DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

 Headquarters United States Marine Corps

 Washington, DC 20380-0001

26 September 1991

 FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-7, Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations, sets

forth the doctrine for fire support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations.

2. SCOPE

This manual addresses the fundamentals, the fire support means, the uses of fire support, and the doctrine

for fire support coordination in MAGTF operations. The manual is designed to be read, understood, and

applied when using FMFM 6-18, Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination.

3. SUPERSESSION

FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination, dated 23 April 1981.

4. CHANGES

Recommendations for improvements to this manual are invited from commands as well as individuals.

Forward suggestions using the User Suggestion Format to:

 Commanding General

 Marine Corps Combat Development Command (WF 12)

 Quantico, VA 22134-5010

5. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

 BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

 M. P. CAULFIELD

 Major General, U.S. Marine Corps

 Director, MAGTF Warfighting Center

 Marine Corps Combat Development Command

 Quantico, Virginia

DISTRIBUTION: 13900013700
 Fire Support in Marine

 Air-Ground Task Force

 Operations

 Table of Contents

Page

Chapter 1. Introduction

Overview 1-1

 Doctrine-1-1

 Techniques and Procedures-1-1

Fire Support 1-1

 Fire Support Coordination-1-2

 Fire Planning-1-2

 Delivery of Fires-1-2

Marine Corps Warfighting Concept 1-2

 Maneuver Warfare-1-2

 Combined Arms-1-2

 MAGTF-1-3

Fire Support System 1-3

 Target Acquisition-1-3

 Weapons System-1-3

 Command and Control System-1-4

Fire Support Responsibilities 1-4

 Command-1-4

 Control-1-5

 Coordination-1-6

Responsibility of the MAGTF and Subordinate Commanders 1-6

 MAGTF Commander-1-6

 GCE Commander-1-6

 ACE Commander-1-7

 CSSE Commander-1-7
Responsibility in Amphibious Operations 1-8

 Commander, Amphibious Task Force-1-8

 Commander, Landing Force-1-9

 FSCC-SACC Relationships-1-10

Responsibility in Joint Operations 1-10

Chapter 2. Fire Support Means

Artillery 2-1

 Mission of Marine Artillery-2-1

 Command and Control of Artillery-2-1

 Tactical Mission-2-2

 Organization for Combat-2-4

 Artillery in Reserve-2-5

 Artillery Characteristics-2-5

Mortars 2-9

 Mission of Mortars-2-9

 Command and Control of 81 mm Mortars-2-9

 Command and Control of 60 mm Mortars-2-9

 Mortar Characteristics-2-10

Naval Gunfire 2-11

 Mission of NGF-2-11

 Command and Control of NGF-2-11

 NGF Characteristics-2-11

 Accuracy-2-12

Marine Aviation 2-13

 Mission of Marine Aviation-2-13

 Command and Control of Marine Aviation-2-13

 Characteristics of Marine Aviation-2-14

Chapter 3. Fundamentals for Employment of Fire

 Support

Firepower and Mobility 3-1

 Firepower-3-1

 Mobility-3-1

Characteristics of Fire Support 3-1

 Targeting-3-2

 Allocation of Fire Support-3-3

 Mobility-3-3

 Continuity-3-3

 Fire Support Coordination-3-3

 Close Liaison-3-4

vi FMFM 2-7
Fire Support Contribution to Combat Power 3-4

 Fire Support Can Complement or Supplement a Supported Activity-3-4

 Fire Support Can Reinforce the Effects of Another Activity-3-4

 Fire Support to Create Opportunity-3-5

 Fire Support as an Extension of Maneuver-3-5

 Fire Support to Cause Enemy Reactions-3-5

Terminal Effects-the Basic Consideration 3-5

 Destruction Fire-3-5

 Neutralization Fire-3-6

 Harassing Fire-3-6

 Interdiction Fire-3-6

 Illumination Fire-3-6

 Suppressive Fire-3-6

 Screening Fire-3-6

Other Considerations 3-7

 Target Selection-3-7

 Terrain and Weather-3-7

 Ability to Observe Impact of Rounds-3-7

 Stationary Target-3-7

 Provide Necessary Support With Least Possible Ammunition-3-7

 Fires in Support of the Offense-3-7

 Fires in Support of the Defense-3-8

Chapter 4. Fire Support Coordination

Principles of Fire Support Coordination 4-1

 Know and Understand the Commander’s Intent-4-1

 Plan Early and Continuously-4-1

 Exploit All Available Targeting Assets-4-1

 Consider the Use of All Available Fire Support Means-4-1

 Use the Lowest Capable Echelon-4-2

 Use the Most Effective Means-4-2

 Furnish the Type of Support Requested-4-2

 Avoid Unnecessary Duplication-4-2

 Consider Airspace Coordination-4-2

 Provide Adequate Support-4-2

 Provide Rapid Coordination-4-3

 Provide for Flexibility-4-3

 Provide for the Safeguarding of Friendly Forces and Installations-4-3

Fire Support Planning 4-3

FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS vii
Fire Support Planning for Amphibious Operations 4-4

 Fire Support Requirements-4-4

 Special Considerations-4-4

Coordination in Operations 4-5

Fire Support Coordination Agencies 4-6

Fire Support Coordination Measures 4-8

 Boundaries-4-8

 Permissive Measures-4-8

 Restrictive Measures-4-9

Fire Support Communications 4-9

Other Coordination Considerations 4-9

APPENDIXES:

A Glossary A-1

B References B-1

viii FMFM 2-7
Overview

The purpose of this book is to provide doctrine

for fire support in Marine Air-Ground Task

Force (MAGTF) operations. Chapter 1 of this

manual defines fire support, describes the fire

support system, and identifies the fire support

responsibilities. Chapter 2 identifies and

provides information about each fire support means

essential to its effective employment. The

mission, command, control, and characteristics of

each resource are addressed. Chapter 3 presents

fundamentals for the employment of fire support.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of fire support

coordination.

Doctrine

FMFM 2-7 provides the doctrinal foundation for

employment of fire support in MAGTF operations.

Doctrine is the fundamental principles by which

the military forces or elements thereof guide their

actions in support of national objectives. It is

authoritative but requires judgment in application.

(Joint Pub 1-02) As it is implemented, doctrine

demands the ability of one to think, teach, and

lead.

Techniques and Procedures

FMFM 2-7 is intended as a preface to using

FMFM 6-18, Techniques and Procedures of Fire

Support Coordination. Techniques are methods

of accomplishing a goal or mission. Techniques

enhance one’s ability to accomplish a task. For

example, the integration of artillery fires for

suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) in a

close air support (CAS) mission. Procedures are a

series of standardized steps for doing something.

For example, the artillery call for fire, the 9-line

CAS brief, and artillery gunnery computations.

Fire Support

Fire support is the assistance to elements of the

ground forces engaged ,with the enemy rendered

by other firing units, including (but not limited

to) artillery, mortars, naval gunfire (NGF), CAS,

and close-in fire support (CIFS). Fire support

entails the collective and coordinated use of

weapons. Fire support delivered by indirect-fire

weapons and armed aircraft comprise one

element of firepower; direct-fire weapons provide

the other. The fires of indirect- and direct-fire

weapons are integrated with each other, with

other assets such as electronic warfare (EW), and

with maneuver to produce combat power.

Combat power includes the destructive and/or

disruptive force a unit can apply at a given time.

Combat power is optimized when it is delivered

at a decisive time and place.

The term supporting arms is often used when

referring to fire support, particularly in

amphibious operations. Supporting arms are the

air, sea, and land weapons of all types employed

to support ground units. (Joint Pub 1-02) The

terms supporting arms coordination and

coordination of supporting fires are also used.

Fire support is composed of three parts-fire

support coordination, fire planning, anddelivery

Chapter 1

Introduction
FMFM 2-7 1-2

of fires. Proper application of these parts results

in the employment of weapons for optimum

effectiveness, while providing safety to friendly

forces and installations.

Fire Support Coordination

Fire support coordination is the planning and

executing of fire so that targets are adequately

covered by a suitable weapon or group of

weapons. (Joint Pub 1-02) Fire support

coordination has two subdivisions: fire support

planning and coordination in operations. Fire

support planning is the continuous and

concurrent process of analyzing, allocating, and

scheduling of fire support to integrate it with the

maneuver forces to maximize combat power.

Fire support planning results in a fire support

plan which outlines how the commander directs

the use of his available indirect-fire weapons and

armed aircraft. Battalion and company level fire

support planners coordinate the delivery of these

fires with the fires of direct-fire weapons.

Coordination in operations is the process of

implementing the fire support plan and

managing the fire support available to combat

units. See chapter 4 for a discussion on fire

support coordination.

Fire Planning

Fire planning is the planning conducted by

supporting arms agencies for the employment

of their weapons so that the fires will be

coordinated in support of the maneuver

commander’s concept of operation. Fire

plans are prepared to implement and extend the

supported commander’s fire support plan.

Delivery of Fires

Delivery of fire is the execution of fire plans and

necessary coordination in operations. Fires are

delivered to produce a variety of effects.

Chapter 3 discusses the contributions fires can

make to combat power.

Marine Corps Warfighting

Concept

Maneuver Warfare

The Marine Corps warfighting concept is based

on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver

capabilities. Maneuver warfare is a warfighting

philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s

cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and

unexpected actions which create a turbulent and

rapidly deteriorating situation with which he

cannot cope. (FMFM 1) Fire support in

maneuver warfare is applied through combined

arms.

Combined Arms

Combined arms is the tactics, techniques, and

procedures employed by a force to integrate

firepower and mobility to produce a desired

effect upon the enemy. Combined arms is

accomplished through the tactics and techniques

that combat forces use at the lower levels and

through the allocation of assets at the higher

levels. The tool used to generate combined arms

is the MAGTF.

The purpose of using combined arms is to

employ units and weapons for mutual support to

achieve complementary and reinforcing effects

that neither could gain separately. The strengths

of one are used to compensate for the limitations

of, or to magnify the force of, another.

Combined arms is applied at all levels, from the

fire team to the MAGTF command element (CE).

FMFM 1, Warfighting, cites the application of

combined arms with its discussion of the fire

team’s employment of the grenade launcher and

automatic rifle.

Supporting arms can be used to achieve a

combined arms effect. An example could be the

integration of indirect fire with aviation. To

neutralize or destroy a mobile armored
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 1-3

formation, indirect fires can be used to slow,

canalize, and restrict the target until aircraft can

deliver their ordnance onto the target. Indirect

fires could not by themselves cause the desired

effect on the target, but they can fix the target

for the more effective means of fire support, in

this case, the aircraft.

At the MAGTF level, the application of

combined arms continues. Marine Corps assets

could be integrated with external assets; i.e., joint

and allied forces. An example would be the

integration of the capabilities of the U.S. Marine

Corps aircraft and the capabilities of the U.S.

Air Force aircraft. Further combined arms

effects could be achieved using other means.

MAGTF

MAGTFs are task-organized for a specific

mission. At the completion of that mission, the

task organization is dissolved in accordance with

prearranged plans. The MAGTF includes a CE,

one or more ground combat elements (GCEs),

an aviation combat element (ACE), and a

combat service support element (CSSE). The

MAGTF can function in an amphibious

operation in support of a naval campaign, or in

sustained operations ashore as part of a larger

joint or combined land campaign.

In a MAGTF, fire support may be provided by

the GCE, the ACE, and by other supporting

forces; e.g., the Air Force, Navy, Army, and

allied forces. The fire support, while used

primarily by the GCE, may be used to support

any element of the MAGTF or to support other

forces.

Fire Support System

Understanding the fire support system is

essential to employing fire support effectively.

(See fig. 1-1.) The system embodies three

components-target acquisition, weapons systems,

and a command and control (C2) system. When

functioning together, these components provide

the firepower that a commander needs.

.

Target Acquisition

Target acquisition is the detection, identification,

and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit

the effective employment of weapons. (Joint Pub

1-02) Without accurate target location data,

indirect-fire weapons are of limited value. Target

acquisition is performed by all means available to

the MAGTF. See figure 1-2 for some of the target

acquisition means available.

Weapons System

A weapons system is the weapon and those components required for its operation. The system

includes a delivery vehicle and weapon combination including all related equipment, materials,

services, and personnel required so that the system

becomes self-sufficient in its intended operational

environment.

Weapons and ammunition provide the means to

attack targets. A variety of weapons and ammunition allows for the selection of the most suitable

means to attack a target.
FMFM 2-7 1-4

CE GCE ACE

 Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) Forward observers (FOs) Forward air controller (airborne) FAC(A)

 Deep reconnaissance units Forward air controllers (FACs) Naval aviation observers (NAOs)

 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collectors Naval gunfire (NGF) spotters Other aircraft (including recon and

 Photographic and satellite sources Naval aviation observers (NAOs) electronic warfare [EW])

 Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Ground Intelligence sensors

 Adjacent units Weapons-locating radar

 External sources Combat troops

Reconnaissance units

Figure 1-2. Target Acquisition.

Weapons systems must be supported, sustained,

and employed for survivability. Without support,

the sustainment of firepower is threatened. This

support includes technical support and combat

service support (CSS). Technical support

enhances the delivery of accurate fires.

 Examples are the meteorological and survey

support for artillery units; beacon support for

NGF and CAS. CSS is essential to a weapons

system. Equipment cannot move if it lacks fuel

or there are no roads. Weapons cannot fire if

they lack ammunition or if they are broken.

Marines cannot move or shoot well if they do

not have water or food for extended periods of

time. Finally, certain actions must be taken to

increase the chances for survival of weapons and

the personnel who operate these weapons.

Active and passive defensive measures must

always be considered and implemented to avoid

enemy detection and position-fixing capabilities.

Other actions include the avoidance of

predictable actions and the employment of

disciplined and trained fire control procedures,

operations security, and electronic countercountermeasures.

Command and Control System

The command and control system is the facilities,

equipment, communications, procedures, and

personnel essential to a commander for planning,

directing, and controlling operations of assigned

forces pursuant to the missions assigned. (Joint

Pub 1-02) The responsibility for the establishment

of the C2 system is vested in the commander. The

commander establishes C2 agencies to assist in

organizing, planning, directing, coordinating, and

controlling fire support. (See fig. 1-3.)

Fire Support Responsibilities

The commander is responsible for all that happens

or fails to happen within his command. This is

especially true regarding the planning and

coordinating of fire support. To clearly understand

the commander’s responsibilities, it is important to

be familiar with the terms command, control, and

coordination.

Command

Command is the authority that a commander in the

military Service lawfully exercises over

subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.

Command includes the authority and responsibility

for effectively using available resources and for

planning the employment of, organizing, directing,

coordinating, and controlling military forces for the

accomplishment of assigned missions. It also

includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale,

and discipline of assigned personnel. (Joint Pub 1-

02) The commander can delegate authority but he

cannot delegate responsibility.
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 1-5

ATF CE GCE ACE CSSE

 Supporting arms Fire support FSCCs Direct air Rear area

 coordination coordination support center operations center

 center (SACC) center (FSCC) (DASC) (RAOC)

 Tactical air Tactical air

 control center command

 (TACC) center (TACC

Figure 1-3. Agencies Established to Assist in Fire Support.

Control

Control is the authority which may be less than

full command exercised by a commander over

part of the activities of subordinate or other

organizations. (Joint Pub 1-02) Control, unlike

responsibility, can be delegated. Control of

supporting arms equates to the authority a

commander has over certain activities, and it may

exist in several forms. The following

subparagraphs discuss these forms of control.

Control Exercised by Supported

Commanders

A commander is given authority over all

activities, including the use of supporting arms

within his assigned zone of action or sector

defense. The commander exercises control

through his fire support coordination center

(FSCC), forward observers, NGF spotters, and

forward air controllers (FACs) as appropriate.

Control of Artillery

The commander of the force (GCE) or division

exercises control of artillery in his organization

through the commander of that artillery unit.

The higher artillery commander organizes

artillery for combat to meet the needs of the

force as a whole and the needs of subordinate

units. He receives guidance from the commander of the force or division of which the

artillery is a part. The selection of firing

positions, assignment of fire missions, resupply,

etc., are controlled by artillery commanders;

however, the delivery of fires and positioning

must be cleared by the appropriate ground

commander who has control of that zone or

sector.

Control of Naval Gunfire

Naval commanders are always responsible for the

allocation, logistics support, and operational

control (OPCON) of fire support ships. In the

postlanding phase of an amphibious assault, the

commander, amphibious task force (CATF) may

pass control of NGF to the commander, landing

force (CLF). This control equates to the

authority to assign tactical missions to ships

assigned to the CLF. Prior to this passage of

control, the assignment of tactical missions is

discharged by the CATF. When ships are given

tactical missions, the selection of targets, the

timing of fires, specification of the line of fire

(when not inconsistent with safe navigation), and

the adjustment of fires are functions of the

supported unit.

Air Control

Air control is the authority to direct the physical

maneuver of aircraft in flight or to direct an

aircraft or surface-to-air weapon (SAW) unit to

engage a specific target. Air control is

performed when an air controller maneuvers an

aircraft by directing the pilot, or a missile

controller directs a SAW unit to engage a
FMFM 2-7 1-6

particular target. Tasks dealing with the actual

maneuver of aircraft are air control tasks. For

more information on air control, see

FMFM 5-60, Control of Aircraft and Missiles

(under development).

Coordination

Coordination is the action necessary to ensure

adequately integrated relationships between

separate organizations located in the same area.

Coordination may include such matters as fire

support, emergency defense measures, area

intelligence, and other situations in which

coordination is considered necessary.

(FMFRP 0-14) The responsibility for

coordination is always vested in the commander.

Planning and coordinating the use of supporting

arms requires close interaction among all

organizations involved.

Responsibility of the MAGTF

and Subordinate

 Commanders

MAGTF Commander

The MAGTF commander exercises authority in

the planning and operational phases. The

MAGTF commander exercises his authority

during planning and execution of operations to

focus his assets and accomplish his mission. He

has three separate but possibly concurrent

engagements: the deep battle, the close battle,

and the rear battle. The deep battle lies beyond

the area of influence of the GCE commander(s).

It is the battle on which the MAGTF

commander usually focuses. To execute this

deep battle, the MAGTF commander retains

OPCON of all organic assets which can influence

the deep battle, including Marine aviation, and

exercises priority of tasking aircraft. He also

retains OPCON of long-range target acquisition

assets. If NGF assets are available, the MAGTF

commander may retain some of these assets to

support the deep battle and allocate NGF assets

to subordinate commands as appropriate.

Command, control, and coordination

responsibilities in amphibious and joint

operations are discussed on pages 8 through 11

of this chapter.

The MAGTF commander establishes an FSCC.

The MAGTF FSCC is a task-organized facility

which includes the personnel, equipment, and

communications links appropriate to the fire

support coordination functions to be performed

and the tactical situation. The MAGTF FSCC is

staffed using the supporting arms representatives

* (e.g., artillery officer, air officer, etc.) on the

MAGTF CE’s staff as a nucleus with

augmentation from USMC and external sources.

USMC sources may include the air/naval gunfire

liaison company (ANGLICO) (if not otherwise

committed); the GCE(s); assets of an

uncommitted MAGTF; and/or non-Fleet Marine

Force (FMF) assets. External sources can

include representatives or liaison

personnel/teams from joint and allied forces.

The role of the MAGTF FSCC is to implement

the MAGTF commander’s intent which will be

focused on the deep battle. The preponderance

of the MAGTF FSCC’s effort is in planning as

opposed to the actual integration of the delivery

of supporting arms. The MAGTF FSCC

complements and extends the fire support

coordination efforts of other elements of the

MAGTF. The MAGTF FSCC maintains close

coordination with the GCE(s) FSCC for

integration of the fire support plans of the deep

and close battles. The MAGTF FSCC interfaces

with the ACE’s Marine Air Command and

Control System (MACCS). Such interface is made

by collocation with a task-organized MACCS

agency. For more on the MAGTF FSCC, see

chapter 4 of this manual, and FMFM 2-7.1, Fire

Support Coordination by the MAGTF Command

Element (under development).

* NOTE: These supporting arms representatives

were previously referred to as the supporting arms

special staff.

GCE Commander

The GCE is a task-organized element
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 1-7

constructed around an infantry unit and includes

appropriate combat support and CSS units. The

GCE commander establishes the GCE FSCC to

perform his fire support coordination functions.

FSCCs are also established by subordinate

commanders of the GCE down to the battalion

level. The GCE FSCC has sufficient target

analysis and communications capability to plan

fires, perform targeting, integrate fires with

maneuver, and accomplish coordination during

operations. The GCE FSCC plans and

integrates fire support within the GCE’s area of

influence.

The GCE has organic artillery and mortar

support. It also plans and coordinates the

delivery of other assets such as NGF, air support,

EW, etc., as allocated by the MAGTF

commander. The delivery of aviation support is

enhanced by tactical air control parties (TACPs)

organic to the GCE. Depending on the size of

the airspace to be controlled, the number and

geographical spread of units, the extent of

projected air operations, communications

requirements, and mobility requirements, a

DASC or liaison team thereof will be collocated

with the GCE FSCC.

The GCE FSCC coordinates with the adjacent

GCE’s FSCC when the MAGTF has multiple

GCEs, with other elements of the MAGTF (e.g.,

CSSE), and with adjacent external forces on fire

support coordination matters. Matters which

cannot be resolved by direct coordination

between subordinate FSCCs are resolved by the

MAGTF FSCC. Fires for the close and rear

battle are integrated and coordinated by the

FSCCs of the GCE(s) who are supported by

DASC.

ACE Commander

The ACE is a task-organized element comprised

of a headquarters and an aviation unit which

varies in size from a helicopter squadron (-)

(Rein) to one or more aircraft wings. Although

normally viewed as a supporting arm, the ACE

may be tasked as the focus of effort for the

MAGTF. The ACE commander performs his

fire support functions through the MACCS.

These functions include control and coordination

of aircraft supporting maneuver forces. In

amphibious operations, control and coordination

of aircraft is initially discharged by the CATF.

When control of air operations has been passed

to the CLF, the ACE coordinates air operations

in the objective area, including antiair warfare

(AAW) and airborne EW, but excluding

antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, sea

mining, and mine countermeasure operations.

The ACE manages the airspace within the

MAGTF’s area of responsibility. The ACE

provides all or a portion of the six functions of

Marine aviation in varying degrees based on the

tactical situation and the MAGTF’s mission and

size. The six functions of Marine aviation are

offensive air support, assault support, air

reconnaissance, EW, AAW, and control of

aircraft and missiles. The ACE receives targeting

information, targeting guidance, and the fire

support plan from the MAGTF. The ACE is

responsible for detailed aviation planning to

support the MAGTF commander’s fire support

plan.

CSSE Commander

The CSSE commander’s responsibility in fire

support includes providing CSS for the

sustainment of fire support, functioning as the

rear area security coordinator (RASC) when

designated, and employing indirect fire assets

when these means are allocated. The MAGTF

commander normally designates the CSSE

commander as the RASC. As the RASC, the

CSSE commander will direct and control rear

area security (RAS )through the rear area

operations center (RAOC). The RAOC is

staffed using organic CSSE personnel, with

augmentation fromo ANGLICO, if not otherwise employed in its

primary mission.

o FMF assets.

o Assets from non-FMF organizations.

Fire support is used for RAS as required. The

fire support representatives in the RAOC
FMFM 2-7 1-8

the operation. Close interface between the

SACC and the ATF joint intelligence center is

essential for targeting.

Upon initiation of planning, the CATF prepares

and publishes the ATF target list. The target list

is a listing of targets maintained and

 promulgated by the senior echelon of command;

it contains those targets which are to be engaged

 by supporting arms, as distinguished from a “list

of targets” which may be maintained by any

echelon as confirmed, suspect, or possible targets

for informational and planning purposes. (Joint

Pub 1-02) Since the ATF target list contains

 those targets which are to be engaged, the ATF

target list should consist of high-payoff targets.

There is only one ATF target list. The ATF

 target list includes recommended targets from all

levels of the LF provided during concurrent

planning and coordination. The ATF target list

 is kept current by the promulgation of target

bulletins (TARBULs). TARBULs add new

 targets as they are discovered, delete inactive and

destroyed targets, and assess the damage on

targets attacked.

Initially, the CATF exercises control over air and

NGF, and through the CLF, artillery. (See

fig. 1-4.) Air control is exercised by various

commanders as the operation progresses. Air

control may be delegated to an advanced force

commander and to the attack group commander

in their respective landing areas. The CATF

assumes control of all air operations upon arrival

in the objective area. Subsequently, control of

all or a portion of air operations may be passed

to the CLF or the joint task force commander

concerned. As the first LF elements reach the

shore, that portion of control that relates to the

firing of specific missions in support of the LF

shifts to those elements. With the

commencement of on-call fires, the control

of supporting arms in the attack of specific

targets and target areas becomes an LF

responsibility when the target affects the LF.

The CATF exercises overall coordination for the

delivery of NGF, air support, and LF artillery

fire, including requests for the use of nuclear and

chemical weapons. The extent of coordination

coordinate the delivery of fire support with the

FSCC of the GCE. When there is more than

one GCE, the coordination is effected with the

GCE closest to the projected/actual location of

enemy rear area activity.

Responsibility in Amphibious

Operations

Commander, Amphibious Task Force

As the overall commander, the CATF is charged

with overall responsibility for an amphibious

operation. The CATF commands all elements of

the amphibious task force (ATF), including the

fire support elements. Because these fire

support elements are organic to the component

commanders, command of the fire support

elements seldom changes. The CATF’s

command of landing force (LF) fire support

elements is exercised through the CLF as a

component commander. CATF’s fire support

responsibilities consist of planning, targeting,

control, coordinating, and monitoring of fire

support activities.

The CATF establishes a SACC at the ATF level

of the amphibious organization. Subordinate

naval commanders also establish SACCs when

appropriate; e.g., attack group, advanced force.

The SACC is a single location on board an

amphibious command ship in which all

communication facilities incident to the

coordination of fire support of the artillery, air,

and naval gunfire are centralized. This is the

naval counterpart to the fire support

coordination center utilized by the landing force.

(Joint Pub 1-02) The SACC is staffed by the

personnel from the ATF, with LF representatives

assigned.

As the coordinating authority for planning, the

CATF is responsible for preparation of the

overall plan for the amphibious operation.

This includes the planning for the employment

of all aircraft, artillery, and NGF prior to the

transfer of control and coordination

responsibility ashore. The CATF prepares a

coordinated air and naval plan for all phases of
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 1-9

status, prepared to take control and coordination

responsibility if required. The CATF continues

to assist the targeting function by passing

appropriate information to the MAGTF G-2

ashore. This information is used by the G-2

section in its liaison with the FSCC.

Commander, Landing Force

The CLF is the officer designated in the initiating directive to command the LF. In Navy/

Marine Corps amphibious operations, the

MAGTF commander is the CLF. The CLF has

responsibility for the coordination of LF requests

for fire support during all phases of the

operation. Air, artillery, and NGF requirements

of the LF are integrated with planned maneuver

operations. Consolidated requests for air and

naval gunfire support (NGFS) are presented to

the CATF for fulfillment. The CLF plans and

controls artillery for the operation.

Conditions permitting, the responsibility for

overall coordination of fires and the control of

air and NGF is normally transferred to the CLF

when the CLF has established the necessary

facilities ashore for control and coordination.

However, this does not mean that they must be

transferred simultaneously. In most cases, the

responsibility for overall coordination can be

passed earlier than control due to the more

complex facilities required for control. After

responsibility for coordination and control has

been passed ashore, the CLF is responsible for

overall planning, coordination, and control of the

fire support means available in the objective

area. Responsibility for the maintenance of the

target list is normally passed to the CLF when

the CATF transfers control to the CLF.

Fire support is coordinated through FSCCs

established at each echelon of the LF, from

battalion to MAGTF. In Navy/Marine Corps

amphibious operations, the MAGTF FSCC is the

LF FSCC.

The LF FSCC provides LF representatives to

work in the ATF SACC. Other LF

representatives may also be provided, such as

exercised by the SACC is primarily supervising

the execution of a detailed fire support plan.

Coordination of supporting fires is accomplished

by subordinate units within their own boundaries

and with adjacent units, with SACC assistance

when required. The actions of subordinate FSCCs

usually do not begin until after the execution of the

overall ATF planned fires and after FSCCs are

established ashore. The SACC makes appropriate

coordination to achieve a combined arms effect,

such as the inclusion of EW support.

When LF command and coordination agencies

are phased ashore and operating effectively, the

CATF normally passes the responsibility for

appropriate fire support coordination and

control functions to the CLF upon request.

Thereafter the CLF coordinates the fires of all

supporting arms with troop maneuvers. The

CATF’s SACC assumes a standby or monitoring
FMFM 2-7 1-10

representatives from the GCE, ACE, CSSE, EW,

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), etc. These

representatives work in the ATF SACC during

the period prior to the passage of coordination

responsibility to the CLF. These representatives

review requests of LF elements ashore, monitor

fire support activities, and plan additional

requirements. They make recommendations

regarding troop safety and type and means of

delivery. They also record all target information

for future reference ashore. One of the

representatives provided is the LF fire support

coordinator (FSC). The LF FSC is provided by

the LF FSCC. The LF FSC keeps the SACC

informed of the use of artillery in order to

permit overall coordination of supporting arms.

The artillery headquarters keeps the LF FSC

informed of the artillery tactical situation using

the LF artillery command/fire direction net.

When subordinate amphibious attack groups and

corresponding landing groups are formed, fire

support coordination agencies are formed for

them and employed in a manner similar to those

of the CATF/CLF. The advanced force echelon

of the FSCC is usually referred to as the FSCC

detachment with the advanced force SACC. The

FSCC detachment embarks with the necessary

personnel and equipment required to conduct

operations, while facilitating the subsequent

transfer to the ATF flagship. Personnel normally

include NGF, air, and target information officers

(TIO) or their representatives. An experienced

individual is appointed to head the FSCC

detachment. Functions of the FSCC detachment

include advising the advanced force commander

and his staff as to the priority of targets from the

LF point of view, and the gathering, tabulation,

and reporting of information of importance to

the CLF about pre-D-day operations. The FSCC

detachment, working with the advanced force

SACC, analyzes the results of pre-D-day

operations and makes appropriate recommendations

to the advanced force commander concerning the

execution of the landing as planned.

FSCC-SACC Relationships

Upon receipt of the initiating directive for an

amphibious landing, CATF and CLF establish the

SACC and FSCC, respectively. Since the CATF/

CLF relationship is that of equals in the planning

stage, liaison between coordination centers should

be established so that concurrent planning can

begin. They work together to accomplish the

overall fire support planning for the assault and

subsequent LF operations ashore.

After passage of control and coordination responsibilities ashore, the SACC performs a monitoring

function. The SACC does those tasks necessary to

maintain the ability to resume control and coordination responsibility should the need arise. Additionally, the SACC will continue to control and coordinate those functions not passed ashore, as required.

Responsibility in Joint

Operations

The MAGTF can operate as a subordinate to a

designated joint force commander (JFC). In

some operations, the MAGTF commander may

be designated as the JFC. The JFC is

responsible for the planning, coordination, and

execution of effective fire support in a joint

operation. Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire

Support and FMFM 2-7.1, Fire Support

Coordination by the MAGTF Command Element

(under development), provide detailed

information for fire support coordination in joint

operations.
 Chapter 2

Fire Support Means

 This chapter appraises the fire support means available to the commander and provides

fundamental information conducive to their employment. Detailed information on each

can be found in appropriate reference materials. See appendix B for references.

Artillery

Mission of Marine Artillery

The mission of artillery in the Marine division is to

furnish close and continuous fire support by

neutralizing or destroying targets which threaten

the success of the supported unit. To accomplish

its mission, artillery conducts three tasks:

o Provide timely, close, accurate, and continuous

fire support.

o Provide depth to combat by attacking hostile

reserves, restricting movement, providing

long-range support for reconnaissance elements,

and disrupting C2 systems and logistical

installations.

o Deliver counterfire within the range of the

weapons systems to ensure the freedom of

action of the ground forces.

Command and Control of Artillery

The artillery regiment is the primary source of

fire support in the Marine division. Through a

process referred to as organization for combat,

artillery units are assigned a command

relationship and receive a tactical mission which

delineates their fire support responsibility.

The assignment of a command relationship is

based primarily on the factors of mission, enemy,

terrain and weather, troops and support

available, and time available (METT-T). The

organization may be modified as the operation or

phases of an operation change. For example, in

compositing two MAGTFs into a larger

MAGTF, artillery units are normally reorganized

and placed under the command of the senior

artillery commander. Through command

relationships, artillery is placed with an

organization. The commander exercises control

of artillery placed in his organization. The

command relationship given (or inherent) to an

artillery unit may be organic, assigned, attached,

OPCON, or administrative control.

Command Relationships

Organic means assigned to and forming an

essential part of a military organization. (Joint

Pub 1-02) The artillery regiment is the organic

artillery component of the Marine division.

Assign means to place units or personnel in an

organization where such placement is relatively

permanent, and/or where such organization

controls and administers the units or personnel

for the primary function, or greater portion of

the functions, of the unit or personnel. (Joint

Pub 1-02) Artillery may be assigned in the

strategic tailoring of a force to meet specific

requirements of a theater of operation or a

contingency plan.

Example: 1st Battalion, 12th Marines is assigned

to 3d Marines.

Attach (NATO) means to place units or

personnel in an organization where such

placement is relatively temporary. Subject to
FMFM 2-7 2-2

limitations imposed in the attachment order, the

commander of the formation, unit, or

organization receiving the attachment will

exercise the same degree of command and

control thereover as he does over the units and

persons organic to his command. However, the

responsibility for transfer and promotion of

personnel will normally be retained by the parent

formation, unit, or organization. (Joint

Pub 1-02) Supply and maintenance requirements

should be specified in the attachment order in

terms of what the receiving unit will provide and

what the parent unit will provide. Attachment

may apply to artillery in several situations:

o Artillery is attached to a supported unit when

artillery requirements cannot be adequately

provided by the parent artillery organization

and control compels the establishment of a

command relationship between the supported

and supporting commander. Artillery units

are not normally attached to battalion-sized or

smaller maneuver units unless distance,

communications, or other factors do not allow

the artillery headquarters to exercise adequate

control over the artillery units. An example of

the above is an artillery battery attached to the

GCE of a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU).

Attachment reduces the ability of the higher

artillery commander to meet the needs of the

force or division commander. There is essentially no difference in quantity and responsiveness of artillery whether a battalion is placed

in direct support (DS) of a regiment or

attached to it. However, from the higher artillery commander’s point of view, there is a difference. When an artillery unit is attached,

the higher artillery commander loses C2 over

that unit. In contrast, if a DS mission is

assigned to the unit, the higher artillery commander can use that unit’s fires when it is not

firing for the supported unit, can reposition

the artillery unit if he so desires, and can even

change the mission of the unit if necessary.

o Artillery may be attached to another artillery

unit for reinforcement. For example, an artillery battalion supporting a reinforced infantry

regiment may have attached firing batteries,

counterbattery radar platoon detachment, etc.

o When a suitable artillery headquarters is

unavailable, an artillery battalion or battery

may be attached to another of like size to

form an artillery groupment. Groupments

are temporary formations used when one unit

must exercise greater control over another unit

than is inherent in a reinforcing mission.

Attachment is established for logistical and

administrative considerations. The senior

commander of the two units is the groupment

commander, and he assigns missions to the

subordinate unit.

Operational control is the authority delegated to

a commander to direct forces assigned so that

the commander may accomplish specific missions

or tasks which are usually limited by function,

time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and

to retain or assign tactical control of those units.

It does not include authority to assign separate

employment of components of the units

concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include

administrative or logistic control. (Joint

Pub 1-02) OPCON has an occasional use in

establishing a relationship between artillery units;

e.g., an artillery battalion may be given OPCON

of a radar section. However, it is rarely used to

establish a relationship between an artillery unit

and a supported unit.

Administrative control is the direction or

exercise of authority over subordinate or other

organizations in respect to administrative matters

such as personnel management, supply, services,

and other matters of the subordinate or other

organizations not included in the operational

missions. (Joint Pub 1-02) Administrative

control is used occasionally in establishing

command relationships for artillery units.

Tactical Mission

Standard Tactical Mission

Infantry units are usually given mission-type

orders; e.g., prevent the enemy from crossing the

river. Artillery units are assigned tactical

missions. A tactical mission defines the fire

support responsibility of an artillery unit,

normally a battalion, to a supported unit or to
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-3

another artillery unit. These missions are assigned

by the higher artillery commander, based on the

guidance given by the commander of the force or

division to which the artillery is a part. An artillery

unit assigned a tactical mission remains under the

command of the higher artillery commander. Like

command relationships, tactical missions may change

in the course of the battle. There are four standard

tactical missions for artillery, described by inherent

responsibilities. (See fig. 2-1.)

When an artillery unit is assigned a tactical mission

of DS, the artillery unit designates how calls for fire

will be answered to fit the needs of the supported

unit. Each firing battery may have its own conduct

of fire (COF) net, each net monitored by the battalion

fire direction center (FDC); or the battalion FDC

may establish multiple COF nets and direct firing

batteries to respond to calls for fire on a designated

net and respond to fire missions assigned by the

battalion FDC.
FMFM 2-7 2-4

Nonstandard Tactical Mission

When fire support requirements cannot be met

or completely conveyed by one of the standard

tactical missions, a nonstandard tactical mission

may be assigned. A nonstandard mission

amplifies, changes, or limits one or more of the

inherent responsibilities of a standard tactical

mission. The nonstandard stipulations should

not degrade the ability of a unit to accomplish

the inherent responsibilities of the standard

mission. The DS tactical mission should not be

modified. The nonstandard tactical mission is

normally used when there is not enough artillery

to cover artillery requirements. An example of a

nonstandard mission is as follows:

 1st Bn 10th Mar (155,T): GS, 2d priority in calls

for fire (PCFF) light armored infantry (LAI)

battalion (Bn) until 031600 AUG

 (1st Bn is GS to the division, but 2d PCFF is to

LAI Bn.)

On-Order Missions

On-order missions serve as warning orders to alert

units of anticipated changes to their tactical mission. This enables the artillery commander to plan

and initiate preparations for transition to another

mission. The assignment of an on-order mission

must take into account positioning and ammunition

requirements.

Organization for Combat

The organization for combat must make artillery

immediately responsive to the needs of the front

line troops, while retaining some artillery

responsive to the needs of the force or division

commander. This is accomplished in part by the

establishment of the organization for combat.

For example, general support (GS) establishes

centralized control while DS establishes

decentralized control. Other methods used to

accomplish this are by the assignment of priority

of fires and priority targets. The optimum

degree of control varies with the tactical

situation. Regardless of the degree of

centralization, the force or division commander

can exercise control of an artillery unit as long as

the unit remains under his control.

There are several guiding fundamentals when

organizing for combat. These fundamentals

include: providing maximum feasible centralized

control, ensuring adequate support for

committed maneuver elements, providing weight

to the main attack or most vulnerable area,

facilitating future operations, and ensuring

immediately available artillery for the higher

commander.

Maximum Feasible Centralized Control

Centralized control places artillery responsive to

the needs of the higher headquarters and the

force as a whole. Artillery is most effective when

control is centralized at the highest level

consistent with its fire support capabilities and

the requirements of the overall mission.

Centralized control permits flexibility in artillery

employment ensuring effective support to the

force as a whole and its subordinate units.

Centralized control is essential in defensive

situations where the force or division commander

will need to use his artillery to respond to the

enemy’s initiatives. The GS and general supportreinforcing (GS-R) tactical missions provide for

centralized control.

Decentralized control makes artillery responsive

to the needs of the front line troops. In

offensive situations, the commander possesses

the initiative. An organization for combat which

places artillery responsive to subordinate

commanders is favorable in these situations.

The DS tactical mission accomplishes

decentralized control.

Priority of Fires

When required, control of artillery can be further

allocated by assignment of priority of fires.

Priority of fires is guidance to a fire support

planner to organize and employ fire support

means in accordance with the relative importance

of the maneuver units’ missions. Priority of fires

is normally used to strengthen the main effort or

the most vulnerable area.
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-5

Priority Targets

Priority targets are a means of allocating control

of artillery to a supported unit. A priority target

is a target which when requested for attack takes

priority over all other requests. Priority targets

are designated by the maneuver battalion

commander, who also provides specific guidance

as to when the targets will become priority,

munitions to use, accuracy, and desired effects.

When not engaged in fire missions, firing units

will lay on priority targets, thereby increasing

responsiveness.

Adequate Support for Committed Maneuver

 Elements

Adequate fire support must be provided to units

committed in combat. What constitutes adequate

support is determined by the commander,

considering METT-T. The minimum adequate

fire support for a committed unit (e.g., infantry

regiment or separate maneuver battalion) is

considered to be one artillery battalion in DS.

Some situations may require more artillery

support; e.g., reinforcing or GS-R artillery. This

may result in less support to one unit to increase

the combat power of another.

Weight the Main Attack or Most Vulnerable

 Area

Weight must be added to support the main attack or

to strengthen the most vulnerable area. This

fundamental can be accomplished in several ways:

o Reinforcing or GS-R missions.

o Assignment of positions and azimuths of fire.

o Allocation of additional ammunition.

o Assignment of priority of fires.

Facilitate Future Operations

Artillery must be responsive to unforeseen events

and capable of smooth transition from one

mission to another. Nonstandard and on-order

tactical missions, positioning, and allocation of

ammunition facilitates this fundamental.

Immediately Available Artillery for the

 Higher Commander

The force or division commander must retain

immediately available artillery with which he can

influence the action. GS and GS-R missions

facilitate this fundamental.

Artillery in Reserve

Artillery is not held in reserve. Artillery with a

unit assigned a reserve mission is given another

tactical mission within the division, or employed

in support of another division if the parent

division is in reserve. Liaison sections may

remain with the reserve unit for planning

purposes.

Artillery Characteristics

Artillery is the commander’s principal means of

fire support in ground combat. It can yield

substantial firepower to the supported unit.

There are fundamental considerations for the

optimum employment of artillery.

Weapons and Ammunition

Artillery weaponry includes cannons and rockets

that can deliver accurate fires at extended ranges.

Marine artillery cannons consist of light (120 mm

or less) and medium (121 mm through 160 mm)

weapons. Marine heavy artillery (161 mm

through 210 mm) is currently located only on

board maritime prepositioning ships. There are

no very heavy (greater than 210 mm) caliber

weapons in the Marine Corps inventory. A

variety of munitions provide increased flexibility

in attacking targets.

Heavier caliber weapons produce greater

effectiveness from one hit than lighter calibers.

A direct hit by a light caliber weapon is usually

required to destroy a hard target such as an

armored personnel carrier. An impact within

10 m by a light caliber weapon will destroy, or
FMFM 2-7 2-6

seriously damage, a medium target, such as a

truck, radar station, or a missile launcher.

However, a direct hit is not always required to

destroy a target by a heavier caliber weapon.

Accuracy

Artillery weapons are area weapons rather than

point-target killers. The exception is guided

projectiles such as Copperhead, which give the

artillery a single shot kill capability against

moving and stationary armored targets. Artillery

weapons can be employed using either direct or

indirect delivery techniques. Fires can be

delivered without observation, but are delivered

most effectively when observed.

Delivery accuracy is a measure of the ability of a

weapon system to place munitions on an aiming

point. Inaccuracy of a weapon system is caused

by a number of factors including hardware

inaccuracies, environmental effects, and human

error. Some of these errors are inherent to the

artillery gunnery system and cannot be

eliminated, thus resulting in natural dispersion.

Dis persion must be understood by all concerned

with artillery fire.

If several rounds are fired under identical

conditions from a single weapon with the same

firing data, the rounds will not fall on the same

point. The pattern on the ground will be

roughly elliptical, with the long axis along the

line of fire. Half of the rounds fired will fal l

within a predictable distance over or short of the

point of aim. This distance is referred to as one

probable error in range (PE/R). All rounds fired

will impact within four PE/Rs of the aim point.

The same procedure applies to deflection and

height of burst probable errors. (See fig. 2-2.)

Generally, the closer the weapon is to the target,

the more accurate the fire.

The dispersion of artillery impact is a

characteristic which can be regarded as either a

capability or a limitation, depending on the type

of target under attack. Against area targets, the

bursting projectiles in the dispersion pattern

achieve a wide area coverage. However, when

attacking small area or point targets, the

dispersion phenomenon necessitates the firing of

many rounds in order to expect one round to cause

effect on the target.
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-7

Massed Fires

Massing artillery fires on targets or critical points

normally results in maximum effectiveness with a

minimum expenditure of ammunition and reduces vulnerability to enemy target acquisition

devices. Successive volleys give the enemy time

to react and seek greater cover and increase the

enemy’s capability of acquiring friendly artillery

fires.

Massed fires are most important when engaging

relatively soft targets (e.g., personnel in open)

which can quickly become hard (e.g., personnel

with overhead cover. Massed fires inflict damage

and casualties on the enemy before the enemy

has time to react and seek cover). Massed fires

do not give increased effectiveness for targets

that are hard and stay hard. In this case, an

accurate volume of fire is more important.

The capability of artillery units to mass fires is

influenced by accurate survey and utilization of

gunnery techniques. Physical massing of artillery

units is not required to deliver massed fires. The

organization for combat must provide a single

commander the ability to order all available

artillery to fire on high-payoff targets (HPTs)

when required. (See fig 2-3.)

Mobility

Artillery units must be able to keep up with the

supported unit. Through mobility, artillery cano Displace quickly.

o Place the bulk of artillery fires where and

when needed.

o Position itself to enhance accuracy.

o Ensure coverage of the supported unit’s zone

of action.
FMFM 2-7 2-8

Artillery weapons are capable of rapid overland/

sea transport or helicopter lift. They are also

capable of rapidly shifting fires to expand

coverage to the supported unit.

In appraising the mobility of artillery, consideration must be given to its CSS. Other

considerations includeo Artillery displacement must be correlated with

the maneuver and fire support requirements

of the supported unit.

o Prudent positioning, route precedence, and

engineer support contribute to artillery’s

mobility.

Responsiveness

A characteristic of artillery is speed in executing

fire missions, regardless of weather, visibility, or

situation. This rapid action allows close

integration with maneuver. Responsiveness can

be obtained through organization for combat,

multiplicity in communications, and continuous

CSS. To ensure responsiveness, FOs, liaison

officers (LNOs), and artillery commanders must

know, understand, and anticipate the supported

commander’s requirements and actions. Supported commanders can enhance responsiveness

by providing timely, definitive guidance to

supporting artillery commanders.

Vulnerability

Firing and communications signatures make

artillery vulnerable to detection. Artillery is

susceptible to interference from enemy air,

ground, and counterfire attacks, particularly

during displacement. It is difficult for artillery

units to defend themselves against ground or air

attacks and still provide fires to the supported

force with current tables of organization. During

the landing phase of an amphibious operation,

artillery is particularly vulnerable. Considerations to reduce vulnerability includeo Dispersed, defilade, and hardened positions,

prudent and deceptive displacements,

avoidance of stereotyped methods, application

of proper gunnery techniques, and other

passive and active measures increase the

survivability of artillery.

o Attack guidance which allows for artillery fires

at decisive times and places in sufficient

volume renders effective support while

enhancing survivability.

o Counterfire should not be perceived as an

artillery duel. While the mission of artillery is

to provide counterfire, effective counterfire is

rendered when all means capable of delivering

this support are used. Jamming of enemy

counterbattery radars and artillery conduct of

fire nets can enhance the counterfire effort.

Continuity

Artillery is capable of providing close and

continuous fire support. Except during

displacement, artillery can deliver observed and

unobserved fires under all conditions of weather

and visibility. Artillery has the capability to use

various techniques of movement (e.g., displace by

echelon) for continuous coverage of the

supported unit. Continuous action is also

enhanced by firing from widely dispersed

positions and passive and active defensive

measures. Essential to continuity is the resupply

of ammunition. Extensive firing at sustained

rates creates a major logistics problem and may

necessitate the assistance of other units of the

LF to move sufficient ammunition.

Effects of Weather and Terrain

Weather and terrain can influence the effects of

some munitions (e.g., snow reduces the

effectiveness of family of scatterable mines.

Terrain may dictate organization for combat,

effect vulnerability of friendly artillery, and

govern CSS capability.
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-9

Mortars

Mission of Mortars

The mission of mortars is to give close

continuous fire support to the infantry

commander in offensive combat and in the

defense.

Command and Control of 81 mm

Mortars

The 81 mm mortar platoon is an organic

component of the weapons company of the

infantry (including LAI Bn). The battalion

commander directs the employment of the

platoon based on the mission and the assigned

frontage of the battalion. The platoon may be

given a tactical mission of GS or DS, or may be

attached to a subordinate unit.

General Support

When the mortar platoon is in GS, it supports

the entire battalion as directed by the battalion

commander. By keeping the platoon in GS, the

battalion commander retains flexibility, ease of

coordination of fires, and the ability to mass

fires. Direct tactical control (i.e., selection and

occupation of firing positions), as well as

administrative matters remains with the platoon

commander.

Direct Support

The mortar platoon, or an element thereof, may

be employed in DS of a specific unit of the

battalion; e.g., a company. Liaison is maintained

between the 81 mm platoon commander and the

supported unit through an FO. The platoon

commander retains responsibility for the control

of the mortar unit/element’s actions, to include

positioning and displacement. The supported

commander controls the allotted fires. This

relationship is normally assigned for a specific

mission or phase of an operation. DS may be

warranted when the mortar platoon cannot

provide the required support while its fires are

under battalion control.

Attached to a Subordinate Unit of the

Battalion

The mortar platoon, or an element thereof, may

be attached to a subordinate unit of the

battalion. Attachment is justified when the

mortar platoon cannot give adequate support to

a unit by operating in a GS or DS role.

Attachment is used when a subordinate unit is

operating beyond the effective range of the

mortar weapon; e.g., a patrol, an independent

attack, or during the early phase of an

amphibious operation. The subordinate unit

commander normally exercises C2 responsibility

to include logistics support for the attached

mortar unit/element. This is the least desirable

method of employment.

Command and Control of 60 mm

Mortars

The 60 mm mortar section is an organic

component of the weapons platoon of the rifle

company. The company commander is

responsible for the tactical employment of the

mortar section. He assigns missions and priority

of fires, allocates priority targets, designates

general firing locations, and approves fire plans.

He determines the appropriate method of

support (GS, DS, or attached). He plans

logistical support, determining the amount and

composition of the ammunition load and its

distribution and resupply. The weapons platoon

commander is the primary advisor to the company

commander on the tactical employment

of the mortar section. He recommends

employment techniques, positions the section,

and assists the commander in developing the

company fire support plan.

General Support

When the mortar section is in GS, it supports all

rifle platoons as directed by the company

commander. By keeping the section in GS, the

company commander retains flexibility, ease of

coordination of fires, and the ability to mass

fires. Direct tactical control of the section

remains with the weapons platoon commander.

Fires are controlled from the company command
FMFM 2-7 2-10

post when observation of the entire company

zone of action is possible from that position. If

not, the mortar section leader mans an

observation post to control the fires. GS is the

preferred method of employment.

Direct Support

The mortar section may be employed in DS of a

specific unit of the company; e.g., a rifle platoon.

The section leader establishes direct liaison with

the supported rifle platoon commander and

conducts fire missions as requested by him. The

weapons platoon commander is responsible for

the control of the section’s actions to include

positioning and displacement.

Attachment to a Rifle Platoon

The mortar section, or an element thereof, may

be attached to a rifle platoon. Attachment is

justified when the mortar section cannot give

adequate support to a rifle platoon by operating

in GS or DS. Situations for attachment arise

when a rifle platoon iso Operating as the advance party in an approach

march.

o Operating as a patrol whose route takes it out

of mortar range.

o Conducting a withdrawal or is situated in a

platoon strong point.

When a mortar squad is attached to a rifle

platoon, the rifle platoon commander assumes

the tactical command, supply, and administrative

functions normally exercised by the weapons

platoon commander. Attachment is the least

desirable method of employment. The

employment of separate mortar squads attached

to individual platoons lessens the destructive

power achieved by consolidating the section.

Attachment also increases the problems

associated with ammunition distribution and

resupply, as well as fire control.

Priority of Fires and Priority Targets

As with artillery, priority of fires may be used to

decentralize the control of mortars. Mortars can

also be assigned priority targets.

Mortar Characteristics

The mortar is the infantry commander’s hip

pocket weapon. Understanding the

characteristics of the mortar is critical to its

successful employment on the battlefield.

Weapons and Ammunition

The 81 mm mortar platoon employs eight

mortars and the 60 mm mortar section employs

three mortars. Mortars can provide a heavy

volume of responsive, accurate fire with a variety

of ammunition. They are ideal for attacking

close-in targets, targets on reverse slopes, and

those targets in areas difficult to reach with lowangle fire. Mortars are particularly effective in

providing white phosphorous and illumination

support.

Mobility

Mortars are transported by vehicle, helicopters,

or by man-pack. Mortars can be man-packed in

terrain where vehicular support is restricted.

However, in a fast-moving operation, the

mobility of mortars, coupled with their limitedrange capability, may be a restricting factor.

Mortars also have the capability to be fired from

a light armored vehicle.

Massing

Mortar fires can be massed on a target by the

organic unit. However, massing of mortar fires

outside the zone of action of the organic unit is

difficult due to the limited range of the mortar.
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-11

Responsiveness

Responsiveness is an inherent characteristic of

mortars.

Vulnerability and Continuity

The high angle trajectory and long time of flight

causes the mortar to be vulnerable to enemy

counterfire. Active and passive measures are

used to increase survivability. Because

ammunition for mortars may have to be manpacked, sustainment of mortars may be difficult.

So mortars should be employed as an

immediately available source of fire support for

the infantry commander. Other indirect fire

weapons are used when they can achieve the

desired results.

Naval Gunfire

Mission of NGF

The general mission of NGFS units in an

amphibious operation is to support the assault

by destroying or neutralizing:

o Shore installations that oppose the approach of

ships and aircraft (pre-D-day);

o Defenses that may oppose the LF (D-day);

o Defenses that may oppose the post-landing

advance of the LF (post-D-day).

Command and Control of NGF

The task grouping of the ATF includes NGFS

ships organized into fire support groups, units,

or elements. A fire support group is a temporary grouping of ships under a single naval

commander charged with supporting troop operations ashore. A fire support group may be further subdivided into fire support units and

elements. The CATF will normally control NGF

during debarkation and landing of the assault

waves. Thereafter, he may delegate this control

authority to his fire support group commander.

CATF will assign ships to provide support as

determined by the NGFS requirements developed by the CLF. The LF naval gunfire officer

(NGFO) recommends tactical missions to meet

these gunfire support requirements. CATF assigns individual ships tactical missions of either

direct or general support to specific LF units.

Reserve support ships not assigned to support

specific LF units are maintained in an on-call

status directly under the gunfire support group

commander or his subordinate unit

commander(s).

When the number of ships permits, each assault

battalion will be assigned a ship in DS. The DS

mission establishes a one-to-one relationship

between a NGFS ship and the supported unit.

The ship delivers fires on planned targets and

targets of opportunity in her zone of fire, which

normally corresponds to the zone of action of

the supported unit. When possible, ships

capable of performing simultaneous missions

(e.g., MK-86 gunfire control system-equipped)

will be given a DS mission to allow for maximum

firepower to the forward units of the LF.

The GS mission requires a NGFS ship to

support the force as a whole or that portion of

the force to which the ship is assigned. A GS

ship attacks targets in her zone of fire which

corresponds to the zone of action of the

supported unit. Prearranged fires are delivered

in accordance with a schedule of fires published

in the ATF operation order and the NGFS plan

in the LF operation order. Fires may also be

allocated to a subordinate unit for a specific

mission(s). Upon completion of the mission(s),

the ship reverts to GS. GS ships are assigned to

regimental-sized units or larger.

As with artillery, the assignment of priority of

fires establishes the precedence of NGF delivery

to a designated unit. Movement and rotation of

ships in the fire support area (FSA) make it

difficult to assign priority targets to NGF.
FMFM 2-7 2-12

NGF Characteristics

Weapons and Ammunition

The active fleet is armed with NGFS ships

equipped with 5-inch and 16-inch guns and

missiles such as Tomahawk. The 5-inch guns are

found on frigates, destroyers, cruisers, and

battleships. The 5-inch/54 caliber gun is the

primary weapon. It is versatile but lacks the

destructiveness of the larger caliber gun. The

5-inch/38 caliber is found on some ships. The

16-inch gun and Tomahawk missiles are found

on the battleships. Naval guns can fire a variety

of shell-fuze combinations.

Accuracy

NGF ships are equipped with automated fire

control equipment for the calculation of firing

data. However, the firing accuracy of NGF is

dependent on the ship’s ability to fix her

position. If navigational aids (e.g., radar

beacons, landmarks) are not available, there will

be appreciable inaccuracies in unobserved fires

and in the initial salvo of observed fires.

A characteristic high muzzle velocity and flat

trajectory make the naval gun effective against

material targets presenting a vertical face to the

gun-target line (GTL). Such targets may be

engaged at short ranges by direct fire using

optical and electronic equipment aboard ship.

 Due to the changing of the ship’s positions and

the relatively large range probable error, NGF

accuracy decreases when attacking small targets

at long ranges using indirect fire techniques.

The naval gun produces a dispersion pattern that

is elongated along the GTL, the size dependent

on the gun and the firing range. For a 5-inch

gun, rounds may impact up to 150 m over or

short and within 50 m left or right of the point

of aim at 21,000 m. The dispersion pattern for

the 16-inch gun is appreciably larger.

While NGF can deliver unobserved fires, these

fires are generally inaccurate and effectiveness is

reduced. When fire is delivered in close support

of troops, adjustment by an observer or spotter is

required.

Mobility

NGFS ships are capable of considerable mobility

along a coastline within the limits imposed by

hydrography and hostile action. In operations on

peninsulas, islands, and inland areas where

ground movement is often restricted, NGF can

range targets beyond that of other indirect-fire

weapons.

Each NGF ship executing a tactical mission is

assigned a definite sea area in which to operate.

These areas are called FSAs. At times, it may be

advantageous to position a ship at an exact

location within an FSA from which fire is to be

delivered. Such locations, referred to as fire

support stations, are used when a specific GTL is

required or maneuvering room is restricted. The

selection, location, and size of FSAs are

determined during amphibious planning.

Mobility allows the firing ship to be positioned

for optimum support to the LF. The most

favorable position is normally one which causes

the GTL to be parallel to the front line trace of

the friendly force or along the axis of a target. If

the ship is firing underway, changes in the GTL

may necessitate cancellation of a fire mission to

preclude danger to friendly forces. This situation

may be partially offset by restricting the

movement of the ship. (See fig. 2-4.)
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-13

Marine Aviation

Mission of Marine Aviation

The mission of Marine aviation is to participate

as the supporting air component of the FMF in

the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases

and for the conduct of such landing operations as

may be essential to the prosecution of a naval

campaign. A collateral mission is to participate

as an integral component of naval aviation in the

execution of such other Navy functions as the

Fleet commanders may direct. The Marine

expeditionary forces and Marine

expeditionary brigades normally have the

equipment and personnel to accomplish all

aviation functions required by the mission, forces

assigned, and enemy threat. However, the ACE

of a MEU normally will only be equipped to

accomplish a portion of these functions. Tactical

aviation, operating as part of the concerted airground effort, has a powerful and direct effect in

ensuring success in battle. It creates the

opportunity for battle by deceiving, dislocating,

and disrupting the enemy.

The ACE is the aviation arm of the MAGTF.

The ACE is task-organized to assist the MAGTF

commander in accomplishing the MAGTF’s

mission. The ACE commander employs his

aviation assets to meet the priorities and

requirements established by the MAGTF

commander and his own requirements. ACE

assets are best employed when available assets

are brought together in a coordinated manner to

weight the main effort. Aviation assets are not

normally held in reserve.

Command and Control of Marine

Aviation

The MACCS is established for the control of

aircraft, missiles, and UAVs. The MACCS is a

tactical C2 system which provides the tactical air

commander (TAC), normally the ACE

commander, with the means to command,

Massed Fires

NGFS are capable of delivering high volumes of

massed fires. Several ships can mass fires on a

target. Power loading and mechanical hoisting

equipment on ships enhance high rates of fire for

short periods.

Responsiveness

NGFS can respond rapidly to requests for fire

support in most situations. However, ships may

be underway on a course or in an area that

requires a change in the GTL and its positioning

in order to hit a target. Reliance on the radio as

the single means of communicating may limit

responsiveness during periods of interference,

interruption, or equipment failure. NGF

responsiveness is enhanced through the

assignment of DS missions and by positioning

ships for the delivery of fire on planned targets.

Vulnerability and Continuity

Enemy defenses, such as attacks by enemy

aircraft, surface-delivered fires, and minefields,

may limit the availability of NGFS to the LF.

Gunfire ships may be withdrawn from support to

the LF to resume their primary mission (e.g.,

AAW or antisubmarine warfare) in defense of

the ATF.

Adverse weather may affect the delivery of NGF.

Hydrographic conditions for the ship and

visibility conditions for the spotter may restrict

the ship’s ability to place accurate fires onto a

target. Radar beacons may be employed to offset

this limitation.

The quantity of ammunition available for NGFS

is dependent upon the ship’s magazine capacity

and the quantity needed by the ship for selfdefense. Ships can be rotated for replenishment

to allow continuous NGFS.

The ability of NGF to support inland operations

is limited. Thus, maximum use should be made

of these fires while the LF is within NGF range.
FMFM 2-7 2-14

Accuracy

The accuracy of attack aircraft is variable; many

factors contribute to its delivery. Accuracy is of

primary concern when engaging targets in the

proximity of friendly troops. Timely and

accurate air support produces a positive effect on

the morale of supported troops and a

detrimental effect on the enemy.

Mobility

The outstanding characteristics of aircraft are

mobility and range. Aircraft can attack targets at

greater range than other supporting arms and can

overcome target disposition or environment

restrictions. The speed of aircraft enables

commanders to concentrate overwhelming

firepower in the objective area from distant and

dispersed sources and to deliver surprise attacks.

The speed and maneuverability of aircraft also

provide a measure of protection from enemy fire.

The ability to exploit the mobility of aircraft may

be dependent on the commander’s emphasis on

degrading enemy air defenses. For example, in

preparation for a major offensive, the POME

may initially be reducing/degrading enemy air

defenses which will allow for the increased use of

ground attack aircraft as the battle unfolds.

Increased dependence is normally placed on air

support during periods wheno Artillery is embarked during the amphibious

assault.

o Land operations have extended beyond the

range of NGF.

o Artillery capability has diminished due to

enemy counterfire, extended range of an

oncoming threat, difficulties in ammunition

resupply.

coordinate, and control all air operations within

an assigned sector and to coordinate air

operations with other Services. It is composed

of C2 agencies with communications-electronics

equipment that incorporates a capability from

manual control through semi-automatic control.

The two major categories of the MACCS are air

direction and air control. Air direction is the

guidance and supervision which a commander

employs to focus his resources on mission

accomplishment. It occurs in the following

sequence: apportionment, allocation, tasking,

fragmentary order. Air control is the authority

to effect the maneuver of aircraft.

The tactical air command center (TACC) is the

senior air C2 agency in the MACCS. It is the

agency from which the TAC manages all aviation

assets to support the MAGTF. The TAC

allocates aircraft to offensive air support

missions directly supporting the MAGTF’s point

of main effort (POME). Additionally, aircraft

are allocated to assault support missions for the

GCE and CSSE of the MAGTF. The TAC

decentralizes control of most of the offensive air

support and assault support assets to the DASC

for coordination with the GCE and CSSE and

for procedural control within the DASC’s

assigned area of responsibility.

Characteristics of Marine Aviation

Aircraft and Ordnance

Marine aviation units are equipped with a variety

of aircraft weapons and associated systems. A

variety of ordnance can be delivered, including

guns firing an assortment of projectiles, rockets,

and guided missiles with diverse warheads and

fuzing, laser-guided bombs of different weights,

incendiary mixtures, chemical spray tanks (only

in A-4 aircraft currently in USMCR), and

nuclear and non-nuclear bombs in various yields

and weights. This multiplicity of ordnance,

coupled with a myriad of attack tactics, allows

for selection of attack means best suited to the

target.
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 2-15

Responsiveness

The responsiveness of air support is a function of

many factors. The primary factor is the distance

the aircraft must fly (from the sea base, airfield,

holding point/area) to the target. Properly

employed attack helicopters and short takeoff/

vertical landing aircraft can reduce response

times considerably. Aircraft can respond more

rapidly when it is positioned on station with

proper ordnance and when pilots are familiar

with the battle situation. Aircraft can be

maintained in an alert status over designated

points during an assault or other critical phases

of a battle. This requires the forecasting of air

support requirements and continuous liaison

between ground and air commanders. The

degree of control and coordination required for

the delivery of airstrikes is reflected in response

times. This is affected by the placement of fire

support coordination measures; i.e., the fire

support coordination line (FSCL).

Vulnerability

Enemy forces may employ air defense systems

that can form a significant threat to friendly

aircraft. The availability of friendly aircraft and

the tactics that pilots use are contingent upon

the air threat. Aircraft should be selectively

employed against HPTs to reduce their exposure.

The enemy’s air defense capability can be

curtailed through proper attack tactics and

SEAD. Suppression of enemy air defenses is

that activity which neutralizes, destroys or

temporarily degrades enemy air defenses in a

specific area by physical attack and/or electronic

warfare. (Joint Pub 1-02) SEAD is conducted

using multiple means, includingo Destructive means delivered by direct- and

indirect-fire weapons, precision munitions,

aviation ordnance, attack helicopters, and

raids.

o Disruptive means such as EW, chaff, and

flares.

o Combination of destructive and disruptive

means.

Continuity

Even though extremely heavy precipitation may

degrade all-weather aircraft, air support is

available 24 hours a day. The most significant

limitation of aircraft is the difficulty in providing

air support at night and during periods of bad

weather. The weather at the target rather than

enroute and home base weather are of primary

concern. Poor weather at the target area creates

difficulty in locating the target and limits the

types of attack which can be made. The

employment of air support radar teams helps in

target identification and delivery during these

conditions. Also, the radar beacon forward air

controller (RABFAC) can be used to provide a

reference point for RABFAC-compatible aircraft.

The RABFAC provides an electromagnetic pulse

on the aircraft’s weapon system computer.

RABFAC-compatible aircraft include the

following (to varying degrees): A-6, A-7, F-111,

F-4 (USAF), and F-16.

Air support requires the availability of suitable

operating sites/bases for servicing and rearming

aircraft. Initially, suitable land bases within

supporting distance will be utilized until

expeditionary landing areas and airfields are

constructed or captured in the objective area. In

the absence of suitable theater airfields, air

support will be provided by sea-based aircraft

during the initial phase of operations. In an

antiair, threat-rich environment, the only CAS

missions which may be worthy are those of an

emergency nature.

Radio communications are of great importance

to air support operations. This is the only

means of relaying detailed instructions to

airborne aircraft.
Chapter 3

Fundamentals for Employment of

Fire Support

Firepower and Mobility

The MAGTF generates combined arms combat

power by attaining a balance between firepower

and mobility. Mobility assets are employed with

supporting firepower and firepower assets are

organized for mobility.

The MAGTF commander organizes his forces for

the most effective application of combined arms.

Operational resources are organized under a

single commander for optimum employment.

The focal point in the MAGTF for combined

arms is Marine Corps infantry. The infantry may

not always be the most significant, dominant, or

decisive element in the MAGTF combined arms

team. At times, or in given situations, other

elements may assume primary roles. Regardless,

the infantry is the universal element of combined

arms because it will have an important role in

almost every operation and must be flexible and

adaptable to generate combined arms combat

power.

Firepower

The Marine infantry battalion, the basic

maneuver unit of the MAGTF, has the capability

for generation of substantial firepower using

organic small arms, direct-fire weapons, and

indirect-fire weapons. Each element of the

battalion-from the fire team to the

company-can engage the enemy with

immediately available weapons to gain fire

superiority and the initiative without delay. This

results in the enemy being hit hard and fast and

being thrown off balance.

Fires delivered by organic weapons are

augmented rapidly by weapons too large for the

infantry to carry-supporting arms and direct-fire

weapons external to the supported unit. Tanks,

artillery, NGF, armed helicopters, and if

necessary, CAS project additional force to

counter the enemy. Both organic and

nonorganic firepower is responsive to the needs

of the Marines doing the fighting.

Mobility

Mobility is the quality or capability of military

forces which permits them to move from place to

place while retaining the ability to fulfill their

primary mission. (Joint Pub 1-02) Marine Corps

infantry are general purpose, each unit capable

of multiple forms of mobility-foot mobile,

motorized (truck-mounted), mechanized

(supported by assault amphibious vehicle, tanks

and LAI Bns) and helicopterborne. Mobility

allows the infantry the ability to position much

of its firepower where and when it is needed.

Firepower assets that lack true mobility are of

little tactical or operational value.

Characteristics of Fire

Support

Fire support is an essential component in

maneuver warfare doctrine. Successful fire

support requires one to understand the

fundamentals of maneuver warfare.

Understanding the fundamentals of maneuver

warfare will enable fire support personnel to

provide effective fire support in operations
FMFM 2-7 3-2

characterized by flexibility, mobility, and agility.

FMFM 1, Warfighting, describes these

fundamentals. Briefly, these fundamentals are as

follows:

o Focus on the enemy instead of terrain.

o Act more quickly than the enemy can react.

Decentralized decision making allows

commanders to implement operational and

tactical decisions more quickly than the

enemy. Such quickness allows commanders to

dictate the course of the battle to the enemy.

o Support maneuver by fire. Firepower supports

maneuver by creating gaps for maneuver,

suppressing and disrupting enemy forces, or

physically destroying the remnants of enemy

units whose cohesion has been destroyed.

o Issue mission-type orders. Mission-type orders

specify what must be done without prescribing

how it must be done. Commanders provide

their intent to help subordinates anticipate

requirements as the battlefield changes.

o Avoid enemy strength and attack enemy

weaknesses.

o Exploit tactical opportunities. Higher

commanders should maintain the flexibility

and agility to react quickly and decisively to

fleeting opportunities created by subordinates.

o Designation of POME. The main effort is the

most important operational task to be

accomplished, that task on which the overall

success of the operation depends at that

instant. In the offense, the main effort is

normally the main attack. Through the main

effort, the commander provides focus to the

decentralized efforts of his command. All

elements of the command must understand and

support the main effort. The main effort shifts

as the battlefield changes.

o Avoid set rules and patterns. The enemy must

not be allowed to anticipate tactical events or

he will seize the initiative.

o Act boldly and decisively. Commanders must

be able to deal with uncertainty, take prudent

risks, and use initiative within their

commander’s intent to seize fleeting

opportunities.

o Command from the front. Commanders

position themselves well forward to make

effective and timely decisions based on firsthand knowledge of the situation.

Targeting

Targeting is the process of selecting targets and

matching the appropriate response to them

taking account of operational requirements and

capabilities. (Joint Pub 1-02) The purpose of

targeting is to select for attack those enemy

installations, units, or equipment which are most

vulnerable and the attack of which best supports

the accomplishment of the mission. In maneuver

warfare, the focus is on a mobile, evasive

target-the enemy. Enemy targets must be

detected, accurately located, identified, and

prioritized for effective attack. This is not to say

that terrain is unimportant. Rather, terrain may

facilitate the detection, location, and engagement

of the enemy. Target acquisition is essential in

the formula for firepower. Vital to targeting is a

responsive means of reporting and disseminating

target information and intelligence.

In some situations, accurate target locations may

initially be scarce, and, as a result, they must be

developed as the battle progresses. In these

situations, fire support must be positioned to

respond to those targets as they are uncovered.

Targeting is based on the scheme of maneuver

and/or tactical plan, with an assessment of the

weather, terrain, and enemy situation. The

targeting effort is focused on the commander’s

intent through such processes as intelligence

preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and target

value analysis (TVA). IPB is the systematic and

continuous process that integrates the enemy’s

doctrine with the weather and terrain, the

mission, and the specific battlefield environment
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 3-3

to systematically determine his capabilities and

limitations for a specific geographic area. TVA

is a process which links the effects of attacking a

target to the target’s function. Through TVA,

those targets whose attack will provide the

greatest tacical benefit are identified. Areas of

interest, decision points, and attack guidance are

also identified in the targeting process.

Well thoughtout targets can contribute to the

targeting process. Targeting can be conducted

analytically and selectively by applying the

knowledge of the enemy order of battle and his

tactics. For example, a specific target may be

plotted on the forward slope of a hill-vice the

top of the hill, as this is the position where the

enemy is more likely to be.

Allocation of Fire Support

The battlefield may become extended as combat

units are employed against enemy formations in

widely-separated areas. The commander

allocates fire support for the generation of

combined arms combat power for multiple

committed units. This allocation is founded on

the factors of METT-T and the commander’s

intent.

Circumstances may dictate that more fire support

is needed for a specific unit(s) or that a certain

supporting arm would be more appropriate.

Such may be the case in the allocation of

support to the POME. Adequate support is

provided by allocation of means, the assignment

of tactical missions, priority of fires, positioning

of fire support, and by allocating ammunition to

fire support means. The potential forces of

other combined arms are considered in

determining the requirements of adequate

support.

Mobility

Mobility is a necessary function for achieving

and maintaining combined arms combat power.

Supporting arms assets must be able to keep up

with the supported unit. They must be capable

of delivering fire support which exploits the

benefits rendered by mobility. Commanders can

enhance the mobility of their supporting arms

through several meanso Establishing continuous liaison to facilitate

forecasting of and preparation for battle needs.

o Assigning basic loads commensurate with the

fire support needs and the unit’s organic

assets. Augment with external transportation

support when required.

o Establishing priorities (route precedence,

positioning, etc.)

o Utilizing engineer activities (road construction/

clearing, airfield construction).

o Maintaining freedom of movement through

friendly air superiority (when possible), air

defense coverage, and provision of counterfire.

 o Seizing and securing lines of communications.

Continuity

Continuity of firepower is as important as

generating firepower. The requirement of

continuity must be uppermost in the supported

and supporting commander’s thought process in

planning and during the delivery of fire support.

Continuity in fire support equates to adequate

communications, positioning of resources,

responsive logistical support, and survivability.

In the event that an FSCC should become a

casualty, the commander must have plans to reconstitute an FSCC or to replace the personnel

and equipment in order to resume fire support

coordination and planning activities.

Fire Support Coordination

The unit that can react the quickest will be the

most effective and probably win the battle. Thus,

fire support planning and coordination in

operations must be responsive. This requires

forecasting of fire support requirements. A

complex plan, overlaid with numerous target

symbols, redundant or unnecessary fire support

coordination measures, and sophisticated

schedules of fire, may appear thorough but in
FMFM 2-7 3-4

reality will not be very flexible. Commanders

must avoid employing this type of fire support

plan as a sense of security. Instead commanders

should look at fire support plans as tools that

are easy to understand, simple to execute, and

readily amendable. This does not reduce the

importance of planning. On the contrary, plans

must be well thoughtout, closely integrated, and

coordinated. Each component-preplanned

targets, fire support coordination measures, and

schedules of fire must serve a specific role in the

generation of combat power. While the result

may appear less voluminous, the plan will be

functional-as a tool should be. Commanders

can contribute by clearly projecting their intent

through attack guidance and by establishing

priorities. Coordination must be simple and

direct, making use of standardized procedures

and techniques, where possible.

Close Liaison

Close liaison at each echelon-company through

MAGTF CE- is essential. Supporting arms

representatives and commanders must know,

understand, and anticipate the supported

commander’s actions and requirements. They

must read the battle with him, think ahead, and

project fire support assistance; not wait to be

told what support is needed. The supported

commander concentrates on the enemy,

anticipating his actions and reactions to gain an

advantage on him. His orders are likely to be

brief, formed as he is seeing and reading the

battle. Responsiveness of fire support is

dependent on the ability of supporting

commanders to react to the commander’s needs.

Fire Support Contribution to

Combat Power

The value of fires is determined by how well

they contribute to the supported activity. Fires

usually have little value in and of themselves.

While fires can kill or wound individuals, destroy

individual pieces of equipment, or destroy

individual structures, fires rarely, if ever, destroy

entire forces. Rather, fires disrupt, delay, or

damage forces. Most forces, if left alone, can

quickly reorganize, resume movement, or repair

damage. Thus, disruptions, delays, and damage

caused by fires are valuable only if they facilitate

some other actions by friendly forces. Fires

contribute to combat power in a variety of ways,

often in combination. Some of these ways are

provided below as aids for thinking about how to

employ fire support.

Fire Support Can Complement or

Supplement a Supported Activity

Fire support can be integrated with a supported

activity to create combat power. Fires may be

delivered before, after, or simultaneously with a

supported activity. These fires can be used to

soften the enemy, create gaps, provide screens,

obscure the enemy observers, or afford

protection.

Fires may be delivered to complement the

activities of the force. For example,

counterbattery fires may be delivered to suppress

the enemy artillery while the infantry attacks or

defends against an attack by the enemy.

Fires may be used to suppress one fortified

enemy position while the infantry attacks

another.

Fires may be delivered on the same object which

the supported unit is attacking. For example, a

fortified position may be attacked by supporting

fires while the infantry attacks it.

Fires can be used to lead supported units onto an

objective. For example, artillery fires are

delivered onto and beyond the objective, then

shifted beyond the objective as the infantry

closes. Mortars deliver fire on the reverse slope;

tank and other direct-fire weapons fire on the

objective. Infantry advances under a canopy of

fire.

Fire Support Can Reinforce the

Effects of Another Activity

Fires can be employed to magnify the effects of

another combined arms activity. This
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 3-5

multiplicity adds to the total combat power,

produces another dimension with which the

enemy must contend, and affords backup in

potential breakdowns which are certain to occur

on the battlefield. Example: artillery fires

planned to cover a minefield. The minefield

itself will slow the enemy. But as the enemy

moves to overcome the effects produced by the

minefield, he is hammered by artillery fires.

Fire Support to Create Opportunity

Fire support can be employed as a means to

allow another activity to occur. Examples: a

concept of operation’s success may be contingent

on the availability of CAS. This prerequisite

may necessitate creating an environment in which

CAS can be used. The planning and execution of

SEAD creates an opportunity for air operations

in support of the maneuver force. Another

example is the delivery of fires to hamper and

disrupt the employment of fire support by the

enemy, making friendly fire support more effective; e.g., counter-OP fires.

Fire Support as an Extension of

Maneuver

Fire support may be exploited by attacking enemy

positions, units, or installations not accessible by

maneuver forces, or to further the attack initiated

by maneuver forces. Examples: attacking enemy

reserve forces to prevent them from reinforcing

forward units engaged with friendly forces;

attacking fleeting targets during exploitation and

pursuit; isolating enemy forces for defeat in

detail. Fire support can be used to establish/

maintain battle momentum; e.g.,

countermechanized fires.

Fire Support to Cause Enemy

Reactions

The effects of fires can cause the enemy to do

something such as slow down, displace, deploy,

change direction, communicate, fire. This often

makes him vulnerable to the force of another

supporting arm. For example, reconnaissance

fire delivered on a suspected enemy position may

cause him to disclose his presence by movement

or return of fire.

Terminal Effects- the Basic

Consideration

The effectiveness of fires is determined largely

through their terminal effects produced on a

target. Fires are particularly effective when

combined with other assets such as EW to attain

combined arms effects on a target. EW can

augment fire support in destruction,

neutralization, harassing, suppression, and

screening missions. Such employment can

reduce ammunition expenditure and further

confuse the enemy.

Destruction Fire

Destruction fire is fire delivered for the sole

purpose of destroying material objects. (Joint

Pub 1-02) Defining the word destruction is

easy, defining what it is and determining when it

has been achieved is difficult, particularly for an

area target. To achieve destructive effects on a

target, it is not necessary to completely destroy

(e.g., demolish) the target. A target may be

considered destroyed if it cannot perform its

primary mission, such as a tank or artillery piece

that cannot shoot or a radar site that cannot

acquire. The determination of when a target has

been destroyed is situational dependent. Some

units and positions can sustain casualties and

damage and still accomplish their mission.

Destructive fire can be delivered by aircraft,

artillery, mortars, and NGF. Artillery, mortars,

and NGF are area weapons. Therefore to

achieve destructive fire with these area weapons

requires a heavy expenditure of ammunition,

considerable time, and a means of observation.

The type and composition of the target may

dictate what type fire support means is employed.

For example, destruction of a fortified bunker

may dictate attack by aircraft while destruction of

an enemy position in the open can be achieved

by an indirect-fire weapon.
FMFM 2-7 3-6

Neutralization Fire

Neutralization fires are delivered to render the

target ineffective or unusable. (Joint Pub 1-02)

The fires are used to temporarily hamper the

movement and/or the firing of the weapon. For

example, artillery fires may destroy an enemy

battery’s FDC. For the time it takes the enemy

to rearrange their operations so the battery has a

fire direction capability, the battery is

neutralized. Like destruction, the effects

required to render a target neutralized are

situational dependent. Neutralization fires can

be delivered by aircraft, artillery, mortars, and

NGF.

Harassing Fire

Harassing fire is fire designed to disturb the rest

of the enemy troops, to curtail movement and, by

threat of losses, to lower morale. (Joint

Pub 1-02) These fires are delivered occasionally, usually at night or during periods of reduced

visibility. Harassing fires can be delivered

intermittently to deceive the enemy as to what

friendly maneuver is doing or preparing to do.

Ammunition constraints and the threat may limit

or make unfeasible the use of these fires.

Harassing fire missions are normally conducted

at division or higher levels. Harassing fires are

well suited to aircraft, particularly against deep

targets, and artillery and mortars. NGF cannot

deliver unobserved fire with sufficient accuracy

for harassing small targets; however they are

suited for harassment of large area targets that are

not close to friendly lines.

Interdiction Fire

Interdiction fire is fire placed on an area or

point to prevent the enemy from using the area

or point. (Joint Pub 1-02) Roads, railways,

routes, and other lines of approach or

communications may be interdicted to prevent,

reduce, or disrupt the enemy forces, supplies, and

communications. Like harassing fires,

interdiction fires are delivered by division or

higher levels when adequate resources exist.

Aircraft are the most effective in the execution

of interdiction missions. Artillery can deliver

effective interdiction fires. Mortars have limited

utility in interdiction due to range. NGF can

deliver interdiction fires with limited

effectiveness due to its dispersion pattern.

Illumination Fire

Illumination fire may be used to observe enemy

operations and movements, to adjust observed

fire during hours of darkness, and to provide

assistance to friendly night operations. Aircraft

possess an excellent capability for illumination.

Tactical aircraft can provide illumination for

short periods (15 minutes each) while the

KC-130 aircraft can provide continuous

illumination for up to 6 hours. Artillery and

mortars possess the best ability for the delivery

of point illumination. NGF can deliver effective

illumination; however, the quantity provided may

be limited by the magazine capacity of the ship.

Suppressive Fire

Suppressive fires are fires on or about a weapons

system to degrade its performance below the

level needed to fulfill its mission objectives,

during the conduct of fire mission. (Joint

Pub 1-02) The effects are only temporary.

Suppressive fires facilitate maneuver by stunning

the enemy and keeping his head down. The

effects are rendered only while the firing is

occurring. When the firing stops, the enemy

returns to action. To be effective, the supported

unit must accomplish something while the

suppressive fires are being delivered-bypass,

maneuver to assault the target or attack it with

direct- or indirect-fire weapons for neutralization

or destructive effects. Suppressive fires can be

delivered by all indirect-fire weapons and

aircraft.

Screening Fire

Screening fires are fires using smoke projectiles

to obscure the enemy’s observation of friendly

forces and their movement. Screening fires can

be delivered by artillery, mortars, and to a

limited extent, NGF.
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 3-7

Other Considerations

Target Selection

Fire support should not be wasted on

unprofitable or unnecessary targets, nor should

combat elements be used to do what fire support

can do quickly. Targets should be attacked only

if their attack contributes to the accomplishment

of the mission. The commander directs/guides

the selection and attack of targets by establishing

target selection standards and attack guidance.

Target selection standards are used to classify a

target as either a “target” or a “suspected target,”

based on accuracy requirements. Attack

guidance is specified by the commander and

magnified by his operations staff and FSC to

explain how and when targets should be attacked.

It includes any restrictions on engagement, use of

munitions, or use of fire support means.

Terrain and Weather

Terrain and weather may limit the use of fire

support, or may improve the effectiveness of

supporting fires; e.g., restricting the enemy’s

movement and providing points with good

observation.

Ability to Observe Impact of Rounds

When observation (which includes sensors, radio

intercepts, and for fixed installations, aerial

photographs as well as observers) is possible,

fires can be adjusted to provide the best possible

effect and continued only so long as they yield

beneficial results.

Stationary Target

For fires to seriously destroy or damage a target,

the target must usually remain stationary or

move very little while the fires are hitting it. For

an area target, such as a tank or infantry

battalion, individuals and pieces of equipment

may move, but the unit is considered a stationary

target if a portion of the unit remains in the

dispersion pattern of the incoming rounds. For

example, if fires are delivered on a tank battalion

when it starts through a narrow pass, individual

tanks will rapidly pass through the impact area.

Since a part of the battalion will continue to be

in the impact area, it is essentially a stationary

target and, therefore, susceptible to damaging

fires. The tanks that become damaged may block

the incoming tanks which have not yet entered

the pass.

Provide Necessary Support With

Least Possible Ammunition

In some circumstances, fire support is best used

to neutralize or suppress a target rather than

destroy it. Because neutralization and

suppression requires less ammunition and takes

less time, more targets can be attacked with the

same assets when firing neutralization or

suppressive fires rather than destructive fires.

Fires in Support of the Offense

In the offense, fires may be delivered during

preparation for an offensive action. Such fires

can be delivered prior to the leading elements of

the attacking force crossing the line of departure

or when ground contact is made with the

enemy-whichever comes first. These fires may

be delivered prior to or delivered as preparation

fires.

Fires are delivered during the conduct of an

attack. Such fires are delivered from the time

the leading elements cross the line of departure

until after the assault on the enemy and

consolidation by the friendly force. Positioning

of weapons, range, and GTL orientation in

relation to leading assault units should provide

the most accurate fires so that assault troops can

lean into supporting fires.

Fires are delivered during exploitation. Such

fires are delivered following the assault on the

enemy force and involve supporting operations

to exploit success of initial gains. These fires

continue into the pursuit.
FMFM 2-7 3-8

 Fires in Support of the Defense

Fires in support of a specific defensive operation

or phase of operation are generally characterized

by heavy, on-call concentrations.

Fires are delivered to place the enemy under

increasing volumes of fire as he approaches a

defensive position. Long-range fires are

delivered by aircraft and long-range indirect-fire

weapons. Fires are planned along expected

enemy routes. Kill zones are planned around

obstacles and barriers or natural terrain in which

the enemy may become delayed or canalized.

Fires are delivered within the battle area. Such

fires may include fires in support of a

counterattack and barrage fire. Barrage fire is

fire which is designed to fill a volume of space or

area rather than aimed specifically at a given

target. (Joint Pub 1-02) They are prearranged

barriers of fire designed to protect friendly

troops and installations by impeding enemy

movements across defensive lines or areas.

As the enemy approaches the defensive position,

indirect- and direct- fire weapons, crew-served

weapons, CAS and CIFS, and small arms are

integrated into close defensive fires. Final

protective fires (FPFs) are immediately available

to provide a barrier of fire designed to impede

enemy movement across defensive lines or areas.

FPFs consist of final protective lines (FPLs),

principal direction of fires (PDFs), and barrages.

FPLs and PDFs apply to small arms; artillery and

mortars normally fire barrages. NGF is not

assigned FPFs because of its dispersion pattern.
Chapter 4

Fire Support Coordination

Principles of Fire Support

 Coordination

Fire support coordination is a continuous process

of evaluating fire support needs or missions,

analyzing the situation, and planning and

orchestrating the implementation of the fire

support plan while in a continually changing

environment. The process enables the

commander to use his available firepower to

influence the action while ensuring the safety of

his troops.

The goal of fire support coordination is to

accomplish coordination in a timely manner to

allow for the responsive delivery of fires. The

maximum effectiveness of fire support is achieved

by applying the principles of fire support

coordination. These principles serve as a mental

framework for fire support coordination. While

some of these principles are more applicable to

either planning or coordination, all must be

applied to furnish effective fire support.

Know and Understand the

Commander’s Intent

Commander’s intent must be understood at the

lowest practical level of command. It is the

commander’s responsibility to provide his intent.

It is the commander’s staff and supporting

commanders and their representatives’ (e.g.,

LNOs, observers) responsibility to ensure they

understand it.

The commander’s intent establishes the

framework within which fire support

coordinators and supporting arms commanders

and their representatives can conduct fire

support coordination. The commander’s intent

is the basis to make fire support decisions during

planning and during the battle, to determine

when and how fires will be delivered, to

determine requirements, and to project assistance

to the commander.

As automated equipment is fielded, it is

important to remember that people must make

decisions. If people rely on computers to make

fire support decisions, the enemy will be able to

anticipate our actions.

Plan Early and Continuously

Fire support planning is a component of battle

planning. Both begin upon receipt of the

mission and the commander’s intent and end

with mission accomplishment. Planning must be

continuous to meet the needs of the present

tactical situation and to prepare for the next.

Warning orders and reverse planning assist

subordinates and supporting units in anticipating

requirements and conducting their own planning.

Time must be allowed for fire support means to

reposition and resupply. Time must be allowed

for preparation, dissemination, and review

(rehearsal as appropriate) of fire plans.

Exploit All Available Targeting Assets

Targets can be effectively attacked only if there is

an accurate and responsive target acquisition

system. Target information from all available

assets must be rapidly evaluated and routed to the

appropriate fire support delivery agency.

Consider the Use of All Available Fire

Support Means

All fire support means-organic, assigned, attached, and supporting-are employed to make

use of their potential contribution to the
4-2 FMFM 2-7

achievement of combat power, consistent with

responsiveness, economy, and priorities. A

concerted effort is made to use all fire support

means in a coordinated manner, ensuring they

complement each other and that the

coordination process permits simultaneous

employment to the maximum extent possible. In

some situations, it may be required to use the

most available means even though it is not the

most effective.

Use the Lowest Capable Echelon

This principle has two applications:

coordination and delivery means. Coordination

is accomplished at the lowest echelon capable of

coordinating effective support. For example, in

regimental operations, if two battalion FSCCs

can effect the required coordination directly, the

regimental FSCC will monitor and intercede only

if the action affects the regiment as a whole.

Similarly, if two subordinate elements of the

MAGTF (e.g., two GCEs) can effect the required

coordination, action by the MAGTF FSCC may

not be required. Effective coordination can be

enhanced if senior commands encourage and

permit subordinate commands to coordinate

without undue interference from above, if the

other principles of fire support coordination are

adhered to, and if fire support coordination

measures are used properly. Fire support is

delivered by the lowest echelon with the means

available to achieve the desired results. If

artillery in direct support can achieve the desired

results, there is no need to risk an aircraft for

the mission.

Use the Most Effective Means

Fire missions are assigned to or requested from

the agency that can deliver the most effective

fire. The most effective means varies with the

nature and importance of the target, the

likelihood of the target staying in its current

location, the availability of observers, the

availability of attack means, and the results

desired. It may be necessary to temporarily fix

the target until a more effective means can

attack it. For example, indirect fire can fix a

mobile target until aircraft can arrive.

Furnish the Type of Support

Requested

The requesting agency is usually in the best

position to determine its immediate fire support

requirements. However, existing conditions,

(e.g., availability of ammunition, tactical

considerations, or higher priorities) may make it

impractical to provide the type of fire support

requested. In these cases, an alternate type of

fire support will be provided, using the type of

fire support requested as a basis. When a fire

support request is disapproved, the original

request is stopped, an alternate agency assigned

the mission, and the requester notified of the

type of support he is to receive. When

appropriate and permitted by the tactical

situation, the requester should be informed as to

the nature of the disapproval to avoid similar

future delays.

Avoid Unnecessary Duplication

Fire support should not be wasted by

“overkilling” targets. However, economy should

not be practiced to the detriment of the mission.

Unnecessary duplication should not be confused

with effective employment of combined arms.

Consider Airspace Coordination

Because all fire support uses airspace,

coordination must be effected to reduce

interference between users. The extent of

airspace coordination is dependent on the time

available. It may consist of a prearranged

airspace coordination area (ACA) or make use

of lateral, altitude, or time separation plans.

Provide Adequate Support

The factors of METT-T and the commander’s

guidance determine the amounts and types of fire

support needed for success.
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 4-3

Provide Rapid Coordination

Procedures for rapid coordination must be

established and practiced in order to attack

targets within the shortest possible time. A

delay in the delivery of fires on a target may

jeopardize the success of the entire force.

Provide for Flexibility

The fire support plan and its method of

execution must allow for changes in any of the

elements of METT-T.

Provide for the Safeguarding of

Friendly Forces and Installations

Providing safeguards to friendly troops, vessels,

aircraft, and installations is a basic tenet of fire

support coordination. Several measures

accomplish this principle. Some of them are the

use of fire support coordination measures,

restricted firing positions to eliminate or reduce

firing signatures, and the consideration of the

location of friendly forces during target analysis.

Fire Support Planning

Fire support planning encompasses those

activities that are essential to the development of

a fire support plan that optimizes the available

fire support means. The purpose of fire support

planning is two-fold: To achieve maximum

effectiveness and efficiency from fire support

means in meeting fire support requirements of

the force as dictated by METT-T and to

determine the allocation of fire support. If

delivery is too slow, the fires may be efficient

but may likely be ineffective. Rigidity in fire

support will allow the enemy to get the upper

hand. If the enemy is allowed to get into the

commander’s decision-making loop, he will be

able to anticipate and counter the commander’s

actions.

The fire support planning process is dictated by

the tactical situation. Fire support planning is

founded on the commander’s intent, the factors

METT-T, and guidance received from higher

headquarters. In situations where time is

available and a clear picture of the enemy can be

drawn, the fire support planning process tends to

be deliberate and detailed. Commanders at

higher, lower, and supporting echelons work

closely to develop the fire support plan. Targets

are analyzed in detail to determine the type and

quantity of fires needed to achieve the desired

results. The higher echelon coordinates the fire

support planning to ensure effectiveness and

efficiency in the attack of these targets. In

situations where the friendly force is in contact

with the enemy, however, planning time may be

limited and the enemy situation less defined due

to the dynamics of the battle. Thus fire support

planning must be expedited. The plan must be

developed in sufficient detail to support the

operation, yet timely enough to be read,

understood, and executed. Less time will be

available for the evaluation of targets. In more

extreme situations, the commander may have to

allocate fire support assets to a lower echelon.

The lower echelon then develops and executes

the fire support plan. This latter method is

referred to as quick fire support planning.

Fire support planning includes many facets such

as estimates of supportability, the determination

of requirements, allocation of resources,

targeting, coordination, and preparation and

dissemination of the fire support plan. The

planning may span from very formal written

products to informal, oral briefings, or short

messages. Detailed techniques and procedures of

fire support planning are discussed in chapter 5

of FMFM 6-18, Techniques and Procedures for

Fire Support Coordination.

Fire support planning is accomplished under the

direct supervision of the FSC as a commander’s

designated head of his fire support coordination

agency which is the FSCC. He is assisted by

supporting arms commanders and their

representatives and the commander’s staff.
4-4 FMFM 2-7

Fire Support Planning for

 Amphibious Operations

Amphibious operations are the most complex of

all military operations. The amphibious fire

support planning process is characterized as a

detailed, concurrent method conducted by ATF

and LF staffs. Amphibious planning is

conducted by the ATF (SACC) and LF (FSCC).

The relationships and roles of these agencies are

discussed in chapter 1. Details of amphibious

planning can be found in NWP 22-2 (Rev. B)/

FMFM 1-7, Supporting Arms in Amphibious

Operations.

Fire Support Requirements

LF requirements are developed by every

subordinate tactical unit, approved and

integrated at successive higher levels, and finally

approved and consolidated at the LF level for

submission to the CATF. Initially, fire support

planning is general in nature, but it becomes

more detailed and specific as tactical plans are

refined, intelligence and target information is

acquired, and fire support means are allocated.

Overall requirements are determined early in the

planning sequence. These requirements consist

of the number and type of aircraft, artillery units,

NGFS ships, and respective munitions needed.

The requirements are reviewed and revised as

detailed planning progresses. Similarly, artillery

requirements are submitted to the CLF by

commanders of subordinate elements of the LF.

The CLF submits his consolidated air and NGF

requirements to the CATF and these are

consolidated with the Navy requirements. The

CATF compares the consolidated overall fire

support requirements with the available fire

support means. If requirements cannot be

fulfilled or adjusted, additional air and NGFS

means are requested by the CATF from Navy

sources, and if necessary, additional artillery is

requested by the CLF from FMF sources. If the

requested additional fire support means cannot

be made available by higher authority, the

preliminary plans are adjusted by the CATF in

consultation with the CLF. Accordingly, aircraft

and NGFS ships are allocated as available.

Detailed requirements represent a refinement of

the overall requirements prepared initially.

Concurrent and parallel planning and continuous

liaison between Navy and Marine staffs ensure

sufficient information is developed on which to

base the approval or modification of LF

requirements and the allocation of necessary

aviation and NGF units prior to completion of

detailed fire support planning. The detailed

requirements are similar to the overall

requirements, but are more complete. Where

appropriate, specific targets to be attacked are

listed and described, ammunition expenditures

for targets are estimated, and schedules for

delivery of fire support recommended. Within

the framework of fire support planning, air,

artillery, and NGF plans are prepared with

reference to the ATF target list. Where

practicable, these plans are based on fire support

requests received from subordinate echelons.

Combined lists of targets received from

subordinate echelons are integrated and

augmented by other targets whose destruction or

neutralization is vital to the success of the LF as

a whole. This planning constitutes the basis for

the detailed requirements submitted to the

CATF and is divided into three phases — pre-Dday, D-day, and post- D-day.

Following the submission of the detailed LF fire

support requirements to the CATF, the air and

NGF requirements are incorporated in the ATF

air and NGF plans, respectively, These plans,

along with the nuclear and chemical requirements are incorporated in the applicable portions of the ATF fire support plan as tabs to the

fire support appendix to the operations annex.

They become a basis for similar tabs and appendixes to the operation plans of the LF and its

organic elements.

LF fire plans for air, artillery, and NGF are

published as separate supporting tabs to

Appendix 12 (Fire Support) to the operations

annex to the operation order. Chemical fire

plans and the fire support coordination plan will
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 4-5

be included as separate tabs to Appendix 12.

Nuclear plans will be included in Appendix 1

(Nuclear Operations) to the operations annex to

the operation order.

Special Considerations

Because air and NGF ordinarily carry the burden

of fire support until organic LF means are

installed ashore, special consideration is rendered

to the requirements for these arms in the initial

phase of the amphibious assault. Other

considerations which influence requirements are

as follows:

Helicopterborne Assaults

Major dependence is placed on air support and

helicopter-transported artillery to ensure

continuous support of the attack if objectives are

beyond the range of NGFS ships. This requires

that plans be made for a greater number of

aircraft and larger amounts of aviation ordnance

and artillery ammunition over a longer period.

Limited Availability of NGFS Ships

In situations where other supporting arms are

not available or when NGFS ships are

insufficient to provide adequate support, the

ATF may place major dependence on air support

for prelanding bombardment.

Early Artillery Employment

In situations where artillery can be emplaced on

offshore islands or landed with helicopterborne

assault forces on objectives inland and within

effective range of the landing beaches, it can

assume an important role in providing fire

support for the surface landing, thereby reducing

air and NGF requirements.

Over-the-Horizon Assaults

The over-the-horizon assault is an operational

concept for positioning amphibious forces

further offshore in the execution of the ship-toshore phase of an amphibious operation which is

intended to enhance the survival of the ATF.

The employment can increase the likelihood of

achieving tactical surprise at the point of power

projection ashore. In these situations, planners

must be attentive to the ability to establish and

maintain communications between elements of

the ATF. The availability of fire support to the

assault must be considered. Air will likely be

available to support the assault element. NGF

can provide fire support using Tomahawk

missiles, and as ships are moved within range of

the assault, using its guns. As artillery is landed,

it too becomes available.

Coordination in Operations

The coordination of fires is continuous

throughout the operation. The planning

responsibility of the FSCC for fire support

coordination extends through the execution of

prearranged fires contained in fire plans to the

unscheduled fires requested by tactical units.

The coordinating responsibility includes the

requirement to disseminate timely fire support

information and to institute coordination

measures as required. Such action is provided as

a part of the planning of fires or it fulfills

requirements arising from the tactical situation

ashore.

The FSCC coordinates fires on targets of

opportunity and planned targets that are beyond

the coordination capability of the supporting

arms control agencies; e.g., FAC/DASC, NGF

spotter/combat information center, FO/FDC.

This generally requires coordination and

integration of the activities of two or more fire

support agencies, troop elements, and adjacent

units affected by the fires.

A target of opportunity (NATO) is a target

which appears during combat and which can be

reached by ground fire, naval fire, or aircraft fire,

and against which fire has not been scheduled.

(Joint Pub 1-02) Targets of opportunity which

involve a single supporting arm, under positive

control and cleared by a responsible agency, may

not require specific clearance by the FSCC.

Internal coordination exercised by supporting

arms control agencies is generally sufficient to

warrant immediate attack of targets of
4-6 FMFM 2-7

opportunity, but battalion-level FSCCs

monitoring supporting arms request nets can

exercise the supported commander’s prerogative

to cancel or modify fire requests as necessary.

These fires are not normally interrupted or

interfered with except when additional

coordination is necessary or when an emergency

exists. If coordination is necessary, the FSCC

delays the firing as necessary, while appropriate

coordination is accomplished. The overriding

principle relative to delaying fires is to anticipate

requirements and establish standing operating

procedures which keep delays to an absolute

minimum.

In artillery and naval gunfire support, a planned

target is a target on which fire is prearranged.

Preplanned air support is air support in

accordance with a program, planned in advance

of operations. (Joint Pub 1-02) Targets are

planned at all echelons. Targets may be planned

by higher echelons and disseminated to

subordinates along with taskings for the attack of

critical targets. Lower echelons plan targets

concurrently to meet their commander’s

requirements and submit these targets as

refinements to the targets planned by the higher

echelon. Preplanned air support, requests for

GS fires, and special requirements are referred to

the next higher echelon for further coordination

and approval.

The battalion FSCCs have responsibility for the

coordination of the majority of the fires in

support of tactical operations. Since the

majority of DS fires are delivered in the

battalion and regimental zones by the fire

support means available to those units, most of

the coordination is accomplished without

referring to higher echelons. Fires which

endanger friendly troops or interfere with

operations of adjacent or higher units must be

coordinated with the headquarters concerned

prior to execution.

During the early stages of the amphibious

assault, control and coordination will be

decentralized until higher echelon control

elements are ashore and functioning.

Communication plans should permit lower

echelons to enter higher echelon nets when

required during this period.

Fire Support Coordination

Agencies

The fire support coordination center is a single

location in which are centralized communications

facilities and personnel incident to the

coordination of all forms of fire support. (Joint

Pub 1-02) Facilities, equipment, and material

are provided by the headquarters to which the

FSCC belongs. Supporting arms units provide

representatives and equipment necessary for

conducting coordination, targeting, and

communications functions for their respective

arms.

The FSCC functions under the general staff

supervision of the G-3/S-3. Since the FSCC is

an advisory and coordinating agency only, it is

not vested with command functions. It is not

charged with actual control or direction of fire

support missions; however, these functions may

be performed when required.

FSCCs are established at each echelon-MAGTF

CE, division, regiment, and battalion.

Companies do not have FSCCs as such. The

company commander, assisted by his supporting

arms representatives, performs the fire support

planning and coordination necessary at the

company level.

The FSC is the officer in charge of the FSCC.

He is the direct representative of the commander

for planning and coordination of all available fire

support. The FSC is responsible for

implementing the fire support coordination

policies of the commander. The FSC’s

responsibility is only for the coordination of fire

support plans and recommendations. The air,

artillery, and NGFOs each have special staff

functions with individual access to the

commander and his staff; nevertheless, they

operate under the direction and guidance of the

FSC in accordance with proper staff functioning.
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 4-7

Intentionally Blank
4-8 FMFM 2-7

Fire Support Coordination

Measures

When used properly, fire support coordination

measures enable the commander to open up

areas of the battlefield for rapid engagement of

targets or to restrict and control fires. The use

of fire support coordination measures is

governed by the tactical situation and should not

be rigidly applied. With the exception of

boundaries, fire support coordination measures

fall into two broad categories-permissive and

restrictive. The following paragraphs present an

overview of fire support coordination measures.

For more detailed information about the usage of

fire support coordination measures, see

FMFM 6-18, Techniques and Procedures for Fire

Support Coordination.

Boundaries

In land warfare, a boundary is a line by which

areas of responsibility between adjacent

units/formations are defined. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Boundaries are used to designate the geographic

limits of the zone of action of a unit. Unless

otherwise restricted, a unit commander enjoys

complete freedom of fire and maneuver within

his own boundaries. No unit may fire across

boundaries unless such fires are coordinated with

the unit to whom the area is assigned, or unless

such fires are beyond the coordinated fire line

(CFL) or appropriate coordination measure of

the affected unit. The restriction applies to both

conventional and special ammunition and their

effects. The attack of targets with conventional

weapons requires that the commander, his FSCC,

and/or the supporting arms control agency

ensure that no more than negligible effects

extend beyond the unit boundaries, unless

approved by the commanders concerned.

In combined arms, boundaries aid the

commander and his subordinates in structuring

the battlefield to facilitate rapid, flexible, and

opportunistic maneuver (movement in

combination with fire). To achieve this, the

establishment and subsequent adjustment of

boundaries must receive deliberate and

continuous attention by the establishing

commander. If employed improperly, boundaries

can impose a rigidity on operations which

impede rather than facilitate rapid, flexible, and

opportunistic maneuver.

Permissive Measures

The purpose of permissive measures is to

facilitate the attack of targets. When established,

permissive measures permit the engagement of

targets beyond the line or into an area without

further coordination.

Coordinated Fire Line

The CFL is a line beyond which conventional

surface fire support means (mortars, artillery,

and NGF) may fire at any time within the zone

of the establishing headquarters without

additional coordination.

Fire Support Coordination Line

The FSCL is a line established by the

appropriate ground commander to ensure

coordination of fire not under his control but

which may affect current tactical operations. The

fire support coordination line is used to

coordinate fires of air, ground or sea weapons

systems using any type of ammunition against

surface targets. The fire support coordination

line should follow well defined terrain features.

The establishment of the fire support

coordination line must be coordinated with the

appropriate tactical air commander and other

supporting elements. Supporting elements may

attack targets forward of the fire support

coordination line, without prior coordination

with the ground force commander, provided the

attack will not produce adverse surface effects

on, or to the rear of, the line. Attacks against

surface targets behind this line must be

coordinated with the appropriate ground force

commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Free Fire Area

The free fire area (FFA) is a specific designated

area into which any weapon system may fire
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS 4-9

without additional coordination with the

establishing headquarters.

Restrictive Measures

The primary purpose of restrictive measures is to

provide safeguards for friendly forces. When

established, a restrictive measure imposes certain

requirements for specific coordination prior to

the engagement of those targets affected by the

measure.

Restrictive Fire Line

The restrictive fire line is a line established

between converging friendly forces (one or both

may be moving) that prohibits fires or effects

from the fires across the line without

coordination with the affected force.

Restrictive Fire Area

The restrictive fire area is an area in which

specific firing restrictions are imposed and into

which fires that exceed those restrictions will not

be delivered without coordination with the

establishing headquarters.

No-Fire Area

The no-fire area (NFA) is an area in which

neither fires nor the effects of fires are allowed.

Two exceptions includeo When the establishing headquarters approves

fires (temporarily) within the NFA on a

mission basis.

o When an enemy force within the NFA engages

a friendly force, the commander may engage

the enemy to defend his force.

Airspace Coordination Area

The ACA is a three-dimensional block of

airspace in which friendly aircraft are reasonably

safe from friendly surface fires. The ACA acts as

a safety measure for friendly aircraft while

allowing the other supporting arms to continue

fires in support of the maneuver force. ACAs

can be prearranged or instituted as separation

plans during the dynamics of the battle.

Fire Support Communications

Reliable communications are essential for

effective control and coordination of supporting

arms at all echelons within the MAGTF. Various

means of communications are used,

including radios, wire, digital and automated

systems, and messengers. Detailed descriptions

of the communication circuits and systems are

contained in FMFM 3-30, Communications. In

planning, the net composition required to meet

the needs of the operation is determined.

Other Coordination

Considerations

Coordination of nuclear, chemical, and

conventional fires which involve troop safety and

tactical considerations affecting adjacent or

higher units is accomplished by the commanders

concerned. The responsibilities of troop

commanders involved extend to coordinating the

effects of their organic and supporting weapons

by personal or representative liaison and through

their FSCCs. Some of the following

considerations are necessary in coordinating fire

support with other units:

o In the case of smoke and illumination fires

extending into adjacent unit areas, the

commander, his FSCC, and/or artillery FDC

coordinate with adjacent and higher units

prior to execution. The use of illumination

should be coordinated with the use of night

observation devices.

o The employment of chemical weapons is

carefully coordinated with higher and

adjacent units. Consideration is also given to

the weather and the characteristics of the area

of operations and their influence on the

chemical weapon employment. In an

amphibious operation, the CATF has

responsibility for the employment of nuclear

and chemical weapons.
4-10 FMFM 2-7

o Nuclear and chemical warnings are issued prior

to delivery of the weapon in order to provide

time to implement normal protective

measures.

o The observation requirements of the MAGTF

and its subordinate elements must be

coordinated.

o Rules of engagement must be fully understood

by all personnel and incorporated into the fire

support coordination process, as appropriate.
Appendix A

Glossary

Section 1. Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAW ...............................................antiair warfare

 ACA ............................. airspace coordination area

 ACE ........... .................. aviation combat element

 ANGLICO .......air/naval gunfire liaison company

 ATF ....................................amphibious task force

 Bn .............................................................battalion

 C2 ........................................command and control

 CAS .......................................... close air support

 CATF ............. commander, amphibious task force

 CE ........................................... command element

 CFL ..................................... coordinated fire line

 CIFS . .....................................close-in fire support

 CLF . .......................... commander, landing force

 COF . ........................................... conduct of fire

 CSS ................................. combat service support

 CSSF ................... combat service support element

 DASC.............................. direct air support center

 DS.................................................... direct support

 EW ........................................... electronic warfare

 FAC ................................... forward air controller

 FAC(A) ............. .forward air controller (airborne)

 FDC ...................................... fire direction center

 FMF ....................................... Fleet Marine Force

 FO .............................................. forward observer

 FPF ....................................... final protective fire

 FPL ...................................... final protective line

 FSA .......................................... fire support area

 FSC ................................ fire support coordinator

 FSCC ...................fire support coordination center

 GCE................................. .ground combat element

 GS ..................................................general support

 GS-R........................... general support-reinforcing

 GTL .............................................. gun-target line

 HPT .......................................... high payoff target

 HUMINT ................................ human intelligence

 IPB ........intelligence preparation of the battlefield

 JFC .................................... joint force commander

 LAI ..................................... light armored infantry

 LF ................................................... landing force

 LNO ................................................ liaison officer

 MACCS. Marine air command and control system

 MAGTF ............... Marine Air-Ground Task Force

 METT-T ...... mission, enemy, terrain and weather,

 troops and support available-time available

 MEU ............................ Marine expeditionary unit

 NAO ................................. naval aviation observer

 NFA ................................................... no-fire area

 NGF ................................................. naval gunfire

 NGFO ................................... naval gunfire officer

 NGFS ................................. naval gunfire support

 OPCON ................................. operational control

 PCFF ................................. priority in calls for fire

 PDF ............................... principal direction of fire

 PE/R ................................ probable error in range

 POME ................................... point of main effort
FMFM 2-7 A-2

 RABFAC ....... radar beacon forward air controller

 RAOC . ....................... rear area operations center

 RAS ........................................... rear area security

 RASC ..................... rear area security coordinator

 Rein ...................................................... reinforced

 SACC .......... supporting arms coordination center

 SAW ................................... surface-to-air weapon

 SEAD ............. suppression of enemy air defenses

 SIGINT ................................... signals intelligence

 TAC .................................. tactical air commander

 TACC ......... tactical air command center (USMC)

 TACC ....... tactical air control center (USAF/USS)

 TARBUL ......................................... target bulletin

 TVA ...................................... target value analysis

 UAV ............................... unmanned aerial vehicle

 USAF ............................... United States Air Force

 USMCR ....... United States Marine Corps Reserve
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS A-3

Section II. Definitions

A

administrative control—(DOD, NATO) Direction or

exercise of authority over subordinate or other

organizations in respect to administrative matters such as

personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air liaison officer—(DOD) An officer (aviator/pilot)

attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary

advisor to the ground commander on air operation

matters. (Joint Pub 1 02)

air/naval gunfire liaison company—A Fleet Marine

Force unit composed of Marine and naval personnel specifically qualified to provide ground control and liaison

agencies for the planning and employment of naval gunfire and USN/USMC air support for allied or U.S. Army

forces of division size or less operating alongside a

MAGTF in joint or combined operations; or in other

operations where forces other than a Fleet Marine Force

are provided U.S. Fleet naval gunfire and naval air support, or for such other supporting arms control and liaison functions as the Fleet Marine Force commander may

direct. The air/naval gunfire liaison company is comprised

of a command element, an operational element (air/NGF

teams), and a support element (e g., administrative, supply, maintenance).

airspace control area—(DOD, NATO) Airspace which

is laterally defined by the boundaries of the area of operations. The airspace control area may be subdivided into

airspace control sub-areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

artillery groupment—Temporary formations used when

one unit must exercise greater control over another than is

inherent in a reinforcing mission.

attach—(NATO) To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary.

Subject to limitations imposed in the attachment order,

the commander of the formation, unit, or organization

receiving the attachment will exercise the same degree of

command and control thereover as he does over the units

and persons organic to his command. However, the

responsibility for transfer and promotion of personnel will

normally be retained by the parent formation, unit, or

organization. (excerpt from Joint Pub 1-02)

B

barrage fire—(DOD, NATO) Fire which is designed to

fill a volume of space or area rather than aimed specifically at a given target. (Joint Pub 1-02)

boundary—(DOD, NATO) In land warfare, a line by

which areas of responsibility between adjacent

units/formations are defined. (Joint Pub 1-02)

C

close air support—(DOD, NATO) Air action against

hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly

forces and which require detailed integration of each air

mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

close-in fire support—Air action unique to attack helicopters against hostile targets which are normally in

closer proximity to friendly forces. CIFS requires detailed

integration with the fire and movement of friendly forces.

(FMFM 5-4A)

coordinated fire line—A line beyond which conventional

surface fire support means (mortars, field artillery, and

naval gunfire ships) may fire at any time within the zone

of the establishing headquarters without additional

coordination. (FMFRP 0-14)

counterfire—(DOD, NATO) Fire intended to destroy or

neutralize enemy weapons. (DOD) Includes counterbattery,

counterbombardment, and countermortar fire. (Joint Pub

1-02)

D

defilade—(DOD, NATO) 1. Protection from hostile

observation and fire provided by an obstacle such as a

hill, ridge, or bank. 2. A vertical distance by which a
FMFM 2-7 A-4

position is concealed from enemy observation. 3. To shield

from enemy fire or observation by using natural or artificial

obstacles. (Joint Pub 1-02)

destruction fire—(DOD) Fire delivered for the sole purpose of destroying material objects. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct air support center—(DOD) A subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system

designed for control and direction of close air support

and other tactical air support operations, and normally

collocated with fire-support coordination elements. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

direct fire—(DOD) Gunfire delivered on a target, using

the target itself as a point of aim for either the gun or

the director. (NATO) Fire directed at a target which is visible to the aimer. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct support—(DOD) A mission requiring a force to

support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force’s request for assistance

(Joint Pub 1-02)

dispersion—(DOD, NATO) A scattered pattern of hits

around the mean point of impact of bombs and projectiles dropped or fired under identical conditions. (excerpt

from Joint Pub 1-02)

F

final protective fire—(DOD, NATO) An immediately

available prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede

enemy movement across defensive lines or areas. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

fire plan—(DOD, NATO) A tactical plan for using the

weapons of a unit or formation so that their fire will be

coordinated. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support-Assistance to elements of the ground forces

engaged with the enemy rendered by other firing units,

including (but not limited to) artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, close air support, and close-in fire support.

fire support area—(DOD, NATO) An appropriate

maneuver area assigned to fire support ships from which

to deliver gunfire support of an amphibious operation.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support coordination—(DOD, NATO) The planning

and executing of fire so that targets are adequately covered

by a suitable weapon or group of weaponS. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

fire support coordination center—(DOD, NATO) A

single location in which are centralized communications

facilities and personnel incident to the coordination of

all forms of fire support (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support coordination line—(DOD, NATO) A line

established by the appropriate ground commander to

ensure coordination of fire not under his control but

which may affect current tactical operations. The fire support coordination line is used to coordinate fires of air,

ground, or sea weapons systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The fire support coordination line should follow well defined terrain features. The

establishment of the fire support coordination line must

be coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the fire support

coordination line, without prior coordination with the

ground force commander, provided the attack will not

produce adverse surface effects on, or to the rear of, the

line. Attacks against surface targets behind this line must

be coordinated with the appropriate ground force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support coordinator—The officer in charge of the

fire support coordination center. He is the direct

representative of the landing force commander for the

planning and coordination of all available fire support.

(FMFRP 0-14)

fire support group—(DOD, NATO) A temporary grouping of ships under a single commander charged with supporting troop operations ashore by naval gunfire. A fire

support group may be further subdivided into fire support units and fire support elements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support planning—The continuous and concurrent

process of analyzing, allocating, and scheduling of fire

support to integrate it with the maneuver forces to maximize combat power.

fire support station—(DOD) An exact location at sea

within a fire support area from which a fire support ship

delivers fire (Joint Pub 1-02)

forward air controller—(DOD) An officer (aviator/pilot)

member of the tactical air control party who, from a forward ground or airborne position, controls aircraft in

close air support of ground troops. (Joint Pub 1-02)
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS A-5

forward observer—(DOD) An observer operating with

front line troops and trained to adjust ground or naval

gunfire and pass back battlefield information. In the

absence of a forward air controller the observer may control close air support strikes (Joint Pub 1-02)

free-fire area—A specifically designated area into which

any weapons system may be fired without any additional

coordination. (FMFRP 0-14).

G

general support—(DOD, NATO) That support which is

given to the supported force as a whole and not to any

particular subdivision thereof. (Joint Pub 142)

general support reinforcing—(DOD) A tactical artillery

mission. General support-reinforcing artillery has the mission of supporting the force as a whole and of providing

reinforcing fires for another artillery unit.(Joint Pub 1-02)

group of targets—(DOD, NATO) Two or more targets

on which fire is desired simultaneously. A group of targets is designated by a letter/number combination or a

nickname. (Joint Pub 1 02)

H

harassing fire—(DOD, NATO) Fire designed to disturb

the rest of the enemy troops, to curtail movement and,

by threat of losses, to lower morale (Joint Pub 1-02)

hardened site—(DOD, NATO) A site constructed to provide protection against the effects of conventional and

nuclear explosions. It may also be equipped to provide

protection against a chemical or biological attack. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

I

illumination fire—(NATO) Fire designed to illuminate

an area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

immediate air support—(DOD, NATO) Air support to

meet specific requests which arise during the course of

a battle and which by their nature cannot be planned in

advance (Joint Pub 1-02)

indirect fire—(DOD) Fire delivered on a target that is not

itself used as a point of aim for the weapons or the director.

(NATO) Fire delivered at a target which cannot be seen by

the aimer. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlefield—A continuous, systematic approach to analyzing the enemy,

weather, and terrain in a specific geographical area. Threat

capabilities are evaluated and the enemy courses of action

with respect to specific battlefield conditions are predicted. (FM-6-20-10)

interdiction fire—(NATO) Fire placed on an area or

point to prevent the enemy from using the area or point.

(Joint Pub 1 02)

L

landing force—(DOD, NATO) A task organization of

troop units, aviation and ground, assigned to an amphibious assault It is the highest troop echelon in the amphibious operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

M

Marine air command and control system—(DOD) A

US Marine Corps tactical air command and control system which provides the tactical air commander with the

means to command, coordinate, and control all air operations within an assigned sector and to coordinate air

operations with other Services. It is composed of command and control agencies with communicationselectronics equipment that incorporates a capability from

manual through semiautomatic control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

marking fire—(DOD, NATO) Fire placed on a target for

the purpose of identification. (Joint Pub 1-02)

massed fire—(DOD) 1. The fire of the batteries of two

or more ships directed against a single target. 2. Fire from

a number of weapons directed at a single point or small

area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

N

naval aviation observer—A specifically trained, qualified, and duly designated officer who, from an aircraft,

performs utility and liaison, observation, and directs supporting fires to include artillery, naval gunfire, close air

support. and close-in fire support. (FMFRP 0-14)

neutralization fire—(DOD) Fire which is delivered to

render the target ineffective or unusable. (Joint Pub 1-02)

no fire area—A designated area into which neither fires

nor effects of fires will occur. Two exceptions

occur: (a) the establishing headquarters asks for or
FMFM 2-7 A-6

approves fire or (b) an enemy force takes refuge in the

area, posing a major threat, and there is insufficient time

to clear the fires needed to defend the friendly force.

(FMFRP 0-14)

nonstandard tactical mission—A mission that amplifies, changes, or limits one or more of the inherent

responsibilities of a standard tactical mission.

O

on-call target—(DOD, NATO) In artillery and naval

gunfire support, a planned target other than a scheduled

target on which fire is delivered when requested. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

on-order missions—Missions that serve as warning

orders to alert units of anticipated changes to their tactical mission. (FM 6-50)

operational control—(NATO) The authority delegated

to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which

are usually limited by function, time, or location; to

deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical

control of those units. (excerpt from Joint Pub 1-02)

organic—(DOD) Assigned to and forming an essential part

of a military organization. (excerpt from Joint Pub 1-02)

over-the-horizon—An operational concept for positioning amphibious forces further offshore in the execution

of the ship-to-shore phase of an amphibious operation

which is intended to enhance the survival of the amphibious task force. The employment can increase the likelihood of achieving tactical surprise at the point of power

projection ashore. (FMFRP 0-14)

P

planned target—(DOD, NATO) In artillery and naval

gunfire support, a target on which fire is prearranged.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

prearranged fire—(DOD, NATO) Fire that is formally

planned and executed against targets or target areas of

known location. Such fire is usually planned well in

advance and is executed at a predetermined time or during a predetermined period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

preparation fire—(DOD, NATO) Fire delivered on a target preparatory to an assault. (Joint Pub 1-02)

priority of fire—Guidance to a fire support planner to

organize and employ fire support means in accordance

with the relative importance of the maneuver unit’s

missions. (FMFRP 0-14)

priority target—Target on which delivery of fire takes

precedence over all the fires for the designated firing element or unit.

procedural control—(DOD, NATO) A method of airspace

control which relies on a combination of previously agreed

and promulgated orders and procedures. (Joint Pub 1-02)

R

reconnaissance by fire—(DOD, NATO) A method of

reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy

position to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by

movement or return of fire. (Joint Pub 142)

reinforcing—(DOD, NATO) In artillery usage, tactical

mission in which one artillery unit augments the fire of

another artillery unit. (Joint Pub 1-02)

restrictive fire area—An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires that would exceed

those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters. The purpose

of the restrictive fire area is to regulate fires into an area

according to the stated restrictions. (FMFRP 0-14)

restrictive fire line—A line established between converging friendly forces that prohibits fires, or effects from fires,

across the line without coordination with the affected force.

The purpose of the restrictive fire line is to prevent interference between converging friendly forces. (FMFRP 0-14)

rules of engagement—(DOD) Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will

initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other

forces encountered. (Joint Pub 1-02)

S

scheduled fire—(DOD, NATO) A type of prearranged

fire executed at a predetermined time. (Joint Pub 1-02)
FIRE SUPPORT IN MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS A-7

screening fire—Fire delivered to mask friendly maneuver

elements and to conceal the nature of their operations

supporting arms coordination center—(DOD) A single location on board an amphibious command ship in

which all communication facilities incident to the coordination of fire support of the artillery, air, and naval

gunfire are centralized. This is the naval counterpart to

the fire support coordination center utilized by the landing force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

suppression of enemy air defenses—(DOD, NATO)

That activity which neutralizes, destroys or temporarily

degrades enemy air defenses in a specific area by physical attack and/or electronic warfare. (Joint Pub 1-02)

suppressive fire — (DOD) Fires on or about a weapons

system to degrade its performance below the level needed

to fulfill its mission objectives, during the candid of the

fire mission (Joint Pub 1-02)

T

tactical air commander (ashore)—(DOD) The officer

(aviator) responsible to the landing force commander for

control and coordination of air operations within the

landing force commander’s area of responsibility when

control of these operations is passed ashore. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

tactical air control center—(DOD, NATO) The principal air operations installation (land or ship based) from

which all aircraft and air warning functions of tactical

air operations are controlled. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical air direction center—(DOD) An air operations

installation under the overall control of the tactical air

control center (afloat)/tactical air command center, from

which aircraft and air warning service functions of tactical air operations in an area of responsibility are

directed (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical fire direction—The control of one or more units

in the selection of targets to attack, designation of the unit

or units to fire, selection of the method of attack, and selection of the most suitable ammunition for the mission

tactical mission—Defines the fire support responsibility of an artillery, naval gunfire, or mortar unit to a supported unit.

target bulletin—An information message, used by the

commander responsible for maintaining the target list,

to keep interested commanders informed of all changes

in the target list. (NWP 22-2)

target of opportunity—(NATO) A target which appears

during combat and which can be reached by ground fire,

naval fire, or aircraft fire, and against which fire has not

been scheduled. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target value analysis—A method for providing a systematic determination of which targets out of the entire

target array should be attacked for the greatest tactical

benefit. (FMFM 6-18)
Appendix B

References

Joint Publications

Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Joint Pub 2-0 Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations

Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations

Joint Pub 3-01.4 J TTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

Joint Pub 3-03 Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations

Joint Pub 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

Joint Pub 3-09 Doctrine for Joint Fire Support

Joint Pub 3-09.1 Joint LASER Designation Procedures

Joint Pub 3-10 Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations

Joint Pub 3-11 Doctrine for Joint Chemical Operations

Joint Pub 3-12 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations

Joint Pub 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone

Joint Pub 3-55 Doctrine for Joint Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)

Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures

Fleet Marine Force Manuals

FMFM 2-7.1 Fire Support Coordination by the MAGTF Command Element (under

 development)

FMFM 3-1 Command and Staff Action

FMFM 3-21 MAGTF Intelligence Operations

FMFM 3-30 Communications

FMFM 5 Marine Aviation

FMFM 5-1 Organization and Functions of Marine Aviation (under development)

FMFM 5-40 Offensive Air Support (under development)

FMFM 5-41 Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support (under development)

FMFM 5-45 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

FMFM 5-60 Control of Aircraft and Missiles (under development)

FMFM 6-18 Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination

FMFM 7-4 Field Artillery Support (to be revised as FMFM 6-9, Marine Artillery Support)

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publications

FMFRP 5-43 Multi-Service Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

FMFRP 5-44 Multi-Service Air Attack Team Operations

FMFRP 5-85 Aviation Equipment and Systems
B-2 FMFM 2-7

Naval Warfare Publication

NWP 22-2 B/FMFM 1-7 Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations

Allied Tactical Publication

ATP 37 Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations

U.S. Army Field Manuals

FM 6-20 Fire Support in the AirLand Battle

FM 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process

FM 6-20-30 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Corps and Division

 Operations

FM 6-20-40 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations

 (Heavy)

FM 6-20-50 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations

 (Light)