UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

 ) 

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ) 

ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) Civ. No. 15-2038 (RC) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) ANSWER 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S ANSWER 

 Defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) submits this answer 

to the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief filed by plaintiffs Citizens for 

Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) and Melanie Sloan. Any allegation not 

specifically responded to below is DENIED.1 

 

1

 This litigation is commenced against the Federal Election Commission (Commission) on 

the grounds that the Commission did not approve a recommendation of the Commission’s Office 

of General Counsel (“OGC”) to find “reason to believe” (“RTB”) that a violation of the FECA or 

of its regulations occurred in this case and that the file was consequently closed. 52 

U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)). The reason for the inaction of the 

Commission is because there were not four or more Commissioners’ votes to proceed on the 

RTB recommendation. Courts have held that, in order to properly review the inaction of the 

Commission, the court must be supplied with a “statement of reasons” of those Commissioners 

who voted against, or abstained from voting for, the OGC recommendation, who the court has 

called the “controlling group.” See Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 831 F.2d 1131, 

1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987); FEC v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F. 2d 1471, 1476 (D.C. 

Cir. 1992) (“[W]hen the Commission deadlocks 3-3 and so dismisses a complaint, that dismissal, 

like any other, is judicially reviewable under Section [30109(a)(8)]. . . . [T]o make judicial 

review a meaningful exercise, the three Commissioners who voted to dismiss must provide a 

statement of their reasons for so voting. Since those Commissioners constitute a controlling 

group for purposes of the decision, their rationale necessarily states the agency’s reasons for 

acting as it did.”); Common Cause v. FEC, 655 F. Supp. 619 (D.D.C. 1986), rev’d on other 

grounds, 842 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The Commission has historically voted by a majority 

vote (pursuant to 52 U.S.C. §§ 30106(c) and 30107(a)(6) (formerly 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c(c) and 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 1 of 25
2 

 1. This paragraph summarizes plaintiffs’ complaint, the allegations of which speak 

for themselves, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that 

the Commission dismissed an administrative complaint filed by plaintiffs, in which the 

Commission on Hope Growth and Opportunity (“CHGO”) was the respondent. 

 2. This paragraph describes portions of the General Counsel’s Reports in the 

administrative matter under review, which speak for themselves, and so no response is required. 

 3. DENY. 

 4. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the allegations in this paragraph, which concern the thoughts and expectations of plaintiffs and 

unspecified provisions of law. To the extent this paragraph alleges that the FEC has refused to 

enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) or that the decisions at issue in this case 

were contrary to FECA, such allegations are DENIED. To the extent this paragraph requests 

judicial relief, that relief should be denied. 

 5. ADMIT that the judicial review provision in FECA at 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8) 

provides statutory jurisdiction and provides for venue in the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Columbia; that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides federal question jurisdiction in the district court; and 

that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Commission. DENY the remainder of the 

paragraph. 

 

437d(a)(6))) to authorize the OGC’s appearance on behalf of the Commission in suits 

commenced pursuant to 52 U.S.C. 30109(a)(8) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)). Accordingly, 

the views of the Commissioners who voted to pursue enforcement are not defended by the OGC, 

although their statements of reasons are part of the administrative record and available for the 

Court’s consideration. Furthermore, the OGC’s representational role in this matter does not 

change OGC’s recommendation to find RTB or any of the reasons supporting it, which are part 

of the administrative record. 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 2 of 25
3 

 6. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the allegations in this paragraph. 

 7. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the allegations in this paragraph. 

 8. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the allegations in this paragraph. 

 9. To the extent this paragraph contains allegations about unspecified information on 

CREW’s website and in unspecified reports and press releases, such sources speak for 

themselves, and so no response is required. The Commission is without knowledge or 

information sufficient to admit or deny CREW’s descriptions of its work in this paragraph. 

 10. The Commission ADMITS that CREW has filed administrative complaints with 

the FEC, but the FEC is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the 

allegations in this paragraph concerning when and why CREW files such complaints. 

 11. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the allegations in the first sentence of this paragraph. The remainder of the paragraph is 

DENIED. 

 12. Commission ADMITS that information about contributions to campaigns of 

Congressional candidates aids in detecting “pay-to-play schemes.” The Commission is 

otherwise without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the allegations in this 

paragraph. 

 13. This paragraph describes a report issued by CREW, which speaks for itself, and 

so no response is required. To the extent this paragraph sets forth allegations about how CREW 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 3 of 25
4 

obtained information discussed in a report that it issued, the Commission is without knowledge 

or information sufficient to admit or deny such allegations. 

 14. This paragraph describes a report issued by CREW, which speaks for itself, and 

so no response is required. To the extent this paragraph sets forth allegations about how CREW 

obtained information discussed in a report that it issued, the Commission is without knowledge 

or information sufficient to admit or deny such allegations. 

 15. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the allegations in this paragraph concerning CREW’s access to information. The remainder of 

this paragraph is DENIED. 

 16. ADMIT the first sentence of this paragraph. ADMIT that registered voters (and 

others) may legally review information that is publicly reported pursuant to FECA’s disclosure 

requirements. The Commission DENIES that it has failed to properly administer FECA. The 

Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the remaining 

allegations in this paragraph, which are vague and refer, inter alia, to unspecified provisions of 

FECA and the unspecified “political activities” of an unidentified political committee. 

 17. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the allegations in this paragraph. 

 18. ADMIT that Ms. Sloan was one of the administrative complainants in this case 

and has filed other administrative complaints with the Commission. The Commission is without 

knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the allegations in this paragraph, which 

concern the thoughts and expectations of plaintiffs and unspecified provisions of FECA. To the 

extent this paragraph alleges that the FEC has refused to enforce “FECA’s mandatory disclosure 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 4 of 25
5 

requirements,” or that the FEC’s dismissal decisions at issue in this case were contrary to FECA, 

such allegations are DENIED. 

 19. ADMIT. 

 20. ADMIT that FECA and FEC regulations contain provisions requiring groups 

meeting the definition of “political committee” to comply with certain organizational, 

registration, and disclosure requirements. 

 21. This paragraph and its accompanying footnote quote the statutory and regulatory 

definitions of “independent expenditure” and the regulatory definition of “expressly advocating,” 

which speak for themselves, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, 

ADMIT that the language quoted in this paragraph appears in the cited statutory and regulatory 

definitions, but DENY that the paragraph sets forth complete statutory or regulatory definitions 

of these terms. 

22. This paragraph describes statutory and regulatory requirements regarding 

reporting of “independent expenditures” which speak for themselves, and so no response is 

required. 

 23. This paragraph describes statutory and regulatory requirements regarding 

reporting of “independent expenditures” which speak for themselves, and so no response is 

required. 

 24. This paragraph describes the statutory and regulatory definitions of an 

“electioneering communication,” which speak for themselves, and so no response is required. 

To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that the language quoted in this paragraph appears 

in the cited statutory and regulatory definitions, but DENY that the paragraph sets forth complete 

statutory or regulatory definitions of this term. 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 5 of 25
6 

 25. This paragraph describes statutory and regulatory disclosure requirements for an 

“electioneering communication” which speak for themselves, and so no response is required. 

 26. This paragraph describes statutory and regulatory disclosure requirements for an 

“electioneering communication” which speak for themselves, and so no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required, DENY that the second sentence sets forth a complete statement 

of the relevant disclosure requirements. To the extent the second sentence alleges specific 

reporting obligations by CHGO or other entities in unspecified contexts, the FEC is without 

information sufficient to admit or deny the allegations. 

 27. This paragraph describes statutory provisions and Commission regulations, which 

speak for themselves, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, 

ADMIT that the language quoted in this paragraph appears in the cited statutory and regulatory 

provisions, but DENY that the paragraph sets forth the complete statutory or regulatory 

provisions. 

 28. This paragraph quotes a provision of FECA and Commission regulations, which 

speak for themselves, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, 

ADMIT that the language quoted in this paragraph appears in the statutory and regulatory 

definitions of the term “political committee,” but DENY that this paragraph sets forth all the 

requirements for such a committee to exist. 

 29. This paragraph quotes portions of the statutory provision defining “expenditure” 

and a Supreme Court decision construing that definition, which speak for themselves, and so no 

response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that the quoted language in 

the first sentence of this paragraph appears in the statutory definition of the term “expenditure” 

but DENY that the first sentence of this paragraph sets forth the complete or accurate statutory 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 6 of 25
7 

definition of that term, and ADMIT that the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo construed 

“expenditure” to reach only “funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election 

or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976) (per curiam). 

 30. This paragraph purports to describe the legal requirements for determining 

whether a group is a political committee based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. 

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), to which no response is required. To the extent a 

response is required, ADMIT that the Supreme Court in Buckley adopted a “major purpose” 

requirement for certain organizations but DENY that this paragraph sets forth a complete 

description of that analysis. 

 31. This paragraph paraphrases the Political Committee Status Supplemental 

Explanation and Justification, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595 (Feb. 7, 2007) (“Supplemental E&J”), and the 

Supreme Court’s decision in FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (“MCFL”), 

which speak for themselves, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, 

ADMIT that the Supplemental E&J provides guidance about how the Commission determines an 

organization’s major purpose, but DENY that this paragraph sets forth the complete explanation 

and justification provided in the Supplemental E&J or the MCFL decision. 

 32. This paragraph paraphrases the Supplemental E&J, which speaks for itself, and so 

no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that the Supplemental E&J 

provides guidance about how the Commission determines an organization’s major purpose, but 

DENY that this paragraph sets forth the complete explanation and justification provided in the 

Supplemental E&J. 

 33. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ descriptions of a provision of FECA and 

Commission regulations, which speak for themselves, and so no response is required. To the 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 7 of 25
8 

extent a response is required, ADMIT that FECA and Commission regulations require groups 

meeting the definition of “political committee” to file a statement of organization with the 

Commission within 10 days of becoming a political committee. 

 34. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ descriptions of certain provisions of FECA and 

Commission regulations, which speak for themselves, and so no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required, ADMIT that FECA and Commission regulations require groups 

meeting the definition of “political committee” to file periodic reports with the FEC that disclose 

the information described in this paragraph. 

 35-40. These paragraphs describe FECA’s statutory provisions governing the FEC’s 

administrative enforcement process, which speak for themselves, and so no responses are 

required. To the extent responses are required, ADMIT that these paragraph generally describe 

FECA’s administrative enforcement procedures, including the procedures for obtaining judicial 

review of a Commission dismissal decision. 

41. ADMIT that the allegations in this paragraph concerning CHGO’s filing status 

with the Internal Revenue Service are consistent with CHGO’s self-description as set forth in its 

responses to FEC Matter[s] Under Review (“MUR”) 6391 and 6471. ADMIT that CHGO has 

not registered as a political committee with the FEC. 

42. This paragraph purports to describe “findings” made in the General Counsel’s 

Reports in MURs 6391 and 6471, which speak for themselves, and so no response is required. 

To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that the Commission’s Third General Counsel’s 

Report stated that CHGO spent $4,059,784.33 on certain television advertisements in 2010 and 

that these advertisements were “either an express-advocacy independent expenditure or an 

electioneering communication.” ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 8 of 25
9 

television advertisements featuring at least 15 candidates for federal office. The allegation in 

this paragraph that CHGO spent the “vast majority” of its money on television advertisements in 

15 unspecified elections is too vague to admit or deny. 

43. ADMIT that CHGO produced and broadcast advertisements featuring at least 15 

candidates for federal office in 2010. To the extent this paragraph contains plaintiffs’ 

characterization of the advertisements, they speak for themselves, and so no response is required. 

44. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement 

identifying Rep. John Spratt and Mick Mulvaney. DENY that this paragraph includes a 

complete and accurate description of the advertisements. To the extent the allegations in this 

paragraph purport to relate spending estimates CREW allegedly obtained from the Campaign 

Media Analysis Group, the Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit 

or deny the accuracy of the estimates.2

 

45. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

contained the text quoted in this paragraph. DENY that this paragraph includes a complete and 

accurate description of the advertisement. To the extent that this paragraph describes portions of 

the First General Counsel’s Report in MUR 6471 — which speaks for itself — it requires no 

response. To the extent the allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending estimates 

CREW allegedly obtained from the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission is 

without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

 

2

 The first and second sentences of footnote 2 on page 13 of the Complaint identify the 

source of spending estimates compiled by Plaintiffs. The Commission is without knowledge or 

information sufficient to admit or deny the veracity of this data. Regarding the third and fourth 

sentences of the footnote, the Commission ADMITS that OGC conducted an investigation in 

which it obtained certain financial information regarding CHGO and its activities, and that not 

all of this information was part of the public record. 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 9 of 25
10 

46. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

contained the text quoted in this paragraph. DENY that this paragraph includes a complete and 

accurate description of the advertisement. To the extent that this paragraph describes portions of 

the First General Counsel’s Report — which speaks for itself — it requires no response. To the 

extent the allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending estimates CREW allegedly 

obtained from the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission is without knowledge or 

information sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

47. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

identified Representative Kathy Dahlkemper and Mike Kelly. DENY that this paragraph 

includes a complete and accurate description of the advertisement. To the extent that this 

paragraph describes portions of the First General Counsel’s Report — which speaks for itself — 

it requires no response. To the extent the allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending 

estimates CREW allegedly obtained from the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission 

is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

48. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

identified Representative Frank Kratovil and Andy Harris. DENY that this paragraph includes a 

complete and accurate description of the advertisement. To the extent that this paragraph 

describes portions of the First General Counsel’s Report — which speaks for itself — it requires 

no response. To the extent the allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending estimates 

CREW allegedly obtained from the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission is 

without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

49. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

identified Representative Allen Boyd and Steve Southerland. DENY that this paragraph includes 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 10 of 25
11 

a complete and accurate description of the advertisement. To the extent that this paragraph 

describes portions of the First General Counsel’s Report — which speaks for itself — it requires 

no response. To the extent the allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending estimates 

CREW allegedly obtained from the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission is 

without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

50. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

identified Representative Suzanne Kosmas and Sandy Adams. DENY that this paragraph 

includes a complete and accurate description of the advertisement. To the extent that this 

paragraph describes portions of the First General Counsel’s Report — which speaks for itself — 

it requires no response. To the extent the allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending 

estimates CREW allegedly obtained from the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission 

is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

 51. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

identified Representative Baron Hill and Todd Young. DENY that this paragraph includes a 

complete and accurate description of the advertisement. To the extent that this paragraph 

describes portions of the First General Counsel’s Report — which speaks for itself — it requires 

no response. To the extent the allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending estimates 

CREW allegedly obtained from the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission is 

without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

52. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

identified Representative C.A. Ruppersberger and Macelo Cardarelli. DENY that this paragraph 

includes a complete and accurate description of the advertisement. To the extent that this 

paragraph describes portions of the First General Counsel’s Report — which speaks for itself — 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 11 of 25
12 

it requires no response. To the extent the allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending 

estimates CREW allegedly obtained from the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission 

is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

53. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

identified Representative Paul Kanjorski and Lou Barletta. DENY that this paragraph includes a 

complete and accurate description of the advertisement. To the extent that this paragraph 

describes portions of the First General Counsel’s Report — which speaks for itself — it requires 

no response. To the extent the allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending estimates 

CREW allegedly obtained from the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission is 

without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

54. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

identified Representative John Salazar and Scott Tipton that included the quotations in the 

second and third sentences of this paragraph. DENY that this paragraph includes a complete and 

accurate description of the advertisement. To the extent that this paragraph describes portions of 

the First General Counsel’s Report — which speaks for itself — it requires no response. To the 

extent the allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending estimates CREW allegedly 

obtained from the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission is without knowledge or 

information sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

55. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast advertisements that 

identified Representative Dan Maffei and Ann Marie Buerkle. DENY that this paragraph 

includes a complete and accurate description of the advertisements. To the extent that this 

paragraph describes portions of the First General Counsel’s Report—which speaks for itself—it 

requires no response. To the extent the allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 12 of 25
13 

estimates CREW allegedly obtained from the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission 

is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

56. This paragraph appears to describe portions of the Third General Counsel’s 

Report in MUR 6471, which speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a 

response is required, ADMIT that the Third General Counsel’s Report identified the referenced 

advertisements. DENY that this paragraph includes a complete and accurate description of the 

advertisements. 

57. This paragraph refers to unspecified “additional advertisements” and “races,” and 

the Commission is unable to admit or deny such vague allegations. 

58. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

identified Representative Walt Minnick. DENY that this paragraph includes a complete and 

accurate description of the advertisement. To the extent that this paragraph describes portions of 

the First General Counsel’s Report — which speaks for itself — it requires no response. To the 

extent the allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending estimates CREW allegedly 

obtained from the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission is without knowledge or 

information sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

59. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

identified Representative Carol Shea-Porter and included the statements quoted in the second and 

third sentences of this paragraph. DENY that this paragraph includes a complete and accurate 

description of the advertisement. To the extent that this paragraph describes portions of the First 

General Counsel’s Report — which speaks for itself — it requires no response. To the extent the 

allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending estimates CREW allegedly obtained from 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 13 of 25
14 

the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission is without knowledge or information 

sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

60. ADMIT that CHGO produced and caused to be broadcast an advertisement that 

identified Representative Allen Boyd and included the statements quoted in the second and third 

sentences of this paragraph. DENY that this paragraph includes a complete and accurate 

description of the advertisement. To the extent that this paragraph describes portions of the First 

General Counsel’s Report — which speaks for itself — it requires no response. To the extent the 

allegations in this paragraph purport to relate spending estimates CREW allegedly obtained from 

the Campaign Media Analysis Group, the Commission is without knowledge or information 

sufficient to admit or deny the accuracy of the estimates. 

61. This paragraph appears to describe portions of the Third General Counsel’s 

Report, which speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is 

required, ADMIT that the Commission’s Third General Counsel’s Report identified the 

referenced advertisement. 

62. ADMIT. 

63. ADMIT. 

64. ADMIT that the FEC sent a letter to CHGO’s attorney instructing CHGO to 

preserve documents related to the administrative complaint. The phrase “as required by law,” as 

used in this paragraph, is too vague and ambiguous for the FEC to admit or deny. 

65. ADMIT that on May 23, 2011, plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint that 

was designated by the Commission as MUR 6471. The remainder of this paragraph describes 

the administrative complaint, which speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 14 of 25
15 

extent a response is required, ADMIT that plaintiffs’ administrative complaint alleged that 

CHGO violated certain provisions of FECA. 

66. ADMIT. 

67. ADMIT the first sentence of this paragraph. The remainder of the paragraph 

describes CHGO’s tax return filed with the Internal Revenue Service for the 2010 fiscal year, 

which speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, 

ADMIT that CHGO reported spending the amounts alleged and disclosed the officers identified 

in the second, third, and fourth sentences of this paragraph. 

68. To the extent this paragraph describes the text of the referenced email, the email 

speaks for itself, and no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that 

the referenced document contains the quoted language. 

69. ADMIT the first sentence of this paragraph. The remainder of this paragraph 

describes the administrative complaint, which speaks for itself, and so no response is required. 

To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that plaintiffs’ amended administrative complaint 

alleged that CHGO violated certain provisions of FECA. 

70. ADMIT the first sentence of this paragraph. The remainder of this paragraph 

describes CHGO’s tax return filed with the IRS for the 2011 fiscal year, which speaks for itself, 

and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT the second, third 

and fifth sentences. The Commission further ADMITS the fourth sentence to the extent it 

describers CHGO’s disclosed expenses for management and legal, but DENIES the fourth 

sentence to the extent that it alleges CHGO had “approximately $14,000 in other expenses.” 

CHGO’s 2011 FORM 990 reported $13,078 in non-management and non-legal expenses. 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 15 of 25
16 

71. This paragraph purports to describe portions of the First General Counsel’s 

Report, which speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is 

required, ADMIT that the First General Counsel’s Report contains the statements in this 

paragraph, except to the extent that the fourth sentence suggests that the First General Counsel’s 

Report made recommendations regarding the amount of CHGO’s independent expenditures and 

electioneering communications, which is DENIED. 

72. ADMIT that on September 16, 2014, the Commission, by a 3-to-3 vote, did not 

find reason to believe CHGO violated FECA by failing to register as a political committee, file 

disclosure reports, or provide appropriate disclaimers on its advertisements. Further ADMIT that 

the Commission, by a vote of 6-0, found reason to believe that CHGO violated 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30104 by failing to report the communications at issue in the First General Counsel’s Report; 

authorized the use of compulsory process as to the alleged violations of 52 U.S.C. § 30104; 

authorized a Factual and Legal Analysis underlying its findings; approved appropriate letters to 

notify CHGO of the Commission’s findings; and took no action on the allegations that CHGO 

violated FECA by failing to organize, register, and report as a political committee and failing to 

include proper disclaimers. This paragraph is otherwise DENIED. 

73. ADMIT. 

74. ADMIT the first sentence of this paragraph. The remainder of this paragraph 

describes portions of the Second General Counsel’s Report, which speaks for itself, and so no 

response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that the Second General 

Counsel’s Report contains the statements in this paragraph. 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 16 of 25
17 

75. This paragraph describes portions of the Second General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Second General Counsel’s Report contains the statements in this paragraph. 

76. This paragraph describes portions of the Second General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Second General Counsel’s Report contains the statements in this paragraph. 

77. This paragraph describes portions of the Second General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Second General Counsel’s Report contains the statements in this paragraph. Further 

ADMIT that under CHGO’s articles of association, the treasurer was responsible for keeping all 

minute books, correspondence, and other records of CHGO. 

78. This paragraph describes portions of the Second General Counsel’s Report and 

the Third General Counsel’s Report, which speak for themselves, and so no response is required. 

To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that these reports contain the statements in this 

paragraph. 

79. This paragraph describes portions of the Second General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Second General Counsel’s Report contains the quoted language and statements, except 

that as to the final sentence of this paragraph, DENY that “CHGO concluded” that 77% of its 

advertisements and 74% of its total spending went toward independent expenditures. 

80. This paragraph describes portions of the Second General Counsel’s Report and 

certain documents described in that report, which speak for themselves, and so no response is 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 17 of 25
18 

required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that the Second General Counsel’s 

Report contains the statements and quotations in this paragraph. 

81. This paragraph describes portions of the Second General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Second General Counsel’s Report contains the statements in this paragraph. 

82. ADMIT. 

83. ADMIT that Commissioners Petersen, Hunter, and Goodman proposed preprobable cause conciliation on CHGO’s alleged reporting violations, that the Commission did 

not take a formal vote on the matter at that time, and that OGC continued its investigation. This 

paragraph is otherwise DENIED. 

84. ADMIT the first sentence of this paragraph. The remainder of this paragraph 

describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which speaks for itself, and so no 

response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that the Third General 

Counsel’s Report described OGC’s investigation into CHGO and included a recommendation 

that the Commission find reason to believe CHGO violated certain provisions of FECA. This 

paragraph is otherwise DENIED. 

85. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains the statements alleged in this paragraph. 

86. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains information regarding $3.2 million transferred 

by Meridian Strategies, LLC, to New Day Media Services, LLC, for advertisement placements. 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 18 of 25
19 

87. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, DENY that 

the Third General Counsel’s Report stated that OGC obtained records regarding Verve Broadcast 

Design in November 2014. ADMIT that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains the 

remaining statements alleged in this paragraph. 

88. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains the statements alleged in this paragraph. 

89. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains the statements alleged in this paragraph. 

90. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains the statements alleged in this paragraph. 

91. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains the statements alleged in this paragraph. 

92. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains the statements and quotations alleged in this 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 19 of 25
20 

paragraph. To the extent this paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterization of statements made 

by Mr. Canfield and Mr. Reed during OGC’s investigation, no response is required.3

93. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains the statements and quotations alleged in this 

paragraph. 

94. This paragraph describes and characterizes CHGO’s tax return filings and 

statements included in the Third General Counsel’s Report, which speak for themselves, and so 

no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that CHGO’s Form 990 

filings for the 2010 and 2011 fiscal years reported no expenditures for fundraising expenses or 

“[p]rofessional fundraising services”; further ADMIT that the Third General Counsel’s report 

contained the quotations alleged in the fifth sentence. DENY that this paragraph contains an 

accurate or complete description of the alleged statements. 

95. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains the statements and quotations alleged in this 

paragraph. 

96. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains the statements alleged in this paragraph. 

 

3

 Footnote 3 on page 26 of the complaint contains plaintiffs’ characterization of statements 

made by Kira Swencki, and no response is required to such characterizations. To the extent a 

response is required, ADMIT that the Third General Counsel’s Report relates Ms. Swencki’s 

statement that “she created PowerPoint presentations for CHGO” and “sent drafts of the 

PowerPoint presentations to Reed, who provided her with edits and instructions.” 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 20 of 25
21 

97. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains the statements alleged in this paragraph. 

98. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contains the quotation alleged in this paragraph. 

99. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report cited internal documents and the Second General 

Counsel’s Report in support of its recommendation that the Commission find that CHGO 

violated FECA, but DENY to the extent that the paragraph suggests that the Second General 

Counsel’s Report included findings of fact. 

 100. This paragraph describes portions of the Third General Counsel’s Report, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the Third General Counsel’s Report contained the recommendation alleged in this 

paragraph. 

101. ADMIT. 

102. ADMIT that on October 1, 2015, the Commission considered the allegations in 

plaintiffs’ administrative complaint and, by a 3-to-3 vote, did not find reason to believe CHGO 

violated FECA; further ADMIT that the Commission then voted 5 to 1 to close the file. ADMIT 

that on September 24, 2014 the Commission found reason to believe that the CHGO violated 52 

U.S.C. § 30104 by failing to file reports. This paragraph is otherwise DENIED. 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 21 of 25
22 

103. ADMIT the first sentence of this paragraph, except that the referenced Statement 

of Reasons was issued on November 6, 2015, not November 5, 2015. The second sentence of 

this paragraph describes portions of the Statement of Reasons of Commissioner Lee E. 

Goodman, Commissioner Caroline C. Hunter, and then-Vice Chairman Matthew S. Petersen in 

MURs 6391 and 6471, which speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a 

response is required, ADMIT that the Statement of Reasons of Commissioners Goodman and 

Hunter and then-Vice Chairman Petersen is the explanation for the decision of the “controlling 

group” in MURs 6391 and 6471 and that the referenced Statement of Reasons contains the 

quoted language. 

 104. This paragraph describes portions of the Statement of Reasons of Commissioners 

Lee E. Goodman and Caroline C. Hunter and then-Vice Chairman Matthew S. Petersen in MURs 

6391 and 6471, which speaks for itself, and so no response is required. ADMIT that the 

referenced Statement of Reasons contains the quoted language. 

 105. This paragraph describes portions of the referenced Statement of Reasons, which 

speaks for itself, and contains legal conclusions, and so no response is required. To the extent a 

response is required, ADMIT that the referenced Statement of Reasons contains the quoted 

language but DENY plaintiffs’ characterization of the investigation in this paragraph’s second 

sentence. 

 106. This paragraph describes portions of the referenced Statement of Reasons, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the referenced Statement of Reasons contains the quoted language. DENY plaintiffs’ 

characterization of the Statement of Reasons in this paragraph’s second sentence. 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 22 of 25
23 

 107. This paragraph describes portions of the referenced Statement of Reasons, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the referenced Statement of Reasons contains the quoted language. DENY the 

“[n]onetheless” characterization in the first sentence of this paragraph. 

 108. This paragraph describes portions of the Statement of Reasons of then-Chair Ann 

M. Ravel and Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub, which speaks for itself, and so no response is 

required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that the referenced Statement of Reasons 

contains the quoted language. 

 109. This paragraph contains a block quote from the referenced Statement of Reasons, 

which speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, 

ADMIT that the referenced Statement of Reasons contains the quoted language. 

 110. This paragraph quotes a portion of the referenced Statement of Reasons, which 

speaks for itself, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT 

that the referenced Statement of Reasons contains the quoted language. 

 111. The Commission incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of its answer 

as if fully set forth here. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, including statements 

regarding statutory provisions and judicial decisions, with regard to the applicable statute of 

limitations, and no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that 28 

U.S.C. § 2462 is the applicable statute of limitations, but DENY that this paragraph sets forth a 

complete and accurate description of its operation and relevant caselaw. The FEC is without 

information sufficient to admit or deny the factual allegations in this paragraph. 

 112-115. These paragraph numbers were omitted from plaintiffs’ complaint and so no 

response is required. 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 23 of 25
24 

 116. Commission incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of its answer as if 

fully set forth here. 

 117. DENY. 

 118. This paragraph describes portions of the General Counsel’s Reports, which speak 

for themselves, and so no response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that 

OGC concluded that in 2010 CHGO spent at least $4,059,784.33 on advertisements that were 

either independent expenditures or electioneering communications: at least $2,933,631.34 on 

ads containing express advocacy and at least $1,126,153 on electioneering-communication ads. 

Further ADMIT that CHGO did not register as a political committee or file reports with the FEC. 

119-123. DENY. 

 124. The paragraph contains legal conclusions and legal argument to which no 

response is required. To the extent a response is required, ADMIT that treasurers have legal 

duties under FECA and that they may be liable in their personal capacities for FECA violations 

in certain circumstances, but DENY that the Commission’s decisions in this matter were contrary 

to law. 

 125. This paragraph consists of legal conclusions and plaintiffs’ vague 

characterizations regarding “possible FEC enforcement for violations,” to which no response is 

required. 

 126. The paragraph contains legal conclusions and legal argument to which no 

response is required. To the extent a response is required, this paragraph is DENIED because it 

is predicated on the counterfactual premise that CHGO was a registered political committee. 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 24 of 25
25 

 127. The paragraph contains legal conclusions and legal argument to which no 

response is required. To the extent a response is required, the Commission is without 

information sufficient to admit or deny the paragraph. 

 128-129. DENY. 

REQUESTED RELIEF 

 1-4. No response is required to Paragraphs 1 through 4 of the plaintiffs’ requested 

relief, but plaintiffs are entitled to none of the relief they request. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Daniel A. Petalas (D.C. Bar No. 467908) 

Acting General Counsel 

dpetalas@fec.gov 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Deputy General Counsel 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

 

Harry J. Summers 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

/s/ Greg J. Mueller 

Greg J. Mueller (D.C. Bar No. 462840) 

Jacob S. Siler 

Attorneys 

gmueller@fec.gov 

jsiler@fec.gov 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20463 

February 12, 2016 (202) 694-1650 

Case 1:15-cv-02038-RC Document 9 Filed 02/12/16 Page 25 of 25