Lisa J. Stevenson, Acting General Counsel (lstevenson@fec.gov)

Kevin Deeley, Associate General Counsel (kdeeley@fec.gov)

Kevin P. Hancock, Acting Assistant General Counsel (khancock@fec.gov)

Sana Chaudhry, Attorney (schaudhry@fec.gov)

FOR THE PLAINTIFF

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

999 E Street, NW

Washington, DC 20463

(202) 694-1650 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

_______________________________________

)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 2:15-cv-00439-DB

)

v. )

) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN

JEREMY JOHNSON, et al., ) IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTION

)

Defendants. ) District Judge Dee Benson

 )

PLAINTIFF FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S REPLY

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS CROSS-MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 1 of 14
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Page

I. THE COMMISSION’S REGULATION IS A VALID 

INTERPRETATION OF 52 U.S.C. § 30122 UNDER CHEVRON’S 

DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW...............................................................2

A. The Regulation Passes Chevron Step One Because Section 30122 Does 

Not Unambiguously Preclude the Commission’s Interpretation ......................2

B. Case Law Limiting Secondary Liability in Private Lawsuits Is 

Inapplicable to the FEC’s Enforcement of the Particular Language of 

52 U.S.C. § 30122..............................................................................................3

C. The Commission’s Interpretation of the Statute in 11 C.F.R. 

§ 110.4(b)(1)(iii) Is Reasonable and Entitled to Deference Under

Chevron Step Two .............................................................................................5

II. THE REGULATION IS CONSTITUTIONAL.............................................................6

A. The Regulation Is Not Subject to Strict Scrutiny...............................................6

B. The Regulation Satisfies the Applicable Standard of Intermediate 

Scrutiny..............................................................................................................8

III. SWALLOW’S APA CLAIMS ARE MERITLESS OR TIME-BARRED....................9

IV. THE FEC HAS STATED A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF ............................10

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................10

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 2 of 14
1

Plaintiff Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) established in its 

opening brief in support of its cross-motion for partial judgment on the pleadings that the third 

affirmative defense of defendant John Swallow’s answer is insufficient as a matter of law. 

(Docket No. 103 (“FEC Mem.”).) The Court should grant the FEC’s cross-motion because that 

affirmative defense’s challenges to 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(iii) under the Constitution and the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) lack merit, and Swallow has failed to show otherwise.

In fact, Swallow has now submitted three briefs that each fail to establish that the FEC’s 

regulation is an invalid exercise of the agency’s authority under 52 U.S.C. § 30122. As the FEC 

has explained, 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(iii) satisfies the two-step framework under Chevron 

U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). First, the statute, which bars “mak[ing] a 

contribution in the name of another” does not unambiguously preclude the regulation’s

interpretation that a person, such as Swallow, who has helped and assisted conduit contributions 

has violated the statute. Second, because the FEC’s interpretation is based on a permissible 

construction of the statute, it is entitled to deference. 

Further, Swallow has failed to demonstrate that section 110.4(b)(1)(iii) is 

unconstitutional; on the contrary, as the FEC has shown, the regulation is constitutionally valid 

because it promotes the government’s important interests in campaign finance disclosure and 

preventing circumvention of contribution limits. Moreover, the regulation is appropriately 

tailored to those interests since it applies only to a person who helped and assisted unlawful 

contributions and who has done so with a knowing state of mind. 

Finally, Swallow’s other APA challenges are meritless or time barred, and Swallow has 

failed to demonstrate that the FEC’s well-pleaded claim against Swallow is implausible. Instead, 

the Complaint’s detailed factual allegations amply support the inference that Swallow violated 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 3 of 14
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52 U.S.C. § 30122 when he knowingly helped and assisted his co-defendant Jeremy Johnson in 

making tens of thousands of dollars in contributions in the names of others. 

I. THE COMMISSION’S REGULATION IS A VALID INTERPRETATION OF 52 

U.S.C. § 30122 UNDER CHEVRON’S DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. The Regulation Passes Chevron Step One Because Section 30122 Does Not 

Unambiguously Preclude the Commission’s Interpretation

The sole issue under Chevron’s step one is whether the controlling statute, 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30122, unambiguously forecloses the Commission’s interpretation in 11 C.F.R. 

§ 110.4(b)(1)(iii) that a person may “make” a contribution in the name of another by knowingly 

helping or assisting that contribution. As the FEC has explained, the statute uses the undefined 

and broad term “make,” which courts have held encompasses multiple ways to contribute in the 

name of another. (FEC Mem. at 14-17.) Swallow’s opposition brief nevertheless asserts that 

section 30122 unambiguously precludes liability for anyone other than the true source of the 

funds that were contributed in the name of another. (Opp’n Br. at 2-3 (Docket No. 114).) 

However, that argument is belied by Swallow’s admission in a separate part of his brief that a 

person who is not the true source, but who has merely “controll[ed] the money,” has also “‘made 

a contribution’” under section 30122. (Id. at 8 (citing the facts of FEC v. Rodriguez, Civ. No. 

86-687 (M.D. Fla.)).) Swallow thus concedes the very statutory ambiguity establishing that the 

regulation passes Chevron step one and that the FEC may interpret the law’s reasonable scope.

Having made that concession, Swallow then falls back on his unconvincing assertion that 

the defendant in Rodriguez unambiguously “made” a conduit contribution by handling the 

money used, while Swallow unambiguously did not (id.). But the Complaint alleges that 

Swallow did far more to enable the conduit contributions at issue here: Swallow recruited 

Johnson, instructed him on making conduit contributions, gave Johnson a motive to make such 

contributions to then-candidate Mike Lee, and then helped Johnson facilitate some conduit 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 4 of 14
3

contributions that had encountered obstacles. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-22, 27-30, 33, 49.)

Moreover, Swallow mischaracterizes the relevant authority in two major respects. First, 

while some cases cited by the FEC (see FEC Mem. at 15) held that section 30122 

unambiguously applies to the true source of funds in a conduit contribution scheme, none of 

those cases held that section 30122 unambiguously applies only to the true source, as Swallow 

implies. (Opp’n Br. at 2-3 (citing cases).) The only issue before those courts was whether the 

true source had violated the statute. At issue here is a separate, unaddressed question: whether a 

person who helps and assists the true source has also made a conduit contribution. Swallow 

admits as much by conceding that “[these] cases had nothing to do with liability for . . . ‘helping 

and assisting’ in a conduit scheme.” (Id. at 3.) Those opinions are nonetheless relevant because 

the courts observed that section 30122’s text is broad enough to capture multiple methods of 

making a contribution in the name of another. (See FEC Mem. at 15-17.) 

Second, Swallow cherry-picks quotes from the FEC’s cited authority to claim that courts 

have found that “the relevant statutory language unambiguously fails to reach intermediaries.” 

(Opp’n Br. at 4.) However, the context Swallow omits is important. The defendants in these 

cases had argued that only conduits, and not true sources, should be liable for “mak[ing]” a 

contribution under section 30122. See, e.g., United States v. Boender, 649 F.3d 650, 660 (7th 

Cir. 2011). The courts rejected these arguments, finding that the true sources had made the 

contributions, not the conduits. And as explained, given Swallow’s alleged actions, he was no 

mere conduit or intermediary engaging in ministerial tasks in his and Johnson’s conduit scheme. 

B. Case Law Limiting Secondary Liability in Private Lawsuits Is Inapplicable 

to the FEC’s Enforcement of the Particular Language of 52 U.S.C. § 30122

The FEC has demonstrated that Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 

Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), does not foreclose its statutory interpretation. (FEC Mem. at 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 5 of 14
4

17-19.) Swallow’s response does not address the relevant issues and mischaracterizes the law. 

First, in Central Bank, the Supreme Court held that “the text of the statute controls” the 

availability of claims based on secondary liability, 511 U.S. at 173, and as the FEC has 

explained, the broader statutory language in section 30122 is far different from section 10(b) of 

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which was at issue in Central Bank. (FEC Mem. at 17, 

19.) Swallow has failed to address this argument. (See Opp’n Br. at 5.)

Second, Swallow has also failed to show how Central Bank, which involved private 

litigants, applies to this government action enforcing a regulatory violation. See Central Bank, 

511 U.S. at 191 (holding that “a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit” 

under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Indeed, nothing in Central Bank

suggests the Supreme Court held that secondary liability has been eliminated in civil 

enforcement actions. The Supreme Court confirmed as much just three years later in United 

States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 664 (1997), when it stated that “Central Bank’s discussion 

concerned only private civil litigation.” Swallow attempts to sidestep O’Hagan’s description of 

what was already clear in Central Bank by dismissing it as an “off-hand discussion” (see Opp’n 

Br. at 5), and yet, Swallow inconsistently urges this Court to give precedential authority to a 

statement in Central Bank that is dicta. Swallow’s argument that O’Hagan cannot overrule 

Central Bank “by implication” is a red herring because Central Bank did not involve the 

availability of secondary liability in a government action.1

 Further, the O’Hagan Court did not

need to “overrule” a case it explicitly distinguished. See 521 U.S. at 664.

2

 

 1 As Swallow notes, the Court should not find that a later case (i.e., Central Bank) 

implicitly overruled a well-established prior precedent (i.e., Chevron). (Opp’n Br. at 5.) 

2 Contrary to Swallow’s assertion (Opp’n Br. at 5), that O’Hagan was a criminal case has 

no bearing on the Supreme Court’s characterization of its own ruling in a previous case. 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 6 of 14
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Third, Swallow has not cited a single case decided in the more than two decades since 

Central Bank where a court applied it to strike a government regulation. And Swallow has failed 

to show why this Court should be the first to do so. In addition, the case law Swallow cites is

inapposite and lacks persuasive force because it involves private litigants and narrower statutes. 

As explained further below, if there are reasonable disagreements regarding the permissibility of 

an agency construing its statute to provide for secondary liability, deference should be accorded.

C. The Commission’s Interpretation of the Statute in 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(iii) 

Is Reasonable and Entitled to Deference Under Chevron Step Two

Section 110.4(b)(1)(iii) satisfies Chevron’s step two because it is based on a reasonable

construction of FECA, and Swallow has not shown otherwise. (FEC Mem. at 19-23.)3

As noted by the FEC previously, the regulation is consistent with several rulings broadly 

construing the undefined term “make” in section 30122 to encompass multiple types of 

contributions in the name of another. (See id. at 22-23.) Swallow does not address this case law, 

nor does he respond to the FEC’s demonstration that its interpretation is well-supported by the 

legislative history of the statute and the regulation’s background.4

Swallow does, however, now concede that the defendant in FEC v. Rodriguez, which led 

 3 Swallow’s opposition brief suffers from the same flaw as his opening brief as it again 

fails to assume the statute’s ambiguity in analyzing step two. (See Opp’n Br. at 7 (arguing that 

the FEC’s interpretation is unreasonable because to “‘make a contribution’ has been understood 

to unambiguously reach the true sources . . . and no further”).) 

4 Swallow questions the relevance of the FEC’s 30-year history of enforcing section 

110.4(b)(1)(iii) administratively. (Opp’n Br. at 1, 19-20.) But courts defer to determinations 

made in FEC administrative enforcement actions. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 223 F.3d 775, 

779-80 (D.C. Cir. 2000). And the agency’s history demonstrates the importance of the 

regulation to supporting one of FECA’s most frequently violated provisions, thereby providing 

evidence of the regulation’s reasonableness. (See FEC Mem. at 30.) The lack of actions in court 

is no surprise given that settlement through required pre-litigation conciliation attempts is the 

“preferred method of dispute resolution under FECA.” FEC v. NRA, 553 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 

(D.D.C. 1983). Even those alleged to have violated the regulation over the decades have not 

chosen to question its validity in court.

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 7 of 14
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to the FEC’s promulgation of section 110.4(b)(1)(iii), violated the statute simply “by controlling 

the money,” even though he was not the true source of the contributed funds. (Opp’n Br. at 8.) 

Swallow’s concession is fatal to his Chevron step two argument since if the statute reasonably 

bars Rodriguez’s handling of money used for conduit contributions, it must also reasonably 

outlaw Swallow’s alleged actions, without which, the conduit contribution scheme alleged in this 

case almost certainly would have never occurred. (FEC Mem. at x-xiv.) Swallow attempts to 

distinguish Rodriguez by asserting that it concerned principal-agent lability (Opp’n Br. at 8), but 

this alleged distinction is meritless since the Rodriguez court did not rely on agency principles 

when it held that the defendant there violated section 30122 by “knowingly assisting in the 

making of contributions in the name of another.”5

 

Finally, Swallow incorrectly asserts that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio 

alterius precludes the FEC’s interpretation of how a person may “make a contribution in the 

name of another” because section 30122 also prohibits a person from “knowingly permit[ing] his

name [from] be[ing] used to effect” a contribution in the name of another. (Id.) But this latter 

clause is a separate and independent basis for liability, and so it cannot represent a method of 

“mak[ing] a contribution” in violation of the first clause of the statute. As such, the “knowingly 

permit” clause has no bearing on whether section 110.4(b)(1)(iii) identifies one reasonable 

method of “mak[ing] a contribution in the name of another.”

II. THE REGULATION IS CONSTITUTIONAL 

A. The Regulation Is Not Subject to Strict Scrutiny 

Swallow’s arguments that the Commission’s regulation is subject to strict scrutiny (see 

 5 Final Order & Default Judgment, FEC v. Rodriguez, No. 86-687-Civ-T-10 (M.D. Fla. 

Oct. 28, 1988), available at https://transition.fec.gov/law/litigation/rodriguez_dc_final_order.pdf.

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 8 of 14
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Opp’n Br. at 9-11) continue to have no basis in fact or law (see FEC Mem. at 3-6). 

Contrary to Swallow’s assertions, the FEC’s action does not implicate pure political 

speech triggering strict scrutiny under Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015). 

For example, Swallow incorrectly alleges that the FEC has brought claims against him for 

merely encouraging Johnson to fundraise for candidates thought to be good for Johnson’s 

business interests. (See Opp’n Br. at 9-10.) But the FEC’s actual allegations — which Swallow 

recognizes must be accepted as true for purposes of the parties’ motions (see Swallow’s Mem. at 

iv (Docket No. 98)) — state that Swallow in fact recruited Johnson, chose Senator Lee as the 

candidate who would receive the illegal contributions, instructed Johnson on how to evade the 

law using straw donors, and participated in carrying out the straw donations scheme. (See 

Compl. ¶¶ 21-22, 27-30, 33, 49.) Further, unlike in Williams-Yulee, at issue here is Swallow’s

solicitation of illegal, not lawful, contributions. (See also FEC Mem. at 5-6 (distinguishing the 

“solicitation” conduct at issue in Williams-Yulee, which Swallow fails to address).) Thus, 

Swallow’s alleged speech is not protected by the First Amendment, which categorically excludes 

“[o]ffers to engage in illegal transactions.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008).

Moreover, Swallow’s strict scrutiny arguments also fail because as the FEC previously 

explained, the Williams-Yulee Court explicitly recognized that contribution limits are subject to 

less rigorous scrutiny because they burden freedom of association, and not speech. WilliamsYulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1665. Swallow tries to evade this on-point authority by alleging that this 

case is not about campaign contributions because it does not concern his money, and it is not 

about disclosure limits because the Commission does not allege that Swallow misreported his 

contributions. (See Opp’n Br. at 9-10.) However, the conduct at issue does involve inaccurate 

disclosures and campaign contributions — the contributions Swallow helped and assisted 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 9 of 14
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Johnson in making in the names of others. As a result of Swallow’s alleged actions, tens of 

thousands of dollars in excessive campaign contributions were made and misreported, denying 

voters valuable information before an election. 

B. The Regulation Satisfies the Applicable Standard of Intermediate Scrutiny 

In its opening brief, the FEC demonstrated that 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(iii) satisfies the 

applicable intermediate scrutiny standards of review. (See FEC Mem. at 7-11.) Swallow’s 

arguments misapply the relevant law and fail to address the FEC’s arguments. 

First, the FEC showed that section 110.4(b)(1)(iii) is substantially related to the important 

government interest in disclosure. Similar to the statutory provision it implements, section 

110.4(b)(1)(iii) underpins important disclosure interests by prohibiting conduct used to 

undermine the transparency Congress sought to achieve with FECA’s disclosure requirements. 

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (per curiam). Contrary to Swallow’s claim that 

disclosure is irrelevant here, this case illustrates precisely why disclosure is important. (Opp’n 

Br. at 14.) When Swallow knowingly helped and assisted Johnson with his straw donor scheme, 

he deprived the public of important information about who is influencing a federal election.

Second, the FEC has established that section 110.4(b)(1)(iii) is closely drawn to serve 

important anti-circumvention interests. As the FEC showed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 

said that preventing the circumvention of FECA’s contribution limits is an important government 

interest. (See FEC Mem. at 8-9.) Indeed, Swallow acknowledges this interest. (See Opp’n Br. 

at 13.) He argues, however, that the Commission has not shown that its regulation is closely 

drawn to serve that interest here. But as the FEC explained in its Memorandum, the regulation is 

appropriately tailored because it applies only when an illegal contribution in the name of another 

is actually made, the defendant must have had a knowing state of mind, and the regulation does 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 10 of 14
9

not restrict any person from helping or assisting lawful contributions.6 

III. SWALLOW’S APA CLAIMS ARE MERITLESS OR TIME-BARRED 

Swallow sets forth a new theory for challenging the regulation as arbitrary and capricious 

— that the FEC conflated principal-agent liability with secondary liability when it adopted the 

judicially approved interpretation of 52 U.S.C. § 30122 in Rodriguez. (See Opp’n Br. at 22.) 

However, Swallow’s proposed understanding is inconsistent with both the express wording of 

the default judgment entered in Rodriguez and the “very deferential scope of review” applicable 

here.7 Van Hollen, Jr. v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 

Further, Swallow’s procedural claims are time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). (See

FEC Mem. at 25-26.) Swallow does not dispute that the limitations period has lapsed. He 

argues that the limitations period is not jurisdictional and that equitable tolling applies, but the 

Tenth Circuit has concluded otherwise. See Urabazo v. United States, 947 F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 

1991) (unpublished).

8

 Moreover, equitable tolling would undermine the concern underlying the 

limitations period regarding “the agency’s interest in prompt review and the public’s settled 

 6 Additionally, Swallow’s arguments fall far short of the requirements to establish 

vagueness even under the heightened standard for laws implicating the First Amendment. See 

Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 478-80 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a 

law will not be invalidated under this standard unless “the potential chilling effect on protected 

expression” is both “‘real and substantial’”). In fact, Swallow has not shown how the regulation, 

which requires a knowing violation, would chill lawful speech. Cf. Bushco v. Shurtleff, 729 F.3d 

1294, 1302-03 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that a sexual solicitation statute was not 

unconstitutionally vague because it did not criminalize the enumerated conduct “when done 

without the intent to participate in statutorily defined sexual activity”). 

7 Swallow argues that the FEC’s reliance on Rodriguez was insufficient to “give a 

reviewing court ‘a satisfactory explanation for its action’” because the FEC relied on the 

allegedly “stray ‘assisting’” language in the case. (Opp’n Br. at 22 (citing Van Hollen, 811 F.3d 

at 497).) However, the word “assisting” is the linchpin of the defendant’s liability in Rodriguez, 

since the court had previously rejected the FEC’s initial theory that the defendant was primarily 

liable for violating the statute. (See FEC Mem. at 25 n.25 (citing Rodriguez).)

8 Though unpublished, the Tenth Circuit’s decision is more persuasive than the out-ofjurisdiction district court opinion Swallow cites, which lacks analysis. (See Opp’n Br. at 22-23.)

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 11 of 14
10

expectations.” See Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., 449 F.3d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 2006). 

Finally, Swallow’s procedural challenge also fails on its merits. The FEC’s 

Memorandum showed in detail that the agency provided sufficient notice to interested parties 

regarding section 110.4(b)(1)(iii). (See FEC Mem. at 26-29.) In response, Swallow rehashes his 

previous arguments, which fail to overcome the FEC’s showing. (See Opp’n Br. at 23-24.)

IV. THE FEC HAS STATED A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF

The Complaint’s detailed factual allegations establish a plausible claim that Swallow 

knowingly helped and assisted Johnson in making contributions in the names of others. (See 

FEC Mem. at 2-3.) Swallow cannot establish implausibility by simply labeling FEC allegations 

as “conclusory,” and claiming that some allegations do not count because they concern his 

speech or would constitute inadmissible evidence. (See Opp’n Br. at 16-17.) First, it is 

elementary that the Complaint’s allegations must be viewed as a whole and accepted as true and 

in a light most favorable to the FEC. See Beltran v. InterExchange, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 

1079 (D. Colo. 2016). Second, as the FEC previously noted, the First Amendment does not 

prohibit considering factual allegations that implicate speech. See Wisc. v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 

476, 489 (1993). Third, and similarly, there is no support for disregarding purported “bad acts” 

allegations, and the case Swallow cites is inapposite. (See Opp’n Br. at 16-17 n.19.) In any 

event, the FEC allegations to which Swallow objects do not bear on propensity — the acts 

alleged are directly relevant to the FEC’s claim and evidence of such acts would be admissible

under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) as bearing on Swallow’s state of mind. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the FEC’s cross-motion for judgment 

on the pleadings against Swallow’s legally insufficient third affirmative defense.

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 12 of 14
11

Respectfully submitted,

Lisa J. Stevenson (lstevenson@fec.gov)

Acting General Counsel

Kevin Deeley (kdeeley@fec.gov)

Associate General Counsel

Kevin P. Hancock (khancock@fec.gov)

Acting Assistant General Counsel

January 29, 2018

/s/ Sana Chaudhry 

Sana Chaudhry (schaudhry@fec.gov)

Attorney

FOR THE PLAINTIFF 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

999 E Street, NW

Washington, DC 20463

(202) 694-1650

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 13 of 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 29, 2018, I electronically filed plaintiff Federal Election 

Commission’s Reply In Support of Its Cross-Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings with 

the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Utah by using the Court’s 

CM/ECF system, which sent notification of such filing to the following: 

Allen Dickerson, Esq. (adickerson@ifs.org)

Tyler L. Martinez, Esq. (tmartinez@ifs.org)

Owen D. Yeates, Esq. (oyeates@ifs.org)

INSTITUTE FOR FREE SPEECH

124 S. West Street, Suite 201

Alexandria, VA 22314

Scott C. Williams, Esq. (scwlegal@gmail.com)

SCOTT C. WILLIAMS, LLC

43 East 400 South

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Defendant John Swallow

Karra J. Porter, Esq. (Karra.Porter@chrisjen.com)

John D. Lauritzen, Esq. (jd.lauritzen@chrisjen.com)

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

257 East 200 South, Suite 1100

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Attorneys for Defendant Jeremy Johnson

/s/ Sana Chaudhry

Sana Chaudhry

Attorney

Federal Election Commission

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 117 Filed 01/29/18 Page 14 of 14