BACKGROUND PAPER

U.S. Air and Ground

Conventional Forces for NATO:

Firepower Issues

March 1978.

Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

Washington, D.C.

U.S. AIR AND GROUND CONVENTIONAL FORCES FOR NATO:

FIREPOWER ISSUES

The Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

PREFACE

The defense budget that the Congress will consider for fiscal

year 1979 places a strong emphasis on improving U.S. conventional

forces for NATO. The choice of appropriate improvements, however,

is tied closely to, and must be viewed in terms of, related

capabilities and improvements in the forces of the NATO allies.

This paper examines and compares U.S. and allied firepower

capabilities in Central Europe. It discusses several planned and

proposed improvements in these capabilities and develops options

for U.S. weapons programs. The paper is part of a CBO series on

the U.S. military role in NATO, undertaken at the request of

the Senate Budget Committee. Other papers in this series are

Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance (December 1977),

U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Overview

(January1978),andtwocompanion backgroundpapers, Air Defense

Issues and Mobility and Logistics Issues. In accordance with

CBO's mandate to provide objective analysis, this study offers

no recommendations.

This paper was prepared by G. Philip Hughes of the National

Security and International Affairs Division of the Congressional

Budget Office, under the supervision of John E. Koehler and

James R. Blaker. The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Sheila K. Pifer, Andrew Hamilton, Daniel F. Huck,

and of Marion F. Houstoun, who edited the manuscript. Edward A.

Swoboda of CBO's Budget Analysis Division provided the cost

analysis. Nancy J. Swope prepared the manuscript for publication.

Alice M. Rivlin

Director

March 1978

111
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CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE iii

SUMMARY ix

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER II. THE FIREPOWER BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE ... . 3

CHAPTER III. ROLES OF NATO FORCES 9

CHAPTER IV. INITIAL FIREPOWER AND REINFORCEMENT

CAPABILITIES OF THE NATO ALLIES 13

Ground-Based Firepower Assets:

Tanks and Artillery 13

Airborne Firepower Assets:

Attack Helicopters and

Close Air Support Aircraft 17

Reinforcement Capabilities 21

CHAPTER V. U.S. FIREPOWER CAPABILITIES AND PROGRAMS .. . 23

Ground-Based Firepower Programs:

Tanks and Artillery 24

Airborne Firepower Assets:

Attack Helicopters and

Close Air Support Aircraft 27

CHAPTER VI. BUDGET OPTIONS FOR U.S. FIREPOWER PROGRAMS . . 31

Option I: Providing Forces to

Augment Allied Firepower

Capabilities With Aircraft 31

Option II: Providing Forces to

Reinforce Allied Corps Sectors

With Ground-Based Firepower

Capabilities 34

Option III: Modernizing Smaller

U.S. NATO Forces 38

"TWIT
ifirir
TABLES

TABLE 1. SELECTED FIREPOWER ASSETS IMMEDIATELY

AVAILABLE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, 1977 4

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF NATO AND SOVIET DIVISIONS

IN TERMS OF MAJOR GROUND-BASED WEAPONS

AND PERSONNEL STRENGTH 14

TABLE 3. DENSITY OF MAJOR WEAPONS IN BRITISH,

GERMAN, AND U.S. DIVISIONS 17

TABLE 4. NATO HELICOPTER ASSETS 19

TABLE 5. PERCENTAGES OF ALLIED AIR FORCES

IN THE NATO CENTRAL REGION PRIMARILY

ALLOCATED TO GROUND ATTACK, 1977 20

TABLE 6. ALLIED RESERVE COMBAT UNITS

AND RESERVE MANPOWER IN NATO'S

CENTRAL REGION 22

TABLE 7. OPTION I: CHANGES TO FISCAL YEARS

1979-1983 FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM 34

TABLE 8. OPTION II: CHANGES TO FISCAL YEARS

1979-1983 FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM 37

TABLE 9. OPTION III: CHANGES TO FISCAL YEARS

1979-1983 FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM 39

FIGURE

FIGURE 1. CORPS SECTORS OF MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY

IN NATO'S CENTRAL REGION 10

VI1

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SUMMARY

U.S. air and ground conventional firepower assets are procured mainly for the defense of NATO. I/ Decisions concerning

these weapons over the next five years will help shape the roles

that U.S. forces play in NATO defenses.

"Firepower," as used here, refers to the capability of

conventional air and ground forces to deliver heavy ordnance

and explosives against enemy forces near the forward edge of the

battle area (the front). The primary weapons providing that

capability are either ground-based—artillery, tanks, and antitank

guided missiles (ATGMs)—or, in the case of armed helicopters and

close air support aircraft, airborne.

The primary function of U.S. conventional ground and tactical

air forces in NATO is to defend West Germany, in cooperation

with allied forces, against an attack by the Warsaw Pact. In

this context, U.S. forces play three roles:

o The equivalent of five U.S. divisions and their support,

based in Europe, defend two of the nine sectors of the

NATO Central Front in West Germany (see Figure 1 in

Chapter III).

o U.S. forces can assist the allies in defending other

sectors of the front. As a practical matter, Europeanbased U.S. tactical aircraft can respond most rapidly to

Pact attacks against allied ground forces.

I/ Air defense and mobility and logistics issues—other important

aspects of NATO defense—and an overview of the NATO defense problem are discussed in Congressional Budget Office,

U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Overview,

Budget Issue Paper (January 1978) and the companion background papers, Air Defense Issues and Mobility and Logistics

Issues.

IX

25-08"? O - T8 - 2

" ~ r~TTirrrr
inn

U.S. forces based outside Western Europe can reinforce

U.S. and allied forces in Europe. These reinforcements

enable the alliance to respond to an attack too large to

be stopped by the forces available in Europe and to

sustain combat there until completion of a full NATO

mobilization for war.

How effective the United States would be in these roles

depends critically on the capabilities of the NATO allies as

well as on those of the Warsaw Pact. U.S. forces in southern

Germany, for example, compose only about one-fourth of the NATO

forces in the Central Region. The remaining three-fourths are

made up of forces from Germany, Belgium, Britain, the Netherlands,

and France.

Most of the allied forces in northern Germany lack the

ground force firepower densities achieved by U.S. divisions.

Allied airborne firepower assets probably do not compensate for

the firepower deficiencies of their ground forces. And much of

their reserve manpower, while numerous, is not organized or

equipped to provide prompt reinforcements with strong combat

units at any point of attack. The allies plan to improve their

firepower capabilities. As the following table suggests, however,

significant differences in firepower may remain between the United

States and two major allied forces in NATO's Central Region, West

Germany and Great Britain. 2/

These differences could be important in the event of conflict. If the Pact decided to attack, it would probably choose

the route that appeared to offer the least resistance. U.S.

ground forces are located in the south central region of the

Central Front, along two of the three major invasion routes.

But a more likely invasion route, defended by allied forces,

lies in the northern plain of Germany, where the terrain is

more favorable to armored forces and where allied firepower

may be relatively weaker. If Pact forces succeeded in breaking

through allied lines at this point, they would then be in a

position to cut supply lines to other, stronger sectors of the

front.

_2/ Other allied armies in the. Central Region average fewer

major weapons per 1,000 men than German and British forces.
DENSITY OF MAJOR WEAPONS IN BRITISH, GERMAN, AND U.S. DIVISIONS:

NUMBERS OF ARTILLERY PIECES, TANKS, AND ANTITANK WEAPONS PER 1,000

MEN

Armored Divisions Mechanized Divisions

Current Planned Current Planned

Great Britain 27.35 39.65 a/ a]

West Germany 27.53 37.87 24.88 38.47

Current U.S. = 53.15 Current U.S. = 50.69

SOURCE: Computed from The International Institute for Strategic

Studies, The Military Balance, 1977-1978 (London: 1977),

pp. 92-93.

a/ Great Britain does not have mechanized divisions in the

Central Region.

Decisions on U.S. firepower assets can be made in view of

these considerations. The United States has made, and is planning

to make, substantial improvements in its firepower capabilities

for NATO. Since 1974, these major improvements include creating

three new infantry divisions based in the United States; _3_/

converting two of five active infantry divisions to mechanized

divisions; increasing combat force levels in Europe; increasing

inventories of tanks and munitions; and procurement programs for

the XM-1 tank, artillery improvements, antitank guided missiles

(ATGMs) for ground forces and armed helicopter forces, and the

A-10 close air support aircraft. At present, the United States

pre-positions the equivalent of two division sets of equipment—

two-thirds of three divisions—in Germany, adjacent to the two

U.S. sectors (V and VII corps) of the Central Front. Eleven

active Army and Marine divisions in the United States are also

available to reinforce the Central Region; at present, however,

those divisions and their equipment must be sealifted to Europe.

3/ This resulted in a 24-division Army, of which 16 divisions are

active and 8 divisions are reserves.

XI

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In setting the fiscal year 1979 defense budget, the Congress

can continue or change the emphasis and pace of NATO force improvements implied in the current (fiscal year 1978) and other

recent defense programs. A wide range of choice is possible.

For example, if the Congress wished to emphasize only the

defense of U.S. sectors of the Central Front, it might concentrate on modernizing U.S. forces clearly allocated to that

role and consider eliminating forces—particularly late-arriving

ground reinforcements—intended primarily to bolster allied

defenses. If, on the other hand, the Congress wished to procure forces that could rapidly help defend the allied sectors

of the front, it could choose between buying additional attack

aircraft, which give prompt but limited firepower support, and

the more costly alternative of improving the reinforcement capabilities of U.S. ground forces. Reinforcement ability could

be emphasized by pre-positioning more equipment or by buying

additional transatlantic and intratheater airlift.

The following options illustrate a range of choice. The

first option provides for an increase in U.S. airborne firepower capabilities at a moderate increase in cost. The second

option emphasizes a major role for U.S. ground forces as reinforcements to allied forces on the North German plain, at a

substantial increase in costs. The third option considers the

program and cost implications of a policy that gives primary

emphasis to the defense of the two U.S. sectors of the Central

Front.

OPTION I. PROVIDING FORCES TO AUGMENT ALLIED FIREPOWER CAPABILITIES WITH AIRCRAFT

If the Congress wished to improve the ability, at a moderate

cost, of U.S. forces to respond quickly to an attack anywhere

along the Central Front, it could increase procurement of airborne

firepower assets. The use of U.S. aircraft to delay enemy attacks

on allied forces and to destroy enemy tanks and armored vehicles

would help U.S. or allied ground forces hold their defensive

positions until ground forces could be shifted from other sectors

of the front or shipped from the United States. A-10s would be

better suited than attack helicopters to the role of assisting

allied sectors because of advantages in range, payload, survivability, and ability to operate from allied bases.

xn
The principal disadvantage of this option is that, whereas

aircraft can supplement ground forces, they cannot replace them:

they can neither deliver the sustained volume of fire as ground

forces of equal cost nor hold or take territory.

Should the Congress elect this approach, the following

actions would be implied, at a cost of $2.3 billion more than

the fiscal years 1979-1983 defense program: kj

o Maintain 24-division Army force structure;

o Maintain XM-1 tank, Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH), and

Cobra/TOW helicopter production schedules as established

in the fiscal year 1979 defense program;

o Produce the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), as established in the fiscal year 1978 defense program;

o Increase A-10 production toward a force goal of nine air

wings and develop imaging infrared Maverick missiles to

provide a night and adverse-weather combat capability;

o Accelerate construction of new aircraft shelters in NATO

to accommodate the A-10.

OPTION II. PROVIDING FORCES TO REINFORCE ALLIED CORPS SECTORS

WITH GROUND-BASED FIREPOWER CAPABILITIES

If the Congress believed that allied forces were likely to

require large and early reinforcement by U.S. ground forces, and

was prepared to increase defense spending substantially, it could

approve the introduction of a major U.S. military presence in

northern Germany. (A "major U.S. military presence" is understood

here to consist of a U.S. corps of three divisions.)

4/ All options include the Army's plan for production of the

IFV, as established in the fiscal year 1978 defense program. Production of the IFV is not, however, included in

the Administration's defense program for fiscal years 1979-

1983.

Kill

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.1111

Short of adding to the forces now deployed in Europe, this

step could best be accomplished by storing heavy equipment in

northern Germany for ground forces airlifted from the United

States. This option implies increasing procurement of tanks,

artillery, and other equipment beyond the levels proposed in the

fiscal year 1979 defense budget, which funds the initial costs for

pre-positioning one division set of equipment in northern Germany.

The additional reinforcement capabilities of U.S. ground forces

make close air support aircraft unnecessary; production of those

aircraft could thus be held to currently planned levels.

This policy provides greater reinforcement of allied firepower capabilities than Option I. Further, the introduction of a

major U.S. military presence in norhtern Germany could alter

Soviet calculations of the likelihood of military success and

hence could help deter a conflict. The options"s disadvantages

are its high cost, the difficulty of securing land for equipment

depots, and the possibility that the divisions could be needed for

reinforcement of U.S. forces in the south. This option would also

significantly expand the U.S. role in NATO, which the Congress

might deem unwise; for example, it might lead financially troubled

allied governments to postpone needed military improvements.

Should the Congress choose this approach, the following

actions would be implied, at a cost of an additional $3.5 billion

above the fiscal years 1979-1983 defense program:

o Retain a 24-division Army structure;

o Provide funds in fiscal year 1979 to prepare to double

the production rate of the XM-1;

o Provide funds in fiscal year 1979 to prepare to double

the production rate of the IFV;

o Continue A-10 production toward a goal of seven air

wings;

o Plan to double AAH production at the earliest possible

date. 5/

_5_/ Since the AAH will not enter production until fiscal year

1983 and since initial production proceeds at the maximum

feasible start-up rate, this action would not entail increased

program costs during the next five-year period.

xiv
o Fund the costs to pre-position two additional division

sets of equipment in Western Europe. 6/

OPTION III. MODERNIZING SMALLER U.S. NATO FORCES

Alternatively, the Congress may want to reverse the trend

toward increased spending on U.S. forces for NATO. It could do so

by limiting firepower improvements to those needed to modernize

forces intended for use in the two U.S. sectors of NATO's Central

Front. The major savings would come from eliminating from the

force structure three active divisions based in the United States.

Options I and II retained those divisions for use in northern

Germany—without pre-positioned equipment in the former case; with

it, in the latter. Option III assumes that if no U.S. forces are

to be allocated specifically to assist allied sectors, the three

divisions would not be required in the force structure.

Option III would be appropriate if the Congress believed

that Option I appeared ineffective and Option II looked either

too costly or seemed likely to commit the United States to an

open-ended posture of compensating for allied shortcomings.

Option III would similarly be appropriate if the Congress preferred to direct defense spending increases to capabilities

useful outside the context of a Central European land battle

or if it preferred to allocate those funds to nondefense parts

of the federal budget. One disadvantage of this option is that,

with a reduced capability to reinforce at the point of attack,

NATO defenses might be more easily breached.

If the Congress elected this course, the fiscal years 1979-

1983 defense program could be reduced by $5.6 billion through

the following actions:

o Delete three active Army divisions;

o Maintain XM-1, AAH, and Cobra/TOW production schedules as

established in the fiscal year 1979 defense program;

6/ The pre-positioning of additional U.S. equipment in Europe is

more fully discussed in the CBO companion background paper,

U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Mobility

and Logistics Issues.

xv
o Produce the IFV, as established in the fiscal year 1978

defense program;

o Continue A-10 production toward the currently planned

goal of seven air wings.

The following table summarizes the annual costs or savings

for each of the options presented above during the five fiscal

years 1979-1983. The costs or savings associated with each option

are expressed as changes from the fiscal year 1979-1983 defense

program proposed by the Department of Defense.

ADDITIONAL COSTS OR SAVINGS OF THREE FIREPOWER APPROACHES COMPARED

TO PROJECTED COSTS OF THE FISCAL YEAR 1979 DEFENSE BUDGET: BY

FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT DOLLARS

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Option I

(Augmentation

Emphasis) 180 190 880 470 620

Option II

(Reinforcing

Emphasis) 290 340 630 1,150 1,090

Option III

(Sector Defense

Emphasis) -160 -720 -1,310 -1,660 -1,770

xvi
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

U.S. procurement programs for conventional ground and tactical air forces are undertaken largely for the defense of NATO.

Weapons systems that deliver firepower against enemy ground forces

are a major component of both the NATO ground and tactical air

forces and U.S. procurement programs. JL/

"Firepower" is used here to mean the ability to deliver heavy

ordnance and explosives on enemy forces at, or immediately behind,

the forward edge of the battle area (the front). Firepower assets

may be either ground-based—artillery, tanks, and antitank guided

missiles (ATGMs)—or, in the case of armed helicopters and close

air support aircraft, airborne. 2J

In deciding on the level and mix of U.S. firepower procurement programs, the Congress makes decisions concerning the

specific roles the United States plays in the defense of NATO.

The principal requirement for U.S. conventional ground and tactical air forces is to defend West Germany from a Warsaw Pact

attack. Within that context, U.S. forces with firepower assets

have three more specific roles. First, U.S. forces stationed in

Europe are responsible for the defense of two of the nine sectors

of the NATO Central Front, where they provide approximately onefourth of its forward defense forces (see Figure 1, Chapter III).

Second, their more mobile firepower assets (primarily aircraft)

provide rapid assistance to allied sectors that are under attack.

I/ For a discussion of air defense and mobility and logistics

issues—other important aspects of NATO defense—and an overview of the NATO defense problem, see Congressional Budget

Office, U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO:

Overview, BudgetIssuePaper(January1978)andthecompanion

background papers, Air Defense Issues and Mobility and Logistics Issues.

2J "Firepower," as defined here, excludes some other types of

weapons used against enemy ground targets, such as small-arms

fire and aerial bombing of deep rear-area targets, since these

generally lack either the weight or the immediate impact on

the battle that this term connotes.

25-087 O - 78 - 3
Finally, U.S. forces located outside Europe—principally in the

United States—provide reinforcements for the entire Central

Front; some are organized and equipped for early reinforcement of

NATO, but most require longer periods of time to respond.

Decisions on the quantity and mix of U.S. firepower procurement programs are consequently decisions on which of these various

roles—forward defense of U.S. sectors, prompt firepower assistance to allies, and provision of both early and later reinforcements—the United States wishes to emphasize.

Thus, if the Congress wished to emphasize only the defense

of U.S. sectors of NATO's Central Front, it might concentrate

on modernizing the U.S. forces clearly allocated to that role

and consider cutting forces—particularly late-arriving ground

reinforcements—that are intended primarily to bolster allied

defenses. If, on the other hand, the Congress wished to provide

early firepower assistance to the allied sectors of the front, it

could buy additional attack aircraft, which would give prompt but

limited firepower support, or it could opt for the alternative

of improving the ability of U.S. ground forces stationed outside

of Europe to reinforce NATO troops by pre-positioning their

equipment in Europe or by buying additional strategic—that is,

transatlantic—airlift.

Choices of this nature depend on an assessment not only

of costs, but also of the military capabilities of the allies as

well as of the Warsaw Pact. Assessment of allied capabilities is

necessary because the relationship among NATO forces in the

Central Region is such that a weakness in one sector of the front

could threaten the defense of the entire front.

The purpose of this paper is to illuminate choices facing

the Congress in the fiscal years 1979-1983 defense program by

examining a range of U.S. firepower procurement decisions in light

of available information on NATO's current firepower assets and

planned allied force improvements. Chapter II examines evidence

suggesting that NATO forces suffer from firepower deficiencies

when compared to the assets of the Warsaw Pact. Chapter III

discusses the roles of NATO defense forces in the Central Region

and the interdependence of U.S. and allied forces. Chapter IV

describes the firepower capabilities and plans of allied forces in

Western Europe, while Chapter V examines U.S. firepower programs

and issues. Finally, Chapter VI sets out three options that

help define the policy choices facing the Congress with respect

to firepower procurement programs and the U.S. role in NATO.
CHAPTER II. THE FIREPOWER BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Firepower and maneuver are the two essential elements of

modern ground combat. Although maneuver brings firepower to bear

on enemy targets, it is the application of firepower that destroys

those targets.

Ground forces almost certainly can deliver more sustained

firepower and destroy enemy armored formations more effectively

than close air support forces of equal cost. But they lack the

capability of airborne firepower assets to cover long distances

quickly to meet an attack or to carry the battle to the enemy.

Firepower assets can also be defined in terms of how quickly

they can be brought to bear in the European Central Region.

"Immediately available assets" are those attached to active

ground and air forces located in Central Europe. _!_/ "Early

reinforcements" are those ground and air units that can be sent to

the Central Region in a few days or a week—for example, allied

ready reserve units in Europe, U.S. tactical air squadrons based

in the United States, and airlifted U.S. ground forces whose heavy

equipment is stored in Europe. "Later reinforcements," such

as U.S. ground forces traveling by sea, are those that take

weeks to complete the move to Europe.

The United States and its NATO allies appear to be at a

numerical disadvantage in immediately available ground force

firepower weapons when compared with the Warsaw Pact. But this

apparent disparity may be exaggerated by differences in the

quality, doctrine, roles, and organization of NATO and Warsaw

Pact forces. Whether the overall balance is unfavorable or

not, however, Warsaw Pact forces could gain a significant local

advantage over NATO by massing for an attack, thus creating a need

for quick reinforcements.

As shown in Table 1, the NATO allies face a more than 2

to 1 disadvantage in the number of tanks and cannon artillery

_!/ West Germany, the Benelux countries, East Germany, Poland,

and Czechoslovakia.

'TTWYTF
immediately available in units on the day military mobilization

begins in Central Europe. That estimate does not consider the

possible contribution of French forces, whose participation in the

war is problematical, but even the inclusion of those forces would

not appreciably alter the balance. Nor does it consider airborne

firepower, where NATO forces may have an edge.

TABLE 1. SELECTED FIREPOWER ASSETS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE IN

CENTRAL EUROPE, 1977 a/

Warsaw Pact

NATO c /

Artillery

Pieces b/

5,800

2,600

Med ium

Tanks

16,200

6,700

Antitank

Guided Missiles

4,000

3,200

SOURCES: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1977-1978 (London: 1977); Western Europe

in 1977: Security, Economic, and Political Issues,

Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the

Middle East, House Committee on International Relations,

95:1 (July/October 1977), pp. 6-16.

aj Available on the day mobilization begins in fully manned

active units in West Germany, the Benelux countries, East

Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

_b/ Includes multiple rocket launchers,

c/ Excluding France.

Although the Pact's initial numerical advantage seems to be

widely accepted, factors other than numbers of weapons in units

also affect the balance of firepower capabilities between NATO and

the Warsaw Pact. One such factor is the quality of arms. For

example, not only do the Soviets have more artillery, but several

of their weapons have greater ranges and rates of fire than NATO
artillery. 2/ On the other hand, almost all NATO artillery in

Europe is self-propelled and has some armor plating, making it

less vulnerable to enemy fire than the bulk of Soviet artillery,

which lacks crew protection. Tanks provide another example.

Although the Pact has more tanks, NATO tanks generally have

better armor protection, more accurate weapons, and are more

lethal at longer ranges.

Doctrine also affects the firepower balance. The Soviets

emphasize conducting offensive operations at the earliest possible

moment in the conflict, and they stress achieving fire superiority

over the enemy. Soviet doctrine for attaining this superiority

emphasizes massing large numbers of artillery at the breakthrough

point, conducting a prolonged, intense artillery barrage to

destroy enemy strongpoints and disrupt enemy control and reinforcement, and then attacking immediately with tanks and motorized

infantry along the path prepared by the artillery barrage. 3/

This doctrine for artillery fire and the less sophisticated Pact

ammunition make it necessary for the Pact to use large amounts of

artillery. These guns deliver an enormous volume of fire on large

areas of—rather than particular targets on—the battlefield.

NATO doctrine, on the other hand, emphasizes using artillery

to attack particular battlefield targets that threaten ground

forces. The superior accuracy and lethality of NATO artillery

weapons permit these targets to be destroyed without prolonged,

disruptive fire over large areas of the battlefield. Given

these different objectives and the ability of NATO artillery to

attain them, it is not clear that NATO needs as much artillery as

the Pact.

Third, some types of weapons—especially ATGMs—appear

particularly suited to defensive operations, while other weapons—

especially tanks—are often regarded as more effective for offensive maneuvers. Thus, in assessing Soviet and NATO firepower

capabilities, it may be misleading to rely solely on direct

2J John Vogt, "Improving NATO Force Capabilities, Atlantic

Community Quarterly (Summer 1977), p. 11.

3J I.N. Voro'byev, "Fire, Assault, Maneuver," in Selected Soviet

~ Military Writings, 1970-1975 (A Soviet View), trans. U.S. Air

Force(Washington,B.C.:U.S.Government Printing Office,

1977), p. 220.

TTHTTF
comparisons of their tanks, without considering that the defensive

advantages of NATO antitank missiles may partially compensate

for Soviet advantages in numbers of tanks.

A fourth factor in the firepower balance is the organization

of firepower assets. Insofar as is known, the Warsaw Pact's

firepower assets are all assigned to military units, which are

organized to attack or defend in a depth of two or three ranks

or "echelons." Consequently, only a portion of the entire force

is directly engaged with enemy forces at any one time. When units

of the first echelon have become ineffective through combat

losses, they are replaced by units from the second echelon, which

take up the fight until they, in turn, need replacement. Units

pulled back to the rear are rebuilt and made ready to rejoin the

battle. This "unit replacement" approach permits Warsaw Pact

forces to engage in continuous ground combat while maintaining a

fairly high level of effectiveness.

In contrast, rather than pulling entire units out of the

line, NATO ground forces replace combat losses on an individual

and continuous basis. Thus, a sizable portion of NATO's assets

are retained in maintenance and war reserve stocks, 4/ and these

assets are not included in Table 1.

A fifth important factor affecting the firepower balance is

mobilization time. The immediate numerical balance of principal

firepower assets is unfavorable to NATO. A short mobilization

time of 14 days would make the numerical balance even more unfavorable, since the Soviets can deploy forces over land from the

Soviet Union faster than the United States can deploy forces from

North America. If NATO, however, has more than three weeks'

warning of a Pact attack or if forces in Europe are able to

sustain combat for a month or so, then reinforcements arriving by

sea from the United States would begin to reduce significantly

NATO's numerical inferiority in firepower assets.

These factors of quality, weapons mix, doctrine, organization, and available mobilization time clearly affect the balance

of firepower capabilities, though it is difficult to assess their

precise impact. It is clear, however, that conclusions about NATO

firepower capabilities based on numerical comparisons of weapons

in units should be qualified to account for these other factors.

47 Congressional Budget Office, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact

Military Balance, Budget Issue Paper (December 1977), p. 20.
Nevertheless, the availability of such extensive Warsaw

Pact ground force firepower assets in Europe, especially when

coupled with the emphasis of Soviet military doctrine on offensive

operations, 5J has prompted concern. The concern is heightened by

the possibility that a Pact attack on Western Europe could occur

with very little warning, could be aimed at rapidly overwhelming

NATO defenses in a short, very intense war, and could be conducted

initially with forces in Eastern Europe, without reinforcements.

These Warsaw Pact forces probably would mass against relatively

weak points in NATO's defenses and could achieve large concentrations of force anywhere along the East-West border. Thus, it

is possible that—whatever the overall balance—if NATO has little

time to mobilize, its firepower capabilities may be inadequate at

the point of attack.

Solutions to correct any firepower deficiencies should,

therefore, take into account the contributions of each NATO

member. In order to assess the effectiveness of possible U.S.

contributions to alleviating those deficiencies, the following

chapters consider the relationship between U.S. and allied forces

and the capabilities and contribution of each for NATO defense.

5/ A.A. Sidorenko, The Offensive (A Soviet View), trans. U.S. Air

Force (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1974), passim.
IH
CHAPTER III. ROLES OF NATO FORCES

The principal mission of NATO's Central Region forces is

to defend West German territory from an attack across its 700-mile

Eastern border. This defense must be conducted as close to

that border as possible, and it must prevent any significant

penetration by attacking forces: not only do large urban and

industrial centers lie close to the border (particularly in the

north), but enemy penetration of allied lines in the north could

threaten supplies for the entire front. In order to protect the

Central Region from forces that could attack anywhere along the

front, NATO should distribute its forward forces fairly evenly.

But whether or not evenly distributed forward defenses can be

attained, it is imperative that NATO be able to reinforce rapidly

at the point of attack.

The organization of the Central Region's defenses, however,

makes this requirement difficult to achieve. Defense responsibility for the East-West border is assigned by sector to each

of the five nations participating in the defense of West Germany.

The four sectors that comprise the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG)

are manned, respectively, by Dutch, German, British, and Belgian forces. I/ The four sectors comprising the Central Army

Group (CENTAG) are divided between German and U.S. forces (see

Figure 1). 2J

Each of the allies in the Central Region plays a largely

independent role in NATO's defense. As the economic, demographic,

and political circumstances of the NATO countries vary, so do the

capabilities of their defense forces. The NATO military and

political councils attempt to equalize defense capabilities

on the Central Front by adjusting the size of the various sectors

I/ A fifth sector in the north, on the Baltic coast, is manned

by German forces and is under the command of Allied Forces

North.

2J Canadian forces are also assigned to CENTAG. French forces,

not under NATO command in wartime, are located to the rear of

CENTAG's sectors.

"T7WT
mill

Figure 1.

Corps Sectors of Military Responsibility in NATO's Central Region

u s T R

SOURCE: Adapted from Richard Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO (Washington, D.C.:

The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 31 and also from U.S. Army materials,

a/ NORTHAG (Northern Army Group) and CENTAGJCentral Army Group) are two subdivisions of NATO

forces in West Germany. The line dividing the two runs from Belgium through West Germany, just south of Bonn,

and into East Germany.
and by recommending force improvements. Nevertheless, allied

force differences remain in density of firepower weapons, combat

supplies, and forces available for reinforcement.

These differences have implications for U.S. policy. Many

of NATO's weaker forces—in terms of firepower assets, combat

supplies, and reinforcements—are concentrated in NORTHAG. Those

sectors lie astride the North German plain—a flat expanse of

territory which, despite its increasing urbanization, still offers

the most favorable terrain in the NATO Central Front for a Warsaw

Pact armored attack. If the allied forces on the northern plain

could be overwhelmed, the attack could sever the communication

lines from the Benelux ports to U.S. forces in southern Germany,

surround U.S. forces, and eventually defeat NATO. If this is the

case, it might thus be of questionable value for the United States

to strengthen its CENTAG forces, without regard to providing

reinforcing capabilities for allied sectors.

Thus, as the United States contemplates efforts to strengthen

NATO and improve its firepower capabilities, it should devote

special attention to the contributions of its NATO allies. If,

despite their continued efforts, their capabilities remain weak,

then perhaps the United States should consider whether further

efforts to strengthen NATO are appropriate. If, under those

circumstances, the United States wished to continue to strengthen

NATO, it might prefer to focus on firepower capabilities that

could rapidly reinforce allied sectors in Europe rather than

on improving U.S. forces in CENTAG. _3/ To examine these choices,

it is necessary to describe the allies' current initial firepower

and reinforcement capabilities and plans. These can then be

compared with U.S. plans to improve capabilities in each type of

firepower weapon system.

3/ Currently, major new U.S. firepower items, such as XM-1 tanks

and Cobra/TOW attack helicopters, are sent to U.S. forces in

CENTAG rather than to forces in the United States or to depots

of pre-positioned equipment for early-arriving reinforcements.

These new equipment items here are referred to as force

improvements. Within the last two years, the United States

has begun to station an additional brigade, called Brigade 75,

in the German sector of NORTHAG. While this action helps

strengthen NATO forces outside of CENTAG, it is probably best

understood as a redistribution of forces rather than as an

improvement in their capabilities.

11
Iff
CHAPTER IV. INITIAL FIREPOWER AND REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES

OF THE NATO ALLIES

GROUND-BASED FIREPOWER ASSETS: TANKS AND ARTILLERY

The military capabilities of the NATO allies vary widely.

Table 2 demonstrates this with respect to ground-based firepower

assets, by comparing the ratios of major weapons to personnel

strengths in present U.S., West German, British, and Soviet

divisions. (Table 2 excludes corps-level firepower assets,

in which the United States has an advantage. Belgian, Canadian,

French, and Dutch ground forces together average fewer weapons per

1,000 men than West German forces.)

Tanks

The allied forces have fewer main battle tanks than U.S.

forces for the same number of troops. The most common NATO

tank is the German Leopard I, which is used by Belgium, West

Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands. This tank is roughly

comparable in performance to the U.S. M60-series tank. The

Germans also possess over 1,300 older U.S. M48 tanks. As the

Leopard II is introduced into the West German army, the M48s

will be transferred to the German territorial forces, and about

half will receive new guns and engines. The British army is

equipped with some 700 Chieftain tanks, and lesser quantities

of older and lighter British, American, and French tanks are also

found in the forces of the Central Front allies.

Thus, while the allies' principal tank is qualitatively

comparable to that of the United States, the allies have been

slower than the United States in replacing the older 1940sand 1950s-vintage tanks in their standing forces with new equipment. Moreover, all but two of the allies have completed their

acquisition of new tanks, and they will neither add nor replace equipment for the next decade or so. Only Belgium and

Canada are still completing their purchases of Leopard I tanks,

and only the West Germans will purchase a new tank—the Leopard II—that is in any sense comparable to the new U.S. XM-1

13
.1111 *Ji

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF NATO AND SOVIET DIVISIONS IN TERMS OF

MAJOR GROUND-BASED WEAPONS AND PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Personnel (1,000)

Tanks

Antitank weapons

Artillery pieces d/

United

States

16.5

378 a/

380

119

West

Germany

Armored

17.0

300

50

118

Great

Britain

Divisions

11.7

212 fa/

72

36

Soviet

Union

11.0

347 c/

153

96

Total Weapons

Weapons per 1,000

Men in Divisions

877

53.15

468

27.53

320

27.35

596

54.18

Mechanized Divisions

Personnel (1,000)

Tanks

Antitank weapons

Artillery pieces d/

Total Weapons

Weapons per 1,000

Men in Divisions

16.0

270

426

115

811

50.69

17.5

250

61

124

435

24.88

!/

e/

e/

e/

I/

£/

12.7

288 c/

183

168

639

50.31

SOURCE: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1977-1978 (London: 1977), pp~92-93.

a/ Includes 54 light tanks.

_b_/ Includes 72 light tanks.

£/ Includes 22 light tanks.

_d/ Includes heavy mortars and multiple rocket launchers.

_e/ Great Britain does not have mechanized divisions in the

Central Region.

14
tank. \J Thus, modernization of allied tank forces is likely to

lag behind that of the United States in the foreseeable future.

Artillery

The allies generally have fewer, lighter, and more varied

types of artillery pieces than comparable U.S. forces. The British, for example, not only have far less, but also much lighter,

artillery than comparable U.S. forces, even after the pending

reorganization of their army: 39 light 105 mm- and 155 mm. divisional artillery pieces as compared with 66 heavier and more

flexible 155 mm. and 8" howitzers per U.S. division. Similarly,

the West German army uses 105 mm. and 155 mm. artillery as corps

general-support weapons, while almost every other army uses

heavier 8" and 175 mm. weapons, supplemented by 155 mm. howitzers,

for that purpose.

The United States and the other NATO allies share the objectives of greater range and improved accuracy, rate of fire,

and lethality in future artillery developments. 2J These features are being incorporated into the Anglo-German-Italian FH-70

155 mm. towed howitzer program, which is now entering service

with the the German army; however, that weapon is replacing,

rather than augmenting, older artillery pieces. A self-propelled

version, the SP-70, which will also be used as a replacement

for older guns, is being developed by West Germany, Britain, and

_!/ The British are building for Iran an improved version of the

Chieftain tank, incorporating special armor. This tank will

also include a 110 mm. gun, which the British believe to be

superior to the XM-1 105 mm. gun. Though this improved

Chieftain tank may be comparable to the XM-1 in armor protection and armament, it lacks the latter"s speed, maneuverability, and "fire-on-the-move" capability. Moreover, because

of the size of the Iranian tank order, the British will not be

able to produce this tank for their own forces until the early

1980s.

2_l U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1977,

p. 171; Lt. Col. B.E. Blunt, "Surface-to-Surface Artillery:

Developments in the Fire Support for the 1980's," Journal of

the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies

(December 1974), p. 13.

15
JllULi.

Italy, but it will not be introduced until the mid-1980s. _3/

In addition, Germany is developing a new multiple rocket launcher,

the RS-80. The capabilities of this system, however, are apparently more limited than those of a similar U.S. system—the

General Support Rocket System—which was under development as of

last year.

Finally, as indicated in Table 2, the density of current

allied antitank weapons is not nearly as great as that of U.S.

weapons. This is particularly true with respect to modern antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), which are considered to be several

times as effective as older antitank weapons. The allies have

very few ATGMs and are only now beginning to introduce these

weapons into their forces and to build up missile stocks. The

United States, on the other hand, has fielded these weapons

for a number of years and has increased the unit issue of ATGMs

on several occasions. The allies, however, are undertaking

the greatest number of improvements in this area, with ambitious plans to field hundreds of ATGM launchers and thousands

of missiles over the next decade. kj Nevertheless, even after

completion of that program, the allied forces will still apparently have fewer ATGMs than U.S. forces.

Table 3 compares the ratio of major weapons to manpower

in current and planned British and German forces with current

U.S. forces. The table suggests that, while the planned improvements will raise the density of weapons in British and German

forces (primarily because of new division structures with larger

numbers of ATGMs), the improvements will still not bring allied

forces up to U.S. levels of firepower capability per 1,000 men.

The allies may also be vexed by the supply problems associated

with fielding many different national types of ATGMs, including

the U.S. TOW, the Franco-German MILAN and HOT, and the British

SWINGFIRE. In sum, it seems clear that NATO allied forces are

significantly weaker in main ground-based firepower assets than

U.S. forces, and European modernization programs apparently will

not close this gap in the foreseeable future.

_3/ Dr. N.J. Hopkins, "A Look Ahead to the Land Warfare Developments of the Mid-Eighties, Part II: Artillery and Air Defense

Weapons," Canadian Defense Quarterly (Spring 1977), p. 17.

4/ See, for example, Rudi Mellor, "Federal Germany's Defense

Potential, Part II: The Defense Industry," International

Defense Review (June 1974), pp. 336-337.

16
TABLE 3. DENSITY OF MAJOR WEAPONS IN BRITISH, GERMAN, AND U.S.

DIVISIONS: NUMBERS OF ARTILLERY PIECES, TANKS, AND

ANTITANK WEAPONS PER 1,000 MEN

Armored Divisions Mechanized Divisions

Current Planned Current Planned

Great Britain 27.35 39.65 a/ a/

West Germany 27.53 37.87 24.88 38.47

Current U.S. = 53.15 Current U.S. = 50.69

SOURCE: Computed from The International Institute for Strategic

Studies, The Military Balance, 1977-1978 (London: 1977),

pp. 92-93.

aj Great Britain does not have mechanized divisions in the

Central Region.

AIRBORNE FIREPOWER ASSETS: ATTACK HELICOPTERS AND CLOSE AIR

SUPPORT AIRCRAFT

Airborne firepower, with its ability to concentrate quickly,

may partly compensate for deficiencies in ground force firepower,

depending on how it is organized and applied. It is clear that

the allies and the United States have different approaches to

the use of airborne firepower, although it is difficult to say

which approach is more effective. Currently, the NATO allies have

essentially no specialized attack helicopter forces. They also

use multimission aircraft for firepower support of ground troops,

while the United States increasingly depends on specialized

aircraft for ground attack missions. Finally, the allies generally provide less coordination between ground forces and airborne

firepower assets.

17

~W¥TT
ill

Attack Helicopters

The attack helicopters that the allies have or are planning

to acquire soon are multimission utility aircraft to which weapons

are temporarily attached. _5_/ The French and the British now have

small forces of about 250 and 100 light, unarmored, wide-bodied

helicopters, respectively, fitted with first-generation French

SS-11 ATGMs. 6/ Britain is planning to acquire 100 Lynx utility

helicopters by the mid-1980s, probably armed with the U.S. TOW

missile, as the mainstay of its future attack helicopter force. TJ

West Germany is also planning to acquire, in two stages, an attack

helicopter capability. Between 1979 and 1982, the West German

army plans to acquire 227 B0105 light, unarmored, wide-bodied

utility helicopters, modified for an attack role and armed with

six HOT ATGMs. That will provide one helicopter regiment per

German corps. Later, after 1985, West Germany expects to purchase

200 truly specialized attack helicopters, incorporating a narrow

silhouette, permanent weapons stations, and a night and allweather fighting capability. 8/ France may also purchase 100 of

5J "European Views on Military Helicopters," Interavia (April

1976), pp. 307-311.

6/ ATGMs are currently distinguished in three generations.

For first-generation ATGMs, the operator must keep both the

target and the missile in view and steer the missile to the

target by remote control. Because of the difficulty of this

operation, these weapons require extensive operator training

and are easily thwarted by any actions, such as explosions or

suppressive fire, which cause the operators to lose track

of either the target or the missile. For second-generation

ATGMs, such as the U.S. TOW missile, the operator must keep

only the target in view, and the missile will automatically be

steered to strike the target. For third-generation ATGMs,

such as the U.S. Hellfire missile now under development, the

operator can launch the missile without ever seeing the

target; it will strike the target by following an energy

source beamed on the target by a remote observer.

TJ "Helicopter Forces Europe," Flight International (August 6,

1977), p. 415.

B/ Ibid., pp. 414-415; "European Views on Military Helicopters,"

pp. 309-310.

18
these aircraft after 1987. The Netherlands and Belgium apparently

wish to have very small attack helicopter forces by the early

1980s, but no specific plans have been announced. Table 4 provides a comparison of U.S. and allied helicopter assets.

TABLE 4. NATO HELICOPTER ASSETS

Attack Utility

United States 1,000 7,000

Central Region Allies a/ 0 1,180

SOURCE: Compiled from International Institute for Strategic

Studies, The Military Balance, 1977-1978, pp. 6, 19-22,

24, 26.

a/ Belgium, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and West Germany.

The European NATO allies not only lack the number and sophisticated kinds of U.S. attack helicopter assets, but they also

plan to use them differently. In contrast to the U.S. practice of

attaching some armed helicopters to ground force divisions, the

Europeans prefer to use the helicopters as a corps reserve force.

The United States would use armed helicopters to harrass or delay

an attacking force or to reinforce a defensive position from which

ground forces had been transferred to meet a threat elsewhere.

The allies would prefer to hold their helicopters in reserve and

commit them only when an enemy breakthrough could not be stopped

by ground forces. Indeed, some allies, notably the British, do

not believe in using attack helicopters near the forward edge of

the battle area except as a last resort. 9/ Although the allied

9/ "The Soldier's Helicopter," Flight International (June 12,

1976), p. 1560; "Helicopter Forces Europe," p. 413.

19

T»¥TTT
i ll III

approach is undoubtedly in keeping with the small size and light

armament of their current helicopter forces, it reduces the

potential effect of these forces on the initial battle, where

their firepower may well be of greatest value.

Close Air Support Aircraft

The allies' close air support capabilities are more extensive

than their attack helicopter capabilities, but the rationale

behind their choice of weapons is similar. Table 5 indicates that

most allies maintain fairly high proportions of their air forces

for ground attack missions when compared with the U.S. Air Force.

The current and future allied close air support assets are,

however, based on multimission aircraft designs that are not

optimized for close air support.

TABLE 5. PERCENTAGES OF ALLIED AIR FORCES IN THE NATO CENTRAL

REGION ALLOCATED PRIMARILY TO GROUND ATTACK, 1977 a/

United West Great The

States Germany Britain Netherlands Belgium France

Percent

of Total

Air Force

66 83 53 71 71 73

SOURCE: CBO estimates based on figures in International Institute

for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1977-1978

(London: 1977) and "World Air Forces 1977," Flight International (July 2, 1977), p. 34.

aj Counts only fighter, fighter-bomber, and ground attack aircraft.

20
The United States is increasingly emphasizing the destruction

of individual tanks with gun and guided missile fire from slowflying aircraft operating from behind friendly forces. The

allies, by contrast, have chosen not to invest in specialized

aircraft for this type of combat; they prefer to deliver scatterable area-type weapons at very high speeds and low altitudes at

some distance behind enemy lines, overflying enemy forces and

defenses in the process. In addition, unlike the United States,

most allies do not stress the role of a Forward Air Controller

in coordinating air strikes with ground force operations. 10/

Thus, many of the allies lack both the personnel and the practice required for close coordination of air strikes and ground

force operations. Consequently, what the allies call "close air

support," the United States would consider "battlefield interdiction"—that is, disrupting enemy troop movements several

kilometers behind the forward edge of the battle area, with little

coordination between friendly air and ground forces.

In practice, these doctrinal and procedural differences

between the United States and the NATO allies in their use of

close air support aircraft do not seem to affect significantly the

conduct of military operations. Despite the apparent procedural

differences, U.S. close air support aircraft can be effectively

used to reinforce allied ground forces. Still, if the United

States wished to emphasize its ability to provide this kind

of flexible air support to the allies, it should strive to better

coordinate close air support procedures and doctrine, in order to

ensure maximum effectiveness of U.S. support.

REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES

The preceding discussion focused on firepower assets that

the allies could use to meet an initial attack. But the allies'

ability to provide additional combat formations to reinforce

the front should also be a matter of concern to the Congress

in deciding on U.S. forces for NATO. Table 6 reviews published

information on the allies' available reserve combat formations.

As the table shows, although the allies have a large supply of

10/ The West Germans are an exception to this generalization,

as they maintain the functional equivalent of Forward Air

Controllers in their ground combat units to coordinate

close air strikes.

21
Hi

reserve manpower, they have relatively few reserve combat units

available for reinforcement of their sectors. These units, many

with obsolescent equipment, are manned by reservists. They may be

marginally useful in modern high-intensity combat. Even the

largest and probably the most effective of these forces—the

West German Territorial Army—is spread out across West Germany

and is designed primarily for rear-area security rather than for

front-line combat, ll/

TABLE 6. ALLIED RESERVE COMBAT UNITS AND RESERVE MANPOWER IN

NATO'S CENTRAL REGION

Country

Major Combat

Formations

Total Available

Reserve Manpower

Belgium

Britain

Germany

The

Netherlands

1 mechanized brigade;

1 motorized infantry

brigade

2 armored reconnaissance regiments

6 territorial brigades

1 armored brigade;

2 infantry brigades

50,000

110,000

504,000 Territorial Army,

plus 615,000 Field Army

replacements

145,000

SOURCE: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The

Military Balance, 1977-1978 (London: 1977), pp. 19-26.

NOTE: Brigades are customarily one-third of a division.

ll/ Five French mechanized divisions, of which two are located in

southern Germany and three in northern France, could, in some

circumstances, be available as reinforcements. These forces,

however, are located at some distance from NORTHAG and, since

France withdrew from NATO's military committees, their

commitment might not be automatic in the event of war.

22
CHAPTER V. U.S. FIREPOWER CAPABILITIES AND PROGRAMS

Unlike the allies, the United States maintains large numbers

of active, well-armed ground force units and tactical air forces

outside the NATO Central Region. Most of these forces are

based in the United States, along with reserve tactical air

squadrons and eight reserve Army divisions.

As discussed in Chapter I, U.S. forces play three roles

in NATO's Central Region defenses. First, U.S. ground forces

stationed in Germany are responsible for the defense of their

assigned sectors (the V and VII corps areas), where the equivalent

of five U.S. divisions and their support is stationed.

Second, U.S. forces in Germany, particularly aircraft, could

assist allied forces in defending other sectors. The ability of

U.S. ground forces to provide prompt assistance in defending

allied sectors is limited, however, by both the difficulties

associated with making relatively long overland journeys close

behind the lines and the risk of weakening the defense of U.S.

sectors.

Third, forces stationed in the United States are available

to reinforce Western Europe. Tactical air force units in the

United States can be deployed to Europe in a few days. The United

States also maintains the equivalent of two divisions ready for

almost immediate deployment by air to Germany, where stocks of

weapons and equipment are held for them in CENTAG. Another 11

active divisions—Army and Marine—could be deployed from the

United States to Europe by sea with their equipment, _!/ but if a

Pact attack were launched on short warning, most would arrive

several weeks after hostilities began. Three of these divisions

were created in 1974—increasing the overall size of the Army from

21 to 24 divisions—and two are still in the process of being

mechanized to make them more effective in the European theater.

These increases are associated with a re-estimate of the forces

I/ These divisions could be used for other missions, such as

~ the defense of the NATO flanks or for combat elsewhere in

the world, but most are clearly earmarked for Europe.

23

TfTTTT
required to defend the NATO Central Region. Since the defense

sectors in NORTHAG, manned by allied forces, are evidently more in

need of reinforcement than the U.S. sectors in CENTAG, these three

additional divisions may be intended to reinforce allied forces in

northern Germany.

Each of these three U.S. roles in the defense of NATO's

Central Region relies upon different mixes of weapons and equipment and emphasizes different force capabilities. The United

States has programs underway to improve its capabilities to

perform each role.

GROUND-BASED FIREPOWER PROGRAMS: TANKS AND ARTILLERY

Tanks

In view of the fact that the U.S. Army is completing a major

program to equip its ground units with Dragon and TOW antitank

guided missiles (ATGMs), the principal ground-based firepower

procurement issues for the fiscal years 1979-1983 period will

involve tanks and artillery.

The principal issue in the U.S. tank program is the ultimate

size and pace of the program to produce XM-1 tanks. Currently,

the United States has an inventory of about 8,000 tanks, 2J about

one-fourth of which are in Europe. The Army's inventory objective

is about 15,000 tanks. The pace at which this objective is

reached will be determined by the number of tanks produced

each year; the costs of achieving that goal will be determined by

the kinds of tanks produced.

The United States is currently producing two basic kinds

of tanks. The M60A3, at a unit cost of about $820,000 in fiscal

2J The present inventory of U.S. tanks consists of the M60Als,

about 540 M60A2s (an improved version incorporating a combined

tank gun and ATGM launcher), about 1,550 1960s-vintage M60

tanks, and about 1,800 older M48 tanks for the reserve components. In addition, the Army has about 1,500 M551 Sheridan

armored reconnaissance vehicles that equip armored cavalry

regiments. These use the same gun-missile system as the

M60A2. The Sheridans will soon be replaced by M60-series

tanks.

24
year 1979, is an improved version of the standard M60A1 main

battle tank. _3/ The XM-1, costing about $1.5 million each over

the life of the program, represents a new generation of tanks. 4/

The Army regards the XM-1 as superior to any tank now in existence

or under development—apparently including the West German Leopard II. The principal advantages of the XM-1 are its superior

armor protection, greater speed and maneuverability, and its

ability to fire accurately while moving. Although M60-series

tanks cannot incorporate the special armor of the XM-1 and may

lack some of its speed, the improved M60A3 will have roughly the

same gun accuracy when stationary but somewhat less accuracy when

on the move.

Last year, the approved Army tank program called for procurement of 2,200 new M60A3s (plus conversion of all M60Als to A3

standards) and 3,312 XM-1 tanks by 1986. This program would

not, however, have enabled the Army to reach its tank inventory

objective before 1988.

An alternative program, proposed by the Army during preparation of the fiscal year 1979 budget, would double the XM-1

production rate and reduce the conversions of M60A3s, thereby

enabling the Army to reach its inventory objective earlier than

the previous plan.

The President's fiscal year 1979 defense budget differs

substantially from that Army proposal. Though the President's

budget would double the XM-1 inventory goal—from 3,312 to 7,058

tanks—it would increase the production rate only slightly, by a

total of 419 tanks in fiscal years 1980 and 1981. Consequently,

the Army would not reach its inventory objective for XM-1 tanks

before the early 1990s.

3/ In addition to producing M60A3 tanks, the Army plans to

upgrade some or all of the 4,140 existing M60A1 tanks to

A3 standards. These improvements include a stabilized gun and

improved fire-control system for firing on the move, improved

night vision equipment, and a more capable engine. The cost

is $340,000 each.

4Y All unit costs represent the total program cost, expressed

in current dollars, averaged over the total number of units

to be procured.

25

TMTTTT
The Army eventually plans to procure a new armored combat

and transport vehicle for mechanized infantry. One candidate

now in development is the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). Last

year, the Army planned to buy approximately 3,100 IFVs over a

period of seven years, at a cost of $1.3 billion, with procurement scheduled to begin in fiscal year 1979. The Administration's fiscal year 1979 program, however, includes no funds for

procurement of the IFV.

The choice of how many XM-ls and IFVs to procure can be

related to choices concerning the U.S. role in NATO. The improvements in firepower and survivability offered by the XM-1

would increase U.S. ground force capabilities in Western Europe.

But expenditures for the XM-1 and IFV would improve its ability to

provide early reinforcement to the allies only if they were

accompanied by expenditures to airlift or pre-position equipment

near the allied sectors.

Artillery

Like the allies, the United States is planning improvements

in the quality, rather than a dramatic increase in the number,

of its artillery pieces. The United States, however, appears

to be ahead of the allies in the area of specialized munitions,

which greatly increase the lethality of artillery weapons.

The United States has an inventory of about 4,450 primary

artillery pieces, mostly towed 105 mm. guns for light divisions

and 155 mm. and 8" self-propelled guns for armored and mechanized

divisions. In view of the recent concern with NATO's firepower

deficiencies, a surprisingly small percentage of the U.S. inventory is currently deployed in Europe. The United States plans

to purchase 136 155 mm. self-propelled howitzers in fiscal year

1979, at a cost of $65 million, apparently as part of an ongoing

program. In fiscal year 1979, it also plans to deploy in Europe

an additional heavy artillery battalion from current inventories,

at a cost of about $4 million, to supplement existing general

fire-support capabilities.

The United States is pursuing its objective of increasing

the range, volume of fire, and lethality of its artillery through

a number of programs, many of which involve only small near-term

costs. These include fitting longer gun tubes to existing 155 mm.

and 8" howitzers; procuring rocket-assisted projectiles for

greater range; developing and procuring improved conventional

26
munitions that scatter bomblets over wide areas; developing

laser-guided artillery shells that can accurately strike tanks and

other point targets; and developing improved artillery-locating

radars and a computerized fire-support coordination capability

(TACFIRE). Finally, as a complement to its cannon artillery, the

United States is also developing the General Support Rocket

System—a multiple rocket launcher capable of delivering a high

volume of fire very rapidly. An accelerated development schedule

may make this system available by the early 1980s. The total

expected fiscal year 1979 cost of these supporting programs for

the artillery will be quite small.

AIRBORNE FIREPOWER ASSETS: ATTACK HELICOPTERS AND CLOSE AIR

SUPPORT AIRCRAFT

Attack Helicopters

The United States was the first country to design a helicopter for the sole purpose of delivering ordnance on battlefield

targets, and it now has an inventory of about 712 narrow-bodied,

rocket- and machine gun-armed Cobra helicopters, which constitute an integral part of the firepower of almost all U.S. Army

divisions. These aircraft are intended to fly close to the

ground, using terrain and vegetation to conceal them from enemy

view and attack. With the assistance of scout helicopters flying

with similar tactics, they locate enemy ground force targets

and climb from their concealed positions only long enough to

fire weapons at the target before descending and moving on under

cover.

The Army is in the midst of a program to convert almost 700

existing Cobra helicopters to carry eight TOW ATGMs by 1981, at

a cost of $1.1 million each, and to procure 305 identically

equipped new Cobras, at a cost of $1.8 million each. This program

will provide U.S. forces with a highly mobile antitank capability.

With the addition of limited night-vision capability, this antitank force will be able to fight in darkness as well.

There are two alleged problems with the Cobra/TOW. First,

as a modified aircraft of the Vietnam era, it is said to lack

sufficient armor protection for a European battlefield. Second,

because the aircraft must emerge from cover for up to 15 seconds

in order to visually guide its TOW missile to the target, it is

said to be vulnerable to enemy detection and destruction. To

alleviate those problems, the Army is developing the Advanced

27
.Ill 1 il.il

Attack Helicopter (AAH), of which 536 are to be built between 1981

and 1987, at a cost of $5.9 million each. The total cost of that

program will be about $4.1 billion. The Cobra/TOW force will

complement this fleet.

The AAH will have greater armor protection and redundant

controls to improve its chances of surviving if hit. Most

importantly, it will fire the Hellfire laser-guided missile,

which follows a laser beam—directed on a target by a ground

observer, another aircraft, or by the AAH itself—and strikes

its target accurately. When the target is designated by a ground

observer or another aircraft, the AAH will be able to fire the

missile from a completely concealed position, thus reducing

its chances of being attacked by the enemy. In addition, the

exposure time of the AAH is slightly reduced even when it designates its own targets because Hellfire missiles fly faster than

TOW missiles.

Despite these advantages, the AAH system is not without

problems. The ground laser designators are, of course, vulnerable

to suppressing fire, and they may very well lack adequate time

to move into position if an attack came with little warning.

The scout helicopters that designate targets for the AAH must

expose themselves during the entire missile flight; lacking armor

protection or defensive armament, they are as vulnerable to

destruction as the Cobra itself. The AAH can, of course, designate targets for its own missiles without the assistance of Scout

helicopters, but its resulting exposure vitiates the advantage

of the Hellfire missile. If the AAH is struck by one or two

bullets—the kind of small-arms threat to aircraft experienced in

Vietnam—its armor would protect it. The most severe threat to

the attack helicopter in Europe is, however, the Soviet radardirected ZSU 23 mm. four-barrelled anti-aircraft gun, the SA-7

hand-held anti-aircraft missile, and SA-8 and SA-9 surface-to-air

missiles. The ZSU-23 delivers a very high volume of fire; if the

AAH is struck by one of its volleys or by one of the anti-aircraft

missiles, the helicopter will probably be destroyed.

In addition, the United States has been reluctant to share

its laser-seeker and laser-designator Hellfire technology with

the NATO allies. Allied laser-designation equipment may not be as

sophisticated and refined as U.S. equipment. Thus, although the

Europeans will have the laser codes needed to designate for

Hellfire and although a NATO standardization agreement ensures

that their laser designators and Hellfire are compatible, the

qualitative differences between U.S. and European equipment might

28
weaken Hellfire's performance if used in conjunction with the

allies. To avoid that impairment, the AAH would have to designate

its own targets—thus reducing, but not eliminating, its survivability advantages over the Cobra/TOW. In sum, the value

of many of the features designed to improve the performance of

the AAH relative to that of the Cobra/TOW is open to question,

especially if it is used to support allied forces.

Close Air Support Aircraft

Close air support aircraft constitute a second type of

airborne firepower assets. The United States defines close air

support as the delivery of air weapons in close coordination with

ground force movements, which implies the presence of a Forward

Air Controller for coordination. While the United States currently performs close air support with 391 A-7D attack aircraft,

supplemented by F-4s and all-weather capable F-lll fighter-bomber

aircraft as needed and available, the Air Force is introducing

an aircraft designed solely for close air support—the A-10.

Procurement of 733 A-lOs is planned between 1976 and 1982, at

a unit cost of $6.2 million and a total program cost of $4.5

billion. The A-10 is designed to be a simple, rugged aircraft

with a large weapons capacity and antitank capability. It

carries a 30 mm. cannon, which fires armor-piercing ammunition at

a very high rate, and as many as six Maverick guided missiles.

Because of its large size and slow speed, the aircraft can best

survive combat by avoiding enemy air defenses. Its primary tactic

is therefore to fly low behind friendly forces, "popping up" only

long enough to strike an enemy target with the gun or a missile.

Despite some vulnerabilities, the Army and the Air Force believe

that the A-10 can survive combat if it uses appropriate tactics

and is assisted by other aircraft that attack enemy air defenses.

Although the basing plan for the A-10 is now under review,

it is clear that a few squadrons of these aircraft will be permanently deployed in Europe. In the event of a crisis or attack,

more could be deployed to Europe within a few days. Once in

Europe, these aircraft would be under the command of Allied Air

Forces Central Europe, which can order them to fight anywhere

they are needed. Thus, they are in principle able to reinforce

any allied ground forces with aerial firepower.

29
mill
CHAPTER VI. BUDGET OPTIONS FOR U.S. FIREPOWER PROGRAMS

In considering the fiscal year 1979 budget, the Congress

will make decisions on U.S. conventional ground and tactical

air firepower programs that will shape the U.S. roles in NATO

during the next five years. The fiscal year 1979 defense program includes funds applicable to each of the three roles that

the United States currently plays in the defense of NATO. These

roles were described in Chapters I and V.

In deciding upon the fiscal year 1979 budget, the Congress

may wish to change the emphasis placed on each role. In doing so,

it could also seek to change the costs of U.S. conventional forces

firepower programs.

The following pages illustrate a range of choices with

respect to U.S. policy toward the allies, U.S. roles in NATO,

and firepower program costs. The first option provides for

an increase in the capability of the United States to assist

the allies with airborne firepower, at a moderate increase in

costs. The second option envisions a major role for U.S. ground

forces in NORTHAG, at a substantial increase in costs. The third

option considers the program and cost implications of a policy

that gives primary emphasis to the defense of the two U.S. sectors

of the Central Front.

OPTION I: PROVIDING FORCES TO AUGMENT ALLIED FIREPOWER CAPABILITIES WITH AIRCRAFT

If the Congress wished to improve, at a moderate cost, the

ability of U.S. forces to respond quickly to an attack anywhere

along the Central Front, it could increase procurement of airborne

firepower assets. These assets could be used for the defense of

the allied as well as the U.S. sectors. A-lOs would be better

suited to this role than attack helicopters, given their superior

range, payload, and survivability, and their ability to operate

from bases in NORTHAG.

Unlike close air support aircraft, U.S. attack helicopters

do not have operating bases in allied sectors with ready stocks

of ammunition and fuel from which to resupply. In order to

31

'TTWTTTT
support allied forces, U.S. helicopters would either have to

return to U.S. sectors to re supply, which would reduce the number

and duration of missions, or they would have to move their supplies with them, which would be a difficult, time-consuming, and

expensive undertaking.

The use of U.S. attack helicopters to supplement allied

firepower capabilities would also raise coordination problems.

U.S. attack helicopters currently operate as an extension of,

and in close coordination with, ground forces. The difficulties

of achieving close coordination between U.S. helicopters and

allied ground forces are, however, exacerbated by the language and

procedural differences of the other NATO armies.

The principal constraints on the utility of the A-10 in

Europe are its lack of a night and adverse-weather capability,

the limited number of aircraft now planned for deployment to

Europe, the lower priority of A-10 reinforcements for Europe, and

a shortage of aircraft shelters large enough to accommodate the

A-10. These constraints become significant when considered in

light of the Pact's ability to choose the time and weather in

which to attack so as to minimize NATO's capabilities. NATO might

need more aerial antitank firepower quickly if there were little

warning of attack.

The first problem could be partially alleviated by providing

the A-10 with some form of night-combat capability—for instance,

by developing an imaging infrared Maverick missile that can be

used at night. The problems of deploying more A-lOs to Europe

are difficult to surmount, since aircraft cannot be indefinitely

added to U.S. forces there without compromising the Mutual and

Balanced Force Reductions negotiations. Moreover, the United

States has a nuclear commitment to NATO, which cannot be maintained by replacing nuclear-capable aircraft with A-lOs lacking

such a capability. Those problems, however, could be mitigated

by increasing both the priority with which A-lOs are moved to

Europe in time of crisis and the number of shelters available to

receive them.

These measures to improve the effectiveness of the A-10 force

and supplement U.S. close air support capabilities on the Central

Front would be appropriate if the United States believed that

the allies required support and if the United States wished to

provide it.

32
The use of U.S. aircraft to delay enemy attacks on allied

forces and to destroy enemy tanks and armored vehicles could

help the allies hold their defensive positions until ground

force reinforcements could be shifted from other sectors of the

Central Front or shipped from the United States.

The principal disadvantage of this option is that, while

aircraft can supplement ground forces, they cannot substitute

for them: they can neither deliver the sustained volume of

fire as ground forces of equal cost nor hold or take territory.

Those factors make the kind of close air support reinforcement

described here a temporary rather than a long-term substitute for

critically weakened ground forces.

Should the Congress elect this approach, the following

actions would be implied, at a cost of $2.3 billion more than

the fiscal years 1979-1983 defense program: \J

o Maintain 24-division Army force structure;

o Maintain XM-1, AAH, and Cobra/TOW production schedules

as established in the fiscal year 1979 defense program;

o Produce the IFV, as established in the fiscal year 1978

defense program;

o Increase A-10 production toward a force goal of nine

air wings, and develop imaging infrared Maverick missiles

to provide a night and adverse-weather combat capability;

o Accelerate construction of new aircraft shelters in NATO

to accommodate the A-10.

Table 7 portrays the additional costs of such an approach

over the next five fiscal years.

I/ All options include the Army's plan for production of the

~~ IFV, as established in the fiscal year 1978 defense program. Production of the IFV is not, however, included in

the Administration's defense program for fiscal years 1979-

1983.

33

"TTWWTTT
TABLE 7. OPTION I: CHANGES TO FISCAL YEARS 1979-1983 FIVE-YEAR

DEFENSE PROGRAM: BY FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT

DOLLARS

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Maintain

24-Division

Army — — — — —

Maintain XM-1,

Cobra/TOW, and

AAH Programs

at Fiscal Year

1979 Plan

Fund Production

of the IFV 80 90 160 170 180

Add Two Wings

of A-10 with

Adverse-Weather

Capability and

Associated

Shelters 100 100 720 300 440

Net Change 180 190 880 470 620

OPTION II: PROVIDING FORCES TO REINFORCE ALLIED CORPS SECTORS

WITH GROUND-BASED FIREPOWER CAPABILITIES

If the Congress believed that the allies were critically weak

in firepower and combat capabilities, wished to provide reinforcing capabilities with long-term "staying power," and was prepared to increase defense spending substantially, it could approve

the introduction of a major U.S. military presence in NORTHAG.

There are basically two ways in which U.S. ground forces

and their firepower assets could be introduced into NORTHAG:

lateral transfer from U.S. defense sectors in CENTAG or direct

movement from the United States.

34
Each of these methods has different strengths and weaknesses.

Because the large ground troop formations into which tanks,

artillery, and antitank firepower assets are integrated lack

rapid mobility within a theater of operations, it would take

several days or a week to reposition them to fight in a distant

area defended by another NATO ally. Moreover, the size of any

move would be limited by the need to maintain the defense of

U.S. sectors. Movement of whole divisions of ground forces

with all or most of their firepower assets from the United States

to NORTHAG would be even more time-consuming, unless there were

substantial, and very costly, improvements in U.S. airlift capabilities. In the event of a short-warning Warsaw Pact attack,

an attempt to reinforce faltering allied forces in Northern

Germany by either one or a combination of these methods would

be risky.

Increased U.S. investment in tanks and artillery, as now

contemplated, would reinforce allied forces in NORTHAG most

effectively if these assets were pre-positioned there to equip

the earliest arriving U.S. troops. Thus, if the United States

believed that the allied forces were likely to require reinforcement and wished to make ground forces available for that

purpose, increased spending on tank, artillery, attack helicopter,

and ATGM programs and pre-positioning much of this equipment in

NORTHAG for the use of reinforcing troops would be appropriate.

This pre-positioning would help ensure that U.S. forces could

arrive in NORTHAG as quickly as possible and respond effectively

to even a short-warning Warsaw Pact attack.

Given the reinforcement capabilities provided by U.S. ground

force firepower assets under this option, additional close air

support aircraft would not be necessary; production of these

aircraft could thus be held to currently planned levels.

The principal advantages of Option II are that it provides

greater reinforcement of allied firepower capabilities than

Option I. Visible preparations for the introduction of a major

U.S. military presence in NORTHAG could alter Soviet calculations

of the likelihood of military success, which might help deter an

attack. The disadvantages of this option are its high cost, the

difficulty of securing land for equipment depots in densely

populated northern Germany and the Benelux countries, and the

possibility that pre-positioning equipment in NORTHAG could

delay reinforcements for CENTAG, should the need arise. In

addition, this option would represent a major expansion of the

U.S. role in NATO, which the Congress might deem unwise. For

35

mfirur
Ill

example, there is a danger that U.S. actions to insure allied

forces against defeat would reduce the urgency of allied force

improvements, making it easier for financially troubled allied

governments to postpone needed military improvements.

Should the Congress choose this approach, the following

actions would be implied, at a cost of an additional $3.5 billion

more than the fiscal years 1979-1983 five-year program: 2J

o Retain a 24-division Army structure;

o Provide funds in fiscal year 1979 to prepare to double

the production rate of the XM-1;

o Provide funds in fiscal year 1979 to prepare to double

the production rate of the IFV;

o Continue A-10 production toward a goal of seven air

wings;

o Plan to double AAH production at the earliest possible

date; _3/

o Fund the costs to pre-position two additional division

sets of equipment in NORTHAG. 4/

Table 8 portrays the additional costs of such an approach

over the next five fiscal years.

2J This option doubles the Army's plan for production of the

IFV, as established in the fiscal year 1978 defense program.

Production of the IFV is not, however, included in the Administration's defense program for fiscal years 1979-1983.

_3_/ Since the AAH will not enter production until fiscal year

1983 and since initial production proceeds at the maximum

feasible start-up rate, this action would not entail increased

program costs during the next five-year period.

j4/ The pre-positioning of additional U.S. equipment in Europe

is more fully discussed in the CBO companion background paper,

U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Mobility

and Logistics Issues.

36
TABLE 8. OPTION II: CHANGES TO FISCAL YEARS 1979-1983 FIVE-YEAR

DEFENSE PROGRAM: BY FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT

DOLLARS

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Maintain

24-Division

Army — — — — —

Double XM-1

and AAH

Production

at Earliest

Possible Date 170 210 260 590 630

Double

Production

of the IFV 120 130 230 310 330

Maintain

Seven-Wing

A-10 Force

Goal

Preposition

Two Additional

Division Sets

of Equipment

in NORTHAG a/ -- —- 140 250 130

Net Change 290 340 630 1,150 1,090

a/ The costs of pre-positioning additional division sets of

equipment in Europe given here are the same as those in the

CBO companion background paper, U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Mobility and Logistics Issues. They

should only be included once in calculating the cost of

overall NATO force options.

37
OPTION III. MODERNIZING SMALLER U.S. NATO FORCES

Alternatively, the Congress may wish to reverse the trend

toward increased spending on U.S. forces for NATO. It could

do so by limiting firepower improvements to those needed to

modernize forces intended for use in the two U.S. sectors of

the Central Front. The major savings would come from cutting

three active divisions based in the United States from the U.S.

force structure. These divisions were retained in Options I

and II for use in NORTHAG—without pre-positioned equipment

in the former case; with it, in the latter. Option III assumes

that if no U.S. forces are specifically allocated to NORTHAG,

the three U.S. divisions would not be required in the force

structure.

Option III could be associated with a policy of limiting

increased U.S. defense costs until it is clear what improvements

allied governments will make in their forces. This policy could

also be an alternative if the Congress felt that the other courses

were unacceptable—if, for example, Option I appeared ineffective

and Option II either looked too costly or seemed likely to commit

the United States to an open-ended posture of compensating for

allied shortcomings. The option might be appealing if the Congress simply wished to allocate additional funds to other areas of

the defense budget or to nondefense activities without increasing

the overall federal budget.

Nevertheless, one disadvantage of this option is that,

with a reduced reinforcement capability, NATO's defenses might be

more easily breached.

If the Congress elected this course, the fiscal years 1979-

1983 defense program could be reduced by $5.6 billion through

the following actions: _5_/

o Delete three active Army divisions;

o Maintain XM-1, AAH, and Cobra/TOW production schedules

as established in the fiscal year 1979 defense program;

This option includes the Army's plan for production of the

IFV, as established in the fiscal year 1978 defense program.

Production of the IFV is not, however, included in the Administration's defense program for fiscal years 1979-1983.

38
o Produce the IFV, as established in the 1978 defense

program;

o Continue A-10 production toward the currently planned

goal of seven air wings.

Table 9 portrays the reductions to the five-year defense

program that Option III would entail.

TABLE 9. OPTION III: CHANGES TO FISCAL YEARS 1979-1983 FIVE-YEAR

DEFENSE PROGRAM: BY FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT

DOLLARS

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Delete Three

Active Army

Divisions aj -240 -810 -1,470 -1,830 -1,950

Maintain XM-1,

Cobra/TOW, and

AAH Programs

at Fiscal Year

1979 Plan

Fund Production

of the IFV 80 90 160 170 180

Maintain

Seven-Wing

A-10 Force

Goal — — — — ___H

Net Change -160 -720 -1,310 -1,660 -1,770

aj The savings from deleting three active Army divisions are

the same as those in the CBO companion background paper,

U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Mobility

and Logistics Issues. They should be included only once in

calculating the cost of overall NATO force options.

39

O