ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED: OCTOBER 31, 2016, AT 9:30 AM

No. 16-5194

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

LAURA HOLMES AND PAUL JOST,

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant/Appellee.

On certification by the United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia under 52 U.S.C. § 30110

Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief

Allen Dickerson

CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS

124 S. West Street, Suite 201

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Telephone: 703-894-6800

Facsimile: 703-894-6811

adickerson@campaignfreedom.org

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

August 15, 2016

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIES, RULINGS UNDER REVIEW, AND RELATED 

CASES

Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28(a)(1), Plaintiffs Laura Holmes and Paul Jost 

submit their Certificate as to Parties, Rulings, and Related Cases. 

A. Parties and Amici

Plaintiffs Laura Holmes and Paul Jost appeared against Defendant Federal 

Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) before the United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia.1 No person filed as amicus curiae before the 

district court. 

B. Rulings Under Review

Under 52 U.S.C. § 30110, this Court sitting en banc considers the 

constitutional question at issue in the first instance. The United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia certified the constitutional question on June 29, 2016, 

pursuant to an order of this Court. See Amended Order, JA 197, Holmes v. FEC, No. 

14-cv-1243-RMC (D.D.C. June 29, 2016), ECF No. 42. The District Court 

previously made findings of fact that it incorporated into its Amended Order. See Id. 

(citing Holmes v. FEC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 123, 126-36 (D.D.C. 2015), reproduced at JA 

142-159). 

 1 Because there has been no merits determination concerning Plaintiffs’ claims, this 

case does not present a true appeal. Consequently, this brief will refer to Laura 

Holmes and Paul Jost as “Plaintiffs” and the Federal Election Commission as the 

“Defendant.” 

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C. Related Cases

Plaintiffs are unaware of any related cases.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Certificate of Parties, Rulings Under Review, and Related Cases........................... ii

A. Parties and Amici ...................................................................................... ii

B. Rulings Under Review .............................................................................. ii

C. Related Cases............................................................................................ iii

Table of Authorities................................................................................................. vi

Glossary of Abbreviations ....................................................................................... ix

Statement of Jurisdiction............................................................................................1

Statement of Issues.....................................................................................................1

Statutes and Regulations............................................................................................1

Statement of the Case.................................................................................................5

Summary of the Argument.........................................................................................8

Argument..................................................................................................................10

I. Standard of Review and Constitutional Scrutiny .....................................10

A. De Novo Review Under § 30110 .............................................................10

B. The FEC Must Demonstrate that FECA’s Burdens Are Closely Drawn to 

the Government’s Interest .....................................................................11

C. FECA Must Be Tailored to Limit True Quid Pro Quo Corruption or Its 

Appearance ............................................................................................14

II. FECA Violates Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Associational Rights.........17

A. The Bifurcated Contribution Limits Are Not Closely Drawn to the 

Anticorruption Interest ..........................................................................18

1. The relevant base limit is $5,200. .........................................................19

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2. The FEC has not shown any relationship between the bifurcated 

contribution limits and the anticorruption interest............................21

B. Significant Harm to Plaintiffs...................................................................25

C. The FEC Cannot Force the Court to Wear Blinders to Evade 

Constitutional Review...........................................................................26

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................28

Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................29

Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................30

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES2

Cases

Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 271 F.3d 262 (D.C. Cir. 2001).....

..............................................................................................................................27

Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)...................................................................22

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)........................................................... 11, 16, 22

Bullitt Fiscal Court v. Bullitt County Bd. of Health, 434 S.W.3d 29 (Ky. 2014) ...26

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)..........................................................11

Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. FEC, 788 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir. 2015).....

..............................................................................................................................11

Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)............................................................ 12, 13, 25

Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989)..........................................27

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).......................26

FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001)................12

FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986)......................................22

FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982)......................................11

FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)..............................................24

General Motors Corp. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin, 898 F.2d 165 (D.C. 

Cir. 1990) .............................................................................................................27

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) ....................................................................5

* Holmes v. FEC, 823 F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2016) .......................................................8

 2 Authorities upon which Plaintiffs chiefly rely are marked with asterisks.

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Lavin v. Husted, 689 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2012)........................................................17

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)............................................................ 12, 21

* McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014)...........................................................

...........................5, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28

McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) ..............................................15

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)..............................................................27

Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000)............. 12, 13, 14, 16, 21, 23

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006)..................................................................12

Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC (In re Anh Cao), 619 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2010) ..10

Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015) .............................................................8

United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2001) ..........................................22

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)........................................................22

United States v. Weaver, 808 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ..........................................10

Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013)................................................1, 10

Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015)............................................. 11, 12, 16

Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008)..........22

Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006)..............................................22

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1331........................................................................................................1

52 U.S.C. § 30101(1)(A)........................................................................................2, 6

52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) ............................................................................................6

52 U.S.C. § 30110........................................................................................... 1, 2, 10

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52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(6).............................................................................................6

52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a) ...............................................................................................3

52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A).....................................................................................6

Regulations

11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b) ..................................................................................................4

11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(3)(i)............................................................................. 7, 24, 28

11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(5)(ii)(B) ................................................................ 6, 20, 24, 28

11 C.F.R. § 110.3(c)(3)..........................................................................................5, 7

78 Fed. Reg. 8530 ......................................................................................................3

Other Authorities

Tim Higgins, Presidential Fundraising: See Who’s Spending, Who’s Lagging, 

Who’s Raising and Where, Bloomberg, July 16, 2015........................................20

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

BCRA: Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 

(2002)

FEC or Commission: Federal Election Commission

FECA: Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), 

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 

(1974), and Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.

94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976).

JA: Joint Appendix

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The district court had jurisdiction to make findings of fact and certify 

constitutional questions to this Court, sitting en banc, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331

and 52 U.S.C. § 30110. Plaintiffs properly invoked 52 U.S.C. § 30110 because they 

are eligible to vote in an election for the office of President of the United States. The 

district court made findings of fact on April 20, 2015, see JA-142 to 159, and 

certified the question of constitutionality on June 29, 2016, see JA-197. This Court, 

sitting en banc, has exclusive jurisdiction to hear the constitutional question 

certified. See 52 U.S.C. § 30110; Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 

2013) (“Wagner I”).

STATEMENTOF ISSUES

Congress and the Supreme Court have concluded that there is no risk of quid 

pro quo corruption where a party’s nominee, having won a primary election, receives

up to $5,200 from a single donor by the end of the general election period. Is the 

Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) closely drawn to the prevention of quid 

pro quo corruption where it forces contributors to the party nominee to give at least 

half of that $5,200 during the primary election period, rather than in full during the 

general election period?

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

The pertinent statutes and regulations related to this case are as follows:

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When used in [the Federal Campaign Election] Act:

(1) The term “election” means—

(A) a general, special, primary, or runoff 

election;

52 U.S.C. § 30101(1)(A)

* * *

The Commission, the national committee of any political 

party, or any individual eligible to vote in any election for 

the office of President may institute such actions in the 

appropriate district court of the United States, including 

actions for declaratory judgment, as may be appropriate to 

construe the constitutionality of any provision of [the 

Federal Election Campaign] Act. The district court 

immediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality 

of this Act to the United States court of appeals for the 

circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en 

banc.

52 U.S.C. § 30110.

* * *

(a) Dollar limits on contributions 

(1) Except as provided in subsection (i) and section 

[30117] of this title, no person shall make 

contributions 

(A) to any candidate and his authorized 

political committees with respect to any 

election for Federal office which, in the 

aggregate, exceed $2,000; 

. . . 

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(6) The limitations on contributions to a candidate 

imposed by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection 

shall apply separately with respect to each election, 

except that all elections held in any calendar year 

for the office of President of the United States 

(except a general election for such office) shall be 

considered to be one election.

. . .

52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a). 

* * *

In order to keep pace with inflation, and consistent with the Act, the $2,000 

contribution limit was adjusted to $2,600 before the 2014 general election. See FEC 

Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist 

Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 78 Fed. Reg. 8530, 8532 (Feb. 16, 2013).

* * *

(3)

(i) A contribution designated in writing for a 

particular election, but made after that election, 

shall be made only to the extent that the contribution 

does not exceed net debts outstanding from such 

election.

. . .

(5) 

. . .

(ii)

. . .

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(B) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(5)(ii)(A) 

of this section or any other provision of this 

section, the treasurer of the recipient 

authorized political committee may treat all

or part of the amount of the contribution that 

exceeds the contribution limits in paragraph 

(b)(1) of this section as made with respect to 

the general election, provided that:

(1) The contribution was made before 

the primary election;

. . .

(4) Such redesignation would not 

cause the contributor to exceed any of 

the limitations on contributions set 

forth in paragraph (b)(1) of this 

section;

. . .

(C) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(5)(ii)(A) 

of this section or any other provision of this 

section, the treasurer of the recipient 

authorized political committee may treat all 

or part of the amount of the contribution that 

exceeds the contribution limits in paragraph 

(b)(1) of this section as made with respect to 

the primary election . . .

11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)

* * *

(c) Permissible Transfers. The contribution limitations of 

11 CFR 110.1 and 110.2 shall not limit the transfers set 

forth below in 11 CFR 110.3(c) (1) through (6) -

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. . . 

(3) Transfers of funds between the primary 

campaign and general election campaign of a 

candidate of funds unused for the primary;

11 C.F.R. § 110.3(c)(3).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs Laura Holmes and Paul Jost are a married couple residing in Miami, 

Florida. JA-142, ¶ 1. Each wished to associate with a candidate in the 2014 general 

election by making campaign contributions. JA-157, ¶ 61; JA-158, ¶ 70; see 

McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., controlling 

opinion)3 (noting that, “[w]hen an individual contributes money to a candidate, he 

exercises both” the right of political expression and the right of political association). 

Ms. Holmes contributed $2,600 to Carl DeMaio, a general election candidate for 

California’s 52nd Congressional district. JA-158, ¶ 67; JA-13, ¶ 21. Mr. Jost 

likewise contributed $2,600 to Dr. Mariannette Miller-Meeks, a general election 

candidate for Iowa’s 2nd Congressional district. JA-159, ¶ 74; JA-14, ¶ 24. Neither 

 3 The Chief Justice authored an opinion for himself and three other justices; Justice 

Thomas concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to argue that Buckley v. 

Valeo ought to be overruled and contribution limits declared unconstitutional. 

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462-63 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Chief Justice’s 

opinion is controlling because it provides the “narrowest grounds” for the judgment. 

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976). All future citations to 

McCutcheon are to the controlling opinion, unless otherwise noted.

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plaintiff gave to either candidate during the primary election; instead, each wished 

to give $5,200 to their party’s general-election nominee. JA-158, ¶ 68; id. at 159, ¶

75. Federal law denied them that opportunity.

Neither Plaintiff disputes Congress’s authority to set limits on contributions 

to federal candidates in order to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. 

Both defer to Congress’s decision to set this limit at $5,200 for a candidate who wins 

her party’s nomination and advances to the general election.4 This case challenges 

only the manner in which an individual must give this non-corrupting contribution.

52 U.S.C. § 30101(1)(A); see 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(6) (“the limitations on 

contributions to a candidate imposed by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection 

shall apply separately with respect to each election . . . ”).

Defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) enforces 

this divided limit. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1). The Commission allows individuals to

write a single check for $5,200 during the primary season—where the entire amount 

may be used for the general election, see 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.1(b)(5)(ii)(B) and 

 4 Originally set at $2,000 ($1,000 for the primary and $1,000 for the general 

election), the limit was doubled by Congress in 2002 and indexed for inflation. JA144, ¶ 6; 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A), (c); JA-145, ¶ 9. When this case was 

originally filed, the limit was $5,200, reflecting the limits for the primary- and 

general-election periods. Although Congress intended § 30110 cases to be heard 

quickly, sufficient time has passed for the relevant limit to rise to $5,400. JA-145, 

¶ 10. To maintain consistency with the record and prior briefing, Plaintiffs will use 

the earlier, $5,200 limit throughout this brief. 

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110.3(c)(3); they are free to write a single check for $5,200 during the general 

election season if part is specifically earmarked for primary period debts, see 11 

C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(3)(i); and they are free to give $2,600 during the primary election 

and a second $2,600 during the general election—where the entire $5,200 may be 

used for the general election, see 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(c)(3). 

But it is unlawful for a contributor to wait until the general election period

before making any contribution at all, and to then write a check for $5,200.

5

Consequently, the contributor who does not want to see her contribution squandered 

during the intra-party fight of a primary election, or who simply wishes to fully 

associate with her party’s ultimate nominee, is limited to giving only half of the 

overall amount Congress has determined to be non-corrupting—only $2,600.

Plaintiffs brought suit on July 21, 2014, seeking injunctive relief that would 

permit them to contribute a full, non-corrupting $5,200 in two specific races. The 

district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, but it 

nonetheless certified facts and questions of constitutionality to this Court on 

November 17, 2014. JA-58 to 59. The FEC moved to remand the case on January 2, 

2015, arguing that it had not been given the opportunity to fully develop a factual 

 5 This is true even though it is perfectly legal for the same contributor to write a 

check for $5,200 the day before the primary election, knowing that the entire amount 

will be used during the general election.

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record, and that the district court had consequently denied it due process. FEC 

Motion for Remand at 17-20, Holmes v. FEC, No. 14-5281 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 2, 2015), 

ECF No. 1529989. This Court granted that motion on January 30, 2015. JA-60. 

On remand, the district court made findings of fact, JA-142 to 159, but 

declined to again certify the questions of constitutionality to this Court, JA-181. This 

Court reversed that decision, in part, on April 26, 2016, relying on the Supreme 

Court’s ruling in Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015). Holmes v. FEC, 823 

F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2016), JA-184 to 196. Accordingly, on June 29, 2016, the district 

court certified Plaintiffs’ First Amendment question to this Court, sitting en banc.

JA-197.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

As things stand today, an individual may write a $5,200 check to a generalelection candidate for Congress, so long as she does so before the primary election. 

If that same contributor decides to give the day after the primary, once her preferred 

party has definitively selected a nominee, and even if she contributed nothing during 

the primary-election period, she may only give $2,600.

Laura Holmes and Paul Jost both wished to give full, non-corrupting $5,200 

contributions to particular candidates who had won the Republican nomination for 

Congress, and to do so entirely during the general-election period. But they could 

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not, because doing so is illegal under FECA, even though neither Plaintiff 

contributed anything at all during the primary-election period. 

This case is directed only to those circumstances. Plaintiffs concede the 

constitutionality of contribution limits generally, and they have no quarrel with

FECA limiting primary-election contributions to $2,600, nor with its overall $5,200 

cap on contributions to general-election candidates. It is the division of that limit—

in such a way as to halve Plaintiffs’ associational freedoms when they choose to wait 

until after a primary contest has concluded before supporting a candidate for office—

that is at issue, and nothing more. 

The FEC cannot show that this limitation does anything to fight quid pro quo 

corruption or its appearance, because it does not. In fact, there is no indication that 

Plaintiffs’ predicament even occurred to Congress. FECA’s decision to structure 

non-corrupting contributions in this manner, then, is at best a prophylaxis-uponprophylaxis regulatory approach that illegitimately burdens freedom of expression 

and association in these circumstances. Accordingly, under longstanding Supreme 

Court precedent going back forty years, and most recently reaffirmed in 

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441, FECA’s per-election division of non-corrupting 

contributions violates the First Amendment.

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ARGUMENT

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY

A. De Novo Review Under § 30110

Under 52 U.S.C. § 30110, the district court must “certify all questions of 

constitutionality of [FECA] to the United States court of appeals for the circuit 

involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc.” 52 U.S.C. § 30110. This Court 

determines the constitutionality of those questions in the first instance, and considers 

the issue “de novo.” Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC (In re Anh Cao), 619 F.3d 410, 

415 (5th Cir. 2010).

6

 6 The district court has three functions in § 30110 cases: It must (1) “develop a record 

for appellate review by making findings of fact”; (2) “determine whether the 

constitutional challenges are frivolous or involve settled legal questions”; and (3) 

“immediately certify the record and all non-frivolous constitutional questions” for 

this Court’s decision. Wagner I, 717 F.3d at 1009. When this case was previously 

certified to this Court, the FEC complained that the case had not been certified with 

a full factual record, although it failed to point to any information it wished to 

present, or any information this Court would require in order to answer the certified 

questions. FEC Motion for Remand at 17-20, Holmes v. FEC, No. 14-5281 (D.C. 

Cir. Jan. 2, 2015), ECF No. 1529989. Based on the FEC’s representations, this Court 

remanded the case to “develop . . . the factual record necessary for en banc review.” 

JA-60. In an effort “to be overinclusive rather than underinclusive,” the district court 

in its findings of fact “included the majority of FEC’s proposed facts,” “omitt[ing] 

or modif[ying only those] proposed finding[s] of fact that [were] argumentative or 

drew legal conclusions.” JA-140 to 141.

The courts have not addressed the standard of review applied to the district court’s 

findings of fact in § 30110 cases. This Court generally reviews findings of fact for 

clear error. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 808 F.3d 26, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2015); 

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B. The FEC Must Demonstrate that FECA’s Burdens Are Closely Drawn 

to the Government’s Interest

Because the law at issue here infringes on fundamental liberties, the FEC 

bears the burden of persuasion, and it must prove that FECA, in this application, 

survives heightened constitutional scrutiny. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25

(1976); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (noting that this is “an area of the most 

fundamental First Amendment activities” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14)). 

Contribution limits are not subject to strict scrutiny, as are complete bans on political 

speech. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); Wagner v. FEC, 793 

F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Wagner II”). Nevertheless, government “action which 

may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest 

scrutiny.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; cf. FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 

197, 207 (1982). 

For FECA to pass such scrutiny, as applied to Plaintiffs, the FEC must 

“demonstrate[] a sufficiently important interest and [show that the law] employs

means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (internal quotation marks omitted). This “closely 

drawn” test requires that this Court “assess the fit between the stated governmental 

 

Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. FEC, 788 F.3d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 

2015). 

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objective and the means selected to achieve that objective.” Id. at 1445. In this case,

that standard demands that the FEC demonstrate that the bifurcated limit is a means 

that is “closely drawn” to a “sufficiently important interest.” Id. at 1444;

7 see also 

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 231-32 (2003) (“When the Government burdens 

the right to contribute, we apply heightened scrutiny. . . . We ask whether . . . the 

statute is ‘closely drawn’ to avoid unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment 

freedoms.”).

Plaintiffs here do not ask whether the Government can impose contribution 

limits at all, and they do not challenge the specific dollar amount Congress has 

chosen, both issues the Supreme Court has already addressed. See Wagner II, 793 

F.3d at 5-6 n. 3 (compiling cases addressing contribution limits under closely drawn 

standard).8 Rather, Plaintiffs challenge only the manner in which the total amount of 

 7 As discussed below, the only interest available to the FEC is the prevention of 

“quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.” See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445. 

8 Plaintiffs note that greater judicial deference may be appropriate when reviewing 

the dollar amount of contribution limits, both because the Supreme Court has 

previously considered the constitutionality of particular limits and because of the 

empirical judgments involved in setting particular limits. See, e.g., Randall v. 

Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (Breyer, J., plurality op.) (“In practice, the 

legislature is better equipped to make such empirical judgments, as legislators have 

particular expertise in matters related to the costs and nature of running for office.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 

Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 446 (2001) (noting that “the dollar amount of the limit need 

not be ‘fine tuned’” (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 

(2000))); cf. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 737 (2008) (“When contribution limits are 

challenged as too restrictive, we have extended a measure of deference to the 

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money that Congress has said will not corrupt a candidate is split between the 

primary and general elections.

As this Court recognized in reversing the district court’s denial of 

certification, this case raises a novel question. See JA-193. In Buckley’s review of 

FECA’s contribution limits, the Justices “mentioned the ‘per-election’ structure only 

a handful of times,” despite penning the “more than 200 pages of the majority

opinion and dissents,” and then only “to ‘summarize[]’ or define the contribution 

limits.” Id. Similarly, “[i]n nearly 800 pages of briefs,” the bifurcated limits were 

“mentioned only” to summarize or define the limits. Id. And, “[o]f the 28 

constitutional questions” certified in Buckley, “none touched upon the subject.” Id. 

Indeed, in no opinion has any court gone beyond “the three sentences” the Buckley 

court spent analyzing FECA’s aggregate limits, an analysis so “superficial” that 

Buckley did not control. JA-194. 

Thus, this case raises a novel question, and the FEC must therefore bear the 

full weight of heightened scrutiny and demonstrate with particularity that FECA’s 

bifurcation provisions are constitutional as applied to Plaintiffs’ specific 

circumstances. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 391 (“The quantum of empirical evidence” 

the government must provide “to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative 

 

judgment of the legislative body that enacted the law.”). “But [the Supreme Court 

has] held that limits that are too low cannot stand.” Davis, 554 U.S. at 737. 

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judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification” 

the government gives for a law).9

C. FECA Must Be Tailored to Limit True Quid Pro Quo Corruption or 

Its Appearance

“There is no right more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in 

electing our political leaders,” and “[t]he right to participate . . . through political 

contributions is [therefore] protected by the First Amendment.” McCutcheon, 134 S. 

Ct. at 1440-41. Because of the importance of this basic right, the Supreme Court has 

“identified only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign 

finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.” Id. at 1450. And 

this anticorruption interest must target, in particular, “what [the Supreme Court has] 

called ‘quid pro quo’ corruption or its appearance.” Id. at 1441. 

 9 By contrast, the plaintiffs in Shrink Missouri did not raise a novel challenge. They 

challenged whether the state could constitutionally impose contribution limits at all, 

as well as whether Missouri’s particular limits were set at an appropriate level. See 

Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 390-91. But the Supreme Court in Buckley had already

upheld a similar law against a similar challenge where a government asserted similar 

justifications. Thus, the state could rely on evidence and studies used in Buckley to 

justify its analogous law. Id. at 391-92, 393, 393 n. 6. And because those plaintiffs 

had not “made any showing . . . to cast doubt on the apparent implications of [the] 

evidence and the record” in the previous case, the state was not required to provide 

additional, “extensive evidentiary documentation” to protect its law. Id. at 394. Here, 

as this Court has already recognized, there is no similar congruence with Buckley (or 

any other authority), and the FEC must bear the full burden of heightened 

constitutional scrutiny.

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This narrow interest requires that the government restrain itself from treating

“nearly anything a public official accepts . . . as a quid; and nearly anything a public

official does . . . as a quo.” McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016)

(rejecting expansive view of quid pro quo). Thus, in protecting against such 

corruption or its appearance, the Government “may not target the general gratitude 

a candidate may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the political 

access such support may afford.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441. In particular, the 

Government cannot adopt and enforce laws in a way that would “cast a pall of 

potential prosecution over these relationships,” including by making “citizens with 

legitimate concerns . . . shrink from participating in democratic discourse.”

McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372. 

In short, courts have a duty to carefully guard against overreaching 

interpretations of the anticorruption interest, and “[a]ny regulation [justified under 

the anticorruption interest] must . . . target [the] direct exchange of an official act for 

money,” i.e., “dollars for political favors.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (citation 

omitted); see also JA-188 to 189. When the Government attempts to regulate 

political association, and targets its efforts beyond this narrow understanding of quid 

pro quo corruption, it “impermissibly inject[s itself] ‘into the debate over who 

should govern.’ And those who govern should be the last people to help decide who 

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should govern.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (citation omitted) (emphasis in 

original).

A correct understanding of the government’s legitimate interest is necessary, 

but insufficient. Governmental efforts to effectuate that interest must also be “closely 

drawn” to avoid unnecessary infringement on constitutional liberties. Id. at 1444. 

After all, “[i]n the First Amendment context, fit matters.” Id. at 1456. In assessing 

that fit, this Court must demand more than “mere conjecture,” Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. 

at 392, and the FEC must “show a real risk of corruption” under the facts of this 

case, rather than relying on general statements, facial precedents, or other authority 

dealing generally with contribution limits in very different circumstances. Id.; see 

also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28 (upholding contribution limit that “focuse[d] precisely 

on . . . the narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for 

corruption have been identified”).

In short, unless the Government can demonstrate that FECA’s bifurcated 

system of contribution limits is targeted toward a risk of corruption that is not already 

addressed by the contribution limits in general, the law is not closely drawn, and it 

unconstitutionally “intrude[s] without justification on a citizen’s ability to exercise 

the most fundamental First Amendment activities.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462

(internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Wagner II, 793 F.3d at 17 n. 20 (noting that 

the Sixth Circuit overturned a law banning prosecutors from accepting contributions 

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from Medicaid providers, because the state produced no evidence that the law 

prevented corruption among prosecutors (citing Lavin v. Husted, 689 F.3d 543, 547 

(6th Cir. 2012)).

II. FECA VIOLATES PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDMENT 

ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS

The Supreme Court has “identified only one legitimate governmental interest 

for restricting” our “right to participate in electing our political leaders . . . through 

political contributions.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441, 1450. That interest is 

“preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.” Id. at 1450.

10

In addressing the anticorruption interest, the relevant yardstick is the total 

amount of money a candidate has received. This is common sense. It is also the

approach taken by the Supreme Court, which has discussed the total limit on an 

individual’s contributions when analyzing constitutional questions related to the 

 10 Before noting that it had approved only the anticorruption interest, the Supreme 

Court briefly mused that the Government might have attempted to defend the 

additional, aggregate limits on donations across candidates by appeal to the 

circumvention interest. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (“And if there is no risk 

that . . . candidates will be corrupted by donations of up to $5,200, then the 

Government must defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they prevent 

circumvention of the base limits.”). The Supreme Court found only the 

anticorruption interest sufficient to justify the infringement upon associational rights 

implicit in contribution limits. Id. at 1450. Here, even if the anti-circumvention 

interest could sustain the bifurcated contribution limits, the Government has neither 

argued that the bifurcated limits are sustained by the anti-circumvention interest nor 

demonstrated that those limits are closely drawn to that interest. Nor has it suggested 

any other valid, let alone substantial, governmental interest.

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base limits. See, e.g., id. at 1448 (“[t]he individual may give up to $5,200”); id. at 

1452 (“Congress’s selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that 

contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption”).

And if the Supreme Court’s approach is correct in looking to the total amount

contributed, then there should be no greater risk of corruption if a donor gives that 

full amount the day after the primary, rather than half the day before. Congress has 

nevertheless created a bifurcated system that arbitrarily bans contributions in the 

former case. 

Ms. Holmes and Mr. Jost do not ask that the Court overturn FECA, the 

existence of campaign contribution limits, or the specific contribution thresholds. 

They simply want to associate fully with their preferred candidate—the party 

nominee—by making a full, non-corrupting donation after the primary election. The 

FEC has failed to demonstrate that this poses any risk of corruption, or that the 

bifurcation of donor contributions meets the requirements of heightened scrutiny.

A. The Bifurcated Contribution Limits Are Not Closely Drawn to the 

Anticorruption Interest

Plaintiffs concede that the prevention of corruption, correctly understood, is a 

compelling—indeed vital—governmental function. But Congress does not have 

limitless discretion in tackling that danger, and the FEC has failed to demonstrate 

that the bifurcated limit is “closely drawn” to that interest. Id. at 1444-46. 

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1. The relevant base limit is $5,200.

Congress has determined, and the Supreme Court has acknowledged, that the 

relevant base limit here is $5,200. Id. at 1452. Indeed, the existence of this 

underlying $5,200 base limit was central to the controlling opinion, and discussed 

by the dissenters, in McCutcheon’s review of additional, aggregate limits across 

candidates. This was no oversight or shorthand: the McCutcheon Court was well 

aware that FECA divided the total amount that is non-corrupting into “base limits 

[that] permit an individual to contribute up to $2,600 per election to a candidate 

($5,200 total for the primary and general elections).” Id. at 1442. 

In determining whether the aggregate limits were closely drawn to the 

anticorruption interest, the Supreme Court consistently focused on the total $5,200 

that can be donated to a candidate who has won a primary election. See, e.g., id. at 

1448, 1451, 1452; id. at 1473, 1474, 1476 (Breyer, J., dissenting). It explicitly stated 

that Congress selected the “$5,200 base limit” because it believed that amount was 

sufficient to prevent the risks of quid pro quo corruption. Id. at 1452. And, working 

at the $5,200 level, the Court could find no basis for believing the aggregate limits 

were tailored to the anticorruption interest. See id. at 1452-56. Consequently, the 

McCutcheon Court held that the aggregate limits were an unconstitutional 

prophylaxis layered atop the prophylaxis already provided by the base limit. Id. at 

1458, 1462.

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The Court’s analysis follows from the common-sense recognition that it is the 

total amount received by a candidate thatsignals whether there is a risk of corruption. 

If, on the other hand, it were the individual, per-election limits that were relevant to 

the anticorruption interest, the McCutcheon Court would have conducted its analysis 

at the per-election level. It did not.

Nor is the Supreme Court alone in recognizing the common-sense truth that 

party nominees are subject to a $5,200 limit. After all, there is little point to winning 

a primary alone; the purpose of an election is to win office, and candidates begin 

raising money for both from the start, as they are allowed to do. See, e.g., 11 C.F.R. 

§ 110.1(b)(5)(ii)(B) (permitting single check for $5,200 during primary to begin 

covering general election expenses); Tim Higgins, Presidential Fundraising: See 

Who’s Spending, Who’s Lagging, Who’s Raising and Where, Bloomberg, July 16, 

2015, at http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-07-16/presidentialcampaign-finance-reports-a-data-visualization (noting that “contributors have 

not maxed out their $5,400 legal limit”).

“Congress’s selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that 

contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption,” 

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452. Plaintiffs only wish to contribute at that level, and 

the FEC has failed to show any quid pro quo corruption that FECA’s bifurcated 

limits target in Plaintiffs’ circumstances. This alone is fatal to the FEC’s defense.

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2. The FEC has not shown any relationship between the bifurcated 

contribution limits and the anticorruption interest

Even if the FEC had shown a risk of quid pro quo corruption targeted by 

FECA’s bifurcated limits, it has failed to show a relationship between the law’s 

burdens and that risk. This is an as-applied challenge limited to FECA’s application 

to a particular type of general-election contribution, and it is the FEC’s burden to 

show that the law is closely drawn to the anticorruption interest in that circumstance.

Id. at 1452 (“When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the 

burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). It has not done so. 

First, the Commission cannot rely on any prior case because there is no prior 

case addressing the constitutionality of a law bifurcating contribution limits. Cf.

Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391-93, 393 n. 6 (noting that a government can rely on 

the evidence and studies of other entities addressing the same issue). In particular, 

the Buckley Court’s rejection of a facial challenge to the very existence of 

contribution limits does not support the Commission. As the Supreme Court has 

stated, its “rejection of [a] plaintiffs’ facial challenge to [a] requirement . . . does not 

foreclose possible future challenges to particular applications of that requirement.” 

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 199; see also Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 

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411-412 (2006) (“WRTL I”) (“In upholding [a statute] against a facial challenge, we 

did not purport to resolve future as-applied challenges.”).

11

Thus, the FEC must demonstrate that the specific, as-applied question raised 

here was at issue in Buckley’s facial challenge. This it cannot do, because, as this 

Court has already held in this very case, FECA’s “‘per-election’ structure” was 

mentioned “only a handful of times” in Buckley for the “limited purpose” of 

“‘summariz[ing]’ or defin[ing] the contribution limits provision,” and even those 

 11 Furthermore, the Buckley Court applied a different standard of review. Buckley 

dealt with a facial challenge to FECA, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35, rather than an asapplied challenge to the bifurcated structure of the contribution limits. Courts have 

a “preference for as-applied review,” United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 138 

(2d Cir. 2001), because facial challenges “mount[] gratuitous wholesale attacks upon 

state and federal laws” rather than confining themselves to “the plaintiff’s own right 

not to be bound by a statute,” Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 485 (1989). Cf. Wash. 

State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008). 

Consequently, the Supreme Court forces those making facial challenges to “shoulder 

[a] heavy burden to demonstrate that [a law] is ‘facially’ unconstitutional,” making 

it “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully.” United States v. Salerno, 481 

U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 

By contrast, as-applied challenges invalidate a law only under the plaintiff’s 

specific circumstances, leaving other potentially constitutional applications in place. 

See e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (striking down 

campaign finance statute as-applied). Furthermore, in cases where fundamental 

rights like those at issue here are involved, the government must bear the burden of 

showing that the law passes heightened scrutiny. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 

1444. And because the Supreme Court has created such a high standard for facial 

challenges to encourage parties to seek the more limited relief of as-applied 

challenges, the government cannot simply point to the denial of a facial challenge to 

say that an as-applied challenge is foreclosed. Cf. WRTL I, 546 U.S. at 411-12 (“In 

upholding [a statute] against a facial challenge, we did not purport to resolve future 

as-applied challenges.”). 

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limited references had to be found throughout “200 pages of the majority opinion 

and dissents” and “nearly 800 pages of briefs.” JA-193. Moreover, none “[o]f the 28 

constitutional questions the district court certified . . . touched upon the subject” of 

the limit bifurcation. Id. 

Thus, lacking any precedent dealing with bifurcated limits, including any 

record from such a case, the FEC must rely entirely on the evidence it has produced

here. Cf. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 393. But this too falls short. The Commission

proposed numerous legislative and other facts, which the District Court adopted 

almost in their entirety. JA-142 to 146. These facts exhaustively relate the history of 

campaign finance regulation and the reasons Congress had for adopting contribution 

limits. In all of that, however, there is nothing demonstrating that giving $5,200 is 

any more corrupting when the total is given a day after the primary election than 

when half is given the day before. Nor are any of the Commission’s legislative facts, 

all of which address the concept of contribution limits at a very high level of 

abstraction, applicable to this as-applied challenge. Id.

On the contrary, even though Plaintiffs do not bear the burden here, evidence 

shows widespread recognition that donating a single check for $5,200 is not 

corrupting. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (noting that “Congress’s 

selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that contributions of that amount 

or less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption”); cf. 11 C.F.R. 

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§ 110.1(b)(5)(ii)(B) (permitting single check before the primary for up to the total 

limit for the primary and general elections); 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(3)(i) (permitting 

single check for $5,200 after the primary, although permitting funds earmarked for 

the primary period to be used only to retire outstanding debts). 

Thus, the FEC cannot meet its burden, and has failed to demonstrate that 

making the total permitted donation of $5,200 during the general election campaign 

would lead to quid pro quo corruption. It has therefore failed to show that the 

bifurcated contribution scheme is closely drawn to the government’s anticorruption 

interest. Rather, like the unconstitutional aggregate limits at issue in McCutcheon, 

the bifurcated limits are “layered on top” of base limits that themselves do not 

directly combat corruption, but only keep it at a greater distance. 134 S. Ct. at 1458.

12

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held, however, that such a “‘prophylaxis-uponprophylaxis approach’ requires that [courts] be particularly diligent in scrutinizing 

the law’s fit.” Id. at 1458 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 479 

(2007) (“WRTL II”) (opinion of Roberts, C. J.)). 

 12 In McCutcheon, the Supreme Court noted that the aggregate limits were layered 

on top “ostensibly” to help fight circumvention of the base limits. 134 S. Ct. at 1458; 

see also, e.g., id. at 1442 (noting FEC arguments that aggregate limits are necessary 

to prevent circumvention). The Supreme Court then noted “multiple alternatives 

available” to prevent the potential of circumvention occurring in the way the FEC 

had argued. Id. at 1458. Here, the FEC has not even indicated a way in which the 

bifurcated limits might help further the anti-circumvention or any other interest.

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B. Significant Harm to Plaintiffs

As the Supreme Court held in McCutcheon, “[t]o require one person to 

contribute at lower levels than others . . . is to impose a special burden on broader 

participation in the democratic process.” 134 S. Ct. at 1449. Moreover, “the 

Government may not penalize an individual for ‘robustly exercis[ing]’ his First 

Amendment rights.” Id. (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 739).

Here, Plaintiffs face a unique constitutional harm. They wish to “robustly 

exercise” their First Amendment rights by fully contributing to the candidate of their 

choice—their party’s nominee for office. Primary elections can be a source of 

tremendous waste, with incredible sums of money contributed to and spent by

candidates who will not even enter the general election and truly stand for office.

Plaintiffs have no desire to see their contributions wasted in this manner, preferring 

to support their party’s ultimate nominees.

Despite years of efforts by political scientists and pollsters, there is no 

electoral crystal ball, and unless a candidate runs unopposed in the primary, 

Plaintiffs generally cannot know for certain who their party’s nominee ultimately 

will be. As a result, absent the perfection of time travel, FECA prevents Plaintiffs 

from association with candidates in their preferred manner and for their intended 

purpose.

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Given the lack of any relationship between the FECA provisions binding them

and any quid pro quo anticorruption interest, FECA’s bifurcated contribution limits 

are not closely drawn. Plaintiffs, accordingly, ought to be free to associate with 

candidates at a time of their own choosing.

C. The FEC Cannot Force the Court to Wear Blinders to Evade 

Constitutional Review

The FEC has insisted that the courts wear blinders to prevent constitutional 

review of FECA’s effect here. JA 173 (district court characterizing this case as a 

facial challenge to the existence of contribution limits). The central question here is 

whether, having concluded that a donor can give up to $5,200 during the primary 

and general election periods without implicating the anticorruption interest, 

Congress can further control and constrict individuals’ associational rights by 

forcing individual donors to split that $5,200 into smaller chunks and give up the 

right to donate the full amount unless they give in to the bifurcated scheme. The FEC 

cannot avoid this question by insisting that the courts look only at FECA’s individual 

election limits and not the statutory system as a whole. 

“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute 

must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory 

scheme.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), superseded by statute as noted 

in Bullitt Fiscal Court v. Bullitt County Bd. of Health, 434 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Ky. 2014). 

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That is, a court “must . . . interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent 

regulatory scheme . . . and fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.” Id. 

(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Davis v. Mich. Dep’t 

of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989); see also Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit 

Union Admin., 271 F.3d 262, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that traditional tools of 

statutory construction require examining context); General Motors Corp. v. Nat’l

Highway Traffic Safety Admin, 898 F.2d 165, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that 

traditional tools of statutory construction require examining the “language and 

design of the statute as a whole” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Thus, for example, a government could not escape constitutional review 

of a minor’s life sentence after Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), by 

mandating 100 consecutive one-year terms for the same count, and then insisting

that a court limit its analysis to the propriety of each one-year term. 

Here, the individual election period limits must be examined in light of the 

statutory scheme as a whole, which includes repeated findings and 

acknowledgements by Congress and the Supreme Court that donors may give up to 

$5,200 without risk of quid pro quo corruption. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 

1452 (noting that “Congress’s selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief 

that contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable risk of 

corruption”). Indeed, the FEC itself has acknowledged that donors can give up to 

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$5,200 in a single check or during the same election period without risk of 

corruption. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.1(b)(5)(ii)(B) and 110.1(b)(3)(i). 

CONCLUSION

Without doing anything to further the anticorruption interest, the bifurcated 

contribution limits “prohibit an individual from fully contributing to” his or her

preferred candidates, “even if all contributions fall within the base limits”—that is,

the “$5,200 each”—that “Congress views as adequate to protect against corruption.” 

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448. Thus, for the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs 

ask that the Court find the bifurcated contribution limits unconstitutional as applied 

to them, i.e., to donors who wish to give the full, non-corrupting $5,200 contribution 

to party nominees once they have won their primary elections. 

Dated: Aug. 15, 2016

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Allen Dickerson

Allen Dickerson (D.C. Cir. No. 54137)

CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS

124 S. West Street, Suite 201

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Telephone: 703-894-6800

Facsimile: 703-894-6811

adickerson@campaignfreedom.org

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation set 

forth in Rule 32(a)(7)(B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure because it 

contains 6,839 words, according to a word count by Microsoft Word 2016, 

excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Rule 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). 

This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5) because 

it has been prepared in a proportionally-spaced typeface—Times New Roman—

using 14-point font. 

Respectfully submitted Aug. 15, 2016 /s/ Allen Dickerson

Allen Dickerson

CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

USCA Case #16-5194 Document #1630503 Filed: 08/15/2016 Page 38 of 39
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 15, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing 

Plaintiffs’ Principal Brief with the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the District of Columbia Circuit using the Court’s CM/ECF system. 

All participants in the case are represented by counsel of record who are 

registered CM/ECF users and will be served by the CM/ECF system. Service was 

made by CM/ECF on the following registered attorneys currently appearing in the 

case:

Erin Rebecca Chlopak Email: echlopak@fec.gov

Charles P. Kitcher Email: ckitcher@fec.gov

Kevin Andrew Deeley Email: kdeeley@fec.gov

Steve Nicholas Hajjar Email: shajjar@fec.gov

Respectfully submitted Aug. 15, 2016 /s/ Allen Dickerson

Allen Dickerson

CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS

Counsel for Plaintiffs

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