1 In a 1988 public reprimand, Robbins was disciplined for pla cing a misleading ad that listed his f

irm’s tele phone num

ber as a n attorne y r eferr al servic e, in viola

tion of Sta

ndard 5, Rule 4-102; in a 1996 public reprimand, Robbins was disciplined for publishing a newsletter ref erring to the firm and an attorney practicing with the firm as specializing in certa in areas of the law when no one at his firm had completed the necessary training or obtained certification as a leg al specialist, in violation of Standard 18; in a 1997 Investigative Pane l reprimand, Robbins was disciplined for publishing a firm brochure stating that the firm’ s fee was contingent upon the outcome of the case without languag e regarding the e xpense of the action, in violation of Standard 5 (b), Rule 4-102; in a 1998 Review Panel reprimand, Robbins was disciplined for failing to deliver file materials to a former c lient’s new lawye r when, during the pendency of the gri eva nce , t he m is si ng m ate ria ls wer e lo cat ed a fte r a m ore th oro ugh sea rch of t he f irm ’s f il es. In addition, in 1985 the State Bar issued Robbins two informal letters of admonition for allowing his investigators to present themselves as attorney s to his clients. 295 Ga. 64 FINAL C OPY

S12Z0998. IN RE W ILLIAM NORMA N ROBB INS.
P ER C URIAM . This is a pe tition for

readm ission as a me mber o f the ba r o f this state. William Norman Robbins was admitted to the Bar in 1978. He was disbarred bythis C ourt in 20 03 fo r admi tte dly paying a “runner” to refe r clients to his office, in violat

ionof Standa

rd 13 of Ba

r Rule 4- 102 (d). In re Rob bins , 276 Ga. 124 (575 SE2d 501) (2003). A s aggrav ating c ircum stance s, this C ourt took into
accou ntprior dis ciplinary offen ses resulting in four previous repr imand s. 1 Id. at 125. We also noted that Robbins ma de false state ments durin g the disciplinary

process and refused to acknowledge his conduct was wrongful. Id.2

More than five years a fte r the date of disbarment, Robbins filed his applic ation

for cer tifica tion of fit ness for readmission. On December 10, 2009, the Board to De termine F itness of Bar Ap plicants cond ucted an infor mal confere nc e for the pur pose of cons idering Rob bins’s app lication. At that conference, with re spect t o recognition of wrongd oing, Robb ins was equiv ocal
as to whether he knew, a

t the ti me he

paid the runner a fee, that suc h paym ent
was improper. He d

id, howe ver, acknowledge that t his condu ct was the result of bad judgment for which he to ok responsib ility and was sorry for it. With respect to rehabilitation , Robbins p resented evidence th at since h is disbar

ment he had become more active in his temple, he had become inv olved in community service by joinin g the Kiwanis Club , and had become a patient volunteer with the Guillain-Ba rre Foundation afte r contracting the disease himself. He declared he was now a differen t person, and if readmitted he planned to b ecome involved with volunteer lawyering a nd in community a ctiv ities w ith other lawyers. H e also testified that he

had offe red to a ssist

the State Bar in e ducating the public and the bar abou t illegal lawyer fee-spl itting. After he was notified that his petiti on h ad bee n tenta tively denied, Robbins request ed a for

mal he aring. The Board provided Robbins witha list o f3

specif icati ons setting forth thegrounds o n which the Board had tenta tively denied his applicatio n and notif ying him that un les s he satisfactorily ref uted these specifications at the hearing, the Board would deny his applic ation. The list of specific allegation s of miscondu ct concluded with the statement that the enumerated actions “cons titute a pattern o f conduct that demons trate s a lac k of judgment, candor, integrity, c haracter, professional ism, rehabilita tion from prio r unethical acts and therequisit e mora l fitnes s require d of a prosp ective member of the State Barof Georgia.” The case was heard b y hearing offi cer Hezekiah Sistrunk, Jr., on Novem

ber 17, 20 10. After morethan a year had pass ed witho ut
a rec omme

ndation fr om thehearin g officer, Robbin s filed a motion to appoint
a replacement officer, and th is Court den ied the motion b ut entered an ord er requirin g the office r to enter his repo rt within te n days or suffer sa nctions t o be entered by the C ourt. Th ree da ys l ater, on Dec embe r 15, 2011, the hea ring officer filed a

14-page report re comm ending a gainst c ertific ation of fitness. By letterdated J anuary

26, 2012, R

obbins wa s notifie d that the Board had entered
a final order denying the a

pplica tion, a fter c onsidera

tion of the hea ring offic er’s findings of fact , conc lusions of law, and recommendations. Rob bins filed this appeal.4

1. In his firs t enumerat ion of error, Robbi ns asserts th e deference normally acco rded to th e Boar

d’s deci sion is not required in this c ase for

three
reaso ns. F irst, R

obbins ass erts tha

t the he aring offi cer’s d elay in issuing
recom menda tions and the fact they were issued on ly after this Cou rt’s order direct ing him to do so cr eate s the appeara nce of pe rsonal motive on t

he part of the hearin g office r to rec omme ndagains t certifica

tion, for to have reac hed any other recom

menda tion aft er thedelay would have b een persona lly em barrass ing to the officer. Robbi ns presents no evidence of bias or even a rgumen t to support such a conc lusion other than speculati on about human nature. The
recom menda tion submitt ed by the

hearin g officer conta ined compre hensive finding s of fact and con clusions o f law suppor ted by references to the he aring transc ript and othe r evide nce. It was w ell-re asone d and the rec omme ndation was suppor ted by the evidence. Second, Robbins a sserts t ha t as a result of

the del ay, t

he rec ord is no longer refle ctive o f his current mo ral and ethica l fitnes s for

admission, which is what the Board to Determ ine Fitness of Bar Applicants is charged with determ ining. Robbins has failed to dem onstrate any prejudice as a result

of the2 In any event, pursuant to the Rules of the Office of Bar Admissions Part A, Section 9, an applicant who has been denied certifica tion of fitness to practice law may reapply a fter three ye ars fro m the date

a final d ecision is affirme d by

this Court. 5 delay. 2 Finally, we rej ect R

obbins’ s asser

t ion that t he Boa rd’s dec ision did not comply with Par t A, Se ction 8 (d

), of the above-no ted Rul es, sta

ting that the applic ant must be notified of the Board’s determ ination n ot to ce rtify in

writing, “giving its rea sons for its d e cision. ” This requirement wa s fulfille d by the notifica tion let ter se nt to Robbins which expres sly ref erenc ed the Fi

ndings of Fact, Conclusion s of Law, an d Reco mmendation of the hea ring offic er and stated that the

decisi on was m ade a fter re viewing the record and tra nscript of the hearing
. Contrary to Robbins’ s argument, the for m of the Board’s wr itten d ecisi on does not leave this Court without a re cord to review i n making it s decisi on to acce

pt or rej ect the

Board’s decisi on. In

arriving at its decision, this Court has rev iewed th e trans cript of th e info rma l conferen ce, t he tran script of the forma l hearing, the F indings of Fa ct, C onclusion s of Law , and Recom menda tion of the he aring offi cer, the Boa rd’s notifi cation

of deci sion lette r, the Board’s seale d investi gativefile, and all other re cords relating to the applic ation for

chara cter a

nd fitnes s certifica

tion that Robbins filed to support3 See Policy Statement of the B oard to Determine Fitness of Bar Applica nts Regarding Character and Fitness Reviews at p. 6. 6 his appeal. The

form of the decision letter i n this case has no t prejudiced Robbins’ s right to appellate review. 2. In case s in whic h past

conduct requires a showing of rehabilitation in order to prove c harac ter and fitness for admission to t he Bar , the app licant is required by the Board to produce evidenc e of, a mong other things, the ta

king of responsibility for past conduct, i nsight and appreciation fo r why the condu ct raises fitness concern s, candor with t he Board, good reputation an d assurances of a desire and inten tion to co nd uct one’ s self in an exe mplar

y fashi on in the future, and positi ve action demonstr ating rehabili tation by thi ngs such as occupa tion, religion, or community or civic servi ce. 3 In such c ases, the applic ant’s burden is to prove re habilit ation a nd fitnes s to be readm

itted to the practice of l aw by clear and convin cing evidence. See In re Spence , 275 Ga. 202 (563 SE2d 129) (2002). R obbins’s re maining enum erati ons of erro r challe nge the substance of the he aring offi cer’s f indings an d conclu sions and the Board’s decisi on regarding Robbins ’s fa ilure to mee t the burd en of cl ear a nd convincing evidence of his r ehabilitation
.7

At the forma l hearing, with respec t to rec ognition of w rongdoing, R

obbins gave evasiv e respon ses to que stions ab out his co ndu ct t hat had resulte d in the disciplinary

action s filed a

gainst hi m pri o r to the disb arment proceedings , which
are set forth in footnot e 1, supra. At firs t, he indicated he di d not remember
rece iving the1985 lett ers of a dmoniti on and tha t he did not

review them prior to the hea

ring, even t

hough th ey were cited in the specificati ons he received prior to the hea

ring. When presse d, he dis misse d the letters by stating they did not constitu te disc iplinary

action s again st him b ut also st ated he would have taken the le tters veryseriousl y and w ould have

correc ted thebehavior noted in the m. Regar d ing the 199 8 Review Panel reprim and for a

misle ading ad , he
r efused to ad mit it was misleading and stated he did no t think any po tential client actually ca

lled the number advertised but h e surm ised the Bar m ust have called the number. Robb ins attribu ted the newsletter th at formed the bas is for the 1996 public reprimand to an error by his office manager who pu blished the newsletter before he reviewe d it. He gave the same expla nation for

the firm brochurethat for

med th e basi s for th e 1997 Inve stigati ve Pane l reprimand. Robbins did, however, later t estify that he too k respons ibility for t hese office mista kes. With respect to t he 1998 Review P anel reprimand, Robb ins admitted8

he ultima tely f ound the m

issing cl ient m ateri als tha t forme d the ba si s for the grievance only af

ter a m ore thorou gh searc h, on ce the Specia l Master to the disciplinary

proceeding su ggested he should look again. When asked about his vigorous defense of the d isbarment proceedi ngs, Robbi ns acknowledg ed that there appea

red to be n o defense to the case and excused the written denials initially fil ed by hi s counse l as “sta ndard la wyering.” When asked a bout whether he lied and thus perjure d himse lf during th e proce edings, Robbins appeared to prevaricate, answe ring that he “did not give

the full state ment, ” and calling his testimony at th e proceeding th at he paid t he runner for his investig ativeservices a “misrepresentati on ,” and noting that he was never charged with per

jury. Robbins’s testimony at th e form al hearing, just as it was at the infor mal hearing , was equivocal with resp ect to demons trating a rec ognition of t he wrongdoing

that re sulted in

disbarm ent. A

n applic ant’s l ack of

candor to the Board is evidence to s upport theconclus ion that h e fail s to posse ss the requisite integrity and character to be a member of the Bar. See In re Baska , 281 Ga. 676 , 677 (1) (641 SE2 d 533) (2007); In re Beasley , 243 Ga . 134, 136 ( 2) (252 SE2d 615) (19 79). Further, since the burden of proof with respec t to the requis it e9

characterand fitne ss to practi ce la w is upon the

applic ant, “[d ]oubt of consequence, of nece ssity, must be decided in favor of

the public’s protection.” (Citat ionand punctua tion omi tted.) In re Lubonovic , 248 Ga . 243, 244 ( 1) (282 SE2d 298 ) (1981)
. With respect to the elem ent of posi tive ac tion, e vidence of reha bilitat ion included testimony that

Robbins is active

in his temple, b ut that activity consisted primarily

of Torah stu dies in which he participated, in some degree, beforethe disba

rment procee dings. In f

act, evidenc e was p rese nted that Robbins increa sed his pa rticipa tion in the se studi es in 1997 , at the timethe compl aint for whic h R obbins was disbarred was filed, and yet he testified untruthfully at t

ha t hearing. Based on the testimony presen ted, it appears that certain trips he took with his templ e were prima rily for his own e njoym ent and involved minimal service to other s. He testified he had volunteered to giv e one
or more interfa ith tours of

his tem ple to Pre sbyter

ian yout h, that he has been involved in fundraising efforts that su pported c ommu

nity proj ects f

or the Kiwanis Club, a

nd that he

had ser ved ot h ers through his involvement with counsel ing patien ts w ith Gill ian-Ba rre Synd rome. While t

hese a ctiviti es are commendable, they are not enough to establish rehab ilitation in this case since10

this evidence is offset by the applica nt’s failure to mee t the burden of proof with respect to other elements of rehabilitat ion, such as cand or and credibi lity, as well
as apprec iation a

nd insight into wh y his pre vious condu ct rai ses fitn ess
conce rns. Further, “[m]ere ly showing that an individ ual is now living as and doing th ose thin gs he or she should have

done throug

hout life ” does no t demonstrate rehabi litation. See In reCason , 249 Ga. 806, 808-809 (294 SE2d 520) (19 82). Although severa l c harac ter wit

nesses testifi ed in suppor t of Robbin s’s applic ation, few were familiar with the det ails of the conduct that led to disbarment, demons trating that Rob bins ha d not di scussed his prior cond uct with the se witn esses o r confide d in them about his understa

nding of hi s wrongdoing. Few ev en knew about the issue of h is testi fying untr uthfully at the disbarment hearin g until th ey were informed by Robbin s’s couns el at the time they were requeste d to appe ar at t he hea ring on his a

pplica tion for re admis sion. Thus, while demonstrating good reputa tion, the se witnesses did not support a finding of insight and

appreciation into why his p ast ac ts raise conce rns about his current fitness. Laurie Robbins, the app licant ’s wife , testified th at Robbins expressed remorse to her and th eir ch il dren and acknow ledged h is wrongful4 In recog nition of his stated disability as a result of suffer ing from the effects of Guillain-Barre Sy

ndrome, Robbins was offered the opportunity to discontinue and reconvene the hearin g on a se cond d ay but he d eclin ed and elect ed to p roceed to con clusi on. Af ter th e heari ng, however, Robbins submitted a Motion to Open Evidence on the ground that his phy sical impairme nt from Gu

illain-B arre Sy

ndrome a dversel y imp acted hi s ability

to testify effec tively during t he hear ing due to fatig ue. He a ttached an affi davit in wh

ich he at tempted to

restate his remorse, understanding, and assumption of responsibility for the unethical professional conduct involved in each of the disciplinary actions brought against him prior to the disbarment proceeding, as well as the conduct that r esulted in disbarment. We agree with the hearing officer that the affidavit not only explained signif icant portions of his testimony during the he aring but also changed and supplemented it. We have consider ed the affidavit in our appellate review of the case. 11 conduct to them prior to the disbarment heari ng. Yet, we n ote that at the disbarmen thearin g, Robbins denied wrongdoing a nd t estified untruthfully abou t his conduct . Thus, her tes timony , and tho se of others, that Robbins unde rstands what he did

in the past was wro ngful and that they believe he would not repeat these m istake s is unconv incing. 4 Finally, Robbins asserts the decision of the B oard in this case is inconsist ent

with its recom

menda tions in pri or re admission cases th at are,
accor ding to Robbins , essentiall y identical t o his. In no ne of the se previ ous
case s, howeve r, is there any discussi on of evidence of pr ior false statem ents to the Board dur

ing the disbarm ent proc eedings or any m ention of the appl icant’ s lack of candor with the Board. See In re Fried berg , 286 Ga . 472 (689 SE 2d 312) (2010) (noting, a

mong other things, more t han 1,400 hours of community12

service and ass umption of lead ership rol es in va rious non-pro fit and r eligious organiz ations); In re Cal houn , 286 Ga . 471 (689 S E2d 31 1) (2010); In re Siegel man , 285 Ga. 817 (683 SE2d 595) (2009) (noting, in addition to exte nsive religiou s studies, volunteer work assisting Jewish inmates a nd other community service throu gh his synag ogue).

“ Generally, if there is any e vidence to support the Board’s decisio n regarding the fitness of

a Bar applican t, it will be uphel d. None theles s, the ultimate decisi on regar

ding a Bar candidate’s fi tness to practi ce la w is made by this Court.”

(Cita tions om itted. ) In re Spence , supra, 275 Ga. at 204. The hearing office r found Robbins’s responses at the hearing “are inconsistent with the fundamental constructs of rehabilitation.” The B oard adopted th es e findings. Our independent review of the re cord confirms the conclu sion that Robbins did not m eet his burden of pr oving the requisite

integri ty, c harac ter, and moral fitness required for re admission to the Georgia B ar. Therefore, we affirm the Boa rd’s dec ision to deny Robbin s’s appli cation
. Certificate

of Fitnes s for Re admis sion denied. All theJustice s concur , excep t Nahmias, J. , not par ticipa ting.13

Decid ed March 28, 2014 – R econsid erati on denie d April 17, 2014. Certification of fitness to prac tice law. Wilson, M orton & Dow

ns, Jam es E. S pence , Jr. , for appellant. Sarah E. Lockwood, Samuel S. Ol ens, Attorney General, S tefan E. Ritte r, Rebecca S. Mick, Senior Assistant Atto rneys Gen eral , for Office of Bar Admiss ions.