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S. HRG. 110–1097 

EPA’S RESPONSE TO 9/11 AND LESSONS LEARNED 

FOR FUTURE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SUPERFUND AND 

ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND 

PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 20, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=senate&committee=environment 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

BETTINA POIRIER, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ANDREW WHEELER, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SUPERFUND AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California, (ex officio) 

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho, Ohio 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, (ex officio) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

JUNE 20, 2007 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, U.S. Senator from the State of New York ........ 1 

Craig, Hon. Larry, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming .............................. 4 

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California ........................ 5 

Lautenberg, Hon. Frank R., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey ........... 7 

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 9 

WITNESSES 

Connaughton, James L., Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality ........... 43 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

Bodine, Susan Parker, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and 

Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Accompanied 

by: George Gray, Assistant Administrator, Office of Research and Development, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ................................................... 46 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

Responses to additional questions: 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 51 

Senator Clinton ......................................................................................... 54 

Rodenbeck, Sven, SC.D., P.E., BCEE, Captain, U.S. Public Health Service, 

Deputy Branch Chief, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ............................................. 76 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 77 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 79 

Stephenson, John B., Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 81 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 83 

Lavin, Nina, Resident .............................................................................................. 142 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 144 

Newman, David M., M.A., M.S., New York Committee for Occupational Safety 

and Health ............................................................................................................ 148 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 150 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 

Court Document, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 12–40 

Letter to Hon. Deborah Glick, Assembly District #66 from Commissioner 

Thomas R. Frieden, MD., Department of Health and Mental Hygiene .......... 41 

EPA National Approach to Response, Crisis Communications Plan for Incidents of National Significance, July 24, 2007 ....................................................63–75 

ATSDR Fact Sheet ................................................................................................... 99 

NSF PR 03–09-January 20, 2003, Scientist Find Geochemical Fingerprint 

of World Trade Center Collapse Recorded in New York Harbor Sediments ... 104 

EOS, Transactions, American Geophysical Union ................................................ 106 

USGS, Determination of a Diagnostic Signature for World Trade Center Dust 

Using Scanning Electron Microscopy Point Counting Techniques, by Gregory P. Meeker, Amy M. Bern, Heather A. Lowers, and Isabelle K. 

Brownfield ......................................................................................................... 111–128 

Article, Journal of Asthma, June 2007............................................................... 132–140 

Presidential Decision Directive-62 ......................................................................... 163 

(1) 

EPA’S RESPONSE TO 9/11 AND LESSONS 

LEARNED FOR FUTURE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SUPERFUND AND

ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 

406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Clinton, Craig, Boxer, Inhofe, and Lautenberg. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

Senator CLINTON. The hearing will come to order. 

I want to welcome all of you. We are expecting votes, and there 

was a lot of scrambling around, trying to decide whether we would 

start the hearing and then go vote or vote and then start the hearing. So some of my colleagues who will join me later will try to figure out the time has been changed, so we’re not sure exactly when 

the vote will occur. But we want to go ahead and get started. 

I thank you all for being here. I know there are a number of New 

Yorkers in the audience. I welcome all of you: Kimberly Flynn, Joseph Jones, Jenna Orkin, Marvin Bethea, Barbara Einzig and everyone else. 

This is the first hearing of the Subcommittee on Superfund and 

Environmental Health. It is entitled EPA’s Response to 9/11 and 

Lessons Learned for Future Emergency Preparedness. 

Also in the audience is my friend and colleague and someone who 

has been a real leader on these issues, Congressman Jerry Nadler. 

This follows a hearing that I chaired in the HELP Committee 

earlier this year in March to address the urgent health needs of the 

thousands of first responders, workers, volunteers and residents 

who have suffered illnesses because of the toxins to which they 

were exposed following the attacks of 9/11. It is a companion hearing to the one that Congressman Nadler will hold on the House 

side next week. 

We will first hear testimony from a Federal panel that includes 

EPA, the White House Council on Environmental Quality, the 

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, and the Government Accountability Office. We will then hear from a panel that in-
2 

cludes a New York City resident and a scientific expert, both heavily involved in 9/11 contamination issues. 

I am delighted to be joined by the Ranking Member on this committee, Senator Larry Craig. Thank you very much, Senator Craig, 

for coming. My Chairman of the full committee, Barbara Boxer, as 

well as my friend and colleague, Senator Lautenberg. I really appreciate each of their interest in this issue. Of course, Senator Lautenberg and I share many constituents who have been suffering 

and even dying because of their exposures to the toxins at and 

around Ground Zero. 

I called this hearing because it is time for answers. Nearly 6 

years after 9/11, we still don’t have the whole truth about the toxic 

cloud of poison that filled the air after the towers fell. We don’t 

have an explanation for the misrepresentations that put countless 

people at risk of exposure to chemicals that we know are causing 

illness and death. 

When we turned to our Government in Washington for guidance 

in the hours, days and weeks after that tragedy, one of the questions people asked was obvious and important: is the air safe. What 

did EPA tell us? On September 18, 2001, Governor Whitman said, 

‘‘I’m glad to reassure the people of New York and Washington, DC., 

that their air is safe to breathe and their water is safe to drink.’’ 

Now, based on EPA’s statements, parents sent their children to 

school in the area, residents returned to their apartments. But as 

the EPA Inspector General informed us in 2003, the EPA’s statements were ‘‘not supported by the data available at the time.’’ 

Now, I recognize that EPA and everyone else involved were operating under unprecedented and extremely difficult circumstances. 

But I simply cannot accept what appears to have been a deliberate 

effort to provide unwarranted reassurances at the direction of the 

White House to New Yorkers about whether their air was safe to 

breathe. I well remember my first visit to Ground Zero, the day 

after 9/11. You could feel it on your skin, the air was acrid and 

thick, you could taste it, you certainly could smell it. 

Back in Washington, I went to work, pushing then-Administrator 

Whitman to address environmental hazards from the 9/11 fallout 

and to hold hearings in New York City on the issue in February 

2002. I pushed for EPA to address the indoor contamination issue 

and fought for the Administration to address the shortcomings 

identified in the first cleanup program leading to a commitment to 

establish the EPA World Trade Center Expert Technical Review 

Panel in 2003. 

I have also worked to secure funding for programs to provide 

medical screening and tracking for first responders. I am very 

pleased that the Senate Labor HHS Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee has approved a bill yesterday to 

provide an additional $55 million in Federal funding to address the 

mounting health needs of those who were exposed to environmental 

hazards. For the first time, we were able to secure bill language 

requiring the Department of Health and Human Services, through 

NIOSH, to extend the program to residents, students and others 

impacted by the toxins. I want to thank Senators Harkin and 

Spector for including this in the legislation. 
3 

The reason I have worked so hard on these issues is because of 

heart-rending stories of people like Felicia Dunn-Jones, and members of her family are here with us. In May, the New York City 

medical examiner reversed an earlier decision and ruled that the 

death of Felicia Dunn-Jones was connected to her exposure on 9/ 

11, the first such ruling in New York. We already had had a ruling 

by the coroner in New Jersey connecting the death of a NYPD detective to his exposure. 

Felicia Dunn-Jones was a 42-year-old lawyer who worked near 

the World Trade Center. In February 2002, she passed away from 

sarcoidosis, often associated with environmental hazards. Her husband, Joe, who lives in Staten Island with his two children, is here 

today, as is Felicia’s sister, Sharon Alvarez. 

She was caught in the toxic cloud, and her story recognizes how 

difficult the balance has been of scientific and medical evidence. 

But it is shifting, showing that increased exposure to 9/11 toxins 

actually can cause illness and death. 

The first responders were the first to see the effects. Within 2 

months of the attacks, 300 firefighters were on medical leave, suffering with lung ailments. Subsequent research has shown this was 

just the first sign of persistent health problems. More than 11,500 

firefighters and 3,000 emergency medical technicians and paramedics took part in the greatest rescue ever mounted. We know 

that thousands are now suffering from adverse health effects. According to fire department studies, exposed firefighters on average 

experienced a decline in lung function equivalent to what would 

have been produced by 12 years of aging. 

More than 34,000 employees of the New York Police Department 

participated in rescue, recovery and cleanup operations at Ground 

Zero or Fresh Kills, where the debris from the disaster was taken. 

More than 2,000 members of the police department have filed medical claims. The rescue and recovery efforts were assisted by heavy 

machine operators, laborers, iron workers, building and construction tradespeople, telecommunication workers and others from the 

public and private sector. 

Researchers at Mount Sinai Medical Center have documented 

physical and mental health effects among this population, with 69 

percent reporting new or worsened respiratory symptoms experienced while at Ground Zero and 59 percent still experiencing persistent health effects more than 2 years after the attacks. 

Almost 60,000 residents live in the vicinity of the World Trade 

Center, south of Canal Street in Lower Manhattan. The dust and 

debris settled in many of the apartments and buildings in the vicinity of the attacks. An analysis of more than 2,000 residents in 

the area found 60 percent experienced the onset of respiratory 

symptoms, a rate approximately three times higher than that of 

people in the surrounding area in Manhattan. 

In addition, students at Stuyvesant High School in Lower Manhattan, who were evacuated because of their proximity to the 

World Trade Center, resumed classes 1 month after the attacks. 

They had rates of respiratory and other illnesses higher than those 

at other New York City high schools. 

Sadly, some of these illnesses were not preventable, as the toxic 

dust cloud literally enveloped many people as they fled from the 
4 

scene. But many who were exposed could have been protected. That 

is why it is important we examine what went wrong. Americans deserve to know what we can do to better protect them. We have a 

number of questions. 

First, why did the Bush administration, EPA and CEQ management choose to downplay and grossly misrepresent the exposure 

health risks posed in the days and weeks after 9/11? Second, the 

EPA’s own Inspector General blasted the EPA’s program to clean 

up indoor contamination, but 4 years later, the EPA is making the 

same mistakes again. 

Third, have EPA and CEQ learned lessons from the disaster and 

are better prepared to protect public health from environmental 

hazards in the future? To me, it is clear from the GAO testimony 

that some lessons are being ignored, and I don’t want us to repeat 

the mistakes. We could never repay those who sacrificed for us, 

who answered the call of duty. We cannot go back in time and pull 

the brave men and women off that pile or order them to wear respiratory protection equipment. We can’t tell the residents, the first 

responders, the workers and the volunteers that the air is too dangerous to breathe. 

But we can clear the air here in Washington and clear the way 

to help those affected and to hold accountable those who did let 

New Yorkers and Americans down, to learn the lessons that we 

should to be fully prepared for the unthinkable. That is why I have 

called today’s hearing. 

Let me turn now to the Ranking Member on this subcommittee, 

Senator Larry Craig. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY CRAIG, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE 

STATE OF WYOMING 

Senator CRAIG. Madam Chairman, the vote has just started. I 

certainly will get us under the wire. 

But again, along with the Chairman, I want to thank all the witnesses today for joining us to examine the lessons learned from 9/ 

11 and EPA’s preparedness for future emergencies. Certainly, reviewing the past is critically important for any of us if we are going 

to be prepared for the future. Most, if not all of us, can tell the 

story of where we were and what we were doing when we first 

learned of the tragic events of 9/11. The aftermath of the Twin 

Towers collapse showed an inspiring level of heroism and teamwork literally unprecedented, I think, in our history. 

These unimaginable circumstances also highlighted emergency 

response successes and shortcomings. That is what we are talking 

about here today. I think it is important to review the lessons we 

have learned and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

In reviewing the reports within the scope of this hearing, it appears to me that criticisms largely hover around outdoor air health 

advisories as well as indoor air health and clean programs. The IG 

report released on August 21, 2003, regarded EPA’s response to the 

World Trade Center collapse states, ‘‘Although many organizations 

were involved in addressing air quality concerns resulting from the 

World Trade Center collapse, subsequent events have demonstrated that ultimately the public, Congress and others expected 

EPA to monitor and resolve environmental issues, even when EPA 
5 

may not have had the overall responsibility to resolve these issues 

or the necessary resources to address them.’’ 

Later, the report states, ‘‘EPA does not have clear statutory authority to establish and enforce health-based regulatory standards 

for indoor air.’’ As you can see, Madam Chairman, there is a serious disconnect, or it appears there is a serious disconnect, between 

what the public and some public officials have as expectations to 

EPA’s ability and the actual authority granted to the Agency. I believe this disconnect should be addressed. I think it is appropriate 

and it is clearly necessary. 

Additionally, there are differing opinions regarding the current 

status of the indoor air test and clean program, and what actions 

can be taken that are prudent for a safety-health standpoint, but 

that still maintain a level of fiscal responsibility. In other words, 

what is reality, what can we do, what is the statutory ability to do 

it, and what does it cost. 

Although it has been less than 6 short years since this tragedy, 

I am interested to hear more about the programs EPA instituted 

as a result of the experience, such as the creation of the Office of 

Emergency Management and the National Decontamination Team 

and the expansion of the Environmental Response Team, among 

others. 

One last thing, Madam Chair. It has been brought to my attention that due to past litigation surrounding these issues aimed at 

Chairman Connaughton, he may be unable to answer all of the 

questions. So I ask that we at least be cognizant to any legal situation that may exist. I am confident he will respond to that. 

With that, Madam Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding the hearing. It is an important hearing. I will conclude this 

statement by saying, let us always review where we have been to 

know where we need to get, and the realities of what happened and 

how we might change them that are within the scope of the law 

or our responsibility, Madam Chairman, in adjusting the law to 

bring it into compliance, allow agencies to move in directions that 

we might otherwise have thought they had the authority to move 

in. 

Thank you. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator Craig. I look 

forward to working with you on those issues. 

Senator Boxer, Chairwoman Boxer. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Senator Clinton, for holding 

this important hearing, but also for your focus on this very moral 

issue and your leadership. 

Nearly 6 year after the attacks of 9/11, the events of that horrific 

day are seared in our memories. We will never forget the collapse 

of the Towers into a billowing cloud that swallowed up thousands 

of people. Who can forget those brave firefighters and police officers 

charging into the smoking buildings and disappearing into the 

choking cloud? 

We remember now the fine, gray dust that covered everything. 

Then we learned that that fine, gray dust was toxic. It contained 
6 

lead, asbestos and other dangerous materials. We are here today 

because we owe it to the families of those who died, those who are 

still sick and their families to ask questions that need to be answered about our Government’s response. 

It is our responsibility, which you are making sure we carry out, 

Madam Chair, to ensure that EPA and the rest of the executive 

branch carry out the laws that we pass, including our environmental laws. We now have a chance to take a look at how we did. 

I am here to support Senator Clinton’s efforts to oversee the Government response. She has my full confidence. She has been a true 

leader on this issue. She has worked to make sure that this committee stays on track and doesn’t look away from this disaster. 

As in the case of many lesser disasters, we only learn afterwards 

what the extent of the danger was to the people who were there. 

There are continuing concerns about the health of many people exposed to the toxins that I described. 

I believe that the Government has a responsibility to level with 

the public about everything they know about the risks. If there are 

dangers, let’s be honest about them. Government should never 

downplay or cover up danger. 

I am concerned about allegations that officials at EPA and from 

the White House twisted the facts and misleadingly reassured the 

public about the health risks after the 9/11 attack in New York. 

Senator Clinton reiterated just one sentence from Administrator 

Whitman, which was reassuring and which was wrong. 

After such disasters and health emergencies, the Government 

also must assure that we quickly and properly cleanup the contamination. The Government did mobilize substantial resources 

after 9/11, but we will hear testimony about some shortcomings in 

the response, especially with respect to the toxic dust that coated 

the indoors of many residences and businesses among other issues. 

Finally, the Government should assist those whose health is hit 

hardest, especially the first responders and the most severely exposed citizens, to ensure that their health is monitored and protected. This is an ongoing concern after the World Trade Center attacks, and other disasters, when first responders and other citizens 

are highly exposed to toxic chemicals and materials. 

Senator Clinton took the lead in getting a provision enacted in 

the Safe Ports Act last Congress that helps mobilize health tracking after a disaster. I want to announce today that she and I are 

working with Senator Baucus on a broader bill to make sure that 

in any, any disaster, a Federal disaster, there is follow-up and 

there is monitoring and there is help for those exposed, those workers exposed. I hope the Administration will work with us on this. 

We reach out to them today to do that. 

Unfortunately, this Administration failed to level with many people in the aftermath of the attack. In 2003, the EPA’s Inspector 

General found that the White House Council on Environmental 

Quality reviewed and changed EPA’s statements in order to downplay the health risks associated with contamination. In public 

statements, the Inspector General said, ‘‘The White House Council 

on Environmental Quality influenced the information that EPA 

communicated to the public through its early press releases when 
7 

it convinced EPA to add reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones.’’ 

Twisting facts to encourage a false sense of security can harm 

people and erode the public’s trust in Government. This is the Inspector General report. This isn’t a political report. Government 

should rely on science and act in the best interests of its citizens, 

not spend the evidence. 

So I am so pleased that we have the opportunity to shed more 

light on these critical issues and right the wrongs that have been 

done. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:] 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much. 

Senator Lautenberg, we will go and vote and tell them to wait 

until you get there. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I feel like the last man standing here, Senator Clinton. To collapse my minutes and wonder whether I am 

going to miss a vote is really not something I want to do. 

Senator CLINTON. Well, why don’t we recess now and we will all 

go vote and come back and then you can give your opening statement. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I would really prefer that. I appreciate it 

and I thank the witnesses. 

Senator CLINTON. So we will be in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Senator CLINTON. The hearing will come to order. 

We have been joined by Senator Inhofe. We will now go to Senator Lautenberg for his opening statement and Senator Inhofe, if 

you have an opening statement. 

Senator INHOFE. I do, thank you. 

Senator CLINTON. Senator Lautenberg. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, 

and thank you, those who are appearing at the witness table, for 

your indulgence while we took care of our voting responsibility. 

On September 11, 2001, more than 3,000 people lost their lives, 

including 700 New Jersey residents. What was not obvious at the 

time, but apparent now, is the damage from the collapse of the 

World Trade Center buildings that extended beyond that immediate territory that fateful day. Now, 6 years later, the health of 

thousands of first responders, search and rescue workers, volunteers who rushed to Ground Zero, many, once again, from my home 

State of New Jersey, continues to decline. 

Residents and office workers from some distance away from 

those buildings have also fallen ill. Their illnesses were caused by 

toxic dust that they inhaled in the days and the weeks after the 

attack. Many of those people are now suffering from respiratory 

problems, reduced lung functions. Many of the firefighters who 

were there can no longer conduct their duties, as has happened 

with other workers as well. Many have died. 

One of those who died from inhaling the toxic dust was Joseph 

Zadroga, a decorated New York City detective from New Jersey. He 

was only 34 years old. Those who worked, lived, or volunteered 
8 

near Ground Zero in the aftermath of the attack had every right 

to expect their Government to provide honest, accurate and complete information about the environmental conditions and health 

consequences in New York City. 

So it is disturbing to me that they were let down by the Administration’s people. After the attack, the EPA downplayed the health 

risks posed by the toxic air and dust the Towers released when 

they collapsed. In 2003, a report by the EPA Inspector General 

found that EPA’s statements misled the public about the safety of 

the air. Misled means that they had knowledge beforehand, and 

the White House rewrote EPA’s press releases to minimize the 

health risks. 

The Administration should have focused on educating the public 

and protecting them from the threats to their health. They certainly would do it if it was a volcano or some other thing that produced toxic materials as a consequence. 

Since 9/11, the EPA has conducted testing and cleaning of apartments and buildings, some apartments and buildings, near the 

World Trade Center. But its approach has been criticized, including 

by an expert panel convened by EPA as insufficient to protect the 

public health, almost 6 years after 9/11. It is outrageous that EPA 

still has not gotten the message clearly. It is infuriating to think 

that people who were doing their duty trying to save others, and 

those who were innocent bystanders are now threatened with illnesses that are debilitating and life-shortening. 

So Madam Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing and 

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses how this program 

should be improved. I am hoping that they will give their fullest 

response. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Madam Chairman, on September 11, 2001, more than 3,000 people lost their lives, 

including 700 residents of New Jersey. 

But as we know now, the damage from the collapse of the World Trade Center 

buildings extended beyond that fateful day. 

Nearly six years later, the health of thousands of first responders, search and rescue workers and volunteers who rushed to Ground Zero—many from New Jersey— 

continues to decline. 

And some nearby residents and office workers have also begun to fall ill. 

Their illnesses were caused by the toxic dust they inhaled in the days and weeks 

after the attack. 

Some of those people are now suffering from respiratory problems and reduced 

lung function. Others have died. 

One of those who died from inhaling the toxic dust was Joseph Zadroga, a decorated New York City detective from New Jersey. He was just 34. 

Those who worked, lived or volunteered near Ground Zero in the aftermath of the 

attack had every right to expect their government to provide accurate and complete 

information about the environmental conditions and health consequences in New 

York City. 

So it’s disturbing to me that the Administration let them down. 

After the attack, the Bush EPA downplayed the health risks posed by the toxic 

air and dust the towers released when they collapsed. 

In 2003, a report by the EPA Inspector General found that EPA statements misled the public about the safety of the air and the White House rewrote EPA’s press 

releases to minimize the health risks. 

The Administration should have focused on educating the public and protecting 

them from threats to their health. 
9 

Since 9/11, the EPA has conducted testing and cleaning on some apartments and 

buildings near the World Trade Center. 

But its approach has been criticized, including by an expert panel convened by 

EPA, as insufficient to protect the public health, almost six years after 9/11. 

It’s outrageous that EPA has still not gotten this right. 

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses about how this program should 

be improved. 

Thank you Madam Chairman. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

The devastation of New York that was suffered on September 

11th was just unprecedented and horrendous. As in all the Presidentially declared disasters, EPA cooperated with its many Federal 

departments to provide coordinated response. This hearing is to examine EPA’s response and future preparedness, and I would say, 

lessons learned. 

Following September 11th, EPA was highly involved conducting 

air, water and dust monitoring in lower Manhattan for environmental hazards. The EPA vacuumed street debris and disposed of 

hazardous waste. The EPA also conducted a voluntary cleanup program from 2002 to 2003 that served more than 4,000 residences in 

lower Manhattan. 

Although the EPA does not ordinarily administer worker protection regulations, it provided respirators, protective gear for workers 

at the World Trade site. The EPA has received some criticism for 

its role following September 11th. The EPA Inspector General released a lengthy report in 2003, alleging many problems with EPA 

responses. I will provide you two brief examples. 

First, the EPA IG alleged that EPA, OSHA and the Council on 

Environmental Quality released misleading information to the public on air monitoring and sampling in press releases. However, in 

the same report, the IG conceded that EPA used many methods to 

inform the public, including public meetings, fact sheets, its web 

site, interviews with newspapers, radio, TV, as well as through 

press releases. The IG concluded in the same report in regard to 

the monitoring data, ‘‘We found no evidence that EPA attempted 

to conceal results from the public.’’ 

Second, although the IG was critical of the EPA’s response, including its response to indoor environmental contamination, the IG 

concluded, ‘‘The EPA’s action to evaluate, mitigate and control risk 

to human health from exposure to indoor air pollutants in the 

World Trade Center area were consistent with applicable statutes 

and regulations.’’ I think quite often you get people who pick and 

choose statements out of reports that give a negative, and I want 

to make sure that we have the full information out here. 

Ultimately, the EPA IG report was incomplete, because the IG 

did not interview other officials in other Federal agencies such as 

OSHA and the CEQ. Following the release of the 2003 EPA IG report, my staff prepared a report, reviewing the IG’s findings and 

interviewed EPA IG personnel, former Acting Administrator Mary 

Ann Orinco, and the CEQ Chairman, Jim Connaughton, and OSHA 
10 

Assistant Administrator John Henshaw. I request that those reports be made a part of the record. During that time, I was the 

Chairman of the committee, so we were very actively involved in 

this. 

I also want to make a comment that normally, I like to get information from people closest to the problem. While the EPA IG was 

critical of EPA’s response, not all officials were critical in their responses to 9/11. Dr. Thomas Frieden, the New York City Commissioner of Public Health, testified at an EPW Clean Air Subcommittee hearing held in New York City in February 2002, ‘‘One 

of the most vivid pictures to emerge is one of unprecedented cooperation between local, State, Federal health environmental and 

occupational agencies, the teamwork is quite extraordinary.’’ That 

was coming from the Commissioner there in New York. 

I hope this hearing does not focus on the conflicting findings of 

a 4-year-old IG report. Instead, I hope this hearing provides legitimate congressional oversight on activities in which the EPA is currently engaged. In January 2007, the EPA opened public registration for a new lower Manhattan testing and cleaning program. This 

program is designed to test for elevated levels of four contaminants 

associated with dust from the collapse of the World Trade Center. 

FEMA has provided $7 million to EPA for this work. I understand 

that members of that expert panel, the CEQ and EPA, convened 

for this purpose and are dissatisfied that a more exacting program 

could not have been developed. 

However, I have an August 2006 letter from the same Commissioner, the New York City Health Commissioner Frieden, stating, 

‘‘The environmental investigation and testing conducted in lower 

Manhattan indicates that potential health impacts from any remaining World Trade Center dust are extremely low or non-existing.’’ I ask unanimous consent that also be made a part of this 

record. 

We have witnesses that I know will shed further light on the 

many issues involving the World Trade Center and its aftermath, 

and I look forward to this committee hearing. I have made two 

unanimous consent requests for inclusions into the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF OKLAHOMA

The devastation New York City suffered on September 11, 2001, was unprecedented and horrendous. As in all Presidentially declared disasters, EPA cooperates 

with many other federal departments to provide a coordinated response. This hearing is to examine EPA’s response and future preparedness and to receive testimony 

on the Test and Clean program EPA is conducting in Lower Manhattan. 

Following September 11th, EPA was highly involved conducting air, water, and 

dust monitoring in Lower Manhattan for environmental hazards. EPA vacuumed 

street debris and disposed of hazardous wastes. EPA also conducted a voluntary 

clean up program from 2002 to 2003 that served more 4,100 residents in Lower 

Manhattan. Although EPA does not ordinarily administer worker protection regulations, it provided respirators and protective gear for workers at the World Trade 

Center site. 

EPA has received criticism for its role following September 11th. The EPA Inspector General released a lengthy report in 2003 alleging many problems with EPA’s 

response. I’ll provide two brief examples. First, the EPA IG report alleged that EPA, 

OSHA, and the Council on Environmental Quality released misleading information 

to the public on air monitoring and sampling in press releases. However, in the 

same report the IG conceded that EPA used many methods to inform the public in-
11 

cluding public meetings, fact sheets, its website, and interviews with newspapers, 

radio, and television, as well as through press releases. The IG concluded in the 

same report, ‘‘In regard to the monitoring data, we found no evidence that EPA attempted to conceal data results from the public.’’ Secondly, although the IG was critical of EPA’s response including its response to indoor environmental contamination, 

the IG concluded, ‘‘EPA’s actions to evaluate, mitigate, and control risks to human 

health from exposure to indoor air pollutants in the World Trade Center area were 

consistent with applicable statutes and regulations.’’ 

Ultimately, the EPA IG report was incomplete because the IG did not interview 

other officials at other federal agencies such as OSHA and CEQ. Following the release of the 2003 EPA IG report, my staff prepared a report reviewing the IG’s findings and interviewing EPA IG personnel, former acting Administrator Marianne 

Horinko, CEQ Chairman Jim Connaughton, and OSHA Assistant Administrator 

John Henshaw. I request that report appear in the hearing record. 

While the EPA IG was critical of EPA’s response, not all officials were critical of 

the response to September 11th. Dr. Thomas Frieden, the New York City Commissioner of Public Health testified at an EPW Clean Air Subcommittee hearing held 

in New York City in February 2002, ‘‘One of the most vivid pictures to emerge is 

one of unprecedented cooperation between local, state, and federal health, environmental, and occupational agencies. The teamwork is quite extraordinary.’’ 

I hope this hearing does not focus on the conflicting findings of a four year old 

IG report. Instead, I hope this hearing provides legitimate Congressional oversight 

on activities in which EPA is currently engaged. 

In January 2007, EPA opened the public registration for a new Lower Manhattan 

Test and Clean Program. This program is designed to test for elevated levels of four 

contaminants associated with dust from the collapse of the World Trade Center. 

FEMA has provided $7 million to EPA for this work. I understand that members 

of the expert panel CEQ and EPA convened for this purpose are dissatisfied that 

a more exacting program could not be developed. However, I have an August 2006, 

letter from New York City Health Commissioner Frieden stating, ‘‘The environmental investigations and testing conducted in lower Manhattan indicates that potential health impacts from any remaining [World Trade Center] dust are extremely 

low or non-existent.’’ I ask consent that this letter appear in the hearing record. 

We have witnesses that I know will shed further light on many of the issues involving the World Trade Center and its aftermath, and I look forward to their testimony. In conclusion, I would also like to point out that Chairman Connaughton has 

volunteered to testify although he is the target of litigation involving the World 

Trade Center. The complaint against him has been dismissed in the district court, 

and the appellate court affirmed that decision. I would request that Senators recognize that there may be questions that Chairman Connaughton may want to answer 

but may choose to decline because it may not be prudent given the litigation. 

I appreciate all the witnesses’participation this morning. 

Senator CLINTON. Without objection. 

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Senator CLINTON. I would now like to introduce our first panel: 

James Connaughton, Chairman, White House Council on Environmental Quality; Susan Bodine, Assistant Administrator, EPA Office 

of Solid Waste and Emergency Response; John Stephenson, Director of Government Accountability Office, Natural Resources and 

Environment Division; and Sven Rodenbeck, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. 

I would just remind our panelists that your written testimony 

will be made a part of the record in full. We ask that you limit your 

spoken testimony to 5 minutes. When the yellow light goes on, that 

means you have 1 minute remaining. When the red light goes on, 

you have passed the 5-minute mark, so please, if you would, wrap 

your testimony up so we will have time for questions. 

Mr. Connaughton, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES L. CONNAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN, 

COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Clinton, 

Ranking Member Craig, nice to see you again, Senator Inhofe, and 

I am sorry Senator Boxer is not here. But I want to acknowledge 

her; I have had a very good working relationship with her since she 

has taken the helm of the committee. 

I welcome the opportunity to testify today to once again go 

through the tragedy of September 11th, which was unprecedented 

in its scope. The physical, the psychological and the social toll of 

that terrible act of terrorism was vast at the time and it continues 

to this day. 

The complexity of the situation facing the local, State and Federal Governments responding to this terrorist attack was immense. 

The work by all was heroic. But I would particularly call out the 

work by the Environmental Protection Agency. I had direct, personal involvement on a day to day, hour by hour and in some cases 

minute by minute, with the folks in the field and the folks here in 

Washington. I saw professionalism at its finest. 

I would note that many of the officials that are being discussed 

and the official actions being discussed at this hearing were undertaken by New Yorkers, Federal Government officials who were 

New Yorkers, Federal Government officials who were from New 

Jersey. Governor Whitman herself was the Governor of New Jersey. Her own son was at the foot of the World Trade Center when 

the first plane hit and called her by cell phone, something I know 

because I was in her office when that call came through. 

My own son that day spent the entire day at school thinking that 

I had been blown up by terrorists. The look on his face when I returned at the end of that long day to find out that I was alive was 

a look that I will never forget. 

So the efforts undertaken by the Government were not just professional, they were also passionate and deeply personal. I think 

that is what this conversation is about. That passion was singularly dedicated to the safety and well-being of the citizens of 

New York, of the rescue workers that came in from all over the 

country to help on that day and the community, the broader community associated and the families associated with those individuals. 
44 

Chairwoman Clinton, I particularly want to call out your leadership on this subject as well as that of Senator Inhofe and Senator 

Lieberman in particular in providing very constructive oversight 

over the last 5 years on this subject, and not just oversight, but 

sound, good advice as we continue to cope with the aftermath of 

the terrorist attacks on New York City. I think you have been very 

thoughtful in the questions you have asked, I think you have been 

diligent in your pursuit of answers and your patience in getting the 

whole story. Most importantly, you have been very practical in 

working together and finding sensible solutions. I am glad that 

that continues. 

Turning first to the wide variety of risk communication issues, 

including those involving air quality, but recognizing that we had 

dozens and dozen of risk communication issues we were dealing 

with, the Environmental Protection Agency did its utmost to communicate the best available information accurately and in a timely 

fashion to meet the needs of lower Manhattan residents, workers 

and businesses. To that end, EPA worked very closely with the 

State of New York, the city of New York, OSHA, and the Council 

on Environmental Quality to ensure the safety, health and wellbeing of the residents of lower Manhattan. 

The Federal Government’s communications in September 2001 

and subsequently were conveyed real-time in very fast-moving circumstances, using a variety of approaches at a variety of levels. In 

all instances, the Federal agencies acted with the best available 

data at the time and updated their communications and actions as 

new information was obtained. 

Many of the allegations that have been raised in the opening 

statements here have been gone over again and again in the last 

several years. But they really culminated in the Senate EPW oversight investigation and then after that, in 2004, these were carefully gone over by the 9/11 Commission, which came to conclusions 

other than those being described in some of the opening statements 

that were made today. 

We all learned a great deal from September 11th, including how 

to improve Federal response and communications efforts. But I 

would note, those improvements happened real-time in response to 

the episode itself. EPA did some amazing work in getting webbased access to resources. We had a level of interaction and coordination in communication that we had not had before. September 

11th itself was an improvement in agency processes. Subsequent to 

that, the agencies have done numerous lessons learned exercises 

and those were ultimately incorporated into their National Approach to Response at EPA. But more broadly, we saw very rapidly 

the establishment of the Homeland Security Council, under Tom 

Ridge, as well as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which has institutionalized within a very short period of 

time those lessons learned. 

With respect to the test and cleanup program, I just want to say 

again, Chairwoman Clinton, that I appreciated the opportunity to 

sit down with you in October 2003 to work out a plan for moving 

forward. I think our staffs worked very well together in quickly developing a workable strategy, identifying appropriate resources and 

using an expert-led process with significant public involvement 
45 

under the supervision and management of seasoned EPA professionals. 

I have not been directly involved in that process since then, but 

EPA has briefed me from time to time on its progress, because I 

wanted to be sure, Madam Chairwoman, that we were keeping 

track in the arrangement that we had reached. I am pleased that 

the top dogs at EPA, Administrator Susan Bodine, accompanied by 

Assistant Administrator, George Gray, are here today, who have 

been very closely associated with that effort. 

As we move forward, Madam Chairwoman and members of the 

committee, I think this inquiry is useful. I think getting the full 

story is helpful and I think we should continue to inform our efforts as we go forward. I hope to never have to employ the processes that we employed on September 11th again on our soil, and 

I think we can all share that view. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Connaughton follows:] 

STATEMENT OF JAMES L. CONNAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL ON

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

Chairwoman Clinton, Ranking Member Craig and Members of the Committee, I 

welcome the opportunity to testify today. The tragedy of September 11th was unprecedented in its scope. The complexity of the situation facing the local, state, and 

Federal governments in responding to this terrorist attack was immense—the work 

by all was heroic. 

Chairwoman Clinton, I appreciate your leadership, as well as that of Senator 

Inhofe and Senator Lieberman, in providing constructive oversight and advice as we 

continue to cope with the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York City on 

September 11, 2001. You have been thoughtful with your questions, diligent in your 

pursuit of answers, and practical in working to find sensible solutions. 

With respect to a wide variety of risk communication issues, including those involving air quality, the Environmental Protection Agency did its utmost to communicate the best available information accurately, and in a timely fashion to meet the 

needs of lower-Manhattan residents, workers, and businesses. To that end, EPA 

worked with the State of New York, the City of New York, OSHA, and the Council 

on Environmental Quality to ensure the safety, health, and wellbeing of the residents of lower-Manhattan. 

The Federal government’s communications in September of 2001 were conveyed 

real-time in fast-moving circumstances, using a variety of approaches, at a variety 

of levels. In all instances, federal agencies acted with the best available data at the 

time, and updated their communications and actions as new information was obtained. 

We all learned a great deal following September 11th, including how to improve 

federal response and communications efforts. EPA completed a lessons learned document for the World Trade Center response in February 2002. EPA has used these 

lessons learned as well as lessons learned from subsequent responses to strengthen 

its organizational structure, to improve its preparedness and response program, and 

to develop its National Approach to Response. EPA will be discussing those changes 

during today’s testimony. These improvements were successfully put to the test in 

the swift and well-coordinated response to the space shuttle Columbia tragedy in 

February 2003. 

With respect to the test and cleanup program, I appreciated the opportunity to 

sit down with you in October 2003 to work out a plan moving forward, building on 

the substantial effort previously undertaken. In a relatively short period of time, our 

staffs were able to quickly develop a workable strategy, identify appropriate resources, and initiate an expert-led process, with significant public involvement, 

under the supervision and management of seasoned EPA officials. 

Although I have not been directly involved since that time, EPA has briefed me 

on its progress. I am pleased that Assistant Administrator Susan Bodine, accompanied by Assistant Administrator George Gray, are here today to discuss their efforts to date. 

Along with EPA’s leadership and expertise, I look forward to continuing to work 

with you, Members of the New York Congressional Delegation, and Members of this 
46 

Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Bodine. 

STATEMENT OF SUSAN PARKER BODINE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY: GEORGE GRAY, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, U.S. 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

Ms. BODINE. Good morning, Madam Chairman, Senator Craig, 

members of the subcommittee. I am Susan Bodine, I am the Assistant Administrator for EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency 

Response. I am accompanied here today by Dr. George Gray, who 

is EPA’s Assistant Administrator for the Office of Research and Development. It was that office that coordinated the test and clean 

program with the city and with Region 2 of EPA. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here to discuss both EPA’s 

National Response Plan and their role in that plan, as well as EPA 

support for the World Trade Center response. 

On September 11th, our country was attacked by terrorists. 

There is a reason that we call them terrorists. They want to destroy our sense of security, they want to damage our economy and 

they want to create fear. On 9/11, their overall mission failed. 

Today, America is stronger than ever. 

But these terrorist acts caused a great deal of pain and suffering. 

There are a lot of individual victims of 9/11: people who were 

trapped in the Twin Towers or in the Pentagon or on Flight 93; 

people who were caught in the initial dust cloud when the Towers 

fell; the rescue workers who put their own lives at risk to help others; and the people who live and work in lower Manhattan. 

I am very proud of our Nation’s response to this attack, and I 

am sure, and I think it has already been discussed, some members 

of this subcommittee went to Ground Zero in New York City in the 

days and weeks after the attack as part of your oversight responsibility. The scene there was very impressive and very emotional. 

What you saw was everybody working together to do their utmost 

both to help our Nation recover from the attack and to help the victims. 

The Federal agencies that responded to the World Trade Center 

disaster did an incredible job working together under our National 

Response Plan. It was called the Federal Response Plan, they 

changed the name. That was the overall framework for coordinating activities. As you know, the Federal Government’s emergency authorities under the Stafford Act are activated when a Governor requests the President to declare a major Federal disaster; 

and then further, if, at the time FEMA, now Secretary for Homeland Security, determines that the State and local resources are 

going to be so overwhelmed that it is an incident of national significance, then we can also trigger the structure of the National Response Plan to provide assistance. The Federal assistance is divided into 15 separate emergency support functions. Agencies have 

leads under emergency support functions as well as support roles. 
47 

Now, EPA is the coordinator and primary agency under Emergency Support Function 10, which is oil and hazardous substance 

materials response. On 9/11, that was the structure we were working under. FEMA activated Emergency Support Function 10, and 

EPA received its first mission assignment on 9/11. EPA responded 

immediately. Our Region 2 headquarters is located in lower Manhattan. We have one of our special teams, the Environmental Response Team, located in Edison, NJ. With these assets in place, we 

were there. EPA personnel were there on the very first day and on 

the first day, they were already collecting air monitoring data for 

asbestos, lead and volatile organic compounds. 

As each day passed, we expanded our sampling programs and 

monitoring programs and ultimately took tens of thousands of samples and over a quarter of a million data points based on those 

samples. At that time, it was the most complex effort in the history 

of the Agency. At every step of the way, we were working not only 

with other Federal agencies, but we were coordinating also with 

top scientific and medical experts, again, from all levels of Government and from the academic world. We pulled together teams of 

experts to establish benchmarks. We found ways of getting test results quickly. We found ways of getting them up on our Web site 

quickly and available to the public, so everyone could see the data. 

In 2002, EPA also provided oversight and sampling for an indoor 

cleanup program that is going to be discussed today. Then in December 2006, EPA announced the availability of further testing 

and cleaning in lower Manhattan. Again, I know that that will be 

the topic of discussion today. 

In my last few seconds, I want to summarize why I am saying 

America is stronger than ever. We have talked about lessons 

learned. We can always improve. EPA now is even more prepared 

to respond. In 2003, we introduced our National Approach to Response that takes the view that it is the entire Agency that needs 

to work together cohesively to respond to an emergency. That 

means we embrace the National Incident Management System, 

which is part of the National Response Plan. That means we have 

trained our people under an Incident Command System, which 

again is part of the National Response Plan, so everybody knows 

what they are supposed to do when an emergency happens. 

We have added additional on-scene coordinators. We have created a West Coast Environmental Response Team like the one in 

Edison that responded. We have created a National Decontamination Team. We have increased our response capacity by training 

over 2,000 people in incident command as well as creating a Response Support Corps. We have done a number of additional things 

I don’t have time to go into. In the written testimony, there is more 

detail. 

I just want to make sure that you know that EPA today is better 

prepared to respond to any emergency. We stand ready to support 

State and local governments when the next emergency happens. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bodine follows:] 

STATEMENT OF SUSAN PARKER BODINE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SOLID

WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Good morning, Madam Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I am Susan 

Bodine, Assistant Administrator of the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Re-
48 

sponse, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). I am accompanied today by 

George Gray, Assistant Administrator of EPA’s Office of Research and Development. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss EPA’s role under the National Response 

Plan (NRP) and Agency efforts associated with the World Trade Center response. 

EPA’S NATIONAL RESPONSE ROLE

As with other federal agencies, EPA’s response pursuant to a disaster declared by 

the President is facilitated through the NRP. The NRP facilitates federal support 

to State and local governments. Under the NRP, EPA is the Coordinator and Primary Agency for Emergency Support Function (ESE) #10—Oil and Hazardous Materials Response. EPA is one of many agencies that may be activated to provide coordinated federal support during an incident, and like the other responding agencies, EPA receives mission assignments from the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) to carry out activities in support of state and local governments. 

Our primary activities under ESF #10 include: efforts to detect, identify, contain, 

clean up or dispose of oil or hazardous materials; removal of drums and other bulk 

containers; collection of household hazardous waste; monitoring of debris disposal; 

air and water quality monitoring and sampling; and protection of natural resources. 

EPA is also a support agency for a number of other Emergency Support Functions. 

EPA RESPONSE AT WORLD TRADE CENTER

EPA played a key role in the nation’s response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist 

attacks on the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan. We activated our emergency response personnel alter the first plane hit the North Tower. Before we knew 

the tragic consequences of the attack, EPA’s responders, most of whom were located 

in our offices in Edison, New Jersey, headed to the site. After the collapse of the 

World Trade Center Towers, EPA began environmental monitoring of the resulting 

dust and debris. EPA responded pursuant to its first mission assignment under ESF 

#10 on September 11, 2001. EPA tested the air in the areas surrounding the World 

Trade Center site, including Brooklyn and Jersey City, New Jersey. On the first 

day, we tested for asbestos, lead and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). 

As each day passed, EPA expanded its sampling program and ultimately the 

Agency took tens of thousands of samples of air, dust and water, which yielded close 

to a quarter of a million results. Levels of pollutants were sometimes elevated, particularly on the debris pile, but for the most part levels of contaminants in the ambient air outside of the immediate vicinity of the pile were not at elevated levels. 

The information that EPA was giving to the public through daily interactions with 

the media was that workers should wear protective equipment and any person who 

experienced health effects should see a doctor. We shared data with reporters every 

day. As soon as we were able, we put our data on our Web site and made it available to the public from our offices in Lower Manhattan. 

EPA also sampled drinking water from water mains in Lower Manhattan. In addition, the Agency sampled water from the Hudson and East Rivers and wastewater 

from a treatment plant in Brooklyn after several rainfalls to check for pollutants 

emanating from the World Trade Center site. While EPA detected one instance of 

slightly elevated PCBs in rainwater runoff at the wastewater treatment plant, ambient surface water sampling results did not indicate human health or ecological concerns. 

EPA worked closely with the city to remove as much of the dust from public 

spaces as we could, including streets and parks. EPA even replaced sand in 

sandboxes. The City augmented our efforts by washing down streets, sidewalks and 

building exteriors. We also established worker and truck wash stations in both 

Lower Manhattan and on Staten Island to prevent dust from migrating from the 

recovery site. 

When the initial phase of recovery efforts drew to an end, EPA through its Interagency Agreements with FEMA, responded to the ongoing concerns of Lower Manhattan residents with a residential indoor dust cleanup program. We consulted with 

city, state and other federal health and environmental officials to find a way to offer 

free cleaning and testing to all residents in Lower Manhattan. In developing our 

program, EPA met extensively with resident and tenant organizations, environmental and community groups, community boards and many city, state, and federal 

elected officials to refine the clean and test program. The program was launched in 

June 2002, with cleaning and testing activities continuing through the following 

spring. In the end, more than 4,000 residences were either tested or cleaned. Of the 

approximately 29,000 residential air samples taken, about 0.4 percent exceeded 

health-based benchmarks for asbestos. The program was completed in the summer 

of 2003. 
49 

EPA TEST AND CLEAN PROGRAM

On December 6, 2006, EPA announced the beginning of a $7-million, FEMA-funded program to further test indoor spaces in Lower Manhattan. Under this program, 

EPA has offered to test indoor spaces in Lower Manhattan in order to give information to people who have remaining concerns about possible contaminants in their 

indoor spaces. One challenge with such a program is that most of the contaminants 

that are associated with the World Trade Center dust are also found in every urban 

environment. EPA scientists did research to see if there is a reliable method to identify dust as being from the World Trade Center. Ultimately, after extensive peer review, EPA concluded that there is not a reliable method to definitively identify 

World Trade Center dust and distinguish it from other sources of such dust. In addition, the vast majority of occupied residential and commercial spaces in Lower Manhattan have been repeatedly cleaned in the more than 5 years since the terrorist 

attacks. However, we wanted to give people another opportunity to find out about 

possible contamination in their homes. 

The program allows residents and building owners in Lower Manhattan to have 

the air and dust in their units tested for four contaminants associated with dust 

from the collapse of the World Trade Center. Priority for testing is based on a property’s proximity to the World Trade Center site. If analysis of dust and air samples 

indicates elevated levels of any of four contaminants of concern—asbestos, lead, 

polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and man-made vitreous fibers such as fiberglass— 

the contaminants will be cleaned up. The registration period for this program closed 

on March 31, 2007. Twenty five building representatives and 272 individual residents registered for the program. Testing of interior spaces is expected to begin later 

this year for all registrants who have sent access agreements to EPA. 

CHANGING THE ORGANIZATION TO MEET GROWING NEEDS OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Agency has made broad, national improvements to its emergency response program. EPA took several steps to reorganize around its new emergency response and homeland security functions, including 

the creation of an Office of Homeland Security and the establishment of a new position of Associate Administrator for Homeland Security. Additionally, we have reorganized OSWER’s emergency response functions under a single office—the Office of 

Emergency Management, which focuses on emergency planning, preparedness and 

response. This new organization allows us to concentrate our efforts and our resources to meet the national requirements identified by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as our internal planning, preparedness, and response 

goals. 

We increased our specialized dedicated emergency response staff to improve our 

preparedness and response capabilities. The Agency hired 50 additional On-Scene 

Coordinators specifically trained to deal with Incidents of National Significance 

(INS) and issues relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction. We expanded and extended the capabilities of our existing Environmental Response Team (ERT) responsible for technological support and training through the establishment of an additional ERT office in Las Vegas, NV. We established a National Decontamination 

Team dedicated to providing decontamination expertise related to biological, chemical, and radiological agents used as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 

The National Decontamination Team is the first of its kind and provides general 

scientific support and technical expertise for identifying technologies and methods 

for decontamination of buildings, building contents, public infrastructure (including 

waste/drinking water plants, chemical plants, power plants, food processing facilities 

and subways), agriculture, and associated environmental media (air, soil and water). 

This special team is honing its expertise, building relationships with other agencies, 

and providing training to EPA responders. Most importantly, it is developing a Decontamination Portfolio which will include comprehensive analytical, sampling, and 

decontamination methods, as well as health and safety information for chemical, biological and radiochemical agents. 

EPA’s newly renovated Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is EPA’s hub for 

emergency management communication and coordination. The EOC is capable of 24/ 

7 operations and has its own independent computer center, backup power source 

and dedicated HVAC, and has a secure access facility. 

Staff in the EOC provide situational awareness to EPA management during emergency responses and are the central link with regional and field response assets. 

The EOC is linked to many other federal operations centers including the FEMA 

National Response Coordination Center, DHS’s Homeland Security Operations Center and the U.S. Coast Guard Command Center. 
50 

Emergency response and associated homeland security issues remain among 

EPA’s top priorities. EPA has drafted a Homeland Security Work Plan to provide 

a framework for advancing the Agency to our next level of preparedness. 

EPA’S NATIONAL APPROACH TO RESPONSE TARGETED IMPROVEMENTS

In addition to strengthening our organizational structure, EPA strengthened its 

policy as well. EPA’s National Approach to Response (NAR) was established in June 

2003 to complement the government-wide NRP and National Incident Management 

System (NIMS). This policy ensures efficient use of emergency response assets within the Agency, creates the necessary consistency across the regions, and highlights 

priorities for further policy development and coordination. An important facet of the 

NAR is the recognition that an effective response requires participation from the entire Agency, not just those offices traditionally responsible for emergency response 

activities. This approach initially grew out of the lessons learned during the response to the September 11th attacks, and experience (e.g. anthrax, Columbia Space 

Shuttle, Hurricane Katrina) continues to inform its direction. 

The NAR has had a positive and tangible impact on EPA’s ability to respond to 

an INS. In fact, as a result of these efforts, EPA responded more effectively to Hurricane Katrina, one of the largest coordinated response efforts in history. Today, I 

will highlight some of the actions we have taken under the NAR to improve our 

processes, procedures and capabilities during an INS. 

EPA has made a major effort to train responders at all levels in the Incident Management System, as required under NIMS. To date, EPA has trained approximately 

2000 staff in the Incident Command System (ICS) and has expanded the training 

program to include EPA executive leadership, and non-emergency response volunteers from across the Agency. As a result of this training, ICS is used in EPA’s dayto-day response operations and was successfully used in the response to Hurricane 

Katrina. 

EPA’s resource of voluntary support personnel proved to be invaluable during our 

response to Hurricane Katrina when we needed to fill support roles at every level 

of the response on a 24/7 basis. Since the Katrina Response, EPA has made improvements to this important program. The Response Support Corps is finalizing 

national guidelines to facilitate consistency in its recruitment, training, and activation. The new basic training Program is designed to ensure that all volunteers understand ICS structure and the expectations of a response. In addition, a national 

database has been developed to track the skills, experience and training of all volunteers. 

EPA ensured communication with the public was one of its top priorities under 

the NAR. After the September 11th response, the Agency created a Crisis Communications Workgroup with the continuing goal of providing timely, accurate and consistent information to the public at the time of a response. The Workgroup is designing several new products including a training program specific to the public information role, which is an important aspect of the ICS structure. 

Incident and Data Management 

EPA implemented a new information technology strategy to manage data more efficiently and consistently during a response event. This strategy was developed during the response to Hurricane Katrina, as part of an overall process to expedite the 

review and public posting of the results of over 400,000 laboratory analyses. EPA 

adapted and integrated existing Agency technology to provide interfaces that allowed the electronic flow of data from the field to the public. Data was posted 

promptly on the Internet for all media analyzed (floodwater, sediments, soil, surface 

water, air). This integrated approach is now serving as the prototype for the Emergency Management Portal currently under development to address day-to-day responses, as well as other potential INS. 

Field Communications 

On September 11, 2001, the ability of all agencies to respond was seriously impacted following the collapse of the World Trade Center towers as cell phones and 

Internet connections were damaged. Under our telecommunication priority 

workgroup, EPA developed standards for quality, quantity and type of communications equipment that should be available to responders in each Region. Over the last 

three years, EPA purchased, evaluated and installed complex technology to create 

a national communications network for EPA responders. Through this national approach, EPA has amassed a pool of equipment that can be used daily in each region 

and shared quickly among regions during a disaster. This strategy paid off during 

the Katrina response when satellite dishes, radios and other communication equipment were sent from every region to assist Regions 4 and 6. As a result, EPA had 
51 

data (Internet) and voice communications in areas that were otherwise disconnected 

for many months. 

Environmental Lab Capacity 

EPA recognizes that our responsibilities under homeland security require us to increase our capacity to analyze and process a large number of field samples for contaminants directly related to terrorist threats based on needs identified after the 9/ 

11 and Capitol Hill anthrax incidents. EPA created a compendium of labs with various pre-identified capabilities that can be accessed as needed during a large scale 

event, and is establishing an Environmental Laboratory Response Network (eLRN) 

of labs capable of handling chemical, biological, and radiological agents. EPA, in 

conjunction with Department of Defense and DHS, developed two prototype triage 

facilities to handle unknown samples in order to protect laboratory staffs health and 

safety and laboratory assets. We are also working with DHS to expand chemical 

warfare agent lab capabilities in fixed laboratories and to design high capacity mobile units. 

CONTRIBUTING TO FEDERAL HOMELAND AND SECURITY EFFORTS

EPA has a long history in emergency preparedness, planning and response. This 

experience allowed us to play a strong role in the development of the NRP and 

NIMS. EPA continues to learn from its experiences and is working with DHS to incorporate changes as the NRP is being revised. 

CLOSING

I am pleased to have had the opportunity to tell you about some of the critical 

steps EPA has taken to meet the needs of the public and the nation in its continued 

response to the September 11th attacks, and in preparation for another major incident. While the EPA requests only one part of the larger efforts occurring at the 

Federal, State and local levels, we take our role very seriously. We can never know 

the exact nature or location of the next incident. The extraordinary efforts of our 

response staff on a daily basis, combined with EPA’s NAR, allows me to say that 

EPA stands ready to respond wherever and whenever it is needed. 

RESPONSE BY SUSAN BODINE TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question. EPA has consistently maintained that there were no elevated levels of 

contaminants largely in the immediate vicinity of the World Trade Center. For the 

hearing record, please describe the steps EPA took with other agencies involved immediately after September 11 to determine the levels of contaminants and EPA’s 

actions to protect residents. 

Response. Extent of Contamination.—The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) and many other agencies collected and analyzed environmental samples after 

the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC). EPA has posted 

much of its monitoring data on its Website at http://www.epa.gov/wtc/monitoring/ 

index.html. 

EPA has also made all of its data available to the public through the National 

Institute of Environmental Health Sciences and Columbia University at http:// 

wtc.hs.columbia.edu/wtc/Default.aspx. 

The EPA sampling data and the data from many other federal and state agencies 

are also available on a CD at http://oaspub.epa.gov/nyr/ced. 

Remote monitoring data was collected and analyzed by the United States Geological Survey (USGS, 2001), the Aerospace Corporation (2002), and EPA’s Environmental Photographic and Interpretation Center (US EPA, December 2005). The New 

York City Department of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP) conducted a building-by-building survey of the lower Manhattan buildings to determine the extent of 

external contamination. The plumes resulting from the collapse of the towers and 

subsequent fires were modeled by EPA (Gilliam, et al., 2005, Huber, et al., 2004). 

It is clear from this data that the plumes from the collapse of the WTC and subsequent fires impacted much of the New York City (NYC) metro area. The most heavily impacted area is approximately bounded on the north by Chambers Street and 

the Brooklyn Bridge approaches. This area is entirely contained within the area 

that was the subject of EPA Region 2’s 2002–2003 Indoor Air Residential Assistance 

Program. 

Impacts on the Indoor Environment.—Shortly after the 9/11 attack, concerns were 

raised about the impact of the attack on the indoor environment. The Ground Zero 

Task Force commissioned a survey of two residential buildings (Chatfield & 

Kominsky, 2001). The buildings sampled were 45 Warren Street, four blocks north 
52 

of Ground Zero (undamaged); and 250 South End Avenue, close to Ground Zero, to 

the southwest of the WTC (damaged). The Warren Street building was considered 

to have been exposed to lower concentrations of dust than that at South End Avenue. The purpose of the survey was to assess the levels of polychlorinated biphenyls 

(PCBs), dioxins, furans, metals, and asbestos inside the buildings. Sampling was 

conducted on September 18, 2001 The report concluded that concentrations of PCBs, 

dioxins, furans, and metals (excluding calcium) were generally low or below comparative background levels at both locations. Concentrations of asbestos found in 

dust samples and in the air inside the apartments were significantly elevated, and 

all of the indoor samples collected in the South End Avenue building exceeded ∼0.05 

S/cc PCMe (structures per cubic centimeter phase contrast microscopy equivalents). 

From November 4 through December 11, 2001, the New York City Department 

of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYCDOHMH) and the Agency for Toxic Substances 

and Disease Registry (ATSDR) collected environmental samples in and around 30 

residential buildings in lower Manhattan, and comparison samples in four buildings 

above 59th Street (NYCDOHMH/ATSDR, 2002). The samples collected were analyzed for asbestos, synthetic vitreous fibers, mineral components of concrete (crystalline silica, calcite, and portlandite), and mineral components of building wallboard (gypsum, mica, and halite). Their 2002 report concluded that higher levels of 

asbestos, synthetic vitreous fibers (e.g., fiberglass), mineral components of concrete, 

and mineral components of building wallboard were found in settled surface dust 

in lower Manhattan residential areas when compared with comparison residential 

areas above 59th Street. NYCDOHMH and ATSDR recommended: 

(1) Frequent cleaning with HEPA vacuums and damp cloths/mops to reduce the 

potential for exposure; 

(2) Additional monitoring of residential areas in lower Manhattan; 

(3) An investigation to better define background levels specific to New York City 

for asbestos, synthetic vitreous fibers, mineral components of concrete, and mineral 

components of building wallboard; and 

(4) Residents in lower Manhattan who were concerned about potential WTC-related dust in their residences participate in EPA Region 2’s Indoor Air Residential 

Assistance Program. 

In February 2002, a multi-agency task force headed by EPA was formed to evaluate indoor environments for the presence of contaminants that might pose long-term 

health risks to residents. As part of this evaluation, a task force subcommittee was 

established (COPC Committee) to identify contaminants of potential concern that 

were likely to be associated with the WTC disaster and to establish health-based 

benchmarks for those contaminants during the planned (2002–2003) Assistance Program in lower Manhattan. A systematic risk-based approach was used to select 

COPC. The goal was to identify those contaminants likely to be present within indoor environments at levels of health concern. The following chemicals were identified as COPC: dioxins, PAHs, lead, asbestos, fibrous glass, and crystalline silica. 

Risk-based benchmarks were developed to be protective of long-term habitability 

of residential dwellings and were submitted for peer review (US EPA, 2003a). EPA 

also conducted a cleaning study to evaluate the performance of the cleaning methods 

recommended in the NYCDOHMH and ATSDR report to ensure that the healthbased benchmarks could be achieved by using them (US EPA, 2003c). EPA concluded the following: 

(1) Observation of apparently WTC dust at that time was a good indicator that 

WTC contaminants were present, and the amount of such dust correlated with the 

level of contamination; 

(2) Concentrations of some contaminants in the WTC dust were elevated above 

health-based benchmarks; 

(3) Use of a standard cleaning method of vacuuming and wet wiping significantly 

reduced levels of WTC-related contamination with each cleaning event and was successful in reducing concentrations to levels below health-based benchmarks (in some 

cases, 2 or 3 cleanings were necessary); 

(4) Asbestos in air is a good indicator of whether additional cleaning is needed; 

and 

(5) Standard HVAC cleaning methods reduced the concentrations of WTC contaminants in HVAC systems. 

Concurrently, EPA also conducted a ‘‘Background Study’’ to determine levels of selected contaminants in fourteen residential buildings (north of 77th Street in Manhattan) not directly impacted by the airborne dust plume that emanated from the 

WTC site (US EPA, 2003b). EPA sampled 25 residential units and nine common 

areas within the 14 buildings. The contaminants studied included: asbestos, lead, 

dioxins, PAHs, fibrous glass, crystalline silica, calcite, gypsum, and portlandite. The 

data collected from this study provided estimates of background concentrations for 
53 

compounds that were identified as COPC related to the WTC collapse. The estimates were shown to be consistent with other background studies and historical 

data, where such comparison data were available. 

Beginning in 2002, residents of lower Manhattan, who lived below Canal Street 

were provided a choice of services. Residents could choose to have their residence 

professionally cleaned, followed by confirmatory testing, or they could choose to just 

have their homes tested. Owners and managers of residential buildings and boards 

of cooperatives and condominiums could also have their building’s common areas 

cleaned and tested and the HVAC system evaluated and cleaned, as necessary. The 

common areas cleaned and tested included areas such as the building lobby, hallways, stairways, and elevator interiors. Certain other common areas, including 

laundry rooms, utility rooms, compactor rooms and elevator shafts, were tested and 

cleaned as needed. 

Between September 2002 and May 2003, residences were cleaned using standard 

asbestos cleanup methods: using HEPA-filtered vacuums and wet wiping all horizontal hard surfaces (i.e., floors, ceilings, ledges, trims, furnishings, appliances, 

equipment, etc.). Vertical and soft surfaces were HEPA vacuumed two times. Depending upon the size of the residence, from three to five air samples were collected 

and analyzed for asbestos by using transmission electron microscopy (TEM) and 

phase contrast microscopy (PCM). A total of 4,167 apartments in 454 buildings and 

793 common areas in 144 buildings were sampled for asbestos in air. A total of 

28,702 valid sample results were analyzed; 22,497 from residential units, and 6,205 

from common areas within residential buildings (e.g., hallways, laundry rooms). In 

a subset of the residences, pre and post-cleanup dust wipe samples were collected 

(e.g., from floors, walls, and furniture) and analyzed for dioxin, mercury, lead, and 

21 other metals. 

Of the total of 28,702 valid residential asbestos in air results generated, the number of samples that exceeded the health-based benchmarks for airborne asbestos 

was very small, 0.47% for the clean and test residences and 0.5% for the test only 

residences. In those residences and common spaces where the benchmark was exceeded in both residences and in common spaces, the cleanup program was successful in achieving the health-based benchmark for asbestos after the first cleaning approximately 99% of the time. An analysis of the location of asbestos exceedances 

does not demonstrate a spatial pattern of exceedances relative to WTC proximity. 

Apparent groups of asbestos exceedances could be explained by the location in the 

sampled buildings and the variability in the number of samples that were collected 

from each building. When we compared the frequency of detection from samples collected from clean and test and test only residences with the frequency of detection 

for samples collected in the background study, we found that they were similar. 

There was a detection rate of 2% in lower Manhattan (2.2% clean and test and 

1.94% for test only) and 5% in upper Manhattan. The minimum concentrations from 

both areas were identical, while the maximum detected concentration in lower Manhattan was higher than the maximum detected concentration in upper Manhattan. 

Although the maximum detected concentrations were not similar between the two 

areas, the percentage of samples that exceeded the health-based criteria was similar, with 0.5% (of all asbestos samples) in lower Manhattan and 0.0% (no 

exceedances) in upper Manhattan. The mean values appear to be indistinguishable 

from background values. 

Wipe samples were collected from 263 apartments in 156 buildings. Aproximately 

14% of the pre-cleanup samples exceeded the 25 μg/ft2 U.S. Department of Housing 

and Urban Development (HUD) screening level for lead. There were very few 

exceedances of the health-based screening values measured for any of the other 22 

metals. The 627 μg/m2 screening value for antimony was exceeded in two pre-cleanup samples (0.1% of all samples); the maximum measured value was 1,180 μg/m2. 

The 157 μg/m2 screening value for mercury was exceeded in five pre-cleanup samples (0.4% of all samples). The health-based benchmark for residential dust dioxin 

loading of 2 μg/m2 was exceeded in four pre-cleanup samples (0.26% of all samples). 

The percentage of apartments that exceeded the lead health-based benchmark was 

greater than the percentages of apartments that had exceedances for other metals, 

mercury and dioxin. The frequency of detection, the maximum detected concentration, and the percentage of samples that exceeded the risk-based criteria were higher in the dust cleanup program in lower Manhattan when compared with the results 

from the background study in upper Manhattan for both test and clean and test 

only residences. The clearest relationship found was between lead concentrations 

and age of building, suggesting lead paint as a cause for high lead measurements 

in lower Manhattan. Proximity to the WTC and floor of the building seemed to be, 

at best, weakly related to measured levels of lead. The level in lower Manhattan 

was consistent, however, with data from the HUD on mixed age housing stock in 
54 

the northeast United States. This factor makes it difficult to distinguish between 

lead from WTC dust and other sources, especially in older buildings. 

EPA Interpretation of Data.—With the exception of heavily impacted buildings 

which remain uncleaned, such as the former Deutsche Bank building at 130 Liberty 

Street, the level of contamination measured in indoor environments in the area 

most heavily impacted by the plume is low. No pattern that could be related to the 

WTC collapse was detectable in this area of lower Manhattan. It appears that cleaning efforts by residents, building owners and operators, EPA, and NYC, where applied, have been successful in reducing levels of contamination. The COPC asbestos, 

man made vitreous fibers (MMVF), and lead, are common materials in the urban 

environment. Silicates form 59% of the earth’s crust. PAHs and dioxins are produced by many combustion sources, including automobiles and the 28,000 structural 

fires that occur in NYC each year. We estimate that there are over 170 million 

square feet of interior space in lower Manhattan. There may be areas within this 

space that have not been cleaned of WTC dust. The lack of a specific indicator for 

WTC dust, the nature of the contaminants, the widespread, low-level, background 

contamination from other urban sources, and the large and varied nature of the 

space involved make a sampling effort to identify additional areas whose cleanup 

would result in a reduction in exposure to WTC contaminants infeasible. 

EPA has identified a small number of buildings that were not cleaned and are 

currently unoccupied. All of these buildings are scheduled for demolition or reconstruction. EPA and a number of federal, state, and local agencies are cooperating 

to ensure that this work is carried out in a manner that will not adversely impact 

public health and the environment. 

RESPONSES BY SUSAN BODINE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CLINTON

Question 1. EPA press releases announcing the latest test and clean program 

state that any residual health risk is minimal. Yet we know that people are getting 

sick. Just this month, a study published by researchers from the New York State 

Department of Health, the NYU School of Medicine, and SUNY at Albany concluded 

that residents who were exposed to contamination generated by the collapse that 

had been deposited in their homes had a significantly elevated rate of persistent airway disease. This study also found a strong correlation between reactive airway disease and exposures to indoor contamination for a period of 3 months or longer. 

These findings, and others like them, suggest that EPA’s testing and risk assessments, which are based on data from 2001 and 2002, are lacking. Has EPA evaluated this and similar studies in order to inform and revise its post 9/11 risk assessment? 

Response. EPA has and continues to evaluate studies (particularly those that appear in peer-reviewed journals) on health effects and contaminant characterization 

resulting from the WTC disaster to inform its ongoing response actions. For example, the draft risk assessment which evaluates exposures and potential health risks 

from outdoor, ambient air developed by EPA’s Office of Research and Development, 

has included evaluations and summaries of epidemiological studies on health effects 

attributed to exposure to World Trade Center-associated contaminants. This risk assessment, titled ‘‘Assessment of Inhalation Exposures and Potential Health Risks to 

the General Population that Resulted from the Collapse of the World Trade Center 

Towers’’ has been submitted as a manuscript for publication in the open literature. 

For more information on the status of that risk assessment, see response to question 

#10 below. 

The particular study referenced in Question 1 (Upper Respiratory Symptoms and 

Other Health Effects among Residents Living Near the World Trade Center after 

September 11, 2001.—Am J Epidem (162) P. 499–507, 2005) focused on the indoor 

(residential) environment and assessed new onset and persisting upper respiratory 

symptoms during approximately the first 12 months post 9/11. One of the strengths 

of this study is that it attempted to recruit a large sample of residents in the vicinity of the WTC; however, like many epidemiologic studies, response rate was poor 

as was dose reconstruction for individuals in the study. Of particular concern is the 

lack of information reported in the study as to whether any of the subjects in the 

affected area were caught in the dust plume on the morning on 9/11/O1 . Acute, 

high intensity exposure of this type would likely be a strong contributing factor to 

new-onset upper respiratory symptoms directly after 9/11. 

In announcing its latest Test and Clean Program, the notation by EPA that residual health risk is minimal was based on information from sampling conducted by 

EPA and others (see above response to question from Senator Inhofe). Most compelling was the information obtained from EPA’s 2002/2003 Indoor Air Residential As-
55 

sistance Program that serviced over 4,000 residential apartments. The residential 

samples obtained from this program were generally obtained beyond one year after 

the event and were evaluated against health-based benchmarks that were developed 

to be protective of long-term exposure for contaminants such as asbestos that pose 

chronic health effects. Data show that about 1% of the residences that were either 

tested (1.15%) or cleaned and then tested (1.03%) exceeded EPA’s benchmark for asbestos in air. 

The collapse of the World Trade Center Towers resulted in impacts to both the 

outdoor and indoor environments. These environmental impacts have resulted in 

measured health impacts to both WTC site workers and, to a lesser extent, the general population residing and working in the vicinity of Ground Zero. EPA has considered this information in its risk assessments and in its current Test and Clean 

Program. 

As noted in our response to Senator Inhofe’s question, EPA implemented the program to address the recommendations outlined in the ATSDR and NYCDOH assessment. 

Question 2. Just this month, a study published by researchers from the New York 

State Department of Health, the NYU School of Medicine, and SUNY at Albany concluded that residents who were exposed to contamination generated by the collapse 

that had been deposited in their homes had a significantly elevated rate of persistent airway disease. This study also found a strong correlation between reactive 

airway disease and exposures to indoor contamination for a period of 3 months or 

longer. 

What this study indicates is that exposure to WTC dust in residential settings 

caused negative health impacts after as little as 3 months of exposure. Is EPA now 

prepared to respond within this kind of time frame to assess and remediate indoor 

contamination caused by a building collapse or other environmental disaster? 

Response. The scope and long-term timing of federal agency response, including 

EPA’s response, will necessarily depend, in part, on the nature of the incident. After 

the events of September 11, New York City was initially responsible for residential 

and indoor air issues following the events of September 11. From the beginning, the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), New York City and State, as well 

as EPA, provided advice to residents on cleanup methods (wet wiping/mopping, 

HEPA vacuuming) that proved effective. In addition, for residences with more than 

minimal dust, EPA urged using professional asbestos abatement cleaners. 

Since that time EPA has made significant progress in preparedness efforts to assess and remediate indoor contamination caused by a building collapse or other environmental disaster. EPA’s National Homeland Security Research Center is engaged in an effort for the development of subchronic health-based exposure advisory 

levels for the general public called Provisional Advisory Levels (PALs). PALs address exposure durations of one day, 30 days, and two years for chemical contaminants detected in air or drinking water. To date, EPA has developed PALs for over 

20 chemicals (which equates to over 360 separate values: three exposure durations, 

for three levels of severity and for two environmental media). In addition, EPA is 

also continuing an effort with the National Research Council’s Committee on Toxicology in the development of Acute Exposure Guidance Levels (AEGLs). They are 

emergency response standards applicable to the general public . They are developed 

for three levels of severity and for the durations of ten minute, 30 minute, one hour, 

four hour and eight hour exposures. PALs are being developed to provide benchmarks to bridge the gap between the acute exposure durations covered by the 

AEGLs and the chronic lifetime exposures covered by inhalation RfCs (Reference 

Concentrations) and oral RfDs (Reference Doses). 

EPA also developed a method to assess risk from exposures to contaminated 

building surfaces. This guidance will be incorporated into an upcoming revision of 

the Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund, Part E, Dermal Risk Assessment, 

which is expected to be released later in 2007. 

Question 3. In February of 2006, Whitehouse Homeland Security Advisor Fran 

Townsend issued a report about the Administration’s response to Katrina. That report concluded the following: 

‘‘Federal officials could have improved the identification of environmental hazards 

and communication of appropriate warnings to emergency responders and the public 

. . . there must be a comprehensive plan to accurately and quickly communicate 

this critical information to the emergency responders and area residents who need 

it. Had such a plan existed, the mixed messages from Federal, State, and local officials on the reentry into New Orleans could have been avoided.’’ 

The report went on to make the following recommendation: ‘‘DHS, in coordination 

with EPA, HHS, OSHA, and DOE should develop an integrated plan to quickly 
56 

gather environmental data and provide the public and emergency responders the 

most accurate information available to decide whether it is safe to operate in a disaster environment or return after evacuation. This plan should address how to best 

communicate risk, as well as determine who is accountable for making the determination that an area is safe. It should also address the need for adequate laboratory capacity to support response to all hazards. The plan should be completed in 

180 days.’’ 

At the hearing I asked a question about whether this work had been completed, 

and EPA responded that: 

‘‘The agency has been working on a crisis communication plan. It is still in draft, 

it is still under review within the agency.’’ 

Please provide a copy of that draft communication plan, as well the timeline for 

completion. In addition, please provide whether EPA is implementing the other recommendations made in the February 2006 White House report on the Katrina response. 

Response. The Townsend Report recommendation you reference recommended 

that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) develop a plan in consultation 

with other federal agencies. DHS is in the best position to report on its progress 

in developing this plan. EPA’s Crisis Communication Plan, (a copy is enclosed with 

this response) outlines responsibilities and procedures to help ensure the public receives accurate, timely, EPA information during a crisis. The plan summarizes 

EPA’s public information roles at the field, regional and national levels during incidents of national significance; provides guidelines for developing and distributing information to the public, in coordination with partner agencies; and outlines the 

Agency’s training requirements for public information staff. EPA considers this a 

living document and expects to update and revise the document periodically. Work 

is also underway to develop a companion resources guide for the implementation of 

the plan. This guide will include message maps, fact sheets, templates for communication of sampling data, job aides and other tools to assist the public information 

staff during a response. The Incident Command System training course for EPA 

Public Information Officers has already been revised to conform with the information in the Crisis Communications Plan. 

An important aspect of communicating risk is the coordination between the Public 

Information Officer staff and the Environmental Unit staff to assure that environmental data is communicated in an appropriate context in plain language. In response to Katrina, a policy was established to include an Environmental Unit in 

EPA Headquarters that will work with public information staff after the data has 

been evaluated, validated and interpreted to assure that the data is presented in 

language that is easily understood and in formats easily accessible to the public. 

EPA also is in the process of establishing an Environmental Response Lab Network (eLRN). The criteria for joining the eLRN will be in place at the end of this 

fiscal year and will include quality assurance and data standard requirements. The 

network will include existing capabilities for standard toxic industrial chemicals as 

well as chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) agents. The environmental lab 

capacity for these CBR agents is limited at this time EPA is working with the DHS, 

Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies to expand these capabilities. 

Although EPA was not assigned the lead on any of the recommendations in the 

2006 White House report on the Katrina response, EPA stands ready to continue 

coordination with the DHS and other agencies to improve inter-agency coordination 

on this important topic of risk communication and community outreach, and other 

recommendations. 

Question 4. In November of last year, Paul Lioy, Edo Pellizzari, and David 

Prezant published an article in the journal Environmental Science and Technology. 

As you know, Dr. Lioy was the Vice-Chairman of the EPA WTC Expert Technical 

Review Panel and is director of the Exposure Science Division of the EIOSHI at 

RWJMS, and Dr. Prezant is the chief medical officer of the FDNY. The authors have 

been heavily involved in examining contamination, exposure and health issues arising from the 9/11 attacks. In this article, they review the lessons of 9/11 and conclude that new protocols, strategies and tools are needed in order to better prepare 

for future disasters and to avoid repeating the mistakes made after 9/11. They make 

a detailed set of recommendations for EPA, OSHA and DHS, and I am going to follow up with detailed questions about these recommendations. 

In regards to the EPA, the report states: ‘‘We need to develop exposure-science 

measurement tools (personal and biological markers), models and strategies for 

event preparedness. A set of ‘‘on the ground’’ protocols is necessary for quickly assessing the hazards and extent of contamination indoors and outdoors. Specific 

types of personal and stationary monitors must be made available for placement in 
57 

strategic locations. A solution for measuring supercoarse particles still needs to be 

provided. Disaster preparedness requires that we develop an effective, universal disaster plan, with disaster-specific components, for outdoor and indoor sampling and 

cleanup with appropriate quality assurance.’’ 

Has EPA taken steps to implement these recommendations or to address the concerns raised by the authors? 

Response. EPA has long used environmental data and a variety of risk-based 

models and tools to estimate the hazards of toxic compounds and their potential for 

human exposure and harm. These tools have been tested against both real and simulated releases and have been found to be very reliable. These tools are used to develop preparedness plans to respond to a variety of disaster scenarios. 

The response to Question 2 above provides information about ongoing efforts to 

develop exposure science measurement tools, models and strategies for event preparedness. 

EPA has a number of emergency response models and tools to quickly assess the 

hazards and extent of contamination at disaster sites. Onsite monitoring data, prevailing meteorological conditions and geo-spatial data can be processed, in real-time, 

to produce site-specific maps depicting the extent, location of the contaminant 

plume, estimated concentration, as well as its migration and movements. These sitespecific maps can help direct emergency response activities such as directing sampling efforts or initiating evacuation, to hasten the recovery efforts and protect the 

public. 

EPA is currently evaluating its inventory of response equipment, methods and 

protocols. Part of this effort has been to develop uniform guidelines for use of response equipment and the compilation of a database of all available response equipment throughout the agency. The location and availability of specific monitoring 

equipment, vehicles, and sampling and analysis equipment will be at the disposal 

of EPA OSCs across the United States. Equipment can be deployed from any EPA 

warehouse to disaster sites throughout the United States. The database is currently 

undergoing beta-testing, with final release scheduled for the end of 2007. 

EPA is continually developing and refining scenario driven disaster response 

plans on both the national and regional level. Inter-agency working groups, sponsored by EPA and DHS, have developed restoration plans for large transportation 

infrastructures. These have produced universal templates that can be used in developing generic disaster preparedness plans for a variety of scenarios. EPA is also 

supporting several inter-agency working groups developing uniform validated sampling plans, analytical methods and quality assurance protocols to support the timely cleanup and restoration of infrastructures after disaster events. 

Question 5. EPA’s testimony stated that the Agency did a good job after Katrina 

in collecting data and making that data available. However, the EPA IG report 

about EPA’s Katrina response states that: ‘‘EPA During emergencies such as Hurricane Katrina, there is an immediate need for decision makers at various levels of 

government to have reliable water quality data. One of the databases used by EPA 

to store floodwater data is the SCRIBE database. EPA provided access to the data 

to officials at the State level and New Orleans parishes. However, Louisiana officials 

had trouble querying the database due to a lack of training and had trouble 

verifying the quality of data due to inconsistent data entry. Set protocols would address these types of issues. 

EPA regional officials concurred that problems existed with querying SCRIBE. 

Region 6 officials said they have taken actions to correct these issues. This included 

querying the database on behalf of Louisiana until the issue was resolved to ensure 

Louisiana obtained the information it needed. This also included Region 6 providing 

training on the use of SCRIBE and making a SCRIBE user guide available to State 

officials.’’ 

Clearly, the communication plan was not prepared to respond to post-Katrina 

needs from outside of the Agency. How do you reconcile your testimony with the 

IG’s assessments? Can you please provide a report on the steps that EPA has taken 

to address the problems identified by the IG report, and to ensure that it has a fully 

operational communication plan in place for response to future emergencies? 

Response. SCRIBE is a field tool for collecting and managing data by On-Scene 

Coordinators (OSCs) and other field personnel. Since SCRIBE is a local application 

for use on personal computers, it is difficult to share data consistently. During 

Katrina, EPA used a preexisting water quality database to store the analytical data 

from the flood water and sediment sampling. This allowed us to share the data with 

the public via EPA’s Enviromapper software. EPA is working to create a data store 

more suited to its environmental assessment data using its new Portal technology. 

Since there will be a predetermined path for the data from the field to the central 
58 

database, this technology will allow us to securely share our data with our partners 

and will also assist EPA in quickly sharing data with the general public. The Emergency Management Portal (EMP) will allow data to be queried and viewed in tabular format or spatially using existing EPA GIS tools. It will also allow data to be 

downloaded for use in other analytical tools. This module of the EMP is scheduled 

to be ready in 2008. In the interim, another approach has been identified in lieu 

of the approach that was utilized during the Hurricane Katrina response. In this 

interim approach as well as the EMP approach, the sharing of information with 

States and other partners will be greatly simplified and EPA does not forsee any 

issues with use of the technology by our partners. 

Question 6. The 9/11 Commission report states ‘‘The EPA did not have the healthbased benchmarks needed to assess the extraordinary air quality conditions in 

Lower Manhattan after 9/11. The EPA and the White House therefore improvised 

and applied standards developed for other circumstances in order to make pronouncements regarding air safety, advising workers at Ground Zero to use protective gear and advising the general population that the air was safe. Whether those 

improvisations were appropriate is still a subject for medical and scientific debate.’’ 

Based on the emerging scientific evidence, I believe it is clear that the improvisations made by the EPA and the White House were flawed, and have placed the longterm health of thousands of Americans in jeopardy. Please provide a detailed plan 

of what metrics you have designed for assessing risk, and your risk communication 

plan for informing the public of those risks during future disaster scenarios. What 

elements of this plan when tested by Hurricane Katrina fell short, and how as a 

result have you modified your action plan in order to protect public health and the 

environment? 

Response. As noted in the response to Question #2 above, EPA has and continues 

to take part in an inter-agency effort to develop acute exposure guideline levels 

(AEGLs). AEGLS span acute exposure durations from 10 minutes to 8 hrs. Evaluation of available AEGLs informed EPA’s position that workers on the pile should 

be equipped with appropriate respiratory protection. For exposures extending beyond the acute phase (greater than 24 hours), EPA developed screening criteria for 

the ambient air based on a subchronic exposure of 1 year (the best estimate in the 

days after 9/11 for site clean-up to be completed and in retrospect a reasonable 

upper-bound estimate given the site clean-up was completed by the end of May, 

2002). 

The methodology used to develop sub-chronic screening criteria for the ambient 

air, as noted in the above 9/11 Commission quote, employed existing standards (e.g., 

National Ambient Air Quality Standards—NAAQS) where relevant and appropriate. 

However, standards are not available for every chemical that may be released as 

the result of an incident of national significance. Thus, for most of the contaminants 

associated with the WTC disaster, screening criteria were risk-based and developed 

using well-established EPA risk assessment procedures and protocols. The full process was submitted for peer review in the draft of the ‘‘World Trade Center Indoor 

Air Assessment: Selecting Contaminants of Concern and Setting Health Based 

Benchmarks—September, 2002. A similar hierarchical process (employing existing 

standards where applicable then reverting to risk-based methods) was used and 

well-received by the independent peer review panel, for developing long-term benchmarks for indoor air and settled in the aforementioned report. 

During the Hurricane Katrina response, we were able to quickly and effectively 

use the methodology that had been developed post 9/11 to generate appropriate 

screening levels to compare to outdoor/ambient air monitoring results. The screening 

levels included relevant standards and the development of one year, risk based criteria for those chemicals without applicable standards. In order to ensure that EPA 

uses the best available scientific information, it is critical to develop incident-specific 

screening levels at the time of the response. 

Question 7. In your testimony you highlight the fact that the EPA’s own Emergency Operations Center has a state of the art HVAC system in order to allow it 

to operate effectively in an emergency situation (pg. 6). A building’s air-handling 

system can be likened to its lungs, and if its air handling system becomes internally 

contaminated, all persons present within it will be continually exposed to those air 

contaminants. As EPA highlights the importance of a building’s air handling system, how do you explain the fact that the EPA’s test and clean program was very 

restrictive in evaluating and cleaning HVAC systems in buildings that were clearly 

impacted by WTC dust and debris? 

Response. The configuration of HVAC systems makes it impractical to obtain load 

samples (mass per unit area) that could be related to the benchmarks. Load samples 

are collected with a series of templates and equipment that cannot be reliably oper-
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ated in a confined space. Concentration (weight per weight) of a contaminant in settled dust is a poor indicator of risk. A very dusty environment may pose a risk even 

if the concentration in dust is low. Conversely, an environment with little dust 

would not pose a risk even if there was a high concentration of the contaminant 

in the small amount of dust. The decision criteria for HVAC cleanup was proposed, 

in early plans, and remains based on the 95% upper confidence level (UCL) for a 

contaminant of potential concern (COPC) in the common areas of the building. Common area samples will be collected in close proximity to HVAC supply ducts in the 

air and of dust from surfaces in these areas. We do not consider this to be restrictive. It is in accord with EPA cleanup goals in many areas; an exceedance in a pathway of concern (air or dust) triggers a cleanup. 

Question 8. The GAO testified that they: ‘‘found no basis for the $7 million EPA 

identified to implement its second program. It was simply the money left over from 

the first test and clean program, and it is less than 20 percent of the first program’s 

funding. EPA chose to limit the scope of the second program to fit within these 

available resources, rather than design a comprehensive program and then estimate 

the resources needed to carry it out. EPA told us that if the demand had exceeded 

available resources, it would have limited participation in the program, rather than 

request additional resources.’’ 

Taking into account the human health data available when the test and clean program was implemented in 2007, how do you justify the modest budget allotted to 

the program in relation to the human health cost attributed to exposure to WTC 

collapse materials? What is the EPA’s policy of giving weight to economic assessments in determining an adequate level of human health protection? In terms of 

protecting human health in an emergency or disaster scenario, where current risk 

analysis paradigms may have little or no applicability, what would be the benefit 

of implementing a response that is directed solely from the scientific guidance 

versus that, as in the post 9/11 New York, in which economic assessments also 

played a directing role? What would a test and clean program look like if it were 

developed without any consideration of economic assessment or existing budgetary 

allotments? 

Response. EPA informed GAO that there is approximately $7 million in FEMA 

funds available to EPA to execute a plan. However, we did not develop a plan based 

on a $7 million budget. Each plan that EPA has proposed has included a table indicating what specific samples would be collected in each unit, space or building sampled. Based upon our experience in the indoor dust clean up program, and information on contract costs in EPA’s existing programs, EPA has evaluated the potential 

costs for the plans by multiplying out the number of samples by the expected sample costs and by adding estimates for the costs of collecting samples, validating sample results and performing any necessary cleaning. The only significant variable involved in the cost estimates is the number of participants. Budgets did not dictate 

the plans, they arose from the plans. 

GAO notes that the $7 million available for the current plan is a little less than 

20% of the first program funding. In the first program a total of 4,167 apartments 

and 144 buildings were sampled for asbestos in air. In the current program, a total 

of 272 apartments and 25 buildings are expected to participate. EPA has not asked 

for additional supplemental appropriations. At this time EPA has no reason to do 

so. 

Regarding the development of a test and clean program without any consideration 

of economic assessment or existing budgetary allotments, our response to Senator 

Inhofe in Question 1 describes the efforts of NYCDOHMH and ATSDR, the agencies 

responsible for public health evaluation, in the aftermath of the WTC attack. As 

noted in the testimony provided by ATSDR to your Committee, the primary finding 

of their investigation was that the levels of materials detected in the air and dust 

did not pose a potential health hazard provided that recommended cleaning measures were followed. Based upon their investigation, NYCDOHMH and ATSDR recommended: 

• Additional monitoring of residential areas be conducted in lower Manhattan; 

• Additional investigation be conducted to define background levels specific to the 

City of New York; and 

• Lower Manhattan residents concerned about possible WTC-related dust in their 

residential areas participate in the 2002–3 EPA voluntary cleaning/sampling program. 

EPA, acting in concert with NYC, implemented these recommendations. Our evaluation of the program results are included in the response to Senator Inhofe: ‘‘No 

pattern that could be related to the WTC collapse was detectable in this area of 

lower Manhattan. It appears that cleaning efforts by residents, building owners and 
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operators, EPA, and NYC, where applied, have been successful in reducing levels 

of contamination.’’ This conclusion is consistent with the initial findings of 

NYCDOHMH and ATSDR. 

Question 9. CEQ’s testimony stated that: ‘‘We had a particular focus on the workers, who faced extreme danger in the conditions during the recovery and rescue 

work. We had a second focus on the people who were acutely exposed to the volume 

of dust immediately after the collapse, and that really was in the hands of the public health professionals. EPA was instrumental in encouraging people to go seek 

medical help and monitoring.’’ 

Based on the Administration’s position, why then were there no statements issued 

to public health professionals advising them to be cognitive of acute exposure symptoms and potential long-term health impacts of exposure to WTC debris and materials? Have you integrated into your future communication plan safeguards to ensure that the medical community and health care system are properly informed? 

Response. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) did 

issue statements to public health professionals advising them to be aware of potential impacts from exposure to WTC debris and material. The National Institute of 

Environmental Health Sciences also worked to provide information to health professionals. While the two Institutes are better able to fully detail their actions, each 

has posted explanatory information on their websites. Information on efforts by 

NIOSH can be found on the NIOSH website at: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/ 

wtc/ and at: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/02–143.html. Information on efforts by 

NIEHS can be found at: http://www.niehs.nih.gov/dert/profiles/stories/2002/ 

911.htm 

EPA will defer to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) on 

statements issued on public health and to public health professionals in general. 

However, as stated in reply to Question 3, EPA’s Crisis Communication Plan outlines responsibilities and procedures to ensure the public receives the most accurate 

information in a timely manner. EPA’s communication plan does make it clear that 

the review environmental data (which is closely linked to health effects) will be coordinated with appropriate affected agencies. As EPA develops the companion resources guide, EPA will coordinate with agencies such as the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). During the response to Hurricane Katrina, 

EPA worked closely with DHHS, ATSDR and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 

regarding the communication of environmental data. As mentioned above, we also 

stand ready to continue this interagency coordination on risk communication with 

DHS and other appropriate agencies to assure necessary community outreach. 

Question 10a. EPA’s draft document, ‘‘Exposure and Human Health Evaluation of 

Airborne Pollution from the World Trade Center Disaster’’, was released for comment and brought to the attention of the press by the Agency during the last week 

of 2002, generating a 12/28 NYT article headlined: ‘‘No Serious Risks for Public 

Near Ground Zero, E.P.A. Reports’’. The draft document underwent peer review at 

a two day meeting, held in NYC and hosted by Versar, Inc., on July 14–15, 2003. 

The peer review report, ‘‘Summary Report of the U.S. EPA Technical Peer Meeting 

on the Draft Document Entitled: Exposure and Human Health Evaluation of Airborne Pollution from the World Trade Center Disaster’’, was finalized in December 

of 2003. Though the product of an external peer review panel is a public document, 

the conclusions and recommendations of the peer reviewers were so antithetical to 

EPA’s purposes that the Agency sought to suppress the report. Only with the assistance of the OIG, was I able to secure its release. 

In December 2005, New Yorkers queried EPA regarding the status of the report 

and learned that it had been revised, and that the revised draft had been submitted 

to the July 2003 peer review panel for a letter review in the summer of 2005 under 

the title, ‘‘An Inhalation Exposure and Risk Assessment of Ambient Air Pollution 

from the World Trade Center Disaster’’ An EPA email response to this query in December of 2005 stated that EPA was in the process of preparing the report for public 

release in January or February 2006. However, requests for revised drafts of this 

document and other information about the process have been unanswered. Please 

provide the following documents and information: 

The revised version of the external review draft, ‘‘Exposure and Human Health 

Evaluation of Airborne Pollution from the World Trade Center Disaster’’, that was 

submitted for peer review in 2005, under the title, ‘‘An Inhalation Exposure and 

Risk Assessment of Ambient Air Pollution from the World Trade Center Disaster’’, 

or under its original title, or under another title: 

The name of the contractor that managed the 2005 peer review for EPA. 

Response. Versar, Inc., 6850 Versar Center, Springfield, VA 22151. 
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Question 10b. The names of the peer reviewers who participated in the 2005 peer 

review. 

Response. Michael Dourson, Ph.D., DABT, Toxicology Excellence for Risk Assessment (TERA), Cincinnati, OH 45211; Alison Geyh, Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University 

School of Public Health, Department of Environmental Health Sciences, Baltimore, 

MD 21205; Patrick L. Kinney, Sc.D., Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia 

University, Department of Environmental Health Sciences, New York, NY 10032; 

John R. Kominsky, M.Sc., CIH, CSP, CHMM, ROH, Environmental Quality Management, Inc., Cincinnati, Ohio 45240; Margaret MacDonell, Ph.D., Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL 60439; Bertram Price, Ph.D., Price Associates, Inc., 

White Plains, NY 10601; Clifford P. Weisel, Ph.D., Environmental & Occupational 

Health Sciences Institute (EOHSI)/UMDNJ, Department of Environmental Medicine, Piscataway, NJ 08854. 

Question 10c. All work products completed by peer reviewers for the 2005 peer 

review and communicated back to EPA. 

Response. The peer reviewers did not provide any products to EPA directly. They 

were hired by Versar and provided their review comments back to Versar. Versar 

provided EPA with a report titled, ‘‘Support for the External Re-Review of the 

NCEA Report Exposure and Human Health Evaluation of Airborne Pollution from 

the World Trade Center Disaster’’ dated October 11, 2005. That report contained a 

brief synopsis by Versar of the overall reviewer response to each of the charge questions, followed by the unedited reviews supplied by each reviewer. 

Question 10d. The charge questions provided to peer reviewers, the list of background documents, and the record of clarifying questions from peer reviewers and 

EPA’s responses to those questions. 

Do you agree that these were important changes to have been made to the document? Do you have any comments on these new additions/changes? Would you recommend further major changes? 

Response. (a) Two new primary conclusions were added, bringing the total to five 

major assessment conclusions. The original three conclusions remain substantially 

the same, with some word changes. Please reread those and provide any fresh insights or comments, if appropriate. The new conclusions address the fact that health 

effects research has indicated that WTC-related respiratory and reproductive health 

effects have been observed in the general population. The new conclusions read: 

Respiratory impacts, such as exacerbated asthma and ‘‘World Trade Center 

Cough’’, have been observed in residents and other individuals living and working 

on the perimeter of Ground Zero, and these impacts have persisted in some individuals to the current time. As in this assessment, researchers studying the respiratory 

impacts have hypothesized that these effects resulted from inhalation exposures 

which occurred near Ground Zero, and very near September 11 in time when concentrations of critical respiratory contaminants (particulate matter, synthetic vitreous fibers, asbestos, and others) were thought to be substantially elevated over 

typical background levels in air. 

In addition to respiratory effects, reproductive effects were observed in two studies. In both studies, the cohorts were selected based on being near Ground Zero on 

September 11, but also who lived and worked in the area for weeks to months afterwards. Thus, both outdoor and indoor exposures may have contributed to the observed effects. In one study, the reproductive effect of intrauterine growth restriction resulting in small for gestational age babies was observed. In the second study, 

a small but significant reduction in gestation and birth weight was observed. Although attribution is not certain, the researchers concluded that the observed reproductive effects suggest an impact of pollutants (PAHs and particulates) and/or stress 

related to the WTC disaster. 

(b) The monitoring chapter was greatly expanded to provide a more complete overview of the monitoring activities and the monitoring data available for analysis in 

this report. 

(c) A new section on Health Risk Uncertainty, including the latest findings on observed health effects has been added to Chapter 2. Exposure Assessment and Risk 

Characterization Approach, and to the Executive Summary. 

(d) A new table outlining the health or regulatory basis for all benchmarks used 

in this assessment is now included as Table 2.2. 

(e) New contaminant assessments have been included on synthetic vitreous fibers 

(SVFs), PAHs, and silica. 

(f) A new cancer risk assessment on asbestos has been added. 

(g) All contaminant monitoring summaries were updated to include all final data 

(the original assessment included data only through March or April of 2002; most 

monitoring activities were discontinued in the summer of 2002). As well, summaries 
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of monitoring for all metals and all volatile organic contaminants were added, even 

though only a limited number of them were assessed. 

(h) A new section in Chapter 5. Comment on the First Several Days After September 11, has been added. This section details the day-by-day monitoring activities 

which occurred between September 11 and September 18, 2001. 

(i) The original Chapter 6. Data on Occupational and Indoor Exposures, has been 

deleted. 

(j) A new appendix, Appendix B. Compilation of World Trade Center Studies on 

Environmental Impacts, Human Exposures, and Health Impacts, has been added to 

the document. (2) The panel also made recommendations that were not followed for 

this version of the assessment. Specifically, the panel recommended that existing 

health benchmarks, developed for a different purpose such as occupational exposure, 

be adjusted so that they are more appropriate for the exposure patterns that might 

be relevant to the target population of this assessment, the general public living and 

working near Ground Zero. EPA had decided that this assessment was not the appropriate forum to be developing new benchmarks. Also, the panel advocated addressing cumulative or aggregate effects of multiple chemical/multiple pathway exposures, to the extent possible and practical. EPA identified the lack of cumulative/ 

aggregate exposure assessment as a major uncertainty for this assessment, but felt 

that both the WTC data and the procedures for cumulative/aggregate assessment 

were not sufficiently developed for this assessment. Does the panel agree with these 

decisions? 

(3) Is the panel aware of any new data or studies that would benefit this assessment? 

(4) Does the panel have any additional comments they wish to make after seeing 

this assessment a second time, given the years between reviews and the information 

and insights that have come out of the WTC experience? 

List of background documents 

1. The current version of the report 

2. The December 2002 version of the report 

3. A draft response-to-comments document prepared by EPA which includes responses to the comments made by the July 2003 external review panel as well as 

responses to comments provided by the public following the December 2002 release 

of the report. 

4. A letter from EPA (developed by EPA and supplied to the contractor prior to 

the initiation of the review) which contains general information about the revised 

report and any specific re-review directions or charges. 

Clarifying questions and responses 

The review was conducted by Versar. If the reviewers had any questions, they 

supplied them to Versar and Versar was responsible for answering the question. If 

Versar did not have an adequate answer, they would ask EPA for assistance in answering the question. No assistance was asked of EPA, so if there were any clarifying questions posed by the reviewers to Versar, EPA is not aware of them. 

Question 10e. The status of the final report. 

Response. Based on the review, EPA prepared a final report and a response-tocomments document which included responses to: public comments supplied after 

the release of the December, 2002 draft document, comments provided by the July 

2003 external review panel, and comments provided by the letter re-review of 2005. 

During an internal Office of Research and Development review of 2006, it was decided that the final report would be most useful if it were prepared as a journal 

article that would be submitted to a peer-reviewed journal for publication. That article was developed during the summer/fall of 2006 and reviewed internally by the 

Office of Research of Development. The manuscript was titled, ‘‘Assessment of Inhalation Exposures and Potential Health Risks to the General Population that Resulted from the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers’’, and was submitted to 

the journal, Risk Analysis, in December of 2006. As of July, 2007, the journal has 

not made a final decision to accept or reject the manuscript for publication. 

Question 11. ‘‘Presidential Decision Directive–62 (PDD–62), ‘‘Protection Against 

Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas,’’ dated May 22, 

1998, puts EPA in charge of building decontamination after terrorist attacks. Why 

did EPA ignore this directive after 9–11?’’ 

Response. EPA has carefully reviewed this classified document and did not find 

any reference to EPA being in charge of building decontamination after terrorist attacks. EPA’s responsibility, per this document, is to participate with the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in responding to such an event. EPA did 

work closely with FEMA and other appropriate State and Federal agencies in responding to 9/11. 
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Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Ms. Bodine. 

Captain Rodenbeck. 

STATEMENT OF SVEN RODENBECK, SC.D., P.E., BCEE CAPTAIN, 

U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPUTY BRANCH CHIEF, 

AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

CAPTAIN RODENBECK. Yes, good morning, Madam Chairperson, 

members of the subcommittee and my fellow panel members. My 

name is Captain Sven Rodenbeck. I am a U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Officer with the Agency for Toxic Substances and 

Disease Registry (ATSDR). Some of my responsibilities while stationed at ATSDR have been evaluating the public health impacts 

over 90 Superfund hazardous waste sites and leading various high 

profile agency responses to environmental health emergencies, including the World Trade Center and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

responses. 

I am here today to provide you and the Subcommittee with a 

briefing of ATSDR’s support that was provided to the New York 

City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene; our participation 

on multiple World Trade Center task forces; and our efforts to 

strengthen environmental health sciences and responses to environmental disasters. 

First, however, I would like to take this opportunity to remember 

all those that we lost on 9/11 and their families who continue to 

remember them and love them in their memories. I would also like 

to acknowledge the sacrifices that the countless responders and volunteers made on that day, some of whom are still suffering. I know 

I will always remember them. 

During the World Trade Center recovery efforts, ATSDR provided direct support to the New York City Department of Health 

and Mental Hygiene. Our biggest contribution was the implementation of a pilot residential sampling program. The objective of that 

pilot program was to sample a small number of residential units 

to determine what the indoor and immediately surrounding outdoor 

environment had as far as residue dust. 

The sampling occurred from November 4 through December 11, 

2001. The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and ATSDR released preliminary sampling results on February 8, 2002, and provided the final report on October 4, 2002. 

Our primary finding of the pilot investigation was that levels of 

materials detected in the air and dust did not pose potential health 

hazards, provided that recommended cleaning measures were followed. 

ATSDR also participated on several World Trade Center-related 

task forces. From February 2002 through the summer 2003, we 

supported the EPA Task Force on Indoor Air in Lower Manhattan. 

This task force provided technical consultation to EPA Region 2 on 

several projects, including the initial EPA voluntary cleaning and 

sampling of residential areas, the cleaning demonstration project 

and the selection of World Trade Center Chemicals of Potential 

Concern. ATSDR also participated on the 2004–2005 EPA Expert 

Technical Review Panel. 
77 

To help strengthen the environmental health sciences, ATSDR 

published the 2002 Toxicological Profile for Synthetic Vitreous Fibers, also known as man-made vitreous fibers. We also convened an 

expert panel to gain a greater understanding of the toxicity of asbestos and man-made vitreous fibers, particularly the fibers that 

are sometime called short fibers, those that are less than 5 microns 

in length. 

ATSDR’s involvement on these various multi-agency World Trade 

Center task forces has served as a template for our responses to 

future environmental disasters. The early establishment of these 

types of task forces can improve the development and implementation of responses to the complex issues that arise from environmental disasters. An example of how this can be done is the 2005 

CDC/ATSDR and EPA Environmental Health Needs and Habitability Assessment Task Force, which provided the State of Louisiana and the city of New Orleans with a rapid scientific evaluation of the overarching environmental health issues that needed to 

be done before the city could be reoccupied. 

ATSDR also participated on the multi-agency task force that 

evaluated whether the storm surge from Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita caused widespread sediment or soil contamination in the New 

Orleans area. 

Madam Chairperson, this concludes my testimony. I would be 

more than happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Captain Rodenbeck follows:] 

STATEMENT OF SVEN E. RODENBECK, SC.D., P.E., BCEE, CAPTAIN, U.S. PUBLIC

HEALTH SERVICE, DEPUTY BRANCH CHIEF, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND

DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Good morning Madam Chairperson and Members of the Subcommittee. My name 

is Captain Sven Rodenbeck, Deputy Branch Chief within the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). I have been a U.S. Public Health Service 

Commissioned Officer for over 28 years. Since September 1987, I have been stationed at ATSDR performing various technical and managerial assignments. These 

assignments have included evaluating the public health impacts of over 90 Superfund hazardous waste sites, co-authoring the 1990 ATSDR The Public Health Implications of Medical Waste: A Report To Congress, and leading various high profile 

agency responses to environmental health emergencies including the ATSDR World 

Trade Center (WTC) (September 2001 through April 2003) and the Hurricane 

Katrina/Rita (September 2005 through July 2006) environmental monitoring and 

public health assessment activities. In addition, from March 2004 through December 

2005, I represented ATSDR on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 

WTC Expert Technical Review Panel. I received my Bachelor of Science degree in 

Environmental Engineering from the University of Central Florida (1978), Master 

of Science degree in Environmental Engineering from the University of Maryland 

(1983), and Doctor of Science degree in Environmental Health (with emphasis in epidemiology, toxicology, and risk assessment) from the Tulane University School of 

Public Health and Tropical Medicine (1997). I am a registered professional engineer 

in the states of Florida and Maryland and a Board Certified Environmental Engineering. I have authored or coauthored numerous peer-reviewed publications and a 

book chapter on solid and hazardous waste. 

I am here today to provide you and the Subcommittee with a briefing of ATSDR’s 

WTC environmental monitoring involvement. I will specifically discuss: (1) ATSDR’s 

support provided to New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 

(NYC DOHMH), (2) ATSDR’s participation on multi-agency WTC Task Forces, and 

(3) ATSDR’s efforts to strengthen environmental health sciences and responses to 

environmental disasters. 

Almost immediately after the planes crashed into the World Trade Center Towers, 

ATSDR implemented its emergency response procedures. From September 16–26, 

2001, an ATSDR technical staff person traveled to the EPA Region II Edison, New 
78 

Jersey, Office to assure reliable communications between EPA Region II and 

ATSDR. 

On September 26, 2001, NYC DOHMH requested that ATSDR provide on-site 

technical support to interpret the environmental monitoring data collected, assist 

with developing public health informational/educational material, and assist in providing technical information to the New York City public during public meetings. 

The on-site technical support to NYC DOHMH continued through June 28, 2002. 

In addition, ATSDR headquarters provided technical support which included the 

plotting and generation of geographic information system (GIS) maps and development of draft fact sheets that discussed asbestos, our pilot residential sampling investigation, and particulate matter (PM). NYC DOHMH and the deployed ATSDR 

staff used these technical materials to prepare for the various community meetings. 

NYC DOHMH/ATSDR PILOT RESIDENTIAL AREA INVESTIGATION

ATSDR supported NYC DOHMH by implementing the Ambient and Indoor Sampling for Public Health Evaluations of Residential Areas Near the World Trade Center. Additional support was provided by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, EPA, the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, and state and 

local environmental and health agencies. The objective was to conduct environmental sampling that characterized ambient and indoor airborne surface dust in a 

small number of residential areas of lower Manhattan. Sampling of residential units 

occurred from November 4 through December 11, 2001. NYC DOHMH and ATSDR 

released preliminary sampling results on February 8, 2002 and provided the final 

report for this investigation to the public on October 4, 2002. The primary finding 

of the pilot investigation was that the levels of materials detected in the air and 

dust did not pose potential health hazard provided that recommended cleaning 

measures were followed. Some of the other finding included: 

• Low levels of asbestos were found in some settled surface dust, primarily below 

Chambers Street. 

• The lower Manhattan residential areas had higher percentages of manmade vitreous fibers (MMVF), mineral components of concrete, and mineral components of 

building wallboard in settled surface dust than the comparison area. 

• Lower Manhattan airborne levels of total fibers were no different than the levels detected in the four buildings above 59th Street, which served as the comparison 

area. 

• Mineral components of concrete and mineral components of building wall board 

were detected in air samples at higher levels in lower Manhattan residential areas 

than in the comparison area. 

Based upon the findings, NYC DOHMH and ATSDR recommended: 

• Additional monitoring of residential areas be conducted in lower Manhattan, 

• Additional investigation be conducted to define background levels specific to the 

city of New York, and 

• Lower Manhattan residents concerned about possible WTC-related dust in their 

residential areas participate in the 2002–3 EPA voluntary cleaning/sampling program. 

ATSDR SUPPORT TO MULTI-AGENCY WTC RELATED TASK FORCES

ATSDR has participated on several WTC related task forces. ATSDR supported 

the EPA Task Force on Indoor Air in Lower Manhattan; which began in February 

2002. This Task Force provided technical consultation to EPA Region II on how best 

EPA Region II should respond to the indoor air issues related to the collapse of the 

WTC towers. In addition to the 2002-3 EPA voluntary cleaning/sampling of residential area, The Task Force on Indoor Air in Lower Manhattan provided technical advice for the: 

• EPA sampling investigation to define better the typical New York City background levels of various WTC related materials (e.g., asbestos, MMVF, and crystalline silica); 

• EPA demonstration project that evaluated the various cleaning techniques that 

could be used to remove WTC related materials from residential areas (e.g., HEPA 

vacuum); and 

• EPA selection of chemicals of potential concern (COPC) to be addressed in indoor areas and development of air and surface screening values to employ as samples were collected. 

The EPA Task Force on Indoor Air in Lower Manhattan completed its efforts in 

the summer of 2003. 

ATSDR was also an active member of the New York City Lower Manhattan Air 

Task Force. The Mayor charged the task force to coordinate the response of the city 
79 

agencies and to establish a complaint and information phone line to address WTC 

environmental issues. The City Task was active from March to June 2002. 

ATSDR also participated on EPA’s 2004-5 WTC Expert Technical Review Panel. 

The purpose of that panel was to help guide EPA on how to determine whether any 

remaining WTC-related dust could be in lower Manhattan or other areas at levels 

of public health concern. As a member of the panel, ATSDR provided various technical guidance some of which is documented in the March 2005 ATSDR Health Consultation, Review of the Proposed Sampling Program to Determine Extent of World 

Trace Center Impacts to the Indoor Environment. 

STRENGTHENING ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SCIENCES AND RESPONSES TO

ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS

One science issue that ATSDR identified from its WTC experience was the need 

to further understand the health risks from exposure to MMVF, known also as synthetic vitreous fibers. To address this, ATSDR developed a ‘‘white paper’’ and the 

2002 Toxicological Profile for Synthetic Vitreous Fibers. To obtain a better understanding of the health risks associated with asbestos and MMVF fibers less than 

5 microns in length (sometimes called ‘‘short fibers’’), ATSDR convened an expert 

panel. The panel met in New York City on October 29 and 30, 2002. The discussions, findings, and recommendations of the panelists are presented in the 2003 

ATSDR Report on the Expert Panel on Health Effects of Asbestos and Synthetic Vitreous Fibers: The Influence of Fiber Length. 

ATSDR’s involvement on the various multi-agency WTC task forces has served as 

a template for our responses to other environmental disasters. The early establishment of multi-agency task forces can improve the development and implementation 

of comprehensive solutions to the complex environmental problems that are associated with disasters. For example, the 2005 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and EPA Environmental Health Needs and Habitability Assessment Joint Task 

Force provided the State of Louisiana and the City of New Orleans with a rapid 

scientific evaluation of the overarching environmental health issues that needed to 

be addressed before the city could be reinhabited. ATSDR also participated on the 

multi-agency task force that evaluated whether the storm surges from Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita had caused wide-spread sediment or soil contamination of the New 

Orleans area. 

In closing, I would like to take this opportunity to remember all of those lost as 

a result of the events of September 11, 2001, and their families and friends who 

will love them forever and keep their memories alive. And I would like to gratefully 

recognize the countless responders and volunteers, some of whom are still dealing 

with what happened on that fateful day and shortly thereafter. I know that I will 

always remember. 

Madam Chairperson, this concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer 

any questions. 

RESPONSES BY SVEN E. RODENBECK TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question 1. Please describe your role on the World Trade Center (WTC) expert 

panel the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened. 

Response. I participated on the EPA WTC Expert Technical Review Panel from 

March 2004 through December 2005. As a panel member, I reviewed all of the 

WTC-related environmental sampling results, the various scientific articles that 

have been published concerning WTC, and the various documents and sampling proposals developed by EPA. Based upon that information, I provided verbal and written comments and recommendations concerning the various issues being evaluated 

by the Panel. 

Question 2. Although members of the panel has expressed disappointment over 

not identifying a dust signature, do you believe that the current testing and cleaning program is a step in the right direction and can you address the problems encountered in the peer-reviewed process to develop a targeted signature dust? 

Response. The Current EPA Testing and Cleaning Program.—The testing and 

cleaning program currently being conducted by EPA in lower Manhattan provides 

the public with an opportunity to have their living spaces tested for WTC chemicals 

of potential concern. If the WTC chemicals of potential concern are found above the 

thresholds established by EPA and can not be attributed to other sources via a survey, then EPA will clean the space. To that end, the program should provide a level 
80 

of assurance to the people participating in this program that their living areas do 

not contain any of those particular chemicals at levels of health concern. 

Developing a World Trade Center Dust Signature.—The panel and EPA focused 

a great deal of time and effort on trying to determine whether there was a specific 

pattern or signature that could differentiate between WTC and normal background 

dust. The development of a WTC dust signature was critical to addressing the main 

charge given the Panel. Without a signature, one cannot answer the basic questions 

that the public and policy leaders are asking: 

• Is there any remaining WTC dust located in indoor areas? 

• Is the WTC dust in the indoor areas at levels of health concern? 

• What is the current extent of WTC dust inside buildings in lower Manhattan 

and elsewhere? 

This was a very technically challenging charge to the Panel, particularly given the 

facts that the most of WTC-related dust constituents/chemicals can be found in typical/ordinary indoor dust, a vast majority of buildings surrounding WTC had already 

been cleaned to varying degrees, and so much time had passed since the collapse 

of the WTC buildings. 

These discussions and activities led to the development of a new laboratory procedure that could potentially identify a specific type of manmade vitreous fibers 

(MMVF) found in WTC dust. It was hoped that the MMVF could be used as a WTC 

signature. But this signature turned out to be an imperfect fit because the specific 

type of MMVF that was being considered was also used in other buildings as insulation and sound reduction material and can be found at varying levels in normal 

background dust. Use of this signature would likely lead to a high false positive 

identification, that is, a significant number of indoor areas being identified as containing WTC dust when they, in fact, did not. This could bring into question the 

scientific reliability of any sampling/cleaning program that is based on that particular MMVF signature. 

In addition, there were Panel discussions as to whether laboratories can consistently identify MMVF using the new laboratory procedure developed specifically for 

WTC. EPA conducted a pilot test in which a number of commercial laboratories 

were asked to use the new procedure. Unfortunately, the commercial laboratories 

could not consistently identify the specific MMVF when provided identical samples 

using the new procedure. 

Question 3. Please describe the air monitoring Agency for Toxic Substances and 

Disease Registry (ATSDR) conducted with the New York City Department of Health 

and Mental Hygiene (NYC DOHMH) following the WTC disaster, Can you further 

describe the work between EPA and ATSDR to identify contaminants of concern for 

the residential cleaning program initiated in 2002 and since? 

Response. NYC DOHMH/ATSDR Limited Residential Area Sampling Near the 

World Trade Center. A complete description, along with the sampling results and 

interpretation, of the limited air and dust monitoring ATSDR conducted with NYC 

DOHMH can be found at: http:((www.atsdr.cdc.gov/asbestos/asbestos/types-of-exposure/—FullReport.html 

The following is a brief description of this limited sampling effort. 

From November 4 through December 11, 2001, environmental samples were collected in and around 30 residential buildings in lower Manhattan. In addition, four 

buildings above 59th Street were sampled and used as a comparison area for this 

limited investigation. The purpose of the sampling was to assess the composition of 

both outdoor and indoor settled surface and airborne dust within a limited number 

of residential areas around WTC This information was used to help determine 

whether additional public health actions were needed to address any remaining 

WTC-related dust inside residential areas. 

Attention was given to those materials reasonably expected to be in the original 

dust cloud and in dust generated by ongoing activities at WTC. Efforts were made 

to obtain as much information as possible with the sampling that could be conducted, given accessibility and equipment limitations. Air and settled surface dust 

samples were collected and analyzed for the following materials used in WTC construction components: asbestos, MMVF, crystalline silica, calcite, portlandite, gypsum, mica, and halite. 

Results from this investigation did not necessarily reflect conditions that would 

be found in other buildings, at other times immediately following the collapse, or 

after the sampling period. The measurements reflect conditions present at the time 

of the sampling (November 4–December 12, 2001) in the buildings and areas sampled. The limited number of results obtained from the comparison areas above 59th 

Street was an attempt to determine the New York City-specific background levels 

of asbestos, MMVF, mineral components of concrete (quartz, calcite, and 
81 

portlandite), and mineral components of building wallboard (gypsum, mica, and halite). 

Identifying World Trade Center Contaminants of Potential Concern.—On February 

2, 2002, EPA Region II formed the Task Force on Indoor Air in Lower Manhattan. 

The ATSDR WTC Response Team was specifically asked to participate on this Task 

Force. The Task Force and its associated Working Groups were responsible for providing technical consultation to EPA Region II on how best EPA Region II should 

respond to the indoor air issues related to the collapse of the WTC towers. 

One of the Task Force Working Groups was specifically charged with establishing 

health-based benchmarks for the WTC contaminants of potential concern. ATSDR 

technical staff worked collaboratively with EPA, the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration, New York State Department of Health, and NYC DOHMH technical 

staff in developing the benchmarks. The process began with the review of an extremely large environmental data set, including indoor and outdoor air and dust 

data. This was followed by a two-level screening which considered individual contaminant toxicity, the prevalence of a contaminant within and across media, and the 

likelihood that a detected contaminant was related to the WTC disaster. The goal 

of the process was to identify those contaminants most likely to be present within 

indoor environments at levels of health concern. 

Once the Working Group members had narrowed the contaminants to those that 

were thought to be related to the WTC, health-based benchmarks were developed 

to be protective of long-term habitability of residential dwellings. The following 

hierarchal approach was employed for developing benchmark values: use of relevant 

and appropriate environmental standards/regulations; calculation of health-based 

benchmarks employing environmental risk assessment guidance, and adaptation of 

occupational standards with additional safety factors. 

The final document developed by the Working Group, after an external peer review, can be found at: http://www.epa.gov/wtc/copc—study.htm. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Captain. 

Mr. Stephenson. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN B. STEPHENSON, DIRECTOR, NATURAL 

RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. STEPHENSON. Madam Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am here today to discuss GAO’s ongoing review of 

EPA’s second program to address indoor contamination from the 

World Trade Center. Our full report will be issued in September 

to you. 

As you know, the terrorist attack at the World Trade Center 

nearly 6 years ago turned lower Manhattan into a disastrous site 

on a scale the Nation had never experienced. As the Towers collapsed, lower Manhattan was blanketed in a mixture of building 

debris and combustible materials that coated building exteriors and 

streets, as well as the interiors of apartments and offices, exposing 

thousands of residents and workers to hazards in the air and in the 

dust, such as asbestos, lead, glass fibers and pulverized concrete. 

To put EPA’s efforts into perspective, Figure 1 in my statement, 

you should all have a copy of this, contains a time line of EPA activity since 9/11. On the day of the attacks, the President signed 

a major disaster declaration, which activated the Federal Government’s assistance to State and local agencies. In May 2002, after 

numerous cleanups, dust collection and air monitoring activities 

were conducted outdoors, New York City formally requested Federal assistance to test and clean indoor space and residences and 

common areas. As shown, EPA implemented the first program to 

test and clean indoor space about 1 year after the disaster. Residents of lower Manhattan living south of Canal Street, about 
82 

20,000 apartments, were eligible to participate in the program, and 

about 20 percent, or 4,100 apartments, did so. 

However, EPA’s first program was severely criticized. In August 

2003, as has been mentioned, the EPA’s Inspector General complained that the cleanup did not require that entire buildings be 

systematically cleaned, including HVAC systems, and concluded 

that the contaminants in uncleaned apartments and common areas 

could enter the air supply system and recontaminate clean spaces. 

In March 2004, EPA convened an expert technical review panel 

to address IG and public concerns about EPA’s program. The panel 

met periodically over 18 months through December 2005. EPA announced its second program to address indoor contamination in December 2006, over 3 years after completion of the first program. 

Only 295 of the over 20,000 eligible home and building owners 

have enrolled, compared to about 4,100 the first time. 

Madam Chairman, you asked GAO to evaluate EPA’s second test 

and clean program to determine, No. 1, the extent to which EPA 

implemented recommendations from the IG, the expert panel and 

others; No. 2, to determine the completeness of information EPA 

provided to the public about indoor contamination; and No. 3, to 

determine how EPA determined that $7 million was the appropriate amount to carry out the program. 

In summary, we found that EPA incorporated some recommendations into its second indoor air program, but its decision not to 

adopt others has limited, in our view, the overall effectiveness of 

the program. EPA did implement recommendations to expand the 

number of contaminants tested beyond asbestos and did agree to 

test in dust as well as air. However, it did not incorporate recommendations to expand the boundaries of cleanup beyond Canal 

Street. EPA reasoned that it would need to identify a World Trade 

Center signature, that is, a method for differentiating between normal urban dust and World Trade Center dust to justify expanding 

the program. 

EPA was ultimately never able to identify such a signature in 

part because it waited nearly 3 years to attempt to do so. EPA also 

did not incorporate recommendations to sample in HVACs or inaccessible locations within apartments and common areas, such as 

behind dishwashers, citing resource constraints. EPA also did not 

incorporate recommendations to expand the program to include 

workplaces, stating that worker safety is the responsibility of other 

agencies. 

We also found that EPA did not provide sufficient information to 

allow the public to make informed choices about the extent of contamination and ultimately their participation in the indoor program. For example, EPA publicly reported that a very small number of samples from its first program exceeded risk levels of airborne asbestos. However, it did not adequately explain that this 

conclusion was based on the fact that most testing was done after 

cleaning rather than before cleaning. This may have given residents a false sense of security and contributed to the low participation in the second program. 

Finally, we found no basis for the $7 million EPA identified to 

implement its second program. It was simply the money left over 

from the first test and clean program, and it is less than 20 percent 
83 

1 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq. The purpose of the Stafford Act is ‘‘to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from such disasters.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b). 2 In addition to using asbestos as a trigger for cleanup, in a small subset of residences, EPA 

conducted sampling for dioxin, mercury, and 22 metals to inform a study about the effectiveness 

of its cleaning techniques. 3 EPA regional officials overseeing the program told us they assumed that some residents 

elected to have testing only because they had their residences cleaned before EPA’s program. 4 A lawsuit was filed in March 2004 that, among other things, challenged the adequacy of 

EPA’s first test and clean program. The case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Second Circuit. Benzman v. Whitman, No. 04–1888 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 10, 2004), appeal docketed, Nos. 06–1166–cv, 06–1346–cv, 06–1454–cv (2nd Cir. March 10, 2006). Pursuant to its longContinued 

of the first program’s funding. EPA chose to limit the scope of the 

second program to fit within these available resources, rather than 

design a comprehensive program and then estimate the resources 

needed to carry it out. EPA told us that if the demand had exceeded available resources, it would have limited participation in the 

program, rather than request additional resources. 

Madam Chairman, that concludes my summary and I will be 

happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stephenson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF JOHN B. STEPHENSON, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND

ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the preliminary results of our ongoing 

work on the development of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) second 

program to address World Trade Center (WTC) indoor contamination. As you know, 

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center turned Lower 

Manhattan into a disaster site, on a scale the nation had never experienced. The 

World Trade Center was a complex of seven buildings on 16 acres surrounding a 

5-acre plaza in Lower Manhattan. The twin towers were at the center of the complex. Each tower had 110 floors, with approximately 43,200 square feet on each 

floor. As the towers collapsed, Lower Manhattan was blanketed in a mixture of 

building debris and combustible materials that coated building exteriors and streets, 

as well as the interiors of apartments and offices. This complex mixture gave rise 

to another major concern: that thousands of residents and workers in the area 

would now be exposed to known hazards in the air and in the dust, such as asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and pulverized concrete. 

On the day of the attacks, the President signed a major disaster declaration, 

which activated the Federal Response Plan. The Federal Response Plan, now replaced by the National Response Plan, established the process and structure for the 

federal government’s assistance to state and local agencies when responding to any 

major disaster or emergency declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 

and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act).1 In May 2002, after numerous cleanup, dust collection, and air monitoring activities were conducted outdoors by EPA, 

other federal agencies, New York City and New York State, New York City formally 

requested federal assistance to clean and/or test residences in the vicinity of the 

WTC site for airborne asbestos.2

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which administered the 

Federal Response Plan, provided such assistance, entering into interagency agreements with EPA in 2002 to develop EPA’s first program. This program allowed residents of Lower Manhattan living south of Canal Street (representing over 20,000 

residences) to elect to have their home professionally cleaned, followed by testing, 

or to have their home tested only. Approximately 20 percent of the eligible residences participated in the program. The majority of these residences were professionally cleaned before they were sampled for asbestos because their owners selected 

the clean and test option rather than the test only option.3 Even though samples 

were collected after cleaning in most cases, some residences (less than 1 percent) 

were still found to have unsafe levels of asbestos. 

EPA’s first program was criticized by several entities; as a result, EPA developed 

a second program, which is the focus of our ongoing work and our testimony today.4

Let me provide some information on the events leading up to the second program. 
84 

standing policy of not addressing issues in ongoing litigation, GAO has not addressed EPA’s first 

test and clean program. 

In August 2003, EPA’s Inspector General made recommendations that addressed 

EPA’s initial efforts to clean up indoor contamination following the towers’ collapse, 

as well as recommendations that focused on EPA’s future preparedness for largescale disasters resulting in indoor contamination. The Inspector General reported 

that the effort to clean up indoor WTC contamination was inadequate for multiple 

reasons. For example, according to the Inspector General, the WTC cleanup did not 

require that entire buildings be systematically cleaned, including heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. As a result, the Inspector General concluded, the contaminants in uncleaned apartments and common areas could enter 

the air supply system and re-contaminate cleaned spaces. With regard to future preparedness, the Inspector General recommended, among other things, that EPA develop protocols for determining how indoor environmental contamination would be 

handled in the event of a future disaster. 

The White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) indicated in October 

2003 that EPA would organize and lead an expert technical review panel to address 

the concerns of the Inspector General and others. In March 2004, EPA convened the 

WTC Expert Technical Review Panel, which met periodically through December 

2005. The panel was composed of 20 individuals from academia and from city and 

federal health and science agencies, such as the Department of Labor’s Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS). It also included two representatives from the CommunityLabor Coalition (CLC), which is a network of community, tenant, labor, and environmental organizations formed after September 11, 2001, to advocate for appropriate 

health and safety efforts in the recovery from the WTC attack. The panel’s overall 

task, as outlined by CEQ, was to advise EPA on efforts to protect New York City 

residents and workers potentially affected by the collapse of the World Trade Center. Specifically, the panel’s goals were to help guide EPA in (1) identifying any remaining risks using exposure and health surveillance information; (2) identifying 

any unmet public health needs; and (3) determining steps to further minimize the 

risks. In addition, the panel was asked to provide advice for EPA’s second program. 

Panel members, including the CLC representatives, submitted individual recommendations to EPA. 

After obtaining the views of advisory groups, including the Inspector General, the 

expert panel, and the CLC, EPA announced its plan for a second program in December 2006. This 2006 plan targets residents and building owners in the same portion 

of Lower Manhattan as EPA’s first program. In the 2006 plan, EPA also provided 

the results of the sampling from its first program. The second program is set to 

begin later in 2007. As of May 10, 2007, EPA told us, 295 residents and building 

owners had enrolled in the second program, compared with 4,166 eligible participants in the first program. Figure 1 shows the chronology of events preceding the 

second program. 
85 
86 

5The National Response Plan replaced the Federal Response Plan. The Federal Response Plan 

was in effect on September 11, 2001. 

Our testimony, which is based on our ongoing work evaluating EPA’s development 

of its second program, discusses (1) EPA’s actions to implement recommendations 

from the expert panel and its Inspector General, (2) the completeness of information 

EPA provided to the public in its second plan, and 

(3) EPA’s assessment of available resources to conduct the program. 

In summary, while we found that EPA has taken some actions to incorporate recommendations from the Inspector General and expert panel members into its second 

program, it decided not to incorporate other recommendations, which may limit the 

program’s overall effectiveness. For example, EPA’s second program incorporates 

recommendations to expand the number of contaminants tested, from asbestos only, 

to three additional contaminants and to test in dust as well as in the air. However, 

EPA’s program does not incorporate a recommendation to expand the boundaries of 

cleanup to north of Canal Street and to Brooklyn. EPA reported that it was unable 

to develop a method for distinguishing between normal urban dust and WTC dust; 

therefore, the agency reported that it cannot assess the extent of WTC contamination, and has no basis for expanding the cleanup effort. EPA did not begin examining methods for differentiating between normal urban dust and WTC dust until 

May 2004—nearly 3 years after the disaster—and therefore the process for differentiating was more difficult. In addition, EPA’s second program does not incorporate 

recommendations to sample in HVACs or ‘‘inaccessible’’ locations within apartments 

and common areas, such as behind dishwashers. The agency chose to offer more limited testing in a greater number of apartments and common areas rather than to 

provide more comprehensive testing (such as in HVACs) in a smaller number of 

these areas. Testing in such a restricted manner make evaluating the adequacy of 

clean up efforts very difficult, and may discourage participation. Moreover, this program does not incorporate the recommendation to test workplaces because, according to EPA officials, other federal agencies have procedures to address worker safety. We discussed the issues we address in this statement with EPA. 

EPA did not provide sufficient information in its second plan to allow the public 

to make informed choices about their participation. Specifically, EPA did not fully 

disclose the limitations in the testing results from its first program. EPA concluded 

that a ‘‘very small’’ number of samples from its first program exceeded risk levels 

for airborne asbestos. However, EPA did not explain that this conclusion was to be 

expected because it took over 80 percent of the samples after residences were professionally cleaned. In addition, EPA did not fully explain that its conclusion was 

based on participation from only 20 percent of the eligible residences. Without this 

additional information, residents who could have elected to participate might have 

been discouraged from doing so because of EPA’s conclusion. 

EPA did not assess the adequacy of available resources to carry out its second 

program effectively. Instead of assessing the costs of carrying out its program and 

providing resources accordingly, EPA has simply identified how much money was 

left over from the first program. Further, the amount of funding provided for the 

second program seems inconsistent with the scale of second program activities. Specifically, the $7 million EPA plans to spend for the second program’s testing and 

cleaning is less than 20 percent of the first program’s funding, despite an increase 

in the number and type of contaminants being sampled. EPA indicated that if demand had exceeded available resources, EPA would have simply limited participation in the program. 

BACKGROUND

After the collapse of the World Trade Center and the accompanying spread of dust 

resulting from the collapse, EPA, other federal agencies, and New York City and 

New York State public health and environmental authorities focused on numerous 

outdoor activities, including cleanup, dust collection, and air monitoring. In May 

2002, New York City formally requested federal assistance to clean and test building interiors in the vicinity of the WTC site for airborne asbestos. Such assistance 

may be made available to state and local governments under the Stafford Act and 

the National Response Plan, which establishes the process and structure for the federal government to provide assistance to state and local agencies when responding 

to threats or acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies.5 FEMA, 

which coordinates the federal response to requests for assistance from state and 

local governments, entered into interagency agreements with EPA to develop and 
87 

6 EPA’s second program does allow commercial building owners to request testing and cleaning, but does not permit workers or employers to do so. 7 A total of 640 individual residents and building owners registered for the second program. 

Of this total, 295 eligible participants submitted the necessary access agreements. 

implement the first and second indoor cleanup programs for residents in Lower 

Manhattan. 

EPA INCORPORATED SOME RECOMMENDATIONS, BUT ITS DECISION NOT TO ADOPT

OTHERS MAY LIMIT THE SECOND PROGRAM’S EFFECTIVENESS

In response to recommendations from the Inspector General and expert panel 

members, EPA’s second program incorporates some additional testing elements. For 

example, EPA is testing for a wider range of contaminants. In addition to asbestos, 

EPA will test for man-made vitreous fibers, which are in such materials as building 

and appliance insulation; lead; and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, a group of 

over 100 different chemicals that are formed during the incomplete burning of coal, 

oil, gas, and garbage. EPA will also test dust as well as the air. In order to test 

the dust for these contaminants, EPA had to develop cleanup standards. However, 

EPA’s second program does not incorporate the following other recommendations: (1) 

broadening the geographic scope of the testing effort, (2) testing HVACs and ‘‘inaccessible’’ locations, and (3) expanding the program to include workplaces.6

Broadening the geographic scope of testing.—EPA did not expand the scope of testing north of Canal Street, as well as to Brooklyn, as advisory groups had recommended. EPA reported that it did not expand the scope of testing because it was 

not able to differentiate between normal urban dust and WTC dust, which would 

have enabled it to determine the geographic extent of WTC contamination. Some expert panel members had suggested that EPA investigate whether it was feasible to 

develop a method for distinguishing between normal urban dust and WTC dust. 

EPA ultimately agreed to do so. Beginning in 2004—almost 3 years after the disaster—EPA conducted this investigation. EPA officials told us that because so much 

time had passed since the terrorist attack, it was difficult to distinguish between 

WTC dust and urban dust. EPA ultimately abandoned this effort because peer reviewers questioned its methodology; EPA decided not to explore alternative methods 

that the peer reviewers had proposed. Instead, EPA will test only in an area where 

visible contamination has been confirmed by aerial photography conducted soon 

after the WTC attack. However, aerial photography does not reveal indoor contamination, and EPA officials told us that they knew that some WTC dust was found 

immediately after the terrorist attacks outside the area eligible for its first and second program, such as in Brooklyn. 

Testing HVACs and in inaccessible areas.—In its November 2005 draft plan for 

the second program, EPA had proposed collecting samples from a number of locations in HVACs. In some buildings HVACs are shared, and in others each residence 

has its own system. In either case, contaminants in the HVAC could recontaminate the residence unless the system is also professionally cleaned. However, EPA’s second program will not provide for testing in HVACs unless tests in 

common areas reveal that standards for any of four contaminants have been exceeded. EPA explains in the second plan that it will not sample within HVACs because 

it chose to offer more limited testing in a greater number of apartments and common areas rather than provide more comprehensive testing in a smaller number of 

these areas. Similarly, EPA had proposed sampling for contaminants in ‘‘inaccessible’’ locations, such as behind dishwashers and rarely moved furniture within 

apartments and common areas. Again, because it was unable to differentiate between normal urban dust and WTC dust, EPA stated that it would not test in inaccessible locations in order to devote its resources to as many requests as possible. 

In fact, EPA only received 295 requests from residents and building owners to participate in the second program, compared with 4,166 eligible participants in the first 

program.7

Expanding the program to include workers/workplaces. According to EPA’s second 

program plan, the plan is ‘‘the result of ongoing efforts to respond to concerns of 

residents and workers.’’ Workers were concerned that workplaces in Lower Manhattan experienced the same contamination as residences. In its second program, EPA 

will test and clean common areas in commercial buildings, but will do so only if an 

individual property owner or manager requests the service. EPA stated that employees who believe their working conditions are unsafe as a result of WTC dust may 

file a complaint with OSHA or request an evaluation by HHS’s National Institute 

of Occupational Safety and Health. Concerns remain, however, because these other 

agencies do not have the authority to conduct cleanup in response to contaminant 
88 

levels that exceed standards. In addition, OSHA’s standards are designed primarily 

to address airborne contamination, while EPA’s test and clean program is designed 

to address contamination in building spaces, whether the contamination is airborne 

or in settled dust. Thus, OSHA can require individual employers to adopt work 

practices to reduce employee exposure to airborne contaminants, whereas EPA’s test 

and clean program is designed to remove contaminants from affected spaces. 

EPA DID NOT PROVIDE THE PUBLIC WITH SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO MAKE FULLY

INFORMED DECISIONS

EPA did not provide sufficient information in its second plan so that the public 

could make informed choices about their participation. Specifically, EPA did not 

fully disclose the limitations in the testing results from its first program. While EPA 

stated that the number of samples in its first program exceeding risk levels for airborne asbestos was ‘‘very small,’’ it did not fully explain that this conclusion was 

limited by the following factors. 

Participation.—Participation in the program came from about 20 percent of the 

residences eligible for participation. In addition, participation was voluntary, which 

may suggest that the sample of apartments was not representative of all the residences eligible for the program. Those who chose to participate may not have been 

at greatest risk. 

Contaminants tested.—EPA’s cleanup decisions were based only on tests for asbestos, rather than other contaminants, and the decisions focused on airborne contamination rather than contamination in dust inside residences. 

Sampling protocol.—EPA took over 80 percent of the samples after professional 

cleaning was complete. Therefore it is not surprising that EPA found few samples 

exceeding its asbestos standard. 

EPA also did not explain in its second program plan that its first program’s test 

results excluded samples that were discarded because they were ‘‘not cleared—that 

is, could not be analyzed because the filter had too many fibers to be analyzed under 

a microscope. However, EPA’s final report on its first program stated that residences with more than one inconclusive result, such as filter overload, were encouraged to have their residences re-cleaned and re-tested. EPA did not explain the impact of excluding these samples or other data limitations from its conclusion that 

the number of samples exceeding asbestos standards was very small. Without providing complete explanations of the data, residents who could have elected to participate might have been discouraged from doing so. 

EPA DID NOT ADEQUATELY ASSESS RESOURCE NEEDS FOR THE SECOND PROGRAM

EPA did not take steps to ensure that resources would be adequate to achieve the 

second program’s objectives. Instead, EPA is implementing this program with the 

funding remaining after its first program—approximately $7 million. EPA could not 

provide us with any basis for determining whether this funding level is appropriate. 

EPA officials told us that they were unable to determine the cost of the program 

without knowing the number of participants. However, we note that funds available 

for the second program are less than 20 percent of the first program’s funding, despite an increase in the number and type of contaminants being sampled. 

Almost two-thirds of the panel members told us they did not believe the $7 million for the sampling and cleanup was sufficient. According to one of the expert panel’s chairmen—a former EPA Assistant Administrator—the $7 million was sufficient 

for initial sampling in the second program, but not for sampling and cleanup. If demand had exceeded available resources, EPA would have simply limited participation by ranking program applicants on the basis of their proximity to the WTC site. 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Shortcomings in EPA’s second program to test and clean residences for WTC contamination raise questions about the agency’s preparedness for addressing indoor 

contamination resulting from future disasters. The effectiveness of this program 

may be limited because some important recommendations were not incorporated, 

and because program implementation will not begin until later this year—more 

than 5 years after the World Trade Center collapsed. Furthermore, owing to these 

factors, the majority of panel members do not support EPA’s second program, noting 

that it was not responsive to the concerns of residents and workers harmed by the 

collapse of the WTC towers, it was scientifically and technically flawed, or it was 

unacceptable because it would not identify the extent of contamination. Some panel 

members questioned the value of participating in EPA’s program, and even stated 

that they would discourage participation. 
89 

Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this testimony. For further information about this testimony, please contact John B. Stephenson, Director, Natural Resources and Environment (202) 512–3841, or stephensonj@gao.gov. Key contributors to this testimony 

were Janice Ceperich, Katheryn Summers Hubbell, Karen Keegan, Omari Norman, 

Diane B. Raynes, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, and Sandra Tasic. Additional assistance was provided by Katherine M. Raheb. 
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Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Stephenson. 

If I may begin by directing a series of questions to Mr. 

Connaughton, Chairman Connaughton. As you noted in your testimony, you and I did meet to discuss the findings of the 2003 Inspector General report, because the report did raise a number of 

serious concerns, primarily White House interference with EPA’s 

communications about air quality and flaws with EPA’s indoor test 

and clean plan. 

I appreciate that we reached an accommodation at that time on 

the indoor contamination issue in the form of your commitment to 

launch an expert panel to look into it. We will explore the work of 

that panel and its results with other witnesses. 

But I think it is fair to say, Chairman Connaughton, that there 

remained a number of troubling issues, raised by the EPA Inspector General, about EPA’s early statements about air quality. This 

is really an opportunity for you to respond to some of these, because I think in the area of lessons learned, the whole issue of how 

we communicate with the public is critical. Every study that I have 

read about how best to convey information to the public with respect to a disaster puts a very high priority on the quality of information, the accuracy of information, the validation of that information by independent sources. Certainly, the Inspector General 

found that EPA’s early statements that the air was safe to breathe 

was incomplete. It lacked necessary qualifications and was not supported by the data available at the time. 

Let me just ask you, isn’t it true that CEQ was involved in the 

drafting of those statements about air quality? 

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Yes, that’s right, Madam Chairwoman. Very 

soon after the attack, Deputy Chief of Staff Josh Bolton established 

a domestic consequences group that ensured that there would be 

significant coordination among the different agencies, Federal 

agencies, in responding, not just in response, but also in communications and other issues associated with that, so that we would 

be working in a coordinated manner. You had ATSDR, you had 

EPA, you had OSHA, you had the New York State Department of 

Health, you had the New York City Department of Health. There 

were a lot of entities that were ramping up to a response. It was 

clear that some level of organization and coordination was going to 

be necessary. 

Not just with the response. What we were doing with the environmental response had to then also take into account, we did not 

know if another attack was coming. The National Security Council, 

there needed to be a central node with them, so that we could feed 

in the environmental piece of the equation while they were looking 

at some of the human health issues, while they were looking at 

some of the security issues, the first responder issues, to be sure 

that we are doing triage on the highest priorities, getting the information that we needed in order and being sure we were taking advantage of resources. 

Senator CLINTON. But let me ask you, Mr. Chairman, because 

the Inspector General goes on to say that the Agency did not reflect 

in its statements the best professional advice of the Agency’s own 

experts. It appeared that the EPA’s best professional advice was 
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overruled when relaying information to the public in the weeks immediately following the disaster. 

Further, the AGA found that the White House Council on Environmental Quality, which you chair, influenced through the collaboration process which you just described the information that 

EPA communicated to the public through its early press releases, 

when it convinced EPA to add reassuring statements and to delete 

cautionary ones. 

So let me ask: did you convince EPA to add reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones? 

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I think those characterizations by the Inspector General were incompletely formed and inaccurate. 

Senator CLINTON. Well, let me just show you, the EPA IG report 

contains several specific examples of these types of changes, and 

one of them is reproduced on a chart that I brought today. Let me 

see—it is impossible to read, but as the chart shows, a draft September 13, 2001 press release stated that ‘‘Preliminary results of 

EPA’s sampling activities,’’ the thousands of samples that Ms. 

Bodine referred to, ‘‘indicated no or very low levels of asbestos. 

However, even at low levels, EPA considers asbestos hazardous and 

will continue to monitor and sample for elevated levels of asbestos 

and work with appropriate officials to ensure awareness and proper 

handling, transportation and disposal of potentially contaminated 

debris or materials.’’ 

That was the original draft. The final release stated that ‘‘EPA 

is greatly relieved to have learned that there appears to be no significant levels of asbestos dust in the air in New York City. We are 

working closely with rescue crews to ensure that all appropriate 

precautions are taken. We will continue to monitor closely. Public 

health concerns about asbestos contamination are primarily related 

to long-term exposure. Short-term low-level exposure is unlikely to 

cause significant effects.’’ 

There is a difference between the meaning and the impact of 

those. EPA originally said, however, even at low levels, EPA considered asbestos hazardous. 

So why did CEQ overrule EPA, an agency with considerably 

more staff and expertise about environmental hazards, and modify 

that press release? 

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Actually, the inverse was the case, Madam 

Chairwoman. We had daily and sometimes more than daily conference calls with the people from Region 2, as well as the people 

here in Washington, including CEQ, that were going over all the 

communications and all of the data. What Mr. Thurndstrom was 

doing was coordinating the output of those discussions. The people 

drafting the press releases were not necessarily the professionals 

who were providing advice on how to construe the data. 

So the final product of that one particular press release was the 

product of a much broader discussion among the public health professionals in the field and back here in Washington on how to 

make this one particular statement. 

The other thing that is important, Madam Chairman, this is one 

press release out of what were thousands and thousands of communications. We had a particular focus on the workers, who faced extreme danger in the conditions during the recovery and rescue 
93 

work. We had a second focus on the people who were acutely exposed to the volume of dust immediately after the collapse, and 

that really was in the hands of the public health professionals. 

EPA was instrumental in encouraging people to go seek medical 

help and monitoring. 

Then there was the third category about the residents, the people 

who were distant from the immediate Ground Zero, but who were 

worried about the smell and the odor and all the things that you 

all know about, the visceral scents from the fires in the days that 

followed September 11th. So what this one press release was was 

the first statement regarding the ambient concerns and it was specifically focused on the questions that came up with respect to asbestos. The data that we had in hand 5 days after monitoring started actually provided much greater reassurance. I can tell you, all 

of us were relieved. We feared that there would be quite substantial amounts of asbestos that people might be directly exposed to. 

As it happens, the data was showing that that was not the case. 

I think the statement in the final press release was the accurate 

one. It is the other formulations that we decided as a group that 

needed to be adjusted. So this is not—your representation of overruling or not overruling and misleading, it just doesn’t capture the 

nature of the dynamic we had at the time. We discussed this a bit 

in your office, and again, I am happy to go into greater detail on 

that process. 

Senator CLINTON. Well, Mr. Connaughton, my time is up, I am 

going to go to my colleagues. But would you be willing to answer 

more specific questions of the nature that would get to the bottom 

of this? Because there is, as you are well aware, other evidence, 

particularly concerning Mr. Thurndstrom and some of his statements and some of the e-mail exchanges between Region 2 and the 

CEQ and EPA here in Washington. 

What we are trying to figure out is how to sort this out. Because 

I think it is fair to say that many people in New York took the 

statements and were greatly relieved and reassured about them. If 

there had been a more accurate depiction, and I would argue that 

the first press release was more accurate, that low levels of asbestos exposure, to say nothing of everything else that was in the air, 

could pose health hazards, people could have made appropriate decisions. 

That is where we are trying to get to the lessons learned here. 

I believe we should always err on the side of giving as accurate a 

picture as possible, so that people can make decisions for themselves. But let me move now to Senator Craig. 

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Senator, if I might, just on one point, the 9/ 

11 Commission did look at all this very carefully and they talked 

with all of us. They concluded that although the White House review process resulted in some editorial changes to the press releases, these changes were consistent with what the EPA had already been saying without White House clearance. 

What we are trying to do on that one press release that everyone 

is focused on is bring into one place what had been a constant flow 

of information on the ground directly to people. I don’t know about 

you, but I don’t read press releases. I don’t think the public was 

reading the press release. What it was was follow-up by reporters 
94 

who were getting more detailed, there were outside people commenting on what the risks were. The New York Department of 

Public Health was making commentary on some of the human 

health issues. 

But really, the most important communications are the ones that 

Governor Whitman—— 

Senator CLINTON. Mr. Connaughton, I understand your position. 

It is also clear, and we should put into the record, there is a current lawsuit going on, which you are well aware of, and under oath, 

the judge has reached very different conclusions based on the testimony that has been provided so far, and gone to the extent of even 

calling Governor Whitman and others at the EPA misleading and 

given great emphasis to the way that this information was communicated, and done so, I think based more accurately on the evidence 

that has been before it. 

But I would just appreciate your willingness to provide additional information, so that we could sort this out. Let me turn now 

to Senator Craig. 

Senator CRAIG. Madam Chairman, I am going to yield to Senator 

Inhofe because of his schedule, then I will come back. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, Senator Craig and 

Madam Chairman. 

Let me start off by recalling to the memories around here that 

I chaired this committee during the years after 9/11. In fact, I was 

somewhat apologetic to you and others during that period of time, 

because we had such intense oversight and so many questions. You 

were always very, very cooperative, and I want to compliment you 

publicly on that, Chairman Connaughton. 

Let me ask you this question. Isn’t it reasonable for a White 

House office, such as CEQ, to coordinate with Federal agencies to 

involve and produce common Federal messages? Are there any 

issues about this you would like to clarify concerning Federal communications? 

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I think in the after-reviews of what happened, I think the process that Deputy Chief of Staff Bolton put in 

place earned high praise, the fact that we were able to so rapidly 

create the coordination function that later became the Homeland 

Security Council, which also everybody was very strongly supportive of across the country, the Governors in particular. So what 

we had going on what exactly what people would expect. You would 

hope that the President and the White House were on top of the 

situation, and were actually coordinating to be sure that information was being obtained in a timely fashion, we are prioritizing 

those needs and we are getting people out to the right people in 

the right place at the right time. 

As a participant in that process, I found it particularly effective. 

Everyone was throwing in their oars. We had fly-overs, doing satellite monitoring, we had airplane monitoring, we had on the 

ground monitoring. That information was coming in at a level of 

detail and a level of coordination that you typically do not see, and 

it is to be commended. 

Senator INHOFE. I am glad you are clarifying that, because we 

had hearings involving all those other parties. I thought it was 

done quite well. 
95 

Let me ask you, Mr. Stephenson, you heard my opening statement, a quote that I made from the New York City Health Commissioner Frieden. I will read it again: ‘‘The environmental investigations and testing conducted in lower Manhattan indicate that 

the potential health impacts from any remaining World Trade Center dust are extremely low or non-existent.’’ Did you consult New 

York City’s Department of Health during the compilation of your 

report, and do you disagree or agree with that statement? 

Mr. STEPHENSON. We did meet with them. They are talking 

about ambient air samples, I believe. We were looking specifically 

at indoor air and the second program in particular. So the sampling I was talking about took place on a voluntary basis from indoor apartments. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. Captain Rodenbeck, let me ask you a 

question. Why don’t you first of all define for some of us what dust 

signature is, then I will ask my question. 

Captain RODENBECK. In this particular case, when we are talking 

about a dust signature, it is the makeup of the dust that makes 

it unique to the original source. So in this case, we are talking 

about how the building material that generated the dust is different in a way so you could look at different samples and say, yes, 

this originated from the World Trade Center. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. Now, were you able to do that, I understand that you were not able to complete the dust sampling to 

your satisfaction? 

Captain RODENBECK. Not to our satisfaction, no. 

Senator INHOFE. I see. Can you comment on whether you believe 

that the current testing and cleaning program is a step in the right 

direction? 

Captain RODENBECK. Without the dust signature, we cannot fundamentally answer the basic question that we all want to answer: 

is there still World Trade Center dust out there at levels of health 

concern. 

Senator INHOFE. Ms. Bodine, you made the comment that you 

talked about lessons learned. I don’t think you had a chance to 

elaborate any on that. Would you like to? 

Ms. BODINE. Yes, thank you, Senator. 

I wanted to point out, one of the challenges during 9/11 was certainly trying to come up with benchmarks and sampling protocols 

and methods to address situations that the Agency had not previously had to address. The staff did a tremendous job of consulting 

with experts, drawing together expert opinion and developing 

benchmarks and protocols. 

But certainly as a lesson learned, we know that we can today 

look and say, what can we anticipate, what don’t we know. Today, 

we can start working on closing those information gaps. 

I mentioned that we had established a National Decontamination 

Team. One of their roles is of course, to respond. They always have 

their bags packed. But it is also to identify data gaps and work 

with our National Homeland Security Research Center, which is in 

Cincinnati, it is one of Dr. Gray’s labs, to work together to do research to close some of those data gaps. 

In addition, we have been developing a network of environmental 

laboratories. Because again, one of the issues during 9/11 and even 
96 

more so during Katrina was just the vast amount of data we collected and it became a capacity issue, collecting data and having 

the labs that are able to analyze it in a sufficient time to then provide good information to the public and provide information to officials who need to make decisions. 

So we have been working with laboratories around the country, 

again, to establish common protocols, so that we have good information, we have information that is of high quality, so that when 

the next disaster hits, we have that capacity. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, and thank you, Senator 

Craig, for helping accommodate my schedule. 

Senator CLINTON. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

It is obvious that there are different memories of things that 

were done and said and challenges to the reliability of things. You 

are all under strictures that talked about correct or not false statements. So I just wanted to be sure that that is clearly understood, 

and that, because, as the Chairperson described, we are going to 

continue this research of ours. Because there are so many challenges to what is said to be the intention of the White House to 

cover issues, so that they were to downplay the public risks and 

the EPA press releases were changed or modified to downplay 

those risks. 

Why did the CEQ, Mr. Connaughton, decline to meet with the 

EPA Inspector General’s investigators as they were preparing their 

report? 

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. As I understand it, and you are now taking 

me back many years on this particular item, as I understand it, the 

Inspector General doesn’t have authority to do oversight of offices 

outside of the EPA, and in particular, the President’s offices. So it 

was just an issue of the Inspector General’s authority. That is as 

I understand it. But I was not closely attuned to all the ins and 

outs of that. But that was dealt with by the White House Counsel’s 

Office. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It is hard to see why that wouldn’t, they 

wouldn’t be included in the traditional IG’s activities. 

EPA officials told the Inspector General that your staff deleted 

recommendations that New York City residents obtain professional 

cleaning services for indoor areas. Why would the White House recommend removing those alerts from the statements? 

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Actually, Senator, I am not in a position to 

recall very specific decisions about very specific pieces of text, some 

of which I was not directly involved in. There was an interface between Mr. Thurndstrom of my office, who actually is a New Yorker 

as well, and the EPA on compiling the results of these broader 

interfaces among the public health professionals that I talked 

about. 

So the effort between them was to see, to do the best job they 

could, using their best professional judgment, to capture the information we were receiving and then communicate that in the most 

accurate and timely way we could, and then to update that information as it was obtained. So any particular issue, items were 

added to the press releases, items were deleted to the press releases, items were changed in the press releases. EPA made 
97 

changes, my office made changes, OSHA suggested changes. This 

was a typical process of an inter-agency coordination on a communications document. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But without laboring under the review of 

the process, what are the elements that were obviously changed, 

differentiated, that would cause people to make changes that said, 

well, one particular CEQ official was designated to work with the 

EPA to ensure that clearances were obtained through the National 

Security Council. Although EPA’s position is that World Trade 

Center area residents should obtain professional cleaning, EPA’s 

press releases did not instruct residents to do so. Instead, they instructed residents to follow recommended and proper cleaning procedures. 

We asked the OCEM, our associate administrator, whether her 

office had considered advising the public through a press release 

that they needed to obtain professional cleaning. The associate administrator said it was in a press release, it was removed by a 

CEQ contact. So there are so many differences here, Madam Chairman, that we are going to have to continue getting answers to 

these questions, if necessary, by writing, but also under the framework of forthrightness. 

I want to close, Ms. Bodine, your statement about America 

stronger than ever is almost gratuitous. Because you make that 

statement without looking at the total problems that this country 

has as a result of inaction in the post-9/11 days, and further problems that we have. We have thousands of people doing security 

work, we have constant, we have new findings that terrorists are 

after us, people are living in a fearful mode. In my judgment, and 

I love our country, and I respect so much those who did the heroic 

work to try and save lives down there, there is no insinuation that 

those things were not done properly. It was as a result of the decisions that were made by the Administration, I think, that put people in jeopardy. 

So when you make a statement like that, America is stronger 

than ever, it doesn’t really register. That is your opinion and it 

would be best if you said, just registered it that way. Thank you. 

Senator CLINTON. I am going to ask the witnesses’ indulgence. I 

have to go vote, I will be right back. We will have one final round 

of questions for the witnesses before we move on to the next panel. 

Those of you who have never been to a Senate hearing before, 

this is the way it works. We never know exactly what we are going 

to have to do from minute to minute. But I really appreciate your 

being here. These are important issues and I will be back very 

shortly. 

[Recess.] 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very, very much for your patience. 

I want to just put a few things in the record before I ask my final 

questions. One, the ATSDR fact sheet, and their study says, ‘‘Results probably underestimate the levels of World Trade Center-related material that were in lower Manhattan immediately after 9/ 

11.’’ The sampling that was done and the results, I think are very 

important for our continuing evaluation. 

Second, there is no consensus, it has been said about whether a 

signature is possible, but there were two studies that I would like 
98 

to enter into the record that said a signature was possible. Unfortunately, we didn’t act in a timely manner. The National Science 

Foundation funded work that has even found a defined dust signature in the sediments of New York Harbor. I would enter that into 

the record. 

Then the USGS released in 2005 preliminary studies demonstrating the ability to apply a World Trade Center dust signature 

that can be used to guide health-based research and remediation. 

[The referenced information follows:] 
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Senator CLINTON. Two final things on some of what has been discussed about the EPA’s authority. 

The EPA has done indoor work in Libby, MT since 1992. In 1998, 

there was a Presidential directive put in place putting EPA in 

charge of building decontamination. That is one of the reasons why 

it was quite bewildering to us that there wasn’t an immediate acceptance of responsibility by the EPA and I can only assume that 

that Presidential directive putting EPA in charge of indoor contamination was either not known of or disregarded. 

Now, I want to go back to Ms. Bodine because you spoke at some 

length about the National Response Plan that the EPA put in 

place, I believe you said, in 2003, is that correct? 

Ms. BODINE. Our National Approach to Response, correct. 

Senator CLINTON. Right. Well, then, I would like to direct your 

attention to a report issued by the White House Homeland Security 

Advisor, Fran Townsend, in February 2006, about the Administration’s response to Katrina. Again, I quote from it. 

‘‘Federal officials could have improved the identification of environmental hazards and communication of appropriate warnings to 

emergency responders and the public. There must be a comprehensive plan to accurately and quickly communicate this critical information to the emergency responders and area residents who need 

it. Had such a plan existed, the mixed messages from Federal, 

State and local officials on the re-entry into New Orleans could 

have been avoided. DHS, in coordination with EPA, HHS, OSHA 

and DOE, should develop an integrated plan to quickly gather environmental data and provide the public and emergency responders 

the most accurate information available to decide whether it is safe 

to operate in a disaster environment or return after evacuation. 

This plan should address how to best communicate risk as well as 

determine who is accountable for making the determination that 

an area is safe. It should also address the need for adequate laboratory capacity to support response to all hazards. The plan 

should be completed in 180 days.’’ 

Now, this was a finding in a report actually done by the White 

House. It certainly raises questions about the comprehensiveness 

and adequacy of the plan that EPA put into place. Has EPA 

worked with the Department of Homeland Security to respond to 

these requests that Fran Townsend made in her assessment of 

what the Government did after Katrina? 

Ms. BODINE. The Agency has been working on a crisis communication plan. It is still in draft, it is still under review within the 

Agency. There is also under the National Response Plan an Emergency Support Function Number 15, which is called External Affairs, which talks about the coordination of communications among 

all the agencies. 

Senator CLINTON. Well, Ms. Bodine, it has to be clear that if 

there were problems in communicating after 9/11, and as you have 

testified today, the Agency began to take steps to try to have a better plan in place, and yet Katrina comes along and the White 

House’s own review finds that the communication system was inadequate, and it is now nearly 2 years after Katrina and there is still 

not a communication plan, that has to raise serious doubts about 

the urgency with which the Administration approaches these 
130 

issues. I would like to see a report from the EPA detailing where 

you are in response to this requirement to have a better plan and 

a further report as soon as you can get that to the committee. 

[The referenced information follows:] 

Recommendation 87 of the White House (Townsend) Report, ‘‘The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,’’ referred to by Chairman Clinton, 

recommended that the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with EPA 

and other Federal agencies, develop an integrated plan regarding communication of 

environmental and safety information to the public and emergency responders. The 

Department of Homeland Security is in a better position to report on its efforts to 

address this recommendation. Meanwhile, EPA has taken a number of actions to 

increase the Agency’s ability to provide timely and accurate environmental data in 

future disaster environments, including establishing a crisis communications work 

group to identify and implement opportunities to strengthen crisis communication 

procedures and developing a draft crisis communications plan. 

Let me now turn to GAO, because GAO has done a very thorough 

job in trying to make sense out of many of the contradictory statements and actions that have marked the 9/11 experience. EPA’s 

testimony notes a very low exceedance rate for asbestos in its first 

indoor test and clean program. Your testimony suggests that EPA 

used this data in a misleading way. Can you elaborate on this 

point, and does GAO have any other criticisms about EPA’s risk 

communication after 9/11? Mr. Stephenson? 

Mr. STEPHENSON. First, you have to remember that the first program, as was the second, was a voluntary program. Air samples 

were taken largely after the apartments had been cleaned. There 

was an option for residents to select tests only or test and clean. 

Eighty percent of them, I believe, chose the latter option, to clean 

first and then test. But you have to assume that the others who 

tested only were not sitting around not cleaning their apartments. 

Our only point was that including that information with any 

public communication might have been heard differently by residents deciding to participate in the program or not. 

Senator CLINTON. Let me follow up on that. EPA’s December 

2006 press release announcing the current test and clean program 

included the following statement from Dr. George Gray: ‘‘We believe the potential for exposure related to dust that may remain 

from the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings is low.’’ 

In your judgment, is this statement by Dr. Gray supported by the 

data that the Agency has collected? 

Mr. STEPHENSON. Well, EPA doesn’t have, has never done a comprehensive assessment of a single building. It is all based on voluntary samples from individual residences. It was done without 

benefit of looking for dust in HVAC areas, hard to access areas, et 

cetera. There was an aggressive test approach where they would go 

into the apartment and blow the air out. But it wasn’t clear which 

of the samples were done in that manner versus the samples simply taken after cleaning. So we think the data is quite inconclusive, 

and we don’t think EPA has ever done a comprehensive assessment 

of the extent of damage in a building, let alone in the lower Manhattan area. 

Senator CLINTON. I certainly agree with that, and I think that 

is the fair conclusion, that EPA has not done a comprehensive 

study. I think it’s clear that we don’t have an accurate base of in-
131 

formation to try to determine the causation behind a lot of the illnesses that people are suffering. We know people are getting sick. 

I mentioned a number of studies in my opening statement. Here 

is another one. Just this month, a study published by researchers 

from the New York State Department of Health, the New York 

University School of Medicine and the State University of New 

York at Albany concluded that residents who were exposed to contamination generated by the collapse that had been deposited in 

their homes had a significantly elevated rate of persistent airway 

disease. The study also found a strong correlation between reactive 

airway disease and exposures to indoor contamination for a period 

of 3 months or longer. 

I would like to enter this report into the record, because really 

this all comes back to my concern that we were never fully focused 

on what we needed to do at the time and instead of going forward 

and saying, well, maybe in the immediate aftermath, which I absolutely agree was confusing and difficult, we missed some points, we 

weren’t as clear as we needed to be, let’s regroup and go forward. 

I think the evidence is very clear that we never did what was required. The EPA never did it, the Council on Environmental Quality never required it. I think it is critical to do the oversight and 

have a detailed evaluation of EPA’s readiness to respond to releases of hazardous substances in disasters. 

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Senator CLINTON. Mr. Stephenson, I will soon submit a request 

to GAO to look into this issue of EPA preparedness more broadly. 

Because my concern is intensified by the White House’s own findings about EPA’s failures in the wake of Katrina. I don’t know how 

any of us can sit here and be satisfied that if something disastrous 

happened tomorrow, we would not once again be facing confusion, 

misstatements, failures, that are going to cost people their lives 

and/or their health. 

So we will be submitting additional questions to each of the witnesses. I look forward to your cooperation. Because for me, this is 

about how do we know we are doing better. That is a duty we owe 

to all of our citizens, and I think it is a duty we have not met. 

I would also submit to the record the decision by Judge Batts in 

the case that I referenced in New York that found that Administrator Whitman certainly knew better than the statements that she 

made. On the contrary, the judge found, after looking at extensive 

evidence, that Governor Whitman’s statements were deliberate and 

misleading, and in fact, they shock the conscience. No argument 

can be made that Whitman could not have understood from existing law that her conduct was unlawful. That is not me, that is not 

Inspector General, that is not a political person, that is a Federal 

judge. 

So we have to do much better. We owe it to the people that look 

to their Government to protect them and I hope that we will be 

able to come up with some lessons learned that will plug holes in 

legislation and regulation. 

Senator Lautenberg, do you have any other questions for this 

panel? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Just if I might, and I thank the panel for 

their continuing to be with us. I want to ask Ms. Bodine about 

whether or not EPA today is prepared to make clear and consistent 

statements about the potential short-term and long-term risks 

posed by toxics and dust during an incident that would produce 

that kind of an after effect. Does EPA have a communications program in place to make the kind of, that kind of statement on an 

issue of environmental protection health, really alerting the people 

who could be affected to the risks that are posed by the consequence of this type? 

Ms. BODINE. Senator, I believe that we do. I would like to point 

out the review of EPA’s communications during Katrina by our 

EPA Inspector General. There was a May 2, 2006 report, the title 

is ‘‘EPA Provided Quality and Timely Information on Hurricane 

Katrina, Hazardous Materials Releases and Debris Management.’’ 

The Agency did a fabulous job during Katrina in collecting data 

and making that data available to the public, so that they could 

make decisions about their own safety. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So you feel that we are in better shape 

today as a result of the post-Katrina data flow than we were at the 

time of 9/11? 

Ms. BODINE. Yes. As has been described, at the time the World 

Trade Center event was unprecedented in terms of the amount of 

environmental information we were collecting, analyzing, making 

available. Katrina was even greater in magnitude. Yet our Agency 

employees have developed ways of getting, creating portals, cre-
142 

ating data bases, getting information out far more quickly than we 

were able to during the World Trade Center response. So yes, we 

are in a better position to communicate. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks. Mr. Connaughton, we know that 

CEQ was involved in editing EPA press releases to minimize the 

concern that a more candid assessment of health risks from toxic 

dust might have done. Why does the White House, why do they 

seem so focused on preventing the raw truth to the public? Why did 

you feel it necessary in CEQ to review press statements and 

change things that were in there that might have been of more concern but more candid? 

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. We don’t. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, you did then, according to the reports that we see, that there were modifications of words and statements that you were the final decisionmaker in terms of what was 

allowable, what could go to the press. There are lots of things that 

stress the fact that no releases were to go out without the approval 

of the Administration, and that would have been you. 

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I disagree with your conclusion, Senator. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. All right. Well, we are going to examine 

the record closely and maybe sharpen your recollection. Thanks 

very much. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator Lautenberg. 

Thanks to the panel. I appreciate all of you being here. We will follow up with some specific requests that we hope will get your 

prompt attention. Thank you all. 

Our next panel, as they are coming forward, includes two people 

with direct experience in New York with respect to the issues we 

are examining. David Newman is from the New York Committee 

for Occupational Safety and Health. Nina Lavin is a resident of the 

World Trade Center area. I thank them both very much for being 

part of this investigation and oversight hearing. 

Nina, we are going to start with you. I thank you for taking your 

time to be with us. I look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF NINA LAVIN, RESIDENT 

Ms. LAVIN. Chairman Clinton, Senator Lautenberg, thank you 

for inviting me here to testify today. 

My name is Nina Lavin and I have resided for the past 5 years 

at 105 Duane Street, which is situated seven blocks directly north 

of the World Trade Center. I was home on September 11th and witnessed the collapse of both Towers. Stunned, I evacuated that 

afternoon. 

The next day I returned home to rescue my pets and collect a few 

belongings. Ten days later, when I returned home to stay, a fine, 

glittery dust had settled on virtually every surface and belonging 

throughout my apartment. 

The fabric wallpaper in our hallways had grayed throughout the 

building. I also noticed dust accumulating around the door frame 

of the entrance to my apartment, which looked completely different 

from the standard, grimy dust I was familiar with from housecleaning. 

Christie Todd Whitman’s statement on September 18, 2001, that 

‘‘the air is safe to breathe’’ set dangerous chaos in motion in lower 
143 

Manhattan. For 8 months, EPA insisted they had no responsibility 

for indoor cleanup. Instead, city agencies were left to take the lead. 

But city agencies weren’t set up to handle the fall-out of what was 

in truth a Superfund site. They also had longstanding, inbred relationships with real estate interests. 

The City Department of Environmental Protection allowed landlords to self-certify that their buildings were safe and looked the 

other way when landlords mis-used testing methods to obtain artificially low results, or failed to test at all. When residents sought 

guidance on how to clean up from EPA, they were directed to the 

City Department of Health Web site, where they were instructed 

to clean up World Trade Center dust themselves, by wet wiping. 

That is what I did. 

Later, to protect myself as best I could, I also purchased a HEPA 

vacuum and ran a HEPA air filtration device. For months, noxious 

fumes from the site entered our homes, so that even inside my 

apartment, the fumes were so intense, it was as though I had stuck 

my head inside an oil drum full of burning industrial materials. 

Consequently, I experienced headaches, burning in my eyes, nose 

and throat, and developed a painful, hacking cough. 

By July 2002, I was diagnosed with chronic bronchitis by a 

pulmonologist at NYU Medical Center and was moved out of my 

apartment for almost 10 months with funding from FEMA. Currently, I am receiving treatment at the Bellevue World Trade Center Environmental Health Clinic. 

Today, 51⁄2 years after the event, like so many other residents, 

I have sinusitis and esophagitis, which are conditions of chronic inflammation, and acid reflux, all of which are now recognized as 

being linked to World Trade Center exposures. These symptoms 

are not diminishing, and while they may not be life-threatening, no 

one knows what is in store down the road. 

The big questions remain: What were we exposed to, for how 

long, and are we still being exposed? Unfortunately, we have no answers to any of these questions, in large part because the EPA refused to take its responsibility for assessing and cleaning up indoor 

contamination. 

In 2002, since EPA wasn’t doing any indoor testing at that point 

to protect residents, I took matters into my own hands. I privately 

hired a certified industrial hygienist to conducted asbestos testing 

inside my apartment. My building was constructed in the early 

1990s and therefore, can be presumed to have been constructed 

free of asbestos-containing materials. Testing using the microvac 

method revealed highly elevated concentrations of asbestos in dust 

clumps formed in the front doorway of my apartment, which opens 

into an interior hallway of the building. Significant but lesser levels were found deep inside the two HVAC units. 

Because of these findings, I chose to participate in the voluntary 

cleanup program EPA offered in 2002. I am not a scientist, but 

common sense tells me this program was woefully inadequate. 

First, the cleanup was voluntary and many of my neighbors took 

this as a sign that participation was unnecessary and a waste of 

time. Second, cleanup of building common areas, hallways, lobbies, 

et cetera, was entirely left to the discretion of building owners, posing a serious recontamination scenario. 
144 

Third, cleaning of HVAC systems was flawed and based exclusively upon an unscientific evaluation of dust color. Very few 

HVACs were ever cleaned. 

Finally, the cleanups were performed by seemingly untrained 

workers, using poor equipment. In my apartment, the cleaning 

crew used cheap, dark-colored, non-absorbent, synthetic bathroom 

towels, which moved the wet dirt around without picking it up. 

Luckily, though, on the advice of cleanup professionals I had spoken with, I had a backup plan: Huggie wipes. I gave these to the 

cleaners and once they began using them, the dust and dirt started 

coming off, and coming off—the same surfaces that had previously 

been cleaned using the cheap, synthetic towels. 

Six months after the EPA cleanup of my apartment, I had testing done again for asbestos, lead and numerous heavy metal 

analytes. While asbestos was found in a low level in one window 

well, the lead was found to be elevated in both windows and in one 

of them, just below the cutoff point for which immediate lead remediation would have been required. 

To quote the written report on the finding of heavy metals, ‘‘The 

heavy metal sampling revealed the presence of various heavy metals found in the apartment. Published standards for acceptable levels of heavy metals on surfaces within the space do not exist. 

Standards have not been developed because the presence of most 

of these contaminants is neither a normal nor an acceptable condition in commercial or residential space.’’ 

It is now 2007. Is the air safe to breathe? No one knows. Lessons 

learned by EPA? I have learned the latest EPA cleanup plan is as 

poor as the last. 

Thank you for allowing me to speak today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lavin follows:] 

STATEMENT OF NINA LAVIN, RESIDENT

Chairman Clinton, Ranking Member Craig, and members of the Committee: 

My name is Nina Lavin. I am a resident of lower Manhattan who experienced 

first hand the devastation that the collapse of the World Trade Center wreaked 

upon my neighborhood. I would like to tell you my story with the understanding 

that it is a stand-in for thousands of others like it. I also want you to know of our 

serious lingering concerns that toxic contaminants still remain in our homes. 

I do not always remember the precise dates of events anymore and the story of 

what happened downtown is hard to summarize in one statement. But what remains crystal clear is that Christie Todd Whitman’s words on September 18, 2001, 

assuring New York and the nation that ‘‘the good news is the air is safe to breathe,’’ 

was reckless and false and set dangerous chaos in motion for all of us living downtown. 

Her statement is directly at odds with what she, her agency, and the administration already knew: that out of 143 bulk samples collected out of doors in the days 

immediately following 9/11, 76% of the tests contained asbestos and 34% of those 

tests met the regulatory definition of asbestos containing materials, or ACMs as 

they are known. 

And EPA would also have understood that while outdoor toxins may dissipate 

over time with wind, rain and sunlight, those that make their way indoors can build 

up and remain in high concentrations, settling on surfaces only to be stirred up over 

and over, often invisibly, as people go about their daily lives. In addition, and importantly, those results were only for asbestos, the tip of the iceberg in terms of what 

we were exposed to down here. 

Once the EPA shirked its responsibility to protect us at the federal level, there 

was an immediate trickle down effect to our local EPA Region 2, and to the City 

Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the City Department of Health 

(DOH). As a resident, I saw the way deception starting at the federal level, where 
145 

policy-making begins, then permeated local policy making in all three of these agencies, putting the health and lives of so many people at risk. 

This trickle down was demonstrated over and over in testimony given during the 

February 23, 2002 hearing convened by the EPA Ombudsman’s office, an independent internal watchdog that no longer exists. Indeed, the only two EPA employees I witnessed trying to protect our health here in New York were Ombudsman 

Robert Martin and his Chief Investigator Hugh Kaufman, who were stripped of 

their jobs while trying to expose the failures of the EPA after 9/11. 

Without EPA acting as the lead agency, it was left to the city agencies to take 

the lead; but the city agencies weren’t set up to handle the fall-out of what was in 

truth a super fund site. And those agencies have long standing, inbred relationships 

with real-estate interests so that they looked the other way and sanctioned use of 

passive air testing methods for indoor use, guaranteed to produce artificially low estimates of asbestos in indoor environments. 

I was asked to tell you about ways in which the collapse of the Towers impacted 

my residence, my health, and to describe the EPA cleanup I received in 2003. Here 

is my history. 

RESIDENTIAL IMPACT

I have resided for the past 12 years at 105 Duane St, which is located in Tribeca 

and situated seven blocks directly north of the WTC site. I was home on September 

11 and witnessed the collapse of both towers. I closed the windows and HVAC flu 

vents before the buildings fell; (little did I know that they even would). I closed 

them in an effort to keep the fumes from burning fuel, and the glass which visibly 

sparkled in the sky, from entering my apartment. After the collapse I waited a couple of hours to make sure my two cats would be all right—the sky outside had 

turned the most apocalyptic color I have ever seen, and I had the fear I might return home to find them dead, like canaries in a mine. Ultimately, having just witnessed the collapse of an urban Mt. Fuji before my very eyes, I was numb with 

shock, and fled. The next day I returned, making my way through pitch black hallways with a flashlight to rescue my pets, and collected a few belongings. When I 

returned home ten days later, a fine, glittery dust had settled on virtually every surface and belonging throughout my apartment. The wallpaper in the building, made 

of some type of synthetic fabric, was grayed throughout the building. I also noticed 

a dust accumulating around the doorframe to the entranceway of my apartment 

which looked completely different from the standard grimy dust I was familiar with 

periodically wiping away when house cleaning. Adding to the impact of the collapse, 

our recently hired building superintendent, the father of two small children who no 

doubt had panicked himself on 9/11, had failed to shut down the building’s centralized HVAC system, which continued to run until mid afternoon, when the entire 

neighborhood finally lost power. 

There were also noxious fumes we all inhaled indoors and out for months. Although I live seven blocks north of the site, the fumes were so intense indoors it 

was sometimes almost as though I had stuck my head inside an oil drum full of 

burning industrial materials, office furniture and whatever else was incinerating on 

that pyre. I knew several people who were having nosebleeds and I experienced 

headaches, burning in my eyes, nose, throat, and developed a painful hacking cough. 

I did the best I could to clean my apartment using whatever information I could 

find at that time; I used wet wipe cleaning methods to avoid stirring up the dust, 

I purchased a HEPA vacuum cleaner, and ran a HEPA air filtration device. 

In December 2001, a resident on the 10th floor of my building hired Ed Olmsted, 

a Certified Industrial Hygienist, to test the public air supply grille on that floor. 

Olmsted conducted a microvac test that revealed 550,000 structures of asbestos per 

cubic centimeter, a high finding, especially for a building built free of ACM’s. 

Meanwhile, the building owner, Related Management, hired Air Tech to do a 

standard air shaft cleaning. Not only was Air Tech not certified to do asbestos remediation, they had never cleaned a building this size. 

Since stirring up the dust in the air supply duct would send the dust straight into 

hallways throughout the building, Joel Kupferman, an environmental attorney to 

whom one of my neighbors had turned for help, contacted the DEP and DOH and 

notified them of the asbestos finding. He also contacted Related Management and 

insisted that representatives of the two agencies be admitted to do an inspection. 

Along with another tenant, I attended the walk-through of several hallways, 

pointing out the dust on the HVAC grille to the DEP and DOH inspectors and to 

Related Management’s Head of Engineering Peter Hoyle. It should be noted that Related Management is one of the wealthiest and most politically powerful real estate 

entities in New York. In the meeting, Hoyle asked Carlstein Lutchmedial, a senior 
146 

member of DEP’s asbestos enforcement team, ‘‘Is it not so that Related Management 

has done everything which it is legally mandated to do?’’ Lutchmedial replied, ‘‘Yes, 

Related Management has done everything which is legally mandated.’’ 

Both agencies then permitted the cleanup to go forward in a building full of residents coming and going, who were largely unaware that this was even an issue. 

By July of 2002 I finally had developed such a serious cough I felt as though my 

throat would fly out of my mouth. Since EPA wasn’t doing any indoor testing to protect residents, the air being safe to breathe, I realized it was time for me to do what 

should have been the government’s job. I privately hired Certified Industrial Hygienist Ed Olmsted, who had tested the 10th floor grille back in December and who 

headed air monitoring oversight at the Fresh Kills 9/11 debris removal site in Staten Island, to conduct asbestos testing inside my apartment. 

I reside in a one bedroom apartment in which the windows and two individual 

HVAC units, located in my living room and bedroom, directly face the World Trade 

Center site. My building was constructed in the early 1990’s and therefore can be 

presumed to have been constructed free of asbestos containing materials and likewise free of corrosive lead containing paint and pipes. Due to the highly cost prohibitive nature of such testing (a written report, three asbestos tests plus one blank 

for control cost $1,700.00) I tested for asbestos alone. 

Testing using the microvac method revealed highly elevated concentrations of asbestos in dust clumps formed in the front doorway of my apartment which opens 

into an interior hallway of the building, and lesser levels deep inside the two HVAC 

units. The interior doorway finding is particularly significant because due to the design of airflow in the building, it definitively implicates the central air intake shaft 

as being the source of the contamination. Presumably it therefore entered other 

apartments as well. 

I took my test report to FEMA in late July, believing they would move me with 

these results in hand. But again, because ‘‘the air was safe to breathe,’’ and because 

the building was structurally sound, FEMA would not move me. FEMA was not 

willing to move anyone without a doctor’s note, which meant people had to wait 

until they became sufficiently sick to obtain a doctor’s note before being moved. 

What I needed was not proof of exposure, it was a doctor’s note, and as I was becoming sick, that was my next step. 

HEALTH IMPACT

In July of 2002 I was diagnosed with chronic bronchitis by a pulmonologist at 

NYU Medical Center, a diagnosis corroborated by my primary care physician. Doctor’s letter in hand, I was finally moved out of my apartment for almost ten months 

with funding from FEMA. I should add that even with this letter, it took the intervention of Congressman Nadler’s office to get FEMA to comply in a timely manner 

and relocate me. (I wonder how many others whose health was impacted didn’t 

know they could turn to their elected officials for help.) By the time I was moved 

out I had an uncontrollable racking, painful cough and my sinuses and esophagus 

were chronically inflamed. I had also developed acid reflux. 

Currently I am receiving treatment at the Bellevue WTC Clinic from its medical 

director Dr. Joan Riebman. Initially I had hoped my symptoms might begin to subside, but unfortunately, five and a half years after the event, I like so many others 

continue to have a lingering group of symptoms, now recognized by the medical community as being linked to WTC exposure. My particular symptoms are sinusitis, 

esophagitis and acid reflux. My voice has changed slightly and I frequently become 

horse at night; I do not have asthma, but subtle changes in my small airways have 

shown up on x-rays. I am sorry to say I am not seeing diminishment of symptoms. 

These health problems are not life threatening at the moment but no one knows 

what’s in store down the road. We certainly know of the exposure related deaths 

of first responders and recovery workers. The big questions remain: what were we 

exposed to, for how long, and does the exposure continue? 

EPA CLEANUP

Months after the collapse, in May of 2002, EPA finally announced they were offering a voluntary residential cleanup program. Comprehensive testing and remediation of indoor residences and office spaces should have been mandatory to protect 

the health of citizens and to prevent recontamination of cleaned spaces by nearby 

un-remediated spaces. 

Voluntary enrollment implied there was no problem; I spoke with neighbors who 

trusted the government assurances and who read ‘‘voluntary’’ to mean having their 

homes cleaned was unnecessary and a waste of time. To also quote from one of the 

outreach fliers created by EPA for public distribution: ‘‘While scientific data does not 
147 

point to any significant long-term health risks, people should not have to live with 

uncertainty about the future.’’ http://www.epa.gov/wtc/flyers/onepagead.pdf This 

quote implies there is no problem with air quality because if there were, there 

would be long-term health risks. 

Another voluntary choice thrust upon residents by EPA was between two different 

options, with no explanation given for choosing one over the other. They were: • ‘‘To have your residence professionally cleaned and then tested for asbestos in 

air.’’ • ‘‘To have your residence tested for asbestos in air without professional cleaning. 

(If—and only if—asbestos is found during testing, you many then ask that your 

residence be professionally cleaned.’’) Again, the air testing methods used for this 

determination were of questionable use in revealing presence of asbestos, and were 

not adequate for uncovering other kinds of contamination. 

While individuals could elect to have their homes cleaned, cleanup of building 

common areas, hallways, lobbies, laundry rooms, etc. was entirely at the discretion 

of building owners. Many landlords did not want to participate in the EPA cleanup 

since this could be seen as suggesting that their buildings were contaminated, potentially setting off tenants’ fears and even flight, raising the specter of litigation 

or possible devaluation of their property. 

There was the further, key issue of residual contamination in central HVAC systems. EPA and DEP avoided cleaning those by devising a visual inspection method. 

Sometime in early 2003 I witnessed the inspection in my building. A duct cleaning 

contractor climbed up a ladder and peered into several of the building’s 10’’ x 10’’ 

hallway vent openings, using a home owner’s flashlight. The evaluation was based 

on the color of the dust. Looking inside the dark air shaft, my contractor described 

our dust as, ‘‘kind of brownish grey. . . .’’ Later I was extremely dismayed to learn 

that this description was being used by EPA to claim that our HVAC was free of 

WTC dust. 

Not content to accept this conclusion based on this preposterous and unscientific 

determination, a neighbor of mine and I reached out to Congressman Nadler for 

help. So Linda Rosenthal of Congressman Nadler’s staff accompanied us to a meeting with Kathy Callahan, EPA Region 2 Assistant Administrator. We argued that 

EPA was required to clean the ductwork, particularly since testing of the duct, 

seven months after Related Management’s supposed cleanup job, again showed the 

presence of asbestos. Kallahan acknowledged she was aware of the asbestos in our 

building and stated she knew it originated from the collapse of the World Trade 

Center. Nonetheless, she staunchly refused to remediate the building’s air supply 

duct. I believe this refusal stemmed from her awareness that it would set a precedent for cleaning of duct work in other buildings, particularly large ones. 

On the day of my cleanup in late April of 2003, several work crews arrived on 

my floor, the goal being for several units to be cleaned simultaneously per day. 

Many of the workers appeared to be quite young. They were not equipped with dual 

cartridge respirators as this was conceived of as a ‘‘courtesy cleanup,’’ not a remediation. My apartment was an exception; armed with my test results, I was able to 

make the case that the workers wear respirators; cleaning crews elsewhere on the 

same floor wore none. The contractor had not supplied the crew with sufficient 

amounts of filter cartridges on hand, so I distributed some of my own. 

Towards the end of the day the On Scene Coordinator (OSC) stopped by my apartment to check on the proceedings; I learned the mandatory air filtration device in 

my apartment, required in order to capture airborne particulates during cleanup, 

had been improperly set-up; so no air filtration had occurred. It is a good thing we 

were all wearing respirators. 

And the wet wiping methods used to clean surfaces in my home? They were all 

dark colored, cheap synthetic bathroom towels, purple and forest green, which just 

dragged the wet dust around without picking it up. The same was true for their disposable, synthetic paper towels. 

But on advice I had previously gathered from environmental cleanup professionals, I had a backup cleaning plan—Huggy Wipes. When I purchased my respirator from a major supplier to the environmental cleanup industry I explained to 

them my apartment had been impacted by the WTC; they advised me the very best 

thing I could use for wet wiping cleanup was Huggy Wipes. And they were right. 

I brought out the Huggy Wipes and once the crew began using them, the dust 

and dirt just kept coming off and coming off—the same surfaces that had already 

been ‘‘cleaned’’ with the cheap supplies they had brought. 

They cleaned wall surfaces and floors, and objects, but they didn’t clean interiors 

of closets, cabinets or drawers, because the EPA protocol excluded those places. And 

they didn’t remove the HVAC units from the walls to get at the contamination behind them that had penetrated from outdoors. 
148 

When the cleanup crew left at the end of the day, I looked down at the door jam 

and saw a large clump of dust, fallen from around the same doorway where independent testing had found the asbestos. 

And it stands to reason that dust was left behind in hard to reach places. The 

cleanup protocol had no provision for inclusion of window tracks, so my sliding windows were not removed from their tracks, and the dust reservoirs were left untouched. 

That has ramifications to this day. The exterior of my windows are depressingly 

dirty, but they must be removed from their tracks in order for the exteriors to be 

cleaned. Removal of them for standard cleanup may well re-contaminate my apartment with underlying dust deposits; if dust is still there, it may be seeping into my 

apartment slowly instead. 

Six months after the EPA cleanup of my apartment I had testing done again, for 

asbestos, lead and numerous heavy metal analytes. While asbestos was found in a 

low level in one window well, lead was found to be elevated in both window wells 

and in one of them, just below the cutoff point for which immediate lead remediation would have been required. To quote the written report on the finding of heavy 

metals, ‘‘The heavy metal sampling revealed the presence of various heavy metals 

found in the apartment. Published standards for acceptable levels of heavy metals 

on surfaces within the space do not exist. Standards have not been developed because the presence of most of these contaminants is neither a normal nor an acceptable condition in commercial or residential space.’’ 

It is now 2007. Is the air safe to breathe? No one knows and the newly devised 

cleanup plan is as poor as the last. Members, I implore you to see to it we get the 

science based, effective cleanup we so desperately need and thank you for reading 

my testimony. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much for your very thorough 

and informative testimony. 

I want to turn now to David Newman. I want to thank Mr. Newman for your work on the EPA World Trade Center Expert Technical Review Panel, and for all of your efforts to address these important and difficult issues in New York. 

Mr. Newman. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. NEWMAN, M.A., M.S., NEW YORK 

COMMITTEE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 

Mr. NEWMAN. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairperson Clinton 

and Senator Lautenberg. My name is David Newman. I am an industrial hygienist with the New York Committee for Occupational 

Safety and Health. I also had the privilege of serving on the EPA 

World Trade Center Expert Technical Review Panel. 

The attacks of September 11, 2001, produced not only an initial 

catastrophic loss of life but also a lingering environmental disaster, 

with adverse health consequences for responders at Ground Zero as 

well as for workers and residents in a much larger geographic area. 

Toxic contaminants were dispersed over a wide area of lower Manhattan and Brooklyn and beyond. We now know that those caught 

in the dust cloud and/or those responding at the World Trade Center site in the first hours or days have higher incidences and greater severities of health impacts. Presumably the intensity and duration of exposure and lack of respiratory protection were significant 

factors. 

These early exposures were unavoidable. However, EPA’s inappropriately reassuring pronouncements that the air was safe to 

breathe were counter-productive to efforts at implementation of 

respiratory protection programs by employers and counter-productive to respirator use by rescue recovery and cleanup workers. 

EPA’s actions contributed to unnecessary exposures to toxic contaminants by thousands of workers and volunteers. Similarly, 
149 

EPA’s risk communications served as disincentives to landlords, 

employers and Government agencies regarding the suitability of 

conducing indoor environmental testing and cleanup. 

The failure of EPA to provide environmental assessment and 

cleanup in commercial and government buildings, coupled with the 

Agency’s limited and inadequate sampling and cleanup in residences, is likely to have subjected area workers and area residents 

to additional unnecessary and unavoidable exposures. 

Because EPA contended for the first 8 months that it had no 

legal responsibility for addressing indoor contaminants, sampling 

and remediation efforts during that time occurred only on a limited, haphazard and often ineffectual basis. The single EPA indoor 

cleanup effort was modest, limited to residences and of questionable effectiveness and scientific merit. The current EPA program 

fundamentally replicates the prior program and disregards virtually all of the recommendations of the members of the WTC 

Panel. This program, like its predecessor, is technically and scientifically flawed, and is unlikely to adequately identify or cleanup 

9/11 contaminants if and where they still exist. 

The geographic boundaries of the current program are arbitrary 

and not scientifically determined. EPA used aerial photographs of 

debris deposition to establish the boundaries. However, aerial photographs do not show the invisible smaller particles that are of considerable health concern and are likely to have been dispersed over 

a wider geographic area. The World Trade Center Expert Panel 

strongly recommended that the program’s geographic boundaries be 

expanded further north in Manhattan and east into parts of Brooklyn. EPA agreed to do so in May 2005, but has reneged on that 

commitment. 

There is no scientific justification for the exclusion of workplaces. 

There is no evidence that workplaces were impacted differently or 

less severely than residences. There is no evidence that a significant number or any number of workplaces benefited from employer-conducted cleanup efforts or that such efforts were effective. 

Most workplaces were not and will never be tested or cleaned. 

The EPA program is designed to avoid finding contaminants. It 

is biased toward sampling cleaner areas and it de-emphasizes sampling in dirtier areas. It excludes testing in precisely the spaces 

that are most likely to harbor residual contaminants, such as mechanical ventilation systems and ceiling plenums. This is problematic for two reasons. First, maintenance workers regularly access 

these spaces and inadvertently disturb settled dust, resuspending 

it into the air, where it is available for inhalation by workers and 

tenants. Second, contaminants in the mechanical ventilation system can lie dormant indefinitely. If they are disturbed at a later 

date by maintenance activities or other causes, the ventilation system will provide a very efficient mechanism for distribution of contaminants throughout occupied indoor spaces. 

The EPA program, the current program, diverges significantly 

from established regulatory and best work practices. The plan establishes different triggers for cleanup of asbestos in different parts 

of residences. It permits higher levels of asbestos to remain on top 

of bookcases or behind large objects of furniture. It is ill-advised to 

remove asbestos from the living room floor and allow it to remain 
150 

behind the refrigerator. City and State asbestos regulations require 

that all areas of a contaminated space be cleaned to a single protective standard. 

The potential consequences of these shortcomings are worrisome. 

Scientists may received skewed data on the extent of geographic 

dispersion of 9/11 contaminants. Residents may receive inaccurate 

assessments of the presence or absence of 9/11 contaminants in 

their living spaces, and may receive inadequately supported assurances of safety. Workers and employers will continue to lack effective access to environmental testing and clean-up. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Newman follows:] 

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. NEWMAN, M.A., M.S., NEW YORK COMMITTEE FOR

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

Good morning, Chairperson Clinton, Ranking Member Craig, and other members 

of the Superfund and Environmental Health Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to present testimony. My name is David Newman. I am an industrial hygienist with the New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NYCOSH). NYCOSH is a nongovernmental, nonprofit organization that has provided technical assistance and comprehensive training in occupational safety and 

health to unions, employers, government agencies, and community organizations for 

over 25 years. 

The attacks of September 11, 2001 produced not only an initial catastrophic loss 

of life at the World Trade Center (WTC) site, but also a lingering environmental 

disaster, with adverse health consequences for responders at Ground Zero as well 

as for workers and residents in a much larger geographic area. Because we may unfortunately be faced with a similar situation again, it is imperative to examine and 

learn from government efforts to protect public and worker health in 9/11 response 

efforts. 

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001 and continuing to this day, 

NYCOSH, in partnership with the National Disaster Ministries of the United 

Church of Christ, has worked closely with unions, employers, and community and 

tenant organizations at Ground Zero and throughout Lower Manhattan. This work 

has included outdoor and indoor environmental sampling, technical assistance with 

the design or evaluation of sampling, cleanup, and re-occupancy protocols and with 

mechanical ventilation and filtration issues. Within days of 9/11, NYCOSH produced 

and distributed the first fact sheets describing respiratory hazards at Ground Zero 

and outlining appropriate respiratory protection. We provided technical assistance 

to unions at, under, and around Ground Zero. NYCOSH, in collaboration with the 

Queens College Center for the Biology of Natural Systems and the Latin American 

Workers Project, operated a mobile medical unit near Ground Zero which provided 

medical screenings to hundreds of immigrant day laborers engaged in the cleanup 

of contaminated offices and residences. We also provided respirators to these cleanup workers, along with changeout filter cartridges, fit-testing, and training in proper 

respirator use. NYCOSH also trained additional hundreds of Lower Manhattan 

workers about 9/11-related occupational and environmental health issues. NYCOSH 

continues to work closely with the health care centers of excellence and with unions, 

employers, and tenant and community organizations to ensure that their constituents are informed about and have access to appropriate medical care for 9/11 health 

conditions. 

In addition, I had the privilege of serving on the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) World Trade Center Expert Technical Review Panel. I also served on 

the Exposure Assessment Working Group of the World Trade Center Worker and 

Volunteer Medical Screening Program and on the Advisory Board of Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health World Trade Center Evacuation Study. 

I currently serve on the Community Advisory Committee of the World Trade Center 

Environmental Health Center at Bellevue Hospital and on the Labor Advisory Committee of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene’s World 

Trade Center Health Registry. 

My testimony will focus on five issues: 

1. Whether the data available to EPA at the time of the 9/11 attacks and during 

subsequent recovery operations indicated a potential for elevated risk from environmental exposures; 
151 

2. Whether the actions of EPA were consistent with regulatory requirements for 

risk assessment and protection of human health; 

3. Whether EPA’s test and clean programs provide effective assessment and remediation of indoor environmental contaminants; 

4. Whether exposure to 9/11 contaminants resulted in harm to human health, 

and, if so, whether this harm was avoidable; and 

5. What lessons have been, or remain to be, learned from EPA’s 9/11 response and 

recovery efforts. 

NYCOSH is well situated to comment on these issues. In addition to our 9/11 efforts, we have provided training and technical assistance on respiratory protection, 

hazard assessment and control, confined space entry, and hazardous waste operations and emergency response, among other topics, to employers, unions, government agencies, and community-based organizations for several decades, often in collaboration with OSHA, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH), the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), the 

New York State Department of Labor, the New York City Department of Environmental Protection, and the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. 

1. What data were available to EPA at the time of the 9/11 attacks and during 

subsequent recovery operations? Did these data indicate a potential for elevated risk 

to human health from environmental exposures?—Although the chemical composition and extent of dispersion of WTC dust remain poorly characterized, the current 

scientific literature is unambiguous as to its general nature and scope. Contaminants were dispersed over a wide area of Lower Manhattan and Brooklyn, and for 

‘‘miles beyond.’’ Hundreds of contaminants have been identified in air, dust, and 

bulk samples.1,2,3 Toxic contaminants of concern include asbestos, PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls), PAHs (polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons), manmade vitreous 

fibers, dioxins, volatile organic compounds, crystalline silica, pulverized glass 

shards, highly alkaline concrete dust, and lead, mercury, and other heavy metals. 

Credible, substantive data that indicated the presence of toxic substances in significant quantities at the WTC site were readily available to EPA prior to and on 

September 11, 2001. 

Prior to and on 9/11, information on the documented presence of toxic substances 

at the WTC site was available in government databases that itemize storage of hazardous raw materials, as per the hazardous chemical storage reporting requirements of the federal Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act.4

These data, readily available at the time, indicated at a minimum the probable presence of barium, lead, chloroform, chlordane, carbon tetrachloride, cadmium, chromium, mercury, hydrogen sulfide, arsenic, and other toxic raw materials at the offices of the United States Customs Service, 6 World Trade Center, and of mercury, 

tetrachloroethylene, PCBs, arsenic, ethane, and other toxic raw materials at the offices of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 1 World Trade Center. The 

purpose of the hazardous raw materials databases is precisely to facilitate safe 

emergency response and effective containment and cleanup in the event of an unanticipated chemical release. 

Additional information on hazardous in-place building materials and office furnishings was widely known in the regulatory and public health communities. 

Knowledge and use of this information was a prerequisite to appropriate preliminary risk assessment, design of safe and effective work methods, and selection of 

protective equipment, including respirators. 

An estimated 400 or more tons of asbestos had been utilized in sprayed-on fireproofing during the construction of the WTC towers.5,6 Additional unknown amounts 

of asbestos-containing material were used in pipe insulation. The extensive use of 

asbestos at the WTC site was well documented prior to September 11, 2001. In 

1971, while the WTC was still under construction, New York City passed Local Law 

49, which banned the use of sprayed-on fireproofing that contained asbestos, effective February 25, 1972. Application of structural fireproofing at the WTC continued 

with non-asbestos-based materials.7 The 1993 bombing of the WTC again raised the 

issue of inadvertent releases of WTC asbestos during disaster events, and some 

WTC asbestos was abated (removed). Thus, the regulatory agencies were without 

doubt cognizant of the potential for the release of hundreds of thousands of pounds 

of asbestos into the ambient air during the collapse of the WTC towers on September 11, 2001. 

Further essential, albeit imprecise, information about the potential for the release 

of additional toxic substances should have been intuitive to any environmental or 

occupational health professional. For example, computers and computer components 

contain significant amounts of lead.8 It can be conservatively estimated that there 

were greater than 10,000personal computers in the WTC complex, each containing 
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4 or more pounds of lead, as well as numerous mainframe computers and servers. 

Consequently, it is likely that at least 40,000 pounds of lead were released into the 

general environment on 9/11, and very possibly a substantially larger amount. 

Similarly, fluorescent light bulbs contain tiny but environmentally significant 

amounts of mercury.9 Estimates of the amount of mercury in a single bulb range 

from 3 milligrams to 21 milligrams. The Port Authority acknowledges the presence 

of 500,000 fluorescent light bulbs in the WTC complex.10 It is therefore possible that 

the amount of mercury released from fluorescent light bulbs only (and not including 

additional sources of mercury such as electric switches) ranged from 3 to 23 pounds. 

This is the approximate equivalent of 8% of the total daily mercury emissions from 

all coal-fired utility boilers in the United States or 26% of the daily mercury emissions from all municipal waste incinerators.11

Environmental sampling results obtained by or available to EPA subsequent to 

September 11 indicated the presence of toxic substances at levels of concern at 

Ground Zero as well as at other locations in Lower Manhattan, both outdoors and 

indoors. 

Early environmental sampling data by EPA confirmed that asbestos was a constituent of WTC dust, at levels of concern. The EPA website posted data for 143 

bulk samples of dust collected in Lower Manhattan, outside of the 16-acre collapse 

site. Asbestos was detected in 76% of the samples. Twenty-six percent of the samples contained asbestos at levels between 1.1% and 4.49%—i.e., at levels between 

110% and 449% of the level at which legal requirements are triggered. Most of 

EPA’s outdoor air samples found relatively low concentrations of asbestos or no asbestos above the detection limit of the sampling, but the EPA website listed at least 

25 12-hour samples, obtained at 10 separate locations, that exceeded the EPA clearance standard established under the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, the 

benchmark that EPA was using for 9/11 asbestos measurements. 

Additionally, 12 of 21 personal air samples obtained in September 2001 by the 

U.S. Public Health Service from workers sifting WTC debris at the Staten Island 

landfill exceeded the OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit for asbestos.12 Sixty percent 

of asbestos air samples collected at Ground Zero by the International Union of Operating Engineers’ National Hazmat Program exceeded the EPA clearance standard.13

Twenty-seven percent of 177 bulk samples initially collected by EPA and OSHA at 

Ground Zero were greater than 1% asbestos, the level at which legal requirements 

are triggered.14 Early independent air monitoring in two Lower Manhattan apartments found significantly elevated indoor levels of asbestos, including results 2 to 

5 times the EPA 9/11 asbestos clearance level in one apartment and 89 to 151 times 

the clearance level in the other apartment.15

EPA test results for outdoor sampling for dioxin showed ‘‘unambiguous elevation’’ 

when compared to typical urban background levels. An EPA report noted: 

the concentrations to which individuals could potentially be exposed . . . within 

and near the WTC site found through the latter part of November are likely the 

highest ambient concentrations that have ever been reported. [emphasis added]16

These findings indicated that workers and residents who returned to areas that 

were reopened to the public as safe one week after 9/11 were potentially exposed 

to concentrations of dioxin ‘‘nearly 6 times the highest dioxin level ever recorded in 

the U.S.’’ The findings also indicated that the dioxin concentrations to which rescue 

and recovery workers were potentially exposed were between 100 and 1,500 times 

higher than the levels of dioxin typically found in urban air.17

In another example, benzene was detected at Ground Zero in 57 of 96 air samples, 

at levels from 5 to 86,000 parts per billion (ppb). (The OSHA permissible exposure 

limit (PEL) for benzene exposure averaged over 8 hours is 1,000 ppb. The OSHA 

short term exposure limit (STEL) for benzene exposure averaged over a 15-minute 

period is 5,000 ppb.) 

Even during November, readings exceeded the OSHA levels in half the tests 

conducted. . . . On November 8, an EPA grab sample at the North Tower plume 

detected 180,000 ppb of benzene—180 times above [sic] the OSHA limit. Even as 

late as January 7, benzene readings were as high as 5,300 ppb.18

The United States Geological Survey (USGS) reported the results of its WTC environmental studies to government response teams as early as September 18, 2001. 

USGS found that steel beams from the WTC site were coated with fireproofing containing chrysotile asbestos at concentrations up to 20%. It reported that in the ‘‘area 

around the WTC . . . potentially asbestiform minerals might be present in concentrations of a few percent to tens of percent’’ and may occur ‘‘in a discontinuous 

pattern radially in west, north, and easterly directions perhaps at distances greater 

than 3/4 kilometer from ground zero.’’ USGS also found that WTC dusts ‘‘can be 
153 

quite alkaline,’’ reaching a pH of 11.8. The agency warned government response 

teams that ‘‘cleanup of dusts and the WTC debris should be done with appropriate 

respiratory protection and dust control measures.’’19

2. Were the actions of EPA consistent with regulatory requirements for risk assessment and protection of human health?—Multiple federal statutes have applicability 

to the protection of public health during catastrophic environmental emergencies. 

The applicability of statutory requirements to disaster response efforts and to subsequent cleanup operations and the uses of agency discretionary power in the application of legal standards are central to assessing governmental response to 9/11. 

EPA is clearly required to protect the public health against exposure to toxic environmental contaminants associated with catastrophic disasters. 

EPA has legal authority and responsibility to respond to a hazardous substance 

release that presents or has the potential to present an imminent and substantial 

danger to public health. EPA is required to assume lead authority with regard to 

issues of environmental health by the National Contingency Plan, the National Response Plan, and Presidential Decision Directive 62 of 1998. 

The National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS), section 112 of the Clean Air Act, establishes standards for air pollutants that may 

cause fatalities or serious, irreversible, or incapacitating illness.20, 21 Hazardous air 

pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act are also regulated as hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), known as Superfund. The National Contingency Plan (NCP), 

part of CERCLA, is the federal plan for responding to hazardous substance releases. 

The NCP assigns the authority to respond to the release of hazardous substances 

to EPA. In the event of a hazardous release, the NCP requires that the release site 

be assessed to characterize the source and type of the release, the pathways of exposure, and the nature and magnitude of the threat to public health. In addition, EPA 

is authorized to ‘‘enter any vessel, facility, establishment or other place, property, 

or location . . . and conduct, complete, operate, and maintain any response actions. . . . ’’ Further, ‘‘the NCP applies to and is in effect when the Federal Response Plan and some or all of its Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) are activated.’’22

The National Response Plan (NRP) mandates a comprehensive response to terrorism incidents. (The Federal Response Plan23 preceded the National Response 

Plan, was in effect on September 11, 2001, and was substantively similar to the 

NRP.) The NRP establishes protocols to protect the health and safety of the public, 

responders, and recovery workers. National Response Plan Emergency Support 

Function #10, the Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex, assigns explicit responsibility to EPA as both the primary agency and the emergency support function 

coordinator in response to an actual or potential discharge or uncontrolled release 

of hazardous materials.24

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62 names EPA as the lead agency for responding to the release of hazardous materials in a terrorist attack and gives EPA 

specific responsibility for indoor remediation. 25, 26 Shortly after 9/11, then—EPA Administrator Christine Whitman confirmed EPA’s responsibility under PDD 62: 

‘‘Under the provisions of PDD 62 . . . EPA is assigned lead responsibility for cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical or biological agents as 

a result of an act of terrorism.’’27

EPA’s response actions were not consistent with its legal obligations to protect the 

health of the public against exposure to outdoor and indoor toxic environmental contaminants associated with a catastrophic disaster. 

EPA’s 9/11 response efforts were predicated on the agency’s contention that environmental regulations were not applicable to natural or technological disasters or 

to terrorist incidents.28 EPA minimized the issue of hazardous waste and chose not 

to consider the WTC site as either a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

(RCRA)29 hazardous waste site or a Superfund site, even though the collapse and 

combustion of the WTC ‘‘must have released chemicals orders of magnitude times 

the reporting thresholds.’’30, 31 According to an EPA senior policy analyst, this was 

the first major chemical or hazardous waste release in 20 years for which EPA did 

not conduct a site characterization for environmental hazards and risks.32 In addition, the agency did not ensure that clearance tests were conducted at the conclusion of the waste and debris removal project to confirm that environmental contaminants had been effectively removed from the WTC site, and no such tests were conducted.33

EPA provided limited, and sometimes incorrect and hazardous, technical guidance 

to the impacted public. EPA press releases counseled residential and business tenants to clean their indoor spaces using ‘‘appropriate’’ equipment, following ‘‘recommended’’ and ‘‘proper’’ procedures, without defining these terms.34 EPA’s tech-
154 

nical advice sometimes contradicted regulatory requirements and even common 

sense. In one instance EPA advised that ‘‘if dust or debris from the World Trade 

Center site has entered homes or offices, people should be sure to clean thoroughly 

and avoid inhaling dust while doing so.’’35 The same press release referred readers 

to the website of the New York City Department of Health for further technical 

guidance. That website advised ‘‘residents and workers returning to homes and offices in Lower Manhattan’’ to clean up WTC dust (i.e., asbestos and other toxic substances, in many cases) with wet rags and HEPA vacuum cleaners, in violation of 

federal and city regulations. It further advised that respiratory protection was not 

necessary so long as these ‘‘guidelines’’ were followed.36 The report of the EPA Inspector General ultimately concluded that advice such as this ‘‘may have increased 

the long-term health risks for those [tenants] who cleaned WTC dust.’’37

EPA’s public statements mischaracterized or ignored sampling results. Its September 18 announcement that the ‘‘air is safe to breathe’’38 was not supported by 

the available data.39 EPA risk communication statements were altered to conform 

to political directives from the White House. ‘‘Guidance for cleaning indoor spaces 

and information about the potential health effects from WTC debris were not included in EPA’s issued press releases. . . . Reassuring information was added . . . 

and cautionary information was deleted’’ after intervention by the White House 

Council on Environmental Quality.40 Other government agencies also issued inaccurate risk communication statements. EPA’s unsupported assurances of lack of risk 

had the unfortunate effect of giving a green light to employers and workers not to 

use respiratory protection and to landlords, employers, and government agencies 

that remediation of contaminants was not necessary. 

For eight months after 9/11, EPA contended that it had no legal responsibility for 

assessing or addressing indoor environmental contamination.41, 42 Indoor environmental testing and remediation in common spaces were left to building owners; testing and remediation of private spaces were left to commercial and residential tenants.43, 44 Because government financial assistance, reoccupancy guidelines, oversight, and enforcement were not provided, private environmental sampling and remediation efforts occurred only on an occasional, haphazard, limited, and often ineffectual basis. The single government-sponsored indoor cleanup effort that ultimately 

took place, EPA’s 2002—2003 ‘‘test or clean’’ program, was modest, non-mandatory, 

limited to residences, and of questionable effectiveness and scientific and technical 

merit. Only 18% of eligible downtown apartments were cleaned or tested.45 Approximately 1,500 Lower Manhattan buildings were excluded, including all schools, hospitals, firehouses, workplaces, businesses, and commercial and government buildings—even City Hall. Most of Chinatown and other impacted communities were also 

excluded. The failure of EPA to require or even encourage indoor environmental assessments, and cleanup where warranted, in commercial and government buildings, 

coupled with the agency’s limited and inadequate sampling and cleanup in residential spaces, is likely to have subjected area workers and residents to unnecessary 

and avoidable exposures. 

3. Will EPA’s December 2006 Lower Manhattan Indoor Dust Test and Clean Program provide effective assessment and remediation of indoor environmental contaminants?—The current EPA test and clean program disregards virtually all of the recommendations and concerns expressed by members of the EPA WTC Expert Technical Review Panel in its 21 months of deliberations. The current program fundamentally replicates the ineffective 2002–2003 Residential Dust Cleanup Program. 

This program, like its predecessor, is technically and scientifically flawed and is unlikely to provide any significant public health or scientific benefit. It is unlikely to 

adequately identify or clean up 9/11 contaminants if and where they exist. It is 

probable that it will under-report any residual 9/11 contamination. The potential 

consequences of these shortcomings are worrisome. Scientists may receive skewed 

data on the extent of geographic dispersion of 9/11 contaminants. Residents may receive inaccurate assessments of the presence or absence of 9/11 contaminants in 

their living spaces and may receive inadequately supported assurances of safety. 

Workers and employers will continue to lack effective access to environmental testing or cleanup. 

Among the many significant deficiencies of the current plan are the following: 

• Insufficient financial resources are allocated for testing or cleaning, if warranted, of potentially affected residences and workplaces. According to EPA and 

FEMA, funds allocated for EPA’s 2002–2003 program were in excess of $25 million, 

while funds allocated for the current program are capped at approximately $7 million. The geographic boundaries and eligibility criteria for the plans are virtually 

identical. That is, the current program is funded at a level approximately 28% of 

the prior program, yet is charged with providing sampling and cleanup in 100% of 

the geographic area served by the prior program. 
155 

• The geographic boundaries of the program are arbitrarily determined. EPA has 

cited images and mapping results from aerial photographs taken on September 13, 

2001 as the basis for the geographic boundaries of the current program. However, 

EPA misinterprets or misuses that data, which actually indicate the ‘‘probable’’ and 

‘‘possible’’ deposition of WTC dust and debris over a larger geographic area than 

that included in the current sampling program.46 These data themselves are of limited scientific utility as they rely entirely on detection of visible dust. The Environmental Photographic Interpretation Center (EPIC) report acknowledges that its 

analysis is limited to ‘‘ground dust/debris deposition as an aggregate (paper, pulverized concrete and wall board, larger building materials, etc.).’’47 Smaller particles 

that are invisible to the naked eye or to the camera lens, such as PM10, PM2.5, and 

asbestos fibers, are likely to have been dispersed over a wider geographic area and 

are of considerable health concern. These are not addressed by these data. The 

EPIC report notes that ‘‘it is possible that dust/debris may extend beyond the 

boundaries as delineated in this report.’’48 Members of the EPA WTC Panel strongly 

recommended that the program’s geographic boundaries be expanded further north 

in Manhattan, including all of Chinatown, and east into parts of Brooklyn. EPA 

agreed to do so in May 2005 but has reneged on that commitment in its current 

program.49

• There is no scientific or legal justification for the exclusion of workplaces and 

places of business from the current program. EPA has not offered any evidence demonstrating that workplaces were impacted differently or less severely than residences. I believe no such data exist and no such assertion could be plausibly made. 

Nor has EPA presented any data that indicate that a significant number (or any 

number) of workplaces benefitted from employer-conducted and -financed cleanup 

efforts, or that these efforts were effective. Because the EPA program leaves employers to bear the financial and technical burden of testing and cleanup, it is likely 

that workplaces which have not yet been privately tested or cleaned will never be 

tested or cleaned. 

Neither OSHA nor NIOSH can effectively address the issue of 9/11 contaminants 

in workplaces. Comments at the July 12, 2005 meeting of the EPA WTC Expert 

Technical Review Panel by representatives from OSHA and NIOSH made clear that 

while these agencies will continue to be responsive to queries from workers, unions, 

and employers, neither agency engages in or funds remediation of workplace contaminants. OSHA, if it finds violations of OSHA standards, may require employers 

to engage in cleanup, or in other protective measures short of cleanup, at employer 

expense. NIOSH may recommend but cannot require remediation, nor can it fund 

remediation. It is possible that indoor environmental conditions in downtown workplaces may not violate OSHA Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs), or that there 

may be no applicable OSHA standards (as is the case for PAHs), while at the same 

time they may exceed EPA benchmarks for settled 9/11 dust. In such situations, 

OSHA could not require remediation. Thus, contamination at levels that would compel remediation in residences will be allowed to remain in workplaces. 

• Because it de-emphasizes testing in indoor areas that are most likely to harbor 

residual contaminants and emphasizes testing in areas that are most likely to have 

been routinely and repeatedly cleaned, the EPA program has a built-in selection bias 

toward sampling cleaner areas. It is designed to avoid finding residual contaminants. 

The nature and extent of residual indoor WTC-derived contamination, if any, is 

unknown at this point in time. Residual indoor contamination, if present, will most 

likely be found in spaces that have been subjected to the least disturbance. Typically, these spaces include: infrequently cleaned areas such as those behind refrigerators, above suspended ceilings, and in cable chases; porous materials such as carpets and drapes that act as reservoirs or ‘‘sinks’’ for settled particulates; and ‘‘dead 

spots’’ where deposition occurs in mechanical ventilation systems, such as in areas 

of low velocity and at bends in high velocity areas in ducts.50

The current EPA program does include testing on porous materials like carpets 

and in infrequently cleaned spaces behind furniture and equipment such as refrigerators. However, it excludes without justification testing in what it mistakenly labels ‘‘inaccessible spaces,’’ i.e, mechanical ventilation systems, ceiling plenums, cable 

chases, etc. This is problematic for two reasons. 

First, so-called inaccessible spaces are accessed by maintenance and utility workers on a regular basis. These workers engage in activities that may disturb settled 

dust and resuspend it in the air, where it becomes available for inhalation both by 

the workers and by tenants. Although a particular ‘‘inaccessible space’’ may not be 

accessed regularly, workers routinely access these kinds of spaces repeatedly over 

the course of every work day. 
156 

Second, the ability of a mechanical ventilation system to capture contaminants in 

the dead spots of the duct work is well known. These settled particulates will lie 

dormant and cannot be identified or measured by sampling that is conducted outside the mechanical ventilation system. However, if the settled particulates are disturbed at a later date by maintenance activities or other causes, the mechanical 

ventilation system can provide a very efficient mechanism for the distribution of 

contaminants throughout occupied indoor spaces. • The EPA program diverges significantly from established regulatory and best 

work practices in industrial hygiene and environmental remediation. For example, 

the plan establishes different benchmarks, or triggers, for cleanup of asbestos in different parts of residences. It permits higher levels of asbestos contamination to remain in ‘‘infrequently accessed areas’’ such as ‘‘out of reach shelving’’51 or ‘‘on top, 

beneath, or behind large objects of furniture such as bookcases.’’52 By contrast, city53

and state54 asbestos regulations explicitly and appropriately require that all areas 

of a contaminated space be cleaned to a single protective standard. 

4. Did exposure to WTC-derived contaminants result in harm to human health, 

and was this exposure and harm avoidable?—Within days of the attacks, EPA declared Lower Manhattan’s air ‘‘safe to breathe.’’55 EPA maintained until recently 

that ‘‘short-term health effects dissipated for most once the fires were put out [and] 

there is little concern about any long-term health effects.’’56 Unfortunately, there is 

considerable evidence to the contrary. It is now well-established that a large and 

increasing number of people who were exposed to 9/11 contaminants, primarily rescue and recovery workers but also area workers and residents, are suffering serious 

and persistent adverse health outcomes. 

The incidence and persistence of 9/11-induced respiratory illness among response 

workers and area workers is extensively documented in the scientific literature, including among rescue, recovery, and service workers,57, 58 firefighters,59, 60, 61, 62 transit workers,63 and immigrant day laborer cleanup workers at buildings outside 

Ground Zero.64 Although there is no question that, in general, those working on the 

pile experienced more severe exposures and health impacts than did community 

residents, students, and workers, it is of note that adverse health impacts have also 

been documented among these latter groups.65, 66, 67, 68, 69

Because Ground Zero workers and other exposed populations may have been exposed at varying levels to a robust array of carcinogens, including asbestos, dioxins, 

silica, benzene, PAHs, and PCBs, there is concern for the potential development of 

late-emerging cancers.70 It is as yet unknown whether or when 9/11-derived exposures will produce late-emerging diseases, but it is prudent and scientifically appropriate to anticipate the possibility. While the latency period for solid tumors is 10 

to 50 years, the latency period for hematologic and lymphatic malignancies can be 

as short as 4 to 5 years.71 Although neither the World Trade Center Medical Monitoring Program nor the scientific literature has yet reported the occurrence of 9/11- 

related cancers, the Monitoring Program has begun the process of verification of 

self-reported cases among responder and recovery worker patients.72

We know now that there is an association between the chronology of firefighters’ 

9/11-related exposures and the severity of their adverse health effects; i.e., those 

caught in the dust cloud and/or those responding at the WTC site in the first hours 

or days tend to have higher incidences and greater severity of health impacts. Presumably, the intensity and duration of exposure and the lack of access to appropriate respiratory protection were significant factors in this association. These early 

exposures were unavoidable. However, EPA’s early and inappropriately reassuring 

pronouncements that ‘‘the air is safe to breathe’’ were counterproductive to efforts 

at implementation of respiratory protection programs by employers and respirator 

use by rescue, recovery, and cleanup workers. EPA’s actions thus contributed to the 

unnecessary and avoidable exposures to toxic WTC-derived contaminants incurred 

by thousands of workers and volunteers. Similarly, EPA’s risk communications 

served as disincentives to landlords, employers, and government agencies regarding 

the suitability of conducting indoor environmental testing and remediation of contaminants, as appropriate. The failure of EPA to provide, require, or even encourage 

indoor environmental assessments, and cleanup where warranted, in commercial 

and government buildings, coupled with the agency’s limited and inadequate sampling and cleanup in residential spaces, is likely to have subjected area workers and 

residents to additional unnecessary and avoidable exposures. 

5. What lessons have been, or remain to be, learned from the 9/11 response and 

recovery efforts?—Less than four years after the disastrous events of September 11, 

2001, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast. Rescue, recovery, and cleanup efforts there sadly were hampered by a failure to learn from the WTC experience. In 

October 2005, a group of more than 100 of the Nation’s foremost labor, religious, 

environmental, community, public health and public interest organizations and 
157 

more than 100 academic, medical, religious and public health leaders, including 

some of the nation’s top experts in the fields of occupational and environmental 

medicine and industrial hygiene, called on Congress to give the highest priority to 

the protection of the health of cleanup workers and of the public at large during 

cleanup efforts.73 Coupled with the recommendations of the report of the EPA Office 

of the Inspector General,74 the following principles for disaster response, adapted in 

part from the call, provide a sound basis for lessons that, unfortunately, have yet 

to be learned: 

• Presume contamination until proven otherwise. 

Given the wide range and toxic nature of contaminants to which workers, volunteers, and residents may be exposed, it is imperative that work areas be presumed 

to be contaminated and that appropriate precautionary measures be implemented 

until the work environment is demonstrated to be safe. 

• Implement the National Response Plan provisions for worker and community environmental testing and monitoring. 

The worker and community environmental testing and monitoring provisions of 

the National Response Plan must be followed closely. They provide for hazard identification, environmental sampling, personal exposure monitoring, collecting and 

managing exposure data, development of site-specific safety plans, immunization 

and prophylaxis, and medical surveillance, medical monitoring and psychological 

support. 

• Enforce all OSHA and EPA regulations. 

Environmental and occupational health standards must be strictly enforced. We 

are distressed that OSHA has defined its role in Katrina response, as in 9/11, as 

advisory rather than enforcement. 

• Assess the hazards. 

EPA should conduct comprehensive environmental sampling to characterize the 

nature and extent of environmental hazards. NIOSH and OSHA must conduct a 

comprehensive assessment of the hazards posed to recovery workers. Hazard assessment should include evaluation of environmental hazards contaminants originating 

in external sources, in-place building materials, biological agents, and other potential sources. Environmental monitoring should be ongoing. Sampling results should 

be accessible to the public in a timely manner. Toxic materials should be catalogued, 

evaluated and tested, and any known or potential releases contained. Failure to act 

will threaten returning residents and workers and will increase long-term cleanup 

costs as toxic substances spread to larger areas. 

• Train and protect cleanup workers. 

All cleanup workers (public and private sector, paid and unpaid) should receive 

the appropriate OSHA-required training and equipment for protection against the 

hazards to which they may be exposed. OSHA should specify the minimum training 

that must be provided to workers engaged in clean-up and recovery. Training may 

include that which is required under OSHA’s Hazard Communication, Respiratory 

Protection, Personal Protective Equipment, and Hazardous Waste Operations and 

Emergency Response standards. Protective equipment may include respirators and 

protective clothing and equipment. 

• Provide medical surveillance. 

Provision must be made for early detection and treatment of occupational, environmental, and psychological illnesses. To ignore the medical needs of potentially 

exposed workers and residents is asking them to be guinea pigs in a long-term experiment the consequences of which remain unknown. All public and private sector 

rescue, response, and cleanup workers, including volunteers, should be entered into 

a centralized database to facilitate medical surveillance. 

• Protect vulnerable workers. 

Special consideration must be given to protection of immigrant and temporary 

workers. In 9/11 response efforts, immigrant and temporary workers were the workers least likely to be provided with proper training and respiratory protection, and 

were the workers least likely to have medical insurance. As a result, they incurred 

high rates of illness without having access to medical treatment. 

• Adopt uniform reoccupancy standards. 

EPA must ensure that a protective health and safety standard for reoccupancy applies uniformly to all communities and also is sensitive to the needs of vulnerable 

populations. EPA has indicated that it will permit local authorities to determine reoccupancy criteria, but it is critical to ensure that all reoccupancy occurs according 

to standards that are adequately protective of public health. 

Thank you for your concern on these matters. 
158 

REFERENCES 

1. P. Landrigan, P. Lioy, et al. Health and Environmental Consequences of the 

World Trade Center Disaster. Environmental Health Perspectives. Vol. 112, No. 6, 

May 2004. http://www.ehponline.org/members/2004/6702/6702.pdf (accessed May 31, 

2007). 

2. J. McGee, L. Chen, et al. Chemical Analysis of World Trade Center Fine Particulate Matter for Use in Toxicologic Assessment. Environmental Health Perspectives. 

Vol. 111, No. 7, June 2003. http://www.ehponline.org/members/2003/5930/5930.pdf 

(accessed May 31, 2007). 

3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Occupational Exposures to Air 

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31. M. Gerrard, op. cit. 

32. H. Kaufman, EPA, personal communication, February 23, 2002. 

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34. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Inspector General, op. cit. 

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a16b318fd6d8e076852572a000650bff/a58e 

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37. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Inspector General, op. cit. 

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39. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Inspector General, op. cit. 

40. Ibid. 

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47. Ibid. 

48. Ibid. 

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74. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Inspector General, op. cit. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Newman. 

I want to give you a chance to respond to the assertions made 

by the members of the first panel. Because clearly, your experience, 

your expertise and your testimony today directly contradict many 

of the claims that were made by the panelists, and I would like to 

ask you to respond to what you heard this morning. 

Mr. NEWMAN. Thank you. Let me start with two areas. 

First, with regard to the comments of Mr. Connaughton, I am 

quoting here from, selectively, of course, from a September 13, 2001 

e-mail, it is an OSHA e-mail, and it says, ‘‘A conference call was 

held this morning with EPA regional and national, as well as representatives from the White House. They were concerned about the 

public understanding of the sample results that are forthcoming 

and our ability to reassure them with respect to air quality. The 

secondary purpose of the call was to discuss the financial market 

and who we can work toward allowing them into their buildings.’’ 

From a memo of September 28, 2001: ‘‘EPA stated that by orders 

of the White House, the EPA web page is not being updated with 

current sample results.’’ So there are clear indications that the 

White House participated in discussions and decisions as to how to 

massage the data that was available to them at that time. 

With regard to the ability and responsibility of the EPA to address the issue of indoor contamination, the National Contingency 

Plan is very clear. It assigns the authority to respond to the release 

of hazardous substances to EPA. It very specifically authorizes 

EPA to enter any vessel, facility, establishment or other place, 

property or location and conduct, complete, operate and maintain 

any response actions. Further, the NCP applies to and is in effect 

when the Federal Response Plan in some or all of its emergency 

support functions are activated. That is, the activation of the Federal or now the National Response Plan and its emergency support 

functions does not override or cancel EPA’s responsibility for indoor 

contamination. This position was confirmed shortly after 9/11 by 

testimony given before Congress by then-EPA Administrator Christine Whitman, who stated, under the provisions of Presidential De-
162 

cision Directive 62, EPA is assigned lead responsibility for cleaning 

up buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical or biological 

agents as a result of an act of terrorism. 

Senator CLINTON. I will put into the record the 1998 Presidential 

Decision Directive, PDD 62, which did task EPA with the leadership role in cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by 

chemical or biological agents as a result of an act of terrorism. 

[The referenced material follows:] 
163 
164 
165 

Senator CLINTON. Mr. Newman, GAO’s testimony and their written reports suggest that EPA remains poorly prepared to address 

indoor contamination issues. Do you share this view and what is 

your view of EPA’s state of preparedness? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Well, I have to begin my remarks by clarifying 

that I do not work for EPA and I am not privy to internal discussions or documents that may exist within EPA. But if we use as 

a yardstick for lessons learned a comparison of EPA’s sampling 

plans in 2002 and EPA’s sampling plans in 2007, I see little, if any, 

significant change that indicates any lessons learned whatsoever. 

Senator CLINTON. Mr. Newman, would you describe for the Committee and the record your work on the Expert Technical Review 

Panel, how you thought that the EPA was responding and at what 

point the panel disbanded and for what reason? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The broad mandate, as you know, of the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel was to assess any remaining health 

risks posed from the events of 9/11 and to determine appropriate 

approaches to deal with questions of public health. The panel, I 

think, in my opinion, was faced with three major broad goals. No. 

1, to assess the extent, if any, of remaining indoor contaminants. 

No. 2, to devise—and that was through a sampling plan—and the 

second was to devise an appropriate clean-up plan to address any 

remaining contamination. No. 3, to address broad issues of public 

health related to the events of 9/11. 

We engaged in extensive collegial discussion over a lengthy period of time on these and other issues. The ultimate, unfortunate 

result was the determination by EPA to disregard virtually all of 

the suggestions and concerns expressed by the panel, shut down 

the panel and proceed with a sampling plan devised by EPA that 

was not reflective or responsive to the discussions and recommendations of the panel. 

Senator CLINTON. At any time, did anyone from EPA advise you 

or advise the panel that they were disregarding your recommendations for financial reasons? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The issue of finances was a big and continuing one 

throughout the course of the panel’s meetings early on. A number 

of panel members, including myself but also others, questioned, 

asked for some guidance from EPA as to how we were to structure 

our discussions with regard to the question of finances. That is, are 

we operating under budgetary constraints in attempting to design 

a sampling and cleanup program, or are we to provide the best scientific advice that we were able to come up with, disregarding any 

financial constraints. They told us at the beginning and on several 

occasions thereafter that we were to disregard any budgetary constraints. 

However, during the course of the panel process, it became very 

clear, in fact, the representative from FEMA who sat in an ex officio position on the panel told Panel members at a Panel meeting 

that the budget was in fact pre-determined and limited to the $7 

million remaining in the FEMA fund from the prior cleanup, at 

which point we again attempted to enter into some substantive discussions as to how, should a sampling and cleanup plan be devised, 

how budgetary constraints would impact on the design of that plan. 

We were again told not to consider those factors. Then at the very 
166 

end, as we know today, that virtually the entire design of the plan 

is limited precisely by those budgetary constraints. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Newman. 

Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I won’t keep the panel long, Mr. Chairman. But Mr. Newman and Ms. Lavin, thank you very much for 

your testimony. The contradiction to what we heard earlier is a 

contrast that has to be noted. It seems to me obvious that there 

was an attempt by the Administration to downplay the risks. You 

attribute it, Mr. Newman, I think primarily to the financial side. 

But I think there was some other sinister motive that was there, 

and that was to not look like we weren’t ready for anything, that 

it was done in many ways in an arrogant and almost boastful manner. When we see that there was any denial that there was an attempt to influence the press release, it just doesn’t square with 

what we see. The precautionary statement, this was in the IG’s report. In the draft version of September 13, 2001, press releases 

were removed and replaced with more reassuring statements, for 

example, second clause of the caption of the draft, the press release 

was noted that EPA was testing for environmental hazards was replaced with a statement reassuring the public about environmental 

hazards. 

Did you see that in your work on your committee in assessing 

what had taken place there? Was there anything obvious to you 

that said they just didn’t want people to know what was out there? 

Let me remove the coloration, you do it yourself. 

Mr. NEWMAN. The panel did not review or assess EPA’s early 

risk communications to the public. So with regard to that aspect 

of your question, I don’t have an answer. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. OK. 

Mr. NEWMAN. But the panel did struggle with the broad mandate 

of assessing any remaining risks to public health. The form that 

that struggle took was, there were many members of the public 

who expressed in the public comment period at panel meetings a 

desire to not only address the issue of whether there was any residual contamination and the implementation of a sampling and 

cleanup program, but to also investigate the issue, broader issues 

of public health from 9/11 with, for example, the lack, at least initially, the lack of Government oversight as to the demolition of 

heavily contaminated high-rise buildings; the issue of various impacted populations who were exhibiting adverse health consequences and their inability to get access to proper medical care; 

the questions of additional research and funding for research that 

was needed. These issues, which were raised by members of the 

public during the meetings as well as by Panel members, including 

myself and others, were short-circuited and the panel did not consider those issues. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. You said that EPA used a helicopter, if I 

understood, to assess the spread of the dust. 

Mr. NEWMAN. They used aerial photographs. I don’t know if it 

was from a helicopter or not. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. How far did any of your research tell you 

physically was the spread of the dust from the fallen building? 
167 

Mr. NEWMAN. As a number of people have testified today, we 

don’t have that data. It is now almost 6 years later. As the gentleman from GAO testified, there is yet to be a comprehensive, targeted, science-based assessment of the geographic extent of the dispersion of World Trade Center contaminants. So we do not have 

that answer. 

So anybody who gets up here, myself included, and says either 

that it was widely dispersed or that it was not widely dispersed, 

that is not a science-based statement. We do not have that data. 

There is the potential for wider dispersion and we acknowledge 

that potential and we are concerned about that. But in terms of 

data, we don’t have it. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I would like to ask, how many people died 

in the aftermath of 9/11 from their exposure to the dust and 

smoke? Have those deaths been officially recognized? Do you have 

any evidence to that effect? 

Mr. NEWMAN. We have a fairly large number of anecdotally reported deaths, that is, deaths reported through the media, deaths 

reported by family members, et cetera. These are deaths of people 

who are, by their exposure history, at and around Ground Zero, are 

presumed to have had exposure to 9/11 contaminants. However, in 

terms of clinically confirmed deaths, the number is very, very low. 

We have the recent one that was referred to by Senator Clinton. 

We have, of course, Police Officer Cedroga. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. How about the number who have put in 

their request for attention to their problems? Respiratory, people 

unable to work, there is a substantial number of people from the 

fire department who were unable to continue with their jobs. 

Mr. NEWMAN. Absolutely. In terms of the medical monitoring 

programs that exist, that is the World Trade Center Medical Monitoring Program and the New York City Fire Department Medical 

Program, as the two primary in this case, we have tens of thousands of cases of clinically confirmed, clinically diagnosed persistent respiratory and other medical conditions, absolutely. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Madam Chairman, thanks for conducting 

this hearing and for bringing the attention that it deserves to the 

public forum. Thank you. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator Lautenberg. 

Ms. Lavin, I just wanted to thank you for coming to testify. Also 

to ask you to describe your experience with the Bellevue program, 

because as I said at the very beginning, we are finally going to be 

able to provide some Federal support for the medical treatment 

program at Bellevue for residents. That has not been included before. We were able to obtain that in the last 48 hours, as a part 

of the appropriations bill. 

Would you describe, if you can recall when you first went there 

and what the experience there was, and what their diagnosis and 

treatment for you has been going forward? 

Ms. LAVIN. I first went there, I think it was March 2007. It was 

February or March, I don’t recall the precise date. I am under the 

treatment of the Director, Dr. Reibman. So far, I am very pleased 

with the program, because it has been specifically designed, the 

doctors are coordinated there, and that is really a key element in 
168 

treatment of the different symptoms of what are now known as 

World Trade Center Syndrome. 

So I think it is essential for them to have long-term funding and 

I hope that they will get more, because that will allow them to 

draw some of the best and the newest doctors, the strongest talent. 

Senator CLINTON. I thank you for that. 

I would like to ask both of you to respond to maybe further written questions as we review the testimony. It would be useful to try 

to help complete the record in that way. I also want to thank you 

for representing so many people who have been afflicted by, in the 

first instance, their exposures and the second instance, the failure 

to accurately describe the toxic dangers and then to respond to the 

legitimate health needs that tens of thousands of people, as Mr. 

Newman said, are confronting. 

I am very grateful to everyone who participated in the hearing, 

and I want to thank you again, and we will continue with this, as 

I said in the beginning. Congressman Nadler will hold a companion 

hearing next week to focus on some additional issues, particularly 

concerned with the city and the city’s response. So the hearing is 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ