* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled

principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and

burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to this Rule, the Court

has determined that this opinion should not be published. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-30332

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

DAVID JEROME FRANK,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Louisiana

(93-CR-20012)

October 2, 1996

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

In this out-of-time appeal, David Jerome Frank challenges the

district court’s admission of certain evidence at the trial at

which he was convicted of several crimes relating to a drug ring in

and around Lake Charles, La. The evidence to which Frank objects

is testimony from a co-defendant, Darryl Levan, to the effect that2

Levan had accompanied Frank on several trips to Texas to purchase

cocaine and that Levan had worked for Fra nk as a drug seller for

over two years. Frank contends that the introduction of the

evidence violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). He urges us to

find that the district court abused its discretion in a dmitting

this evidence and that the error was prejudicial to him.

Naturally, the government disagrees.

We review the district court’s decision to admit evidence for

abuse of discretion. S ee

, e.g.

, United States v. Cheramie

, 51 F.3d

538, 540 (5th Cir. 1995). Were we to find an abuse of discretion,

we would not reverse Frank’s conviction unless Frank was prejudiced

by the lower court’s error. U nited States v. Palmer

, 37 F.3d 1080,

1084 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied

, 115 S. Ct. 1804 (1995). We

find that the district court’s decision to admit Levan’s testimony

was not an abuse of discretion and therefore AFFIRM his conviction.

Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence seeks to prevent

the admission of other crimes or bad acts of a criminal defendant,

unless they are relevant to considerations other than a defendant’s

propensity to commit crimes. In U nited States v. Beechum

, 582 F.2d

898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), c ert. denied

, 440 U.S. 920

(1979), we held that the determination of whether admission of

extrinsic-offense evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) can be

b oiled down to a two-part test. First, the evidence must be

relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character. Second,3

the evidence must possess probative value that is not substantially

outw eighed by its undue prejudice and must meet the other

requirements of Rule 403.

We find that the admission of Levan’s testimony satisfies the

Beechum test. Among the permissible purposes for this evidence

under Rule 404(b) is proof of knowledge or intent by the defendant.

We first find that the jury could reasonably find, from Levan’s

testimony, that Frank actually committed these extrinsic offenses.

See United States v. Ridlehuber , 11 F.3d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1993)

(to be “relevant,” government must establish the “preliminary

fact[]” of occurrence of the other acts). We further find that

Levan’s testimony was relevant, as that word is defined in Rule

401, in establishing knowledge and intent. S ee United States v.

Williams

, 957 F.2d 1238, 1243-45 (5th Cir. 1992) (extrinsic

evidence of engaging in similar crimes can be relevant to

establishing the defe ndant’s knowledge or intent to commit the

crime charged). S ee also Beechum

, 582 F.2d at 911-12 & n.15. Step

one is satisfied. Step two, compliance with Rule 403, is also

satisfied as we find that its probative value is not substantially

outweighed by any unfair prejudice.

In light of the foregoing, Frank’s conviction is

AFFIRMED.