IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2013-CA-01713-SCT GINGER M. POPE, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF NANCY

SPRINGER, DECEASED

v. DR. CHARLES F. BROCK AND DR. STEV EN CLARK

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/26/2013 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHARLES E. W EBSTER TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: TOMIKA HOLIDAY CLINTON GUENTHER KIMBERLY N. HOW LAND GERALD H. JACKS ELLIS TURNAGE JAMES L. W ILSON, IV COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: BOLIVAR COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ELLIS TURNAGE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: JAMES LAW RENCE W I LSON, IV TOMMIE G. W ILLIAMS CLINTON M. GUENTHER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DISPOSITION: APPEAL DISMISSED - 12/17/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., KING AND COLEMAN, JJ. RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. On March 24, 2006, the Bolivar County Circuit Court granted Dr. Charles F. Brock and D r. Steven C lark summ ary judgm ent based on the expiration of the one-y e ar statute of lim itations i n the Mississippi Tort Claim s A c t (“MTCA”). On S eptem ber 2 7, 2010, Bolivar Medical Center (“BMC”), the f inal rem aining def

endant, was di s mi s s e d w ith prejudice.Im

properly r ely ing on an order certif y ing the March 24, 2006, order as f inal, which was later corrected by two separate orders by the trial court, Ginger M. Pope requested an additional f ourteen day s i n which to f ile her appeal. The trial court granted Pope additional tim e, and she f i led her notice of appeal on October 9, 20 13. This C ourt f i nds that the trial court erroneously granted Pope additio n a l tim e to f ile her appeal and that Pope’s appeal is dism issed as out of

tim e. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On January 6, 2 006, Drs. Brock and Clark f iled a m oti o n f

o r s u mma r y j udgm ent averring that they were e m ploy ees of Cleveland Medical Alliance, an entity covered by the Mississippi Tort Claim s Act, and were i mm une f rom personal liability

. Drs. Brock and Clark also argued they

were protected by

the Act’s one-y ear statute of lim itations. ¶3. The trial court h eard argum ents on Ma r c h 22, 2 006. Pope argued that the previous decision o f this Court in Pope v. Brock , 912 So. 2d 935 (Miss. 2005) (“ Pope I ”), was the law of the case. Pope additionally argued that Drs. Brock’s and Clark’s claim s of i mm unity and protection were precluded by the d octrines of law of the case, judicial estoppel, and waiver. Finally , Pope argued that the Cleveland Medical Alliance was not a g o v e r n me n tal entity covered by

the MTCA. ¶4. The trial court granted s umm ary judgm e n t in f avor of Drs. Brock and Clark on March 24, 2006. 1 The trial court f ound that Drs. B rock and Clark did invoke the protection of the MTCA in their Fourth Af f irm ative Def

ense and that Drs. Brock and Clark were entitled to

1 T h is o rd e r w as en tered b y th e clerk o n M arch 3 0 , 2 0 0 6

.

2its protections and imm unities as em

ploy ees of Cleveland Medical Allian c e, an i nstrum entality of a comm unity hospital (Greenwood-Lef lore Hospital). As to Pope’s
argum ent regarding judicial estoppel, the trial court f ound: Judicial estoppel precludes a party f rom asserting a position, benef itting f rom that position and then taking a contrary stand later in the sam e litigation. See In re: E state of R i c hardson , 9 03 So. 2d 51, 5 6 (Miss. 2005). Bef ore a p arty can be bound by a choice m ade in litigation, the party m ust actually have two inconsistent rem edies. T he doctrin e o f estoppel ref ers to f actual m atters and not to contentions o f law applied to the given s tate of f acts. The Court f

inds persuasive Def

endants’ argum ent that they did not benef it f rom their ar gum ent that the sixty (60) day notice provision did n ot toll the s tatute of l im itations f or m edical negligence. The issue which was considered b y the Suprem e C ourt on interlocutory appeal in this m atter was the proper construction and ef f e ct of the sixty (60) day notice requirem ent f or m edical negligence actions d ealing with the two (2) y ear s tatute of lim itations. The issue o f which statute of lim itations was a pplicable was not raised bef ore the Court and was not determ ined by the Suprem e Court. The m atter f or appellate review w as the i nterpretation of the notice provision and h o w it a f f ected the running of the statute of lim itations and whether or not there was a t olling of the statute o r only an extension of the statute which would h ave m ade a dif f erence. The issues in the present m otion deal with whether or not Plaintif f c om plied with the notice of claim provisions of § 11-46-11, MCA, and whether or not Drs. Brock and C l a r k a r e imm une f rom personal liability

. The Court f inds f or t h o s e r e asons the doctrine of the law of the case is not applicable. Finding tha t no notice of claim was f iled prior to the expiration o f the one-y ear statute of lim itations, the trial court held that Pope’s claim s were tim e-barred. At this point in tim e, that order was not a f

i nal, appealable order, as Pope had pending claim s against BMC. ¶5. Nonetheless, Pope f iled a notice of appeal, which she later voluntarily dism issed, 2 and approxim a tely t w o m onths later, Pope f iled a m otion f

or reconsideration of the March 24,

2 On July 27, 2006, the circuit clerk docketed a notice f rom the S uprem e Court clerk indicating that P ope’s m otion f or voluntary dism issal of the appeal was granted. On August 17, 2006, the Suprem e Court issued a m andate conf irm ing the dism i ssal of

the appeal. 32006, order in the trial court. On July 13, 2 0 0 6 , Drs. Brock and Clark f iled a response to Pope’s m otion f

o r reconsideration. ¶6. On October 9, 2006, the trial court denied Pope’s m otion f or reconsideration. 3 Prior

to the trial court’s r

u ling on the m otion f

o r reconsideration, this Court held that the Bolivar Lef lore Medical Alliance was a comm unity hospital entitled t o the p rotections o f the MTCA. Bolivar Leflore Med. Alliance v. William s , 938 So. 2d 1222 , 1223 (Miss. 2006). This Court’s holding in Bolivar was c onsistent with the trial court’s earlier r uling that Drs. Brock and C lark were entitled t o the prot e c t i o n s a n d imm unities o f the MTCA as em ploy ees of Cleveland Medical A lliance. O n October 20, 2 006, Drs. Brock and C lark f i led a R ule 54(b)

m otion to certif

y the c ourt’s March 24, 2006, judgm ent a s f inal. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Eleven day s later, on October 31, 2006, Pope f iled another notice o f appeal. Approxim ately two weeks later, on N ovem b er 1 6, 2006, Pope again f iled a m otion f

or voluntary

dism issal of that appeal. 4 ¶7. On Novem

ber 3, 2006, 5 the trial judge signed an order certif y ing the March 24, 2006, judgm ent as f

inal pursuant t o Rule 54(b)

. 6 However, the circuit clerk f ailed to provide the parties notice of

the order granting certif

i cation of f inal judgm ent.

3 T h is o rd e r w as en tered b y th e clerk o n O cto b er 1 2 , 2 0 0 6

. 4 On Decem

ber 4, 2006, the circuit clerk docketed a notice f rom the Suprem e Court clerk that Pope’s m otion f or v oluntary d i s mi s s a l of the appeal was granted o nce again on Novem ber 30, 2006.

5 T h is o rd e r w as n o t en tered b y th e clerk u n til N o v em

b er 2 7 , 2 0 0 6

. 6 The trial court, upon the discovery o f this order, noted that it was entered “by way of inadvertence and m istake.” 4¶8. On March 5, 2007, unaware that the trial court had entered an order certi f y i n g t h e judgm ent as f

i n al, Pope r esponded in opposition to Drs. Brock and Clark’s m otion to certif y the March 24, 2 0 06, judgm ent as f inal, m ore than f

our m onths a f

ter Drs. B rock and Clark had f iled t h e i r mo t i o n . On the s am e day , Pope f iled a m otion to a m end her com plaint to add additional causes o f action. On March 27, 2007, Drs. Brock and C lark, also unaware of the order c ertif

y ing the M arch 24, 2006, judgm ent as f i nal, responded to Pope’s opposition to their m otion to c ertif

y the judgm ent as f

inal. Dr s . B r o c k a n d Clark also f iled a m otion to strike Pope’s response as untim ely

. ¶9. On October 22, 2007, the trial court heard argum ents on Drs. Brock’s an d C l a r k’s

m otion to certif

y judgm ent as f

inal. On October 26, 2 007, the trial c ourt denied Pope’s

m otion f or leave to am end h er com plain t a n d denied Drs. Brock’s and Clark’s m otion to certif y judgm ent as f

inal. 7 T h i s order served to rectif y the trial court’s earlier m istake in holding that the March 24, 2006, o rder was f inal and appealable, f

inding that the March 24, 2006, order was not a f

inal, appealable order. ¶10. Approxim ately f

our m onths later, Pope f

ile d a nother m otion f

or reconsideration of

the March 2 4, 2006, order based on waiver. Alternatively , Pope asked that the trial court certif y the j udgm ent as f

i nal, taking a position opposite f rom her p revious response to D rs. Brock’s

a n d C l ark’s m o tion to certif y . Drs. Brock and C lark responded to Pope’s m otion f o r reconsideration, once again requesting that the judgm ent be certif ied as f inal. Af ter a hearing

7 T h is o rd e r w as en tered o n O cto b er 2 9 , 2 0 0 7

. 5on Septem

ber 19, 2008, the trial court denied the m otion f or reconsideration. 8 The trial court also addressed the request to certif y the judgm ent a s f

i nal, specif

i cally stating that, “although the c laim s against def

endants Brock and Clark have been resolved by the order of the court, there rem a ins the undism issed d ef endant Bolivar Medical Center (“BMC”)

. . . [ t his court f inds] that M.R.C.P. 5 4(b) certif ication is inappropriate.” The trial court r ef erenced its October 2 6, 2007, order, which held the March 24, 2 006, order was not a f inal order. Pope sought an interlocutory appeal f r om the order deny ing the second m otion f or reconsideration, but this Court d enied the petition on Novem ber 12, 2008. The M a r c h 2 4 , 2006, order

rem ained unappealable until such tim e as all def endants were af

f orded com

plete relief

. ¶11. On Septem

ber 27, 2010, the last rema i n i n g d e f e n d a n t , BMC, was dism issed with prejudice. On that d ate, no claim s r e ma i n e d p e n ding against any def endants. A lso, on that date, the March 24, 2006, o rder dism issing Drs. Brock and Clark was f inal and appealable. Beginning on that date, Pope’s clock to appeal began to run. ¶12. W h ile preparing her appeal, Pope claim s to have f irst becam e aware of the Novem ber 3, 2006, order c e r t if

y i ng the judgm ent as f

inal pursuant to Rule 54(b). However, as previously stated, the trial court had rectif ied its inadvertent f

inding that the March 24, 2006, judgm ent was f

inal on O c t o b e r 2 6 , 2007, and the trial court conf irm ed its f

inding on Septem ber 19, 2008, tha t t h e March 24, 2006, o rder was n ot a f inal order. Theref

ore, the
N o v e m ber 3, 2006, order clearly was overruled by two subsequent, separate orders o f t h e trial court, f

inding the March 24, 2006, order was not f inal.

8 T h is o rd e r w as en tered o n S ep tem b er 1 9 , 2 0 0 8

. 6¶13. On October 8, 2 0 10, ine x p l i c a b l y d u r i n g her tim e to f ile an appeal, Pope f

iled a Motion to Reopen Tim e f or Filing Notice of

Appeal, stating: On October 4, 2010, i n order to prepare a designation o f record to appeal the ord e r g r a n ting summ ary j udgm ent to def endants B rock and Clark f i led on March 30, 2006, the undersigned per sonally reviewed a printed copy of the electronic d ocket s h e e t and discovered the entry o f the N ovem ber 2 7, 2006 o r d e r g r anting def

endants Brock and Clark’s m otion to certif y judgm ent a s f inal pursuant to M.R.C.P. 54(b). Pope argued that, because notice was not provided to counsel of record, the trial court should allow Pope f

ourteen additional d a y s t o f ile her notice of appeal. At the tim e Pope sought leave to reopen h e r tim e to appeal, she had approxim ately nineteen day s to f

ile her appeal. ¶14. Drs. Brock and Clark f iled a response in opposition to Pope’s m otion, arguing that, because Mississippi’s Rules of Appellate Procedure are s t r i c t l y e n fo r c e d , P o p e ’ s m o t ion m ust be denied and dism issed as untim ely , since it was not f iled within 180 day s of t he entry of the order as required by

Rule 4(h). ¶15. On Decem

ber 6, 2010, Pope f

iled another Motion f

or Leave to am end her com plaint to add the nine Suprem e Court Justices, in their of f icial capacities, as party

def endants: Since the adoption a n d t h e e f f e ctive date of Miss. R. App. P. 4 (h), the Mississippi Supr e me Court has interpreted, applied and enf orced the provisions of Rule 4(h) in s uch an arbitrary , capricious and invidious m anner as to deny sim ilarly s ituated appellants equal protection of law and the unequal treatm ent s temm ed f

r om in part an intent or purpose to deny plaintif f’s rights secured by

the Fourteenth Am e ndm e n t of the United States Constitution. On April 7, 2011, Pope f

iled a m otion f

or r elief f r om the ef

f ect of the f

inal judgm ent entered

on Novem

ber 3 , 2006, e ven though that order had been corrected by two subsequent orders.

7Doctors B rock and C lark opposed Pope’s m otion, once again arguing that such m otion was

untim e ly

. ¶16. On Septem

b er 26, 2 013 , m o r e t h a n two y ears af t er Pope had f

iled h er m otion f

or relief , the trial court s ua sponte entered its own Rule 60(b) m o tion, g r a n t ing Pope her requested relief and vacating its order certif y ing its judgm ent as f

inal. 9 The trial court stated that the Novem

b er 3, 2006, order was entered by w ay of “inadvertence and m istake.” The trial court determ ined that “the only avenue o f relief f or the plaintif

f is pur s u a n t t o Rule 60(b). In this case, the court f i nds that Rules 60(b)(2), (6), and (4) are applicable.” The trial court granted Pope f

ourteen day s in which to f i le notice of

her appeal. ¶17. On October 9 , 2013, Pope f iled her notice of appeal f rom the March 30, 2 006, Order granting summ ary judgm ent to Drs. Brock and Clark; the O c t ober 12, 2006, O rder deny ing Pope’s m otion f

or reconsideration; and the S eptem b er 2 2 , 2 0 0 8 , O r der deny ing Pope’s

m otion f or reconsideration. Drs. Brock and Clark f iled n otice o f a c ross-appeal f rom the Septem ber 30, 2013, order granting relief f rom judgm e nt and vacating the order certif y ing judgm ent as f

inal. S TATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ¶18. Pope raises the f

ollowing issues: 1. Wh e t h e r t h e law of the case doctrine and t h e ma n d a t e r u l e b a r relitigation of

the applicable statute of

lim itations. 2. W hether the doctrine of judicia l e s t o p p e l b a r s r e l i t i g a t i o n o f the applicable statute of

lim itations.

9 T h is o rd e r w as en tered b y th e clerk o n S e p tem

b er 3 0 , 2 0 1 3

. 83. Wh e t h e r D r . B r o c k a n d D r . C l ark waived the one-y ear statute of lim itations and pre-suit notice provisions of the MTCA. 4. Wh e t h e r t h e t r i a l court e rred in f inding the MTCA pre-suit not i c e provisions were jurisdictional and could not be waived. Drs. Brock and Clark raise the f ollowing issues on cross-appeal: 1. Wh e t h e r Pope’s t im e to appeal, tim e in w hich to seek e x t e n s i o n t o appeal and tim e in which to reopen a ppeal all expired bef

ore h er Notice of Appeal was duly

f iled. 2. W hether the trial court erred in providing relief to Pope under MRCP 60(b)(4). 3. W hether the trial court erred in providing relief to Pope under MRCP 60(b)(2). 4. W hether the trial court erred in providing relief to Pope under MRCP 60(b)(6).
5. W hether the trial court erred in granting Pope relief f rom its Novem

ber 27, 2006, Order Certif

y ing Judgm ent as Final.
W e will address the issues raised in Drs. Brock’s and Clark’s c r o s s - a p peal, declining to address Pope’s issues, as the issues raised on cross-appeal are dispositive. ¶19. The trial court erroneously granted P o p e r e l i e f f r o m a j u d g me n t that had been corrected by t w o s e p a r a t e orders by the trial court, w hich nullif ied the Novem

ber 3, 2006,

o r d e r . There was n o r elief to be granted and there w as no order certif y ing the judgm ent a s f inal to vacate. Because there was no relief to be granted, the trial court e rroneously allowed Pope an a d ditional f

ourteen day s f

rom the date of the Septem ber 2 6, 2013, order, to f

ile her appeal. However, the date w hich began the running of Pope’s t im e t o appeal was Septem ber
2 7 , 2 010, the date BMC, the last def endant, w as dism issed f

rom the case. Pope had thirt y

9day s f

rom the date the Septem

ber 27, 2 010, order w as entered to f ile her notice o f appeal, as,
at that poin t , a l l d ef

endants stood dism issed. Pope’s appeal w as not f iled until October 9, 2013, m ore than three y ears af ter her right to appeal h a d e x p ired. T heref ore, this Court

reverses the Septem

ber 26, 2013, judgm ent of the trial c o urt and dism isses Pope’s appeal as untim e ly

. ANALYSIS ¶20. The question bef

o re this C ourt is not dependent on resolution of any f a ctual dispute which should be subm itted to a f inder of f act. Theref

ore, the question b ef

ore u s is one of law, which w e review de novo . Sarris v. Sm ith , 782 So. 2d 7 2 1 , 7 2 3 (Miss. 2001). On crossappeal, Drs. Brock and Clark argue that the trial court e r r e d i n g ranting Pope relief

. This C o u r t agrees. It is quite clear f rom a thorough review of the r ecord that Pop e h a d e v e r y

o p p o r t u n i t y to appeal the d ism issal of Drs. Brock an d Clark. There was absolutely no im p edim ent to Pope’s appeal of that dism issal under the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure or otherwise. It is inescapab l e that w h en BMC was dism issed, Pope’s tim e to appeal began to run. ¶21. Pope had an absolute right to appeal; however, Pope f aile d t o t i mely exercise that right. Instead of f

iling an appeal, she sought relief f r o m a j u d g me n t that twice had been nullif ied. W hen Pope f

irst becam e aware of the Novem ber 3, 2006, judgm ent, she should have known such order was void af ter a review of the entire record. She h ad notice, and does

not claim other w i s e , of the two subsequent orders deny ing the parties’ request f or certif i cation as f

inal. Pope should have k

nown that Rule 54(b) was no longer a pplicable due

1 0to those two subsequent o rders and the d ism issal of all def endants. Pope should h ave known that her tim e to appeal began upon the d ism issal of all def e n dants and had not y et expired. ¶22. The relief sought by Pope w as inappropriate, an d the trial court e r roneously granted Pope that relief

. In i ts order granting Pope relief , the trial court f

ailed t o analy

ze the ef f ects of the two subsequent o rders on the order certif y ing j udgm ent as f

inal. The trial court f

ailed

to r ecognize that the N ovem ber 3, 2006, order was m eaningless and the trial court had done nothing to im

pede Pope’s appeal process; theref o re, there was no relief that th e t rial court could grant Pope. Pope sim ply f ailed to tim e ly f

ile her notice of appeal af ter all def endants were accorded com

plete relief

. ¶23. T h e t r i a l c o urt f

ound that relief was warranted under R ule 60(b)(2) because it ha d entered an order inadvertently

. W hile the court noted Pope did not f ile a m otion on this basis within the specif

ied six-m onth tim e period and that the rule was silent as to whether the court could rectif

y i t s own m istake outside the six-m onth t ime p eriod, the court determ ined that

r e l i e f was warranted pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2). The court also held that this was a c a s e o f “extraordinary and com

p elling circum stances” and, theref o re, relief w as w arranted under Rule 60(b)(6). Finally , the trial court determ ined that relief under Ru l e 6 0 ( b)(4) was warranted because the judgm ent was void at the tim e it was e n t e r e d

. T h e trial court noted that, prior to the judgm ent being entered, Pope had f iled a notice of appeal which transf erred jurisdiction to this Court. The appeal was not dism issed until three d ay s af ter the order certif ying judgm ent a s f

inal was entered. The court f urther noted that relief m

ust be sought within a reasonable tim e. Because Drs. Brock and C lark suf f ered n o prejudice and because

1 1good cause exis t e d f o r Pope’s f

ailure to act, the trial c ourt d eterm i ned, under the specif ic f acts of this case, that relief was sought w it h i n a reasonable tim e and relief under Rule 60(b)(4) was appropriate. ¶24. W h ile the trial court g ranted Drs. Brock’s and Clark’s m otion on Novem ber 3, 2006, certif ying the judgm ent dism issing Drs. Brock and C lark a s f inal, the trial c ourt entered two subsequent orders correcting its h o l d i n g that the March 24, 2006, judgm e nt was f inal.
Because the case was st i l l p e n d i n g, the trial court was authorized to correct its f orm er judgm ent. See Gill v. State , 962 So. 2d 5 52, 554 (Miss. 2007) (“Moreover, ‘[ a]ll courts have the inherent power to correct and m ake their judgm ents speak the truth.’ Turner v. State , 212 Miss. 5 9 0 , 5 9 4 , 55 So. 2 d 228 (1951). This Court additionally has held that the power to
correct an error in the record of a judgm ent rendered by it at a f orm er term is inherent in the

court sy stem

. See Claughton v . Ford , 2 02 M iss. 361, 3 0 So. 2d 805 (1947).”). As such, the
Novem ber 3, 2006, order is void and is if no im port to this case. Because the Novem ber 3, 2006, order was void, there was no relief to be af f orded to Pope. ¶25. In her October 8, 2010, mo t i o n , P o p e i m p roperly raised the Novem ber 3, 2006, judgm ent and her nonreceipt of the judgm ent t o support h er argum e nt f or additional tim e to appeal. At the tim e this m otion was f iled, Pope h ad nineteen day s rema i ning on her prescribed tim e to a

ppeal; thus no additional tim e was necessary . As such, Pope’s claim ed reliance on this overruled order is specious, given the f actual history

. ¶26. Pope was f

u l ly aware that a l l d e f

e ndants had been dism issed af ter BMC was dism issed

on Septem

ber 27, 2010. Once all claim s against all d ef e n dants had been dism issed, the case

1 2was f

inal, subject to appeal. Rule 54(b) was no longer applicable. Pope had thirty day s f rom the entry of the Septem

ber 27, 2 0 10, order to f

i le her n otice of appeal with this Court. Pope’s opportunity to tim ely appeal the dism issal of D rs. Brock and C lark was n ot i m peded by the earlier order, which later was twice overruled by the trial court. ¶27. T h e p r o c e d u re f

or appealing a circuit c ourt judgm ent is clearly s e t o u t i n t h e Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under Rule 4 (a), a notice of appeal “shall be f iled with the clerk of the trial court within 3 0 day s a f t er the date of entry of judgm ent or order appealed f

rom .” M.R.A.P. 4(a). Rule 2(a) r equires the m andatory dism issal of

an appeal if the notice was not tim ely f iled pursuant to Rules 4 and 5. M.R.A.P. 2(a). “Rule 2(a) ref lects

t h e l ong-standing rule in this state that the f ailure to f ile a tim ely appeal leaves this Co u r t without jurisdiction to consider the case.” Bank of Edwards v. Cassity Auto Sales, Inc. , 599 So. 2d 579, 581-82 (Miss. 1992). See also In re Estate of Ware , 573 So. 2d 7 73, 7 74 (Miss. 1990); K ennedy v. Gervais , 345 So. 2d 1 039, 1039 (Miss. 1977). Rule 2 i s strictly enf orced.
Estate of W

are , 573 So. 2d at 775. See also Duncan v. St. Rom ain , 569 So. 2d 687, 688-89 (Miss. 1990) (appeal d ism issed where out-of

- state lawy er relied in good f aith on conf

licting statutory appeal period of f orty -f ive day s); Tandy Electr., Inc. v. Fletcher , 554 S o. 2d 308, 310 ( Miss. 1989) (This Court has declared that “appeals not perf ected within thirty day s will be dism i ssed, period.”). ¶28. Rule 4(h) d oes provide the tria l c o u r t w i t h authority to reopen the tim e f or appeal. However, Rule 4(h) applies only :

1 3if [ the court] f inds (a) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did n o t receive s uch notice from the clerk o r any party w ithin 21 d ay s of its entry

. . . . M.R.A.P. 4(h) (em

phasis added). Because Pope does not and cannot argue that s he did not receive notice o f the Septem ber 2 7, 2010, order dism issing BMC or the March 24, 2006, order dism issing Drs. Brock and Clark, Rule 4(h) is not applicable. ¶29. The trial court im

properly g ranted Pope relief under Rule 60(b)(2), (4), an d (6). Rule 60(b) a pplies to “ f

i n a l j u d g m ents, orders o r proceedings” and thus is not applicable to the

n o n f i n a l N ovem

ber 3 , 2006, order. The trial c ourt could not grant Pope relief f rom th e N o vem ber 3, 2006, order, because that order twice had been overruled by the sam e tr i a l judge. M oreover, it was not necessary f or the t r i a l court to v acate the Novem ber 3, 2006, order because it already

had vacated it on two prior occasions. ¶30. The issue bef

ore the trial court was not a com p licat e d i s s u e . Drs. Brock and Clark f i l e d a m otion f

or summ ary j udgm ent based on the running of a one-y ear statute of lim itations. The trial court v acated the original Rule 54(b) certif i cation by twi c e d e n y i ng other m otions a n d clearly providing reasons as to w hy the d ism issal o rder s hould not be certif i ed as f inal. ¶31. One thing is certain–by Septem b er 27, 2010, all parties h ad b een dism issed. Com plete relief had been accorded to all parties. This unquestionably is when the tim e to appeal began

to run. Pope’s attem

pt t o rely on an order that l ater was rectif ied on two separate o ccasions in an attem

pt to gain additional tim e to appeal is to no avail. The history of the case clearly shows that the March 24, 2 006, order was not a f inal j udgm e n t u n t i l BMC was dism issed.

1 4The trial court twice overruled his decision during the pendency of the case. T here was no f inal judgm ent until all def endants were dism issed o n Septem ber 27, 2 010, a f

act which was

com pletely overlooked by the trial court and all parties. CONCLUSION ¶32. This Court f

inds that the trial c ourt erroneously entered its Septem ber 2 6, 2013, order granting Pope f

ourteen additi o n al day s to appeal. Theref ore, we d ism iss Pope’s appeal as untim e ly

. ¶33. APPEAL DISMISSED. WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR, KITCHENS, P IERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.

1 5