IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN DOE 1, et al.,

Civil Action No. 17-2694 (ABJ)

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant.

MOTION TO INTERVENE BY CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS 

IN WASHINGTON AND ANNE WEISMANN

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) and Anne Weismann —

the complainants in the administrative action at issue in this case — respectfully move to 

intervene as defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). A memorandum of points and 

authorities and a proposed order are attached to this motion. Pursuant to LCvR 7(j), an answer to 

the unsealed version of plaintiffs’ complaint is also attached.

Pursuant to LCvR 7(m), the undersigned counsel has attempted to confer with all counsel 

of record regarding this motion. John Doe #2 opposes the motion. The Federal Election 

Commission states as follows: “The Commission will file a written response setting forth its 

position on the motion.” Counsel for John Doe #1 have not responded to email or telephone 

inquiries. 

Respectfully submitted,

Stuart C. McPhail (D.C. Bar No. 1032529)

Adam J. Rappaport (D.C. Bar No. 479866)

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 

455 Massachusetts Avenue NW

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 22 Filed 01/03/18 Page 1 of 16
2

Washington, DC 20001 

(202) 408-5565 

smcphail@citizensforethics.org

arappaport@citizensforethics.org

/s/ Adav Noti

Adav Noti (D.C. Bar No. 490714)

Mark P. Gaber (D.C. Bar No. 988077)

Campaign Legal Center

1411 K Street NW, Suite 1400

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-2200

anoti@campaignlegalcenter.org

mgaber@campaignlegalcenter.org

Counsel to Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and Anne Weismann

January 3, 2018

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 22 Filed 01/03/18 Page 2 of 16
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN DOE 1, et al.,

Civil Action No. 17-2694 (ABJ)

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 

INTERVENE BY CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON

AND ANNE WEISMANN

In 2012, one or more unknown donors illegally routed $1.71 million through several 

pass-through entities to a super PAC. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and 

Anne Weismann (collectively, “CREW”) filed a complaint with the Federal Election 

Commission (“FEC”), seeking to vindicate CREW’s statutory right to know who provided those 

campaign funds. 

In the course of investigating CREW’s complaint, the FEC appears to have discovered 

the identity of a trust and a trustee who either financed this conspiracy or played a vital role in 

furthering it. But the FEC’s Commissioners deadlocked on whether to accept its own attorneys’

recommendation to investigate these coconspirators, even while the FEC penalized the passthrough entities and the recipient of the undisclosed funds for effectuating the plot to hide the 

donors’ identities.

To complete the unlawful concealment of their campaign spending and prevent the FEC 

from revealing the true source of the campaign funds, the coconspirators have now filed suit in 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 22 Filed 01/03/18 Page 3 of 16
2

this Court. If plaintiffs’ claim proves successful, CREW will be deprived of three specific 

statutory rights. First, CREW will be deprived of its right to know who gave $1.71 million to 

Now or Never PAC — the very information that CREW’s administrative complaint sought to 

obtain and that is now being withheld. Second, the plaintiffs’ claim would significantly impede 

CREW’s exercise of its statutory right to challenge the FEC’s baffling decision to close CREW’s 

complaint without even investigating — much less penalizing — those coconspirators. See 

CREW v. FEC, Civ. No. 17-2770 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 22, 2017). Third, intervention is consistent 

with the practice of courts in this district in “reverse FOIA” cases, which plaintiffs here claim to 

be bringing. Accordingly, CREW’s motion to intervene in this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

24(a)(2) should be granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

In the 2012 election cycle, Now or Never PAC, a federal “super PAC,” received a $1.71

million contribution that Now or Never PAC reported as having been contributed by American 

Conservative Union (“ACU”), a corporation. In 2014, ACU reported to the Internal Revenue 

Service that ACU had been merely a pass-through for the $1.71 million, having received it as “a 

political contribution [that ACU] promptly and directly delivered to a separate political 

organization.” 

In February 2015, CREW filed an administrative complaint with the FEC alleging that 

Now or Never PAC, ACU, and the unknown persons who originally provided the $1.71 million

to ACU had each violated the federal prohibition on making or accepting a political contribution

 

1 Except where otherwise noted, the facts in this section are derived from the notification 

that the FEC sent to CREW upon closing MUR 6920. See Letter from Antoinette Fuoto, FEC, to 

Anne L. Weismann, CREW (Nov. 3, 2017), 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/100487769.pdf. 

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3

in the name of someone other than the true contributor. See 52 U.S.C. § 30122. The FEC 

designated CREW’s complaint Matter Under Review (“MUR”) 6920.

On November 3, 2017, the FEC notified CREW that on October 24 the FEC had 

negotiated a $350,000 civil penalty with Now or Never PAC, ACU, and an entity named 

Government Integrity, LLC. According to the negotiated agreement, Government Integrity had 

received $2.5 million “from another source” and passed $1.8 million along to ACU; ACU then 

immediately gave $1.71 million to Now or Never PAC. Now or Never PAC reported ACU as 

the donor of the funds on mandatory public disclosure reports, despite knowing that ACU was 

merely a pass-through.

The FEC’s regulations provide that it will make the relevant portions of an enforcement 

file public 30 days after the enforcement matter is concluded, see 11 C.F.R. § 111.20(a), and 

federal law provides that an administrative complainant must file any challenge to the FEC’s 

failure to take lawful action on its complaint within 60 days of the matter’s conclusion, 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(B). CREW therefore contacted the FEC on December 5, 2017, to inquire as to 

why the file in MUR 6920 had not yet been made public. CREW contacted the FEC again on 

December 15 with the same inquiry.

On December 19, the FEC made public certain limited documents from the file of MUR 

6920. Contrary to the FEC’s own policy and longstanding procedure,2those documents were 

altered to redact the names of the coconspirators over whose activity the FEC’s Commissioners 

had deadlocked. Also on December 19, CREW became aware of the instant lawsuit. 

 

2

See FEC, Disclosure of Certain Documents in Enforcement and Other Matters, 81 Fed. 

Reg. 50,702 (Aug. 2, 2016) (tracing history of FEC’s disclosure policies); see also 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(4)(B)(ii) (“If the Commission makes a determination that a person has not violated 

this Act . . . , the Commission shall make public such determination.”).

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On December 20, CREW filed with the FEC a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)

request for the unredacted administrative record of MUR 6920.3 On December 22, CREW filed 

suit in this Court to challenge the FEC’s failure to take lawful action on CREW’s administrative 

complaint. CREW v. FEC, Civ. No. 17-2770 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 22, 2017). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTIONS TO INTERVENE

The D.C. Circuit employs a four-factor test for motions to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

24(a): “1) timeliness of the application to intervene; 2) a legally protected interest; 3) that the 

action, as a practical matter, impairs or impedes that interest; and 4) that no party to the action 

can adequately represent the potential intervenor’s interest.” Crossroads Grassroots Policy 

Strategies v. FEC, 788 F.3d 312, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

4

 

III. CREW SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERVENTION

A. CREW’s Motion Is Timely

CREW files this motion only 15 days (9 business days) after the case was unsealed and 

the public complaint was filed. CREW’s motion is timely. See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. 

Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (approving motion to intervene filed “less than two 

months after the plaintiffs filed their complaint and before the defendants filed an answer”); 

WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 320 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding intervention timely 

“approximately sixteen weeks after the initial complaint was filed, and approximately four weeks 

after the amended complaint . . . was filed”).

 

3 The FOIA request is available at https://www.citizensforethics.org/foia/expedited-foiarequest-federal-election-commission-american-conservative-union-mur-6920/.

4 An intervenor who meets the four-factor test necessarily also has Article III standing to 

intervene because “the standards for constitutional standing and the second factor of the test for 

intervention as of right are the same.” Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 320 (citing Fund for Animals, 

Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).

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B. CREW Holds Statutory Interests in the Information at Issue Here, and 

Those Interests Would Be Impaired and Impeded If Plaintiffs Were to 

Prevail 

1. CREW Holds a Statutory Right to Know Who Provided $1.71 Million

to Now or Never PAC, as Uncovered by the FEC’s Investigation of 

CREW’s Administrative Complaint 

CREW has a legally protected interest potentially impaired by this suit because federal 

law grants CREW a statutory right to know precisely what plaintiffs seek to conceal — the 

source of the $1.71 million contribution. 

Federal law requires political committees to disclose their contributors, 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30104(b)(3)(A), and prohibits any person from contributing in the name of another, id. 

§ 30122. The Supreme Court has long upheld these disclosure requirements as important to “the 

free functioning of our national institutions.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (quotation 

marks omitted). Disclosure laws “deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption 

. . . , discourag[ing] those who would use money for improper purposes either before or after the 

election.” Id. at 67. Such laws also inform the public and aid voters in making decisions at the 

ballot box: “This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper 

weight to different speakers and messages.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010).

Congress authorized individuals and groups to file administrative complaints with the 

FEC regarding violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 52 U.S.C. § 30101-

46, including violations of its disclosure provisions. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1). In FEC v. Akins, 

524 U.S. 11 (1998), the Supreme Court explained that Congress intended, with these provisions, 

to give voters a statutory right to the specified information. The Court held that Congress 

“intend[ed] to protect voters” from political committees that violated FECA’s disclosure 

requirements and that an administrative complainant was an intended beneficiary of the law. Id. 

at 20. In upholding an administrative complainant’s standing to sue in federal court, the 

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Supreme Court explained that violations of FECA’s disclosure requirements create a “concrete 

and particular” injury because the statute ‘seek[s] to protect individuals . . . [who] fail[] to 

receive particular information about campaign-related activities.” Id. at 21-22.

The plain text of FECA, together with the Supreme Court’s precedent, confirm that 

CREW has a legally protected interest at stake in this suit. FECA requires disclosure and 

prohibits contributing in the name of another. These provisions benefit the public as a whole, but 

the legally protected interest is particularly acute with respect to CREW, because CREW 

exercised its statutory right to file an administrative complaint. As the Court confirmed in Akins, 

CREW is an intended beneficiary of the disclosure provision and has a legal right to seek and 

obtain that information. See CREW v. FEC, 243 F. Supp. 3d 91, 101-02 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding 

CREW suffered injury-in-fact where it was “deni[ed] . . . information [CREW] believes the law 

entitle[d] . . . [it] to,” specifically, the identity of a contributor). CREW thus easily satisfies the 

second factor for intervention because it has a protected statutory right to the information 

plaintiffs seek to conceal with this lawsuit.

The third intervention factor — that the suit potentially impair or impede CREW’s 

legally protected interest — is also satisfied here. Plaintiffs seek a court order precluding the 

FEC from releasing the identity of the person who financed or effectuated the $1.71 million 

contribution — the very information FECA entitles CREW to obtain. The lawsuit thus plainly 

impairs or impedes CREW’s legally protected interest because it could eviscerate that interest. 

Because CREW filed its administrative action, it was poised to benefit by learning the identities 

of persons responsible for the $1.71 million contribution. With this action, plaintiffs seek to 

remove that benefit to CREW. “[W]here a party benefits from agency action, the action is then 

challenged in court, and an unfavorable decision would remove the party’s benefit,” the party has 

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“a sufficient injury in fact” to warrant intervention in that court challenge. Crossroads, 788 F.3d 

at 317.

2. CREW Holds a Statutory Right to Seek Judicial Review of the FEC’s 

Failure to Act Against the Plaintiffs

CREW holds a second, independent statutory right implicated by plaintiffs’ lawsuit: The 

right to seek judicial review of the FEC’s failure to take enforcement action against the funders 

of the $1.71 million contribution to Now or Never PAC. 

Unlike most law enforcement agencies, the FEC’s decision not to take action on a 

complaint is subject to judicial review; the complainant can file suit in this Court to challenge 

such a decision. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8). If the challenge is successful, the FEC must take 

additional action to conform to the law. Id. § 30109(a)(8)(C).

Because of this unusual ability to obtain judicial review of FEC inaction, the D.C. Circuit 

has held that the respondent to an FEC administrative complaint has a right to intervene in cases 

where the administrative complainant brings suit to force the FEC to take enforcement action. 

See Crossroads, 788 F.3d 312. The court in Crossroads identified a number of reasons that such 

intervention falls within Rule 24(a), most notably that the respondent’s rights and interests would 

be affected by the actions that the FEC would be required to take if the plaintiff prevailed. See 

Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 316-19.

Crossroads controls here, as the instant case is merely its mirror-image. In Crossroads, 

administrative complainants sued the FEC to force FEC action (i.e., reconsidering an 

enforcement decision) that would have been detrimental to the interests of the respondent in the 

administrative matter. The respondent therefore intervened as of right to protect its statutory 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 22 Filed 01/03/18 Page 9 of 16
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interests. Here, administrative respondents5have sued the FEC to force FEC action (i.e., 

redacting the documentation regarding the FEC’s enforcement decision) that would be 

detrimental to the interests of the complainant in the administrative matter. The reasoning of

Crossroads requires that the complainant be permitted to intervene to protect its statutory 

interests against the action that plaintiffs are trying to compel.

6

In addition to seeking information through FOIA (see infra Part II.B.3), CREW is already 

exercising its statutory right to seek judicial review of the FEC’s failure to investigate or enforce 

against the donors. See CREW v. FEC, Civ. No. 17-2770 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 22, 2017). If 

plaintiffs here achieve the concealment they seek, CREW’s exercise of its right will be 

significantly impeded. To win its suit, CREW will need to show that the FEC’s failure to 

enforce — as explained by the statement of two of the three FEC Commissioners who voted not 

to take action on plaintiffs’ illegal conduct7 — was contrary to law. See 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(C). As part of that showing, CREW will need to demonstrate that the factual 

record before the Commission regarding the donors did not support the legal conclusions reached 

in the Commissioners’ statement. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 209 

 

5 Although it is unclear whether the FEC technically designated plaintiffs as respondents in 

MUR 6920, CREW’s administrative complaint specifically stated that it was filed against the 

“Unknown Respondent” who was “the true source of funds ACU transferred to Now or Never 

PAC.” Compl. ¶¶ 1, 12, MUR 6920 (American Conservative Union et al.) (Dec. 20, 2017), 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/100487727.pdf.

6 Crossroads analyzed this question primarily within the framework of the intervenor’s 

Article III standing, but the analysis applies indistinguishably here because the test for standing 

is the same as the “legally protected interest” prong of the D.C. Circuit’s intervention test. See 

supra n.4.

7 Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Caroline C. Hunter & Comm’r Lee E. Goodman, 

MUR 6920 (American Conservative Union et al.), 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/current/100487859.pdf. The third Commissioner who 

voted not to enforce, Commissioner Matthew S. Petersen, did not issue a statement in the matter.

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 22 Filed 01/03/18 Page 10 of 16
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F. Supp. 3d 77, 88 (D.D.C. 2016) (noting standard of review in challenges to FEC’s failure to 

enforce).

If plaintiffs prevail here, it will be exceedingly difficult for CREW to make the necessary 

showing. Indeed, CREW will not know who the donors were, much less be able to effectively 

litigate the case that the FEC’s inaction against them was contrary to law. Even the 

Commissioners’ explanatory statement — the very document that CREW will be challenging —

would remain redacted. This would reduce CREW’s arguments to a series of guesses and 

hypotheticals about the concealed material, with briefing along the lines of: “Assuming the 

redaction in Document A refers to Secret Respondent B . . . .” To force CREW to litigate in the 

dark like this would severely impair its statutory right to challenge the FEC’s inaction under 

section 30109(a)(8).

3. CREW’s Intervention Would Be Consistent with Cases Granting 

FOIA Requesters Intervention in Reverse FOIA Suits

CREW’s intervention in this case would be consistent with cases granting FOIA 

requesters intervention in reverse FOIA suits. Plaintiffs cast this case as a reverse FOIA action, 

contending that FOIA Exemption 7(C) entitles them to an order precluding the FEC from 

releasing their identities. See Pls.’ Emerg. Mot. for Temp. Restraining Order & Prelim. Inj. at 7. 

Courts regularly grant intervention motions by the FOIA requester in such actions (and indeed, 

CREW submitted a FOIA request to the FEC promptly upon learning of this case). For example, 

in National Business Aviation Ass’n, Inc. v. FAA (“NBAA”), a reverse FOIA action, the court 

granted intervention to ProPublica, the FOIA requester, reasoning that having filed the FOIA 

request sought to be blocked, “it follows that, should the Court find in NBAA’s favor, 

ProPublica will have lost its opportunity to protect its interests.” Order at 2, NBAA, No. 1:09-cv1089-RMC (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2009), ECF No. 28. Moreover, the court explained that “neither of 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 22 Filed 01/03/18 Page 11 of 16
10

the current parties represents [ProPublica’s] interests fully — NBAA’s interests are directly 

opposed, the Government’s interest is merely to adhere to FOIA, and ProPublica has a positive 

desire to obtain the contested documents.” Id.; see also Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. SEC, 

10 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2013) (considering arguments of intervenor-defendant in “reverse 

FOIA” action); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same).

The same is true here. CREW has sought the identity of the $1.71 million contributor 

both via the FEC’s regulations requiring disclosure and through FOIA. Plaintiffs’ interests are 

directly opposed to CREW’s. And should plaintiffs prevail here, the FEC likely would be 

obligated to deny CREW’s pending FOIA request pursuant to this Court’s order. Absent 

intervention now, CREW’s only recourse would be a collateral attack on this Court’s order 

through a suit challenging its FOIA denial, where CREW would already have the deck stacked 

against it by virtue of the result in this case. See Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 320 (noting that 

“persuasive weight” of plaintiff’s victory in first case would harm intervenor’s interests in 

subsequent litigation). 

C. The FEC Cannot Be Relied Upon to Adequately Represent CREW’s Interest

An intervenor “ordinarily should be allowed to intervene unless it is clear that the 

[preexisting] party will provide adequate representation.” Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 321

(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1293 (D.C. Cir.

1980)); accord Fund for Animals, 322 F.3d at 735 (“[T]his ‘requirement of [Rule 24(a)(2)] is 

satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his interest ‘may be’ inadequate . . . .’”

(quoting Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972))). The intervenor’s 

burden on this prong is “not onerous,” Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 321 (internal quotation marks 

omitted), and “should be treated as minimal,” Fund for Animals, 728 at 735; see also Forest Cty. 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 22 Filed 01/03/18 Page 12 of 16
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Potawatomi Cmty. v. United States, 317 F.R.D. 6, 11 (D.D.C. 2016) (describing burden on this 

prong as “de minimis”).

The intervenor’s burden is particularly minimal when the intervenor is a private party 

and the original party is a government agency: The D.C. Circuit has instructed courts to “look 

skeptically on government entities serving as adequate advocates for private parties.” 

Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 321; Fund for Animals, 322 F.3d at 736 (“[W]e have often concluded 

that governmental entities do not adequately represent the interests of aspiring intervenors.”); 

Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting “the relatively large 

class of cases in this circuit recognizing the inadequacy of governmental representation of the 

interests of private parties in certain circumstances”).

The FEC cannot be relied upon to represent CREW’s interests here for two reasons. 

First, as explained above, CREW requires the information at issue to effectively prosecute its 

action challenging the FEC’s unlawful failure to act against the underlying donors of the $1.71

million. In other words, CREW intends to use the information to effectively litigate and win its 

lawsuit against the FEC. The FEC, of course, does not want CREW to win that lawsuit; to the 

contrary, the FEC’s attorneys are obligated to zealously defend against it. There is therefore a

fundamental disparity between the incentives that CREW and the FEC face to make the 

information available. See Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 321 (reversing denial of intervention where 

result of suit might have been to place intervenor and government in adversarial posture in 

subsequent action); see also Fund for Animals, 322 F.3d at 737 (noting that government party 

“would be shirking its duty were it to advance [intervenor’s] . . . interest”); Am. Great Lakes 

Ports Ass'n v. Zukunft, Civ. No. 16-1019, 2016 WL 8608457, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2016)

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 22 Filed 01/03/18 Page 13 of 16
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(noting inadequacy of government party’s representation of private intervenor’s interests); Forest 

Cty, 317 F.R.D. at 15 (same). 

The second reason the FEC cannot be assumed to represent CREW’s interests involves 

appellate review: If plaintiffs prevail in this Court, the FEC almost certainly will not appeal. 

Under FECA, the affirmative votes of four FEC Commissioners are required to appeal a case. 

52 U.S.C. §§ 30106(c), 30107(a)(6). Because no more than three of those Commissioners may 

be affiliated with one political party, id. § 30106(a)(1), mustering the necessary four votes for an 

appeal of an adverse judicial decision has historically proven to be exceedingly difficult for the 

FEC. Indeed, it appears that the FEC has not appealed a district court judgment — nor sought 

certiorari on an adverse circuit court judgment — in more than ten years. Movant’s intervention 

in this case is therefore critical to preserving the opportunity for further review in the event of an 

adverse judgment in this Court or in the court of appeals. See In re Brewer, 863 F.3d 861, 872 

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding intervention as plaintiff appropriate where preexisting plaintiffs 

“decided not to pursue an appeal from an unfavorable decision”); Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 321 

(noting that inadequacy of representation prong was met where intervenor and FEC disagreed 

about “post-judgment strategy”); Eagle Pharm., Inc. v. Price, Civ. No. 16-790, 2017 WL 

3822725, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2017) (granting motion to intervene as defendant in part 

because “if [plaintiff] prevails on the merits in the case and the Federal Defendants elect not to 

appeal, [intervenor] would have no appeal in which to intervene at a later date”).

IV. CONCLUSION

CREW has concrete legal rights to the information at issue in this case — rights that 

would be severely impeded or foreclosed if plaintiffs were to prevail and that the FEC might not 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 22 Filed 01/03/18 Page 14 of 16
13

adequately represent. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, CREW’s motion to intervene 

should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Stuart C. McPhail (D.C. Bar No. 1032529)

Adam J. Rappaport (D.C. Bar No. 479866)

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 

455 Massachusetts Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20001 

(202) 408-5565 

smcphail@citizensforethics.org

arappaport@citizensforethics.org

/s/ Adav Noti

Adav Noti (D.C. Bar No. 490714)

Mark P. Gaber (D.C. Bar No. 988077)

Campaign Legal Center

1411 K Street NW, Suite 1400

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-2200

anoti@campaignlegalcenter.org

mgaber@campaignlegalcenter.org

Counsel to Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and Anne Weismann

January 3, 2018

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 22 Filed 01/03/18 Page 15 of 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 3, 2018, I caused the foregoing Motion to Intervene by 

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and Anne Weismann, including

attachments, to be served on the following through the Court’s electronic case filing system:

William W. Taylor , III, Esq., wtaylor@zuckerman.com

Dermot W. Lynch, Esq., dlynch@zuckerman.com

Kathleen C. Neace, Esq., kneace@velaw.com

Kevin Deeley, Esq., kdeeley@fec.gov

Charles Kitcher, Esq., ckitcher@fec.gov

/s/ Adav Noti

Adav Noti (D.C. Bar No. 490714)

Campaign Legal Center

1411 K Street NW, Suite 1400

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-2200

anoti@campaignlegalcenter.org

Counsel to Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and Anne Weismann

January 3, 2018

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 22 Filed 01/03/18 Page 16 of 16