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No. 02-1674 

================================================================ 

In The 

Supreme Court of the United States 

----♦-- -

MITCH MCCONNELL, 


UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al., 


Appellants, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Appellees. 

----♦-- -

On Appeal From 


The United States District Court, 


District Of Columbia


----♦-- -

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE BIPARTISAN 

FORMER MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES 

CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES 

----♦-- -

RANDY L. DRYER 

Counsel of Record 

J. MICHAEL BAILEY


H. DOUGLAS OWENS


PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER


201 South Main Street 


Suite 1800 


Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 


(801) 532-1234 


================================================================ COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964 

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 
i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 


INTEREST OF AMICI................................................ 1 


SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2 


ARGUMENT ............................................................... 6 


I.	 BCRA WILL HELP RESTORE INTEGRITY


TO NATIONAL POLITICS BY ENDING


LARGE SOFT MONEY DONATIONS .............. 7 


A. 	 The National Parties Expect Members of


Congress to Raise Soft Money, and Mem­


bers are Rewarded or Penalized Accord­


ingly.............................................................. 7 


B. 	Soft Money Donations Unavoidably Cor­


rupt the Legislative Process ....................... 10 


1. 	Large Donors Enjoy Disproportionate 


Access to Members of Congress ............ 11


2. 	Large Donors Exercise Disproportion-


ate Influence on the Legislative Proc­


ess ........................................................... 13 


C. 	Soft Money Donations Unavoidably Cor­


rupt the Electoral Process........................... 20 


II.	 BCRA WILL HELP RESTORE OUR CITI­


ZENS’ FAITH IN DEMOCRACY ....................... 25 


A. 	BCRA Mitigates the Appearance of Cor­


ruption.......................................................... 25 


B. 	BCRA Enhances Political Participation


and Discourse .............................................. 27 


CONCLUSION............................................................ 29 


APPENDIX ........................................................................A-1 

ii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page 

FEDERAL CASES 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).................... 9, 24, 25, 29


FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003)................. 7, 9, 10 


FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 


197 (1982) ................................................................... 7, 25 


FEC v. The Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45 


(D.D.C. 1999) .................................................................. 21 


Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Government Political Action


Committee, 528 U.S. 377 (2000)................................. 7, 25 


FEDERAL STATUTES 

Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. No.


93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. ................... 6 


MISCELLANEOUS 

148 Cong. Rec. H346 (2002)............................................... 19 


148 Cong. Rec. H373 (2002)............................................... 18 


Craig B. Holman & Luke P. McLoughlin, Buying 


Time 2000 (2001) ............................................................ 23 


Jonathan S. Krasno & Frank Sorauf, Issue Advo­


cacy and the Integrity of the Political Process, in 


INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE: COURT


TESTIMONY ON THE NEW REFORMS (2003)...................... 23 


Jonathan S. Krasno & Frank Sorauf, Why Soft 


Money Has Not Strengthened Parties, in INSIDE


THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTI­


MONY ON THE NEW REFORMS (2003) .............................. 23 

iii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued 

Page 

Mark Mellman & Richard Wirthlin, Public Views 

on Party Soft Money, in INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN 

FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTIMONY ON THE NEW 

REFORMS 267 (Corrado, Mann & Potter eds., 

2003)................................................................................ 26 
1 

INTEREST OF AMICI 

Amici are former members of the U.S. Senate and 

U.S. House of Representatives (the “Former Members”).1 

They are deeply interested in the Bipartisan Campaign 

Reform Act (“BCRA”) and in this litigation because its 

outcome will shape the environment for federal elections 

for decades to come and have a profound impact on citi

zens’ confidence in the integrity of federal elections and of 

the officials who are elected. This Court’s decision will 

either bolster a nascent hope for meaningful campaign 

reform or cause a return to the pre-BCRA days of cynicism 

and disillusionment. The Former Members have devoted 

many years, for some most of their lives, to making repre

sentative government work in practice, including the real 

and gritty business of running for office. They hold a 

unique position among interested parties in that they 

(a) have studied and crafted federal campaign finance law, 

(b) have lived with its consequences as federal candidates, 

fund-raisers and officeholders, and (c) are free to criticize 

the fund-raising system they no longer rely on to remain 

in office. In those roles the Former Members have seen, 

firsthand, the growing influence and appearance of influ

ence of big money and special interests on elections and 

the legislative process. They are also acutely aware of the 

resulting sense of disenfranchisement felt by so many 

citizens. Based on their experience and their exceptional 

knowledge of the system, the Former Members attest to 

the need to “clean up” the financing of federal campaigns 

1

 This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties. No 

counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any 

person or entity, other than Amici or their counsel, make a monetary 

contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. 
----------------------------- ------------------------------

2 

and by so doing to restore the voters’ confidence in the 

process. They believe the principles enacted by BCRA 

advance these worthy objectives. 

The Former Members who have joined in this brief are 

an impressive and diverse bipartisan group whose service 

in Congress and experience in federal elections spans the 

modern campaign era. The Former Members are identified 

in the Appendix. Collectively, they represent more than 

500 years of elected public service at the federal level. 

They come from both sides of the political aisle with 

constituencies from all walks of life: young and old, poor 

and wealthy, urban and rural, educated and uneducated. 

----♦-- -

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

Amici submit this brief to convince this Court of the 

profound necessity to sustain the reforms enacted by the 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”). The Former 

Members are on intimate terms with the practical realities 

of campaign finance law. They know the effects of soft 

money on elections, and they know its effects on the 

legislative process. While serving in Congress, they wit

nessed the conflict between the ideal of representative 

government, where a representative’s duty and exercise of 

judgment is owed to constituents and to the broader public 

interest, and the reality of raising the enormous sums of 

money needed for the next election. They hope that their 

experience will demonstrate to the Court the compelling 

need for reform. They believe that the benefits of BCRA in 

serving the values of a democratic republic do not come at 

the expense of free speech or vigorous electioneering. 

Indeed, BCRA will expand the number of voices participat

ing in elections. BCRA will move elections closer to the 

ideal of a contest of ideas among all interests and away 
3 

from recent trends of elections as contests only among 

moneyed interests. BCRA will help check a growing 

cynicism in the electorate and foster greater participation 

in campaigns at the grass roots level and in voting itself. 

The Former Members wish to underscore that the 

campaign finance system that existed before BCRA cor

rupted and undermined the legislative process in that it 

often altered legislative outcomes by elevating moneyed 

interests at the expense of the broader public interest. 

Members of Congress are induced to offer their time and 

attention to donors, and in particular to large donors. 

Regrettably, but undeniably, it is a fact of political life that 

members of Congress are often more attentive to those 

who donate money to them or to their political party than 

to those who do not. Large donations are the lifeblood of 

any campaign. Money leads to preferential access, and 

access means influence. Through such “access,” large 

donors are able to influence legislation to their advantage, 

often to the detriment of the overall public interest. 

Members of Congress quickly learn that if they do not 

provide time and attention to large donors, and if they do 

not act to influence or acquiesce in legislative decisions 

favoring such large donors, then they and their party are 

likely to be at a serious disadvantage. As former Senator 

Paul Simon bluntly stated, “When people have donated 

$50,000 or $100,000, they are going to want their pound of 

flesh after the election.” Declaration of Senator Paul 

Simon (“Simon Decl.”)2

 ¶ 15. The expectation is unwritten, 

but is often honored nonetheless. 

2 This and the other declarations cited herein from former and 

current members of Congress are in the record and were cited in the 

opinions below. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly 

(D.D.C. May 19, 2003), reprinted in Appellants’ June 2003 Supplemental 

(Continued on following page) 
4 

Foes of BCRA claim that all is well so long as there is 

no quid pro quo between the donor and the officeholder. 

The reality is that serious, if incremental, corruption 

occurs without any explicit quid pro quo agreement. The 

quid is given with the expectation that the quo is, or soon 

will be, on its way. Those expectations are rewarded often 

and amply enough to keep everyone playing the game. 

Even where the expectation is not fulfilled, the perception 

remains among others in Congress and in the public at 

large that money “opened the door” or “greased the 

wheels” of government. 

The Former Members want to emphasize that most of 

their colleagues serving then and now are upright and 

honest men and women who are doing their best to serve 

the public. Cases of personal venality and individual 

corruption are quite rare. Nonetheless, the corrosive effect 

of the money chase on the institution of Congress overall 

and the public’s perception of it are not in dispute. 

BCRA does not end all campaign donations, of course, 

so it does not remove all temptation to favor donors. But 

BCRA will effectively end the single worst temptation – 

the unlimited soft money donations that function with 

essentially the same effect and influence as direct cam

paign donations. 

If unchecked by BCRA, donors will continue to use 

soft money loopholes to avoid the key provisions of preBCRA law, including the requirements to disclose the 

identity of donors, limit the amount of donations, and 

prohibit donations from corporations and unions. In 

reality, BCRA does little more than reimpose the limits on 

Appendix to Jurisdictional Statements, Vol. II. The declarations can 

also be found at www.campaignlegalcenter.org. 
----------------------------- ------------------------------

5 

campaign finance practices that this Court has previously 

found to be constitutional. 

These soft money loopholes are primarily exploited by 

means of the so-called “issue” advertisement. Issue adver

tisements purport not to advocate the election of a particu

lar candidate; that is a fiction believed nowhere, but relied 

on everywhere to skirt the prior law. Virtually every 

member of Congress has either benefited from or been 

pilloried by an issue advertisement. Because candidates 

for federal office ultimately learn the source or sources of 

funding for most of these advertisements, large soft money 

donations funding them present a serious potential for 

undue influence. 

The Former Members are very familiar with negative 

attitudes held by the public toward government in general 

and toward big-money politics in particular. This public 

cynicism is based on a perception that a citizen without 

great wealth cannot effectively participate in government. 

Such cynicism is supported by an observation of pre-BCRA 

campaign and legislative practices. The belief that “money 

talks,” and that only “big money” talks effectively, corrodes 

the foundation of American democracy by conveying to 

average non-wealthy citizens a sense that their participa

tion does not matter. The Former Members believe that 

upholding BCRA will do much to expand the depth, 

breadth and authenticity of political speech occurring in 

an election, and rather than curtail speech will encourage 

every citizen, regardless of wealth, to take part in his or 

her government. 

----♦-- -
6 

ARGUMENT 

The growing use of the soft money loophole in the 

Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. No. 93-

443, 88 Stat. 1263, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1974), can be 

chronicled with numbers and statistics. For the 1992 

elections, the two major parties raised $86 million in soft 

money. This amount roughly tripled for the 1996 elections 

and then nearly doubled again to $495 million in the 2000 

election cycle. Memorandum Opinion of Judge KollarKotelly (D.D.C. May 19, 2003), reprinted in Appellants’ 

June 2003 Supplemental Appendix to Jurisdictional 

Statements Vol. II (hereinafter “Kollar-Kotelly Op.”) at 

489sa. Soft money accounted for 42 percent of the spend

ing by the national political parties in the 2000 presiden

tial election. Kollar-Kotelly Op. at 491sa citing Expert 

Report of Thomas Mann at 24-25. Yet this exponential 

growth only begins to tell the story. Amici here witnessed 

firsthand the harm caused by exploitation of the loopholes 

closed by BCRA, including distortions in policy-making 

favoring large donors and the demoralization of the 

electorate. 

Our republican form of government depends upon the 

essential trust of the people – trust in their elected represen

tatives to serve the public interest and the common weal. 

The Former Members believe that BCRA is necessary to 

combat the dry rot eating at that element of trust and at 

republican government itself. They believe that BCRA will 

help restore integrity to the federal electoral process, 

mend the damaged trust with the electorate, and improve 

and expand political discourse in this country. The Court 

should take notice of and credit their firsthand observa

tions concerning the practices BCRA is designed to correct 

and the overwhelming need for the reforms BCRA makes. 

Similarly, the Court should give deference to the Congress 
7 

that enacted BCRA in that campaign finance reform is 

squarely within its area of special expertise.3 

I. BCRA WILL HELP RESTORE INTEGRITY TO 

NATIONAL POLITICS BY ENDING LARGE 

SOFT MONEY DONATIONS. 

A.	 The National Parties Expect Members of 

Congress to Raise Soft Money, and Members 

are Rewarded or Penalized Accordingly. 

BCRA was passed in part to reform the manner in 

which members of Congress (“Members”) raise money for 

their respective political parties. Under the prevailing preBCRA regime, Members were expected to raise significant 

amounts of soft money for their party committees, were 

given incentives to do so, and could face sanctions if they 

did not. The party committees usually asked Members to 

solicit additional contributions from persons who had 

already donated the maximum possible amount to the 

Member’s election campaign. The party committees kept 

track of how much each Member raised, and this governed 

in large part how much money the party was willing to 

3 See FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2207 (2003) (“[D]eference 

to legislative choice is warranted particularly when Congress regulates 

campaign contributions, carrying as they do a plain threat to political 

integrity and a plain warrant to counter the appearance and reality of 

corruption and the misuse of corporate advantages.”); Nixon v. Shrink 

Mo. Gov’t Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., 

concurring) (“Where a legislature has significantly greater institutional 

expertise, as, for example, in the field of election regulation, the Court 

in practice defers to empirical legislative judgments. . . . ”); FEC v. Nat’l 

Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982) (“[C]areful legislative 

adjustment of the federal electoral laws . . . to account for the particular 

legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations 

warrants considerable deference. . . . ”). 
8 

spend on that Member’s election campaign. Members were 

asked to make the calls to raise the money because donors 

preferred to give with the knowledge of a Member, thus 

gaining favor in the Member’s sight. Donors often gave to 

a party committee with the understanding that the funds 

would go on the “tally” or be credited to the “account” of a 

particular candidate and be used to help with his or her 

campaign. Party committee officials regularly informed 

Members of large donations and who made them. 

Most donors were well aware that Members could 

take direct credit for their donations to the parties, and 

would specifically inform the Member when they made a 

party donation. An experience typical for the Former 

Members is that of Senator David Boren: “Like other 

Senators, I was expected to ‘sell a table’ and attend these 

[fund-raising dinners], and, from time to time, I did. 

Sometimes, lobbyists called me or other Senators, offered 

to buy a ‘table’ for the corporation they represent and then 

offered to ‘make sure the donation goes on your tally.’ ” 

Declaration of Senator David Boren (“Boren Decl.”) ¶ 5. 

Senator Dale Bumpers recounts: “The last time I ran, I 

remember that the DSCC [Democratic Senatorial Cam

paign Committee] promised to give every candidate a 

minimal amount of money regardless of whether he or she 

did any fundraising for the DSCC. To get more than the 

minimum, however, you had to raise money for the DSCC. 

For example, if I had helped the DSCC raise the maximum 

amount it could legally expend on my behalf, I certainly 

would have expected the maximum to come back to me.” 

Declaration of Senator Dale Bumpers (“Bumpers Decl.”) 

¶ 11. The Former Members have had similar experiences. 

Conversely, Members who did not raise soft money 

often were penalized. The party committees withheld 

donations to candidates who did not raise money for the 

party. “I . . . tried to minimize the time I spent raising ‘soft 
9 

money’ for the Democratic Party, and as a result, I re

ceived almost no money from the Democratic Party for my 

campaigns. At the time, the DSCC and other national 

party organizations kept records or ‘tallies’ of how much 

soft money a Senator had raised for the party. The DSCC 

then gave little money to the campaigns of those Senators 

who had not raised adequate party funds.” Boren Decl. 

¶ 4. This experience is similar to that of the Former 

Members in both parties, who also saw particular soft 

money expectations levied by leadership on colleagues who 

held seats on the most powerful committees. There is an 

inseverable link between the national political parties, 

their congressional fund-raising committees and federal 

candidates. Large contributions to national parties and 

their committees pose the same risk of corruption or 

appearance of corruption as large contributions by indi

viduals directly to candidates themselves. The latter have 

been banned by Congress and upheld by this Court for 

decades.4

 BCRA merely prevents individuals and others 

from doing indirectly what they cannot do directly. 

Soft money is used less and less for traditional, 

grassroots, party-building activities, and more and more 

for electioneering. This should be expected because it is 

axiomatic that the primary function of political parties is 

to get their candidates elected. Moreover, this Court has 

recognized that expenditures of candidates and of political 

committees “are, by definition, campaign related.” See 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976). As Senator Bump

ers stated: “Political parties’ primary interest is in supporting and electing their candidates. The parties are 

4

 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); FEC v. Beaumont, 

123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003). 
10 

money raisers, and they spend the money they raise to 

assist their candidates in campaigns.” Bumpers Decl. ¶ 4. 

As set forth below, this campaign spending typically takes 

the form of so-called “issue” advertising. 

B.	 Soft Money Donations Unavoidably Corrupt the Legislative Process. 

In establishing a democratic republic, the Founders 

intended elected officeholders to cast their votes and make 

other decisions based on some combination of their own 

judgment, the preferences and expectations of their 

constituents, and a regard for the larger public interest. 

This ideal is undermined by current practices relating to 

soft money. 

Because soft money donations are so large compared 

to hard money donations, the soft money donations heavily 

influence Members in the legislative process. And because 

legislative leaders are especially interested in and informed about these donations, the effect on key leadership 

decisions, such as taking party positions and scheduling 

bills for consideration, are particularly susceptible to 

undue influence. 

Of course, it would be against the law for an explicit 

quid pro quo to exist between Member and donor. But the 

relationship need not be an explicit one to effectively 

corrupt the legislative process. As this Court observed in 

its recent decision in FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 

2207 (2003), “corruption” is to be “understood not only as 

quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence on 

an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such 

influence.” 
11 

1. Large Donors Enjoy Disproportionate 

Access to Members of Congress. 

In the pre-BCRA system, many Members granted 

greater “access” to large soft money donors and raised 

money from donors for whom they made favorable legisla

tive decisions. In turn, donors gave financial support to 

Members perceived to be sympathetic and willing to 

further the donors’ legislative agenda. Whatever the cause 

and effect relationship in a given instance, the cumulative 

effect and appearance are suspect. 

It is only natural that a busy member of Congress 

with ten minutes to spare will spend those minutes returning the call of a large soft money donor before or 

instead of the call of other constituents. Money equals 

access which equals influence. Former Senator Paul 

Simon’s testimony filed with the court below is illustrative 

of the views of the Former Members: 

Because few people can afford to give over 

$20,000 or $25,000 to a party committee, those 

people who can will receive substantially better 

access to elected federal leaders than people who 

can only afford smaller contributions or can not 

afford to make any contributions. When you increase the amount that people are allowed to 

give, or let people give without limit to the parties, you increase the danger of unfair access. 

Simon Decl. ¶ 16. 

Party committee officials often promised large donors 

access to Members in return for contributions. Perceiving 

that their political survival depended on it, Members and 

their staffs easily recalled who their party’s large donors 

were and usually were eager to grant requests for attention. 

No matter how busy a politician may be during 

the day, he or she will always make time to see 
12 

donors who gave large amounts of money. 

Staffers who work for Members know who the 

big donors are, and those people always get their 

phone calls returned first and are allowed to see 

the Member when others are not. 

Declaration of Senator Alan K. Simpson (“Simpson Decl.”) 

¶ 9. 

The congressional community is not large. Members 

know which lobbyists represent large donors. Large donors 

and Members attend conferences, briefings, retreats, golf 

outings and dinners together on a frequent basis. Each 

group needs what the other has. It is natural that Mem

bers should feel beholden to the donors. Donors and their 

representatives communicate openly with Members about 

financial matters, notifying them when large donations to 

the party have been made, sometimes even preferring to 

hand the checks directly to the Members. Members and 

donors often do not discuss matters pending in Congress 

at the same time that donations are discussed. This 

formality helps to insulate the transaction from becoming 

a quid pro quo. But even at fund-raising events it is not 

uncommon for the donor to mention a desire to see the 

Member at some subsequent time about a matter of 

interest. Though most donations are made without specific 

intention of asking for something in return, donors are 

aware that their donation will afford them access when 

they need it. 

The Former Members stress that it was exceedingly 

rare for a Member to make a particular legislative decision 

because of a particular past or expected donation. The 

system was much more subtle and incremental than that. 

Even as the vast majority of individual Members have 

never “sold” a vote, it is just as true that the influence of 

campaign donations is so pervasive that it acts as an 
13 

invisible hand to guide and nudge outcomes in ways that 

causation is always “plausibly deniable.” 

The larger the donation, the greater the access. 

“Sometimes, the party asked us to solicit soft money for 

attendance at events that included access to the president; 

other times major donors were given access to certain 

lawmakers. The more money one donates, the higher-level 

players he or she has access to.” Simpson Decl. ¶ 4. 

The Former Members are convinced that the reason 

most large donors give to political parties is because the 

donors believe they will receive special access to and 

influence over government officials, even as most also feel 

their cause is legitimate or even altruistic. Donors also 

believe, with ample justification, that if they do not make 

large donations when requested by Members, those offi

cials will pay less attention to their views and positions or 

even favor those with opposing views. Because Members 

need donations to survive politically, and because donors 

need the access their donations obtain for them, and 

because an opposing party or competing donor is usually 

ready to fill any vacuum in the system, neither the Mem

bers nor the donors can afford to “unilaterally disarm” by 

opting out of the fund-raising “arms race.” In order to 

reform the system, it takes legislation like BCRA to level 

the playing field for all involved. 

2. Large Donors Exercise Disproportionate 

Influence on the Legislative Process. 

The Former Members believe that the pre-BCRA 

system distorted and corrupted the legislative process in 

ways ranging from the subtle to the blatant. As noted, 

Members make time to meet with large donors or their 

representatives. Such meetings “are not idle chit-chats 
14 

about the philosophy of democracy,” as Senator Warren 

Rudman describes them. 

In these meetings, these special interests, often 

accompanied by lobbyists, press elected officials – 

Senators who either raised money from the spe

cial interest in question or who benefit directly or 

indirectly from their contributions to the Sena

tor’s party – to adopt their position on a matter 

of interest to them. Senators are pressed by their 

benefactors to introduce legislation, to amend 

legislation, to block legislation, and to vote on 

legislation in a certain way. No one says: “We 

gave money so you should do this to help us.” No 

one needs to say it – it is perfectly understood by 

all participants in every such meeting. 

Declaration of Senator Warren Rudman (“Rudman Decl.”) 

¶ 7. The Former Members can attest to the accuracy of 

Senator Rudman’s description. The access afforded to 

large donors to, at a minimum, make their case, gives 

them a substantial advantage. A large donor is much more 

likely than others to be successful in inducing legislative 

decisions that benefit the donor. 

The Former Members have witnessed specific exam

ples of legislation affected by the influence of large money 

donors. Senator Simon recounts one such incident: 

It is not unusual for large contributors to seek 

legislative favors in exchange for their contribu

tions. A good example of that which stands out in 

my mind because it was so stark and recent oc

curred on the next-to-last day of the 1995-96 leg

islative session. Federal Express wanted to 

amend a bill being considered by a Conference 

Committee, to shift coverage of their truck driv

ers from the National Labor Relations Act to the 

Railway Act, which includes airlines, pilots and 

railroads. This was clearly of benefit to Federal 
15 

Express, which according to published reports 

had contributed $1.4 million in the last two-year 

cycle to incumbent Members of Congress and al

most $1 million in soft money to the political parties. 

I opposed this in the Democratic Caucus, arguing 

that even if it was good legislation, it should not 

be approved without holding a hearing, we 

should not cave in to special interests. One of my 

senior colleagues got up and said, “I’m tired of 

Paul always talking about special interests; 

we’ve got to pay attention to who is buttering our 

bread.” I will never forget that. This was a clear 

example of donors getting their way, not on the 

merits of the legislation, but just because they 

had been big contributors. I do not think there is 

any question that this is the reason it passed. 

Simon Decl. ¶¶ 13-14.5 

5 Senator John McCain, one of BCRA’s sponsors, describes another: 

In June 1998, it was widely reported that during the Sen

ate’s consideration of a bill entitled the National Tobacco 

Policy and Youth Smoking Reduction Act (S. 1415), U.S. 

Senator Mitch McConnell, then head of the National Repub

lican Senatorial Committee, talked at a Republican Sena

tors’ policy lunch about political advertising by major 

tobacco manufacturers. In a complaint it filed on June 29, 

1998 with the Federal Election Commission, the Campaign 

for Tobacco-Free Kids characterized Senator McConnell’s 

communications as follows: “Based upon reports that have 

been widely published in the news media, only hours before 

Republican Senators were due to vote for or against cloture 

on S. 1415, Senator Mitch McConnell informed his col

leagues in a closed door meeting that if they voted to kill the 

tobacco bill, the major tobacco manufacturers were promis

ing to mount a television ad campaign to support those who 

voted against the bill.” [citation omitted] I was present at 

the meeting and this is an accurate report of what Senator 

(Continued on following page) 
16 

The examples from both parties are abundant. Current Senator John McCain recounts how, while a bill was 

pending to get generic drugs to market faster, the Republi

can senatorial and congressional campaign committees 

held a gala dinner that raised nearly $30 million in mostly 

soft money, a substantial portion of which came from 

pharmaceutical companies. McCain Decl. ¶ 11. He also 

witnessed the “hijack[ing]” of telecommunications deregu

lation legislation that ended up “filled with internal 

inconsistencies designed to appease . . . competing donors 

rather than to serve the public interest,” and he saw the 

demise of an important amendment to the Sarbanes-Oxley 

corporate governance bill based on the opposition of large 

donors to the parties. McCain Decl. ¶¶ 9-10. 

Warren Rudman describes how “[s]ome large donors 

will ask for help with personal causes, such as immigra

tion matters, tax reform, or political appointments. Others 

attend meetings with elected officials in order to voice 

their company or industry’s concerns with particular 

legislation and to affect the outcome of the legislation.” 

Rudman Decl. ¶ 8. He concludes that “[e]lected officials 

may not intend to be affected by such access, but the fact 

is that they receive a disproportionate amount of input 

and advice from larger, more wealthy contributors. This 

can skew their judgment.” Id. 

The Former Members can recount witnessing instances when favors for soft money donors were dispensed 

in a number of ways, including tactical parliamentary 

McConnell said. This episode graphically indicates that cor

porate soft money is widely used to influence legislative 

votes. 

Declaration of Senator John McCain (“McCain Decl.”) ¶ 8. 
17 

maneuvers such as the offering of amendments, mobiliza

tion of support or opposition, and speeding or delaying 

action. The Former Members join with Senator David 

Boren when he says “I know from my first-hand experi

ence and from my interactions with other Senators that 

they did feel beholden to large donors.” Boren Decl. ¶ 8. 

Such feelings are openly acknowledged in moments of 

candor: 

I remember specific instances when Senators’ 

votes were affected by the fear of losing future 

donations. One time, Senator Bob Dole and I 

were seeking votes on an important national issue. More than once, we heard a Senator tell us, 

‘I realize it’s an issue of great importance, but if I 

vote for that I won’t get any more money. I want 

to be here for another term. You do want me back 

here next year, don’t you?’ These senators know 

that it’s a bad idea to poison the well that nour

ishes the system. 

Simpson Decl. ¶ 11. 

Of course, special interests are not limited to making 

soft money donations, and critics of reform might protest 

that soft money is no more corrupting than hard money. 

The Former Members simply state to the contrary that 

soft money carries more risk for the simple reason that the 

donations are so much larger. Hard money donations are 

limited in size. Soft money donations are in effect unlim

ited. These large, soft money donations, both past and 

anticipated, are more prominent in the minds of the 

Members. The Members know, in deciding on a vote or 

parliamentary tactic, that a lot of money can ride on what 

they are about to do. They do not necessarily change their 

minds for that reason, but there is an insidious effect on 

the psychology of the institution. Quite humanly, Members 

may hope for an easier time fund-raising in the next 
18 

election cycle, or they may fear a more difficult effort. 

They know that “[w]hen people have donated $50,000 or 

$100,000, they are going to want their pound of flesh after 

the election.” Simon Decl. ¶ 15. The recipients of such 

donations know that the piper must be paid, or at least 

respected: “ . . . many Members of this body pause at least 

once to ask themselves how a vote will affect their contri

butions when they should be asking solely how it will 

affect this great Nation.” 148 Cong. Rec. H373 (2002) 

(Statement of Rep. Baird). Again, these effects are magni

fied in the case of critical decisions by leadership. 

Members often seek out positions on powerful committees, such as the Senate’s Finance Committee or the 

House’s Ways and Means, in part because it is easier to 

raise money from those positions. Most of this money is 

raised from donors who have matters of interest pending 

before these committees. The party committees and 

leaders in turn expect the Members on these powerful 

legislative committees to raise more soft money for the 

party committees. 

The overwhelming principle motivating donors is the 

need to obtain access and influence. This is particularly 

clear in light of the frequent practice of making large 

donations to both parties. Forty of the 50 top soft money 

donors in 1996 donated to both parties, as did 35 of the top 

donors in 2000. Kollar-Kotelly Op. at 619sa-620sa citing 

Expert Report of Thomas Mann tbls. 5-6). This seemingly 

contradictory behavior is in fact easily explained by the 

need donors feel for access on both sides of the aisle and by 

a fear, based on experience, that they will be ignored or 

even punished by one party if they give only to the other. 

Many donors are left feeling “shaken down” for their 

money. 
19 

Remaining in office is a form of personal benefit to a 

Member of Congress. Members enjoy financial and other 

emoluments and privileges and a status not available to 

most citizens. These benefits are hard earned and deserved. Indeed, many Members make tremendous per

sonal financial and other sacrifices in order to serve the 

public. Nonetheless, most Members desire to continue in 

elected office. Their desire requires reelection, and their 

reelection campaigns depend on raising huge sums of 

money. The money necessary to deter or defeat opponents 

and win reelection increasingly comes from large donors 

and political parties, often in the form of soft money. 

Pre-BCRA practices involving soft money exploited 

loopholes in the previous election law, and turned that law 

on its head. Indeed, BCRA’s sponsor said that BCRA’s 

purpose is “to enforce the 1907 law banning corporate 

treasury money, the 1947 [law] banning union dues money, 

and enforce the 1974 law banning unlimited sums of 

money.” 148 Cong. Rec. H346 (2002) (Statement of Rep. 

Shays). BCRA is designed to restore force and effect to 

these earlier statutes, which have already been upheld by 

this Court. 

The Former Members urge the Court to consider their 

experience. The current system of political fund-raising is 

badly in need of repair. The process of donation to Mem

bers, followed by access and favor granted by Members, 

followed by further donation to Members, is inherently 

corrupting at the institutional level even though the 

participants are well intentioned and do nothing legally 

wrong. This cycle reinforces itself when donors tend to 

ignore Members who do not provide access and favors, and 

Members tend not to provide access and favors to those 

who do not donate. The circle is complete without the 

necessity of a quid pro quo. Quid regularly followed by quo 
20 

is amply sufficient. BCRA removes the most powerful force 

in this cycle – soft money. 

C. Soft Money Donations Unavoidably Corrupt 

the Electoral Process. 

Beyond the distortions to the legislative process, soft 

money is also deleterious to the electoral process under the 

pre-BCRA system. It is soft money that fuels the abuses 

associated with “issue advertisements” and “coordinated 

expenditures.” An issue advertisement simply masks the 

otherwise illicit infusion of soft money into congressional 

elections through a charade-like and formalistic compli

ance with the law. Issue advertisements studiously avoid a 

“direct” pitch to the public to vote one way or another, 

instead making that pitch indirectly (but still effectively) 

by urging support or opposition to a particular issue and 

then tying that support or opposition to a particular 

candidate with statements such as “tell him [the oppo

nent] to quit doing that.” Most issue advertisements run in 

the periods immediately prior to elections, so it is appar

ent they are not intended to provoke debate on the issues 

of the day, as their name might suggest. Voters get the 

very obvious message that they should vote for or against 

Congressman X. It is the Former Members’ experience and 

belief that the so-called “express advocacy” test to determine whether a campaign advertisement comes within the 

scope of FECA is so easily avoided as to render meaningless the ban on companies and unions using treasury 

funds to pay for advertisements designed to influence 

federal elections. 

By law, advertisements paid for with soft money must 

be sponsored and funded by outside organizations or the 

parties themselves. Additionally, the sponsors of the 

advertisements must avoid explicit coordination of their 
21 

advertisements with the campaign in question. Otherwise, 

the cost of the advertisements is considered to be an inkind contribution to the campaign, which may be illegal if 

funded by soft money. Explicit coordination with the 

campaign is unnecessary because election consultants who 

have no formal ties to campaigns are perfectly capable of 

analyzing what message will be useful to elect or defeat a 

particular candidate. Candidates rarely take action to stop 

issue advertisements they perceive as helpful. 

The coordination between the candidate and the 

sponsor can take other indirect forms, such as when the 

consultants producing the advertisements work for other 

candidates for federal office in the same areas where the 

advertisements run. Consultants or staffers sometimes 

move freely from a job working for a candidate to one 

working for the sponsoring advocacy group and vice versa. 

Political parties can also be the conduit for information 

between campaigns and advocacy groups. Sometimes 

political parties loan persons to assist campaigns with 

their media. These persons may also serve unwittingly as 

a conduit between a political party and the campaign. 

With such overlaps, polling data and other research and 

advice often are shared. While these relationships and 

behaviors effectively coordinate soft money expenditures 

with the campaign, the “independent” expenditures are 

not counted as campaign contributions under FEC deci

sions that narrowly and unrealistically define coordination 

as “substantial discussion” about the coordinated commu

nication. See, e.g., FEC v. The Christian Coalition, 52 

F. Supp. 2d 45, 91-92 (D.D.C. 1999). 

There is ample evidence that political parties, party 

committees and candidates for office manipulate this soft 

money loophole to their advantage. Candidates or others 

associated with them sometimes circumvent limits appli

cable to donations to campaigns by suggesting that donors 
22 

contribute to the interest groups that run the issue adver

tisements. Members are frequently favorably disposed 

towards such donors just as they would be to other soft 

money donors. 

Specific examples of the circumvention of pre-BCRA 

election law abound. “The national Democratic party 

managed to finance two-thirds of its pro-Clinton ‘issue ad’ 

television blitz by taking advantage of the more favorable 

allocation methods available to state parties. They simply 

transferred the requisite mix of hard and soft dollars to 

party committees in the states they targeted and had the 

state committees place the ads.” Mann Expert Report at 

22, quoted in Kollar-Kotelly Op. at 494sa. Republicans 

engage in the same types of conduct: 

[The group “Republicans for Clean Air”] spon

sored ads praising then-Governor George W. 

Bush and criticizing Senator John McCain before 

the 2000 Republican presidential primaries in 

three states. Eventually, after the first of these 

primaries (South Carolina’s) reporters uncovered 

that Republicans for Clean Air consisted of two 

brothers, Charles and Sam Wyly, long-time 

friends and supporters of Governor Bush. 

Charles Wyly, in fact, was an authorized fundraiser for the Bush campaign. . . . [I]t is impossi

ble to imagine officials of the Bush campaign 

were in the dark about Republicans for Clean 

Air. According to press estimates, the Wylys 

spent $25 million on their ads for Governor 

Bush. [internal footnote omitted] We find it inconceivable that an expenditure of that magni

tude could remain unknown to the small circle of 

financial leaders close to both the Bush cam

paign and the Wylys (including Charles Wyly 

himself) or the even smaller circle of Republican 

media consultants. 
23 

Jonathan S. Krasno & Frank Sorauf, Issue Advocacy and 

the Integrity of the Political Process, in INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTIMONY ON THE NEW 

REFORMS 189, 194-95 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2003).6 

It is apparent to the Former Members that soft money 

is not being used by the parties for state and local elec

tions or for other party-building activities, as FECA 

contemplates. The national parties raise soft money and 

work through state parties to influence federal elections. 

Party-sponsored soft money advertisements increasingly 

have become explicit electioneering. Parties and their 

committees are almost never mentioned in the advertise

ments for which they pay. In 2000, for example, 92% of the 

advertisements paid for by the parties did not even iden

tify the name of the party. None encouraged voters to 

register with the party or to volunteer in support of the 

party. Craig B. Holman & Luke P. McLoughlin, Buying 

Time 2000 at 64 (2001), quoted in Kollar-Kotelly Op. at 

507sa. But 99 percent of such ads in 2000 mention candi

dates, 51 percent name the opposing candidate, 17 percent 

name the party’s candidate, and 32 percent name both 

candidates. Jonathan S. Krasno & Frank Sorauf, Why Soft 

Money Has Not Strengthened Parties, in INSIDE THE 

CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTIMONY ON THE 

NEW REFORMS 49, 51 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2003). 

The soft money exception has swallowed the rule. 

Such blatant disregard of campaign contribution limits by 

the combination of soft money and issue advertisements 

6 Jonathan Krasno is a Visiting Fellow at Yale University’s 

Institute for Social and Policy Studies. Frank Sorauf is a Regents’ 

Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. 

Both filed expert testimony for the Appellees in the Court proceedings 

below. 
24 

should not be permitted. It can best be corrected by upholding BCRA. 

Generally, the public needs to know the true source of 

an advertisement in order to fairly assess it and assign a 

degree of credibility. Another problem with issue adver

tisements not paid for by party committees is that they 

frequently are paid for with money filtered through 

nominal “committees” that do not disclose in any meaning

ful way how or by whom they are funded. While pre-BCRA 

law requires the sponsor to identify itself at the end of the 

advertisement, such identification can be the name of an 

entity created to conceal the identity of the true sponsor. 

The lack of full disclosure of receipts and expenditures for 

issue advertisements undermines the candor and financial 

transparency that should be present in elections. The 

secrecy creates opportunity for corruption, since the public 

does not know who is paying for advertisements that 

benefit a candidate. 

Disclosure was one of the primary objectives of FECA, 

and was seen by this Court as a substantial guard against 

corruption. As this Court has held, “[D]isclosure require

ments deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of 

corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures 

to the light of publicity. This exposure may discourage those 

who would use money for improper purposes either before 

or after the election. A public armed with information 

about a candidate’s most generous supporters is better 

able to detect any post-election special favors that may be 

given in return.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. Without BCRA, 

the disclosure requirements of FECA can be evaded. BCRA 

will restore it to efficacy. 
25 

II. BCRA WILL HELP RESTORE OUR CITIZENS’ 

FAITH IN DEMOCRACY. 

A.	 BCRA Mitigates the Appearance of Corruption. 

This Court has repeatedly held that the public percep

tion of the probity of elected representatives is an impor

tant and sufficient governmental interest.7

 BCRA was 

passed, in part, not only to address actual corruption, but 

to address the appearance of corruption, an issue this 

Court has previously noted as being of grave concern to 

our democracy. In Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t Political 

Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000), the Court warned 

that the “ . . . cynical assumption that large donors call the 

tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part 

in democratic governance.” BCRA was Congress’s response 

both to the wholesale evasion over time of the principles 

underlying the FECA and to the growing appearance of 

corruption and its corrosive effect. 

As the district court noted, in the 2000 election cycle 

almost a half billion dollars in soft money was contributed 

to the national parties by corporations, unions and 

wealthy individuals. Memorandum Opinion of Judge 

7 This Court has stated that legislation may be justified by a 

government’s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption in 

addition to actual corruption. FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 

459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (affirming the “importance of preventing both 

the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and 

the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the 

appearance of corruption”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (“Of 

almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrange

ments is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from 

public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of 

large individual financial contributions.”). 
26 

Richard J. Leon (D.D.C. May 1, 2003), reprinted in Appel

lants’ June 2003 Supplemental Appendix to Jurisdictional 

Statements Vol. IV at 1189sa; Kollar-Kotelly Op. at 491sa. 

Although these funds were ostensibly not made for the 

purpose of influencing the outcome of federal elections, the 

Former Members’ experience demonstrates that the public 

believes the opposite – and for good reason. The Federal 

campaign law prior to the enactment of BCRA had become 

so riddled with loopholes, and large contributors had 

become so adept at exploiting these loopholes, that the 

safeguards against corruption and the appearance of 

corruption were rendered meaningless. 

The pervasive public cynicism about the electoral 

process is directly linked to the perception that a citizen 

without great wealth cannot effectively participate in 

government. Too many citizens believe that “money talks” 

and that only “big money” talks with any effectiveness. 

This belief leaves non-wealthy citizens with a sense that 

their participation does not matter and so corrodes the 

foundation of participatory democracy. The health of 

republican government will be strengthened when a major 

corrupting influence, one that is obvious to the average 

voter, is curtailed. Nearly three-quarters of voters believe 

that their congressional representatives sometimes decide 

how to vote on an issue based on what their party’s big 

donors want. Mark Mellman & Richard Wirthlin, Public 

Views on Party Soft Money, in INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN 

FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTIMONY ON THE NEW REFORMS 

267 (Corrado, Mann & Potter eds., 2003). Campaign laws 

and practices which, without BCRA, seem to the public to 

be designed to discourage voter participation and diminish 

public confidence in government and in the electoral 

process are a shame. BCRA will help end that shame. The 

Former Members believe that this Court’s affirmation of 

BCRA and BCRA’s underlying principles will do much to 
27 

restore the faith of the citizenry in our democratic proc

esses by mitigating the appearance of corruption. 

B.	 BCRA Enhances Political Participation and 

Discourse. 

BCRA will strengthen the electoral process by foster

ing a greater role in that process for the individual voter 

and small contributor, a role that prior legislation sought 

to protect, but which soft money practices have trampled. 

BCRA’s opponents assert that it will impinge free speech. 

To the contrary, the Act will expand the speech opportuni

ties for the vast majority of “ordinary” citizens in the 

electoral process. 

The Constitution establishes a system where the 

Members of Congress represent the people of a particular 

state or district. Soft money practices effectively undermine and distort that system, affording soft money donors 

influence that eclipses that of the average voter and 

average donor. Their voices are lost when Members grant 

disproportionate access and other attention to soft money 

donors. Senator Simon has expressed the Former Mem

bers’ views in this regard: 

In a very real sense, we are going through the old 

fight between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander 

Hamilton: should propertied interests have pref

erence in what goes on in government? And our 

answer, with our present system of financing 

campaigns, is yes, people with money are going 

to be given greater influence, because their 

names are going to be recognized. They are going 

to have greater access than those who did not 

contribute. The soft money system is the most 

egregious part of the abuse of political contribu

tions resulting in preferred access. 

Simon Decl. ¶ 17. 
28 

The voices of the average voter and the average small 

donor are drowned out when a flood of soft money, from 

undisclosed sources, pours into a race. Those citizens see 

and understand what is going on, and they are discour

aged from participating and even from voting. As money 

tends to compromise the elected, it also serves to disen

franchise the electors. Any true competition of ideas has 

little chance when faced with the financial conglomerate of 

special interests. Such distortions have been curbed in the 

past with this Court’s approval, and the Former Members 

respectfully urge the Court to uphold BCRA, which was 

Congress’ long-fought effort to eliminate the worst abuses 

in the campaign finance system. 

BCRA will go far to counter the dismay with which 

people react to the big money politics of the recent past. 

The Former Members have remained active in public 

affairs in many different ways and continue to have 

extensive opportunity to listen to the public on matters of 

concern. They continue to encounter the palpable cynicism 

about government in general and soft money politics in 

particular they experienced while in office. One of the 

issues most frequently mentioned is campaign finance and 

soft money. The public is angry and frustrated with gov

ernment officials who often appear to be for rent. The 

public is convinced that Members and other federal 

officials are beholden to special interests who bankroll 

campaigns through unlimited soft money donations. They 

believe that these interests have far too much sway over 

their representatives, and they believe their own votes, 

their own participation in grassroots activities, and their 

own small donations do not count for much. These beliefs 

generate the apathy, indifference and low voter turnout 

that cut at the very root of American democracy. Represen

tative democracy is seriously damaged when so many 

citizens believe they have no meaningful opportunity to 
----------------------------- ------------------------------

29 

participate in government because they lack the financial 

resources to compete with rich and powerful donors. 

BCRA stands for the proposition that the national 

government is not for sale to the highest bidder, and it 

welcomes and encourages the participation of the average 

citizen. Without that participation, the American political 

system is in peril. Senator John Glenn, once a candidate 

for this country’s highest office, framed the issue clearly: 

I hope that when the courts review this law, they 

consider what the future of this country is going 

to be. In this case, the courts will be dealing with 

an issue that is going to be a key part of whether 

this country continues to look at itself as a coun

try that represents every citizen’s interests 

equally, or whether we go back toward that oli

garchy from which we escaped in 1776. Yet the 

great thing about this country is that there is no 

such thing as an average citizen. Under the Con

stitution, every citizen should be considered 

equal and supreme. If we get away from that, we 

get away from what makes this country great. 

Declaration of Senator John Glenn ¶ 7. 

----♦-- -

CONCLUSION 

BCRA’s reforms were designed principally to restore 

the integrity of the Federal Election Campaign Act, to 

address the fundamental concerns expressed in Buckley v. 

Valeo regarding corruption and the appearance of corrup

tion, and to stop the massive use of soft money to circum

vent the constitutionally approved limitations on 

campaign contributions. This Court should give effect to 
30 

BCRA’s objectives and affirm and reverse the decision of 

the Court below accordingly. 

Respectfully submitted, 

RANDY L. DRYER 

Counsel of Record 

J. MICHAEL BAILEY

H. DOUGLAS OWENS

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

201 South Main Street 

Suite 1800 

Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 

(801) 532-1234 

August 5, 2003 
A-1 

APPENDIX 

The Former Members who have joined in this brief are 

an impressive and diverse bipartisan group whose service 

in Congress and experience in federal elections spans the 

modern campaign era. Collectively, they represent more 

than 500 years of elected public service at the federal 

level. They come from both sides of the political aisle with 

constituencies from all walks of life: young and old, poor 

and wealthy, urban and rural, educated and uneducated. 

They are listed below: 

Representative John B. Anderson served as a Republican 

U.S. Representative from Illinois from 1961 to 1981. He 

was a candidate for President of the United States in 

1980. 

Representative Michael D. Barnes served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Maryland from 1979 to 1987. 

Representative Thomas M. Barrett served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Wisconsin from 1993 to 2003. 

Representative Anthony Beilenson served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from California from 1977 to 1997. 

Representative James H. Bilbry served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Nevada from 1987 to 1995. 

Representative Robert A. Borski served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Pennsylvania from 1983 to 2003. 

Senator Leslie L. Byrne is currently a Virginia State 

Senator. She served as a Democratic U.S. Representative 

from Virginia from 1993 to 1995. 

Representative Bob Carr served as a Democratic U.S. 

Representative from Michigan from 1975 to 1981 and 1983 

to 1995. 
A-2 

Representative William F. Clinger served as a Republican 

U.S. Representative from Pennsylvania from 1979 to 1997. 

Representative Barber B. Conable, Jr. served as a Republican U.S. Representative from New York from 1965 to 

1985. 

Representative Sam Coppersmith served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Arizona from 1993 to 1995. 

Representative William J. Coyne served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Pennsylvania from 1981 to 2003. 

Representative Thomas J. Downey served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from New York from 1975 to 1993. 

Senator Thomas F. Eagleton served as a Democratic U.S. 

Senator from Missouri from 1968 to 1987. 

Representative Don Edwards served as a Democratic U.S. 

Representative from California from 1963 to 1995. 

Representative Ben Erdreich served as a Democratic U.S. 

Representative from Alabama from 1983 to 1993. 

Representative Peter Hoagland served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Nebraska from 1989 to 1995. 

Representative Elizabeth Holtzman served as a Democratic U.S. Representative from New York from 1973 to 

1981. 

Representative James P. Johnson served as a Republican 

U.S. Representative from Colorado from 1973 to 1981. 

Representative Robert Kastenmeier served as a Democratic U.S. Representative from Wisconsin from 1959 to 

1991. 

Representative John J. LaFalce served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from New York from 1975 to 2003. 
A-3 

Representative Elliott H. Levitas served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Georgia from 1975 to 1985. 

Representative Bill Luther served as a Democratic U.S. 

Representative from Minnesota from 1995 to 2003. 

Representative James Maloney served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Connecticut from 1997 to 2003. 

Representative Marc Lincoln. Marks served as a Republican U.S. Representative from Pennsylvania from 1977 to 

1983. 

Representative Abner J. Mikva served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Illinois from 1969 to 1973, 

September 1975 to 1979. 

Vice President Walter F. Mondale served as Vice President 

of the United States from 1977 to 1981. He served as a 

Democratic U.S. Senator from Minnesota from 1964 to 

1976. He was a candidate for President of the United 

States in 1984. 

Representative Jim Moody served as a Democratic U.S. 

Representative from Wisconsin from 1983 to 1993. 

Representative Constance A. Morella served as a Republican U.S. Representative from Maryland from 1987 to 

2003. 

Senator Charles H. Percy served as a Republican U.S. 

Senator from Illinois from 1967 to 1985. 

Representative John Edward Porter served as a Republican U.S. Representative from Illinois from 1980 to 2001. 

Representative Glenn Poshard served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Illinois from 1989 to 1999. 
A-4 

Senator David Pryor served as a Democratic U.S. Senator 

from Arkansas from 1979 to 1997. He served as a Democratic U.S. Representative from Arkansas from 1966 to 

1973. 

Representative Patricia Schroeder served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Colorado from 1973 to 1997. 

Representative Karen Shepherd served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Utah from 1993 to 1995. 

Representative David E. Skaggs served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Colorado from 1987 to 1999. 

Representative Peter Smith served as a Republican U.S. 

Representative from Vermont from 1989 to 1991. 

Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, III served as a Democratic 

U.S. Senator from Illinois from 1970 to 1981. 

Representative Richard Swett served as a Democratic U.S. 

Representative from New Hampshire from 1991 to 1995. 

Representative Jill Long Thompson served as a Democratic U.S. Representative from Indiana from 1989 to 

1995. 

Governor Lowell Weicker served as an Independent 

Governor for the State of Connecticut from 1991 to 1995. 

He served as a Republican U.S. Senator from Connecticut 

from 1971 to 1989. He served as a Republican U.S. Representative from Connecticut from 1969 to 1971. 

Representative Howard E. Wolpe served as a Democratic 

U.S. Representative from Michigan from 1979 to 1993.