NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0147n.06 F iled: F ebruary 19, 2009 Nos. 05-4063, 06-3462, 06- 3499, 06-3750 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. YOSEF A. ABDELSALAM, AMJAD SALEM, et al., YA HIAAL CH ARBA JI , and F ETHI YO UN ES, De fend ant s- App e lla nt s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE U NI TED STA TES DIST RI CT CO UR T F OR THE SOU THER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

Be for e : C OLE, G IBBO NS, and R OG ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge
. These consolidated appeals by four c riminal d ef en d an t s ar i s e o u to f t h ei r c o n v i ct i o n s fo r v ar i o u s o ff en s es re l at edt o t h ei r i n v o l v em en t i na l ar ge operation that transported, re packa g ed, and sold stolen prope rty
. The c enter of the re packa g e and
sa le s e ff or t wa s Da y ton , Oh io, and

the g oo ds mov e d f

ro m D ay ton to o the r s ta te s. On

a pp e a l, Y a hia Al c ha rb a ji a nd F e thi Yo un e s c ha lle ng e the de nia l of the ir mot ion fo r mis tr ia l. Yo se f A bd e lsa lam,United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

2

Amjad Salem, and Y o u n es also appe al their sente nces, a nd Salem appea ls the imposit ion of forf eiture mone y

judgme nts. For t h e rea sons set forth below, w e af firm the district cour

t’s denial of the motion for a mis tr ia l by Yo un e s and Al c ha rb a ji and a ff ir m the se nte nc e s of Yo un e s and Ab de lsa lam. We va c a te Salem’s sentenc e and rema nd for rese ntencing
. We a ffirm the $36,046.30 forf eiture money jud g me nt a g a ins t Sa le m but va c a te the $2 ,6 33 ,8 02 .5 0 mo ne y jud g me nt a g a ins t hi m and re mand wi th ins tr uc tio ns . I. I ne ar ly 2 0 0 2 , a ta s k f o r c e o f th e O h io O r g an iz e d

Cr im e I n v e s ti g a ti o n s Co mm is s ion (“O OCI C”) beg an an investigation into a criminal org anization believed to be eng ag ed in a massive stolen proper

ty fenc ing ope ration base d in convenien ce stores in Day ton. The fe nced stolen
me rc ha nd ise inc lud e d f

oo d s tamps , b a

by fo rm ula , d ia be tic blo od

g luc os e str ips , N ic od e rm patc he s, Ni co re t t e gu m , as s o rt edo v er -t h e- co u n t er m ed i ca t i o n , h ea l t h an d b ea u ty i t em s , fo o d , an d cl o t h i n g. The org anization c l ea n ed , re p ac k age d , re s o l d , an d t ra n s p o rt edt h i s m er ch an d i s e. I tt ra n s p o rt ed stolen
m e r c h an d i s e f

r o m th e S o u t h e r

nD i s t r i c to f

O h i o t o o t h e r s t a t e s i n c l u d i n g In d i an a , Il l i n o i s , K e n tu c ky, Michig an, Wisconsin, New Yor k, and F lorida. The OO CI C completed appr ox imately 288 underc over tra

nsactions during its investigation of the org anization. On J anuar y 22, 2 0 0 4 , the OOCI C simul taneously executed seve nteen se arc h
w ar r an t s , f i f t e e nb an k s e i z u r e w ar

r an t s , an d t w e n t y ar r e s t s a tm u l t i p l e l o c a t i o n s i nO h i o , K e n tu c ky,
and F lor ida . T hr e e of

the wa rr ants we re e xec ute d at Ric k’ s G ro c e ry Sto re , D ay ton , O hio ; Mi dw e st Distributors, a/k/a B usiness Center Sales, Day ton, O hio; and L inden Stop-N-L ock Storag e Unit A-4,United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

3

Da y t o n , Oh i o . A s ea rc h wa rr an tal s o wa s ex ec u t edat S al em ’s re s i d en ce l o ca t edat 2 7 3 4 R o ck l ed ge Trail, B eave rcr eek, O hio. Sa le m w a s se lf

-e mpl oy e d a

nd ow ne d M idw e st D istri bu tors, a/k /a B us ine ss C e nte r S a le s. Salem also held a le ase inter est in L inden Stop-N-L ock Storag e Unit A-4. Younes was the proprie tor of Rick’s Gr ocer

y Store. I tems were seized from ea ch of t h es e locations during execution of the
sear ch wa rra nts. Alchar baji was the pr oprietor of

One Stop Wash and Shop, Day ton, Ohio. Abdelsalam wa s employ ed by

Salem and wor

ked at a warehouse operated by the orga nization wher e price t ag s, store marking s, and sec urity

stickers we re r emoved or “cle an ed ” from stolen re tail mercha ndise in a production line. On J anuar y 28, 2004, as a result of the OOCI C inve stigation, a g rand jury returne d a fifty -two count indictment (the “ stolen proper ty indictment”) a g ainst twenty defe ndants i n cludi ng the four
a pp e lla nts . T he ind ic tme nt c ha

rg e d Sa le m w ithon e c ount o f co ns pir a c y in vio la tio n of 18 U .S. C. § 371, nine counts of inter state transpor tation of stolen proper

ty in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2, six counts of receipt and possession of i nterstate stolen proper ty in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315, and ele ven counts of una uthorized possession of fed era l food stamp acc ess device s in violation of 7 U .S. C. § 20 24 (b ). Th e ind ic tme nt c harged Abd els alam w ithon e c ount o f c on sp ir a c y in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and one count of interstate tra nsportation of stolen prope rty in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2. The indi ctment charg ed Younes and Alcharba ji with one count eac h of c on sp ir a c y

in v iol a tio n o f 18 U .S. C. § 37 1. Th e ind ic tme nt a lso so ug ht f or fe iture of

ill e g a llyUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

4

obtained proc eeds unde r 7 U.S.C. § 2024(h) and 18 U .S.C. § 981(a) (1)( C) and substitute assets under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(6) (B ) and 21 U .S.C. § 853(p). On Marc h 24, 2004, a g rand jury returne d a s i x t y -t wo count indi ctment (the “ money launder ing indictment”) ag ainst Salem, Abdelsalam, a nd another

defe ndant, alleg ing mone y launder ing of

fense s associate d with the stolen proper ty operation. Abdelsalam wa s c h a r g ed with one
c ount o f co ns pir a c y to la

un de r mon e y in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 19 56 (h ). Sa le m w a s c ha rg e d w ith
on e c ount o f c on sp ira c y

to l a un de r m on e y

in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 19 56 (h ), thi rt y -t hr e e c ounts of m oney launder ing in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2, one c ount of conspira cy to evade
re po rtin g req ui rem e nts in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 37 1, and tw e nty -s e ve n c ounts of

str uc tur ingto evade repor

ting require ments in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The indictment also sought f

orfe iture of pr operty

trac eable to offense s pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) and31 U.S .C . § 53 17 (c)(1 ) and su bs ti tu te a ss ets pu rsu ant to 18 U.S .C
. §§ 98 2(a) (1) and98 2(a) (6) (B) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). On Ma y 4, 2004, the two ca ses wer e consolidate d.

A. Y osef Abdelsalam On April 22, 2005, Abde lsalam enter ed a guilty plea to the c onspiracy co u n t of the stolen proper ty indictment, count 1, pursuant to a wr itten plea ag ree ment. The plea ag ree ment stated, “The parties f urther a g ree that the offe nses involved re cei v i n g s t o l en property and the De fenda

nt was inv olv e d in

the bu sin e ss o f r e c e ivi ngsto le n p ro pe rt y , r e su lti ng in a t

wo le ve l in c re a se purs ua

nt t o § 2B1.1( b)(4) .” The fac tual basis for the ple a ag ree ment stated that the off enses involved stolen
merc handise and stated t hat Abdelsalam was a “low-le vel assistant, and labor er” in the org anizationUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

5

who unloaded, sor

ted, and r emoved tag s from stolen merc han d i s e. The plea a g ree ment further stated, “The parties unde rstand that the c onspiracy char g e involved 50 or m ore total victim s resulting in a four le vel incre ase pur suant to § 2B1.1( b)(2) (B ).” The pre -sentenc e re port (“PSR”) for Abdelsalam calculated an of fense lev el o f 17 and a
c ri min a l hi sto ry

c a te g or y of I
. Th e PSR be g an wi th a ba se of fe ns e le ve l of six and a dd e d e ig ht p oin ts for a loss of betwee n $70,000 and $120,000, four points for between 50 and 250 victim s, and two points because Abdelsalam participate d in a business ac tivity involving the tra

nsportation of stolen g oo d s an d the re packa g ing of stolen g oods. The PSR subt rac ted three points for ac cepta nce of responsibility . I t computed the advisory Guidelines ra

ng e as 24 to 30 month s . T h e P S R stated,

“ B a se d u pon th e de fe nd ant’ s r ole a s an e mpl oy e e a t th e wa re ho us e , th e numbe r o f c on su me rs his beha v i o r i m p ac ted is unknown. As such, a g ents and the g overnme nt estimated based upon the amount purcha s ed by

the def endant that his beha

vior impacted be tween 50 a nd 250 consumers.” Ab de lsa lam in iti a lly

did no t ob je c t to the PSR b ut l a te r f ile d a se nt enci ng mem or and

um w ith objections. The district cour t ag ree d with the PSR ’s Guidelines c alculation. At his se nte nc inghe ari ng , Abd e ls ala m’ s c ult ur a l ba c kg ro un d, fa

mil y his tor y , a nd fa mil y situation were disc ussed. Abdelsa lam’s counse l rec ounte d h is b a c k gr o u

n d a n d u p b r in g in g , including that he had be en raised i n a diffe rent c ulture, that he w as a r ece nt immi g rant to Amer ica, a nd that he
was e ighte en at t h e t i m e he participate d in the criminal org anization. His counsel argued that imprisonment wa s unnece ssary beca use of Abde lsalam’s “pa

rticular c hara cter istics” and re spect for the law. F ollowing c ounsel’s ar g ument, the district court stated, “ The Court understands the ag e of thi s y oungman a

nd the Court ho we ve r d oe s no t be lie ve that he la c ks ne c e ssa ri ly so ph ist ic a tio n w ithUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

6

reg ard to what was occ urring . I t occur red f or a sig nifican t p er i od of time.” The district court
s en t enced Abdelsa lam to imprisonment for 24 months, a $100 special a ssessment, and two y ear s
su pe rv ise d r e le a se . Abd e lsa lam f ile d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l.

B. Amjad Salem On Aug ust 15, 2005, Salem enter ed a guilty plea pur suant to a written plea ag ree ment. He ple d guil ty

to t he fo llo wi ngc ounts in t

he sto le n p ro pe rt

y ind ic tme nt: c ount 1 (c on sp ir a c y ); c ount 2 (interstate transportation of stolen property ); count 3 (r ece ipt an d p o s session of interstate stolen pr op e rt y ); and c ount 2 3 ( un a

uth or ize d p osses si on of

fe de ra l f oo d s tamp a c c e ss d e vic e s) . H e a lso pled g uilty

to count 1 in the money launder ing indictment, conspirac y to launder mone y . The plea ag re em en t s t ated, “ The de fenda nt understands that the Probation Depar tment will conduct an advisory pre- sentenc e investi g ation and will rec ommend to the Court a sentenc ing guideline ra ng e. The defe ndant understands that the Probation Depa rtment’s rec ommendations are not binding on the Court and the ter

ms of this P lea Ag ree ment are not binding upon the Court or Probation Depa rtment.” Salem’s PSRcalc ulated an offe nse level of 38 with a criminal history cate g ory of I I I . The PSRstarted with a ba se off ense le vel of seve n and adde d eig hteen points for a lo s s m o re than $2,500,000, six points for more than 250 victims, two points because the offe nse involved re ceiving sto le n pro pe rt

y and Sa le m wa s in the bu sin e ss o f r e c e ivi ngand se lli ngsto le n p ro pe rt

y , tw o p oin ts beca use Salem par

ticipated in re locating a fr audulent sche me to another jurisdic t i o n t o evade law
e nf or c e me nt, tw o p oin ts f

or a c on vic tio n und e r 1 8 U .S. C. § 19 56 , a nd fo ur po int s b e c a

us eUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

7

tr ans a c tio ns to e va de re po rt ingwe re ma de a t di ff e re nt b ra nc he s. Th e re po rt

su btr a c te d tw o p oin ts fo r a c c e pta

nc e of re sp on sibili ty

and on e po int

be c a us e Sa le m pr ov ide d ti me ly no tif ic a tio n o f h is int e nt t o p le a d guil ty . I t f ound the Gu ide lin es sen tenc ingra ng e wa s 2 92 to 3 65 mon ths . D e fe ns e counsel objec ted to portions of the PSR i ncluding the “amount of loss, role in the off ense, c riminal history and any rec ommendation reg ardingupwar d depar ture or c onsecutive se ntence time.” The district c ourt conducte d an evidentiar y hear ing to r esolve Salem’s objections. The g overnme nt presente d testimony from two co- defe ndants, Awwa d Oweida and F adi Mardi n i , and five OO CI C ag ents, Dea n Bla ir, Danie l Osterfe ld, M i ch ae l Ga b rielson, Rog er H off, a nd Mark Ba rnhar t. At the hearing , Oweida indicated that Salem was his boss in the conspirac y . Fur thermore , Mard ini , s ta te d th a t Sa le m c on tr oll e d the or g anizatio n. B arnha rt te sti fi e d Sale m w a s th e “ bo ss” in the c on sp ir a c y , r e c e ive d th e larg e st p ro fi ts, and c on tr oll e d th e ke y de c isi on s. Ac c or din g to B arnha rt , Salem rec ruited per sons t o j o i n the org anization. Bar nhart a lso testified that Salem purcha sed purportedly stolen proper

ty on forty -nine oc casions fr om underc over a g ents and that these purcha ses had a r etail value of

$3 4 3 , 0 0 0 .00. He f

urther te stified there wer e a total of 288 underc over transac tions from Salem’s co-c onspirators that had a reta il value of a

bout $618,000.0 0 . He speculated t hat t here wer e “hundreds if not thousands” of total victims. The g overnme nt calculated the fa ir marke t retail value of products sold to the conspirac y was $1,078,123.83. I t also examined five ba nk acc ounts that were part of the org anization a nd conclude d the total loss was $2,633,802.50. S al em d i d n o to ff er ev i d en ce at t h e h ea ri n g. I n calc ulating Salem’s offe nse l evel, the district c ourt started w ith an offe nse leve l of seven. I t fo u n d t h at the amount of loss wa s betwee n $1,000,000.00 and $2,500,000.00 and e nhance d theUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

8

sentenc e by

six teen points for this amount o f l o s s . Additionally , the district court e nhance d the
se nte nc e by

fo ur po int s b e c a

us e the of fe ns e inv olv e d 50 and 25 0 vic tim s and by fo ur le ve ls b e c a us e Salem had a c ontrolling a

nd ag g ravating r ole i n the m oney launder ing sc heme. Ultimately arr iving at an of fense level of 34 a

nd a cr iminal hist ory

cate g ory of I I I , it found that the Guidelines rang e wa s 188 to 235 months. The dist rict court sentenc ed Salem to 132 months imprisonm ent, a $500 spe cial assessment, and 3 y ear s supervised r elea se. The United States f

iled a civil f

orfe iture ac tion ag ainst all proper ty ref ere nced in both of the ind ic tme nts . T he dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d a de fa ult jud g me nt and decr ee o f f or fe iture in t

he c ivi l forf eiture a ction
. T h e d i s trict court e ntere d forf eiture mone y

judgme nts ag ainst Salem in the
a mou nts of $2 ,6 33 ,8 02 .5 0 a

nd $3 6, 04 6. 30 . Sa le m ti me ly fi le d a no tic e of a pp e a l.

C. Y ahia Alcharbaji and Fethi Y ounes On Oc tob e r 1 1, 20 05 , th e joi nt j ur y tr ia l of Yo un e s and Al c ha rb a ji be g an. Duri ngtr ia l bo th defe ndants moved for

a mistrial based on te stimony by Ba rnhar t about a Cincinnati / Kentucky investigation. The district c ourt denied the motion. B oth Alchar baji and Youne s were convicted of the conspira cy

count of the stolen pr operty indictment. The district cour

t sentenced Alcha

rbaji to 24 months imprisonm ent, a $100 spe cial assessment, and two y ear s of super vised rele ase. It entere d a money judgme nt of $11,369.74 for the Un ite d St a te s. Al c ha

rb a ji f ile d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l. Younes’s PSR calculate d an off ense le vel of 26 and a criminal history cate g ory of I . I t started wi th a ba se of fe ns e le ve l of

six and a dd e d tw e lve po int s f

or los s in e xce ss o f $ 61 8, 00 0, fo ur po int sUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

9

fo r b e tw e e n 5 0 a

nd 25 0 v ict im s, tw o p oin ts b e c a us e Yo un e s p e rs on a lly

pa rt ic ipate d in

bu sin e ss activity involving re ce i v i n g and selling stolen g oods, and two points beca use Youne s was an org anizer, lea der, or

manag er. The PSRcalc ulated a G uidelines rang e of 63 to 78 months. Younes made se vera l objections to the PSR including the calc ulation of t he amount of loss and the number
o f v i ctims and the dete rmination that he wa s in the business of rec eiving stolen proper ty
. The district cour

t computed a Guidelines rang e of 41 to 51 months, from an offe nse leve l of 22 and a criminal history cate g ory of I , and sentenc ed Younes to 42 months imprisonment, a $100 specia l assessment, and two y ear s of supervise d rele ase. It noted that it increa sed the off ense le vel by tw o p oin ts b e c a

us e Yo un e s w a s in

the bu sin e ss o f s e lli ngand re c e ivi ngsto le n p ro pe rt

y and a lso incre ased the offe nse leve l by another two points because Younes w as a l eader or ma nag er. The district court used a

criminal history

cate g ory of I . The district cour

t expl ained it had “ considere d all of the fa ctors listed under 18 U .S.C. § 3553” and had “ paid close attention and considere d the nature and cir cumstance s of this o ffe nse and the history and/or c hara cter istics of the Def endant.” I t elaborated: Obviously

the Def endant ha s no prior record. The Court has howeve r bec ome ver y familiar with the nature of the circ umstances of this offense. The Court also has not ignor ed the cate g ory of need for sentence , a sentence to ref lect the seriousness of the offe n s e , to a f

f o r d a na d e qu a te d e te r

r e n c e , an d

to p r o te c t t

h e p u b li c f r o m f u rther crimes a nd to provide the De fenda nt with the nece ssary

ty pe of a sentenc e. The C o u rt h a s c o n s id e r e d th e k in d s o f s e n te n c e s a v a il a b le an d th e Co u rt a lso has c on sid e re d a ll o f t

he se thi ng s in

lig ht o f t he a dv iso ry

g uid e lin e s. The Court in compar ing D efe ndants with reg ard to dispositi ons, obviously there are many many fa c tor s to take int o co ns ide ra tio n th e re . T he re are fa c tor s th a t w e are a ll awa re of that are la id o ut i n th e a dv iso ry g uid e lin e s, tho se kin d o f c omp utatio ns .United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

10

We are also awa

re of t h e fa ct t h at there are other ty pes of motions, other ty

pes of fac tors tha t p la

y in to a s e n te n c e th a t a

D e f e n d an t r e c e iv e s , th o s e b e in g 5 K , 3 553 motions t hat ar e broug ht to the court and r uled upon. The Court has c onsidered a ll of these fa ctors . . . . Younes filed a

timely notice of a

ppeal.
II. A. Denial of the Motion for a Mistrial by Alcharbaji and Y

ounes Yo un e s and

Al c ha rb a ji b oth a rgue that th e dis tr ic t c ourt a bu se d its dis c re tio n in de nyingthe ir mot ion s f or a mis tr ia l. On e of the wi tne sse s c a lle d by the pr os e c uti on duri ng the tr ia l of Al c ha rb a ji and Youne s was Bar

nhart, a specia l ag ent with the Depa rtment of Ag riculture’ s Offic e of Inspector Gene ral Investig ation. During his te stimony , Ba rnhar t r efe rre d to a

companion ca se “c enter ed out of Cincinnati, Ohio.” During his testimony , the following exchang e occ urre d: Q: Now, at the out set of the task f orce when it first stood up back in January of ‘0 2, y ou we re a me mbe r o f t

he ta sk fo rc e , is that c or

re c t? A. Yes, sir. Q. At that po int

did y ou – did t

he ta sk fo rc e have any

sp e c if ic name s o f t arg e ts that they wer e looking at in the Day ton are a? A. No. We had intellige nce inf ormation from the K entucky investigation. Q. Okay . So at that point i s i t fa i r to say that neither Mr . Younes or Mr
. Al c ha rb a ji w e re ide nti fi e d ta

rg e ts? A. Th e y

we re no t.

. . . Q. Th e ir

name s e ve ntu a lly

did be c ome kn ow n a s ta

rg e ts, c or re c t?United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

11

A. Yes, sir. Q. Wer e y ou

pe rs on a lly

inv olv e d in

the pr oc e ss t

hat le d to the ide nti ty

of the se tw o d e fe nd ants a s c ri min a l ta rg e ts? A. Yes, sir. Q. De sc ri be if

y ou c ou ld, y our i nv olv e me nt, y our k no wl e dg e in t

he pr oc e ss le a din g up fr om t

he s tar t of the ta sk

fo rc e ’s bu sin e ss b a c k in

Janu ary of 20 02 un til y ou rea ched the point where these t wo i n d ividuals became targ ets. What were the ste ps , th e inv e sti g a tiv e ste ps that w e re us e d in or de r t o r e a c h th a t po int ? A. Ba sed on the infor matio n t h at we obtained during the Cincinnati Kentucky investigation we knew – M r . R i o n . O b

j e c t i o n . H e ar s ay. The Court. My

understandingis the question is what did he know. Mr . K e lle r. Ye s. Mr. Rion. Idon’t know w h at h e i s go ing to sa y . But I assume that what he kn o w s i s w h a ts o m e b o dy t o l d h i m , w h i c h w o u l d

m a k e i th e ar s ay. Th e Court
. I wi ll a c c e pt the ob je c tio n. B ut I ’m ov e rr

uli ng the ob

je c tio n. An d it will be a continuing objection. Q
. Wha t di d

y o ukn o w a s t h e c a s e a g e n ta s t h e c a s e d e v e l o p e d w i t h r e s p e c tto the se tw o D e fe nd ants e ve ntu a lly be c omi ngtarg e ts. Ho w d id you re a c h th a t po int ? A. I was the case ag ent in the Cincinnati/L exington Kentucky investi gat i o n as w e l l
. I s a ta t t h e G o v e r

n m e n t ' s t a b l e d u r i n g t h e i r t r i a l
. T h e y w e r e l a t e r f o u n d g u i l t y. Mr. Rion. Objection. The Court. Sustained. Mr. Rion. I ’d ask the a nswer be stricken. Th e Court
. I t w ill be str ic ke n. L a die s and g e ntl e me n y ou

sh ou ld d isr e g ard

that. That should play

no part in y our consider ation.United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

Despite the a

mbiguity of the sente nce “ They

wer e found guilty ,” def

ense co u n s el neve r 1 claimed that the jur

y might think that “they” re fer red to Alc harba

ji and Younes
. R at her, the argument was that Alchar baji and Younes wer e prejudiced by the refer ence to other individuals who had bee n found g uilty

of cha rg es ar ising out of a

distinct, but si milar, investiga tion. 12 Q. Ple a se de sc ri be the inv e sti g a tiv e ste ps . A. The investigation i n L exington, Cincinnati/L exington showed that that tar g et of investig ation was i s s uing c hecks a nd also rec eiving proper

ty from the Day ton, Ohio are a. B ased on that information the task for ce 02- 3 was established. During the next break in proc eeding s, outside the prese nce of the jury , Alchar

baji’s counse l made a motion for a mistrial, which wa s joined by Younes’s c ounsel. The motion was ba sed upon Ba rnhar t’s test i m o n y

t h at d ef en d an t s i nt h e C i n ci n n at i / L ex ington, Ke ntucky investiga tion were found g uilty
. The district court took the m otion under advisement. Counsel supplemented the motion for

1 a mistrial outside the prese nce of the jury the following day , arguing that an audio ca ssette play ed for the jur y ref ere nced Y ounes’s travel from Ci ncinnati t o Day ton. During a subseque nt confe renc e outside the prese nce of the jury about the motion for a mistrial, counse l for Youne s moved for
sever ance from Alcha

rbaji. On the f

ifth day of trial, counse l for Youne s, jo i n ed b y co unsel for Alchar baji, rene wed the motion for a mistrial, a rg uing that the prejudice from B arnha rt’s statement
was e x ace rbate d by

subsequent re fer ence s to the Cincinnati/L exington, Ken tu c k y investigation. The dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie d th e mot ion

fo r a mis tr ia l, r

uli ngfr om t

he be nc h th a t th e mot ion

wa s n ot “ we ll founded.” Whil e instructing the jury befor e deliber ati ons, the district court g ave the following instruction:United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

13

Any thing to which a

n objection has b ee n s u s t ai ned by the Court or any

thing that you may have se e n o r h e ard outsi de the c ourt ro om i s n ot e vid e nc e . T he se ite ms m us t be e nti re ly disreg arde d. State me nts or

a ns we rs tha

t w e re st ri cke n b y

the Cou rt or wh ic h y ou

we re ins tr

uc te d to disreg ard a

re not e vidence
. An d l i k ew i s e they must be treate d as thoug h y ou never hear d them.
This court re views the district cour t’s denial of a mot ion for a mistrial for abuse of discr etion. United States v. Martinez , 4 30 F .3 d 3 17 , 3 36 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) . T he cou rt eval uates fi ve fa c tor s in consideringwhether

a mistrial should be g rante d following an improper ref ere nce: “ (1) whe ther the
rema rk wa s unsolicited, (2) whe ther the g overnme nt’s line of que s tioning wa s rea sonable, (3) whether the limiti ng instruction was immediate, clea r, and f orce ful, (4) w hether

any bad fa ith was evidenc ed by

the g overnme nt, and (5) wh ether the rema rk wa s only

a small part of

the evidenc e ag ainst the defe ndant.” Zue rn v . Ta te , 336 F.3d 478, 485 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “[A] deter mination of the fairne ss to the acc used is the primary conce rn in ruling upon a mistrial moti on.” Un ite d S tat es v . S he ril l , 388 F.3d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (a lteration in orig inal). Yo un e s ar g ue s tha t the g ov e rnme nt sol ic ite d the state me nt f ro m B arnha

rt that th e de fe nd a nts in the case arising from the Cincinnati/L exingt o n , Kentucky investigation were convicted. T he statement’s c ontext , howeve r, cle arly demo n s t ra t es t hat the g overnme nt did not sol icit it. The pr e vio us qu e sti on s w e re a bo ut h owthe inv e sti g atio n o f Y oune s and Al c ha rb a ji b e g an –

bo th g ener ally and spec ifically
. Ba

rnhar t’s answe r, which foc used on anothe r trial and de fenda nts other than Alcha

rbaji and Y ounes, wa s larg ely non-re sponsive to the questi on. Fur thermore , this li ne of questioning w as re asonable , as questions relating to how an ag ent bega n an investig ation are rele vant and provide backg round and c ontext ual information.United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

14

Younes next contends that the district c ourt’s limit ing instruction w as not sufficie ntly clea r and for cef

ul. This argument, howeve r, i s belied by the trial transc ript. I mmediately following the statement, the district cour t ordere d the stat em en t s t ri cken a nd instructed the jury , “L adies a nd g entlemen y ou should disre g ard that. That should pla y no part in your consideration.” I n United Sta te s v . F orre st , a g ov e rnme nt w itn e ss “b lur te d out” that th e de fe nd ant h a d b e e n p aro le d f ro m st a te p r i s o nf i v e m o n t h s e ar l i e r . 1 7 F
. 3 d 9 1 6 , 9 2 0 ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 9 4 )
. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r

y, “L adies a nd g entlemen of

the jury , Iam g oing to instruct you to disreg ard that co m m ent and not consider it for any

purpose.” Id
. at 920 n.2. This court, reviewing the district court, e x plained that the instruction was “ clea

r and immediate afte r the a g ent’s initial ‘ b l u rt ed’ state ment.” Id. at 920. Simi larly , the instruction here was immediate, c lear , and for cef u l
. As an additional cur ative
measure , during final jury instructions, the district court g ave a n additional instruction to disreg ard statements that wer e stricke n and to treat the statements as if they wer e neve r hea

rd. More over, a jury is “pre sumed to understand and foll ow s uch directions from the c ourt.” Id. at 920-21. Ne ither defe ndant ar g ues, and the re is no evidenc e, that the g overnme nt acted in ba d faith in producingthe state me nt. Yo un e s argue s that the re mark “ pla y e d no sma ll pa

rt in the e vid e nc e ” a g a ins t hi m be c a us e B arnha rt wa s the a g e nt in ch arg e of the inv e sti g a tio n a nd the fi rs t w itn e ss c a lle d b y the g ov e rnme nt. Simi larl y , A lc ha

rb a ji a rgue s th a t th e state me nt wa s imp or tant. I n fa c t, t

he state me nt w a s o nly

a sma ll part of the evidenc e ag ainst Younes and A lchar baji. The go v er n ment prese nted testimony from
sever al convicte d co-de fenda nts, Awwad O weida, F adi Mardini, and J amal Hussein. I t presente d the testimony

of undercover task forc e member s Diane Core y , By ron Guinther, a

nd Dennis Castle;United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

15

these ag ents conducte d numerous undercove r t ransa ctions with both Younes and Alc harba ji. The g overnme nt introduced testimony from additional task for ce me mbers and f rom co n fi dential informants B ever ly

Wil liams and Kelly Ring. The g overnme nt introduced e x hibits i ncluding stolen proper ty , the orga

nization’s financial re cords, a nd underc over a

udio and videotape rec ording s of telephone c onversations and cont ro l l ed transac tions. This pl ethora of evide nce de monstrates that B a rn ha rt ’s stat eme nt repr esen ted on ly a sm all po rt io n o f t he ev id ence a gains t Y ou nes andAl cha rb a ji. Younes an d Al char

baji both argue that they wer e denie d a fa ir trial bec ause B arnha rt’s state me nt w a s so pr e

jud ic ia l. G ive n th e a

bo ve ana ly sis , Y oune s and Al c ha rb a ji the dis tr ic t c ourt

did
no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

de nyingthe mot ion

fo r a mis tr ia l. See, e .g. , Zerka v. G reen , 49 F.3d 1181, 1187 (6th Cir. 1995) (“ [A li tigan t ] is entitled to a fair tria l but not a perfe ct one, f or there are no perf ect tria ls.” (citation omitted)). We a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of the mot ion s for a mis tr ia l by Yo un e s and Al c ha rb a ji.

B. Pr oc e d

u r a l a n d S u b s t a n t i v e R e a s o n a b l e n es s o f th e S e n t e n c es I

m p o s e d U p o n Yo u n es, Abdelsalam, and Salem An appe llate cour

t review s a district court’ s s entenc e to deter mine if it is unreasonable
. United States v. Book

er , 5 4 3 U. S
. 2 2 0 , 2 6 1 (2 0 0 5 ). Fo l l o wi n g Booke r , this court g ener ally applies
an abuse of discretion standa rd to sentenc ing de cisions. Gall v. United States , 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2 00 7) ; see also Rit a v. Un i t ed States , 1 27 S. Ct . 2 45 6, 24 65 (2 00 7) (s ta tin g that a pp e llate c ourt s revie w the re asonable ness of a district court’s sente nce f or an a buse of discr etion).United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

16

I f a de fenda

nt does not object to his sentence in the di strict court after the district court a sks if h e h a s an y o b

je c ti o n s , th is c o u rt r e v ie w s h is c h a ll e n g e to it for plain e rror . United States v. Vonner , 5 1 6 F. 3 d

3 8 2 , 3 8 5 -8 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8
. ) ( en b an c) (ap p l y i n g Un ite d S tat es v . B os tic , 371 F.3d 86 5 (6 th Cir . 2 00 4) ); see also United States v. Alex ander , 5 17 F .3 d 8 87 , 8 89 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) . Pl a in
err or is “( 1 ) error (2) that was obvious or c lear (3) that a ffe cted de fenda nt’s substantial rig hts and (4) that a ffe cted the f

airne ss, integ rity , or public reputation of the judicial proce eding s.” Vonner , 516 F.3d at 386 (internal quotations omitted). This court “f

irst ensure[s] t hat the district cour t committed no significa

nt proce dural e rror ,” and nex t “consider [s] the substantive re asonable ness of the se ntence imposed under a n abuse- of-discr etion standard.” Ga ll , 1 28 S. Ct . at 59 7; se e als o U nit e d S tat es v . S mi th , 516 F.3d 473, 476 (6th Cir. 2008). A sentenc e is proce d u ra l l y u n rea sonable if the c ourt committed serious proc edura l error “such a s failing to c alculate (or improperly calc ulating) the Guidelines rang e, treating the G uidelines
a s ma nd a tor y , f a ili ngto c on sid e r t

he § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s, se le c tin g a sen te nc e ba se d o n c le a rl y
err oneous fa cts, or fa iling to adequately explain the chose n sentenc e–including an explanation for any deviation from the G uidelines rang e.” Ga ll , 128 U.S. at 597. When review ing f or substantive
rea sonablene s s , i f a sentence f alls within the Guidelines rang e, we “apply a pre sumption of
rea sonablene ss.” United States v. W ittingen , 519 F.3d 633, 637 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

“ A r e v i e w i n g c o u rt w i l l f i n d t h a t a s e n t e n c e i s s u

b s t an t i v e l y unreasonable wher e the district court selec t[ s] t he sente nce a

rbitrar ily , bas[es] t he sente nce on imper missibl e fa ctors, fa il[ s] t o consider pertinent § 3553(a ) fa ctors, or g iv[ es] an unrea sonable amo unt of weig ht to any pertinent fa ctor.”United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

17

Un ite d S tat es v . Ta te , 516 F.3d 459, 469 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (citation and in t er n al q u o t at ion marks omitted).

1. Y ounes Yo un e s argue s th a t hi s se nte nc e wa s unr e a so na ble in l ig ht of

the fa c tor s se t f

or th i n 1 8 U .S. C. § 355 3 (a ), s p ecif

ically 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) , beca use the district cour

t “cr eate d unwar

rante d sentenc e disparities among the defe ndants in this case with similar rec ords who h av e bee n found g uilty of similar conduc t” and the district c ourt did not adequately explain it s decision. Younes’s se ntence is not procedur ally unrea sonable. The district cour t examined the fac tors
se t f or th i n 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a ), no te d th a t th e Gu ide lin e s w e re no t man dat ory , a nd a de qu a te ly explained the rea sons for the c hosen sentenc e. Se e Ga ll , 128 S. Ct. at 597 . The dis tr ic t c ourt “ pa id cl o s e a tt e n ti o n an d c o n s id e r e d th e n a tu r e an d c ir c u ms ta

n c e s o f th is o f

f e n s e an d th e h is to r

y and/or char acte ristics of the De fenda nt.” The district c ourt specif ically examined 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) , noting that in compa

ring the sentenc es, it considere d “many many fac tors,” including the advisory Guidelines and motions for downw ard de parture s for substantial assistance and ac ceptan ce of responsibility

ruled upon by

the cour t. Younes ar g ues t h i s ex planation is insufficient. F rom the
rec ord, howe ver, it is clea r that the district cour

t c onsidered 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a )(6) and explained the “ba sis for re

jecting it.” United States v. Richardson , 437 F.3d 550, 554 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Apply ing a

presumption of re asonable ness to this withi n-Guidelines s en tence , Younes’s sentenc e is not substantively unrea sonable. See W

ittingen , 519 F.3d at 637. Whil e a “ district court may consider dispa

rity in the s en tencingof code fenda nts . . . a depa

rture intende d to achieveUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

18

uniformity

. . . is not appropr iate when a basis for the disparity exis ts.” Un ite d S

tat es v . W all s , 293 F.3d 959, 969 (6th Cir. 2002)
. Younes ha s not rebutted this presumption. He doe s not arg ue about his se nte nc e a t a ll b ut i ns te a d c ri tic ize s th e Gu ide lin e s f or the se nte nc e s g ive n to oth e r d e fe nd a nts
. Younes ba ses his argument on the number of counts of conviction for each de fenda nt, the leng th of
eac h defe ndant ’s s entenc e, and the leng th of ea ch def endant’ s probation. Howe ver, he does not discuss fac tors contributing to his co-def endant s’ sentenc es, such a s an ea rly plea, a cce ptance of
re sp on sib ili ty , o r s ub sta

nti a l a ssi sta

nc e . He re , Yo un e s we nt to tr ia l wh ile many of his c o- de fe nd a nts did not, and he did not rec eive credit for substantial assistance or acce ptance of responsibili ty , unlike many of his co-de fenda

nts. B e c a us e we c on c lud e that Y oune s’ s se nte nc e wa s r e a so na ble , w e a ff

ir m it
.

2. Abdelsalam Abdelsalam argues that the distri ct court (1) failed to take his cultural bac kg round and up br ing ingint o a c c ount, (2 ) fa ile d to pr op e rl y c on sid e r the po ssi bil ity of no ne e d f or imp ri so nme nt, (3) f ailed to consider

a downwa

rd depa rture f or fa mily ties and r es p o n s i b i l ities under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, (4) la cked a

sufficie nt fac tual basis to apply a two-le vel enha

n ce m en t under U .S.S.G. § 2B1.1( b)(4) for be ing a

person in the business of re ceivingand selling stolen proper ty , and (5) lacke d a suff icient fa ctual basis to apply a four -leve l enhanc ement under U.S.S. G. § 2B 1(b)( 2)(B ) for involvement in an offe nse with more than 50 vic tims. I nitially , we note that Abdelsalam’s a rg ument that the district court fa iled to take his cultural backg round and upbr inging into a ccount and failed to c onsider the possibili ty of a sentenc e withoutUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

Fur thermore , we note that U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 states, in releva nt part, “f

am i l y t i es and 2 responsibilities are not ordinarily rele vant in deter mining whe ther a

depar ture may be wa rra nted.” See U nited States v. Lozano-Alvarez , 2 26 F . App ’x 53 1, 53 4 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) . L ike the Gu ide lin e s, policy statements like this remain advisory in nature. 19 imprisonment is not supported by the rec ord. Abdelsalam’s counsel rec ounted his backg round and upbring ing, inc luding that he had been raised in a differ ent culture, that he was a rec ent immigra

nt to A me ri c a , a

nd tha t he wa s e ig hte e n at th e tim e he pa rt ic ipate d in t

he c ri min a l or g anizatio n. Hi s
coun s e l a ls o ar g u e d

th a t i mp r is o n me n t w a s u n n e c e s s ar y b e c a u s e o f A b d e ls a la

m’ s “ p arti cular
c ha ra c te ri sti c s” and

re sp e c t f or the law. Th e dis tr ic t cour t ex pl icitl y c on sid e re d th e se argume nts , explaining, “The Court understands the a g e of this y ou ng man and the Court howe ver doe s not believe that he lacks nece ssarily sophistication with reg ard to what was occ urring . I t occur red f or a sig nificant pe riod of time.” The a rg ument that the district court should have g iven Abdelsa lam a downwa rd depa rture for f amily ties and re sponsibili ties under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 also fa ils. This court does not “re view decisions of a district c ourt not to depart downw ard ‘ unless the re cord r efle cts that the district court was not aw are of or did not understand its discre tion to make such a de parture .’” United States v. Pu c k e tt , 4 2 2 F. 3 d

3 4 0 , 3 4 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . S te war t , 30 6 F .3 d 2 95 , 3 29 (6 th Cir. 2002)). The transcr ipt of the sentenc ing hear ing c ontains no indication that the district court wa s
unawa re it could de part downw ard. Thus, the argument is not subject to this court’s r eview. 2 Abdelsalam’s argument that the district court lac ked a sufficie nt fac tual basis to applya twolevel enha nceme nt under U.S.S .G. § 2B1.1( b)(4) for being a per son in the business of rec eiving and selling stolen pr operty

lacks mer it. His plea ag ree ment stated, “The parties f urther a g ree that theUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

20

offe nses involved re ceivin g s t o l en proper ty and the De fenda

nt was involved in the business of
rec eiving stolen proper

ty , resulting in a two level increase pursuant to § 2B 1.1(b)( 4).” The fac tual basis for the guilty

plea, which Abdelsalam a g ree d was acc urate , stated that the off enses involved stolen merc handise and explained that A bdelsalam’s role was that of “low-le vel assi s t an t , and labore r,” w ho unloaded, sorte d, and re moved tag s from stolen merc handise for other membe rs of the conspi r a c y . T h u s , th e f

a c tu a l b a s is f

o r th e p le a p r o v id e d f

a c ts th a t s u

p p o rt th e a

p p li c a ti o n of the
e nh anc e me nt. F ur

the rm or e , th a t Ab de lsa lam sti pu la te d to the a pp lic a tio n of the e nh anc e me nt i n h is plea ag ree ment likely preve nts his challeng e on appe al. Se e Un ite d Sta te s v . B az zi , 94 F.3d 1025, 10 28 (6 th Cir . 199 5) (h old ing that def e nd ants wa ive d the ir ri g ht to a pp e a l an e nh anc e me nt t o th e ir sentenc es wh e n

th e ir p le a a gr e e me nts c ontained sente ncing calc ulations including the e nhance ment). Abdelsalam’s argument that the district court lacked a sufficie nt fac tual basis to apply a four

level enha nceme nt under U.S.S.G. § 2B1( b)(2) (B ) for involvement in an offe nse with more than 50 vic tim s a lso fa ils
. He argue s tha t app lic a tio n of the e nh anc e me nt v iol a te s Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U.S. 296 (2004), b ec au s e “it was not based on fac ts admitted by

him or proven be y ond a re asonable doubt by a jury .” The PSRstated, “B ased upon the def

endant’ s role as a

n employ ee at the war ehouse, the number of consumers his behavior impacted i s u nknown. As such, a g ents and the g overnme nt estimated based upon the amount purcha sed by

the def endant that his beha

vior impacted

b e tw e e n 50 and 250 consume rs.” Abde lsalam failed to pr oduce evidenc e calling into que stion these fac ts a nd thus his arg ument does not succe ed. See United States v. Lang , 33 3 F .3 d 67 8, 68 1 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) (“ [a] d e fe nd ant c ann ot s ho w that a PSR is inaccur ate by

simply denying the PSR ’s truth. I nstead, bey ond such a ba re de nial, he must produceUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

21

some evidenc e that ca lls the reliability or cor rec tness of t h e al l ege d facts into question. I f a defe ndant meets this burden of productio n , t h e g overnme nt must t hen convinc e the c ourt that the PSR ’s fa cts are actua lly

true. B ut the defe ndant g ets no fre e ride: he must produc e more than a bar e denial, or the judge may

rely entirely on the PSR .” (citation omitted)). M oreove r, the Supreme Court
re c e ntl y state d th a t it s “ Sixth Am end men t case s d o n ot a uto ma tic a lly

fo rb id a se nte nc ingc ourt

to take a c c ount o f f

a c tua l matte rs no t de te rm ine d b y a ju ry and to in c re a se the se nte nc e in conseque nce.” Ri ta , 137 S. Ct . at 2465-66. A c ha lle ng e to t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e sti ma tio n o f the tot a l numb e r of vic tim s a lso fa ils . T his fac tual finding is e valuated for c lear err or. United States v. W alton , 908 F.2d 1289, 1301 ( 6th Cir. 1990) (holding that an estimation of the amount of drug s attributable to one def endant wa s not clear
err or). The plea a g ree ment stated that Abde lsalam’s sentenc e would be enhance d for this number of victims, and the PSR ex plained that the esti mation was based upon hi s criminal ac ts. The district court did not clea

rly err in this estim ation. Apply ing the presumption of re as o n ab l en es s , Ab d el s al am ’s s en t en ce i s b o t h p ro ce d urally and substantively

rea sonable. The di s trict court c onsidered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fa ctors and sentenc ed Abde lsalam to 24 months, a sentence at the low end of his Gui d el i n es ra n ge. W e thus conclude that Abdelsalam’s sentenc e wa s rea sonable.

3. Salem Salem challeng es, for the first time on appe al, four c omponents of the advisory Guidelines
c a lc ulatio n th a t r e su lte d in an o ff e ns e le ve l of

34 . H e argue s that the dis tr ic t c ourt c omm itt e d p la inUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

Th e ple a a g re e me nt s ta te d, “ Th e de fe nd ant u nd e rs tand s th a t th e Pr ob a tio n D e pa rtme nt w ill 3 condu c t a na d v is o r y p r e - s e n te n c e inv e s ti g a ti o nan d w il l r e c o mm e n d

to th e Co u rt a

s e n te n c ing g uideline ra

ng e. The defe ndant understands that the Probation Depa rtment’s re commendations ar e not binding on the Court and the terms of this Plea Ag ree ment are n o t b i n d i n g u pon the Court or Probation Depa

rtment.” 22 err or in using a

base of fense level of seven, computing the amount of loss, a nd in de termining the total number of victims and that Salem wa s an org anizer or lea der of the money

launder ing sc heme.

a. Calculation of

the Base OffenseLevel Salem argues that the district cour t plainly err ed in using a base offe nse leve l of seven, r ather than six . I n this arg ument he is corr ect. Salem first argues that the use of an offe nse level of six in the plea a g ree ment should prevent the d is tr ic t c o u rt f

r o m u s in g a b a s e o f

f e n s e le v e l o f s e v e n . T o b e s u r e , th e p le a a g r e e me n t u s ed a base offe nse level of six , not se ven. By the terms of the ple a ag ree ment, howeve r, these c alculations
we re bin din g on

ne ith e r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

no r prob ati on , and bo th c ou ld c a lc ulate dif fe re nt b a se of fe ns e le ve ls. 3 Sa le m a lso argue s th a t th e ba se of fe ns e le ve l sh ou ld b e six, r a the r tha n s e ve n, on

the me ri ts. The money

launder ing c ount is brought unde r 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), which is sente nced unde r U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1. W h en calculating the base of fense level for

a count of

money launder ing, the court must de termine the underlying offe nse from which the launder ed funds wer e derive d and whether the def endant c ommitt ed the unde rlying of fense . The underly ing offense here is rece ipt of stolen proper

ty in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315. S ee U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1). A ppendix A to t he SentencingGuidelines spec ifies that a se ntence for money launder ing w ith an underly ing offense ofUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

23

rec eipt of stolen prope rty

is calculated under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a) (1), the appr opriate ba se off

ense le vel for mone y

launder ing is seven “ if (A) the def endant wa s convicted of an of fens e re fe re n ced to this g uideline; and (B ) that off ense of conviction has a

statutory maxi mum ter

m of imprisonment of 20 y ear s or more.” Otherw ise, the applica ble base offe nse leve l is six . U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a )(2) . Thus, the dispute conc erns whe ther money launder ing is “ ref

ere nced to this guideline.” The c ommentary

explains the meaningof “r efe renc ed to this guide line.” I t states, in releva nt pa rt , “ F or purp os e s o f s ub se cti on (a)(1) , a n o ff e ns e is ‘ re fe re nc e d to thi s g uid e lin e ’ i f ( i) thi s g u id e li n e is th e a

p p li c a b le Ch a p te r T w o g u id e li n e d e te r

mi n e d u n d e r th e p r o v is io n s o f

§ 1 B1.2 (Applica ble Guidelines) f

or the off ense of conviction
. . .” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, a pplication notes 2(A)
. A c c o r d i n g t o A p p e n d i x A o f t h e S e n t e n c i n g G u i d e l i n e s , 1 8 U
. S
. C
. § 2 3 1 5 , r e c e i p to f s t o l e np r o p e rt y, is an offe nse re fer ence d to this gui d el i n e. T h e base offe nse leve l is six beca use the off

ense of
c on vic tio n, a lth ou g h it

ha s a ma ximumte rm of tw e nty y e ars , is no t “ re fe re nc e d to ” § 2 B 1. 1. Thus , § 2 B 1. 1(a) (2) wo uld

a pp ly . Sa le m w a s c on vic te d o f m on e y la un de ri ng , w hic h is an o ff e ns e ref ere nced to § 2S1.1, and not (or only indirectly

) to § 2B1.1. I f in d i re ct ly ref ere nced of

fense s of conviction wer e included in § 2B 1.1(a) (1)( A), then subse ction (A) w ould be surplusag e, without independe nt meaning
. Thus, the district court commit ted error that wa s plain. Be cause the district court used the wrongbase offense level in computing Sale m’s sentenc e, the e rror aff ecte d substantial rig hts and the fa irness of the se ntenci ng hear ing. F urthermor e, at or al ar g ument, the g overnme nt
conce ded that the ba se off ense le vel should be six , rathe r than seve n. We reve rse Salem’ s sentence and re mand for r esente ncing using a base of fense level of six, rather than se ven.United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

24

b. Am ou nt o

f Lo ss Sa le m c ha lle ng e s th e dis tr ict court ’s fi nd ing on the a mou

nt o f l os s a s c le arl y

e rr on e ou s, arguing the loss figur es pre sented at the evidentiar y hear ing w ere inflated a

nd not supported by sufficie nt evidence . As previously noted, see pag e 7 su

pra , the district c ourt h el d an ev i d enti ary hear ing r eg ardingsentenc ing issues in Salem’s c ase a nd found that the amount of loss was betwe en $1 ,0 00 ,0 00 .0 0 a

nd $2 ,5 00 ,0 00 .0 0 an d en ha

nc e d the se nte nc e by

16 po int s f

or thi s amou

nt o f l os s. A t t h e h e ar i n g , t h e g o v e r n m e n t p r e s e n t e d t w o d i f

f e r e n t m e t h o d s f

o r c a l c u l a t i n g t h e l o s s . F i r s t , it
c a l c u l a t e d

t h e f a i r m a r k e tr e t a i l v a l u e o f

p r o d u c t s s o l d t o t h e c o n s p i r a c y a s $ 1 , 0 7 8 , 1 2 3
. 8 3
. S e c o n d l y, it ex amined five bank ac counts that wer e part of the org anization a nd conclude d the total loss was $2,633,802.50. Salem did not offer any evidenc e. We reviewthe di strict court’s loss ca lculation under the SentencingGuidelines for clea r
err or . United States v. Mic kens , 453 F.3d 668, 670 (6th Cir. 2006). The g overnme nt was re quired to prove the loss amount by a “preponde ranc e of the evidenc e.” U .S.S.G. § 6A1.3 comment. The offe nse conduc t on which the amount could be based inc luded (A) a ll acts and omissions c o m m itted, aided, abe tted, counsele d, commanded, induced, pr ocure d, or willfully cause d by

the def endant; and (B ) in the ca se of a

jointly undertaken cr iminal activity (a cr iminal plan, scheme, endea vor, or e nterprise undertaken by the def endant in conc ert with othe rs, whethe r or not cha

rg ed as a conspirac y

), all re asonably

fore seea ble ac ts and omissions of o t h e r s i nf

u rt h e r an c e o f

t h e j o i n t l y u n d e rt a k e nc r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a )(1) (A), ( B) . “‘L oss’ means the va lu e o f t h e property taken, damag ed, or destroy ed. Or d i n ar ily , when pr operty is taken or de stroy ed the loss is the fair marke t value of the pa rt ic ula r p ro pert y at is su e.” U. S.S. G. § 2 B 1. 1 c omm e nt 2 ; se e als o U nit e d S tat es v . M oo re , 225United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

25

F.3d 637, 642 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 0 ). The c omments further e x plain, “F or the purpose s of subsection (b )( 1) , th e los s n e e d n ot b e de te rm ine d w ithpr e c isi on . T he c ourt ne e d o nly make a

re a so na ble estimate of the loss, g iven the available information. This e stimate, for example, ma y be base d upon the appr ox imate number of victims and the ave rag e los s to eac h victim, or on more g ener al fa ctors such as the s cope and duration of the offe nse.” Id
. § 2 B1
. 1 co m m en t3
. “In c h al l en gi n g t h e c o u rt 's loss c a lc u lati o n , [a d e f

e n d an t] mu s t c ar

r y th e h e a v y b u r d e n o f p e r s u a d in g th is Co u rt th a t the evaluation of the loss was not only inacc urate , but outsid e t h e re al m of permissible ca lculations.” United States v. Ham ilton , 263 F.3d 645, 654 ( 6th Cir. 2001). This c ourt has cre ated a methodology to determine loss. Mo or e , 225 F.3d at 642. “Fir st, we deter mine whether

a mar ket value for the stolen property is readily asce rtainable ; second, if a marke t value is asc erta inable, we deter mine whether

that fig ure c orre sponds with the gre ater fig ure be tween the har m suffer ed by

the victim and the g ain re alized by the def endant.” Id. “More over, ‘ the price
a wi lli ng buy e r wo uld pa

y a wi lli ngse lle r at th e tim e and pla c e the pr op e rt

y wa s st ole n o r at any

tim e during the re ceipt or conce alment of stolen proper ty ’ is the customary

test for de termining marke t value.” I

d. ( c i t i n g United States v. W arshawsky , 20 F.3d 204, 213 ( 6th Cir. 1994)). The g overnme nt’s two methods of ca lculation utiliz e this approa ch, and the district court m ade a
rea sonable e stimate of loss. Salem attacks the loss calculations, a r g u in g th a t t h e g o v e r nment’s two methods of ca lculation
we re bo th f

lawe d a nd that th e govern me nt r e lie d o n c a lc ulatio ns inv olv ingre ta il v a lue wh e n it should ha ve relied, at least in pa

rt, upon calc ulations using wholesale value. Salem is corre ct that t h e r e c o r d

d o e s n o te xp l a i nw h e t h e r t h e p r o p e rt y

s e i z e d c a m e f r o m r e t a i l o r

w h o l e s a l e l o c a tio ns .United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

26

Salem’s attack on the intricac ies of the calc ulations f ails, howeve r, beca

use the loss ca lculation need not be pre cise a

nd can b e a reasonable e stimate g iven the ava ilable information. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 c omment 3. The district c ourt’s loss c alculation was re asonable and base d upon the evidenc e pr e se nte d at th e he ari ng . T he c ourt did no t c omm it e rr or , c le ar or oth e rw ise , in c a lc ulatin g the los s.

c. Enhance ment for 50 to 250 Victims Sa le m ar g u e s th e d is tr ic t c o u rt e r r e d in a p p ly in g a f o u r - le v e l e n h an c e me n t f

o r b etwee n 50 and 250 victims. He a

rg ues that insufficie nt evidence of the nu m b er of victims was pre sented. Ba rnhar t testified that Salem purcha sed purported stolen proper ty on 49 occa sions from underc over ag ents and that these purcha ses had a reta il value of $343,000.00. He also testified t hat there wer e a total of 288 underc over transac tions fr om Sale m’s co-c onspirators that had a reta il value of a

bout $618,000.00. He spe culated that there w ere “hundre ds if not thousands” of tot al v i ct ims. Base d upon this evidence , the district court did not clea rly err in estimating ther e we re be tween 50 a nd 250 victims. See U

nited States v. W

alton , 908 F.2d 1289, 1301 ( 6th Cir. 1990).

d. Enhance ment for Being an Organizer or Leader The district cour

t enhanc ed the se ntence by four leve ls beca

use Salem was an org anizer or leade r of the mone y

launder ing scheme , a finding that Salem challeng es. Salem argues the four -leve l enhanc ement pursuant to U .S.S.G. § 3B1.1 is not war rante d beca

use the district court did not make a finding that the cr iminal activity involved five or more persons and ther e wa s insufficient evide nce that Salem was a

n org anizer or lea der. A t a n evidentiar

y hear ing, the testimony

of Aww ad Owe ida,United States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

27

a co- defen dant, indicated that Salem was his boss in the conspirac y . Fur thermore , another

codefe ndant, Fadi Mardini, t estified that Salem controlled the org anization. Age nt Ba rnhar t testified Sa le m w a s th e “ bo ss” in the c on sp ir a c y , re c e ive d the larg e st pr of its , a nd c on tr oll e d th e ke y

de c isi on s. Salem rec ruited multiple persons to join the org anization. The conspirac y resulted in the indictment of 19 other persons. Given thi s evidenc e, the dist rict cour t corre ctly

deter mined that Salem was a

n
or g anize r o r l e a de r o f t

he mon e y la un de ri ngsc he me inv olv ingfi ve or mor e pe rs on s.

C. The Forfeiture and Money Judgme nts Imposed Upon D efendant Salem Th is c ourt

re vie ws the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s int e rp re ta tio n o f f e de ra l f or feitu re l aws de novo
. United States v. J

ones , 502 F.3d 388, 391 ( 6th Cir. 2007). The g overnme nt has the burde n to prove forf eiture by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Id. “F indings of fac t a re revie wed f

or cle ar e rror . The issue of whe ther those f

acts a re suf ficient to constitute a pr oper c ri m inal forf eiture is re viewed de novo.” Id. (c i t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . O ’D e ll , 247 F.3d 655, 679 ( 6th Cir. 2001)). Sa le m pr e se nts se ve ra l argume nts a s to wh y the fo rf e iture mon e y

jud g me nts in t

he a mou nts of $2,633,802.50 a n d $ 3 6,046.30 are not rea sonable. He argues (1) the evidenc e wa s insufficient to establish he possessed a ssets sufficient to trig g er t h e s t atutory “substitute assets” provisions of forf eiture la ws, (2) the $2,633,802.50 money judgme nt is clearly err oneous, and (3) the district er red by failing to rule whether the money seized from Salem’s r esidenc e should be c riminally forf eited and fa iled to order the return of cer tain jewelr

y as the pa rties had a g ree d. Salem argues that the e vidence was insuffic ie nt t o e s ta b li s h th at he possesse d assets suffic ient to tr ig g e r th e s tatuto r

y “ s u b s ti tute a s s e ts ” p r o v is io n s o f f o r f e it u r e la w s , w h ic h r e n d e r s th e moneyUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

28

jud g me nts inv a lid . Afo rf e iture a c tio n c an ta

ke the fo rm of

a mon e y jud g me nt, fo rf

e iture of sp e c if ic assets, or f

orfe iture of substitut e asse ts. United States v. Candelaria-Silva , 166 F.3d 19, 42 ( 1st Cir. 1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t at i o no m i t t ed ); 2 1 U. S
. C
. § 8 5 3 (p )( 1 ). A s t at u t e p ro v i d e s f o r f o r f ei tu re fo l l o wi n g a conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, one of the counts to which S alem pled g uilty
. See 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(1) (“The court, in imposing se ntence on a per son convicted of an offe nse in violation
o f s e c t i o n 1 9 5 6
. . . o f t h i s t i t l e , s h a l l o r d e r t h a t t h e p e r s o nf o r f e i tt o t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s an y p r o p e rt y,
rea l or personal, involved in such offense, or any proper ty trac eable to such proper

ty .”) We a g ree with the First and T hird Circuits that an in personam money judgme nt is authorized under the forf eiture statute. H oweve r, we also ag ree with those circ uits that, beca use any future a ssets Salem ob ta ins to s a tis fy

su c h a mon e y jud g me nt w ill ne c e ssa

ri ly be su bs tit ute a sse ts, the g ov e rnme nt m us t comply with the require ments of Section 853(p)( 1). See Cande laria-Silva , 1 66 F .3 d at 42 ; United States v. Voigt , 89 F.3d 1050, 1084- 88 (3d Cir. 1996). Salem argues t he $2,633,802.50 money judgme nt, the amount of one of the loss calculations prese nted at the evidentiar y hear ing, is c lear ly err oneous and w as not based on suf ficient e vidence
. I n its brief the g overnme nt states, “The United States conc edes t h at t h e Court should vacate that money judgme nt [ the $2,633,802.50 money judgme nt] and re mand this matter in order to have the district court make more de finite fac tual finding s to support a money judgme nt up to an amount of $2.5 milli on.” Given the district court’s findingthat the amount of loss was be tween $1,000,000.00 and $2,500,000.00, this money judgme nt is clea rly err oneous. We vacate the $2,633,802.50 money judgme nt and re mand to the district court for fac tual finding s under Sec tion 853( p)(1) and a r evisedUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

29

fig ure of up to $2,500,000.00 should the gove rnment succ ee d i n m eeting its burden unde r the section. Salem argues the district e rr ed b y fa i l ing to r ule whethe r the money

seized from Salem’s residenc e should be c riminally forf eited and f

ailed to orde r the re turn of ce rtain jewe lry as the pa rties had ag ree d. Specifica lly , the plea a g ree ment provided that the district c ourt would deter mine whether money seized from Salem’s re s i d ence should be criminally forf eited to the United States and also provide d that cer tain piece s of jewe lry

seized from his residenc e would be r etu rn ed afte r sentenc ing. “ A ca se bec omes moot when the issues pre sented a re no long er ‘ live’ or parties lac k a leg ally cog nizable inter est in the outcome.” Cle v e lan d Bra nc h, N.A .A .C. P v. City of P ar ma , O hio , 263 F.3d 513, 530 (6th Cir. 2001) (interna l quotation marks and citations omitted). On August 17, 2005, the district court g rante d a def ault judgme nt and dec ree of for feitu re i n the civil forf eiture action that cove rs the money seized from the residenc e, which rende rs the ar g ument conce rning the money seized from the re sidence moot. I n its brief the g overnme nt states, “On August 28, 2007, the Un ite d St a te s A tto rn e y ’s Of fi c e no tif ie d Sa le m’ s a

pp e llate de fe ns e c ouns el in wr iti ngof

its willingness to make appropr iate ar rang ements for

the immediate re turn of the r equeste d single item of jewe lry seized from S alem’s residence as di scussed in ¶ 9 of t he Plea Ag ree ment.” As the pa rties
a g re e to t he re tur n o f t he ite m of

je we lr y , th a t is su e a lso is m oo t.

III
. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the district court’s de nial of the motion for a mistrial by Yo un e s and

Al c ha rb a ji a nd a ff ir m th e se nte nc e s o f Y oune s a nd Ab de lsa lam but va c a teUnited States v. Abde lsalam, 05-4063

30

Salem’s sentenc e and r emand f or re sentenc ing. We a ffirm the $36,046.30 f orfe iture money judgme nt ag ainst Salem but vacate the $2,633,802.50 money judgme nt ag ainst him and remand to t he dis tr ic t c ourt

to m a ke fa c tua l f

ind ing s a nd de te rm ine the a mou

nt o f t he mon e y jud g me nt i n an amount up to $2,500,000.00.