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******************************************************ERNEST FRANCIS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 34349) (AC 34449)
DiPentima, C. J., and Gruendel and Mihalakos, Js. Argued April 24—officially released July 15, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Newson, J.)
ErnestFrancis, self-represented, the appellant (petitioner). Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, and Jo Anne Sulik, senior assistantstate’s attorney, forthe appellee (respondent).Opinion PER CURIAM. The self-represented petitioner, Ernest Francis, appeals from the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1 First, the petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal. Second, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly (1) dismissed his constitutional claims, (2) rejectedhis claims ofineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) denied him the opportunityto subpoena certain witnesses. We dismiss the appeal.
In 1992, the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to fiftyyears incarceration. State v. Francis, 228 Conn. 118, 635 A.2d 762 (1993). In 1995, the petitionerfiledhis firstpetition forawrit ofhabeas corpus. After a trial, the court denied the petition and the petitioner’s subsequent petition for certification to appeal. SeeFrancis v. Warden, Superior Court,judicial district of Hartford–New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV95-0550706 (February 18, 1998), appeal dismissed, 63 Conn. App. 282, 775 A.2d 1004, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 933, 776 A.2d 1150 (2001). In 2000, the petitioner filed his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After

atrial, the courtdeniedthepetition. This courtaffirmed thatjudgment.Francisv. CommissionerofCorrection, 142 Conn. App. 530, 66A.3d 501, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 92, 177 A.3d 141 (2013). In 2008, the petitioner filed his third petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the subject of the present appeal.
Inasixcountamendedpetition, thepetitioneralleged that (1) General Statutes § 54-46a, the statute providing for probable cause hearings for persons charged with crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, is unconstitutional, and (2) his prior habeas counsel providedineffective assistance ofcounsel. Therespondent, the Commissioner ofCorrection, deniedthe allegations and raised several special defenses. On October 28, 2011, thehabeas courtdismissedthepetitioner’s constitutional claims. On December 19, 2011, following an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court rejected the petitioner’s claims ofineffective assistance ofcounsel. Subsequently, thepetitionerfiledapetitionforcertification to appeal the habeas court’s decision, which was denied. This appeal followed. ‘‘The standard ofreview and the hurdles a petitioner must overcome to obtain appellate review of a habeas court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after certification to appeal has been denied are well known.

. . . In Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), [our Supreme Court] concluded that

. . . [General Statutes] § 52-470 (b) prevents a reviewing court from hearing the merits of a habeasappeal following the denial of certification to appeal unless the petitionerestablishes thatthe denial ofcertificationconstitutedanabuseofdiscretionbythehabeas court. In Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 615–16, 646 A.2d 126 (1994), [our Supreme Court] incorporated the factors adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431–32, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991), as the appropriate standard for determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal. This standard requires the petitioner to demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner];

orthatthequestionsareadequatetodeserveencouragement to proceed further.

. . . A petitioner who establishes an abuse ofdiscretion through one ofthe factors listed above must then demonstrate that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits.

. . . In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion [a reviewing court] necessarily must consider the merits ofthe petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determinedthatthe petitioner’s appeal was frivolous.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Oliphant v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 146 Conn. App. 499, 513–14, 79 A.3d 77, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 963, 83 A.3d 346 (2013). Having considered the merits of the petitioner’s claims on appeal, we are notpersuadedthatthe habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, as the issues are not debatable among jurists of reason, a court could not resolve the issuesinadifferentmannerandthequestionspresented

are not adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. First, the petitioner’s claim that § 54-46a is unconstitutional in that it fails to provide a right to disqualify

a judge, a right to an impartial tribunal or a right to participate is meritless. The right of the accused to be heardbyanimpartialtribunalis guaranteedbythe state and federal constitutions and need not be recited in each statute delineating the criminal procedure of the state. See Conn. Const., art. I, § 8; U.S. Const., amend. VI. A mechanism to challenge the judge presiding at thepetitioner’sprobable causehearing andtrial existed atthe time ofthose proceedings and exists today. Practice Book §§ 1-22 and 1-23 (formerly Practice Book [1978–97] §§ 996 and 997). Second, the petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are meritless in light of the habeas court’s factual findings. Both attorneys alleged to have performed ineffectively testified at the habeas trial and expressly were found to be credible and to have performed competently. The habeas court also expressly found that the petitioner had failed to produce anycredible evidence supporting his allegations. The habeas court specified that the petitioner had not met his burden with respectto eitherperformance orprejudice as to any ofhis claims. SeeStricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) (requiring that habeas petitioner satisfy performance prong, by demonstrating that counsel made

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as constitutionally guaranteed counsel, and prejudice prong, by demonstrating reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, result of proceeding wouldhave been different). The habeas court’s findings are supported by evidence in the record and there is no basis to disturb them on appeal. Linarte v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 147 Conn. App. 500, 504, 89 A.3d 1 (‘‘As an appellate court, we do not reevaluate the credibility of testimony

. . . . Rather, we must deferto the [trier offact’s] assessment ofthe credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 944, A.3d (2014). Finally, the petitioner’s claims that the habeas court improperly denied him the opportunity to subpoena certain witnesses is meritless.2 The court is granted broad discretion in issuing subpoenas for witnesses on behalfofself-represented parties. Practice Book § 7-19 (‘‘[a] judge

. . . may direct or deny the issuance of subpoenas as such judge deems warranted under the circumstances, keepinginmindthenature ofthe scheduled hearing and future opportunities for examination of witnesses, as may be appropriate’’). The petitioner has not presented any persuasive argument as to why the habeas court’s decision not to issue subpoenas to certain witnesses constitutes an abuse of that discretion. Accordingly, we conclude that all of the petitioner’s claims are without merit and that the habeas court acted properly in denying his petition for certification to appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.

1 On February 14, 2012, the petitioner filed two appeals from the same underlying judgment of the habeas court, one to this court and one to our Supreme Court. On April 20, 2012, our Supreme Court transferred the latter appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-4. On August 2, 2012, by order ofthis court, the two appeals were consolidated pursuant to Practice Book § 61-7.

2 The petitioner also claims that the habeas court improperly denied him

access to the court when it did not review all ofthe evidence before it. The petitioner relies exclusively on an excerpt ofthe hearing transcript wherein the courtstatesthat‘‘duringlunchbreak, the courthastakenthe opportunity to review, not all clearly, but a decent portion of the exhibits.’’ It cannot be inferred from this single comment that the court failed to review the entirety ofthe evidence at any point during the proceedings. Therefore, we conclude that this claim is also meritless.