documentation, and adjudication processes and roles. In the short term, the proposed Aviation Channeling Services Project (ACSP) intends to provide choice to 

aviation stakeholders in the selection and use of Designated Aviation Channelers 

(DACs) for the purpose of aggregating applicant data and then transmitting that 

data to TSA. The roles and responsibilities in the pending ACSP are consistent with 

the roles and responsibilities that are performed today. 

Question 3. If so, what specific roles do you envision federalizing? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is reviewing the full 

security threat assessment process including current roles and responsibilities 

among the government, private entities, and individuals. TSA is considering 

changes to the data collection, document verification, fee collection and adjudication 

processes as part of the Standardized Vetting, Adjudication and Redress rulemaking. Prior to implementing any changes to the current processes, TSA will solicit comment and feedback from industry and stakeholders to better inform the decisions being made. 

Question 4. I understand that the cost to workers in the aviation industry, or their 

employers, for required background checks are roughly one-third of what other 

transportation workers pay for similar checks as part of the Transportation Worker 

Identification Credential (TWIC) program or for a hazardous material endorsement. 

Please provide the Committee with an analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness 

of the existing aviation worker background screening model. 

Answer. While the aviation worker program requires similar security threat assessment (STA) checks to the Transportation Worker Identification Credential 

(TWIC) program, the aviation worker STA and associated credential (Security Identification Display Area/SIDA badges) are not solely managed by the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA). Unlike TWIC, in the current vetting program for 

airport and airline workers, TSA does not produce, issue, or manage secure credentials for these workers. Furthermore, the cost of operating contractor-provided enrollment and card activation services for TWIC applicants is also included in the 

TWIC fee charged to applicants. 

TSA conducts the required security checks, but, unlike the TWIC program, TSA 

does not adjudicate the criminal history records check for the airports or the large 

aircraft operators; these functions are managed by the airports and airlines. Unlike 

the TWIC program, aviation workers are currently not charged for TSA costs related 

to the security threat assessment that TSA does conduct. TSA currently pays for 

these costs through appropriations. 

In accordance with the pertinent laws, TSA must complete a rulemaking to collect 

user fees to pay for the costs of the vetting programs. TSA is in the process of completing a proposed rule that will cover fees for the aviation worker checks. However, 

TSA will continue to collect, on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

the Government fee of $17.25 for the fingerprint-based Criminal History Records 

Check (CHRC). Additionally, aviation workers are not provided the same redress opportunities (appeals, waivers, review by an Administrative Law Judge) as TWIC applicants. 

The reason for the difference in redress between aviation workers and TWIC applicants lies in the governing statutes. In aviation, the statute (49 U.S.C. 44936) is 

very prescriptive about the kind of redress, list of crimes, and look-back periods that 

aviation workers must adhere to, and the statute does not authorize the ability to 

40 

apply for waivers, nor does it require ALJ review. For TWIC, the statute (46 U.S.C. 

70105) specifically requires TSA to establish a waiver process and provide the opportunity for ALJ review. 

Question 5. Please provide the Committee with the security rationale for the recent aviation worker background check proposal and explain what specifically the 

agency is doing to ensure that its efforts don’t diminish security or disrupt the existing background check process at airports. 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is committed to providing a seamless expansion of service providers through the Aviation Channeling 

Services Project and fully understands the importance of the flow of information between airport stakeholders and TSA. TSA has sought industry input and met with 

aviation stakeholders to leverage their relevant expertise and experience as we introduce choice to airports and aircraft operators. These meetings and the feedback 

TSA has received from airports have helped inform our business and technical requirements and should serve to mitigate the risk associated with transitioning to 

an environment of choice among multiple Designated Aviation Channelers. Further, 

the Designated Aviation Channelers will undergo a thorough qualification and testing process and be required to comply with Federal information security and privacy 

requirements. 

Question 6. Are the agency’s efforts to change the existing aviation worker background screening system being driven by security or by other factors, such as a desire to promote competition in the screening process? 

Answer. In response to Congressional inquiries, private industry, and aviation 

stakeholders, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is pursuing a model 

that will provide a choice of qualified channeling service providers for airports and 

aircraft operators and competition among the potential vendors. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. Airlines have been charging passengers fees for checking their bags 

and as a result, more passengers are opting to carry the bags onboard aircraft. 

What is the impact on checkpoint security, including resource implications, as a result of more passengers bringing their baggage onto the aircraft as a carry-on, as 

opposed to checking their bag? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has witnessed a 20 

percent decrease in the number of checked bags submitted for screening during the 

last 2 years as most major air carriers have instituted baggage fees. The number 

of items X-ray screened as carry-on property has dramatically increased, resulting 

in a 17 percent reduction in hourly passenger screening throughput. This trend has 

forced TSA to reexamine resource allocation in terms of balancing checkpoint and 

checked baggage staffing requirements. It should be noted that at checkpoints serving air carriers that have not instituted checked baggage fees, the reduction in 

throughput has not been observed. 

Question 2. The Department of Homeland Security requires manifest information 

to be provided 24 hours prior to loading for all maritime cargo entering our ports. 

However, for cargo entering our country by air, manifests only have to be provided 

4 hours prior to arrival—which could be too late to stop a bomb before it enters our 

airspace. Shouldn’t we require more advance notice for air cargo, particularly highrisk cargo, entering the United States? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is working closely with industry and our international partners to expedite the receipt of cargo manifests for 

international flights to the United States prior to departure in order to identify and 

screen items based on risk and current intelligence. The Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have already 

initiated joint pilot activities with industry to explore the feasibility of advanced information in the air cargo environment. 

Question 3. The Senate Fiscal Year 2011 Homeland Security Appropriations Bill 

includes four million dollars above the President’s request for air cargo security in 

order for TSA to conduct a voluntary pilot program to obtain air cargo information 

prior to departure. The purpose is to identify high-risk cargo for additional screening or even prevent it from being loaded on an aircraft. How soon will the Department be able to get this pilot program up and running? 

Answer. On October 28, 2010, the global counter-terrorism community disrupted 

a potential attack when individuals with ties to Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula 

in Yemen attempted to conceal and ship explosive devices in cargo on board aircraft 

41 

ultimately bound for the United States. The Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are working collaboratively and partnering with the private sector in the express consignment, passenger, and heavy all-cargo environment to identify strategies for strengthening air 

cargo security. This on-going collaborative effort is being extended throughout the 

air cargo industry and several pilot programs will be undertaken. The initial pilot 

within the express consignment environment commenced in December of 2010. 

Question 4. The flying public has expressed privacy concerns about body scanners 

at airport checkpoints. There is a software upgrade being tested that could potentially address many privacy concerns by eliminating the actual body image and replacing it with a generic ‘‘stick figure’’ image, while still locating and identifying potential threats. When will the TSA have this technology installed at airports across 

the country? 

Answer. Automated Target Recognition (ATR) software is used with Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) and displays a generic stick figure-like image on the monitor 

attached to the AIT machine to show potential threats concealed on a passenger, 

and does not display the actual image of the passenger. It provides strong privacy 

protections and eliminates the need to staff an extra officer in a private room. Software development is currently underway and will be followed by testing to ensure 

it meets our screening requirements. 

Question 5. The 9/11 Act included the requirement that DHS establish mandatory 

training standards for front-line employees in the rail, transit and bus industries. 

This was due in over 2 years ago, but the TSA has yet to establish these critical 

standards. Will the TSA complete this overdue requirement by the end of next year? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has drafted a Notice 

of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) entitled Surface Transportation Employee Training, to meet the 9/11 Act requirement to establish mandatory training standards for 

front-line employees in the rail, transit, and bus industries. The draft NPRM is currently being reviewed and is estimated to be published in the fourth quarter of FY 

2011. In the interim, TSA has continued to work with the rail, transit, and bus industries on security awareness training they provide to their employees. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK PRYOR TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. I understand that in the days immediately following the attempted 

plot, at the direction of President Obama and Secretary Janet Napolitano, TSA deployed a team of security inspectors to Yemen to provide assistance and guidance 

to the Government of Yemen with their cargo screening procedures. Why did such 

a meeting not take place at an earlier date considering we knew such threats might 

be coming from this region and specifically this country? 

Answer. Previous to the incident, U.S. efforts were targeted primarily to countries 

with direct air service to the United States or those otherwise served by U.S. aircraft operators; currently, direct air service to the United States from Yemen is not 

available and no U.S. aircraft operators provide service to/from Yemen. As a result 

of the incident, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), through its 

Transportation Security Administration Representative (TSAR), has been working 

collaboratively with the Government of Yemen. TSARs are senior TSA personnel 

posted in key locations worldwide to work with the governments in the TSAR’s assigned region, to improve their aviation security postures and aid governments in 

recognizing that the threat to the aviation sector remains high and therefore mitigation measures must be implemented to counter new and emerging threats as they 

arise. 

Question 2. Was this threat not a concern prior to the discovery of this plot? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was concerned about 

threats and vulnerabilities for cargo worldwide, including Yemen. Those concerns 

were expressed in a classified assessment (U//FOUO) Air Cargo Threat Assessment 

dated 7 October 2010. 

Question 3. What other transportation threats from this region are of most concern to you and what proactive measures are you taking to prevent them? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is concerned about 

worldwide threats to transportation, including those emanating from Yemen, the 

Arabian Peninsula, Horn of Africa and other areas. TSA documents threats to civil 

aviation including hijackings, improvised explosive devices, and Man-Portable Air 

Defense Systems (MANPADS) in our classified assessments. TSA also documents 

tactics, techniques, and procedures used by terrorist groups against other modes of 

42 

transportation, and share those with stakeholders in briefings, intelligence summaries, and threat assessments. 

TSA is also highly engaged in outreach and assistance with the Government of 

Yemen. After the threat was uncovered in October 2010, TSA sent a team of Transportation Security Specialists to Yemen to aid the government in improving cargo 

security standards in Sana’a. TSA is also working to implement an Aviation Security Sustainable International Standards Team (ASSIST) program in Yemen. ASSIST is a comprehensive technical assistance program given to countries with demonstrated difficulty in satisfying the security Standards and appropriate Recommended Practices established by the International Civil Aviation Organization 

(ICAO). 

TSA also participates in the ICAO Donor Nations group, which is a multilateral 

group comprised of several representative countries and regional organizations focused on assistance and capacity building activity with regard to aviation security. 

The purpose is to provide a forum for members to exchange information on respective capacity development initiatives to foster collaboration and avoid a duplication 

of effort. Participation in this group enables TSA to coordinate international capacity building efforts in Yemen. 

Question 4. I understand that the U.S. and air cargo carriers put a hold on cargo 

shipments from Yemen and Somalia. Should we be concerned that this group will 

send packages from other points of origin? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) works to mitigate the 

risk that terrorist groups will send explosive devices from locations other than 

Yemen and Somalia through a variety of activities. TSA currently works to ensure 

the security of U.S.-bound air cargo through its Foreign Airport Assessment Program, which evaluates foreign airports’ compliance with security standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as well as through 

air carrier inspections that evaluate air carriers’ compliance with TSA regulatory requirements for operations to the United States. In order to address the requirement 

to screen 100 percent of all inbound air cargo, TSA has been working on a two-step 

process: (1) recognizing those National Cargo Security Programs of key foreign governments that provide a commensurate level of security as U.S. air cargo security 

requirements, with priority placed on the top 20 countries that represent 80 percent 

of all inbound air cargo to the United States; and (2) requiring additional measures 

for air carriers. TSA also conducts cargo security training courses for foreign governments needing assistance to improve their cargo security posture. 

Additionally, TSA is working on an ICAO-led effort to identify ways to build upon 

the positive cargo security enhancements achieved through the recently adopted 

Amendment 12 to Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). Potential mitigation measures for the future that are being considered include: development of a common definition among States of high-risk 

cargo; creation of advanced cargo information requirements; creation of a hub concept for screening of high-risk cargo; establishment of standard compliance requirements; standardization of chain of custody requirements; and the creation of joint 

compliance and technology teams. 

Question 5. I understand that much of air cargo security relies on foreign governments for screening implementation and enforcement. How is this system working? 

Answer. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a specialized 

agency of the United Nations (UN) established in 1944 by the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). The Chicago Convention is the primary international agreement on international civil aviation. ICAO currently has 

190 Contracting States. The principal mandate of ICAO is to advance aviation safety and security worldwide. ICAO develops and promotes Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for the security of international civil aviation. Security 

Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention contains standards for air cargo security and 

enforcement that all Contracting States are required to follow. The Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) assesses all international airports with U.S. aircraft 

operations or that serve as a last point of departure for all flights to the U.S., for 

compliance with ICAO requirements. TSA conducts assessments every one to 3 

years depending on the level of risk associated with each airport. When an assessment reveals that an international airport is not meeting ICAO minimal standards, 

TSA works with that airport and host government authorities to ensure that measures are taken to correct security deficiencies. 

Question 6. How do non-UN participating countries conduct cargo screening? 

Answer. The 190 countries that are signatories to the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) agree to comply with the Standards and Recommended Practices put forward in Security Annex 17 to this Convention. Only air 

43 

carriers from countries that are signatories to the Chicago Convention are allowed 

to operate commercial air transport service to the U.S. The Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) conducts assessments of airports with flights to the United 

States in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44907. TSA can only speak to international 

airports with U.S. aircraft operations or foreign air carriers with a last point of departure flight, which would follow the international standards in Annex 17. 

Question 7. What security measures should shipping companies and airlines (large 

and small) be responsible for in screening cargo? 

Answer. For international inbound cargo, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regulates only domestic air carriers, foreign air carriers flying from the 

last point of departure into the United States, and their authorized agents. Freight 

forwarders and shipping companies overseas are not subject to TSA regulations. 

These entities are regulated by foreign governments who provide compliance oversight. 

In response to the recent cargo plot, many foreign governments have implemented 

enhanced security requirements for air cargo, which may include screening. Depending on the government’s air cargo security program, requirements may apply to any 

supply chain. 

Question 8. Currently commercial aviation passengers pay a $2.50 security fee per segment flown limited to $5 per one-way trip. This fee structure only covers 36 percent of aviation security, which is increasing every day. Should passengers pay 

more? 

Answer. The administration believes that there should be a modest increase in 

the aviation security passenger fee, which has not risen since it was first implemented in 2002. While the nation as a whole benefits generally from aviation security, airline passengers derive significant direct benefits as well. Recognizing this, 

the original authorizing legislation (the Aviation and Transportation Security Act) 

that created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) included passenger 

user fees to more closely allocate the cost of aviation security services to the individuals who directly benefit from this unique government service and simultaneously 

reduce the burden on the general taxpayer. The proportion of support that these 

fees provide for aviation security has decreased significantly as the level of funding 

required for more effective aviation security has risen. The increase in the passenger fee that the administration has proposed would come close to restoring the 

intended balance between appropriated funding and direct passenger contributions. 

Question 9. Should air cargo face a similar fee? 

Answer. The passenger fee model would not make sense in the air cargo context, 

because unlike passenger security much of the cost of cargo security is borne by industry, not the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Currently TSA only 

collects fees that support security threat assessments of workers in the air cargo 

supply chain as well as security assessment fees for the Certified Cargo Screening 

Program. 

Question 10. TSA is in the process of implementing new screening measures for 

passengers including the widespread use of Whole Body Imaging technologies and 

pat-downs. What are the different technologies used to conduct Whole Body Image 

searches? 

Answer. There are two types of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) security 

screening systems currently used by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at airports: general-use (backscatter) x-ray and millimeter wave. Millimeter wave technology bounces harmless electromagnetic waves off the body to create a black and white three-dimensional image. Backscatter technology projects low 

level X-ray beams over the body to create a reflection of the body displayed on the 

monitor. Millimeter wave technology produces an image that resembles a fuzzy 

photo negative. Backscatter technology produces an image that resembles a chalk 

etching. 

Question 11. Are there concerns with radiation levels for TSA employees, passengers (frequent fliers & pilots)? 

Answer. There are two types of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) security 

screening systems currently used by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at airports: general-use (backscatter) X-ray and millimeter wave. There 

are no radiation safety concerns with the systems as long as they are properly operated and maintained. Advanced imaging technology is safe and meets national 

health and safety standards. 

Backscatter technology was evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration’s 

(FDA) Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), the National Institute 

for Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Johns Hopkins University Applied 

Physics Laboratory (APL). 

44 

All results confirmed that the radiation doses for the individuals being screened, 

operators, and bystanders were well below the dose limits specified by the American 

National Standards Institute (ANSI). 

For comparison, the energy projected by millimeter wave technology is thousands 

of times less than a cell phone transmission. A single scan using backscatter technology produces exposure equivalent to 2 minutes of flying on an airplane. 

Question 12. How is TSA dealing with complaints related to pat-down searches? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) welcomes feedback 

and comments on screening procedures from the traveling public through the TSA 

Contact Center via a toll-free telephone number, through the www.tsa.gov website, 

or by e-mail. A passenger can also register a complaint by U.S. Mail. When a passenger identifies an airport in his or her complaint, TSA refers that complaint to 

the Customer Support Manager (CSM) at the airport. Passengers can also contact 

the TSA supervisory personnel at each airport or the CSM directly or through the 

‘‘Talk to TSA’’ section of the website which sends complaints directly to the airport. 

CSMs work with the Federal Security Director who is responsible for ensuring that 

the Transportation Security Officer workforce follows TSA’s Standard Operating 

Procedures and adheres to the Agency’s principles for professional and courteous 

checkpoint screening. 

TSA’s Office of Civil Rights and Liberties examines complaints alleging discriminatory conduct and violations of civil rights. If a complaint is disability-related, 

TSA’s Office of Disability Policy and Outreach conducts the investigation. 

All complaints are taken seriously, and volume and trends are reported to TSA 

leadership. Passengers may also contact the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil 

Liberties (CRCL). CRCL reviews and assesses information concerning abuses of civil 

rights, civil liberties, and profiling on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion, by employees and officials of DHS. TSA is committed to doing everything we can to make 

the traveling experience as expeditious and comfortable as possible while ensuring 

the safety of all passengers. The Agency will continue to evaluate and adapt these 

procedures to strike the right balance between privacy and security, while ensuring 

we are addressing evolving threats. 

Question 13. Is there another less-invasive way to check passengers for explosives? 

Answer. Given the threat and currently available technology, the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) believes that the security measures in place best 

mitigate the risk posed by an adversary with a body-borne improvised explosive device. TSA will continue to examine its procedures and consider options to balance 

its important security requirements with the needs of the traveling public. 

Question 14. TSA is currently reconsidering its proposed rule providing security 

measures for general aviation. The Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP) has not 

been finalized. When will TSA release a final rule? 

Answer. In response to the public comments received after issuing the Large Aircraft Security Program Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in October 2008, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is modifying the rulemaking proposal to 

take public comments into account and evaluate the feasibility/effectiveness of certain criteria, including aircraft weight, vetting of crew and passengers, and securing 

the aircraft. Currently, the Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) 

is being prepared, and TSA expects the SNPRM to be released in mid–2011. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. Yemeni officials screened and cleared the two packages destined for 

the Chicago, IL synagogues containing the explosive devices before placing them on 

passenger aircraft. During the November 16, 2010 Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) on Air Cargo Security you stated that the Yemeni officials had X-ray equipment, but lacked explosive detection equipment and 

didn’t have the same level of screening standards that the U.S. has. You met with 

Deputy Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimi on November 3, 2010, and other aviation 

officials in Yemen on the recent events. I understand that you provided the Yemeni 

officials some guidance in standards and policies and you left them some explosive 

detection equipment. What type of commitment did you receive from the Yemeni 

government on increasing standards and policies when it comes to cargo screening? 

What is your confidence that they will follow through? 

Answer. During the early November visit to Yemen, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator John Pistole met with Deputy Prime Minister 

45 

Rashad al-Alimi, as well as officials from the Yemeni Directorate General of Civil 

Aviation and the Ministry of Interior. During these and subsequent meetings with 

additional TSA officials, Yemeni government officials committed to work with the 

United States over the next 18 months to enhance its aviation security system. This 

year and a half long project will consist of three phases: building a foundation, finalization of all aviation security programs consistent with international standards, 

and, developing specialized skills. At this time, it is too early to evaluate the success 

of the program; however, TSA will be glad to report additional details as the program develops. 

Question 2. Secretary Napolitano on her November 8 press release stated that she 

ordered a ‘‘ground halt on all cargo coming from Yemen.’’ I know that there is a 

ban on all air cargo coming from Yemen and Somalia, but does a ground halt to 

all cargo coming from Yemen mean any resulting maritime, rail, or truck cargo that 

originated in Yemen? Is this ground halt extended to Somalia as well? Are you 

aware of other increased security measures in the other cargo venues (rail, truck, 

and maritime) since the failed air cargo attempts? 

Answer. The term ‘‘ground halt’’ is typically applied to aircraft operations and 

means that no aircraft are allowed to be airborne. The Transportation Security Administration has not increased security measures applied to cargo originating from 

Yemen or Somalia for modes of transportation other than air cargo, nor are we 

aware of increased security measures in rail, truck, and maritime cargo since the 

failed attacks. 

Question 3. DHS issued a Security Directives and Emergency Amendments that 

bans all air cargo from Yemen and Somalia, prohibits high risk cargo from being 

transported on passenger jets, prohibits toner or ink cartridges greater than 16 

ounces in carry-on and checked luggage, prohibits toner or ink that can be transported on crewmembers or in cargo packages identified as high risk, and requires 

all-cargo aircraft operators to screen all high risk cargo using TSA-approved technology. This is to continue to 12/8/10. Why 12/8/10? What kind of analysis does DHS 

plan to perform to determine whether to extend all or some of the measures or to 

cancel the measures? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued the Security 

Directives and Emergency Amendments (SDs/EAs) that were effective on November 

8, 2010. Those SDs/EAs expired on December 8, 2010. This 30-day period gave TSA 

time to monitor and assess the threat environment based on intelligence; discuss 

with industry, other Federal agencies, and foreign governments to assess the operational impacts of the requirements; and determine an appropriate next course of 

action. TSA has issued revised SDs/EAs in December 2010, which have modified and 

further extended the security requirements to ensure the safety of air cargo shipped 

on passenger planes and all-cargo planes. 

Question 4. What obstacles are you coming across while trying to entice or enhance security standards and policies abroad? How can Congress help? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) strives to overcome 

the obstacles of new and emerging threats while trying to enhance aviation security 

standards and policies abroad. TSA would appreciate your continued support as we 

work to mitigate new and emerging threats. The process will always be evolving as 

terrorists find additional ways to exploit the system. We have been fortunate to develop close working relationships with our international partners, which have resulted in unprecedented collaboration to close gaps and mitigate threats. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. TOM UDALL TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. Does TSA have a formal audit process in place to make sure that all 

procedures are followed regarding the use of AIT and pat-downs? If so, what is this 

process? If not, will you commit to implementing such a process? 

Answer. Federal Security Directors coordinate with their staffs to ensure that 

screening procedures are conducted properly and in accordance with standard operating procedures. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in the final 

stages of developing a Quality Assurance program that will soon be deployed nationwide. 

Question 2. You stated in the hearing that Advanced Imaging Technology is evolving and the next generation of the machines will produce an image that is a ‘‘stick 

figure or a blob’’ so that individual passengers are not identifiable. You also said 

that this technology is already in use in Amsterdam, but it currently has problems 

46 

because there are too many false positives. Do you have an estimate of how long 

it will take for the technology to be ready for use in the United States? 

Answer. The Dutch have been using a form of Automated Target Recognition 

(ATR) on their L–3 millimeter wave (MMW) Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) 

units for approximately one year. They are experiencing a very high alarm rate and 

the majority of their passengers are being patted down. L–3 has since developed the 

next iteration of the ATR software which the Canadians, Dutch and the U.S. are 

testing in both the lab and in the field over the next several months. 

Question 3. The Washington Post published an article on November 22, 2010 titled 

‘‘Scientists say they have solution to TSA scanner objections.’’ In the article it states 

that employees at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory developed a program in 

2006 that would make the images produced by AIT machines grossly distorted to 

protect passengers’ privacy, but would still allow the machines to identify any objects on the body. One of the employees said that they presented the idea to DHS, 

but their offer was rebuffed. The article states that a current TSA spokesman could 

not immediately confirm the employees’ 2006 conversation with federal officials 

about the program because it was during the previous administration. Has TSA 

been in contact with Lawrence Livermore during the current administration to explore whether their program would allow AIT to fully screen passengers while also 

protecting their privacy? If not, will TSA thoroughly review and test their program 

to determine its ability to modify AIT machines in a way that will protect privacy 

while maintaining their detection capabilities? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not been in direct 

contact with Lawrence Livermore National Labs (LLNL) about any image distortion 

initiatives that LLNL may have underway. At this time, TSA is addressing passenger privacy concerns through the development of Automated Target Recognition 

(ATR). ATR software is used with Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) and displays 

a generic stick figure-like image on the monitor attached to the AIT machine. With 

the use of ATR, Transportation Security Officers will never view the actual image 

of a passenger. Therefore, ATR will render image distortion programs unnecessary. 

TSA is currently working with industry to develop ATR to meet TSA detection 

standards and will reach out to LLNL to determine if their proposals are applicable 

to AIT operations. 

Question 4. In August 2009, suicide bomber Abdullah Asieri attempted to kill 

Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef, head of Saudi Arabia’s counter terrorism operations. 

Asieri avoided detection by two sets of airport security and palace security by smuggling a pound of high explosives and a detonator in his body cavity. Although the 

prince was not killed in the explosion, it demonstrated that terrorists were able to 

smuggle explosives through various types of security screening. Would Advanced 

Imaging Technology or the newer enhanced pat-down procedures detect explosives 

hidden in a body cavity? If not, isn’t the use of these procedures ineffective against 

a known threat and any passenger screened by TSA and allowed to board an aircraft could potentially have explosives hidden in their body cavity? 

Answer. For security reasons, specific detection capabilities will need to be provided in a classified setting. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employs many layers of security that address a multitude of threats including explosive 

trace detection, explosives detection canines and behavior detection. Each layer of 

security is designed to work collaboratively with the others. The result is a system 

as a whole that is very difficult to manipulate and is adaptable to changing threats. 

TSA is currently deploying the best available technology to passenger checkpoints 

to detect threat items and appreciates the support that the Committee has provided. 

Question 5. The recently implemented pat-down procedures don’t only raise questions about passenger privacy, but also about TSO morale. While senior TSA officials are responsible for developing and implementing screening policies, the TSOs 

at airport screening points bear the brunt of passenger disapproval about these policies. What has TSA done to help TSOs deal with the stress of their jobs and to address morale problems related to performing invasive pat-downs? Has the implementation of new pat-down procedures had an impact on TSO recruitment and retention? 

Answer. Prior to deploying enhanced pat-down procedures, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) worked closely with our National Advisory Council, 

which is comprised of TSA airport frontline employees, including many Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) from across the Nation. We crafted new training for 

all TSOs tied directly to the new procedures; this training included anticipated passenger sensitivities and the risk-based reasons for the new procedures. We also piloted the new procedures at select locations. Since deployment nationwide, reporting 

from airports indicates TSOs have received a positive response by the general public 

47 

to the new procedures. In screening almost two million passengers daily, the relatively few occasions for the enhanced pat-downs (several hundred a day) have not 

had an impact on the performance of our TSOs who continue to perform their duties 

with a high level of professionalism. Federal Security Directors (FSDs) use daily 

shift briefs to address any perceived issues and to ensure the TSOs understand the 

reason why the policy is in place. Administrator Pistole’s provided a video message, 

which highlights the purpose, value and instills to TSOS that they are doing the 

right thing and for a good cause. Also, the Deputy Administrator sent a message 

out to the workforce thanking them and asking them to continue to do great work. 

Additionally, TSA employees may receive assistance for job stress through the Employee Assistance Program. All of this is done to provide the workforce with motivation to do their job well and keeps morale high. 

Question 6. There has been significant discussion recently about implementing the 

‘‘Israeli model’’ for airport screening—that is, profiling, detailed interviews, highly 

invasive searches of suspect passengers, etc. Please provide your opinions on whether the ‘‘Israeli model’’ would work for airport screening in the United States. Specifically, please discuss how much adopting this type of screening might cost, how 

many additional employees the TSA would need to hire, and how it would compare 

to current TSA screening procedures in regards to civil liberties concerns. 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not conducted a 

formal analysis of the cost required to implement a United States airport security 

system modeled on Israel’s system. The substantially higher passenger volumes and 

the comparative complexity of the U.S. commercial aviation systems with its 450 

geographically dispersed locations would likely pose considerable operational and financial challenges for transplanting the Israeli system in this nation. An analysis 

of Israel’s system also must take into account not only differences in scale regarding 

passenger enplanement but also the differences in U.S. policy toward privacy and 

civil rights and civil liberties. 

TSA has consulted extensively with Israel and adapted key techniques to meet 

U.S. aviation security needs. In particular, TSA already operates a behavior detection program that is based on Israel’s model, and continues to increase the direct 

human evaluation of passengers during screening. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. Following the recent attention given to the enhanced pat-down procedure put in place November 1, TSA showed a willingness to revisit portions of its 

protocol (such as providing different procedures for pilots and young children). 

Given that this is a work-in-progress, can you tell me what additional changes to 

the enhanced pat-down procedure you are considering making in the near future? 

How often do you plan on reviewing current procedures? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration continuously evaluates and 

adapts screening procedures to strike the appropriate balance between addressing 

evolving threats and the needs of the traveling public. TSA is sensitive to the concerns of all passengers and maintains an ongoing dialogue with groups representing 

a variety of segments of the population, including those with medical or developmental disabilities and victims of sexual assault, in order to better understand their 

needs. 

Question 2. What are the most recent figures for the percent of the population receiving the enhanced pat-down? What is the percentage of the traveling public that 

is receiving pat-downs by opting out of the full body scan, and what percentage receives a pat-down or targeted search as a result of triggering an alarm or indicating 

some sort of anomaly when going through the scanner? 

Answer. Approximately 2.79 percent of all passengers between October 31, 2010 

and December 11, 2010, received the full standard pat-down (mainly when opting 

out of AIT screening) and approximately 3.2 percent of passengers received a targeted pat-down as a result of AIT anomalies. 

Question 3. TSA currently uses both millimeter wave and backscatter technology 

in the full body scanners that it is bringing on line. In staff briefings, TSA officials 

have mentioned that they believe eventually one technology or the other will prove 

superior and will represent the dominant technology in the future. Will this result 

in the mothballing and storage of millions of dollars in equipment, considered obsolete, similar to what occurred with the ‘‘puffer’’ machines? 

Answer. Both technologies have met the Transportation Security Administration’s 

(TSA) qualification requirements and are effective security screening equipment. 

48 

Even if one particular technology ultimately proves superior and TSA determines 

to purchase only that technology in the future, TSA will continue to utilize the units 

it has already purchased. TSA does not expect to retire any AIT units prior to the 

end of their anticipated useful life. 

Question 4. Administrator Pistole, you have mentioned that you are not employing 

technology that would show a generic ‘‘stick figure’’ image (Automated Target Recognition) rather than a naked body image in current scanners because you believe 

there would be complications with false positives. ATR technology, however, is already being used in airports in Europe. What specific challenges do you see in implementing this technology in the US? Can you provide a description of the events 

that must occur before this technology is employed here, and provide a timeline concerning when ATR can come into use? 

Answer. As indicated, Automated Target Recognition (ATR) software is used with 

Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) and displays a generic stick figure-like image 

to show potential threats concealed on a passenger. The main challenge in the development, testing and deployment of ATR remains the high number of false alarm 

rates experienced both in testing in the U.S. and in the field by the Netherlands. 

AIT alarms must be resolved through a physical pat-down process. A high number 

of false alarms increases the need for pat-downs and slows the overall screening 

process. Before ATR can be successfully deployed in the US, further software development and testing are required. TSA’s preliminary lab results indicate that the 

false alarm rate is moving toward an acceptable level; however, this cannot be confirmed until the completion of field testing. 

Proposed ATR Timeline: 

• ATR Qualification Testing and Evaluation (QT&E) was completed at the Transportation Security Laboratory. 

• Within the next 30 days ATR will be tested and evaluated in the field. This 

testing will take 60 days. 

• A System Evaluation Report will be generated following the conclusion of the 

test process. Based upon findings, a DHS acquisition decision will be pursued 

for system-wide implementation. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK BEGICH TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. Does the TSA intend to deploy Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) 

equipment for passenger screening to airports in Alaska? If so, what is the timeline 

for deployment and which airports will receive the AIT equipment? 

Answer. The Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport is scheduled to receive 

Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) units in calendar year 2011. 

Question 2. When will Automated Target Recognition (ATR) software be ready for 

deployment to airport screening checkpoints nationwide? 

Answer. Deployment of Automated Target Recognition (ATR) software is dependent on development by Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) manufacturers and the 

successful completion of testing to ensure ATR meets Transportation Security Administration (TSA) requirements. ATR is being testing in a laboratory environment 

and field testing is scheduled to begin in February 2011. 

Question 3. It seems the use of ATR would go a long way to alleviating many of 

the privacy concerns associated with AIT scanners. Is there anything that can be 

done to speed up the deployment of ATR software? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is working closely 

with Advanced Imaging Technology manufacturers as they develop the next generation of Automated Target Recognition (ATR) software. This close working relationship provides valuable feedback to the manufacturers that they can use to enhance 

their current algorithms. In addition, TSA is working through the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate to identify other opportunities to accelerate ATR development. 

Question 4. What training do Transportation Security Officers receive before they 

are cleared to screen passengers using enhanced pat-downs? 

Answer. Each Transportation Security Officer (TSO), Lead TSO, and Supervisory 

TSO is required to successfully complete 6–61⁄2 hours of training before he or she 

is permitted to independently perform the revised pat-down procedures. The Transportation Security Administration developed and deployed a training package that 

includes web-based components and a classroom instruction module that requires a 

proficiency demonstration at the end of the course. 

49 

Question 5. I’ve heard from numerous Alaskans who have previously been victims 

of sexual assault. The enhanced pat-downs employed by TSA have been extremely 

traumatic for some sexual assault survivors. Has the TSA provided Transportation 

Security Officers with any special or additional training regarding sensitivity to passengers who have experienced sexual abuse, medical procedures, are developmentally disabled, or have other special needs and circumstances that may make 

an enhanced pat-down a less appropriate screening method? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is sensitive to the concerns of all passengers and maintains an ongoing dialogue with groups representing 

a variety of segments of the population, including those with medical or developmental disabilities, and victims of sexual assault. TSA officers currently receive specialized training for those with medical or developmental disabilities and it will be 

augmented to include sensitivity to victims of violence and sexual abuse based on 

feedback from groups representing those passengers. TSA officers are trained to 

treat all passengers with dignity and respect, and to fully communicate with each 

passenger to ensure they understand the process throughout screening. All passengers can request to be screened in a private location and can have a witness 

present when a pat-down is required. Pat-downs are primarily used to resolve an 

alarm or an anomaly, or on passengers who choose not to pass through the WTMD 

or Advanced Imaging Technology. Currently, statistics show that less than 3 percent 

of the traveling public receives a pat-down. 

Question 6. How is TSA collecting and evaluating complaints about the enhanced 

pat-downs to ensure additional training or oversight is directed to airports with high 

complaint levels? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) welcomes feedback 

and comments on screening procedures from the traveling public through the TSA 

Contact Center (TCC) via a toll-free telephone number, through the www.tsa.gov 

website or by e-mail. A passenger can also contact TSA by U.S. Mail. When a passenger identifies an airport in his or her complaint, TSA refers that complaint to 

the Customer Support Manager (CSM) at the airport. Passengers can also contact 

the CSM or TSA supervisory personnel at each airport directly or through the ‘‘Talk 

to TSA’’ section of the website which sends complaints directly to the airport. CSMs 

work with the Federal Security Director who is responsible for ensuring that the 

Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce follows TSA’s Standard Operating 

Procedures (SOP) and adheres to the Agency’s principles for professional and courteous checkpoint screening. TSA passenger and baggage screening complaint data 

is reported to the public in a monthly Congressionally-mandated Department of 

Transportation (DOT) report, ‘‘Air Travel Consumer Report’’ as required by Section 

421(a) of Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, P.L. 108–176. 

TSA’s Office of Civil Rights and Liberties (OCRL) assesses complaints alleging 

discriminatory conduct and, may conduct an inquiry to determine what occurred, if 

the SOP was followed and whether a violation of the passenger’s civil rights or civil 

liberties occurred. If a complaint is disability-related, TSA’s Office of Disability Policy and Outreach (ODPO) conducts the investigation. Both OCRL and ODPO conduct outreach, monitor trends, provide targeted sensitivity and cultural awareness 

training, and, if necessary, work with TSA’s Office of Security Operations to revise 

or develop new procedures. 

TSA’s Office of the Ombudsman provides confidential, neutral, and informal assistance in resolving questions and concerns from individuals about TSA processes, 

programs, and procedures when other available TSA resources for resolution have 

been unsuccessful. Finally, passengers may also contact the DHS Office for Civil 

Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL). CRCL reviews and assesses information concerning abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and profiling on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion, by employees and officials of DHS. 

Regardless of the avenue, all complaints are taken seriously, and volume and 

trends are reported to TSA leadership. TSA is committed to doing everything we can 

to make the traveling experience as expeditious and comfortable as possible while 

ensuring the safety of all passengers. The agency will continue to evaluate and 

adapt these procedures to strike the right balance between privacy and security, 

while ensuring we are addressing evolving threats. 

50 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. It is my understanding that the international air cargo supply chain 

still relies heavily on paper documentation instead of electronic information, which 

would be more easily scrutinized for anomalies or problems earlier in the shipping 

process. One area of improvement that I envision to bolster our intelligence and security efforts would be to transition from a paper-centric documentation system to 

an electronic system. Would this transition improve your counter-terrorism efforts 

in the air cargo sector, and are you working with industry to move in that direction? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agrees that having an 

electronic based system would be beneficial to counter-terrorism efforts. TSA is currently working with industry stakeholders to leverage existing electronic capabilities 

and best practices, and the agency supports the greater use of electronic documentation across the air cargo industry. As industry moves more toward electronic 

records, TSA will continue to explore ways to obtain this information in a secure 

and timely manner for vetting purposes. 

Question 2. At your nomination hearing, I emphasized the importance of the relationship between TSA and industry stakeholders. A safe and effective security system is mutually beneficial to industry and government alike. To that end, reports 

indicate that authorities suspect that several packages mailed from Yemen to Chicago in September 2010 may have been a ‘‘dry run’’ for this recent terrorist event. 

Given the knowledge of the ‘‘dry run,’’ did TSA alert the cargo industry of the potential plot, so they could heighten their security analysis, especially in Yemen? If not, 

why? 

Answer. While the specifics of this cargo plot were not known until hours before 

the discovery of the packages from Yemen, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regularly shares threat information with its stakeholders, including direct briefings when there are specific items of interest to the air cargo industry. Our 

logs indicate that TSA has provided information on threat related items to major 

cargo carriers on at least seven occasions since 2008. In addition, TSA produces an 

annual assessment of the threat to air cargo, which reviews relevant intelligence related to cargo threats. The assessment is used to inform stakeholders and the transportation security community. 

Question 3. What role do canine units play in the all-cargo sector, and does TSA 

need more canine units? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) takes a risk-based approach toward deploying its canine resources. TSA currently does not use canine 

teams in the all-cargo environment. Presently, canine teams are used in the passenger air cargo environment. In this environment, the TSA uses two types of canine teams: teams led by local Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) and proprietary 

teams (federal teams) led by TSA cargo inspectors to screen air cargo destined for 

transport on passenger aircraft. LEO-led canine teams, are contractually obligated 

to spend approximately 25 percent of their duty time in the air cargo environment 

and associated facilities providing law enforcement presence and screening air 

cargo. 

120 TSA proprietary canine teams are primarily dedicated to screening air cargo 

at high-volume air carrier facilities to enhance air cargo security. As part of the layered security approach, the canine teams conduct routine security sweeps for the detection or deterrence of explosive threats where cargo is staged, consolidated, or otherwise prepared for transport. TSA canine teams also conduct random patrols at 

various areas within the cargo environment during peak and non-peak hours. Based 

on current air cargo volume, and the fact that industry has attained 100 percent 

screening in the U.S., TSA does not have an immediate need for more canine units, 

but continues to assess operational needs. 

Question 4. Following 9/11, several airports and air carriers, under the understanding that they would be reimbursed, invested in costly in-line baggage systems 

at airports and various airport terminals. Today, some airports and air carriers have 

yet to be reimbursed for those costs, and some are reimbursed at a lower percentage 

than others. Will TSA set aside resources to start reimbursing these airports and 

air carriers to create a clean slate moving forward? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) takes a risk-based approach to investing in security programs; therefore, the agency must prioritize limited funding toward airports that do not have in-line baggage systems in place. Reimbursement for all or a portion of these costs absent prior formal TSA agreements 

is not possible. TSA appreciates the investments made by these airports to enhance 

51 

security; however, reimbursement of previous efforts outside a formal agreement 

comes at the cost of advancing current or future security measures. 

Question 5. Please provide a list of the airports, air carriers, or other entities that 

have requested full or partial reimbursement for the installation of Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) after the 9/11 terrorist attacks that have not received full or 

partial reimbursement? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration has received requests for reimbursement from the following entities who invested in in-line baggage systems 

without prior formal agreements: Anchorage (ANC), Atlantic City (ACY), Chicago 

Midway (MDW), Detroit (DTW), Fairbanks (FAI), Harrisburg (MDT), Honolulu 

(HNL), Indianapolis (IND), Kahului (OGG), Miami (MIA), Nantucket (ACK), American Airlines/New York (JFK), Orlando (MCO), Pittsburgh (PIT), Richmond (RIC), 

SW Florida (RSW), Tampa (TPA), Theodore Francis Green (PVD), Yampa Valley Regional (HDN). 

Question 6. Additionally, it is the Committee’s understanding that TSA has not 

been timely in responding to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests pertaining 

to documents related to requested reimbursement funds for EDS installation. Please 

provide the Committee with a list of EDS installation related FOIA requests that 

have been requested by either airports, air carriers, or other entities since the 

9/11 terrorist attacks, along with the status of those requests and justification for 

non-response, if applicable. 

Answer. Since September 11, 2001, TSA has received 13 requests under the Freedom of Information Act for information related to installation of Explosive Detection 

Systems, and has fully responded to 9 of the 13. Four recent requests, all received 

in this fiscal year, are still outstanding and are in the process of providing a response. A complete list of the 13 requests is provided below. 

Case Number Description Status Status as of 12/6/10 

FY2010 

TSA10–0044 (case received 

in FOIA Office 10/22/09) 

Documents regarding a variety 

of work, including EDS installation, done at Providence, RI airport 

Closed on 12/6/10 Closed 

TSA10–0117 (case received 

in FOIA Office 11/23/09) 

Documents related to EDS installation at JFK airport in New 

York, NY, including documents 

related to TSA’s reimbursement 

of entities for airport facility improvements 

Interim response 

provided 12/10/10 

Case in final 

review 

TSA10–0636 (case received 

in FOIA Office 7/6/10) 

Contractual, payment, and settlement information related to 

in-line baggage screening system installation at Cleveland, 

OH airport 

Open as of 12/6/10 In processing 

TSA10–0803 (case received 

in FOIA Office 9/1/10) 

All TSA contracts (including 

technical information) for EDS 

systems entered into between 

1/1/2008 and 9/1/2010 

Open as of 12/6/10 In processing 

FY2009 

TSA09–0844 Documents, including payments, 

requests for payment, and correspondence between federal 

and local governments, related 

to EDS installation at Kansas 

City, MO airport 

Closed 10/22/09 Closed 

FY2008 

TSA08–0450 Contracts, proposals, and award 

letters related to design, procurement, and installation of 

EDS machines 

Closed 7/9/2009 Closed 

52 

Case Number Description Status Status as of 12/6/10 

FY2007—None 

FY2006 

TSA06–0594 Contracts, work orders, and 

drawings regarding EDS installation at Minneapolis-St. Paul 

International Airport 

Closed 9/19/06 Closed 

FY2005 

TSA05–0004 Request for EDS installation-related contract Closed 11/8/04 Closed 

TSA05–0141 Request for EDS installation-related contract Closed 4/14/05 Closed 

TSA05–0442 Contract with Boeing for EDS 

installation and maintenance 

Closed 7/28/05 Closed 

FY2004 

TSA04–0306 Documents related to Massport 

EDS installation 

Closed 4/22/04 Closed 

TSA04–0528 Wide-ranging request for documents that included request for 

‘‘documents and records related 

to the schedule of deployment of 

inline EDS systems for 2004 and 

2005’’ and documents related to 

the seven airports that had received letters of intent to reimburse for construction 

Closed 3/22/04 Closed 

FY2003 

TSA03–0223 Copy of ‘‘any contract between 

FAA and Boeing’’ related to EDS 

installation 

Closed 8/28/03 Closed 

Question 7. TSA’s role in surface transportation security is clearly much different 

than its role in aviation. While TSA Agents serve as frontline screeners at all airports, this is obviously not feasible when it comes to surface modes. Speaking broadly, how do you view TSA’s role when it comes to surface transportation security? 

What would be the most important improvement that TSA could make to increase 

its oversight of surface transportation security? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is mandated to protect the surface transportation system and to ensure the freedom of movement and 

the security of people and commerce. In accordance with the 9/11 Act, TSA is responsible for assessing security threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences in all surface transportation modes and taking appropriate responses to mitigate the risk. 

This mission is accomplished largely by a consortium of federal, state, local, and private entities optimizing resources in a risk-based approach to security. 

TSA is working to enhance surface transportation security through its resource 

allocations, training, risk assessments, intelligence sharing and other discrete areas 

of focus. For example, the Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment was completed and delivered to Congress on June 30, 2010, and is designed to inform the 

development or maintenance of risk mitigation strategies and actions that include, 

but are not limited to, the development of security standards, grants, programs, 

countermeasures, and resource allocations. It provides a cross-modal analysis as 

well as individual analyses focused on the unique risks in each transportation mode. 

TSA will use this assessment when looking to improve oversight of surface transportation security. TSSRA 2.0 is expected to be completed in December 2011. 

Question 8. The recently uncovered plot targeting the D.C. Metro system is another indication of the threat our nation’s mass transit system faces. At a hearing 

of this Committee in April, we discussed the need for TSA to better coordinate with 

transit operators. Has TSA made any progress in this area? 

53 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has and continues to 

make progress coordinating with transit operators. Examples include: 

• On a regular basis, TSA conducts conference calls with the Transit Policing and 

Security Peer Advisory Group and over 100 varying transit agencies. Both calls 

include an unclassified briefing from TSA’s Office of Intelligence and an opportunity for transit stakeholders to ask questions. 

• TSA issues Random Surge Operations Messages to expand collaboration between TSA and the transit community, especially the Tier I and II Transit Security Grant Program security partners, and promote random, unpredictable activities. The surge operations include a list of precautionary and voluntary security protective measures with some possible funding options. 

• TSA also worked with stakeholders on implementing recommendations from the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) Public Transit Security Information 

Sharing Report (GAO–10–895 September 22, 2010). 

Question 9. A March 2010 Inspector General’s report recommended that TSA better support passenger rail agencies by improving its assessments of emergency procedures and response capabilities. What is TSA doing to improve these assessments? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken a number 

of steps to improve the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program. The BASE program assesses the status of a transit system’s implementation 

of 17 Security and Emergency Management Action Items and measures compliance 

with existing TSA Security Directives. During these comprehensive system-wide assessments, which include an assessment of security management and accountability 

systems, TSA inspectors identify security weaknesses, including weaknesses in 

emergency response planning and employee training. 

First, TSA has modified the frequency of BASE assessments to focus on passenger 

rail agencies that have not done as well as other agencies in improving security. 

Second, TSA has developed a program to assist the agency in addressing significant 

vulnerabilities. A Performance Improvement Action Plan (PIAP) is written with objectives and milestones within a structured timeframe, and TSA inspectors make increased visits to the agency to help the agency implement the PIAP. Third, TSA has 

developed a matrix that is available to the passenger rail agency to identify aids, 

brochures, websites, templates, and other forms of assistance that will strengthen 

its security posture and improve assessments. Fourth, an initiative is underway to 

establish a panel with representatives from the transit industry as well as representatives from TSA’s federal security partners (Federal Transit Administration 

and Federal Emergency Management Agency) to further coordinate with TSA on the 

BASE assessment tool. 

Question 10. In addition to aviation and other modes of passenger transportation, 

we must also consider the vulnerability of our nation’s pipelines. How does TSA 

oversee the security of the 2.5 million miles of pipeline in our country? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was mandated by the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) to 

review pipeline operator adoption of DOT’s security recommendations issued in 

2002. Pub. L. 110–53 §§ 1557 and 1558 (codified at 6 U.S.C. 1207 and 1208). 

Through Corporate Security Reviews, TSA assesses companies’ security plans and 

procedures. In addition, TSA conducts Critical Facility Inspections to examine the 

physical security companies have in place. At the conclusion of these visits, TSA 

provides recommendations to facility operators on how to strengthen the security 

posture of the facility. TSA’s approach emphasizes information sharing and the provision of technical assistance to collectively protect the nation’s pipeline network. 

Through these and other programs, TSA has built a strong working relationship 

with the pipeline industry, a relationship which has served to help pipeline operators secure their critical facilities. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN ENSIGN TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. The DHS Office of Inspector General report of November, 2009 reiterated by the GAO report of June 2010, found deficiencies in the chain of custody between the parties that control the cargo prior to its loading onto the aircraft, as part 

of the TSA’s Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). The GAO report also stated 

that while the TSA directs when and how to achieve cargo security with various 

technologies, it does not issue ‘‘. . . standards for the types of technologies that 

should be used.’’ What has been the TSA’s progress with improving the chain of custody and the issuance of standards regarding technologies to be used for cargo secuVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Oct 13, 2011 Jkt 070643 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\70643.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
54 

rity, and the level of cooperation received from the certified cargo screening facilities 

(CSF) to correct this problem, including any objections or issues on the part of the 

CSFs? 

Answer. 

Improvement of Chain of Custody 

One way that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has focused its 

efforts to improve the chain of custody is by developing training modules that will 

ensure consistent training across regulated parties. TSA plans to provide these modules to the air carriers, Indirect Air Carriers, Certified Cargo Screening Facilities 

(CCSF), Independent Cargo Screening Facilities, and authorized representatives. 

The modules will include training covering the following areas: 

• Acceptance and transfer procedures; 

• Cargo screening procedures; 

• Chain of custody measures; 

• Facility security; 

• Security coordinator training, and; 

• Handling of Sensitive Security Information and Personally Identifiable Information. 

Each module will include instructor and student guides and tests. TSA intends 

to finalize the modules, post the materials for industry comment, and educate industry on the use of the modules in the first quarter of calendar year 2011. 

Technology Standards 

TSA is in the process of updating the security programs for those participating 

in the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). The next updates are designed 

to provide a process for TSA review and approval of chain of custody technology (i.e., 

Tamper Evident Technology- seals, tape, etc.). 

Outreach and Compliance Activities for the CCSP 

TSA has engaged in extensive outreach to CCSP participants to assist CCSFs in 

complying with TSA regulations. TSA works with each CCSF to ensure that they 

understand the security program requirements. TSA also has compliance inspectors 

that conduct routine, as well as random inspections of CCSFs to determine whether 

the facilities are in compliance with TSA regulations and security program requirements, including chain of custody requirements. TSA evaluates industry feedback 

regarding chain of custody best practices and uses applicable industry practices in 

the development of future security programs and chain of custody procedures. 

Question 2. The use of pat-downs has raised the competing concerns of security 

versus privacy. Does TSA have a written policy in place regarding the use of patdowns of air travelers? If so, please provide it to the Committee. 

Answer. Written policies and procedures are contained in Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) Standard Operating Procedures. These documents are Sensitive Security Information and can be provided in a closed setting to the Committee. 

Question 3. Does TSA keep statistics on how many travelers have gone through 

pat-downs, whether because of a decision to opt out of the full body scan or because 

of other alerts or anomalies? If not, has your agency discussed this and what were 

the details of that discussion? 

Answer. Yes, TSA is now collecting this data. Approximately 2.79 percent of all 

passengers between October 31, 2010 and December 11, 2010 received the full 

standard pat-down (mainly when opting out of AIT screening and approximately 3.2 

percent of passengers received a targeted pat-down as a result of AIT anomalies). 

Question 4. A type of passenger screening equipment that uses a lower level of 

radiation and depicts a less realistic body image was mentioned in news reports recently. This machine is built by L–3 Communications Security & Detection Systems, 

a Massachusetts-based company. The machine is used by Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport. Which company manufactures the screening equipment currently in place at 

U.S. airports, as well as those machines that are waiting to be deployed? 

Answer. Current Advanced Imaging Technology units are manufactured by 

Rapiscan Systems, Inc. and L3 Communications, Security & Detection Systems Division. 

Question 5. Why was the current model of screening equipment chosen rather 

than a type similar to this Massachusetts-based machine? 

55 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has purchased and 

deployed the Massachusetts-based screening equipment, manufactured by L3, in addition to Rapiscan’s screening equipment. At this time, L3 and Rapiscan are the 

only two companies that have successfully completed testing to demonstrate that 

they meet the TSA’s requirements. The image produced by the L3 millimeter-wave 

scanner is similar to the image produced by the Rapiscan backscatter x-ray machine; both machines detect anomalies on a passenger’s body. 

Question 6. Were any studies done on the medical effects of the body scanning 

equipment currently in use? If so, please provide those results. 

Answer. Advanced Imaging Technology is safe and meets national health and 

safety standards. Backscatter technology was evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health, the National Institute for 

Standards and Technology, and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. All results confirmed that the radiation doses for the individuals being 

screened, operators, and bystanders were well below the dose limits specified by the 

American National Standards Institute. For comparison, the energy projected by 

millimeter wave technology is thousands of times less than a cell phone transmission. A single scan using backscatter technology produces exposure equivalent 

to 2 minutes of flying on an airplane. 

TSA performed evaluations to ensure the systems meet the applicable regulatory 

requirements and national safety standards prior to deployment. TSA takes all 

measures to ensure the safety and health of the traveling public and TSA employees 

when purchasing and deploying new technology. Before TSA purchases technology, 

the technology is validated by manufacturers, through third party testing, or additional evaluations sponsored by TSA to ensure it meets regulatory requirements and 

national safety standards. 

Question 7. As part of the Screening Partnership Program (SPP), airports can opt 

out from having TSA employees do the screening and instead choose private contractor screeners. As I understand it, this is the situation at 16 airports in the U.S. 

Please provide a listing of: 

The specific airports whose SPP applications are pending; 

The length of time each application has been pending; 

The reasons for each application’s continued delay (if applicable); and, 

The estimated date of decision for each application. 

Answer. The specific airports whose Screening Partnership Program (SPP) applications are pending and length of time the applications have been pending are: 

1. West Yellowstone, MT (WYS)—15 Months (September 2009) 

2. Glacier Park, MT (GPI)—15 Months (September 2009) 

3. Missoula, MT (MSO)—7 months (June 2010) 

4. Butte, MT (BTM)—20 Months (March 2009) 

The SPP program applications are currently under review by the Administrator 

of the Transportation Security Administration. A decision on all of the applications 

will be made following the completion of the review. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN THUNE TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. Because of the obvious publicity generated from new TSA screening 

policies do you plan to revisit these procedures in the near future? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continuously reviews 

and updates screening policies based on threat assessments and intelligence and 

balances the need to safeguard aviation with the needs of passengers. TSA has been 

and will continue to be receptive to input from the traveling public. TSA strives to 

keep the traveling public informed of policies through our website, established aviation stakeholder partnerships, and other public forums. 

Question 2. As part of the Air Cargo plot that was disrupted last month, do you 

believe that air cargo companies should be required to disable certain package 

tracking information that could be used to estimate when and where a package is 

during the course of its journey? 

Answer. Package tracking information is a concern to the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA). TSA is evaluating the potential impact of disabling this 

tracking information on industry operations. 

56 

Question 3. Thankfully a number of terrorist acts have not been carried out over 

the past few years in the United States (Detroit bombing last December, Times 

Square bomb plot, Richard Reid, and the most recent explosive devices that originated in Yemen). How many of those failed plots do you attribute to increased TSA 

security screening practices and how much was pure luck or related to the quick 

thinking of alert bystanders? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) have a layered approach to aviation security. Every 

day, TSA Transportation Security Officers screen almost 2 million passengers. More 

than 50,000 trained transportation security officers, transportation security inspectors and behavior detection officers are on the front lines guarding against threats 

to the system every day. Many are veterans of the U.S. military who have previously fought terrorism overseas, and they are now serving our country at home. 

Screening both provides a deterrent against attacks and serves as the nation’s last 

line of defense for aviation security. 

Intelligence, information sharing and cooperation are critical in the fight against 

terrorism. TSA works with all of their partners, the traveling public, foreign governments, the private sector and law enforcement to increase global aviation security 

and enhance information sharing. As TSA sees the ever evolving nature of the 

threat, TSA adapts to use the latest intelligence and cutting edge technology to keep 

the traveling public safe. TSA has engaged our partners to ensure passenger vetting 

by Secure Flight, and we are seeing the increased use of technology, including Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), in other locations. Together with DHS, TSA has 

launched a nationwide expansion of the ‘‘If You See Something, Say Something’’ 

campaign—a simple and effective program to raise public awareness of indicators 

of terrorism, crime and other threats and to emphasize the importance of reporting 

suspicious activity to the proper transportation and law enforcement authorities. 

The combination of all these efforts provides the greatest safeguard against the 

terrorist threat. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. I have received, and continue to receive, very angry calls, letters, and 

e-mails from my constituents about the intimate and aggressive nature of the patdowns. One constituent, Pamela Robinson who is a Diamond Medallion Member on 

Delta Airlines and flies approximately 200,000 miles year, described her experience 

at the TSA checkpoint in San Francisco. She did not set off the magnetometer; however, a TSA agent told her that her shirt was too loose and her pants too wide, so 

she needed to be patted down. 

Reading from her statement to my office: ‘‘The agent described how she would rub 

her hand inside my ‘inner thigh’ in my groin area.’’ I felt disgusted and stated, ‘‘I 

don’t think so. You will not touch me like that.’’ She then tried to convince me by 

continuing to describe how she was now going to ‘‘pat’’ my entire body down with 

her hands. I felt sick just hearing her describe how she thought I was going to stand 

there and allow her to molest me in front of the public. She stated that ‘‘I could 

go to a private room.’’ I stated that ‘‘I am not going into a private room to be molested either.’’ 

Another constituent, a law enforcement officer who was patted down, told my staff 

that the type of pat-down he received is, in his experience, reserved for suspects who 

demonstrate probable cause. Recognizing that TSA is not a law enforcement agency, 

it leads me to my questions: 

Does TSA view each passenger as if they have probable cause that they are a terrorist? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) authority to search 

passengers at checkpoints does not require probable cause or any level of individualized suspicion about a passenger. TSA’s specific authority to screen passengers and 

their property is set forth in Sections 101 and 110 of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). Under Section 101 of ATSA (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 114 

(e)(1)), the TSA Administrator ‘‘shall be responsible for day-to-day Federal security 

screening operations for passenger air transportation and intrastate air transportation.’’ Under Section 110 of ATSA, (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a)),‘‘The Under 

Secretary of Transportation for Security shall provide for the screening of all passengers and property, including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and checked 

baggage, and other articles, that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air 

transportation.’’ Particular screening methods, however, are not prescribed by statVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Oct 13, 2011 Jkt 070643 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\70643.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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ute. Federal courts have held screening is lawful when no more extensive or intensive than necessary to detect the presence of weapons and explosives. See e.g., 

United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174 (3rd Cir. 2006). Federal courts have held that airport security screening is a valid special needs search, and need not be based on probable 

cause or any level of individualized suspicion. As discussed in Aukai and Hartwell, suspicionless searches, such as aviation checkpoint security screening, are lawful 

under the Fourth Amendment when they serve a special need distinct from ordinary 

law enforcement and are tailored to minimize the intrusion on personal privacy. Additionally, as the court stated in Hartwell, absent a search, there is no effective way 

to detect which passengers pose a threat, and ‘‘as yet there is no foolproof way of 

confining the search to the few who are potential hijackers.’’ Hartwell, at 180. 

Question 2. Where does TSA derive its authority to conduct these physical 

screenings? Is it explicit under legislation such as the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act (ATSA), the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 

and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, or is 

it a legal interpretation by your lawyers? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) authority to screen 

is explicit under sections 101 and 110 of the Aviation and Transportation Security 

Act (ATSA). TSA has the statutory mandate to screen all passengers and property 

that will be transported on passenger aircraft. This is codified in 49 U.S.C. §§ 114 

and 44901. In addition, under Section 4013 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44925), Congress has directed 

that TSA ‘‘shall give a high priority to developing, testing, improving and deploying, 

at airport screening checkpoints, equipment that detects nonmetallic, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and explosives, in all forms, on individuals and 

in their personal property.’’ Particular screening methods, however, are not prescribed by statute. 

Question 3. During the hearing, Senator Dorgan asked what I thought was a very 

good question. In asking whether you were sensitive to the growing concern over 

the new pat-downs, he said: ‘‘Does that worry you that maybe we’re at a point 

where this is not a vocal minority, that maybe we have overstepped?’’ You responded: ‘‘Yes, I’m concerned about that, but, no I’m not going to change the policy.’’ 

If you are, by your own admission, concerned that TSA is overstepping, then why 

not have a review of the policy and make changes? 

Answer. My concern was based on the intensity of the feedback we received, not 

the efficacy of the screening policies themselves. As always, the Transportation Security Administration will continue to evaluate and adapt screening procedures to 

strike the appropriate balance between privacy and security, while ensuring that we 

are addressing evolving threats. A review of travel during the recent Thanksgiving 

and December high-travel period shows that the screening process went very 

smoothly throughout the country. 

Question 4. I recognize that security is a balancing act, and that we must balance 

the free flow of commerce and freedom of movement with security in the post 9/11 

world. I was disappointed that Secretary Napolitano said that ‘‘if people want to 

travel by some other means’’ they have that right, and when she implied that air 

travel is not a right. That comment does not reflect an understanding of the necessity of air travel for many and its importance to our nation’s economy. 

I also do not think that DHS and TSA have done a good enough job of explaining 

the meaning and intent of its aviation security regulations and policies to the traveling public, or to its field representatives who are charged with enforcing them. For 

example, one constituent relayed an experience in Atlanta where he was told he was 

now required to remove his wallet when going through screening. He asked when 

this new rule was implemented, and was told, ‘‘it has always been this way.’’ 

TSA, it seems, consistently fails to communicate these changes, especially when 

doing so could probably speed up the process and give travelers an idea of what to 

expect. If you travel through 5 different airports, you will have 5 different TSA experiences. 

Do you agree with Secretary Napolitano that, for example, my constituents who 

need to travel the over 2,000 miles to the West Coast for business should find other 

means to travel? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has responsibility for 

protecting the security of the aviation system and specific authority to screen passengers and their property. TSA appreciates the support and cooperation of those 

who fly. Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1540.107 (a) however, provide that no individual may enter a sterile area of an airport without complying 

with the systems, measures, or procedures in place to control access to that area. 

58 

Further, no individual may enter a sterile area or board an aircraft without submitting to the screening and inspection of his or her person and accessible property in 

accordance with TSA’s procedures. Simply put, TSA must ensure that all passengers 

are properly screened, and we know that all passengers want assurances that those 

traveling on their flight are similarly screened for their safety. Under Title 49 Code 

of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1503.401, TSA has authority to assess civil penalties for violations of these aviation security requirements. Thus, to ensure the 

safety of the public, civil penalties or the denial of air transportation will apply to 

those who refuse to comply with federal regulations. 

Question 5. What will you do to ensure that TSA policies and regulations are 

properly understood and consistently enforced by TSA field representatives, and 

properly communicated to your customers, the traveling public? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has a comprehensive 

training program in place to ensure that all TSA policies and regulations are understood by the entire screening work force. TSA uses a number of communications vehicles to reinforce messaging to the workforce and field leadership. Among these vehicles are agency-wide broadcast messages from the Secretary of Homeland Security, the TSA Administrator, and the TSA Deputy Administrator; daily shift briefs 

provided to the work force; transmittal of information via Intranet sites open to the 

work force; our public Internet site; Intranet sites dedicated to field leadership; leadership conferences; newsletters; and local town halls. Included in the training and 

messaging are periodic reminders of established avenues to report concerns with 

consistent enforcement of standards, to include the TSA Ombudsman. 

For the traveling public, TSA provides extensive signage and audio messaging at 

airports; a user-friendly Internet site; a network of customer service managers at 

airports across the nation; and broad outreach for feedback from the public through 

the TSA Contact Center. We refine our public communications through close coordination with key government and industry stakeholders. 

Question 6. As a grandfather of 9, most of whom are under the age of 6, I have 

a special interest in this question. My staff received a call from a constituent who 

at the time was at the airport and who was very upset that his 4 year old daughter 

had two options to be screened: either the advanced imaging screening or the physical pat-down. He has very legitimate concerns with the image produced by the advanced imaging screening, regardless of whether the TSA agent is in a private room 

where no one else can see the images, and has very legitimate concerns with the 

intimate nature of the physical screening. Can you clarify once and for all how TSA 

is treating child travelers? 

Answer. Children who appear to be 12 years of age and younger receive a modified version of the pat-down when it is required. The modified pat-down is required 

if a child alarms the Walk Through Metal Detector, has Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) anomalies, or if the child’s parent or guardian requests a pat-down in 

lieu of AIT on the child’s behalf. The modified version of the pat-down is less 

invasive than the pat-down conducted on adults. As with all of the Transportation 

Security Administration’s (TSA) pat-down procedures, the modified pat-downs are 

only conducted over clothed areas and can always be conducted in private with witnesses present; TSA will not separate a parent or guardian from a minor. In addition, targeted pat-downs on specific areas of individuals, including children, may be 

conducted if the individual or child is wearing bulky clothing that could conceal a 

prohibited item or resolution of an AIT anomaly is required. 

Question 7. If a parent is traveling with a child that they do not want to be subjected to AIT radiation, what are their options? 

Answer. A modified pat-down is conducted on children who appear to be 12 years 

old or younger if the child’s parent or guardian refuses Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) on the child’s behalf. The modified version of the pat-down is less 

invasive than the pat-down conducted on adults. As with all the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) pat-down procedures, the modified pat-down is only 

conducted over clothed areas and can always be conducted in private with witnesses 

present. TSA will not separate a parent or guardian from a minor. The TSA website 

at www.tsa.gov contains information regarding radiation and AIT safety. 

Question 8. My constituents have voiced a number of concerns with the advanced 

imaging technology (AIT) machines. The notion of a near naked image being seen 

by someone in a different room is disconcerting, regardless of whether that image 

is stored. They have voiced concerns with the radiation they are subjected to during 

the process. They also have voiced concerns with throughput at the machines which, 

by my own experience in Atlanta, I can tell you is very slow. What progress has 

TSA made in moving to the automated target recognition feature that would eliminate the viewing room and instead use a stick-figure image on the machine itself? 

59 

Answer. Software development is currently underway and will be followed by testing to ensure it meets Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screening requirements. If it meets these requirements, Automated Target Recognition (ATR) 

software will be used with Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) and displays a generic stick figure-like image on the monitor attached to the AIT machine to show 

potential threats concealed on a passenger, and does not display the actual image 

of the passenger. ATR will provide strong privacy protections and eliminate the 

need to staff an extra officer in a private room. 

Question 9. Can you guarantee that these images are not being stored, as we 

learned the U.S. Marshal Service was doing at an Orlando courthouse? 

Answer. The Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deploys to airports cannot store, export, print, or transmit 

images. TSA directs AIT vendors to disable the storage capability of their machines 

at the factory. All images are automatically deleted from the system after they are 

reviewed by the remotely located operator. No cameras, cellular telephones, or any 

other device capable of capturing an image is permitted in the resolution room. Use 

of such a device is terminable offense. 

Question 10. What studies has TSA done to ensure that the levels of radiation, 

especially by the backscatter machines, are not harmful? 

Answer. Advanced Imaging Technology is safe and meets national health and 

safety standards. Backscatter technology was evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health, the National Institute for 

Standards and Technology, and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. All results confirmed that the radiation doses for the individuals being 

screened, operators, and bystanders were well below the dose limits specified by the 

American National Standards Institute. For comparison, the energy projected by 

millimeter wave technology is thousands of times less than a cell phone transmission. A single scan using backscatter technology produces exposure equivalent 

to 2 minutes of flying on an airplane. 

Question 11. With regards to throughput, will TSA staff and run the security lines 

to a specific wait time? That is, can TSA guarantee that passengers will clear security within 30 minutes of beginning the process, for example? If not, why not? 

Answer. Although the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) strives to 

process passengers through screening as efficiently as possible, application of 

screening protocols at a checkpoint is not tied to throughput and screening of individuals and property must be completed to ensure the safety of the traveling public. 

While TSA cannot guarantee a wait time of less than 30 minutes, historical data 

indicate that 99.4 percent of passengers wait less than 20 minutes. 

Question 12. Please clarify that if a passenger clears the AIT machines with no 

anomalies, they do NOT have to have the ‘‘more invasive’’ pat-down. 

Answer. That is correct. If a passenger clears the Advanced Imaging Technology 

machine with no anomalies, they do not have to undergo the standard pat-down. 

Question 13. When we met prior to your confirmation, we discussed the fact that 

TSA uses a cookie cutter, one size fits all approach to security and screens everybody the same way, when what they should be doing is managing risk to the specific 

threats. We also discussed that the best way to do this is to use intelligence to determine who would need greater scrutiny and to apply it to those who need it, using 

behavioral detection officers at the TSA checkpoint and at the actual gate itself. At 

the time my understanding was that you agreed with this view. 

My staff recently witnessed a situation in New York where TSA agents were 

working at the gate, and selecting passengers as they were walking on the airplane 

for screening. My understanding, again, is that these agents use behavioral detection to determine who should be screened. 

Before starting to board the plane, the airline agent called for two specific passengers to board first. The TSA agent pulled one of the two people aside for screening as they were boarding. The person said ‘‘no ma’am, I don’t think you want to 

screen me.’’ The agent insisted, and began going through the person’s belongings in 

full view of the rest of the passengers and before anyone else was allowed to board. 

Ultimately, the passenger was identified as an air marshal. 

This concerns me, because to me it underscores the lack of communication between the TSA, the air marshals, and the airline. It also underscores that no intelligence is being used to determine who needs to have extra scrutiny applied to them. 

The situation forced the public identification of the undercover air marshals on this 

particular flight. Finally, it underscores the concerns that I hear from many of my 

constituents, and that is that TSA’s policies and procedures are ‘‘security theater.’’ 

60 

What guidance are your screeners given at the gate in determining whom to pull 

out for extra screening? Are they using behavioral detection or other intelligence, 

or are they pulling passengers out of line based on their own whims? 

Answer. Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) are instructed to select passengers for gate screening based on random screening protocols or behavior detection. Specific procedures describe what actions should be taken if a Federal Air Marshal is selected for gate screening. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employs several methodologies 

to determine flights chosen for gate screening operations, in addition to random selection, to include: collaboration with the TSA’s Office of Intelligence using real-time 

intelligence for flights of interest, as well as with the Federal Air Marshals Service 

for flights that have gone through a risk-modeling process and are determined to 

be of interest for aviation security. The specific procedures for gate screening are 

Sensitive Security Information (SSI) that cannot be discussed in public. However, 

TSA will schedule a closed meeting at your convenience to brief the Committee on 

these procedures. 

Question 14. Are breakdowns in communication between the TSA and air marshals like this common? 

Answer. The airport sterile area is a fluid environment within which Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assets, to include Federal Air Marshals 

(FAMs), operates 365 days a year in an effort to ensure the safety of the traveling 

public. To strengthen security at our nation’s airports, TSA implemented the random assignment of Transportation Security Officers (TSO) and Behavioral Detection 

Officers (BDO) to airport departure gates in an effort to remain unpredictable and 

thereby increasing the effectiveness of limited available resources. 

On occasion, FAMs are scheduled for flights where departure gate screening occurs. The airport environment, varied flight schedules and the element of randomness introduced with departure gate screening increases the likelihood a FAM may 

be selected for departure gate screening. However, as a result of procedures currently in place, this is not a common occurrence. 

TSA’s Office of Security Operations (OSO) and Office of Law Enforcement/Federal 

Air Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS) have taken steps to mitigate the potential for a 

breakdown in communication between FAMs, TSOs and BDOs. FAMs are aware of 

the existence of random departure gate screening. FAMs are instructed to take 

measures to prevent being selected for screening. These measures include discreet 

communication with TSOs and/or BDOs as soon as it is evident their flight is selected for random screening in an effort to make their presence and identity known 

to the TSA elements conducting the screening. 

Unfortunately, even with these measures in place there is no guarantee a FAM 

will not be selected for screening. For instance, boarding has commenced prior to 

a FAM team’s arrival at the departure gate due to unforeseen circumstances (such 

as a flight delay or last minute schedule change) and discreet communication is not 

possible. In such an event, FAMs and TSOs are instructed to interact in a manner 

that would ensure the anonymity of FAMs. 

TSA will continue to work to ensure such instances that you described are minimized or eliminated. 

Question 15. What steps will you take to ensure that situations like this do not 

happen in the future? 

Answer. Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS) will continue to work closely with 

TSA’s Office of Security Operations (OSO) to make certain breakdowns in communication occur as infrequently as possible. The potential for Federal Air Marshals 

(FAMs) to be selected for screening exists on a daily basis. However, TSA has put 

procedures in place to limit the potential for a breakdown in communication between FAMs, Transportation Security Officers (TSO) and Behavioral Detection Officers (BDO). 

Question 16. As a member of the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, I read with 

great interest recent articles (including: http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/2010– 

08–25-airportscreening25lSTlN.htm) regarding TSA’s treatment of amputees. As 

you know many of our Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom 

veterans have lost limbs in service to their country as a result of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 

My state of Georgia is home to the 3rd Infantry Division, 13 military installations 

including the Home of the Infantry at Fort Benning, as well as the Eisenhower 

Army Medical Center and the Charlie Norwood Veterans Hospital, which serves as 

a poly-trauma and rehabilitation center for our nation’s active duty and retired 

wounded warriors from all our nation’s military conflicts. 

61 

A recent article in USA Today highlighted the concerns of many amputees about 

TSA’s use of CastScope and called on the TSA to ‘‘clean up its act’’ when screening 

people who have lost a limb. Many amputees find they have been subjected to ‘‘inconsistent, unfair, abusive and often embarrassing screenings’’ by TSA personnel. 

Furthermore, the CastScope subjects passengers to a significant amount of radiation and, as one passenger who lost a limb as a result of a radiation overdose said, 

‘‘It’s ironic to lose my leg to a radiation overdose, and now, if I want to travel, I 

have to expose myself to more radiation.’’ 

My understanding is that our wounded warriors and other amputees have to subject themselves to CastScope and cannot opt out. Further, I have read the complaints many wounded warriors and amputees have had with regards to the insensitivity of TSA agents toward amputees, and the lack of understanding about how 

CastScope works. 

For passengers who are amputees, what are the options beyond CastScope? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is very sensitive to 

the special needs of amputees, including wounded warriors, and has been working 

closely with the Amputee Coalition of America to ensure proper training of TSA 

screeners and to improve screening processes generally for amputees. Persons who 

wear prosthetic devices will be screened using either Advanced Imaging Technology 

(AIT), or the Walk Through Metal Detector (WTMD), or they may opt-out of either 

and undergo a pat-down. If the person undergoes AIT or WTMD screening and either an AIT anomaly is identified or the WTMD alarms, a pat-down will be conducted. The pat-down may be conducted on all areas of the body except for the prosthetic device. A visual inspection will be conducted of the accessible exterior area 

of the prosthetic device. A pat-down and visual inspection can always be conducted 

in a private screening area. Upon completion of the pat-down and visual inspection, 

the person’s hands, footwear, and prosthetic will be tested for explosives. In the airports where CastScope is available, it is used in addition to the other screening 

methods described previously. If the person declines the CastScope procedure, they 

will not be allowed to enter the sterile area of the airport and will be allowed to 

depart the screening checkpoint. Since June 2010, TSA has worked closely with the 

Amputee Coalition of America to identify ways to make the CastScope process safer 

and more comfortable to people with prosthetics. In addition, TSA is in the process 

of researching ways to increase the privacy of those undergoing CastScope screening 

through the use of privacy screens. 

Question 17. What steps are you taking to ensure that TSA agents are all trained 

in the proper way to treat passengers who are amputees? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration is working closely with the 

Amputee Coalition to develop new training to help TSOs gain a higher degree of 

sensitivity regarding screening persons with prosthetics. In addition, in direct response to concerns identified in a survey conducted by the Amputee Coalition last 

summer, TSA has recently made a number of changes to its CastScope procedures 

including requiring that some of the scans be conducted in the seated position. TSA 

also worked directly with the Amputee Coalition to identify specifications for the 

type of chair and stool needed to conduct these scans on amputees more safely and 

comfortably. In addition, training has been provided regarding minimizing the number of scans to that reasonably necessary to ensure that no prohibited items are 

present in the cast or prosthetic device. The frequency of the training provided to 

TSOs was also increased from yearly to a quarterly requirement so that TSOs will 

be able to carry out these procedures more effectively and expeditiously, thereby 

causing less inconvenience to passengers who are amputees. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DAVID VITTER TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. Administrator Pistole, as you know, the federal government took over 

all aspects of security screening post-September 11, including the purchase and installation of Explosive Detection Systems known as EDS, at airports across the 

country. 

In one instance, American Airlines was in the middle of constructing a new stateof-the-art terminal at New York’s JFK International Airport when the terrorist attacks occurred on 9/11. Rather than stop construction or postpone the project, they 

made the bold decision to proceed—in my mind, a very good demonstration of corporate citizenship. 

To keep the project on track while the new TSA was organized, American agreed 

to front the money for the EDS installation with a clear understanding that TSA 

would reimburse them. To date, that reimbursement has not occurred despite reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Oct 13, 2011 Jkt 070643 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\70643.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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peated attempts and countless correspondence that has changed hands between 

TSA, American and the Port Authority of New York. 

In fact, I am aware of a FOIA request sent by American to TSA on October 29, 

2009 (attachment #1) requesting certain documentation on this issue that TSA acknowledged on November 25, 2009 (attachment #2). As of today, there has been no 

reply, which I find completely unacceptable. 

I am further aware of a joint letter sent by American Airlines and the Port Authority of New York to you dated August 20, 2010, requesting a meeting to discuss 

this matter and your response that took over 2 months to answer—on October 25, 

2010—where you denied their request for a meeting, which I also find unacceptable. 

Can you tell me when TSA intends to respond to the FOIA request? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) sincerely regrets the 

delay in responding to the Freedom of Information Act request submitted by American Airlines for information related to the in-line baggage screening system at John 

F. Kennedy International Airport. TSA is actively processing this request and issued 

its first response on December 10, 2010. 

Question 2. Furthermore, can you give me an explanation as to why you would 

refuse to meet with two of the largest stakeholders at the nation’s busiest international airport on such an important issue? 

Answer. TSA has been advised that American Airlines has filed suit against TSA 

on this matter in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 

TSA will respond to the lawsuit through appropriate channels. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MIKE JOHANNS TO

HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE

Question 1. Please provide the information requested during the hearing regarding screening procedures for advanced imaging technology and pat-downs. 

Answer. During the hearing on November 17, 2010 Senator Johanns stated that 

he had recently traveled by commercial aircraft and had been subjected to both Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) and a pat-down and questioned the circumstances 

under which a passenger who did not alarm the AIT would subsequently receive a 

pat-down as well. While the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) cannot 

determine exactly what may have occurred when Senator Johanns was screened, the 

vast majority of passengers do not receive pat-downs. Pat-downs are primarily used 

to resolve anomalies observed during Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) screening 

or alarms of the Walk Through Metal Detector (WTMD). Passengers who elect not 

to undergo WTMD or AIT screening will also receive a pat-down. Rigorous privacy 

safeguards are in place for both screening procedures. TSA’s standard operating procedures for AIT and pat-downs are Sensitive Security Information and can be provided to the Committee in a closed setting. 

Question 2. Regarding Advanced Imaging Technology, the TSA website states 

that, ‘‘This technology is optional to passengers in the U.S. Passengers who opt-out 

of imaging technology screening will go through alternative screening, including 

same-gender pat-downs.’’ 

Many passengers do not believe these are acceptable alternatives—either go 

through a machine that allows a TSO to see a highly invasive image of the passenger or have a TSO give a passenger a full pat-down. What steps is TSA taking 

to accommodate passengers who have legitimate concerns, including concerns based 

on religious beliefs, that either option is an unreasonable privacy violation? 

Answer. The use of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) and the pat-down are 

among the layers of security the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deploys to address the current threat to aviation security. Last year’s Christmas Day 

plot and the recently thwarted plots to conceal and ship explosives on aircraft bound 

for the U.S. require that we use the most effective security measures available to 

protect the safety of the traveling public. We employ rigorous privacy safeguards to 

protect the privacy of the public when using either the AIT or conducting a patdown. DHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and TSA’s Office of Civil 

Rights and Liberties meet regularly with many religious groups to both hear their 

concerns and to educate them about TSA’s screening procedures. Feedback from 

these dialogues are used to inform TSA’s screening operations. We welcome such 

feedback and remain committed to do everything we can to make the travel experience as expeditious and comfortable as possible while ensuring the safety of all passengers. However, all passengers must undergo screening in order to ensure that 

they are not a threat to their fellow passengers or to the aircraft. This is in fulfillment of the requirements that Congress mandated that TSA implement in order to 

keep the traveling public safe. 

63 

ATTACHMENT 1 

JONES DAY

Washington, DC, October 29, 2009 

KEVIN J. JANET, 

FOIA Officer, TSA–20 

Arlington, VA. 

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request; In-line Baggage Security System Installation at Terminal 8 of John F. Kennedy International Airport 

Dear Mr. Janet: 

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and on 

behalf of American Airlines, Inc. (‘‘American’’), I hereby request that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) provide copies of the following: 

1. All documents related to, memorializing, or reflecting communications between American, TSA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), any Member of Congress, and/or the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey 

(PANYNJ) respecting the installation of and/or funding for the in-line baggage 

screening system at Terminal 8 of John F. Kennedy International Airport. 

2. All documents related to TSA’s reimbursement of airlines, airport managing 

authorities, or private non-airline entities for costs associated with the acquisition or installation of baggage screening systems, or other improvements designed to meet TSA requirements at airport facilities, including but not limited 

to: (a) requests for and payment of such reimbursements and all correspondence 

related thereto; (b) the development of reimbursement guidelines or ratios by 

TSA; and (c) communications within TSA or between TSA and OMB on the subject of reimbursement to airlines, airport authorities, or private non-airline entities for such projects. 

3. All documents related to development of TSA’s airport facility improvement 

reimbursement prioritization schedule called for by 49 U.S.C. § 44923, including 

but not limited to all internal guidance, communications with OMB, and communications with Congress related to the same. 

For purposes of this request, the term ‘‘documents’’ should be interpreted as including, but not limited to, all records, correspondence, memoranda, reports, briefs, 

requests for clarifications, proposals, e-mails, e-mail attachments, electronic records 

including but not limited to Blackberry and/or other personal data assistant records, 

letters, papers, maps, charts, drawings, spreadsheets, scientific or technical data, 

meeting notes, telephone logs, audio recordings, voice-mail records, and notes documenting any communications, regardless of physical form or characteristics. 

In responding to this request, TSA should identify and produce responsive documents wherever and with whomever found. In addition, TSA should specifically 

search documents currently or formerly maintained by the following individuals: 

David M. Stone, Kip Hawley, Michael Golden, John Reed, Rodger Dickey, Richard 

Hayes, Tom Blank, Jim Blair, Elle Han, Charlotte Pead, Jason M. Conley, Mohammad Siddiqui, Connie Thornton, James I. Murray III, Libby Waldman Strugatch, 

David Hobbs, Bill Britts, Kimberly Ennet, Marisa Maola, and Chuck Burke. 

In the event TSA withholds any information responsive to this request, please 

provide an index identifying such information with a detailed explanation of the 

specific reason(s) and statutory basis for each document withheld. If part of any document or documents responsive to this request is claimed to be exempt from disclosure, TSA—through redaction or otherwise—should produce all non-exempt portions 

of such document or documents. 

American is willing to pay fees associated with processing this request. In the 

event TSA estimates such fees will exceed $1,000, please contact me in advance to 

discuss. 

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) and 43 C.F.R. § 2.12, please send all responsive documents to my attention within twenty (20) days of receipt of this request. Production may be in electronic or hard-copy form. 

Thank you in advance, and please feel free to contact me with any questions. 

Sincerely, 

GRANT H. WILLIS. 

64 

ATTACHMENT 2 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Washington, DC, November 25, 2009 

Mr. GRANT H. WILLIS, 

Jones Day, 

Washington, DC. 

Re: TSA10–0117 

Dear Mr. Willis: 

This acknowledges receipt of your October 29, 2009, Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) request to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), seeking information on behalf of your client, American Airlines, Inc. Your request was received 

in this office on November 23, 2009. 

Due to the increasing number of FOIA requests received by this office, we may 

encounter some delay in processing your request. Per Section 5.5(a) of the TSA 

FOIA regulations, 6 C.F.R. Part 5, the Department processes FOIA requests according to their order of receipt. Although TSA’s goal is to respond within 20 business 

days of receipt of your request, the FOIA does permit a 10-day extension of this time 

period. As your request seeks numerous documents that will necessitate a thorough 

and wide-ranging search, TSA will invoke a 10-day extension for your request, as 

allowed by Title 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B). If you care to narrow the scope of your request, please contact our office. We will make every effort to comply with your request in a timely manner. 

Provisions of the Act allow us to recover part of the cost of complying with your 

request. We shall charge you for records in accordance with the DHS Interim FOIA 

regulations as they apply to noncommercial requestors. As a non-commercial requestor you will be charged 10-cents a page for duplication, although the first 100 

pages are free, as are the first 2 hours of search time, after which you will pay the 

per quarter-hour rate ($4.00, $7.00, $10.25) of the searcher. You stated in your request that you are willing to pay assessable fees up to $1,000.00. You will be contacted before any additional fees are accrued. 

We have queried the appropriate program offices of TSA for responsive records. 

If any responsive records are located, they will be reviewed for determination of releasability. Please be assured that one of the processors in our office will respond 

to your request as expeditiously as possible. We appreciate your patience as we proceed with your request. 

Your request has been assigned reference number TSA10–0117. Please refer to 

this identifier in any future correspondence. You may contact this office at 

866.364.2872. 

Sincerely, 

KEVIN J. JANET, 

FOIA Officer, 

Freedom of Information Act Office. 

65 

ERIC D. MILLER, 

Pueblo, CO 

Dear Committee Members, 

The following is a copy of the letter sent to Janet Napolitano in regards to the 

poor treatment of a TSA officer against my blind son in Colorado Springs, Colorado. 

I am submitting this letter for the Statement of Record of the TSA Oversight meeting on November 17, 2010. 

Sincerely, 

ERIC D. MILLER

Secretary JANET NAPOLITANO

Department of Homeland Security 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 

15 November 2010 

Dear Madam Secretary, 

I am writing to let you know of two events I witnessed during my brief visit 

through the TSA screening area in Colorado Springs, Colorado last Wednesday, November 10, 2010. My son, Garrett and I were traveling to Wilmington, North Carolina to celebrate his 10-years of cancer survivorship by participating in the 

Beach2Battleship Half Ironman distance triathlon. Garrett was diagnosed with a 

medulloblastoma (brain tumor) in June of 2000. Garrett was given a 50/50 chance 

of living 5-years. He was left blind, mute and paralyzed on a ventilator after his 

surgery. He endured 6-weeks of radiation and 64-weeks of chemotherapy. He spent 

2 years in speech and physical therapy re-learning to walk and talk. To say Garrett 

has been through the ringer is a gross understatement. His resiliency has been reported on CNN, MSNBC, USA Today, and many other publications. His foundation, 

the Rush-Miller Foundation is responsible for donating over 90 tandem bicycles to 

blind and low vision children in 25 states and 6 countries. 

Garrett’s story was chosen to be profiled by the Beach2Battleship race and our 

sponsor. His face greeted all visitors to Wilmington arriving in the airport and could 

be seen all over Wilmington, including a front page news story. This trip was a victory for Garrett! After understanding Garrett’s journey I believe you will be as concerned by the story I am about to relate. 

While standing in line at TSA check point in Colorado Springs I witnessed one 

of the TSA employees near the metal detector. She was smiling and using a sticker 

to persuade a toddler to come through the detector. I vividly remember thinking to 

myself, ‘‘If every TSA employee was creative and friendly like this woman, they 

wouldn’t have as many complaints.’’ I really considered her gesture with this child 

above and beyond, a great example of superior customer service. Her name I found 

out later was Natasha. 

Contrast the above story with this experience. As I came through the metal detector I was selected for further screening, likely due to my very baggy jeans. Garrett 

had passed through the screening just before me and I ask the screener to please 

have someone escort Garrett to a chair because he is blind. I went to the waiting 

area for my screening. I noticed the screener had done nothing to assist Garrett and 

he was becoming confused. I went back to the screener, ‘‘Ma’am, the boy right there 

with the white cane is blind and needs assistance finding an area to put his things 

on and let him know where I am please.’’ 

Again, unbelievably nothing was done. I went back a third time and ask, ‘‘MA’AM, 

the boy there is blind, this is very confusing to him, please find him some assistance.’’ I then looked around the corner and identified a chair and directed Garrett 

verbally to the chair. I could see Garrett sitting in the chair getting very agitated 

because of all of the people and all of a sudden I was nowhere to be found. At this 

point I was getting very irritated! I went back to the screener and demanded, 

‘‘Ma’am HE IS BLIND. LOOK AT HIM. HE IS CONFUSED. GET HIM SOMEONE 

NOW.’’ Finally at this point she ask someone to help Garrett. I ask the man behind 

me in line if my perception of the event was accurate and all he could do was shake 

his head. 

I cooperated with my screening and found a supervisor to let him know about the 

incident. And here is the irony. The person who provided the superior example of 

customer service to the toddler was the very same person who also provided some 

of the most blatantly inconsiderate customer service we have ever experienced, 

Natasha. 

66 

We are not a ‘‘poor us’’ disability rights family. We expect Garrett to compete 

against his peers regardless of physical abilities. We don’t expect TSA or anyone 

else to bend over backward to help us. HOWEVER, my initial request should have 

been acted on immediately. Once his cane came out, there shouldn’t have been any 

questions, but 4 times? ARE YOU KIDDING ME! 

Garrett’s story has resonated around the country. I don’t believe Natasha was discriminating against Garrett, I don’t feel she was rude to me. However she was just 

unbelievably inconsiderate and humiliating. Garrett has had enough taken from 

him, let alone his dignity. Frankly, when the cane came out, anyone of the many 

TSA people in Garrett’s line should have asked if he needed any assistance. I am 

not asking for Natasha to face any disciplinary action. But this event does open the 

avenue for awareness and training for TSA in identifying people needing assistance. 

Here is a link to Garrett’s foundation and race. Put a face with Garrett’s story. 

I believe an apology letter to Garrett from Natasha and her supervisor is not out 

of the question. If she would like to go to Garrett’s school and talk to the kids about 

the TSA and how to go through airport security it would be a great learning experience for her and the kids, I am sure I can arrange a time at the Colorado School 

for the Deaf and Blind. Let’s try to find a positive solution to this incident. 

I look forward to your timely reply. 

http://www.ppdi.com/beach2battleship/emiller.htm 

Letters to Garrett may be addressed to: 

Mr. Garrett D. Rush-Miller 

2520 Spruce Street 

Pueblo, CO 81004 

Please feel free to contact me regarding more information surrounding this incident. I look forward to hearing from you. 

Sincerely, 

ERIC D. MILLER

Garrett’s Dad 

November 16, 2010 

From: diana@frontier.net 

To: ADAM DUFFY

Dear Honorable Committee Members, 

I want to convey to you how outrageous the current tactics are from the TSA. 

These tactics (the body scanners and the pat-downs and now letting them put their 

hands down your pants) are physically and mentally intrusive, degrading, a health 

risk and safety issue. On top of that the TSA agents are rude power mongers. The 

only thing that I see that is coming out of these tactics is to instill fear in the American people. 

There have been many documented situations of the body scanner pictures being 

compromised. There has also been many documented times the TSA agents have 

completely gone overboard with their authority. When you challenge them in anyway they threaten you that you will not be able to get on your flight, being arrested 

and/or fined. Case in point John Tyner of Oceanside as reported by the SignOn San 

Diego News. 

When I fly I don’t want to be handled like a criminal. I want to be treated with 

respect for the American citizen that I am. I have a right to be secure in my person 

and papers. 

It is foreseeable that these tactics will have an effect on the airline industry. I 

don’t think that is a desirable outcome Considering the state of the economy. 

In addition I am a cancer survivor and have had enough radiation to last two life 

times. I don’t need anymore radiation from the body scanners and I don’t need to 

be touched inappropriately. 

Even in writing this I am fearful that I will be put on one of those do not fly 

list. 

These tactics need to be halted immediately. In utter disgust. 

DIANA SAUDER

Durango, CO 

Æ