UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) Civ. No. 17-22643 (RNS-EGT) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) OPPOSITION TO 

DAVID RIVERA, ) MOTION TO DISMISS 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

PLAINTIFF FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S MEMORANDUM IN 

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 

 The Court should deny defendant David Rivera’s motion to dismiss the Complaint. As 

the Complaint describes in detail, in 2012, then-U.S. Congressman David Rivera violated the 

Federal Election Campaign Act’s (“FECA”) ban on making contributions in the names of others, 

see 52 U.S.C. § 30122, when he knowingly helped and assisted the making of nearly $70,000 in 

contributions in a false name to the campaign of Justin Lamar Sternad. 

Sternad was a candidate in Florida’s 26th Congressional District’s 2012 Democratic 

primary election along with Rivera’s likely general election opponent, Joe Garcia. Rivera 

directed an associate, Ana Sol Alliegro, to approach Sternad with an offer to help fund his 

campaign, to which Sternad agreed. With Alliegro’s help, Rivera then hired vendors to provide 

services to Sternad’s campaign and arranged for those vendors to be paid for those services, 

while taking several measures to conceal his involvement and the source of the contributions. 

Upon Alliegro’s instructions, Sternad then concealed the sources of the in-kind contributions that 

Rivera facilitated by falsely stating in his campaign’s public disclosure reports that the 

contributions were loans from Sternad’s personal funds. 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 1 of 19
2 

Rivera’s motion should be denied because it is premised on mistaken understandings of 

the Complaint and the provision he violated, 52 U.S.C. § 30122. First, the Complaint does not 

allege that Rivera merely made lawful in-kind contributions that were not properly reported by 

the recipient committee, as Rivera asserts. Instead, the Complaint clearly alleges that the in-kind 

contributions Rivera facilitated were illegal because they were made in a false name. 

Second, Rivera’s motion attacks a strawman when it incorrectly claims that the 

Complaint failed to allege a valid section 30122 violation because it does not state that Rivera 

paid or reimbursed “third parties” (i.e., conduits) to pay the vendors. Section 30122 outlaws at 

least two types of contributions in the names of others — “false name” contributions (which is 

the type involved in this case) and “conduit” contributions with falsely disclosed straw donors 

(which is not the alleged conduct here). Rivera’s argument is premised on a purported 

requirement that he himself must have played a particular role in a particular version of the latter 

type of contribution, which the Complaint does not allege. The Complaint alleges that Rivera 

knowingly helped and assisted false name contributions. It does not — and need not — specify 

that he was the true source of funds in a conduit scheme using other persons as disclosed straw 

donors. 

Finally, Rivera misrepresents the Complaint by claiming it states that Sternad knew the 

identity of all of the true contributors to his campaign, and misrepresents the law by claiming 

that this fact, if true, would defeat the Complaint. Rivera is wrong on both counts. Though 

aware of the payments to vendors and the false attribution of the funds to himself, Sternad is not 

alleged in the Complaint to have been definitively aware of the source of all of the contributions 

that Rivera facilitated for his campaign. But even if Sternad was aware, Rivera still would have 

violated section 30122 since the contributions at issue were attributed to a false name with 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 2 of 19
3 

Rivera’s help and assistance. Rivera cites no authority for his apparent position that a false name 

contribution cannot take place where the candidate is in on the scam, nor could he. FECA’s text 

specifically rules out such an interpretation and plaintiff Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or 

“Commission”) has enforced section 30122 in similar factual contexts. 

Rivera’s motion to dismiss should be denied. 

BACKGROUND 

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 

A. Plaintiff Federal Election Commission and FECA 

Plaintiff FEC is a six-member independent federal agency that is responsible for 

administering, interpreting, and civilly enforcing the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 

52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-46. Congress authorized the Commission to “formulate policy” with respect 

to FECA, id. § 30106(b)(1); “to make, amend, and repeal such rules . . . as are necessary to carry 

out the provisions of [FECA],” id. §§ 30107(a)(8), 30111(a)(8); and to investigate possible 

violations of the Act, id. § 30109(a)(1)-(2). The FEC has exclusive jurisdiction to initiate civil 

enforcement actions for violations of FECA in the United States district courts. Id. 

§§ 30106(b)(1), 30109(a)(6). 

FECA was enacted in significant part to “limit the actuality and appearance of corruption 

resulting from large individual financial contributions.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) 

(per curiam). To that end, FECA requires candidates, political parties, and political committees 

to disclose publicly the amounts they spend and receive in reports filed with the FEC. See

52 U.S.C. § 30104. FECA’s disclosure requirements help voters make informed decisions at the 

ballot box, deter corruption and its appearance by publicizing large contributions, and allow the 

FEC and the Department of Justice to detect violations of FECA’s other provisions. Buckley, 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 3 of 19
4 

424 U.S. at 66-69. 

Additionally, FECA limits the dollar amounts and permissible sources of contributions to 

candidates for federal office, political parties, and political committees. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a), 

30118-19, 30121. For instance, during the 2011-2012 election cycle that is at issue in this case, 

no person could contribute in excess of $2,500 per election to a federal candidate.1

 

Additionally, certain sources, such as foreign nationals and corporations, may not contribute any 

sum to a federal candidate’s committee. See id. §§ 30118-19, 30121. 

FECA defines “contribution” to include “any gift, subscription, loan, advance or deposit 

of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election 

for Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i). Because this definition broadly includes 

“anything of value,” the term “contribution” includes in-kind contributions. 11 C.F.R. § 

100.52(d). In-kind contributions consist of “the provision of any goods or services,” such as 

“supplies” or “advertising services,” without charge or at a less than fair market value. Id. 

B. FECA’s Prohibition on Making a Contribution in the Name of Another 

FECA states that “[n]o person shall make a contribution in the name of another person[.]” 

52 U.S.C. § 30122 (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441f).2

 The statute prohibits at least two types of 

contributions in the name of another. First, it bans “false name” contributions. This is the type 

of contribution in the name of another at issue in which Rivera is alleged to have participated. 

False name contributions include, but are not limited to, the scenario of a person “[m]aking a 

                                                            

1

 The $2,500 limit on contributions to candidate committees is indexed for inflation. See

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A) (contribution limit), 30116(c)(1)(B)(i) (establishing that limit is 

indexed to inflation); see Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limits and 

Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 76 Fed. Reg. 8368 (Feb. 14, 2011). 

2

 Effective September 1, 2014, the provisions of FECA that were codified in Title 2 of the 

United States Code were recodified in a new title, Title 52. See Editorial Reclassification Table, 

http://uscode.house.gov/editorialreclassification/t52/Reclassifications_Title_52.html. As a 

result, many of the relevant authorities cited herein refer to 2 U.S.C. § 441f. 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 4 of 19
5 

contribution of money or anything of value and attributing as the source of the money or thing of 

value another person when in fact the contributor is the source.” 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(2)(ii) 

(describing an example of a contribution in the name of another). 

 Second, section 30122 also bars “conduit” contributions, which include the scenario 

when a person provides funds to a conduit (also called a “straw donor”), who then contributes 

those funds to a candidate or committee without disclosing the true source of the contribution. 

See, e.g., 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(2)(i) (describing an example of a contribution in the name of 

another); United States v. O’Donnell, 608 F.3d 546, 548-49 (9th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing false 

name from conduit violations of section 30122). The Complaint does not allege that Rivera was 

the true source of funds in a conduit scheme involving straw donors who inaccurately identified 

themselves as contributors to a recipient committee and became inaccurately disclosed as a 

result. 

Under the Commission’s regulations, a person can be liable under section 30122 even 

when he or she is not the source of the contributed funds, when that person “[k]nowingly help[s] 

or assist[s] any person in making a contribution in the name of another.” 11 C.F.R. 

§ 110.4(b)(1)(iii). A person knowingly helps or assists a contribution in the name of another 

when he or she “initiate[s] or instigate[s] or ha[s] some significant participation in a plan or 

scheme to make a contribution in the name of another.” Affiliated Committees, Transfers, 

Prohibited Contributions, Annual Contribution Limitations and Earmarked Contributions, 54 

Fed. Reg. 34,098, 34,104-05 (Aug. 17, 1989). 

FECA’s ban on making contributions in the names of others prevents people from 

evading FECA’s disclosure requirements and from circumventing FECA’s contribution limits. 

For example, under section 30122, a prohibited contributor (such as a foreign national or 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 5 of 19
6 

corporation) may not conceal its illicit contribution by using a false name. The statute also 

prevents even legal contributors such as individuals from using a false name to hide that they 

contributed an excessive amount of money to a campaign or committee. As a result, courts have 

repeatedly held that section 30122 promotes the government’s important interests in promoting 

campaign finance disclosure and preventing the circumvention of FECA’s contribution limits. 

See, e.g., United States v. Whittemore, 776 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015); O’Donnell, 608 F.3d 

at 554; Mariani v. United States, 212 F.3d 761 775 (3rd Cir. 2000); Goland v. United States, 903 

F.2d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Curran, No. 92-558, 1993 WL 137459, at *1 

(E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1993). Because making a contribution in the name of another is a common 

way for individuals to attempt to hide illicit contributions, section 30122 historically has been 

one of FECA’s most frequently violated prohibitions. See Department of Justice, Federal 

Prosecution of Election Offenses 166 (7th ed. May 2007).3

Reflecting section 30122’s importance to FECA’s system of disclosure requirements and 

contributions limits, Congress authorized the courts to impose civil and criminal penalties for 

violations of section 30122 that are significantly enhanced relative to those for other FECA 

provisions. Civil penalties for knowing and willful violations of section 30122 are authorized to 

be at least five times greater than the penalties for other FECA violations. See 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(6)(C). 

For decades, the FEC has consistently and repeatedly enforced section 30122 in 

administrative enforcement matters against respondents who knowingly helped or assisted the 

making of false name or conduit contributions. See, e.g., Matter Under Review (“MUR”) 

                                                            

3

 See https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2013/09/30/electbookrvs0807.pdf. 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 6 of 19
7 

4322/4650 (Waldholtz)4; MUR 6922 (ACA International)5; MUR 5948 (Critical Health Systems 

of N.C., P.C.)6

; MUR 5849 (Cannon)7; MUR 4748 (Moniot).8

For example, in MURs 4322 and 4650 (Waldholtz), the Commission concluded that the 

treasurer of a campaign committee (and spouse of the candidate), Joseph Waldholtz, knowingly 

accepted approximately $1.8 million in false name contributions for his wife’s campaign and 

knowingly helped and assisted the making of those illegal contributions. See MUR 4322/4650 

Conciliation Agreement ¶¶ IV.9, IV.27 (Oct. 12, 1999).9 Waldholtz admitted that he and his 

wife, Enid Greene, had solicited the contributions from Greene’s father to help fund Greene’s 

campaign. Id. ¶¶ IV.17-19. Instead of reporting Greene’s father as the contributor, Waldholtz 

provided false contributors to the FEC in the Greene campaign’s public disclosure reports. Id. 

¶ IV.23. The reports incorrectly stated that the $1.8 million had been contributed by fabricated 

“ghost contributors” and by the candidate herself from her own assets. Id. ¶¶ IV.23, IV.25-26. 

In addition to section 30122, the Commission concluded that Waldholtz had also violated 

FECA’s provisions requiring campaigns to accurately report the identities of their contributors. 

Id. ¶¶ IV.6, IV.25, V. 

In another instance, in MUR 6922 (ACA International) in an effort to address a perceived 

shortfall in a political action committee’s bank account, a corporate officer authorized a transfer 

of $23,419 to committee’s account. See MUR 6922 Conciliation Agreement ¶ IV.4 (Aug. 17 

                                                            

4

 https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/93382.pdf. 

5

 https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/111951.pdf. 

6

 https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/95874.pdf. 

7

 https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/95225.pdf. 

8

 https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/38705.pdf. 

9

 https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/93382.pdf. 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 7 of 19
8 

2015).10 To obscure the true source of that transfer, and in violation of section 30122, the 

corporate officer directed his staff to create records falsely indicating previous donors to the 

committee, who contributed less than the statutory maximum contribution, had made additional 

contributions. (Id.) 

Similarly, in MUR 4748 (Moniot), the Commission concluded that a television station 

executive violated section 30122 by knowingly helping and assisting the station in making illegal 

corporate contributions to five members of Congress through its employees. See Factual & 

Legal Analysis (“F&LA”) (Resp’t Moniot) at 2-311; see also MUR 4758 (Moniot) Conciliation 

Agreement (Aug. 23, 2000), supra note 8. Moniot “initiated the entire sequence of events” by 

convincing the station that it should make contributions to members of Congress in hopes that 

members would then appear in stories aired by the station. Moniot F&LA at 4. Moniot not only 

“actively participate[d] in the decision making process,” but also asked station staff to 

participate, and drafted the letters to members of Congress that accompanied the illicit 

contributions. Id. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

A. The Complaint Alleges That Rivera Knowingly Helped and Assisted the 

Making of Nearly $70,000 in False Name Contributions to the Sternad 

Campaign 

Defendant David Rivera was a United States Congressman representing Florida’s 25th 

Congressional District from January 2011 through January 2013. (See Compl. ¶ 6 

(Docket No. 1).) In 2012, Rivera unsuccessfully ran for re-election as the Republican candidate 

to represent Florida’s redrawn 26th Congressional District. (Id.) Rivera lost that election to 

Democrat Joe Garcia. (Id. ¶ 12.) Garcia became the Democratic nominee in the 2012 general 

                                                            

10 https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/111951.pdf. 

11 https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/38714.pdf.

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 8 of 19
9 

election after defeating three other candidates in the Democratic primary, including Justin Lemar 

Sternad. (Id.) 

During the Democratic primary, Rivera executed a scheme to secretly provide funds to 

Sternad’s campaign in an apparent attempt to oppose and weaken Garcia, who was likely to be 

Rivera’s general election opponent. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 1, 26.) In April 2012, Rivera initiated 

the scheme when he met with his associate, Ana Sol Alliegro, to discuss providing financial 

support to Sternad’s primary campaign, and directed Alliegro to approach Sternad with the offer 

to help fund his campaign. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Alliegro spoke with Sternad and offered to provide 

funds for his campaign, to which Sternad agreed. (Id. ¶ 15.) At Rivera’s direction, Alliegro then 

spent the next few months serving as an intermediary transmitting funds to Sternad, the Sternad 

Committee, and the vendors providing services to the Committee. (Id.) 

As part of that scheme, nearly $70,000 in in-kind contributions were made to Sternad in 

the form of campaign services. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 16.) Rivera and Alliegro hired vendors to 

provide Sternad’s campaign with flyers, demographics research, and mailing services. (Id. ¶ 16.) 

Rivera worked with the vendors, separately and with Alliegro, to design and distribute materials 

for the Sternad campaign. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

Rivera also ensured that the vendors were paid for their services to Sternad’s campaign 

while taking steps to ensure that his involvement in those payments would be concealed to those 

not involved in the arrangement. (Id. ¶¶ 17-21.) For one payment, Rivera delivered a check for 

more than $13,000 to a vendor named Expert Printing. (Id. ¶ 19.) That check was issued by a 

non-profit organization called the Florida Action Network, which Rivera helped found in early 

April 2012, the same month his scheme began. (Id.) On the same day Rivera delivered the 

Florida Action Network’s check to Expert Printing, Rivera directed Expert Printing to issue a 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 9 of 19
10 

check for $9,000 to another vendor, Rapid Mail, to pay for mailing costs for the Sternad 

campaign. (Id. ¶ 20.) 

Rivera also used cash to pay the vendors to conceal his involvement. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 17-18.) 

Alliegro delivered some of those cash payments to the vendors, while others were delivered by a 

courier service. (Id. ¶ 18.) In one instance, after the owner of Rapid Mail asked Rivera about an 

outstanding payment for its work for Sternad, Rivera instructed the owner to check his mailbox, 

where the owner found an envelope containing several thousand dollars in cash. (Id. ¶ 21.) In 

another example of Rivera’s efforts to his hide his payments to the vendors, Rivera insisted that 

Expert Printing not use his name on its invoices for services to Sternad after an instance where 

Expert Printing had done so. (Id. ¶ 17.) These in-kind contributions to Sternad continued from 

July through August 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 19-21.) 

In the meantime, Alliegro instructed Sternad that in his disclosure reports to the FEC he 

should attribute a false name as the source of these in-kind contributions — his own. (Compl. 

¶ 22.) In multiple FEC reports from May to August 2012, Sternad falsely stated he had used his 

own personal funds to loan money to his campaign to pay for the nearly $70,000 in services that 

Rivera and Alliegro had arranged for him to receive. (Id.) 

In 2013 and 2014, Sternad and Alliegro pleaded guilty to criminal charges relating to 

Rivera’s scheme. (Compl. ¶¶ 23-24.) After his 2013 guilty plea, Sternad filed amended 

disclosure reports with the FEC attributing the in-kind contributions at issue to “Unknown 

Contributors” rather than himself. (Id. ¶ 24.) 

B. Procedural History 

In April 2013, the FEC notified Rivera that it had received information indicating that he 

may have violated FECA. (Compl. ¶ 28.) After an investigation, the Commission unanimously 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 10 of 19
11 

concluded that there was probable cause to believe that Rivera knowingly and willfully violated 

52 U.S.C. § 30122 and 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b). (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.) After attempts to reach a 

conciliation agreement failed, the Commission filed this lawsuit on July 14, 2017. (Docket No. 

1.) This Court granted the Commission additional time to serve the summons and Complaint 

upon Rivera after finding that “[w]hether through coincidence or by design” Rivera “has dodged 

service in this matter and has otherwise failed to respond” to the FEC and the United States 

Marshals Service’s attempts to contact him. (Order Granting Mot. to Extend the Time for 

Service at 1 (Docket No. 11).) The FEC successfully served Rivera on October 20, 2017. 

(Docket No. 15.) On November 22, 2017, Rivera moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) (see Mot. to Dismiss Compl. (“Mot.”) (Docket No. 17)), and the FEC now 

opposes that motion. 

ARGUMENT 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only “contain sufficient factual 

allegations to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Moore v. Grady Mem’l Hosp. 

Corp., 834 F.3d 1168, 1171 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)). A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” but only factual 

allegations that are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (same). When reviewing a 

motion to dismiss, a court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and evaluate all plausible 

inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 

693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012). “The threshold of sufficiency that a complaint must meet 

to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is . . . ‘exceedingly low.’” Corbett v. 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 11 of 19
12 

Transp. Sec. Admin., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1178 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting Ancata v. Prison 

Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir.1985)). 

II. THE FEC HAS STATED A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM 

A. The FEC Has Pleaded Sufficient Facts Showing that Rivera Violated 

52 U.S.C. § 30122’s Prohibition of False Name Contributions 

 The FEC has pleaded sufficient facts in its Complaint upon which the Court may 

reasonably infer that Rivera violated the contribution in the name of another provisions in 

52 U.S.C. § 30122 and 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(iii). These provisions bar a person from 

knowingly helping or assisting the making of a false name contribution, including by initiating, 

instigating, or significantly participating in a false name contribution scheme. See supra pp. 4-5. 

As the Complaint explains, Rivera initiated, instigated, and significantly participated in false 

name contributions to the Sternad campaign. 

 First, as the Complaint establishes, false name contributions were made to the Sternad 

campaign. A false name contribution occurs where anything of value is contributed and the 

thing of value is attributed to someone other than the true source of funds. See, e.g. 11 C.F.R. 

§ 110.4(b)(2)(ii) (describing an example of a false name contribution); MURs 4322/4650 

(Waldholtz).12 Here, nearly $70,000 worth of campaign services were contributed to Sternad for 

the 2012 democratic primary election. See supra p. 9. Sternad was attributed as the source of 

those contributions on the Sternad campaign’s public reports to the FEC when in fact the true 

source was some other person or group of persons. Id. at 9-10. One of the apparent true sources 

was the Florida Action Network, which issued a check for more than $13,000 to Expert Printing. 

Id. at 9. Sternad also was not the true source for the cash payments to the vendors, as he has 

                                                            

12 https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/93382.pdf. 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 12 of 19
13 

admitted. Id. at 10. The Complaint does not take a definitive position that Rivera was the true 

source of the cash that was given to the vendors — he could theoretically establish during 

discovery that the cash came from some other source — but in any event, the Complaint 

establishes that the true source was not Sternad. Id. at 9-10. If Rivera was the true source of the 

cash that paid for in-kind contributions to the Sternad campaign, then Rivera would not only 

have violated section 30122 by knowingly helping or assisting false name contributions to 

Sternad, see 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(iii), he also would have violated section 30122 by making 

the false name contributions as the source of that money, id. § 110.4(b)(1)(i). In either case, 

Rivera at a minimum participated in the false attribution of Sternad’s name as the true source of 

the contributions: He concealed his involvement in the payments to the vendors and had 

Alliegro interact with Sternad and instruct him to falsely attribute his own name as the source of 

the in-kind contributions. See supra p. 10. 

 Second, the Complaint’s facts establish that Rivera knowingly helped and assisted the 

false name contributions to the Sternad campaign. The Complaint details how Rivera initiated 

and instigated the scheme. Rivera directed Alliegro to approach Sternad with an offer to help 

fund his campaign, and Sternad agreed. See supra p. 9. Rivera also significantly participated in 

the scheme. He and Alliegro hired the vendors, helped them design and distribute Sternad 

campaign materials, and made sure the vendors were paid. Id. at 9-10. Rivera also concealed 

the source of the funds by routing money from the Florida Action Network through multiple 

vendors and by paying vendors in cash.13 Id. Moreover, the Complaint details how Rivera used 

Alliegro to direct Sternad to provide a false name for the source of those funds on his campaign’s 

disclosure reports to the FEC. Id. at 10.

                                                            

13 Because cash can be difficult to trace and easier to launder than other forms of payment, 

FECA limits cash contributions to $100 or less per election. 52 U.S.C. § 30123. 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 13 of 19
14 

As a result, the Complaint establishes that Rivera did far more than merely make legal inkind contributions to Sternad, as Rivera claims. (Mot. at 3-4.) Instead, the allegations present an 

amply plausible claim that Rivera knowingly helped and assisted with in-kind contributions 

made in the name of another, under 52 U.S.C. § 30122 and 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b). These 

allegations show that Rivera initiated, instigated, and significantly participated in the scheme. 

Moreover, if all of the funds had come from Rivera, the in-kind contributions would have vastly 

exceeded the then-applicable limit of $2,500 per election to a federal candidate. See supra p. 4 

& n.1. Rivera acknowledges the limit but then proceeds to wrongly claim that “[h]ad the 

candidate, Mr. Sternad, disclosed the true and known source of the contributions made to the 

vendors, there would not have been any violation of FECA.” (Mot. at 4.) Rivera had a clear 

motive to disguise extensive cash contributions if they were from his own funds or otherwise not 

attributable to individuals in amounts of no more than $2,500; the allegations of the Complaint 

do not amount to mere misreporting by the Sternad campaign. Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

should be denied. 

 B. Rivera Attacks a Strawman When He Characterizes the FEC’s Claim as 

 Presenting a Conduit Contribution Theory 

 As detailed above, there are at least two possible ways in which section 30122 can be 

violated — false name contributions and conduit contributions through inaccurately identified 

straw donors. See supra pp. 4-5. In this case, the FEC has alleged a false name scheme. 

Id. at 12-14. 

 Rivera, in his motion to dismiss, constructs a strawman argument, claiming the FEC did 

not properly allege a different type of section 30122 violation, a conduit contribution scheme 

with straw donors. Rivera irrelevantly asserts that the FEC failed to allege that Rivera used such 

straw donors in his scheme: “There is no allegation within the four corners of the complaint 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 14 of 19
15 

alleging that Mr. Rivera either reimbursed third parties or provided funds to third parties so that 

they could pay the vendors and effectively hide the source of the donation from the Sternad 

campaign.” (Mot. at 4.) 

However, the use of a “third party” (i.e., a conduit or straw donor), in the manner Rivera 

describes, is not an element of a false name violation. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(2) (providing 

contrasting examples of a potential conduit scheme and a potential false name scheme). Courts 

have repeatedly recognized that false name schemes violate section 30122. See Whittemore, 776 

F.3d at 1079 (explaining that “false name contributions [undermine transparency] by shielding 

the identity of the true contributor”); O’Donnell, 608 F.3d at 550 (describing section 30122 as 

applying whether funds are directed “either directly . . . or through an intermediary”); United 

States v. Boender, 691 F. Supp. 2d 833, 838-39 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (considering both false name and 

conduit contributions); United States v. Danielczyk, 788 F. Supp. 2d 472, 481-82 (E.D. Va. 2011) 

(describing how prohibited contributions under section 30122 can be direct or indirect); United 

States v. Suarez, No. 13-420, 2014 WL 1898579, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 8, 2014) (“holding that 

[section 30122] unambiguously proscribes . . . false name contributions”). Rivera is attacking a 

particular version of a type of violation not alleged in the Complaint and his argument, therefore, 

presents no reason to dismiss the Complaint. 

C. The Complaint States a Valid Claim Regardless of Whether Sternad Knew 

the Identity of the True Contributor 

Rivera incorrectly asserts that because the Complaint states that “the Sternad campaign 

was fully aware of the identity of the donor of the in-kind contributions,” it was only the Sternad 

campaign, and not Rivera, that violated the law. (Mot. at 4.) Rivera is incorrect for two reasons. 

First, he misrepresents the Complaint. Second, even if his misrepresentation were correct, the 

Complaint would still state a valid claim against Rivera. 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 15 of 19
16 

First, the Complaint does not state that Sternad definitively knew the identity of the true 

source of the false name contributions he received, despite Rivera’s repeated misrepresentations 

otherwise. (See, e.g., Mot. at 4 (“[T]he Sternad campaign was fully aware of the identity of the 

donor”; “Mr. Rivera is alleged to be the sole donor”). Rivera provides no citations for these 

assertions. The Complaint identifies the Florida Action Network as one true source of the inkind contributions, and does not state that Sternad knew that. See supra p. 9. As for the cash 

payments to the vendors, Rivera ensured that the vendors received those cash payments, but the 

Complaint does not conclusively state that the cash belonged to Rivera. See id. at 9-10. Even 

assuming that the cash did belong to Rivera, the Complaint does not say that Sternad was certain 

of that. See id. As the Complaint describes, months after the scheme, Sternad filed an amended 

FEC disclosure report with the FEC. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Sternad included a cover letter with his 

report stating that deposits were coordinated with payments directly to vendors by Alliegro 

and/or Rivera. (Id.) But Sternad’s report nevertheless identified the contributors as “Unknown 

Contributors,” indicating residual uncertainty about the true source or sources. (See id.) 

Second, even if the Complaint had stated that Sternad was aware of the true source of the 

false name contributions he received, that awareness would not defeat the FEC’s claim, as Rivera 

wrongly suggests. (Mot. at 4.) Rivera provides no authority for his interpretation of the statute, 

which if correct, would mean that a false-name contributor could evade liability simply by 

getting the candidate in on the scheme. Nothing in the text of the statute, the statute’s 

implementing regulation, the FEC’s regulatory guidance, or the FEC’s past enforcement cases 

support that interpretation, and Rivera does not claim otherwise. 

Indeed, Rivera’s interpretation is inconsistent with the text of the statute itself, which 

shows that Congress intended section 30122 to prohibit false name contributions even where the 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 16 of 19
17 

recipient was aware of the scheme. Section 30122 broadly prohibits not only “mak[ing] a 

contribution in the name of another person” but also “knowingly accept[ing] a contribution made 

by one person in the name of another person.” 52 U.S.C. § 30122 (emphasis added). Under 

Rivera’s theory, however, it would be impossible for a recipient to knowingly accept a false 

name contribution since the recipient’s knowledge that the contribution was in a false name 

would negate the violation. Rivera’s reading of the law therefore cannot be correct. Consistent 

with the correct reading of FECA, the Commission has concluded in its administrative 

enforcement proceedings that false name contributions in violation of section 30122 have taken 

place in situations where the recipient-candidate was aware of the true identity of the contributor 

and yet attributed a false name to those contributions in its reports. See supra pp. 7-8 (describing 

MURs 4322/4650 (Waldholtz) and MUR 6922 (ACA International)). 

 Therefore, the Complaint here would establish that Rivera made false name contributions 

to Sternad even if the Complaint had stated that Sternad knew that Rivera was the true source of 

the contributions. Sternad attributed a false name to those in-kind contributions and Rivera 

helped ensure that Sternad did so by, among other things, having Alliegro recruit Sternad and 

direct him to falsely attribute his own name to the contributions in his FEC reports. See supra p. 

9-10. Rivera incorrectly argues that the only FECA violation on the facts alleged here is a 

reporting violation by Sternad that Rivera may have aided and abetted. (Mot. at 4-5.) But 

Rivera gives no valid reason why Rivera cannot be liable for participating in a false name 

contribution just because he may have also aided and abetted a reporting violation. It is not an 

either-or choice, and in fact, the Commission has pursued similarly situated respondents for 

violating both section 30122 and FECA’s reporting requirements in previous matters. See supra

pp. 7-8 (describing MURs 4322/4650 (Waldholtz) and MUR 6922 (ACA International).) Even if 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 17 of 19
18 

other theories of liability against Rivera could have been alleged, it does not undermine that what 

is alleged in the Complaint and supported by the facts is that Rivera knowingly helped and 

assisted in making a false name contribution in a violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30122 and 11 C.F.R. § 

110.4(b)(1)(iii). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Rivera’s Motion to Dismiss the 

Complaint. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson (Special Bar No. A5502354) 

Acting General Counsel 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley (Special Bar No. A5502355) 

Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

Kevin P. Hancock (Special Bar No. A5502375) 

Acting Assistant General Counsel 

khancock@fec.gov 

December 11, 2017 

/s/ Greg J. Mueller 

Greg J. Mueller (Special Bar No. A5502376) 

Sana Chaudhry (Special Bar No. A5502350) 

Attorneys 

gmueller@fec.gov 

schaudhry@fec.gov 

FOR THE PLAINTIFF 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 18 of 19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Greg J. Mueller, counsel of record in this case, certify that on December 11, 2017, I 

electronically filed plaintiff Federal Election Commission’s Memorandum in Opposition to 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint with the Clerk of the United States District Court for 

the Southern District of Florida by using the Court’s CM/ECF system, which sent notification of 

such filing to the following: 

Roy J. Kahn, Esq. 

rjk@roykahnlaw.com 

Counsel for Defendant David Rivera 

/s/ Greg J. Mueller 

Greg J. Mueller (Special Bar No. A5502376) 

Attorney 

gmueller@fec.gov

Case 1:17-cv-22643-RNS Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/11/2017 Page 19 of 19