ypp

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of t

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 3

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 

Syllabus

MCCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION E

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No. 02ñ1674. Argued September 8, 2003óDecided De

2003*

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), w

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), the 

tions Act of 1934, and other portions of the United State

most recent of nearly a century of federal enactments 

purge national politics of what [is] conceived to be the 

fluence of ëbig moneyí campaign contributions.î Un

Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 572. In enacting BC

sought to address three important developments in the y

óóóóóó

*Together with No. 02ñ1675, National Rifle Association 

eral Election Commission et al., No. 02ñ1676, Federal 

mission et al. v. McConnell, United States Senator, et al., 

McCain, United States Senator, et al. v. McConnell, Unite

tor, et al., No. 02ñ1727, Republican National Committee et 

Election Commission et al., No. 02ñ1733, National Righ

mittee, Inc., et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., 

American Civil Liberties Union v. Federal Election Com

No. 02ñ1740, Adams et al. v. Federal Election Commiss

02ñ1747, Paul, United States Congressman, et al. v. Fe

Commission et al., No. 02ñ1753, California Democratic 

Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02ñ1755, Americ

of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et 

Election Commission et al., and No. 02ñ1756, Chamber of 

the United States et al. v. Federal Election Commission 

appeal from the same court.
ìissue ads,î and the disturbing findings of a Senate inve

campaign practices related to the 1996 federal elections

With regard to the first development, prior to BCRA

closure requirements and source and amount limitat

only to so-called ìhard moneyî contributions made for t

influencing an election for federal office. Political part

dates were able to circumvent FECAís limitations by 

ìsoft moneyîómoney as yet unregulated under FECAó

activities intended to influence state or local election

purpose activities such as get-out-the-vote (GOTV) driv

party advertising; and for legislative advocacy adverti

if they mentioned a federal candidateís name, so long 

not expressly advocate the candidateís election or def

gard to the second development, parties and candidates 

FECA by using ìissue adsî that were specifically inte

election results, but did not contain ìmagic words,î 

Against Jane Doe,î which would have subjected the a

restrictions. Those developments were detailed in a 

Committee Report summarizing an investigation into 

eral elections, which concluded that the soft-money loo

to a meltdown of the campaign finance system; and dis

tial reforms, including a soft-money ban and restriction

sue advocacy by nonparty groups.

Congress enacted many of the committeeís proposals 

tle I regulates the use of soft money by political parties

and candidates; Title II primarily prohibits corporation

from using general treasury funds for communication

tended to, or have the effect of, influencing federal elect

and Titles III, IV, and V set out other requirements. E

challenging BCRAís constitutionality were filed. A th

trict Court held some parts of BCRA unconstitutiona

others. The parties challenging the law are referred to 

tiffs, and those who intervened in support of the law a

defendants.

Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in pa

251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 251 F. Supp. 2d 948, affirmed in part 

in part.

JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE OíCONNOR delivered 

opinion with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, conclu

statuteís two principal, complementary featuresóCong

plug the soft-money loophole and its regulation of 

communicationsómust be upheld in the main. Pp. 23ñ
(a) In evaluating ß323, the Court applies the less 

dard of review applicable to campaign contribution 

Buckley and its progeny. Such limits are subject on

drawnî scrutiny, see 424 U. S., at 25, rather than to s

because, unlike restrictions on campaign expenditure

limits ìentai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the 

ability to engage in free communication,î e.g., id., at 2

ver, contribution limits are grounded in the important 

interests in preventing ìboth the actual corruption t

large financial contributions and the eroding of public 

the electoral process through the appearance of corru

Federal Election Commín v. National Right to Work Com

197, 208. The less rigorous review standard shows pro

to Congressí ability to weigh competing constitutional i

area in which it enjoys particular expertise, and provid

ficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns abo

tion of regulations designed to protect the political proc

Finally, because Congress, in its lengthy deliberatio

BCRAís enactment, properly relied on Buckley and its pro

cisis considerations, buttressed by the respect that the L

Judicial Branches owe one another, provide additional po

for adhering to the analysis of contribution limits the Co

tently followed since Buckley. The Court rejects plaint

that the type of speech and associational burdens that 

are fundamentally different from the burdens that 

Buckleyís contribution limits. Pp. 24ñ32.

(b) New FECA ß323(a)ówhich forbids national par

and their agents to ìsolicit, receive, . . . direct . . . , or sp

. . . that are not subject to [FECAís] limitations, prohib

porting requirements,î 2 U. S. C. A. ßß441i(a)(1), (2)ód

the First Amendment. Pp. 32ñ52.

(1) The governmental interest underlying ß323(a

the actual or apparent corruption of federal candidat

holdersóconstitutes a sufficiently important interest to 

bution limits. That interest is not limited to the eliminat

quo, cash-for-votes exchanges, see Buckley, supra, at 2

also to ìundue influence on an officeholderís judgment, an

ance of such influence,î Federal Election Commín v. Colo

can Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 441 (Colora

interests are sufficient to justify not only contribution lim

but also laws preventing the circumvention of such limit

While the quantum of empirical evidence needed to s
Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 391, the idea that large 

to a national party can corrupt or create the appearance 

of federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel 

ble, see, e.g., Buckley, supra, at 38. There is substanti

these cases to support Congressí determination that s

tions of soft money give rise to corruption and the appe

ruption. For instance, the record is replete with examp

party committeesí peddling access to federal candidat

holders in exchange for large soft-money donations. Pp

(2) Section ß323(a) is not impermissibly overbro

subjects all funds raised and spent by national parti

hard-money source and amount limits, including, e.g., f

purely state and local elections in which no federal offi

The record demonstrates that the close relationship be

officeholders and the national parties, as well as the m

parties have traded on that relationship, have made 

money contributions to national parties suspect, rega

those funds are ultimately used. The Governmentís st

in preventing corruption, and particularly its appeara

sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to nation

FECAís source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Pp. 

(3) Nor is ß323(a)ís prohibition on national partie

directing soft-money contributions substantially over

prohibitionís reach is limited, in that it bars only soft-m

tions by national party committees and party officers a

official capacities; the committees themselves remain 

hard money on their own behalf or that of state commit

and local candidates and to contribute hard money to 

tees and candidates. Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively t

tation banís overbreadth is demonstrated by ß323(e), 

federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited a

money from individual donors under certain circumsta

ferences between ßß323(a) and 323(e) are without cons

nificance, see National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 2

Congressí reasonable and expert judgments about nat

teesí functions and their interactions with officeholders. 

(4) Section 323(a) is not substantially overbroad w

the speech and associational rights of minor parties, ev

latter may have slim prospects for electoral success. It 

to require that all parties and candidates follow the s

signed to protect the electoral processís integrity. Buck

at 34ñ35. A nascent or struggling minor party can 
(5) Plaintiffsí argument that ß323(a) unconstitu

feres with the ability of national committees to associ

and local committees is unpersuasive because it hing

naturally broad reading of the statutory terms ìspend,î 

rect,î and ìsolicit.î Nothing on ß323(a)ís face prohibits 

officers from sitting down with state and local party 

candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend 

long as the national officers do not personally spend, r

or solicit soft money. Pp. 51ñ52.

(c) On its face, new FECA ß323(b)ówhich prohibit

cal party committees from using soft money for activ

federal elections, 2 U. S. C. A. ß442i(b)óis closely drawn 

important governmental interest of preventing corrupti

pearance. Pp. 52ñ66.

(1) Recognizing that the close ties between feder

and state party committees would soon render ß323(a

tion measures ineffective if state and local committ

available as a conduit for soft-money donations, Cong

ß323(b) to prevent donors from contributing nonfederal 

committees to help finance ìFederal election activity,î 

fined to encompass (1) voter registration activity during 

before a federal election; (2) voter identification, GOTV

campaign activity ìconducted in connection with an ele

a [federal] candidate . . . appears on the ballotî; (3) an

municationî that ìrefers to a clearly identified [feder

and ìpromotes,î ìsupports,î ìattacks,î or ìopposesî such 

and (4) the services of a state committee employee w

more than 25% of his or her compensated time to ìact

nection with a Federal election,î 2 U. S. C. A. ßß431(20

activities that fall within this definition must be fund

money. ß441i(b)(1). The Levin Amendment carves out 

to this general rule, allowing state and local party com

for certain federal election activitiesónamely, act

within categories (1) and (2) above that either do n

clearly identified candidate for Federal office,î or, if 

broadcast communications, refer ìsolely to a clearly ide

date for State or local office,î ßß441i(b)(2)(B)(i)ñ(ii)ówit

ratio of hard money and so-called ìLevin funds.î Le

subject only to state regulation, but for two additiona

First, no contributor can donate more than $10,000 per 

gle committeeís Levin account. ß441i(b)(2)(B)(iii). Secon

funds and the allocated portion of hard money to pay f
committees to solicit the hard-money portion. ßß44

441i(b)(2)(C). Pp. 52ñ55.

(2) In addressing soft-money contributions to stat

Congress both drew a conclusion and made a prediction

from the record that soft moneyís corrupting influence 

self into the political process not only through national 

tees, but also through state committees, which functio

nate avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces

evidence shows that both candidates and parties alrea

who have reached their direct contribution limit to d

committees. Congressí reasonable prediction, based on 

campaign finance regulation, was that donors would re

by directing soft-money contributions to state comm

purpose of influencing federal candidates and elections

eral candidates would be just as indebted to these co

they had been to those who had formerly contributed t

parties. Preventing corrupting activity from shifting 

state committees and thereby eviscerating FECA clear

an important governmental interest. Pp. 55ñ57.

(3) Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that, even if 

a legitimate interest, its restrictions are so unjustifiabl

and overbroad that they cannot be considered ìclose

match the Governmentís objectives. Pp. 57ñ66.

(i) Section 323(b) is not substantially overbro

ß323(b) captures some activities that affect state camp

federal offices, these are the same activities that were c

FECís pre-BCRA allocation rules, and so had to be fun

hard money because they affected both federal and s

As a practical matter, BCRA merely codifies the FECís 

gime principles while justifiably adjusting the applicab

order to restore the efficacy of FECAís longstanding 

contributions to state and local committees for the pu

encing federal elections. By limiting its reach to ìFeder

tivities,î ß323(b) is narrowly focused on regulating cont

directly benefit federal candidates and thus pose the g

corruption or its appearance. The first two categorie

election activityîóvoter registration efforts and voter 

GOTV, and generic campaign activities conducted in co

a federal electionóclearly capture activities that confer 

benefit on federal candidates by getting like-minded 

polls. If a voter registration drive does not specifically m

eral candidate, state committees can take advantage 
the third category of ìFederal election activity,î ìpubli

tion[s]î that promote or attack a federal candidate, d

the election in which that candidate is participating, 

ß323(b)ís contribution caps to such communications is 

to the anticorruption interest it is intended to address. 

gressí interest in preventing circumvention of ß323(b)ís 

tions justifies the requirement of the fourth category of 

tion activityî that federal funds be used to pay any 

party employee who spends more than 25% of his or her 

time on activities connected with a federal election. Pp. 

(ii) The Levin Amendment does not unjustifiab

sociation among party committees by forbidding tran

funds among state parties, transfers of hard money to f

able federal portion of Levin expenditures, and joint 

Levin funds by state parties. While preserving parties

freedom is important, not every minor restriction on 

wise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitution

See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 450, n. 11. Given the de

terconnected regulatory scheme at issue here, any asso

dens imposed by the Levin Amendment restrictions 

weighed by the need to prevent circumvention of the e

Pp. 63ñ65.

(iii) The evidence supporting the argument th

Amendment prevents parties from amassing the resour

engage in effective advocacy is speculative. The histor

finance regulation proves that political parties are e

flexible in adapting to new restrictions on their fundra

Moreover, the mere fact that ß323(b) may reduce the m

to state and local parties to fund federal election activi

inconsequential. The question is not whether the amo

over previous election cycles is reduced, but whether th

so radical as to drive the sound of the recipientís voice b

of notice. Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 397. If state o

can make such a showing, as-applied challenges rem

Pp. 65ñ66.

(d) New FECA ß323(d)ówhich forbids national, st

party committees and their agents to ìsolicit any fund

or direct any donationsî to ß501(c) tax exempt organ

make expenditures in connection with a federal election

political organizations ìother than a political committee

trict, or local committee of a political party, or the au

paign committee of a candidate for State or local office,
circumvention measure. Absent this provision, nation

local party committees would have significant incentiv

their formidable fundraising apparatuses, including th

access to federal officeholders, into the service of lik

exempt organizations that conduct activities benefitin

dates. All of the corruption and the appearance of cor

dant on the operation of those fundraising apparatuses 

Plaintiffsí argument that ß323(d)ís solicitations ba

squared with ß323(e), which allows federal candidates a

ers to solicit limited soft-money donations to tax-exe

tions engaged in federal election activities, is not p

ß323(d)ís solicitation restriction is otherwise valid, it is 

unconstitutional by the mere fact that Congress chose n

the activities of another group as stringently as it mig

National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 210. Furthermo

ence between the two provisions is explained by the fact 

party officers, unlike federal candidates and officeho

free to solicit soft money on behalf of nonprofit organiz

individual capacities. Given ß323(e)ís tight content

amount restrictions on soft-money solicitations by fede

and officeholders, as well as the less rigorous standa

ß323(e)ís greater solicitation allowances do not render ß

tation restriction facially invalid. Pp. 67ñ71.

(2) Section 323(d)ís restriction on donations 

ß501(c) or ß527 organizations is a valid anticircumven

insofar as it prohibits donations of funds not already r

pliance with FECA. Absent such a restriction, state a

committees could accomplish directly what the antis

strictions prevent them from doing indirectlyóraising 

soft money to launder through tax-exempt organization

federal election activities. Although the ban raises ove

cerns if read to restrict donations from a partyís federal 

funds already raised in compliance with FECAís source

disclosure limitationsóthese concerns do not require t

challenge be sustained, given this Courtís obligation 

statute, if possible, in such a way as to avoid constitutio

see, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62. Because t

not compel the conclusion that Congress intended ìdon

clude donations from a partyís hard-money account, a

the constitutional infirmities such an interpretation wo

Court narrowly construes ß323(d)ís ban to apply only t

funds not raised in compliance with FECA. Pp. 71ñ73.
fer, or spendî soft money in connection with federa

U. S. C. A. ß441i(e)(1)(A), and limits their ability to d

and local elections, ß441i(e)(1)(B)ódoes not viola

Amendment. No party seriously questions the const

the general ban on soft-money donations directly to 

dates and officeholders and their agents. By severing t

link to the soft-money donor, the ban is closely drawn 

corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal c

officeholders. The solicitation restrictions are valid a

tion measures. Even before BCRAís passage, federal c

officeholders solicited donations to state and local part

tax-exempt organizations, in order to help their own, a

partyís, electoral cause. See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 

centives to do so will only increase with Title Iís restr

raising and spending of soft money by national, state, 

ties. Section 323(e) addresses these concerns while a

the individual speech and associational rights of feder

and officeholders. Pp. 74ñ77.

(f) New FECA ß323(f)ówhich forbids state and loc

or officeholders to raise and spend soft money to fund 

ìpublic communicationsî that promote or attack federal 

U. S. C. ß442i(f)óis a valid anticircumvention provision

places no cap on the funds that such candidates can spe

tivity, but, rather, limits only the source and amount of 

that they can draw on to fund expenditures that direct

eral elections. And, by regulating only contributions 

ìpublic communications,î the section focuses narrowly 

money donations with the greatest potential to corrupt 

the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and 

Plaintiffsí principal arguments against the sectionó(1) 

nition of ìpublic communicationsî as communications th

attack a clearly identified federal candidate is unco

vague and overbroad; and (2) that soft-money contribu

and local candidates for ìpublic communicationsî do n

appear to corrupt federal candidatesóare rejected. Pp. 

2. Several plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that BCR

ceeds Congressí Election Clause authority to ìmake o

governing federal elections, U. S. Const., Art. I, ß4, and 

stitutional federalism principles by impairing the State

regulate their own elections. In examining federal A

Amendment infirmity, the Court focuses on whether St

officials are commandeered to carry out federal regula
upon States or state officials. And, because it does not 

empt state legislation, Title I leaves States free to enfo

restrictions on state electoral campaign financing. M

this Court has policed the absolute boundaries of Cong

power, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 

no reason to believe that Congress has overstepped its El

power in enacting BCRA. Indeed, as already found, Ti

drawn to match Congressí important interest in preventi

tion or the appearance of corruption of federal candida

holders. That interest is sufficient to ground Congressí 

Elections Clause power. Pp. 79ñ80.

3. Also rejected is the argument that BCRA Title I 

protection by discriminating against political parties in 

cial interest groups, which remain free to raise soft m

voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and bro

tising (other than electioneering communications). Fi

tually favors political parties in many ways, e.g., by a

committees to receive individual contributions substan

ing FECA limits on contributions to nonparty politica

More importantly, Congress is fully entitled to conside

real-world differences between parties and interest 

crafting a campaign finance regulation system, see Nat

Work, 459 U. S., at 210, including the fact that parties h

and power in the legislature vastly exceeding any int

Taken seriously, plaintiffsí equal protection argumen

into question not just BCRA Title I, but much of FECA

structure. Pp. 82ñ85.

4. Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed insofa

ßß323(e) and 323(f) and reversed insofar as it invalid

323(b), and 323(d). P. 82.

5. The District Courtís judgment is affirmed to the 

upheld the disclosure requirements in amended FECA 

jected the facial attack on the provisions relating to do

or more, but reversed to the extent that it inval

ß304(f)(5). Pp. 82ñ95.

(a) BCRA ß201 comprehensively amends FECA ß3

quires political committees to file detailed periodic fin

with the FEC. The narrowing construction adopted in 

ited FECAís disclosure requirement to communications 

vocating the election or defeat of particular candidates. 

a new term, ìelectioneering communication,î which enc

ìbroadcast, cable, or satellite communicationî that clear
targeted to the relevant electorate. 2 U. S. C. A. ß

BCRA also amends ß304 to provide disclosure requirem

sons who fund electioneering communications (and 

amends FECA ß316(b)(2) to extend those requiremen

tions and labor unions).

Plaintiffs challenge the new termís constitutionalit

to both disclosures and expenditures, arguing primarily 

drew a constitutionally mandated line between express 

so-called issue advocacy, and that speakers have an in

Amendment right to engage in the latter category of 

ever, a plain reading of Buckley and Federal Election C

sachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (MCFL), s

express advocacy restriction is a product of statutory i

not a constitutional command. Both the concept of exp

and the class of magic words were born of an effort to a

tional problems of vagueness and overbreadth in the 

the Buckley Court. Consistent with the principle th

tional rule should never be formulated more broadly tha

the facts to which it is to be applied, Buckley and MCFL 

to the statutory language before the Court and in no way 

tutional boundary that forever fixed the permissible scop

regulating campaign-related speech. The notion that the 

ment erects a rigid barrier between express and issue 

cannot be squared with this Courtís longstanding recogn

presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfu

electioneering speech from a true issue ad. Buckleyís exp

line has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or 

ruption, and Congress enacted BCRA to correct the flaw

nally, because the components of new FECA ß304(f)(3)

ìelectioneering communicationî are both easily underst

tively determinable, the vagueness objection that persua

ley Court to limit FECAís reach to express advocacy is in

Pp. 82ñ88.

(b) With regard to plaintiffsí other concerns about 

phrase ìelectioneering communication,î the District C

rejected their submission that new FECA ß304 unn

quires disclosure of the names of persons who contribu

more to the individual or group paying for the comm

erred in finding ß304(f)(5) invalid because it mandates 

executory contracts for communications that have not y

cause the important state interests identified in Buck

the electorate with information, deterring actual co
Buckley amply supports application of FECA ß304ís 

quirements to the entire range of ìelectioneering com

Buckley also forecloses a facial attack on the new ß304 

requires disclosure of the names of persons who contrib

more to segregated funds or spend more than $10,000 

year on electioneering communications. Under Buckley

proof, the evidence here did not establish the requisi

probability of harm to any plaintiff group or its mem

from compelled disclosure. However, the rejection of th

lenge does not foreclose possible future challenges to pa

cations of that disclosure requirement.

This Court is also unpersuaded by plaintiffsí cha

FECA ß304(f)(5)ís requirement regarding the disclosur

contracts. The new provision mandates disclosure onl

son makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 in 

year to pay for electioneering communications. Given 

short time frames in which such communications are 

terest in assuring that disclosures are made in time to 

vant information to voters is significant. Yet fixing th

filing disclosure statements based on the date when 

bursements exceed $10,000 would open a significant loo

the advance disclosure requirement, for political sup

avoid preelection disclosures about ads slated to run d

paignís final weeks simply by making a preelection do

less than $10,000, with the balance payable after the 

record contains little evidence of any harm that might 

requirementís enforcement, and the District Courtí

about such harm cannot outweigh the public interest in 

disclosure before an election actually takes place. Pp. 8

6. The District Courtís judgment is affirmed insofar a

plaintiffs advanced no basis for finding unconstitutiona

which amends FECA ß315(a)(7)(C) to provide that disb

electioneering communications that are coordinated wit

or party will be treated as contributions to, and expend

candidate or party, 2 U. S. C. A. ß441a(a)(7)(C). That p

fies the scope of ß315(a)(7)(B), which provides that 

made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or co

at the request or suggestion of a candidate or party con

butions. BCRA pre-empts a possible claim that the t

tureî in ß315(a)(7)(B) is limited to spending for expr

Because Buckleyís narrow interpretation of that term 

statutory limitation on Congressí power to regulate fed
treats other coordinated expenditures. Pp. 96ñ97.

7. The District Courtís judgment is affirmed to the 

upheld the constitutionality of new FECA ß316(b)(2), an

the extent that it invalidated any part of that section

extends to all ìelectioneering communicationsî FECA ß

strictions on the use of corporate and union general trea

U. S. C. A. ß441b(b)(2). Because those entities may stil

administer segregated funds, or PACs, for such commu

provision is a regulation of, not a ban on, expression. B

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). This Courtís consideratio

claim that the expanded regulation is both overinclusi

inclusive is informed by the conclusion that the distin

express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy is not co

compelled. Thus, the Court examines the degree to 

burdens First Amendment expression and evaluates w

pelling governmental interest justifies that burden. P

not carried their burden of proving that new FECA 

overbroad. They argue that the justifications that ad

port regulation of express advocacy do not apply to sign

ties of speech encompassed by the electioneering co

definition. That argument fails to the extent that issue 

during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal 

general elections are the functional equivalent of expr

The justifications for regulating express advocacy app

those ads if they have an electioneering purpose, which 

jority do. Also rejected is plaintiffsí argument tha

ß316(b)(2)ís segregated-fund requirement is underinclus

does not apply to print or Internet advertising. The r

flects that corporations and unions used soft money to 

tual torrent of televised election-related ads during th

riod. Congress justifiably concluded that remedial le

needed to stanch that flow of money. Finally, ß304(f)(

excludes news items and commentary from the electi

munications definition, is wholly consistent with Firs

principles as applied to the media. Pp. 97ñ103.

8. The District Courtís judgment is affirmed to the 

upheld new FECA ß316(c)(6), as limited to nonprofit en

not so-called MCFL organizations. BCRA ß204, 

ß316(c)(6), 2 U. S. C. A. ß441b(c)(2), extends to nonprofi

the prohibition on the use of general treasury funds to 

tioneering communications. This Court upheld a simi

in Beaumont, supra, except as it applied to organizat
union, and do not accept contributions from those en

479 U. S., at 264. The same constitutional objection to 

pre-BCRA restrictions to such organizations necessaril

equal force to FECA ß316(c)(6). That ß316(c)(6) does n

exempt MCFL organizations is not a sufficient reason to 

This Court presumes that the legislators were fully a

provision could not apply to MCFL-type entities, and th

concedes that it does not. As so construed, the provis

valid. Pp. 103ñ106.

9. Because this Court has already found BCRA ß20

contract disclosure requirement constitutional, plaintiff

a similar disclosure requirement in BCRA ß212, which 

ß304(g), 2 U. S. C. A. ß434, is essentially moot. Pp. 106ñ

10. The District Courtís judgment is affirmed to the 

invalidated BCRA ß213, which amends FECA ß315(d)

political parties to choose between coordinated and in

penditures during the postnomination, preelection 

U. S. C. A. ß441a(d)(4). That provision places an un

burden on the partiesí right to make unlimited indepen

tures. Although the category of burdened speech is li

pendent expenditures for express advocacyóand ther

tively smallóit plainly is entitled to First Amendme

The governmental interest in requiring parties to avoi

words is not sufficient to support the burden imposed 

The fact that the provision is cast as a choice rather tha

prohibition on independent expenditures does not mak

tional. Pp. 107ñ114.

11. The District Courtís judgment is affirmed to the 

rejected plaintiffsí challenges to BCRA ß214, which 

ß315(a)(7)(B)(ii), 2 U. S. C. A. ß441a(a)(7)(b)(ii)

ß315(a)(7)(B)(i) long has provided that expenditures 

trolled by or coordinated with a candidate will be treate

tions to the candidate. BCRA ß214(a) extends that ru

tures coordinated with political parties; and ßß214 (b) 

the FEC to promulgate new regulations that do not ì

ment or formal collaboration to establish coordination,

ß441a(a) note. FECA ß315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is not overbro

cause it permits a finding of coordination in the abse

existing agreement. Congress has always treated expen

after a wink or nod as coordinated. Nor does the a

agreement requirement render ß315(a)(7)(B)(ii) unco

vague. An agreement has never been required under ß3
constitutional challenge for almost three decades. P

provided no evidence that that the definition has ch

speech, and have made no attempt to explain how an 

quirement would prevent the FEC from engaging in w

will be intrusive and politically motivated investigation

this facial challenge to BCRA, plaintiffsí challenge to ßß

is not ripe to the extent that they allege constitutional 

the FECís new regulations rather than the statute. Pp. 

THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Cour

to miscellaneous BCRA Title III and IV provisions, co

the District Courtís judgment with respect to these pr

be affirmed. Pp. 2ñ11.

1. The plaintiffsí challenges to BCRA ß305, ß307, an

aire provisions are nonjusticiable. Pp. 2ñ8.

(a) The McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to cha

ß305, which amends the federal Communications Ac

quirement that, 45 days before a primary or 60 days be

election, broadcast stations sell air time to a qualified 

their ìlowest unit charge,î 47 U. S. C. ß315(b). Section 

ment, in turn, denies a candidate the benefit of that ch

fied circumstances. 47 U. S. C. A. ßß315(b)(2)(A), (

McConnellís testimony that he plans to run ads critica

nents and had run them in the past is too remote tem

isfy the Article III standing requirement that a plaintif

an ìinjury in factî that is ìactual or imminent,î Whitmo

495 U. S. 149, 155, 158, given that the lowest unit charg

is not available until 45 days before a primary, that Se

nellís current term does not expire until 2009, and that, 

earliest day he could be affected by ß305 is 45 days be

Republican primary election. Pp. 2ñ4.

(b) The Adams and Paul plaintiffs lack standing 

BCRA ß307, which amends FECA ß315(a)(1) to increase 

inflation certain contribution limits. Neither injury a

Adams plaintiffs, a group of voters, voter organization

dates, is sufficient to confer standing. First, their asser

deprives them of an equal ability to participate in the el

based on their economic status does not satisfy the 

quirement that a plaintiffís alleged injury be an invasion 

and particularized legally protected interest, Lujan v

Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560, since political ìfree tradeî d

sarily require that all who participate in the political m

so with exactly equal resources, e.g., MCFL, 479 U. S.
they do not wish to solicit or accept the large campaign 

BCRA permits does not meet the standing requirement 

leged injury be ìfairly traceableî to ß307, see Lujan, s

since their alleged inability to compete stems not from 

tion, but from their own personal choice not to solicit o

contributions. Also inadequate for standing purpose

plaintiffsí contention that their congressional campaig

interest advocacy involve traditional press activities, su

contribution limits, together with FECA ß315ís individ

contribution limitations, impose unconstitutional editor

them in violation of the First Amendmentís Freedom 

Clause. These plaintiffs cannot show the requisite sub

hood their requested relief will remedy their alleged 

see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United Stat

ens, 529 U. S. 765, 771, since, even if the Court were t

BCRA ß307ís increases and indexes, as they ask, both F

bution limits and an exemption for institutional news 

remain unchanged. Pp. 4ñ8.

(c) The Adams plaintiffs lack standing to challenge 

ìmillionaire provisions,î BCRA ßß304, 315, and 316, w

for a series of staggered increases in otherwise applic

tion-to-candidate limits if the candidateís opponent spe

ing amount of his personal funds, and eliminate the co

penditure limits in certain circumstances. Because th

allege the same injuries that they alleged with regard t

they fail to state a cognizable injury that is fairly trace

Additionally, none of them is a candidate in an electi

the millionaire provisions, and it would be purely conj

sume that any of them ever will be. P. 8.

2. The District Courtís decision upholding BCRA ß31

of FECA ß318(a) to include mandatory e

communications-disbursements disclosure is affirmed 

inclusion bears a sufficient relationship to the importan

tal interest of ìshed[ding] the light of publicityî on cam

ing, Buckley, 424 U. S., at 81. Assuming, as the Cou

FECA ß318 is valid both to begin with and as amen

ß311ís amendments other than the electioneering-co

inclusion, the latter inclusion is not itself unconstitution

3. BCRA ß318ówhich forbids individuals ì17 years o

to make contributions to candidates and politica

U. S. C. A. ß441kóviolates the First Amendment righ

see, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
tion, see Buckley, 424 U. S., at 20ñ22, the Court appli

scrutiny to such a limitation, asking whether it is justi

ficiently important interestî and ìclosely drawnî to a

sary abridgment of the First Amendment, see e.g., p

(joint opinion of STEVENS and OíCONNOR, JJ.). The Gove

scant evidence for its assertion that ß318 protects agai

by conduitói.e., donations by parents through their min

circumvent contribution limits applicable to the paren

more convincing case of the claimed evil, this interest 

attenuated for ß318 to withstand heightened scrutiny

Missouri, 528 U. S., at 391. Even assuming, arguendo

ment advances an important interest, the provision is 

as shown by the Statesí adoption of more tailored appro

11.

4. Because the FEC clearly has standing, the Court 

dress whether the intervenor-defendants, whose pos

identical to the FECís, were properly granted interven

to, inter alia, BCRA ß403(b). See, e.g., Clinton v. City of 

U. S. 417, 431ñ432, n. 19. P. 11.

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the Courtís opinion with res

Title Vóß504 of which amends the Communications A

require broadcasters to keep publicly available records 

related broadcasting requests, 47 U. S. C. A. ß315(e

that the portion of the judgment below invalidating ß5

violative of the First Amendment must be reversed. Pp

1. Section 504ís ìcandidate requestî requirementsó

broadcasters to keep records of broadcast requests ìm

behalf of any . . . candidate,î 47 U. S. C. A. ß315(e)(1)(A

They are virtually identical to those contained in a long

regulation. The McConnell plaintiffsí argument that 

ments are intolerably burdensome and invasive is rejec

has consistently estimated that its regulation imposes 

see a comparatively small additional administrative bu

ver, the ß504 requirement is supported by significant 

interests in verifying that licensees comply with their 

allow political candidates ìequal time,î 47 U. S. C. ß315

such time at the ìlowest unit charge,î ß315(b); in evalu

they are processing candidate requests in an evenhand

help assure broadcasting fairness, ß315(a); in makin

aware of how much candidates spend on broadcast 

U. S. C. A. ß434; and in providing an independently co

data for verifying candidatesí compliance with BCRAí
regulation unconstitutional, it cannot strike down BCR

didate requestî provision, which simply embodies the r

statute, thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal i

2. Because ß504ís ìcandidate requestî requirements 

tional, its ìelection messageî requirementsówhich serv

ernmental interests and impose only a small incremen

requiring broadcasters to keep records of requests (ma

to broadcast ìmessage[s]î that refer either to a ìlegally 

didateî or to ìany election to Federal office,î 4

ßß315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii)ómust be constitutional as well. P

3. BCRA ß504ís ìissue requestî requirementsów

broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by any

cast ìmessage[s]î related to a ìnational legislative issue 

portance,î 47 U. S. C. A. ß315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or a ìpolitical 

tional importance,î ß315(e)(1)(B)ósurvive the McCon

facial challenge. These recordkeeping requirements s

help determine whether broadcasters are fulfilling the

under the FCCís regulations to afford reasonable oppor

discussion of conflicting views on important public issu

they too heavily favor entertainment, discriminating 

affairs broadcasts. The plaintiffsí claim that the above

tory language is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad 

sive, given that it is no more general than language 

used to impose other obligations upon broadcasters a

comparable to other BCRA language upheld in th

Whether the ìissue requestî requirements impose dispro

ministrative burdens will depend on how the FCC inter

plies them. The parties remain free to challenge the 

interpreted by the FCCís regulations, or as otherwise a

out the greater information any such challenge will l

the Court cannot say that the provisionsí administrativ

so great, or their justifications so minimal, as to wa

them facially unconstitutional. Similarly, the argumen

sue requestî requirement will force the purchasers to 

mation revealing their political strategies to opponents 

that BCRA ß504 is facially unconstitutional, but the pla

free to raise this argument when ß504 is applied. Pp. 9ñ

STEVENS and OíCONNOR, JJ., delivered the opinion of t

respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which SOUTER, G

BREYER, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the o

Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, in whi
and in which THOMAS, J., joined with respect to BCRA ßß

316, 319, and 403(b). BREYER, J., delivered the opinion 

with respect to BCRA Title V, in which STEVENS, OíCON

and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion co

respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, dissenting with res

Titles I and V, and concurring in the judgment in part and 

part with respect to BCRA Title II. THOMAS, J., filed an o

ring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BC

318, concurring in the result with respect to BCRA ß318, 

the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect 

II, and dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I, V, and ß

opinion SCALIA, J., joined as to Parts I, IIñA, and IIñB. 

filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and 

part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which REH

joined, in which SCALIA, J., joined except to the extent th

holds new FECA ß323(e) and BCRA ß202, and in whic

joined with respect to BCRA ß213. REHNQUIST, C. J., fil

dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, in whic

KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion disse

spect to BCRA ß305, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ.,