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i 

65–807 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–36] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE 

ACTIVITIES AND DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 5, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, April 5, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request for Department of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Activities and Department of Defense Nuclear Forces Programs .............................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, April 5, 2011 ............................................................................................ 49 

TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2011 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR 

FORCES PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 4 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Benedict, RADM Terry, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, U.S. 

Navy ...................................................................................................................... 38 

Chambers, Maj. Gen. William A., USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic 

Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force ........................................ 36 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy .......................................................... 5 

Triay, Hon. Ine ́s R., Ph.D., Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy ...................................................................... 8 

Weber, Hon. Andrew, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, Office of the Secretary of Defense ...... 35 

Winokur, Hon. Peter S., Ph.D., Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board ..................................................................................................................... 10 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Benedict, RADM Terry ..................................................................................... 153 

Chambers, Maj. Gen. William A. .................................................................... 146 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P. ............................................................................ 58 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta ...................................................................................... 56 

Triay, Hon. Ine ́s R. ........................................................................................... 99 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 53 

Weber, Hon. Andrew ........................................................................................ 131 

Winokur, Hon. Peter S. .................................................................................... 110 
Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 167 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 167 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 190 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 188 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 179 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 171 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 5, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:34 a.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. I call to order the meeting of the subcommittee and 

I would like to extend a warm welcome to our first panel of witnesses today, Mr. Tom D’Agostino, Administrator of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, Dr. Ine ́s Triay, Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management and Dr. Peter 

Winokur, Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Safety Board. 

I welcome all of you and thank you for your dedication. 

This annual nuclear budget hearing has typically focused solely 

on the Department of Energy, DOE, and National Nuclear Security 

Administration, NNSA. 

However, the Department of Defense also has a significant role 

in maintaining our Nation’s nuclear deterrent and is the primary 

customer for NNSA’s weapons activities, is directly responsible for 

shaping many of NNSA’s plans and programs. Therefore, I have 

asked three key DOD [Department of Defense] leaders to testify in 

a second panel on the Department’s nuclear programs and budgets 

and the linkages with NNSA. 

And I would also like to welcome these individuals, Mr. Andrew 

Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and 

Biological Defense Programs and Staff Director of the Nuclear 

Weapons Council, Major General William Chambers, Assistant 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear 

Integration, and Rear Admiral Terry Benedict, Director of the 

Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs. 

Remarkably, a strong bipartisan and bicameral consensus has 

been forged over the need for nuclear modernization. This way was 

paved 2 years ago, with the important work done by the bipartisan 

Strategic Posture Commission, led by Dr. William Perry and Dr. 

James Schlesinger. 
2 

Less than 2 weeks ago, all 16 members of this subcommittee sent 

a letter to the Budget Committee, urging them to support NNSA’s 

funding increases and to ensure that such funds are categorized as 

national defense. 

The Nuclear Posture Review and the Section 1251 Report made 

many promises with respect to the modernization of our nuclear 

warheads, delivery systems, and infrastructure. 

Based on what I have seen thus far of the fiscal year 2012 budget requests, I am encouraged that the Administration appears 

ready to honor these promises. 

But there is much work that needs to be done, and my focus 

today is to understand exactly how these programs are being implemented and the plans, programs and budgets of NNSA and 

DOD. 

NNSA has outlined a tightly choreographed warhead life extension plan over the next two decades that meets DOD’s requirements, matches its availability, its variable capacity and work 

force, and syncs to its infrastructure modernization plans. 

Any perturbations in this plan or changes in funding have wide 

reaching implications. 

To this end, I am particularly concerned about the B61 [nuclear 

bomb] life extension program, LEP. Despite specific time line requirements, the magnitude of the B61 LEP will not be known until 

cost and design studies are completed later this year. NNSA has 

been unable to start the W78 [thermonuclear warhead] life extension program, which will also explore the feasibility of a common 

ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] and SLBM [submarinelaunched ballistic missile] warhead due to limitations in the continuing resolution. 

I would ask Administrator D’Agostino to discuss how these programs are being managed to minimize schedule and cost risk. 

I am also concerned about NNSA’s two major construction 

projects at Los Alamos and Y–12 [National Security Complex]. 

This year’s budget request includes revised cost estimates for 

both projects, based on a 45 percent completion design, which are 

significantly higher than earlier estimates. 

Despite the cost growth, only $340 million has been added to the 

Future-Years Nuclear Security Program, FYNSP, and the majority 

of the construction funds will come outside the FYNSP. I would 

like to understand what is driving these costs and how NNSA 

plans to simultaneously manage these large-scale construction 

projects. 

The $4.1 billion increase in modernization funding contained in 

last November’s 1251 Report is welcome, but upon further inspection, is a bit misleading. Of the $4.1 billion added to the FutureYears Nuclear Security Program, $1.5 billion of this, or 37 percent, 

is allocated to employee pension plans, not modernization. 

I am open to any ideas that could give NNSA and its contractors 

greater flexibility in meeting their pension obligations. 

On the DOD side, the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] and 1251 

Report described plans for the sustainment and modernization of 

several DOD systems, including a new bomber, dual-capable aircraft and a new cruise missile, a potential ICBM follow-on, the 

Ohio-class replacement submarine, the Trident D5 [submarine- 
3 

launched ballistic missile] life extension program, a new joint Air 

Force-Navy fuze replacement program, and the nuclear command 

and control infrastructure. This is a tremendous to-do list. 

Does the budget request merely contain placeholders for these 

plans or are there concrete activities associated with each? 

I am also concerned about the solid rocket motor industrial base 

and I know that Admiral Benedict’s budget, in particular, has increased to accommodate rising costs to sustain this important capability. 

Another issue that I am closely watching is the implementation 

of the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty. We 

have yet to see exactly how DOD will implement the force reductions in the treaty or the associated funding requirements. However, senior Administration officials, including the President’s national security advisor, have already commented that, ‘‘We are 

making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions’’ and 

that, ‘‘The Department of Defense will develop options for further 

reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.’’ 

It would seem to me that we need to understand and work 

through the details of how to smartly implement New START before rushing towards another round of reductions. 

Additionally, and I have said this in previous years, I remain 

concerned about nuclear safety and security. 

There is no margin for error in the nuclear business. 

I would appreciate our witnesses discussing their efforts to address nuclear safety and security, including Dr. Winokur’s safety 

assessment of our nuclear facilities and operations. 

In the area of Environmental Management, I would welcome Dr. 

Triay’s update on EM [Environmental Management] progress to 

date, her priorities, and the challenges ahead. Additionally, our 

committee included a provision in last year’s defense bill to authorize the establishment of energy parks on former defense nuclear facilities. 

Miamisburg Mound in my district in Ohio was once a key Cold 

War-era nuclear production facility and, after an extensive cleanup 

effort, has been redeveloped into a business park for high-tech companies. It is certainly one of the success stories in the cleanup process and is a candidate for channeling the community’s legacy nuclear expertise into new energy research. 

I have also asked Deputy NNSA Administrator Harrington to 

participate in today’s hearing to address member questions on nuclear nonproliferation. This issue is handled at the full committee 

level, but we have been given approval by Chairman McKeon to 

discuss it today with our expert witnesses. 

There is strong bipartisan support to keep dangerous material 

out of the wrong hands, especially for the urgent task of identifying, securing, and reducing foreign sources of potential nuclear 

and radiological threats. 

The committee is also closely monitoring plans to build nuclear 

centers of excellence in China and India to understand their scope 

and how DOD and NNSA funding would be used. 

On a final note, I would want to make it clear that while our 

subcommittee supports the increase in nuclear funding, we do not 

write blank checks. 
4 

We will continue to conduct rigorous oversight of the nuclear 

portfolio, seek out areas for cost savings and efficiencies, and make 

budget modifications consistent with our oversight findings. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for being with us today. Your 

leadership and expertise is greatly appreciated. 

And with that, I would like to turn to my ranking member, Ms. 

Sanchez, for her opening comments. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Chairman Turner. 

Thank you, again, to all of you for being before us. Thank you 

for, several of you, secretary and others, who met with us ahead 

of time to discuss some of the issues, and I know that that brought 

a whole bunch of other questions. 

So I am hoping that—it is a busy morning, but that more of our 

members show up to ask those questions. If not, you will have a 

lot for the record, I am sure. 

I would like to touch on a few specific issues related to nuclear 

nonproliferation, nuclear cleanup, and sustaining our nuclear deterrent and our nuclear forces. 

First, I have been very concerned about the delays in the urgent 

nuclear nonproliferation effort stemming from the continuing resolution. Even securing all vulnerable weapons-usable material in 4 

years remains one of the most pressing national security issues 

that we have. 

I am also interested in hearing about interagency coordination 

and how the Department of Defense supports nuclear nonproliferation activities and what opportunities and challenges still remain 

for cooperative threat reduction. 

Next, the nuclear cleanup remains an important priority; sites 

like Hanford and Savannah River site, played a unique and irreplaceable role during the Cold War and now we must make diligent 

and quick progress toward cleanup. So I would like to hear a little 

of that. 

I look forward to the opportunity to hear about the progress 

made. 

Especially, because I know we put monies in the stimulus package to be able to do that. And what problems and pitfalls still remain with respect to that? 

Third, President Obama and Vice President Biden have made 

clear the importance of maintaining a safe, secure and reliable nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing, especially in the context of 

nuclear weapons reductions. And so I look forward to hearing about 

how the fiscal year 2012 budget request will strengthen the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

Several challenges loom ahead, including how NNSA will oversee 

concurrent construction, on time and on budget, of the Chemistry 

and Metallurgy Research Replacement, or the CMRR, facility at 

Los Alamos National Laboratory and of the Uranium Processing 

Facility at Y–12. 
5 

And I would also like to hear about how the fiscal year 2012 

budget request supports surveillance activities, verification and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. 

And I would like to hear the discussion of the Department of Defense’s plans for sustaining and replacing our nuclear forces in the 

context of the New START force reduction and potential further 

nuclear reductions and what cost savings, if any, are being considered there. 

I would also like to specifically point to the challenges sustaining 

the industrial base, with regard to our solid rocket motors in the 

wake of NASA’s [the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s] cancelling its Constellation program and what the cost impact will have for the Department of Defense. 

And finally, I would like to hear about progress made on spring 

cleaning the nuclear enterprise culture within the Air Force. Retaining, developing and recruiting all those critical skills remain 

essential for the nuclear mission at DOD, as well as NNSA. 

So, again, welcome to all of our guests and, Mr. Chairman, I also 

want to remind you or mention that at 12:30, we have a Democratic meeting. So most of us will be leaving for that, but should 

come back once that is done. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 56.] 

Mr. TURNER. Very good. 

And now, we will turn to the first of three witnesses and ask 

each to summarize his or her statement in about 5 minutes. 

We will then proceed to member questions and then transition 

to the second panel. 

Mr. D’Agostino, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Chairman Turner, Ranking 

Member Sanchez, for the opportunity to address the committee 

today. 

I would also like to take the opportunity to recognize my Principal Deputy Administrator Neile Miller and Deputy Administrator 

Don Cook, who are both with me, in addition to Deputy Administrator Harrington, as you mentioned earlier in your remarks. 

They are seated behind me. 

I would like to thank you and the committee for your continued 

support of the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration and the 35,000 men and women working 

across our enterprise to keep our country safe, protect our allies, 

and enhance global security. 

We couldn’t do this work without strong support, bipartisan support, and engaged leadership in Congress. 

I come before you today to discuss the President’s budget request 

for the NNSA, the capabilities we offer the Nation and, indeed, the 

world right now are on display. 
6 

As you know, the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan on 

March 11, 2011, caused significant damage to the nuclear power 

plants there, releasing radioactive materials into the environment. 

First and foremost, our thoughts and prayers are with the Japanese people as they deal with this crisis. To assist in the response, 

the Department deployed 45 people and over 17,000 pounds worth 

of equipment to Japan, including NNSA’s Aerial Measuring System 

and our Consequence Management Response Teams. 

They are on the ground, utilizing their unique skills, expertise, 

and equipment in partnership with Japan to help address the situation. 

While these teams are at the tip of the spear here at home, we 

have teams working around the clock at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and at our Remote Sensing Laboratory in Nevada, working on the information and putting together products 

that can be used by the Defense Department, the interagency team 

and the Japanese Government to understand what is happening on 

the ground. 

Everyone in the NNSA understands the important role we are 

playing with this tragedy. It shows the commitment to service and 

excellence that mirrors our work and the important—and, frankly, 

highlights the resources President Obama has requested for the 

NNSA. 

The budget request seeks to make critical investments in the future of our enterprise, which will allow us continue to implement 

the President’s nuclear security agenda. As I see it, the request can 

be broken down into three key themes. 

First, we are investing in our future. President Obama has com- mitted to invest more than $85 billion over the next decade to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile, 

and to modernize the infrastructure and revitalize the science and 

technology base that supports the full range of our nuclear security 

missions. 

As part of that commitment, the budget request provides $76 billion for our Weapons Activities account to support our efforts to leverage the best science and technology in the world to maintain our 

deterrent. 

This will enable us to enhance our surveillance of the stockpile, 

proceed with key life extension programs, and continue to design 

and modernize the facilities we need to maintain our Nation’s expertise in uranium processing and plutonium research and development. 

Investing in a modern, nuclear security enterprise is critical to 

our stockpile stewardship program. But it also supports the full 

range of the nuclear security mission, which brings me to the second key theme in this budget request, which is implementing the 

President’s nuclear security agenda. 

President Obama has made strengthening nuclear security and 

the nuclear nonproliferation regime one of his top priorities. As he 

said in his speech in Prague in April 2009, almost exactly 2 years 

ago to the date, the threat of a terrorist acquiring and using a nuclear weapon is the most immediate and extreme threat we face. 

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and keeping dangerous nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists is a vital na-
7 

tional security priority. These are, without a doubt, national security programs, and I hope this committee and the Congress will 

treat them as such. 

To address that threat, we are requesting $2.5 billion in 2012 and more than $14.2 billion over the next 5 years for our Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation programs. 

This will provide the resources required to meet the commitments secured during the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. For fiscal 

year 2011, it includes $1 billion to remove and prevent the smuggling of dangerous nuclear material around the world and enable 

NNSA to continue to lead the international efforts to implement 

more stringent standards for the physical protection of nuclear material and for nuclear facilities worldwide. 

To power the nuclear Navy, President Obama has requested $1.1 

billion for NNSA’s Naval Reactors program. This will allow us to 

continue the design work on a propulsion unit for the Ohio-class 

replacement submarine, in order to meet the Navy’s required procurement date of 2019. 

It includes critical investments in modern and sustainable spent 

fuel infrastructure at the naval reactors facility at Idaho National 

Laboratory. 

And, finally, it seeks the resources to refuel the land-based prototype in upstate New York. 

Mr. Chairman, I realize that this committee has many competing 

requirements. And while I believe that nothing is more important 

than ensuring our Nation’s security, we also recognize that this request comes at a time of acute financial stress for our entire country. 

It is my responsibility to show to you that we can manage those 

resources wisely. 

This brings me to the third theme, outlined in this request, and 

that is our commitment to improving the way we do business and 

manage our resources. 

Together, we are working with our M&O [management and operations] partners to streamline our governance model, to devote 

more resources to critical mission work and maximize our ability 

to complete our mission safely and securely. We are making sure 

that we have the right contracting strategy in place. 

We are improving our project management by ensuring we have 

qualified project managers leading our major projects, setting cost 

and schedule baselines on construction projects when design work 

is 90 percent complete, subjecting those estimates to rigorous independent reviews and placing a renewed focus across our organization on sound project management. 

That is why we recently created a new policy and oversight office 

for managing major projects that reports directly to me. This will 

help ensure that project management gets the senior-level, highlevel, focus that it deserves. 

And we are continuing to find ways to save money across our enterprise. For example, since 2007, our Supply Chain Management 

Center has used new technologies and pooled purchasing power to 

drive efficiencies across our sites. 

This result has been more than $213 million in auditable cost 

savings. 
8 

All of this is part of our effort to create one NNSA, a true partnership and an integrated enterprise between all our programs and 

our partners to fulfill our continuing missions. 

Taken together, these steps will ensure that we have a modern 

21st century nuclear security enterprise that is safer, more secure, 

more efficient, and organized to succeed. 

That is the vision outlined in this budget request. It supports the 

full range of NNSA missions. More importantly, it invests in the 

infrastructure, the people, and the science and technology required 

to fulfill our mission and to make the world a safer place. 

I look forward to working with the members of this committee, 

and with that, I would be happy to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary D’Agostino can be found in 

the Appendix on page 58.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Dr. Triay. 

STATEMENT OF HON. INE ́ S R. TRIAY, PH.D., ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Secretary TRIAY. Thank you. 

Good afternoon, Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez 

and members of the subcommittee. 

I am pleased to be here today and to address your questions regarding the Office of Environmental Management’s fiscal year 2012 

budget request. 

The fiscal year 2012 budget request of $6.1 billion will protect 

human health and the environment, through the safe environmental cleanup of past nuclear weapons development and Government-sponsored nuclear energy research. 

The Office of Environmental Management’s primary responsibility is to keep our employees, the public, and the states where 

cleanups are located safe from radioactive and hazardous materials 

contamination. 

We continue to adhere to a safety-first culture that integrates environment, safety, and health requirements and controls into all 

work activities. 

Over the last two decades, the Office of Environmental Management’s compliance posture has evolved to where we have a well-defined and established relationship with our regulators. 

The fiscal year 2012 budget request maintains a compliant position, by honoring regulatory commitments. 

There are approximately 40 cleanup agreements that provide a 

framework for cleaning up the Cold War legacy that EM will continue to abide by. 

The Office of Environmental Management’s goal in fiscal year 

2012 is to meet 100 percent of its enforceable agreement milestones 

that are located within cleanup agreements. 

For example, our fiscal year 2012 budget fully funds the TriParty Agreement settlement with Washington State as well as the 

Transuranic Waste Retrievals at Idaho, that are consistent with 

terms of the Idaho Settlement Agreement. 

In addition to keeping our program running safely and efficiently, the Office of Environmental Management enables key oper-
9 

ations of the Department’s defense complex, including the National 

Nuclear Security Administration. 

For instance, our management of special nuclear materials, spent 

nuclear fuel and transuranic waste allows NNSA to continue to 

carry out their mission. Our fiscal year 2012 budget request supports NNSA’s critical defense activities, through the continued environmental cleanup work that maintains compliance at NNSA’s 

own sites. 

Over the past 2 years, the Office of Environmental Management 

has made significant progress in accelerating environmental cleanup across the departmental complex. 

We estimate that by the end of fiscal year 2011, the acceleration 

of excess facilities decontamination and decommissioning and 

cleanup of contaminated areas will reduce the legacy cleanup footprint by 40 percent. This will lead to approximately 90 percent 

footprint reduction by 2015. 

In terms of square miles, we project that by the end of fiscal year 

2011, the footprint will have been reduced from 900 square miles 

to 540 square miles. By 2015, it is envisioned that the footprint 

could be reduced to 90 square miles. 

Footprint reduction efforts have resulted in estimated cost avoidances of approximately $3 billion and cost savings of approximately $4 billion, for a total of $7 billion in life-cycle costs. 

In fiscal year 2012, the continued management and removal of 

legacy transuranic waste from generator sites will directly support 

risk reduction and aid in the goal of reducing site footprint. 

We estimate that the disposition of 90 percent of legacy transuranic waste will be completed by 2015. 

The last few years, the Environmental Management program has 

been focusing on providing opportunities to small businesses to perform our environmental cleanup work. 

Recovery Act prime and sub contracts have awarded a total of $1.8 billion to small businesses. In addition, base, prime and sub 

contracts have awarded $1.7 billion to small businesses in fiscal 

year 2010. 

Overall, the feedback we have received from small businesses 

participating in the Recovery Act projects has been very positive. 

Recovery Act funds have allowed small businesses to enhance their 

competitive skills, pursue opportunities in new markets, sectors, 

and reinvest in their company’s infrastructure. 

The Office of Environmental Management will continue to promote the usage of small businesses and identify future opportunities for small businesses to perform our environmental cleanup 

work. 

The Office of Environmental Management’s continued progress in 

contracts and project management performance has resulted in our 

program meeting three of the five criteria needed to be removed 

from the Government Accountability Office highest-risk list. 

The GAO [Government Accountability Office] has noted that the 

Office of Environmental Management has demonstrated strong 

commitment and leadership, demonstrating progress in implementing corrective measures and develop a corrective action plan 

that identifies root causes, effective solutions and near-term plans 

for implementing those solutions. 
10 

Currently we continue to work toward meeting all of the Government Accountability Office’s requirements to be removed from the 

high-risk list. 

Mr. Chairman, ranking member and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to be here today representing the Office 

of Environmental Management. We are committed to achieving our 

mission in a safe, effective, and efficient manner. We will continue 

to apply innovative environmental cleanup strategies, so that we 

can complete quality work safely, on schedule and within costs, 

thereby demonstrating value to the American taxpayer. 

I am pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Triay can be found in the 

Appendix on page 99.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Dr. Triay. 

I want to acknowledge that Congressman Bishop has joined us, 

and I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Bishop of Utah, and other 

committee and non-committee members, if any, be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after all committee members have had 

an opportunity to ask their questions. 

Before I recognize Dr. Winokur, I would like to acknowledge 

three Safety Board members joining him today and thank them for 

their service. If you would upon—acknowledge, raising your hand, 

so we can verify you. 

Ms. Robertson. 

Mr. Mansfield. 

Mr. Bader. 

Very good. Thank you for being here and thank you for your 

service. 

Dr. Winokur. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER S. WINOKUR, PH.D., CHAIRMAN, 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 

Dr. WINOKUR. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. 

I am Peter Winokur, the Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, known as the DNFSB. 

I submitted a written summary for the record that describes the 

Board’s mission and highlights a number of safety issues that are 

particularly important to ensuring that the defense nuclear complex can safely accomplish its missions. I will provide a brief overview for your consideration today. 

Our agency was established by Congress to provide safety oversight for the defense nuclear facilities operated by DOE and, now, 

NNSA. We are the only agency that provides independent safety 

oversight of DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. 

The Board’s budget is essentially devoted to maintaining and 

supporting an expert staff of engineers and scientists, nearly all of 

whom have technical Master’s degrees or doctorates to accomplish 

our highly specialized work. 

The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2012 includes $29 

million in new budget authority for the Board. This is $3 million 

more than fiscal year 2010. It will support 120 personnel, the target we have been growing toward for several years. We believe this 
11 

level of staffing is needed to provide safety oversight of DOE’s defense nuclear complex, given the pace and scope of DOE’s activities. 

The Board’s safety oversight is geared around several broad safety issues. 

To begin with, we expend great effort to ensure that DOE preserves and continuously improves its safety directives. We are carefully evaluating the outcome of the DOE 2010 Safety and Security 

Reform Plan as well as DOE’s follow-on initiative to compress its 

review process to expedite revision of seven health and safety directives essential to public and worker safety. 

At this time, DOE and NNSA are designing and building facili- ties with a total project cost of more than $20 billion. I cannot overstate the importance of integrating safety into the design of these 

facilities at an early stage. Failing to do so will lead to surprises 

and costly changes later in the process. 

The Board is committed to the early resolution of safety issues 

with DOE. To that end, we publicly document significant unresolved technical differences between the Board and DOE concerning design and construction projects in quarterly reports to 

Congress. 

The Board is continuing to urge NNSA to replace unsound facilities and invest in infrastructure for the future. The 9212 complex 

at Y–12 and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

building at Los Alamos are both well overdue for replacement. 

Last September, the Board issued its first report to Congress on 

aging and degrading facilities. We will update this report periodically to highlight the greatest infrastructure needs affecting safety 

of DOE and NNSA defense nuclear facilities. 

In addition to legacy facilities that need replacement, DOE and 

NNSA have large quantities of legacy nuclear materials awaiting 

disposition. 

DOE’s preferred disposition for many materials has been chemical processing through the H–Canyon facility at the Savannah 

River site. 

On February 28, 2011, the Board wrote to the Secretary of Energy to express its concerns that the premature shutdown of H– 

Canyon could have significant, unintended safety consequences. 

I would like to highlight two final topics today. 

The first is the Board’s evaluation of design changes at DOE’s 

Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plan. The second 

deals with lessons learned from the March 11th earthquake in 

Japan. 

The Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, or 

WTP, is under design and construction at an estimated cost of 

more than $12 billion. This project is needed to convert 53 million 

gallons of high-level waste stored in 177 tanks at Hanford, into 

glass for disposal. 

DOE began a major redesign of the project in 2009, with the design more than two-thirds complete and construction of major facilities between one-quarter and halfway done. 

The Board held a public hearing in October 2010, to discuss our 

three greatest safety concerns with WTP, which include its mixing 

and transfer systems, control strategies for flammable hydrogen 

gas and process systems, and whether the tank forms can deliver 
12 

waste that meets the criteria needed for WTP to operate safely and 

effectively. 

The Board issued a formal recommendation to the Secretary of 

Energy on the need for large-scale testing of WTP’s mixing and 

transfer systems after the public hearing. We are still evaluating 

the other issues as DOE continues to develop information. 

The March 11th earthquake in Japan provides a sobering reminder that nuclear facilities need to continually update their assessments of natural hazards and to be ready to respond to events 

that analysts consider beyond their design basis. Twelve days after 

the earthquake, the Secretary of Energy issued a safety bulletin on 

Events Beyond Design Basis Analysis, which requires DOE sites 

with Hazard Category 1 or 2 nuclear facilities to assess their ability to respond to Beyond Design Basis accidents. 

We will track this activity closely and continue our own ongoing 

efforts to strengthen emergency preparedness at DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. 

That ends my statement. I will be happy to answer any questions 

you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Winokur can be found in the Appendix on page 110.] 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Thank you. 

We are going to now turn to a 5-minute round of questions because we have so many members who are in attendance who want 

to ask questions. We are going to try to limit it to 5 minutes and 

then hopefully get to a second round with our goal of getting to the 

second panel with plenty of time for members to participate with 

the second panel. 

Mr. D’Agostino, both of my questions are going to be directed to 

you in the first round. And the first question goes to the issue of 

New START. As I indicated in my opening statement, everyone has 

a lot of questions about how New START will be implemented, and 

yet Administration officials are discussing further reductions to the 

stockpile, as evidenced by their own statements. 

NNSA’s 2010 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

states, ‘‘a modernized complex will enable further reductions in the 

stockpile over time.’’ 

Now, in looking at that statement, I assume that the converse of 

that is also true. Meaning that, it could be viewed as a constraint, 

also, for the reductions, until modernization of the complex is completed. 

What direction have you been given to look at further nuclear reductions beyond New START levels? 

Two, what specific warhead and facility modernization activities 

must be completed in order for NNSA to be comfortable with further stockpile reductions? 

And would it be advisable to make reductions in our hedge prior 

to the completion of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility, CMRR, at Los Alamos and the Uranium Processing Facility, UPF, at Y–12? 

And then secondly, I would like you to end with a commercial for 

NNSA as a national security funding item. As you know, with H.R. 

1, initially, NNSA was identified as subject to a cut, as all of DOE 
13 

was, which I think was problematic in that NNSA not being identified as national security. 

Working with Senator Kyl, we certainly hope to restore that on 

the Senate side, but also then continue to work on the House side, 

both with the Appropriations and Budget Committee, that item 

was corrected and restored in the last CR [continuing resolution]. 

No one, of course, at this point knows where we are going to be 

after this week. 

But we are certainly hopeful that in the next CR and, certainly, 

in the budget discussions in 2012 that NNSA will be viewed as national security and not subject to the cuts, but actually subject to 

the increases that are necessary in order to modernize and support 

the nuclear weapons infrastructure. 

So if you would end with a commercial on that, I would greatly 

appreciate it. 

Mr. D’Agostino. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Yes, thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the questions. 

With respect to your first one, I have not been directed to reduce 

or to do studies on the size of the stockpile. It would be, to answer 

your question straight up, the plan that we have right now, the 

plan that we submitted in our Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, there is a particular—there is a classified piece of this. 

I won’t go into those classified details, but I will answer you as specifically as I can. 

The Defense Department ultimately determines and makes recommendations to the President on the size of the stockpile. But one 

thing we have clear with the Defense Department and the National 

Nuclear Security Administration is our understanding that it is important to be able to demonstrate that our infrastructure is responsive and being able to respond to needs that the country may have. 

First of all, responsive in ability to take care of the existing 

stockpile that we have right now. And we have identified that in 

our plan as having a Uranium Processing Facility that is up and 

running, having a Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility that is available to do the surveillance work on our 

stockpile and help support a modest amount of pit manufacturing 

capability. 

We have also identified this on our high explosive pressing capability. Right now, we are very limited in our ability to make the 

size of high explosives that we need in order to support the stockpile out into the future, and we have a project at the Pantex Plant 

in Amarillo to go off and replace that capability. 

These are just some examples of some infrastructure pieces that 

I believe will be necessary to demonstrate—not just build, but demonstrate the operation of—to show that we do have a responsive infrastructure, an infrastructure that can respond to national needs. 

The advisability piece of your question might be best deferred to 

my Defense Department colleagues who will be joining you on the 

second panel. But I would say there is a consistency in what I just 

said and in the plans that we submitted to Congress on that front. 

With respect to the National Nuclear Security Administration, 

the work we do is work on nuclear weapons, taking care of our 
14 

stockpile; it is providing the propulsion systems for our submarines 

and aircraft carriers. 

It is about protecting nuclear material, so they do not get in the 

hands of terrorists. And it is providing the capabilities to respond 

to nuclear emergencies, including the emergency we have right 

now. It would be hard for me to imagine that that could not possibly be national security work. 

In addition to those four core mission areas, the entire national 

security mission areas, also assist the Government in being able to 

respond to other events, providing the capabilities to help the Missile Defense Agency knock a satellite out of the sky, which we did 

do 3 years ago with the Missile Defense Agency. 

It was the NNSA’s classified supercomputers that helped provide 

the trajectory, direction, and verified and validated that when the 

satellite was hit, it wasn’t just hit; it was a hydrazine tank that 

was in the satellite that was hit, which was an ultimate mission. 

So my view is that that is national security work through and 

through. And I will leave it at that, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Chairman Turner. 

I also am concerned about the money side of what is going on, 

as we discussed before, Secretary. 

One of the impacts is the inability to remove all the highly enriched uranium from Belarus, as promised, by 2012. 

Are you concerned about those reductions? And has this impacted our efforts to secure nuclear materials? 

And how has this impacted your other non-proliferation programs? Since a lot of the funding—I am sorry, did you say something? 

Mr. TURNER. Yes, we just wanted to note that Ms. Harrington is 

then going to join the panel for the purposes of the transcript. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Oh, okay. 

Okay. 

So, back to my question. 

What is going on? What do we need to worry about here? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I will start the—and ask my colleague, 

Anne Harrington, who runs the day-to-day of the non-proliferation 

program for me. 

We are deeply concerned about the reductions we had, particularly in fiscal year 2011. We had a very significant increase from 

our fiscal year 2010 request, specifically directed to work off of our 

goal, or the President’s goal, of securing nuclear material, vulnerable nuclear material, within the next 4 years. 

And that required a sizeable increase in resources. We do have 

the scope of our work well-identified. You mentioned one of the 

countries. There are a number of others that we are working on 

right now as well. 

Without these resources, and of course we are 6 months into the 

fiscal year right now, without these resources, what we have been 

doing is, essentially, doing what I would call day-to-day program 

management on this to try to minimize the impact on the specific 

projects we have of securing this material. 

I will let Ms. Harrington deal with the specifics of the countries 

and the like. 
15 

So, Anne. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Welcome, Ms. Harrington. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman and thank 

you, Ms. Sanchez. 

The impact of the continuing resolution has been minimized to 

this point by a lot of active and almost daily review of budget allocations within the defense nuclear nonproliferation budget. 

We have tried our best to maintain an aggressive schedule for removing and protecting the vulnerable materials that have been 

identified around the world, but we are rapidly approaching the 

point where the trade-offs for continuing that very forward-looking 

schedule will become more and more difficult to maintain. 

For example, we are confronted with choices such as do we not 

deliver a detector for an Air Force-launched satellite that gives us 

our only capability to detect nuclear detonations around the world? 

Anywhere from the ground through space. 

Or do we reduce our efforts to install radiation detection equipment at container seaports around the world as we have been directed by Congress? 

Or do we implement other programmatic slowdowns or eliminations that would cause us to reduce capabilities in one aspect or 

another? 

But we have tried very hard, so far, because we realize we all 

need to make a contribution to reducing the deficit. But as the Administrator pointed out, these are national security trade-offs that 

we are making, and I would be untruthful if I were to say that the 

current situation has had no impact. 

Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

I have a question for Dr. Triay. 

There was a lot of money put in the stimulus to work on cleanup. 

I have a lot of colleagues who say that that stimulus money wasn’t 

spent well or its purpose wasn’t very well defined. 

Can you talk a little bit about those particular monies and what 

progress you have made with those monies? 

And what challenges still remain for cleanup? 

Secretary TRIAY. Thank you very much. 

I believe that the Recovery Act, the portfolio of the Environmental Management program has been extremely well defined. 

We selected activities in the portfolio for which the Environmental Management program has a proven successful track record. 

The regulatory framework was well defined and we had contracts 

in place, so that we could immediately put people to work. 

Bottom line is that we have been able to deal with 260 of the excess facilities in the weapons complex. And we have been able to 

deal with 8,000 cubic meters of transuranic waste and 85,000 cubic 

meters of low-level waste. 

Two million tons of milling and tailings, and with respect to the 

amount of active footprint area reduction, as I was saying before, 

we have been able to decrease the footprint by 30 percent so far, 

from over 900 square miles of active cleanup down to, by the end 

of 2011, 540 square miles. 
16 

We think that not only we are going to meet the Administration’s 

goal of 40 percent reduction by 2011, but we are going to surpass 

it. 

At our Hanford facility, we are looking to surpass the 40 percent 

goal to over 50 percent; at our Savannah River site, we are going 

to reach over 60 percent. 

So I believe that the work that we have done in the Recovery Act 

program has really assisted the complex, the Department of Energy 

complex, to accelerate cleanup activities and demonstrate the 

progress that can be made due to these economies of scale. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of 

you for being here. 

Secretary D’Agostino, I guess I will start with you, if you don’t 

mind. 

I know that one of the five campaigns of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration is readiness, and I understand you have 

got a lot of things to keep track of. But one of those elements, of 

course, of readiness, includes the production of the critical nuclear 

weapons component of tritium. And the GAO report recently said 

that the sole U.S. production facility was leaking large amounts of 

tritium into the cooling water which, in my mind, potentially compromises that source and it being our sole source, and adds to the 

concern over a shortage of tritium. 

And I guess my first question is, how is this shortage of that key 

ingredient being resolved? And is the request for $142.5 million for 

the readiness campaign sufficient to not only increase the tritium 

production to an acceptable level but, at the same time, address the 

other components of the readiness campaign? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Franks, with respect to your question 

on tritium, we had established an incredibly stringent permeation 

grade early on in the program to, what I would call, something that 

was probably physically impossible. 

Mr. FRANKS. Not realistic, yes. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Yes, unrealistic. 

And so we have realized, even after a check and a design on the 

TP bars, which are the tritium-producing bendable absorption rods, 

we have made an improvement in the permeation rates; in other 

words, reduce the permeation rates, but not to the level that we 

have had before. 

So what that does, in effect, to make sure that we remain within 

our NRC, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, license piece is have a 

reduction in the number of tritium rods that we put inside each reactor core load at Watts Bar. 

We don’t have a near-term tritium problem. It will be 5 years, 

if we stay at this certain rate, before we end up having any concerns on tritium production. 

And this gives us plenty of time to do a couple of things. We have 

a couple of backup plans in this area. 

One of our backup plans has to do with using other reactors with 

the TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority], and we are entering into 

negotiations with them to use Watts Bar unit two and potentially 
17 

Sequoia, if we have to, which will more than cover the Nation’s 

needs. 

But we are also doing another thing, and that is modifying the 

environmental impact statement and taking a look at the license 

amendment to what will be a reasonable and still very safe tritium 

permeation rate to allow us to increase the number of tritium rods 

in each reactor core load. 

So one of those two paths—first of all, there is not a near-term 

problem, but we are aware that if we continue down this path, we 

are going to need to do something different and we have kind of 

two tracks on resolving this particular case. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I wish all questions could be answered that 

favorably. That is pretty encouraging. 

Well, Mr. Secretary, let me then switch gears completely on you. 

I know that your testimony over the years here, that I have been 

here in this committee, has been, I think, dead on target, related 

to the potential of terrorists gaining some type of access to nuclear 

weapons, whether they develop them or someone gives it to them. 

And one of the concerns that I have had lately, in addition to 

that, or I should say in specificity, is the whole concern that now 

there is indication that smaller warheads, very small warheads, 1- 

or 2-kiloton warheads, can be enhanced to emit greater gamma ray 

radiation that makes them a more potentially dangerous weapon in 

the hands of enemies trying to launch an EMP [electromagnetic 

pulse] attack against the Nation, or even in a given area. 

So my first question is, is that, without getting into any classified 

origins, is that a concern that you have? 

And secondarily, with all of the misinformation over Soviet, to 

use the phrase, ‘‘suitcase bombs,’’ it seems like if anything would 

fit that category, or fit that description, it would be one of the 

small, 1- or 2-kiloton, warheads. And could they be enhanced for 

greater gamma ray emission? And do you see this as any sort of 

particular national security concern? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Franks, I would say that all of these 

items are of concern to us. We can provide a classified answer, to 

get into some of the specifics there. It would take a fair amount of 

effort to enhance one of these so-called suitcase devices in order to 

give it these special characteristics. 

We are concerned about whether it is 1 kiloton, 500 tons, 10 kilotons, we are concerned with that whole range and that is why we 

have a program really focused on the material piece of the problem, 

obviously coupled with the Intelligence Community itself. 

So, yes, I am concerned. I am concerned about all of these. 

The smaller devices, of course, present different challenges with 

respect to finding these things, but at the same time, this is the 

reason why we have this full spectrum approach on our program. 

In our nonproliferation program, we start off with the assumption that the information on how to make one of these things is out 

there. Not that it is or it isn’t; I won’t confirm that, of course, but 

there is an assumption that we would say information is out there. 

Therefore, we have to focus on the material piece of this, protecting the material in its place, detecting illicit transfers of material across borders and land border crossings, getting rid of excess 

material that we may have, so it doesn’t contribute to the problem, 
18 

and looking at ways to convert from high-enriched uranium to lowenriched uranium across research reactors and isotope production 

reactors that we have. 

So I will take your specific question, which the answer would be 

classified and provide a classified response for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 167.] 

Mr. TURNER. All right, sir. Well I am glad you got your radar out 

anyway. 

With that, we recognize Mr. Larsen for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary D’Agostino, what relation does your 2012 nonproliferation budget have to your 2011 nonproliferation budget? That is to 

say, what impacts will be on your 2012 budget for implementation 

if your 2011 request is not provided? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. If the 2011 request is not provided, that 

puts us very far behind on our security work, for sure, in a number 

of areas. We will look to do it in a balanced way to make sure our 

highest priority things are completed in fiscal year 2011. 

What that does is it puts an extra strain on the fiscal year 2012 

budget and you will—I don’t know if you have noticed, our fiscal 

year 2012 budget is slightly less than the fiscal year 2011 budget. 

And that is because in the fiscal year 2012 budget, we do not have 

$100 million increment in there for our work on the physical material disposition with Russia. There are a series of payments that 

go on with that. 

So if we don’t get the fiscal year 2011 budget and if we are trying 

to maintain our focus on securing material worldwide, without giving up the other elements of our defense nonproliferation program, 

those fiscal year 2012 resources would be severely strained and we 

would certainly not be able to honor the commitments we have 

made internationally and commitments we have made to ourselves, 

on securing this material worldwide. 

Would you like additional information from Ms. Harrington? 

Mr. LARSEN. That is good right now. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Okay. 

Mr. LARSEN. I just wanted to thank the Chairman here, and the 

ranking member, for taking a lead on this letter that we put out 

in the last 2 weeks regarding the—I mean, the—not just the desire, 

but the need to look at this part of the budget as a part of the defense budget, as opposed to just another part of the energy budget. 

And hopefully we will be successful in moving that forward. 

A question for Dr. Winokur. With a short I? 

Dr. WINOKUR. That is right. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

On page 18 of your testimony, you discussed the Hanford WTP 

and the three safety issues that you had found as a result of your 

hearing. I didn’t really recall, from your testimony, what has been 

the follow-up? October 2010 were the hearings; we are now in 

March of 2011—or April 2011, perhaps 5 months is not long 

enough. But what has been the result of these three findings? 

Dr. WINOKUR. Well, the first finding was to look at the mixing 

and transfer of systems. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 
19 

Dr. WINOKUR. Because there was the concern that there might 

be solids building up at the bottom of vessels, which could provide 

safety concerns with criticality, exceeding flammable hydrogen gas 

and some operational problems with indexes themselves. 

In December, the Board wrote a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy and would recommend that a large-scale testing 

program—actually during the hearing, the project agreed to a 

large-scale testing program. 

And we wanted to make sure that I advised the Secretary about 

what we thought would be important in that large-scale testing 

program. So that when it went forward, we would have a clear resolution of issues and address the safety concerns. 

Mr. LARSEN. On that point, Ms. Triay, if that is going to happen, 

is that going to happen within the existing requested budget? Or 

is that going to add costs to this particular program? 

Secretary TRIAY. No, it will happen within the request that we 

have made for fiscal year 2012. 

Mr. LARSEN. So 2012. 

Secretary TRIAY. Yes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Okay. Good. 

Dr. Winokur. 

Dr. WINOKUR. And I think the second issue we talked about were 

concerns about hydrogen in pipes and ancillary vessels. We were 

worried about detonations. 

Basically, what happened was the project is using a different 

strategy to address this problem, using what is called a Quantitative Risk Assessment. It is the first time that the Department 

has used this approach and it is a different approach. 

The Board is waiting, I think April, hopefully this month, we will 

see from the project, basically, the validation of this methodology, 

the results and basically, hopefully convince ourselves that we are 

comfortable that hydrogen-related issues in pipes and vessels will 

be appropriately addressed. 

And the last issue, of course, deals with the tank farms themselves. I think at the hearing, the Board made the point that we 

have to look at this as an integrated problem, and the integrated 

problem is that not only does this plan have to operate effectively, 

but the tank farms need to be able to control, characterize, and 

transfer waste into that facility that it really can handle. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

Dr. WINOKUR. And that, I think, is an ongoing problem and certainly we have met with the Department on that. I think that is 

something that you should look at as an issue that we will be addressing over the next several years. 

Because I think the project will continue to refine what the 

waste acceptance criteria is that that plant can receive, and the 

tank farms will continue to adjust and improve and understand the 

capabilities they need. 

Mr. LARSEN. Good. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Yes, I have a couple of questions for Mr. D’Agostino. 
20 

With respect to the Nuclear Posture Review, Section 1251 Report 

to Congress, and NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship and Management 

Plan make many commitments to modernize America’s nuclear arsenal and the complex that sustains it. 

These commitments include sizeable funding plans. 

Please discuss the funding increases in fiscal year 2012 in the 

budget request and the intent and purposes for those additional 

funds. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Fleming, thank you for the question. 

We have increases across three broad fronts. The first broad 

front is in what we call Directed Stockpile Work. This is direct 

work on our nuclear weapons themselves, the surveillance activities, which is the activities needed to look inside the warheads to 

see how they are doing, particularly the older warheads themselves. 

We are very interested in how they are aging. 

Those resources went up to about $240 million from prior years, where they are steady state at about $80 million per year. So it is 

a significant increase, percentagewise, in surveillance activities and 

work on our Directed Stockpile Work to finish the production rate 

on the W76 [thermonuclear warhead] life extension, to do the initial studies and do the first production unit on the B61 bomb and 

to start the study on the W78 warhead study, which is something 

that we know we will have to address in about 10 years’ time. And 

it does take a little bit of time to do the initial preparatory work. 

The second area is in our science capabilities, because the scientific capabilities allows us to maintain the stockpile without underground testing, so work on a supercomputer platform, for example, to allow us to use modern codes to do accelerated aging tests. 

The final area, which is our biggest increase, particularly when 

we compare it to fiscal year 2011, a 21-percent increase, is in our 

infrastructure investments. These are investments, not only at the 

uranium and plutonium facilities that you have heard mentioned 

in the hearing, but also across our enterprise, particularly at 

Pantex, the High Explosive Pressing Facility, which we will be getting underway very shortly, we have just received bids in hand. We 

will make the decision very shortly and getting this facility up and 

running by the year 2016. 

So, some of that increase supports that activity. 

It also includes an activity in fiscal year 2012 in Tennessee to do 

what we call Facility Risk Reduction. Chairman Winokur described 

some concerns. He is aware of some concerns that we have in the 

9212 building, which is the Nation’s only uranium-capable building, to do the kind of processing the Nation needs to do. Not just 

for the stockpile, but for the non-proliferation program. 

We are spending upwards of $75 million over the next few years, 

just to keep that capability going, so that when the Uranium Processing Facility comes in play, we know we have—I would say we 

are almost limping along to get to the end. 

So it is across those three broad areas on the stockpile that we 

are working on. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. 

One follow-up question, what are the most significant challenges 

in that process that you see? 
21 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Two significant challenges, as I see it. We 

have great people. They are very capable. They have been working 

the stockpile for many years. But the two biggest challenges that 

I see are in being able to recruit the next generation of folks, so 

that the people that we have now can train this new generation, 

because we have a golden opportunity for the next 15 years, and 

we are doing a tremendous amount of work. 

And this is the time to get that next generation up and running. 

Because the next generation are the folks that are going to take 

us from 2025 out to 2045, 2050. 

And again, this isn’t just about nuclear weapons. Of course it is 

taking care of the stockpile. But that next generation will do that 

vital nuclear counterterrorism work; because the best person to 

have on your team to take apart an improvised nuclear device is 

the weapons designer that knows how to put it together to begin 

with. 

So, we want to make sure those people are connected up. 

So, the people piece is the first one. 

The next challenge is project management. We have, the Chairman mentioned, a number of very significant, complicated facilities 

that we are going to be building over the next 15 years. We have 

to make sure that our project management house is in order and 

running well, and has all the elements of nuclear safety, project 

management principles, and the like. 

We started down that road to address this problem. You have to 

address it early, because the time to catch the problem is early on 

in the project, not after you have started; not after you are done 

with the design and are trying to pour concrete. 

So the things we have taken to move early is get our project 

management policy changed—and I mentioned one thing earlier, 

which is let us finish the design work before we go off and start 

pouring concrete—doing sound cost estimates in between each of 

our critical decision pieces. And we have done this. We have 

changed our organization. 

Neile Miller has brought a tremendous amount of management 

expertise into the organization and has looked at this and said that 

is, project management is the piece. We need an office that is fairly 

focused on this and we need to recruit the best person to run that 

office. We are actively looking for the best person we possibly can 

to run this particular office, to get this project management piece 

right. 

We have had some early success, but we need some longer success. And we have had early success that the Project Management 

Institute has awarded to some of our projects. One project in particular, in Anne’s program, the distinguished award, which is the 

first time ever a federal agency has ever won this award, for one 

of Anne’s projects. The National Ignition Facility has been running 

steady state and has executed. And they have won, there, the PMI 

[Project Management Institute] award of the year, last year, for the 

most complicated project. 

But our challenge is not the past. Our challenge is the future. 

And that is what we are going to focus on. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Sutton. 
22 

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. 

My questions are going to focus on the Hanford Waste Treatment 

Plant. The Hanford complex is the biggest and most expensive 

cleanup project in the DOE complex, and perhaps the most important. 

It is also my understanding from the testimony here today and 

information that I have gathered that the project has just been 

plagued with cost increases, delays, and technical issues. 

So, Dr. Winokur, I know you talked a little bit about this, but 

if you could just give us, in quick, order a short rundown on the 

present concerns with regard to Hanford. 

Dr. WINOKUR. Well, let me begin by providing some context as 

to why I think it has become very challenging. 

The Board has actually committed to the early integration of 

safety and design at these facilities. 

I think we have already mentioned the fact that if you integrate 

things early—and I think Tom mentioned this—before you pour 

concrete or before the design is largely complete, you can address 

the issues. If you have to go back at a later time and try to retrofit 

safety, it is very hard. 

Now, what happened with this project is it underwent a major 

redesign in 2009. When I say major redesign, I mean that design 

criteria in the project changed, and this raised safety issues for the 

Board. 

We began communicating with the Department about these safety issues as early as January—well, really, immediately after, but 

since very significant communications beginning in January of 

2010. 

Then we felt in order to really focus these issues—and you have 

asked me what those issues are—we had to have a hearing. 

Ms. SUTTON. I understand. 

Dr. WINOKUR. At the hearing, the three issues that I think we 

really focused on were the mixing systems. Basically, this facility 

separates waste into a high- and a low-level waste stream. 

In the black cell region of the facility, you have no access for 40 

years while the plant operates. 

One of the things you have to do is be able to mix solids, mix 

the actual radioactive waste, so that it can be transported and then 

operations performed on it. 

The Board felt that, when it looked at the new design criteria 

that the accumulations of solids was part of that design criteria. It 

raised a safety concern for us. 

Ms. SUTTON. I appreciate that. I want to speed this along because I have a lot of questions. So, I really appreciate that. 

I understand the mixing concern. There were also concerns with 

respect to the hydrogen gas figures, as I understand it, and also 

criticality concerns, perhaps. 

So, if those are the things that we are looking at right now in 

regard to Hanford, would you agree that those are the major concerns? 

Dr. WINOKUR. Yes, those are major concerns; that is in the written oral testimony. 
23 

Ms. SUTTON. Okay. Then let me go a little bit further here, because I also have some concern about the safety culture at Hanford. I don’t know if that is a concern for you. 

Would you say that is a concern, Chairman? 

Dr. WINOKUR. It is a concern for us. 

Ms. SUTTON. Okay. So, do you think that enough attention is 

being paid or has been paid to safety and quality at Hanford? You 

talked about how, at some point, it became a big issue. 

I mean, I know that, for example, a former research and technology manager has alleged that he was removed for raising safety 

and technical concerns. 

I guess one question I would have: Has there been an investigation into that matter? 

Dr. WINOKUR. Yes, there has been. The Board received a letter 

in July of 2010 from Dr. Walt Tamosaitis, who raised concerns 

about the safety culture on the project. 

So the Board believed he was a credible individual who had 

played an important role at the project. The Board felt it was necessary to conduct an investigation. 

I mean, whenever the Board gets whistleblower or other information, other concerns, the Board always investigates. Either we investigate it ourselves, or we turn it over to the IG [Inspector General]. 

A natural evolution of that letter was to begin the safety culture 

investigation, and we had a hearing. 

So, the Board wanted to be sure that what happened at the hearing didn’t have safety culture problems. In other words, the witnesses felt very comfortable with sharing information with the 

Board. 

So, we certainly looked at that. Subsequent to that, we have 

identified other issues. 

Now, I can tell you that the Board hopes to share the information of that investigation with the safety culture, the waste treatment plant, with the Secretary of Energy in the near future. 

We do have concerns about safety culture. We will be identifying 

them for the Secretary’s consideration. 

Ms. SUTTON. I appreciate that, and I will look forward to seeing 

more information about the safety culture. 

Can you just share with me, in the very brief time we have left, 

what do you look for when you evaluate the safety culture? 

Dr. WINOKUR. Well I think the crux of the safety culture is an 

empowered workforce, people who are comfortable with raising concerns with their management so that you don’t have the messenger 

being shot. I think that is really what adds to the safety culture. 

Even though you measure it in the way that the work is performed and how empowered they are, safety culture is driven by 

leadership. So we always have to look at that aspect of it. 

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This question is for Dr. Triay. In looking at your bio, it says that 

you lead the largest, most diverse and technically complex environmental cleanup program in the world, including enough radioactive 

waste to completely fill the Louisiana Superdome. 
24 

In that context, it would seem, then, that we should be seeking 

appropriate storage facilities, not, as a country, seeking to close 

them down. 

President Obama indicated that he does not intend to pursue 

Yucca Mountain as a long-term repository for high-level waste. 

Yucca Mountain remains designated by law as a repository for 

high-level radioactive waste. 

In your judgment, would Yucca Mountain serve our repository 

needs? 

Secretary TRIAY. As the Secretary has testified, we believe that 

the studies that are going to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Commission will inform any decisions moving forward that the Administration will make with respect to high-level waste repositories. 

I will just point out that the waste we have in the Environmental 

Management complex is low-level waste, transuranic waste, and 

high-level waste. 

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant has been operating safely for 10 

years and has been able to disposition over almost 80,000 cubic meters of transuranic waste since it started working. We have very 

viable options for low-level waste. 

As we progress in taking those lessons learned, those will all be 

taken into account in the Blue Ribbon Commission studies. I personally have been asked by the Blue Ribbon Commission to give 

them the lessons learned from my time as the field manager of the 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, dispositioning of transuranic waste. 

So, I believe that we are committed as a country, ultimately, to 

have a repository for high-level waste. We are awaiting the Blue 

Ribbon Commission recommendations to the Secretary in draft 

form in the summer and finalized in the next calendar year. 

Mr. BROOKS. Do you have a judgment as to when studies on 

Yucca Mountain first began and how many have been conducted? 

Secretary TRIAY. The Yucca Mountain project is not part of the 

portfolio in the Environmental Management program. But I understand your point that—— 

Mr. BROOKS. We are talking many years, even a decade or so? 

Secretary TRIAY. Yes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Why is another study needed? 

Secretary TRIAY. I believe that the studies that you refer to with 

respect to Yucca Mountain have been specific to the geohydrological 

conditions as well as how to isolate the waste. 

The Blue Ribbon Commission is looking, I believe, more broadly 

as to what are the options for a high-level waste and spent nuclear 

fuel. 

They are not looking specifically at the geohydrological conditions 

of any particular site. But they are looking at the process that got 

us to a point that the Administration felt that it could not move 

forward with the Yucca Mountain decision. 

Mr. BROOKS. What insight can you share with us that would help 

convince us and the American public that the Administration’s 

stance with respect that Yucca Mountain is motivated more by capturing Nevada votes or Senator Reid’s capturing Nevada votes 

rather than sound public policy? 

Secretary TRIAY. I have been working, like you mentioned, in the 

field of nuclear waste management for over 25 years. 
25 

The main aspect of moving forward with dispositioning of radioactive waste—whether it is low-level or transuranic, high-level 

waste, spent nuclear fuel—is the intent of the community that surrounds that particular site to move forward and deal with the mission that has been delineated for that particular repository. 

That is what I have learned from being a field manager at the 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, for 5 years 

before coming to headquarters in the Environmental Management 

program. 

I believe that part of what the Blue Ribbon Commission is going 

to look at is what is the process that would get us to success, rather than starting and then having to stop and deal with extensive 

periods of litigation because we have not had a clear community as 

well as national interest merge with respect to a focus that we 

need to have in this very difficult field of dispositioning radioactive 

waste. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well I would say my time is expired. 

Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary D’Agostino, I think you made an important point a 

while ago that it is important for the U.S. to have the best nuclear 

capability for a variety of reasons; keeping our own nuclear deterrent, but also having that capability for a variety of contingencies 

is necessary that people, programs, and facilities all contribute to 

having that level of excellence where we want it to be. 

You mentioned a few minutes ago some of the challenges on the 

facilities part of it, and a 21-percent increase, I think you said. Of 

course, that comes off what some people would argue as decades of 

neglect. So we have a lot of catching up to do. 

One of the questions—let me ask this. Can you tell me, over the 

next 5 to 10 years, what percentage of your construction budget is 

devoted to the facility at Los Alamos and the facility at Y–12? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Well, let us see. In a typical year—I am 

going to try to get my way to answering you directly. 

I think, typically, when we were a steady state and we don’t have 

these large facilities in our program, we have spent—recapitalizing 

at the rate of about $200 million to $250 million to $400 million 

a year, depending on what facilities we have because we have, obviously, a multi-billion dollar set of infrastructure to take care of. 

The two line-item projects that we have right here are probably in the neighborhood of $300 million to $600 million a year, depending on which over the next 10 years as we look ahead. 

So, what we have got, I would say about these two facilities will 

comprise more than 50 percent of the normal recapitalization that 

we would be doing. 

I would have to check the statistic table I have here in my book 

to get the exact percentage. But it is a significant share. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And it would take about how long to build? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. These large facilities, we feel, are going to 

be 10-year construction activities from the initial design work that 

has to get done, defining the performance base line, and then actually building them. 
26 

Typically, it takes about a year and a half to 2 years to transition 

these into operations. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. A normal recapitalization project like the 

high explosive press is more on the order of about 31⁄2 years or so. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. It just seems to me an enormous challenge to have—and we have had these challenges since I have been 

on this committee. 

Whether it was NIF [National Ignition Facility] or whatever, we 

have had some very expensive facilities—— 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Mr. THORNBERRY [continuing]. As part of NNSA. 

Then we also have kind of the smaller, more routine things in 

competition with the same dollars. 

The third thing we have is trying to transition the complex to a 

smaller footprint where it makes more sense with the number of 

weapons and the kinds of activities we are doing now. 

All three of those priorities seem to me to be competing for the 

same dollars. 

I guess I am curious what you can tell us about how you sort 

that out—— 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Okay. 

Mr. THORNBERRY [continuing]. Year in, year out. Ten years to 

build a building? I mean, I know it is a complicated building, but 

good heavens. Surely, there has got to be a better way. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. We are looking at better ways on these 

things. It is one of the challenges that we have been given. 

Don Cook, who is the deputy administrator, is looking at this 

particular challenge. He is exactly the right person for this job. 

He was the individual that was in charge of a $550 million facility at Sandia many years ago and brought that facility in under 

budget and early because of the way he approached the construction. 

He has, in fact, directed both of our M&O contract partners at 

Y–12 and Los Alamos to look for ways to leverage each other’s capabilities there. 

In some cases for these facilities, we have similar business teams 

working on these projects, particularly in the early design phase. 

How do we integrate those two activities so we don’t relearn the 

lessons from before? 

The one thing I would say on how do we balance priorities—I 

think it is a very good question. 

I recall very specifically when we were in the fiscal year 2011 

budget formulation process internally within the Administration 

and the same in the fiscal year 2012 process taking a look at the 

out-year resources we have dedicated not to these facilities, but to 

what I would call our base workload. 

I asked for significant increase in resources for what I would call 

just your normal recapitalization. I received support from the 

White House for that. 

So this 10-year plan does have that in there. The challenge will 

be, of course, making sure that it stays in that account so we don’t 

keep adding to our deferred maintenance problem. 
27 

Many of the things that we want to do, particularly at Y–12, for 

example, serve similar purposes: recapitalizing and shrinking of 

the footprint. 

You know, this is always one of those things where, 10 years 

from now, it will get better. But we do have a plan, and we have 

to execute the plan now, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes, and shrinking the footprint reduces security costs and has a variety of benefits. 

I agree. We have got to stick with the plan. It just looks challenging to get from here to there, for me. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. We will go to Mr. Bishop. Then after 

that we will have a second round for questions if members have 

second questions for this panel. 

Mr. BISHOP. Well, Mr. Chairman, I see you have changed my 

nameplate. I was expecting to use Mr. Scott’s five and then run 

down to mine and get another five. Apparently, you have closed 

that avenue of abuse of the process to me. 

I actually am here to listen to this panel and have questions for 

the next one. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Then turning to our second round, returning again to Mr. 

D’Agostino. 

The B61 bomb is a key capability that supports the U.S. contribution to NATO’s [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s] nuclear alliance and our extended deterrence commitments. 

The NNSA budget request contains a significant increase in 

funds for the B61 Life Extension Program and includes plans for 

NNSA to begin engineering development activities, Phase 6.3, in 

fiscal year 2012. 

However, the cost and design study of Phase 6.2 and 6.2A is not 

yet complete, and the Nuclear Weapons Council will not meet until 

later this year to authorize entry into the next phase. 

What gives NNSA confidence that it can proceed into engineering 

development? How is NNSA managing schedule costs and risk to 

meet the delivery requirements for a first LEP life extension production unit by 2017? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Chairman, the approach we are taking is what I would call is very active project management. This 

is a project. 

Just like an infrastructure project is a project, this is a project. 

It has a defined cost, scope, and a schedule basis. 

You correctly point out that we are not—we have not yet completed our, what we would call design work, if you will, to determine what the exact cost will be. 

What we have done in the past is, you know, parametric analysis 

on estimating what the future cost will be. We will make adjustments at the end of this calendar year once we have the actual 

costs for this project. 

One thing that is clear with—at the Nuclear Weapons Council: 

Mr. Ash Carter is the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council. 

We just had a meeting. We have regular meetings, but our most 

recent one actually delineated and lined out how we are going to 

get ourselves to a final decision point on this life extension. 
28 

We are holding firm to the 2017 date, not because we think that 

is a good—a date we pulled out of the air. That is a date that is 

required because of our concerns on some components on this system. 

So without a doubt, we are going to be hitting that date; we have 

to. The Nation’s security on this warhead demands it. 

The question will be, can we do all that we had hoped to do on 

this warhead and take advantage of this opportunity? 

We think it will be challenging, but doable. That is our plan over 

the next 6 months, is to really put the meat and potatoes behind 

that particular statement on exactly what is going to get done. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Triay, last year, our committee authorized the 

Department of Energy to establish energy parks on former defense 

nuclear facility sites. 

This is an idea way for the Department to leverage communities 

and have legacy nuclear and other technical expertise and transition them to focusing on new energy research and development. 

Can you provide us with an update on what the Department is 

doing in establishing these energy parks and whether any candidate sites have been identified? 

Secretary TRIAY. I am pleased to do that, Mr. Chairman. On February 17th, 2011, the Department established an Asset Revitalization Initiative Task Force that is led by the Director of Legacy 

Management, Mr. David Geiser. 

It has representation from all the elements in the Department, 

especially all of the energy offices. 

In addition to energy parks, the task force is going to look broadly at any beneficial reuse that the communities are interested in 

pursuing with the vast tracks of land that we have cleaned up as 

a result of our work. 

So, in August of this calendar year, that task force is going to 

report to senior DOE management on a path forward on the Asset 

Revitalization Initiative. 

At that time, we should be able to clearly delegate to you one of 

the strategies that are going to be utilized and the advantages that 

different approaches for beneficial reuse, such as energy parks, 

have. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Dr. Winokur, in your testimony in page 12 and 13 and a little 

bit beyond that, you discuss the nuclear security infrastructure in 

some of our facilities. 

So I am curious: In the Board’s assessment, what challenges remain yet with the design of the CMRR and the UPF at Y–12, and 

how many issues have you assessed been resolved? How many have 

you assessed are yet outstanding? 

Dr. WINOKUR. Well, with the CMRR facility, as you know, or may 

not know, the Board did a congressionally directed certification of 

that facility. 

Actually, both the Board and NNSA independently performed the 

certification in September of 2009. 

At that time, the Board was comfortable that the safety strategy 

had been developed for that facility that the controls had been 
29 

identified and that a path forward to implement those controls in 

a final design was in place. 

So, I think we were comfortable with that facility and how it was 

proceeding. But the caution always was there is a lot of, you know, 

details that have to be filled in to actually build this thing and get 

to a final design. 

The concern right now, from the Board’s point of view, and is becoming a recurring concern, is that the NNSA is looking at, perhaps, a change in the safety strategy of the facility. They are going 

to do that by, perhaps, reducing the material at risk for the facility. 

That is certainly their decision. The Board does not, you know, 

weigh in on that. 

But if they do change the material at risk in the facility, they 

are also considering a change in the safety strategy or the safety 

controls themselves, perhaps downgrading them. 

So, I think this thing is, right now, in a situation where we really 

have to get clearer. We wrote a letter to the Administrator in February asking him to provide a little more detail to us about exactly 

how NNSA is going to proceed with this facility. 

So, we are kind of in a situation right now where we are waiting 

just to get, you know, recalibrated in terms of what the Administrator wants to do with that facility. Then we are going to have to, 

in a sense, relook at what the safety controls are and convince ourselves are adequate. 

The UPF facility down at Y–12 was a facility that the Board had 

some initial structural concerns about. I think most of those are resolved. 

But where the Board has had a little bit of difficulty is that— 

and I think the Administrator said this—they didn’t want to make 

some decisions about the strategies until they were 90 percent, 95 

percent done with the design. 

The Board felt that, you know, in waiting to do that, which 

seemed prudent, that some of the steps along the way, some of the 

preliminary design steps were not actually done. 

So the Board is a little bit uncertain, to some extent, in that facility about exactly what the safety strategy is going to be going 

forward. We need to work with NNSA to get clear about that. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. This gets to some of the questions Mr. Thornberry was asking, you know, these big projects, we want—everyone 

wants to see them get done right, absolutely. 

So, in that vein, Mr. Secretary, do you have some response for 

us today with regards to what the Board has contacted you about? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I don’t have concerns. I would use different words, but the Chairman uses the words that he feels is appropriate. 

I don’t believe—the word ‘‘downgrade’’ is not something we apply 

to safety, whereby appropriately, you know, safety given—the right 

safety for the right risk. 

We have the responsibility in the executive branch to make sure 

that we factor in all the pieces together, nuclear safety being a primary concern of ours. 

When we go off and take a look at what it would take to build 

a particular safety, we assume quantities and material at risk. As 

time goes on, we get the opportunity to refine that. 
30 

If there is no plutonium in the building or if there is half as 

much plutonium in the building, that changes the safety analysis 

and problem and, therefore, allows us to take a look, at does that 

potentially reduce costs? 

Of course, the Board is with us every step of the way in examining this and providing independent input. Frankly, I value that 

independent input—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Can I ask you a question? Because I don’t want 

anyone to think there is a discussion about what the definition of 

‘‘downgrade’’ is or anything like that—— 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. Or anyone is misconstruing anything 

like that. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN. Just in the sense, is it a reasonable request the Defense Nuclear Facilities Board is making to NSSA about Y–12 and 

about CMMR? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Yes, the request we are planning on giving the Board the information they need, absolutely. We always do 

that. 

We want to do it in a way after we have taken a look at the analysis ourselves. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, excellent. Yes, great. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Winokur, you know, we have all been following the tragedy 

in Japan and the—I think it is the Fukushima power plant, if I remember the nomenclature correctly. 

It occurs to me that, in the midst of all of that, that they probably had time to, you know, reinsert their control rods in the reactor. But the ancillary problem of losing their backup generators because of the—I think because of the tsunami—left them with battery power and, of course, with the reactor not in generation mode, 

they had to rely upon the grid, which is not a shocking thing. 

When that wasn’t available, that became a very serious challenge 

to them. 

Some of us on this committee, you know, have endorsed and introduced legislation to do everything we could do, to protect the 

grid from potential, you know, electromagnetic interference, whether it is manmade or geomagnetic, and the loss of the grid is a great 

concern to me. 

I guess I am asking you, do we have any protocols in place that 

would render us fairly impervious to such a challenge here? 

I know that the Administration has called for a higher capacity 

battery backup. But those batteries do run down. I mean, you 

know, there is just—I mean,—there is certainly—I am all for what 

they are saying. 

But is this going to be enough? If we should lose our grid, what 

are the implications for, potentially, nuclear power plants in full 

generation mode at the time? 

And what are our abilities to cold-start if we have to? I realize 

this is kind of getting a little out of your lane. But I think it is primarily still something you can address. 
31 

Do we have the ability to respond effectively to a like issue? Even 

though I know we have a little better—we are not quite as vulnerable to what happened in Japan. 

But can we respond to that effectively? 

Dr. WINOKUR. Well, let me begin by saying, as I have said in my 

oral statement, that the Secretary of Energy has already tasked 

with the Department of Energy to take a look and see, you know, 

whether or not they had an emergency response, or will have an 

emergency response in place, to address the serious either designbasis accident or beyond-design basis accident. 

What you are saying is very true. You definitely need backup 

power. Maybe there will be some thought given to whether it needs 

to be doubly redundant or not. 

You need water for fire suppression. You have to make sure you 

have guaranteed sources. And, probably just as importantly, you 

need a very robust defense in depth. 

So, when the Board talks to the Department about safety, we 

usually use the word ‘‘adequate’’ protection of public and worker 

safety. 

But I think when it comes to the response to the backup, you 

really have to think of it as being robust and bullet-proof. That is 

one lesson. 

I think the other challenge for the Department is that emergency 

preparedness for them is really a very significant issue because you 

have sites like Savannah River where you have tritium facilities, 

which are in close proximity to facilities that handle plutonium and 

highly-enriched uranium that are near tank farms which have toxicological and radiological waste. 

So, if a serious accident occurs, there is going to have to be a 

very carefully orchestrated plan and a command center to determine where the damage is and whether the workers should, perhaps, shelter in place or try to vacate the area. I mean, you don’t 

really know. 

So, I think it puts a real premium, and I think the Board’s been 

interested in this for years. We became even more interested in 

this when we saw the BP spill out in the Gulf, and the thousandyear flood at Pantex that really, there is a lot more work that 

needs to be done in this emergency response and emergency preparedness area. 

Mr. FRANKS. Let me just encourage the Administration, and you, 

Dr. Winokur, and others to take a good look at the Shield Act that 

we have put forth to protect the grid from EMP or geomagneticrelated damage because of the criticality of the grid to back us up 

in these situations. You know, it is hard to sometimes realize all 

of the cascading effects that occur. 

I mean, if you run out of diesel fuel for whatever you have or 

your batteries run down and with the plant being not in full generation mode to be able to maintain its own circulation, maintain 

its own cooling capacity, then that becomes something to look at 

carefully. 

I hope you will do that because it seems that there is a pretty 

strong consensus that we need to do this, even though it is just one 

area. 
32 

But I think that some impetus on your part or some encouragement on your part might help it. I hope we do that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. 

Dr. WINOKUR. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Winokur, I have a question along the line of what Mr. 

Franks just asked. 

Can you refresh my memory about contingency plans? Let us 

say, for example, I live in the Southern California area near something called the San Onofre power plant where Southern California 

Edison is the one that is drawing the power from there, a private 

company. 

It sits on the ocean, probably on what we would consider county 

property right within the sphere of influence of a public municipality that has its own government called San Clemente, with a 

federal highway running alongside it, an interstate highway, and 

some local arterials and state highways connecting everything. 

So, I know we plan for this, and I know we have plans, and they 

are probably adequate. But in light of what happened in Japan 

and, really, a perfect storm coming together and overwhelming 

what probably their contingency plan is, who is in charge of that 

contingency plan? 

Who oversees it? Are we going back and looking at every power 

plant we have in that way and saying, what would happen with an 

overwhelming situation? 

Who is in charge of making sure that barriers are correct or 

things need to be heightened or spent rods are outside in a more 

vulnerable area and highways aren’t adequate to evacuate people 

we need to evacuate if there is that type of a population right next 

to the reactors? 

Dr. WINOKUR. Thank you. It is a little bit out of our jurisdiction. 

But I do want to, hopefully—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Who would I ask? 

Dr. WINOKUR. The Governor of the State. I don’t know. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Well, that is exactly what—you know, is it the 

Governor? Is it the State? Or the feds? 

Dr. WINOKUR. I can’t really comment. But I would like to make 

a relevant comment from the Safety Board’s point of view because 

we do have responsibilities for defense nuclear facilities and DOE 

sites. 

I want you to know that what I lose sleep over at night is what 

you are talking about. 

When I look at facilities and I try to rate which ones I am the 

most concerned about, the first thing I say to myself is, ‘‘Which site 

is near a population center? Which site, if I have a problem, is 

going to more immediately impact the public?’’ 

So, there are some places like the Nevada Test Site where, even 

if there was an accident, which would be a very unfortunate thing, 

we are still pretty far from a population center. I feel more confident, and I know that I can confine the emergency response in 

the site. 

But there are others where that can’t be done. I think those are 

the ones that we need to work with the Department on to ensure 
33 

that the emergency response and emergency preparedness not only, 

probably like you are suggesting, includes the site, the Department 

of Energy, but also—I am sure that the Department does this—the 

interacting community around it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you feel comfortable that the Department of 

Energy and Department of Defense facilities have the contingency 

plan for the overwhelming scenario? 

Dr. WINOKUR. You are referring to the beyond design basis accident? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Probably. 

Dr. WINOKUR. Well I think that more work needs to be done in 

that regard. 

If you look at the Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 830, 

which really defines safety at these facilities, it actually does direct 

the Department to look at the beyond design basis accidents. 

I think the Board would probably benefit. I think we will, by taking your question to heart and having a meaningful discussion with 

the Department of Energy about how those kinds of assurances can 

be provided. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Doctor. I know the Secretary wanted 

to—— 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Yes, ma’am. 

You asked who is responsible. In the Department of Energy, my 

organization is responsible for the emergency operations organization and responding to emergencies in the Department. 

Establishing that infrastructure of people and capabilities and 

the communication system and the teams that go out and deploy 

and go check, what we do—first of all, one of the things we are 

doing is moving nuclear material out of areas where we have large 

populations. 

The inventory of plutonium at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in Livermore, California, is a prime example of that. 

We recognized 3 years ago that we had a population center that 

was growing around our laboratory and that we had two sites in 

the country that were working plutonium. 

We said, ‘‘Well, this is very special material. We want it in fewer 

sites, and we want it away from as many people as possible.’’ 

So that is why we are de-inventorying it. In fact, our FY 2012 

budget goes to support the final year of de-inventory activities to 

do that. 

The second piece of this on the emergency side is, we have a-this 

organization, we conduct exercises regularly. 

There are national-level exercises with the FBI [Federal Bureau 

of Investigation] and state and local authorities. We do one of those 

big exercises once per year, including an example of, potentially, a 

power plant problem. This is all exercises, of course, so they are— 

we have an opportunity to do that. 

The second piece are monthly, what we call, no-notice exercises, 

where we don’t tell everybody that we are going to do one. We, I 

won’t say, surprise them, but, in effect, we do surprise, just check 

and see, is everybody ready to respond to this event. 

Finally, we are obviously in the middle of responding right now. 

We are learning a lot. As we are helping the Japanese, we are 
34 

learning a lot about better coordination that we need to have within the executive branch and within the Department of Energy. 

Ine ́s may have one last piece to add to that, if I could. 

Secretary TRIAY. Thank you. Very quickly, we in the Environmental Management office are also responsible for the emergency 

preparedness so that we can respond to an emergency for those 

sites that are under the direction of the Environmental Management Program, one of those sites being the Hanford site. 

To that end, of course, at the Hanford site we have, like Chairman Winokur pointed out, 177 tanks, 53 million gallons of radioactive waste, 175 million queries. 

We take emergency preparedness extremely seriously, along the 

lines of what the Administrator was talking about. We also take 

the ultimate in design and construction of the Waste Treatment 

Plant, which will address this huge issue extremely seriously. 

The Secretary has exercised great leadership when it comes to 

the Waste Treatment Plant. We avail ourselves of the best independent experts from industry, academia, as well as our national 

laboratories. 

As a matter of fact, some of the issues that Chairman Winokur 

identified on mixing control for hydrogen tank farms readiness 

have benefitted from the work of those independent experts. 

And we are committed to continue utilizing those independent 

experts, collaborate with the Board, and be ready to start the 

Waste Treatment Plant, finish the design by 2013, finish the construction by 2016 and start operations by 2019 to resolve this huge 

environmental issue of the Hanford tank farms. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Before we conclude with this panel, I want to give 

anyone an opportunity to add to their comments or to make concluding statements if they have something they would like to highlight or focus on. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I wanted to recognize my father, Tom D’Agostino, who is in the room here. 

He has served this country for over 45 years, starting off in the 

Marine Corps as an officer in the Korean War. He has been an inspiration to me and dedication. 

I have learned a lot from him, and I am here because of him. So 

I wanted to thank him publicly. 

Thank you. I appreciate your indulgence. 

Mr. TURNER. Very good. 

Well, in recognition with your father, we would like to continue 

our recognition of you all for your input and contribution. 

We are just all so appreciative of the fact that you continue to 

serve in this capacity and know that you are making a tremendous 

difference. 

With that, we will turn then to Panel Two. We will take a 5- 

minute break before we make that switch. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. I would like to provide a warm welcome to Mr. 

Weber, General Chambers and Admiral Benedict. 

As I mentioned earlier, this annual nuclear budget hearing has 

typically focused solely on DOE and NSSA programs and budgets. 
35 

However, the Department of Defense also has a significant role 

in maintaining our Nation’s nuclear deterrent, and is directly responsible for shaping many of NSSA’s plans and programs. 

Therefore, I have asked three key DOD leaders to testify in the 

second panel on the Department’s nuclear programs and budgets 

and the linkages with NNSA. Mr. Weber, you are now recognized 

for your opening statement, if you would. 

Also, we have your written statements. If you could, in about a 

5-minute time period, although we are not going to run the clock, 

summarize what your statement is. 

We will turn, then, to the first round of questions. 

Mr. Weber. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW WEBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND 

BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Secretary WEBER. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez 

and members of the subcommittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss the 2012 budget request for the Department of 

Defense nuclear forces programs. 

It is an honor to come before you with my colleagues, General 

Chambers and Admiral Benedict, to provide testimony on the Department’s nuclear deterrence requirements. 

Today’s testimony will focus on our work with the Department 

of Energy, from whom you have just heard, to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons 

exist. 

Building upon a longstanding Department of Defense-Department of Energy partnership, the Nuclear Weapons Council has 

made substantial progress over the past 2 years. 

As stated in this subcommittee’s letter to the Honorable Paul 

Ryan concerning nuclear weapons-related appropriations, a safe, 

secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile is essential to United States 

security. 

America’s strategic forces continue their role as a pillar of our 

national security. In the past few months, I have had the opportunity to witness firsthand our Forces’ dedication and commitment 

to this mission. 

I traveled to Naval Base Kitsap in Washington State, last fall 

and, in February of this year, to Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana. 

During these visits, I spoke with the extraordinary airmen, sailors and marines, who gave me a great appreciation for the challenges they face each and every day executing our strategic deterrent mission. 

Before discussing fiscal year 2012 plans, it is important to step 

back for a moment and consider the status of the nuclear security 

enterprise before the Nuclear Posture Review. 

According to the bipartisan Schlesinger-Perry Report, the physical infrastructure was in serious need of transformation. 

DOD also had inadequate plans for modernization of delivery 

platforms for nuclear weapons. 
36 

Perhaps most importantly, both Departments were dealing with 

the absence of a much-needed national consensus on the future role 

of our Nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

By completing last year’s Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration helped restore this national consensus, and outlined a comprehensive plan to revitalize the nuclear enterprise and respond to 

all 21st-century nuclear threats, including nuclear terrorism. 

The Departments of Defense and Energy now have a shared path 

forward to recapitalize the nuclear enterprise. 

The Department of Defense has a robust plan for recapitalizing 

the delivery systems that support our nuclear deterrent. 

The NPR concluded that the United States will retain a nuclear 

triad under a New START Treaty comprised of ICBMs, SLBMs and 

nuclear-capable bombers. 

To keep the nuclear stockpile safe, secure, and effective for the 

long term, we are moving forward with SLBM, ICBM and gravity 

bomb warhead life extension programs. 

We will also bolster the human capital base throughout the nuclear enterprise while restoring the infrastructure that supports 

the stockpile. 

Nuclear threats to our Nation have changed significantly in the 

last 20 years. Indeed, the world is safer today from the threat of 

full-scale nuclear war than it was during the Cold War. 

While the U.S. and Russia reduce the number and role of nuclear 

weapons, the U.S. must retain and maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal. 

We ask you to support the President’s 2012 budget request so 

that we can further these goals. 

I appreciate the opportunity you have given us to testify today, 

and would be pleased to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Weber can be found in the 

Appendix on page 131.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

General Chambers. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM A. CHAMBERS, USAF, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND 

NUCLEAR INTEGRATION, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General CHAMBERS. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to discuss your Air Force’s strategic deterrent forces. 

Your Air Force nuclear enterprise consists of 450 intercontinental 

ballistic missiles, 96 bombers, squadrons of F–15C [Boeing Eagle 

fighter jet] and F–15E dual-capable fighters, and approximately 

23,000 dual-capable airmen who operate and sustain them. 

These forces produce the strategic deterrence that remain vital 

at a time when the national military strategy identifies a strategic 

inflection point. 

Maintaining credibility of our strategic deterrent requires a longterm visible commitment to our nuclear capabilities. 

Continuing to strengthen our nuclear enterprise remains the Air 

Force’s number one priority. Our Secretary and Chief of Staff articulated strategic guidance to engrain the Air Force’s commitment 
37 

to the advances we have made and to sustain the focus on the nuclear enterprise. 

My written statement lays out that guidance, and I respectfully 

request that statement be entered into the record. 

Today, I would like to highlight the following areas: Our focus on 

human capital to ensure appropriate nuclear expertise at all levels; 

the importance of modernizing and recapitalizing nuclear deterrent 

operations capability; and implementation of the Nuclear Posture 

Review and New START. 

When the Air Force established reinvigoration of the nuclear enterprise as our top priority, we included our most precious resource, our Airmen, as an integral part of that effort. 

In response, the nuclear and personnel communities jointly created an analytical process, resulting in a comprehensive nuclear 

enterprise human capital effort, which lays out the active management steps required to deliberately develop Airmen and their nuclear expertise. 

From investing in our people to investing in our weapons systems, every one of our systems in the Air Force’s nuclear enterprise 

is undergoing some form of modernization or recapitalization. 

Successful deterrence over the next two decades require sustaining and modernizing our fore structure in a consistent and deliberate manner. 

During the next 7 years, implementation of the 2010 Nuclear 

Posture Review and the New START will bring a reduction in the 

role of numbers of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. 

The Air Force will remove, for example, multiple warheads from 

its ICBMs. The United States and Russia will reduce the number 

of accountable strategic warheads. 

Final force structure numbers will be based on meeting the combatant commanders’ requirements and maintaining the overall effectiveness of the deterrent force. 

Our ability, as outlined in the national military strategy, to help 

enable other nations achieve their security goals, serve as a convener to cooperatively address common security challenges while, 

lastly, act as a security guarantor—preferably with partners and 

allies, but alone, if necessary—rests on a foundation of U.S nuclear 

capabilities and the strategic deterrence they provide. 

The President’s budget request reflects the positive steps we are 

taking to improve this Air Force core function. 

Across the FYDP [Future Year Defense Plan], Air Force investment in nuclear deterrence operations totals $28 billion. The Air 

Force is committed to ensuring this investment results in systems 

and capabilities that best operationalize strategic deterrents for our 

Nation. 

The national military strategy acknowledges that our Nation’s 

security and its prosperity are inseparable. Preventing wars is as 

important as winning them, and far less costly. 

In this time of constrained resources, the efficacy of nuclear deterrent operations is evident in the fact that for approximately 3 

percent of the Air Force total obligation authority, your Air Force 

continues to deliver the bedrock of global strategic stability, providing the ICBM and bomber legs of the triad as well as dual-capa-
38 

ble fighter capability 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a 

year. 

Thank you for this subcommittee’s continued support of America’s Air Force and, particularly, its support to our Airmen and 

their contributions to strategic deterrence. 

[The prepared statement of General Chambers can be found in 

the Appendix on page 146.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Admiral Benedict. 

STATEMENT OF RADM TERRY BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR, 

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral BENEDICT. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member 

Sanchez, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an 

honor to testify before you today representing Strategic Systems 

Program. 

SSP’s [Strategic Systems Program’s] mission is to design, develop, produce, support and protect our Nation’s sea-based strategic 

deterrent, the Trident II D–5 strategic weapon system. 

The recently ratified New START treaty increases the dependence on the submarine leg of the triad. The reductions in warheads 

and launchers will result in ballistic missile submarines carrying 

approximately 70 percent of the Nation’s strategic commitment. 

I have focused on four priorities since returning to SSP: Nuclear 

weapons security, the D–5 life extension program, the Ohio replacement program, and the solid rocket motor industrial base. 

The first priority I would like to address and, arguably, the most 

important priority, is the safety and the security of the Navy’s nuclear weapons. 

Our Marines and Navy Master at Arms provide an effective and 

integrated elite security force at our two strategic weapons facilities in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington. 

The U.S Coast Guard units have been commissioned at both facilities to protect our Ohio-class submarines as a transit to and 

from their dive points. This team provides a comprehensive security umbrella. 

The second priority I would like to discuss is SSP’s life extension 

efforts to ensure an effective and reliable sea-based deterrent. The 

D–5 weapons system continues to demonstrate itself as a credible 

deterrent and exceeds the operational requirements established for 

the system almost 30 years ago. 

Last month, the USS Nevada conducted the 135th consecutive 

successful flight test of the D–5 system. 

However, we cannot simply rest on our successes. We must remain vigilant of age-related issues to ensure a continued high level 

of reliability. 

SSP is extending the life of the D–5 weapons system through an 

update to all the subsystems: Launcher, navigation, fire control, 

guidance, missile and re-entry. 

These life extension efforts will provide the Navy with the system we need to meet the operational requirements of the future. 

My next priority, and one of the highest Navy priorities, is the 

Ohio replacement program. To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of the Trident II, the Ohio replacement 
39 

SSBN will enter service with the D–5 weapons system beginning 

in 2029. 

Another critical component of the Ohio replacement program is 

the development of a common missile compartment that will support D–5 deployment on both the Ohio-class replacement and the 

successor to the United Kingdom’s Vanguard class. 

Finally, I would like to discuss the importance of the solid rocket 

motor industrial base. The Navy is maintaining a continuous production of rocket motors. 

However, we have faced significant cost challenges as both NASA 

and the Air Force demands have declined. 

We are working with our industry partners, the Department of 

Defense, and Congress to sustain the solid rocket motor industrial 

base and find ways to maintain successful partnerships. 

We look forward to continuing this collaborative approach to 

maintain this critical national capability. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. I respectfully 

request that my written statement be submitted for the record, and 

I am pleased to answer your questions at this time, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict can be found in the 

Appendix on page 153.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

As you can tell we had a vote that was called. That is the 10- 

minute bell that we have to get to the Capitol for. 

I am going to yield my time to Mr. Bishop so he would not have 

to return after the votes, since he has sat through so much of this 

hearing. 

But before I do, Admiral, I just want to point out one correction 

to your statement. The Ohio-class submarine replacement program 

is not the Ohio replacement program because Ohio will never be replaced. 

So the—and that, of course, is near and dear to me, being from 

Ohio. 

Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that kindness. 

I would be willing to come back, obviously, unless we are talking 

about Ohio again. It should be Utah class, I think. 

Rear Admiral, I appreciate your comments very much, especially 

your fourth point there on the base. I realize that the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs has been impacted by NASA’s space shuttle conclusion as well as the completion of Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program. 

Knowing that the current and diminished solid rocket market 

has impacted the D–5 missile, what does the Navy plan to do, actually, to minimize those costs? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, we have been working very collaboratively with our industry partners, both Lockheed Martin and 

ATK. 

To that extent, I went out to Utah, went through the plant and 

took a series of briefings from ATK. 

As a result of that, I requested that those briefings be provided 

to General Kehler, who is commander of the U.S. strategic forces 
40 

as well as Mr. Stackley, who is ASN, RD&A [Assistant Secretary 

of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition)]. 

What those presentations show is an aggressive approach by 

ATK to try to minimize their cost. Specifically, they have reduced 

their indirect costs approximately 24 percent over the last 3 years. 

They have also significantly reduced their headcount from approximately 4,900 individuals to about 2,800, a reduction of 42 percent, in order to maintain costs. 

They have consolidated within buildings to the maximum extent 

possible. 

And while all that was happening, sir, over the last 3 years, the 

D–5 program has taken significant efforts in quality and process 

improvements where we have reduced approximately 17,000 hours 

and cost-avoided about $10 million a year. 

So, to get—I am sorry, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. If I could just interrupt because I appreciate that; 

you are right on with what you are saying you are doing. Do you 

also have a plan in the future because NASA is still dithering on 

what they want to do with the heavy lift, whether they want to 

obey Congress or not. 

So, in—regardless of what NASA ultimately decides to do, do you 

also have a sustainability plan regardless of NASA’s involvement 

in the future? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, we have a requirement to maintain strategic deterrence. We have a requirement today to—we have a plan 

today to move forward with minimum sustaining. 

An analysis that we conducted said that we need to produce 12 

sets of motors per year in order to maintain safety at ATK. 

Mr. BISHOP. So I am assuming you are planning on maintaining 

that—— 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir 

Mr. BISHOP [continuing]. Production level. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. We are. 

Mr. BISHOP. Through the current as well as the new Ohio-class 

as well? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. That is wonderful. 

Would the Navy benefit if the Air Force—and I am not trying to 

put the General on the spot here—would continue its production of 

the Minuteman ICBMs as well as NASA continuing on with the 

same manner in a low rate-production concept? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. I think any increase in volume to 

the projected reduction based on NASA and the logical termination 

of the Minuteman line today would significantly benefit the United 

States Navy in terms of overhead charge. 

Mr. BISHOP. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Chairman, I know you are anxious to get over here to vote 

with everyone else. I have a couple of other questions. 

But if I could submit those in writing, I would be appreciative. 

We will let you move on with the committee. 

Thank you for the kindness of allowing me to be here. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Thank you so much. We will be recessed. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. TURNER. I am going to call the subcommittee back to session. 
41 

Since we have returned from votes and we have myself and Mr. 

Larsen, we will just do one round of questions and clean them all 

up, if someone else is waiting to ask a question beyond us. 

And with that, I will begin with General Chambers. 

The Nuclear Posture Review states, ‘‘The Air Force will retain a 

dual-capable fighter as it replaces F–16s and the F–35 Joint Strike 

Fighter. These decisions ensure the United States will retain the 

capability to forward-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in support of its alliance commitments.’’ 

Now, please discuss the Air Force’s plans to make the F–35 

[Lockheed Martin Lightning II fifth-generation fighter jet] Joint 

Strike Fighter fully nuclear-capable and nuclear-certified. When is 

this capability needed and when will it occur? 

Now, the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter continues to experience 

schedule delays. What is the Air Force’s mitigation plan to sustain 

our current dual-capable aircraft capability in Europe, should the 

F–35 continue to experience schedule delays? 

And also would you please discuss the current status of and future plans for our NATO allies in dual-capable aircraft? Are you 

seeing decisions and investments by our allies in DCA, dual-capable aircraft, sustainment or follow-on systems that would maintain 

their burden share commitments? 

And do you have any concerns in this area? 

General. 

General CHAMBERS. Thank you, Chairman Turner. 

A great question. As you know, the U.S.’ commitment to the 

NATO alliance for dual-capable aircraft is currently fulfilled by a 

combination of F–16s [General Dynamics Fighting Falcon fighter 

jet] and F–15Es. The plan to eventually replace those airplanes 

with the F–35 is still in place. 

The F–35 program, of course, is under scrutiny and under a review, a technical baseline review which, when completed, will give 

us some idea of the potential delays in the program. 

The money to develop the F–35 as a platform that can carry the 

new life extended B61 is in our program. That, to answer your 

question about timeline, the slip of the F–35 in terms of production 

and delivery and IOC, initial operating capability, is unknown at 

this time. But it is likely to move to the right. 

The block of software that makes the F–35 able to carry the new 

B61 is the first block of software after the development phase. And 

that is still part of the project and the program. 

Because of this delay, our command in Europe, the United States 

Air Forces in Europe, who presents these forces to the alliance, has 

a number of planning options underway to cover this capability to 

NATO in the event of a slip. And it involves existing aircraft, such 

as the F–16 and F–15E. 

And we are confident that, through a number of measures, to include the potential life extension of the F–16, to include reverting 

the primary high readiness mission back to F–15Es, all those options are being pursued in order to cover a potential gap that an 

F–35 slip might create. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. 

Turning then, from our bombers, to our sea-based leg of the nuclear triad; Admiral, today the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad 
42 

comprises just over half of the total deployed stockpile. Under New 

START, the sea-based leg of the triad will comprise two-thirds of 

our deployed stockpile. 

As the Strategic Posture Commission observed, ‘‘Each leg of the 

triad has its own value.’’ However, New START places a significant 

dependence on one of these legs. 

How is the Department thinking through the risks of such a policy decision, and how is it managing such risks? And does this 

greater dependency drive certain programmatic, operational or, I 

am certain as you might advocate, resource considerations, than 

perhaps were required before looking at a triad that is certainly 

not going to be a third, third, third? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. 

So, as I stated in my opening statement, and as you reiterated 

there, under the New START treaty, we do approach greater than 

two-thirds of the deployed forces. As I would also mention, we also 

are the survivable leg of the triad. 

Of course, as we look forward, we are doing life extension efforts 

in a very planned manner, in all of our functional subsystems, in 

launcher, in fire control, in guidance and navigation, missile and 

re-entry. 

We believe that taking a phased approach in a very orderly manner through the Ohio program, which we are required to maintain 

through 2042, and then using that base line as the functional SWS 

[strategic weapons system] for the Ohio replacement program, 

minimizes the risk. 

We are able, now, to optimize limited resources. But I would tell 

you that, in the Department of the Navy, from the Secretary on 

down, we have strong leadership and dedication to the mission and 

to our requirements to supply this to the COCOM [combatant commander]. 

So, I believe that in a trying time of resources, I have a fair voice 

at the table in terms of achieving and updating the requirements 

and resources necessary to carry out my mission, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Weber, the Nuclear Posture Review stated that, ‘‘The secretary of defense has directed a number of initiatives to further improve the resiliency of the NC3, the nuclear command, control, and 

communications system. An interagency study is being initiated to 

determine the investment needed and the organizational structure 

best suited to further strengthen the NC3 capabilities.’’ 

Individual NC3 programs are spread across the services and the 

lead architect in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Networks 

and Information Integration, NII, is being eliminated. 

To the extent you can discuss this in an unclassified hearing, 

please describe the Department’s concerns about our nuclear command and control infrastructure, and when do key program and resource decisions need to be made and when will the Department 

be able to provide the committee with its NC3 investment strategy? 

Secretary WEBER. Okay. Well, the Nuclear Command and Control System, as outlined in the NPR, is a very high priority. The 

commander-in-chief needs a reliable, assured capability to communicate to the nuclear forces. I mean, that is a fundamental part of 

our deterrent. 
43 

And we have a few efforts under way. 

One is the former commander of Strategic Command, Admiral 

Richard Mies, led a federal advisory committee that did a comprehensive review of the NCCS [Nuclear Command and Control 

System] and we are working within the Department and interagency partners on implementation of many of those recommendations. 

The dissolution of the NII office will have no impact on NC3. 

Some of those core elements will be moved to other elements within 

DOD, such as the Chief Information Officer’s domain as well as 

other parts of the AT&L [Acquisition, Technology and Logistics] 

side of the Department of Defense, where I work. 

We are making investments currently. General Kehler, from 

STRATCOM appeared before this subcommittee recently and noted 

that the new construction that starts in the fiscal year 2012 budget 

request at Offutt Air Force base, includes an EMP-hardened command and control facility for Strategic Command. 

So that is part—that is really a central node of the NCCS system. And that is just an example of one of the investments that we 

are making. 

In addition, we are upgrading our cryptographic modernization 

programs and those are included in the President’s fiscal year 2012 

address. 

We will provide additional details to you in a classified question 

for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 167.] 

Mr. TURNER. We have discussed our bombers and our sea-based 

leg triad. Now, General Chambers and Admiral Benedict, would 

you please discuss some of the challenges that you are working 

through on how you would implement the New START force structure reductions? When will the Department make its final decisions 

on its post-New START force composition? And when will Congress 

see the specific implementation schedule and estimated funding requirements? 

General CHAMBERS. Chairman Turner, the final decisions on the 

exact force structure numbers are still being reviewed. 

The military advice on those force structure numbers is now 

being discussed among the services and the Joint Staff and with 

our partners in OSD. 

That decision which, as you know, we have reported to Congress 

in the Section 1251 Report of the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] for our two legs of the triad, that the numbers will be 

up to 420 ICBMs and up to 60 bombers. 

That ‘‘up to’’ must be defined and that decision will be made in 

the coming weeks, perhaps in a few months. 

We are not yet concerned about the timeline to execute the treaty. The steps taken to implement the treaty in general are fairly 

straightforward. But on the Air Force side, perhaps the most challenging part of the timeline, although we have a good plan, is the 

final conversion method for the B–52 [Boeing Stratofortress strategic bomber] force. 

Once that final B–52 number is determined and we lay that 

timeline into our plan, we are confident we will be able to execute. 
44 

We will need to advocate for the funds each year. As you know, 

we will be implementing both the eliminations and the conversions 

toward the latter part of the entry into the force period. And so, 

in the coming years, as we advocate for these needs in the budget, 

we will come with those figures. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, excuse me, sir, I would add that as General Chambers said, we are, again, we are also working with 

NNSA, with STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command], and 

with DOD in terms of the exact planning requirements, not only 

in terms of schedule, but also in terms of numbers, specifically with 

us, with hedge. 

We are working closely to define those. We have submitted our 

budget request as part of the 1251 and in that request, we made 

an assumption that the implementation would be more in the outyears rather than the near-term years. 

Again, as the General said, as we get more definitive definition 

on the exact numbers and timing, we expect our budget request to 

be adjusted adequately. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I was just thinking, 

Mr. Chairman, how useful it has been to have the two panels 

today. As you noted early on, it really is sort of creating that continuum for the subcommittee to understand the soup-to-nuts on the 

nuclear security enterprise and how the nuclear weapons play into 

it, how we deploy and then, obviously, following on to treaty commitments as well and how it supports it. 

So thanks for setting it up this way. 

General Chambers, I will start with you. If I can go back to the 

Chairman’s question about NATO, can you characterize, what has 

the response been from allies to the potential or the slipping of this 

F–35 timeline? Are you seeing decisions and investments that allies otherwise would have made on the burden-sharing commitments slipping as well? Are they in a wait-and-see? 

How is that—what is the impact here? 

General CHAMBERS. Mr. Larsen, thank you. 

Good question. 

As you know, the current burden-sharing nations who contribute 

to this commitment to the alliance aren’t all invested in the F–35 

program. Specifically, Italy and the Netherlands are the two countries that are brought into the program. They have been consulted 

by the F–35 program office all along the way and will be fully 

briefed when the technical baseline review is completed as to how 

the delivery schedule is affected by a potential slip. 

They, in their planning, have envisioned this new platform to fulfill its dual-capable aircraft capability to the alliance. But they, as 

well, obviously, argue for the money needed to do that on an annual basis, with their governments. 

Very difficult to predict how that is going to come out. 

At the alliance level, politically, all current burden-sharing nations continue to be committed to this mission. As you know, at the 

Lisbon summit, the strategic concept was confirmed and it still includes the mission of strategic deterrence based on our nuclear capability, provided by the dual-capable aircraft and all current bur-
45 

den-sharing nations are officially on record as continuing to support that. 

As this plays out, if the platform slips and governments shift 

their position, we will monitor that very closely. 

Mr. LARSEN. Back to you, General Chambers, and this is a shift 

here of subject. Can you provide an update on the Air Force’s nuclear surety inspection process and how things have improved since 

the 2007 and 2008 incidents? 

General CHAMBERS. Yes, sir. Since those incidents, the Air Force 

has committed an increased rigor in its inspection process that actually has been very impressive. 

It has involved the standup of a core inspection team at Air 

Force’s Inspection Agency, which is a branch of our Inspector General and stationed at Kirtland Air Force Base. They form the core 

and the deepest level of expertise of all inspectors and they supplement and add to the capability of our Major Command inspectors. 

The standardization of inspector training has taken place. The 

development has—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Has that taken hold? 

General CHAMBERS. It has taken hold and we have seen it in the 

quality of discrepancies that have been written up by the inspectors, the quality in which we share the information across commands about how units have done, the ability to trend our inspection results out, so that we can improve. 

Perhaps one of the most important initiatives has been the addition of root cause analysis which is a formal problem-solving method of get at the heart of what an inspector has found as a discrepancy and actually get to the root cause. 

It is increasing the performance of our units and we have seen, 

in general, a positive trend in results. We will always look to our 

inspectors to find problems, so that we can get better every day. 

But this increased rigor, the standardized training, standardized 

check list, the use of root cause analysis, has all enhanced the commanders’ ability to do better every time. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. 

Admiral Benedict, we have had this discussion, not you and I, I 

am sorry. But the subcommittee has had a discussion in the past 

with regards to the Ohio-class replacement program. 

New START, though, when it was negotiated, assumed a reduction from 24 missile tubes per hull to, I think, a maximum of 20. 

The current configuration, as I understand it, would move from 

24 to 16. 

Can you discuss, for the subcommittee here, the Navy’s rationale 

for that? For moving from 24 to 16 as opposed to the max of 20? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, as part of the work-up for the Milestone 

A with Dr. Carter in OSD, SSP supported extensive analysis at 

both the OSD level as well as STRATCOM’s analysis. 

Throughout that process, we provided, from the SWS capability, 

our perspective. Ultimately that was rolled up into both 

STRATCOM and OSD and senior Navy leadership and in previous 

testimony, the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], and General Chilton have all expressed their confidence 

that the mission of the future, given their perspectives as they see 

the environment today can be met with 16. 
46 

And so, as the acquisition and the SWS provider, we are prepared to support that decision by leadership, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

And did your analysis that fed into this, did you look at specific 

numbers then? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, we looked at the ability of the system; 

again, SSP does not look at specific targets with—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. Yes, yes, yes. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Our input was the capability of the missile, 

the number of re-entry bodies and the throw weight that we can 

provide against those targets and, based on that analysis, the leadership decision was 16, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. I want to go back to the solid rocket motor industrial base. And I didn’t quite understand the response, and I forget 

if it was Admiral Benedict or General Chambers, about the idea of 

a production line of 12 and what the necessity of that production 

line of 12 meant. 

Is that because we needed those for replacements or we need 

those on the shelf just in case? How are those—how do those play 

out for us? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. 

When we look at minimum sustaining rate, the first thing we do 

is the analysis on what is the minimum number of operations that 

we need to do in order to sustain a viable work force and experience with both the tooling and the processes from a safety standpoint. 

We have looked at a number of ranges and, through an analysis, 

have determined that 12—basically one set per month—is the right 

number in order to keep a safe throughput. 

Now, we don’t build one motor set per month. We do build, essentially, one first stage per month. We build second stages in 

groups and we build third stages four at a time, from a cost efficiency. 

In terms of production from sustainment, we built the D5 very 

quickly at the beginning, before the Cold War ended. And so we 

have an aging issue that we also need to address; propellant, given 

its chemistry, doesn’t last forever. 

So as we have done the analysis, we believe that we can get approximately 30 years of life out of our rocket motors. 

So as we look at our production line for the future, both in support of Ohio through 2042 and then entry into the Ohio replacement submarine class, we will need to sustain production of rocket 

motors to ensure that we don’t have a safety issue with aging propellant in the future. 

Mr. LARSEN. So as I understand it, the industrial base is important, but the requirement has to do with the safety of the motor? 

The certainty of it? The surety of it? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. But in our mind, those are linked. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. You need the industrial base in order to 

achieve this. But to achieve this requirement, you set the requirement first, and then that defined the industrial base? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Okay. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes. 
47 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

Thanks. Is that right? General Chambers, are you part of that 

response before? I don’t want to have you answer something, if you 

don’t need to. 

General CHAMBERS. I wasn’t, sir. But Admiral Benedict did mention, of course, that our requirements have declined because the 

Minuteman III propulsion program has recently been completed. So 

our motors are good right now. We are, through our ICBM demonstration validation program, exploring, through engineering and 

design angles, the potential for modernizing the propulsion for our 

aging issues, which will come later this decade. And we want to 

look at with a mind toward a potential follow-on Minuteman III as 

well. 

Mr. LARSEN. And with any luck, the Chairman and I will still be 

here to deal with that one too. 

General CHAMBERS. We will look forward to that, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Maybe in different positions. We will see. 

That is it. Thanks a lot. Thanks. 

Mr. TURNER. Gentlemen, I want to thank you so much for participating and also for your leadership in the areas that make such 

a big difference for our nuclear deterrent. 

With that, we will be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 5, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 5, 2011 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 5, 2011 

(167) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Secretary WEBER. Department of Defense (DoD) leadership is working to formulate the DoD Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) investment 

strategy in the broader context of the national leadership command capabilities, 

with a report due to the Congress by February 6, 2012. 

The DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) is working several key initiatives to address the findings highlighted within the Nuclear Posture Review and other national-level studies. The DoD CIO is developing a National Leadership Command 

Capability (NLCC) architecture framework to support the development of an integrated command capability in support of the national and nuclear mission. The 

framework includes the development of an enterprise-level model to capture the current nuclear architecture. The model will be one tool to provide the critical analysis 

needed to assess current capability gaps, provide trade-off analyses to make informed business decisions, develop risk mitigation strategies, and provide the foundation for significant and measurable improvements in our nuclear command and 

control capability. 

In addition, the Department has developed draft policies that include a renewed 

emphasis on capturing and consolidating Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) configuration data in addition to new policy that directs management and oversight responsibilities for developing and maintaining the nuclear command, control, and 

communications capability that supports our nuclear deterrent strategy. The DoD 

CIO is developing a five-year roadmap for the national and nuclear mission that will 

lay out key elements of the concept of operations, a focus on information assurance 

requirements, and a comprehensive development and funding strategy. The CIO will 

be working with the Combatant Commands, Services, and Agencies in the Department, and key members within the Interagency to ensure the viability and soundness of the roadmap. The management and oversight of national and nuclear C3 

mission issues are being addressed within the NLCC Executive Management Board 

(EMB) chaired by the DoD CIO. 

DoD CIO and USSTRATCOM are also co-chairing a ‘‘National and Nuclear C3 

Focus Team’’ that is analyzing and prioritizing NC3 funding issues, currently for 

POM13, to state the case for resourcing important National and NC3 programs. 

These and other initiatives will provide the basis for the DoD CIO response to 

the House Armed Services Committee Report (112–78), in support of House Bill 

1540, tasking the Department to ‘‘provide a report on the NC3 architecture, longterm strategy, and an identification of the NC3 elements across the services, including current and needed investments across the Future Years Defense Program’’ by 

February 6, 2012. This process will be worked by a Tiger Team under the NC2 

Issues Working Group, under the auspices of the NLCC EMB. 

The DoD would be pleased to answer any further questions you have on this matter to keep you appropriately informed. [See page 43.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. [The information referred to is classified and is retained 

in the subcommittee files]. [See page 18.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 5, 2011 

(171) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. The November update to the Section 1251 Report identified plans to provide an additional $4.1 billion increase to NNSA’s budget for nuclear modernization. However, $1.5 billion of this $4.1 billion—or, 37-percent—is allocated to 

cost growth in NNSA defined-benefit pension plans. 

Please explain the scope of this issue and why NNSA is in this situation. Is it 

unique to NNSA? What options are being considered by NNSA and what options 

might the Congress consider to give NNSA and its contractors greater flexibility in 

meeting their pension obligations? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Many DOE/NNSA contractors sponsor defined benefit 

plans for their employees. Pursuant to DOE/NNSA contracts, DOE and NNSA reimburse the contractors for pension contributions. In recent years, the market downturn has adversely affected defined benefit pension plans’ asset performance. Poor 

asset performance combined with interest rate decreases have caused pension plans 

to become increasingly underfunded. This underfunding has resulted in increased 

pension contributions for DOE and NNSA contractors as well as many other private 

employers that sponsor defined benefit plans for their employees. 

In accordance with its contractual obligations, DOE/NNSA is committed to continuing to reimburse contractors for these pension costs. As noted in the November 

2010 Update to the Section 1251 Report required by the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010, NNSA estimated that costs associated with contractor pension reimbursements would equal roughly $875 million during FY 2012. The $875 

million figure has since been revised to $840 million and the revised figure was submitted in the February 2011 NNSA Congressional Budget Request. Of the approximately $840 million associated with NNSA contractor pension obligations for FY 

2012, it is anticipated that the NNSA share of providing pension benefits to University of California retirees from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) will approximate $224 million. The remaining amount of the estimated FY 2012 contribution is spread among 22 other 

retirement plans. 

Over the past two years, DOE/NNSA has intensified its efforts to improve oversight of contractors’ pension obligations. In particular, the Department and NNSA 

have: 

• developed a central repository for pension and postretirement plan information 

that increases the ease in collecting updated information from contractors as 

well as provides Department users with the ability to compare information 

among the plans and determine trends among the contractor populations; 

• acquired the capability to model financial and economic impacts across the 

complex’s contactor pension plans; 

• completed two annual comprehensive pension management plan reviews that 

further the robust interchange between the Department and its management 

and operating (M&O) and facilities management contractors; and 

• initiated the second annual survey of the comprehensive contractor employee 

benefits analysis that will again be shared with the contractors and programs 

as well as compared to industry benchmarks. 

With this information, DOE and NNSA are now better able to evaluate the 

breadth of the overall pension funding situation to determine actual pension cost 

projections for the future and develop policy options to mitigate and control pension 

cost growth, volatility, and liability to the Government. 

Mr. TURNER. China’s proliferation record in the past has been rather mixed, to 

say the least. Howard Berman, Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, once said that China’s pattern was to ‘‘proliferate, promise not to, proliferate, promise not to, and proliferate.’’ NNSA and DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) budgets now include proposed funding for a nuclear Center of Excellence in China. What confidence do you have that China has changed its behavior— 

that it is now committed to nonproliferation in its actions as well as its words? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. In the past, the nuclear and arms trade practices of the 

People’s Republic of China (PRC) did not conform to international nonproliferation 
172 

regime standards. Over the years, China has joined multilateral institutions and 

treaties such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, while also engaging in bilateral cooperation, such as conducting activities under the 2004 Statement of Intent signed 

by DOE and the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), and the 1998 Peaceful 

Uses of Nuclear Technology (PUNT) Agreement between DOE and the State Development Planning Commission of the PRC. Improving China’s nuclear security and 

export controls standards has been a long-term, bipartisan security goal of the 

United States along with partner countries in the nonproliferation regime. 

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a nuclear 

weapon state, China is a critical member of the nuclear security community. Formalizing the nonproliferation advances that China has made in the past decade is 

important to international efforts in nonproliferation. Recent high-level interactions, 

such as the state visit to the United States by President Hu Jintao in January 2011, 

and agency-to-agency technical exchanges, have reinforced the view that China is 

engaged in improving nuclear security. NNSA is therefore working with China to 

improve its indigenous capacity by sharing best practices in nuclear security and to 

assist the Chinese in implementing accepted global standards throughout their nuclear complex. 

Through U.S.-China cooperative engagement, including the Center of Excellence 

(COE), NNSA aims to improve global nuclear security by raising China’s awareness 

of material security issues and associated nuclear security and safeguards methods 

and technologies; promoting an export control system that prevents illicit transfers 

of WMD dual-use commodities; minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium 

(HEU) in civilian applications; establishing a platform for promoting further U.S.- 

China technical cooperation; strengthening China’s training capabilities on nuclear 

and radiological material security; and improving security of radioactive sources. Cooperation on the COE reflects the U.S. and Chinese governments’ commitment to 

strengthening their cooperation on nonproliferation, nuclear security and in combating nuclear terrorism. 

Additional cooperation between the U.S. and China includes: 

• NNSA and CAEA conducted a joint technology demonstration (Tech Demo) at 

the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) in October 2005 to promote adoption of modern security practices and technologies at China’s nuclear facilities. 

The Tech Demo initiated cooperation in numerous areas, including material 

protection, control, and accounting; nuclear safeguards; nuclear security culture; 

domestic inspections; and secure transportation. Since the successful completion 

of the Tech Demo, NNSA’s International Material Protection and Cooperation 

Program has cooperated with CAEA to conduct several technical workshops 

supporting the exchange of best practices in various areas of nuclear security. 

• NNSA provided radiation detection equipment to China for the 2008 Beijing 

Olympics, the Shanghai Expo and the Asia Games and is also working to install 

radiation detection equipment at the Port of Yangshan in Shanghai. 

• NNSA is also collaborating with the Chinese to establish a Customs training 

center at the Qinhuangdo Training Center. 

Mr. TURNER. The U.S. has been doing the Nunn-Lugar program for a couple decades now, primarily focused on securing and dismantling nuclear systems in Russia 

and the former Soviet Union. Many of these efforts are nearing completion and 

ramping down. 

Do you have any concerns about potential Russian proliferation threats that are 

not covered under the Nunn-Lugar program that worry you? If Russia has become 

a responsible actor with improved cash flow, shouldn’t they be shouldering more of 

the responsibility for securing and destroying their own nuclear materials? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. While the majority of major security upgrades in Russia, 

including all Russian Federation Ministry of Defense warhead storage sites, were 

completed by the end of 2008, as agreed to in the 2005 Bratislava Nuclear Security 

Initiative, several important areas and buildings have been added to the scope of 

our activities and are reflected in our revised Joint Action Plan, which lays out the 

scope of security work to be undertaken by the United States and Russia by site. 

These areas contain large quantities of weapons usable nuclear materials. The recent extension of the statutory deadline for bilateral cooperation in Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) to January 1, 2018, will permit the MPC&A 

program to continue to work closely with the Russian Federation to ensure the successes of the past 15 years of cooperation are maintained until all cooperative upgrade projects are completed. 

While some security upgrade work is still underway, NNSA and Rosatom have established well-defined criteria to guide the transition of sustainability responsibil-
173 

ities to Russia for completed security upgrades by site, which are formalized in a 

Joint Sustainability Plan. This plan outlines seven key principles that characterize 

a sustainable MPC&A program and guide U.S.-Russian project teams assessments 

of each site’s ability to transition to full Russian support (MPC&A organization; site 

operating procedures; human resource management and site training; operational 

cost analysis; equipment maintenance, repair, and calibration; performance testing 

and operational monitoring; and MPC&A system configuration management). When 

deficiencies are identified, U.S.-Russian project teams agree to specific activities 

that should be undertaken to address those gaps. 

Though the NNSA is continuing efforts to fully transition responsibility for 

MPC&A sustainability support to the Russian Federation, it is in the national security interest of the United States to remain engaged. While there are no specific 

threats of concern outside the Nunn-Lugar Program scope, there are threats within 

the scope that continue to concern the U.S. and influenced the interest in MPC&A 

Program extension, namely the insider threat. While not a new consideration for the 

MPC&A Program, the threat of a knowledgeable, authorized person (insider) stealing even small quantities of nuclear material remains a concern. The MPC&A Program is looking at new and creative ways to further thwart insider theft or diversion of materials through additional layers of security, programmatic and procedural 

changes, and further improvements to nuclear material control and accounting. 

We agree that as Russian national budgets increase, their share of funds devoted 

to nuclear security activities should increase as well. At every opportunity, NNSA 

seeks to cost share with our Russian counterparts, and has a long list of successful 

examples. 

Examples include: 

• At various Russian Rosatom and Civilian sites, cost sharing arrangements are 

in place for the installation and sustainability of MPC&A upgrades. In addition, 

the Ministry of Defense has committed to take over full financial responsibility 

for sustaining permanent warhead sites (11 sites with DOE-funded upgrades, 

18 sites with DOD-funded upgrades). 

• The Second Line of Defense Program has a cost-sharing arrangement with the 

Russian Federal Customs Service (FCS) for installing radiation detection equipment at Russia’s border crossings whereby approximately half of the sites have 

been funded and equipped by the FCS and half funded and equipped by NNSA. 

Transition of all maintenance and sustainability responsibility to the FCS for 

deployed radiation detection systems is planned to be completed by 2013. 

• In support of Russian plutonium disposition efforts, the Fast Reactor and Gas 

Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor (GT–MHR) programs both rely on cost-sharing. For Russian plutonium disposition, the U.S. pledged to provide up to $400 

million to assist Russia in disposing of its excess weapon-grade plutonium. The 

total estimated cost of the Russian contribution for implementing the program 

is approximately $2.5 billion. The U.S. may fund up to 100% of a limited number of non-proliferation activities (BN–600 blanket removal and BN–800 core redesign), but in most cases the U.S. will fund no more than 50% of the total cost 

of any given Russian plutonium disposition activity. For the GT–MHR program, 

joint research and development in Russia is funded on a 50/50 cost sharing 

basis with the U.S. Since 2000, the U.S. has provided $29.1 million and 

Rosatom has provided $32.6 million for GT–MHR work in Russia. The U.S. does 

not release funds until Rosatom commits, in writing, to provide an equivalent 

amount of Russian funds. U.S. funds for the GT–MHR program do not count 

against the $400 million U.S. pledge. 

With respect to securing vulnerable radiological materials in Russia, the Global 

Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is continuing its cooperative efforts to recover radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) in the Russian Federation. GTRI funds 

have supported the recovery, disassembly, and disposal of RTGs, as well as the replacement of these units with alternative power sources (APS). As an example of 

cost-sharing, GTRI no longer pays for the installation of APS units. Instead, Russia 

is responsible for securing the necessary transportation and technical crew to complete the installations. Additionally, Russia has provided discounted or ‘at cost’ rates 

for some RTG transportation during multiple U.S.-funded recovery campaigns. Although the U.S. plays a large role in recovering RTGs, it is an international effort 

involving Norway, France, Canada, and Russia. To date, the U.S. has recovered 273 

RTGs, Norway has recovered 213 RTGs (some using funds from Finland), France 

has recovered 16 RTGs, and Canada has funded the recovery of 64 RTGs through 

the U.S. and Norway. Using these contributions, Russian technical specialists perform the RTG recovery, transport, disassembly, and disposal activities. Additionally, 

Russia pays for the recovery of RTGs using funds from the Federal Target Program 
174 

(FTP). In the past few years, Russia has recovered 32 RTGs. The RTG recoveries 

are coordinated at the international level through the IAEA. 

Mr. TURNER. Administrator D’Agostino, in your testimony you noted that it would 

not be advisable to make reductions in our hedge stockpile until NNSA is able to 

‘‘demonstrate that our infrastructure is responsive and being able to respond to 

needs that the country may have,’’ which included ‘‘having a uranium processing facility that is up and running, having a chemistry and metallurgy research replacement facility that is available to do the surveillance work on our stockpile and help 

support a modest amount of pit manufacturing capability,’’ as well as a capability 

at the Pantex Plant to make the size of high explosives necessary to support the 

stockpile out into the future. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. To elaborate, as described in the Nuclear Posture Review, 

the non-deployed stockpile currently includes more warheads than required to hedge 

against technical or geopolitical surprise, due to the limited capacity of the NNSA 

complex to conduct LEPs for deployed weapons in a timely manner. Progress in restoring NNSA’s production infrastructure will allow these excess warheads to be retired along with other stockpile reductions planned over the next decade. 

The recommended size of the projected future stockpile is updated annually in a 

Nuclear Weapons Council memorandum to the President based on a joint DoD–DOE 

assessment that factors in progress on LEPs, NNSA progress in infrastructure recapitalization, and the geopolitical security environment. Ultimately, the President 

has the final say regarding the size of the stockpile. The President’s final decision 

comes in the form of a Presidential Policy Directive. 

Mr. TURNER. The May 2010 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

(SSMP), Table D–1, specifies a ‘‘baseline capacity provided by a capability-based infrastructure’’ to include the ability to deliver to the stockpile up to 80 plutonium 

pits and 80 Canned Sub-Assemblies (CSAs) per year. The SSMP further states that 

the manufacturing capability for 80 pits and 80 CSAs per year are dependent on 

the construction completion of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

(CMRR) facility and Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). Furthermore, in reply to 

a committee request for information (delivered to the committee on April 12, 2011), 

NNSA noted that reductions in the hedge stockpile would be conditioned on the ‘‘realization’’ of certain ‘‘events,’’ including ‘‘successful’’ Life Extension Programs for 

several warheads, and the ‘‘full operational functionality’’ of CMRR and UPF, 

planned for 2023 and 2024, respectively. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. To elaborate, as described in the Nuclear Posture Review, 

NNSA has a limited capacity for nuclear warhead component production. Current 

facilities cannot support future stockpile life extension requirements, and have no 

‘‘surge’’ capacity in the event of a technical failure or geopolitical surprise. Therefore, USSTRATCOM requires that NNSA maintain a hedge stockpile. As noted in 

the NPR, progress in restoring NNSA’s infrastructure—construction of CMRR and 

UPF, among other facilities—should allow this hedge to be reduced. 

Mr. TURNER. The compilation of this testimony and material from NNSA would 

lead one to conclude that reductions in the hedge stockpile should not be made until 

these conditions are met. Please tell us if this conclusion is correct, and elaborate 

on these and any other specific capabilities that must be demonstrated or fully operational, and identify the associated infrastructure milestones for the realization of 

such capabilities, before such cuts could safely be made while preserving current or 

better levels of safety, security, and reliability to our deterrent. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. As described in the Nuclear Posture Review, NNSA has a 

limited capacity for nuclear warhead component production. Current facilities cannot support future stockpile life extension requirements, and have no ‘‘surge’’ capacity in the event of a technical failure or geopolitical surprise. Therefore, 

USSTRATCOM requires that NNSA maintain a hedge stockpile. As noted in the 

NPR, progress in restoring NNSA’s infrastructure—construction of CMRR and UPF, 

among other facilities—should allow this hedge to be reduced. 

The recommended size of the projected future stockpile is updated annually in a 

Nuclear Weapons Council memorandum to the President based on a joint DoD–DOE 

assessment that factors in progress on LEPs, NNSA progress in infrastructure recapitalization, and the geopolitical security environment. Ultimately, the President 

has the final say regarding the size of the stockpile. The President’s final decision 

comes in the form of a Presidential Policy Directive. 

Mr. TURNER. Administrator D’Agostino, how quickly would we be able to respond 

to unfavorable changes in the geopolitical nuclear security environment? Please 

comment on whether significant reductions to our deployed and non-deployed weapons would constrain or expand our technical flexibility to respond to unfavorable 

changes in the geopolitical environment, and how this technical flexibility would be 

affected as our weapons continue to age. 
175 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The first and second questions are for DoD and 

STRATCOM, not the NNSA to answer. 

Regarding the questions on how this technical flexibility would be affected as our 

weapons age, one of the reasons the reserve stockpile is maintained in such a high 

state of readiness is because NNSA has a limited capacity for nuclear warhead component production. As noted in the NPR, progress in restoring NNSA’s infrastructure—construction of CMRR and UPF, among other facilities—should allow this 

hedge to be reduced as we transfer risk from the reserve stockpile to the infrastructure. However, our ability to retire additional weapons or conduct follow on strategic 

or non-strategic reductions is a policy decision not directly affecting NNSA at this 

time. Previous Administrations have exercised this flexibility in consultation with 

allies, and reduced the number of weapons needed to provide extended deterrence 

and meet security commitments. 

Projected future reductions to the total stockpile are premised on a number of assumptions and events, listed below. As these assumptions and events are realized, 

reductions in the size of the hedge should begin to occur. 

• New START implementation occurs as scheduled (New START entered into 

force on February 5, 2011). 

• Warhead life extensions increase stockpile safety, security, and reliability as 

planned and required. 

• Infrastructure improvements provide the capability to produce components and 

extend the life of existing weapons. The CMRR and UPF are expected to be at 

full operational functionality by 2023 and 2024, respectively. The Pantex High 

Explosive Pressing Facility is expected to be fully operational in 2017. 

• The geopolitical nuclear security environment remains favorable. 

The realization of these events will allow us to mitigate the risk that significant 

reductions to the deployed and non-deployed stockpiles will constrain our technical 

flexibility to respond to unfavorable changes in the geopolitical environment. Moreover, modernization of the Nuclear Security Enterprise and continued success in the 

science based stockpile stewardship and management program will provide a solid 

foundation for our continued ability to increase our technical flexibility to manage 

our aging stockpile at lower numbers. 

In addition to maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent, the NNSA is developing a 

broad array of capabilities underpinning an agile response to future changes in the 

global nuclear security environment. NNSA’s Defense, Nonproliferation, 

Counterterrorism, and Emergency Response Programs are collaborating to provide 

capabilities to analyze foreign nuclear weapons programs and to strengthen nuclear 

forensics capabilities. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 P. L. 111–32 provided $30 million to support a sustainable capability to analyze nuclear and biological weapons intelligence, resulting in more effective management and technical coordination between NNSA and the intelligence community. 

Beyond FY12, NNSA plans to advance a program that would continue to strengthen the science and technology capabilities needed for assessing foreign nuclear 

weapons activities. Building on the infrastructure supporting stewardship of the US 

stockpile, this program will ensure an enduring technical foundation for intelligence 

missions. Capabilities developed under this program will advance the development 

and interpretation of intelligence indicators, the assessment of foreign weapons capabilities, and the mitigations of threats associated with technical advances. The 

NNSA also has an effort underway to strengthen related nuclear counterterrorism 

and counterproliferation efforts that cut across a number of its major programs. 

Mr. TURNER. China’s proliferation record in the past has been rather mixed, to 

say the least. Howard Berman, Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, once said that China’s pattern was to ‘‘proliferate, promise not to, proliferate, promise not to, and proliferate.’’ NNSA and DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) budgets now include proposed funding for a nuclear Center of Excellence in China. What confidence do you have that China has changed its behavior— 

that it is now committed to nonproliferation in its actions as well as its words? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. In the past, the nuclear and arms trade practices of the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) did not conform to international nonproliferation regime 

standards. Over the years, China has joined multilateral institutions and treaties 

such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, while also engaging in bilateral cooperation, such as conducting activities under the 2004 Statement of Intent signed by 

DOE and the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), and the 1998 Peaceful Uses 

of Nuclear Technology (PUNT) Agreement between DOE and the State Development 

Planning Commission of the PRC. Improving China’s nuclear security and export 
176 

controls standards has been a long-term, bipartisan security goal of the United 

States along with partner countries in the nonproliferation regime. 

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a nuclear 

weapon state, China is a critical member of the nuclear security community. Formalizing the nonproliferation advances that China has made in the past decade is 

important to international efforts in nonproliferation. Recent high-level interactions, 

such as the state visit to the United States by President Hu Jintao in January 2011, 

and agency-to-agency technical exchanges, have reinforced the view that China is 

engaged in improving nuclear security. NNSA is therefore working with China to 

improve its indigenous capacity by sharing best practices in nuclear security and to 

assist the Chinese in implementing accepted global standards throughout their nuclear complex. 

Through U.S.-China cooperative engagement, including the Center of Excellence 

(COE), NNSA aims to improve global nuclear security by: raising China’s awareness 

of material security issues and associated nuclear security and safeguards methods 

and technologies; promoting an export control system that prevents illicit transfers 

of WMD dual-use commodities; minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium 

(HEU) in civilian applications; establishing a platform for promoting further U.S.- 

China technical cooperation; strengthening China’s training capabilities on nuclear 

and radiological material security; and improving security of radioactive sources. Cooperation on the COE reflects the U.S. and Chinese governments’ commitment to 

strengthening their cooperation on nonproliferation, nuclear security and in combating nuclear terrorism. 

Additional cooperation between the U.S. and China includes: 

• NNSA and CAEA conducted a joint technology demonstration (Tech Demo) at 

the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) in October 2005 to promote adoption of modern security practices and technologies at China’s nuclear facilities. 

The Tech Demo initiated cooperation in numerous areas, including material 

protection, control, and accounting; nuclear safeguards; nuclear security culture; 

domestic inspections; and secure transportation. Since the successful completion 

of the Tech Demo, NNSA’s International Material Protection and Cooperation 

Program has cooperated with CAEA to conduct several technical workshops 

supporting the exchange of best practices in various areas of nuclear security. 

• NNSA provided radiation detection equipment to China for the 2008 Beijing 

Olympics, the Shanghai Expo and the Asia Games and is also working to install 

radiation detection equipment at the Port of Yangshan in Shanghai. 

• NNSA is also collaborating with the Chinese to establish a Customs training 

center at the Qinhuangdo Training Center. 

Mr. TURNER. The U.S. has been doing the Nunn-Lugar program for a couple decades now, primarily focused on securing and dismantling nuclear systems in Russia 

and the former Soviet Union. Many of these efforts are nearing completion and 

ramping down. 

Do you have any concerns about potential Russian proliferation threats that are 

not covered under the Nunn-Lugar program that worry you? If Russia has become 

a responsible actor with improved cash flow, shouldn’t they be shouldering more of 

the responsibility for securing and destroying their own nuclear materials? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. While the majority of major security upgrades in Russia, including all Russian Federation Ministry of Defense warhead storage sites, were completed by the end of 2008, as agreed to in the 2005 Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative, several important areas and buildings have been added to the scope of our 

activities and are reflected in our revised Joint Action Plan, which lays out the 

scope of security work to be undertaken by the United States and Russia by site. 

These areas contain large quantities of weapons usable nuclear materials. The recent extension of the statutory deadline for bilateral cooperation in Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A), to January 1, 2018, will permit the MPC&A 

program to continue to work closely with the Russian Federation to ensure the successes of the past 15 years of cooperation are maintained until all cooperative upgrade projects are completed. 

While some security upgrade work is still underway, NNSA and Rosatom have 

well defined criteria used to transition sustainability to Russia for completed security upgrades by site, which are formalized in a Joint Sustainability Plan. This plan 

outlines seven key principles that characterize a sustainable MPC&A program and 

guide U.S.-Russian project teams assessments for each site’s ability to transition to 

full Russian support (MPC&A organization; site operating procedures; human resource management and site training; operational cost analysis; equipment maintenance, repair, and calibration; performance testing and operational monitoring; and 

MPC&A system configuration management). When deficiencies are identified, U.S.- 
177 

Russian project teams agree to specific activities that should be undertaken to address those gaps. 

Though the NNSA is continuing efforts to fully transition responsibility for 

MPC&A sustainability support to the Russian Federation, it is in the national security interest of the United States to remain engaged. While there are no specific 

threats of concern outside the Nunn-Lugar Program scope, there are threats within 

the scope that continue to concern the U.S. and influenced the interest in MPC&A 

Program extension, namely the insider threat. While not a new consideration for the 

MPC&A Program, the threat of a knowledgeable, authorized person (insider) stealing even small quantities of nuclear material remains a concern. The MPC&A Program is looking at new and creative ways to further thwart insider theft or diversion of materials through additional layers of security, programmatic and procedural 

changes, and further improvements to nuclear material control and accounting. 

We agree that as Russian national budgets increase, their share of funds devoted 

to nuclear security activities should increase as well. At every opportunity NNSA 

seeks to cost share with our Russian counterparts, and has a long list of successful 

examples. Examples include: 

• At various Russian Rosatom and Civilian sites, cost sharing arrangements are 

in place for the installation and sustainability of MPC&A upgrades. In addition, 

the Ministry of Defense has committed to take over full financial responsibility 

for sustaining permanent warhead sites (11 sites with DOE-funded upgrades, 

18 sites with DOD-funded upgrades). 

• The Second Line of Defense Program has a cost-sharing arrangement with the 

Russian Federal Customs Service for installing radiation detection equipment 

at Russia’s border crossings whereby approximately half of the sites have been 

equipped by the FCS and half by NNSA. Transition of all maintenance and sustainability responsibility to the FCS for deployed radiation detection systems is 

planned to be completed by 2013. 

• In support of Russian plutonium disposition efforts, the Fast Reactor and Gas 

Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor (GT–MHR) programs both rely on cost-sharing. For the fast reactor program, the U.S. pledged to provide up to $400 million 

to assist Russia in disposing of its excess weapon-grade plutonium. The total 

estimated cost of the Russian contribution for implementing the program is in 

excess of $2 billion. The U.S. may fund up to 100% of a limited number of nonproliferation activities (BN–600 blanket removal and BN–800 core redesign), 

but in most cases the U.S. will fund no more than 50% of the total cost of any 

given Russian plutonium disposition activity. For the GT–MHR program, joint 

research and development in Russia is funded on a 50/50 cost sharing basis. 

Since 2000, the U.S. has provided $29.1 million and Rosatom has provided 

$32.6 million for GT–MHR work in Russia. The U.S. does not release funds 

until Rosatom commits, in writing, to provide an equivalent amount of Russian 

funds. U.S. funds for the GT–MHR program do not count against the $400 million U.S. pledge. 

• With respect to securing vulnerable radiological materials in Russia, the Global 

Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is continuing its cooperative efforts to recover radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) in the Russian Federation. 

GTRI funds have supported the recovery, disassembly, and disposal of RTGs, 

as well as the replacement of these units with alternative power sources (APS). 

As an example of cost-sharing, GTRI no longer pays for the installation of APS 

units. Instead, Russia is responsible for securing the necessary transportation 

and technical crew to complete the installations. Additionally, Russia has provided discounted or ‘at cost’ rates for some RTG transportation during multiple 

U.S.-funded recovery campaigns. Although the U.S. plays a large role in recovering RTGs, it is an international effort involving Norway, France, Canada, and 

Russia. To date, the U.S. has recovered 273 RTGs, Norway has recovered 213 

RTGs (some using funds from Finland), France has recovered 16 RTGs, and 

Canada has funded the recovery of 64 RTGs through the U.S. and Norway. 

Using these contributions, Russian technical specialists perform the RTG recovery, transport, disassembly, and disposal activities. Additionally, Russia pays 

for the recovery of RTGs using funds from the Federal Target Program (FTP). 

In the past few years, Russia has recovered 32 RTGs. The RTG recoveries are 

coordinated at the international level through the IAEA. 

Mr. TURNER. China’s proliferation record in the past has been rather mixed, to 

say the least. Howard Berman, Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, once said that China’s pattern was to ‘‘proliferate, promise not to, proliferate, promise not to, and proliferate.’’ NNSA and DOD’s Cooperative Threat Re-
178 

duction (CTR) budgets now include proposed funding for a nuclear Center of Excellence in China. What confidence do you have that China has changed its behavior— 

that it is now committed to nonproliferation in its actions as well as its words? 

Secretary WEBER. We understand the concerns regarding China’s past actions. 

We believe that China shares our interest in improving the security of nuclear 

materials worldwide. The Center of Excellence partnership between the United 

States and China is intended to promote best practices in nuclear security in China 

and throughout the region. 

Those best practices are intended to strengthen security procedures and reduce 

the likelihood of proliferation of nuclear material. 

China is funding all construction and land acquisition for the Center of Excellence, which is significantly in excess of fifty percent (50%) of the expected total cost 

for establishment of the Center. Closely monitoring and managing funds for cooperative programming initiatives is a hallmark of the way we work, and we ensure accountability with all our partners. 

Mr. TURNER. The U.S. has been doing the Nunn-Lugar program for a couple decades now, primarily focused on securing and dismantling nuclear systems in Russia 

and the former Soviet Union. Many of these efforts are nearing completion and 

ramping down. 

a) Do you have any concerns about potential Russian proliferation threats that 

are not covered under the Nunn-Lugar program that worry you? 

b) If Russia has become a responsible actor with improved cash flow, shouldn’t 

they be shouldering more of the responsibility for securing and destroying their own 

nuclear materials? 

Secretary WEBER. (a) The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program continues to be a primary mechanism by which the U.S. Government partners 

with the Russian Federation to address shared proliferation concerns. 

The CTR Program’s site-specific work in Russia is a key component of the U.S. 

interagency strategy to support the focused and intensified international effort to secure or eliminate nuclear materials. 

Working with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), we continue to partner with 

the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) to ensure that the necessary capabilities 

exist to transition responsibility to MOD to maintain and sustain the physical protection system upgrades that have been installed at nuclear weapons storage sites. 

Further, our continued support for transportation security in Russia supports U.S. 

nonproliferation objectives by securely shipping warheads to dismantlement locations or more secure storage sites, pending dismantlement. 

(b) In addition to providing transparency into Russian Federation WMD threat reduction activities, the CTR Program enhances United States security by providing 

a mechanism to engage in confidence and security building measures, enabling us 

to share best practices in dismantling, destroying, securing, and safeguarding nuclear delivery systems. 

We continue to believe that engagement with the Russian Federation through the 

CTR Program supports U.S. non-proliferation and strategic interests. 

Moreover, cooperation with the Russian Federation funded through the CTR Program has endured as a steady, open channel even during periods of instability in 

other aspects of the United States-Russia relationship. 

We closely manage and oversee the manner in which funding for cooperative programming initiatives is handled. Care in this regard is a hallmark of the way we 

work, and we ensure accountability with all our partners. 

The CTR Program considers each Russian request independently; not all requests 

for support are granted. 

Mr. TURNER. Discuss some of the challenges that you are working through on how 

you would implement the New START force structure reductions. When will the Department make its final decisions on its post-New START force composition and 

when will Congress see the specific implementation schedule and estimated funding 

requirements? 

General CHAMBERS. Providing a specific implementation schedule, along with an 

accurate cost estimate, is not feasible until a force structure has been established. 

The Air Force is currently working with the Joint Staff to evaluate potential force 

structure options. The Air Force remains confident we will be able to meet New 

START central limits requirements before the 5 Feb 2018 deadline. 

Mr. TURNER. Discuss some of the challenges that you are working through on how 

you would implement the New START force structure reductions. When will the Department make its final decisions on its post-New START force composition and 

when will Congress see the specific implementation schedule and estimated funding 

requirements? 
179 

Admiral BENEDICT. The Secretary of Defense, based on recommendations from the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, established a baseline force structure which is outlined in the 

updated 1251 Report. While final force structure decisions do not impact Navy force 

structure, the DoD continues to study the final force structure under New START 

and will announce the end state force structure at the appropriate time. 

To implement New START force structure reductions, the Navy will reduce the 

overall number of deployed SLBM warheads. This activity will be accomplished over 

the 7-year reduction window allowed by the Treaty, and to the maximum extent 

possible, will be accomplished as part of normal missile processing operations in 

order to minimize operational fleet impacts, as well as reduce the cost associated 

with Treaty implementation. 

The Navy also plans to convert four SLBM launchers on each of its existing 

SSBNs such that these converted launchers will no longer be capable of launching 

an SLBM, resulting in a force of 14 SSBNS each with 20 SLBM launchers. This 

effort will require design and procurement of a new launcher closure. Additionally, 

the Navy must procure ballasts for each of the converted launcher tubes to ensure 

proper stability and operation of the submarine. 

These activities are a multi-year design and procurement effort. Successful completion of conversions of these launchers and subsequent removal from Treaty accountability requires careful management and synchronization of all planned maintenance efforts with the SSBN force during the conversion period. SSP has identified the funding required to perform New START Treaty implementation activities 

in the 1251 Report and is working within the Navy resourcing process to request 

resources. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What has been the impact of operating below the FY10 appropriations levels for until April 2011 and the delayed and reduced FY11 appropriations 

(reduction in $300 million below the FY11 budget request), on progress to urgently 

secure or remove vulnerable nuclear weapons-materials. One impact has been 

NNSA’s inability to remove all highly-enriched uranium from Belarus as promised 

by 2012. 

Are you concerned about these reductions and how has this impacted our efforts 

to secure nuclear materials? How has this impacted your other non-proliferation 

programs, since a lot of the funding has been reprioritized to cover GTRI efforts? 

How will funding be allocated in FY11? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. During the Continuing Resolution, NNSA allocated its reduced FY 2011 budget authority to the highest priorities. NNSA ensured that programs supporting the President’s commitment to secure the most vulnerable nuclear 

materials around the world in four years were funded to the greatest extent possible. In accordance with the agreements reached by the President at the April 2010 

Nuclear Security Summit and the December 2010 Joint Statement with Belarus, 

NNSA has allocated funding to complete highly enriched uranium (HEU) removals/ 

downblending from Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, Kazakhstan, and South Africa in FY 

2011 and has fully funded efforts needed in FY 2011 to remove all remaining HEU 

from Ukraine, Mexico and Belarus by April 2012 despite the lower than expected 

FY 2011 budget. However, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) postponed 

long-lead procurement and preparation activities for HEU removals from Vietnam 

and Hungary due to NNSA’s prioritization of other nonproliferation activities under 

the lower than requested funding levels, which will delay these shipments from 

2012 to 2013, assuming full and on-time arrival of FY 2012 requested funding. 

Additionally, GTRI efforts related to research reactor conversion and radiological 

material security have been significantly reduced in FY 2011, and may be reduced 

in FY 2012 and FY 2013 in order to accommodate accelerated nuclear material 

lockdown efforts. Reductions include fewer HEU reactors converted to LEU in FY 

2011 and FY 2012 than planned, an approximately two-year delay in creating domestic non-HEU based Mo-99 supply, an approximately two-year delay in development of a new LEU high density fuel to convert high performance research reactors, 

and fewer radiological recoveries and security upgrades both domestically and internationally. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Please give us more details on how the NNSA contributes and improves verification. What are the challenges that remain? What is the constraint on 

making faster progress? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. NNSA develops technologies and methodologies, negotiates 

measures, and implements agreements to verify information and compliance with a 

range of arms control and nonproliferation initiatives. Examples include: 
180 

• Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement: NNSA implements the 

monitoring provisions of the 1993 HEU Purchase Agreement, under which 500 

Metric Tons (MT) of Russian weapons-origin HEU is converted to low enriched 

uranium (LEU) in Russia and then shipped to the United States where it is fabricated into nuclear fuel and produces electricity for U.S. consumers. NNSA 

uses a variety of monitoring approaches to ensure that the HEU provided by 

the Russians is in fact weapons-origin material. These approaches include: 24 

annual on-the-ground special monitoring visits to the four Russian nuclear materials production sites under the Agreement; the right to use U.S. monitoring 

technology and equipment inside the four Russian nuclear material production 

facilities; and the receipt and analysis of Russian nuclear material processing 

and accountability documents. This three-pronged approach provides high confidence that the Russians are meeting their commitments under the Agreement. 

• New START: NNSA provided policy and technical support to the interagency 

deliberation process, and NNSA representatives were responsible for negotiating specific portions of the Treaty. NNSA supported the achievement of U.S. 

arms control objectives while at the same time ensuring the safety, security, 

and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. For the purpose of implementing the Treaty, NNSA is leading efforts to develop and use radiation detection equipment for inspections to confirm that objects declared to be non-nuclear are non-nuclear. In support of follow-on arms limitation treaties, NNSA 

is developing technology for counting deployed and stored weapons, ascribing a 

weapon to a particular class of treaty controlled items, verifying chain-of-custody of a nuclear weapon from production to dismantlement, and enabling 

transparent and verifiable dismantlement of a nuclear weapon and disposition 

of its nuclear material. 

• Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): NNSA supports the U.S. 

interagency and the CTBT Organization’s Provisional Technical Secretariat in 

Vienna, Austria, to improve the effectiveness of all parts of the CTBT and nuclear testing detection verification regime. The NNSA provides technical solutions for the development of U.S. verification/monitoring capabilities that could 

be used to support CTBT verification/monitoring and provide technical support 

for implementation of the CTBT. This is accomplished though the sharing of expertise gained on procedures and technology developed by the United States 

during its long experience of nuclear testing and nuclear explosion monitoring. 

This capability development focuses on reducing detection thresholds through 

research and demonstrations related to source physics, propagation, sensors, 

and analytical methods. 

Verification challenges that persist involve both scientific and programmatic 

issues. 

• On the scientific front, confirming the presence or absence of HEU components 

in a manner that does not reveal sensitive weapons information remains a significant challenge. Unlike plutonium components, HEU does not emit signatures that are readily detectable absent interrogation using a neutron source. 

Interrogation with a source, however, complicates the measurement in terms of 

safety considerations as well as the range of information that may be revealed 

as a result of the interrogation and detected response. Verifying the presence 

of high explosives as an attribute of a warhead poses similar technical challenges. Additional resources to apply to these types of scientific challenges can 

help, but to an extent they will remain constrained by physics. 

• On the programmatic side, issues requiring further investigation include balancing the level of access and information the United States is likely to require 

from another country in a future verification regime against the level of access 

and information the United States may be willing to provide. This involves 

managing access to sensitive sites in a manner that supports verification without compromising sensitive activities at the site or significantly impacting ongoing operations and schedules. One way to address this is to build transparency 

and verification into new facilities, but this is not a simple process and requires 

a good understanding of potential future verification requirements and designs 

that would support such requirements. Further, such measures could create additional resource requirements in the design and construction phases. Resources 

can also be applied after specific requirements are identified, for example, to 

build a dedicated facility to support monitored storage of items or verification 

of specific operations. However, building a dedicated facility after monitoring 

and verification requirements are specified is likely to cost much more than 

building capability into a facility that is already being designed to meet existing 
181 

operational requirements. Further, such an approach simply may take too long 

to be effective. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What can be done to increase the rate of dismantlements? What 

is the limiting factor? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The dismantlement rate has been defined through an 

NNSA commitment to Congress to eliminate by FY 2022 the retired warheads that 

existed at the end of FY 2009. The dismantlement plan outlined in the FY 2012 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) supports this FY 2022 goal, 

and the President’s Budget Request fully funds this dismantlement plan. 

There are several limiting factors associated with increasing the rate of 

dismantlements including safety considerations; facility capacity; competing program commitments such as alterations, life extension programs, limited life component exchanges, and surveillance; weapon complexity; the storage of the warheads 

and associated components from the dismantlement operations; and secure transportation. 

Efforts within Defense Programs for dismantlement activities are interlinked; in 

order to achieve increased dismantlements NNSA would need additional support not 

only for Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition, but also for the Office of Secure 

Transportation, Production Support and Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities 

(RTBF). Dismantlement funding enables this increase shifts, the Office of Secure 

Transportation funds the addition weapons movements, Production Support accommodates the additional production & engineering management, tooling provisioning, 

material procurement, receiving inspection, and product transportation, while RTBF 

provides for additional facility operations cost, equipment maintenance costs, additional container costs, storage capacities, and disposition waste stream levels. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What improvements have been made on surveillance and how does 

the FY12 budget request support this? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Surveillance activities are essential to enabling continued 

certification of the reliability of the stockpile without nuclear testing. Surveillance 

involves withdrawing weapons from deployment and subjecting them to laboratory 

tests, as well as joint flight tests with the DoD to assess their reliability. These activities allow detection of possible manufacturing and design defects as well as material degradation over time. The NNSA continues to implement a surveillance program that builds on those core activities, which allows us to support the current 

state of the stockpile, detect in advance potential problems, and take remedial actions. 

The NNSA has reviewed the stockpile surveillance program and its funding profile. When adjusted for inflation, FY 2005 through FY 2009, funding for surveillance 

activities fell by 27 percent. Beginning in FY 2010, the surveillance budget was increased by 50 percent, from $158 million to $239 million. In the FY 2012 budget 

request, the President seeks to sustain this increase and a more robust surveillance 

program throughout the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP). 

With increased funding many improvements have been made on surveillance. The 

NNSA increased the number of planned laboratory and flight tests from 48 in FY 

2010 to 74 in FY 2011. The total number of planned major surveillance activities 

(including pit, canned subassembly, gas transfer systems, detonator cable assembly 

tests and disassembly and inspection) also increased from 276 in FY 2010 to 432 

in FY 2011. In addition, surveillance activities supported the development of diagnostic capabilities at Y–12 for critical components of the nuclear explosive package. 

These capabilities will aid the current W76–1 production and surveillance of other 

warheads in the stockpile. This increased testing rate and improved diagnostics continue to be supported in the FY 2012 budget request. Furthermore, NNSA has taken 

action to hire a Surveillance Senior Advisor to assure a cohesive program, to enable 

a cost effective program, and to integrate surveillance activities across the nuclear 

weapons enterprise. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What measures are you taking now to ensure that CMRR and UPF 

do not exceed cost and schedule projections? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Construction of large, one-of-a-kind facilities such as 

CMRR and UPF presents significant challenges. Several reviews by the GAO have 

found that initiating construction before designs are complete contributes to increased cost and schedule delays. In response to these review findings, and in order 

to assure the best value for the taxpayer, NNSA has concluded that reaching the 

90 percent engineering design stage before establishing a project baseline for these 

facilities is critical to the successful pursuit of these capabilities. 

Responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars necessitates close examination of requirements of all types and understanding of their associated costs, so that NNSA 

and DoD can make informed decisions about these facilities. To this end, DoD, in 

cooperation with NNSA, is carrying out an independent review of the safety, secu-
182 

rity, environmental and programmatic requirements that drive the cost of these facilities. In parallel with, and in support of this effort, a separate independent review 

for UPF is being conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers. In addition, the Secretary of Energy, with support from independent senior experts, is evaluating program requirements. 

The overriding focus of this work is to ensure that UPF and CMRR are built to 

achieve needed capabilities without incurring cost overruns or scheduling delays. 

We expect that construction project cost baselines for each project will be established in FY 2013, after 90 percent of the design work is completed. The CMRR and 

UPF will be planned in a few critical phases that will enable NNSA to set and track 

performance baselines for these subprojects or ‘‘chunks’’ of clearly defined work 

scope to enhance transparency and project execution. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What measures are you taking now to ensure that CMRR and UPF 

do not exceed cost and schedule projections? 

Dr. WINOKUR. Although the Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for the 

design and construction of defense nuclear facilities required to carry out its mission, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s (Board) enabling statute (42 

U.S.C. 2286 et seq) contains specific provisions regarding the Board’s responsibilities with respect to DOE design and construction projects. These responsibilities 

apply to all defense nuclear design and construction projects, including the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). 

• REVIEW OF FACILITY DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION. The Board shall review the design of a new Department of Energy defense nuclear facility before 

construction of such facility begins and shall recommend to the Secretary, within a reasonable time, such modifications of the design as the Board considers 

necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. During the 

construction of any such facility, the Board shall periodically review and monitor the construction and shall submit to the Secretary, within a reasonable 

time, such recommendations relating to the construction of that facility as the 

Board considers necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and 

safety. An action of the Board, or a failure to act, under this paragraph may 

not delay or prevent the Secretary of Energy from carrying out the construction 

of such a facility. [42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(4)] 

Of note, the Board has spent considerable effort on reviewing (and encouraging 

DOE to review) the design of planned major facilities such as UPF and CMRR for 

safety-related concerns as early as possible in the design process. This approach results in a high degree of safety being engineered into the facilities’ structures, systems, and components, and helps avoid unplanned costs associated with retrofitting 

or redesigning facilities to address safety issues recognized belatedly. 

Directly related to this responsibility, in July 2007 a report was prepared jointly 

by the Board and DOE, as requested in the Conference Report of the John Warner 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. The applicable portion of 

the Conference Report is as follows: 

• The conferees note their concern regarding the untimely resolution by the Department of Energy of technical issues raised by the Board. The conferees believe that the Board and the Department would benefit from a more structured 

process for issue resolution that would allow issues to be raised, evaluated, and 

adjudicated at logical points in the design and construction process. The conferees urge the Board to evaluate whether more frequent use of the Board’s formal recommendation process would drive both parties towards this more structured process. The conferees also encourage the Board to take a constructive 

role in the problem-solving process by quickly evaluating corrective actions proposed by the Department and its contractors. 

• The conferees are encouraged by efforts between the Department and the Board 

to develop a process to provide for more timely identification and resolution of 

technical differences over design standards amid other issues at the Department’s nuclear facilities. Specifically, conferees support the pending revision of 

the Department’s Order 413.3 to require critical safety determinations be made 

prior to Critical Decision 1 in the Department’s project management system. 

The conferees direct the Board and the Department to continue these discussions and to report jointly to the congressional defense committees on their efforts to improve the timeliness of issue resolution, including recommendations, 

if any, for legislation that would strengthen and improve technical oversight of 

the Department’s nuclear design and operational activities. Until such time as 

this report is submitted, the conferees further direct the Board to provide to the 

congressional defense committees quarterly reports to identify and report the 
183 

status of significant unresolved issues. [H.R. Rep. No. 109–702, at 976 (2006) 

(Conf. Rep.)] 

The report, prepared jointly by the Board and DOE, describes actions that provided for more timely identification and resolution of technical issues raised by the 

Board. Broadly, the actions promoted (1) the early identification of safety requirements and strategies at the conceptual and preliminary design phases of a project 

to avoid cost increases and schedule delays, and (2) more effective processes or protocols for the communication to DOE of issues identified by the Board and for the 

tracking and management of these issues. These concerns had arisen primarily as 

a result of significant cost increases and schedule delays due to the untimely resolution of technical safety issues during the design of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at the Hanford Site. The significant actions include the following: 

• DOE Order 413.3, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, was revised to incorporate elements that help ensure the early integration of safety into the design process. The following are examples of significant changes: 

– Safety requirements for each critical decision have been identified. 

– Safety design reports are required at the conceptual and preliminary design 

stages. 

– A Technical Independent Project Review, which focuses on safety documentation, is required as part of the Critical Decision-1 review for high-risk, highhazard, and Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. 

– The Integrated Project Team membership now includes technical safety experts. 

– Safety responsibilities during the design process are now defined for DOE’s 

Central Technical Authorities, Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety, and Chief of 

Nuclear Safety. 

• DOE Manual 413.3–1, Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, 

was revised and converted to a series of guides to clarify the requirements of 

the associated DOE Order and to make clearer reference to safety standards 

and requirements. 

• A new standard, DOE–STD–1189, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, 

was developed to provide a detailed description of the safety-related design information required to meet the requirements of DOE Order 413.3 for integrating safety early into the design. Significant elements of this new standard 

included the following: 

– The development of a Safety Design Strategy that provides a roadmap for 

addressing important safety issues as the project progresses. 

– The development, in the conceptual design stage, of facility-level design basis 

accidents to provide the necessary input for the classification of important 

safety functions and systems. 

– The guidance for the preparation of a Conceptual Safety Design Report, a 

Preliminary Safety Design Report, and the Preliminary Documented Safety 

Analysis. 

• DOE and the Board are jointly evaluating the effectiveness of DOE Order 413.3 

and DOE–STD–1189 by demonstrating their application to two ongoing defense 

nuclear facility design efforts: the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit at the 

Idaho National Laboratory and the UPF at the Y–12 Nuclear Security Complex. 

These demonstration efforts are providing feedback on the effectiveness of actions taken to improve the early integration of safety into design. 

• DOE and the Board have reaffirmed the importance of the Board’s ready access 

to information as described in the Board’s legislation: ‘‘The Secretary of Energy 

shall fully cooperate with the Board and provide the Board with ready access 

to such facilities, personnel, and information as the Board considers necessary 

to carry out its responsibilities....’’ [42 U.S.C. 2286.c(a)] 

• The Board continues to provide Congress with periodic reports on the status of 

significant unresolved issues with DOE design and construction projects. 

• The Board continues to issue ‘‘project letters’’ early in the design process to apprise DOE of the status of safety issues raised by the Board. These project letters are updated by the Board as the project situation requires. 

• DOE and the Board are conducting joint periodic discussions to review the status of significant unresolved safety issues and to allow the Board to evaluate 

actions being taken to resolve these issues. DOE and the Board use these joint 
184 

periodic reviews as a mechanism to maintain senior management awareness of 

the status of these unresolved issues. 

Specific to the CMRR design and construction project (but not UPF), on September 4, 2007, the Board submitted to Congress its certification report on the design of CMRR. This report was mandated by Congress in Section 3112 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 [Public Law 

110–417]. Section 3112 directed the Board to submit a certification to the congressional defense committees that concerns raised by the Board regarding design of 

CMRR safety-class systems (including ventilation systems) and seismic issues had 

been resolved. Section 3112 also required that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) perform a parallel CMRR certification review to certify that 

the Board’s concerns had been resolved. At that time, the CMRR Project was at the 

end of the preliminary design stage. NNSA has continued to develop the CMRR Documented Safety Analysis and the design of safety-related structures, systems, and 

components as the project prepares for and proceeds to final design. 

The Board worked closely with NNSA throughout the CMRR certification review 

process to identify the Board’s concerns and the actions necessary to resolve them. 

As part of this process NNSA revised or agreed to revise the CMRR preliminary design, design requirements, and design processes to address these concerns as more 

fully described in the certification report. NNSA also committed to implement detailed designs during final design consistent with the specific design requirements 

agreed to as part of the certification process. 

The Board’s certification relies upon the future full implementation of these final 

design commitments by NNSA. The Board continues to review the design progression for implementation by NNSA consistent with these commitments. The Board 

will reopen issues if commitments, as described in the certification report, are not 

properly met during final design. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What has been the impact of operating below the FY10 appropriations levels for until April 2011 and the delayed and reduced FY11 appropriations 

(reduction in $300 million below the FY11 budget request), on progress to urgently 

secure or remove vulnerable nuclear weapons-materials. One impact has been 

NNSA’s inability to remove all highly-enriched uranium from Belarus as promised 

by 2012. 

Are you concerned about these reductions and how has this impacted our efforts 

to secure nuclear materials? How has this impacted your other non-proliferation 

programs, since a lot of the funding has been reprioritized to cover GTRI efforts? 

How will funding be allocated in FY11? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. During the Continuing Resolution, NNSA allocated its reduced 

FY 2011 budget authority to the highest priorities. NNSA ensured that programs 

supporting the President’s commitment to secure the most vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years were funded to the greatest extent possible. In 

accordance with the agreements reached by the President at the April 2010 Nuclear 

Security Summit and the December 2010 Joint Statement with Belarus, NNSA has 

allocated funding to complete highly enriched uranium (HEU) removals/ 

downblending from Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, Kazakhstan, and South Africa in 

FY2011 and has fully funded efforts needed in FY 2011 to remove all remaining 

HEU from Ukraine, Mexico and Belarus by April 2012 despite the lower than expected FY 2011 budget. However, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) 

postponed long-lead procurement and preparation activities for HEU removals from 

Vietnam and Hungary due to lack of funding, which will delay these shipments from 

2012 to 2013, assuming full and on-time arrival of FY 2012 requested funding. 

Additionally, GTRI efforts related to research reactor conversion and radiological 

material security have been significantly reduced in FY 2011, and may be reduced 

in FY 2012 and FY 2013 in order to accommodate accelerated nuclear material 

lockdown efforts. Reductions include fewer HEU reactors converted to LEU in FY 

2011 and FY 2012 than planned, an approximately two-year delay in creating domestic non-HEU based Mo-99 supply, an approximately two-year delay in development of a new LEU high density fuel to convert high performance research reactors, 

and fewer radiological recoveries and security upgrades both domestically and internationally. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. DOD in its budget request roll-out documents listed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as one of the top strategic challenges 

to US national security. 

a) How does DOD support nuclear non-proliferation efforts and please detail what 

progress has been made on interagency coordination and what challenges remain? 

b) DOD plans to transfer funds to NNSA to support weapons activities in FY13 

through FY16. Will DOD have a say on where its money is spent? 
185 

Secretary WEBER. (a) DoD actively supports interagency and international efforts 

to enhance U.S. leadership in global non-proliferation activities. The Administration’s efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime through the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Fissile 

Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) are instrumental to raising barriers to WMD proliferation. 

We continue to participate actively with the Department of State and other interagency colleagues to implement the Action Plan adopted by the May 2010 NPT Review Conference. 

In addition, the United States’ ‘‘negative security assurance’’ set forth in DoD’s 

2010 Report of the Nuclear Posture Review is clear: ‘‘The U.S. will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.’’ This assurance underscores the security benefits of adhering 

to, and complying fully with, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With regard to the 

CTBT, DoD will remain fully engaged in development of the Treaty’s verification regime. At the same time, we remain committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and 

effective nuclear deterrent for our security and that of our allies. Finally, DoD continues to support FMCT-related discussions among technical experts in the UN Conference on Disarmament FMCT. These discussions are not a substitute for actual 

negotiations, but hopefully they will foster greater appreciation of key technical 

issues. 

Our nonproliferation activities are not limited to these formal regimes. The 

United States recognizes the importance of multilateral activities and mechanisms 

that help to prevent proliferation, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 

and the Nuclear Security Summit. DoD is working with interagency partners to 

focus our PSI efforts on promoting key interdiction capabilities, identifying resources 

to support these capabilities, and designing strategies to engage nations proactively 

in the capacity-building process. The momentum and specific non-proliferation accomplishments generated by the Nuclear Security Summit were impressive, and 

DoD will support follow-on actions in preparation for the next Nuclear Security 

Summit in Spring 2012. 

DoD also supports nuclear non-proliferation efforts by conducting and enabling 

on-site inspections in implementation of arms control treaties such as New START 

Treaty, and through the development of technology to support these inspections. 

In a related fashion, collaborative training interaction (e.g., the International 

Counter-Proliferation program) with other countries in concert with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies encourages important border security improvements in the 

overall international capacity to identify and interdict WMD materials before they 

become a real threat. 

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program serves as a critical DoD contribution to the overall USG non-proliferation framework. Under the CTR Program, 

DoD contributes, in cooperation with other U.S. Government entities and international partners, to the implementation of the President’s global nuclear lockdown 

initiative to eliminate, remove, and secure vulnerable nuclear materials. 

Interagency coordination on all of these activities has been effectively led by the 

National Security Staff (NSS) through the Interagency Policy Committee structure. 

At the working level, DoD coordinates on a daily basis with the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA), the Department of Homeland Security Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office, the Department of State, and the intelligence community. 

DoD has strengthened its collaboration at the senior level with NNSA by holding 

quarterly, Assistant Secretary-level bridge meetings and by institutionalizing several working groups to develop new joint projects to support nuclear nonproliferation. DoD also cooperates closely with counterparts in NSS, NNSA, and Department 

of State to support preparations for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. 

(b) DoD plans to transfer $2.2B from FY13–16 to support NNSA’s nuclear weapons activities. Funds will be allocated annually to NNSA for program activities endorsed by the DoD-led Nuclear Weapons Council. These funds are in addition to the 

$5.7B DoD transfer to NNSA for nuclear weapons and naval reactor programs and 

demonstrate the commitment of the Administration to fund fully the investments 

needed to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for the long term. 

The NWC will continue its current role of reviewing nuclear weapons requirements for DoD, and will be increasingly active in assisting NNSA in its efforts to 

constrain costs. NNSA budget requests to Congress will be adjusted as necessary— 

up or down—based on the best information available at the time. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) doing to support verification and detection improvements that will support further nuclear 
186 

weapons reductions and the Comprehensive test Ban Treaty? What are the challenges that remain? 

Secretary WEBER. Until the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) enters into force, DTRA’s role is focused on developing CTBT-related detection and 

verification technologies, establishing on-site inspection procedures, and testing and 

preparing for potential inspections in the United States through various tabletop 

and planning exercises. 

DTRA is a member of the DoD Nuclear Test-Ban Implementation Working Group 

and supports the Interagency Verification and Monitoring Task Force (VMTF) and 

Backstopping Group. DTRA serves as the co-chair of the VMTF’s On-Site Inspection 

Subgroup and as a member of the Radionuclide Subgroup. 

DTRA is developing technology to improve our ability to detect evasive and lowyield nuclear testing in support of the CTBT, and to support warhead counting and 

identification for future arms reduction agreements that may include non-strategic 

weapons. DTRA’s technology development program emphasizes the improvement of 

DoD capabilities to conduct on-site inspections for a variety of treaties. 

Remaining technology challenges include improving our ability to detect evasive 

underground nuclear weapon testing and our ability to characterize and identify nuclear warheads without revealing sensitive information. Another key challenge is 

improving our ability to detect on-site or remote signatures associated with the production of special nuclear materials. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. With the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) being 

eliminated due to efficiencies, who will implements the important function of longterm thinking on non-proliferation and arms control in DOD/DTRA? How will this 

function be affected by this organizational change? 

Secretary WEBER. With the closure of the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 

(ASCO), the Strategy and Plans (SP) Enterprise in DTRA, which previously managed ASCO, will continue to manage and sustain the function of long-term thinking 

on non-proliferation and arms control. 

While reducing overhead costs by eliminating the old organizational structure of 

ASCO, DTRA is improving management efficiency to implement most of the functions that ASCO previously performed, and those functions will still be accomplished within DTRA. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Could you outline what force structure shifts you are considering 

to implement New START? Will these changes enable us to meet requirements into 

the future, and be flexible to allow further reductions later? 

General CHAMBERS. Per Section 1251 of the 2011 National Defense Authorization 

Act, to meet the New START central limits, the Administration plans to convert or 

eliminate some ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. Air Force planning efforts are focused on complying with the limits dictated in 

the Section 1251 report of up to 420 ICBMs and up to 60 nuclear capable bombers. 

The procedures established in New START allow for simpler and less expensive conversion and elimination than provided for in the previous START. These new procedures are expected to enable DoD to meet national security requirements and implement future conversions and eliminations more expeditiously and at lower cost. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. According to budget documents, the Air Force has been provided 

with over $10 billion (when adjusted for inflation) since FY 1997 to refurbish the 

Minuteman III ICBM. Can you talk about the upgrades that have already been 

made and upgrades that are planned to extend the life of the Minuteman III to 

2030? 

General CHAMBERS. Since FY97 required system updates and life extension programs were executed to the MM III weapon system based on results from aging surveillance and other assessment programs. In 2002, based on decisions stemming 

from a Nuclear Posture Review, Air Force life requirements for MMIII were extended to require sustainment of a 500 missile force through FY20. To meet this 

requirement various upgrades and Life Extension Programs (LEPs) were conducted 

to cover multiple aspects of the MM III weapon system and involved numerous 

tests, calibration, flight testing and other related support equipment upgrades. Significant upgrades to the MM III included a complete Propulsion Replacement, a 

Guidance upgrade/replacement and an ICBM Cryptography Upgrade (Phase I and 

Phase II). 

In 2007, the National Defense Authorization Act directed the sustainment of a 

450 MMIII missile force at ‘‘operational specification’’ through FY30. To meet this 

new requirement the Air Force plans on continued LEPs to extend MM III life 

through 2030. Some significant aspects of the MM III to be upgraded in future programs include an ICBM Fuze Modernization program, a Solid Rocket Motor Modernization program and a Guidance Life Extension Program. The Air Force will con-
187 

tinue refurbishments where modern components replace obsolete parts and conduct 

upgrades to the MM III as aging, surveillance and other assessment programs identify a need to do so. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Could you outline what force structure shifts you are considering 

to implement New START? Will these changes enable us to meet requirements into 

the future, and be flexible to allow further reductions later? 

Admiral BENEDICT. As outlined in the updated 1251 Report, the Navy will convert 

four SLBM launchers on each of its existing 14 SSBNs, thereby stabilizing the number of SSBNs to be maintained and facilitating Navy planning for the OHIO Class 

submarine replacement. By maintaining all 14 OHIO Class SSBNs, each with 20 

SLBM launchers, the Navy continues to meet current and future requirements 

while simultaneously being flexible to allow for further reductions. The Navy is ensuring plans for the OHIO Replacement submarine are informed by new START as 

OHIO Class SSBNs begin to retire in 2027. 

Consistent with the guidance in the Nuclear Posture Review, the resultant force 

structure will retain the ability to ‘‘upload’’ some nuclear warheads as a technical 

hedge against future problems with U.S. delivery systems or warheads, or as a result of a fundamental deterioration of the security environment. If further reductions are desired, either additional reductions of warheads on the deployed missiles 

or conversion of more launchers on each of the existing 14 SSBNs are possible. 

These decisions will be made external to the Navy, but Navy implementation plans 

provide considerable flexibility to the decision makers and do allow for a wide range 

of options if future force changes are needed. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are your concerns about the solid rocket industrial base and 

what is the plan moving forward as DOD will bear higher costs to sustain a lower 

production rate? 

Admiral BENEDICT. The Navy is concerned that the decline of the Solid Rocket 

Motor industry has placed a heavy burden on Navy resources. The Navy is maintaining a continuous production capability at a minimum sustaining rate of twelve 

rocket motor sets per year through the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). However, SSP has faced significant cost challenges as both NASA and Air 

Force demands have declined. Reduced industrial demand has resulted in overhead costs spread over a smaller customer base. The Navy’s growing percentage of 

the Solid Rocket Motor business base has already resulted in increased unit costs. 

SSP will continue to experience those cost increases if demand shrinks further in 

coming years. 

SSP is working with our industry partners, DoD, NASA, and Congress to sustain 

the Solid Rocket Motor industrial base, mitigate cost increases, and find ways to 

maintain successful partnerships. The OSD (Industrial Policy)-led Inter Agency 

Task Force, with membership from Navy, the Air Force, OSD, working with the 

Missile Defense Agency and NASA, developed a Solid Rocket Industrial Base 

Sustainment Plan. SSP has been an integral part of this process. Continued collaboration is necessary to find an inter-agency solution to maintain this crucial national 

capability. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. According to the Navy, the SSBN(X) program ‘‘is inextricably linked 

to legacy SSBN retirements. The latest start for the lead SSBN(X) is FY 2019 and 

the replacements must start reaching the operational force by FY 2029. There is no 

leeway in this plan to allow a later start or any delay in the procurement plan.’’ 

a) Has there been any impact from the delay in FY11 appropriations on the 

Navy’s plan to develop and procure the first SSBN(X) in FY 2019? 

b) Are you concerned about any impacts in naval reactor development that might 

have resulted from the delayed appropriations? 

Admiral BENEDICT. a) The OHIO Replacement (OR) FY 2011 request was $493 

million. Due to the Continuing Resolution, only $237.8 million has been released to 

date. The Continuing Resolution has resulted in a delay in procuring of fixture manufacturing and long lead time material that supports Common Missile Compartment 

prototyping efforts. 

The OHIO Replacement program was marked $51.6 million ($49.3 million Congressional reduction and $2.3 million for economic assumptions), for a revised FY 

2011 control of $441.4 million. This $51.6 million FY 2011 reduction increases the 

technical risk to meet the established cost targets. It also impacts execution of the 

OR build strategy which requires design maturity to support a FY 2019 construction 

start. Due to the reduction in FY 2011 funding the program will be required to 

delay procurement of fixtures that facilitate Common Missile Compartment (CMC) 

component development, fabrication and integration. The program will also have to 

reduce manning levels which will adversely impact missile tube design completion, 

ship length decision, and ship specifications. The serial nature of some design prod-
188 

ucts will result in a lower design maturity than goal at construction start with attendant increased construction cost and future potential delay in construction start. 

The program will be required to request funding for restoration of this FY 2011 $49.3 million Congressional reduction in future budget requests. 

b) The OHIO Replacement is being designed to have a life-of-ship core, which will 

reduce the SSBN force level by 2 ships. In addition to the delayed appropriations 

this year, in each of the last two years Naval Reactors’ Department of Energy funding (which supports the life-of ship core) has been cut by the Appropriations Committee ($58 million in FY2010 and over $100 million in FY11). Some of this funding 

was for OHIO Replacement and therefore these cuts will impact the timely completion of Naval Reactors’ development. Naval Reactors has stated that the current 

cuts to OHIO Replacement will result in delays of at least six months to the design 

and delivery of the reactor plant, and commensurate delays to the delivery of the 

lead ship. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Last month Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn stated that 

the cost of the SSBN(X) program will be shouldered by diverting funds from other 

naval and Pentagon programs and perhaps by boosting the defense budget, but the 

program should not get its own special funding stream. However, some voices within 

the Navy have talked about treating the new submarine as a national strategic 

asset that is funded outside the Navy’s budget as has been done with other programs, such as our missile defense program. Has a decision been made one way or 

another on this issue? 

Admiral BENEDICT. As the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

& Logistics (USD(AT&L)), Dr. Ashton Carter, testified before the House Appropriations Committee’s Defense Subcommittee (HAC–D) on 13 April 2011, the position 

of the Office of the Secretary of Defense remains that the OHIO Replacement Program will be funded within the Navy’s shipbuilding account. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. LARSEN. Dr. Triay, I understand that DOE conducted an independent review 

of the safety culture at the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant project. What were the 

results of that review and how would you describe the state of the safety culture 

on this project? 

Secretary TRIAY. During August 2010 and September 2010, the Department’s Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) conducted an independent review of the 

nuclear safety culture of the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) project. The report, 

issued in October 2010, concluded that the framework for a strong safety culture 

has been established, and that overall, managers encourage employees to raise questions or concerns. The report also noted that, 

‘‘Most ORP personnel indicated their belief that the nuclear safety culture within 

ORP is strong and improving. Although a limited number of individuals had varying concerns, the majority of ORP personnel who were interviewed expressed positive 

views of the nuclear safety culture and current senior management.’’ 

‘‘Although improvements are needed in some areas, BNI and its subcontractors 

have established the framework for a strong nuclear safety culture at WTP.’’ 

The report included the following six recommendations. 

For the Office of River Protection (ORP): 

1. Based on the outcome of the Federal Project Director’s WTP Management Assessment Report, ORP should institutionalize the processes and formally define the roles 

and responsibilities and clarity interfaces between the WTP Federal organization and 

the other ORP organizations (e.g., Engineering and Nuclear Safety, Environmental 

Safety and Quality, and Tank Farm Project); and 

For the WTP prime contractor, Bechtel National Inc. (BNI): 

2. Perform a systematic assessment of the existing processes for identifying and resolving nuclear safety issues, with particular emphasis on root cause analysis of 

problems involving the initial identification of issues; 

3. Establish a formal change management process that identifies the actions needed to ensure that safety programs are not degraded by changes in project status or 

priorities; 

4. Identity mechanisms to strengthen trust among the workforce and better communicate information to employees; 

5. Include actions and elements in the development and implementation of the 

NSQC Plan to ensure that it results in sustainable and continuous improvement in 

the nuclear safety and quality culture at the WTP; and 
189 

6. Examine all credible concerns to ensure that the nuclear safety culture does not 

degrade over time and to better determine the extent of the concerns. 

In addressing the first recommendation, ORP has updated its Project Execution 

Plan to institutionalize processes, formally define roles and responsibilities, and 

clarify interfaces between the WTP Federal organization and the other ORP organizations. In December 2010, BNI responded to recommendations two through six 

above with an action plan and a forecast date to have all actions complete by September 30, 2011. The ORP Project Team reviewed the proposed responses and notified BNI that the improvements proposed were ‘‘well aligned with the intent of the 

HSS recommendations’’ and that in early FY 2012, ORP will conduct a review to 

verify their effectiveness. 

The Department of Energy has a strong history and culture of safety in working 

with unique nuclear hazards and facilities. EM stands by its safety record and the 

nuclear safety culture of the Department including the Waste Treatment Plant 

project. The safety of our workers and the public is of fundamental importance to 

our projects. 

Mr. LARSEN. Dr. Triay, can you please share the status of technical issues regarding the Waste Treatment Plant project? Are these issues considered to be open or 

closed? What remaining work needs to be done to address these issues? 

Secretary TRIAY. The Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) project continues to make 

significant progress toward resolution of technical issues. Design and engineering of 

the WTP is now approximately 81 percent complete. In 2010, the Department of Energy (DOE) commissioned a review of the WTP to evaluate several aspects of the 

project, including a technical design review to address and provide advice on the following areas: 1) whether technical risks have been adequately addressed in the design, and 2) whether the design is sufficiently mature to allow proceeding with needed procurement and construction activities to meet WTP requirements. That review 

identified no additional specific technical issues beyond those already being addressed by the project. The three technical issues currently open are: 

1) adequacy of pulse jet mixing technology in process vessels; 

2) potential for a flammable gas event in piping in ancillary vessels; and, 

3) selection of a value for a parameter that is used to determine radiological 

impacts to members of the public in an accident scenario (deposition velocity). 

Final closure actions for these three technical issues are nearing completion. Further details are provided below. 

Pulse Jet Mixing (PJM): 

The DOE believes the remaining uncertainty regarding use of PJM technology at 

the WTP is being addressed by the approach presented during the October 7–8, 

2010, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) public hearing on WTP, and 

in our supplement to the public hearing record submitted to the DNFSB in January 

2011. In December 2010, the DNFSB issued a recommendation (DNFSB 2010–2) to 

the Secretary with specific sub-recommendations it believes need to be addressed 

during the conduct of our Large Scale Integrated Testing (LSIT) process. The Implementation Plan for addressing DNFSB 2010–2 is under development and is being 

communicated to DNFSB staff. The first increment of LSIT will test mixing system 

performance limits. The satisfactory completion of this increment will provide the 

assurance needed to complete fabrication and proceed with on-time installation of 

vessels in the Pretreatment Facility. Follow-on increments of the LSIT will focus on 

optimizing operational performance of WTP, and tank waste processing and feed delivery system performance. An Independent Review Team of national experts has 

been retained to review the technical parameters and decisions resulting from the 

LSIT process. 

Hydrogen in Piping and Ancillary Vessels (HPAV): 

In its April 15, 2010, periodic report to Congress, the DNFSB expressed concern 

‘‘that many changes to the design of WTP are being approved by the DOE prior to 

the resolution of numerous outstanding technical issues.’’ In an effort to resolve this 

concern, the DNFSB suggested a comprehensive, independent, expert-based review 

of the safety design strategy for control of hydrogen in pipes and ancillary vessels. 

This led to the formation of the HPAV Independent Review Team (IRT). 

The IRT consisted of experts that evaluated the WTP approach for addressing 

HPAV events in three areas: 1) quantitative risk assessment to evaluate the potential frequency and magnitude of hydrogen events; 2) gas phenomena; and 3) structural. The HPAV IRT concluded that the design approach for HPAV piping and components is acceptable, provided that the project resolves the findings identified by 
190 

the team. The project is currently in the process of completing its efforts to address 

and close the HPAV IRT findings. 

The Office of Environmental Management (EM) has high confidence that the 

HPAV design approach yields a superior design for WTP that not only complies with 

DOE safety policies but assures the operational reliability necessary for efficient 

achievement of the critical waste treatment mission to safely treat Hanford’s radioactive liquid waste. 

Deposition Velocity: 

In May 2010 and again in July 2010, the DNFSB communicated its concerns to 

the Department regarding the WTP’s selection of a value that is used in determining the radiological dose consequences to a member of the public in the event 

of an accident. In response to these concerns, the Department’s Chief of Nuclear 

Safety prepared a technical analysis using recognized subject matter experts, recommending an appropriate value for this parameter, but suggesting that the WTP 

project could adopt a more conservative value as it deemed appropriate. Subsequently, DOE forwarded this recommendation to the WTP contractor requesting 

that it evaluate the analyses and make a recommendation back to DOE on selection 

of an appropriate value. The contractor is expected to complete its evaluation and 

make a recommendation for use of the value by the end of May 2011. The Department expects this value will be consistent with the DNFSB’s recommended values. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

Mr. HEINRICH. Mr. Administrator, I am concerned that the FY12 President’s 

Budget Request does not include funding for the recapitalization of Sandia’s MESA 

fabrication facility. Without funding, the fabrication facility may be at risk of becoming obsolete by industry standards and unable to fully support next generation 

microelectronics for stockpile systems. 

Can you please speak to the importance of funding equipment and infrastructure 

recapitalization at MESA’s fabrication facility in the current and upcoming budget 

cycles? 

Can you also explain what plans the Administration has in place to do so? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The MESA fabrication facilities are comprised of a Microelectronics Development Laboratory (Silicon fabrication facility) built in 1986 and a 

recently completed Micro-fabrication facility which came on line in 2005. The MESA 

recapitalization addresses facility upgrades, equipment retooling, and the Silicon 

Fabrication Retooling (SSiFR), in the 1986 Silicon fabrication facility. 

The NNSA will upgrade the Silicon fabrication facility by replacing high risk 

items such as the acid exhaust system and the chase ceiling tiles, both of which are 

original to this 25-year old facility. Additionally, the SSiFR effort is also necessary, 

and will enable production of the Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) 

that are needed to support the life extension needs of the B61, W78 and W88. 

The current Life Extension Program (LEP) schedule shows all three LEPs running in parallel. In addition, the W78 and W88 LEPs will require prototyping of the 

strategically hardened ASICs and other components in parallel with B61 War Reserve production. As a result, heavy demands will be placed on the existing facilities 

thus necessitating their upgrade and equipment retooling. 

Recapitalization is planned to be executed in distinct phases over four years, with 

emphasis on replacement of the highest risk tools as part of the SSiFR effort. Facility infrastructure and upgrades will proceed in parallel with SSiFR work. The 

phased execution would be implemented in such a way that the production capability of the facility would not be impacted during the prototype and War Reserve 

production. 

A prioritized plan for the phased execution of SSiFR recapitalization will be completed in FY2011. The SSiFR effort will begin in FY2012, and is expected to cost 

$80M. The facility upgrades (a series of expense and general plant projects expected 

to cost $20M) will begin in 2013. NNSA expects to complete these upgrades by FY 

2016. 

Mr. HEINRICH. I was pleased to see $25M included in the FY12 President’s Budget 

Request for the construction of the AF Nuclear Weapons Center Sustainment Center 

at Kirtland Air Force Base. 

I understand this facility will allow our nation to track, monitor and provide ‘‘positive inventory control’’ for all Air Force Nuclear Weapons Related Material worldwide. 

Can you please talk a little more about the value this facility will bring to our 

nuclear weapons enterprise? 
191 

General CHAMBERS. The Sustainment and Integration Center (STIC) will provide 

a single hub for tracking nuclear weapons and related material. The STIC will be 

manned 24 hours-a-day, 365 days-a-year to monitor and provide real-time information on the condition and location of nuclear weapons and Nuclear Weapons Related 

Materials, maintain communication with key DoD and DOE command centers, and 

to provide state-of-the-art capabilities in support of effective crisis management and 

corrective action responses, if required. 

Æ