U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series 

Major Ship Fire 

Extinguished by CO2

Seattle, Washington

USFA-TR-058/September 1991

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Security

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

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the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

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This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, 

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For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, National Fire Data Center, 

16825 South Seton Avenue, Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727.

Major Ship Fire Extinguished by CO2

Seattle, Washington

Investigated by: Philip Schaenman

This is Report 058 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted 

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-90-C-3338 to the United 

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

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Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

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and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

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commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Major Ship Fire Extinguished by CO2 – Seattle, Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Ship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Hazardous Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Fire Origin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Seattle’s Maritime Firefighting Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Initial Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

CO2 Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Aft Firefighting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Other Aspects Of Firefighting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Firefighter Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Involvement Of Local, State, And Federal Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Losses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Lessons Learned. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Appendix A: Area Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Appendix B: Ship Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Appendix C: Fire Investigator’s Scene Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Appendix D: Seattle Fire Department’s Marine Firefighting Operations SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Appendix E: Marine Unit Training Courses and Equipment List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

COURSES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Introduction To Marine Fire Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Legal Considerations Of Marine Fires. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Marine Drawings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Foam Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Vessel Construction And Arrangement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Emergency Mooring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Vessel Stability In Firefighting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Introduction To Damage Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Marine Fire Protection Courses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Marine Fire Tactics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Command Post Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Port Emergency Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Instrument Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Tactical Workshop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Bulk CO2 Application. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Bulk CO2 Drill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

MARINE RESPONSE EQUIPMENT LIST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

CO2 Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Measuring And Monitoring Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Communications Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Dewatering Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Tools. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Ventilation Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Breathing Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Advisors Kit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Miscellaneous Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Appendix F: Draft Regulations for Welding and Cutting on Marine Vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Appendix G: Ship Fire Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Appendix H: Photographs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1

Major Ship Fire

Extinguished by CO2

Seattle, Washington

Investigated by: Philip Schaenman

Local Contacts: Chief Claude Harris

Assistant Chief Steve Bailey

Fire Marshal B. L. Hansen

Seattle Fire Department

301 Second Avenue South

Seattle, Washington 98104

(206) 386-1400

OVERVIEW

On September 16, 1991 the Seattle Fire Department successfully extinguished a major fire aboard 

a fish processing ship, the 324-foot Omnisea, which was docked and undergoing refitting at Pier 91. 

(See Area Map in Appendix A.) The fire started from a cutting and welding operation. It burned 

undetected in the absence of a firewatch while the crew took a coffee break.

Rather than fight the fire as a structure fire using water, the Seattle Fire Department’s Marine Unit 

made the strategic decision to use carbon dioxide as the prime extinguishing agent. Handlines and 

monitors were used to cool hazardous materials stored on the deck, to cool the ship deck and hulls 

and to keep the fire from spreading to the pier. An interior defense was made of the aft third of the 

ship while the CO2 was being set up. (See Appendix B for diagram of the Omnisea.)

Even though the Department had plans in place for CO2 supply, the delivery of CO2 was delayed and 

did not arrive for over four hours after the initial response. But the real delay in proceeding was 

caused by the time it took to button up the ship. The carbon dioxide was injected after five hours of 

effort to seal hatches and portholes to make the ship tight enough to hold the CO2. It was pumped 

into five holes cut in the side of the hull. This successfully extinguished the fire. Ten truckloads of 

CO2 were used because of the difficulty in making the ship airtight (less than two truckloads were 

needed in theory). Seattle had plans for using CO2 in ship fires and had exercised with CO2 but had 

never used it on a ship fire before.
2

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Fire Origin Cutting and welding in hold. Firewatch not used.

Reporting Delayed by lack of firewatch and crew’s attempt to extinguish fire.

Spread Extensive use of polyurethane foam insulation.

Extinguishment CO2 used successfully after a 5-hour effort to seal the ship enough to hold the gas.

Permits Ship had appropriate permit. Seattle Fire believes that more stringent rules are needed; 

repairs above a minor extent should be done in a shipyard.

CO2 Availability Despite prior training and arrangements, CO2 was slow in arriving at the scene.

Multi-agency Coordination Done extremely well; used a bus as focal point for meetings throughout the fire. NOAA, 

EPA, Coast Guard and State Ecology participated along with several city departments.

Evacuation Plans Cameo computer model used to predict movement of possible ammonia plume as input to 

an ad hoc evacuation plan. NOAA set up portable weather station.

Hazardous Materials Large quantity of ammonia in tanks and refrigeration piping posed an air Hazmat threat; 

ship fuel oil posed a water pollution threat. Acetylene and aviation gasoline also present in 

drums.

Department Staffing Levels The incident used 75 percent of the fire department’s on-duty suppression force; mutual aid 

used extensively to fill-in.

The ship had about 12,000 pounds of ammonia in five tanks that fed the refrigeration system used to 

store fish and fish products. The largest of the tanks, with 6,000 pounds of ammonia, was known to 

be directly in the flames in the area of origin in the hold. It was continually in danger of exploding, 

which could have endangered an affluent community a quarter of a mile away on the bluff overlooking the pier where the ship burned. In addition, the ship had just been filled with fuel oil and 

could have rolled over from taking on too much firefighting water. Further, the ship had a number 

of cylinders of acetylene on the deck and below decks, and over 10 drums of aviation gasoline and 

lubricants on deck. The ship had no automatic extinguishing system in the holds.

During the fire, the city prepared to cope with an ammonia cloud release and coordinated a variety 

of Federal, State and local agencies in an exemplary disaster preparation effort. Fortunately it wasn’t 

needed.

The fire department extinguished the fire with the CO2 and saved the entire superstructure and 

engine compartment in the aft third of the ship. Damage was assessed at $7-10 million. There were 

no serious injuries.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 3

THE SHIP

The Omnisea is a 324-foot seafood processing ship that acts as the mother ship to a fleet of 30 Alaskan 

fishing boats and was valued at about $8 million. It was built in 1945 to haul military cargo. The 

ship is 50 feet wide and has a tonnage of 4,948 tons gross. It normally operated in the Alaskan 

waters but had returned early, on August 1, and had to be berthed at Pier 91, one of the largest piers 

in the United States, jutting out from Seattle into Elliot Bay. Overlooking this pier is an affluent residential community, Magnolia Bluff.

The ship had had an additional deck installed over its original top deck. At the time of the fire it was 

undergoing extensive refitting, which involved cutting and welding below decks. The ship had some 

hatches removed, leaving large vertical openings into the hold in addition to its usual openings for 

dropping in fish and where stairs went down. Below decks most of the holds were inter-connected 

horizontally with doors open or non-existent.

The ship’s owner had obtained the appropriate permits for the cutting and welding operations. 

About 35 workers were on-board at the time of the fire. The ship was scheduled to leave on October 

23 (about a month after the fire occurred).

Several parts of the ship had built-in fire suppression systems using C02: the engine room, the electrical room and the paint lockers. But the holds did not have any automatic systems.

The original ship had been insulated with 6”-8” spray-on polyurethane on virtually all walls and 

ceilings, and that provided the very high fuel load in this fire. The insulation had been sprayed with 

a fire retardant, but it was said to have worn off. Also, the insulation surfaces were breached. In 

addition, there were many plywood partitions, pallets and cabinets below decks. The new deck of 

the ship had rock wool insulation, which did not burn readily.

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

The ship had numerous types of hazardous materials on board at the time of the fire:

Ammonia--One tank on deck and four tanks below decks, totaling about 12,000 pounds.

Aviation Gasoline--Several 55-gallon drums in a rack on the deck, for fueling helicopters.

Petroleum Products--Several drums in a rack on deck (a total of 20 drums of various types).

Fuel Oil--215,000 gallons of bunker fuel had been freshly loaded.

Acetylene tanks--Several above and below decks, for the cutting and welding operations in progress.

THE FIRE ORIGIN

About 9:30 a.m. on September 16, 1991 a work crew in the Number 3 tween (or middle) deck hold 

took a coffee break from cutting pipe with an acetylene torch and doing some welding. This was two 

decks below the main deck in an area used for flash freeze packaging. They did not have a firewatch 

standing by as required by Seattle Fire Code. It requires maintaining a firewatch during cutting and 

welding, and for at least half an hour after cutting and welding terminates. This requirement was 

further specified on the fire permit. (Failure to comply is a criminal violation.) The workers involved 

were reported to have said their operation was too small to use a firewatch.
4

About 7-10 minutes after the coffee break started, the first mate who was just returning to the ship 

noticed smoke coming up from the Number 3 hold in the center of the ship and advised everyone in 

the galley that there was a fire below decks. Crew members went to investigate and saw a fire rolling 

up from the vicinity of large plastic disposal bags near the wall. Apparently embers or sparks or the 

heat from the cutting/welding operation had ignited either the bags or insulation or something else 

in the vicinity. One person (the Vice President of the company that owned the ship) went up several 

decks to call the Fire Department. A few others attempted to fight the fire with carbon dioxide and 

water lines, but could not extinguish the fire, which was starting to roll up the walls and produce 

large quantities of smoke. The crew was equipped with oxygen masks for shipboard firefighting, but 

quickly had to retreat as the fire raged out of control. The crew was ordered off the ship by management, and the crew made sure everyone not yet aware of the fire had left the ship.

SEATTLE’S MARITIME FIREFIGHTING BACKGROUND

The Seattle Fire Marshal (at the time of the fire), Bobby Lee Hansen, was a Nationally known expert 

on marine firefighting, and headed a Seattle effort in the mid-1970s to train a contingent of 50 

Seattle firefighters for use as a Regional marine response team. Each firefighter received 250 hours 

of training. Equipment was cached in three locations in the State. This project was funded by the 

United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) and included pre-fire planning for about 60 ships 

that frequently visited Seattle. Pre-fire plan booklets were kept on each ship and at each U.S. fire 

department where the ship frequently called. The MARAD project was followed by a joint U.S. Fire 

Administration/MARAD project to decide on a National approach to maritime fires in or near ports. 

Stanford Research Institute evaluated various approaches and concluded that a modified Seattle 

approach was the preferred choice.

Thus Seattle had made a major, nationally-recognized preparation effort for marine fires and had 

kept up their preparations over the years. They also had experience in fighting a similar ship fire 

with more conventional techniques a few years earlier and had come away from that feeling that a 

structure fire approach was not entirely satisfactory for ship fires.

The Seattle Fire Department had trained to use CO2 for ship fires and had actually discharged CO2

into a vessel in training. Their preparations and experience served them well in this fire.

THE INITIAL RESPONSE

The first call on the fire was received at 0939. Because the fire was not immediately discovered and 

the call to the fire department was further delayed by the initial firefighting by the crew, the fire was 

already of significant size below decks.

The Seattle Fire Department dispatched its full complement for a ship fire, which included “Unit 

99,” its marine unit. The marine unit includes an engine company (E-36) with a complement of 

one officer and four crew specially cross-trained for ship fires. They also have the Marine Firefighting 

Van, E-4, a fireboat, Battalion 7 and Battalion 1 (Deputy Chief of Operations). They had rehearsed 

extinguishment of large ship fires using carbon dioxide but had never done so in practice. The 

marine unit is dispatched for fires on ships over 50 feet long, pier fires, or when requested.

The initial response included the normal response of four engines and two ladders for the intersection nearest the ship plus the marine unit. (See the timeline in Appendix G for the specific units 

included.)
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 5

As the first units approached the ship they saw a huge column of smoke rising from midships and 

immediately called for a second alarm. It eventually went to five alarms.

The first units arrived at 0944. They immediately laid lines and began pumping water into the 

hold but could not get at the fire directly. The ship’s first mate informed the firefighters of a small 

ammonia tank on the deck and various drums of aviation gasoline, other petroleum products, and 

acetylene bottles, but the full extent of the hazardous materials was not known until an hour later. 

Monitors were set up to cool the drums and the on-deck tanks. The water attack from the deck 

continued for about 30 minutes.

The marine unit arrived about 8-10 minutes after the first call to the fire department. Arriving with 

them was the Battalion 1 Deputy Chief and Acting Assistant Chief Dave Campbell who assumed the 

role of Incident Commander throughout the fire. They considered three main strategies: pushing 

the ship into the middle of the bay and letting it burn itself out; putting firefighters aboard for a 

structure-like attack (the approach used in the previous ship fire); or the CO2 approach. The fire 

situation matched the requirements for a carbon dioxide attack, and the decision was made to start 

preparation for it at once. The key decision elements were that the fire was large but confined and 

was inaccessible to direct streams of water. (The Seattle Marine Firefighting Operations orders, 

shown in Appendix D, specify that CO2 is to be used when there is poor access, undue risk to firefighters, water damage is intolerable, and/or on-board CO2 has been exhausted.) The CO2 would 

both smother and cool the fire.

One of the first responding ladder companies (L-4) happened to be videotaping a training session 

and the photographer went along; this led to a visual record of the early conditions faced and the 

initial stages of the firefighting.

The fireboat Chief Seattle arrived and nosed against the ship from the starboard side. It sprayed water 

on the hull and deck virtually throughout the fire.

Higher Alarms--A second alarm was called at 0945 soon after the first unit arrived.

Between 30 and 60 minutes into the fire, the ship started to list from the water being poured on 

board from above. The ship was empty of cargo and riding high in the water. Adding water to the 

top decks meant that it didn’t take much water to cause the ship to list.

Approximately one hour into the fire, the first mate of the ship informed the marine unit that there 

was an ammonia tank in the hold in the vicinity of the fire with about 6,000 lbs. and one in another 

hold, in addition to a small one on deck. There actually were a total of four ammonia tanks below 

decks. They were part of the system used to refrigerate fish and fish products. The mate said there 

were approximately 8,000 - 10,000 pounds of ammonia on board.

The threat of an ammonia explosion plus the growing list of the ship triggered a decision by the 

Incident Commander to pull all fire crews off the ship and briefly stop the water flow. The crews on 

the pier then set up unmanned monitors which were used along with the Seattle fireboat Chief Seattle

to pour water on the Hazmat tanks on the deck to cool them. The fireboat was also used as a platform 

from which to get onto the ship from the water side.

As the fire progressed, it spread horizontally, both forward and aft, and vertically, both upward and 

downward.
6

There were considerable flame and smoke showing from the hatches on deck, plus sufficient radiant 

heat from the sides of the ship to ignite the wooden pilings and side planks of the pier.

About 150 firefighters were used at the peak of the fire, about 75 percent of the 197 on-duty suppression staff. The off-duty shift was called back. Mutual aid was used extensively to fill in for 

deployed units in various places.

CO2 OPERATIONS

Seattle had an agreement with a local CO2 manufacturing firm (Liquid Carbonics) to provide CO2

by truck to a ship fire at any time around the clock. They had practiced with the company’s delivery truck and had arrangements to quickly obtain a truckload and to order additional truckloads if 

needed. Liquid Carbonics has a processing plant in Seattle that repackages bulk quantities into small 

containers. The bulk plant is 109 miles away, near Bellingham.

As Murphy’s Law would have it, the only available CO2 truck driver was not to be found for at least 

an hour, and the company could not provide CO2 immediately. Further, local stores of CO2 were low 

and it was estimated that it would take hours to obtain additional CO2.

Over a six-hour period the Seattle Fire Department proceeded to prepare the ship for the CO2 after 

careful study of the ship’s plans which were obtained from the bridge. There were two major preparation tasks: sealing the many large openings from which the CO2 could leak, and cutting holes to 

insert the CO2. As it turned out, the actions needed to prepare to use the CO2 took longer than the 

delivery of the CO2.

The first CO2 arrived by a tanker truck at about 1400 hours, an hour after it was expected. However, 

pumping of the CO2 into the ship did not start until about 1600 hours.

Some steel hatch covers on the ship were missing because the ship was undergoing repairs, and some 

aluminum hatches had burned through. Some portholes had been broken by the initial firefighting 

and others were blown out by the fire. All of these openings plus many others had to be sealed.

Fortunately, the pier had a number of steel plates handy and a large mobile crane on treads that 

could be used to position the plates over the holes. It was also fortunate that it was daylight and the 

weather was good.

The steel plates had to be cut roughly to fit over the holes; this was done by a combination of city 

Water Department workers and skilled workers found on the pier. The plates were just laid over the 

large openings, not welded. Firefighters had to reboard the vessel, protected by hosestreams from 

others, to guide the plates into position. This was highly hazardous; the deck was hot enough to 

melt the treads of their boots, and a firefighter who knelt down had his knee pad melted. Also there 

was the danger of an ammonia explosion, though a strong smell of ammonia in the air suggested 

that it was venting at least to some extent.

Small steel plates also were cut and welded in place over broken portholes. Other portholes and 

small vents were covered or stuffed with tarpaulins and other handy materials.

The portholes on the water side were sealed by workers from a rented tugboat. The portholes on the 

pier side were sealed using ladders from the pier.

Late in the sealing operation just prior to starting the discharge of CO2, it was discovered that a large, 

about 6-foot by 8-foot, vertical hole had not been sealed. It had been missed in a survey of openings 
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 7

made early in the incident. To put a steel plate over it required cutting away sections of two catwalks, 

each about 10 feet long, that blocked the crane from lowering the plate in place. Firefighters barely 

able to stand the heat and protected by streams from others, succeeded in cutting away the catwalks, 

but only a poor rough fit of the plate was possible.

While the sealing operation was underway, small round holes were cut into the hull of the ship in six 

places using cutting torches. One of the lower holes was cut into the ship by two men on a narrow 

skiff that had to be moved into place in the slot between the ship and the pier--a dangerous operation. Fittings to receive the CO2 tubing were welded in place in the holes. The holes were made on 

the pier side only. Three of the holes were placed at about 40-foot intervals on the level of the tween 

decks of holds #2 and #3, as spotted by the first mate; the other two holes were placed below them 

on a lower level, though not as low as the first mate desired. (The sixth hole was not used.) The 

multiple holes were intended to allow insertion of CO2 into at least two tween decks holds where 

the fire started and into two lower holds. Although CO2 is a gas and would spread out, there was 

concern that use of only one hole might inadvertently pump it into a closet or area from which it 

would not distribute. There also was a need to experiment to see where the best results could be 

obtained (in the hold of fire origin, the next hold, or holds not yet reached). In fact all were tried; 

the CO2 was pumped intermittently into three upper and two lower holds. If the ship had been 

loaded it would have ridden lower in the water, and it would not have been possible to inject CO2

into the lower holds.

A test discharge was made at the start of the CO2 pumping operation to determine what effect the 

CO2 would have on the products of combustion inside the vessel. They did not want the CO2 to force 

smoke and heat into areas where firefighters were protecting exposures.

On either side of three of the CO2 holes, another pair of small holes were cut to insert thermocouples. 

These were used to determine whether the CO2 was making a difference by reading their trends over 

time, and observing them at times when the CO2 was shut off to see whether the temperature stayed 

down or whether it rose. In one instance the temperature registered 100 degrees Fahrenheit but 

climbed to 800 degrees Fahrenheit when the CO2 was stopped; it was then resumed. The thermocouples were inserted about one and a half to two feet into the ship. Of course they partly measured 

the temperatures of the CO2 being pumped in near them and not the temperature further into the 

hold. But their readings were still highly useful.

At the outset, a rough estimate was made as to how much CO2 would be needed to create a 60 percent CO2 atmosphere. The estimate was 24 tons, based on a rule of thumb that one pound of CO2

produced nine cubic feet of vapor. The volume of the Omnisea to be flooded was 433,000 cubic feet. 

Additional calculations estimated that 37 tons were needed to achieve a 80 percent CO2 atmosphere 

(or allow for some leakage). Less than two truckloads were estimated to suffice. In fact, 10 trucks 

with 165 tons (330,000 pounds) of CO2 were used. Most of the CO2 escaped through a variety of 

leaks, even though CO2 is heavier than air and might (erroneously) be thought to settle down.

It was positively determined that the CO2 extinguished the fire and that the fire did not burn itself 

out. There was much more fuel available to burn in the holds than burned.

A concern during the fire was whether the CO2 might accidentally be injected directly on the ammonia tank in the tween deck Number 3 hold and whether that would cause the tank to crack or lose 

strength and fail catastrophically. It turned out that they missed it by about five feet. The tank survived with its structure intact and was not deformed. The pressure relief valve apparently proved 
8

adequate for this size tank, though there also may have been ammonia leakage from piping damage 

during the fire; there was considerable fire damage to the piping, gaskets and valve.

AFT FIREFIGHTING

While the CO2 attack was being made, the Incident Commander decided to attempt to save the aft 

third of the ship, which included the 4-story superstructure above and the engine compartment 

below; this was the most valuable part of the ship.

Two 3-person land companies were put on each of the four levels of the superstructure, one down 

each of the two corridors leading forward. They were to try to hold the fire at a vertical bulkhead 

running top to bottom through the ship at that point, penetrated by sealable hatches leading to the 

forward two-thirds of the ship. The crews were able to do this successfully, though one company 

advanced further than ordered, more than halfway down the ship through a corridor over the burning hold, and then up to the deck. The interior crews had to wet each other down to keep cool.

OTHER ASPECTS OF FIREFIGHTING

The fire started in the Number 3 lower hold and spread to three lower level and three higher level 

holds. After the fire was thought to be extinguished, firefighters used infrared detectors to find any 

remaining smoldering embers. The fire crews also had to blow away toxic and explosive gases from 

each compartment.

One and three-quarter inch hoselines were used by the land companies to cool the areas where other 

firefighters were sealing fire doors, covering openings, and securing hazardous materials on deck. 

The water turned to steam; the deck was too hot to kneel on.

The Incident Command System was used successfully. Major sectors were: operations; planning (the 

attack); financial; logistics. The acting Assistant Chief for Operations was the Incident Commander.

During the fire the commandeered crane used to lift steel plates on board was also used to lift the 

ammonia tank off the deck and to take off the acetylene bottles.

FIREFIGHTER SAFETY

Shipboard firefighting poses one of the most dangerous environments imaginable, especially when 

one is unfamiliar with the ship and there are all sorts of work equipment, unfinished repairs and 

hazardous materials present. It has been likened to working a fire in a steel basement three or four 

levels below ground. Seattle went to great lengths to monitor the safety of their firefighters, but there 

was still great hazard in the face of high temperatures and hazardous materials. The deck was so hot 

that hoses caught fire if kept in one place too long.

The Seattle Fire Department firefighter accountability/passport system was used to keep track of all 

personnel working on the fireground. A department safety officer was on the scene throughout the 

incident.

The State Department of Labor and Industry sent occupational safety specialists to the scene to monitor the safety of the workers at the fire. They required that workers on ladders be given harnesses or 

use a cherry picker, and that welders taken on board wear bunker gear.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 9

Engine 22 is assigned to operate the department’s communications van. It went to this fire as it does 

to all major fires, monitored radio communications for calls for help or missed messages, and acted 

as a communications bridge if the intended recipients did not hear messages sent to them. On board 

the ship, crews protected each other with fog streams. Rescue crews were positioned in the aft section to assist the defensive crews on each level if that became necessary.

The engine companies and command post on the pier were relocated once the below deck ammonia 

threat was known.

Firefighting crews were rotated through a rehabilitation staging area; metro buses were used to 

provide seats and heaters.

Only about three companies were allowed on deck at one time. Firefighters were not allowed to go 

into the holds because of fear of getting trapped, especially if the ship started to capsize.

There were only minor injuries to firefighters. None were hospitalized. This was partly good fortune to those going in harm’s way, but also a tribute to the safety practices and safety concerns from 

the rank- and-file firefighters up through the officer ranks, who take safety very seriously in light of 

past experiences in Seattle.

INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL AGENCIES

Early in the fire the department called for assistance from a number of local, state, and Federal 

agencies. Some contacted others in turn. The City’s Department of Emergency Management was 

responsible for contacting them. It took about an hour for all to arrive. The agencies involved and 

their roles were as follows:

Early in the fire the Coast Guard was asked to monitor the tilt of the ship and to advise well in advance 

of any peril of tipover. Because the ship was unloaded, there was continual concern that it might 

roll over and that it might do so rapidly. The maximum list that occurred was five degrees, reached 

at about 30 minutes into the firefighting. It was thought that the ship could safely go to 15 degrees 

(26-30 degrees was considered the point it could capsize). The fire department checked the ship’s 

inclinometer while the Coast Guard monitored inclination from the dock and the sea. If necessary, 

the ship’s power could have been used for emergency off-loading of the water, but it was preferred 

not to power the ship.

Once the fire department was told about the ammonia tanks below decks, they called the State’s 

Department of Ecology to set up a plume model using the CAMEO Hazmat computer model, which 

Seattle had helped develop. The concern was where the ammonia cloud would go if the tank 

exploded. The model showed that if low winds blew inshore, the plume would drift intact over the 

nearby Magnolia Bluff section of Seattle. The fire department would have about a half hour before 

the cloud reached the residential area.

Interestingly, because the ship fire was a quarter mile away from the nearest residential area, a strong 

wind would have broken up and diluted the plume, and a still atmosphere would have allowed it to 

disperse slowly. But a gentle wind back toward shore could have kept the plume intact enough to be 

a hazard to the nearby residential community, causing people to pass out. Preparations were made 

to evacuate any area of the city threatened by the plume.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The Department of Ecology, besides operating the CAMEO model, sent a spill response team to 

monitor any spill of the 215,000 gallons of bunker fuel should the ship capsize. This department 

was also asked to monitor particulate matter coming from the ship but was not equipped to do so. 

Consequently, they called in the (Federal) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which had a Regional 

office in Seattle. EPA set up a particulate monitoring system as requested.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was called in to set up a portable weather 

station near the ship to monitor the wind and feed that important information to the CAMEO model. 

They were able to show that the winds would not blow the cloud toward the City for most of the 

duration of the incident.

The Port of Seattle Police and Seattle City Police were used to evacuate about 600 workers from Pier 91 

and the adjacent Piers 89-90. Three ships were asked to get underway and leave the piers to protect 

themselves should the Omnisea explode or the pier catch fire.

The Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) was asked by the fire department to declare the airspace around the 

fire a prohibited flying zone to keep news helicopters away.

And as previously noted, the city’s Water Department helped drill holes in the side of the ship for 

the CO2.

Evacuation Plans--Once the ammonia tanks were discovered, plans were prepared to evacuate thousands 

from the Magnolia Bluff residential area. The police had the prime responsibility for developing and 

executing the plans, though other agencies participated. The details of the evacuation plan varied 

depending on which way the ammonia cloud might drift. City buses were brought to the Magnolia 

Bluff area, and five companies of firefighters were stationed in the area to assist the evacuation and be 

ready to extinguish fires if an explosion started spot fires. Seattle’s Police and Office of Emergency Services 

staff also prepared to make announcements in the neighborhood and go door-to-door. Police were 

positioned around the perimeter of the area.

One extraordinary preparation by the City’s Office of Emergency Services and the Fire Department’s 

Public Information Officer (PIO) was to record a tape to be broadcast by the Emergency Broadcast 

System on radio and TV to alert the areas threatened. They were concerned that because of its rare 

use the citizens might overreact to the EBS or not heed it at all. The Office of Emergency Services 

feels that the EBS should be used more frequently for major weather problems and other events, 

enough to familiarize the citizens with it.

The potential EBS message would have told people to evacuate and would have provided public 

education on preparing to care for yourself for three days if you had to be evacuated and the condition in which you should leave your home (what to shut off, lock, etc.) prior to evacuation. If you 

could not escape you were to go to the highest level in the house and not go to the basement where 

the fumes would settle. You were to seal doors and windows of the refuge area of your house using 

wet towels. The message was prepared and ready to be transmitted by the King County Emergency 

Communications Center, which has responsibility for the EBS in the Seattle area.

The Red Cross and other private disaster relief agencies had been contacted about the possible ammonia 

explosion and had already identified a local high school as a first level shelter and other places for 

shelters if the danger was more widespread. Fortunately these plans did not have to be used.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 11

Coordination of Multiple Agencies--The Incident Commander worked out a simple, highly effective 

method of keeping local, State and Federal agencies coordinated. A large city bus was brought to the 

scene and meetings were held on the bus of all agencies present. These meetings were scheduled 

at 30 to 60 minute intervals and assured that all parties touched base at least that often. A battalion 

chief was used as the liaison and coordinator. He encouraged the agencies to keep representatives 

on or near the bus, and not wander off. Each agency was asked for various resources--information, 

expertise, equipment--either to provide immediately or to get lined up in case it was needed. All 

cooperated well.

The bus offers a warm, sheltered, well-lit, reasonably pleasant place to meet and wait. It also has 

large glass windows so those on the bus can see what is going on without having to wander around 

the scene on their own.

Water Containment--A private company on the pier was contacted to provide a barge with pumping 

capability to off-load the firefighting water from the ship and prevent the chemical- and oil-contaminated water from being dumped into the harbor. That was accomplished successfully after the 

fire.

LOSSES

The cost of repairing damage to the ship was estimated at $7-10 million. (The exact loss assessment 

was pending refined reconstruction estimates versus costs of a new ship.)

There were eight minor injuries to civilians.

Two of the decks of the ship had severe damage in the holds and crew quarters. Both decks were 

buckled in a number of places.

The ship owner was billed for the cost of the CO2 and some other equipment costs. The fire still cost 

the fire department thousands of dollars for overtime and purchase or rental of special equipment, 

e.g., the crane.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Using CO2 to extinguish a large ship fire is practical, but many preparations are needed to do 

it in a timely manner.

Supplies of CO2 in truckload quantity need to be arranged for as part of pre-fire planning. Ideally 

a truckload would be stored at the port.

The fire department needs to plan how to use the CO2 and to practice the skills to hook it up. 

Ship plans needed to be found and understood quickly, and an inspection made to determine 

how best to seal the ship. Preparation to seal the ship may take longer than expected (as was the 

case here). It should be started at once and not delayed until arrival of the CO2.

2. Port facilities should be surveyed as to equipment, materials and skills routinely available 

for use in extinguishing ship fires with CO2 (and by other means).

Materials needed for CO2 operations go beyond the CO2. The availability of equipment, materials, and skills needs to be identified for weekend and night-time emergencies, not just during the 

normal work week. It was great luck that in this fire an adequate size crane was available, with 

an operator, that steel plates of adequate size were available, and that enough cutters and welders 

could be found quickly.
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

3. Fire departments engaged in shipboard firefighting should have standard operating procedures outlining the response and strategies for different types of ship fires.

These are complex fires that require considerable planning and training. They are dangerous to 

firefighters and need special safety considerations. The Appendix includes an example of an SOP 

from Seattle.

4. Interagency coordination was crucial both to give early warning of a potential disaster and 

to plan steps to mitigate it.

Besides the threat of the fire itself, there was potential for an airborne threat from an ammonia 

tank explosion and a water pollution threat if the ship leaked fuel oil or capsized.

Although the State of Washington had responsibility for monitoring air and water pollution, they 

could not bring their own weather station and particulate monitoring systems to the site, and 

had to ask EPA and NOAA. Fire departments need to know exactly where to go for such equipment and how fast it can be brought to the scene in practice. It is not enough to be told that 

an agency has the equipment. Find out where it is and how they would get it to the scene in a 

timely fashion at any time of year or any hour of the day.

5. Local agencies should consider more frequent testing and use of the Emergency Broadcast 

System in medium-size disasters and not just catastrophes.

The EBS is an effective means to quickly reach many people, but needs instant credibility to be 

effective. Seattle’s Office of Emergency Services was concerned as to whether the EBS would be 

effective because they had not used it for a real incident. Exercising the system occasionally will 

increase its familiarity to the citizens and will train those who operate the system and those who 

need to trigger its use. An example of additional use would be to broadcast messages during 

snowstorms to stay at home and not to abandon cars in roadways. But it must not be overused 

or abused, lest it not be taken seriously when needed in an emergency.

6. Planning how to fight fires on various classes of ships that visit a port, and even particular 

ships that visit frequently, should be undertaken, as with other pre-fire suppression plans.

MARAD endorsed Seattle’s plans of the 1970s whereby 50-60 ships that regularly visited the 

Seattle region had fire plans stored on the ship and at each of the ports the ships visited regularly. 

That can save a great deal of time in deciding on firefighting operations, having ship plans available, and knowing what resources will be needed.

7. Some further research information is needed by marine firefighting.

Understanding whether flame impingement will cause ammonia (or similar) tanks to blow 

or whether the venting is sufficient for different size tanks would be useful. Also, would CO2

impingement on the heated tanks of hazardous materials cause them to crack while being 

heated?

8. Shipboard repair operations must take firewatches seriously: the watches should be 

continuous.

The fire got a head start because there was no watch for the required 30 minutes after welding 

had ceased. The smoldering insulation would have been detected at a much earlier state if there 

had been a firewatch.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 13

9. Vessels often catch fire while undergoing repairs: special safeguards are needed.

Since the fire, Seattle has proposed a much more stringent set of rules regarding ship repairs. 

The idea is to require more repairs to be done by experts in shipyards than at dockside by crews. 

Vessels undergoing repairs often have cutting and welding operations, hatches open or missing, 

fire barriers breached and a skeleton crew--all conditions present in this fire. It is like a high-rise 

with holes between floors, all fire doors open and the fire protection system closed down.

Seattle’s previous requirements were for trained safety experts to oversee welding and other 

metal work while a ship was in port. But there are not enough experts in the area for the large 

number of vessels seeking permits for such work. Seattle has now proposed that three levels of 

permits be considered. Level One would permit minor repairs with minimum regulations. Level 

Two would require stricter precautions, and Level Three must be done in a shipyard.

Level One welding and cutting is defined as work that does not require more than one cutting 

torch or welding machine, does not involve hazardous areas and is completed in 14 days.

Level Two is welding or cutting in hazardous areas, e.g., compartments with polyurethane insulation. It must be completed within 30 days. (This was the situation in this incident.)

Level Three is major repairs that require over 30 days or will place the vessel’s fire protection 

systems out of service. The Appendix includes the complete definition and precautions proposed 

by Seattle for each level.

10. Planning city evacuation routes for all situations is not entirely feasible: the ability to plan 

the details in real time is needed.

In this incident, the choice of evacuation routes depended on where the ammonia cloud might 

drift. There were too many options to consider to have plans for all possibilities. While Seattle 

had practiced for disasters, the details of the plan had to be kept fluid as the estimated direction 

and size of the ammonia cloud changed.

The real-time plans involved where to place shelters as well as evacuation routes. Shelter locations preferably would be close to the neighborhood involved but obviously not in the path of 

the ammonia cloud--which meant they could not be prespecified.

15

Appendices

A. Area Map

B. Ship Diagram

C. Fire Investigator’s Scene Report

D. Seattle Fire Department’s Marine Firefighting Operations SOP

E. Marine Unit Training Courses and Equipment List

F. Draft Regulations for Welding and Cutting on Marine Vessels

G. Ship Fire Timeline

H. Photographs

17

Appendix A 

Area Map
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
19

Appendix B

Ship Diagram
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
21

Appendix C

Fire Investigator’s Scene Report
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 23
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 25
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
27

Appendix D

Seattle Fire Department’s Marine Firefighting 

Operations SOP
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 29
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 31
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 33
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 35
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 37
38 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
39

Appendix E

Marine Unit Training Courses and 

Equipment List
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

COURSES

INTRODUCTION TO MARINE FIRE PROTECTION

This session introduces the student to the subject of marine fire protection and describes the course 

of training to be given. It includes a general discussion of existing problems and provides a limited 

amount of statistical data regarding marine fires. This data includes which types of vessels have the 

most fires, where the fires generally start aboard ship, and subjects of a similar nature.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF MARINE FIRES

During a fire aboard ship, the authority and responsibility of the various agencies involved may differ substantially from those incidents involving shoreside fires. In addition, personnel from several 

agencies may be required to work cooperatively to extinguish the fire.

This class outlines the responsibility of various agencies that may become involved with a ship fire 

in port. It discusses the principles of comparative negligence, outlines problems which have been 

encountered at past fires, and suggest ways to avoid similar problems in the future. The primary 

objective is to familiarize the student with the responsibility and authority of those agencies that 

may be involved in marine firefighting operations. (The information presented is based on U.S. Law 

and Regulations.)

MARINE DRAWINGS

It is rare for emergency response personnel to be intimately familiar with the particular vessel on 

fire. It is important for the Firefighter to be able to quickly and correctly read basic marine drawings. 

While merchant seamen will be generally familiar with several classes of vessels, most will not have 

worked extensively with marine drawings.

This segment of training provides the basic skills needed to read general arrangement booklets, fire 

control plans, and similar documents. The skill to read such drawings is valuable during firefighting 

operations in order to improve understanding of the spaces which may have to be entered, and to 

better explain the general arrangement to shoreside personnel who may not be familiar with the 

vessel.

FOAM OPERATIONS

This is a more advanced class limited to the discussion of firefighting foam. The objective of this 

session is to acquaint the student with types of firefighting foams available, and those in common 

use aboard ship. Students are trained in the characteristics of each foam, their compatibility with 

each other, and the equipment available for its application. Students will be shown how to calculate 

application rates for various size fires involving different flammable liquids.

VESSEL CONSTRUCTION AND ARRANGEMENT

This session discusses the major components of breakbulk cargo vessels, their construction and 

arrangement. The class begins the process of making the student familiar with the shipboard environment, and prepares him/her for additional training to come.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 41

EMERGENCY MOORING

This session is designed to familiarize students with typical mooring and anchoring system components in use aboard ship. The primary objective is to discuss emergency procedures which can be 

used to move a vessel under fire conditions.

VESSEL STABILITY IN FIREFIGHTING

Failure to have a proper appreciation for the vessel’s stability has brought several firefighting efforts 

to an unsuccessful conclusion. The objective of this segment is to acquaint the student with the basic 

principles of vessel stability. It discusses the forces which affect stability and how firefighting can 

cause those forces to change. The class discusses basic terms, and presents steps which can be taken 

to improve the stability of a vessel under emergency conditions.

INTRODUCTION TO DAMAGE CONTROL

Not all of the incidents requiring emergency response personnel are the result of fire. In some cases, 

emergencies may involve uncontrolled flooding of the vessel due to equipment failure or structural 

damage. In other cases, uncontrolled flooding may be a part of the fire problem. This class introduces the student to procedures for the control of progressive flooding, and dewatering of vessels.

MARINE FIRE PROTECTION COURSES

There are numerous examples of ship fires where a major problem was the failure to use the fire 

protection systems built into the vessel. One reason for this has been the lack of knowledge on the 

part of firefighters and crew members of the system’s capabilities and correct operating procedures. 

In many cases, this has made firefighting much more difficult and dangerous that it needed to be.

This session provides the student with information on several types of systems commonly found 

aboard ship. The segment discusses alarm, detection, confinement, and extinguishing systems. 

Emphasis is placed on the general operating procedures, and the advantages and limitations of each 

system discussed.

MARINE FIRE TACTICS

This session on Marine Fire Tactics includes training on how to size up the fire, gather data, and 

identify resources needed for successful extinguishment. This class discusses the establishment of 

fire boundaries and methods of direct and indirect extinguishment. Various methods of hoseline 

extinguishment are discussed along with the advantages and disadvantages of each. The class also 

discusses when to use the vessel’s built-in fire protection systems, as well as when to supplement 

them.

COMMAND POST OPERATIONS

For a ship fire to be fought successfully, there must be a combined and coordinated effort, often 

involving several agencies. This session presents the students with information on the purpose of a 

Command Post. How and where to establish one aboard the vessel, who should be in the Command 

Post, and what jobs they should accomplish. The class also presents information on which documents should be in the Command Post, and communications and record keeping procedures.
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

PORT EMERGENCY PLANNING

This segment of training presents the student with information relating to preparation of port emergency plans. It discusses the roles of various agencies involved, locating needed equipment, and 

other factors to consider in the preparation of such plans. The objective is to encourage students to 

develop emergency plans for their own port.

INSTRUMENT OPERATIONS

Students are introduced to the operation of various instruments available to assist in the extinguishment of ship fires. The course discusses the operating features of various instruments, their advantages, and disadvantages. Students are taught basic techniques which can be used to obtain readings 

and how to interpret the readings.

TACTICAL WORKSHOP

In this classroom segment, the students are divided into groups of five to eight persons. Each group 

is made up of representatives from each category attending the training (port authority, fire service, 

ships crew, Coast Guard). Each group is given a separate fire problem to solve using the information 

presented in the class to date. Students are provided with various documents to assist in completing 

the exercise. Each group chooses a spokesperson who presents the group’s solution to the rest of the 

class. The class as a whole is asked to critique each group’s solution.

BULK CO2 APPLICATION

This session compliments the session on instruments, and prepares the student for the field application of CO2 aboard a training vessel. The class discusses procedures to follow when applying the CO2

in bulk from tank trucks, including predischarge preparation, grounding, sealing, ventilation, and 

testing readings.

BULK CO2 DRILL

This session constitutes the field application portion of the previous segments of instrument operation, and bulk CO2 application. The session requires the use of a vessel available for training, and 

involves the use of a bulk CO2 tank truck. Students are required to extinguish a simulated Class A 

fire in the cargo hold by actually applying CO2. Students will set up for application, apply the CO2, 

obtain test readings, vent the CO2, and assure the compartment is safe for personnel. Final testing 

must be conducted under the supervision of a certified Marine Chemist.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 43

MARINE RESPONSE EQUIPMENT LIST

CO2 Equipment

a. Drager Multi-gas Detector Instrument

Measures the concentration of CO2 from 5% to 60%

b. 2, CO2 nozzles (3’) (4’)

Attached at end of CO2 hose

c. 2, “C” clamps

For securing nozzles

d. 2 safety chains

Securing nozzles where clamps won’t work

e. 300’ CO2 hose

To connect bulk supply to vessel

f. 1, CO2 MANIFOLD

To connect CO2 hose to bulk tanker truck

g. 1 box assorted threaded pipe fittings

Used in connecting various-sized fittings

h. Assorted opened-end wrenches

Connecting CO2 hose

i. 1 large safety cable

Safety feature where CO2 hose connects to bulk tanker truck

j. 6 small safety cables

Safety feature for CO2 hose connection to each other

k. 1 grounding wire

For grounding CO2 nozzle

l. 4 rolls teflon tape

To seal threads at CO2 hose connections

Measuring And Monitoring Equipment

a. Drager Multi-gas Detector Instrument

To measure levels of CO2, flammable and toxic gases

b. Assorted sampling tubes

Used with the Drager Instrument as noted above

c. 1 Explosimeter

To measure flammable vapor levels

d. 1 Pyrometer

Taking temperature readings
44 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

e. Assorted lengths of thermocouple wires

Used with Pyrometer to take readings at remote sites

f. 3 heavy-duty magnets

For securing thermocouple wires

g. 1 GasTechtor

Used to measure content of oxygen and flammable vapors

h. 50’ GasTechtor sampling lines 

To take remote readings

Communications Equipment

a. 4 sound power head phones

For telephone system that operate without electricity

b. 1 amplifier for sound power phones 

c. 1 junction box

d. 3, 200’ wire reels and 2, 500’ wire reels

For sound power phone communications at remote locations

e. 1 portable radio

f. 1 bull horn

Alternate communication method

Dewatering Equipment

a. 1 gasoline portable trash pump (360 gpm)

For dewatering operations

b. 1, 240 volt Prosser Pump (300 gpm)

For dewatering operations

c. 4 educators with 3 1⁄2” male couplings

For dewatering operations

d. 1 dewatering syphon

For dewatering operations

Tools

a. Tool box with: hacksaw, diagonal cutters, vise grips, channel locks, tinsnips, metal and wood 

chisels, screwdrivers, sparkplug wrench, tape measure, acetylene cutting tip, open-end wenches

b. 1, 36” pipe wrench

For ship piping, etc.

c. 1, SCBA powered impact wrench 

For ship hatches, etc.

d. 1 Slice portable oxygen cutting torch

For cutting holes in steel bulkhead and decks.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 45

Ventilation Equipment

a. 2 “Coppus” Vano fans with 200 feet of electrical extension cord 

Used to provide ventilation aboard vessels

b. 220 feet of flexible exhaust tubing

Used with fans for smoke removal or providing fresh air

Breathing Equipment

a. 4 MSA Hip-Air Masks

For confine space enter and rescue

b. 900 feet of supply air hose

To supply the Hip-Air Masks

c. 1 regular manifold

To control air pressure and supply to Hip-Air Masks.

Advisors Kit

a. 1 camera for pictures

b. 2 calculators

c. 1 tide book

d. Spare batteries and film

e. List of contact people and telephone numbers used during emergency operation

f. 1 hazardous materials guidebook

g. 2 pocket tape recorders

h. Incident Command Packets, includes check-off lists for: bulk CO2 operations, CO2 guidelines, 

temperature readings form CO2 charts and tables, command post, fire boundary check list, 

exposure check list, dewatering check list, miscellaneous NFPA booklets.

Miscellaneous Equipment

a. 3 cargo nets to haul aboard equipment

b. 10 assorted sizes wood plugs for plugging small fuel leaks, etc.

c. 1 gas can with fuel for portable trash pump

d. 1 line gun for providing lines from one vessel to another

e. Assorted size tie ropes for securing equipment, etc.

f. 6 boxes duct seal for securing small fuel leaks, etc.

g. 5 fog applicators

h. 1 city and State map
46 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

i. 1 ship to shore connection for supplying water from shore to ship’s system

j. 8 bulldozers for pier protection

k. 100 feet of air line hose for pneumatic jack hammer operations at pier fires

1. 1 first aid kit

m. Assorted pre-fire books: shows layout of various types of vessels and ship extinguishing systems, etc.

n. 6 utility straps for securing hose and equipment

o. 6 life vests for safety (manufactured especially for fire fighters)

p. 2 rolls plastic for sealing ship prior to CO2 application

q. 2, 6-foot by 6-foot wood blocks for propping open watertight doors when hose lines pass 

through

r. 1 penetrating nozzle used to extinguish fires in baled cargo, etc.

s. Low Expansion Foam Nozzle (9 to 1)

t. Medium Expansion Foam Nozzle (65 to 1)

u. 4, head lamps (miner type) with chargers

v. 1 hand truck
47

Appendix F

Draft Regulations for Welding and Cutting on 

Marine Vessels
48 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

3-1-92 No. 49.101.1

SEATTLE FIRE DEPARTMENT

INSPECTION GUIDELINE

SUBJECT: WELDING AND CUTTING ON MARINE VESSELS

FIRE CODE REFERENCE: SFC ARTICLE 49

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: NFPA 306

A. PERMITS:

SCOPE: These regulations shall become effective on May 1, 1992. The regulations apply to 

operations involving the use of oxygen/fuel gas mixtures or electric arc welding on marine 

vessels within the Corporate Limits of the City of Seattle. The regulations apply regardless of the 

size of the vessel and regardless of whether or not the vessel is at anchor, moored, in drydock, or 

ashore.

 GENERAL DEFINITIONS:

For the purpose of these regulations, the following words have the meanings set forth below.

Adjacent Spaces: Those spaces in all directions from the subject space, including 

all points of contact, corners, diagonals, decks, tank tops, and 

bulkheads. 

Confined Space: Any compartment of small size and limited access such as double 

bottom tank, cofferdam, or similar space which by virtue of its 

small size and confined nature can create or aggravate a hazardous condition.

Class 1 A pier, designated by the Chief, which by virtue of its construction, location, fire protection and fire hydrant availability, is suitable to permit certain repairs to vessels which are over 200 feet 

in length.

Class 2 Designated Facility: A pier, designated by the chief, which by virtue of its construction, location, fire protection and fire hydrant availability, is suitable to permit certain repairs to vessels which are up to 200 feet 

in length.

Designated Facilities: Those piers, designated by the chief, and by virtue of their construction, location, fire protection and fire hydrant availability, 

are suitable to permit certain repairs to vessels.

Enclosed Space: Any space, other than a confined space, which is enclosed by a 

bulkhead and overhead. The term includes cargo holds, tanks, 

quarters, and machinery spaces.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 49

Fire Watch: A person designated by the supervisor of the welding operation 

to watch for signs of fire. Such persons shall be familiar with fire 

department permit conditions, the area where the welding and 

cutting is to take place, and procedures for sounding an alarm in 

the event of fire.

Gangway: A ramp-like or stair-like means of access provided to enable personnel to board or leave a vessel including accommodation ladders, gangplanks, and brows. A gangway shall have a walking 

surface not less than 20 inches wide, be of adequate strength, 

maintained in good repair and safely secured. Each side of a 

gangway, and turntable if used, shall have a railing with a minimum height of 33 inches, with a mid-rail. Rails constructed of 

rope or chain shall be kept taught at all times.

Intervening Barrier: Means a barrier which is an integral part of the vessel’s structure, 

which when closed, will not permit the passage of flammable 

liquids or vapors. The length of the vessel as measured along the 

centerline.

Length of Vessel: The length of the vessel as measured along the centerline.

Major Conversion: Means a conversion that -

1. Substantially changes the dimensions or carrying capacity of 

the vessel;

2. Changes the type of the vessel;

3. Substantially prolongs the life of the vessel; or

4. Otherwise so changes the vessel that it is essentially a new 

vessel as determined by the chief. In making such determinations, the chief may consult with the U.S. Coast Guard 

Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection, Puget Sound.

Marine Chemist: The holder of a valid Certificate issued by the National Fire 

Protection Association in accordance with the “Rules for the 

Certification of Marine Chemists.”

Powder Actuated Device: Means a tool or machine which drives a stud, pin, bolt, or other 

type of fastener by means of an explosive charge.

Ship Repair: Means any repair of a vessel including, but not limited to alterations, modification, conversion, installations, cleaning, painting, and maintenance work and includes ship building and ship 

breaking.

Vessel: Includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used as a means of transportation on water, including 

special purpose floating structures not primarily designed for or 

used as a means of transportation on water.
50 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Shipyard Competent Person: Is an individual, registered with OSHA meeting one or more of 

the following requirements:

1. The holder of a valid Certificate issued by the National Fire 

Protection Association attesting that the holder has successfully completed a course of training as a Shipyard Competent 

Person.

2. The holder of a Certificate from the Seattle Fire Department 

attesting that the holder has successfully passed the Seattle 

Fire Department’s Certification Examination for Shipyard 

Competent Person.

3. The holder of a Certificate attesting that the holder has 

successfully passed a course of instruction in Shipyard 

Competent Person training which is accepted by the chief.

 PERMiT CONDITIONS:

 Permit Classifications:

Fire Department Permits for Welding and Cutting on Marine Vessels shall be divided into three 

categories.

Level I: Those permits for welding and cutting operations which are minor in nature. (See 

below for further definition)

Level II: Those permits for welding and cutting operations which exceed the limits of a Level 

I permit but do not involve a major conversion of the vessel. (See below for further 

definition)

Level III: Those permits for welding and cutting which involve a major conversion of the vessel. (See below for further definition)

 GENERAL CONDITIONS RELATINGTO ALL WELDING AND Cutting ABOARD VESSELS:

 Permits Required:

A permit shall be obtained from the fire department prior to the commencement of any welding 

and cutting operations aboard any marine vessel.

A copy of the Fire Department Permit shall be displayed at the foot of the gangway or in such 

other location where it is readily visible from the pier or dock. The permit shall be displayed in 

such a manner as to be protected from the effects of weather.

Violation of Permit Conditions:

Violation of permit conditions shall be cause for immediate revocation of the Fire Department 

Welding and Cutting Permit. Permits which are revoked shall only be re-issued in accordance 

with the following schedule:
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 51

First Revocation: Permits shall not be re-issued for a period of 24 hours and shall 

require the payment of a new permit fee.

Second Revocation: Permits shall not be re-issued for a period of 5 working days and 

shall require the payment of a new permit fee.

Third Revocation: Permits shall not be re-issued for a period of 30 days and shall 

require the payment of a new permit fee.

Notification of the Fire Department:

A means shall be provided to rapidly contact the fire department in the event of an emergency. 

Such means shall be available within 200 feet of the work site.

 Preparations for Closure of the Vessel: 

Prior to the commencement of repairs, arrangements shall be made to close the vessel as soon 

as possible in the event of fire. Closure time shall not exceed 30 minutes. Such arrangements 

shall not require the use of ship’s power to make the closures. Such closures shall be sufficient 

to ensure the efficient use of carbon dioxide (C02) to extinguish the fire.

If it is not possible to prepare the vessel to be closed within 30 minutes, the person applying for 

the permit shall have cranes and crane operators available within 60 minutes whenever work 

is being performed. Such cranes must be capable of lifting not less than 10,000 pounds with a 

boom of sufficient length to reach the outboard side of the largest vessel at the pier.

EXCEPTION: During the construction of new vessels, when no combustible materials are present.

 Gangways Required:

Gangways shall be provided for access to vessels in accordance with the following schedule:

1. Vessels less than 200 feet in length - One (1) gangway.

2. Vessels 200 feet or more in length - Two (2) gangways.

EXCEPTION: Gangways are not required for vessels whose size or design permit boarders 

to step directly aboard from the dock and where the vessel is moored in such 

a way to prevent falling between the vessel and the dock during periods of 

poor visibility.

 Prohibited Activity

The following activities are prohibited during welding and cutting operations:

Fuel transfer operations aboard the vessel on which the welding is to take place or aboard any 

other vessel located within 100 feet in any direction.

Transfer, loading or unloading of hazardous materials shall take place in accordance with the 

following requirements:
52 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

1. Welding and cutting shall not occur within 200 feet of a transfer of flammable liquids or 

gases by means of a hoseline.

2. Welding and cutting shall not occur within 100 feet of a transfer of combustible liquids by 

means of a hoseline.

EXCEPTION: Welding and cutting shall not take place within 50 feet of the transfer of Class 

IIIB Combustible liquids by means of a hoseline.

3. Other transfers shall not occur within 50 feet of welding and cutting operations unless an 

intervening barrier exists and is fully closed during the welding and cutting operation.

4. Other transfers shall not occur within 100 feet of welding and cutting operations when no 

intervening barrier exists or if an existing barrier cannot be fully closed.

Spray painting or the application of other flammable compounds unless sufficient ventilation is 

provided to maintain the atmosphere at not more than 10 percent of the lower explosive limit 

for the particular material being applied as determined by a marine chemist or shipyard competent person. Monitoring of such areas shall be carried out by a shipyard competent person.

Fire Watches:

Whenever welding and cutting operations are taking place above or within ten (10) feet of combustible material, a responsible individual shall be appointed as fire watch and shall be on duty 

continuously during such operations. If during any hot work operation there will be a transmission of heat through a bulkhead, or above or below a deck where any such work is being done, 

a fire watch shall be maintained on both sides of the deck or bulkhead.

Such persons shall have no other duties other than to watch for fire. Fire watches shall remain 

on duty for not less than 30 minutes after welding and cutting operations are completed.

Welders and cutters may not serve as their own fire watch.

Persons appointed as fire watch may be a member of the vessel’s crew or other person designated 

by the individual in charge of the work.

Persons appointed as fire watch shall read and sign a copy of the fire department permit conditions indicating that he or she understands them.

Fire Extinguishing Devices Required:

One or more fire extinguishers with a rating of not less than 2-A 40-BC shall be kept at the location where welding and cutting is being done. Extinguishers aboard the vessel which are protecting hazardous areas (such as galleys and engine rooms) may not be used for this purpose.

A firehose of not less than 3/4 inch diameter shall be laid out and charged in the vicinity of 

welding and cutting operations. Such hose shall be of sufficient length to reach all areas within 

the compartment or space being worked on.

Additional 1-1/2 inch fire hoses shall be available in the immediate area. Such hoses are not 

required to be charged. See below for special requirements involving combustible insulation.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 53

Special Safeguards Relating to Combustible Insulation:

When it is necessary to cut or weld on an area which is covered with combustible insulation, 

such insulation shall be removed in accordance with the following requirements:

1. Remove foam 36 inches in all directions, and clean all foam bits and pieces from the area 

prior to starting welding and cutting. The remainder of exposed combustible insulation to 

be wet down or covered with wet tarps or other suitable materials for a distance of not less 

than five (5) feet past the most distant point where sparks or slag will fly or fall.

Alternate: Remove foam 12 inches in all directions and coat exposed edges with No Char or 

equivalent substance. Clean all bits and pieces of foam from the area prior to start of welding or cutting. The remainder of exposed combustible insulation to be wet down or covered 

with wet tarps or other suitable materials for a distance of not less than five (5) feet past the 

most distant point where sparks or slag will fly or fall.

2. An 1-1/2 inch fire hose shall be immediately available in areas where welding and cutting is 

being done on combustible insulation other than polyurethane foam insulation.

3. When welding and cutting is being performed in areas where poly-urethane foam insulation 

is present, one fire hose not less than 1-1/2 inch in diameter shall be laid out and charged 

in the vicinity of welding and cutting operations. One other uncharged 1-1/2 inch hoseline 

shall be immediately available. Such hose shall be of sufficient length to reach all areas within 

the compartment or space being worked on and/or into immediately adjacent spaces.

4. Fire watch to remain 30 minutes past completion of welding and cutting.

5. Any sign of fire will result in an immediate call to the Fire Department 9-1-1 number.

6. When welding on an area that has combustible insulation sprayed on the other side it will be 

permitted to leave the insulation in place if the following conditions are met:

a. Use a shipyard competent person as a fire watch and maintain the fire watch one hour 

past work completion.

b. One charged 1-1/2 inch hoseline shall be available in the area of the combustible insulation. One uncharged line shall be immediately available. Such hose shall be of sufficient 

length to reach all areas within the compartment or space being worked on and/or into 

immediately adjacent spaces.

c. The weld will be made in small sections, cooled with water, and then another small section welded, cooled, etc.

d. Any oil contaminated foam will either be removed completely or removed back to clean 

foam prior to welding.

e. Any sign of fire will result in an immediate call to the Fire Department 9-1-1 number.

 Removal and/or Relocation of Materials:

The following materials must be removed from or relocated within the vessel if welding and cutting operations are to be performed at any location where the risk of rapid fire spread is high and 

the materials are so arranged that they cannot be adequately cooled by Fire Department hoselines 
54 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

in the event of a serious fire without entering the hull or superstructure. Areas where the risk of 

fire is deemed to be high include, but are not limited to:

1. Compartments insulated with poly-urethane foam.

2. Compartments which contain highly combustible interior finishes.

The following materials must be removed from the vessel prior to welding and cutting operations in high risk areas:

1. Compressed gas cylinders except those needed for welding and cutting.

2. Drums of flammable and combustible liquids.

3. Explosives.

The following materials must be relocated within the vessel prior to welding or cutting in high 

risk areas.

1. Flammable refrigerant gases shall be pumped back into the main receiver(s) of the system.

Ventilation:

Forced draft exhaust ventilation of adequate capacity to remove welding and cutting vapors 

and any accumulation of flammable vapor shall be installed prior to performing any work in an 

enclosed or confined space.

Fuel Cylinders and Hoses:

All cylinders or containers used for the storage of compressed gases shall be constructed, charged 

and marked in accordance with Nationally recognized safe practices. [1988 SFC 49.101(b)]

Cylinders shall be stored in locations where they are not subject to excessive rise in temperature, 

mechanical injury, or tampering. All cylinders (including empty ones) shall have their caps in 

place and all valves tightly closed. [1988 SFC 49.104(b)]

Oxygen cylinders in storage shall be separated from fuel gas cylinders or combustible materials 

(especially oil and grease) by not less than 20 feet.

Cylinders, valves, regulators, hose and other apparatus and fittings shall be kept free of oil or 

grease of any type. Such devices shall not be handled with greasy or oily hands, gloves or other 

greasy/oily materials.

All compressed gas cylinders, including those in use, shall be adequately secured to prevent falling or being knocked over. [1988 SFC 49.104(c)]

Hose lines shall be inspected frequently for leaks, burns, torn or worn areas, loose connections 

or other defects which may render the hose unfit for service. Defective lengths of hose shall be 

discarded. [1988 SFC 49.106(e)]

Oxygen and fuel gas cylinders shall be placed far enough away from the welding or cutting 

operation to ensure that they will not be unduly heated by radiation from heated materials, 

sparks or slag, or by misdirection of the torch flame.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 55

All torches and hose shall be disconnected from the cylinders at the end of work and shall not be 

left below deck or in confined spaces.

Fuel gas cylinders shall not be placed below the main deck, in confined spaces, or under overhanging decks where flammable gases which are lighter than air may accumulate.

Fuel Gas Manifolds:

Shall bear the name of the substance they contain in letters at least 1 inch high which shall be 

either painted on the manifold or located on a sign attached to the manifold.

Shall be placed in a safe and accessible location in the open air. They shall not be located within 

enclosed or confined spaces.

Shall have hose connections, including both ends of the supply hose that leads to the manifold, 

of a type that will prevent the hose from being interchanged between the fuel gas and oxygen 

manifold and supply header connections. Hose connections shall be kept free of grease and oil.

When not in use, manifold and header hose connections shall be capped.

Nothing shall be placed on top of a manifold, when in use, which will damage the manifold or 

interfere with the quick closing of the valves.

 Other Precautions Against Fire:

Flammable or combustible liquids may not be stored within 50 feet of welding and cutting 

operations. Combustible materials shall not be located within 25 feet of welding and cutting 

operations. (Including the opposite side of surfaces on which welding or cutting is being 

performed.)

Welding and cutting shall not be done in or near compartments or spaces where flammable 

liquids or vapors, lint, or loose combustible stocks are so located or arranged that sparks or hot 

metal from the welding or cutting operation may cause ignition or explosion of such materials.

When welding or cutting must be done above or within 10 feet of combustible construction or 

material, or above a place where workers are employed, or where persons are likely to pass, noncombustible shields shall be interposed to protect such materials or persons from sparks and hot 

metal or oxide.

 Inspection Required (Applies to Level II and Level III Welding and Cutting):

For Level II and Level III welding and cutting, regular inspections shall be made by a Shipyard 

Competent Person during the entire repair period to note and eliminate fire hazards and to 

implement work procedures to keep such hazards to a minimum.

The types and amounts of fuel oils and other flammable or combustible liquids in all cargo, bunker, deep, settler and double bottom tanks shall be determined. Such determination shall include 

associated piping systems.

The information obtained from such inspections shall be distributed to the department or individual responsible for fire safety of vessels while under repair. Such information shall be readily 

available to the fire department in the event of a fire.
56 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Prior to the commencement of welding and cutting operations, an inspection shall be made of 

the area in which the work is to occur to assure that:

1. The work to be performed is not prohibited for Level II welding and cutting.

2. Prohibited activity is not taking place elsewhere on the vessel. (See the section entitled 

Prohibited Activity.)

3. The area is safe for the welding and cutting to take place and Fire Department Permit 

Conditions are being complied with.

Such inspection shall be made by the shipyard competent person or a certified marine chemist. 

Such inspections shall include the opposite sides of bulkheads or decks on which welding or 

cutting operations are to be performed.

 Tests for Flammable Vapors and Gases (Applies to Level II and Level III Welding and 

Cutting):

The permissible level of concentration of flammable vapors or gases shall not exceed ten percent 

(10%) of the lower explosive limit in all parts of the spaces in which welding and cutting is to 

be performed.

Pipe lines which may convey hazardous substances into the spaces which have been certified as 

“Safe For Men - Safe For Fire” shall be disconnected or blanked off, or other positive means shall 

be taken to prevent the discharge of hazardous substances from entering the space.

Manholes and other closures which were secured at the time of tests shall remain secured. If it 

is necessary to open secured spaces or to manipulate any valves which may tend to alter conditions, welding and cutting operations shall stop and not resume until further tests have certified 

the space is “Safe for Men - Safe for Fire.”

SPECIAL CONDITIONS RELATINGTO LEVEL I WELDING AND CUTting:

 Definition:

Level I welding and cutting is work which involves repairs or modifications which are minor 

in nature and which do not involve any cutting or welding on or near hazardous areas of the 

vessel.

 Level I Permit Application and Renewal:

Permits for Level I welding and cutting shall be issued for a period not to exceed fourteen (14) 

calendar days. At the time of application the person applying for the permit may indicate their 

intent to apply for an extension of the permit at the end of that period.

Permits for which an extension will be requested shall be placed on a special inspection schedule 

by the Fire Marshal’s Office. Such inspections shall be random and unannounced.

Extensions may be granted only to those applicants who are found to be in full compliance with 

the conditions of their permit during the special inspection. Permit fees for extension of existing 

permits shall be 50% of the fee for a new permit.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 57

 Level I Limitations:

Level I welding and cutting must not require the use of more than one cutting torch or one welding machine.

Level I welding and cutting must not involve work on hazardous areas or compartments of the 

vessel. Such hazardous areas include, but are not limited to:

1. Fuel systems (including tanks and piping and compartments adjacent to such tanks and 

piping).

2. Compartments which are insulated with combustible or flammable insulation, including 

insulation which has a fire resistive barrier installed over the surface.

3. Engine rooms.

4. Cargo or storage areas which contain or have contained hazardous materials (including flammable liquids and gases or combustible liquids).

5. Work on surfaces directly adjacent to those compartments listed above (i.e., The opposite 

side of an insulated space which might expose the insulation to heat).

Examples of Level I welding and cutting include work on:

1. Standing rigging

2. Replacement of cleats and pad eyes

3. Work involving deck machinery

4. Similar repairs or modifications

 Authorized Locations:

Level I welding and cutting may be performed at the vessel’s normal berth.

EXCEPTION: Level I welding and cutting shall not be performed at fuel terminals, passenger 

terminals, or terminals or piers at which the use is primarily residential or recreational in nature.

Vessel’s Fire Protection Systems:

During welding and cutting operations all of the vessel’s fire protection systems shall remain in 

service.

 Inspection Required:

Prior to the commencement of welding and cutting operations, an inspection shall be made of 

the area in which the work is to occur. Such inspection shall be made by the person in charge 

of the repairs or modifications and shall assure that:

1. The work to be performed does not involve an area of the vessel prohibited for Level I welding and cutting.

2. Prohibited activity is not taking place elsewhere on the vessel.
58 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

3. The area is safe for the welding and cutting to take place.

Such inspections shall include the opposite sides of bulkheads, overheads or decks on which 

welding or cutting operations are to be performed.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS RELATINGTO LEVEL II WELDING AND CUTtiNG:

 Definition:

Level II welding and cutting includes that work which exceeds the limits of Level I welding and 

cutting but is less than a major conversion of the vessel or that work which involves welding or 

cutting on or near areas of the vessel which are hazardous in nature.

Such hazardous areas include:

1. Fuel systems (including tanks and piping and compartments adjacent to such tanks and 

piping.

2. Compartments which are insulated with combustible or flammable insulation.

3. Engine rooms.

4. Cargo or storage areas which contain or have contained hazardous materials (including flammable liquids and gases or combustible liquids).

5. Work on surfaces directly adjacent to those compartments listed above (i.e., The opposite 

side of an insulated space which might expose the insulation to heat).

 Level II Permit Application and Renewal:

Permits for Level II welding and cutting shall be issued for a period not to exceed 30 calendar 

days. At the time of application, the person applying for the permit may indicate their intent to 

apply for an extension of the permit at the end of that period. Permits for which an extension 

will be requested shall be placed on a special inspection schedule by the Fire Marshal’s Office. 

Such inspections shall be random and unannounced.

Extensions may be granted only to those applicants who are found to be in full compliance with 

the conditions of their permit during the special inspection. Permit fees for extension of existing 

permits shall be 50 percent of the fee for a new permit.

 Authorized Locations:

Level II welding and cutting may only be performed at designated marine facilities.

Designated facilities shall be divided into classes and shall comply with the following 

requirements:

Class I Facilities:

1. Repairs, other than major conversions, may be performed on vessels of any length.

2. Such facilities must have a valid facility permit from the fire department for welding and 

cutting operations to take place.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 59

3. Shall have not less than two (2) fire hydrants one of which is located within 500 feet of 

the vessel under repair, each capable of delivering not less than 2,000 gallons per minute. 

Additional hydrants capable of delivering 2,000 gallons per minute shall be required for each 

100 feet of vessel length for vessels over 300 feet in length up to a maximum of 5 hydrants. 

Such hydrants shall be so located that two-company hose lays by the fire department are not 

required to reach them in the event of fire.

4. Be equipped with fire lanes not less than 20 feet wide and shall be capable of supporting 

a 50,000 pound vehicle or 30,000 pounds per axle. Such fire lanes shall be so located to 

provide vehicle access to within 75 feet of the vessel.

EXCEPTION: This requirement may be waived where the facility is so arranged that the fire 

department will not be delayed in the deployment of equipment.

Class II Facilities:

1. Repairs, other than major conversions, may be performed on vessels less than 200 feet in 

length.

2. Such facilities must have a valid facility permit from the Fire Department for welding and 

cutting operations to take place.

3. Shall have not less than two (2) fire hydrants one of which is located within 500 feet of the 

vessel under repair, each capable of delivering not less than 2,000 gallons per minute.

 Prohibited Locations:

Level II welding and cutting permits shall not be issued for the following piers and terminals:

1. Combustible piers which are not equipped with automatic sprinklers.

2. Combustible piers which are not equipped with firefighting standpipes or hydrants.

3. Fuel Terminals.

4. Passenger Terminals

5. Piers where use is primarily residential or recreational in nature.

6. Piers or any type where a welding and cutting facility permit was not issued from the fire 

department.

Vessel’s Fire Protection Systems:

During welding and cutting operations, all of the vessel’s fire protection systems shall remain in 

service.

Special Personnel Required:

Depending on the exact nature of the work, Level II welding and cutting must be performed under 

the supervision of an NFPA Certified Marine Chemist or a full-time employee with responsibility 

for safety, or both. Full-time safety persons shall meet the requirements for Shipyard Competent 

Person. 
60 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Examples of Level II welding and cutting include:

Removal or replacement of major components of the vessel’s propulsion system. Replacement 

of deck houses or other large structural components. Replacement of hull or deck plating.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS RELATINGTO LEVEL III WELDING AND CUTTING:

 Definition:

Level III welding and cutting is that work which involves a major conversion or work which will 

place a major portion of one or more of the vessel’s fire protection systems out of service.

 Authorized Locations:

Level III repairs may only be performed in a shipyard.

Vessel’s Fire Protection Systems:

Whenever welding and cutting operations are to occur, the vessel’s fire protection systems shall 

remain in service or other steps shall be taken to provide a level of fire protection equivalent to 

the protection provided by the vessel’s systems. Such alternate measures shall meet the approval 

of the chief.

Special Personnel Required:

Level III welding and cutting must be performed under the supervision of an NFPA Certified 

Marine Chemist or a full-time employee with responsibility for safety. Full-time safety persons 

shall meet the requirements for Shipyard Competent Person.

CONDITIONS RELATINGTO BOTH LEVEL I AND LEVEL II WELDING AND CUTtinG:

 Duties of Shipyard Competent Persons (Applies to Level II and Level III Welding and 

Cutting):

For Level II and Level III welding and cutting operations Shipyard Competent Persons shall:

1. Be continuously on duty at the job site during the time work is being performed.

2. Personally make such inspections and tests as are necessary to assure that the area in which 

the work is to be performed is safe for welding and cutting. Such inspections and tests shall 

be performed prior to the commencement of welding and cutting operations.

3. Make frequent inspections of those areas in which welding and cutting operations are being 

performed to assure that hazardous conditions have not developed.

4. Personally make an additional inspection at the end of each work shift or upon completion 

of the work, whichever comes first, in order to assure that conditions are safe and no fire will 

start in the area.

5. Ensure that the conditions contained in any fire department permit are being complied with 

by those individuals performing welding and cutting operations.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 61

6. Ensure that any conditions contained in a Marine Chemist Certificate are being complied 

with by those individuals performing welding and cutting operations.

7. Ensure that required ventilation is in place and operating correctly.

8. Stop the repair work if permit conditions are not complied with, or if unsafe conditions are 

discovered or develop during the repair job. Such repair work shall not resume until unsafe 

conditions have been eliminated.

Marine Chemist Certificate Required (Applies to Level II and Level III Welding and Cutting):

No person shall engage in hot work or the use of powder actuated fastening tools in or on the 

spaces listed below until a certificate setting forth that such work can be done safely is issued. 

Such certificates shall be valid only if they are issued by a Marine Chemist certified by the 

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).

A Marine Chemist Certificate shall be required prior to welding and cutting operations on any 

vessel:

1. Within or on the boundaries of cargo tanks which have been used to carry combustible or 

flammable liquids and/or gases, or within spaces adjacent to such cargo tanks.

2. Within or on the boundaries of fuel tanks.

3. On pipe lines, heating coils, pumps, fittings, or other appurtenances connected to cargo 

tanks, fuel tanks or fuel systems.

4. Within the boundaries of engine rooms.

5. Within the boundary of any machinery compartment or space in which the machinery uses 

a flammable or combustible liquid or flammable gas in its operation.

Marine Chemist Certificates shall be issued in strict accordance with the requirements of NFPA 

306 Standard for the Control of Gas Hazards on Vessels.

B. CODE:

C. APPLICABILITY:

D. OCCUPANCY REQUIREMENTS: N/A

E. GUIDELINES--OPERATIONS:

63

Appendix G

Ship Fire Timeline
64 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix G

Ship Fire Timeline

September 16. 1991

09:30:00 Crew takes coffee break

09:39:00 Fire reported to fire department.

UNITS INITIALLY DISPATCHED

E-20, E-41, E-8, E-2, E-9, L-4, L-6, B-4, B-1, U-99, Marine Response 

Team (E-36, E-4, B-7), Medic 10, Medic 16, Air 9

09:44:00 First units on scene (E-20, E-41)

09 45:00 SECOND ALARM

E-18, E-5, E-10, L-8, L-1, B-2

09:50:00 Added: Air-26

10:02:00 Added: Aid-5

10:08:00 THIRD ALARM

E-21, E-16, E-6, E-22, L-3, L-10, B-5

10:14:00 Assistant Chief of Operations

11:49:00 Added: E-3 (Second Fireboat)

12:07:00 FOURTH ALARM

E-35, E-24, E-17, E-25, L-7, L-11

12:11:00 Added: B-55 (Off-shift BC)

12:38:00 Added: B-3

13:27:00 Added: Aid 14

13:31:00 Added: E-38, E-30, E-34, E-13

13:35:00 Added: Aid 31

14:52:00 Added: Medic 1

15:00:00 Approximate time CO2 applied

15:21:00 Added: L-304

15:32:00 Added: E-32

16:36:00 Added: E-37

20:54:00 Added: E-31, E-29, E-11, E-28

21:14:00 Added: Foam 1, E-27

Units kept on scene two more days.
65

Appendix H 

Photographs
66 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

(Photo by Benjamin Benschneider/Seattle Times)

A tug and two fireboats alongside the Omnisea during the fire.

Note at lease nine firefighters visible on board on the starboard side amidships.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 67 (Photo by Philip Schaenman)

The Omnisea tied up to the pier as it was during the fire.
68 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

(Photo by Philip Schaenman)

Drums of aviation gasoline and other petroleum products.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 69 (Photo by Philip Schaenman) e came up from tween 

 .

e and smok

t hold had to be sealed

 . Major columns of fir

tch and tha

eceiving house on deck

another ha ”“house .

 Fish r e looking aft .

e hole in the center of the 

ucturstr

deck through squar

View from super
70 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

(Photo by Philip Schaenman)

Looking across center of ship to nearby residential community.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 71 (Photo by Philip Schaenman) Closeup of hole used to insert C

O2 with coupling welded into place.
72 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

(Photo by Philip Schaenman)

Ammonia tank in hold near fire origin.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 73 (Photo by Philip Schaenman)

Port side – maximum discoloration near 

Hold #3; paint in good condition toward bow; note that the hull did not buckle.
74 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

(Photo by Philip Schaenman)

Steel plate welded over porthole as part of buttoning up the ship prior to CO2 insertion.

Adjacent portholes were stuffed with materials to seal them. Note buckling of deck and railing from heat.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 75 (Photo by Philip Schaenman)

Hatch opening to holds; it, too, had to be sealed.
76 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

(Photo by Philip Schaenman)

Bow of Omnisea. Note amount of compartments and equipment on deck – a complex area for firefighting.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 77 (Photo by Philip Schaenman) Crane used to lift steel plates on board.
78 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

(Photo by Philip Schaenman)

Aft third of the ship was saved, including ship controls, electronics, and engine room.
USFA-TR-058/September 1991 79 (Photo by Philip Schaenman)

Bow end of ship.
80 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

(Photo by Philip Schaenman)

Seattle harbor looking from pier where Omnisea was docked.