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GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,

AND THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION

IN AFRICA: THE FISCAL YEAR 2012 PROPOSED

BUDGET

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 10, 2011

Serial No. 112–58

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

KAREN BASS, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................................... 8

Ms. Sharon Cromer, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development ................................................ 16

Mr. Patrick Fine, Vice President for Compact Implementation, Department 

of Compact Operations, Millennium Challenge Corporation ............................ 24

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement ........................................... 12

Ms. Sharon Cromer: Prepared statement .............................................................. 18

Mr. Patrick Fine: Prepared statement ................................................................... 26

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 58

The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Material submitted for the record ................... 59

(1)

GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, 

AND THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION IN AFRICA: THE FISCAL YEAR 

2012 PROPOSED BUDGET 

TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. Good afternoon to everybody. Welcome. Thank you 

for being here, especially to our very distinguished witnesses. 

We are holding today’s hearing for the purpose of examining the 

administration’s proposed level of funding for governance, democracy, human rights, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation 

programs in Africa for the upcoming fiscal year and to determine 

our overall strategies for Africa programming as we move forward. 

A large percentage of U.S. assistance to Africa is for global 

health programs. Due to the size of the global health budget and 

the number of important issues specific to global health, this subcommittee will hold a separate hearing at a later date on the 2012 

request for global health funding. 

As we are all aware, our Nation is in severe economic distress. 

Unemployment hovers around 9 percent, even as gasoline and food 

prices continue to rise. Our Nation is engaged in two wars. Meanwhile, our national deficit is measured in the trillions of dollars, 

$14.3 trillion as of this morning, and en route to $25.1 trillion by 

2021, according to the Congressional Budget Office. It is for this 

reason that this House recently passed a plan to begin the process 

of significantly reducing our deficit. 

Recent surveys have shown that many Americans have the widespread impression that U.S. Government funding for foreign operations is much higher than it really is. In actuality, our spending 

for foreign assistance is less than 1 percent of our budget. It may 

seem like more because of the frequent, unanticipated emergencies 

to which we respond out of our national generosity of spirit. 

The administration’s proposed global bilateral budget for 2012 is 

$25.8 billion and the Africa allocation is $7.8 billion, representing 

29 percent of the overall bilateral aid request. This bilateral aid request includes funding allocated for economic support funds, develVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:45 Oct 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\051011\66291 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

opment assistance, and State Department-administrated international security assistance. However, it does not include aid administered by agencies other than USAID and the State Department or multilateral aid. Africa represents 40 percent of the Development Assistance account, 10 percent of the Economic Support 

Fund, and 4 percent of the State Department administered International Security Assistance budget. 

Over the past decade, American bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Af- rica grew from $1.1 billion in Fiscal Year 2002 to $8.8 billion in 

2010. The largest increases were due to significant growth in global 

health spending under the Bush administration and lesser but additional growth in development aid and some security programs. 

There will have to be some efficiencies made and certainly some 

genuine priorities in funding in our overall foreign assistance program. In this subcommittee, our concern is that African reductions 

in funding are not so significant that they prevent us from conducting programs that have saved lives and provided the most 

basic necessities for millions of African citizens and supported our 

national security efforts in the region as well. 

It is not because of the generosity of spirit alone that we conduct 

foreign assistance programs in Africa, although that would, in and 

of itself, justify our abiding commitment. The United States, however, has genuinely significant national interests on the continent 

as well. 

In the first quarter of this year, we watched unrest in North Af- rica cause oil prices to rise steadily. We face the prospect of $5 for 

a gallon of gasoline not only when oil supplies are interrupted but 

also on the fear of potential interruption. The U.S. gets nearly onefifth of our oil from West Africa; and with an increasing number 

of oil fields in Uganda, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, and other locations on the continent, Africa has become too 

important a petroleum source to merely hope that supplies will not 

be interrupted. 

Energy security has long been a concern of the U.S. Government 

because of the importance of oil to our and much of the world’s way 

of life. Failed states provide safe havens for terrorists and now pirates, who threaten commerce and lives. Somalia and Sudan have 

long been well known as sites for al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to train and harbor their minions, as well as modern-day 

pirates operating on the seas. 

East Africa is home to Islamic fundamentalists, some of whom 

perpetrated attacks on U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 

1998 that claimed American lives and many more African lives. 

I would note parenthetically that I chaired the hearings in this 

room in 1998. We heard from Admiral Crowe and Assistant Secretary Carpenter from Diplomatic Security about how ill-prepared 

we were and how many at our Embassies had thought they could 

never strike here. Instead, they did; and thousands of people were 

killed and many more were wounded. 

I would also note parenthetically that, out of that, we wrote what 

was known as the Embassy Security Act, the Meg Donovan and 

Admiral Nance Foreign Relations Act of 2000—and I was a sponsor 

of that—that provided authorization for about $6 billion to beef up 

our Embassies. But the lesson was learned in Tanzania at Dar 

3

Salem and in Nairobi when our Embassies were so brutally hit by 

the terrorists. 

And as we watch government after government fall suddenly or 

crumple under the pressure of popular uprisings, there is concern 

that Islamic militants could seize power and create enemy states 

where allies now exist. Failed states or even weak states could become bases for international criminal cartels. International drug 

traffickers are increasingly using African countries as transshipment points. In fact, since 2003, West Africa has been the 

source of 99 percent of all drugs seized in Africa, and those seizures have increased by a factor of five during that period. 

The United Nations has dubbed Guinea-Bissau, one of the 

world’s poorest countries, as Africa’s first narco state. Now Mozambique, considered a rising economy on the continent, has become a 

drug transshipment point as well. The war on drugs has now shifted from Central and South America and Asia, and that fact cannot 

be ignored. 

The very air we breathe is partially created by the world’s rain 

forests. While the role of rain forests and oxygen generation has 

been, at times, exaggerated, they are realistically estimated to be 

responsible for the production of some 20 percent of Earth’s oxygen. 

Cutting down the rain forest in Africa is not merely a local problem 

for African countries, it is a global issue for us all. Certainly, we 

know storms in West Africa contribute to hurricanes in our hemisphere, so mitigating the negative impact of climate change in Africa is our problem, too. 

The rise of food prices in recent years is a global problem. Scarcity of food produced in Africa means the worldwide shortage also 

causes our food prices to rise. Even if we produce enough for ourselves, the market for food is not limited to one country alone. The 

demand for staples such as rice, wheat, and corn affects everyone, 

and the lack of money to buy such agricultural products in Africa 

means African farmers have their market opportunities limited. 

A point has been made that nearly 80 percent of the strategic 

minerals that the United States needs originate in Africa. An estimated 97 percent of the world’s platinum is from Africa, as well as 

90 percent of the cobalt, 80 percent of the chromium, 40 percent 

of the manganese, half of the world’s gold reserves, and as much 

as one-third of all uranium. In recent years, the mineral coltan, 

largely coming from Africa, has enabled the development of computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices. Africans should 

enjoy more of the largesse of those sales. 

The world would be hard pressed to construct jet aircraft, automobiles, catalytic converters, or computers, cell phones and iPods 

without the minerals found in Africa and, in some cases, almost nowhere else. 

Modern life worldwide depends on a functional African continent, 

and our foreign assistance program must be aimed first and foremost at meeting basic humanitarian needs. We must help the Africans to help themselves, but in so doing we also help ourselves. 

Our testimony this afternoon will be presented by three witnesses: Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie 

Carson; Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for the U.S. Agency 

for International Development’s Africa Bureau, Sharon Cromer; 

4

and the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Vice President for 

Compact Implementation, Patrick Fine. 

Before we hear from our distinguished witnesses, I would like to 

yield to my good friend and colleague, Don Payne, for any opening 

comments that he might have. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank you 

for convening this hearing and for your continued interest and attention to Africa. 

Let me welcome the guests who will be testifying, all of which 

have distinguished curriculum vitae. 

The objective of today’s hearing is to review the President’s budget request for Africa, including bilateral and regional priorities for 

foreign assistance. I look forward to learning about and reviewing 

the administration’s program and resource priorities in sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa as well as the basis for projections for 

these requested funds. 

The total bilateral foreign assistance request for Africa for Fiscal 

Year 2012 is $7.8 billion, nearly three-quarters of which is dedicated to global health, which, as the chairman said, will be covered 

in a separate budget hearing later this month. Today, we will cover 

major priorities, including Feed the Future, humanitarian assistance, democracy and governance programs, security assistance, and 

economic development programs. 

While we discuss the budget for Africa and are keenly aware of 

the effects the economic downturn has had on our own country—

and we are all keenly aware of that as we proceed now in the Congress—we know that this downturn also has affected the rest of the 

world. The recent economic turmoil makes our efforts to strengthen 

African economies, trade, access to emerging markets, together 

with investment in good governance and democracy, even more important. 

We know that the world is deeply interconnected, and instability 

in one country will affect the security and well-being of those 

around the world. The recent revolutions in North Africa and the 

Middle East remind us that food security and good governance, for 

example, are not only humanitarian issues but affect the stability 

of an entire region. This is a lean budget for lean times, to use Secretary Clinton’s word, but we must make sure that security, democracy, and good governance remains a priority. 

According to U.N. population projections, Africa is projected to 

undergo the greatest population increase of any world region in the 

coming decade. People across the continent are demanding governments that serve them and provide for better access to world economies in order to provide growth and opportunity. In this context, 

we must be prepared for the destabilizing and complex interaction 

between population changes, rising food costs, and climate change. 

I am heartened to see that the President’s Fiscal Year 2012 

budget provides for increased investment in both agriculture and 

climate change; and I look forward to your accounts there on the 

panel of how you intend to use the requested funds to help 

strengthen the continent’s resilience to climate disaster, as well as 

the slower, equally pernicious challenges of soil erosion and changing weather patterns. 

5

I also look forward to hearing how the budget will be used to 

strengthen Africa’s agriculture production as well as regional markets and infrastructure to ensure that sufficient food reaches the 

local population. 

While Africa faces great challenges on the continent, we also find 

the greatest potential for growth. In countries like Tanzania, only 

22 percent of arable land is farmed because of inefficiencies in the 

market. I am interested in hearing how the Feed the Future initiative will address these issues. 

In addition to these priorities, we must continue to work to stabilize countries that have recently underwent serious political and 

humanitarian crises and to prevent further crises. 

In this tough economic climate, we must remember that investing in conflict prevention will serve us in the long term. As we all 

know, a stitch in time saves nine, as my grandmother used to say. 

By defraying humanitarian costs, military costs and lost economic 

development will, of course, increase. 

It is estimated that every dollar invested in preventing conflict 

from turning deadly saves us from spending $60 in crisis response 

after violence erupts. We must remain vigilant about recognizing 

the percolating signs of political unrest and nipping them in the 

bud before a full-scale conflict erupts. We must strengthen our investment in good governance, democracy, and conflict prevention. 

I look forward to hearing from you how this budget increases our 

Government’s ability to help prevent and mitigate crises, specifically the important role of the Complex Crisis Fund, or the CCF. 

The recent uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, where professional 

militaries were able to play a pacifying role, reinforces the importance of security sector strengthening and rule of law. I am pleased 

to see the request for a new account, the Global Security Contingency Fund, to enhance foreign militaries and provide justice sectors and stabilization assistance, and I am curious to learn how 

that account will be managed operationally. 

Human rights activists have long raised concerns that some African governments receiving U.S. security and counterterrorism assistance are involved in human rights abuses. I want to know what 

steps we are planning to take to ensure that U.S. security assistance programs do not abet human rights abuses on the continent. 

On the same note, I am surprised to see that countries such as 

Niger and Guinea, which are undergoing fragile transitions from 

military to civilian rule governments, face steep aid cuts. I am 

eager to hear how the administration’s choice of 13 aid priority recipient countries match such priorities as preventing, mitigating, 

and resolving armed conflict. 

And, finally, we must continue to focus on encouraging good governance, sustainable investments, and strong partnerships with African countries. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, the MCC, 

created through bipartisan consensus under President Bush’s leadership in an effort to introduce a new approach to foreign economic 

assistance, works toward all of these goals. It creates powerful incentives for countries to uphold democratic and free market principles and to invest responsibly in their citizens. By upholding 

standardized principles of effectiveness, the MCC ensures that U.S. 

6

tax dollars are used efficiently and that partner countries advance 

toward economic growth. 

The MCC’s compact investments compel countries to make sustainable and substantial reforms. For example, due to the incentive 

of the compact agreement, Ghana passed landmark legislation that 

will improve access to improved seed varieties, certified fertilizers 

and pest-free plants, and ensure that it is better equipped to provide long-term food security for the country. 

The MCC also encourages reform beyond partnership countries. 

It is clear that eligible criteria and focus on policy performance creates powerful incentives for reform. Mozambique’s government, due 

to its continued focus on MCC eligibility, developed an action plan 

to expand access to childhood vaccinations, increase primary school 

attendance for girls, and strengthen natural resource management 

practices. 

Mr. Fine, I look forward to hearing how the MCC plans to expand on its good track record and how it will work to ensure that 

GDP growth in Africa will mitigate poverty levels. I also look forward to hearing how the MCC proposes to address democracy, governance, and human rights concerns that emerge in partner countries after the compacts are signed. 

With economic pressure underlying our Fiscal Year 2012 budget 

debate, I remain a firm advocate for continued investment in good 

governance, peace building, humanitarian assistance, food security, 

and economic development in Africa. I am deeply concerned that 

many of the calls for cuts in international spending are based on 

a belief that the United States, as the chairman mentioned, spends 

far more than it actually does on foreign aid. A poll conducted by 

World Public Opinion and managed by the University of Maryland 

shows that Americans vastly overestimate the percentage of the 

Federal budget allocated to foreign aid, as has been mentioned before, with a median estimate of 25 percent of what the average 

American feels we spend on foreign aid, according to the World 

Public Opinion. 

When asked how much they think we should appropriate, percent-wise the median response is 10 percent, a response that has 

remained unchanged for the past 15 years, straight line. In reality, 

of course, as has already been mentioned by the chairman, our foreign assistance account is less than 1 percent of the Federal budget. The budget for Africa represents a mere fraction of that investment, which yields great returns. 

The President’s Fiscal Year 2012 foreign affairs budget request 

for Africa reflects tough choices and significant savings in difficult 

economic times. In an interconnected world characterized by grave 

turmoil and uncertainty, this budget request represents the resources needed to protect Americans and America’s national security interests in Africa. A stable, well-governed, and developed Africa will be a strong partner to the United States in trade, in business, and in national security. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne. 

Ms. Buerkle. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

7

I just thank you for holding this hearing today. Thank you for 

the ranking member’s comments. And I just look forward to hearing the testimony of our three witnesses here today, and I thank 

you for being here. 

I yield back. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member 

Payne. I also want to thank our witnesses for taking the time out 

for your testimony today. 

As a member of the Budget Committee, I do believe that tough 

fiscal times call for tough fiscal decisions that stretch us to critically examine our values. Having said that, I do believe that our 

foreign assistance in Africa delivers lifesaving humanitarian assistance, provides crucial health interventions, and creates partnerships with Africans to improve democracy, governance, and education outcomes. 

The international affairs budget is critical to the U.S. economic 

engagement with the world, especially at a time when there is wide 

recognition of the need to boost U.S. exports to create jobs. Nearly 

half of American exports now go to the developing world, and the 

U.S. must continue to invest overseas. 

Investment in Africa is a mutual partnership. In the last 10 

years, smart American investment in Africa has shown marked returns. The United States has played an instrumental role in ending 

conflicts as well as decreasing the instances of death from malaria 

and other preventable diseases. This relationship has created jobs 

for American firms and workers who have benefited from marked 

growth in Africa. While Africa’s future must be driven by Africans, 

the United States should play a major role by investing in our African partners to ensure economic and democratic outcomes that lead 

to worldwide stability and prosperity. 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

We now have the privilege of welcoming our three very distinguished witnesses to the subcommittee, beginning with Ambassador Johnnie Carson, who was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of 

State for the Bureau of African Affairs on May 7, 2009. Prior to 

this, he was the National Intelligence Officer for Africa at the National Intelligence Council after serving as the Senior Vice President of the National Defense University here in Washington from 

2003 to 2006. 

Ambassador Carson’s 37-year Foreign Service career includes 

ambassadorships to Kenya, 1999 to 2003; Zimbabwe from 1995 to 

1997; and Uganda from 1991 to 1994; and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs from 1997 to 1999. 

Earlier in his career, he served as staff director for this committee, 

from 1979 to 1982. 

Ambassador Carson is the recipient of several Superior Honor 

Awards from the Department of State and a Meritorious Service 

Award from the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. The Centers for Disease Control presented Ambassador Carson its highest 

award, ‘‘Champion of Prevention Award,’’ for his leadership in directing the U.S. Government’s HIV/AIDS prevention efforts in 

Kenya. 

8

Sharon Cromer is currently the Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Africa Bureau at USAID, a position she has held 

since May 2010. She is a senior USAID Foreign Service officer, 

with more than 20 years of experience in the international humanity and development assistance area. From 1986 to 1997, she was 

assigned to missions in Pakistan, Cote d’Ivoire, and Senegal. Following these consecutive tours, she assumed the role of Deputy Director of USAID’s mission in Indonesia. Ms. Cromer subsequently 

was USAID’s Mission Director in Ghana and later Mission Director 

in Nigeria. 

Upon her return to Washington in 2009, Ms. Cromer served as 

Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy Conflict and 

Humanitarian Assistance on a temporary basis before assuming 

the position of Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau of 

Management. 

Patrick Fine is Vice President for Compact Implementation for 

the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Previously, Mr. Fine served 

as a senior vice president at the Academy for Educational Development and director of the Global Education Center, where he 

oversaw education development programs in countries in Africa, 

Latin America, and in Asia. 

Prior to working at AED, Mr. Fine served at USAID as the Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in the African Bureau and a 

member of the Senior Foreign Service for the United States. Mr. 

Fine served as USAID Mission Director in Afghanistan in 2004 to 

2005, where he oversaw rapid expansion of U.S. assistance for reconstruction and development. His areas of expertise include international education, private sector and livelihood development, development finance, donor coordination, decentralization, community 

development, and fostering public/private partnerships. 

A very fine panel of extraordinary men and women; and I would 

now like to turn the time to you, Ambassador Carson, for such time 

as you would consume. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. CARSON. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, and 

other members of the committee, I would like to thank all of you 

for inviting me to testify today on the President’s Fiscal Year 2012 

budget request for sub-Saharan Africa. 

As this is my first appearance before the subcommittee since the 

112th Congress began, I would like to express my very deep and 

sincere appreciation to Chairman Smith and Congressman Payne 

in particular for their past support of the African Affairs Bureau 

and for their many years of dedicated service and leadership of this 

subcommittee. 

The President’s 2012 request for Africa reflects our core U.S. priorities and interests in the continent. I would like to highlight 

those priorities and some of the major policy challenges and opportunities that we face in Africa today. 

We remain committed to five overarching policy priorities: 

Strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law; encouraging long-term development and growth, including food security; 

9

enhancing access to quality health care and education; assisting in 

the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of conflicts; and working 

with African nations and leaders to address transnational challenges, including terrorism, maritime security, climate change, 

narcotrafficking, and trafficking in persons. 

The Fiscal Year 2012 request of $7.8 billion represents a 10 percent overall increase from the Fiscal Year 2010 enacted total of $7 

billion. This increase is due in large measure to increases requested for each of the President’s special initiatives. The request 

for global climate change has increased by 141 percent, Feed the 

Future by 20 percent, and global health by 12.6 percent. Our requests for discretionary funds to support non-initiative programs is 

$1.8 billion. They include programs focused on enhancing democracy and governance, economic growth, conflict resolution, and 

transnational issues. 

The United States has many challenges and commitments 

around the globe, but it is important for us not to lose sight of our 

growing national interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is a region where the United States has benefited from longstanding partnerships and friendships and enjoys some of the highest approval ratings in the world. The ties between Americans and 

Africans are deep and historic. With few exceptions, Africa is not 

a place where we see anti-American demonstrations and rhetoric. 

That is indicative of the prevailing appreciation for our country’s 

longstanding commitment to democracy and human rights and for 

our steadfast support in addressing Africa’s many challenges and 

problems. 

The spread of democracy in Africa over the past two decades and 

the vibrancy of pro-democracy activism across the continent is further evidence that most Africans share our fundamental political 

values. In the international arena, we might not see eye to eye 

with Africans on every issue, but, overall, most governments there 

have been cooperative as we deal with a variety of global challenges. 

Our economic interests in Africa are clear and compelling. Approximately 14 percent of U.S. oil imports come from that region, 

making it a strategic part of our energy security portfolio. Imports 

from Nigeria alone are about 9 percent of our total oil imports and 

almost the same volume as those from Saudi Arabia. 

With promising exploration and development in a number of 

countries, sub-Saharan Africa’s significance for global oil and gas 

will only increase in the coming years. Africa’s enormous share of 

the world’s mineral reserves and a rapidly growing population—

which is expected to increase by 20 percent over the next two decades—will make the countries of sub-Saharan Africa a major market for American businesses. 

Helping African countries, no matter how small and poor, realize 

their full potential and succeed as economically viable democracies 

is in our national interest. If fledgling democracies are allowed to 

fail and undemocratic regimes are allowed to endure unchallenged, 

then people will lose confidence in democracy and free market economic principles, and we will find ourselves on the defensive in the 

global competition for influence, ideas, and friends. 

10

Many sub-Saharan African countries face enormous challenges to 

their survival as functioning states, and we must continue to help 

them meet those challenges so that they can better help us as we 

deal with a wide range of global issues such as narcotrafficking, piracy, illegal immigration, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases. 

With our limited resources and personnel, we are managing a 

long list of near- and long-term problems that have a direct impact 

on U.S. security, political, economic, and humanitarian interests. 

Over the last year, we have been actively engaged in Sudan, Somalia, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, the eastern Congo, Uganda, and GuineaConakry. Working with our African partners and members of the 

international community, we have made progress, but political and 

security challenges remain ahead in all of those countries as well 

as others in the continent. 

Beyond these fast-moving issues which dominate the headlines, 

our Government is trying to address a number of slower moving 

but nonetheless high-impact challenges. The greatest of these is 

the continued prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases 

which have tragic consequences for economic livelihoods and the social welfare of Africans across the continent. It is estimated that 

some 22.5 million Africans are living with HIV/AIDS, about twothirds of the world’s total. Millions more suffer and die regularly 

from malaria, tuberculosis, and other debilitating but preventable 

endemic diseases. Women and children suffer disproportionately. I 

realize you will discuss this and other health aspects of the Fiscal 

Year 2012 budget request in a separate future hearing, but it is important to underscore the problems and challenges of public health 

in sub-Saharan Africa. 

Although a handful of African countries have demonstrated improved rates of macroeconomic performance and growth compared 

to previous decades, the overall poverty and social indicators for 

much of the continent are sobering. Ethiopia’s per capita GPD, for 

example, is only $344 a year. Life expectancy in Nigeria, Africa’s 

most populous country, is only 48 years. Basic infrastructure is 

lacking in many countries struggling to keep up with their growing 

populations. As of last year, southern Sudan, which is expected to 

become independent on July 9 of this year, had only 50 kilometers 

of paved road. And food security remains an ongoing concern across 

much of the continent. 

I have already alluded to some of the many security challenges 

in Africa. There are others, such as the presence of terrorist groups 

and drug traffickers in the Sahara and the ascendence of drug trafficking in such countries as Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Our 

preferred approach to all of these challenges is to work through African security and judicial institutions and develop their capacity, 

rather than rely on direct and potentially costly U.S. intervention 

and involvement. This approach may be slow and imperfect, but we 

believe it is the only truly sustainable one for the African context, 

and it is the most cost-effective approach for the United States. 

When Africans take ownership of their own security responsibilities, we are more likely to have the requisite trust and political 

buy-in of key players than if quick-fix solutions are imposed from 

the outside; and this buy-in is what can lead to more durable and 

11

sustainable outcomes. To put it differently, the more proactive we 

are in encouraging and supporting African-led security initiatives 

and solutions, the less likely we will need to intervene directly ourselves down the road. 

Africa’s complex challenges demand considerable time, attention, 

and resources, but we must also be attentive to the significant 

gains and progress that have occurred in many African countries 

over the past decade and which are continuing. Liberia and Sierra 

Leone, for example, require our engagement and support to help 

sustain their largely successful post-conflict transitions. Helping 

Africa’s most democratic countries—such as Senegal, Mali, Ghana, 

Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Tanzania, and South Africa—continue with their political and economic reforms is vital for 

demonstrating the sincerity of our commitment to democracy and 

good governance, as well as encouraging other countries to follow 

their model. 

In recent years, regional organizations such as the African Union 

and the Economic Community of West Africa and the East African 

Community have demonstrated a growing commitment in censuring unconstitutional changes of power, promoting economic integration, and addressing regional security problems. It is in our interest to see that these organizations continue to build capacity 

and become more assertive across the continent. 

I have worked on Africa for most of my professional career, and 

whenever I review the budget numbers I am still amazed at how 

our Government manages to do so much with so little. Roughly 

speaking, one can easily fit the land masses of the United States, 

China, and Western Europe into sub-Saharan Africa. After southern Sudan becomes independent on July 9, sub-Saharan Africa will 

have 49 states. 

We have 44 Embassies, five consulates, and several regional platforms used by U.S. Government agencies spread across sub-Saharan Africa. Those of you who have been out to the region know 

most of these missions are thinly staffed with an ambassador and 

only a handful of reporting officers and supporting personnel. 

In closing, I would like to state simply that every dollar that we 

invest in helping Africans to address their problems and better capitalize on their opportunities may not satisfy our high expectations 

for rapid and quick economic growth, development, health, security, 

and political stability, but they sure can go a long way in preventing situations from getting worse and costing us even more 

money in the future. 

And as my colleagues from USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corporation will detail in their testimonies, many of our efforts do in fact have a very positive and significant impact on improving the lives of Africans. It is through these programs and our 

vigorous diplomacy that the United States will remain a critical 

and key player in Africa and protect and advance our long-term interests on the continent. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and other distinguished members, thank you. I will be happy to address specific questions at the 

conclusion of the others’ testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Carson, thank you very much. 

Ms. Cromer. 

STATEMENT OF MS. SHARON CROMER, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. CROMER. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member 

Payne, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 

inviting me to speak today. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Payne, it is always an honor for the Agency to have an opportunity to share our 

work with such great supporters of Africa. 

This year, USAID celebrates 50 years of the generosity of the 

American people who believe that we can make the world a better 

place if we use our wealth and expertise to invest smartly. 

Where can we make a difference? That question drives everything we do. We are becoming more selective in how we choose the 

countries and sectors where we will invest our resources. Under 

USAID Forward, we are moving toward practices that are most effective at achieving development results that are measurable and 

real and that create conditions where our assistance is no longer 

needed. 

In all of our areas of work we are seeking to put in place more 

effective, more modern, and more efficient strategies to get better 

results and better outcomes. At the same time, we are constantly 

in search of science and technology innovations that will accelerate 

economic growth and improve health. Promising innovations in 

vaccines, clean energy, and information technologies can produce 

especially dramatic results in Africa, where even small-scale or 

low-cost technologies can leapfrog traditional development hurdles 

and yield exponential development gains. 

Today, I will discuss our priorities in Africa, the major Presidential initiatives that focus on food security, global health, and climate change. 

Over the last decade, dozens of African countries embraced democracy; and, today, nine of Africa’s 48 states are regarded by 

Freedom House as full democracies. This is a significant achievement, and the United States’ sustained efforts to support democracy through diplomacy and development have played a key role. 

The number of conflicts in Africa has also been sharply reduced. 

USAID will continue our work until that number is zero, employing 

a range of conflict mitigation, peace, and reconciliation and early 

warning and prevention mechanisms in Africa, especially in the 

Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. 

Africa’s economies have made measurable strides, embracing reforms and adopting pro-business policies. Prior to the onset of the 

global financial crisis in 2008, Africa enjoyed nearly a decade of 

economic growth, averaging 5.3 percent a year. This kind of growth 

is essential to reducing poverty. USAID envisions a world where 

market-led development replaces foreign assistance, so our priority 

is to foster broad-based growth that will accelerate gains and leverage private sector investment. 

Feed the Future affirms this commitment to advance prosperity 

by improving the most basic human condition, the need for a reliable source of food and the means to purchase it. Agricultural 

17

growth is highly effective in reducing poverty, especially in Africa, 

where the majority of rural poor depend on agriculture for their 

livelihoods. 

The United States’ bipartisan commitment to help is a signature 

of American leadership. Yet this year more than 350,000 women 

worldwide will die in pregnancy or childbirth, and 8 million children will die of preventable diseases. Half of these deaths will 

occur in Africa. 

Our global work in HIV/AIDS has provided care to 9.4 million 

people and prevented a quarter million newborns from contracting 

the disease. 

As part of our women’s health programs, we have supported 25 

fistula centers in Africa and funded training, treatment, and counseling. The Global Health Initiative will accelerate progress toward 

even more ambitious goals that will improve millions of lives. 

Africa is a continent most vulnerable to climate change, and we 

are committed to forging a truly global solution to this emerging 

challenge. The Global Climate Change Initiative is helping countries adapt to this challenge while addressing the sectors where the 

effects of climate change will be most pronounced—food security, 

health, and stability. 

For USAID to accomplish its goals, we must get the most out of 

every taxpayer dollar. USAID partners with other donors for greater impact, as we did with the British in Nigeria to ensure that elections were free and credible. We are proud of our efforts with the 

State Department to support the successful referendum on independence in southern Sudan. We are also engaging with regional 

organizations like the African Union to support democracy and 

trade. 

Our efforts reap dividends for both Africa and the United States. 

Disease and conflict know no borders, and undeveloped markets 

limit the potential of global economic growth. 

At the same time, we cannot turn our backs on the great need 

we see in Africa. The American people have demonstrated their 

commitment to responding to the needs of others through 

outpourings of donations to families in Japan and Haiti. Assistance 

is an American value. 

As USAID looks ahead to the next 50 years, we are very much 

looking forward to a continued conversation with our partners in 

Congress on challenges and opportunities in Africa. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, and members of the subcommittee. I will be happy to respond to any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cromer follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Ms. Cromer, we thank you very much. 

Now we go to Mr. Fine. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PATRICK FINE, VICE PRESIDENT FOR 

COMPACT IMPLEMENTATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMPACT 

OPERATIONS, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION 

Mr. FINE. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, and Ms. 

Bass, I would like to begin by thanking you for the leadership that 

you are providing to advance American interests in Africa. Like my 

colleagues, I have spent much of my adult life living in Africa, and 

I know firsthand that America matters to Africa and that Africa 

matters to us. 

It is great to be with USAID and with the Department of State 

to discuss U.S. assistance to Africa and the unique role that the 

Millennium Challenge Corporation plays in advancing American 

interests by reducing poverty and promoting good governance in 

Africa. 

If there are no objections, I will summarize my remarks and submit a full statement for the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. FINE. Africa is home to more impoverished nations than any 

other region of the world. Appropriately, most of MCC’s partner 

countries are in Africa, where two-thirds of our funds are dedicated. Although countries in conflict like Cote d’Ivoire grab the 

headlines, I have witnessed the remarkable progress in over 30 

years that I have been living in and working in Africa, and I have 

seen the vital role that U.S. assistance has played in increasing access to education, combating disease, promoting human rights, and 

strengthening market economies. 

President Obama laid out a clear vision for development that articulates the strategic, economic, and moral imperatives that explain why development assistance is vital to U.S. national security. 

The President’s global development policy recognizes that protecting our interests and advancing our ideals requires economic 

and diplomatic tools, such as the MCC, USAID, and the State Department. 

MCC is a specialized instrument that works with poor but wellgoverned countries. Our programs build capacity, including trade 

capacity, and strengthen relationships with important emerging 

economies. 

As you know, MCC only works with countries selected using publicly available third-party indicators that measure the extent to 

which a country is ruling justly, investing in its people, and providing economic freedom. Making selectivity a core feature of our 

business model creates an amazingly powerful set of incentives for 

good policy performance. This is often called the ‘‘MCC effect,’’ and 

we have seen governments undertake reforms to become eligible for 

MCC assistance. More importantly, countries make these reforms 

before we put any money on the table. They make them to retain 

the assistance programs already being implemented and now, as 

the first generation of compacts complete, to become eligible for a 

second compact. 

Within the context of the U.S. Government’s overall diplomatic 

relationship with a country and working especially closely with the 

25

Department of State and USAID, we continually work with our 

partner countries on policies and practices needed to ensure the 

sustainability of our investments. At a macro level, this means engaging civil society, respecting the rule of law, confronting corruption, and valuing human rights. At the investment level, we condition assistance on sector-level reforms, making it clear that, if commitments are not met, we reserve the right to suspend or cancel 

a compact. In fact, we have a record of doing just that. 

Secretary of State Clinton has described development resting on 

a three-legged stool made up of government, the private sector, and 

civil society. Each leg must be strong, and they all must be balanced to support the difficult work and political will that goes into 

bringing about the kind of change that expands opportunities and 

reduces poverty. 

The MCC selection process creates direct incentives for governments to adopt policies that promote economic growth, and our emphasis on country ownership and placing responsibility for program 

implementation on our partner countries strengthens the other legs 

of the stool. 

We actively encourage participation from civil society groups in 

our programs. They must be consulted during compact development, and they must be represented on the local governing boards 

our partner countries establish to oversee the programs. We also 

make concerted efforts to promote private-sector participation. The 

reason is simple. MCC programs reduce constraints to economic 

growth, but it is the private sector—whether we are talking about 

small-scale commercial farmers or the truckers who are transporting goods on improved roads or large-scale follow-on investments in manufacturing or retail—that create jobs and income that 

reduce poverty and put a country on the path away from aid dependency. 

In return for scarce U.S. taxpayer dollars, we advance U.S. economic and security interests. The emerging economies of sub-Saharan Africa are the growth markets of the 21st century. Between 

2000 and 2008, GDP per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa grew 

by 54 percent when adjusted for purchasing power parity, which is 

a lot faster than we thought it was going to grow when I was living 

in Uganda back in the early ’90s. 

Our competitors see these opportunities, and they are investing 

heavily. The World Bank expects international capital flows to the 

region to be higher than anywhere else in the world. America’s development assistance helps unlock the potential in these markets, 

it fosters the personal and business relationships that grow into 

mature trade relationships, and it promotes our security interests. 

President Obama has requested $1.125 billion for MCC for Fiscal 

Year 2012. We are currently developing programs with Zambia, 

Cape Verde, and Ghana. By supporting funding for MCC, Congress 

will reaffirm America’s commitment to investing in countries that 

are committed to their own development. 

Look at our track record in terms of the results that benefit the 

poor and in terms of the incentives for good policy performance 

that create the business environment to allow countries to increasingly finance their own development, and you will see this taxpayer 

money is well spent. 

26

With that, Chairman Smith, I would like again to state my appreciation for your continued support of results-based foreign assistance. And we look forward to continuing our strong working relationship with you, Congressman Payne, and other members of 

the subcommittee. 

I would be happy to answer any questions that you have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine follows:]


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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Fine, thank you very much. 

And for all of our witnesses, any additional comments, written 

testimony that you would want included in the record, it will be so 

ordered. 

Let me just begin with a basic question to help the subcommittee 

gain a better understanding of some of the huge shifts in funding 

at both the country level as well as at the functional level. 

I note that some countries will receive overall funding increases 

in excess of 20 percent, including Cameroon, DRC, Ghana, Malawi, 

Mali, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, 

other countries will have existing developmental assistance programs cut by more than half, including Burundi and Guinea. And 

Sierra Leone’s development assistance funding will be cut by some 

27 percent, and Angola’s will be cut by 13 percent. Development assistance programs would be eliminated in eight countries: Benin, 

Cameroon, Chad, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, and 

Togo. I mean, these are, the way I look at it, rather significant 

changes in how the money is allocated. 

And on the functional level, just very briefly, looking at peace 

and security, counterterrorism is cut by 49 percent, but conflict 

mitigation and reconciliation is enhanced by 60 percent. You know, 

perhaps you could speak to, was the counterterrorism money not 

being efficacious or was it better utilized somewhere else, how were 

those decisions made? 

And then, when we look at education, education is cut by 10 percent, basic education by 3, but higher education by 80 percent. 

Water supply and sanitation is cut by 27 percent. This is from 2010 

to 2012 numbers. 

And, you know, both Mr. Payne and I, since we have been in 

Congress, particularly on the water side, have believed, and I think 

very passionately, that waterborne microbes and disease attributable to contaminated water remains one of the leading killers of 

children, through diarrheal disease and other diseases. And I am 

just, you know, wondering out loud and asking you a very specific 

question, how that is justified. 

And on the higher education piece, from $25 million to $5 million, it seems rather draconian, but perhaps there is—and I am 

sure there is a real method to how you are doing this. 

So if you could speak to those functional accounts and how some 

of the money has been moved away from some countries in a total 

fashion, zero funding, others are getting significant and beefed-up 

allocations. 

Mr. CARSON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me, first of all, 

not try to answer your question by going through and discussing 

point by point with respect to each country and each account. But 

we can, in fact, provide you with the rationale for what we have 

done. But let me try to provide a strategic overview of what we 

have done. 

And that strategic overview is to essentially provide assistance 

sufficient to fund the President’s key initiatives in global health, in 

Feed the Future, in climate change, and to ensure that there was 

adequate funding for those programs. 

In addition to that, we have tried to provide assistance to Africa 

under the five major strategic categories that I outlined earlier: 

38

Support for democracy and governance and strengthening of democratic institutions in Africa—there have been a number of elections 

that are forecast for Africa going forward. We want to make sure 

that we have resources to be able to commit to help in the democratic process. 

Secondly, we have tried to provide assistance sufficient to help 

continue to support economic reform and economic development 

across the continent. 

And, thirdly, we have tried to, as I say, put money into health 

care, which is a major initiative of the President. 

We have also put money into the prevention and mitigation of 

conflict. And we have moved some money that was previously provided to countries on a bilateral basis under the security accounts 

into a regional account, which would give us more flexibility in 

using that money to address crises. 

And then, finally, we have effectively focused on the need to work 

with Africa to deal with transnational and global challenges. 

But we can give you, if it is insufficient now, a more detailed response as to why we did what we did in each of the countries that 

you have outlined, and you have outlined at least nine countries 

where you saw major changes. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. And we will make it a part of the 

record, Mr. Ambassador. And I would agree that, like, in the DR 

Congo, for example, I note that you have increased the amount of 

money to some $86 million. And that is certainly needed; if this is 

going to be a free and fair election, we certainly have to do our 

part, along with other European and other African countries that 

will be assisting. So it isn’t a matter of trying to find where best 

to put those moneys. 

And I just want to raise and underscore the concern about the 

water and the importance of clean water, as well as the education 

piece that I mentioned earlier. 

Let me ask you, with regard, any of you who would like to respond, on the trafficking issue, I have read the interim report that 

was put out April 5th by the Trafficking in Persons Office. And it 

shows some positive progress among numerous African countries, 

although some have not made any progress at all and have actually 

gone in the wrong direction. 

And I am just wondering if you could speak to how well you work 

and interface with the TIP Office, whether or not you see overall 

progress in combating modern-day slavery, both sex slavery as well 

as labor trafficking. And, in your view, is it getting worse, has it 

ebbed, or is it getting better, in terms of our efforts, global efforts 

as well as indigenous African efforts, to stop it? And any country 

that you might want to highlight that might, you know, jump off 

the page in terms of, you know, a job well done that needs to be 

affirmed and reinforced. 

Mr. CARSON. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that the issues of trafficking in persons is a major priority of the Department of State, 

it is a major priority of the African Affairs Bureau. We work very, 

very closely with Ambassador Luis CdeBaca, who runs the G/TIP 

office at the State Department, and we work very closely with 

Under Secretary Maria Otero, whose office oversees the TIP program. 

39

We believe that our interventions have, first of all, increased the 

awareness of African governments about the problems that they 

confront in trafficking in persons and that the criteria that we have 

put in place, including the tier rating system, has energized many 

African countries to take steps which we believe are important in 

addressing the challenges and problems that African countries face. 

We believe that we have raised awareness. We have encouraged 

governments to pass legislation focusing on trafficking in persons, 

to appoint special representatives, to increase the number of investigations, and also to increase the number of prosecutions that 

have taken place. 

South Africa is, in fact, a good example. We believed that, last 

year, as South Africa was preparing to host the soccer World Cup, 

that there would be a dramatic upsurge in trafficking in persons 

and in sex slavery. The South Africans indicated a willingness to 

put in place a law. That law is before their national assembly. But 

they did, in fact, undertake a number of activities that were designed to prevent trafficking in persons from becoming a problem, 

including the appointment of special law enforcement officers to 

deal with it, the creation of special child protection sites in and 

around soccer locations, and stepping up the prosecution of individuals who were responsible for trafficking. 

This is a major concern of ours across the continent, and we take 

it seriously. And we continue to push African governments to acknowledge the problem, work against it, pass laws to ensure that 

people can be punished, and then to investigate, prosecute, convict, 

and jail those who were responsible. We think progress is being 

made, not nearly as rapidly as we would like, but it is being made. 

Ms. CROMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

From 2001 to 2009, we programmed about $145 million in 70 

countries to address both sex and labor trafficking. We focused our 

efforts on prevention and protection. 

In Africa, we are working in about four countries—the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Mauritania, and Senegal—as 

the Ambassador said, to raise awareness, to better understand the 

issue, to enact domestic anti-trafficking legislation, and to address 

the needs of the victims. Today, we have two countries that are 

fully compliant Tier I countries—Nigeria and Mauritius—and 18 

African countries that are in Tier II, making significant progress. 

Mr. FINE. The U.S. has done more than anybody else to combat 

trafficking. And if you look at G/TIP and the scale, the grades, the 

score card that comes out now, that is a game-changer in Africa. 

I mean, people pay attention to it. It influences policy. 

MCC works very closely with the State Department and with 

G/TIP. We coordinate with them almost on a daily basis. It is something we give a lot of attention to. And the MCC is a very valuable 

asset for the U.S. Government to create incentives for good policy 

performance, and it shows up in trafficking. 

An example is Lesotho. Earlier this year, Lesotho passed an antitrafficking law. And part of what motivated that behavior was the 

whole diplomacy that went around the MCC investment there. 

Another example where MCC had a direct impact on government 

actions to do something about trafficking is in Senegal, where the 

government passed a law against child begging to do something 

40

about the thousands of these young boys, the talibs, who were out 

begging, and that had become a corrupted, abusive practice. And 

they put seven of these corrupt, sort of false marabouts in prison. 

Now, passing that law—or, it was a decree—making that decree 

and taking action against corrupt marabouts or imams would have 

been unthinkable 15 years ago. I mean, there was a lot of talk 

about it 10, 12 years ago, but nobody would have thought that the 

government could take that kind of courageous action in the face 

of an established and respected cultural practice that had been, 

over the years, corrupted. And, again, that action was, in part, a 

direct result of influence brought to bear by the State Department 

and MCC acting together, using the MCC as an asset to advance 

that dialogue. 

So there are other countries where I see policy changes, where 

countries pay more attention to it than they would otherwise because of MCC. Mozambique is an example. And, Chairman, Mali 

is an example where not as much progress has been made as needs 

to be made but where we certainly have the government’s attention. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I would just note, in the interim report, the countries, especially 

Senegal, that you mentioned, as of April—and we will get the full 

report in June—have said that they have made significant progress 

in combating trafficking since the 2010 TIP report. So the interim 

report reads mostly in a very, very positive way about progress 

being made. 

And I think leveraging the work that the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation does is just another way of getting good people within 

governments to realize the duty they have to combat this horrific 

scourge of modern-day slavery. 

Let me just also ask—maybe, Ambassador Carson, to you—the 

African Union has complained that it is not being consulted on 

international operations on the continent. And that was primarily 

focused on Libya. Jean Ping made some very, you know, strong 

comments. 

And I am wondering how our Government, particularly our Ambassador, interfaces at the AU with regards to these kinds of 

issues. If you could just speak to that. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, let me just say that we have tried to work 

closely with the African Union to enhance its ability to participate 

in peacekeeping and security activities on the continent. And the 

AU is now engaged very significantly in Somalia, where it has 

some 12,000 AMISOM peacekeepers, and are working without the 

support of the United Nations. They are also a part of the United 

Nation’s Mission in the Sudan. 

We, too, have noted Chairman Ping’s statements about the desire 

of the AU to be consulted more closely on issues related to Libya. 

But we believe that the AU is just as committed as the United 

States and those in the international community to bringing about 

fundamental reforms in Libya that will lead to a democratic transition. I think that their methods and means may be different, but 

their objective of seeing a democratic transition in which we would 

see elections and full participation by all Libyans is probably exactly the same as ours. 

41

We think that the AU has become a much more positive and constructive regional organization over the last decade. They are doing 

more to speak out and uphold the principles of democracy and 

human rights and to encourage economic reform. And we want to 

generally continue to encourage them in that direction. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask three final questions and then yield for 

whatever time they would like to consume to my distinguished colleagues. 

First, on AFRICOM, could you perhaps, Ambassador Carson, 

speak to its progress? I, frankly, would love to see it located on the 

African continent. But, short of that, we are hoping that, as it looks 

for a base home, that places like the joint base in New Jersey 

would be adequately looked at. And then, of course, that is something that I will pursue at a different venue. But let me just—how 

well is it working? Because, obviously, there is a great deal of cooperation among USAID and the humanitarian component of our 

foreign policy. 

And if you could just briefly speak to the transnational crime 

issue. That is straight-lined from 2010 to 2012. Do you see a burgeoning problem of drugs, illicit drugs, as I mentioned in my opening comments? And is that sufficient to combat it? 

And, finally, I do want to note and congratulate you on the Feed 

the Future and the nutrition component. The expectation here is 

that it would go up 186 percent, from $34.5 million to $99 million. 

I was at the Millennium Development kickoff last September at a 

First Ladies of Africa luncheon. And Lady Odinga and other first 

ladies spoke very eloquently about the need for the first 1,000 

days—and I know the administration is working along those lines, 

as well—that if you care for and provide proper nutrition from the 

moment of conception during those first 1,000 days, the next 25,000 

days of that child’s life, then adult’s life, will be significantly enhanced. 

And we see the polar opposite of that in places where there is 

severe malnutrition. And nothing could be more stark than what 

happens in North and South Korea, where nutrition has been denied and, you know, young people are anywhere from three to five 

inches shorter in North Korea because of that stunted consequence 

of not having adequate nutrition. 

I do believe strongly in the politics and the policies of inclusion. 

So I could commend you for ensuring that the child in utero, the 

child before birth gets that food, that nutrition, so that he or she, 

once born and as they go through their lives, have a greater quality 

of life because of that attention that was given to them as they 

were unborn. So thank you for that great initiative. 

But if you could speak to AFRICOM, if you would, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, you raise three issues of significance. 

First of all, AFRICOM is 3 years old. It has gotten off to an excellent start. It continues to work closely with the Department of 

State and other agencies overseas. In most instances, it is in a supporting role. The military in Africa is an important and critical and 

valuable institution, but we recognize that it can do its best work 

42

if it is under civilian, democratically elected, and constitutional 

control. 

Our AFRICOM elements on the continent are helping to professionalize Africa’s military, making them responsive to democratic 

control and making them the defenders of the nation rather than 

the predators of the nation. We think that AFRICOM is doing well. 

I will not speak to the issue of headquarters location. I think, 

when it was established 3 years ago, there was much discussion 

about whether it should be on the continent. I think that was an 

issue that distracted it from doing the kind of job that we all want 

it to do. 

I only note that the United States Government only has one of 

its combatant commands outside of the United States territorial geography, and that is the European Command. I think AFRICOM 

is in a good location. I leave it to DOD to determine whether it 

should be a different location. 

With respect to transnational crime, we are very, very concerned 

about transnational crime. If we had been sitting in this room 20 

years ago, we would not have been talking about the movement of 

narcotics through West Africa into Western Europe, we would not 

have been talking about narcotrafficking states. But yet, today, 

some 50 percent or more of the drugs that are landed in Western 

Europe transits through West Africa. 

Most of this is cocaine coming out of Central America, going 

across the Atlantic, and taking advantage of porous borders, weak 

security institutions, and corruption to get into West Africa and 

then move on to Western Europe and, in some cases, even from 

Western Europe back into the United States. 

One the reasons why we continue to focus on the need for strong 

democratic institutions and good governance is to be able to deal 

with issues related to crime and narcotrafficking. It is not just, 

however, a West African problem; it is also a problem in East Africa, as well, in a different kind of way, where the airports of Addis 

Ababa and Nairobi and the port of Mombassa are used as transshipment points for heroin coming out of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Because of the strong airline links and good airport facilities, 

we see heroin moving through those areas. And in southern Africa, 

we see particularly the emergence of a culture of synthetic drug 

manufacturing, again, moving out from there into the Middle East 

and Western Europe. 

It is important that we work with African states to increase their 

level of awareness about the threat that transiting causes, about 

the threat that illegal money coming out of drugs causes, and undermining governments, and the need to improve their customs, police, and anti-drug authorities. We have worked very hard with African countries on this and will continue to do so. 

You also raised a question about Feed the Future. Feed the Future is only in its second year, which means that it is still very, 

very much a new program and a new initiative. But the administration is determined to do everything that it possibly can to help 

Africa increase its agricultural production. 

Both the President and the Secretary of State have spoken eloquently about the need to help Africa create the green agricultural 

revolution that helped to transform agriculture in Asia and Latin 

43

America in the 1970s and 1980s. That agricultural revolution has 

largely eluded Africa, and because of that, Africa remains one of 

the food-dependent and deficit continents in the world. 

And so there is a genuine need to help at the lower end to end 

hunger at the household and village level, and at the upper end to 

help Africa use agriculture as a basis for sustained economic development through major agricultural exports and the creation of 

agro-industry, not so much to compete against American markets 

but to go into places like the Middle East and South Asia, where 

there are burgeoning populations, little arable and agricultural resources, that, in fact, could benefit from larger agricultural exports 

from Africa. 

Ms. CROMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was just going to add, with regard to Feed the Future, that one 

of the criteria for selecting countries under Feed the Future is their 

own commitment to substantial proportions of their own resources 

going into agriculture and economic and social development. 

In Africa, it was truly a country-owned, country-led effort, with 

countries developing the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, CAADP, which set forth their plans for agricultural development. And so this is not simply a U.S. initiative, 

this is a true partnership. And I think it is unique in that sense. 

Mr. FINE. Feed the Future is a USAID initiative, but it is one 

where MCC works very closely with USAID to advance the objectives of food-secure nations. In fact, over 40 percent of our investments are in the agricultural area. And there are great examples 

of real tight coordination, meaningful coordination, and whole-ofgovernment approach between USAID and MCC to ensure that investments in agriculture get the full synergy of U.S. engagement. 

A good example is in Mali, where MCC is investing in an irrigation program and has converted thousands of hectares of bush, of 

unproductive bush land, into now thriving rice fields. And it is phenomenal to see the difference and to see hundreds of people who 

had no real livelihood before now become successful rice farmers, 

generating thousands of tons of rice. 

Now, that infrastructure investment and some of the training of 

farmers has been done by MCC. We have an agreement with 

USAID where USAID’s program is going to come in and work in 

the same area to do follow-on training with farmers and to work 

to make sure that the agricultural inputs, that the market linkages 

are all in place so that that investment is sustainable over a long 

term. So it is a good example of our organizations working together. 

Mr. SMITH. Ranking Member Payne? 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

It is really very interesting to hear your responses to the questions. 

And, as you have indicated, I think, Ambassador Carson, that it 

would be very difficult. I had a number of specific questions regarding why things are done in one country. First of all, we realize that 

there is a budget crunch; therefore, decisions have to be made. 

However it is—and I certainly will not ask you to try to go into the 

rationale for these. However, at some time in the future, could you 

give us a general view of how determinations are made? 

44

For example, you take Chad and Mauritania, both are impoverished countries with a history of authoritarian and military intervention in politics. They were also among the 10 countries participating in the U.S.-led Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, 

the TSCTP. 

Now, I just wonder, are you concerned by, one, there is proposed 

cutting to bilateral economic and democracy-promotion assistance 

to these countries, but we are continuing or increasing the military 

assistance, and would the enemies of the U.S. make the U.S. seem 

to be more vulnerable to accusations of militarizing foreign aid in 

the Sahel, for example? 

So, you know, there are a number of questions that some of the 

countries, like Niger, you know, there are 13 priority countries for 

the U.S. assistance in Africa as well as 5 foreign assistance priorities. In some cases, there are incongruencies, in my opinion. For 

example—I am not being critical. I know it just, like I said, a very 

difficult thing to try to figure out. 

For example, you state that it is a U.S. foreign assistance priority to strengthen democratic institutions and prevent armed conflict. However, the State Department, not you, but the administrators, propose cutting the Governing Justly and Democratically program in Niger and Guinea. And these are in the middle of fragile 

transitions from military to civilian rule. Both of them are very, 

very, as you know, fragile. Niger has, as you know, a continued 

drought in one part of the country, water in another part. One part 

has had no rain for maybe a decade. But they are in the middle 

of this transition from military to civilian rule. As well as Sierra 

Leone, which, as you know, the horrible situation they had. They 

are in the post-conflict era. 

So, you know, I just wonder how the administration proposal to 

cut aid in Fiscal Year 2012 to several African countries affects 

those U.S. policy priorities? And what is the expected impact of our 

bilateral relations with affected countries? Do, like, proposals in 

Fiscal Year 2012 aid cuts to transitional countries risk jeopardizing 

the fragile democratic gains? 

So, you know, I could go all over the continent and pick out three 

or four more. But I just wondered, some basic kind of rationale, a 

simple one. You did say that you could deal with it later, and I 

don’t want to spend a lot of time on—it doesn’t seem like 

nitpicking. I mean, they are countries. But, you know, how the determination is made, other than I guess the big fact is that there 

is a scarcity of funds to do really what you want to do. And I certainly recognize that. 

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, let me respond by not trying to go 

down in detail as to the rationale of all of these, but it is important 

to say several things. 

One is, we are not trying to militarize our policies in Africa. That 

would be contrary to our desire to strengthen democratic institutions and promote democracy and good governance. 

In all of the countries that you have mentioned—Mauritania, 

Niger, and Chad—over the last 2 years, we have worked enormously hard to promote better democratic institutions and governance in each one of those. 

45

Two years ago, I personally was very much engaged with our 

partners in Senegal and in ECOWAS to help Mauritania move 

back away from a coup which had brought in a military leader to 

a government which is now recognized as one which is far better 

and which is oriented democratically. The same thing is true of 

Niger, where we first had a civilian usurpation of power, then a 

military coup d’etat, and then finally, just months ago, an election 

that returned that country to democratic rule. 

We, in both the instance of Mauritania and in the instance of 

Niger, cut substantially our assistance programs because these governments had been taken over by military authorities. Both of 

them are now back under the control of civilian leaders. 

We want to do as much as we can to continue the political and 

democratic progress that is under way in both of those countries, 

and don’t look forward to reducing our assistance, but look forward 

to maintaining it and doing things that we previously were doing 

that had to be cut off. This is particularly true of Niger. 

But at the same time that I say this, both of those countries border the Sahelian region, where there are issues of terrorism and 

politically inspired kidnapping. And we believe that it is important 

not only to work with these governments to strengthen their democracies and improve their economic performance, but also to assist them in dealing with the spread of al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb, which has, in fact, become a problem to states in the region. 

I didn’t say anything about Chad. Chad has just had elections, 

as well. And we think that the Chadians have, themselves, done 

some very good things over the last 2 years in helping to defuse 

the tension along the Chadian-Sudan-Darfur border. But more 

needs to be done to help that country improve its civilian democratic institutions, as well as to live up to some of the economic potential that it has but has not yet realized. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

I agree with you on Chad. Just the manner in which they welcomed Darfurians into an area that was challenged for water in the 

first place, and having the influx of hundreds of thousands of people. I went out to some of those camps when they first arrived 

there, and do have to give the Chadians credit for accepting them 

in and trying to help provide for them. We know that, like I said, 

President Deby has a little work to do, but I think, overall, in my 

opinion, that they tend in the right direction. 

The question of elections—we have seen this trend in Zimbabwe 

where the strong man loses and then they want to have a coalition 

government. Now, you have always pushed that there should be—

you know, this shouldn’t be winner take all, and there should be 

some recognition for other political parties. But I was starting to 

get a little concerned when I started to hear not our administration 

but others in Cote d’Ivoire talking about, well, maybe there needs 

to be a shared government between Ouattara and Gbagbo, which 

would have certainly sent another bad trend. Even Kenya’s shared 

government, to me, is not—the President tends, in my opinion, to 

have much more power than the Prime Minister, Odinga. And so 

I don’t think that—and I am glad that the Ivoirian situation was 

resolved without the way of this—well, this Rodney King-type 

46

thing, you know, we can all get along, because the one who is really in charge tends to exert most of the power. 

Having said that, we have just seen a Nigerian election, which 

I think was better than the one 4 years ago but left a lot to be desired. I think the fact that Gbagbo had to be removed—because if 

that was going to be the trend with the 16 elections in 2011 and 

the number of important elections coming up in 2012—Liberia, 

Congo, DRC, Kenya, Senegal, Sudan—I don’t know about Sudan, 

but those five—we really need to ensure that the whole democracy 

question moves forward. 

Now, I know that the funds are not available—I think in the first 

election in the DRC, we, I think, had about a $30 million budget, 

something like that, I mean, an enormous budget. Now I hear we 

have maybe $2 million or $3 million or $4 million. So the outcomes 

are certainly—as you know, the DRC had to get South Africa to fly 

helicopters in to leave ballots in places that you couldn’t get to. So 

I kind of wonder how these elections will turn out. 

So I just wonder, how can the U.S. best work to ensure that the 

elections held in countries that benefit from less international attention go smoothly? Are we working with our partners in the EU 

or other donor and potential donor countries, Japanese or the Koreans, or other people to see how we can have them perhaps assist 

in the cost—you know, as we all know, democracy is very expensive. You know, you save a lot of money when you don’t have to 

have elections, but that is not the right thing to do. 

And so, is there any approach to try to encourage other countries 

to have the concern that we have and have had—great job being 

done by the NED all over the world. 

Anyone could try to answer that. 

Mr. CARSON. Congressman Payne, thank you very much for your 

question. 

We have focused a great deal on strengthening democracy, and 

I think, over the last 2 years, our track record in support of that 

has been pretty good. Let me give you four quick examples and 

then talk a little bit about the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

Deputy USAID Assistant Administrator for Africa Sharon 

Cromer mentioned Nigeria. And Nigeria is important; it is most 

populous state in the continent. In 2007, it held deeply, deeply 

flawed elections where maybe 10 or 15 percent of the population 

actually cast a vote for the presidency. The elections in 2007 represented a continuing decline in electoral participation and credibility. In 1999, that country was returned to the civilian rule. 

Those elections were so-so; 2003, again, a decline; 2007, we are 

there. 

We were determined to do as much as we possibly could, working 

with the Nigerian Electoral Commission, to ensure that the elections that took place in 2011 were a substantial and significant improvement over 2007 and 2003 and 1999. Working jointly with 

DFID, the British aid agency, we came up with some $35 million. 

Our assistance helped to fund local observation groups, to put in 

place a parallel vote tabulation system, to provide technical assistance of a global nature to the newly appointed electoral commissioner, Professor Jega, and to ensure that we were able to do 

things that would help ensure that election. 

47

I went out to Nigeria myself during the first round of elections 

and traveled in three states to see for myself what had happened. 

And I am very pleased that Nigerians responded in very large 

numbers to an opportunity to vote in that country for the very first 

time in many years. It was not without technical hitches and problems, and it was not without violence after the second round, which 

was the Presidential round. But I can say that it was indeed a substantial and significant and clear improvement over what had gone 

on in 2007. 

We pushed very hard, along with Nigerians in civil society and 

those in government, to help make this happen. Having done that, 

we cannot turn our backs on Nigeria. We have to make sure that 

we continue to work. 

But Nigeria is not the only example. Niger, which has held successful elections this year as well, saw a return to civilian rule 

after approximately 15 months of military takeover. The former 

President, Tandja, the last civilian President there, overthrew the 

decision of the Supreme Court, overthrew the decision of his legislature, and overthrew the decision of many around him when his 

term had ended and he decided to stay on. There was a military 

coup, and, as a result, we were one of the very first to step in, pulling out our Peace Corps program, stopping our MCC program, and 

suspending our aid. 

Our Ambassador took a very tough, early line and said this 

would not be acceptable. We also said that we would not, in fact, 

go back in unless there was a civilian government. Again, we 

stepped in, we played a useful role, working with Nigeriens who 

were committed to democracy in that country, working with some 

military officers who were determined, themselves, to move back 

into a civilian situation. And we also, I might add, cut off our assistance to the Nigerien military and to their participation in the 

Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Program. They responded. Again, 

working with ECOWAS as well in this process, with General 

Abubakar, President Abubakar, who had led the transition to democracy in 1999 in Nigeria, worked very closely with him. Again, 

we were a part of that successful effort, again, working behind African initiatives. 

The same thing can be said in Guinea-Conakry, where, for 50 

years, under several different leaders, that country had not had a 

free and fair election. After the death of President Conte, a military 

junta came to power. But we worked very closely with ECOWAS, 

with President Blaise Compaore ́ from Burkina Faso, with the Moroccans, and also with the French to ensure that there was a transition in that government, as well. I, myself, went out and met the 

head of the military junta and worked with Blaise Compaore ́, with 

the French and the Moroccans, and with ECOWAS to ensure the 

kind of transition that occurred there, again, driven largely by our 

concern about a military that was carrying out gross violations of 

human rights. 

And let me say on the Ivory Coast, we have been extraordinarily 

engaged on this issue, as well. From the very, very beginning, we 

have said that we would not accept an arrangement in which the 

victor of the election, now-President Alassane Ouattara, would 

48

have to share power with the person who stole the election—never 

been our position. 

It is not very well known, but both President Obama and Secretary Clinton were both very clear from the very beginning. President Obama attempted to talk on two occasions with President 

Gbagbo early on in this crisis, in December and January, to encourage him to step aside. The effort was also made by Secretary of 

State Clinton, as well. We offered, among others, an opportunity 

for Gbagbo to leave and to step aside and even to come into the 

United States. We also sought friends of Mr. Gbagbo here in the 

United States to reach out to him. And, of course, he did not accept 

any of those offers. 

But never, never on the table was a compromise in which we 

would subject him to having to do what Morgan Tsvangirai has 

done in Zimbabwe and, I might even add, what Prime Minister 

Raila Odinga has done in Kenya. It was clear that Alassane 

Ouattara won that election, and we stood beside and behind 

ECOWAS and the decision by ECOWAS that Alassane Ouattara 

had won that election, again, working very closely with ECOWAS 

and the leaderships in West Africa on this. But we were very 

strong behind Choi and ECOWAS and the U.N. on this issue of the 

Ivory Coast. 

There are some 16 Presidential contests for Africa slated for this 

year across the continent. Many of them, like Nigeria and Niger, 

have already taken place, but there are other big ones coming up 

over the next 6 months. We expect Cameroon to be one; we expect 

Liberia to be another. But the next really big one will be in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

We will focus as much political attention on trying to ensure that 

the elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are a step 

forward, not a step backward, in democracy, and that they, too, will 

provide not fewer but more Congolese to be able to participate in 

the process, have confidence in the elected leaders who come out 

of it, and can build on this set of elections coming this year to make 

greater progress in democracy but also open the door for development. 

We are not stepping back from these. There is a strong commitment on our part to do as much as we can. It is important that 

democratic institutions be strengthened across the continent. They 

empower people economically and they empower them to unleash 

their ability to lean forward and to contribute to the growth of 

their societies. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I think my time has expired. 

I won’t ask a question for an answer, but in concern about Abyei 

and a solution to Sudan—like I said, we don’t have time for an answer—but I don’t think that we should take the pressure off the 

Government of Khartoum until Abyei and all of those issues are resolved, because we can have something like we had in India and 

Pakistan going on for 60 years in the future. 

Secondly, hopefully, we can keep an eye on Somalia. As you 

know, I have a lot of investment in Somalia. We have to maintain 

that whole peninsula for a democratic-elected person or we are 

going to have more chaos than we can ever dream of. If you think 

49

piracy is something now, let the TFG go out of power and alShabaab take over with the support of al-Qaeda. 

And finally, the issue of—I mentioned Sudan and Somalia. Just 

finally—and I am a pacifist, but I think that there ought to be 

some attention—Kony should not, after 22 years, still be able to 

roam around Africa. I think there ought to be a little SEALs 

project—we might want to get him alive, but that man should not 

be allowed for 20-something-plus years, to terrorize, to maim, to 

kill, to brutalize, and he still goes on. To me, he is the number one 

terrorist in the world. 

So, like I said, I have already abused my time, so I won’t ask for 

a question, but I just wanted to get that on the record. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CARSON. Let me respond very, very quickly, if I could, on 

Sudan. 

We absolutely agree with you, Congressman Payne, that it is absolutely critical to resolve the remaining issues of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Abyei must be resolved. A political solution 

has to be found. If it is not resolved, it could become a festering 

sore that could lead to a new conflict. We don’t want to see that 

happen. 

The other issues that must be resolved are related to oil and 

wealth sharing, to citizenship and naturalization, also, to borders 

and the resolution of five border issues, and, finally, the issue of 

debt. 

The clock is ticking very, very rapidly. Southern Sudan is slated 

to receive its independence on July 9. We are working as hard as 

we can under the leadership of Ambassador Princeton Lyman, who 

is the Secretary and the President’s Special Envoy on Sudan, to resolve these issues. We are working with President Thabo Mbeki 

and the high-level panel, as well as with the U.N. and its Special 

Representative, Haile Menkerios. But we believe that it is absolutely critical that we do as much as we can to resolve all of these 

issues before July 9 so that they do not become festering problems 

that could in fact lead to new conflicts and disagreements and ongoing tension in the future. 

On Somalia, we recognize the enormous problems that Somalia 

has caused. We see Somalia not only as an imploded state which 

has caused enormous problems for the Somali population, but we 

see Somalia as a cancer, in a sense, that has metastasized regionally, generating hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees traveling 

across the border into Kenya, across the Red Sea into Yemen. The 

number of Somalis leaving that country probably is in excess of 

6,000 a month. It is also generating not only refugees but illegal 

trading, illegal arms movements. 

But Somalia has become more than just a regional problem. That 

regional cancer has metastasized into a global one. And we see that 

manifested in multiple ways, but in the way that we see it most 

clearly is in the piracy on the high seas. Piracy is not a result of 

issues that are happening in the waters of Somalia, but because 

there is no government, there is no security force, there are no 

judges and no laws to punish pirates, but, more importantly, no 

economy to prevent or to have some other alternative. 

50

But we see it also in terrorism, and the fact that there continue 

to be in Somalia remnants of the al-Qaeda East Africa cell that 

was responsible for the destruction of the American Embassies in 

Nairobi and Dar Salem in August 1998. 

So Somalia is a domestic problem, a regional problem, and a 

global problem; and we need to continue to work on that. We have 

a dual-track strategy that we are focused on in which we are continuing to help AMISOM and help the TFG stand up. But we also 

are working with those local entities in south central Somalia that 

are not affiliated with TFG but are anti-al-Shabaab. We are looking for opportunities to work with them. And we are also stepping 

up our engagement in working with the regional authorities in 

Puntland and in Hargeisa and Somaliland. So we have not taken 

our eye off the ball in Somalia. It is a complex issue, but we are 

very much focused on trying to deal with it. 

With respect to Uganda and Joseph Kony, we know that he has 

been around for a long time and over that period of time has 

caused a great deal of hardship not only in northern Uganda from 

where he comes but also in the northeastern part of the Congo, the 

Central African Republic, and even parts of southern Sudan from 

time to time. 

Under legislation that was passed by the Congress last year, we 

have, in effect, stepped up our own engagement in activities and 

assistance to the Ugandan authorities to help them track Kony in 

the Congo and the Central African Republic. In the process, we 

have tried to help to strengthen not only the Ugandans but also the 

regional capacity in the Congo and also in the Central African Republic. 

There are a lot of things—I won’t go into them in detail—that 

we are doing to assist the Ugandans, and we will continue to work 

as effectively as we can with them and with others in the region 

to strengthen their capacity to go after this man and to deal with 

him. It is an enormous area, it is the size of Texas, and when you 

only have 2- or 3,000 people trying to do it, it is a difficult job. I 

think that over the last 2 years we have dispersed his forces and 

degraded his threat capacity, even though he continues to be a 

problem. We have to support the Ugandans as they continue to 

pursue him. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

I wanted to ask one of the panelists to comment a little bit more 

about the transnational crime in Africa. 

Reference was made to the cocaine trafficking from South America to West Africa, and I think you also mentioned Afghanistan and 

heroin traffic. I am assuming, but I don’t know, that these South 

American cartels are responsible for the cocaine, and I was wondering who is it that is involved in the trafficking in Africa of the 

heroin from Afghanistan. 

Mr. CARSON. The traffickers coming out of Central America are 

some of the same traffickers who have tried to penetrate the U.S. 

for many years. As our defenses have become stronger and tighter, 

those networks have moved across the Atlantic into West Africa 

and have begun to penetrate Europe and, as I say, in very small 

51

quantities even come transatlantic from Europe into the United 

States. 

We can have someone come up and give you a thorough briefing 

on it, but some of these are the same networks. The reason why 

we know this to be a fact is because we have worked with a number of African countries who have successfully made arrests of 

narcotraffickers from Central America——

Ms. BASS. Central or South? Central America? 

Mr. CARSON. Central and South. And they have been turned over 

to Federal law enforcement officials, brought back to the United 

States where they have faced prosecution. 

We have gotten excellent cooperation from the Liberians, from 

the Ghanaians, from the Sierra Leoneans; and there have been reported published cases of individuals as they have been busted for 

trying to suborn and to illegally influence or corrupt officials in 

West Africa. They have made arrests, and they have turned these 

individuals over to the United States. 

In East Africa, the problem is very different. Again, there it is 

traffickers trying to take advantage of air links and networks into 

probably the two best airline hubs in the East African Community 

that have links with the Asian subcontinent and also with Europe. 

And so it is just transiting and trafficking of a different sort, 

mainly through the airports and through the ports; and it is in fact 

again heroin and not cocaine. 

Ms. BASS. In which countries in East Africa? 

Mr. CARSON. The two that are used are, of course, the two that 

have the best airlines and the best airports and the best connections, and that is Ethiopia and Kenya. Because you have daily 

flights in and out of both of those airports into the Middle East, 

and they have excellent connections into Western Europe and on. 

So they are simply transit points for transshipment there. It is on 

a different level than what is happening in West Africa, which, obviously, West Africa is far more troubling and concerning. 

Ms. BASS. So the administration has requested an increase in 

funding for transnational crime, and I wanted to know what type 

of programs does the new funding envision? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes. The increase is quite substantial. There is a 

352 percent increase. It jumps from, Fiscal Year 2010, funding of 

$2.2 million to over $10 million in the Fiscal Year 2012 request. 

Ms. BASS. So I wanted to know what type of programs that 

funds. I see the increase but wanted to know what programs are 

envisioned for that funding and where? 

Mr. CARSON. Well, let me say that it is training, it is investigation, it is forensics, it is enabling the capacity to increase border 

security, customs investigations, and techniques for detection both 

at airports and at seaports. Some of this is also used to create what 

are called ‘‘vetted’’ narcotics units, locally staffed and trained but 

with individuals who are highly skilled and who are able to operate 

against international syndicates that operate these rings. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Just one final question, if I could, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ethiopia, if I am not mistaken, if I am looking at this number right, is slated to get $608 million in the 2012 budget, pretty much 

current levels. And I am wondering, how does Ethiopia’s 2009 law 

52

that empowered the Meles government with new authorities over 

NGOs if those authorities received at least 10 percent of their funding from overseas, and that would include the Diaspora, how does 

that affect our funding for NGOs that promote human rights and 

democracy? 

Mr. CARSON. This is a piece of legislation—I think it is the NGO 

Act—that we have talked with the Ethiopian Government about on 

a number of occasions. I myself have talked to officials at the highest level about this legislation; and we have said that we believe, 

in our own estimation, that it constrains the ability of NGOs to 

carry out the full range of activities that they would like to do and 

that it is a constraint. We hope that at some point this legislation 

will be reviewed. 

But the Ethiopian Government does have it on the books, and 

they say that their desire is to create indigenously funded organizations and not organizations that are dependent on funds from the 

outside. Our belief is is that there should in fact be more latitude 

and that if organizations can secure outside funding for what are 

responsible civil society organizations that are not in contravention 

of any laws that are undermining the state that these things 

should be considered. But we talk about this issue with the Ethiopian Government. 

Mr. SMITH. But I think it is clear that constraint is the design. 

That is why the law was enacted in the first place. How does that 

affect those organizations, particularly the human rights organizations, civil society organizations that want to promote true pluralism and really want to hold the government to account? Does 

that restrain our ability to fund those organizations? 

Mr. CARSON. It certainly doesn’t restrain our ability to talk with 

them, to engage with them, and that is important. There is nothing 

more powerful than an idea whose time has come. 

Mr. SMITH. Victor Hugo. 

Mr. CARSON. But let me just say that those organizations continue to operate in Ethiopia. They have not been barred. I suspect 

that many of them would like to have greater outside funding and 

assistance, but they continue to exist; they are not prohibited or 

barred. And, as I say, we have talked to the government about it 

and encouraged that there be more liberalization in this area. 

Mr. SMITH. Can you assure us that our funding for NGOs that 

promote human rights, that that money is not being diverted to 

those organizations, NGOs that are compliant with the government 

and certainly maybe working in tandem with the government? We 

always know there are front groups that purport to be human 

rights organizations that fall far short of an internationally recognized——

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think our funding is being 

diverted at all. I think that which is given is in fact going to legitimate civil society groups who are doing a range of things. These 

are not just civil society groups promoting human rights but civil 

society groups that are doing other things, including microfinance 

and microcredit, and working in various other activities. But I am 

confident that our funding is being appropriately used and not 

being diverted. 

53

Mr. SMITH. And just the last question, are there any other countries in sub-Saharan Africa that have a law similar to the NGO law 

in Ethiopia? 

Mr. CARSON. I don’t know, but I will find out. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

The hearing is adjourned. Thank you very much to our distinguished witnesses. 

[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE


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