FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ILAI KANUTU KOONWAIYOU, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v. 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Secretary of 

State; UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-35233 

D.C. No. 

3:21-cv-05474-

DGE 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

David G. Estudillo, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 6, 2022

San Francisco, California

Filed June 7, 2023

Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Lucy H. Koh, Circuit 

Judges, and Joseph F. Bataillon, District Judge*

Opinion by Judge Koh

* The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the 

District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
2 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel reversed the district court’s grant of the 

Government’s motion to dismiss in a case in which Ilai 

Kanutu Koonwaiyou sought a declaration that his mother’s 

status as a non-citizen national—which she attained after 

Koonwaiyou’s birth—qualified him to be a non-citizen 

national of the United States, and remanded.

In 1986, Congress amended the Immigration and 

Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”) to make individuals born to 

only one non-citizen national parent outside the United 

States and American Samoa eligible to become “nationals, 

but not citizens, of the United States at birth.” 8 U.S.C. § 

1408. Prior to 1986, such status extended only to (1) those 

born in American Samoa, (2) those born outside the United 

States or American Samoa with two non-citizen national 

parents, and (3) those found in American Samoa under the 

age of five whose parents are unknown.

The panel explained that Congress has extended 

citizenship to individuals born in every United States 

territory, except American Samoa, meaning that those with 

ties to American Samoa are the only group eligible for noncitizen national status. The status of an American Samoan 

is a hybrid: for example, as non-citizens, they are denied the 

right to vote and run for federal or state office outside 

American Samoa; but as nationals, they can serve in the 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN 3

American military, receive most federal benefits, travel 

freely in the United States, and cannot be removed as aliens. 

Koonwaiyou was born in 1967 in Western Samoa to a 

Western Samoan father and an American Samoan 

mother. His mother is now a non-citizen national, but she 

only became eligible under the 1986 amendments and did 

not attain her status until after Koonwaiyou was 

born. Koonwaiyou sought a declaration that his mother’s 

status qualifies him to be a non-citizen national. The district 

court held that, under the 1986 amendments, Koonwaiyou’s 

mother’s status as a national commenced only on the date it 

was conferred and was not retroactive to her date of 

birth. The court therefore found Koonwaiyou did not qualify 

to be a non-citizen national.

To answer the narrow question whether Koonwaiyou 

qualifies for non-citizen national status, the panel wrote that 

it must decide whether those individuals, like Koonwaiyou’s 

mother, who qualify under but were born before the 1986 

amendments are eligible for the same non-citizen national 

status as those born on or after the amendments. The 

Government’s position was that the 1986 amendments

should apply only prospectively, such that this non-citizen 

national status could only be conferred on those born on or 

after the amendments.

The panel concluded that the text of the 1986 

amendments makes clear that Congress intended for the 

addition to apply retroactively and to bestow the same status 

on those born before, on, or after the date of enactment: 

“national[], but not citizen, of the United States at birth.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1408. Under this interpretation, the uncodified 

provision of the 1986 amendments—which provides that the 

amendments “shall apply to persons born before, on, or after 
4 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

the date of the enactment” of the amendments—could be 

easily harmonized with the text of § 1408, giving every word 

in the amendments meaning. The uncodified section also 

provided the necessary clear statement regarding 

retroactivity.

The panel observed that the uncodified section clarified 

that those qualifying under but born before its enactment do 

not automatically become non-citizen nationals; instead, 

they attain status only after proving that they meet certain 

requirements. However, the panel concluded that it went too 

far to conclude, as the Government argued, that this 

provision was a subtle attempt by Congress to bestow a 

different status on individuals qualifying under but born 

before the 1986 amendments. The panel explained that this 

interpretation clashes with the text and structure of § 1408: 

it would require reading the prefatory “at birth” language out 

of § 1408 for one group of individuals.

The panel further explained that its interpretation is 

consistent with similar provisions in the INA, where 

Congress specified whether persons achieve status “at birth” 

or as of a particular date. The panel also wrote that its 

interpretation was consistent with the purpose of the 1986 

amendments, which the parties agreed was to expand the 

class of American Samoans eligible to become non-citizen 

nationals. Finally, the panel explained that the limited 

legislative history supported the panel’s view that Congress 

aimed to establish equal status for all American Samoans 

who qualify for non-citizen national status under § 1408.

Applying its interpretation, the panel concluded that 

Koonwaiyou’s mother’s non-citizen national status extends 

back to her birth and, as a result, that Koonwaiyou qualifies 

for non-citizen national status too. 
KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN 5

COUNSEL

Aaron Korthuis (argued), Matt Adams, and Margot Adams, 

Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Seattle, Washington; 

Tim Warden-Hertz, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, 

Tacoma, Washington; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lauren E. Fascett (argued), Senior Litigation Counsel; 

Alexandra L. Yeatts, Legal Intern; Elianis Perez, Assistant 

Director; William C. Peachey, Director, District Court 

Section; Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General, Civil Division; Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States Department of Justice; 

Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees.
6 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

OPINION

KOH, Circuit Judge:

In 1986, Congress amended the Immigration and 

Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”) to make individuals born to 

only one non-citizen national parent outside the United 

States and American Samoa eligible to become “nationals, 

but not citizens, of the United States at birth.” 8 U.S.C. § 

1408; see also Pub. L. No. 99-396, § 15, 100 Stat. 837, 842–

43 (1986). Congress made clear that this expanded 

eligibility was open to those “born before, on, or after the 

date” the amendments were enacted. § 15(b), 100 Stat. at 

843. The question we must decide is whether those

qualifying under but born before the 1986 amendments

receive the same national status as those born on or after the 

amendments’ enactment. The district court found that they 

do not. We find that they do, and reverse. 

I.

“All citizens of the United States are also nationals. 

However, some nationals are not citizens. Traditionally, 

only persons born in territories of the United States were 

non-citizen nationals.” Perdomo-Padilla v. Ashcroft, 333 

F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 2003). Today, Congress has 

extended citizenship to individuals born in every territory,

except American Samoa. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1402 

(defining eligibility for citizenship for those born in Puerto 

Rico); id. § 1406 (same for those born or living in the U.S. 

Virgin Islands); id. § 1407 (same for those born or living in 

Guam). Those with ties to American Samoa are the only 

group still eligible for non-citizen national status. See id. 

§ 1408; see also Perdomo-Padilla, 333 F.3d at 967–68; Sean 

Morrison, Foreign in a Domestic Sense: American Samoa 
KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN 7

and the Last U.S. Nationals, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 71, 84 

(2013). 

For the American Samoans who qualify, the status of 

non-citizen national is “hybrid.” Cabebe v. Acheson, 183 

F.2d 795, 797 (9th Cir. 1950). As non-citizens, “American 

Samoans are denied the right to vote, the right to run for 

elective federal or state office outside American Samoa, and 

the right to serve on federal and state juries.” Fitisemanu v. 

United States, 1 F.4th 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2021). They are 

also excluded from at least some federal jobs. See Morrison, 

supra, at 85. But, as nationals, qualifying American 

Samoans can serve in the American military, receive most

federal benefits, and travel freely in the United States. See 

Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 865; Morrison, supra, at 84. They are 

also eligible to use their time in American Samoa to satisfy 

some residence and physical presence requirements for 

naturalization, see 8 U.S.C. § 1436, and, even if they never 

become citizens, they cannot be removed as aliens, see 

Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 2001).1

Ilai Kanutu Koonwaiyou (“Koonwaiyou”) seeks noncitizen national status. Koonwaiyou was born in 1967 in 

Western Samoa to a Western Samoan father and an 

American Samoan mother. His mother is now a non-citizen 

national, but she only became eligible under the 1986 

amendments and did not attain her status until years after 

Koonwaiyou was born. After the State Department rejected 

1

In addition to the consequences for individuals, there are active debates 

about whether non-citizen national status protects “the Samoan way of 

life” by insulating communal landownership and other local practices 

from constitutional scrutiny. Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 309–

10 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 880–81. We are not 

asked to address those debates here, and we express no views on them. 
8 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

his application for a certificate of non-citizen national status, 

Koonwaiyou filed the instant suit, seeking a declaration that 

his mother’s status qualifies him to be a non-citizen national. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (conferring jurisdiction for such 

actions). The district court held that, under the 1986 

amendments, Koonwaiyou’s “mother’s status as a national 

of the United States commenced on the date it was conferred 

and was not retroactive to her date of birth.” The court

therefore found Koonwaiyou did not qualify to be a noncitizen national and granted the Government’s motion to 

dismiss. Koonwaiyou timely appealed.

II.

We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss 

de novo. See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 

897 (9th Cir. 2011). The question before us is a narrow one:

whether Koonwaiyou qualifies for non-citizen national 

status. Specifically, we must decide whether those 

individuals, like Koonwaiyou’s mother, who qualify under 

but were born before the 1986 amendments are eligible for 

the same non-citizen national status as those born on or after 

the amendments’ date of enactment. 

A.

“As always, we begin with the text.” Sw. Airlines Co. v. 

Saxon, 142 S. Ct. 1783, 1789 (2022). The 1986 amendments 

modified 8 U.S.C. § 1408, the U.S. Code provision that 

governs non-citizen national eligibility for those with ties to 

American Samoa, which is known in the INA as the
KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN 9

“outlying possessions of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 

1101(a)(29).2 Section 1408 reads:

[T]he following shall be nationals, but not 

citizens, of the United States at birth: 

(1) A person born in an outlying 

possession of the United States on or after 

the date of formal acquisition of such 

possession; 

(2) A person born outside the United 

States and its outlying possessions of 

parents both of whom are nationals, but 

not citizens, of the United States, and 

have had a residence in the United States, 

or one of its outlying possessions prior to 

the birth of such person; 

(3) A person of unknown parentage found 

in an outlying possession of the United 

States while under the age of five years, 

until shown, prior to his attaining the age 

of twenty-one years, not to have been 

born in such outlying possession; and 

(4) A person born outside the United 

States and its outlying possessions of 

parents one of whom is an alien, and the 

other a national, but not a citizen, of the 

2

In the INA, “[t]he term ‘outlying possessions of the United States’” 

also includes Swains Island. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29). Because Swains 

Island is “a part of American Samoa” under federal law, we refer to the 

“outlying possessions” as American Samoa throughout. 48 U.S.C. § 

1662. 
10 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

United States who, prior to the birth of 

such person, was physically present in the 

United States or its outlying possessions 

for a period or periods totaling not less 

than seven years in any continuous period 

of ten years—

(A) during which the national parent 

was not outside the United States or 

its outlying possessions for a 

continuous period of more than one 

year, and 

(B) at least five years of which were 

after attaining the age of fourteen 

years. 

The proviso of section 1401(g) of this title 

shall apply to the national parent under this 

paragraph in the same manner as it applies to 

the citizen parent under that section.

8 U.S.C. § 1408. 

Stripped of conditions not relevant here, the text of §

1408 is straightforward. The first three subsections extend 

non-citizen national status to (1) individuals born in 

American Samoa, (2) those born outside the United States or 

American Samoa to two non-citizen national parents, and (3) 

those found in American Samoa before the age of five whose 

parents are unknown. See 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1)–(3). All three 

of these subsections originated in the Nationality Act of 

1940, were carried over in modified form to the INA, and 

have remained largely unchanged since. Compare 

Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 204, 54 Stat. 

1137, 1139, and Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN 11

Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 308, 66 Stat. 163, 238, with 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1408(1)–(3). The fourth subsection, added by the 1986 

amendments, expanded eligibility to those persons born 

outside the United States or American Samoa to only one 

non-citizen national parent. See 8 U.S.C. § 1408(4); Pub. L. 

No. 99-396, § 15(a), 100 Stat. 837, 842–43 (1986). 

The structure of § 1408 strongly suggeststhat individuals 

who qualify under any of the four subsections attain the same 

status. Section 1408 states that “the following shall be 

nationals, but not citizens, of the United States at birth” and 

then lists the four subsections without differentiation. To 

bestow a prospective status only on those qualifying under 

the fourth subsection but born before its enactment, as the 

Government argues, we would have to read the phrase “at 

birth” out of § 1408 for this subgroup of individuals. Doing 

so would violate the well-established canon against 

surplusage, which “requires a court, if possible, to give effect 

to each word and clause in a statute.” United States v. Lopez, 

998 F.3d 431, 440 (9th Cir. 2021). Thus, even though the 

fourth subsection was added much later, nothing in § 1408 

indicates that any of those who qualify under it attain a 

different status. Instead, the structure of § 1408 indicates

that all become “nationals, but not citizens, of the United 

States at birth.” 8 U.S.C. § 1408. 

This interpretation is consistent with an uncodified 

section of the 1986 amendments. That section reads:

(b) The amendment [that adds § 1408(4)] 

shall apply to persons born before, on, or after 

the date of the enactment of this Act. In the 

case of a person born before the date of the 

enactment of this Act —
12 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

(1) the status of a national of the United 

States shall not be considered to be 

conferred upon the person until the date 

the person establishes to the satisfaction 

of the Secretary of State that the person 

meets the requirements of [§1408(4)] of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act, and 

(2) the person shall not be eligible to vote 

in any general election in American 

Samoa earlier than January 1, 1987.

§ 15(b), 100 Stat. at 843. Though not included in the U.S. 

Code, this uncodified section is binding law. See U.S. Nat’l 

Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 

448 (1993) (emphasizing that provisions in the Statute at 

Large retain the force of law even if they are omitted from 

the U.S. Code); see also Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 

423, 426 (1943) (holding that “the Code cannot prevail over 

the Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent”). As 

such, when interpreting the statutory text “as a whole,” we 

must consider it. King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 

221 (1991). 

The uncodified section confirms our interpretation. 

First, the uncodified section makes clear that § 1408(4) 

applies retroactively. A law is retroactive if “the new 

provision attaches new legal consequences to events 

completed before its enactment.” Landgraf v. USI Film 

Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994). Because applying a law 

retroactively raises serious concerns about notice, fairness, 

and equality, we normally employ a strong presumption 

against it. See Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 

37–38 (2006). But the presumption against retroactivity 

only applies if Congress has not “expressly prescribed the 
KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN 13

statute’s proper reach.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. In other 

words, where Congress is clear that a new law applies to 

actions that took place before its enactment, our judicial 

presumption yields to statutory text. See Valiente v. Swift 

Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 54 F.4th 581, 585 (9th Cir. 2022). 

In the uncodified section of the 1986 amendments, 

Congress provided the necessary clear statement. The 

uncodified section clearly states that “persons born before, 

on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act” qualify for 

national status under § 1408(4). § 15(b), 100 Stat. at 843. 

This language distinguishes the 1986 amendments from 

similar statutes that clearly specify Congress’s intent to limit 

retroactivity to a particular class of individuals, see Wolf v. 

Brownell, 253 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that a 

law granting citizenship “at birth” was not retroactive to all 

individuals when Congress specifically limited its 

retroactivity to children born between specified dates to a 

specific class of qualifying parents), or contain no clear 

statement about their retroactive reach, see Friend v. Holder, 

714 F.3d 1349, 1351–52 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a law 

granting citizenship “as of the date of birth” was not 

retroactive because it provided no indication that it applied 

to those born before its enactment). The Government’s 

claim that the presumption against retroactivity still applies

if the 1986 amendments are read to stretch non-citizen

national status back to “birth” for those born before its 

enactment is unpersuasive. It conflates an interpretative 

question, “the point at which one’s . . . status, if successfully 

established, takes effect,” with the retroactivity question, 

“whether the statute applies to individuals born before the 

. . . Act’s effective date.” Friend, 714 F.3d at 1352. Only 

the latter is subject to the presumption against retroactivity, 
14 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

which the clear statement in the uncodified section of the 

1986 amendments easily overcomes.

3

Second, the uncodified section of the 1986 amendments

clarifies that those qualifying under but born before its 

enactment do not automatically become non-citizen

nationals. Instead, they are “considered to be” non-citizen 

nationals only after they prove to the Secretary of State that 

they were in fact born to a non-citizen national parent who 

met the physical presence requirements listed in § 1408(4). 

§ 15(b)(1), 100 Stat. at 843. Moreover, the uncodified 

section is clear that no matter how quickly people born 

before the 1986 amendments applied for national status, they 

could not obtain one of the benefits of national status—the 

right to vote in elections in American Samoa—until 

approximately four months after the 1986 amendments 

became law. See § 15(b)(2), 100 Stat. at 843 (indicating that 

people born before the amendments were enacted “shall not 

be eligible to vote in any general election in American 

Samoa earlier than January 1, 1987”). As the Government 

emphasizes, no other group who qualifies for non-citizen

3

It is notable that, despite relying on the presumption against 

retroactivity, the Government is silent on the second step of the wellestablished retroactivity test. See Valiente, 54 F.4th at 585 (summarizing 

“two-step test”). Under that step, if Congress has not provided a clear 

statement about a statute’s reach, we must decide if “the . . . statute 

‘would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s 

liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to 

transactions already completed’” when applied retroactively. Tyson v. 

Holder, 670 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Landgraf, 511 

U.S. at 280). These considerations actually support our interpretation: 

the 1986 amendments when applied retroactively enhance rights, do not 

increase liability for past conduct, and impose new duties only on those 

who choose to become non-citizen nationals.
KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN 15

national status under § 1408 is subject to this kind of 

certification regime or conferral delay.

But it goes too far to conclude, as the Government 

argues, that this portion of the amendments was a subtle 

attempt by Congress to bestow a different status on 

individuals qualifying under but born before the 1986

amendments’ enactment. That interpretation clashes with 

the text and structure of § 1408: as already described, it 

would require us to read the prefatory “at birth” language out 

of § 1408 for one group of individuals. To be sure, “[t]he 

canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule,” and such a 

reading might be required if there were no other way to 

reasonably parse the statute’s text. Marx v. Gen. Revenue 

Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 385 (2013). Here, though, the codified

and uncodified portions of the 1986 amendments can easily 

be harmonized. Congress created a scheme where all those 

eligible under § 1408(4) receive the same status, but those 

born before the amendments’ enactment are required to 

prove their eligibility before their status is “considered to be 

conferred upon” them. § 15(b)(1), 100 Stat. at 843. In other 

words, the 1986 amendments can be read to give every word 

meaning if we understand the uncodified provisions as 

establishing a procedure for those born before the enactment 

of the 1986 amendments to attain the same status of 

“national[], but not citizen[], of the United States at birth” as 

everyone else who qualifies under § 1408. 
16 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

B. 

This interpretation of the 1986 amendments is confirmed 

by looking to other indicia of meaning.4 We start with 

similar sections in the INA. See Cheneau v. Garland, 997 

F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (“As part of our 

statutory analysis, ‘[w]e also look to similar provisions 

within the statute as a whole and the language of related or 

similar statutes to aid in interpretation.’” (quoting United 

States v. LKAV, 712 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2013))). Time

and again in analogous provisions, Congress specified 

whether persons achieve their status “at birth” or as of a 

particular date. Section 1401, for example, lists eight 

categories of persons, all of whom “shall be nationals and 

citizens of the United States at birth.” 8 U.S.C. § 1401 

(emphasis added). Section 1402, in contrast, makes clear 

that individuals born in Puerto Rico on or after April 11, 

1899 but before January 13, 1941 cannot become “citizens 

of the United States at birth,” but only “citizens of the United 

States as of January 13, 1941.” Id. § 1402. Indeed, in its 

treatment of individuals born in the past or current territories 

of Puerto Rico, id., Alaska, id. § 1404, Hawaii, id. § 1405,

4 The Government claims that the State Department’s Foreign Affairs 

Manual corroborates its prospective-only interpretation. See 8 U.S. 

Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 308.9-5(e). We have 

previously held that the Foreign Affairs Manual is not entitled to 

deference. See Scales v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). 

Consistent with our prior finding, there is no indication that the State 

Department arrived at its interpretation of § 1408 after engaging in any 

of the careful processes associated with the traditional modes of 

administrative law. See id. We cannot even rely on the Manual for its 

persuasive value: it offers only “conclusory statements . . . with no 

analysis,” providing no reasoning to support its reading of § 1408. 

NLRB. v. SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. 288, 308 (2017).
KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN 17

and the Virgin Islands, id. § 1406, Congress carefully 

shifted—often in the same section—between providing 

citizenship “at birth” and as of a particular date. 

It is significant, then, that § 1408 includes no equivalent 

temporal toggle. “[W]here Congress includes particular 

language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . 

. it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally 

and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Nken 

v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 430 (2009) (quoting INS v. 

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987)). Here, the 

surrounding code provisions make clear that Congress knew 

how to include the prospective-only language that the 

Government would have us read into the 1986 amendments. 

It also confirms that Congress chose, instead, to make noncitizen national status uniformly begin “at birth” in § 1408. 

Next, we turn to the purpose of the 1986 amendments. 

See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 

(2011) (relying on purpose “readily apparent from [statute’s] 

text”). The parties agree that Congress enacted the 1986 

amendments to expand the class of American Samoans 

eligible to become non-citizen nationals to include those 

born outside the United States to only one non-citizen

national parent. By making this statute retroactive, Congress 

indicated a further intent to eliminate, once and for all, the 

gap in eligibility for people born abroad to a single noncitizen national parent. See § 15(b), 100 Stat. at 843; see 

also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267–68 (describing one 

“legitimate purpose[]” of retroactive legislation as “giv[ing] 

comprehensive effect to a new law Congress considers 

salutary”). 

The Government’s preferred interpretation, though, 

would have the amendments perpetuate the very problem the 
18 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

statute was designed to solve. It would deny non-citizen

national status to individuals, like Koonwaiyou, born abroad 

to a person recognized under law as a national, thereby

continuing to block access to non-citizen national status to a 

subgroup of individuals Congress enacted the 1986 

amendments to help. We find it implausible, to say the least,

that Congress hid a second-class non-citizen national status 

within a statute explicitly expanding eligibility for American 

Samoans to become non-citizen nationals. 

More than that, the Government’s interpretation would 

split the status of families like Koonwaiyou’s in two: 

children born before a parent claimed non-citizen national

status would never be eligible, while those born after would 

qualify and could pass their status to their children. Absent 

any apparent reason for such a division within the same 

family, that consequence would contravene not just 

congressional purpose, but also common sense. See 

Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) 

(emphasizing that “‘structure, history, and purpose’ . . . not 

to mention common sense” all play a role in statutory 

interpretation (quoting Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76 

(2013))). 

Finally, we consider the legislative history. Where, as 

here, a statute’s text makes us sure of its meaning, we need 

not look to legislative history to confirm our reading. See 

Hughes, 255 F.3d at 759–60. We note, though, that nothing 

in the legislative history supports the Government’s 

prospective-only interpretation. For example, when 

members of Congress discussed the uncodified section of the

1986 amendments, they did not treat it as a temporal limit on 

non-citizen national status. Instead, supporters treated this 

section as a procedural hurdle, repeatedly urging the 

Secretary of State to be sensitive to the record-gathering 
KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN 19

difficulties of those born before 1986. See, e.g., 132 Cong. 

Rec. H18619 (Aug. 1, 1986) (statement of Rep. Udall) 

(“Many of the individuals who would qualify for U.S. 

nationality under this provision are older and desirable 

records may not exist to substantiate the residency of their 

parents. In these cases, officials of the Department of State 

should . . . use liberal discretion . . . to qualify every 

individual who can reasonably be presumed to be eligible.”); 

id. at H18624 (statement of Mr. Sunia, non-voting 

representative from American Samoa) (describing need for 

“the Secretary of State to understand the circumstances of an 

applicant who will have to supply proof of his or her parent’s 

. . . residence so many decades ago”). Indeed, if anything, 

the limited legislative history supports our view that

Congress aimed to establish equal status for all American 

Samoans who qualify for non-citizen national status under § 

1408. See id. at H18619 (statement of Rep. Udall) (“This 

provision would enable these residents of American Samoa 

to take their place with other members of their 

community.”). 

III.

At bottom, the Government’s strained statutory 

construction and nullification of key words in the statute 

result in the creation of second-class non-citizen national 

status for those qualifying under but born before the 

amendments and differential treatment of their children 

based on whether the children were born before or after their 

parent obtained the non-citizen national status. All this in a 

statute that was explicitly intended to retroactively expand, 

rather than restrict, eligibility for non-citizen national status. 

We reject the Government’s interpretation in favor of the 

plain meaning of the 1986 amendments. The text of the
20 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

amendments makes clear that Congress intended for it to 

apply retroactively and to bestow the same status on those 

born before, on, or after the date of enactment: “national[], 

but not citizen, of the United States at birth.” 8 U.S.C. § 

1408. Under our interpretation, the uncodified procedural 

provision of the 1986 amendments can be easily harmonized 

with the long-standing text of § 1408, giving every word in 

the 1986 amendments meaning. Our interpretation is also 

consistent with similar provisions in the INA, with the 

statute’s purpose, and with the available legislative history. 

Our interpretation leads us to conclude that Koonwaiyou’s

mother’s non-citizen national status extends back to her birth

and, as a result, that he qualifies for non-citizen national 

status too. 

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and we 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED.