BACKGROUND PAPER

U.S. Air and Ground

Conventional Forces for NATO:

Mobility and Logistics Issues

March 1978

Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

Washington, D.C.

U.S. AIR AND GROUND CONVENTIONAL FORCES FOR NATO:

MOBILITY AND LOGISTICS ISSUES

The Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Qovernment Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

FT
II
PREFACE

The defense budget that the Congress will be considering in

fiscal year 1979 places a strong emphasis on improving U.S.

conventional forces for NATO. U.S. decisions concerning air and

ground conventional forces for NATO are, however, tied closely to,

and must be assessed in terms of, the capabilities of our NATO

allies.

This paper outlines the increasing importance of mobility

and logistics in NATO defense. It compares U.S. and allied

capabilities in those areas and presents options regarding U.S.

decisions on logistics and mobility. The paper is part of a

CBO series on the U.S. military role in NATO. Other papers in

this series are U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO:

Overview (January 1978),Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military

Balance"" (December 1977), and two forthcoming, background papers,

Air Defense Issues and Firepower Issues. This series was undertaken at the request of the Senate Budget Committee. In accordance with CBO's mandate to provide objective analysis, the study

offers no recommendations.

This paper was prepared by Peggy L. Weeks and Alice C. Maroni

of the National Security and International Affairs Division of the

Congressional Budget Office, under the supervision of John E.

Koehler and James R. Blaker. The authors are indebted to Nancy J.

Bearg, Sheila K. Fifer, Marshall Hoyler, and G. Philip Hughes.

The authors wish to gratefully acknowledge the contributions of

Daniel F. Buck, and of Marion F. Houstoun, who edited the manuscript. Edward A. Swoboda of CBO's Budget Analysis Division

provided the cost analysis. The manuscript was prepared for

publication by Nancy J. Swope.

Alice M. Rivlin

Director

March 1978

111
n
CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE iii

SUMMARY ix

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1

CHAPTER II. MAJOR LOGISTICS ISSUES FOR NATO:

MOBILITY RESOURCES AND WAR RESERVE STOCKS .. . 7

Mobility 8

War Reserve Stocks 9

Problems Resulting from the Concept of

Logistics as a National Responsibility .. . 10

CHAPTER III. U.S. AND ALLIED PROGRAMS FOR MOBILITY

AND WAR RESERVE STOCKS 13

Mobility 14

War Reserves—U.S. and Allied Responses ... . 20

CHAPTER IV. U.S. OPTIONS FOR MOBILITY

AND WAR RESERVE STOCKS. 23

Congressional Concern with U.S.

Roles in NATO 24

Option I: Building U.S. Forces

In Europe to Augment Allied Defenses ... . 25

Option II: Building U.S. Forces to

Reinforce NATO Directly 28

Option III: Defending the U.S. Sector:

Modernizing Smaller U.S. Forces for NATO . . 32

APPENDIX. CURRENT U.S. AND ALLIED MOBILITY RESOURCES . . 37

'T

TABLES

Page

TABLE 1.

TABLE 2.

TABLE 3.

TABLE 4.

TABLE A-l.

TABLE A-2.

U.S. MOBILITY PROGRAMS BEING PROPOSED

TO THE CONGRESS

OPTION I: ADDITIONS TO AND SAVINGS FROM

THE FISCAL YEARS 1979-1983 DoD FIVE-YEAR

DEFENSE PROGRAM

OPTION II: ADDITIONS TO THE FISCAL YEARS

1979-1983 DoD FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM . .

OPTION III: SAVINGS FROM THE FISCAL YEARS

1979-1983 DoD FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM . .

CURRENT U.S. AIRLIFT INVENTORIES .

CURRENT ALLIED AIRLIFT INVENTORIES

17

27

31

33

39

40

FIGURES

Page

FIGURE 1,

FIGURE 2,

CORPS SECTORS OF MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY

IN NATO'S CENTRAL REGION

THREE-PHASE MOVEMENT OF U.S. FORCES TO

EUROPE IN THE EVENT OF A WARSAW PACT

INVASION 43

Vll

SUMMARY

Mobility and logistics are increasingly important to the

defense of Western Europe. If NATO is to respond effectively to a

Warsaw Pact non-nuclear attack across the West German border, it

must be able to move and re-equip troops with materiel rapidly.

NATO's mobility—its capacity to move men and materiel to and

within Europe—can compensate for the Pact's ability to choose the

time and location of an invasion. Further, if the Pact's ability

to launch a short-warning attack is increasing—as some observers

argue—NATO mobility capabilities become even more important.

NATO's logistics—as reflected in its capacity to sustain intense

combat through the maintenance of sufficient war reserves—is

likewise not only intrinsically important, but also of increasing

concern because the Warsaw Pact's ability to mount and sustain an

intense attack appears to be growing.

The United States has already undertaken a series of major

programs to improve its mobility and logistics resources. And the

Congress will deal with new proposals for more improvements in

fiscal year 1979. This is in marked contrast to the action of

most European members of NATO: most allies not only lag behind

the United States in their airlift resources and war reserve

stocks, but they also appear to be planning few improvements in

those areas over the next five years.

This discrepancy between U.S. and European capabilities in

mobility and logistics could seriously weaken the alliance's

ability to defend Europe. For while the logistics and mobility

resources of NATO forces have always been considered a national

responsibility and have evolved into separate systems, they are

nevertheless interdependent. For example, supplies destined for

U.S. forces, based primarily in southern Germany, must cross

allied sectors, and they are moved almost entirely by European,

not U.S., resources. Hence, in the event of war, the failure of

one or two of NATO's logistics systems to re-equip their forces

and sustain combat might lead to the collapse of NATO's resistance

along the the entire Central Front—that region marked roughly by

the border separating the Federal Republic of Germany from Eastern

Europe.

IX

23-889 O - 78 - 2

TI
THE U.S. RESPONSE

Over the last several years, the United States has embarked

on a series of strategic (transatlantic) and tactical (intratheater) mobility resource improvement programs. It has also

undertaken programs to increase its war reserve stocks. The

Congress has already approved initial funding for the first steps

of a Defense Department effort to nearly double the transatlantic

delivery capability of the U.S. airlift force. This effort

includes programs to expand the cargo capacity of the 234 C-141

aircraft in the Military Airlift Command and enable them to be

refueled in flight; maintain the current capability of the 70 C-5A

aircraft by improving their wing structure; and make wide-bodied

commercial aircraft in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (GRAF) more

capable of transporting military cargo.

Additional funding requests for these programs are continuing

in fiscal year 1979, as are requests to procure an Advanced

Tanker/Cargo Aircraft (ATCA) for the strategic airlift force.

The Advanced Medium STOL Transport (AMST) for the tactical airlift

fleet has been under development, but funds for fiscal year 1979

for this program have been deleted. In addition, funding requests

for the Army include programs to modernize CH-47 helicopters and

to procure Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft Systems (UTTAS)—

renamed Black Hawk in fiscal year 1979—as replacements for the

UH-1 helicopters. The Defense Department has also requested

funding to pre-position additional sets of divisional equipment in

Europe for Army forces that would be moved to Europe in the event

of a crisis. (The Army's acronym for such equipment is POMCUS,

for "pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets.")

The United States has also sought to improve its ability to

sustain high levels of combat by reconstituting the stocks of ammunition and other war reserves that were drawn down by the 1973

Middle East war. And because the Defense Department has revised

its calculations of the level of materiel needed to sustain a conventional war in Europe, additional funding requests to increase

U.S. war reserve stocks, some of which would be pre-positioned in

Europe, have been proposed in the fiscal year 1979 budget.

THE ALLIED RESPONSE

Although, in contrast to the United States, European NATO

allies do not need strategic mobility resources, most are not

even considering any tactical airlift improvements until the late
1980s. And while the United States has increased both its targets

for and its stocks of war reserves, its allies do not appear

to have done either. The Federal Republic of Germany recently

took steps to improve its military's response time to a crisis and is now studying a wide range of ways to improve early

operational readiness. But none of the allies have committed

themselves to the kind of mobility improvements or the expanded

war reserve stock programs on which the United States has embarked.

OPTIONS FOR U.S. MOBILITY AND LOGISTICS

Given what appear to be continuing and perhaps growing

differences between U.S. and allied views on the mobility and

logistics needs of NATO, how might decisions on major U.S. mobility and logistics programs be structured? The answer depends in large part on which of the three U.S. military roles

in NATO the Congress might want to emphasize. In a broad sense,

the United States performs three NATO military roles: defending

the U.S. sectors of control, augmenting the allies' capability

to defend their sectors by improving U.S. capabilities in Europe, and reinforcing NATO's overall defenses with U.S. troops

and materiel located outside Europe. Decisions on mobility

and logistics resources can be viewed in that framework. Relatively high investments in interoperable war reserve stockpiles pre-positioned in Europe, for example, would enable NATO

allies to use U.S. resources rapidly anywhere along the Central

Front; hence, that funding approach would emphasize the second

U.S. military role in NATO. Similarly, relatively high investment in strategic mobility resources and in equipment prepositioned in Europe for U.S. combat forces would be consistent

with a desire to improve the capacity of the United States to

reinforce NATO from outside Europe. Finally, if the Congress

believes that the United States should delay major improvements of its mobility and logistics resources until the allies

commit themselves to comparable improvements, it might wish

to restrict mobility and logistics improvements to those programs that emphasize the defense of the U.S. sector in Europe.

Structuring mobility and logistics decisions for NATO in

such a way suggests the following options regarding the major

mobility and logistics decisions for fiscal year 1979. The

options are not based on cost-effective analysis, but are meant

to illustrate the kinds of programs that would be consistent with

the general objective of each option.

XI

" IT T
Option I: Building U.S. Forces in Europe to Augment Allied

Defenses

o Continue support for C-5A rewinging programs and C-141

modification programs.

o Support the CH-47 helicopter modernization program.

o Procure UTTAS (Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System).

o Support expansion of major war reserve stocks, particularly pre-posit ioned stocks that can be used by the

allies.

o Do not support procurement of ATCA, AMST, or additional

GRAF modifications.

Option II: Building U.S. Forces to Reinforce NATO Directly

o Continue support for C-5A rewinging, C-141 modifications,

and CH-47 modernization.

o Support procurement of ATCA, AMST, and UTTAS.

o Support the establishment of additional POMCUS and additional pre-positioned war reserve stocks.

Option III: Defending the U.S. Sector: Modernizing Smaller

U.S. Forces for NATO

o Delete three Army divisions.

o Continue support for C-5A rewinging programs and C-141

modification programs.

o Support continued modernization of CH-47 helicopters.

o Support procurement of UTTAS, but in numbers appropriate for fewer active forces.

o Do not support, procurement of ATCA, AMST, or additional

GRAF modifications.

o Support procurement of war reserve stocks appropriate to

meet the requirements of fewer active forces.

XII
Option III would be the least expensive budgetary strategy

implied by the three options. Compared to Option III, for example, Option I would cost roughly $10.6 billion more over the

next five years. Option II, inherently the most expensive approach and the most similar to Department of Defense plans for

mobility and logistics for the next five years, would cost about

$10.8 billion more than Option III over the next five years.

The five-year costs of each option—as compared to what

appear to be the implications of the Administration's fiscal year

1979 budget—are portrayed in the following table.

ADDITIONAL COSTS OR SAVINGS OF THREE MOBILITY AND LOGISTICS

APPROACHES COMPARED TO PROJECTED COSTS OF THE FISCAL YEAR 1979

DEFENSE BUDGET: BY FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT YEAR

DOLLARS

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Option I

(Augmentation

Emphasis) 270 380 440 430 750

Option II

(Reinforcing

Emphasis) 330 430 480 550 630

Option III

(Sector

Defense

Emphasis) a/ -610 -1,350 -1,960 -2,325 -2,130

a/ The majority of these savings are associated with the deletion of three Army divisions.

Xlll

TTTT

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The United States builds and maintains conventional air and

ground forces principally for the defense of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO). Major improvements in U.S. conventional forces—such as those the Congress will consider in the

fiscal year 1979 defense budget—are likewise aimed primarily at

defending Western Europe.

Major improvements in U.S. conventional air and ground forces

may not, however, significantly enhance NATO's ability to withstand a Warsaw Pact invasion from Eastern Europe. I/ For example,

the greatest relative weaknesses in NATO defenses at present are

not in its U.S. forces, but in the armies of its Western European allies, which provide three-quarters of the ground and air

forces in Western Europe. Further, NATO is organized so that

each national army is located in and responsible for defending a

designated sector of the West German border (see Figure 1). 2j

Although a Warsaw Pact attack could occur in any sector of NATO's

Central Region, the most favorable geographic conditions for such

an invasion are in the northern part of West Germany, where the

weaker Western European armies are positioned. Major improvements

in U.S. conventional forces might therefore not only strengthen

I/ For a full discussion of the relationship among assumptions

concerning how the, nature of the Warsaw Pact attack shapes

force requirements, see the CBO fiscal year 1978 budget issue

paper series, Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces. This series of papers included an Overview and four studies on individual forces: The Navy (GPOStock No. 052-070-03826-8),

Army Procurement Issues (GPO Stock No. 052-070-03834-9), The

Tactical Air Forces (GPO Stock No. 052-070-03847-1), and The

Theater Nuclear Forces (GPO Stock No. 052-070-03846-2).

(Note: Only the Overview paper is available from CBO; the

other four papers should be ordered from the Government

Printing Office by the GPO stock numbers in parentheses

after each paper.)

_2_/ Canada also maintains forces in West Germany, but it does not

have a designated corps sector.

TT
Figure 1.

Corps Sectors of Military Responsibility in NATO's Central Region

WEST

ERMA

SCHLESWIGSOURCE: Adapted from Richard Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO (Washington, D.C.:

The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 31 and also from U.S. Army materials,

a/ NORTHAG (Northern Army Group) and CENTAG (Central Army Group) are the two subdivisions of NATO

forces in West Germany. The line dividmg the two runs from Belgium through West Germany, just south of Bonn,

and into East Germany.
NATO's already strongest force, but do so in an area where force

improvements might be least effective.

NATO's capacity to mobilize its forces in response to a Pact

invasion across the Central Front and to sustain combat in the

European theater is essential to the success of any allied defense

of Western Europe. The mobility and logistics resources upon

which that capacity depends are expensive. In fiscal year 1979,

about 35 percent of the U.S. Department of Defense budget—roughly

$44 billion--!s being requested for mobility and logistics procurement and services.

In recent years, a growing concern that a Warsaw Pact attack

is likely to occur with little warning has led to pressures to

improve NATO's ability to move men and materiel rapidly to and

within the European theater. Similarly, a heightened perception

that conventional warfare in Europe might be intense and use up

materiel at extremely high rates has aroused concern regarding

NATO's ability to sustain its combat forces.

Some observers, for example, argue that, as a result of such

factors as the Warsaw Pact's improved airpower, armored personnel

carriers, and firepower, the most likely Pact strategy would be a

sudden attack and a short, intense war, designed to bring overwhelming force to bear against the NATO Central Front--particularly northern Germany—before reinforcements from outside NATO

Europe could arrive. 3/

The possibility of a sudden Warsaw Pact attack clearly

increases the mobility and logistics needs of NATO. The shorter

the warning of an invasion, the less time NATO would have to

introduce more forces to the Central Front or to distribute them

in a way that would improve defense capability. Less warning

would also weaken the ability of NATO's forces to sustain combat.

For example, shorter warning would lessen NATO's ability to

transport ammunition and other materiel rapidly expended in war

to positions where it would be readily available. Less warning

would also give NATO less time to eliminate the bottlenecks in

supply lines that simply do not surface during peacetime operations .

3/ See statement of Senator Sam Nunn, "Gearing Up to Deter

Combat in Europe," Congressional Record (September 13, 1976),

p. S15661.

TTI
i 11IJ

Other observers have raised the possibility of higher expenditures of materiel than previously projected. Arguing by analogy

from the very early but heavy losses of ammunition and other

materiel in the 1973 Middle East war, these observers suggest

that a war in Europe is likely to be fought largely with the

materiel on hand. Thus, they see the victor as the side best

equipped and able to move materiel as needed within the European

theater.

Taken together, these concerns point to the most challenging

non-nuclear scenario that NATO might face. Given the Pact's initial advantage in any outbreak of war in Europe of choosing where

and when it would occur, it might launch a sudden and intense

attack against the relatively weakly defended North German Plain,

whose terrain is most suited to the kind of armored tactics that

the Pact is believed to use. If the intensity of the assault is

great enough to exhaust NATO's supplies before they can be replaced, the Pact might break through NATO's defenses. In that

event, the supply lines to West German and U.S. forces in southern

Germany could be severely threatened, reinforcement of NATO

defenses could become extremely difficult, and the possibility

that NATO forces in the south might be isolated could become very

real.

In short, changing perceptions of the threat and of the

nature of modern conventional warfare have, over the last several

years, brought mobility and logistics issues to the forefront of

NATO defense planning and budgeting, kj Scenarios like the one

sketched above are, of course, planning artifacts, not predictions

of war. But because they posit such dire consequences, they are

gaining more attention. And because they question NATO's ability

to sustain high-intensity combat at almost any point along the

Central Front, they indicate an increasing need for the United

States to assess the mobility and logistical resources of all NATO

forces. In the last analysis, the capacity of the United States

to move forces to and within Europe and to sustain combat there

cannot be separated from the capacity of the NATO allies to do the

kj Assessments concerning the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance—that is,

a decision as to which alliance would win a conventional conflict—are a matter of judgment. For a full discussion of the

determinants of NATO/Warsaw Pact balance assessments, see the

companion budget issue paper, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact

Military Balance, Congressional Budget Office (December 1977).
same. U.S. decisions concerning logistics and mobility are

therefore tied closely to, and must be assessed in terms of,

allied mobility and logistical capabilities.

As background for Congressional consideration of the fiscal

year 1979 budget, this study—part of a larger study of NATO

conventional forces _5/—outlines major current U.S. and allied

mobility and logistical resources and proposed improvements in

these resources, sketches the kinds of budgetary decisions regarding them that the Congress is likely to face, and frames those

mobility and logistics decisions in terms of optional ways of

supplementing or complementing what the allies are likely to

do.

Chapter II sets the stage by discussing the major logistical

issues for NATO, namely, mobility resources and war reserve

stocks. Chapter III describes and compares the mobility and

logistics approaches and programs of the United States with those

of the NATO allies. Chapter IV places pending decisions regarding

U.S. mobility and logistical resources in three strategic frameworks, each of which would supplement allied capabilities and

contribute to NATO's defense somewhat differently. The first

option concentrates on augmenting weak areas by positioning more

supplies in Europe. The second emphasizes improving the U.S.

capability to reinforce NATO's weak areas with reinforcements

based in the continental United States. The third option focuses

on defending only U.S. sectors of the Central Front, which would

lead to a reduction in U.S. forces. The study concludes with

estimates of the costs associated with each approach.

5_/ See the CBO budget issue paper for fiscal year 1979, U.S. Air

and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Overview (January

1978)andtheforthcoming companion background papers, Firepower Issues and Air Defense Issues.

iTnnnr

CHAPTER II. MAJOR LOGISTICS ISSUES FOR NATO: MOBILITY RESOURCES

AND WAR RESERVE STOCKS

Logistics, broadly defined, refers to the many elements that

move, support, and sustain combat forces. This paper focuses,

however, upon two specific logistical issues involved in the

role of the United States in the defense of NATO:

o Our ability to transport U.S. troops and equipment to

and within continental Europe in response to a Warsaw

Pact invasion of West Germany.

o Our ability to ensure the availability of U.S. war reserve

stocks to sustain combat in the European theater.

The first issue confronting the United States involves

decisions regarding U.S. "mobility forces"—the number and types

of transportation resources needed to move U.S. combat forces and

materiel to Europe at the outbreak of a war and within the European theater during a war. The requisite level of mobility forces

is determined primarily by such factors as expected warning time

before an attack, the amount of men and materiel that are to be

moved, and the capacity of reception facilities. The size

of equipment in U.S. inventories is another factor influencing

U.S . mobility needs. In recent years, for example, the Army's

choice of larger firepower items has tended to decrease the

effectiveness of current airlift resources; that is, as the

size and weight of ground force equipment have grown, it has

become more difficul t and more time-consuming to move. U.S .

mobility force decisions therefore involve trade-offs between its

air, ground, and sea transportation resources and the level of

equipment pre-positioned in Europe for active-duty troops located

in the United States. (The Army's phrase for this equipment is

POMCUS, an acronym for "pre-positioning of materiel configured to

unit sets.")

Decisions concerning the logistics resources needed to

sustain combat in the event of a NATO war revolve primarily around

the issue of U.S. war reserve stocks. Decisions regarding war

reserve stocks—combat-essential items stockpiled to replace

combat losses—must also be made in terms of how well things can

be moved. Debate here revolves around questions of how large the

'TITBIT ¥"
stocks of materiel should be, what they should contain, and where

they should be positioned. _!/ These, in turn, are a function of

estimates of the intensity and duration of combat and the amount

of destruction.

MOBILITY

The movement of troops and materiel from the United States

to Europe in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion can be thought

of in terms of three phases. The first stage of such a transportation effort — the "preparation phase"--consists of alerting

and equipping troops with materiel at home bases and assigning

them to airfields or seaports. The second phase of the movement—

the "deployment stage"--begins with the movement of men and

materiel to airfields and seaports, where they are loaded onto

aircraft or ships and dispatched. This phase involves the use of

"strategic mobility resources"--that is, transoceanic aircraft or

ships — to transport men and materiel to Europe. Airlift is

obviously faster but also more expensive, so it is reserved for

priority items. Sealift, accounting for the remainder, would

transport greater tonnages of materiel and equipment too bulky

to be moved by air. The third major stage concerns movement

within Europe. Once troops and materiel arrive in Europe, they

can be moved by a variety of "tactical"--that is, intratheater--

transport, including rail, truck, barge, and air.

Figure 2 (at the back of this paper) depicts the major steps

in this transportation process. While the figure implies that the

requisite sealift transportation would be available, not all

sealift resources would be available immediately (see the Appendix

for a more detailed discussion). Further, although Figure 2

portrays the C-5 and C-130 aircraft as only strategic or tactical

lift resources respectively, many aircraft can be used in either

mode.

\J Pre-positioned war reserve stocks are a separate category of

equipment from POMCUS, although many of the same items are

contained in each. POMCUS equips a division (and, in some

cases, includes materiel necessary to support a division).

War reserve stocks, on the other hand, essentially refer to

replacement items—such as ammunition and tanks~-that are

expected to be consumed once fighting begins; such stocks may

or may not be pre-positioned.
There is a direct trade-off between strategic mobility

resources and POMCUS: mobility requirements can be reduced by

pre-positioning equipment and supplies in Europe. For example,

pre-positioning of equipment for U.S.-based Army divisions not

only reduces the need for transoceanic transportation, but also

allows forces to be built up in Europe much more rapidly, since it

is faster to equip units after they have been deployed in Europe

than it is to prepare and transport them with all their equipment.

More pre-positioning would also enable some U.S. strategic airlift

resources to shift to a tactical role in Europe more quickly.

Too much pre-positioning can, however, be costly and dangerous. Materiel placed in Europe cannot, for example, be used

for training by troops stationed elsewhere. POMCUS may therefore

require the purchase of more equipment if troops are to be trained

and efficient in its use. (The amount of additional equipment

needed would, however, be less than a full division set.) Further, storage costs in Europe are high. And finally, while

pre-positioned materiel allows forces to be built up more rapidly

in Europe, it is also susceptible to destruction by the Warsaw

Pact.

WAR RESERVE STOCKS

War reserve stocks are high-consumption, combat-essential

items (equipment, munitions, and supplies) stockpiled to replace

early combat losses. They may or may not be pre-positioned.

The amount of war materiel that should be stockpiled depends on

estimates of the intensity and duration of combat and the length

of time it would take factories to produce materiel in wartime.

Appropriate levels of war reserves for U.S. forces are also a

function of the number of U.S. divisions positioned in Europe

early in the war, when consumption of those items is expected to

be high.

All NATO members maintain war reserve stocks of varying

levels to sustain the forces they would commit to combat, but

how those levels are calculated also varies. The United States

stocks enough war reserves for 90 days of conflict. Some NATO

allies, for example, have 30 days of stocks. 2/ But because

27 Richard Burt, "U.S. Analysis Doubts There Can be Victor in

Major Atomic War," New York Times (January 6, 1978), p. A-4.

Timor"
these requirements are calculated differently, 30 days of allied

stocks may not equal 30 days of U.S. stocks.

PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE CONCEPT OF LOGISTICS AS A NATIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY

NATO has always considered logistics a national responsibility. Although there are many multinational bodies concerned

with European logistics issues, there is no common NATO logistics

posture, only a collection of disparate national support systems.

Indeed, six independent logistics systems have evolved in Europe,

each responsible for supporting a national force within a specific

area of NATO's Central Front. Each support system has its own

maintenance, storage, and distribution facilities and procedures.

Multiple logistics systems for NATO are in large part necessary because U.S. and allied military equipment is generally not

interoperable. _3/ If it were, a single NATO-wide logistics system

might be feasible; surpluses of items in one national inventory

could, for example, be used to meet the needs of other sectors and

other national inventories.

Separate national logistics systems and procedures are more a

liability than an advantage. For one thing, they introduce excessive complexity into NATO planning and hinder evaluation. The

lack of a standard NATO-wide measure of each ally's level of

x<rar reserve stocks, for example, prevents NATO planners from

accurately estimating how long each ally would be able to fight.

Separate national logistics systems would also hinder the wartime

movements of NATO forces along the Central Front, inasmuch as the

use of forces across sector boundaries would require additional

logistics arrangements.

The possibility that some Central Region sectors do not have

enough materiel to sustain combat for very long, when coupled with

the possibility that an ally's combat needs cannot be filled with

resources from the other NATO allies' sectors, raises the spectre

of a Warsaw Pact breakthrough. That, in turn, could jeopardize

the entire NATO defense structure, since a Pact breakthrough in

_3_/ "Interoperability" refers to the ability of one NATO ally to

use another ally's items, such as spare parts and ammunition,

to operate nonstandard NATO weapons systems.

10
one sector of the Central Front might also sever lines of communication and resupply to other sectors.

NATO's logistics are not, however, a story of absolute

independence. Agreements with some European NATO allies allow

the United States to use European ships for wartime deployment.

Reliance by the United States and other NATO allies on hostnation support within Europe is another important exception to

the concept of national responsibility for logistics: transportation within the European theater, excluding airlift, is now

almost entirely the responsibility of host nations. In general,

the United States now relies on indigenous resources (European

civilian transportation and manpower) to the largest extent

possible. Host-nation support, as practiced in the REFORGER

exercise ("return of forces to Germany," an annual NATO peacetime

exercise), for example, includes a "full range of port and rail

services; billeting, food and medical services for U.S. personnel; and convoy, fuel and limited maintenance support" for U.S.

vehicles. 4/

Our allies have more than enough ground transportation

capacity to support the deployment of all NATO forces in the event

of a Warsaw Pact invasion. Nevertheless, some U.S. observers

question the wartime reliability of allied civilian labor and

transportation. Those questions point to our general inability to

measure the degree to which U.S. reliance on host nations for

logistical support would actually work in time of war. Such

uncertainties serve as an incentive for us to maintain as much

independence and control as possible; that, in turn, tends to

support the concept of logistics as a national responsibility, and

hence the multiple logistics systems now characteristic of NATO.

"USAREUR Changing Logistics Scene," Army Logistician (MayJune 1977), pp. 2-3.

11

CHAPTER III. U.S. AND ALLIED PROGRAMS FOR MOBILITY AND

WAR RESERVE STOCKS

The logistics resources needed to support U.S. NATO forces

are significantly different from those of the other NATO forces.

Unlike the other NATO nations, the United States must maintain a

strategic—that is, a transoceanic—mobility force in order to

both initially deploy and resupply its troops with equipment in

the event of a war in Europe. _!/

Despite the virtually unique mobility and logistical problems

generated by its great distance from Europe, the United States

shares with all NATO allies the basic problem of creating and

maintaining transport systems and providing supplies that will

enable NATO forces to respond effectively to a possibly intense,

short-warning Warsaw Pact invasion at an unspecified place along

the Central Front, most likely in one of the more weakly defended

allied sectors, in particular, the North German Plain. Assessing

NATO's mobility and logistics capability thus involves examining

U.S. and allied mobility inventories and levels of war reserve

stocks.

The geographic location of the United States accounts for

the emphasis it has placed on procuring and improving strategic

mobility resources; it also accounts for the lack of allied

emphasis on strategic mobility reflected in their mobility inventory and improvement programs.

Even in tactical mobility, however, the United States has

more versatility than do the other NATO allies. In the event

of war, the United States and the European allies would use the

European highway and rail transportation networks. In addition,

however, to its shared access to ground mobility transport, the

United States has significantly more numerous—and more capable—

tactical aircraft than the allies, which reduces U.S. reliance on

ground transport (see the Appendix). Further, while the United

I/ Canada similarly confronts the logistical problems posed by

distance, but plans to transport to Europe far less materiel

than the United States.

13
.i Jim HI

States has undertaken a major effort to improve its airlift

capacity to transport and resupply troops and materiel within

Europe in the event of a Pact invasion, the other NATO forces have

only maintained a roughly constant capacity, and they plan few

improvements during the next five years. Hence, the already

disparate tactical mobility capabilities of the United States and

the other allied armies appear to be increasing rather than

decreasing.

Similarly, as previously mentioned, the United States has

substantially more war reserve stocks than do the allies. And

while the United States is investing heavily in ammunition, it

does not appear that the allies have planned similar initiatives.

MOBILITY

The U.S. Response

Over the last several years, the United States has embarked

upon a series of both strategic and tactical mobility improvements. The Congress has already approved initial funding for

major strategic airlift programs:

o stretching and aerial refueling C-141 aircraft; 2/

o modifying wide-bodied commercial aircraft of the Civil

Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to make them more capable

of transporting military cargo in wartime;

o rewinging C-5A aircraft; 3/

2j "Stretching" refers to structural aircraft modifications

that expand the volume of their cargo compartments. C-141s

have the power to lift heavier loads than their cargo compartments can hold; "stretching" enables them to carry more

equipment.

_3_/ The C-5A rewing program is necessary to ensure that the

C-5As will be capable of remaining in the inventory for nearly

the original expected service life. The C-5As were purchased

with the expectation that each would have a service life of

30,000 flying hours; without the rewing, service life will

be cut to 8,000 hours.

14
o developing and procuring the Advanced Tanker/Cargo Aircraft (ATCA).

The C-141 stretch program, GRAF modifications, and a proposal

to increase C-5A and C-141 aircraft utilization rates (the number

of hours per day a plane may fly) were submitted as an airlift

enhancement package by the Department of Defense in 1975. The

C-5A rewing and C-141 stretch programs, subsequently funded somewhat in line with Defense Department requests, are now underway.

Programs for utilization rate increases, and especially GRAF modifications, received funding on a much more limited basis than the

Defense Department's original request. Together, these programs

were originally designed to approximately double the transatlantic

delivery capability of the U.S. mobility force (as measured in

tons per day), reducing the approximate air delivery time of an

infantry division from fourteen to seven days. 4/ As they are now

designed, these programs will, however, fall short of that goal

because of reductions in utilization rate objectives and in the

number and kind of GRAF modifications.

In fiscal year 1979, the Defense Department has again asked

the Congress to increase our strategic airlift capability. Additional funding requests to modify wide-bodied commercial aircraft

(GRAF) will require decisions. And while President Carter did not

request funds in fiscal year 1978 for the Advanced Tanker/Cargo

Aircraft (ATCA)—a new airplane designed largely for strategic

mobility use—the fiscal year 1979 defense budget includes funds

for that program. 5/

Funds to improve tactical airlift are also being requested

in fiscal year 1979. The major tactical airlift program is

4/ The Posture of Military Airlift, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Research and Development, House Committee on

Armed Services, 94:1 (November 1975), p. 235. Air delivery

time for armored and mechanized divisions is somewhat more

than 14 days and somewhat less for airmobile and airborne

divisions.

5/ Fiscal year 1979 is an appropriate time to decide whether to

continue the ATCA program, since authorization for the first

two airplanes is requested in fiscal year 1979. The cost

of the ATCA for the next five years is programmed at $940

million.

15
.1JHUJ

replacement of the C-130, the workhorse of the tactical airlift

fleet. Candidates include the Advanced Medium STOL (Short TakeOff and Landing) Transport (AMST), for which there are two prototypes, and a stretched STOL C-130. Although there are no funds

for it in the fiscal year 1979 budget, the AMST program—still in

the research and development phase — is potentially expensive. Its

estimated five-year cost is about $1.1 billion. In addition,

there are programs underway to improve transport helicopter

capability. These include continuing modernization of the Army's

CH-47 and acquiring UTTAS (Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft

Systems) to replace the UH-1. 6/ (The latter would be assigned to

individual Army units.) Funding for these programs for fiscal

year 1978 was $312 million. Requests for funding for fiscal year

1979 are $365 million.

The fiscal year 1979 budget contains requests to cover

some costs associated with POMCUS stocks. A program to replenish stocks used to supply Israel during the 1973 Middle East

war, funded by the Army's projected procurement for equipment,

is underway. By 1983, the Department of Defense plans to preposition enough additional equipment for three more divisions, TJ

which would bring the total number of POMCUS-equipped divisions

to the equivalent of four or five divisions and some support

units. 8/ Potential costs associated with increasing the number

of divisions with pre-positioned equipment include real estate for

storage sites, construction of storage facilities, and possibly

procurement of additional equipment. (A more detailed discussion

of these costs is included in Chapter IV.)

Table 1 summarizes the major mobility improvements being

proposed to the Congress in fiscal year 1979. That table, which

adopts the movement stages discussed earlier, shows that the

Defense Department will seek to expand its mobility capabilities

by spending a little over $0.8 billion in fiscal year 1979.

6/ UTTAS is well into the production phase and could cost some

$2.2 billion over the next five years. The Defense Department's Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979 refers to this system

as Black Hawk.

2_l The Budget of the United States Government: Department of

~ Defense Extract for Fiscal Year 1979, p. 52.

_8/ The Posture of Military Airlift, Hearings, p. 587.

16
TABLE 1. U.S. MOBILITY PROGRAMS BEING PROPOSED TO THE CONGRESS:

FISCAL YEAR 1979 COSTS IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

Movement Phases

Preparation

(Movement to

Seaports/Airfields)

Deployment

(Transatlant ic

Movement)

Reception and

Employment

(Tactical Mobility)

None C-141 Stretch $66

C-5A Rewing $37

Modi fy Widebodied Commercial Aircraft $69

ATCA $157

More POMCUS

(1 Division) $71

AMST

Stretch STOL

C-130 a/ 0

CH-47

Modernization $42

UTTAS $377

Totals $400 $419

a/ The stretched STOL C-130 has been offered by Lockheed as a

competitor with AMST prototypes to replace the C-130. It is

not a program that is receiving Congressional funding at this

time.

The Allied Response

In marked contrast to the United States, the allies have

very few current programs or plans to improve their tactical

airlift forces. 9/ The lack of changes in their tactical airlift

9/ European NATO allies, by definition, do not need strategic

mobility forces for a war in Europe.

17

nirmrr
.11

resources is likely to lead to even more pronounced differences

in U.S. and allied intratheater airlift capabilities (see the

Appendix for a comparison of U.S. and allied tactical airlift

resources). For example, part of the rationale for U.S. mobility

improvements stems from the fact that changes in the Army's major

firepower items (tanks, mechanized artillery, and other heavy

equipment) have changed airlift requirements. That is, as equipment has become larger and heavier, airlift delivery time has

increased, and hence our mobility capability has decreased.

Allied inventories are also shifting toward larger ground equipment. Yet, while the United States has been planning to procure

new tactical airlift systems, like the AMST, to transport most of

these large items within the European theater, the allies have no

comparable projects underway.

One reason the allies may not be choosing to invest in

tactical airlift programs for the modern Army's heavy equipment is

because they are expensive. The AMST, for example, would cost

about $800 million for full-scale development alone.

Whatever their rationale, most of the allies will not even be

considering airlift force improvements until at least the late

1980s. The West German Air Force does not plan to procure

transports and helicopters until the 1990s, as its C-160 Transall

short-range transport aircraft and CH-53G helicopters are expected

to be operable until then. 10/ The French have, however, reopened

the production line for the Transall in order to meet the Air

Force requirement to replace Noratlas. ll/ The oldest of Canada's

C-130 Hercules transports will probably not be replaced until

1985; the Boeing 707s, shortly thereafter. 12/ The Canadian

transport fleet does not now plan to procure additional aircraft. 13/

107 "The West German Air Force Re-equips for the 1980s," Interavia (April 1976), p. 386.

_y_7 "World Air Forces 1977," Flight International (July 2, 1977),

p. 44.

12/ W.N. Russell, "Airlift "85," Canadian Defense Quarterly

(Winter 1975-1976), p. 15.

13/ "Air Transport Flying Well Without Buying New Planes," Financial Post (February 19, 1977).

18
The British also have no plans to upgrade their aircraft

mobility programs significantly. The C-130s, the core of their

airlift resources, are now being reconditioned to extend the

lifetime of the force into the late 1980s. 14/ But this represents a retrenchment from their plans of several years ago.

Indeed, the British have been forced by budget constraints to

retire some of their current force and to postpone procurement of

some transport helicopters. Plans to procure medium-lift helicopters were delayed in 1976, and while the British may seek to

procure CH-47Cs 157 or CH-53Ds 16/ in the future, the prospects

for this are not high.

Thus, intratheater as well as transoceanic airlift improvements for NATO are almost exclusively a U.S. undertaking. The

West Germans have concentrated their mobility improvement efforts

on the first stage of mobility (preparation). For example, they

have made arrangements to ensure that military personnel on

off-duty standby will be instantly available. They are also

studying other ways to achieve early operational readiness,

including adopting more effective recall and induction procedures;

extending standby readiness to logistics troops; maintaining a

more suitable stock of ammunition, fuels, lubricants, food,

clothing, equipment, and medical supplies; and reducing the time

required to furnish combat vehicles with their initial loads of

ammunition. 17/ In brief, like the West Germans, the allies

generally appear uninterested in going beyond this preliminary

stage, despite some recognition of a requirement for tactical

airlift. 18

_14/ "World Air Forces 1977," p. 46.

157 "News in Brief," Interavia (July 1977), p. 660.

16/ "European Views on Military Helicopters," Interavia (April

1977)', p. 311.

17/ Security and Defence: The Policy of the Federal Republic of

Germany, Publication of the Minister of Defense of the

Federal Republic of Germany (June 1977), pp. 45-46.

18/ Primarily because of the commitment of troops to Northern

Ireland, the British Army of the Rhine has only 40,000 men in

West Germany, down about 15,000 from the level of several

years ago. Some of the equipment for the troops in Northern

19

[IBfl
I Mil!ill

Notwithstanding the fact that the United States has not only

more mobility resources, but also more mobility improvement programs than the other NATO nations, in the event of war the active

forces of most NATO allies can still be positioned in the Central

Region before all divisions stationed in the United States arrive

there. This discrepancy in U.S. and allied mobility capabilities

is, however, almost entirely a function of their extreme difference in geographical distance from the Central Front.

Hence, in the last analysis, firm conclusions about the

comparative adequacy of allied and U.S. mobility capacity are

difficult to draw. The allies have less versatility and capability to move forces and supplies rapidly within Europe than the

United States, but the implications of these differences for U.S.

mobility requirements are difficult to determine.

An important factor, then, in estimating U.S. mobility and

logistics requirements is the ability of the NATO allies to

sustain an attack. That capability depends largely on levels

of war reserve stocks. In particular, allied sustainability is

one factor that must be considered in determining the rate at

which the United States should be able to deploy reinforcements to

the European theater. It also raises the issue of possible

U.S. purchases of war reserves for allied use.

WAR RESERVES—U.S. AND ALLIED RESPONSES

U.S. and allied differences in war reserve stocks strongly

suggest major differences in their capacity to sustain an intense

level of combat. Although all NATO members have formally agreed

to develop war reserve stockpiles sufficient to sustain their

forces in combat for specified time periods, each ally calculates

these requirements differently. Over the last few years, the

United States has modified its calculations to the point that the

estimated requirement has been doubled. Thus, although the

Services' new estimates indicate significant shortfalls between

what they now have on hand and what they believe is required,

Ireland is pre-positioned in Europe. These troops and some

of their equipment, however, would have to be recalled if an

attack were to occur and, to augment their forces at the

planned rate, the British would have to have more mobility

forces.

20
the United States has at this time more war reserve stocks in

Europe than at any time in history. The United States is, moreover, continuing to increase the amount of money allocated for war

reserves. Requests for war reserve ammunition alone are expected

to grow from $760 million in fiscal year 1978 to over $1.5 billion

by fiscal year 1981.

The allies, however, do not appear to have significantly

adjusted their war reserve requirements, and the discrepancy

between allied and U.S. estimates of war reserve requirements is

growing, not declining. If U.S. estimates are correct, this

raises serious doubt as to the ability of some of the allies to

defend their corps areas long enough to allow either the arrival

of replacements or wartime production of new equipment, supplies,

and ammunition.

There are indications that the United States is correct in

its upward revision of war reserve requirements. First, nearly

all observers of the most recent example of modern conventional

warfare—the 1973 Middle East war—were impressed by the greater

destructiveness of improved weapons. The analogy between what

happened in 1973 on the sands of the Sinai and what would occur

on the North German Plain should war break out in Europe is, of

course, limited. But there is a consensus that the new weaponry

entering the inventories of the Warsaw Pact necessarily means

that the intensity of conflict in Europe—and hence its destructiveness—would be higher than previously estimated.

Second, there is a growing belief that the Warsaw Pact

is today better able to maintain a high-intensity conflict for a

longer period than it was ten or even five years ago. In addition, NATO weaponry has improved, so it is likely that the rates

at which its ammunition and materiel would be expended would

be higher, quite apart from consideration of any changes in Pact

weaponry. Available evidence thus suggests the validity of

the general U.S. approach of calculating increased war reserve

requirements.

21
ill ! Ill I
CHAPTER IV. U.S. OPTIONS FOR MOBILITY AND WAR RESERVE STOCKS

In the broadest sense, the U.S. military role in NATO is

threefold. In the first place, like most other members of NATO,

the United States is responsible for defending its sectors of

the Central Front, and we currently deploy ground forces and

their associated combat support forces and logistics bases in

Europe to carry out that mission. As shown earlier in Figure 1,

the bulk of U.S. Army forces in Europe is located in southern

Germany, astride major avenues of approach from eastern Germany

toward Stuttgart and Frankfurt. This disposition is, however,

more a legacy of post-World War II occupation agreements among

the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union

than it is a reflection of military considerations. J_/ For,

as the earlier discussion has suggested, the area of greatest

military concern to NATO defenders is increasingly seen as the

North German Plain, about 200 miles north of most U.S. peacetime

deployments. 2j

Secondly, the United States is responsible for augmenting the

defense of other sectors of the Central Front—a military requirement generated by the fact that the Warsaw Pact would probably

have the initial choice of where and when a war would begin and

might be able to bring overwhelming power to bear against a

localized area in the initial stages of a conflict. In the event

of war, therefore, the use of U.S. troops and materiel positioned

in Europe would not necessarily be restricted to the U.S. sectors,

and NATO strategists consider using European-based U.S. resources

to augment the strength of its NATO allies anywhere along the

Central Front.

I/ Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force Structure

~~ in NATO: An Alternative (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 39.

2/ The importance of the North German Plain is recognized by U.S.

~~ and NATO planners, and the United States has deployed a

separate brigade there. Of the roughly 200,000 U.S. ground

troops in Germany, however, over 90 percent remain deployed in

the CENTAG area of southern Germany.

23

MBIT
Finally, the United States is committed to reinforcing NATO

with additional U.S.-based resources. That is, in the event of

war or in preparing for it, the United States plans to transfer

U.S. forces and materiel from bases in the United States or other

points outside Europe to the Central Front. These incoming

military resources could be used to bolster U.S. forces already

stationed in southern Germany, but the location of their employment would depend primarily on where the need was greatest. And

that means the likelihood that they would be sent to the North

German Plain is high.

CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN WITH U.S. ROLES IN NATO

Many of the mobility and logistics decisions before the

Congress in fiscal year 1979 could stress one or more of the three

roles to which the United States is committed in the defense of

NATO. Adoption of one funding approach would not, however,

necessarily diminish our ability to perform other roles. Relatively high investments in pre-positioned, interoperable war

reserve stockpiles in Europe, for example, would tend to emphasize the concept of augmentation—that is, increasing the ability

of NATO allies to use U.S. resources. By this same token,

additional investments in strategic mobility resources or in

POMCUS stocks would improve the capacity of the United States to

reinforce NATO rapidly from outside Europe. And should the

Congress wish to emphasize defense of the U.S. sectors, it might

well adopt mobility and logistics modernization programs appropriate for a reduced force.

What, then, would be some of the major considerations that

might lead the Congress to emphasize one or more of the three

military roles the United States performs in Europe? What kinds

of logistics and mobility programs would be consistent with these

approaches? And how much would they cost? The following sections

structure the major decisions before the Congress on logistics and

mobility in terms of three options, each directed toward emphasis

on one of the three roles the United States performs in fulfilling

its military commitments to NATO. Rationales—the kinds of assumptions and concerns that might lead the Congress to support an

option's mobility and logistics elements—are included. The costs

of each option—expressed in terms of additions to or reductions

from the projected five-year costs of the fiscal year 1979 defense

budget--are also presented. These options are not structured to

include the most cost-effective methods of accomplishing the

role emphasized in each. Rather, they are illustrative of the

24
kinds of programs that should be considered as consistent with the

general direction emphasized by each option. Thus, the costs

associated with each option do not necessarily portray how much it

would cost to achieve the option's goal. They are, however,

accurate estimates of the costs of achieving each option's goal in

the manner described and, as such, can be used for comparisons.

OPTION I: BUILDING U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE TO AUGMENT ALLIED

DEFENSES

If the fundamental problem facing NATO is the possibility

that an intense, short-warning Warsaw Pact attack on one of the

more weakly defended allied sectors of the Central Front might

overwhelm NATO defenses there before major reinforcements could

arrive, one way the United States could improve NATO's defense

capabilities would be through procurement of flexible, mobile, and

interoperable U.S. assets. The mobility requirements of this

option would be tactical mobility forces that could rapidly

transport supplies, particularly ammunition, to the weaker, and

hence more prone to attack, areas of the Central Front. This

option would also call for building war reserve stocks that could

be used very early in a conflict by both U.S. and allied forces in

Europe.

Modernization of U.S. tactical airlift assets, already begun,

will provide the resources necessary to meet the mobility requirements of this option. Hence, adoption of Option I implies that

the Congress need not support additional budgetary requests to

increase U.S. tactical airlift resources—or, in particular, our

strategic airlift resources—in fiscal year 1979. The following

budgetary decisions would be consistent with a NATO defense

approach that stresses building U.S. forces in Europe to augment

allied defenses:

o Continued support of the strategic mobility improvement

programs to rewing C-5As to maintain their current capability, to stretch C-141 aircraft, and to modify C-141s

for aerial refueling. 3/ Current strategic airlift

3_/ The C-5A rewing, C-141 stretch, CH-47 modernization, and

UTTAS procurement are included in some form in all three

options largely because funding for them is ongoing and has

gone beyond the point where cancellation would make sense.

25

mini IT
resources, with those improvements, would enable the

United States to have about eight divisions deployed in

Europe within 21 days after the beginning of mobilization

(five divisions already stationed there, two-thirds of

three divisions with POMCUS, and an additional armored

division arriving by air). 4/

Continued support of CH-47 helicopter modernization

programs and the procurement of UTTAS. Those tactical

airlift improvement programs would extend the expected

service life of the CH-47 helicopters, thereby preserving their current lift capability into the 1980s,

and, by replacing the UH-1 with UTTAS, increase the

overall transport capacity of the Army's helicopter

resources.

No procurement for ATCA or additional GRAF modifications.

Since each of those programs could improve the transatlantic airlift capacity of the United States, their

addition would not be particularly consistent with the

intratheater mobility objectives of Option I.

No procurement for the AMST. Although the AMST is designed to improve tactical mobility, its major aim is

to increase our tactical capacity to transport large

items of equipment--such as tanks--by air. Option I,

however, stresses our capability to move ammunition

rapidly within Europe, which can be done with the current

C-130 fleet that the AMST is to replace. Thus, the AMST

might not be worth the additional cost, given the demands

of Option I.

4/ Sealift begins arriving two or three weeks after mobilization

begins. With certain improvements in the preparation phase

(funds for which have not been appropriated by the Congress),

sealift could, however, transport the equivalent of four

divisions within 30 days. (This estimate takes account of

expected attrition.) Rates of deployment by air are based on

figures contained in The Posture of Military Airlift, Hearings

before the Subcommittee on Research and Development, House

Armed Services Committee, 94:1 (November 1975), p. 241.

Sealift capability in tons is based on U.S. Department of

Defense, Navy Accelerated Sealift Study: Project Sea Express

(July 25, 1974), p. 43.

26
In terms of stockpiling considerations, Option I would call

for purchasing more war reserve stocks than U.S. forces alone

require, and for pre-positioning those stocks in locations in the

Central Front where they could be used rapidly by allied forces.

War reserve stocks purchased for allied use would differ

slightly in composition from those purchased solely for U.S. use.

This option concentrates on providing ammunition, since providing

the allies with ammunition is considered to have a high payoff.

To ensure their availability very early in the war, these ammunition stocks for the allies should be pre-positioned in Europe.

Pre-positioning of such stocks would also reduce demands on U.S.

strategic mobility resources.

War reserve stocks for the allies must, of course, consist of

interoperable items. Examples of interoperable NATO ammunition

include ammunition for 155 mm. howitzers, 8-inch howitzers, and

105 mm. tank ammunition. Hawk missiles, some aircraft ordnance,

and some small arms ammunition could also be included.

Table 2 portrays the effect Option I would have on the fiscal

year 1979 defense budget's projected five-year costs for major

mobility and logistics programs.

TABLE 2. OPTION I: ADDITIONS TO AND SAVINGS FROM THE FISCAL

YEARS 1979-1983 DoD FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM: BY

FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT YEAR DOLLARS

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Strategic Mobility

ATCA

GRAF modifications

One POMCUS division

-160

-70

-70

-260

-130

-80

-260

-130

-20

-250

-140

-30

0

-70

-30

War Reserve

Ammun i t i on

for Allies 570 850 850

Net Changes 270 380 440

27

111UI1
OPTION II: BUILDING U.S. FORCES TO REINFORCE NATO DIRECTLY

If the Congress believes that the most effective NATO response

to an intense, short-warning Pact attack is the rapid introduction

of additional U.S. combat power to the European theater, then it

might want to emphasize building U.S. forces to reinforce NATO

directly. Two ways of doing this would be to reduce the time required to get a sizeable U.S. combat force—about a three-division

corps—in position to counter the most likely avenue of Pact attack, and to increase the overall deployment rate for U.S. reinforcements. This approach would be consistent with procurement of

additional POMCUS for northern Germany, continued improvement of

U.S. strategic airlift resources, and increased war reserves.

More strategic airlift resources would help U.S. efforts to

dispatch U.S. troops and materiel to NATO's Central Front more

rapidly, but the biggest payoff in terms of increased mobility is

likely to come from the procurement of more POMCUS. The prepositioning in Europe of equipment for three additional divisions

would significantly reduce the time required to introduce major

U.S. combat strength, because it takes much less time to transport U.S.-based troops to their equipment sites in Europe than it

does to airlift a unit and all its equipment from the United

States to Europe. The combat troops attached to divisions with

pre-positioned equipment would need approximately only one day per

division to travel to Europe and one day to be issued their

equipment. In contrast to Option I's capacity to deploy about

eight divisions in Europe 21 days after the decision to send them,

the pre-positioning of equipment for three divisions would make it

possible to have about 10 U.S. divisions in Europe within 10

days.

Determination of the optimal number of units with pre-positioned equipment depends, in part, on assumptions one makes about

warning time. The shorter the expected warning time, the lower

the estimates of equipment and troops that airlift can deliver

before a war begins. Therefore, as warning-time estimates

decrease, emphasis on POMCUS will increase. But the optimal size

of POMCUS also depends on command structure considerations.

Judged in these terms, three divisions seem a reasonable level—

large enough to assure both considerable combat power and U.S.

control if used outside the U.S. defense sectors in southern

Germany.

The following budgetary decisions would be consistent with

an emphasis on the U.S. reinforcement role:

28
o Continued support of the Defense Department's strategic

airlift enhancement programs, particularly those designed

to rewing C-5A aircraft, stretch C-141 aircraft and make

them capable of being aerially refueled, and the GRAF

modifications.

o Procure ATCA. The Advanced Tanker/Cargo Aircraft is

designed in part to meet the increase in the numbers of

aircraft that can be aerially refueled. Since Option II

places a premium on rapid transatlantic movement, the

marginal increase in airlift delivery speed provided by

ACTA would be consistent with the thrust of this option.

Aerial refueling increases airlift capacity by approximately 25 percent. That same increase, however, could be

obtained by using existing KC-135 tankers, assuming a

sufficient number could be freed from their responsibilities in the Strategic Air Command (SAC).

o Establish additional POMCUS sites for three divisions in

Europe and procure any equipment necessary to fill them.

o Procure additional war reserve stocks and pre-position

them in Europe. Additional pre-positioned war reserves

would support the objectives of this option because more

U.S. forces would arrive in the early stages of combat,

when consumption rates of such stocks are expected to be

highest. In addition, war reserves for the allies would

increase the probability that they could successfully

sustain combat.

o Procure the Advanced Medium STOL Transport (AMST). The

AMST would provide more capability to airlift large Army

equipment. If, in addition tc building reinforcement

capability with troops based in the United States, the

United States wants a capability to reinforce weak areas

within Europe with full Army units, purchase of the AMST

would be justified. _5/

In sum, Option II would enable the United States to have the

following forces in place 21 days after mobilization:

_5_/ The AMST has been a controversial program, and funds for it

have been deleted from the fiscal year 1979 defense budget.

Although the value of the capability it would add to the

29

Miu»ir
• •Ill 111

o The equivalent of five divisions already stationed in

Germany.

o Five divisions with pre-positioned equipment (and some

support units).

o One and one-half armored divisions arriving by air (depending on the number and type of GRAF modifications).

Except for procurement of the AMST, this option is very

similar to Defense Department plans for mobility and logistics for

the next five years. It would, however, be more expensive than

the current five-year defense program, primarily because the cost

of pre-positioning equipment for three more U.S. Army divisions in

Europe is likely to exceed current Army estimates for several

reasons. First, the cost of real estate for the storage sites in

Germany or the Benelux is very high. Second, storing equipment so

that it would be ready very quickly in the event of war could

require building ready-for-issue centers. Those centers would be

much larger than equipment sites, because they would contain more

complete facilities for issuing, assembling, and maintaining

equipment. The real estate and the construction and maintenance

costs for such centers would thus be higher than those of simple

storage facilities.

Current estimates of additional pre-positioning costs might

also be too low because purchases of additional equipment to complete the unit sets of equipment for each division might be necessary. In theory, it is possible to pre-position another division

set of equipment in Europe without purchasing additional equipment. Equipment drawn from war reserve stocks can be pre-positioned in Europe, at which point it can become the POMCUS set for

that division. If mobilization occurred, the division would deploy to its POMCUS site, leaving its own division equipment in the

United States. The remaining equipment would then be allocated

partly to war reserves, which would be sent to Europe to resupply

U.S. forces in Europe, and partly to the military reserves, who do

current force is debatable, consideration of the AMST program

seems consistent with a general concern with rapid strategic

and tactical reinforcement capability. It is included in this

option because the thrust of this option is to build combat

forces in Europe more rapidly. Thus, demands for tactical

mobility might be higher in the earlier stages of the reinforcement .

30
not have as much equipment as active forces. In fact, there is

considerable uncertainty about whether this could be achieved,

especially for more than one additional division, since there seem

to be some shortages in the Army's inventory of equipment. More

specifically, the Army is currently below its stated objectives

for war reserves. If these shortages proved sufficient to prevent

a full POMCUS set from being created, the cost of POMCUS would

then depend on the amount and type of equipment necessary to fill

the shortages. Additional procurement costs could be $0.7 to $3

billion over five years.

Pre-positioning equipment in Europe also reduces the amount

of equipment available for training purposes in the United States.

One group likely to be affected by the equipment reallocation

is the military reserves. This is inconsistent with the current policy of improving their capability, and especially their

readiness. 6/

Option II would add about $2.4 billion to the cost of the

Defense Department's program for fiscal years 1979-1983 (in

current year dollars). Table 3 summarizes these additions.

TABLE 3. OPTION II: ADDITIONS TO THE FISCAL YEARS 1979-1983 DoD

FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM: BY FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS

OF CURRENT YEAR DOLLARS

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Strategic Mobility

Two POMCUS Divisions — — 140 250 130

Tactical Mobility

AMST

War Reserves

Totals

30

300

330

130

300

430

140

200

480

200

100

550

400

100

630

See Congressional Budget Office, Improving the Readiness of

the Army Reserve and National Guard: A Framework for Debate,

BudgetIssue Paper (February 1978).

31

•MHiiiir
OPTION III: DEFENDING THE U.S. SECTOR: MODERNIZING SMALLER

U.S. FORCES FOR NATO

Some considerations argue for an approach that stresses the

defense of U.S. sectors of the Central Front, perhaps at the

expense of the United States' ability to perform other defense

roles. For instance, if the United States wished to demonstrate

to the allies an unwillingness to continue bearing a large portion

of the financial burden of NATO's defense without greater allied

contributions, it might limit its NATO defense improvements to

those which would help most in performing its own sector defense

role.

This approach could also be a logical extension of some of

the rationale underlying Options T and II. For example, if one

believes that the early arrival of U.S. reinforcement divisions is

crucial to reducing the risk of a successful Pact attack but one

is unwilling to bear the cost of increasing U.S. reinforcement capability, it could be argued that the United States has more

forces than could be used effectively in the event of a NATO war.

In such a case, a reduced force would be appropriate for supporting the role of defending the U.S. sector.

Option III would remove three divisions from the current

structure of the Army, thereby reducing its total active and

reserve force to 21 divisions. The lower force level, combined

with the relatively slow rate of deployment needed to strengthen

only U.S. forces in NATO, argues for giving mobility and logistics

programs low priority for spending.

The following specific measures would be consistent with

this approach:

o Buy war reserve stocks to meet only the requirements of

the reduced force.

o Support continued modernization of strategic airlift

resources by maintaining programs to rewing C-5A aircraft

and modify C-141 aircraft.

o Support continued modernization of tactical airlift

resources by maintaining the CH-47 modernization program.

o Procure UTTAS, but in numbers appropriate for the reduced

force structure.

32
o Undertake no new mobility initiatives, such as procuring

ATCA or AMST, or supporting additional CRAF modifications.

Option III would still enable the United States to have the

following forces in place in the Central Front 21 days after the

beginning of mobilization:

o The equivalent of five divisions already stationed in

Germany.

o Two-thirds of three divisions with pre-positioned equipment (and some support units).

o Approximately one armored division arriving by air.

The savings suggested by this approach, vis-a-vis what appear

to be the five-year implications of the fiscal year 1979 defense

budget, are summarized in Table 4.

TABLE 4. OPTION III: SAVINGS FROM THE FISCAL YEARS 1979-1983

DoD FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM: BY FISCAL YEAR, IN

MILLIONS OF CURRENT YEAR DOLLARS

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Delete 3 Army Divisions -240

Strategic Mobility

ATCA -160

CRAF modifications -70

One POMCUS division -70

Tactical Mobility

UTTAS (for 21

divisions) -70

' Net Savings 610

-810 -1,470 -1,830 -1,950

-260

-130

-75

-75

1,350

-260

-130

-25

-75

-250

-140

-25

-80

0

-70

-30

-80

1,960 2,325 2,130

33

•FIHTI'
.Ill BUI 1
APPENDI X
•n mini i
APPENDIX. CURRENT U.S. AND ALLIED MOBILITY RESOURCES

U.S. CAPABILITIES

U.S. airlift forces comprise aircraft under the Military

Airlift Command (MAC), the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and

helicopters under the command of the Army and the Marines.

MAC has active mobility forces consisting of 70 C-5As and 234

C-141s, which make up the strategic airlift inventory. In addition, there are 15 active squadrons of C-130s (234 aircraft)

and 254 C-130s in reserve and Air National Guard units which

make up the tactical airlift force. I/ (Increased reliance on

host-nation support for intratheater mobility has not affected

airlift requirements, since airlift is not included in host-nation

support agreements. 2/

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) consists of civilian

passenger and cargo aircraft under contract to the Department of

Defense for use in emergencies. These planes would be flown and

maintained by commercial pilots and crews. As of November 1,

1975, 244 long-range aircraft have been committed to this program,

91 of which are passenger aircraft. The remaining 153 are cargo

I/ Current inventory numbers for C-5As, C-141s, and C-130s were

~~ provided by the Department of Defense and represent the number

of unit-equipped (UE) aircraft. There are some additional

aircraft that are in the inventory to keep the capability at

the UE level when aircraft are in need of maintenance and

repair.

2/ Bulk cargo, such as rations and some ammunition, can be

~ transported in any mobility ship or plane. C-141s and C-130s

are capable of carrying oversize cargo, which include such

items as refueling trailers and 105 mm. howitzers. Any cargo

that is too large to be transported by a C-141 is considered

outsize, and must be transported by the C-5As if it is to go

"by air. Examples are CH-47 Chinook helicopters, 20-ton

cranes, and M-60 tanks. There are some items of equipment

that cannot be transported by air, such as heavy cranes and

some fixed-wing aircraft.

37

iiiniir
or cargo/convertible aircraft. 3/ These aircraft would be used

primarily to augment MAC's C-141 force. A detailed list of U.S.

airlift resources is shown in Table A-l.

U.S. sealift resources consist of ships under the Military

Sealift Command (MSC), the U.S. Merchant Marine, the National

Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), the Effective U.S. Control Fleet

(EUSC), and NATO flag ships.

As of September 1976, the MSC has had a government-owned

fleet of 67 ships, including six cargo ships. The remaining 61

ships include tankers, project, and fleet support ships. In

addition, 21 cargo ships from the Merchant Marine are under

contract to the MSC, bringing the total number "of cargo ships

within what is known as "the MSC-controlled fleet" to 27.

The NDRF contains 130 World War II Victory ships. These

resources are maintained primarily to augment the MSC fleet in the

event of a major contingency and to provide backup capability for

the Merchant Marine. It has been estimated that it would take a

considerable amount of time, perhaps months, to put these ships in

operable condition. 4/

ALLIED CAPABILITIES

In general, the allies have very few airplanes in their

inventories comparable in range to U.S. strategic airlift resources. Most allied aircraft are similar in range and capability

to, but are far less numerous than, the U.S. tactical airlift

fleet. Table A-2 provides a detailed list of allied airlift

resources.

In addition to military airlift resources, NATO allies have a

considerable wartime airlift capacity from their civilian aircraft

resources. The allies do not have at this time a formalized

3J The Posture of Military Airlift, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Research and Development, House Committee on Armed

Services, 94:1 (November 1975), p. 190.

_4/ National Defense and Economic Benefits of the U.S. Flag Merchant Marine, Hearings before the Subcommittee on The Merchant

Marine, House Committee on Merchant Marines and Fisheries,

94:1 (August 1975).

38
system, comparable to the U.S. GRAF fleet, for controlling commercial airplanes during wartime. However, efforts are underway to

encourage the allies to formally commit commercial assets for military use in time of war. The capability of these aircraft for

cargo transport would be significantly enhanced if the planes were

to undergo modifications similar to those proposed by the United

States under the GRAF modification plan.

TABLE A-l. CURRENT U.S. AIRLIFT INVENTORIES

Range Payload

(miles) (pounds)

TACTICAL

488 C-130s a/ 2,487 44,000

Helicopters

434 CH-47s b/

73 CH-54s

126 CH-53s c/

3,987 UH-ls d/

STRATEGIC

70 C-5As e/

234 C-141s

SOURCES: Jane's All

115

230

257

318

3,749

4,080

the World's

12,000

23,000

13,000

4,000

220,000

70,847

Aircraft (annual volumes for 1968

through 1977)for range and payload data; numbers in U.S.

inventory from Department of Defense.

a/ Data is for C-130H; C-130s can carry 92 troops or 64 paratroops.

b/ Data is for CH-47C; CH-47s can carry 44 troops.

c/ Data is for CH-53D; CH-53s can carry 37 combat-equipped

troops.

d/ Data is for UH-1H; UH-ls can carry 12 troops,

e/ 220,000 is design, not current, payload.

39

IMlllfli
TABLE A-2. CURRENT ALLIED AIRLIFT INVENTORIES

Country

BELGIUM

Tactical

12 C-130H

BRITAIN

Tactical

11 VC-lOs

45 C-130s

Helicopter

We s sex

CANADA

Tactical

5 C-130H

19 C-130E

12 Buffaloes

Range

(mi les)

2,487

N/A

2,487 a/

N/A

2,487

2,420

691 b/

Payload

(pounds)

44,000

(92 troops or 64 paratroops)

N/A

44,000 a/

(92 troops or 64 paratroops)

N/A

44,000

(92 troops or 64 paratroops)

44,000

18,000 b/

Strategic

5 Boeing 707s 4,300

(41 troops or 64 paratroops)

89,000

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Tactical

76 C-160D Transalls 1,056 c/

3 VFW 614s 748

35,000 £/

(93 troops, 61-81 fullyequipped paratroops)

7,992

(40 passengers)

(Continued)

SOURCE: Jane's All the World's Aircraft (annual volumes for 1962 and for

1968 through 1977).

aj Details are for C-130H designation.

W These figures refer to performance with smooth airfield surfaces. An

unprepared airfield would reduce the range to 403 miles and the payload

to 12,000 pounds.
TABLE A-2. (CONTINUED)

Country

Range

(miles)

Payload

(pounds)

FEDERAL REPUBLIC

OF GERMANY (Continued)

Helicopters

110 VFW/

Sikorsky CH-53G

105 Bell UH-lDs

Strategic

4 Boeing 707 320Cs

4 Hansa Jets

FRANCE

Tactical

86 Transalls

120 Noratlas

Helicopters

70 Alouette Ills

190 Alouette Us

130 SA 330 Puma

NETHERLANDS

Tactical

Fokker VFW

F-27 Troopship

N/A

318 d/

4,300

1,615

1,056

N/A

298

62 _f /

370

1,197 g/

N/A

(37 combat-equipped troops)

4,000

(12 troops)

89,000

4,000

(7-12 passengers)

35,000

(93 troops, 61-81 fullyequipped paratroops)

17,000

1,650 e/

1,322

N/A

(16 individuallyequipped troops)

13,000 _g/

(44 passengers)

c/ These details are for the C-160F designation.

d/ This figure is for the UH-1 designation.

e_/ Payload is for external sling loads.

f/ Range at sea level with a reduced payload is 447.

g/ Details are for MK-200 designation.

•iimr
HI mil in "
Figure 2

Three-Phase Movement of U.S. Forces to Europe in the Event of a Warsaw Pact Invasion

PREPARATION PHASE - - STATESIDE DEPLOYMENT PHASE - -

TRANSATLANTIC MOVEMENT

RECEPTION AND EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE

Airlift

Airfield Reception

Unload-.POMCUS

Reserve Forces

Called to

Mobilization

Stations

(

Equipment \^

Issued to \ Troop Units

Reserve Troop ./ Enter

Units Y Training

v V

t War Reserve Stocks Issued

Active and Reserve

Forces Proceed to

Points of Departure

to Begin Loading

Ships and Aircraft

Sealift

Seaport Reception

Unload /

Intrath eater

Movement To

Battle Sites

Pre-Positioned

War Reserve

Stocks

Preparation of reserve forces-distinct from active-duty troops-involves equipping

them for dispatch to airfields and seaports. Reserves' first move is to local mobilization stations throughout the United States, where they are issued the materiel

they will take abroad. Some such equipment comes from inventories of war

reserve stocks (rapidly used-up items, including tanks and guns, stockpiled to replace early combat losses). The reserve troops are given weapons and field training and then assigned points of departure. Active forces, who may be issued

equipment from war reserve stocks if replacement of materiel is necessary, are

assigned points of departure.

The deployment phase begins with the movement of active and reserve forces

to airfields and seaports, where troops and equipment are loaded for crossing

the Atlantic. Transoceanic movement of both active-duty and reserve forces is

accomplished by "strategic" vessels and aircraft. The airlift planes, reserved for

priority items, include C-5Asand C-141sand the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (civilian

craft put to military use); KC-135 tankers are used to refuel C-5As in flight. Heavy

materiels move mainly by sealift, provided by Merchant Marine ships, the Military

Sealift Command, the National Defense Reserve Fleet, the Effective U.S. Control

Fleet,and NATO flagships.

All movements within Europe fall under the heading reception and employment.

The troop- and equipment-carriers are unloaded at seaports and airfields and

their cargo moved into position by various intratheater ("tactical") means-road,

rail, airplane, helicopter. POMCUS-Pre-positioning of Materiel Configured to Unit

Sets-is issued to active duty troops whose equipment was pre-positioned in Europe.

Combat forces may also be re-equipped with pre-positioned war reserve stocks to

replace early combat losses.

Prepared by the Congressional Budget Office.