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EASTERN EUROPE:

THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 26, 2011

Serial No. 112–80

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Thomas O. Melia, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State ...................................... 8

Nadia Diuk, Ph.D., vice president, programs, National Endowment for Democracy ........................................................................................................................ 33

Mr. Stephen Nix, regional director, Eurasia, International Republican Institute ........................................................................................................................ 43

The Honorable David Kramer, president, Freedom House .................................. 65

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 3

Mr. Thomas O. Melia: Prepared statement ........................................................... 12

Nadia Diuk, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................ 37

Mr. Stephen Nix: Prepared statement ................................................................... 45

The Honorable David Kramer: Prepared statement ............................................. 68

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 86

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 87

(1)

EASTERN EUROPE: THE STATE OF 

DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM 

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. BURTON. The Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia of the 

Foreign Affairs Committee will come to order. 

Good afternoon. Thank you all for being so patient. We had a 

whole bunch of votes on the floor and in addition to that, we had 

to take a picture. You know how important that is for Congressmen 

and Congresswomen. If you don’t, now you do. 

Anyhow, I appreciate your being here. It’s been 20 years since 

the fall of the Soviet Union. In that time, the countries of the 

former Soviet Union and her Iron Curtain satellites have strived 

to adopt democratic governments and free market economies. For 

some, the transition was swift and complete. For others, the transition is still ongoing and for a tragic few, freedom and prosperity remain elusive. 

I believe much of the credit for this progress is due to the courageous leadership of many democratic-minded people in the region, 

but these brave patriots could not have succeeded without the dedication of people like former President Ronald Reagan, and others 

in the United States and elsewhere, who invested in the future of 

these countries by helping to plant the seeds of democracy and nurturing them over time. Countries such as Lithuania, Estonia, and 

Latvia which have adopted strong democratic institutions, electoral 

systems representative of the people and economies which have the 

opportunity to flourish should be applauded for their efforts. 

However, as we have seen in countries such as Georgia, Serbia, 

Albania, and Moldova who have struggled in their transition, democracy, although still holding on, is not without it’s challenges. 

While the people of Georgia, Serbia, Albania, and Moldova have 

steadfastly maintained their commitment to achieving the democratic standards that ‘‘Western countries enjoy,’’ there’s a real risk 

that people could start to grow tired of the struggle to reform of 

malintented actors suddenly swept into power seemingly overnight. 

We must not allow such things to happen. The United States and 

the European Union must continue to encourage and support those 

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equivocally let them know that the United States is unwavering in 

our commitment to their success. 

Similarly, we must be equally unwavering in pressuring the 

leaders of those countries who have not adopted democratic ideals 

such as Belarus and Russia to make the necessary reforms to allow 

democracy to take root and to end corruptive and repressive practices. The United States, without a doubt, must let the leaders of 

such nations know that the status quo will not be tolerated and 

that the only way to fully join the international community is to 

embrace true democracy that enables freedom and rights which are 

obtainable by all of their citizens. 

Recently, I along with six other Members of Congress took part 

in the Community of Democracies Forum in Vilnius, Lithuania. It 

was encouraging to see so many nations from around the globe 

take part in an open forum to speak out in support of democracy 

and against those who destabilize democracy for their own corrupt 

purposes. Also encouraging was to see established democracies 

such as the United States and Germany attending the conference 

to support the goal of promoting democratic rule as well as 

strengthening democratic norms and institutions around the world. 

Forums such as the Community of Democracies enable cooperation to take place and we in the United States must support such 

efforts. To that end today, we’re going to examine the current status of democracy and freedom in Eastern Europe, not only for 

former Soviet States, but also for all countries in the region. The 

good fight is for democracy and we must encourage its existence 

and nurture it so that it flourishes. Without our strong support and 

the support of European Union friends we would doom millions of 

people to repression that inhibits personal growth and stifles freedoms such as the right to assembly, the right to freely practice religion, the right to a free press and media, and the right to be in 

control of your own future. We must not let that happen. 

I am glad that the U.S. Department of State is providing testimony and I’m thrilled that Freedom House, the International Republican Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy are 

here represented today. Thank you, and I look forward to learning 

how we can better support democracy and freedom in Eastern Europe. And I might add that we’re going to be going over in Europe 

on a number of codels to meet with officials in those countries and 

talk to them about a myriad of problems and questions that exist, 

not the least of which is the financial stability of the entire region. 

With that, I will yield to my ranking member, Mr. Meeks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]

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Mr. MEEKS. I want to thank you, Chairman Burton, for calling 

this hearing and providing an opportunity to review the state of 

freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia and to consider how best to engage with countries of the region to support the 

stiffening of democratic rights and liberties in the region. 

This large swath of the world includes some of Western civilizations oldest democracies and of course, some of its newest. Compared to some, the United States is a newcomer on the block. Others, however, are carved crudely out of failed empires or attained 

statehood with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the 

Soviet rule have defined their borders in the past two decades. 

These are truly young democracies with legacies of authoritarian 

regimes that are difficult to relinquish. 

Democracies are works in progress, even in countries with a solid 

foundation and a long history of freedom and democratic institutions, like the United States. Even in Greece, the country that we 

credit as being the birthplace of democracy thousands of years ago, 

even Greece still tweaks the format. Just last year, Greece enacted 

a law allowing legal immigrants to vote in municipal elections. 

As we conduct this review, we must turn the prism of scrutiny 

on ourselves while we consider the imperfect rule of law in Russia, 

the discrimination against minorities throughout much of the region, and the identity laws that deny citizenship and voting rights 

to Roma, we remember our own flawed democracy that once defined a person or a man in such a way as to disenfranchise and 

even dehumanize women and minorities for centuries. And we observe that our democracy continues to struggle with and in some 

cases ignores the question of whether one’s sexual preference is 

cause to deny an individual the rights of association, inheritance, 

insurance, marriage, and other rights and privileges that the majority population enjoys. 

Democracy is not a perfect system. It’s greatest strength—that it 

relies on the will of the majority—can be a great vulnerability. 

Leaders and representatives may fail to make difficult and necessary decisions like raising taxes for fear of alienating voters with 

the power to vote them out of office. 

As we will likely hear today, voters may choose governments we 

do not like. We shall hear that some European Governments have 

flip-flopped from left to right and back again. Rather than concluding that a given country is backsliding, we should conclude 

that voters are exercising their right to change course, peacefully 

and democratically. The system is working when that happens. 

I expect that we shall also hear today about challenges to countries in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. It is important to approach 

this information constructively and remember that our work today 

is not to sanction countries for failing. We, too, have failed. Rather, 

our purpose should be to lead by example and to offer our assistance where we can make a difference. Engagement also dictates 

that we expand our economic and trade relationship with Russia, 

while encouraging them to address the challenges of democracy. 

And it is gratifying that the full committee authorized this policy 

during our recent markup for the Foreign Affairs Reauthorization 

Bill. 

6

With respect to this, I urge my colleagues to scrutinize the votes 

of last week’s State Authorization Markup. I fear that the bill that 

emerged from that session may have jeopardized some important 

democracy assistance in the vulnerable spots of the region. 

I am delighted to learn that our European friends are considering the United States National Endowment for Democracy as a 

model for undertaking of foreign policy—the Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and EU High Representative for External 

Relations Catherine Ashton who are pushing for the creation of the 

European Endowment for Democracy, a flexible, funding mechanism for supporting democratic transition processes in neighboring 

countries. 

I hope our witnesses will also touch on this and other interesting 

regional cooperations planned that are underway. And I know that 

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Marino and Mr. Deutch recently participated in a Community of Democracies Parliamentarian Forum and 

that the NGOs that will be testifying today were also present 

there. And I look forward to hearing about this and their testimony 

and the organization’s potential. 

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe and the United States 

have worked together successfully to advance freedom and democracy in the newly independent states. For most of these new partners, the goal has been economic and political stability and membership in one or more premiere trans-Atlantic organizations. That 

is NATO, the European Union and OSCE. This work is not over 

as the Balkan nations strive to pass through reform to prepare 

themselves for membership. But Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, if expansion of these organizations is finite, what goal or incentive will inspire these countries to take on the challenges of reform? I hope our witnesses will speak to this issue as well. 

Finally, the protracted, frozen conflicts in Moldova and the 

southern Caucasus are reminders that we can not expect forward 

motion on freedom and democracy if we, the United States and the 

EU, disengage or embrace isolationism. In Belarus, or on the EU’s 

borders, Europe’s last dictator has orchestrated an electoral fraud 

and violent crackdowns on peaceful dissent. Close coordination between the United States and European Union is important in addressing this situation, but most importantly Belarus’ democratic 

neighbors have a vital role to play by backing civil society and 

independent media with material assistance and political support. 

Central and Eastern Europe have shown a strong willingness to 

assume leadership in the EU and NATO and I think this is a real 

opportunity to assume a leadership role. If the Arab Spring has 

taught us anything it is that democracy is still relevant and that 

the people who are oppressed seek freedom and seek the power to 

change their governments, the promises of democracy. 

I commend the work of IRI, Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy, and others who have implemented the 

U.S. vision of strengthening democracy worldwide. And I’m eager 

to hear the testimony from our witnesses and I again thank the 

chairman for calling this hearing and having an agenda where we 

will be traveling and seeing for ourselves what’s happening on the 

ground because I think that’s how we learn more by going there 

7

and visiting and interacting with people and I look forward to traveling with you in the future. 

Mr. BURTON. Toward that end, I hope your wife is feeling much 

better. She had a little back trouble. And I want to say that I’m 

very happy that I was able to co-sponsor the Russia amendment 

with you, even though we still have some problems over there. 

The gentlelady from Ohio, would you have an opening statement? 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Mr. Chairman, I’ll be brief. I just want to say that 

this is a very important topic and while I might be new to this 

panel, I am not new to the International Republican Institute or 

the National Endowment for Democracy, because some 15, 16 years 

ago I was sent by the IRI to Russia to work with both the IRI and 

the NED to help in their election processes and to train candidates. 

And back then we were working toward democracy in Russia and 

we’re still working through it today and I look forward to the testimony and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. BURTON. I thank the gentlelady. And we’ll now recognize Mr. 

Sires from New Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important 

hearing today to examine democracy and the human rights development in Eastern Europe. While human rights conditions are not 

perfect across Europe, I think we can agree that the situation in 

Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the South Caucasus, has 

greatly improved since the days of the Cold War and the wars in 

the Balkans. 

Much of the success can be credited to the integration of Europe 

and the desire of many of these countries to join NATO and the 

European Union. I think it can be concluded that the EU has had 

a great impact on the progress of human rights in the region. The 

human rights situation is generally better among EU member 

states than EU member candidates. 

I have personally seen firsthand the progress made on democracy 

and freedom in the region when I travel to both Poland the Czechoslovakia. While great improvements have been made, there are still 

shortcomings in human rights and democracy in such countries as 

Belarus, Ukraine, and even the EU member Hungary. It is my 

hope that today’s hearing will help us assess how we can balance 

the need to continue to help new democracies in the region emerge 

without letting other democracies regress. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today. And I thank 

you, Chairman, for holding this meeting. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Poe of Texas, do you have an opening statement? 

Mr. POE. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today’s hearing focuses on 

democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights in Eastern Europe. One item of human rights that I am particularly concerned 

about, not only Eastern Europe but worldwide is the dastardly 

deed of human trafficking that occurs in Eastern Europe and other 

places in the world. Thankfully, the Trafficking of Persons Report 

established by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and produced 

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curring in the world and in our own country where human beings, 

mainly females, are bought and sold for sex and for labor. It is a 

form of modern-day slavery. 

Many countries, in my opinion, aren’t doing enough to address 

this issue. We need to do all that we can to pressure all countries 

that do not meet the minimum standards in combating traffic and 

to change course and focus on this issue. 

Significant numbers of Eastern European countries have poor 

human trafficking records. The 2011 Trafficking of Persons Report 

places Russia, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Estonia all on the Tier 

2 watch list with many other Eastern European countries on Tier 

2. Tier 2 watch list countries have a significant number of trafficking victims and have not provided evidence that they are increasing their efforts from the previous year to combat this horrible 

crime. 

While Tier 2 countries are making efforts to come into compliance, they still don’t meet the minimum standards established in 

the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Both Tier 2 and Tier 2 

Watch List countries are considered to be making significant efforts 

to bring themselves into compliance and with the standards of the 

Trafficking and Victims Protection Act, it is necessary for the 

United States to continue to put pressure on these countries to 

make real changes. 

The United States claims to be and is the leader in human rights 

throughout the world and it is important that we take the lead 

worldwide in making sure that human trafficking, modern day 

slavery, comes to an end. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ll submit the rest of my comments for the 

record. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Poe. Mr. Melia, we really appreciate you being here today. Let me introduce our guests. Mr. Melia 

is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights and Labor. He’s responsible for DRL’s work in Europe and in Russia and the countries of Central and South Asia as 

well as workers’ rights and issues worldwide. 

He came to DRL in 2010 from Freedom House where he was deputy executive director for 5 years. And for more than 12 years, Mr. 

Melia held senior posts at the Democratic National Institute. I 

really appreciate you being here today. We normally swear witnesses in, so if you wouldn’t mind, I’m sure you’re very truthful. 

Will you rise so we can swear you in? 

Do you swear to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth, 

so help you God? 

Mr. MELIA. I do. 

Mr. BURTON. You can proceed with an opening statement if you 

have one. Can you turn on the microphone? 

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS O. MELIA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. MELIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Meeks and 

the other members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today about the state of human rights and 

9

democracy in Eastern Europe. I ask that my full written testimony 

be submitted for the record. 

Mr. BURTON. Without objection. 

Mr. MELIA. I apologize for its length. To paraphrase a great 

American, if I had taken more time, I would have made it a bit 

shorter, but in the interagency clearance process, more things get 

added to these kinds of documents than get taken out. Assistant 

Secretary Michael Posner asked me to send his regards specifically 

to the members of this subcommittee to emphasize his desire and 

that of all my colleagues in the Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights and Labor to work closely with this subcommittee to address the challenges and opportunities in this important region. 

I want to commend you also, Mr. Chairman, for the selection of 

the non-governmental panel that is to follow and that I intend to 

stay and listen to. Nadia Diuk, Steve Nix, and David Kramer are 

among the very best analysts of the democracy challenges in this 

region and they are also activists of the first order, leaders of important NGO efforts to assist local efforts in these countries to promote the cause of freedom. So I’m proud to be at the hearing today 

with them. 

This is a timely moment to discuss democracy in Eastern Europe. 

Lithuania, one of the brighter stars of democratic consolidation to 

have emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union just concluded 

a very successful term as chair of the Community of Democracies—

as you saw when you were in Vilnius 3 weeks ago. Moldova, too, 

has moved forward in recent months with orderly elections and is 

deepening its democratic habits on several fronts. Turkey and Hungary are in the midst of major constitutional reforms that have 

raised some concerns and anxieties because of the very large majorities that those governments have in their Parliaments. In the 

past few weeks, more happily, Belarusians have recently found creative new ways to protect their government’s harsh repression, 

demonstrating the resiliency of the human spirit in Belarus. 

I want to start with two broad points. First, even among our allies in Europe, we have a continuing interest in the fair treatment 

of minorities. Roma, Europe’s largest minority, continue to experience violence, segregation and other discrimination. Anti-Semitic 

and anti-Muslim incidents are too common and not going away. 

And individuals with disabilities struggle to participate fully in 

governance due to limited accessibility. Moreover, members of the 

lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities face discrimination and even violence in many parts of Europe. These issues are 

important in their own right and because the U.S. and democratic 

Europe can send important messages by our own examples of what 

tolerance and inclusion, what equal citizenship for all can look like. 

Second, I want to add a caveat about the enduring project of 

trans-Atlantic integration. The promise of EU and NATO membership has been highly effective in promoting reform and democracy. 

Ten former Communist countries from the former Yugoslavia and 

the Warsaw Pact have now joined the EU and today’s news is that 

Croatia has been told it may join by the turn of the year. In every 

case to date, however, the Democracy Index scores from Freedom 

House in its Nations in Transit Report declined the year after each 

of these countries’ admission to the EU, demonstrating that memVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:15 Jan 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EE\072611\67599 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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bership in the EU is not the end of history, does not mean that 

democratic development is over or concluded. 

We’re concerned, for instance, these days about Hungary’s current democratic trajectory since the Fidesz-led government there 

won two-thirds of the seats in Parliament last year. The government has taken several major steps to limit checks and balances 

and otherwise solidify the power of the government party. As Secretary Clinton said during her visit to Budapest last month, ‘‘We 

call for real commitment to the independence of the judiciary, a 

free press, and governmental transparency.’’

We also have a great interest in developments in Turkey, concerned about media freedom. We’ve urged that an investigation 

into prosecutions of journalists proceed in a transparent manner, 

and with due process. And while the government there has taken 

some positive steps in expanding religious freedom, we continue to 

urge that the Halki Seminary be reopened and the other issues relating to the status of the Orthodox patriarch. 

Ukraine is an important partner and we have major concerns 

about the directions things have gone since the Presidential elections last year. I visited Ukraine the second week in July for the 

third time in 9 months and met with government officials, civil society, and opposition leaders. As you know, former government officials including Prime Minister Tymoshenko are facing prosecution 

on charges that seem puzzling at best and mischievous more likely. 

At the same time, there is positive momentum in some areas. We 

urge the government to reach for a genuine consensus on the rules 

of the game as it develops a new election law and we take note of 

the concerns raised by partners like NDI and IRI. The Yanukovych 

government needs to deepen its engagement on election reform 

with other parts of society. 

On Belarus, the Obama administration has continued the longstanding bipartisan policy centered on consistent advocacy for democracy and human rights. I myself went to Minsk in mid-January, shortly after the crackdown on December 19th, to demonstrate 

the U.S. Government solidarity with the families of political prisons. I met also with human rights lawyers, journalists and civic 

leaders. In tandem with the EU, we imposed sanctions and asset 

freezes on individuals responsible for the crackdown and we have 

increased our support for democratic actors by 30 percent this year 

to aid those facing repression. 

Mr. Chairman, perhaps the most complex challenge to democratic reform in Europe lies in Russia. In a 6-day visit there in 

March I traveled beyond Moscow to Perm and Ekaterinburg where 

I acquired a better sense of the diversity of opinion of the Russian 

people and the challenges they face in advancing democracy. Two 

weeks ago, Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov met in 

Washington. In addition to working together to address shared interests like confronting Iran’s nuclear threat and priorities such as 

Afghanistan and missile defense, they announced several important partnership initiatives. It’s within this context a partnership 

of great breadth and strategic importance that we continue to support a democratic, modern Russia governed by the rule of law. 

Unfortunately, continued restrictions on fundamental freedoms 

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ship with us. We’ve expressed our concerns that parliamentary 

elections in December may fall short of international standards and 

though an assessment team from OSCE’s ODIHR office is arriving 

soon, it’s important that Russia follow up with a formal unrestricted invitation for ODIHR election observers. 

We continue in our engagement throughout the year to raise concerns about the assaults on freedom of the press and freedom of expression, particularly the numerous, unsolved cases of murdered 

activists like Natalya Estemirova, the rampant corruption and impunity exemplified by the case of Sergei Magnitsky and restrictions 

on freedom of assembly for members of groups like Strategy 31, the 

Khimki Forest Defenders, and various LBGT groups. 

U.S. programs in Russia, including those funded by DRL, my bureau, focused on developing an independent media bolstering local 

human rights defenders capacity and of course, we continue to 

speak out publicly and privately against human rights abuses on 

a consistent basis. 

We’re grateful for the partnership with the Congress in this effort. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear 

here today and I look forward to your questions and our discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Melia follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. I appreciate your opening 

statement. One of the—I have a few questions here that I think are 

extremely important and you addressed one of them in your opening statement regarding Hungary. They passed a religious repression law just recently. Have we had any contact with that government protesting that move, restricting religious freedom to just a 

few religions in particular? 

Mr. MELIA. The law you’re referring to requires the re-registration of religions in Hungary and thereby disadvantages a number 

of them. 

Mr. BURTON. Tell me a little bit about that. I mean they can’t 

register as a legitimate religion, but can they assemble or what 

kind of restrictions have been put on them by the Hungarian Government? 

Mr. MELIA. The law has just been passed so in terms of whether 

it will lead to any actual restrictions in the day-to-day operations 

of faith communities remains to be seen. The Hungarian Government has told us that it won’t. But I can tell you that Assistant 

Secretary Posner and I raised this issue last week in a meeting in 

our office with a visiting minister from the Hungarian Government. 

We said this looks very troubling and looks like it’s moving in exactly the direction you suggest. We asked them to revisit that. 

Our Embassy in Budapest raises this, among other issues, with 

the Hungarian Government. They are in the midst of passing a lot 

of laws these days in Hungary. They are passing more fundamental 

laws in the wake of the constitutional reform that was just enacted 

a few weeks ago. They are going through a series of I think it’s almost two dozen cardinal laws which are fundamental laws framing 

major parts of Hungarian society. And they’re doing it without adequate consultation with political opposition and civil society and 

frankly, without heeding much of the advice they’re getting from 

the international community. 

Hungary is a partner of ours. It’s a NATO ally. It’s a member 

of the EU. It just concluded its turn as President of the EU. We’re 

engaged on a very vigorous basis with Hungary and trying to get 

their attention on some of these measures. 

Mr. BURTON. I think since they are a member of the EU and they 

are an ally, a NATO ally, I think it’s incumbent upon us since we 

stand for freedom, democracy, and human rights and religious freedom, that we send a formal letter, if not criticism, but a formal letter of protest because that flies in the face of what we stand for 

as well as our NATO allies and I believe the European Union. So 

I don’t know if anybody from the Hungarian press is here, but we 

think this was a mistake and we hope that they’ll rectify that. 

You mentioned Turkey. Can you restate real quickly the concern 

that you had about Turkey that was in your opening statement? 

Mr. MELIA. Well, I can refer to the fuller statement where it’s 

discussed at greater length. 

Mr. BURTON. You don’t need to go into great detail, but you mentioned something that eludes me at the moment. 

Mr. MELIA. I mentioned the importance of the Halki Seminary, 

the Greek Orthodox Seminary that’s been closed since the mid1970s due to a law that was passed by a previous government that 

25

restricted the ability of any faith community to operate educational 

establishments. 

Mr. BURTON. The Patriarch of the Orthodox Church is in Turkey. 

Mr. MELIA. That is right. 

Mr. BURTON. And we passed an amendment in the authorization 

bill which we passed last week that addresses that and urges Turkey to make some changes that would allow for the reconstruction 

and the expansion of religious freedom over there, especially since 

one of the leaders of one of the biggest churches in the world actually resides and is headquartered in Turkey. 

Mr. MELIA. 300 million Greek Orthodox. 

Mr. BURTON. 300 million. 

Mr. MELIA. That’s right. 

Mr. BURTON. And my wife happens to be one of them so I have 

to be absolutely sure I bring that up. 

Mr. MELIA. And we bring it up frequently with the Government 

of Turkey. And in the aftermath of their recent elections in which 

the Erdogan government was reconfirmed in office, we have taken 

it up again and there have been some measures taken to accommodate the ecumenical Patriarchy there. They’re making it easier for 

others to gain Turkish citizenship so that they can become part of 

the operation of the Patriarchy in Istanbul. That’s part of normalizing the succession prospects of others to take over as Patriarch. 

So they’re doing some minor things that are accommodating the 

community there, but they haven’t yet found a way to reopen the 

seminary which continues to have a high school that operates and 

it continues to operate as a library and a resource center. The facility, I understand, is maintained in good stead. They’re just not allowed to train seminarians for the priesthood at a college-equivalent level. And that’s something that we’ve been pressing them 

about on a regular basis. 

Mr. BURTON. Turkey is a NATO ally and a good friend, but I 

think just mentioning this to the government would be a profitable 

thing. 

Mr. MELIA. We will continue to do so. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just make one more comment and ask a 

question. There are two cases and I think you mentioned one, 

Sergei Magnitsky. 

Mr. MELIA. Yes. 

Mr. BURTON. And Mikhail Khodorovsky. I had the same problem 

you did with some of these Russian names. Can you give me an update on that situation? I know you mentioned it briefly in your 

opening statement. 

Mr. MELIA. Well, Sergei Magnitsky, you recall, was the lawyer 

for an American firm that uncovered some fraud, a $230 million 

fraud against his company and reported it to Russian authorities 

and was promptly accused of having undertaken the fraud himself 

and was imprisoned and held for about a year without charge or 

trial. And during his imprisonment, he became ill and he died 

through neglect which most observers think was malicious and intentional. 

We have called on numerous occasions for the prosecution of 

those responsible, that there should be no impunity for those responsible for his tragic death. It is a major human rights violation 

26

of this innocent, 37-year-old lawyer when he died last year. So that 

continues to be one of our engagement points. 

In response, legislation that Senator Cardin introduced, and has 

also been introduced in the House by several of your colleagues, 

would call for visa bans on some people identified as being responsible for Magnitsky’s death. I think there has been some action 

taken recently. You’ll note that just in the last 2 weeks, two prison 

officials had charges opened against them and prosecutions are beginning about his death. So that is an item that we continue to 

press the Russians on and we’ll continue to do so. It’s become a 

kind of emblematic case in Russia. A lot of Russians are as outraged about it as we are. 

Mr. BURTON. They should be. Khodorovsky, he evidently was responsible for U.S. investors losing $12 billion. Can you give us any 

update real quickly on that? 

Mr. MELIA. I’m not familiar with the aspect that you just mentioned. Mikhail Khodorovsky was one of the wealthiest men, maybe 

the richest man in Russia 10 years ago when he became a supporter of opposition political movements and most observers believe 

that for his involvement and support of alternative political operations in Russia, he was tried and convicted of fraudulent activities. He was recently resentenced a few months ago and his term 

was extended. He was to have gotten out of jail later this year. 

Mr. BURTON. One of the things I hope you’ll check on, because evidently U.S. investors were bilked out of or lost $12 billion, and 

since he’s been incarcerated I wonder if we could find out what 

happened to those assets and if there’s any way that there could 

be some repayment for the money that U.S. investors lost as a result of this. 

Mr. MELIA. You may be referring to the fact that his company, 

Yukos Energy, which was an oil exploration company was taken 

over by——

Mr. BURTON. Expropriated by the government. 

Mr. MELIA. By the state and that included a lot of American 

ownership as well. So that was part of what was done to 

Khodorovsky. That’s right. 

Mr. BURTON. Are we making any protest about that to try to get 

some of those funds back and if not, will we? Sorry to take so much 

time. 

Mr. MELIA. That’s all. You know, we’ve mostly addressed taking 

to the Russia Government our concerns about the prosecution of 

his case and his imprisonment and the extension. I would have to 

get back to you. I’ll take that question and explore what we’ve done 

in terms of the assets themselves. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, we’d really appreciate that. I mean obviously 

if he was incarcerated illegally, it’s great to protest that, but I’m 

sure these American business people who were bilked out of $12 

billion because of government expropriation would like to protest as 

well. 

Mr. Meeks? 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I’ll just pick right 

up since you ended with Russia, let me just ask some questions 

about Russia. One of the things that I’ve been looking to move forward with is Russia’s accession to the WTO, because that will then 

27

force them into some rules and regulations and that might be good. 

But my question about Russia lies with the President’s reset policy 

and from the way I understand it, it’s expanding engagement in 

areas of mutual interests that will not only improve an important 

relationship, but open markets. But the question is, and also the 

hope is, sometimes my viewpoint is when you engage with countries in this regard, you also can have a significant impact on 

human rights, on workers’ rights, in democratic principles. And I 

know there’s a lot—I’m trying to figure out how do we improve the 

situation because Russia is key in the area. 

Can you talk a little bit about the President’s reset policy as well 

as maybe make a comment on the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission and whether that’s working successfully or not. 

Mr. MELIA. Sure. Thank you for that, Mr. Meeks. When the 

President came to office 21⁄2 years ago, we set upon a course that’s 

been frequently referred to as the reset with Russia in order to repair a relationship that had broken down to the point where there 

was almost no communication between the two governments. And 

over the last 21⁄2 years, we have found a way to engage with Russia 

on a range of things that are important to our national security 

and our prosperity and that includes working with the Russians on 

shrinking our nuclear arsenals, working with them to corral Iran 

and its nuclear ambitions. And they’ve provided access for supplies 

to our service members to get in and out of Afghanistan over Russian territory. 

They abstained on the key vote on the Libya action at the U.N. 

Security Council in order to let it go forward. So there are a number of ways in which we are doing normal business with Russia 

that we were not able to do before the start of this reset policy. 

Our hope has been that this engagement will give us more influence and more leverage with the Russians to move further in the 

direction of respect for human rights and opening up the political 

system to respect democratic norms. It’s been less successful on 

that front. 

We continue to engage with them on a regular basis. As I said, 

we call them out on individual cases as they occur, on recurring 

strategic problems like the freedom of assembly, curtailment of 

freedom of expression. There is generally what I call an ‘‘information deficit disorder’’ in Russia in that the authorities make it difficult for alternative points of view to get reflected in the official 

media and even in private media. There are definitely efforts to 

curtail freedom of expression in a broad, systematic way. And we 

try to address that in a couple of ways. One is by pressuring the 

government to relent. The other is by supporting independent 

media through grants and through our work in the OSCE and 

other ways. 

We can’t make other countries do what we want most of the 

time. What we can do is try to engage with them and pressure 

them and persuade them and cajole them and also support through 

material means and in our solidarity efforts, other voices to be 

heard. So we’re doing that in Russia. We’d like it to be more successful and we’ll continue to work at that. 

In terms of public statements, we speak out publicly about our 

concerns in Russia at least as often and probably more often than 

28

we do with any other country in the world. So the engagement that 

we have in terms of cooperation on things that are important to 

our national security interest does not keep us from speaking the 

truth in public to the Russian Government. 

Mr. MEEKS. And on that same, you know, note, you talked about 

our activities in helping strengthen civil society, etcetera, can help 

promote democracy, move things around. Now given the fiscal crisis that we’re having in the United States and other problems, it 

seems as though funding for assistance to Europe and Central Asia 

has plummeted and continues to plummet. The good news about 

that is that the EU is taking a greater role in this regard and I’m 

convinced that the United States’ role is not obsolete. We’re not 

just going to—just, compete with the EU. 

In fact, there has often been the case where U.S. funding assistance has initiated innovative programs that the EU has subsequently taken over which is a testament to American innovation 

which I think is a good thing. But I’m always concerned when traveling with the United States’ reputation and with the dwindling 

amount of money that we’re going to be having to fund various programs that are there, some of it because of what we have, but I 

want to make sure that we’re not cutting off our nose to spite our 

face. 

What kind of goodwill do you think that we can continue to build 

in Eastern Europe and Eurasia if the funding levels keep going 

steadily down? And how will this impact, for example, the Northern Distribution Network or the future of the Manas Base in 

Kyrgystan, in particular, the impact of cutting funds to them? 

Mr. MELIA. That’s either one big question or a lot of small questions. They’re all important. I think the main question you asked 

is about whether our influence and our prestige in the world will 

be diminished if we shrink our ability to be present in grants and 

activities around the world. I think you’re right. To the extent that 

we are not able to be providing support to democratic activists in 

countries throughout Eastern Europe and beyond into Central 

Asia, that is the extent that our light will be fading in the eyes of 

people who are looking for our help. 

We are engaged on the security front across Central Asia and 

around the world, but even there, there are pressures on the budget, obviously, and that’s part of the debate that’s going on in this 

town this week. 

We are finding smarter ways to use the resources we have to 

make it available to support the work of democratic activists in 

various places. We’re doing that through virtual programs, enabling international networks to get together online and to support 

each other in ways I think have come to fruition in Belarus in recent weeks, for instance. We’ll continue to do that. 

If there’s a dramatic cut in resources, then there will be a dramatic cut in the ability of America to be present on the front lines 

where people want us to be. I’ve traveled in the 11 months that I’ve 

been in this job, I’ve been to 10 of the former Soviet Republics and 

I have found that people look to America, first and foremost for our 

example, the kind of democracy that they know we are and are becoming, as we struggle to improve our democracy all the time. And 

they want us to be speaking out that we know what’s going on in 

29

other countries, that we have a preference for the democrats, small 

D democrats. And we’re going to put our influence and our weight 

and our resources behind them. 

There are republicans, too, in some of these places, but I’m talking more generally about democrats. So I think you’re right. The 

more that we’re able to be present in the world, the more we’re 

able to help people that ask for our assistance. 

Mr. MEEKS. The last question I have, do you think we’ll have—

because my concern is about the Northern Distribution Network 

and the future of Manas, especially with the cooperation that we’ve 

been having with Kyrgyzstan. Do you think it’s going to have any 

effect there? 

Mr. MELIA. Kyrgystan is the best hope for a democratic breakthrough in Central Asia. They’ve had competitive elections a few 

months ago and five parties are in Parliament. President Roza 

Otunbayeva, the woman who came in as interim President, she’s 

going to stand down when they hold a Presidential election later 

this year. That is the country that has the best chance to consolidate a democratic system. It happens to be the place where the 

Manas Air Base is and where we have access to Afghanistan. 

I think we need to demonstrate that we’re interested in 

Kyrgystan not just because of their strategic location, but because 

we care about the people of Kyrgystan and the policy of this administration is to do so. And so we are emphasizing our support for 

trying to consolidate this democratic opportunity in Kyrgystan 

right now. That’s the largest recipient of our democracy and governance assistance and the place where we can be the most helpful 

I think. 

Mr. BURTON. Incidentally, we’re planning to take the codel over 

there some time either late this year or early next year. 

Ms. Schmidt of Ohio. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you. First, a quick comment on Russia and 

then I want to focus on Romania. It was 16 years ago, I think it 

was 16 years ago, that I actually went over to Voronezh, Russia to 

help them establish a way to win elections in a democratic fashion. 

And it’s ironic that this many years later, they’re still struggling 

for democracy in Russia. But having said that, focusing on Romania, what target date has the administration given the Romanian 

Government for restoring the remaining 5,000 properties belonging 

to religious communities illegally confiscated under communism? 

And is the State Department aware that the Romania Restitution 

Committee has met only twice in 2 years and for the past 9 years 

has handled only one third of all religious property claims? 

Mr. MELIA. You have gotten outside my briefing. I don’t know 

the answer to that, Congresswoman. I will take that question and 

get back to you in the next few days, either in person or with a 

written response to you on that. I just don’t know the answer to 

that. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you. You probably can’t answer the other 

two with Romania. I will just say, in closing, on my Romania question that I do have some folks back home that have interests in Romania and one of the things that they struggle with is the level of 

corruption that is there and it makes it very difficult for American 

30

companies to do business when corruption still is commonplace in 

many parts of the former Soviet Union. 

Well, maybe you can answer the last question that I have. Is our 

Embassy in Bucharest prepared to send an observer to the trial of 

Attila Marko, which is set to begin on September 6th in Brasov? 

As you probably know, Mr. Marko is the only Hungarian member 

of the Romania Restitution Committee who has been scapegoated 

and falsely indicted for abuse of power because he approved the 

restitution of specific property in 2001. If you don’t know that, you 

can get back to me on that. 

Mr. MELIA. I will include that in my response to you. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Okay, and you mentioned that the Organization 

for Security Cooperation in Europe, whose mission has drastically 

changed since its founding, its operations during the Cold War and 

20 years of post-Soviet Union democracy building. What role do you 

see the OSCE taking in the next 20 years? 

Mr. MELIA. Well, the OSCE is an important mechanism for a 

number of reasons. Twenty years ago in 1990, at the end of the Soviet Union, it transformed from an occasional meeting of foreign 

ministers into a permanent organization with a Secretariat and a 

number of missions. An important part of that mission has been 

the Office for Democratic Initiatives and Human Rights based in 

Warsaw and they have been able to put missions on the ground in 

various countries and provided advisory and technical assistance 

and political momentum to accelerate certain reform initiatives. 

They provide a lot of assistance in monitoring of election processes 

across the OSCE space. 

I was with the Secretary in Astana last December when the 

OSCE summit took place. And the Astana Declaration reaffirmed 

all of the 56 member states’ commitments to the human rights catechism that has been built up over the years in OSCE, including 

the proposition that human rights in any individual country is the 

responsibility of all the members, that it is not an intrusion on the 

internal affairs of another state to take an interest in human rights 

situations elsewhere. And so, all of the countries agreed to that. 

That’s particularly important in the case of Central Asia because 

the five countries of Central Asia don’t belong to any other framework organization that provides a discussion on human rights and 

democratic fundamentals in the way that other parts of the former 

Soviet Union or parts of the Council of Europe or nowadays, the 

European Union. So the OSCE is especially important in Central 

Asia. It’s also important as a reference point in places like Ukraine 

and Russia and in the Caucasus. So it will continue to be a way 

that we can gather together governments who otherwise may go 

their separate ways. 

The monitoring missions and the peacekeeping efforts in the socalled frozen conflicts in Moldova, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, along Georgia’s northern border, OSCE provides an important way to get these governments together from time to time to 

try to address these security issues, as well as the human rights 

issues that are attached to them. So we think that it will remain 

an important mechanism going forward. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Sires? 

31

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I had to go to 

my office. 

Mr. BURTON. That’s okay. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much for your testimony. I’m sorry 

I missed most of it. You know, a couple of years ago we traveled 

to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary and also we went to Russia. One of the things that one of our colleagues asked the Russians 

when we were there is that the BBC did polling in Russia and they 

said about two thirds of the Russians do not like us or distrust us. 

Is that still the case? I mean this was about 3 years ago. 

The other question I have is I just want to know how much—one 

of the other things that came out during the conversation is the influence of Russia on Hungary which used to be a lot more than in 

Poland and Czechoslovakia. I was just wondering if you can comment on that. 

Mr. MELIA. I mentioned earlier the information deficit disorder 

that we see in Russia where discussion of a lot of public issues and 

political options and political opportunities is curtailed due to restrictions on the broadcast media in particular. The information 

space is flooded by anti-American—I guess propaganda is not too 

harsh a word to use. There’s a campaign to feed suspicion and paranoia about the West, about the United States, and about democracy. That’s the information environment that we’re competing in 

through Voice of America and through our information programs, 

exchange programs, things like that. 

It’s a contested space and right now the dominant view is that 

the United States and other Western governments do not want 

Russia to succeed as an independent state. Now that is exactly 

wrong. Right? We know that the United States wants Russia to 

stand on its feet and be a self-sufficient, law-abiding democratic 

state that can be part of the international community. We want 

Russia to succeed. But there is this campaign abroad in the land 

that says exactly the opposite, that somehow we’re trying to weaken Russia and make it something other than a success. So public 

opinion is inclined in the way you say. That’s right. 

Mr. SIRES. In terms of Hungary? 

Mr. MELIA. Hungary on the other hand has to this point had a 

very open, vibrant media environment. It has a history of being 

part of the Warsaw Pact, being dominated by the Soviet Union. 

There’s a lot of hostility toward Russia and the Soviet legacy. That 

was underscored, I think in recent days. They dedicated a statute 

to Ronald Reagan in Budapest last month to commemorate the fall 

of communism. 

Mr. SIRES. We have to go there, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MELIA. So I would say well, there are obviously business connections between Hungarian businesses and Russian counterparts. 

The Hungarian Government is part of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. 

The OSCE has all these connections to Russia. I don’t think I 

would be as concerned about Russia somehow suborning Hungary. 

That was sort of the inference in your question. 

Mr. SIRES. Right. 

Mr. MELIA. I think Hungarians are aware enough of their surroundings and they can make up their own minds. There have been 

six elections in Hungary since the fall of communism. Five times 

32

they’ve thrown out the incumbents and put in an alternative government. So Hungarians are pretty good at being able to make decisions and say no when they want to. So I’m confident that Hungary will retain its well-deserved and long-fought for independence 

from Russian and other kinds of foreign influence. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. Where did you come up with 

this information deficit disorder? That’s a term that I’ve not heard 

before. Is that something that you made up? 

Mr. MELIA. Well, it emerged from some conversations in my office. I have some very able colleagues in the Democracy and 

Human Rights Bureau, and that’s a phrase that we came up with 

to describe what we see as one of the central challenges in the democratization of Russia which is this public discourse space. 

Mr. BURTON. You don’t need to explain, I just thought it was 

kind of cute. 

Mr. MELIA. You can quote me on it. 

Mr. BURTON. Now Mr. Meeks had one more question. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me ask this question which is something of an 

issue that really concerns me. I look at my own history and Dr. 

Martin Luther King once said, ‘‘Injustice anywhere is a threat to 

justice everywhere.’’ And when I look at the situation of the Roma 

throughout Europe and Eurasia, it’s deplorable. Roma communities 

are on the fringe of society. They’re largely unemployed and 

uneducated. They’re living under bridges and in shanties and garbage dumps and children are subject to servitude and trafficking. 

So I was wondering if you could address what is being done to 

help fight and help them with human and civil rights of Roma and 

to address statelessness in general, if you could? 

Mr. MELIA. The Roma community is the largest minority across 

Europe and is present in various proportions in many countries in 

Europe, East and West. In our diplomacy, in our Embassies in 

those countries, we do a lot of outreach to Roma communities. We 

provide grants to organizations that advocate for Roma rights. We 

in DRL have several programs along those lines trying to strengthen the advocacy for Roma interests and rights in a number of the 

new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. 

The Hungarian Government, we keep circling back to Hungary, 

in their recently concluded presidency of the EU, they made the 

elevation of the plight of the Roma the signature issue of their 

presidency and that’s to the credit of the Hungarian Government. 

And we hope that there will be more follow through across the EU 

institutions to try to bolster the situation of Roma so they can 

enjoy their citizenship and participate in political and economic 

life. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Melia, thank you very much. Your testimony 

was very thorough and we really appreciate you answering the 

questions so well and thank you for the new terminology. We really 

appreciate that. 

Mr. MELIA. Thank you for the opportunity. 

Mr. BURTON. If you can send us the answer to some of the questions that you weren’t prepared for, we’d appreciate it. 

Mr. MELIA. Will do. 

33

Mr. MEEKS. He’ll give you the credit the first time for your statement. The second time it will belong to him. 

Mr. BURTON. That’s absolutely right. 

Mr. MELIA. I’m willing to share. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, sir. Our next panel we’d like to welcome to the table. David Kramer, he is the—David, where are you? 

David Kramer, do we have the—there we go. He’s the president of 

Freedom House, which he joined in October 2010. Prior to joining 

Freedom House, Kramer was a senior trans-Atlantic fellow at the 

German Marshall Fund of the United States which is a good organization. He was an adjunct professor at the Elliott School for 

International Affairs at the George Washington University and before joining GMF, Kramer served as Assistant Secretary of State 

for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor from March 2008 to January 2009. Thank you very much and welcome. 

Steve Nix joined IRI in October 2000, as regional director for 

Eurasia. In that position, he oversees programs in Azerbaijan, 

Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova, 

Russia and the Ukraine. Nix joined the IRI after serving for 2 

years as Senior Democracy Specialist at the U.S. Agency for International Development. He’s a specialist in political party development and judicial and legal reform in the former Soviet Union. 

Welcome. Thank you, Mr. Nix. 

Nadia Diuk, did I get that right? 

Ms. DIUK. It’s pronounced Diuk. 

Mr. BURTON. Diuk. I’m sorry. They wrote this down wrong. It 

wasn’t the way I read it. I would have said that. She serves as vice 

president of programs for Europe and Eurasia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean at the National Endowment for Democracy, 

a private nonprofit organization funded by the U.S. Congress to 

strengthen democratic institutions around the world through nongovernment efforts. She has worked in Eastern Europe for nearly 

20 years. You’re too young for that, but for 20 years, at NED. I 

want to thank you all for being here today, and just because we 

have a practice of doing this, I’d like for you to be sworn in. 

Do you swear to tell the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 

so help you God? 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Thank you. Let’s start with Dr. Diuk. Did I get that right that 

time? Thank you, Doctor. 

STATEMENT OF NADIA DIUK, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT, 

PROGRAMS, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY 

Ms. DIUK. Chairman Burton, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to join in today’s very timely hearing on a region that continues to hold tremendous importance for freedom and democracy around the world. 

For the record, I would like to note that the National Endowment 

for Democracy does not take policy positions, so all the recommendations I offer today come as a result of my own assessments. 

As you know, this year marks the 20th anniversary of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and just over 20 years since the lifting 

of the Iron Curtain when the countries we previously called EastVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:15 Jan 04, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EE\072611\67599 HFA PsN: SHIRL
34

ern Europe cast out the Communist systems that kept them as 

‘‘Captive Nations’’ and shackled them to the Soviet Union. This is 

a good time to rethink the terminology. These states are fully integrated into Europe whose institutions have proven to be one of the 

main guarantors of freedom and democracy, an aim that we should 

support for countries still on the outside. 

For this reason, I’m pleased to see that the title of this hearing 

refers to Eastern Europe. We should view Moldova, Ukraine, 

Belarus, and even Russia as the new Eastern Europe and consider 

the inclusion of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia which are, after 

all, already members of the Council of Europe. 

This brief review of the state of freedom and democracy has been 

informed by reports, discussions, and feedback from the many nongovernmental groups NED works with in the region. Overall, although there have been some gains, the general trend has been a 

slow backsliding and in some cases dramatic reversal. I have presented details and examples in my written remarks. 

In four of the western Balkan states, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, 

and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the prospects of EU membership in 

the interest of EU officials have provided a sobering and positive 

effect on democratic backsliding. 

Moving to the East, the deteriorating state of democracy and 

freedom in the Southern Caucasus is of continuing concern. In 

Azerbaijan, the overall trend is a slow and painful decline of political pluralism and civil society. Constitutional amendments have 

removed Presidential term limits. The recent parliamentary elections were considered the worst ever. Freedom of association is 

nonexistent and an attempt to introduce an extremely restrictive 

NGO law in 2009 was diverted only as a result of international 

pressure. 

The prospects of democracy and freedom look more hopeful in Armenia where protest rallies of up to 15,000 people have taken place 

recently and the political prisoners who were held after the 2008 

protests have been released. Despite the real gains achieved by 

Georgia in the past few years, there is cause for concern about 

creeping authoritarian tendencies that could mar its record as a 

leader for democracy and freedom in the region. 

Moving back into the heart of the new Eastern Europe, Moldova 

is the one bright spot where trends toward democracy are positive. 

However, the authoritarian regime in the breakaway region of 

Transistria remains a problem. The situation in Belarus remains 

dire as the crackdown, begun after the Presidential election on December 19th, continues. I think you have very full details from all 

three of us on that, so I won’t dwell on that which I know my colleagues will talk more about. 

Mr. Chairman, I have left Ukraine and Russia until last in order 

to underscore their importance. The relationship between the two 

and the direction each takes will determine the future of freedom 

and democracy not only in their own country, but in the region as 

a whole. The trend lines in Russia have been unremittingly negative. Human rights defenders and independent journalists have 

been killed. We have witnessed the grizzly death in detention of 

the lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky. And civic activists have been routinely harassed, especially those who work on the North Caucasus. 

35

By creating an array of government-controlled commissions, public chambers, and councils which have essentially replaced the role 

of political parties, and aggregating and expressing the interests of 

the people and by refusing the registration of truly independent political parties, the Kremlin has effectively created two classes in 

Russia, those who wield political power and control of all the public 

and private assets and those who have limited access to justice and 

no genuine representation of their interests. 

Despite the growing frustration within society and the increasing 

number of street protests such as the 31 Movement, it is ironic that 

the current regime will likely use the upcoming elections with the 

inevitable falsifications and manipulations to claim the continued 

legitimacy of its rule. 

In 2004, when the rulers in the Kremlin saw their Ukrainian 

neighbors to the south bring down their authoritarian government, 

they responded by strengthening control over civil society groups 

and further curbing the independent media. Many authoritarian 

rulers around the world have followed Russia’s lead to conduct 

their own backlash against democracy. Always the source of innovation when it comes to anti-democratic strategies, the Kremlin 

has also taken proactive measures to promote support for the government through sponsorship of youth groups such as Nashi, which 

means ‘‘ours,’’ whose jingoistic ideology challenges and erodes the 

fragile democratic values that civic and human rights activists in 

Russia struggle to advance. 

This brings me to Ukraine where I met last week with both government officials and civic leaders. Just a few years ago, Ukraine 

played a pivotal role as a champion of democracy and freedom in 

the region. Indeed, one prominent Russian pro-democracy commentator declared that the best way to promote democracy in Russia 

was to make sure it succeeded in Ukraine. Since the election of 

President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2010, however, the prospects for freedom and democracy have taken a sharp downturn. 

The constitution has been amended to recentralize power with the 

presidency. The judicial system has been manipulated to launch 

criminal proceedings and selective prosecutions against former officials. Last year’s local elections were considered to have been manipulated in favor of the ruling power. Independent media have 

come under pressure. The security services have started to monitor 

civic organizations. There has been a concerted effort by the authorities to coopt advisory councils of civic organizations. 

As in Russia, there have also been efforts to undermine freedom 

of religion. 

Despite these negative trends, civil society in Ukraine remains 

strong and motivated. Ukraine’s significance for the region’s democracy activists cannot be underestimated: They come to Ukraine to 

hold conferences, conduct training seminars, exchange experiences 

and generally to ‘‘breathe the air of freedom’’ which is not available 

in their own countries. Russian journalists, Belarusian human 

rights defenders, and civic leaders from the South Caucasus have 

all come to Ukraine to work and meet. Ukraine’s crucial role as the 

democratic anchor for civic activists in the region should not be 

overlooked despite the backsliding of its own democracy. 

36

Mr. BURTON. Dr. Diuk, could you summarize, please? We try to 

keep it close to 5 minutes, if possible. 

Ms. DIUK. Yes. You will see that my recommendations are actually in my written remarks, but if there is one that I would like 

to highlight, it is to support the increased participation of women 

in politics which is a problem in all authoritarian states. I haven’t 

singled that out because it is a widespread problem and particularly since it has been proven that the presence of women usually 

reduces the level of corruption and has a tendency to break up the 

opaque and corrupt relationships maintained by male-dominated 

authoritarian political aides. 

Mr. Chairman, I think Eastern Europe has a great deal to offer. 

As we focus on the democratic breakthroughs in the Middle East 

and as we look forward to a period of austerity, we should be mindful that a strategic and concerted effort conducted through diplomatic and nongovernmental actors is the most cost-effective way to 

achieve our goals. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Duik. follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much for that testimony and we 

here in the United States try to make absolutely sure, in fact, the 

women in Congress make absolutely sure that there’s no discrimination. 

Mr. Nix, you’re recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN NIX, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, 

EURASIA, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 

Mr. NIX. Chairman Burton, Ranking Member Meeks, thank you 

very much for this opportunity to testify about a very important 

part of the world. We know the focus is sometimes elsewhere, the 

Middle East, North Africa, however, Eurasia remains a very, very 

important area for the strategic interests of the United States, so 

thank you for this opportunity and I ask that my remarks be entered into the record. 

Mr. Chairman, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the former 

Soviet Republics have moved at various speeds and paces in terms 

of democratic reform, processes, and values. Some are on the right 

trajectory, others are not. Today, my testimony will focus on two 

areas that we think are very much in the wrong trajectory, those 

are Belarus and Ukraine and two that we think generally are on 

the right track, Moldova and Georgia. 

In Belarus since 1994, Alexander Lukashenka, the last dictator 

in Europe, has ruled Belarus with an iron fist, using tactics common under Soviet rule, a large state security apparatus, harassment, arrests, beatings, and in some case, murder. The fraudulent 

December 2010 Presidential election, the brutal crackdown initiated after it, against those who dared to oppose the regime, and 

the unfair post-election trials follow the pattern of repression that 

has characterized Lukashenka’s 17 years of rule. 

Lukashenka’s post-election plan was to further discourage the 

opposition by holding trials and to continue to incarcerate 

oppositionists. This plan is not succeeding. During the month of 

June, people have gathered in what are now known as silent protests. People gather and clapping has become a popular way of expressing discontent and a desire for change. Soon the authorities 

began arresting anyone who clapped. So it’s becoming increasingly 

clear to the authorities that they can no longer control the silent 

protests which are expanding throughout the country. 

The question remains, what is the U.S. position with regard to 

the regime and toward the opposition? The U.S. House has passed 

the Belarus Democracy Act. The U.S. Government has extended 

economic sanctions on Belarus for another year. However, Mr. 

Chairman, we don’t feel that that’s enough. U.S. assistance should 

be directed toward increasing the effectiveness and capacity of 

democratic political parties and activists inside the country. They 

are the ones who constitute the alternative to Lukashenka’s regime. They are the ones in a position to provide economic and social reform. The political opposition needs increased technical and 

commodities assistance. 

In Ukraine, many international organizations have criticized 

Ukraine’s current trajectory on democratization. In the year since 

Yanukovych became President, Freedom House has downgraded 

Ukraine from being free to partly free. The Ukraine Government 

44

has begun to closely monitor NGOs and their activities including 

the IRI. A cabinet of ministers’ decree makes it easier to deregister 

civil society organizations. IRI has received a written request from 

Parliament demanding information on IRI’s activities in Ukraine 

since 1991. The request is unprecedented in nature and scope for 

the IRI’s long history in Ukraine. 

In spite of numerous European and U.S. Government statements 

of concern about the application of selective justice, the Ukrainian 

Government continues to prosecute and incarcerate leading opposition figures. The U.S. has consistently supported Ukraine’s EuroAtlantic aspirations. The U.S. must be very direct with its Ukrainian colleagues. It should tell the Ukrainian authorities frankly 

when their actions, whether involving elections, civil society, rule 

of law, or media are in contradiction with Western standards. 

In Georgia, Mr. Chairman, the government continues to build 

democratic institutions and in the past several years, we feel 

there’s been areas of notable progress. The position of Tbilisi Mayor 

has become an elected position. Georgia has undertaken constitutional reform, is now working on a new election code in an attempt 

to ensure that elections scheduled for 2012 and 2013 meet international standards. The U.S. has consistently supported Georgia’s 

sovereignty and territorial integrity and should continue to do so. 

In the meantime, the U.S. should continue to support Georgia’s efforts to build democratic institutions. 

And finally, in Moldova, after years of political stagnation since 

achieving independence from the Soviet Union, Moldova has 

reached a historic and transformative point in its democratic development. In 2009, voters ended 8 years of Communist Party rule 

and elected a coalition of reform-minded pro-Western deputies. 

Since then, the government has made impressive progress in implementing democratic reforms, showing greater respect for human 

rights and moving toward its ultimate goal of European integration. 

Moldova’s economy would substantially benefit from greater access to global markets including the U.S. The Moldovan Government is committed to expanding the international markets for its 

country’s products. The Jackson-Vanik amendment hinders the 

government’s ability to do so. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me close with an observation. The Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia Act which was formerly known as the Freedom Support Act and the Support for 

Eastern European Democracy, or SEED Act, and the programs that 

these pieces of legislation created have provided essential support 

for those struggling to promote democracy throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It’s important that support continue from the United States to help those countries which are 

seeking to consolidate democratic institutions and practices such as 

Georgia and Moldova as well as those continuing to struggle in 

places like Belarus and Ukraine to finally establish a path to a 

democratic future. 

Again, thank you for this opportunity and I would like to commend you on a personal note, Mr. Chairman, for coming to Vilnius 

and seeing with your own eyes what the Community of Democracy’s Parliamentarian Forum is trying to do. And you should know 

45

that they’re having a follow-up event in Washington which I hope 

you’ll be able to attend. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nix follows:]


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Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Nix. I really appreciate 

that comment. I will be at that conference. And the thing that was 

unusual about the conference in Vilnius is their legislative branch 

was in session and they left me in charge of the whole conference. 

And I didn’t know what was going on. 

Mr. NIX. I was in the audience and I thought you did an outstanding job. 

Mr. BURTON. Would you call my wife? She doesn’t appreciate me 

and I’d like for her to know that. 

Mr. Kramer. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID KRAMER, 

PRESIDENT, FREEDOM HOUSE 

Mr. KRAMER. Chairman Burton, Member Meeks, members of the 

subcommittee, it’s an honor to appear before you here today and 

also an honor to be on this panel with my friends, Steve Nix and 

Nadia Diuk, and also my friend and former Freedom House colleague, Tom Melia. I also want to commend you on the timing of 

today’s hearing, Mr. Chairman, because it allows me to shamelessly plug two publications from my organization, Freedom House: 

Nations in Transit 2011, which describes trends in East and Central Europe and Eurasia, and Sounding the Alarm: Protecting Democracy in Ukraine. I recommend both. 

Mr. BURTON. Can we get copies of those? 

Mr. KRAMER. With pleasure, sir. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. 

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, the state of democracy and freedom 

in East and Central Europe is fairly strong and resilient albeit 

with some exceptions, but in Eurasia I would argue the picture is 

much more bleak. The countries closest to the European Union, 

and by the extension to the trans-Atlantic community, are at a pivotal point in their development. Belarus, as Steve and Nadia have 

explained, is pushing the limits of repression as Europe’s last dictatorship, even if a breakthrough there in Lukashenka’s demise may 

come about before too long. 

Ukraine, arguably the most strategically important country along 

the EU’s borders, is also moving in the wrong direction when we 

look at things in a democratic perspective. And trends there, if left 

unchecked, threaten to steer Ukraine in a direction of greater centralization and consolidation of power, even authoritarianism and 

kleptocracy. 

As we look at the Caucasus, only Georgia has really shown signs 

of progress, whereas in Azerbaijan, there has been backsliding. 

Moldova, as Steve has indicated, is in contrast to these other countries, moving in the right direction and earning the greatest net 

improvement in our scores in the Nations in Transit Report. We 

hope that that progress will continue. 

For the West and its interest in seeing these countries become 

more democratic, policy should involve deeper engagement with 

these countries, not less. And pushback on abuses, not silence. This 

will not be easy given competing demands elsewhere in the world, 

but if the majority of countries in Eurasia continue to veer off the 

democratic path, the challenge for the West will only grow. 

66

There are some common features as we look at the countries in 

Eurasia in particular, and that’s where I want to focus, Mr. Chairman. A number of these consolidated authoritarian systems do not 

permit real political competition and instead hold stage-managed 

elections in a desperate bid for legitimacy. Governments in the region, just as those in the Middle East, systematically deny space 

for moderate, political expression and alternative viewpoints, driving these viewpoints into greater extremist directions. 

Rampant corruption and lawlessness hobble economic opportunity and reform, and in many cases, the opaque regimes in the 

region tend to treat the national wealth as their own wealth. This 

is part of the broader pattern of narrow regime interest taking 

precedence over public good. 

None of the consolidated authoritarian regimes in question have 

signaled a willingness or capacity to undertake genuine reforms. 

Instead, the prevailing strategy seems to be just as it was with regimes in the Middle East, to tighten the screws and hope for the 

best. That is not a wise or effective strategy. 

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues have covered a number of countries 

in the region. Some of them are covered in our reports. I want to 

cover Russia in my remaining time. And let me cut right to the 

chase by saying that Russia’s leaders show no respect for human 

rights, accountability, or independent institutions and refuse to 

allow a viable opposition to take root. This disrespect for human 

rights and lack of accountability extends to past abuses as well. 

Lithuania has sought cooperation from Russian legal authorities in 

its pursuit of accountability and justice for the killings of 14 people 

on January 13, 1991. This is included in the Lithuanian authority’s 

requests for the extradition of Mikhail Golovatov, commander of 

the Alpha KBG Unit at that time, who had briefly been detained 

in Austria but has been inexplicably released. 

Looking ahead with Presidential elections coming up in Russia, 

I don’t see a reason to be optimistic or hopeful about the situation 

there. Prime Minister Putin continues to out poll President 

Medvedev, although not by huge margins, and the support for both 

leaders has been declining. A return by Putin as President, I think, 

would be a depressing blow for those hoping for an end to the authoritarian rut that Russia has been in for the past decade. 

Sovereign democracy, the term that has been used to try to pretend that Russia is pursuing a democratic path in its own way, is 

something that I think none of us want to see extended for 6 more 

years at least, should Putin return, and the Presidential term has 

been extended from 4 to 6 years. 

Many Western observers favor Medvedev over Putin, viewing the 

former as a more liberal, Western-oriented reform leader. But even 

if Medvedev remains President, I frankly don’t see many signs or 

much reason to be hopeful that Russia will move in a more democratic direction despite Medvedev’s lofty rhetoric about modernization and rooting out legal nihilism. Russia, after more than 3 years 

under his presidency, has really shown no improvement on democracy and human rights issues, and in many respects it is as bad 

as it was under the 8 years with Vladimir Putin as President. 

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tigated for their reporting and their activities. Critics like Mikhail 

Khodorkovsky, as you asked Tom Melia before, Mr. Chairman, suffer the punishment of authorities because they step out of line and 

are victims of the judicial system as Russian leaders choose to use 

it. The North Caucasus, while less violent than it was a decade or 

a decade and a half ago, continues to remain a mess when it comes 

to human rights, and Chechen leader Kadyrov is pointed at as responsible for many abuses himself. 

Overall, the lack of accountability for human rights abuses and 

the grossly politicized legal system create an environment wherein 

such abuses are not only condoned but expected, almost as a demonstration of loyalty to the regime. 

Mr. Chairman, there are a number of activists, lawyers, and 

journalists who have been killed over the years in Russia with no 

resolution to their cases: Natalya Estemirova, Aleksandr 

Litvinenko, Anna Politkovskaya, Paul Klebnikov, and Sergei 

Magnitsky, just to name a few. In the Magnitsky case you had 

asked Tom Melia about before, I would strongly encourage, Mr. 

Chairman, and I know I’m over my time, support by the U.S. 

House of Representatives, along with the U.S. Senate for the Justice for Sergei Magnitsky Bill in the interest of trying to hold Russian officials accountable for gross human rights violations, not 

only in the case of Magnitsky and his murder—and I do call it a 

murder since he was denied medical treatment and allowed to die 

in prison—but for other similar gross human rights abuses. I would 

strongly urge the subcommittee and the full committee and the 

chamber itself to get behind this bill. This bill, I would argue, Mr. 

Chairman, is what has moved Russian officials to do anything. In 

the past, before legislation was being considered by U.S. or European parliamentarians, the Russians not only ignored this case, 

but they rewarded and promoted officials who were involved in the 

Magnitsky case. That has come to an end and I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this subcommittee will get behind this legislation. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kramer follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. I just mentioned to my right 

hand here that we’ll take a hard look at that and see if we can get 

on that bill. 

One of the things that you mentioned about Belarus was 

Lukashenka and his iron fist and iron hand over there. They’re 

building a nuclear facility very close to the border near Vilnius in 

Lithuania. 

Do any of you have any comment about that or any suggestions 

on how we can—I’m not sure we can—dissuade Russia from going 

ahead with that or Belarus? And let me also just expand that and 

say, how strong is the control or influence that Russia has over 

Belarus? 

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, the relationship, I would argue, between Russia and Belarus is quite strained. I don’t think it’s a secret to say that Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev cannot stand President Lukashenka. They seem to be enjoying the current plight that Lukashenka is in and want to try to exploit it so 

that Russia can buy up assets inside Belarus. Belarus is being 

squeezed from all sides. Lukashenka, I should say, is being 

squeezed from all sides. And I think that’s a good thing because he 

deserves to be for the gross human rights abuses he’s committed. 

Mr. BURTON. It’s surprising that Russia is building that nuclear 

power plant. They’re so close to Vilnius. 

Mr. KRAMER. Commercial interests, Mr. Chairman, sometimes 

strongly outweigh other interests that we see in the region, including safety and security for those living along the border. 

Mr. BURTON. We were in Moscow just a couple of weeks ago and 

we met with the opposition. And we share your concern about the 

lack of I guess chance that they have of having any kind of an impact on the upcoming elections. And I believe that if I were a betting man that whoever Putin decides is going to be the next President, whether it’s Medvedev or himself will be the President because of the conversations we’ve had with business and political 

leaders over there. 

Let me see what else I had here I wanted to ask you about. Georgia. We were in Georgia and one of the things that you neglected 

to mention was the invasion of Georgia by Russia and the occupation and the building of barracks and actually small town, if you 

will, right on the border there between Georgia and Russia. Do any 

of you have any prospects or thoughts on—or any evaluation on 

what can be done to get Russia to relent and move out of that 

area? 

Mr. NIX. I would just say this, Mr. Chairman. The Georgian concern is that on the other side of the border, the unrecognized border, Russian forces continue to build up there and there’s a great 

concern and the Georgian Government is looking to purchase defensive weapons to defend itself and that is a very, very important 

issue to the Georgian Government. 

Mr. BURTON. We went down to a city that they’re building which 

is in close proximity to the occupation. We went down there with 

the President of Georgia. And they’re doing that to show the positive impact that the free society is having in that area to try to dissuade the kind of things you’re talking about. I was not aware until 

79

just now. You say they’re building up forces on the Russian side 

for potential invasion further into Georgia? 

Mr. NIX. I don’t want to speculate the aims, but according to the 

Georgian Government, there is a build up on the border area, yes. 

Mr. BURTON. I wasn’t aware of that when I was there just a few 

short weeks ago. I was aware of the occupation, but not of any additional military. 

Mr. NIX. I think it’s more of a construction in nature than anything else. 

Mr. BURTON. I think you’re right there. They’re permanently 

building structures for their troops and their families. You mentioned Moldova and Jackson-Vanik. You think we ought to change 

our attitude on Jackson-Vanik with Moldova? 

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, on Moldova, I think absolutely. On 

Jackson-Vanik, to be perfectly honest, Mr. Chairman, I think Jackson-Vanik should be lifted for Moldova, for Russia as well. JacksonVanik was a piece of legislation that served its purpose very effectively. It came about in the 1970s and the emigration of Soviet 

Jews is obviously no longer an issue in light of the collapse of the 

Soviet Union. 

In the case of Moldova, I would lift Jackson-Vanik without any 

additional steps. In the case of Russia, I would lift Jackson-Vanik 

and then substitute it for a Magnitsky kind of bill so that there is 

legislation in place that applies to Russia’s abuses today, rather 

than abuses that the Soviet Union committed in the past. 

Mr. BURTON. Do you think a Jackson-Vanik repeal would be 

something that would convince the Russians to take a different 

track on issues like that? 

Mr. KRAMER. No, I don’t. But my interest——

Mr. BURTON. I think so. 

Mr. KRAMER. My interest, Mr. Chairman, is Jackson-Vanik really 

doesn’t play. 

Mr. BURTON. It’s outlived its usefulness. 

Mr. KRAMER. And moreover, if we were to graduate Russia from 

Jackson-Vanik, we would disarm them from one of the political 

weapons they like to use against us and hit us over the head: You 

still have this old piece of legislation that you hold against us. 

Mr. BURTON. I think you make a very valid point. 

Mr. Meeks? 

Mr. MEEKS. Just on that, following the chairman, what about 

Russia’s interest in entering into the WTO? Do you think that will 

cause them to at least do some more—abide by some of the rules 

and regulations there? 

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Meeks, in an ideal world, I would say yes, but 

I am not convinced that Russia really wants to join the WTO. Just 

in the past 10 days, we’ve seen Prime Minister Putin talk about 

the automobile industry in Russia and making sure that WTO 

membership would not adversely affect that in Russia. 

President Medvedev just the other day talked about maintaining 

agricultural subsidies in Russia. There are indications that there 

are splits within the Russian leadership on joining WTO. My hunch 

is that Russia would prefer to point the finger and blame Georgia 

for blocking Russia’s joining the WTO than it actually would joining WTO itself. And so we have to be careful not to want WTO 

80

membership for Russia more than Russia does. And I fear that 

that’s where we’ve wound up. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me go back to what we were talking about earlier and thank you for that. It seemed to me that one of the driving 

attractions for some of the developing nations like Moldova, for example, and then to a degree the other extreme would be the 

Ukraine, is entrance into the EU and now that the EU seems to 

be saying that they’re not going to expand any more, the question 

is what—do you think there’s any other motivations that one will 

have to inspire progress in strengthening those democracies? 

Moldova is on the right path from what I’m hearing from everyone. 

But they know if the EU is not going to open up, do they continue? 

Do they go back? Would it be an incentive for the Ukrainians if 

they thought they did the right thing, they could get access into the 

EU? 

Give me your thoughts, Dr. Diuk? 

Ms. DIUK. Ukraine’s foreign policy in the first few months of 

Yanukovych actually was veering a little toward Russia, so they 

weren’t too interested in the EU, but it seems to have veered back 

again now and there are some active talks taking place on association status for Ukraine. 

Ukraine is very sensitive about its international image and even 

if EU membership itself may be a little way off, I think the current 

government does like to put itself forward as a European state and 

they have made claims that, ‘‘Oh, we will make sure that all of the 

European standards are adhered to within our country, even if we 

are not admitted to the actual union in the very near future.’’

However, we should look at these statements with a little bit of 

skepticism, but I think the EU is a very disciplining element and 

we should keep up with making sure that the EU does look at this 

positively. 

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Nix? 

Mr. NIX. Yes, Mr. Meeks, with regard to Moldova, I would say 

that Moldova has taken great steps in terms of reform and they are 

dedicated to European integration. In fact, the alliance, AEI stands 

for the Alliance for European Integration. And first and foremost, 

they’re all about becoming part of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance and 

taking great steps, as I said, to do so. 

In turn, the European Union is negotiating a free trade agreement and other agreements, instruments with Moldova. And I 

think the two sides are moving together. I think also our polling 

data indicates that the Moldovan people, although they’re supportive of EU membership, know that it will take some time for 

that to actually take place. So I think the level of expectation is 

not that great in terms of the number of years it might take for 

Moldova to integrate. 

Mr. MEEKS. I wanted to mention the fact that the EU has concluded its trade agreement with Moldova, but yet here in the 

United States we don’t even have a PMTR with Moldova. Do you 

think that that’s something we should begin to institute working 

with Moldova in short order? 

Mr. NIX. I really do. One of the basic concerns of Moldova is that 

it receives scant attention and for a country which is the same size 

as all the Baltic States, it receives very little attention. To be able 

81

to come together and unite the political opposition as they did in 

the 2009 election and defeat the last popularly elected Communist 

government in Europe was an outstanding feat that largely went 

unnoticed. So it struggles for attention. One of my recommendations in my written testimony is that, Mr. Chairman, you and the 

members of the subcommittee travel to Moldova and see exactly 

what this government is trying to achieve. See the reforms that 

they’re instituting. They are young, reform-minded, Western-oriented leaders and it would be critical, I think, for you to go. 

I applaud Vice President Biden who went in the past year and 

our chairman, Senator McCain also visited. I would really encourage the subcommittee to go out and see for yourselves. 

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Meeks, if I could just very quickly, I would add 

to that I think there really is no reason not to grant PNTR to 

Moldova and graduate it from Jackson-Vanik. The challenge has always been finding the legislative vehicle by which to do it, and if 

there could be more focus on that, I think that would be a very significant move. Thank you. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me ask this question because in light of the Arab 

Spring and the connection to the Internet and people fighting for 

democracy, I was wondering in Russia the effectiveness of groups 

like the Blue Bucketeers or what is it, the Khimki Forest people 

or the now Article Sanction 31 protest, whether or not any one of 

you could talk about the influence of these groups who are trying 

to utilize the Internet as a light on government corruption and 

some of the things that are taking place now, trying to stand up. 

Are they starting to take hold? Is it something that can mushroom 

or what’s your viewpoint? What are your thoughts? 

Ms. DIUK. One of the things that we’ve noticed, particularly with 

information coming from our partners in Russia, is that these protests are increasing now, whether it’s the Khimki Forest, whether 

it’s the 31 Protest or protesting against the restrictions on freedom 

of association. However, the difficulty for all of these protests are 

that they are out on the street. They find it very difficult with the 

other restrictions in terms of political organization to channel those 

ideas and demands into any sort of institution in Russia that will 

pay any attention. 

You mentioned the Internet. Yes, of course, it has been a very 

useful tool for informing people. There is a whole sort of virtual 

independent Russia out there on the Internet, but I would like to 

mention also that the Russian authorities are very aware of this 

and they have also flooded the Internet with their own sort of progovernment and anti-democratic Web sites that are manipulated 

very effectively by the Russian Government. 

I don’t see for the future how these protest movements can actually feed into the political system. 

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Meeks, I think to the extent that these movements exist, they’re very nascent, and they are driven largely by 

frustration with corruption as we saw in the removal of the governor of Kaliningrad. Even the Blue Bucket movement was driven 

by abuse of blue lights by officials who weren’t entitled to use such 

blue lights on their cars and caused a number of fatal accidents. 

In some cases they are fed by economic reasons, as we saw out 

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pose duties on the imports of foreign cars. We haven’t really seen 

a movement driven by resentment, frustration, or unhappiness 

with the anti-democratic direction that the Russian leadership has 

taken the country over the past 10-plus years. I’m not saying it is 

impossible to happen, but there aren’t very strong roots yet in Russia for it to take shape. 

Mr. MEEKS. If I may, last question. Everybody is getting frustrated and I try to figure out with what’s going on in Belarus and 

with the fact that, and you know, how do we increase freedom and 

democracy there given who we have there, and the fact that the 

United States Government, the EU, or I don’t believe any of your 

NGOs are allowed to operate freely in Belarus. 

So I’m just hoping, I’m just trying to figure this out. What strategies can we utilize to try to increase freedom and democracy in 

Belarus? 

Mr. NIX. Yes, sir. I’d like to answer that directly. As I stated in 

my testimony, we feel that now is the time to really add pressure 

to the regime which is under pressure. As David pointed out, 

Lukashenka is under tremendous economic pressure, social pressure. Now is the time for change. There was a movement in the 

past 2 years on both of the—on the part of the EU and the United 

States to try to do some sort of rapprochement with this regime. 

And so there was an attempt to do soft projects, education, environment, business development that they thought would bring Belarus 

closer into Europe. 

The events of December 19th, the brutal crackdown demonstrated that there’s no more gray areas. It’s only black and white 

and these types of projects don’t work. The only thing that we 

think works is the hard projects where you are actually training 

people to be politically active, civil society to be active, and to try 

to promote change from within the country. 

As you correctly point out, those of us who are in the business 

of doing more of the hard projects are prohibited from entering. My 

people just applied and we were rejected for visas and just simply 

can’t get into the country. We operate from Vilnius, Lithuania. Our 

colleagues at NDI operate from Kiev, Ukraine, and we think that 

that’s the most appropriate way for our organizations to work in 

the country, to do it offshore and that’s what we’d like to continue 

to do. 

Ms. DIUK. I’d just like to add to that. At the National Endowment for Democracy because we work with small amounts of funding, we have provided considerable amounts of funding to Belarus 

and independent activists and they accept this funding and work 

with this funding at huge risk to themselves, but it is possible to 

do. We’ve been doing it for many years now and also assisting both 

IRI and NDI to convert their programs in the country and we 

would hope for further support to be able to do that. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. Sires? 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I listen to your comments, are we—I’m talking about America—too distracted in not 

devoting sufficient attention to this area with all of the things that 

we have going on in this country? Are we too distracted? I mean, 

you know——

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Mr. NIX. I would just say this, Congressman, that we understand 

why there is focus on other parts of the world right now. But it’s 

my opinion and I think my two colleagues join me in this and Mr. 

Melia as well, what happens in this region has tremendous impact 

far beyond the region. And so this region remains of critical strategic interest to the United States. So additional focus is necessary. 

It may be difficult for all that’s going on, as you pointed out, but 

again, we think that attention, assistance, involvement, engagement is critical in Eurasia. 

Mr. SIRES. I just wonder how you feel. 

Mr. KRAMER. Congressman, it has been a several decades long 

goal to see a Europe whole, free, and at peace. And that vision has 

not yet been realized. There is a lot of work still to be done. There 

are challenges in the region. In the case of Russia, not only is it 

not moving in a democratic direction internally, but it even poses 

a challenge to other countries that look to move in a more democratic direction to try to block those countries’ integration into 

Euro-Atlantic institutions. 

As Steve said, and I agree with him, it is completely understandable that a lot of attention on the part of the U.S. Government and 

European Governments is on the Middle East and events happening there. But we cannot take our eye off the ball in Eastern 

Europe and Eurasia. It is critically important what happens there. 

We do want to see that vision come true of Europe, whole, free, and 

at peace. 

Ms. DIUK. I might as well add my bit here, too. I echo everything 

that my two colleagues have said and I can understand why there’s 

been a lot of excitement about the events in the Middle East, but 

we have to remember that there was similar excitement 20 years 

ago about this region of the world and we still haven’t managed to 

get it right in that region yet. So I think that all goes for greater 

attention, possibly more attention than is being given right now. 

And as well, not just to single out one country, but to look at the 

region as a whole and see how inter-connected it is, how these civic 

activists work on a regional basis. We should be helping them on 

a regional basis and not to just work with one country and possibly 

downplay some others because of budgetary or other attention deficit issues that we might have. 

Mr. SIRES. You know, as a follow up of my colleague’s questions, 

one of the tactics that we could use would probably be to block 

loans, IMF loans, to some of these countries and other international loans. Have we ever applied that tactic against 

Lukashenka? 

Mr. KRAMER. Congressman Sires, the IMF extended a loan to 

Lukashenka after he released the political prisoners in 2008 and 

extended that loan in 2009. Lukashenka broke his promise to the 

IMF by grossly inflating state spending by increasing salaries to 

state employees right before last December’s Presidential election, 

obviously designed to buy votes, quite literally. 

So there are very good economic reasons not to move forward 

with any additional International Financial Institution support to 

Lukashenka. There are also political reasons not to do so, and I 

know the IMF does not like to get involved in politics, but I would 

argue in the current circumstances, as long as there are some 40 

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plus political prisoners languishing in Belarusian jail cells, there 

should be absolutely no consideration given to an IMF loan. In fact, 

if the IMF won’t announce it, it won’t even consider an IMF loan, 

a Belarus working group that some of us are involved in has recommended that Secretary Geithner and EU finance ministers come 

out and state very clearly that the U.S. and EU will not support 

any IMF loans to Belarus. 

Lukashenka is holding out for the hope that the IMF will bail 

him out. And not only should the IMF not bail him out, we need 

to send two signals. One to him that the IMF is not going to come 

to his rescue, but we also need to send a signal to the opposition 

and civil society in Belarus to let them know that the IMF is not 

going to undercut their efforts to bring about change there. 

Mr. NIX. Again, I would just—yes, this is a critical point. 

Lukashenka is desperate for cash. He cannot continue to fund a 

state-run economy the way he has been. Russian pressure has been 

placed on the economy. Subsidies on gas and oil have been reduced. 

So he really is in a desperate spot. Now is the time to really turn 

up the pressure on this regime, both economically and politically. 

Mr. BURTON. If the gentleman would yield, I want to thank the 

Assistant Secretary for sticking around. I guess he didn’t hear me. 

Thank you very much for staying around for the second panel. I appreciate that very much. Thank you. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. SIRES. I really have no other questions. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just end by making a couple of comments. 

First of all, you folks, as well as the State Department have real 

insights into the problems facing Europe and Eurasia. We’re going 

to be going on our next codel to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus to try 

to address those issues. We may even stop by Azerbaijan during 

that trip. But if there are things that you think need immediate 

attention or attention in the not too distant future for a congressional delegation to focus on, we’ll be glad to try to do that. 

There are some parts that you talked about today where we have 

not been with Moldova, as an example. And we want to make sure 

we do whatever is necessary over the next couple of years to make 

sure that we help as much as possible to stabilize that entire region, especially in view of the fact that right now they’re having severe difficulties financially in the European Union with Greece and 

Italy and Ireland and Portugal and Spain. And so anything we can 

do to assist in that whole region, we’d like to. 

So you have the expertise. If you have any suggestions if you 

would contact my ranking member, Mr. Meeks or myself, or any 

member of the committee and we’ll see if we can’t work that into 

our schedule in the future. 

Do any of you have any last minute comments on things we may 

have omitted? Any other comments? Thank you very much. We 

really appreciate your testimony. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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