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604 OCTOBER TERM, 1995

Syllabus

COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN

COMMITTEE et al. v. FEDERAL ELECTION

COMMISSION

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for

the tenth circuit

No. 95–489. Argued April 15, 1996—Decided June 26, 1996

Before the Colorado Republican Party selected its 1986 senatorial candidate, its Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado Party), a petitioner

here, bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party’s

likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought suit

charging that the Colorado Party had violated the “Party Expenditure

Provision” of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 2

U. S. C. § 441a(d)(3), which imposes dollar limits upon political party “expenditure[s] in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate.” The Colorado Party defended in part by claiming that the expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment as

applied to its advertisements, and filed a counterclaim seeking to raise

a facial challenge to the provision as a whole. The District Court interpreted the “in connection with” language narrowly and held that the

provision did not cover the expenditure at issue. It therefore entered

summary judgment for the Colorado Party, dismissing the counterclaim

as moot. In ordering judgment for the FEC, the Court of Appeals

adopted a somewhat broader interpretation of the provision, which, it

said, both covered this expenditure and satisfied the Constitution.

Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded.

59 F. 3d 1015, vacated and remanded.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O’Connor and Justice Souter,

concluded that the First Amendment prohibits application of the Party

Expenditure Provision to the kind of expenditure at issue here—an

expenditure that the political party has made independently, without

coordination with any candidate. Pp. 613–623.

(a) The outcome is controlled by this Court’s FECA case law. After

weighing the First Amendment interest in permitting candidates (and

their supporters) to spend money to advance their political views,

against a “compelling” governmental interest in protecting the electoral

system from the appearance and reality of corruption, see, e. g., Buckley

v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14–23 (per curiam), the Court has ruled unconstitutional FECA provisions that, inter alia, limited the right of individuals,
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id., at 39–51, and political committees, Federal Election Comm’n v.

National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497, to

make “independent” expenditures not coordinated with a candidate or

a candidate’s campaign, but has permitted other FECA provisions that

imposed contribution limits both when an individual or political committee contributed money directly to a candidate, and when they contributed indirectly by making expenditures that they coordinated with the

candidate, see Buckley, supra, at 23–36, 46–48. The summary judgment record indicates that the expenditure here at issue must be

treated, for constitutional purposes, as an “independent” expenditure

entitled to First Amendment protection, not as an indirect campaign

contribution subject to regulation. There is uncontroverted direct evidence that the Colorado Party developed its advertising campaign independently and not pursuant to any understanding with a candidate.

Since the Government does not point to evidence or legislative findings

suggesting any special corruption problem in respect to political parties’

independent expenditures, the Court’s prior cases forbid regulation of

such expenditures. Pp. 613–619.

(b) The Government’s argument that this expenditure is not “independent,” but is rather a “coordinated expenditure,” which this Court

has treated as a “contribution” that Congress may constitutionally regulate, is rejected. The summary judgment record shows no actual coordination with candidates as a matter of fact. The Government’s claim

for deference to FEC interpretations rendering all party expenditures

“coordinated” is unpersuasive. Federal Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U. S. 27, 28–29, n. 1, distinguished. These regulations and advisory opinions do not represent

an empirical judgment by the FEC that all party expenditures are coordinated with candidates or that party independent and coordinated

expenditures cannot be distinguished in practice. Also unconvincing

are the Government’s contentions that the Colorado Party has conceded

that the expenditure here is “coordinated,” and that such coordination

exists because a party and its candidate are, in some sense, identical.

Pp. 619–623.

(c) Because this expenditure is “independent,” the Court need not

reach the broader question argued by the Colorado Party: whether, in

the special case of political parties, the First Amendment also forbids

congressional efforts to limit coordinated expenditures. While the

Court is not deprived of jurisdiction to consider this facial challenge by

the failure of the parties and the lower courts to focus specifically on the

complex issues involved in determining the constitutionality of political

parties’ coordinated expenditures, that lack of focus provides a prudential reason for the Court not to decide the broader question. This is
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the first case to raise the question, and the Court should defer action

until the lower courts have considered it in light of this decision.

Pp. 623–626.

Justice Kennedy, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice

Scalia, concluded that, on its face, FECA violates the First Amendment when it restricts as a “contribution” a political party’s spending “in

cooperation, consultation, or concert, with . . . a candidate.” 2 U. S. C.

§ 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). The Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (per curiam), had no occasion to consider limitations on political parties’

expenditures, id., at 58, n. 66, and its reasoning upholding ordinary contribution limitations should not be extended to a case that does. Buckley’s central holding is that spending money on one’s own speech must

be permitted, id., at 44–58, and that is what political parties do when

they make the expenditures that § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) restricts as “contribution[s].” Party spending “in cooperation, consultation, or concer[t]

with” a candidate is indistinguishable in substance from expenditures

by the candidate or his campaign committee. The First Amendment

does not permit regulation of the latter, see id., at 54–59, and it should

not permit this regulation of the former. Pp. 626–631.

Justice Thomas, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia,

concluded in Parts I and III that 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d)(3) is unconstitutional not only as applied to petitioners, but also on its face.

Pp. 631–634, 644–648.

(a) The Court should decide the Colorado Party’s facial challenge to

§ 441a(d)(3), addressing the constitutionality of limits on coordinated

expenditures by political parties. That question is squarely before the

Court, and the principal opinion’s reasons for not reaching it are unpersuasive. In addition, concerns for the chilling of First Amendment

expression counsel in favor of resolving the question. Reaching the

facial challenge will make clear the circumstances under which political parties may engage in political speech without running afoul of

§ 441a(d)(3). Pp. 631–634.

(b) Section 441a(d)(3) cannot withstand a facial challenge under the

framework established by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (per curiam).

The anticorruption rationale that the Court has relied on is inapplicable

in the specific context of campaign funding by political parties, since

there is only a minimal threat of corruption when a party spends to

support its candidate or to oppose his competitor, whether or not that

expenditure is made in concert with the candidate. Parties and candidates have traditionally worked together to achieve their common goals,

and when they engage in that work, there is no risk to the Republic.

To the contrary, the danger lies in Government suppression of such

activity. Pp. 644–648.
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Justice Thomas also concluded in Part II that, in resolving the facial

challenge, the Buckley framework should be rejected because there is

no constitutionally significant difference between campaign contributions and expenditures: Both involve core expression and basic associational rights that are central to the First Amendment. Curbs on

such speech must be strictly scrutinized. See, e. g., Federal Election

Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S.

480, 501. Section 441a(d)(3)’s limits on independent and coordinated expenditures fail strict scrutiny because the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling governmental interest in preventing the

fact or appearance of “corruption,” which this Court has narrowly defined as a “financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors,” id., at 497.

Contrary to the Court’s ruling in Buckley, supra, at 28, bribery laws

and disclosure requirements present less restrictive means of preventing corruption than does § 441a(d)(3), which indiscriminately covers

many conceivable instances in which a party committee could exceed

spending limits without any intent to extract an unlawful commitment

from a candidate. Pp. 640–644.

Breyer, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which O’Connor and Souter, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an

opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 626. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined as to Parts I and III, post, p. 631.

Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined,

post, p. 648.

Jan Witold Baran argued the cause for petitioners. With

him on the briefs were Thomas W. Kirby, Carol A. Laham,

and Michael E. Toner.

Solicitor General Days argued the cause for respondent.

With him on the brief were Deputy Solicitor General

Bender, Malcolm L. Stewart, Lawrence M. Noble, Richard

B. Bader, and Rita A. Reimer.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American

Civil Liberties Union et al. by David H. Remes, David H. Miller, Arthur

B. Spitzer, Steven R. Shapiro, Joel M. Gora, and Arthur N. Eisenberg;

for the Democratic National Committee et al. by Joseph E. Sandler and

Robert F. Bauer; for the National Right to Life Committee, Inc., by

James Bopp, Jr., and Richard E. Coleson; and for the Washington Legal
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608 COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN

COMM. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

Opinion of Breyer, J.

Justice Breyer announced the judgment of the Court

and delivered an opinion, in which Justice O’Connor and

Justice Souter join.

In April 1986, before the Colorado Republican Party had

selected its senatorial candidate for the fall’s election, that

party’s Federal Campaign Committee bought radio advertisements attacking Timothy Wirth, the Democratic Party’s

likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC)

charged that this “expenditure” exceeded the dollar limits

that a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (FECA or Act) imposes upon political party “expenditure[s] in connection with” a “general election campaign” for

congressional office. 90 Stat. 486, as amended, 2 U. S. C.

§ 441a(d)(3). This case focuses upon the constitutionality of

those limits as applied to this case. We conclude that the

First Amendment prohibits the application of this provision

to the kind of expenditure at issue here—an expenditure that

the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate.

Foundation et al. by Benjamin L. Ginsberg, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul

D. Kamenar.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Brennan

Center for Justice by Burt Neuborne; and for Common Cause et al. by

Roger M. Witten, Donald J. Simon, and Alan Morrison.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Kentucky et al. by A.

B. Chandler III, Attorney General of Kentucky, Pamela J. Murphy, Deputy Attorney General, Morgan G. Ransdell, Assistant Attorney General,

Sheryl G. Snyder, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut,

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Tom Udall,

Attorney General of New Mexico, W. A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General of West

Virginia; for the Committee for Party Renewal et al. by E. Mark Braden

and Stephen E. Gottlieb; and for the Republican National Committee by

George J. Terwilliger III, John P. Connors, E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Robert L. Hodges, and Darryl S. Lew.
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I

To understand the issues and our holding, one must begin

with FECA as it emerged from Congress in 1974. That Act

sought both to remedy the appearance of a “corrupt” political

process (one in which large contributions seem to buy legislative votes) and to level the electoral playing field by reducing

campaign costs. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25–27

(1976) (per curiam). It consequently imposed limits upon

the amounts that individuals, corporations, “political committees” (such as political action committees, or PAC’s), and

political parties could contribute to candidates for federal

office, and it also imposed limits upon the amounts that candidates, corporations, labor unions, political committees, and

political parties could spend, even on their own, to help a

candidate win election. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 608, 610 (1970 ed.,

Supp. IV).

This Court subsequently examined several of the Act’s

provisions in light of the First Amendment’s free speech and

association protections. See Federal Election Comm’n v.

Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986);

Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480 (1985) (NCPAC); California

Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182

(1981); Buckley, supra. In these cases, the Court essentially weighed the First Amendment interest in permitting

candidates (and their supporters) to spend money to advance

their political views against a “compelling” governmental interest in assuring the electoral system’s legitimacy, protecting it from the appearance and reality of corruption. See

Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 256–263; NCPAC,

supra, at 493–501; California Medical Assn., supra, at 193–

199; Buckley, 424 U. S., at 14–23. After doing so, the Court

found that the First Amendment prohibited some of FECA’s

provisions, but permitted others.
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Most of the provisions this Court found unconstitutional

imposed expenditure limits. Those provisions limited candidates’ rights to spend their own money, id., at 51–54, limited

a candidate’s campaign expenditures, id., at 54–58, limited

the right of individuals to make “independent” expenditures

(not coordinated with the candidate or candidate’s campaign),

id., at 39–51, and similarly limited the right of political

committees to make “independent” expenditures, NCPAC,

supra, at 497. The provisions that the Court found constitutional mostly imposed contribution limits—limits that apply

both when an individual or political committee contributes

money directly to a candidate and also when they indirectly

contribute by making expenditures that they coordinate with

the candidate, § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). See Buckley, supra, at 23–

36. See also 424 U. S., at 46–48; California Medical Assn.,

supra, at 193–199 (limits on contributions to political committees). Consequently, for present purposes, the Act now

prohibits individuals and political committees from making

direct, or indirect, contributions that exceed the following

limits:

(a) For any “person”: $1,000 to a candidate “with respect to any election”; $5,000 to any political committee

in any year; $20,000 to the national committees of a political party in any year; but all within an overall limit

(for any individual in any year) of $25,000. 2 U. S. C.

§§ 441a(a)(1), (3).

(b) For any “multicandidate political committee”:

$5,000 to a candidate “with respect to any election”;

$5,000 to any political committee in any year; and

$15,000 to the national committees of a political party

in any year. § 441a(a)(2).

FECA also has a special provision, directly at issue in this

case, that governs contributions and expenditures by political parties. § 441a(d). This special provision creates, in

part, an exception to the above contribution limits. That
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is, without special treatment, political parties ordinarily

would be subject to the general limitation on contributions

by a “multicandidate political committee” just described.

See § 441a(a)(4). That provision, as we said in subsection

(b) above, limits annual contributions by a “multicandidate political committee” to no more than $5,000 to any candidate. And as also mentioned above, this contribution limit

governs not only direct contributions but also indirect contributions that take the form of coordinated expenditures, defined as “expenditures made . . . in cooperation, consultation,

or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents.”

§ 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). Thus, ordinarily, a party’s coordinated expenditures would be subject to the $5,000 limitation.

However, FECA’s special provision, which we shall call the

“Party Expenditure Provision,” creates a general exception

from this contribution limitation, and from any other limitation on expenditures. It says:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law with

respect to limitations on expenditures or limitations

on contributions, . . . political party [committees] . . .

may make expenditures in connection with the general

election campaign of candidates for Federal office . . . .”

§ 441a(d)(1) (emphasis added).

After exempting political parties from the general contribution and expenditure limitations of the statute, the Party

Expenditure Provision then imposes a substitute limitation

upon party “expenditures” in a senatorial campaign equal to

the greater of $20,000 or “2 cents multiplied by the voting

age population of the State,” § 441a(d)(3)(A)(i), adjusted for

inflation since 1974, § 441a(c). The provision permitted a political party in Colorado in 1986 to spend about $103,000 in

connection with the general election campaign of a candidate

for the United States Senate. See FEC Record, vol. 12,

no. 4, p. 1 (Apr. 1986). (A different provision, not at issue
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in this case, § 441a(d)(2), limits party expenditures in connection with Presidential campaigns. Since this case involves

only the provision concerning congressional races, we do not

address issues that might grow out of the public funding of

Presidential campaigns.)

In January 1986, Timothy Wirth, then a Democratic Congressman, announced that he would run for an open Senate

seat in November. In April, before either the Democratic

primary or the Republican convention, the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado Party or Party),

a petitioner here, bought radio advertisements attacking

Congressman Wirth. The State Democratic Party complained to the FEC. It pointed out that the Colorado Party

had previously assigned its $103,000 general election allotment to the National Republican Senatorial Committee, leaving it without any permissible spending balance. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign

Comm., 454 U. S. 27 (1981) (state party may appoint national

senatorial campaign committee as agent to spend its Party

Expenditure Provision allotment). It argued that the purchase of radio time was an “expenditure in connection with

the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal office,” § 441a(d)(3), which, consequently, exceeded the Party

Expenditure Provision limits.

The FEC agreed with the Democratic Party. It brought

a complaint against the Colorado Party, charging a violation.

The Colorado Party defended in part by claiming that the

Party Expenditure Provision’s expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment—a charge that it repeated in a

counterclaim that said the Colorado Party intended to make

other “expenditures directly in connection with” senatorial elections, App. 68, ¶ 48, and attacked the constitutionality of the entire Party Expenditure Provision. The Federal District Court interpreted the provision’s words “ ‘in

connection with’ the general election campaign of a candidate” narrowly, as meaning only expenditures for advertis-
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ing using “ ‘express words of advocacy of election or defeat.’ ”

839 F. Supp. 1448, 1455 (Colo. 1993) (quoting Buckley, 424

U. S., at 46, n. 52). See also Massachusetts Citizens for

Life, 479 U. S., at 249. As so interpreted, the court held, the

provision did not cover the expenditures here. The court

entered summary judgment for the Colorado Party and dismissed its counterclaim as moot.

Both sides appealed. The Government, for the FEC, argued for a somewhat broader interpretation of the statute—

applying the limits to advertisements containing an “electioneering message” about a “clearly identified candidate,”

FEC Advisory Op. 1985–14, 2 CCH Fed. Election Camp. Fin.

Guide ¶ 5819, p. 11,185 (May 30, 1985)—which, it said, both

covered the expenditure and satisfied the Constitution. The

Court of Appeals agreed. It found the Party Expenditure

Provision applicable, held it constitutional, and ordered judgment in the FEC’s favor. 59 F. 3d 1015, 1023–1024 (CA10

1995).

We granted certiorari primarily to consider the Colorado

Party’s argument that the Party Expenditure Provision violates the First Amendment “either facially or as applied.”

Pet. for Cert. i. For reasons we shall discuss in Part IV,

infra, we consider only the latter question—whether the

Party Expenditure Provision as applied here violates the

First Amendment. We conclude that it does.

II

The summary judgment record indicates that the expenditure in question is what this Court in Buckley called an

“independent” expenditure, not a “coordinated” expenditure

that other provisions of FECA treat as a kind of campaign

“contribution.” See Buckley, supra, at 36–37, 46–47, 78;

NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 498. The record describes how the

expenditure was made. In a deposition, the Colorado Party’s Chairman, Howard Callaway, pointed out that, at the

time of the expenditure, the Party had not yet selected a
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senatorial nominee from among the three individuals vying

for the nomination. App. 195–196. He added that he arranged for the development of the script at his own initiative,

id., at 200, that he, and no one else, approved it, id., at 199,

that the only other politically relevant individuals who might

have read it were the Party’s executive director and political

director, ibid., and that all relevant discussions took place at

meetings attended only by Party staff, id., at 204.

Notwithstanding the above testimony, the Government argued in District Court—and reiterates in passing in its brief

to this Court, Brief for Respondent 27, n. 20—that the

deposition showed that the Party had coordinated the advertisement with its candidates. It pointed to Callaway’s statement that it was the practice of the Party to “coordinat[e]

with the candidate” “campaign strategy,” App. 195, and for

Callaway to be “as involved as [he] could be” with the individuals seeking the Republican nomination, ibid., by making

available to them “all of the assets of the party,” id., at 195–

196. These latter statements, however, are general descriptions of Party practice. They do not refer to the advertising

campaign at issue here or to its preparation. Nor do they

conflict with, or cast significant doubt upon, the uncontroverted direct evidence that this advertising campaign was

developed by the Colorado Party independently and not pursuant to any general or particular understanding with a

candidate. We can find no “genuine” issue of fact in this

respect. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 586–587

(1986). And we therefore treat the expenditure, for constitutional purposes, as an “independent” expenditure, not an

indirect campaign contribution.

So treated, the expenditure falls within the scope of the

Court’s precedents that extend First Amendment protection

to independent expenditures. Beginning with Buckley, the

Court’s cases have found a “fundamental constitutional

difference between money spent to advertise one’s views
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independently of the candidate’s campaign and money contributed to the candidate to be spent on his campaign.”

NCPAC, supra, at 497. This difference has been grounded

in the observation that restrictions on contributions impose

“only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability

to engage in free communication,” Buckley, supra, at 20–21,

because the symbolic communicative value of a contribution

bears little relation to its size, 424 U. S., at 21, and because

such limits leave “persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering

their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with

financial resources,” id., at 28. At the same time, reasonable

contribution limits directly and materially advance the Government’s interest in preventing exchanges of large financial

contributions for political favors. Id., at 26–27.

In contrast, the Court has said that restrictions on independent expenditures significantly impair the ability of individuals and groups to engage in direct political advocacy and

“represent substantial . . . restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech.” Id., at 19. And at the same

time, the Court has concluded that limitations on independent expenditures are less directly related to preventing corruption, since “[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate . . . not only

undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate,

but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given

as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.” Id., at 47.

Given these established principles, we do not see how a

provision that limits a political party’s independent expenditures can escape their controlling effect. A political party’s

independent expression not only reflects its members’ views

about the philosophical and governmental matters that bind

them together, it also seeks to convince others to join those

members in a practical democratic task, the task of creating
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a government that voters can instruct and hold responsible

for subsequent success or failure. The independent expression of a political party’s views is “core” First Amendment

activity no less than is the independent expression of individuals, candidates, or other political committees. See, e. g., Eu

v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489

U. S. 214 (1989).

We are not aware of any special dangers of corruption

associated with political parties that tip the constitutional

balance in a different direction. When this Court considered, and held unconstitutional, limits that FECA had set

on certain independent expenditures by PAC’s, it reiterated

Buckley’s observation that “the absence of prearrangement

and coordination” does not eliminate, but it does help to

“alleviate,” any “danger” that a candidate will understand

the expenditure as an effort to obtain a “quid pro quo.” See

NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 498. The same is true of independent

party expenditures.

We recognize that FECA permits individuals to contribute

more money ($20,000) to a party than to a candidate ($1,000)

or to other political committees ($5,000). 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a).

We also recognize that FECA permits unregulated “soft

money” contributions to a party for certain activities, such

as electing candidates for state office, see § 431(8)(A)(i), or

for voter registration and “get out the vote” drives, see

§ 431(8)(B)(xii). But the opportunity for corruption posed

by these greater opportunities for contributions is, at best,

attenuated. Unregulated “soft money” contributions may

not be used to influence a federal campaign, except when

used in the limited, party-building activities specifically designated in the statute. See § 431(8)(B). Any contribution

to a party that is earmarked for a particular campaign is

considered a contribution to the candidate and is subject

to the contribution limitations. § 441a(a)(8). A party may

not simply channel unlimited amounts of even undesignated

contributions to a candidate, since such direct transfers are
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also considered contributions and are subject to the contribution limits on a “multicandidate political committee.”

§ 441a(a)(2). The greatest danger of corruption, therefore,

appears to be from the ability of donors to give sums up to

$20,000 to a party which may be used for independent party

expenditures for the benefit of a particular candidate. We

could understand how Congress, were it to conclude that the

potential for evasion of the individual contribution limits was

a serious matter, might decide to change the statute’s limitations on contributions to political parties. Cf. California

Medical Assn., 453 U. S., at 197–199 (plurality opinion) (danger of evasion of limits on contribution to candidates justified

prophylactic limitation on contributions to PAC’s). But we

do not believe that the risk of corruption present here could

justify the “markedly greater burden on basic freedoms

caused by” the statute’s limitations on expenditures. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 44. See also id., at 46–47, 51; NCPAC,

supra, at 498. Contributors seeking to avoid the effect of

the $1,000 contribution limit indirectly by donations to the

national party could spend that same amount of money (or

more) themselves more directly by making their own independent expenditures promoting the candidate. See Buckley, supra, at 44–48 (risk of corruption by individuals’ independent expenditures is insufficient to justify limits on such

spending). If anything, an independent expenditure made

possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed

by a party rather than the donor, would seem less likely to

corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent

expenditure made directly by that donor. In any case, the

constitutionally significant fact, present equally in both instances, is the lack of coordination between the candidate

and the source of the expenditure. See Buckley, supra, at

45–46; NCPAC, supra, at 498. This fact prevents us from

assuming, absent convincing evidence to the contrary, that a

limitation on political parties’ independent expenditures is
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necessary to combat a substantial danger of corruption of the

electoral system.

The Government does not point to record evidence or legislative findings suggesting any special corruption problem

in respect to independent party expenditures. See Turner

Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 664 (1994)

(“When the Government defends a regulation on speech as a

means to . . . prevent anticipated harms, it must do more

than simply posit the existence of the disease sought to

be cured” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));

NCPAC, supra, at 498. To the contrary, this Court’s opinions suggest that Congress wrote the Party Expenditure

Provision not so much because of a special concern about

the potentially “corrupting” effect of party expenditures, but

rather for the constitutionally insufficient purpose of reducing what it saw as wasteful and excessive campaign spending. See Buckley, supra, at 57. In fact, rather than indicating a special fear of the corruptive influence of political

parties, the legislative history demonstrates Congress’ general desire to enhance what was seen as an important and

legitimate role for political parties in American elections.

See Federal Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial

Campaign Comm., 454 U. S., at 41 (Party Expenditure Provision was intended to “assur[e] that political parties will

continue to have an important role in federal elections”);

S. Rep. No. 93–689, p. 7 (1974) (“[A] vigorous party system

is vital to American politics . . . . [P]ooling resources from

many small contributors is a legitimate function and an integral part of party politics”); id., at 7–8, 15.

We therefore believe that this Court’s prior case law controls the outcome here. We do not see how a Constitution

that grants to individuals, candidates, and ordinary political

committees the right to make unlimited independent expenditures could deny the same right to political parties. Having

concluded this, we need not consider the Party’s further

claim that the statute’s “in connection with” language, and
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the FEC’s interpretation of that language, are unconstitutionally vague. Cf. Buckley, supra, at 40–44.

III

The Government does not deny the force of the precedent

we have discussed. Rather, it argued below, and the lower

courts accepted, that the expenditure in this case should be

treated under those precedents, not as an “independent expenditure,” but rather as a “coordinated expenditure,” which

those cases have treated as “contributions,” and which those

cases have held Congress may constitutionally regulate.

See, e. g., Buckley, supra, at 23–38.

While the District Court found that the expenditure in

this case was “coordinated,” 839 F. Supp., at 1453, it did not

do so based on any factual finding that the Party had consulted with any candidate in the making or planning of the

advertising campaign in question. Instead, the District

Court accepted the Government’s argument that all party

expenditures should be treated as if they had been coordinated as a matter of law, “[b]ased on Supreme Court precedent and the Commission’s interpretation of the statute,”

ibid. The Court of Appeals agreed with this legal conclusion. 59 F. 3d, at 1024. Thus, the lower courts’ “finding”

of coordination does not conflict with our conclusion, supra,

at 613–614, that the summary judgment record shows no actual coordination as a matter of fact. The question, instead,

is whether the Court of Appeals erred as a legal matter in

accepting the Government’s conclusive presumption that all

party expenditures are “coordinated.” We believe it did.

In support of its argument, the Government points to a

set of legal materials, based on FEC interpretations, that

seem to say or imply that all party expenditures are “coordinated.” These include: (1) an FEC regulation that forbids

political parties to make any “independent expenditures...

in connection with” a “general election campaign,” 11 CFR

§ 110.7(b)(4) (1995); (2) FEC Advisory Opinions that use the
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word “coordinated” to describe the Party Expenditure Provision’s limitations, see, e. g., FEC Advisory Op. 1984–15, 1

CCH Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide ¶ 5766, p. 11,069 (May

31, 1984) (AO 1984–15); FEC Advisory Op. 1988–22, 2 CCH

Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide ¶ 5932, p. 11,471, n. 4 (July

5, 1988) (AO 1988–22); (3) one FEC Advisory Opinion that

says explicitly in a footnote that “coordination with candidates is presumed and ‘independence’ precluded,” ibid.; and

(4) a statement by this Court that “[p]arty committees are

considered incapable of making ‘independent’ expenditures,”

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., supra, at 28–29,

n. 1.

The Government argues, on the basis of these materials,

that the FEC has made an “empirical judgment that party

officials will as a matter of course consult with the party’s

candidates before funding communications intended to influence the outcome of a federal election.” Brief for Respondent 27. The FEC materials, however, do not make

this empirical judgment. For the most part those materials

use the word “coordinated” as a description that does not

necessarily deny the possibility that a party could also make

independent expenditures. See, e. g., AO 1984–15, ¶ 5766,

at 11,069. We concede that one Advisory Opinion says, in

a footnote, that “coordination with candidates is presumed.”

AO 1988–22, ¶ 5932, at 11,471, n. 4. But this statement, like

the others, appears without any internal or external evidence that the FEC means it to embody an empirical judgment (say, that parties, in fact, hardly ever spend money

independently) or to represent the outcome of an empirical

investigation. Indeed, the statute does not require any such

investigation, for it applies both to coordinated and to independent expenditures alike. See § 441a(d)(3) (a “political

party . . . may not make any expenditure” in excess of the

limits (emphasis added)). In any event, language in other

FEC Advisory Opinions suggests the opposite, namely, that

sometimes, in fact, parties do make independent expendi-
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tures. See, e. g., AO 1984–15, ¶ 5766, at 11,069 (“Although

consultation or coordination with the candidate is permissible, it is not required”). In these circumstances, we cannot

take the cited materials as an empirical, or experience-based,

determination that, as a factual matter, all party expenditures are coordinated with a candidate. That being so, we

need not hold, on the basis of these materials, that the expenditures here were “coordinated.”

The Government does not advance any other legal reason

that would require us to accept the FEC’s characterization.

The FEC has not claimed, for example, that, administratively

speaking, it is more difficult to separate a political party’s

“independent,” from its “coordinated,” expenditures than,

say, those of a PAC. Cf. 11 CFR § 109.1 (1995) (distinguishing between independent and coordinated expenditures by

other political groups). Nor can the FEC draw significant

legal support from the footnote in Democratic Senatorial

Campaign Comm., 454 U. S., at 28–29, n. 1, given that this

statement was dicta that purported to describe the regulatory regime as the FEC had described it in a brief.

Nor does the fact that the Party Expenditure Provision

fails to distinguish between coordinated and independent expenditures indicate a congressional judgment that such a distinction is impossible or untenable in the context of political

party spending. Instead, the use of the unmodified term

“expenditure” is explained by Congress’ desire to limit all

party expenditures when it passed the 1974 amendments,

just as it had limited all expenditures by individuals, corporations, and other political groups. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 608(e),

610 (1970 ed., Supp. IV); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 39.

Finally, we recognize that the FEC may have characterized the expenditures as “coordinated” in light of this Court’s

constitutional decisions prohibiting regulation of most independent expenditures. But, if so, the characterization cannot help the Government prove its case. An agency’s simply

calling an independent expenditure a “coordinated expendi-
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ture” cannot (for constitutional purposes) make it one. See,

e. g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429 (1963) (the government “cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional

rights by mere labels”); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372

U. S. 229, 235–238 (1963) (State may not avoid First Amendment’s strictures by applying the label “breach of the peace”

to peaceful demonstrations).

The Government also argues that the Colorado Party has

conceded that the expenditures are “coordinated.” But

there is no such concession in respect to the underlying facts.

To the contrary, the Party’s “Questions Presented” in its petition for certiorari describes the expenditure as one “the

party has not coordinated with its candidate.” See Pet. for

Cert. i. In the lower courts the Party did accept the FEC’s

terminology, but it did so in the context of legal arguments

that did not focus upon the constitutional distinction that we

now consider. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 9–10, n. 8

(denying that the FEC’s labels can control constitutional

analysis). The Government has not referred us to any place

where the Party conceded away or abandoned its legal claim

that Congress may not limit the uncoordinated expenditure

at issue here. And, in any event, we are not bound to decide

a matter of constitutional law based on a concession by the

particular party before the Court as to the proper legal characterization of the facts. Cf. United States Nat. Bank of

Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S.

439, 447 (1993); Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U. S.

611, 623–628 (1948); Young v. United States, 315 U. S. 257,

259 (1942) (recognizing that “our judgments are precedents”

and that the proper understanding of matters of law “cannot

be left merely to the stipulation of parties”).

Finally, the Government and supporting amici argue that

the expenditure is “coordinated” because a party and its candidate are identical, i. e., the party, in a sense, “is” its candidates. We cannot assume, however, that this is so. See,

e. g., W. Keefe, Parties, Politics, and Public Policy in America
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59–74 (5th ed. 1988) (describing parties as “coalitions” of differing interests). Congress chose to treat candidates and

their parties quite differently under the Act, for example,

by regulating contributions from one to the other. See

§ 441a(a)(2)(B). See also 11 CFR §§ 110.2, 110.3(b) (1995).

And we are not certain whether a metaphysical identity

would help the Government, for in that case one might argue

that the absolute identity of views and interests eliminates

any potential for corruption, as would seem to be the case

in the relationship between candidates and their campaign

committees. Cf. Buckley, supra, at 54–59 (Congress may

not limit expenditures by candidate/campaign committee);

First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 790

(1978) (where there is no risk of “corruption” of a candidate,

the Government may not limit even contributions).

IV

The Colorado Party and supporting amici have argued a

broader question than we have decided, for they have

claimed that, in the special case of political parties, the First

Amendment forbids congressional efforts to limit coordinated expenditures as well as independent expenditures.

Because the expenditure before us is an independent expenditure we have not reached this broader question in deciding

the Party’s “as applied” challenge.

We recognize that the Party filed a counterclaim in which

it sought to raise a facial challenge to the Party Expenditure

Provision as a whole. But that counterclaim did not focus

specifically upon coordinated expenditures. See App. 68–69.

Nor did its summary judgment affidavits specifically allege

that the Party intended to make coordinated expenditures

exceeding the statute’s limits. See id., at 159, ¶ 4. While

this lack of focus does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction

to consider a facial challenge to the Party Expenditure Provision as overbroad or as unconstitutional in all applications,

it does provide a prudential reason for this Court not to
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decide the broader question, especially since it may not be

necessary to resolve the entire current dispute. If, in fact,

the Party wants to make only independent expenditures

like those before us, its counterclaim is mooted by our resolution of its “as applied” challenge. Cf. Renne v. Geary, 501

U. S. 312, 323–324 (1991) (facial challenge should generally

not be entertained when an “as-applied” challenge could resolve the case); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S.

491, 503–504 (1985).

More importantly, the opinions of the lower courts, and the

parties’ briefs in this case, did not squarely isolate, and address, party expenditures that in fact are coordinated, nor

did they examine, in that context, relevant similarities or

differences with similar expenditures made by individuals or

other political groups. Indeed, to our knowledge, this is the

first case in the 20-year history of the Party Expenditure

Provision to suggest that in-fact coordinated expenditures

by political parties are protected from congressional regulation by the First Amendment, even though this Court’s

prior cases have permitted regulation of similarly coordinated expenditures by individuals and other political groups.

See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 46–47. This issue is complex. As

Justice Kennedy points out, post, at 629–630, party coordinated expenditures do share some of the constitutionally relevant features of independent expenditures. But many such

expenditures are also virtually indistinguishable from simple

contributions (compare, for example, a donation of money

with direct payment of a candidate’s media bills, see Buckley,

supra, at 46). Moreover, political parties also share relevant

features with many PAC’s, both having an interest in, and

devoting resources to, the goal of electing candidates who

will “work to further” a particular “political agenda,” which

activity would benefit from coordination with those candidates. Post, at 630. See, e. g., NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 490 (describing the purpose and activities of the National Conservative PAC); id., at 492 (coordinated expenditures by PAC’s are
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subject to FECA contribution limitations). Thus, a holding

on in-fact coordinated party expenditures necessarily implicates a broader range of issues than may first appear, including the constitutionality of party contribution limits.

But the focus of this litigation, and of the lower court opinions, has not been on such issues, but rather on whether the

Government may conclusively deem independent party expenditures to be coordinated. This lack of focus may reflect,

in part, the litigation strategy of the parties. The Government has denied that any distinction can be made between a

party’s independent and its coordinated expenditures. The

Colorado Party, for its part, did not challenge a different provision of the statute—a provision that imposes a $5,000 limit

on any contribution by a “multicandidate political committee” (including a coordinated expenditure) and which would

apply to party coordinated expenditures if the entire Party

Expenditure Provision were struck from the statute as unconstitutional. See §§ 441a(a)(2), (4), (7)(B)(i). Rather than

challenging the constitutionality of this provision as well,

thereby making clear that it was challenging Congress’ authority to regulate in-fact coordinated party expenditures,

the Party has made an obscure severability argument that

would leave party coordinated expenditures exempt from

that provision. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 11, n. 9.

While these strategies do not deprive the parties of a right

to adjudicate the counterclaim, they do provide a reason for

this Court to defer consideration of the broader issues until

the lower courts have reconsidered the question in light of

our current opinion.

Finally, we note that neither the parties nor the lower

courts have considered whether or not Congress would have

wanted the Party Expenditure Provision’s limitations to stand

were they to apply only to coordinated, and not to independent, expenditures. See Buckley, supra, at 108; NCPAC,

supra, at 498. This nonconstitutional ground for exempting party coordinated expenditures from FECA limitations
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should be briefed and considered before addressing the

constitutionality of such regulation. See United States v.

Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 92, and n. 9 (1985).

Justice Thomas disagrees and would reach the broader

constitutional question notwithstanding the above prudential

considerations. In fact, he would reach a great number of

issues neither addressed below, nor presented by the facts of

this case, nor raised by the parties, for he believes it appropriate here to overrule sua sponte this Court’s entire campaign finance jurisprudence, developed in numerous cases

over the last 20 years. See post, at 635–644. Doing so

seems inconsistent with this Court’s view that it is ordinarily

“inappropriate for us to reexamine” prior precedent “without the benefit of the parties’ briefing,” since the “principles

that animate our policy of stare decisis caution against overruling a longstanding precedent on a theory not argued by

the parties.” United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855, 856 (1996). In our view,

given the important competing interests involved in campaign finance issues, we should proceed cautiously, consistent

with this precedent, and remand for further proceedings.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals

is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

Justice Kennedy, with whom The Chief Justice and

Justice Scalia join, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part.

In agreement with Justice Thomas, post, at 631–634, I

would hold that the Colorado Republican Party (Party), in

its pleadings in the District Court and throughout this litigation, has preserved its claim that the constraints imposed by

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), both on

its face and as interpreted by the Federal Elections Commission (FEC), violate the First Amendment.
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In the principal opinion’s view, the FEC’s conclusive presumption that all political party spending relating to identified candidates is “coordinated” cannot be squared with the

First Amendment. Ante, at 619–623. The principal opinion finds the presumption invalid, and I agree with much of

the reasoning behind that conclusion. The quarrel over the

FEC’s presumption is beside the point, however, for under

the statute it is both burdensome and quite unrealistic for

a political party to attempt the expenditure of funds on a

candidate’s behalf (or against other candidates) without running afoul of FECA’s spending limitations.

Indeed, the principal opinion’s reasoning with respect to

the presumption illuminates the deficiencies in the statutory

provision as a whole as it constrains the speech and political

activities of political parties. The presumption is a logical,

though invalid, implementation of the statute, which restricts as a “contribution” a political party’s spending “in

cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request

or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents.” 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). While

the statutory provision applies to any “person,” its obvious

purpose and effect when applied to political parties, as the

FEC’s presumption reflects, is to restrict any party’s spending in a specific campaign for or against a candidate and so

to burden a party in expending its own money for its own

speech.

The central holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976)

(per curiam), is that spending money on one’s own speech

must be permitted, id., at 44–58, and this is what political

parties do when they make the expenditures FECA restricts. FECA calls spending of this nature a “contribution,” § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i), and it is true that contributions can

be restricted consistent with Buckley, supra, at 23–38. As

the principal opinion acknowledges, however, and as our

cases hold, we cannot allow the Government’s suggested

labels to control our First Amendment analysis. Ante, at
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621–622. See also, e. g., Landmark Communications, Inc.

v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829, 843 (1978) (“Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake”). In Buckley, we concluded that

contribution limitations imposed only “marginal restriction[s]” on the contributor’s First Amendment rights, 424

U. S., at 20, because certain attributes of contributions make

them less like “speech” for First Amendment purposes:

“A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The

quantity of communication by the contributor does not

increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution,

since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated,

symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the

contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity

of the contributor’s support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a

candidate or campaign organization thus involves little

direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a

contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.

While contributions may result in political expression if

spent by a candidate or an association to present views

to the voters, the transformation of contributions into

political debate involves speech by someone other than

the contributor.” Id., at 21 (footnote omitted).

We had no occasion in Buckley to consider possible First

Amendment objections to limitations on spending by parties.

Id., at 58, n. 66. While our cases uphold contribution limitations on individuals and associations, see id., at 23–38; California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453 U. S.

182, 193–199 (1981) (plurality opinion), political party spending “in cooperation, consultation, or concert with” a candi-
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date does not fit within our description of “contributions” in

Buckley. In my view, we should not transplant the reasoning of cases upholding ordinary contribution limitations to

a case involving FECA’s restrictions on political party

spending.

The First Amendment embodies a “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should

be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Times

Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964). Political parties

have a unique role in serving this principle; they exist to

advance their members’ shared political beliefs. See, e. g.,

Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm.,

489 U. S. 214 (1989); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234,

250 (1957). Cf. Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U. S.

186, 250–251 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). A party performs this function, in part, by “identify[ing] the people who

constitute the association, and . . . limit[ing] the association

to those people only.” Democratic Party of United States

v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U. S. 107, 122 (1981).

Having identified its members, however, a party can give

effect to their views only by selecting and supporting candidates. A political party has its own traditions and principles

that transcend the interests of individual candidates and

campaigns; but in the context of particular elections, candidates are necessary to make the party’s message known and

effective, and vice versa.

It makes no sense, therefore, to ask, as FECA does, whether

a party’s spending is made “in cooperation, consultation, or

concert with” its candidate. The answer in most cases will be

yes, but that provides more, not less, justification for holding

unconstitutional the statute’s attempt to control this type of

party spending, which bears little resemblance to the contributions discussed in Buckley. Supra, at 627–628 and this

page. Party spending “in cooperation, consultation, or concert with” its candidates of necessity “communicate[s] the underlying basis for the support,” 424 U. S., at 21, i. e., the hope
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that he or she will be elected and will work to further the

party’s political agenda.

The problem is not just the absence of a basis in our First

Amendment cases for treating the party’s spending as contributions. The greater difficulty posed by the statute is its

stifling effect on the ability of the party to do what it exists

to do. It is fanciful to suppose that limiting party spending

of the type at issue here “does not in any way infringe the

contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues,”

ibid., since it would be impractical and imprudent, to say the

least, for a party to support its own candidates without some

form of “cooperation” or “consultation.” The party’s speech,

legitimate on its own behalf, cannot be separated from

speech on the candidate’s behalf without constraining the

party in advocating its most essential positions and pursuing

its most basic goals. The party’s form of organization and

the fact that its fate in an election is inextricably intertwined

with that of its candidates cannot provide a basis for the

restrictions imposed here. See Federal Election Comm’n

v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S.

480, 494–495 (1985).

We have a constitutional tradition of political parties and

their candidates engaging in joint First Amendment activity;

we also have a practical identity of interests between the two

entities during an election. Party spending “in cooperation,

consultation, or concert with” a candidate therefore is indistinguishable in substance from expenditures by the candidate or his campaign committee. We held in Buckley that

the First Amendment does not permit regulation of the latter, see 424 U. S., at 54–59, and it should not permit this

regulation of the former. Congress may have authority,

consistent with the First Amendment, to restrict undifferentiated political party contributions which satisfy the constitutional criteria we discussed in Buckley, but that type of regulation is not at issue here.
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I would resolve the Party’s First Amendment claim in

accord with these principles rather than remit the Party to

further protracted proceedings. Because the principal opinion would do otherwise, I concur only in the judgment.

Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice and

Justice Scalia join as to Parts I and III, concurring in the

judgment and dissenting in part.

I agree that petitioners’ rights under the First Amendment have been violated, but I think we should reach the

facial challenge in this case in order to make clear the circumstances under which political parties may engage in political speech without running afoul of 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d)(3).

In resolving that challenge, I would reject the framework

established by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), for analyzing the constitutionality of campaign finance laws and hold that § 441a(d)(3)’s limits on independent

and coordinated expenditures fail strict scrutiny. But even

under Buckley, § 441a(d)(3) cannot stand, because the anticorruption rationale that we have relied upon in sustaining

other campaign finance laws is inapplicable where political

parties are the subject of such regulation.

I

As an initial matter, I write to make clear that we should

decide the Colorado Republican Party’s (Party’s) facial challenge to § 441a(d)(3) and thus address the constitutionality of

limits on coordinated expenditures by political parties. Justice Breyer’s reasons for not reaching the facial constitutionality of the statute are unpersuasive. In addition, concerns for the chilling of First Amendment expression counsel

in favor of resolving that question.

After the Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought

this action against the Party, the Party counterclaimed that

“the limits on its expenditures in connection with the general
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election campaign for the Office of United States Senator

from the State of Colorado imposed by 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d)

are unconstitutional, both facially and as applied.” App. 68.

Though Justice Breyer faults the Party for not “focus[ing]

specifically upon coordinated expenditures,” ante, at 623,

the term “expenditures” certainly includes both coordinated

as well as independent expenditures.1 See 2 U. S. C.

§ 431(9)(A) (“The term ‘expenditure’ includes . . . any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift

of money or anything of value, made by any person for the

purpose of influencing any election for Federal office” (emphasis added)). Moreover, at the time the Party filed its

counterclaim, all party expenditures were treated by law as

coordinated, see Federal Election Comm’n v. Democratic

Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U. S. 27, 28–29, n. 1

(1981), so a reference to expenditures by a party was tantamount to a reference to coordinated expenditures.

Given the liberal nature of the rules governing civil pleading, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8, the Party’s straightforward

allegation of the unconstitutionality of § 441a(d)(3)’s expenditure limits clearly suffices to raise the claim that neither

independent nor coordinated expenditures may be regulated

consistently with the First Amendment. Indeed, that is

precisely how the Court of Appeals appears to have read the

counterclaim. The court expressly said that it was “analyzing the constitutionality of limits on coordinated expenditures by political committees,” 59 F. 3d 1015, 1024 (CA10

1995), under § 441a(d)(3).

For the same reasons, the fact that the Party’s summary

judgment affidavits did not “specifically allege,” ante, at 623,

that the Party intended to make coordinated expenditures

is also immaterial. The affidavits made clear that, but for

1 Justice Breyer acknowledges as much when he asserts earlier in

his opinion that “the unmodified term ‘expenditure’ ” reflects a congressional intent “to limit all party expenditures.” Ante, at 621 (emphasis

in original).
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§ 441a(d)(3), the Party would spend in excess of the limits

imposed by that statute, see App. 159 (“[T]he State Party

intends to pay for communications within the spending limits

of [§ 441]. . . . However, the State Party would also like to

pay for communications which costs [sic] exceed the spending limits of [§ 441a(d)], but will not do so due to the deterrent and chilling effect of the statute”), as did the Party’s

brief in this Court, see Brief for Petitioners 23–24 (“The Colorado Party is ready, willing and able to make expenditures

expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates for

federal office that would exceed the limits imposed by

§ 441a(d), but it has been deterred from doing so by the obvious and credible threat of FEC enforcement actions”).

Finally, though Justice Breyer notes that this is the first

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) case to raise

the constitutional validity of limits on coordinated expenditures, see ante, at 624, that is, at best, an argument against

granting certiorari. It is too late for arguments like that

now. The case is here, and we needlessly protract this litigation by remanding this important issue to the Court of

Appeals. Nor is the fact that the “issue is complex,” ibid.,

a good reason for avoiding it. We do not sit to decide only

easy cases. And while it may be true that no court has ever

asked whether expenditures that are “in fact” coordinated

may be regulated under the First Amendment, see ibid., I

do not see how the existence of an “in fact” coordinated

expenditure would change our analysis of the facial constitutionality of § 441a(d)(3), since courts in facial challenges

under the First Amendment routinely consider applications of the relevant statute other than the application before

the court. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612

(1973). Whether or not there are facts in the record to support the finding that this particular expenditure was actually

coordinated with a candidate, we are not, contrary to the

suggestion of Justice Breyer, incapable of considering

the Government’s interest in regulating such expenditures
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and testing the fit between that end and the means used to

achieve it.2

The validity of § 441a(d)(3)’s controls on coordinated expenditures is an open question that, if left unanswered, will

inhibit the exercise of legitimate First Amendment activity

nationwide. All Justice Breyer resolves is that when a

political party spends money in support of a candidate (or

against his opponent) and the Government cannot thereafter

prove any coordination between the party and the candidate,

the party cannot be punished by the Government for that

spending. This settles little, if anything. Parties are left

to wonder whether their speech is protected by the First

Amendment when the Government can show—presumably

with circumstantial evidence—a link between the party and

the candidate with respect to the speech in question. And

of course, one of the main purposes of a political party is to

support its candidates in elections.

The constitutionality of limits on coordinated expenditures

by political parties is squarely before us. We should address

this important question now, instead of leaving political parties in a state of uncertainty about the types of First Amendment expression in which they are free to engage.

2 Justice Breyer’s remaining arguments for avoiding the facial challenge are straw men. See ante, at 625 (if § 441a(d)(3) were invalidated in

its entirety, other FECA provisions that the Party has not challenged

might apply to coordinated party expenditures); ibid. (if § 441a(d)(3) were

upheld as to coordinated expenditures but invalidated as to independent

expenditures, issues of severability would be raised). That resolution of

the primary question in this case (the constitutionality of § 441a(d)(3) with

respect to all expenditures) might generate issues not previously considered (such as severability) is no reason for not deciding the question itself.

Without suggesting that remand is the only appropriate way to deal with

possible corollary matters in this case or that these arguments have merit,

I point out that we can, of course, decide the central question without

ruling on the issues that concern Justice Breyer.
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II

A

Critical to Justice Breyer’s reasoning is the distinction

between contributions 3 and independent expenditures that

we first drew in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per

curiam). Though we said in Buckley that controls on

spending and giving “operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities,” id., at 14, we invalidated the expenditure limits of FECA and upheld the Act’s

contribution limits. The justification we gave for the differing results was this: “The expenditure limitations . . . represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on

the quantity and diversity of political speech,” id., at 19,

whereas “limitation[s] upon the amount that any one person

or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee

entai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s

ability to engage in free communication,” id., at 20–21. This

conclusion was supported mainly by two assertions about the

nature of contributions: First, though contributions may result in speech, that speech is by the candidate and not by the

contributor; and second, contributions express only general

support for the candidate but do not communicate the reasons for that support. Id., at 21. Since Buckley, our campaign finance jurisprudence has been based in large part on

this distinction between contributions and expenditures.

See, e. g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U. S. 238, 259–260, 261–262

(1986); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative

Political Action Comm. (NCPAC), 470 U. S. 480, 497 (1985);

3 Coordinated expenditures are by statute categorized as contributions.

See 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (“[E]xpenditures made by any person in

cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion

of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall

be considered to be a contribution to such candidate”).
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California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453

U. S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion).

In my view, the distinction lacks constitutional significance, and I would not adhere to it. As Chief Justice Burger

put it: “[C]ontributions and expenditures are two sides of the

same First Amendment coin.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.,

at 241 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).4 Contributions and expenditures both involve core First Amendment expression because they further the “[d]iscussion of

public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates

...integral to the operation of the system of government

established by our Constitution.” Id., at 14. When an individual donates money to a candidate or to a partisan organization, he enhances the donee’s ability to communicate a message and thereby adds to political debate, just as when that

individual communicates the message himself. Indeed, the

individual may add more to political discourse by giving

rather than spending, if the donee is able to put the funds to

more productive use than can the individual. The contribution of funds to a candidate or to a political group thus fosters

the “free discussion of governmental affairs,” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966), just as an expenditure does.5

4 Three Members of the Buckley Court thought the distinction untenable

at the time, see 424 U. S., at 241 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part); id., at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part); id., at 290 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part), and another Member disavowed it subsequently, see Federal Election Comm’n v. NCPAC, 470 U. S. 480, 518–521 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652,

678 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that distinction “should have

little, if any, weight in reviewing corporate participation in candidate

elections”). 5 See H. Alexander, Money in Politics 234 (1972): “The constitutional

arguments against limiting campaign spending also apply against limiting

contributions; specifically, it is the right of an individual to spend his

money to support a congenial viewpoint . . . . Some views are heard only

if interested individuals are willing to support financially the candidate or

committee voicing the position. To be widely heard, mass communica-
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Giving and spending in the electoral process also involve

basic associational rights under the First Amendment. See

BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First

Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 Calif. L. Rev.

1045, 1064 (1985) (hereinafter BeVier). As we acknowledged in Buckley, “ ‘[e]ffective advocacy of both public and

private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.’ ” 424 U. S., at 15

(quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S.

449, 460 (1958)). Political associations allow citizens to pool

their resources and make their advocacy more effective, and

such efforts are fully protected by the First Amendment.

Federal Election Comm’n v. NCPAC, supra, at 494. If an

individual is limited in the amount of resources he can contribute to the pool, he is most certainly limited in his ability

to associate for purposes of effective advocacy. See Citizens

Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 296 (1981) (“To place a . . . limit . . . on

individuals wishing to band together to advance their views

. . . is clearly a restraint on the right of association”). And

if an individual cannot be subject to such limits, neither can

political associations be limited in their ability to give as a

means of furthering their members’ viewpoints. As we

have said, “[a]ny interference with the freedom of a party is

simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents.” Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957)

(plurality opinion).6

tions may be necessary, and they are costly. By extension, then, the contribution of money is a contribution to freedom of political debate.” 6 To illustrate the point that giving and spending in the political process

implicate the same First Amendment values, I note that virtually everything Justice Breyer says about the importance of free independent

expenditures applies with equal force to coordinated expenditures and contributions. For instance, Justice Breyer states that “[a] political party’s independent expression not only reflects its members’ views about the

philosophical and governmental matters that bind them together, it also

seeks to convince others to join those members in a practical democratic
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Turning from similarities to differences, I can discern

only one potentially meaningful distinction between contributions and expenditures. In the former case, the funds

pass through an intermediary—some individual or entity responsible for organizing and facilitating the dissemination of

the message—whereas in the latter case they may not necessarily do so. But the practical judgment by a citizen that

another person or an organization can more effectively deploy funds for the good of a common cause than he can ought

not deprive that citizen of his First Amendment rights.

Whether an individual donates money to a candidate or

group who will use it to promote the candidate or whether

the individual spends the money to promote the candidate

himself, the individual seeks to engage in political expression

and to associate with like-minded persons. A contribution

is simply an indirect expenditure; though contributions and

expenditures may thus differ in form, they do not differ in

substance. As one commentator cautioned, “let us not lose

sight of the speech.” Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer

First Amendment, 1982 S. Ct. Rev. 243, 258.

Echoing the suggestion in Buckley that contributions have

less First Amendment value than expenditures because they

do not involve speech by the donor, see 424 U. S., at 21, the

Court has sometimes rationalized limitations on contributions by referring to contributions as “speech by proxy.”

See, e. g., California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election

Comm’n, 453 U. S., at 196 (Marshall, J.) (plurality opinion).

The “speech by proxy” label is, however, an ineffective tool

for distinguishing contributions from expenditures. Even in

the case of a direct expenditure, there is usually some gotask, the task of creating a government that voters can instruct and hold

responsible for subsequent success or failure.” Ante, at 615–616. “Coordinated” expression by political parties, of course, shares those precise

attributes. The fact that an expenditure is prearranged with the candidate—presumably to make it more effective in the election—does not take

away from its fundamental democratic purposes.
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between that facilitates the dissemination of the spender’s

message—for instance, an advertising agency or a television

station. See Powe, supra, at 258–259. To call a contribution “speech by proxy” thus does little to differentiate it from

an expenditure. See Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 243–244,

and n. 7 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part). The only possible difference is that contributions

involve an extra step in the proxy chain. But again, that is

a difference in form, not substance.

Moreover, we have recently recognized that where the

“proxy” speech is endorsed by those who give, that speech

is a fully protected exercise of the donors’ associational

rights. In Federal Election Comm’n v. NCPAC, we

explained:

“[T]he ‘proxy speech’ approach is not useful . . . [where]

the contributors obviously like the message they are

hearing from [the] organizatio[n] and want to add their

voices to that message; otherwise they would not part

with their money. To say that their collective action

in pooling their resources to amplify their voices is not

entitled to full First Amendment protection would subordinate the voices of those of modest means as opposed

to those sufficiently wealthy to be able to buy expensive

media ads with their own resources.” 470 U. S., at 495.

The other justification in Buckley for the proposition that

contribution caps only marginally restrict speech—that is,

that a contribution signals only general support for the candidate but indicates nothing about the reasons for that support—is similarly unsatisfying. Assuming the assertion is

descriptively accurate (which is certainly questionable), it

still cannot mean that giving is less important than spending

in terms of the First Amendment. A campaign poster that

reads simply “We support candidate Smith” does not seem

to me any less deserving of constitutional protection than

one that reads “We support candidate Smith because we like
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his position on agriculture subsidies.” Both express a political opinion. Even a pure message of support, unadorned

with reasons, is valuable to the democratic process.

In sum, unlike the Buckley Court, I believe that contribution limits infringe as directly and as seriously upon freedom

of political expression and association as do expenditure limits. The protections of the First Amendment do not depend

upon so fine a line as that between spending money to support a candidate or group and giving money to the candidate

or group to spend for the same purpose. In principle, people

and groups give money to candidates and other groups for

the same reason that they spend money in support of those

candidates and groups: because they share social, economic,

and political beliefs and seek to have those beliefs affect governmental policy. I think that the Buckley framework for

analyzing the constitutionality of campaign finance laws is

deeply flawed. Accordingly, I would not employ it, as Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy do.

B

Instead, I begin with the premise that there is no constitutionally significant difference between campaign contributions and expenditures: Both forms of speech are central

to the First Amendment. Curbs on protected speech, we

have repeatedly said, must be strictly scrutinized. See Federal Election Comm’n v. NCPAC, supra, at 501; Citizens

Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S., at 294; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,

435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978).7 I am convinced that under tradi7 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the Court purported to scrutinize strictly the contribution provisions as well as the expenditure rules.

See id., at 23 (FECA’s contribution and expenditures limits “both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests”); id., at 25 (contribution limits, like expenditure limits, are “ ‘subject to the closest scrutiny’ ” (citation

omitted)). It has not gone unnoticed, however, that we seemed more forgiving in our review of the contribution provisions than of the expenditure

rules. See, e. g., California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n,
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tional strict scrutiny, broad prophylactic caps on both spending and giving in the political process, like § 441a(d)(3), are

unconstitutional.

The formula for strict scrutiny is, of course, well established. It requires both a compelling governmental interest

and legislative means narrowly tailored to serve that interest. In the context of campaign finance reform, the only

governmental interest that we have accepted as compelling

is the prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption, see Federal Election Comm’n v. NCPAC, 470 U. S., at

496–497, and we have narrowly defined “corruption” as a

“financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors,” id., at

497.8 As for the means-ends fit under strict scrutiny, we

have specified that “[w]here at all possible, government must

curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech

that does not pose the danger that has prompted regulation.”

Federal Election Comm’n v. MCFL, 479 U. S., at 265.

In Buckley, we expressly stated that the means adopted

must be “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment” of

First Amendment rights. 424 U. S., at 25. But the Buckley Court summarily rejected the argument that, because

less restrictive means of preventing corruption existed—for

instance, bribery laws and disclosure requirements—FECA’s

contribution provisions were invalid. Bribery laws, the

Court said, “deal with only the most blatant and specific

attempts of those with money to influence governmental

action,” id., at 28, suggesting that those means were inade453 U. S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion) (contributions are “not the sort

of political advocacy that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full First

Amendment protection”). But see id., at 201–202 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (under Buckley, there is no lesser

standard of review for contributions as opposed to expenditures). 8 As I explain in Part III, infra, the interest in preventing corruption is

inapplicable when the subject of the regulation is a political party. My

analysis here is more general, however, and applies to all individuals and

entities subject to campaign finance limits.
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quate to serve the governmental interest. With respect to

disclosure rules, the Court admitted that they serve “many

salutary purposes” but said that Congress was “entitled

to conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure, and

that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant.” Ibid. Finally, the Court noted that contribution caps leave people free to engage in independent political

speech, to volunteer their services, and to contribute money

to a “limited but nonetheless substantial extent.” Ibid.

In my opinion, FECA’s monetary caps fail the narrow

tailoring test. Addressing the constitutionality of FECA’s

contribution caps, the Buckley appellants argued:

“If a small minority of political contributions are given

to secure appointments for the donors or some other

quid pro quo, that cannot serve to justify prohibiting all

large contributions, the vast majority of which are given

not for any such purpose but to further the expression

of political views which the candidate and donor share.

Where First Amendment rights are involved, a blunderbuss approach which prohibits mostly innocent speech

cannot be held a means narrowly and precisely directed

to the governmental interest in the small minority of

contributions that are not innocent.” Brief for Appellants in Buckley v. Valeo, O. T. 1975, Nos. 75–436 and

75–437, pp. 117–118.

The Buckley appellants were, to my mind, correct. Broad

prophylactic bans on campaign expenditures and contributions are not designed with the precision required by the

First Amendment because they sweep protected speech

within their prohibitions.

Section 441a(d)(3), in particular, suffers from this infirmity.

It flatly bans all expenditures by all national and state party

committees in excess of certain dollar limits, without any

evidence that covered committees who exceed those limits

are in fact engaging, or likely to engage, in bribery or any-
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thing resembling it. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of

Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 689 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)

(where statute “extends to speech that has the mere potential for producing social harm” it should not be held to satisfy

the narrow tailoring requirement (emphasis in original)).

Thus, the statute indiscriminately covers the many conceivable instances in which a party committee could exceed the

spending limits without any intent to extract an unlawful

commitment from a candidate. Cf. Schaumburg v. Citizens

for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980) (State

may not, in effort to stop fraud in charitable solicitations,

“lump” truly charitable organizations “with those that in fact

are using the charitable label as a cloak for profitmaking and

refuse to employ more precise measures to separate one kind

from the other”). As one commentator has observed: “[I]t

must not be forgotten that a large number of contributions

are made without any hope of specific gain: for the promotion

of a program, because of enthusiasm for a candidate, or to

promote what the giver vaguely conceives to be the national

interest.” L. Overacker, Money in Elections 192 (1974).

In contrast, federal bribery laws are designed to punish

and deter the corrupt conduct the Government seeks to prevent under FECA, and disclosure laws work to make donors

and donees accountable to the public for any questionable

financial dealings in which they may engage. Cf. Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, supra, at 637–638

(explaining that “less intrusive” means of preventing fraud

in charitable solicitation are “the penal laws [that can be]

used to punish such conduct directly” and “disclosure of the

finances of charitable organizations”). In light of these

alternatives, wholesale limitations that cover contributions

having nothing to do with bribery—but with speech central

to the First Amendment—are not narrowly tailored.

Buckley’s rationale for the contrary conclusion, see supra,

at 641–642, is faulty. That bribery laws are not completely

effective in stamping out corruption is no justification for the
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conclusion that prophylactic controls on funding activity are

narrowly tailored. The First Amendment limits Congress

to legislative measures that do not abridge the Amendment’s

guaranteed freedoms, thereby constraining Congress’ ability

to accomplish certain goals. Similarly, that other modes of

expression remain open to regulated individuals or groups

does not mean that a statute is the least restrictive means

of addressing a particular social problem. A statute could,

of course, be more restrictive than necessary while still leaving open some avenues for speech.9

III

Were I convinced that the Buckley framework rested on a

principled distinction between contributions and expenditures, which I am not, I would nevertheless conclude that

§ 441a(d)(3)’s limits on political parties violate the First

Amendment. Under Buckley and its progeny, a substantial

threat of corruption must exist before a law purportedly

9 Justice Stevens submits that we should “accord special deference to

[Congress’] judgment on questions related to the extent and nature of

limits on campaign spending,” post, at 650, a stance that the Court of

Appeals also adopted, see 59 F. 3d 1015, 1024 (CA10 1995). This position

poses great risk to the First Amendment, in that it amounts to letting the

fox stand watch over the henhouse. There is good reason to think that

campaign reform is an especially inappropriate area for judicial deference

to legislative judgment. See generally BeVier 1074–1081. What the argument for deference fails to acknowledge is the potential for legislators

to set the rules of the electoral game so as to keep themselves in power

and to keep potential challengers out of it. See id., at 1075 (“ ‘Courts

must police inhibitions on . . . political activity because we cannot trust

elected officials to do so’ ” (emphasis deleted)) (quoting J. Ely, Democracy

and Distrust 106 (1980)). See also R. Winter, Political Financing and the

Constitution, 486 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 34, 40, 48 (1986). Indeed, history demonstrates that the most significant effect of election reform has been not to purify public service, but to protect incumbents and

increase the influence of special interest groups. See BeVier 1078–1080.

When Congress seeks to ration political expression in the electoral process, we ought not simply acquiesce in its judgment.
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aimed at the prevention of corruption will be sustained

against First Amendment attack.10 Just as some of the

monetary limits in the Buckley line of cases were held to

be invalid because the Government interest in stemming corruption was inadequate under the circumstances to justify

the restrictions on speech, so too is § 441a(d)(3) invalid.11

The Government asserts that the purpose of § 441a(d)(3) is

to prevent the corruption of candidates and elected representatives by party officials. The Government does not explain precisely what it means by “corruption,” however; 12 the

closest thing to an explanation the Government offers is that

“corruption” is “ ‘the real or imagined coercive influence of

large financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on

their actions if elected to office.’ ” Brief for Respondent 35

(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 25). We so defined

10 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 45–47 (striking down limits on independent expenditures because the “advocacy restricted by the provision

does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption”);

Federal Election Comm’n v. MCFL, 479 U. S. 238, 263 (1986) (invalidating

caps on campaign expenditures by incorporated political associations because spending by such groups “does not pose [any] threat” of corruption);

Federal Election Comm’n v. NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 498 (striking down limits on independent expenditures by political action committees because “a

quid pro quo for improper commitments” in that context was a “hypothetical possibility”); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 297 (1981) (stating that “Buckley does not

support limitations on contributions to committees formed to favor or oppose ballot measures” because anticorruption rationale is inapplicable);

First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 790 (1978) (concluding

that limits on referendum speech by corporations violate First Amendment because “[t]he risk of corruption . . . simply is not present”). 11 While Justice Breyer chides me for taking the position that I

would not adhere to Buckley, see ante, at 626, and suggests that my

approach to this case is thus insufficiently “cautiou[s],” ibid., he ignores

this Part of my opinion, in which I explain why limits on coordinated

expenditures are unconstitutional even under the Buckley line of

precedent. 12 Nor, for that matter, does Justice Breyer explain what sorts of quid

pro quos a party could extract from a candidate. Cf. ante, at 615.
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corruption in Buckley for purposes of reviewing ceilings on

giving or spending by individuals, groups, political committees, and candidates. See id., at 23, 35, 39. But we did not

in that case consider the First Amendment status of FECA’s

provisions dealing with political parties. See id., at 58,

n. 66, 59, n. 67.

As applied in the specific context of campaign funding by

political parties, the anticorruption rationale loses its force.

See Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance

Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 Ford. L.

Rev. 53, 105–106 (1987). What could it mean for a party to

“corrupt” its candidate or to exercise “coercive” influence

over him? The very aim of a political party is to influence

its candidate’s stance on issues and, if the candidate takes

office or is reelected, his votes. When political parties

achieve that aim, that achievement does not, in my view, constitute “a subversion of the political process.” Federal Election Comm’n v. NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 497. For instance, if

the Democratic Party spends large sums of money in support

of a candidate who wins, takes office, and then implements

the Party’s platform, that is not corruption; that is successful

advocacy of ideas in the political marketplace and representative government in a party system. To borrow a

phrase from Federal Election Comm’n v. NCPAC: “The fact

that candidates and elected officials may alter or reaffirm

their own positions on issues in response to political messages paid for by [political groups] can hardly be called corruption, for one of the essential features of democracy is the

presentation to the electorate of varying points of view.”

Id., at 498. Cf. Federal Election Comm’n v. MCFL, 479

U. S., at 263 (suggesting that “[v]oluntary political associations do not . . . present the specter of corruption”).

The structure of political parties is such that the theoretical danger of those groups actually engaging in quid pro

quos with candidates is significantly less than the threat of

individuals or other groups doing so. See Nahra, supra, at
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97–98 (citing F. Sorauf, Party Politics in America 15–18 (5th

ed. 1984)). American political parties, generally speaking,

have numerous members with a wide variety of interests,

Nahra, supra, at 98, features necessary for success in majoritarian elections. Consequently, the influence of any one

person or the importance of any single issue within a political

party is significantly diffused. For this reason, as the Party’s amici argue, see Brief for Committee for Party Renewal

et al. as Amicus Curiae 16, campaign funds donated by parties are considered to be some of “the cleanest money in politics.” J. Bibby, Campaign Finance Reform, 6 Commonsense

1, 10 (Dec. 1983). And, as long as the Court continues to

permit Congress to subject individuals to limits on the

amount they can give to parties, and those limits are uniform

as to all donors, see 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(1), there is little risk

that an individual donor could use a party as a conduit for

bribing candidates.

In any event, the Government, which bears the burden of

“demonstrat[ing] that the recited harms are real, not merely

conjectural,” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512

U. S. 622, 664 (1994), has identified no more proof of the corrupting dangers of coordinated expenditures than it has of

independent expenditures. Cf. ante, at 618 (“The Government does not point to record evidence or legislative findings

suggesting any special corruption problem in respect to independent party expenditures”). And insofar as it appears

that Congress did not actually enact § 441a(d)(3) in order to

stop corruption by political parties “but rather for the constitutionally insufficient purpose of reducing what it saw as

wasteful and excessive campaign spending,” ibid. (citing

Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 57), the statute’s ceilings on coordinated expenditures are as unwarranted as the caps on

independent expenditures.

In sum, there is only a minimal threat of “corruption,” as

we have understood that term, when a political party spends

to support its candidate or to oppose his competitor, whether
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or not that expenditure is made in concert with the candidate. Parties and candidates have traditionally worked together to achieve their common goals, and when they engage

in that work, there is no risk to the Republic. To the contrary, the danger to the Republic lies in Government suppression of such activity. Under Buckley and our subsequent cases, § 441a(d)(3)’s heavy burden on First Amendment

rights is not justified by the threat of corruption at which it

is assertedly aimed.

***

To conclude, I would find § 441a(d)(3) unconstitutional not

just as applied to petitioners, but also on its face. Accordingly, I concur only in the Court’s judgment.

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,

dissenting.

In my opinion, all money spent by a political party to secure the election of its candidate for the office of United

States Senator should be considered a “contribution” to his

or her campaign. I therefore disagree with the conclusion

reached in Part III of the principal opinion.

I am persuaded that three interests provide a constitutionally sufficient predicate for federal limits on spending by political parties. First, such limits serve the interest in avoiding both the appearance and the reality of a corrupt political

process. A party shares a unique relationship with the candidate it sponsors because their political fates are inextricably linked. That interdependency creates a special danger

that the party—or the persons who control the party—will

abuse the influence it has over the candidate by virtue of its

power to spend. The provisions at issue are appropriately

aimed at reducing that threat. The fact that the party in

this case had not yet chosen its nominee at the time it broadcast the challenged advertisements is immaterial to the analysis. Although the Democratic and Republican nominees
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Stevens, J., dissenting

for the 1996 Presidential race will not be selected until this

summer, current advertising expenditures by the two national parties are no less contributions to the campaigns of

the respective frontrunners than those that will be made in

the fall.

Second, these restrictions supplement other spending limitations embodied in the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971, which are likewise designed to prevent corruption.

Individuals and certain organizations are permitted to contribute up to $1,000 to a candidate. 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(1)(A).

Since the same donors can give up to $5,000 to party committees, § 441a(a)(1)(C), if there were no limits on party

spending, their contributions could be spent to benefit the

candidate and thereby circumvent the $1,000 cap. We have

recognized the legitimate interest in blocking similar attempts to undermine the policies of the Act. See California

Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182,

197–199 (1981) (plurality opinion) (approving ceiling on contributions to political action committees to prevent circumvention of limitations on individual contributions to candidates); id., at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and

concurring in judgment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 38

(1976) (per curiam) (approving limitation on total contributions by an individual in connection with an election on

same rationale).

Finally, I believe the Government has an important interest in leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the

cost of federal campaigns. As Justice White pointed out in

his opinion in Buckley, “money is not always equivalent to

or used for speech, even in the context of political campaigns.” Id., at 263 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is quite wrong to assume that the net effect

of limits on contributions and expenditures—which tend to

protect equal access to the political arena, to free candidates

and their staffs from the interminable burden of fundraising,
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and to diminish the importance of repetitive 30-second commercials—will be adverse to the interest in informed debate

protected by the First Amendment. See id., at 262–266.

Congress surely has both wisdom and experience in these

matters that is far superior to ours. I would therefore accord special deference to its judgment on questions related

to the extent and nature of limits on campaign spending.*

Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of

Appeals.

*One irony of the case is that both the Democratic National Party and

the Republican National Party have sided with petitioners in challenging

a law that Congress has the obvious power to change. See Brief for Democratic National Committee as Amicus Curiae; Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae.