No. 68761 

FILE 

JUN 16 2016 

cLET - Al E IN E M1I cANu 

BY 441SHI'‘ ,t It: 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

KIM BLANDINO, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 

CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE ROB 

BARE, DISTRICT JUDGE, 

Respondents, 

and 

CITY OF LAS VEGAS, 

Real Party in Interest. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

This is a pro se petition for a writ of prohibition and a writ of 

mandamus Petitioner Kim Blandino argues that respondent Judge Bare 

improperly held him in contempt of court and banned him from the 

courtroom and from a 25-foot space outside the courtroom. Blanclino 

further argues that Judge Bare improperly disqualified himself in 

Blandino's appeal from a judgment of conviction involving a misdemeanor. 

Whether to consider a writ petition is within this court's 

discretion, Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 

P.2d 849, 851 (1991), and a petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating 

that extraordinary relief is warranted, Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 

120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). "A writ of mandamus is 

available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a 

duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or 

capricious exercise of discretion." Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial 

Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (citations 

omitted); see also NRS 34.160. A writ of prohibition may issue when a 

district court acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction. See NRS 34.320. 

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In Peng-illy v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Ass'n, this court 

held that there was no right to appeal from a contempt order, but that 

review of a contempt order was available in a petition for a writ of 

mandamus or prohibition. 1116 Nev. 646, 649, 5 P.3d 569, 571 (2000). 

"[A] writ of mandamus is available to control a manifest abuse of 

discretion—for example, when the order purportedly violated does not 

clearly prohibit the conduct engaged in by the contemnor." Id. at 650, 5 

P.3d at 571. Whereas, "[a] writ of prohibition is available where the 

district court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction—for example, when a 

finding of indirect contempt is not based upon a proper affidavit." Id. at 

650, 5 P.3d at 571-72. 

Blandino argues that the district court exceeded its 

jurisdiction in imposing the courtroom and 25-foot bans because one of the 

incidents used to find him in contempt was not within Judge Bare's 

immediate view and because Judge Bare did not immediately impose 

sanctions for the other two incidents. 

We conclude that Blandino has not demonstrated that he is 

entitled to extraordinary relief. The district court's labeling the order as 

involving contempt and pursuing contempt sanctions pursuant to 

summary proceedings is problematic for the reasons identified by 

Blandino. See NRS 22.030(2) (providing that if the contemptuous act is 

not in the immediate view of the district court, "an affidavit must be 

presented to the court . . . of the facts constituting the contempt"); Intl 

Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 832 

1We summarily deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and 

petition for a writ of certiorari as the claims raised fall outside the scope of 

these writs. See NRS 34.360; NRS 34.020(3). 

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(1994) (providing that if the court delays punishing direct contempt 

(contempt in the court's immediate presence) until the completion of trial, 

"due process requires that the contemnor's rights to notice and a hearing 

be respected"). The label of contempt and reliance upon NRS Chapter 22 

is likewise awkward in this case because the district court imposed a 

sanction not available under NRS 22.100(2). Nevertheless, Judge Bare 

properly acted within his inherent authority in imposing the bans to 

control the dignity of the courtroom and to prevent an abuse of the judicial 

process. See NRS 1.210(1) (providing that the district court has the power 

to "preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence)"; NRS 1.210(2) 

(providing that the district court has the power to "enforce order in the 

proceedings before it"); Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 261-62, 163 

P.3d 428, 440 (2007) (providing that a court's inherent authority includes 

the power "to preserve the integrity of the judicial process"). Further, 

ordinary due process requirements were not triggered because there was 

no life, liberty, or property interest involved. See United States v. Mourad, 

289 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 2002). Therefore, we conclude that the district 

court did not exceed its jurisdiction in imposing the bans. 

Blandino next argues that Judge Bare acted arbitrarily and 

capriciously in imposing the bans because he was not disruptive and was 

only trying to aid the court. An arbitrary or capricious exercise of 

discretion is "one founded on prejudice or preference rather than on 

reason, or contrary to the evidence or established rules of law." State v. 

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 931-32, 267 P.3d 

777, 780 (2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). We 

conclude that Blanclino has not demonstrated that he is entitled to 

extraordinary relief. Blandino has failed to demonstrate that Judge Bare 

acted with prejudice or preference or that his actions fell outside 

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OF 

NEVADA 3 

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Douglas 

Gibbons 

J. 

established law. The record supports Judge Bare's grave concern that 

Blandino may have been engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and 

that this caused a disruption to the orderly processes of the court. 

Finally, Blandino argues that Judge Bare exceeded his 

jurisdiction in disqualifying himself from Blandino's appeal and Judge 

Bare should be compelled to decide Blandino's appeal. We conclude that 

Blandino has not demonstrated that he is entitled to extraordinary relief. 

First, this issue is moot as the appeal has been decided by another judge 

during the pendency of these proceedings More importantly, Judge Bare's 

decision to disqualify himself from future proceedings involving Blandino 

is not contrary to relevant authority. See NCJC Rule 2.11(A) (providing 

that a judge should disqualify himself "in any proceeding in which the 

judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned"). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 2 

2Blandino has filed a number of supplements and amendments to 

the original petition. Some of the claims presented in these supplements 

and amendments are new and different from those set forth in the original 

petition and therefore were not addressed in the answer. We decline 

permission to expand the scope of claims before this court beyond those 

raised in the original petition, and thus, we decline to consider these 

claims. We further decline to consider any claims for which Blandino 

failed to present cogent argument. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 4 

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cc: Hon. Rob Bare, District Judge 

Kim Blandino 

Las Vegas City Attorney/Criminal Division 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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OF 

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