UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ VINCENT DEWAYNE GAYLORD, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. STATE OF KANSAS, Defendant - Appellee. No. 23-3075 (D.C. No. 5:23-CV-04018-KHV-RES) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , McHUGH , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Plaintiff Vincent DeWayne Gaylord, a ppearing pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his suit ag ainst the State of Kansas. The district court dismissed the complaint because soverei gn immunity insulated the St ate and Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which the district court could grant relief. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 31, 2024 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 23-3075 Document: 010110992797 Date Filed: 01/31/2024 Page: 12 I. On March 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a form complaint for pro se litigants, twelve pages of exhibits, and a second form comp laint for pro se litig ants for employment discrimination claims. The district cour t construed these thr ee documents as the complaint. Plaintiff assert ed claims for defamation, fa lse-light invasion of privacy, an employment discriminati on violation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and a civil rights vi olation under 28 U.S.C. § 134 3. The district court— agreeing with the magistrate judge’s r ecommendations—dismissed the complaint on two grounds. First, the district court dismissed three of the four claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) because the El eventh Amendment pr ovides the State of Kansas sovereign immunity fro m suits for monetary damage s. Second, the district court dismissed the remaining claim for a failing to state a Title VII claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff appeals.
II. “Questions involving Eleventh Amendmen t immunity are questions of law that this court reviews de novo. ” Cornforth v. Univ. of Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1129, 1131 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Sturdevant v. Pa ulsen, 218 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000)). We also review the district court’s dism issal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Co rr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 ( 10th Cir. 1999)). “Dismissal of a pro se compla int for failure to state a clai m is proper only where it is Appellate Case: 23-3075 Document: 010110992797 Date Filed: 01/31/2024 Page: 23 obvious that the plaintiff ca nnot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amen d.” Id. (quoting Curl ey v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir.2001)). Just as with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissals, “we must accept th e allegations of the compla int as true and construe those allegations, and any reas onable inferences that mi ght be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir.2002)). And “we liber ally construe pro se filings” though “we do not ‘assume the role of advocate.’” Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Le dbetter v. City of Topeka , Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187–88 (10th Cir. 2003)).
III. Liberally construing Plaintif f’s brief, Plaintiff objects to the district court’s dismissal of his claims. While Plaintiff doe s not clearly appeal the dismissal of each cause of action, he references the tota l damages for which he pleaded in his complaint and reiterates the same genera l facts from his comp laint. Thus, we presume he appeals the dismissal of each cause of action. The district court dismissed most of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) because the Eleventh Amendment pr ovides the State sovereign immunity from suits for monetary damage s. Under the Eleventh Amendment, a plaintiff may not sue a state in federal cour t unless the state consen ts to the suit in unequivocal terms or if Congress unequivo cally abrogates the state’s immunity. Appellate Case: 23-3075 Document: 010110992797 Date Filed: 01/31/2024 Page: 34 Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1315 ( 10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2010)). Here, Plaintiff demands two million do llars in damages and requests no other form of relief. Because th is is a suit for monetary da mages, sovereign immunity blocks Plaintiff’s claims if no excepti on exists. One claim—the employment discrimination claim—survives as we ha ve recognized that Congress abrogated sovereign immunity for Title VII claims. Crumpacker v. Kansas Dep’t of Hum. Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n.2 (1976)). But Plainti ff cites no unequivocal consen t to suit or congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity for his othe r claims. And we see no exception. So sovereign immunity bars Plai ntiff’s claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and a civil rights violation under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Thus, we address only his Title VII discrimination claim on the merits. Plaintiff alleges that De fendant engaged in empl oyment discrimination in violation of Title VII because Defendant prevented him from obtaining a teaching job. “Title VII makes it unlawful ‘to disc harge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, becau se of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” Kha lik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012) (quo ting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Es sential to this claim is an employment relationship with Defendant. S ee Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Since plai ntiff has no employment relati onship with defendants, he Appellate Case: 23-3075 Document: 010110992797 Date Filed: 01/31/2024 Page: 45 cannot pursue a claim for discrimination agai nst them under [] Title VII. . .”) Even under the most liberal re ading of the complaint, Plaintiff pleaded no such employment relationship. And without that relationship, Pl aintiff states no Title VII claim against Defendant upon whic h relief may be granted. For these reasons, we conclude that th e State is immune from suit on all but one of Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintif f failed to state a cl aim upon which a court may grant relief on the other. Thus, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal.

Entered for the Court

Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 23-3075 Document: 010110992797 Date Filed: 01/31/2024 Page: 5