United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-2774

___________ Diana Piantanida, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Wyman Center, Inc., also known as * Kiwanis Camp Wyman, * * Appellee. *

__________ Appeals from the United States No. 96-2987 District Court for the

__________ Eastern District of Missouri. Diana Piantanida, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Wyman Center, Inc., also known as * Kiwanis Camp Wyman, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: April 18, 1997 Filed: June 23, 1997

___________The Honorable Stephen N. Limb augh, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1 District of Missouri. -2- Before LOKEN, MAGILL, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
The Wyman Center, Inc. (Wyman Center) demoted it s empl oyee Diana Piantanida while she was on maternit y leav e, allegedly because she had failed to perform he r profession al duties in a timely manner prior to going on leave. Piantanida brought this employment di scrimination acti on based on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 4 2 U.S.C . § 2000e(k) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (PDA), and th e Miss ouri Human Rights Act, Rev. Mo. Stat. §§. 213.010

- 213.137, a lleging that she had been demoted, and thereby cons tructivelydischarged, because she was a "new mom. " The district court granted summary judgment agains t 1 Piantanida, holding that Piantanida's claim fo r discrim ination based on her status as a new parent fel l outside the parameters of the PDA. We affirm.

I.
On June 15, 1992, Piantanida began working for th e Wyman Center, an organization dependent on charitabl e dona tions, as an executive assistant. One o f Piant anida's key duties was to send form letters t o donors acknowledging their gifts to the Wyman Center. At the en d of an initial probationary period of he r employment, Piantanida's direct supervisor gav e Piant anida a favorable evaluation, but noted concern s-3-

with Piantanida's ability to meet deadlines and to sta y curr ent with day-to-day projects. See Appellant's App
. at 275 (evaluation dated Sept. 15, 1992). Piantanid a took maternity leave from her position on Mar ch 22, 1993.-4-

During Piantanida's maternity leave, the Wyman Cente r alle gedlydiscovered that Piantanida had failed to sen d acknowledg ment letters to donors for 83 gifts. On April 20, 1993, the Wyman Center notified Piantanida that sh e would b e given a different position when she returne d fro mher maternity leave because of her apparen t inab ilityto complete the acknowledgment letters in a time lymanner. The new position had fewe r respon sibilities and a salary of about half of the ol d position.
Piantanida has agreed that her demotion was not base d on he r pregnancy or her maternity leave. See Dep. o f Diana Piantanida at 137-40, reprinted in Appe llant's App.The following testimony was presented by Piantanida at her deposition: 2 Question (by defense counsel): So it would be fair to say the sole reason you think that your demotion was caused by--well, you tell me what it is you think that the change in the job structure wit h you was related to your maternity leave? Answer (by Piantanida): I was told by Dave Hilliard that he told Lorrie Goecker to create a position for a new mom to handle. Q. Okay. Was there any--was there anything else? A. This new position being created is the mai n reason, because there's no justification that this position should be made, other than now I have a new baby and I wouldn't be capable of doing the job. Q. So t his was related not to your pregnancy, not to your maternity , but being a new mother? A. Correct.

. . . Q. So is it fair to say that the sole c omment that you're relying upon is the comment that you allege Mr. Hilliard said, that this would be a good job for a new mom? A. Correct. Q. Was there anythingelse at Wyman that you think was responsible for moving you into this new job? A. No.
-5- at 204. Piantanida, however, claims that, when she spok e

2Dep. of Diana Piantanida at 138-39 (emphasis added), reprinted inAppellant's App.

at 204. -6- with the Wyman Center-7-

abou t the new position, the Wyman Center's Executiv e Directo r, David Hilliard, told her that she was bein g given a po sition "for a new mom to handle." Id. at 138, repr inted in Appellant's App. at 204. Piantanid a declin ed to accept the new position because of its lo w pay. The person who replaced Piantanida rece ived as much as P iantanida received in her original position; i.e. , almost twice as much as Piantanida was offered for th e new position. Piantanida brought t his Title VII action against the Wyman Center, alleging pregnancy discrimination. Th e dist rict court granted summary judgment to the Wyma n Center, an d ordered Piantanida to pay $1743.46 in costs. The court held that discrimination based on one's status as a new parent is not prohibited by the PDA, and tha t Pianta nida had therefore failed to state a claim. Se e Mem. (June 4, 1996) at 21, reprinted in Appellant's Add. at 22. The court also reached the alternative holdin g that su mmary judgment was proper even if this status i s protect ed by the PDA. See id. ("Assuming arguendo tha t the plaintiff's claim of discrimination as a 'new mother' comes within the purview of the PDA, . . . plaintif f fail s to produce sufficient evidence showing a materia l issue of fact exists on whether the defendant treated the plaintiff-8-

less favorably than others because of her pregnancy , chi ldbirth, and/or related medical conditions.")
. Piantanida now appeals.

II.
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment d e novo, taking all of the facts and inferences from th e facts in t he light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Zakrze wski v. Fox , 87 F.3d 1011, 1012 (8th Cir. 1996)
. Summ aryjudgment is appropriate where "there is n o genuin e issue of material fact and the moving party i s entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.
Title VII was amended to prohibit discriminatio n based o n pregnancy after the Supreme Court in Genera l Electri c Co. v. Gilbert , 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976) , held that pregnancy discrimination was not based o n gender. The amended statute provides that:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis o f sex" include, but are not limi ted to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, o r related medical conditions ; and women affected bypregnancy, childbirth, or related medica l condi tions shall be treated the same for al l employment-related purposes, including receip t of benefits under fringe benefit programs, a s other persons not so affected but similar i n their ability or inability to work, and nothing in se ction 2000e-2(h) of this title shall b e interpreted to permit otherwise. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (emphasis added).-9-

Piantanida has agreed that her dismissal was no t dire ctlyrelated to either her pregnancy itself or he r decision to take maternity leave. We are thu s faced with th e narrow question of whether being discriminate d against because of one's status as a-10-

new p arent is "because of or on the basis of pregnancy , chil dbirth, or related medical conditions," id. , an d therefore violative of the PDA.

In exa mining the terms of the PDA, we conclude tha t an in dividual's choice to care for a child is not a "medical condition" related to childbirth or pregnancy
. Rather, it is a social role chosen by all newparents who mak e the decision to raise a child. While the class o f new pa rents of course includes women who give birth t o chil dren, it also includes women who become mother s thro ugh adoption rather than childbirth and men wh o beco me fathers through either adoption or biology. A n emplo yer's discrimination against an employee who ha s accepted this parental role--reprehensible as thi s disc rimination might be--is therefore not based on th e gender-specific biological functions of pregnancy an d chil d-bearing, but rather is based on a gender-neutra l status potentially possessible by all employees , including men and women who will never be pregnant. Cf. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr. , 95 F.3d 674, 679-8 0 (8th Ci r. 1996) (holding that an employer's denial o f fert ilitytreatments under insurance benefits is not a violation of PDA, and noting that "[p]otentia l pregnancy, unlike infertility, is a medical condition that is sex

related be cause only women can become pregnant. In this case . . . the policy of denying insurance benefits fo r trea tment of fertility problems applies to both femal e and male w orkers and thus is gender-neutral"); Troupe v. MayDep't Stores Co. , 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994 ) (hol ding that PDA plaintiff's complaint, that she wa s terminated because her employer did not believe that she would return from her maternity leave, was not a-11-

violati on of Title VII, and noting that a male employe e on med ical leave could also be terminated due t o employer's fear that he would not return).
Piantanida's claim of discrimination based on he r statu s as a new parent is not cognizable under the PDA
. Cf. Pirain o v. International Orientation Resources Inc. , 84 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff successfully alleged pregnancy discrimination, and stating that "[t]his is therefore not a c ase in which the cla im relates onlyto an employer's refusal to hir e (or reinstate) a mother with a young child, withoutBecause we affirm the dist rict court's grant of summary judgment on the basis that 3 Piantanida has failed to state a cognizable claim under Title VII and the PDA, we do not consider the district court's alternative grant of summary judgment. -12- a hin t of any role that the earlier pregnancy played i n the decision" (emphasis added)). Piantanida ha s therefore failed to state a claim for relief under Title VII. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's gran t of summary

judgment against her. See Troupe , 20 F.3d at 738 (n oting that plaintiff "has made no effort to sho w that if all the pertinent facts were as they are excep t for the fact of her pregnancy, she would not have bee n fired. So in the end she has no evidence from which a rational t rier of fact could infer that she was a victim of pregnancy discrimination"). 3

III.
Piantanida also appeals the district court' s asse ssment of costs against her. Piantanida's argumen t that the d istrict court erred in its assessment of costs is p remised entirely on her argument that the distric t court e rred in its grant of summary judgment. See Repl y Br. at 26 ("With respect to the order taxing costs , plaintiff has no substantive objections to raise
. Plaintiff merely seeks to have the order vacated shoul d the Court reverse the district court's grant of summar y judgmen t in this case."). Because we conclude that th e district court did not err in granting summary judgmen t agai nst Piantanida, we also affirm its assessment o f costs against her.-13-

A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT .