U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Chinese Lessons from 

Other Peoples’ Wars

Editors:

Andrew Scobell

David Lai

Roy Kamphausen

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Strategic Studies Institute Book

CHINESE LESSONS FROM OTHER 

PEOPLES’ WARS

Andrew Scobell

David Lai

Roy Kamphausen

Editors

November 2011

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ISBN 1-58487-511-9
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword ........................................................................v

1. Introduction .............................................................1

 Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen 

2. People’s Liberation Army Lessons from 

Foreign Conflicts: The Air War in Kosovo..........33

 June Teufel Dreyer 

3. Sinica Rules the Waves? The People’s Liberation 

Army Navy’s Power Projection and Anti-Access/

Area Denial Lessons from the Falklands/

Malvinas Conflict ..................................................75

 Christopher D. Yung

4. The People’s Liberation Army’s Selective 

Learning: Lessons of the Iran-Iraq “War of the 

Cities” Missile Duels and Uses of Missiles

in Other Conflicts ................................................115 

 Christopher Twomey

5. Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars ...............153

 Dean Cheng

6. The People’s Liberation Army Lessons Learned 

from Recent Pacific Command Operations 

and Contingencies .............................................. 201

 Frank Miller

7. The Influence of U.S. Counterinsurgency 

Operations in Afghanistan on the People’s 

Liberation Army .................................................237 

 Martin Andrew
8. Learning from the Neighbors: The People’s 

Liberation Army Examines the Small 

Wars and Counterinsurgencies Waged 

by Russia ..............................................................277

 Yu Bin

9. About the Contributors ......................................321

iv
v

FOREWORD

I am delighted to introduce this 2011 publication 

by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), the National 

Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), and the United 

States Pacific Command (USPACOM), which focuses on the lessons learned by the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) from the experiences of non-Chinese 

armed forces during the previous 30 years. The papers 

contained in this volume could not be more timely or 

valuable to policymakers and scholars alike. 

Throughout my career, and currently as the USPACOM Commander, I have consistently sought a solid 

and relevant understanding of China, and the PLA in 

particular. The importance of China stems not only 

from its current international role and its influence on 

the Asia-Pacific region in particular, but also because 

China’s impact on global developments will likely 

continue to grow. One of our enduring imperatives, 

therefore, is to accurately survey China’s experiences 

as a means to grasp its existing perceptions, motivations, and ambitions. More than ever, solid, evidencebased scholarship that evaluates what the PLA has 

learned from the use of force and conflict elsewhere 

in the world is needed to shed light on the prospects 

for its cooperation, or rivalry, with the international 

community. This jointly sponsored study by SSI, NBR, 

and USPACOM is an important contribution toward 

this end.

The judgments associated with the PLA Conference in October 2010, and this volume, provide 

unique, valuable insights on how the PLA has applied 

the lessons learned from others’ military actions to its 

own strategic planning. For example, the PLA rapidly 

oriented itself to the importance of airpower, com-
mand and control, and precision munitions from the 

U.S. experience in Operations DESERT SHIELD and 

DESERT STORM. Of equal significance are the lessons 

learned by China’s armed forces that now apply to its 

new non-traditional military roles; such as the best 

practices to address all-hazard disasters and common 

transnational threats of piracy and terrorism. 

The expertise and scholarly analysis provided by 

SSI and NBR inform the decisions that affect our operations and approach throughout the Asia-Pacific 

region. I commend both organizations for their commitment to excellence with the presentation of the 

annual PLA Conference and the resulting conference 

volumes. Chinese Lessons from Other People’s Wars is 

an essential source for those seeking to understand 

China’s strategic judgment and calculus, and will help 

prepare us to address the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead.

ROBERT F. WILLARD

Admiral, USN

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

vi
1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Andrew Scobell

David Lai

Roy Kamphausen

The annual Conference on the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) took place at the U.S. Army 

War College (USAWC), in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on 

October 22-24, 2010.1

 The topic for this year’s conference was the “PLA’s lessons from Other People’s 

Wars.” Participants at the conference sought to discern what lessons the PLA has been learning from the 

strategic and operational experiences of the armed 

forces of other countries during the past 3 decades.

Why did observers of the PLA want to study what 

Chinese military analysts might learned about nonChinese wars? The answer is twofold. First, the PLA 

has not fought an actual war since 1979. Yet, during the 

last 3 decades, fundamental changes have taken place 

on the battlefield and in the conduct of war. Since the 

PLA has not fought since 1979, it had no experience in 

the changing face of war, and thus could not follow 

Mao Zedong’s admonition to “learn by doing (在战争

中学习战争)”; instead, it must look abroad for ways 

to discern the new pattern of warfare in the evolving 

information age. Studying Chinese military analysts’ 

observations of non-Chinese wars therefore provides 

us a glimpse of what the PLA takes from others’ experience to improve its capability and to prepare itself 

for dealing with China’s national security issues, such 

as Taiwan, the South and East China Sea disputes, and 
2

internal unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, to name the most 

obvious ones.

Second, Chinese military analysts have noticeably 

more freedom in assessing and commenting on the 

strength and weakness as well as the success and failures of other countries’ wars. Indeed, for political reasons, Chinese military analysts have to emphasize the 

heroics and triumphs of the PLA’s war experience and 

downplay setbacks and failures.2

 While there is certainly recognition of the daunting challenges—in Korea, for example, accounts readily acknowledge that 

the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) were totally 

unprepared logistically and devastated by airpower—

there are limits to the levels of candor. To date, there 

is no critical analysis of the PLA’s claimed success or 

dismissed failure in the Sino-Vietnamese Border War 

of 1979 by Chinese military analysts (however, there 

are a few studies done by scholars outside of China3). 

Studying Chinese military analysts’ observation of 

other people’s wars, therefore, provide us key hints as 

to what Chinese military analysts consider important 

aspects of current and future military operational success and failure. 

CHINESE MILITARY OPERATIONAL 

EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS

In more than 80 years since becoming a formidable 

political and military force in China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA (first as the guerrilla 

Red Army during the First [Kuomintang (KMT or the 

Nationalist Party]-CCP Civil War [第一次国共内战] of 

1927-37, then as a “semi-professional” branch of the 

KMT-CCP anti-Japanese coalition, the 8th Route [八

路军] and New 4th Armies [新四军], the PLA during 
3

the Second KMT-CCP Civil War [第二次国共内战] of 

1946-49, and finally a standing military of the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) have survived a tremendous 

amount of military conflict. Their experience spans 

from guerrilla warfare to large-scale campaigns and 

fighting against foreign armed forces in the Korean 

War of 1950-53, the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, 

the Sino-Soviet border skirmishes of 1969, the SinoVietnamese naval battles of 1974, and the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979 (there were also naval skirmishes with Vietnam in 1988 and with the Philippines 

in 1994 over the Spratly Islands).4

In addition, the PLA has been employed domestically to deal with widespread civil unrest, protests, 

riots, and rebellions.5

 Recently, the PLA has adopted a 

more serious and systematic approach to noncombat 

missions. As a result, Chinese military doctrine has 

evolved to include the concept of Military Operations 

Other Than War (MOOTW). What this has meant is 

that, whereas in the past, nonwar missions were part 

and parcel of the military’s job, these operations are 

now becoming formally integrated into PLA doctrine.6

Nevertheless, PLA leaders are quick to stress that the 

military’s “core mission” remains warfighting.7

The richest PLA operational legacy is in land warfare—there is an extensive record to reflect upon. 

Some important lessons were learned, including the 

importance of concentrating forces for an attack, the 

value of massed firepower, and seizing and maintaining the initiative.8

Yet, some lessons do not appear to have been 

learned or perhaps they were learned but then 

promptly forgotten. For example, one major lesson 

of the Korean War concerns the importance of logis-
4

tics. Since the campaigns against the KMT and the 

Japanese were fought on Chinese soil, the supply lines 

were short or, more often, nonexistent. The PLA was 

used to producing its own food, living off the land, 

or capturing supplies from the enemy. None of the 

approaches were available on the Korean Peninsula. 

These initial problems were addressed as the CPV put 

considerable effort into building a logistics tail. But 

keeping roads repaired and supplies flowing were 

constant challenges for CPV commanders. Yet, the logistical lessons of Korea seem to have been forgotten 

a quarter of a century later when the PLA went on the 

offensive against Vietnam.9

Moreover, another lesson of Korea was the importance of air defense. The U.S. Air Force wrought tremendous devastation on North Korea and seriously 

impaired CPV ground operations, especially ravaging 

supply lines. The Chinese adapted to this by operating 

at night, fortifying positions and hardening facilities.10

The CPV also focused efforts on anti-aircraft batteries. 

Indeed, because of Korea, the Chinese gave concerted 

attention to improving air defenses for military installations and cities throughout China. Chinese military 

“volunteers” gained invaluable experience while serving in Vietnam in the 1960s as anti-aircraft units countering U.S. Air Force bombers.11 As a result of these 

lessons and the reality of deficiencies in aircraft and 

pilots, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has funneled extensive resources and attention into air defense efforts. 

As far as the lessons from air wars, the PLA had 

very limited wartime operational experience upon 

which to draw. Indeed, the only significant air combat operations conducted were in Korea and over the 

Taiwan Strait in 1958.12 In the early 1950s, the Chinese 

air force was on a steep learning curve, albeit with sig-
5

nificant Soviet assistance in terms of aircraft, training, 

and even actual personnel.13 Chinese airmen and their 

flying machines acquitted themselves remarkably 

well but recognized their limitations and focused on 

air defenses for ground operations. While the tactical experience was extremely valuable and carefully 

monitored, operational lessons were few, if any, because airpower was viewed as a mere adjunct to the 

main event—operations on the ground. There was 

no air war in the 1979 Vietnam conflict,14 and the last 

“significant aerial combat” was in 1958.15 Thus, it was 

not until the 1991 Gulf War that the PLA leadership 

began to appreciate airpower not merely in a “supportive role” but as a dimension of battle space in its 

own right.16 The PLA also studied the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) air war against the 

rump Yugoslavia in 1999.17 Of course, China was not 

merely a disinterested observer because a NATO targeting error resulted in the accidental bombing of the 

Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The direct hit resulted 

in death and injury to Chinese citizens and severe 

damage to the building.

Similarly, the PLA has traditionally viewed sea 

power as an adjunct to land power. Other than attention to coastal defense, the focus of PLA Navy (PLAN) 

efforts has been on amphibious operations with the 

target of Taiwan foremost in their minds.18 It was 

only very recently, particularly since the late 1980s 

and 1990s, that concentrated attention has been given 

to developing blue water naval capabilities and offshore defense. PLAN operations were largely limited 

to the defense of seaports and coastal cities, modest 

amphibious operations against Hainan Island and 

some off-shore islands during the 1950s, and several 

naval skirmishes against Vietnamese forces in 1974 
6

and 1988. Although China seems to have focused significant attention on its submarine fleet, the PLAN has 

no experience whatsoever in submarine warfare. As a 

result, the Chinese navy had to turn to other people’s 

wars for operational lessons of sea power.19

Where ballistic missiles are concerned, the PLA 

has perhaps the least amount of experience. Missile 

tests are the extent of this, including, of course, those 

conducted in the context of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait 

Crisis. Nevertheless, the PLA has invested heavily in 

building up a potent arsenal of short-range ballistic 

missiles. Therefore, China must look elsewhere in 

search of operational lessons for ballistic missile employment.20

PLA LESSONS FROM OTHER PEOPLE’S WAR

One should not simply assume that a military 

learns from experience. Learning a lesson requires a 

sequence of distinct processes—analysis of experience, identifying the key lessons, and then acting to 

“institutionalize” these lessons. The final phase may 

be the most difficult, as the armed forces or service 

branch must follow through to implement changes in 

its organization or doctrine. Change in a complex bureaucracy like the military is never easy. As one U.S. 

Army analyst observed:

An army learns lessons after it incorporates the conclusions derived from experience into institutional 

form. Out of the commander’s experience may come a 

lesson, and from that lesson may come new or adapted 

doctrine or perhaps dissemination of potentially useful information. Only after its institutionalization, can 

the lesson be correctly described in the past tense as 

a lesson learned. Until then it remains just a lesson or 
7

usable experience, a semantic distinction that few can 

appreciate.21

Douglas Lovelace, Director of the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the first discussant at the conference, added “a little more texture” to the lessons 

learned framework with the following essential evaluation criteria, at least from a U.S. Army lessons learned 

perspective: 

• A valid and reliable observation;

• Understanding the observation;

• Discerning the significance of the observation;

• The applicability of the observation; and,

• Assessing the effectiveness of the lesson 

learned.22

Professor Lovelace pointed out that the U.S. approach has its own idiosyncrasies. For instance, he 

suggested that most American lessons learned are 

focused at the operational or tactical levels of war. 

Moreover, Professor Lovelace opined that the United 

States almost certainly has an expeditionary bias in its 

lessons learned: the U.S. military looks for lessons to 

enhance its own ability to project military power. He 

also suggested that these same idiosyncrasies are not 

likely to be the same for the PLA. He posited for instance, that China’s military may well focus its lessons 

learned more at the strategic level of war and have as 

a bias a more defensive, homeland security approach. 

These are high standards against which to judge 

the lessons learned by a country’s armed forces. But 

we should not necessarily hold the PLA up to these 

standards. First, unlike the U.S. military, the PLA does 

not have a unified center for lessons learned (key U.S. 

examples are the Joint Center for Operational Analy-
8

sis, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Air 

Force Center for Knowledge Sharing Lessons Learned, 

the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, and the 

Navy Lessons Learned System). The PLA Academy of 

Military Science (AMS) is perhaps the closest equivalent to an institution making concerted efforts to learn 

from foreign military experiences. Yet learning from 

other people’s war is ostensibly only one part of the 

AMS’s many missions; and there is no indication that 

the AMS has developed any systematic way to handle 

this complicated business. 

Second, we do not know precisely what lessons the 

PLA learns from the other people’s wars, what it dismisses, or whether it has learned wrong lessons. For 

instance, Chinese analysts may be led to believe that 

Slobodan Milosevic was defeated by air power alone 

in the “Kosovo Air War.” They could have missed an 

important factor that Milosevic surrendered in time to 

avoid a contemplated invasion by NATO ground forces. Another possible wrong lesson can be the much 

talked-about American aversion to taking casualties. 

As the American sacrifice in Iraq and Afghanistan 

shows, the nation’s acceptance of casualties depends 

very much on the situation. It would be a mistake to 

take aversion to casualties as an inherent problem of 

the U.S. military and the American people.

Moreover, we do not know how the PLA learns 

lessons, and how the PLA makes changes and implements lessons learned. To the best of our knowledge, 

the PLA does not officially report on the lessons 

learned from a conflict. Observers of the PLA have to 

piece together widely scattered information in order 

to speculate on the lessons the PLA presumably has 

learned from foreign militaries and other people’s 

wars. Thanks to China’s substantial output of pub-
9

lications on military topics in recent decades, there 

has been a growing amount of writings by the PLA 

and other Chinese security and military analysts on 

other people’s wars and recommendations for PLA 

improvements. In addition, in recent years there has 

been extensive coverage by Chinese mass and military 

media of the PLA’s frequent military exercises. Many 

of those news reports like to highlight the PLA’s new 

developments in both weaponry and the conduct of 

war, both of which could be results of learning and 

implementation of lessons from foreign militaries and 

other peoples’ wars. 

In this volume, we present a number of case studies based on publicly available Chinese sources. The 

authors are mindful of the methodological problems 

that a less-than-complete publicly available documentary and analytical record in Chinese on the wars 

might present. Readers are advised to bear these challenges in mind when reading the accounts of each 

war. Hopefully, over time the PLA will see that it is in 

its interest to increase transparency and become more 

professional in conducting the lessons learned business.

The first case concerns the PLA’s observation of 

the Kosovo Campaign. China pays heavy attention to 

this case for at least two compelling reasons. First, the 

Kosovo Campaign is a controversial foreign military 

intervention on the basis of the rights of individuals 

trumping the sovereign rights of states. China has 

three “sore spots,” namely, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, sharing similar features with the Kosovo issue. 

They have the potential to trigger foreign intervention, 

and China takes this potential very seriously. Second, 

the Kosovo Campaign was an awesome display of air 

power. The PLA cannot afford to ignore this war and 

must draw lessons from it. 
10

A survey of the Chinese literature on the Kosovo 

War (the United States calls it a campaign, but not a 

war) reveals several important things. We see an expected Chinese criticism of the U.S.-led military intervention in the former Yugoslavia. China warns the 

world not to take the Kosovo case as the beginning of 

human rights over sovereign rights interventions and 

the U.S.-led West not to contemplate similar actions 

against China’s handling of the Taiwan, Tibet, and 

Xinjiang problems.23

Another interesting finding is that the PLA has observed many aspects of the U.S.-led military operation 

in the Kosovo campaign, in addition to its signature 

features, the air campaign, application of precisionguided munitions, and the informatization of warfare.24 These include, but are not limited to, logistics 

support and military equipment resupply, military 

transportation, mobilization of the reserve forces, 

psychological warfare and public relations warfare, 

anti-air raids, use of unmanned aerial vehicles, hightech approaches, naval superiority, mobilization of 

the people, and so on.25 The PLA even pays attention 

to issues such as how to survive as a prisoner of war,26

to prevent suicide in the military,27 to deal with troop 

reductions due to casualties,28 and many more. 

In 2000, June Teufel Dreyer published an SSI monograph on the PLA’s study of the Kosovo War.29 She 

found that different groups in the PLA learned different lessons from their analyses of this case. Dreyer 

identified three prominent schools of opinion inside 

the PLA, each claiming to have learned the right lessons and advocating must-follow solutions. The first 

school was impressed with U.S. air power and overall advanced military machine and support systems. 

The advocates of this school suggested that China 
11

undertake measures to catch up with the U.S. forces 

and prepare for an evenly-matched contest with the 

United States in future conflicts. The second school, 

however, drew a different lesson: Milosevic lost the 

war because he did not know how to employ asymmetric tactics to deal with a much more powerful opponent; China therefore should modernize its national 

defense at its own pace, and the PLA should follow 

its own tradition, that is, winning from the position 

of the weak, to deal with the United States. The third 

school dismissed the claim of U.S. triumph in weapon 

technology and continued to advocate the primacy of 

people over weapons, a teaching from Chairman Mao 

and a tradition of the CCP and PLA. 

Dreyer was invited to revisit this case at the conference. She finds that a decade afterwards, the debate is 

still ongoing in China. However, it also appears that 

the PLA has taken the views of all three schools into 

account: China has made impressive improvement in 

the PLA’s capabilities; the CCP and PLA continue to 

follow their traditions; and the lessons appear to have 

been learned with “Chinese characteristics.”

The second case is the Falkland-Malvinas War of 

1982.30 This war remains to this date the most classic 

case between two determined warring nations involving the use of sea, air, and ground forces, with longrange expeditions and close engagements. The war 

also had heavy casualties including the loss of major 

warships and fighter jets. It is a case all major powers 

study. But China is clearly more interested than any 

other nation in studying this war, presumably for this 

case’s remarkable resemblance to the Taiwan issue, 

which could take China into a fight against Taiwan 

resistance and a U.S. military intervention.

In 2008, Lyle Goldstein of the U.S. Naval War College China Maritime Studies Center published an ar-
12

ticle on the PLA lessons learned from the Malvinas 

War.31 Goldstein found that although China sided with 

Argentina politically, Chinese military analysts had 

nevertheless no problem pointing out the fundamental mistakes Argentina made in this war. PLA analysts 

saw that Argentina leaders had missed Sun Zi’s basic 

teaching—they did not know the enemy or themselves 

well. Specifically, Argentina made a wrong calculation about the British will to fight for the Malvinas. 

Moreover, Argentina overestimated its own fighting 

capability. After all, Argentina’s “war machine” was 

not well-maintained, without assured resupply, and 

there were major mistakes in Argentina’s strategy and 

operations. The PLA appears to have taken these lessons to heart—it has been working hard to upgrade its 

fighting capabilities over the last 2 decades and holds 

no illusion as to possible U.S. intervention. 

While Goldstein’s work focuses on the PLA’s 

analyses of the Malvinas War as a traditional ChinaTaiwan-U.S. case, Christopher D. Yung in this current 

volume finds the PLA’s interest goes beyond Taiwan—it is learning the lessons from Britain to prepare 

the PLAN for carrying out missions far from its home 

base. Much of the British experience, such as anti-access and area denial; effective command and control; 

national mobilization, a sound defense economy, and 

a self-reliant resupply system; expedition force protection; foreign base and access facility; long-range 

air power; the use of merchant vessels; well-protected 

logistics supply lines; and so on, has provided valuable lessons. There is ample evidence that the PLA is 

acquiring these capabilities and preparing for these 

operations. Of note is that the PLA is also implementing these lessons in its naval operation in the Gulf of 

Aden. 
13

The third case examines PLA analyses of the use 

of missiles in other people’s wars. The relevant case 

that comes to mind is the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. 

The relevance of this case for China is clearly about its 

need to use missiles as a main deterrence force against 

Taiwan’s push for independence and possible U.S. 

military intervention in a cross-Taiwan Strait confrontation. 

Christopher Twomey has presented some intriguing findings in this study. Although PLA analysts 

paid noticeable attention to the Iran-Iraq “war of the 

cities”—that is, the indiscriminate bombing of civilian 

centers with missiles and the political and coercive impact of those missile attacks on the two nations, China 

did not appear to be interested in the lessons of those 

brute terror attacks. Instead, the PLA clearly prefers 

the use of precision-guided missiles. In The Science 

of Second Artillery Campaign, an official publication 

of China’s missile and nuclear force, the PLA openly 

prescribes that its conventional missiles will be used 

exclusively against the enemy’s key military targets 

that the weapons of other services cannot reach. These 

targets include the communications hubs, weapons 

delivery platforms, and, most practically, the aircraft 

carrier battle groups. 

Twomey offers three possible reasons for this PLA 

preference. One may be that China does not want to 

terrify the 23 million people in Taiwan with “raids 

against the cities” there. As Sun Zi puts it, the worst 

strategy in a war is to slaughter the opponent’s people. If China wants to take Taiwan intact, it is not in 

its interest to indiscriminately fire missiles that cause 

massive destruction there. The other reason appears 

to be that the PLA is more interested in the U.S. use 

of precision-guided missiles (PGM). Indeed, there are 
14

many PLA studies about the PGM and its employment 

in the U.S. joint and integrated operations in the last 

20 years, reflecting an ostensible PLA learning from 

the U.S. military. Improvements in PLA ballistic missile accuracy may well be linked to an effort to create 

Chinese-style PGM’s using ballistic missiles. Finally, 

it is also highly likely that the PLA has made its own 

efforts to promote internal innovations in the use of 

missiles as deterrence in the Taiwan issue. This doctrinal development is also consistent with the PLA’s 

ongoing revolution in military affairs with Chinese 

characteristics. Whatever the case, the PLA clearly believes that PGMs are powerful weapons of the weak 

against the strong (read the United States). It is determined to make them a central component in China’s 

missile strategy today. 

The fourth case is about China’s lessons from the 

Gulf Wars (Gulf War I of 1991 and Gulf War II of 2003). 

Almost certainly the greatest overall impact of a nonChinese war was the Gulf War of 1991, which by most 

accounts stunned the PLA.32 The high tech dimensions and swift victory by the U.S. and coalition forces 

against the Iraqi military left a lasting impression on 

Chinese military leaders. Chinese leaders characterized this U.S. show of force as the new revolution in 

military affairs (RMA). They saw that this U.S.-led 

RMA came as a result of the U.S.-led West taking advantage of the revolution in science and technology, 

namely the breakthroughs in computation, electronics, and information processing and transmission. 

Chinese leaders took the stunning U.S. show of force 

as a wakeup call and made all-out efforts to learn from 

the United States and improve the PLA. In many ways, 

the PLA has made improvements. As Dean Cheng 

presents in his chapter, much of the PLA’s learning 
15

has been translated into its strategic guidelines and 

operational handbooks and is guiding the PLA to develop its capabilities. 

China, however, is very critical of the second Gulf 

War. Chinese hold that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a 

blatant violation of “international rules and norms;” it 

is another bad example of sidestepping the United Nations (UN) to pursue U.S. self interests (the first being 

the Kosovo campaign). As a result, Chinese see that 

Gulf War II has had a negative impact on U.S. prestige; it substantially hurts U.S. soft power; the United 

States has paid a heavy price for it (heavy casualties, 

economic expenses, and many other factors); and to a 

great extent, this war contributes further to the steady 

decline of American power, which was celebrated as 

having created a “unipolar moment” after the first 

Gulf War and expected to “rule a lasting unipolar era” 

for many years to come.33

However, the above criticism at the political and 

strategic level aside, China still pays close attention 

to the operational aspects of the U.S. military actions 

in the second Gulf War. Chinese characterize the U.S. 

“shock and awe” campaign as the United States pushing its military superiority to a new height. They also 

find impressive the execution of electronic and information warfare. Indeed, the PLA takes the informationization of warfare as the defining factor of the 

ongoing RMA. In the last three National Defense White 

Papers (2004, 2006, and 2008), China has placed the 

informationization of its armed forces as the goal of 

China’s national defense modernization. 

At the same time, the PLA and Chinese analysts 

continue to pay attention to those U.S. military operations they have been studying since Gulf War I and 

the Kosovo campaign (see the listing in the discussion 
16

of Case 1). In addition, as Dean Cheng presents in his 

chapter, Chinese analysts have paid special attention 

to the so-called “three warfares,” namely, psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. 

They see that the United States made unprecedented 

efforts to wage these “soft battles” of the war; these efforts helped the United States set the stage for the war 

and create the winning conditions even before the war 

started. In addition, the United States also made these 

efforts to justify the war, exercise damage control (following the Abu Ghraib scandal, for example), and 

maintain Americans’ support for the war. Although 

Chinese dismiss some aspects of these approaches, 

they nevertheless believe that these are good lessons 

to learn and that they should integrate these soft-war 

approaches in their warfighting capability. 

The fifth case is about the PLA’s observation 

of the operations of the U.S. Pacific Command. The 

Western Pacific has not had a war since World War 

II, although there have been several land wars on its 

edges, the Korean War of 1950-53, the Vietnam War of 

1965-73, and the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979; 

and several naval confrontations between China and 

Vietnam and the Philippines. However, this vast area 

has never been truly “pacific.” There has always been 

an undercurrent of tension. Since the mid-1990s, the 

U.S.-China power transition has become the defining 

characteristic of this region. More recently, U.S.-China 

tension has come to the surface as a result of the two 

nations confronting each other over the U.S. military 

activities in China’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone 

(EEZ) and tensions in the Korean peninsula and in the 

South and East China Seas. 

Much of China’s direct military interaction, and at 

times confrontation, is with the U.S. Pacific Forces. As 
17

Frank Miller puts it in this case study, the U.S. Pacific 

Command (PACOM) is the face of the U.S. military to 

the PLA, and so it is not surprising that China pays 

close attention to PACOM’s strategic design and operations in the Western Pacific. The Chinese understand that the United States is concerned with a rising and increasingly more powerful China and has 

maintained a two-pronged policy of engagement and 

hedging toward China. They clearly see that while the 

engagement part of this policy involves all the instruments of U.S. foreign policy, including the military, 

PACOM is the pillar of the U.S. military preparation 

for a worst-case scenario against the possibility that “a 

rising China turns bad.” 

China’s study of PACOM is extensive. As Miller 

shows, the PLA looks closely into the organization 

of PACOM, its force structure and equipment, training activities, regional engagement plans, outreach, 

humanitarian operations, and joint military exercises. 

Perhaps the most-studied subject is U.S. aircraft carrier battle group operations. China may be on the verge 

of acquiring an aircraft carrier capability, but a debate 

about this capability has been going on in China for 

decades. Proponents argue that China is the only major power in the world without an aircraft carrier and 

the world should not be surprised to see China acquire one; more importantly, as China seeks to secure 

and protect its expanding maritime interests, it must 

develop a strong blue-water naval power with aircraft 

carriers at its core. Skeptics in China, however, believe 

that the aircraft carrier is a war machine of yesterday; 

China should use its resources to develop weapons of 

tomorrow. The interesting convergence of this divide 

in China is that both schools study extensively the PACOM aircraft carrier battle group operations, with the 
18

proponents paying more attention to the useful part 

while the opponents, as Miller observes, “study ways 

to defeat the U.S. systems.”34

In the sixth case study, Martin Andrew examines PLA observations about U.S. counterinsurgency 

(COIN) operations in Afghanistan. PLA analysts note 

that U.S. COIN operations took place on extremely 

difficult battlefields at high altitude and in complex 

terrains; they are therefore much-needed lessons for 

the Chinese military. In addition, U.S. employment 

of network centric methods and equipment in a wide 

range of operations informs the PLA on its transformation. In a careful analysis, Andrew highlights the 

PLA’s interests in aviation operations such as helicopter assault, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) maneuver, close air support in combat, precision strike, and 

utilizing space assets to support ground operations. 

These are valuable lessons for the PLA in its modernization efforts.

The final case study is about the PLA’s observation of counterinsurgency operations by the Russians 

against the Chechens. Russia’s Chechen problem has 

much relevance to China’s Xinjiang problem (and 

China’s Taiwan and Tibet problems). Russian experience in dealing with this problem is thus very valuable 

to the Chinese. There is a general consensus among 

Chinese analysts that Russia’s initial handling of the 

Chechen problem under the Boris Yeltsin administration was a total disaster. PLA General Yang Hui (杨晖) 

has rightly highlighted the key problems such as the 

lack of agreement among the senior Russian leaders 

on what to do with the Chechen independence movement, the Russian government and military’s complete incompetence and lack of preparation in waging 

the first Chechen War of 1994-96, the miscalculation of 
19

the Chechens’ fighting capability, the near absence of 

intelligence on the enemy, and so on.35

Chinese analysts, however, give high marks to 

Russia’s tactics in the second Chechen War of 1999. 

They commend Putin’s decisive acts taken against the 

Chechens, such as steadfast resistance to the Chechen 

independence quest, decisive military action against 

the armed Chechen rebels, a unified and better coordinated government and military, standing up against 

U.S.-led Western double standards and criticism, cutting off the Chechens’ external support, and taking 

measures to improve Chechen economic conditions 

and rebuilding war-torn Chechnya.36

Yu Bin observes China’s key takeaways as: 1) tolerance and compromise to rebellions and insurgence 

should not be entertained; 2) decisive action, or even 

preemption, is essential to stop an insurgency “at its 

infancy;” 3) keep the People’s Armed Police (PAP) 

and the PLA at full capacity; and 4) stand firm to oppose outside interference. 

LESSONS (IMPLICATIONS) FOR THE UNITED 

STATES

As we have seen, Mao Zedong’s dictum to “learn 

by doing” provides little help to a military that last 

fought in earnest more than 3 decades ago. Studying 

Chinese military analysts’ observations of non-Chinese wars therefore provides us a glimpse of what the 

PLA takes from others’ experience both to improve its 

peacetime deterrent capabilities and to prepare for potential military operations in a Taiwan contingency, in 

the South and East China Seas disputes, against internal unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, or to fulfill its “new 

historic missions.” This process of “learning from 
20

other’s lessons learned” is what a seasoned member 

of the U.S. intelligence community referred to at the 

conference as the “extrapolation factor” and can be 

thought of as a military application of what the field 

of international political economy refers to as the “advantages of late developing countries.” 

However, at best this approach provides just a 

glimpse into PLA thinking and observers must be 

wary of an overly deterministic linkage between the 

lessons the PLA has or has not learned, and what it 

may or may not be doing about them. The causal evidence chain linking observations by PLA commentators about a foreign crisis to a debate in China and to 

subsequent concrete changes in doctrine, techniques, 

equipment, or strategy poses big methodological challenges for such an endeavor as ours. In many cases, 

the evidence is just not fully there to make these links, 

especially without the sorts of inputs that firsthand 

participants in the Chinese process might provide. 

What occurs more frequently are the half-associations, 

the emergence of lessons learned that piggy back and 

reinforce ongoing developments in the PLA, and lessons that perhaps support a party line in an internal 

political debate.

Nonetheless, the process can provide valuable insights. At one level, Chinese military analysts have 

noticeably more freedom in objectively assessing 

the successes and failures of other nation’s conflicts 

than they do in looking at their own. While important 

observers of China’s military such as Dennis Blasko 

point out that the PLA does undertake “after action 

reviews” (AAR) in which it frankly assesses performance and identifies shortcomings, it is likely the case 

that for political reasons Chinese military analysts 

still tend to emphasize the heroics and triumphs of 
21

the PLA’s war and exercise experience at the expense 

of learning fully from setbacks and failures. Studying 

Chinese military analysts’ observations of other people’s wars therefore provides us key hints as to what 

Chinese military analysts consider important aspects 

of current and future military operational success and 

failure for the PLA itself.

Moreover, we can also enhance our understanding 

of PLA priorities by understanding what observations 

about foreign operations the PLA is not making. This 

is what one former U.S. policymaker pointed out at 

Carlisle as the lessons “not learned” or not adopted, 

the so-called “dogs that do not bark.” While it may be 

difficult to parse real lessons learned from academic 

“noise” in PLA scholarly writings, we can say with 

high confidence that it would be extremely rare to find 

a topic of high importance to PLA thinkers that did 

not find some expression in the open literature. 

This leads us to the first policy implication, namely 

that the military lessons that the PLA learns are embedded within a broader Chinese domestic political 

reality that shapes and colors them. This seems especially the case because the PLA seems to learn its lessons more at the high operational to strategic levels 

of war, precisely the domain where politics most inserts itself. For instance, China strongly opposed the 

Kosovo air war because of the terrible precedent it set. 

Beijing continues to worry about the specter of foreign 

military intervention in China, a concern heightened 

because of the country’s history of being bullied by 

foreign gunboats and boots on the ground. Taiwan, as 

well as Tibet and Xinjiang, are locations where Beijing 

focuses its concern. This distorted the military lessons 

China learned from NATO air operations, and what 

China might have gleaned on the topic of air power 
22

at an operational level was diminished by a political necessity to qualify American successes precisely 

because it was feared that this power might be used 

against China itself at some future point. This then 

would diminish the likelihood of learning lessons 

about the value of low-tech people’s war approaches 

to such sustained bombing campaigns, largely in the 

face of the data gleaned from that conflict. This would 

thus appear to be an example of a lesson not learned 

or one improperly applied. 

A second implication emerges from the observation made by Professor Lovelace that the lessons most 

readily learned by the PLA are those at the high operational and strategic levels of war. This is a fortunate 

merging of evidence and relevance for U.S. policymakers. As Christopher Yung’s chapter indicates, Chinese 

strategic planners place a high priority on an accurate 

pre-conflict strategic assessment; indeed a singular 

criticism of Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas was 

that Buenos Aires failed to conduct a comprehensive 

strategic assessment in the run-up to its own actions 

that precipitated the conflict. 

This dynamic suggests that the issue bears close attention by Western observers of the PLA as well. If the 

contingency or crisis involves the United States, then 

the Chinese will take a very careful measure of how 

committed and capable the United States is for the 

fight. And so, demonstrating the type of commitment 

and capabilities that convey resolve becomes a very 

necessary element of deterrence precisely because the 

Chinese pay so much attention to it. PACOM plays an 

important role in this regard. Everything that PACOM 

does to enhance regional stability, bolster alliances, 

dissuade provocations, and so on ultimately serves to 

shape how China writes its pre-combat strategic as-
23

sessment. So in a very real sense issues of peace and 

war hinge on PACOM’s daily operations in peacetime. 

This, then, leads to a final policy implication, which 

emerges from Frank Miller’s treatment of PLA lessons 

learned from PACOM. Miller argues persuasively 

that PACOM is a singular point of focus for the PLA. 

PACOM’s regional engagement strategy, military 

diplomacy, and multilateral exercises in particular 

have been studied by the PLA and adopted for Chinese use. But PLA adoption of PACOM approaches 

should not in any way be construed as acceptance of 

PACOM. Quite the contrary, the PLA sees PACOM as 

both one model for how the PLA might develop, and 

as an obstacle to achievement of its goals—a potential 

adversary who must be understood and thwarted. As 

the U.S. Government more broadly seeks ever more 

cooperative approaches to its engagement with China, 

it remains essential to recognize that just as the United 

States has elements of both “hedge and engage” in its 

approach, so does China. Just as there are U.S. analysts who portray the PLA as the source of destabilizing operations—think of the January 2007 anti-satellite launch, the January 2011 J-20 test flight, increasing 

assertiveness in China’s littoral seas during 2009 and 

2010, and unyielding military pressure on Taiwan over 

the years, to name a few—so, too, does China seek to 

portray the U.S. military as the singular source of destabilizing actions. China characterizes U.S. military 

reconnaissance operations in international air and seas 

off China’s coast as unfriendly and an obstacle to the 

further development of productive bilateral relations. 

Military professionals and decisionmakers would be 

well advised to be circumspect about these developments, avoiding impulses to over-correct or resort to 

the default settings in U.S. policy approaches. Chinese 
24

soldiers and statesmen will inevitably draw their own 

lessons from these American reactions to Chinese actions.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. The annual PLA conference has been in existence for more 

than 2 decades. 

2. Writings of the glorious military history of the Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP) and PLA abound. The following are a 

few examples. Xiao Yusheng, (肖裕声), 中国共产党军事史论 (On 

the Military History of the Chinese Communist Party), Beijing, China: 

Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Archive Chubanshe, 2007; He Xin (何訫), 中国共产党武装斗争认识史 (History of 

the Chinese Communist Party Armed Struggle Experience and Learning), Beijing, China: CCP History Chubanshe, 2007; 中国工农红军

史略 (History of the Worker-Peasant Red Army), Beijing, China: CCP 

Archive Chubanshe, 1987; 八路军史, (上, 下) (History of the Eighth 

Route Army, Vols. I and II). Beijing, China: CCP Archive Chubanshe, 2005; 新四军战史 (Battle History of the New Fourth Army), 

Beijing, China: PLA Chubanshe, 2000; 中国人民解放军第一, 二, 

三, 四野战军战史 (Battle History of the PLA’s 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th 

Field Armies), Beijing, China: PLA Chubanshe, 1998; 中国军事科

学学会军事历史分会与军事科学院军事历史研究所合编 (Military 

History Chapter of the Chinese Military Science Association and 

the Military History Research Institute of the Academy of Military Science, eds.), 发扬优良传统,履行神圣使命:纪念中国人民

解放军建军80周年学术研讨会论文集 (Promoting Good Tradition, 

Carrying out Sacred Mission: Collected Works Commemorating the 

80th Anniversary of the Founding of the PLA), Beijing, China: The 

Academy of Military Science Publishing, 2008; Yao Youzhi (姚有

志) and Li Qingshan (李庆山), 解放军横扫千军的四十大战役 (40 

Major Sweeping Campaigns of the PLA), Shenyang, China: Baishan 

Publishing, 2009. 

3. See Xiaoming Zhang, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A 

Reassessment,” China Quarterly, 2005; and Edward C. O’Dowd 

and John F. Corbett, Jr., “The 1979 Chinese Campaign in Vietnam: 

Lessons Learned,” in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry 

M. Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of History: The Chinese People’s Libera-
25

tion Army at 75, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2003; Harlan W. Jencks, “China’s Punitive War with 

Vietnam: An Assessment,” Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 7, August 

1979.

4. For the CCP and PLA’s own accounts of their history, see 

Note 1 for some of the primary references. For non-Chinese analyses of the CCP and PLA’s historical experience, two recent publications are good sources for reference: Mark A. Ryan, David M. 

Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: 

The PLA Experience Since 1949, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003; 

Burkitt, Scobell, and Wortzel, eds., The Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army at 75.

5. On the use of the PLA to restore order in the Cultural Revolution, see Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond 

the Great Wall and the Long March, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, chap. 5; on the PLA’s operational response to the 

1989 Tiananmen protests, see ibid., chap. 7. On the PLA’s response 

to the Tibetan protests of 2008, see Murray Scot Tanner, “How 

China Manages Internal Security Challenges and its Impact on 

PLA Missions,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew 

Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2009, pp. 39-98; on the PLA’s domestic operations to deal with 

the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and other domestic challenges, see 

Harold Tanner, “The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Internal Security Challenges,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and 

Andrew Scobell, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the 

Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010, pp. 237-294. 

6. These new noncombat missions include peacekeeping and 

anti-piracy missions. On the former, see Bates Gill and Chin-hao 

Huang, “China’s Expanding Presence in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Implications for the United States,” in Kamphausen, 

Lai, and Scobell, ed., Beyond the Strait, pp. 99-126; on the latter, see 

Andrew E. Erickson, “Chinese Sea Power in Action: The Counter 

Piracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond,” in Kamphausen, 

Lai, and Scobell, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad, pp. 295-376.
26

7. See, for example, Andrew Scobell, “Discourse in 3-D: The 

PLA’s Evolving Doctrine, Circa 2009,” Kamphausen, Lai, and Scobell, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad, pp. 99-134.

8. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., “Introduction: Patterns of PLA Warfighting,” in Chinese 

Warfighting, pp. 3-22. See also Dennis Blasko, “PLA Ground Forces Lessons Learned: Experience and Theory,” in Burkitt, Scobell, 

and Wortzel, ed., The Lessons of History, pp. 61-88.

9. O’Dowd, Chinese Military Strategy, pp. 70-71; Susan M. Puska, “Taming the Hydra: Trends in China’s Military Logistics Since 

2000,” in Kamphausen, Lai, and Scobell, eds., The PLA at Home and 

Abroad, p. 554.

10. On these lessons, see John J. Tkacik, Jr., “From Surprise to 

Stalemate: What the People’s Liberation Army Learned from the 

Korean War,” in Burkitt, Scobell, and Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of 

History, pp. 293-326.; Yu Bin, “What China Learned from its ‘Forgotten War’ in Korea,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, eds., 

Chinese Warfighting, pp. 123-142.

11. Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill, NC: 

University of North Carolina Press, 2001, pp. 225-227; Zhai Qiang, 

China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

12. On the overall lessons learned by the PLAAF, see Kenneth W. Allen, “PLA Air Force, 1949-2002: Overview and Lessons 

Learned,” in Burkitt, Scobell, and Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of History, pp. 89-156. See also, Xiaoming Zhang, “Air Combat for the 

People’s Republic: The People’s Liberation Army Air Force in Action, 1949-1969,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, eds., Chinese 

Warfighting, pp. 270-300.

13. Liu Zhen, Liu Zhen Huiyilu [Memoirs of Liu Zhen], Beijing, 

China: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1990. Liu was the first commander 

of the Air Force of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.

14. Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century. Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 1995, pp. 92-93.
27

15. Allen, “PLA Air Force,” in Burkitt, Scobell, and Wortzel, 

eds., The Lessons of History, p. 144.

16. Tian Yueying (田越英), “人民空军战略的发展演变及规律 “ 

(“The Pattern and Evolution of PLA Air Force Strategy”), 军事历

史 (Military History), No. 6, 2009.

17. June Teufel Dreyer, The PLA and the Kosovo Conflict, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001. 

18. For an overview and analysis of amphibious operations in 

the Taiwan Strait, see Xiaobing Li, “PLA Attacks and Amphibious 

Operations During the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-55 and 1958,” 

in Ryan Finkelstein, and McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting, pp. 

143-172. For an analysis of sea power lessons learned, see Bernard 

D. Cole, “The People’s Liberation Army Navy after Half a Century: Lessons Learned in Beijing,” in Burkitt, Scobell and Wortzel, 

eds., The Lessons of History, pp. 157-192. See also Alexander C. 

Huang, “The PLA Navy at War, 1949-1999; From Coastal Defense 

to Distant Operations,” in Chinese Warfighting, pp. 241-269.

19. See, for example, Lyle Goldstein, “China’s Falklands Lessons,” Survival, Vol. 50, No. 3, June 2008, pp. 65-82.

20. For PLA lessons on missiles, see Mark A. Stokes, “The 

People’s Liberation Army and China’s Space and Missile Development: Lessons from the Past and Prospects for the Future,” in 

Burkitt, Scobell, and Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of History, pp. 193-

252.

21. Dennis J. Vetock, Lessons Learned: A History of U.S. Army 

Lesson Learning, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1988, p. 128. On the specific challenges of changing an army, 

see General Donn A. Starry, “To Change an Army,” Military Review, March 1983, pp. 20-27. This discussion draws on Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, “Introduction: The Lessons Learned 

by China’s Soldiers,” in Burkitt, Scobell, and Wortzel, eds., The 

People’s Liberation Army at 75, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003, pp. 4-5.

22. Douglas Lovelace, “Discussion Notes,” 20th Annual PLA 

conference, Carlisle, PA, October 25, 2010.
28

23. See Cao Shulan (曹淑兰), “论科索沃独立对于中国稳定的不

利影响 “ (“On the Kosovo Independence and Its Negative Impact 

on China’s Stability”), 湘潮 (Xiangchao), No. 3, 2000;Chen Zhiqiang, ( 陈志强) “当代科索沃问题的国际政治因素" (“The International Political Factors in the Contemporary Kosovo Issue”), 史学

集刊 (Collected Papers of History Studies), No. 3, 2010; Ji Jingfang (纪

景方) “科索沃战争引发的理论思考 “ (“Some Theoretical Thoughts 

on the Kosovo War”), 军事历史 (Military History Studies), No. 1, 

2000; Liu Shaoming (刘绍明) and Xu Bin (许彬), “世纪末的警钟: 

科索沃战争留给我们的启示" (“Alarm Bell at the End of the Century: The Lessons of Kosovo War”), 湘潭师范学院学报 (Journal of 

Xiangtan Normal University), No. 2, 2000; and Qian Wenrong (钱

文荣) “人道主义干预与国家主权” (“Humanitarian Intervention 

and National Sovereignty”), 和平与发展季刊 (Peace and Development Quarterly), No. 3, 2000; and “科索沃独立开创了危险的先例” 

(“Kosovo Independence: A Dangerous Precedence”), 和平与发展

季刊 (Peace and Development Quarterly), No. 2, 2008. 

24. This is a main lesson from the Kosovo War. There are 

many studies on informationization warfare. The Chinese Defense White Papers have made it clear that China makes the informationization of its national defense and armed forces as the goal 

of national defense modernization. 

25. Jia Wannian (贾万年), Guo Shusen (郭树森), Tian Xuejun 

(田学军), “伊拉克战争美军卫勤保障特点及对外军的启示” (“What 

the PLA Can Learn from the U.S. Military Logistics Support in 

the Iraq War”), (PLA Military Medical Affairs), No. 8, 2006; Zheng 

Ran (郑然) and Zhou Shiwei (周世伟), “伊拉克战争美军卫勤动

员及其启示” (“Lessons from U.S. Military Medical and Logistics 

Support Mobilization in the Iraq War”), 西南国防医药 (Medical 

Journal of National Defense Forces in Southeast China), No. 3, 2006; 

Liu Hongwei (刘洪卫), “科索沃战争对我军军交运输建设的几点启

示” (“Several Lessons from Kosovo War on Our Military Transportation Development”), 军事经济研究 (Military Economics Studies), No. 11, 1999; Na Tingbin (那廷斌), “建设强大后备力量为打赢

未来战争做好准备: 科索沃战争给我们的一点启示"

(“Developing 

a Powerful Reserve Force and Preparing to Win Future Wars: 

Lessons from the Kosovo War”), 学理论 (Theoretical Studies), No. 

8, 1999; Meng Xianchen (孟宪臣), “科索沃战争对心理战的启示"

(“Lessons from the Kosovo War on Psycho-Warfare”), 政工学刊 
29

(Journal of Political Works), No. 3, 2000; Zhang Peigao (张培高), “

战争离我们并不遥远: 从科索沃战争看国土防空的紧迫性" (“War 

Is Not Far from Us: Lessons from the Kosovo War on the Urgency of Territorial Air Defense”), 中国国情国力 (China National 

Power), Vol. 97, No. 1, 2001; Ji Xiumin (计秀敏), “北约军队的 ‘空中

眼睛’: 介绍无人机在科索沃战争中的应用" (“NATO’s ‘Eyes in the 

Air’: An Introduction to the Use of UAV in the Kosovo War”); 

Lin Yuchen (林玉琛) and Jin Mengjiang (金孟江), “无人机将成为

压制防空作战的有效武器: 科索沃战争经验总结之" (“UAV Will 

Become An Effective Weapon in Countering Air Defense: One of 

the Lessons from the Kosovo War”), 现代防御技术 (Modern Defense Technology), Vol. 29, No. 1, 2001; Ai Chun (艾春), “科索沃

战争中的海上力量" (“Naval Forces in the Kosovo War”), 海洋军

情 (Maritime Military Information); Wang Shuli (王树理), Lai Yuan 

(来源) and Zhang Songquan (张松权), “科索沃战争中交战双方战

争动员与准备的特点及其启示" (“The Characteristics and Lessons 

of War Mobilization and Preparation on Both Sides of the Kosovo 

War”), 军事历史 (Military History), No. 4, 2002; Zeng Zhongqiu 

(曾仲秋) and Wang Peian (王培安), “科索沃战争给我国国防动员

的启示“ (“Lessons from the Kosovo War on Our National Defense 

Mobilization”), 国防 (National Defense), No. 11, 2001.

26. Huang Jun (黄俊) and Tao Guodong (陶国栋), “美军教

飞行员如何当战俘“ (“U.S. Military Teaches Pilots How to Be a 

POW”), 环球军事 (Global Military), No. 9, 2009; Cao Tingze (曹

廷泽) and Pan Dahong (潘大红), “从科索沃战争看未来后勤保障“ 

(“Lessons from the Kosovo War on Logistic Support”), 军事经济

研究 (Military Economics Studies), No. 5, 2000; Chen Daiyun (陈代

云) and Le Hanhua (乐汉华) “科索沃战争对加强我军战场军需保

障的启示“ (“Lessons from the Kosovo War on Our Military Battlefield Supply”), 军事经济研究 (Military Economics Studies), No. 

12, 1999; Dong Xiaomei (董孝梅) and Zhao Jianyuan (赵建元), “科

索沃战争中美军的后勤保障及启示“ (“Lessons from U.S. Military 

Logistic Supply during the Kosovo War”), 军事经济研究 (Military 

Economics Studies), No. 8, 2000; Liu Yaqi (刘亚奇), “美军民力后勤

保障的内容及成功经验“ (“The Components and Successful Experience of U.S. Civil-Military Logistic Support System”), 基层后勤

研究 (Research on Rear Service at a Basic Level), Vol. 6, No. 2; Wang 

Feng (王丰), Lu Baoliang (卢保亮), and Tang Guoping (唐国坪), 

“科索沃战争对后方仓库建设的启示“ (“Lessons from the Kosovo 

War on Warehouse Construction”), 军事经济研究 (Military Economics Studies), No. 10, 1999.
30

27. Zhao Hanqing (赵汉清), Shi Jianan (施建安), and Wang 

Weihua (汪卫华), “美军在伊拉克战争中自杀的预防及对我军的启

示“ (“What the PLA Can Learn from the U.S. Military Suicide Prevention in the Iraq War”), 东南国防医药 (Military Medical Journal 

of Southeast China), Vol. 12, No. 1, 2010.

28. Li Peijin (李培进), Li Shuming (李书明), and Ma Jing (马

婧), “美军伊拉克战争中伤病员减员分析及启示“ (“Lessons from 

U.S. Military Handling Troop Reduction Due to Casualty in the 

Iraq War”), 人民军医 (PLA Military Medical Affairs), No. 7, 2010.

29. June Teufel Dreyer, The PLA and the Kosovo Conflict, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000.

30. The British and Americans call it the Falklands War, but 

the Chinese go with Argentina to call it the Malvinas War. Since 

this study is about Chinese learning of this war, we use Malvinas.

31. Lyle Goldstein, “China’s Falklands Lessons,” Survival, 

Vol. 50, No. 3, 2008.

32. See, for example, Paul H. B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine, 1949-1999,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting, pp. 46-50.

33. See Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, 1990/91; and “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” National Interest, Winter 2002/03, for the discussion of the “American hegemonic opportunities.” See Chinese critics in Zhou Guiyin 

(周桂银), “先发制人战争的道义限度“ (“On the Moral Limitation 

of Preemptive War”), 世界经济与政治 (World Economics and Politics), No. 8, 2010; Luo Feng (罗峰), “美国预防性战争的逻辑“ (“On 

the Logic of the U.S. Preventive War”), 世界经济与政治 (World 

Economics and Politics), No. 9, 2010; Li Xia (李霞), “浅析伊拉克战

争对美国软实力的影响” (“An Analysis of the Impact of the War 

on Iraq on the U.S. Soft Power”), 学术交流 (Academic Exchanges), 

March 2010; Li Jie (李洁), “伊拉克战争的得与失“ (“The Cost and 

Benefit of the War on Iraq”), 瞭望周刊 (Outlook Weekly), March 24, 

2008; and Li Xia (李霞) and Lao Yanan (劳亚男), “伊拉克战争对美

国霸权的负面影响“ (The Negative Impact of the War on Iraq on 

the U.S. Hegemony”), 赤峰学院学报 (Journal of Chifeng University 
31

[Soc.Sci]), Vol. 31, No. 6, June 2010, for a few of the critical analyses.

34. There is a huge literature on China’s need to develop its 

maritime power (海权). Daniel M. Hartnett and Frederic Vellucci, 

Jr., Continental or Maritime Power? A Summary of Chinese Views on 

Maritime Strategy since 1999, Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, October 2007, is a good analysis of this debate. There are also 

numerous writings about the strength and weakness of aircraft 

carrier battle group capabilities. There is no need to list them here.

35. See also Zhang Qinlin (张勤林), Xue Lin (薛平), and Dai 

Gongxun (戴功勋), “从车臣战争看武警部队未来反分裂, 反恐怖

作战“ (“Lessons from the Chechen Wars on the People’s Armed 

Police’s Future Operations on Anti-Separatism and Anti-Terrorism”), 警察技术 (Police Tactics), No. 4, 2000; Yang Wenxin (杨文

新) and Zhang Qing (张庆), “俄罗斯不再妥协:1995年以来俄罗

斯与车臣恐怖分子的3次较量“ (“Russia No Longer Compromises: 

Russia’s Three Battles against Chechen Terrorists since 1995”), 环

球军事 (World Military), No. 2, 2003.

36. See Zhou Liang (周良), “试析车臣问题久拖不决的深层根

源“ (“An Analysis on the Fundamental Reasons for the Prolonged 

Chechen Problem”), 当代世界 (Contemporary World), No. 5, 2010.

33

CHAPTER 2

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

LESSONS FROM FOREIGN CONFLICTS:

THE AIR WAR IN KOSOVO

June Teufel Dreyer

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND ITS OUTCOME

Executive Summary.

Different groups within the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) learned different lessons from their analyses of the Kosovo conflict; a decade after the confrontation, the three distinct voices that emerged at the 

time continue to be heard in only slightly modified 

form. Advocates of the first school, that the PLA must 

match the United States weapon for weapon, have 

seen large increases in the defense budget each year. 

Judging from multiple foreign analyses, these have 

enabled the PLA to reach a level that would make 

a regional conflict between U.S. and Chinese forces 

a more even contest than it would have been in the 

Kosovo era. The second school, which argued that the 

PLA should rely on using existing weaponry better 

and employ inexpensive asymmetric techniques lest 

China be lured into an arms race that would bankrupt 

it, still castigates those who claim that battlefield victory is impossible unless and until they are provided 

with state of the art weapons. Leapfrog techniques and 

asymmetric weapons continue to be discussed in military periodicals. With regard to the third voice, which 

argued for the continuing validity of people’s war, the 
34

passage of the National Defense Mobilization Act in 

2010 specifically cited the crucial role of the civilian 

population in prosecuting war. Defense periodicals 

frequently mention the role of the people in reinforcing military operations, often referencing Kosovo as 

an example. The primacy of men over weapons is 

regularly affirmed, as is the need for political work to 

bolster morale and belief in the party’s policies as the 

proper guide for action. There has been no resolution 

of the debate among the three schools, which can be 

seen as complementary rather than mutually contradictory. Only the first is expensive, and with the country’s economy continuing to grow, it does not place an 

undue burden on the national budget.

This analysis finds certain pitfalls in the PLA’s 

analysis: lessons learned that are suspiciously advantageous to the particular part of the military that 

makes a case for them, a tendency not to challenge certain factors that might challenge cherished PLA traditions, and an apparent unwillingness to consider the 

implications of certain issues at all.

The Setting.

On March 24, 1999, subsequent to the failure of international efforts at a summit at Chateau Rambouillet, France, to persuade the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to halt the ethnic 

cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began a bombing 

campaign to force the FRY government of Slobodan 

Milosevic to comply with its demands. The action was 

taken by NATO rather than the United Nations (UN) 

since two permanent members of the UN’s Security 

Council, Russia and China, were opposed. Russia’s 
35

sympathies lay with the Serbs as fellow Slavs and 

adherents to Eastern Orthodox Christianity; Moscow 

also feared that a Kosovo successfully detached from 

the FRY would embolden its own restive minority 

regions such as Chechnya. The People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) feared setting a precedent for the intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states that 

could be applied to China with regard to such areas as 

Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. For similar reasons, Beijing also opposed western states’ demands for a referendum on independence in Kosovo that, given its majority Albanian population, would certainly succeed.

Although NATO planners had assumed that Milosevic would quickly capitulate after the bombing 

started, he did not, presumably assuming that NATO 

would give in quickly. Operation ALLIED FORCE, 

as it was officially named, devolved into a protracted 

bombing effort that was hampered by unfavorable 

weather conditions, enemy resilience, and disharmony both among the members of the allied coalition and 

within the U.S. high command. Field commanders 

chafed under rules of engagement that inhibited their 

ability to carry out their missions. For example, the 

Dutch government refused to allow the presidential 

palace to be bombed because it contained a painting 

by Rembrandt.1

 And, because losing allied pilots to 

Serbian anti-aircraft fire might undermine the unity of 

the coalition, NATO pilots were forced to bomb from 

heights that made targeting more difficult.

At the same time, citizens of the FRY had to endure 

daily attacks from the sky that damaged more and 

more vital infrastructure nodes, while Serb air defenses failed to destroy enemy aircraft in significant numbers. Initial popular support for Milosevic’s government began to erode even as Milosevic himself began 
36

to contemplate both the inevitability of his defeat and 

the growing possibility that he might be overthrown 

by his own people. Russia, for reasons of its own, 

did not come to his support. The Kremlin’s analysts 

began to fear a NATO ground-force invasion, which 

would create pressure for President Boris Yeltsin to 

send in the Russian military. This would have been 

unwise from many points of view: among others, the 

cost of the invasion would be high; the Russian military’s power projection capabilities at that time were 

limited; and the troops would have to pass through 

areas controlled by countries supporting NATO’s effort. Perhaps most important to Yeltsin was his concern that confronting NATO would jeopardize vitally 

needed western investment in his country’s tottering 

economy.2

On June 9, after 78 days, Milosevic conceded, albeit 

not without extracting some concessions. Although 

some conditions were more stringent than those decided on at Rambouillet—for example, a requirement 

that FRY troops be withdrawn from Kosovo was added—others were more favorable to him. NATO access 

was to be limited to Kosovo rather than to the whole 

of the FRY, as it would have been under the original 

Rambouillet plan. The stipulation that Kosovo’s future 

would be decided by referendum was dropped; and 

the UN Security Council would affirm Yugoslavia’s 

territorial integrity and sovereignty over Kosovo. 

The People’s Liberation Army Contemplates the 

Kosovo Operation.

In China, newspapers and journals associated with 

the PLA studied the unfolding military campaign 

with careful interest and occasional references to the 
37

fact that the lessons of Kosovo would be relevant to 

the sort of campaign the PLA itself might have to 

mount against an enemy, unnamed but clearly the 

United States, with technological superiority in a local 

war on China’s periphery. The militaries of other nations, most particularly Taiwan and to a lesser extent, 

India, were also interested in what lessons the PLA 

had learned from Kosovo, anticipating that the lessons might be used against them in a future encounter 

with the PRC. 

Jiefang Junbao (PLA Daily; hereafter JFJB) rejected 

NATO’s contention that the war was being fought 

for humanitarian reasons. It saw NATO’s clear intent 

as an effort to further American hegemonic aims, to 

remove “the last red nail of socialism” from Europe, 

to reinforce its agenda of global democratization, and 

(puzzlingly but unexplained) to “bomb the euro with 

the U.S. dollar.”3

 Early hopes that Belgrade would be 

able to forge an alliance with Moscow and Minsk, thus 

creating a wider European confrontation leading to a 

ground force invasion, escalating anti-war sentiment 

in Europe, and a reprise of the embarrassing defeat 

the United States suffered in Vietnam4 did not materialize.5

As NATO intensified its campaign, targeting additional nodes and deploying high-technology weapons, military sources sounded progressively less optimistic about the outcome. Anger was tinged with 

respect for the weapons and skill of the enemy forces, 

with the mood becoming more pronounced after the 

bombing of the code room of the Chinese embassy in 

Belgrade. Three journalists were killed, of whom two 

may have been PRC intelligence agents who may have 

been channeling information to Yugoslav forces that 

enabled them to better resist the aerial attacks against 

them. 
38

Military media were impressed with the improvements in weaponry, precision bombing, bunker-busting, and network centric warfare that had been seen 

in nascent form in the Gulf War 8 years before. Detailed comparisons were made with not only the Gulf 

War but several prior U.S. military operations. JFJB 

noted that, while munitions dropped from the air accounted for one-fourth of all munitions expended in 

World War II, the ratio was one-third in Korea, half 

in Vietnam, four-fifths in the Gulf, and 100 percent in 

Kosovo. It concluded that air strikes had evolved from 

a supplementary role into the main combat form for 

future wars and that control of space would become 

increasingly important.6

Implicit in this analysis, and to become progressively more noticeable in later analyses that added 

comparisons with wars not yet fought in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, was the conclusion that the U.S. military carefully examined its performance in every confrontation 

and made strenuous efforts to correct perceived deficiencies. Kosovo also represented a further step in the 

evolution of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). 

Mechanized warfare was giving way to informationalized warfare, with translation of the awkward term 

soon to be elided into “informatized” warfare. The 

key to victory would no longer involve the integration of land, sea, and air forces on a three-dimensional 

battlefield; instead, war would be fought on a five-dimensional battlefield comprising land, sea, sky, space, 

and electromagnetic spheres embedded in a network 

centric context. Control of the time gap (时代差) would 

give the party that possessed it the winning edge on a 

battlefield in which front lines and platforms were disappearing.7

 Technological advances meant that NATO 

forces were able to prosecute the Kosovo conflict with 
39

relatively fewer numbers of combatants: numbers had 

become less important. Precision bombing meant that 

fewer bombs need be expended by fewer pilots, and 

the advent of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) meant 

that those who directed the drones would be able to 

remain at a safe distance while doing so. Kosovo was 

also variously described as the first purely air war, the 

first no-contact war, and the first war in which space 

played a major role. America’s extreme aversion to casualties was noted, as was the success of its efforts to 

rescue the pilots of downed planes. 

Ideologically, military media characterized the 

invasion as a setback for Chinese hopes that the unipolar world that followed the disintegration of the 

Soviet Union would segue smoothly into a multipolar balance of power. The United States had bypassed 

the UN and, while claiming to fight for democracy 

and humanitarian causes, had trampled on the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of 

other countries. In the words of Academy of Military 

Science strategist Yao Youzhi, Washington in reality 

practiced the maxim that might makes right, “allowing its own officials to set off fireworks while banning 

the common people from lighting lamps.”8

 Another 

lesson that must have been learned but was never explicitly stated was that Russia could not be counted on 

as an ally.

Since Europe had been expected to form one of 

the poles of resistance to American hegemonism, the 

willingness of European nations to participate in the 

confrontation called for an explanation. Here again, 

Yao Youzhi provided an answer: although aware of 

American desires to control both NATO and Europe, 

they had their own “sinister designs.” Having fought 

endlessly for dominance in Europe over the centuries, 
40

participation in the U.S. use of force against the FRY 

gave European states “a chance to sing their operas 

on a borrowed stage,” regaining the feeling of having 

some power. Yao noted that Germany had been afforded an opportunity to send troops abroad for the 

first time since World War II ended; he felt Berlin’s 

exceptional willingness to do so portended a desire to 

reestablish its image as dominant power in Europe. 

Although America was attempting to use Kosovo to 

preclude the emergence of a separate pole of power, 

Yao opined that perhaps Washington had not anticipated German motives.9

 Other analysts predicted 

that the United States would lose its power quickly. 

PLA media saw Kosovo as evidence that America had 

emerged from the shadow of the Vietnam War and 

was again flexing its muscles militarily.

They viewed the Kosovo conflict in the context of 

other events most Americans would see as discrete, 

such as the enhanced U.S.-Japan security relationship; America’s desire to revisit the Anti-Ballistic 

Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Russians; the bipartisan congressional Cox Commission’s conclusion that 

the PRC had stolen high-level U.S. weapons technology; repeated complaints from both official sources 

in Washington and nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) about human rights violations in the PRC; 

and Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui’s comment that 

the relationship between the PRC and the Republic of 

China on Taiwan (ROC) should be seen as a special 

state-to-state relationship. Upgraded U.S.-Japanese 

security cooperation might serve as the basis for the 

creation of an “Asian NATO” that would constitute 

another building block in the encirclement of China.10

Combining these events into a strategy to block the 

PRC’s advance toward modernization, commentators 
41

predicted ominous consequences for China, with the 

PLA cast in a major role as defender of the ancestral 

land. The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade 

on May 8 reinforced this scenario, with JFJB and other 

publications regularly repeating the phrase “war is 

not far from us.”11

Three Schools of Thought Contend.

 PLA planners drew certain obvious conclusions 

from their analysis of the Kosovo conflict. If air power 

were to be the decisive factor, as it had been in Kosovo, 

troop training would have to make defense against air 

strikes its focus. Kongjun Bao, the air force newspaper, 

opined that air wars would be decisive in future battles; an air force logistics specialist contrasted the efficiency of NATO operations in transporting men and 

materiel to the FRY area with the deficiencies of the 

PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) work in this regard. He suggested consulting the FRY’s experience. Of particular 

interest was the value of secreting assets in the FRY’s 

rear areas: the writer felt that China had been too 

hasty in dismantling the logistics depots in so-called 

“third line” areas and too eager to construct “appearance projects” in more vulnerable areas.12 Training 

should stress “three offensives and three defenses”: 

attacking stealthy warplanes, cruise missiles, and helicopters; and defending against precision air raids, 

electronic measures, and reconnaissance.13 Fighting a 

war against a technologically superior enemy would 

require better educated officers and men; therefore, it 

was imperative that training programs stress scientific 

and technological knowledge. Noting the effectiveness 

of the U.S. Air Force in rescuing downed pilots, JFJB 

urged that anti-air raid preparations include counter-
42

rescue training. The PLA must focus on defeating rescue operations from both land and air, creating both a 

“land net and a sky net,” so that enemy pilots could be 

prevented from ever flying again.14

A succession of essays in military journals dealt 

with the issue of informatized war and how to counter it. One fairly typical essay suggested a three step 

process: 

1. Use digital, computer, and global communications technology to integrate early warning in the 

operational space, automated command and control, 

and precision strikes;

2. Use the command, control, communications, 

computers, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system to combine the arms and 

services in an organic way to establish an integrated 

military force; and,

3. Use the battlefield information superhighway to 

achieve battlefield integration.15

That NATO had achieved its successes with a 

relatively small fighting force lent weight to plans to 

downsize the PLA.

While there was a consensus that the nature of war 

had fundamentally changed, that a threat to China existed, and that the PLA needed to reinforce its ability 

to defend the PRC, different voices expressed different opinions on how this should be done. One school 

held that it was imperative for the PLA to increase its 

ability to confront the unnamed high-technology hegemonist on its own terms: “the nation that manages 

to stay in the forefront of the big tide of science and 

technology will be able to gain the initiative in future 

war.”16 China would need UAVs, cruise missiles, and 

better electronic surveillance equipment, as well as 
43

the ability to take countermeasures against American 

assets.

In June, a Hong Kong newspaper announced that 

a military high-tech research institute had been established under the party’s Central Military Commission 

in response to the events of Kosovo. It characterized 

the institute as the descendant of an earlier group 

headed by Marshal Nie Rongzhen that Mao Zedong 

had tasked to develop the PRC’s nuclear bomb. The 

head of the modern-day version was to be General 

Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of the general staff in 

charge of PLA intelligence and military research units, 

and would include members of the cabinet-level Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense; the ministries of information, industry, 

and education; the Chinese Academy of Sciences; the 

Chinese Academy of Engineering; as well as leading 

scientists, engineers, technicians, and intelligence officers from civilian and military units. High-ranking 

PLA officers were described as urging the central 

government to set aside funds as a matter of urgency 

in order to develop and acquire more sophisticated 

weaponry.17 In a lengthy article in the August 1999 

issue of the party Central Committee’s semimonthly 

official journal, Qiushi (求是, Seeking Truth), Chief of 

the General Staff General Fu Chuanyou made a strong 

case for the high-technology option, stating flatly that 

military training in science and technology was the 

only way to win.18

A second school questioned the wisdom of trying 

to counter the United States weapon for weapon. Luo 

Laisheng, a participant in a forum sponsored by the 

Guangzhou Military Region on the theme “Implications of NATO’s Air Strike on the FRY for Military 

Training With Science and Technology,” opined that 
44

Kosovo had broken the myth that high-technology 

weapons are invincible and corroborated the lessons 

of history in which those in a weaker position managed to defeat stronger enemies. New weapons will 

always have some fatal weaknesses, said Luo, while 

old ones, as long as they are well-placed and wellused, can prevail. He chided comrades who felt that 

the PLA’s armaments and training were too backward. Other participants echoed his plea to eschew 

defeatism and enable existing weaponry to be more 

effectively utilized.19

Another vocal backer of opposition to an all-out effort to match the United States in weapons technology 

was Qiao Liang (乔良), one of the two senior colonels 

whose book, Unrestricted Warfare (超限战), had been 

published just prior to the Kosovo confrontation. In an 

interview with China Youth Daily (中国青年报), Qiao 

argued that for China to strive for a high technology 

military to deal with the United States was to fall into 

the same trap that had bankrupted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and caused it to disintegrate. Stating that the PRC could never catch up, 

Qiao compared the effort to “trying to break a stone 

with an egg.” Other measures would be far more effective. For example, he stated, never in history had a 

great power ever really eliminated a guerrilla force. 

Declaring, albeit erroneously, that Western powers 

had devised the rules of war in order to advantage 

themselves, Qiao advocated that China ignore them.20

In Qiao and his co-author Wang Xiangsui (王湘

穗)’s analysis, as more weapons are developed and 

deployed, the value of each individual weapon in 

combat is diminished. As a corollary, no single type 

of weapon can be decisive, save in the highly unlikely 

event of nuclear weapons in a total war. Qiao and 
45

Wang characterized Americans as being excessively 

fearful of casualties as well as very rich. As a consequence, they tended to see warfare as a “marathon in 

military technology” rather than a test of morale, bravery, intelligence, and strategy. Such a mindset, they 

posited, creates a different kind of vulnerability. The 

proliferation in types and costs of weapons that are 

necessary to support this marathon could even cause 

the American economy to collapse. Note that Qiao 

and Wang’s characterization of the United States as 

a-strategic contrasts with the more prevalent descriptions of Kosovo mentioned above, as part of a larger 

American strategy to encircle the PRC to prevent its 

modernization and rise on the international scene.

The lesson Qiao and Wang drew for China, as 

a much poorer country, was that the PRC must use 

whatever means are at its disposal, refusing to be fettered by rules and codes devised without its participation and which would work against it. Biological and 

chemical warfare, terrorism, and the manipulation of 

environmental conditions—for example, producing 

harmful climate changes in the enemy’s territory—

must all be employed.21

Aware that if a strong country used no-limit warfare against a weaker opponent, the weaker country was unlikely to survive, Qiao noted that history 

proved this was unlikely to happen. “Barbarians always historically rise by breaking the rules of civilized 

and developed countries, which is what human history is all about. The United States has been on the 

rise for a century, having drawn up its own rules.”22

While the image of America as a Gulliverian giant 

constrained by rules of its own making must have 

been satisfying to patriotic readers, the implicit equation of Chinese with barbarians could not have been. 
46

JFJB echoed Qiao’s sentiments, minus the reference to 

barbarians, quoting Mao Zedong as having said “We 

are not gentlemen, and do not have to practice any 

‘idiotic’ humanity, justice, and virtue.”23

Proponents of this school argued for seeking out 

the vulnerabilities inherent in the enemy’s superior 

strength and employing countermeasures that they 

generally referred to as shashoujian (杀手锏) and occasionally as sashoujian (撒手锏)—assassin’s mace weapons—or, less poetically, low-cost quick-fix substitutes 

to enhance the PRC’s military capabilities. PLA publications show awareness that the technologically superior side is also capable of using this type of asymmetric warfare, and that “U.S.-led NATO” did in fact use 

it in Kosovo. The tacit assumption seems to be that the 

Chinese side will use it more cleverly and effectively. 

Laser beams could blind satellites, and computer networks could be disrupted. The PLA could use decoys, 

such as those employed by FRY troops, to deceive 

NATO forces into wasting valuable munitions to kill 

nonexistent tanks, and deceptive tactics to lure strikes 

to areas where enemy troops were not located.

For the third school, Kosovo proved that people’s 

war retained its validity in the modern age. Instances of civilians joining hands across bridges and surrounding power plants to prevent them from being 

bombed and of noncombatants hacking into NATO 

communications were much praised. PLA media described computer-literate Serbs as bombarding the 

NATO web site with viruses and large amounts of 

email; they were said to have paralyzed the computer 

system on the USS Nimitz and to have brought down 

the White House server for an entire day.24 The PLA’s 

General Political Department also pointed to the role 

of political work and the importance of keeping high 
47

morale among both civilian and military personnel. 

According to Chinese media accounts, the army and 

the people had functioned as one, conforming precisely to the script of people’s war. 

Not surprisingly, the bombing of the embassy in 

Belgrade elicited calls for military retaliation. Calls for 

militant counteraction were vociferous; according to 

the Hong Kong press, there had been anti-American 

demonstrations at military academies around the 

country even before the attack.25 These became more 

prominent thereafter.26 Although the U.S. embassy in 

Beijing was quickly besieged by rock-throwing mobs 

that some believed had been officially encouraged, 

there were nonetheless evident efforts to restrain the 

more militant from taking concrete action. Chinese 

president and simultaneously head of the Central 

Military Commission Jiang Zemin appears to have 

been in the forefront of these. Obviously choosing his 

words carefully so as not to invite criticisms of cowardice from his domestic enemies, Jiang assured an 

enlarged meeting of the Politburo’s Standing Committee that party and government would never barter away its principles. Although he made no explicit 

linkage between the consequences of a militantly antiU.S. policy and China’s bid to enter the World Trade 

Organization (WTO), Jiang stressed that it was important to continue negotiations on that issue. 

Our current struggle against the U.S.-led NATO is unlikely to come to a successful end within a short period 

time, for the United States will continue to resort to 

sophistry concerning its bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the FRY and . . . we must further retain our 

rights for taking corresponding actions. . . . We must 

carry out our struggle against hegemonism and power 

politics, yet we cannot close our door and refuse to 
48

deal with certain western countries, like the United 

States. Although we know perfectly well that the wolf 

is going to attack man, we still need to deal with the 

wolf. That is, we must “dance with the wolf.” This is 

the reality we must face and the diplomatic strategy 

we must adopt. We should develop ourselves and 

enhance the comprehensive national strength of our 

country under the condition of simultaneously fighting against and having dealings with hegemonism 

and power politics.27

Jiang vowed to discuss the matter with U.S. President Bill Clinton at an appropriate time. 

A provincial party chief strongly supported Jiang’s 

contention vis-à-vis the hardline military faction. Sichuan party head Xie Shijie took direct issue with those 

who said that large increases in the military budget 

were necessary to safeguard the PRC’s sovereignty 

and dignity, saying that: 

We must unify the safeguarding of state sovereignty 

and national dignity with the continuation of the policy of opening to the outside world. The overall masses 

must differentiate between the authorities of the U.S.-

led NATO bloc and improvements in the investment 

environment. One hand must court business and attract investments, while the other hand must increase 

exports.28

 A few days later, a JFJB commentator who was 

perhaps not entirely pleased with Jiang Zemin’s ruling on the need to dance with the wolf, used the same 

metaphor to convey a more ominous message: although the predator had yet to come, the sounds of its 

claws sharpening could be heard from time to time. 

Since war was not far away, continuing efforts at preparedness were what were needed.29
49

Jiang Zemin’s view prevailed. China was admitted 

into the WTO, albeit not immediately; its economic 

and military strength continued to grow impressively; 

tensions in Sino-American relations abated; and Kosovo, though scarcely forgotten, ceased to command the 

passionate response it had aroused in 1999. 

Kosovo in a Decade’s Perspective.

Ten years later, the PRC was at least able to dance 

as an equal with the wolf, and perhaps even to assume the role of leading partner. No obvious choices 

had been made among the three schools, and they 

can certainly be seen as complementing rather than 

competing with each other. Indeed, General Xiong 

Guangkai (熊光楷), who had been chosen to head the 

high-technology institute research unit mentioned 

above, attempted a synthesis of the three. In his 2003 

book, International Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs, (国际战略与新军事变革), Xiong argued 

that these, combined with the “important thinking of 

Comrade Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents,” were the 

essence of the RMA with Chinese characteristics. The 

PLA should study and draw lessons from all previous 

local wars that were conducted under high technology 

conditions, while not fully or indiscriminately copying them. The reality, said Xiong, is that the PLA was 

still in the stage of partial mechanization. The state of 

mechanization should be completed, using informatization to guide mechanization and mechanization to 

promote informatization: these should be considered 

dual tasks. Finally, the army and the people should 

be combined, attaching importance to enhancing the 

traditional superiority of people’s war under hightechnology conditions. This combination would be 

the basis for military superiority (优势).30
50

Only the first, high-tech focused, school is expensive, and with its economy thriving and the PLA 

downsized, China has been able to fund more and better military hardware. Yet the same three schools of 

thought continue to voice their opinions. Something 

close to dissent from Xiong Guangkai’s synthesis can 

be found in Missile Force Daily (火箭兵報), the newspaper of the Second Artillery Corps. After a brief nod 

to the importance of talented personnel and forward 

thinking, the author states that, although “some people say” (有人說) that one can defeat a better armed 

adversary if one masters better ways of fighting,

 . . . this may be true of previous forms of war. In informatized war, if one’s weapons are inferior, one’s fighting skills may also be restricted . . . only by striving 

to master the scientific and technological development 

can we more rapidly change the model of shaping 

combat capabilities.31

With regard to the first school, as detailed by the 

annual reports of the U.S. Department of Defense 

(DoD) and a number of China’s increasingly apprehensive neighbors, the PRC has made significant acquisitions in technologically sophisticated weaponry. 

It has the most active land-based ballistic missile program in the world, is developing and testing offensive 

missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading some missile systems, and developing 

methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. The air 

force has acquired UAVs and Su-30 fighter planes; a 

new bomber will be equipped with a new long-range 

cruise missiles. Aerial surveillance capabilities have 

also been improved. There is an active aircraft carrier research and development program. The navy is 

improving its over-the-horizon targeting capability 
51

with more capable radars that can be used in conjunction with overhead imagery from satellites to assist 

its next-generation anti-ship missiles to locate targets 

longer distances from China. The missiles themselves 

have longer ranges and better accuracy. A new ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) and two new 

nuclear-powered attack submarines have entered service, and a new base has been constructed on Hainan 

Island in the South China Sea that provides the PLA 

Navy (PLAN) with direct access to important international sea lanes as well as a port from which submarines can enter the deep waters of the South China 

Sea.32

An Indian defense journal said that China had 

learned the value of space as the fourth dimension, 

and took note of the PRC’s major efforts in that area.33

Taiwan military sources said that Kosovo had changed 

the PLA’s strategy away from trying to take Taiwan 

through either a blockade or amphibious landing scenario to one of “immediate response and decisive action.” A sudden, paralyzing assault comprising electromagnetic pulse technology, missile strikes, and air 

attacks would compel the now-defenseless Taiwan to 

surrender before other countries had a chance to intervene, and without incurring significant manpower 

resources.34

As the PRC’s economy has continued to make impressive progress while the western world was beset 

by its worst financial downturn in recent years, the 

argument that the United States is trying to lure China 

into an arms race in order to bankrupt it has faded 

from the media. Even so, the PLA’s China National Defense News (中国国防报) opined as late of 2006 that the 

U.S. edge in weapons technology had led other countries to imitate every move it made, thereby luring 
52

them into failing to learn anything valuable. Imitators 

would hence lose their own capital, even to making 

blind investments, only to be left further and further 

behind.35

Those who favor making better use of existing armaments rather than lust after the latest high technology and using innovative low technology that may or 

may not employ unlimited warfare techniques continue to argue their case. The example of the F-117 comes 

up again and again, sometimes used in support of 

clever tactics, sometimes in support of low technology 

being able to defeat state of the art technology, and 

sometimes in support of the value of people’s war. In 

2006, the deputy commander of a unit in the Shenyang 

Military Region quoted Chairman of the Central Military Commission Hu Jintao as saying that the military 

should fight on the basis of existing armaments. However, he noted, there was a tendency to deviate from 

this thinking: some officers and soldiers believed it 

was impossible to prevail unless they had advanced 

technology. The commander argued that several recent wars, including Kosovo, had shown that the role 

of traditional weapons should not be underestimated 

and that, conversely, high-tech weapons are not flawless and perfect. Specifically referencing the F-117, the 

commander advised “if one’s sword is inferior, then 

one should try to have a better technique of using the 

sword (剑不如人剑法高于人).”36

Similar sentiments emanated from the newspaper 

of the Beijing Military Region, where a commentator 

opined that when, in the Fifth Encirclement Campaign 

of the 1930s, the Red Army abandoned the strategy 

and tactics that had previously served it well, the 

result was defeat. He advocated combining reliance 

on actual weapons on hand with careful use of strat-
53

egy and tactics, concluding that good tactics, not just 

weapons, were an important trump card.37

The roles of climate control and camouflage, again 

referencing Kosovo, were also regularly mentioned. A 

2009 report described the PLA as carefully studying 

the uses to which climate change might be employed 

on the battlefield. One of its examples was that of FRY 

defenders burning tires that created smoke so dense as 

to conceal troop withdrawals. Properly used, weather 

weapons could defeat opponents through surprise 

moves.38 The orbits of satellites could be tracked and 

items of interest to an enemy moved out of their path 

or otherwise concealed.39

 An engineer identified by Air Force News (空军报) 

as a camouflage expert praised the FRY’s well-concealed single aircraft shelters and aircraft cave depots 

that he described as having protected a large quantity of operational aircraft, surface missiles, radar, 

and other weapons and equipment. Having learned 

from the FRY’s experience, the PLA’s camouflaging 

equipment and materials had now achieved serialization and possessed various camouflaging capabilities. 

However, he conceded, camouflage netting, paints, 

and other standard equipment now in service were 

still far from being able to satisfy the needs of air force 

units; high resolution satellites could still detect military targets.40

Another expert, Wang Jiaying, attached to the Second Artillery Corps and described by its newspaper 

as a battlefield magician, noticed that the vegetation 

camouflage used by FRY troops in the Kosovo conflict 

lasted up to 7 days—i.e., far longer than that in use by 

the PLA. Research revealed that the FRY troops had 

used a certain type of preservative liquid on the cut 

stems of the vegetation; the Chinese military then ad-
54

opted the same preservative. Wang’s research also led 

to the development of protective coatings for missiles, 

which depended on collecting samples in the specific 

areas where the missile emplacements were located. 

Becoming ill at a sentry post more than 4,000 meters 

above sea level—the location was unnamed but was 

almost certainly in Tibet, and the symptoms the article describes are those of altitude sickness—Wang 

refused to leave until his work was completed.41

According to Taiwan sources, the protection 

measures taken by the Second Artillery Corps since 

Kosovo were very effective: optical sensors of satellites were unable to penetrate either the thick bunkers 

or the mountain caves used to protect troops. Hence, 

while Taiwan’s imagery satellites could detect the deployment locations of the missiles, it had no way to 

know exactly how many missiles were inside them. 

PLA propaganda films had shown many ballistic missiles being launched from forested areas at night, indicating the Second Artillery’s ability to launch from 

the field. The Second Artillery had also conducted 

operational training in warehouses or on factory shop 

floors in recent years. These measures had significantly minimized the probability of detection while 

Second Artillery Corps troops were in training or on 

operations. A special militia unit had been tasked with 

the preparation of fake missiles that were visually indistinguishable from real ones, even to a spy satellite 

equipped with infrared or synthetic aperture radars.42

According to a July 2010 report, the PLA has set up 

a centralized cyberspace unit with a dedicated base,43

and multiple reports indicate that the PLA has been at 

least partially responsible for cyber espionage against 

foreign governments and corporations.44
55

As for people’s war, China’s National Defense 

Mobilization Law, approved by the National People’s 

Congress in February 2010, gave the state the legal 

right to requisition “civilian facilities, locations, and 

other materials owned or used by organizations and 

individuals,” thereby broadening its powers in this 

regard and deepening the level of military-civilian integration.45 As noted by former RAND analyst James 

Mulvenon, the concept of national defense mobilization has a clear lineage from Maoist people’s war, 

when civilians were expected to carry out guerrilla 

activities against invaders and support the military 

according to the classic water and fish metaphor. In 

the post-Mao era, however, local governments have 

tended to resent the burden of supporting military 

units through supplying food, fuel, and financial contributions, thus necessitating a law that more clearly 

defined their responsibilities.46

Dennis Blasko points out that from 1998 forward, 

every one of China’s White Papers on defense has 

explicitly stated that the PLA adheres to the concept 

of people’s war as part of China’s military strategy. 

Spokespersons explain that the notion of people’s war 

as based on rifles, millet, and human wave tactics that 

emphasize guerrilla warfare and protracted conflict is 

a misperception: in its present day incarnation, people’s war has been redefined as a form of organization 

of war that has nothing to do with the level of military 

technology.47 Civilians are responsible for contributing their skills to the war effort, either enthusiastically 

or by having them requisitioned, at whatever level of 

time and technology the state deems appropriate. In 

the cyberwar that is anticipated to be crucial to success in future conflict, civilian hackers are expected to 

play an important part, with frequent references made 
56

to the role that they played in Kosovo.48 A possible 

portent of the role nonmilitary personnel might play 

is the example of a graduate student in engineering 

in Liaoning who produced a paper on how to attack 

a small U.S. power grid sub-network so as to cause a 

cascading power failure throughout the country.49

As for the noncombat aspects of a winning strategy, the PLA’s political work stresses the “three warfares”—media, psychological, and legal—as major 

weapons intended to weaken the will and spirit of 

the enemy with the fewest casualties. To be most effective, this should ideally begin in peacetime before 

the onset of hostilities in order to turn public opinion 

in the enemy country and among its soldiers against 

the war effort. Morale-undermining activities are, 

of course, nothing new: the example of Tokyo Rose 

comes immediately to mind. What is new, according 

to Taiwan sources, is that the relationship between the 

PLA’s political warfare and its military operations has 

changed in such a way that the former has risen from 

subordinate status to being independent.50

Lessons Learned From Past Wars.

To a significant extent, the lessons learned by the 

PLA are lessons its leaders already knew or that served 

as justification for positions that advantaged their 

own niches within the defense establishment. For example, the PLAAF learned that air wars would be the 

wave of the future and that control of the air had been 

the decisive factor in victory51; its air transport division learned that air transport was a crucial element 

in NATO’s ability to prosecute the war and pointed 

out that in Kosovo the scale at which support and 

transport planes was used approached that of main 
57

combat aircraft, enabling large quantities of weapons 

and equipment to reach the battlefield quickly. 52 The 

chief of staff of a logistics unit highlighted the importance of logistical support for the air force’s operations,53 the Second Artillery to the successes achieved 

by missiles, and the General Political Department to 

the need to maintain high morale among troops and 

population, and to the importance of properly carrying out propaganda work. The key to victory in informational war would be to conquer the psychology 

and willpower of the opponent.54 As a retired Taiwan 

general pointed out, no one needed to teach the PLA 

the value of propaganda.55 To be sure, there is a difference between simply knowing the value of something 

and learning how to use it better, as the PLA seems to 

have done from observing the FRY’s practice thereof. 

Meanwhile, Western strategists expressed doubts that 

the domination of air conflict and absence of ground 

support would be replicated in any future war, which 

so far they have not.

Although it is obvious that the PLA studied the 

Kosovo confrontation carefully, some factors confronting NATO appear to have been ignored in assessing its operations. These include the difficulties of 

prosecuting a war by committee that presented field 

commanders with rules of engagement that severely 

impinged on their ability to carry out military operations, and an extreme aversion to casualties, two factors that would presumably not affect PLA operations 

to the same extent. Although these are unlikely to 

apply to a war undertaken by China, PLA strategists 

might want to contemplate whether the United States, 

in fighting a war that did not involve getting the 

consent of numerous and sometimes fractious allies, 

would use the same restrictive rules of engagement.
58

As well as whether western scruples about civilian 

casualties would continue to prevail when vitally important national interests or the lives of their own soldiers hung in the balance.56

An additional factor is that, although the experiences of Kosovo are repeated mantra-like in publications from following years, later voices appear to be repeating earlier ones with little effort at reexamination. 

This runs the risk of myth-creation, which, if based on 

falsehoods, could be dangerous. For example, there is 

no attention to the issue of whether the destruction 

of an F-117 stealth fighter was genuinely a triumph 

of the civilian population that can be replicated on a 

larger scale, a lucky shot, a consequence of pilot error, 

or the result of prior information on the plane’s flight 

plan from a less than enthusiastic member of NATO.57

Similarly, the enthusiastic support of the Serbian people for their government is presented as immutable. 

U.S. studies, however, indicate that initial citizen support became so frayed in the course of bombing that 

Milosevic’s fear of an uprising against him became a 

major factor in his decision to capitulate.58

With regard to the Serbian fighters, Air Commander Lieutenant General Michael Short expected to lose 

many planes, but to his delight he lost only two and 

no pilots, and commented, 

The truth of the matter is that there were not a lot of 

Serbs who were willing to die for Slobo [Milosevic], 

trying to shoot down a NATO airplane. Their effort 

throughout the war was to survive, to move, to hide, 

to get missiles in the air, but [they] made little or no 

attempt to guide those missiles. Almost all their shots 

were ballistic shots, which means they weren’t guided.59
59

This tendency to bend history in order to “prove” 

a point the author wishes to make is also evident in 

such instances as the above-mentioned Beijing Military Region commentator who argued that the Red 

Army was defeated in the Fifth Encirclement Campaign of the mid-1930s when it abandoned tried and 

true strategies. There is no acknowledgement that 

the differences caused by a new Kuomintang (KMT) 

strategy, the ever-tightening ring of blockhouses suggested by Chiang Kai-shek’s German advisers, might 

necessitate a change in the Red Army’s responses. In 

this regard, the author is accepting party history unquestioningly: Mao used the defeat to bolster his own 

sagging political fortunes. There is no indication that 

any counterstrategy Mao might have suggested—and 

an exhaustive search of the Yan’an archive could not 

locate any evidence of any counterstrategy Mao had 

advanced—could have succeeded.60

While PLA sources express awareness of the need 

to maintain high morale among troops, the issue of 

when and under what circumstances morale might 

erode remains unexplored in the PLA literature on 

lessons learned from Kosovo. Other issues that have 

passed into unexamined unquestioned mythology 

and could mislead the PLA are: whether the bombing 

of the PRC embassy in Belgrade was, as PLA publications aver, planned in retaliation for Chinese help 

to the FRY61; and, whether NATO bombed the presidential palace,62 “wantonly and indiscriminately” 63

and used cluster bombs against civilians. In truth, the 

presidential palace was placed off limits, and targets 

were carefully chosen to avoid civilian casualties. Less 

than 500 died as a result. Target planners were quickly 

ordered to cease using cluster bombs after Milosevic’s 

press staff persuaded CNN to run a segment on what 
60

it termed a terror weapon.64 The constant repetition 

of the success of Serbian forces in concealing tanks, 

while an accurate observation, begs the question of 

how much this contributed to overall military success, 

since Milosevic surrendered even though many of his 

tanks survived. In other words, to focus on the number of tank kills may be to use the wrong metric.

Finally, while the PLA sought lessons from Kosovo that would enable it to better fight an unnamed 

superior military power, there is no indication that, in 

its avowed strategy of fighting local wars under hightechnology conditions, it has considered that the Chinese military might find itself in the role that NATO 

had in Kosovo. Hence, while applauding the ingenuity of the people in outwitting the higher-technology 

enemy through employing camouflage, deception, 

and guerrilla tactics, there is no public acknowledgement that the PLA might find the same tactics used 

against it by Uyghurs, Tibetans, or Taiwanese. 

Concerning the cases cited above, the PLA might 

wish to consider what the Kosovo war actually accomplished. More than a decade after Milosevic’s capitulation, the status of Kosovo remains in limbo. The efforts of UN Forces in Kosovo (UNMIK) to get the two 

sides together to reach resolution of their differences 

have been unsuccessful. Neither Belgrade, the capital 

of Serbia, nor the Kosovo Serbs will agree to recognize 

Kosovo as an independent state, while Pristina, the 

capital of Kosovo, sees the independence of Kosovo 

as a fait accompli. Its leaders insist that they will agree 

to negotiations only as two independent states. After 

Kosovo issued a unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 and gained diplomatic recognition from 

69 countries, including the United States, Serbia took 

its case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In 
61

July 2010, the court issued an advisory opinion declaring that the unilateral declaration of independence 

did not violate international law. The Chinese foreign 

ministry, seeing an ominous precedent, immediately 

denounced the ruling. The victory for Kosovo was, 

however, tempered in that the ICJ, in its 10 to 4 ruling, 

did not go so far as to affirm Kosovo’s independence.

Lessons from the Lessons?

It is instructive to compare what the PLA learned 

from the U.S. experience in Kosovo conflict with what 

the United States learned from its own performance 

in Kosovo. There are few similarities in the analyses. 

Whereas PLA publications emphasized the impressive levels of technology and training, American analysts tended to focus on significant shortcomings and 

errors, to the extent that one is reminded of an episode 

from the Keystone Kops of comic book fame/infamy. 

Since NATO had publicly ruled out a ground invasion 

from the beginning, Serbian forces were relieved of the 

necessity to position their tanks to cut off roads and 

other avenues of attack, where they could have more 

easily been targeted by NATO air power. Instead, they 

dispersed and hid their tanks and armored personnel 

carriers (APCs), leaving paramilitary units free to pursue ethnic cleansing. After 6 weeks of bombing, there 

were more Serb forces in Kosovo than when the campaign began.65 The planning process was described as 

lacking a plan, and two parallel chains of command 

caused additional difficulties. In terms of hardware, 

there were interoperability problems and shortages 

of precision-guided weapons. At congressional hearings held a few months after the conflict ended, there 

were scathing criticisms of the DoD failure to create a 
62

littoral naval force, the fact that 95 percent of the air 

forces’ refueling fleet was deployed elsewhere when 

they were needed to support the Kosovo operation, 

the fact that pilots lacked adequate flying hours, and 

that the kill chain—the time between identification of 

a target and the delivery of weapons—was too long.66

Although examining past conflicts is in the abstract, 

and often in reality, a valuable exercise, there are pitfalls to be avoided. The first is that one may learn the 

wrong lesson and not discover it until attempting to 

apply it in the next confrontation. A second is that, 

although the lesson learned may be correct, it may not 

be applicable to subsequent conflicts, because of different factor inputs such as political circumstances, terrain, and changes in technology. A third caveat is that 

different entities within one’s defense establishment 

may not agree on what lessons have been learned. Finally, one may have learned the correct lesson but be 

unable to apply it for political and ideological reasons. 

As noted above, all of these problems can be seen to 

some degree in the PLA’s assessment of the war in 

Kosovo. As PLA sources have pointed out, China is 

not Kosovo, nor is it Yugoslavia. But were there no 

parallels between Kosovo and the type of military operation that the PLA anticipates fighting, there would 

be no reason for it to have so closely examined the 

conflict in Kosovo, or to have repeatedly used them 

as guides for defense planning. In August 2010, the 

British Broadcasting Company (BBC) reported that 

the PLA had staged night drills to repel Kosovo-like 

air raids by the United States.67
63

Implications for the United States.

American policy planners should be aware that the 

PLA scrutinizes the combat performance of the U.S. 

military in minute detail, and that it will seek to adapt 

its weapons and strategy to counter, match, or exceed 

those of the United States. However, Chinese analysts 

are selective in their choice of factors to emulate. Assuming that they are saying privately what they say 

publicly—an important caveat—this selectivity shows 

several flaws in the lessons they have learned that U.S. 

planners should take note of.

First, the analyses seem to ignore many of the deficiencies that U.S. military and civilian critics cited in 

their post-Kosovo assessment. Some of this is understandable, since they are unlikely to be relevant to a 

war fought by the PLA. China would presumably not 

have to try to placate numerous members of a fractious coalition, and would therefore have no need to 

fetter the PLA with rules of engagement that make 

targeting difficult, Nor would Beijing publicly rule 

out a ground invasion, thereby avoiding the disadvantageous consequence of freeing an adversary from 

positioning its tanks at probable lines of attack where 

they could be easily targeted. But the PLA’s publications do not evince awareness of the shortages of 

munitions, in the types of munitions available, and in 

personnel whose skills levels were adequate for the 

jobs they were asked to do. This indicates that the PLA 

may overestimate the capabilities of the U.S. military.

A second implication that U.S. authorities should 

be aware of is the Chinese penchant for sanctifying 

misinformation from its own military history to justify its use in the present day. The aforementioned admonition not to abandon tried-and-true tactics, since 
64

doing so led to the defeat of communist forces during 

the Encirclement Campaigns, is based on a falsified 

account of what happened that party historical accounts have accepted as truth. This apparent unwillingness to challenge shibboleths constitutes a potential vulnerability that U.S. planners should take into 

consideration. 

A third factor to be aware of is that a desire to overestimate the role of the population in helping to defeat 

an invader could lead the Chinese into another dangerous blind alley. Although it is true that the Serbian 

population initially supported President Milosevic’s 

defiant actions, civilian support for the war eroded 

under the bombing campaigns to an extent that Milosevic, fearing that he might be overthrown by his own 

people, capitulated. 

A related instance that also reveals a vulnerability 

the United States should be aware of is the apparently 

uncontested belief that the downing of the F-117 fighter was a triumph of inferior weapons and or people’s 

war.68 NATO experts have pointed out that, had the 

FRY military had an adequate integrated air defense 

system and more soldiers who were properly trained 

to use the equipment they had, many more NATO 

planes might have been brought down. American 

planners should carefully monitor whether such misassessments are distracting attention from creating of 

a stronger defenses, in this case an upgraded integrated air defense system (IADS).69

A fourth factor to be aware of is that the Chinese, 

in identifying themselves in the role of the FRY government, and people do not appear to recognize that 

they are likely to be in the position that NATO was in 

the FRY if they fight the sort of informationized war 

on China’s periphery that has been the focus of the 
65

PLA’s strategy since Kosovo. In a confrontation in Tibet, Xinjiang, or Taiwan, it is the PLA that will have to 

contend with people’s war resistance.

Fifth, Chinese commentaries do not acknowledge 

that the same dependence on high technology that 

they believe to be the Achilles heel of the American 

military may become a comparable vulnerability that 

the United States can use against the PLA as its own 

weaponry becomes increasingly sophisticated.

Finally, U.S. planners should be aware of the PLA’s 

tendency to interpret actions that the United States 

sees as reactions to particular events, such as the decision to intervene in Kosovo to halt ethnic cleansing, 

through the prism of a conviction that it is part of an 

American grand strategy to maintain and extend U.S. 

global hegemony. Its analysts appear to see no contradiction between this and an equally strongly held 

belief that the United States has entered a period of 

rapid decline.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Michael R. Gordon, “Weeks of Bombing Will Aim to Break 

Milosevic’s Grip,” New York Times, April 1, 1999. Additionally, the 

palace itself, formerly the residence of a king, was considered of 

historical value.

2. Bernard Gordon, “U.S. Warns Russia: Don’t Provide Help 

to Serbian Military,” New York Times, April 10, 1999, pp. A1, A8.

3. Yue Xuanyi (岳宣义), “科索沃战争对我军政治工作的警示” 

(“Warnings and Enlightenments Provided By Kosovo War For 

the Political Work of Our Army”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), August 

24, 1999, p. 6.

4. Jin Tao (金涛) , “‘多来诺骨牌’谬论土重来” (“‘Domino Theory’ Stages a Comeback”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), April 9, 1999, p. 4. 
66

5. Zhang Zhaozhong (张召忠), “北约会出动地面部队马” 

(“Will NATO Dispatch Ground Forces?”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), 

April 5, 1999, p. 4; Hu Wenlong (胡文龙), “北约空袭将作战略调

整” (“NATO To Make Strategic Readjustment To Its Air Strikes”), 

解放军报 (PLA Daily), April 15, 1999, p. 4.

6. Tan Baoping (谭保平), “在科技练兵的聚焦点上着力新三大

三防:训练引发的思考” (“Make Efforts to Focus of Science and 

Technology Troop Training—Thoughts on the New ‘Three Offensives and Three Defensives’ Training”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), 

November 23, 1999, p. 6.

7. Wang Hui (王辉), “掀起信息化作战的盖头来” (“Lifting the 

Cover From Information Operations”), 中国国防报(China National 

Defense News), December 11, 2008, p. 3.

8. Ma Ling (马玲), “U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century as 

Viewed From Kosovo—A Conversation With Strategist Yao Youzhi” (“姚有志”), 大公报 (Ta Kung Pao), Hong Kong, May 3, 1999, 

p. A1. 

9. Ibid.; Dong Guozheng (董国政), “军事因素回潮因由何在” 

(“Causes of the Reversion to Military Affairs”), 解放军报 (PLA 

Daily), September 10, 2008, p. 7.

10. Liu Huadi (刘化迪), “冷战思维仍在影响当今世界” (“Cold 

War Thinking Still Influential in Today’s World”), 解放军报 (PLA 

Daily), February 28, 2005, p. 11.

11. See, among many other such references, Bi Changhong (毕

长虹), “单极化图谋与战争危险” (“Polarization Plot and Danger of 

War”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), May 21, 1999, p. 4.

12. Qin Yonghua (秦勇华), “从科索沃战争看战役后勤保障” 

(“Looking at Logistical Support in the Kosovo War”), 解放军报 

(PLA Daily), August 17, 1999, p. 6. The “third line” refers to a project undertaken under Mao Zedong to relocate defense assets to 

caves and other concealed locations in the PRC’s hinterlands to 

shield them from destruction in case of attack by the Soviet Union 

or some other enemy. The remoteness of their locations also reduced the bases’ usefulness, and the project is generally considered to have been a failure. See Barry Naughton, “The Third 
67

Front: Defence Industrialization In the Chinese Interior,” China 

Quarterly, No. 115, September 1988.

13. Tan Baobing (谭保平), “Stressing the Focus of Science and 

Technology Troop Training—Thoughts on the New ‘Three Offensives and Three Defensives’ Training,” 解放军报 (PLA Daily), 

November 23, 1999, p. 6; see also Tian Long (天龙), “中国军力报告

与中美关系” (“Chinese Military Strength and Sino-American Relations”), 镜报 (The Mirror), September 1, 2003, pp. 42-44.

14. Hu Jian (胡坚), “反空袭不可忽视反救援” (Anti-Rescue’ 

Operations Necessary”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), June 22, 1999, p. 6.

15. Tang Liehui (唐列辉), “努力探人与战器结合的优解” 

(“Make Efforts to Find Best Solution to Man-Weapons Integration”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), June 15, 1999, p. 6.

16. Zhu Wenquan (朱文泉) and Zhao Taizhong (赵太忠), “提

高针对性增强坚迫感—从科索沃局再谈入特久学习高科技知识” 

(“Focus on the Key Aspects, Enhance a Sense of Urgency—Viewing the Profound and Protracted High-Tech Knowledge Lessons 

of the Kosovo Situation”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), May 25, 1999, 

p. 6.

17. Cary Huang, “Beijing Sets Up Panel on High-Tech Weapons,” Hong Kong Standard, June 11, 1999, p. 6.

18. Fu Quanyou (傅全有), “大兴科技练兵强 固钢铁长城” 

(“Vigorously Conduct Military Training in Science and Technology to Strengthen the Great Steel Wall”), 求是 (Qiushi, Seeking 

Truth), No. 15, August 1, 1999, pp. 12-17. 

19. Duan Zhiming (段志明), Mei Lijin (梅里金), Liu Jianmin (

刘建民) and Xiang Zihui (项子辉), “科索沃销烟的警示—广州军区

某集团军‘从北约空袭南联盟看科技练兵’座谈会纪要" (“Warning From the Flame of War in Kosovo—Summary of Forum Held 

By a Group Army of Guangzhou Military Region Under the 

Theme of Implications of NATO Bombing of Yugoslav Federation for Military Training With Science and Technology”), 解放军

报 (PLA Daily), April 20, 1999, p. 6. 
68

20. Sha Lin (沙麟), ”Two Senior Colonels and ‘No-Limit Warfare’,” 中国青年报 (China Youth Daily), June 28, 1999, p. 5, FTS 

19990728000697.

21. Qiao Liang (乔良) and Wang Xianghui (王湘穗), 超限战

(Unlimited War), Beijing, China: PLA Literature and Arts Press, 

1999.

22. Sha Lin, p. 5.

23. Zhu Xiaoning (朱小宁), "袭断‘非对称战场’"(“A Monopoly on the ‘Asymmetrical Battlefield’”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), 

November 23, 1999, p. 6.

24. Yue Xuanyi(岳宣义), “Warnings and Enlightenment Provided by Kosovo War for the Political Work of Our Army,” 解放

军报 (PLA Daily), August 24, 1999 p. 6, FTS 19990919000018.

25. Lo Ping, “Zhu Rongji’s Visit to U.S. and Internal Struggle Within Top Hierarchy,” 动向 (Tung Hsiang), No. 164, April 

15, 1999, pp. 6-10, FTS19990427001937. According to Lo, a veteran correspondent for the respected Hong Kong magazine 争鸣 

(Cheng Ming), the demonstrations took place March 22-24.

26. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Urgent U.S. Action Needed to Soothe 

Beijing and Prevent Collapse of Ties,” South China Morning Post, 

May 1, 1999, p. 1. Lam hypothesized that the reason military hardliners were able to gain the upper hand is that Beijing saw patriotism as a means to divert attention from social problems such as 

unemployment.

27. Yü Ching-sheng, “Jiang Zemin Repeatedly Expounds 

China’s Domestic and Foreign Policies in Three Internal Speeches 

Giving a Quick Response and Winning the Support of the Public,” 

Ching Pao, July 1, 1999, pp. 24-26, FTS19990703000863. Article is 

dated June 3, 1999, based on Jiang’s speeches prior to that; hence 

Pan’s article of June 8 can be considered a response to Jiang.

28. Agence France Presse, “‘Forget Bombing, Court Investment’,” South China Morning Post, May 19, 1999. 
69

29. Pan Shunrui (潘顺瑞), “战争离我们并不遥远" (“War Is 

Not Far From Us”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), June 8, 1999, p. 6.

30. Xiong Guangkai.

31. Cheng Dezhi, “由美国成立网络司令部想到的 “ (“Thoughts 

on the American Military’s Establishment of a Cyberwar Command”), 火箭兵报 (Missile Force Daily), June 22, 2010, p. 3.

32. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, available from www.defense.gov.pubs/pdfs/2010_

CMPR_Final.pdf; ibid., Annual Report on the Military Power of the 

People’s Republic of China 2009, available from www.defenselink.mil/

pubs/pdfs/ China_Military_Report_09/pdf .

33. Ajey Lele, “China’s Posture in Space and Its Implications,” 

Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. 21, No. 4, July 1-August 31, 

2008, pp. 605-620.

34. This summarizes the assessments found in several articles 

such as (no author) “超限戰的第一線專訪林勤經中將” (“The First 

Line of No-Limit Warfare: Conversation with LTG Lin Abe”), 

國防政策評論 (Taiwan Defense Affairs), Vol. 1, No. 4, September 

2001, pp. 125-143; Chung Chien (鐘堅), “共軍高技術犯台戰爭如

何以戰逼降” (“PLA’s High-tech War Preparation: Taking Taiwan Without Bloodshed”), in ibid, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 2000, pp. 

140-147; Cheng Jung-mai (鄭君邁), “無人飛行載具之運用與前景” 

(“Use and Prospects of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles”), 空軍學術雙

月刊 (Air Force Bimonthly Journal), January 7, 2006, pp. 1-6.

35. Lin Guoli (林国利) and Zhu Jingcheng (朱竟成), “反思拉氏

的’七十天” (“Reflecting on Rumsfeld’s ‘Seventy Days”), 中国国

防报 (China National Defense News), January 12, 2006, p. 3.

36. An Weiping (安卫平), “立足现有装备谋打赢” (“Rely on 

Existing Weapons to Win”), 前進報 (Forward Daily), March 27, 

2006, p. 4.

37. Liao Keduo (廖可铎), “好战法也是撒手剑“ (“Good Tactics 

Are Also A Trump Card”), 战友报 (Soldiers), March 10, 2009, p. 2.
70

38. Zeng Fanxiang (曾凡祥) and Chen Yongbo (陈永波), “直

面全球气候挑战—军队应探索烟发展之路" (“Face Global Climate 

Change Directly: Military Should Examine Low Carbon Emission 

Development Path”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), December 17, 2009, 

p. 12.

39. Lu Yuan et al. (路远), “卫星信息反抗研究“ (“Research on 

Satellite Information Countermeasures”), 现代防卫技术 (Modern 

Defense Technology), Vol. 35, No. 5, October 2007, pp. 86-91.

40. Wei Liping, “Adept at Playing Hide and Seek with Reconnaissance Satellites: Interview With Camouflage Protection Expert and Senior Engineer Liu Baorong,” 空军报 (Air Force News), 

April 19, 2007, FEA20070717231986.

41. Liu Jun (刘军), “战场魔术师” (“Battlefield Magician”), 火

箭兵 (Missile Force Daily), April 4, 2006, p. 3.

42. Kuo Nai-jih (郭乃日), “商用衛星影像的衍生用途” (“Uses 

Derived from Commercial Satellite Imagery”), 看不見的臺海戰爭 

(The Invisible War Across the Taiwan Strait), May 1, 2005, pp. 145-

174.

43. Minnie Chan, “PLA Sets Up Centralised Cyber War Command,” South China Morning Post, July 22, 2010, p. 6.

44. Medius Research, “Report Says China Military Likely Behind Cyber Espionage and Attacks,” July 6, 2010, available from 

www.prenewswire.com/news/releases/medius-research-report-sayschinse-military-likely-behind-cyber-espionage-and=attacks-97850_579.

html .

45. Mobilization Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民

共和国动员法), February 26, 2010, available from www.npc.cn. 

46. James Mulvenon, “2010 National People’s Congress Highlights: Defense Budgets and the New National Defense Mobilization Law,” China Leadership Monitor No. 32, Spring 2010, p. 3.

47. Dennis J. Blasko, “Chinese Strategic Thinking: People’s 

War in the 21st Century,” China Brief, Vol. 10 No. 6, March 18, 

2010.
71

48. Yin Bangxiong (尹邦雄), “信息战必修构建和利用畅通的

军民通信网络” (“Information War: Must Smoothly Construct a 

Military-Civilian Communications Network”), 战士报 (Soldier’s 

Daily), December 27, 2005, p. 3.

49. John Markoff and David Barboza, “Paper in China Sets 

Off Alarms in U.S.,” New York Times, March 20, 2010.

50. Pan Chin-chang (潘進章), “Preliminary Examination of 

the Chinese Military’s ‘Political Warfare’,” 國防雜誌 (Defense 

Journal), No. 1, Vol. 24, pp 31-43; citation from p. 37.

51. Shang Jinsuo (尚金锁) and Li Liming (李黎光), “党的空军

建设指导理论的创新” (“Innovative Development of the Party’s 

Guiding Theory for Air Force Formation”), 军事科学 (Military 

Science), October 20, 2007, pp. 42-48; citation from p. 48.

52. Jiang Xun (蔣遜), Wang Yawei (王亚伟), Xiong Wankui 

(熊万奎), “空军机动能力建设的启示” (“Lessons from the Establishment of Air Transport Power”), 现代军事 (Conmilit), August 

2, 2008.

53. Jiang Shuli (江书立), “加强现代空军作战后勤核心保障能

力建设” (“Strengthen the Building of Modern Air Force Logistics 

Core Capabilities”), 空军报 (Air Force Daily), February 17, 2009, 

p. 4.

54. Chang Long, “Grasp the Trend of New Military Changes—Review and Prospect from the Gulf War to the Iraq War,” 解

放军报 (PLA Daily), October 28, 2003, CPP20031030000061.

55. General Lin Abe.

56. Anatol Lieven reinforces this latter point in “Hubris and 

Nemesis: Kosovo and the Pattern of Western Military Ascendancy and Defeat,” Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen, eds., War 

Over Kosovo. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, p. 103.

57. France was the putative culprit, with information deliberately concealed from it by the other allies due to concern that 

it might be passed on to FRY contacts. See, e.g., Hugo Gordon, 
72

“France Kept in Dark by Allies,” London Daily Telegraph, April 9, 

1999, p. 1.

58. For a detailed analysis, see Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.

59. General Short, interviewed on Frontline, February 22, 

2000, available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html.

60. See, e.g, Hu Chi-hsi, “Mao, Lin Biao, and the Fifth Encirclement Campaign,” China Quarterly, No. 82, June 1980, pp. 350-

280. Hu bases his conclusions on an examination of the Yan’an 

archive, obtained by Kuomintang forces when they captured the 

CCP capital,

61. The rumor at the time was that the bombing was in retaliation for anti-NATO espionage being carried out by Chinese 

intelligence personnel that had caused heavy losses to the U.S. 

Air Force, and that two of the three reporters killed in the attack 

doubled as intelligence agents, as in fact Xinhua personnel often 

did. Su Lan, “Chinese Embassy Bombing Incident—China-US Espionage War Comes to Light,” Kaifang [Open], Hong Kong, No. 

152, July 2, 1999, pp. 17-19, in FBIS FTS19990720000639.

62. Su Size (苏思泽), “Kosovo War and New Military Theory,” 

June 1, 1999, p. 8, FTS19990701000148.

63. Xie Wenqing (謝文悝) and Liu Wanping (刘万平), “‘Humanitarianisn in Name But Hegemony in Fact’—Commenting 

Upon NATO and Denouncing Power Politics,” 解放军报 (PLA 

Daily), May 23, 1999, p. 4, FTS19990601001918.

64. Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001, 

pp. 2001-201, citing an interview with an unnamed American officer involved in the operation.

65. Ibid.
73

66. Lessons Learned From the Kosovo Conflict—The Effect of the 

Operation On Both Deployed and Non-Deployed Forces and On Future Modernization Plans, hearing before the Military Procurement 

Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, October 19, 1999, available from commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has292020.000/has292020_0.HTM; see also Lambeth.

67. BBC, London, August 11, 2010, citing Minnie Chan, “PLA 

Carries Out Night Drills Near Yellow Sea Based On Scenario of 

An Attack By the United States,” South China Morning Post, August 11, 2010.

68. The F-117 was actually brought down not by a mobilized 

population, but by the 3rd Battalion of the FRY’s 250th Air Defense Brigade. The colonel who commanded it attributed his success to the F-117’s stealthy radar signature being momentarily 

disrupted by its bombing doors being open.

69. It should be noted that the PLAAF’s January 2011 test 

flight of the J-20 indicates that the denigration of the invincibility 

of the stealthy F-117s did not deter the PLA from developing its 

own stealthy plane.

75

CHAPTER 3

SINICA RULES THE WAVES?

THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVY’S 

POWER PROJECTION

AND ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL LESSONS

FROM THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CONFLICT

Christopher D. Yung

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter examines the lessons the Chinese military has drawn from the Falklands/Malvinas conflict 

of 1982 and applied (doctrinally, operationally, and in 

terms of procurement) to the expected contingencies 

of Taiwan and an “Out of Area” maritime campaign.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Chinese analysts highlight the following conclusions, which serve as guidance for the operations 

practiced and executed, doctrine being developed, 

and weapon systems and platforms procured. These 

conclusions are: “Know your enemy, know yourself”; 

the importance of tactical estimates and correct deployment/employment of forces; the importance of 

tactical and war-fighting guidelines (doctrine); the 

importance of effective systems of command and control; the importance of national mobilization and defense economy; “Take your protection with you”; the 

importance of bases and access to facilities; the paramount importance of air power; the important role of 

merchant shipping; the role of amphibious forces; and 

logistics as force multiplier or “Achilles Heel.”
76

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

• Owing to their applicability to China’s defense 

of the “Near Seas,” the Chinese military are 

likely to continue procuring or developing into 

a mature capability diesel-electric submarines, 

modern surface combatants, land-based and 

sea-based maritime strike aircraft, anti-ship 

cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and 

maritime surveillance capabilities to track and 

target ships at sea.

• Owing to their applicability to China’s “Out of 

Area” maritime campaigns, the Chinese military are likely to continue procuring or developing L-class amphibious ships, aircraft carrier 

capabilities, nuclear attack submarines, aerial 

refueling capabilities, and replenishment ships.

• Operationally, the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) will continue participating in exercises 

that stress combined arms ground-sea-air operations; amphibious operations; coordination 

among surface combatants, air forces, and subsurface forces; command and control of forces 

afloat, in the air, and ashore; and a combination 

of general purpose forces with ballistic missiles 

and other Second Artillery forces.

• The PLA will seek to gain access (temporarily 

or periodically) to a naval support facility far 

from China’s shores, will continue to practice 

its operations far from Mainland China in conjunction with foreign partners, and will continue to operate “Out of Area” in the Gulf of 

Aden, the Indian Ocean, and in other foreign 

locations.
77

INTRODUCTION

Commentaries on China’s PLA cite Operations 

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and the Kosovo 

Conflict as military conflicts to which the Chinese 

have paid particularly close attention. These commentaries correctly argue that these two conflicts played 

central roles in convincing the PLA that it needed to 

conduct an extensive modernization program and a 

thorough reevaluation of Chinese military doctrine.1

While there is no question that Operations DESERT 

SHIELD/DESERT STORM and Kosovo played an 

important part in shaping Chinese perspectives on 

defense transformation, an often overlooked military 

conflict that had a profound impact on Chinese military thinking is the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War between Great Britain and Argentina. 

With the exception of the excellent article2 written 

by Lyle Goldstein of the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) of the Naval War College, the author 

can think of no other piece written by a non-Chinese 

author dedicated to the major lessons that the Chinese 

took away from that conflict. There are many reasons 

why this may have been the case. First, because Operation DESERT STORM and the Kosovo campaign 

loom large in Chinese writings and commentaries of 

western military campaigns, they have drowned out 

the fewer, but no less important, Chinese writings 

commenting on the Falklands/Malvinas. Second, because Operation DESERT STORM and Kosovo were 

conflicts involving the United States—the most advanced military in the world—western analysts and 

observers discussing those conflicts’ major lessons on 

modern warfare may have themselves overlooked the 

importance of the Falklands/Malvinas campaign and 
78

what it offers to a modern military audience by way 

of lessons. Third, the Chinese have been very focused 

on the transformation of the PLA from a relatively 

backward, manpower intensive military to a joint, 

information-centered, mechanized, combined arms 

force. The Chinese have themselves claimed that the 

best recent examples of western campaigns to provide 

lessons on these larger transformational issues are the 

Desert Storm and Kosovo campaigns—not the Falklands/Malvinas campaign.

With the above commentary in mind, then, what 

does a chapter on China’s lessons from the Falklands/

Malvinas conflict add to our understanding of China’s 

future military capabilities and China’s concept of operations? As Lyle Goldstein pointed out, there is quite 

an obvious analogy between the situation the Argentineans found themselves in in 1982 and the possibility that the Chinese may be in a similar military situation sometime in the future; that is, the Argentineans 

had the task of preventing an outside power from interfering in a territorial dispute close to Argentina’s 

shores.3 This is not unlike a China-Taiwan-U.S. scenario. The lessons that the Chinese can take from the 

Falklands/Malvinas are directly applicable, then, to 

the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy that 

the Chinese are said to be preparing for in case of a 

Taiwan contingency.4

 But is it also true that the Chinese can learn from the British experience of that war? 

Are there naval, power projection, and expeditionary 

issues the Chinese are learning from when they examine that conflict? Since the PLA appears to be focused 

on two broad contingencies—a Taiwan scenario and 

an out of area contingency—it behooves us to examine 

closely the one case history that seems to offer lessons 

for both contingencies. What naval power projection 
79

and expeditionary lessons as well as anti-access/area 

denial lessons have the Chinese learned from the Falklands/Malvinas conflict? And what does this tell us 

about future Chinese naval and maritime capabilities 

and concepts of operations?

WHY THE CHINESE STUDY THE FALKLANDS/

MALVINAS WAR

Thus far, the Falklands/Malvinas campaign represents the last major naval or maritime campaign of 

any tactical or operational significance. No conflict 

since then has involved so many elements of naval operations in a major theater of war—amphibious ships, 

submarines, surface combatants, naval aviation, and, 

of course, aircraft carriers. It is thus no wonder that 

the Chinese have spent some time paying attention to 

its lessons. In 2000 Vice Admiral Ding Yiping, the former PLA Navy (PLAN) Chief of Staff, wrote that “for 

the future of military theory, development of military 

units and of military equipment, [the Falklands/Malvinas] war produced a deep influence.”5

 Lyle Goldstein 

points out that the Nanjing Naval Command College 

had dispatched research teams to “study naval forces, 

naval strategy, sea defence, and blockade operations 

in the Falklands/Malvinas War with the goal of understanding future naval warfare.”6

The Falklands/Malvinas campaign also involves 

a conflict centered around sovereignty or territorial 

disputes—something that the Chinese are themselves 

heavily involved in. Therefore, Chinese commentators 

have periodically revisited the Falklands/Malvinas 

conflict not just to derive the military, tactical, and operational lessons that it offers, but also to obtain pearls 

of wisdom on the political and legal ramifications of 

the conflict.7
80

Finally, it should be recalled that the Falklands conflict preceded Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT 

STORM by 7-8 years, respectively, and it preceded the 

Kosovo conflict by 16 years. Before these two major 

conflicts were available for the PLA to derive lessons 

from, the most relevant instance of modern war that 

the Chinese could learn from prior to the 1990s was 

the Falklands/Malvinas campaign. 

A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE FALKLANDS/

MALVINAS CONFLICT

Before discussing at length what the Chinese took 

away from the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, it is important to briefly discuss what transpired in that 

conflict. This is not the place to present the legal and 

historical arguments that the British and the Argentineans have offered to support their claims to the 

Falklands/Malvinas. Suffice it to say that both the 

British and Argentina claims cite initial discovery, administration of the islands, colonization, uncontested 

sovereignty for significant periods of time, and the 

self-determination of the islands’ inhabitants. As we 

now know, this unresolved dispute continued into the 

late 20th century when, after talks on the future of the 

Falklands between Argentina and Great Britain broke 

down, Argentina took the Falklands by force, prompting the formation of a British expeditionary task force, 

which sailed over 8,000 nautical miles to the south Atlantic, launched bombing raids against the defenses 

on the Falklands from the British base on Ascension 

Island, and used one of its nuclear attack submarines 

to sink one of the Argentinean navy’s cruisers (the 

Belgrano). The British suffered serious losses from air 

attacks from the Argentinean air force, but finally in 
81

May and June 1982 they conducted an amphibious 

assault against the Argentinean defenses on the Falklands and eventually compelled the surrender of Argentinean forces on the Falklands on June 14 and from 

the Argentinean forces on the South Sandwich Islands 

on June 20. 

WHAT HAVE THE CHINESE WRITTEN ABOUT 

THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CONFLICT?

“Know Your Enemy, Know Yourself.”

Although it has become a clichéd phrase lifted from 

the ancient writings of Sunzi, Chinese military thinkers actually take seriously the idea that in a conflict the 

central task of the military and the national security 

decisionmakers is to get the strategic policy absolutely 

right—that means having a very solid understanding 

of what the enemy is likely to do, his strengths and 

weaknesses, and understanding your own strengths 

and weaknesses. This has applications to Chinese 

strategy regarding actions meant to deny access to the 

United States during a Taiwan contingency. In 2007 

the Chinese press (Xinhua) published an article on the 

Falklands/Malvinas conflict.8

 In it, the author—military historian Zhou Ming—argued that one of the reasons the British won that war and the Argentineans 

lost it was because British strategic policy was sound 

while Argentinean strategic policy was not. Although 

“the Argentinean side initially seized the initiative . . . 

they erroneously judged that England was not able to 

launch an expedition, and at the same time also overestimated their own nationalistic feelings and military 

capabilities.”9

 The analysis continues that “this policy 

was built on the foundation of wishful thinking.”10

England, by contrast, 
82

though initially [had to] hastily retaliate, its strategic 

policy was accurately, objectively, and in clear headed 

fashion, able to estimate the situation, adopting resolute and vigorous guiding principles, giving priority 

to the military struggle, while simultaneously taking 

control of politics, foreign relations, and economics, 

and amply mobilizing international and internal factors.11

A Chinese assessment made 6 years earlier issued 

the very same arguments.12

The Importance of Tactical Estimates and Correct 

Deployment/Employment of Forces.

In the first article noted above, Zhou Ming wrote of 

the importance of tactical estimates (i.e., intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance), and of deploying 

the right forces for the right missions and tasks. The 

article states, 

The Argentinean military, in considering the international situation, the (likely) British plans, and other 

strategic considerations made errors in judgment. 

After England dispatched its forces, they [the Argentinean military] thought England would attack Argentina’s native territory (the mainland), and took a large 

quantity of troops and used them to defend the mainland; with regard to its border dispute with Chile, 

they [exercised] a deeply suspicious vigilance, and 

to its border dispatched a large quantity of armored 

units; in the Malvinas war zone . . . they failed to make 

ample use of that territory, barely deploying as occupation troops 3% of the total armed forces.13

Even when it came to deploying forces to the war 

zone, the Argentineans exercised poor judgment. 
83

“[I]n East Malvinas they took the main force and concentrated them near ports and harbors, and in their 

defensive zones dispersed their defensive forces, and 

did not have ample enough motorized units in reserve, 

thereby giving the English military opportunities that 

could be exploited.”14

The Importance of Tactical and Warfighting 

Guidelines (Doctrine).

The Chinese have observed that Argentina’s defeat 

in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict can, in addition to 

the factors noted above, be explained by its military 

following poor tactical guidelines. “[T]he Argentinean 

military philosophy was passive, its tactics inflexible, 

and furthermore lacked real effective aircraft to attack 

the British defensive capabilities and, still further, to 

attack Britain’s most important, yet most vulnerable 

supply shipping; this was Argentina’s greatest mistake.”15 This failure to observe Great Britain’s glaring 

weakness in the length of its logistical supply line is a 

particularly egregious fault of the Argentinean military. “From the perspective of the history of warfare, 

to not attack a very long and yet very vulnerable supply line, is extremely short-sighted.”16 England, on 

the other hand, had a correct tactical philosophy. Its 

“tactics were more agile, and its forces were good at 

snatching key links [objectives], and seizing the initiative.”17 By seizing the southern Malvinas, the British 

were able to rather quickly inspire the imaginations 

of the common British citizen, while at the same time 

establishing a foothold and an advanced base in the 

operating area. They gave their nuclear attack submarines the freedom to take the initiative and attack the 

Argentinean navy aggressively. The resulting sinking 
84

of the Belgrano by the nuclear attack submarine HMS 

Conqueror forced the fragile Argentinean navy into 

staying out of the war.18

The Importance of Effective Systems of Command 

and Control.

Argentina’s joint command during the Falklands/

Malvinas conflict, Chinese writings have observed, 

“was famously ineffective and unable to bear the burden of making strategy and policy and coordinating 

the action of the upper level echelons, including the 

president . . . with the [military] high command.”19

Lacking any real combat experience, the upper echelons of the Argentinean decisionmaking system did 

not accomplish anything significant in this conflict. 

The command and control system of the war zone was 

difficult for all involved to understand.20 As a result, 

another Chinese assessment concludes, “[v]arious Argentine command elements were unaware of one another’s orders and bungled the use of intelligence.”21

The Importance of National Mobilization and 

Defense Economy.

Beyond what the two countries did on the battlefield and within the highest levels of national security 

decisionmaking, the Chinese have commented that 

Argentina was not particularly well-placed either economically or in terms of population morale for the conflict. “Although Argentina had determination to seize 

the Malvinas,” Chinese authors have written, “there 

was not a long period of morale preparation and materiel [build up] preparation.”22 The Argentinean soldiers dispatched to the Malvinas were insufficient and 
85

their eventual situation (i.e., number of forces) did not 

improve. Added to this, Argentina itself,

lacked the defense industry, and during peacetime 

with regard to the most important strategic goods and 

materials [it] failed to put these items in reserve. After 

the United States and the European Union launched 

an arms embargo, then usable aircraft, missiles and 

other wartime consumables were not able to be replenished.23

Take Your Protection with You.

In “The Union Jack Rises Again,” one of a number 

of essays on foreign wars published in a book compiling the military history of foreign wars (1993), the 

authors Wang Shuangmei and Duan Guangda wrote 

that one of the most notable observations from the 

Falklands/Malvinas conflict was the military capability that the British were able to bring with them across 

long distances to settle the territorial dispute.24 In particular, this essay, as well as other Chinese commentary on the war, focuses on the British ability to create 

a protective bubble by integrated sea and air forces 

formed around the military task force.25 Chinese analysts note that there are a number of methods an expeditionary force may pursue to create a “blockade” 

of sorts. First, a submarine may keep outside forces at 

bay either through the indirect threat it poses to surface combatants or by stealthily attacking intruders; 

second, by maintaining a constant air and sea patrol 

around the task force; and finally, by direct confrontation by surface combatants to challenge or dissuade 

intruders from penetrating a protected area.26 Chinese 

authors point out that the British ability to take its protection along also meant that the attacker’s power was 
86

able to isolate the operating area from the interference 

of Argentina’s armed forces from mainland South 

America. That is, the area around the Falklands/

Malvinas could be isolated by a sea and air blockade 

and then it could be attacked and retaken. By contrast, 

the Argentineans failed to effectively use air power, 

submarines, surface combatants, and high-tech precision weaponry (e.g., anti-ship cruise missiles [ASCMs]) to keep the British task force out of the operating 

area. In addition, the British ability to export airpower 

through the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers was cited as 

one of the central elements of the British success in the 

Falklands/Malvinas dispute.27 Similarly, the authors 

in “The Union Jack Rises Again” note that it was also 

important that the British brought long-range nuclear 

submarines, which were able to wreak havoc with the 

Argentinean naval surface forces—sinking the Belgrano and essentially forcing the Argentinean Navy to 

sit out the war.28

The Importance of Bases and Access to Facilities.

Chinese writings cite the importance of access 

to facilities and bases for British success in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. In a recent essay on the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, one Chinese author noted 

that the Royal Air Force (RAF) was able to launch air 

strikes from Ascension Island against the defenses entrenched on the Falklands/Malvinas.29 Those strikes 

would not have been possible if the British had not 

had access to that territory. Chinese authors have also 

correctly noted that bases and facilities are necessary 

for military forces to put themselves in order before 

being dispatched on expeditions and offensive operations.30 This is akin to the U.S. Navy amphibious doc-
87

trine concept of Preparation, Embarkation, Rehearsal, 

Movement, Assault (PERMA). Owing to the fact that 

the task force had deployed in a hurry, some of the 

surface combatants and amphibious ships had been 

incorrectly loaded.31 The task force was forced into reloading equipment and supplies on Ascension Island. 

The “Preparation” aspect of the operation would not 

have been possible without access to the advance base 

on Ascension.

The importance of access to a base of operations is 

not restricted to an established, fully constructed facility. Chinese authors point out that the simple access to 

a firm and stable piece of territory or land from which 

to conduct operations is essential to military operations.32 For the Falklands/Malvinas campaign, one 

Chinese author writes that the essential factor that enabled the British to attack Argentinean forces from a 

base of operations was brought about by successfully 

landing British ground forces on the Falklands/Malvinas themselves, and the establishment of a beachhead 

is the crux of the matter.33

The Paramount Importance of Air Power.

Chinese observers of the Falklands/Malvinas 

correctly point out that the correct application of air 

power was an extremely important factor explaining 

the success of the British expedition. One recent Chinese essay on the relevance of air power to this conflict 

pointed out that the tasks for which aircraft were used 

in this conflict were: to cooperate with the special task 

force fleet in conducting its operations; to conduct air 

combat to include air-to-air combat and strikes against 

land and sea targets; to conduct reconnaissance and 

gather intelligence on the disposition of the enemy’s 

forces; to conduct air defense and “counterstealth” 
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operations; and finally, to serve as a lead, guide, or 

navigation asset for the attack forces.34

Chinese observers note that British air power 

helped create a protective blockade around the British 

task force. These authors also note that it was Argentinean aircraft that alone were able to penetrate the 

blockade, attack British forces, and ultimately to sink 

the HMS Sheffield and other Royal Navy ships. Inadequate construction of airfields, Chinese authors point 

out, obstructed Argentina’s air campaign against the 

British.35 RAF access to Ascension Island, the creation 

of an air bridge from England to Ascension Island, and 

carrier aviation permitted British aircraft to feed the 

British logistics system, thereby permitting the British 

war effort in the Falklands/Malvinas.36 Royal Navy 

landing ships and landing craft, Chinese authors note, 

sailed to the Falklands/Malvinas under the protective 

cover of British aircraft provided by the two carrier 

battle groups of the task force.37

The Important Role of Merchant Shipping.

Chinese commentators on the Falklands/Malvinas 

conflict point out the important role merchant or civilian shipping played. The Royal Navy lacked the sufficient number of ships to transport a steady stream 

of supplies to the theater of conflict. Chinese military 

historians note that the British brought 60 civilian 

merchant vessels to the Falklands/Malvinas conflict.38

The Chinese essay speculates that reliance on merchant vessels, and by extension civilian crews, to conduct naval operations was what caused, in part, the 

British to have to expend close to 10 million pounds 

sterling per day over the course of the operation.39 The 

heavy reliance on merchant shipping can also prove 
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to be a risky course of action. When the merchant vessel (MV) Atlantic Conveyor was sunk by Argentinean 

aircraft, the Royal Navy lost valuable military assets 

necessary for the conduct of the landings on the Falklands/Malvinas.

The Role of Amphibious Forces.

Chinese observers of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict also took note of the importance of amphibious 

operations for the British success in that campaign. 

Chinese commentaries take note of the fact that the 

Argentineans completely underestimated Great Britain’s ability to mobilize an expeditionary force, embark that force on amphibious ships, sail thousands of 

miles as part of a joint expeditionary force, and then 

land those forces for offensive operations against the 

Argentinean defenders.40 Another military historian 

puts it this way, “the crucial or key element allowing 

[the British] to obtain a correct military campaign was 

its ability to conduct a successful amphibious campaign.”41 This campaign allowed the British to attack 

Argentinean military power and neutralize it, then at 

the point where the British landed on the Falklands/

Malvinas to build or establish a solid base of operations, and thereafter to conduct offensive combat operations.42 Amphibious operations also put the British 

in a position to assume a dominant position over the 

Argentinean defenders.43

Logistics as Force Multiplier or “Achilles Heel.”

Chinese articles on the Falklands/Malvinas make 

much of the centrality of logistics to modern warfare. 

One article notes that the Argentineans did not have 

even one adequately sized airport or airfield to which 
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additional forces or equipment could be flowed.44 Consequently, on the Falklands/Malvinas islands themselves the Argentinean military lacked the necessary 

supplies to provide a sustained defense. By contrast, 

the article noted the British logistical system provided 

British forces with the supplies that they needed to 

wage their war. Although the logistical line was long 

and would have been vulnerable to a cunning and 

ruthless enemy had Argentina been more prepared, 

the British were able to piece together a logistical system that supported their operations for the duration.45

The flip side of this observation, Chinese authors 

note, is that the Argentineans should have focused 

on the British logistical system as its “Achilles Heel.” 

Since British forces and equipment had to travel such 

long distances to get to the theater of operations, some 

attention should have been paid by the Argentinean 

military on how to attack that system.46 The British logistical system would have been a “soft underbelly” 

against which Argentina could have made surgical 

cuts to disrupt the British war effort. Instead, Chinese 

articles note, the Argentineans seemed oblivious to 

this factor as anything important and having the potential to affect the outcome of the war.47

APPLYING THE LESSONS OF THE FALKLANDS/

MALVINAS CONFLICT

From the above account, it is clear that Chinese observers have paid attention to the Falklands/Malvinas 

conflict and have drawn specific lessons from it. Does 

it follow that China’s military leadership has taken 

those lessons and applied them to the improvement 

and development of the PLA? In other words, do we 

see evidence of these lessons in doctrine, procurement 

or acquisitions, and in operations?
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Doctrine.

As some observers of the PLA have noted, there 

is no equivalent to the English word “doctrine” in 

Chinese.48 The PLA refers to practices, guidance, and 

theory. Within authoritative PLA documents attesting 

to the future practices, guidance, and theory of warfighting, then, do these reflect some of the lessons of 

the Falklands/Malvinas conflict? In a word, “Yes.” 

Although it will be apparent later in this chapter that 

specific weapon systems and platforms and missions 

exercised or practiced will be more applicable to either 

a Taiwan contingency or an out of area power projection operation, by and large, the doctrinal lessons 

taken from the Falklands/Malvinas campaign generally apply equally to both. The first of these common 

lessons is the PLA guidance on the role of logistics 

both in support of PLA power projection operations 

and in support of the PLA’s efforts to defend its territory in the “near seas.” Jianxiang Bi has written that in 

authoritative PLA guidance:

According to PLA assumptions, the most critical center of gravity is a support system located in an opponent’s forward deployed and rear bases, which could 

not be defended against every attack in every place 

and at every conceivable time. Today, the military 

heavily depends on its logistics support system, so 

that the system itself becomes bloated, extremely visible and vulnerable.49

As we have noted above, one of the key lessons 

that Chinese observers have taken away from the 

Falklands/Malvinas conflict is that the Argentineans 

failed to recognize the vulnerability of the British logistics system and hence, passed up the opportunity 
92

to attack that vulnerability. In similar fashion, the Chinese have also recognized, partially as a result of the 

lessons derived from the Falklands/Malvinas campaign, that logistics is a “force multiplier” for one’s 

own operational efforts. Here is what China’s Defense 

White Paper of 2008 had to say on the issue of maritime 

logistics:

Aiming at enhancing its integrated logistical support 

capabilities, the Navy has preliminarily built a logistical support system with shore-based logistical support 

as the foundation and sea-based logistical support as 

the mainstay, and meshes the two into an integrated 

whole. It has stepped up the building of ship bases, 

berthing areas, supply points, docks and airfields. As 

a result, a shore-based support system is basically in 

place, which is coordinated with the development 

of weaponry and equipment, and suited to war-time 

support tasks. The Navy has gradually deployed new 

types of large integrated supply ships, medical ships 

and ambulance helicopters, and succeeded in developing many types of maritime support equipment and 

a number of key technologies, leading to significant 

progress in the modernization of the maritime support 

force.50

The second area in which the Falklands/Malvinas 

conflict may have had a significant impact on PLA 

warfighting doctrine both for power projection and 

for A2/AD is in the employment of air power. Bi Jianxiang again writes:

China’s military leaders now call for substantial offensive air capabilities, with emphasis on developing 

joint hard-target kill weapons, warning and tracking system, and real-time (near real-time) C2. While 

[PLAAF] foreign acquisition programs aimed at 

achieving regional reach and a flexibility of opera-
93

tions and responses remain a top priority of the Air 

Force, F-11/Su-27 fighters and indigenous helicopter 

production is increasing. Within a decade, the air units 

have already acquired a status of notable importance, 

allowing the PLA to entertain a far wider operational 

option spectrum than ever before.51

As this chapter has pointed out previously, Chinese observers of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict 

clearly took away the importance of air power to the 

eventual outcome of that war. Argentina’s failure to 

take full advantage of its airpower hampered its A2/

AD efforts; Great Britain’s ability to make use of aircraft carriers, access to Ascension Island, and aerial 

refueling, helped it project power far from its shores 

and snatch victory. 

That the Chinese took to heart the important lesson from the Falklands/Malvinas campaign that an 

expeditionary force and an anti-access force has to 

operate in an integrated, self-protected manner is also 

illustrated in its 2008 Defense White Paper. The Defense 

White Paper clearly describes a naval force that is meant 

to create a protective bubble around a task force:

Efforts are being made to build new types of submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircraft forming a 

preliminary weaponry and equipment system with 

second-generation equipment as the core and the 

third generation as the backbone. The submarine 

force possesses underwater anti-ship, anti-submarine 

and mine-laying capabilities, as well as some nuclear 

counter-attack capabilities. The surface ship force has 

developed a surface striking force represented by new 

types of missile destroyers and frigates, and possesses 

maritime reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine, 

air-defense, mine-laying, and other operational capabilities. The aviation wing has developed an air striking force represented by sea-attack aircraft, and pos-
94

sesses reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and 

air-defense capabilities.52

Another doctrinal lesson taken from the Falklands/Malvinas and that applies both to a Taiwan 

contingency and an out of area military campaign is 

the importance of establishing a firm strategic policy. 

Mark Stokes, in his observations of how China would 

undertake an air war, observes that: 

[p]reparations for a campaign begin with issuance of 

strategic direction in the form of a strategic policy development process called the juece . . . the juece first 

establishes a general game plan . . . for military action 

that explores all possible outcomes, develops stratagems . . . and analyzes centers of gravity.53

Given the criticism the Chinese have leveled at 

the Argentinean failure to establish a sound strategic 

policy, this process clearly was in part derived from 

the lessons of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict.

Additionally, current doctrine or guidance defining how the PLA should exercise command control, 

and which is applicable to both an A2/AD contingency 

and an out of area power projection operation, can also 

be argued to have been derived from the lessons of the 

Falklands/Malvinas. Stokes again points out what authoritative sources claim to be the proper organization 

of joint command and control headquarters. This organization is meant to make sure that all of the relevant 

warfighting and political decisionmaking bodies are 

involved, and that each layer of organization understands its decisionmaking role—a lesson clearly taken 

from the Falklands/Malvinas experience: “[T]his [Joint 

Force Headquarters] organization normally would 

consist of representatives from the Central Military 
95

Commission, the four general departments, service 

headquarters, and the Chinese Communist Party. . . . 

[T]he primary mission of the command would be to 

plan and prepare for joint operations and exercise 

authority over each corps-level service branch . . . assigned to the Joint Theater Command.”54

Finally, as far as doctrine goes, the PLAN’s statements about what it expects future naval campaigns 

will look like seems to be a direct reflection of what 

they observed in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. In 

China’s 2008 Defense White Paper, the PLAN expects 

intense conflict over control of the sea.55 This means 

that the PLAN must strive for control of surface, subsurface, and air. The difficulty the Argentineans faced 

in integrating the different parts of the military to fight 

a comprehensive campaign suggests a Falklands/

Malvinas influence upon Chinese doctrinal thinkers 

when in this same document, the PLAN argues that 

the naval campaign both in projecting power and in 

denying access to an invading force must involve the 

integration of sea, air space, and land operations. The 

PLAN’s emphasis on the importance of high-tech, 

long-range, precision weapons may also be traced to 

the Falklands/Malvinas campaign if also reinforced 

by PLA observations of Operation DESERT STORM 

and the Kosovo Campaign. Despite all of the shortcomings of the Argentinean military, the Argentinean 

Air Force’s successful use of the Exocet missile to sink 

the Sheffield is an immediate example of the power 

and effectiveness of high-tech, long-range, precision 

weaponry on the battlefield.
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Procurement.

Additional evidence that the PLA is applying lessons learned from the Falklands/Malvinas conflict is 

found in the procurement record of the PLA. The most 

striking bit of evidence is that the PLA has consistently been procuring platforms, weapons systems, and 

capabilities that are applicable in an A2/AD context 

and that are directly related to the lessons of the Falklands/Malvinas. For example, according to Ronald 

O’Rourke, 

China reportedly is developing or deploying maritime surveillance and targeting systems that can detect U.S. ships and submarines and provide targeting 

information for Chinese ASBMs and other Chinese 

military units. These systems reportedly include landbased over-the horizon back scatter (OTH-B) radars, 

land-based over-the-horizon surface wave (OTH-SW) 

radars, electro-optical satellites, radar satellites, and 

sea-bed sonar networks.56

Additionally, the lessons taken from the Falklands/Malvinas on the importance of land-based aircraft applied to a maritime scenario seem to have had 

some (reinforcing) effect on Chinese acquisition priorities. O’Rourke points out that “ONI [Office of Naval 

Intelligence] projects that the numbers of land-based 

maritime strike aircraft, carrier-based fighters, and helicopters will almost triple between 2009 and 2020.”57

The Department of Defense (DoD) report to Congress 

on Chinese military power noted the Chinese interest in developing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missles (ASBMs) 

and ASCMs, and Admiral Robert Willard, the U.S. 

Pacific Command (PACOM) commander, stated that 

he believed the Chinese ASBM capability had reached 
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Initial Operating Capability (IOC).58 The procurement 

of such hi-tech, long-range precision weaponry conforms to the value the Chinese originally saw in such 

hi-tech anti-ship weaponry as the Exocet missile during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict.

Both the Falklands/Malvinas and an A2/AD strategy suggest that there is great utility in an effective 

submarine force—especially a diesel submarine force. 

O’Rourke notes that: 

currently the submarine force consists of six nuclear 

[-powered] attack submarines [SSNs], three nuclear 

[-powered] ballistic missile submarines [SSBNs], and 

53 diesel [-electric] attack submarines [SSs]. Over the 

next 10 to 15 years, primarily due to the introduction 

of new diesel-electric and [non-nuclear powered] air 

independent power (AIP) submarines, the force is 

expected to increase incrementally in size to approximately 75 submarines.59

Finally, both the lessons of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict and an A2/AD strategy call for the development of a robust surface combatant force. Again 

O’Rourke’s analysis is pertinent here. 

China since the early 1990s has deployed five new 

classes of indigenously built destroyers, one of which 

is a variation of another. Compared to China’s 14 remaining older Luda (Type 051) class destroyers which 

entered service between 1971 and 1991, these five new 

indigenously built destroyer classes are substantially 

more modern in terms of their hull design, propulsion 

systems, sensors, weapons and electronics. . . . Like 

the older Luda-class destroyers, these new destroyer 

classes are armed with ASCMs.60
An examination of the PLAN’s order of battle also 

suggests that the PLA is thinking beyond the Taiwan 

contingency. Some of the procurement items that have 

recently stood out are the acquisition and the planned 

acquisition of L-class ships (e.g., the landing ship dock 

[LSD], amphibious transport dock [LPD], and landing 

helicopter dock [LHD]).61 While it is tempting to believe that procurement of these amphibious assets is 

a reflection of the steady development of a Taiwancontingency capability, the L-class ship is more suited 

for longer-range expeditionary operations. The procurement of scores of landing craft and Landing Ship 

Tanks (LSTs) makes more operational sense for Taiwan than the procurement of a large deck ship that 

can carry troops, aircraft, and vehicles hundreds of 

miles before off-loading them. It should also be noted 

that the most recent PLAN deployment to the Gulf of 

Aden for counterpiracy escort operations included for 

the first time the Kunlunshan—the PLAN’s current 

LPD.62

L-class ships make sense more for a South China 

Sea or East China Sea dispute than they do for a Taiwan contingency because they are capable of transporting aircraft on their decks—much as aircraft carriers do.63 Air power projected from China during a 

Taiwan contingency need not come from the flight 

decks of ships, but from PLA Air Force (PLAAF) bases 

on the mainland.64 In fact, air cover and air strike operations in a Taiwan context make much more sense 

coming from mainland bases than from the flight 

decks of ships. That is because during war at sea those 

flight decks are much more vulnerable to air attack 

themselves and, of course, the ships that they are on 

are vulnerable to a whole host of threats from submarines, surface combatants, and mines. Therefore, if a 

98
99

military force can help it, it will usually prefer to operate under the cover of air coming from land bases. Of 

course, as naval history attests, countries operating far 

from their shores do not have that luxury and must 

rely on the flight decks of aircraft carriers and other 

aircraft carrying ships to provide protection for their 

expeditionary task force. Flight decks on L-class ships 

are much smaller than those found on aircraft carriers and accommodate fewer aircraft; nonetheless, they 

can still be used to provide air cover and defense of 

the task force for a limited conflict in the South or East 

China Sea65—a lesson the Chinese took away from the 

Falklands/Malvinas. Additionally, L-class ships do 

not have the associated potential political backlash 

that aircraft carriers do in the region. 

Despite the potential backlash, recent Chinese commentaries and statements from high ranking PLA officials suggest that China will soon acquire an aircraft 

carrier and attempt to make it operational.66 The push 

for a carrier, an associated air wing, and the ships to 

protect the carrier, is clearly descended from the lessons the PLA has taken from other navies and their 

campaigns—including the British experience during 

the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. China and just about 

every other navy in existence acknowledge that to operate far from coastal waters requires that the Navy 

in question “bring its protection with them.” At one 

level, that means bringing an L-class ship with aircraft 

deployed on it; but it also likely means bringing an 

aircraft carrier with all of the air and fire power that 

that entails. 

Bringing protection with you also implies a longrange submarine capability—particularly that found 

in nuclear attack submarines. The Chinese have a large 

number of diesel submarines;67 however, one could 
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argue that these would be used almost exclusively for 

a Taiwan contingency. Since they are extremely quiet 

and stealthy but do not have an especially long range, 

diesel subs are exceptionally suited for placement in 

choke points and other strategic locations, where they 

can lie in wait for approaching naval task forces—a 

situation very applicable to a Taiwan contingency.68

The nuclear attack submarines are much more useful at greater distances from China’s shores. The continued utility of long-range attack submarines with 

greater endurance explains why the Chinese continued to put money into a Han class replacement, even 

though diesel submarines—designed to lie in waiting 

in shallow water—are much more relevant to an A2/

AD military strategy. The possible development, then, 

of the Type 095 class nuclear attack submarine speaks 

to the fact that the Chinese may be serious about developing a sustained long-distance attack submarine 

capability.69 Such a capability would play a role similar to the Royal Navy’s use of its submarines to attack 

the surface combatant force of the enemy during the 

Falklands/Malvinas dispute. 

China’s continuing interest in procuring air-to-air 

refueling assets (e.g., the reported purchase of IL-78 

Midas tankers on order from Russia)70 may also be a 

reflection of the lessons the British learned from the 

Falklands/Malvinas conflict. The British found that 

they lacked sufficient aircraft to sustain air cover for 

the Royal Navy task force. Even with the presence of 

an aircraft carrier and with air-to-air refueling allowing 

an air bridge to be formed between Ascension Island 

and the Falklands/Malvinas, the British still lacked 

sufficient air power. Similarly, the Chinese recognize 

that they may lack the air power from L-class ships 

and the one or two carriers that they develop down 
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the road. At present, the PLAAF has in its inventory 

10 H-6U tankers and the PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) 

has in its inventory four such aircraft.71 Supplemental 

airpower could be derived from an aerial refueling 

capability that would extend the legs of PLAAF aircraft operating far from bases on the Mainland or off 

Hainan Island. The development of this capability is, 

as these numbers attest, slow. This suggests that for 

the present the Taiwan contingency remains a higher 

priority than out of area power projection, but that 

could change as the Taiwan contingency becomes remote.

While on the subject of the importance of air power, China’s continual development of its jet aircraft 

program is in part a legacy of the lessons taken from 

the Falklands/Malvinas. No modern military or navy 

can be effective without modern aircraft. Thus, the 

PLAAF and the PLANAF remain embarked on a program of acquisition and development of the J-10, the 

Su-27, and Su-30 to ensure that the PLA has the most 

up to date aircraft that it can afford to buy or build.72

The arrival of China’s most modern logistics and 

supply ships can also be argued to be at least partially 

the result of the lessons from the Falklands/Malvinas. 

Since logistics was a force multiplier for the British and 

an “Achilles Heel” for the Argentineans, the Chinese 

clearly recognize the centrality of logistics to out of 

area operations. The procurement of the newest class 

of comprehensive supply ships over the past half decade is illustrative of this viewpoint.73 Again, like the 

pace of aerial refueling assets, the PLAN’s acquisition 

of underway replenishment ships has been slow. This 

again may be a reflection of the fact that the Taiwan 

contingency remains a higher priority than out of area 

power projection.
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Operations.

The China-watching community has had decades 

to watch the PLA and the PLAN exercising the Taiwan contingency. It should therefore not be surprising 

that many experts on the PLA have amassed evidence 

that Chinese military training is geared toward its 

most important contingency—a Taiwan scenario. But 

is it also the case that that training is based in some 

part on the lessons of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict? David Shambaugh noted that in 1995 and 1996 

the “so-called East Sea (Donghai) exercises increased 

dramatically in scale, involving live-firing from ships, 

tanks, and bombers. Even more notably, in both years, 

the PLA’s Second Artillery introduced a new element 

into the mix: short range ballistic missiles.”74 These 

exercises, which began in 1994, also involved “mock 

amphibious landings and combined air-ground-naval 

operations.”75

Shambaugh also noted the combination of surface 

combatants and tactical aircraft with submarine and 

anti-submarine exercises beginning after 1998, which 

represented another “Falklands-like” evolution. Of 

particular note was the increasing length of both 

the diesel electric and nuclear powered submarines 

during these exercises.76 The combination of surface 

combatants, amphibious operations, ground force operations, and the use of high-tech precision weaponry 

(e.g., ballistic missiles) are vintage lessons from the 

Falklands/Malvinas conflict.

Similarly, Captain (U.S. Navy, Ret.) Bernard Cole 

observed that in 1999 the PLAN’s “naval-aeronautical-antisubmarine” exercise endeavored to practice 

“Command and control of forces ashore, in the air, 

and at sea” and “was exercised by the Fleets’ Naval 

Air Force Command Center.”77 In June 2000, Cole 
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noted, the East Sea exercises emphasized “securing 

beach heads, executing rapid maneuver along front 

lines, rapid establishment of air defenses, and securing logistics in conjunction with the use of antiaircraft 

artillery and landing vessels. Exercise goals included 

making an amphibious assault, ensuring logistics support, and moving inland, all in the face of enemy air 

superiority.”78

Although China has not recently engaged in naval 

combat, its current operations out of area might reflect the lessons of the out of area operations of other 

navies—the Falklands/Malvinas conflict being one of 

them. The importance of civilian merchant shipping 

in support of out of area operations—a lesson directly 

passed down from the Falklands/Malvinas War—

has been largely accepted by the PLAN. The Gulf of 

Aden deployment, the 2002 global circumnavigation 

by a PLAN task force, and port visits and exercises 

with the navies of Southeast Asia and South Asia all 

relied on a comprehensive supply ship that conducted 

underway replenishments, provided food stuffs and 

other consumables to the task force crews, and performed routine medical exams.79

The temporary support and access arrangements 

that the Chinese government has made with the governments of the countries with ports in the Indian 

Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and South China Sea reflect 

the PLAN’s long experience with out of area operations since the early 1970s. However, the importance 

of access to naval facilities and bases was definitely 

reinforced by the British experience in the Falklands/

Malvinas War. In the wake of the PLAN Gulf of Aden 

deployment, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo’s recent interviews and articles80 calling for the establishment of 

some kind of base or facility that could support the 

out of area deployers focused his arguments on the 
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kinds of logistical difficulties such a facility would 

overcome: access to medical care, access to repair and 

other maintenance facilities, a site to load equipment, 

and easing a long and tenuous supply line. Although 

the admiral did not cite the Falklands/Malvinas as a 

supporting example—clearly the Falklands/Malvinas 

case supports the idea that advance basing eases the 

burden and makes possible out of area operations.

The PLAN has also recently conducted “show of 

force” or demonstration exercises in the East China 

and South China Seas that are slight reflections of 

the Falklands/Malvinas campaign. The South China 

Morning Post reported81 that destroyers, frigates, and 

auxiliary ships from the North Sea Fleet passed between Taiwan and the Philippines (the Bashi Strait) to 

conduct large scale exercises in the South China Sea. 

This was followed up by another naval task force from 

the East Sea Fleet comprised of a Sovremenyy guided 

missile destroyer, frigates, and submarines passing 

through Japan’s Miyako Strait to conduct anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises in the Pacific, near to 

Japan. These task forces representing a capability that 

“brings its protection with it” through the presence of 

submarines and guided missile surface combatants as 

part of a single multi-vessel force are obviously lessons the PLAN learned a long time ago from the Falklands/Malvinas campaign about what its navy task 

forces should look like.

CONCLUSION: WHAT’S NEXT FOR THE PLAN?

Given that the PLAN has learned from the Falklands/Malvinas conflict and given that it has applied 

these lessons to what it has procured and how it operates today, what does this suggest for the future operations, activities, and trajectories for the PLAN? As 
105

mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there is a 

very strong analogy between the Falklands/Malvinas 

conflict and the anti-access/area denial operations 

the PLA is contemplating, should a Taiwan contingency arise. We should therefore expect the PLA to 

continue procuring weapon systems, platforms, and 

other capabilities that accord with the lessons of the 

1982 conflict and fit in nicely with an A2/AD strategy. 

Therefore, the continued acquisition of modern diesel-electric submarines, ever improving surface combatants, an effective and operational ASBM and its attendant maritime surveillance capability to effectively 

survey and target ships at sea, as well as additional 

land-based maritime aircraft, can all be expected. The 

Falklands/Malvinas case, however, also provides 

lessons on how to project power over long distances 

to accomplish a nation’s objectives. In the short-run, 

were China to apply its Falkland lessons to its power 

projection operations, it would first most likely negotiate for a more overt and consistent access to facilities 

far from Mainland China’s shores. This would enable 

China to repair its ships at shipyards far from Chinese 

bases; it would allow its personnel access to medical 

care, and it would also permit its forces access to better communication support infrastructure. In short, it 

would go a long way towards helping China with its 

out of area logistical challenges.

Additionally, China will continue to procure replenishment or comprehensive supply ships. This 

will permit the PLAN to operate far from home waters 

and will ensure the PLAN’s ability to operate far from 

home in the absence of a network of bases and facilities. To protect any task force operating far from home 

waters, the Chinese will continue to develop and build 

destroyers and other surface combatants until they 
106

have enough capacity to support missions deemed 

essential by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the 

Central Military Commission (CMC), and the PLA 

General Staff Department (GSD). The Chinese will 

continue to develop and procure air-to-air refueling 

assets in order to permit PLAAF and PLANAF aircraft 

to support Chinese naval forces operating further out 

from China’s shores in such contingencies as a South 

China Sea or East China Sea dispute. 

In the long-run, the PLAN will likely continue to 

develop and procure amphibious forces with a capability to operate out of area and far from China’s 

shores (i.e., large deck amphibious ships). The purposes of such a force would not be meant to apply to 

a Taiwan contingency, but for a long-distance dispute 

in the South China or East China Seas. On the subject 

of the acquisition of new assets, the Chinese are likely 

to have developed or acquired (and made useful by 

the PLAN) an aircraft carrier purportedly for the purpose of meeting a mission in support of a sovereignty 

dispute with other countries in the region. Lastly, if 

the lessons of the Falklands/Malvinas campaign are 

any guide, China will continue to develop and directly procure long-range nuclear powered attack 

submarines that would act in support of out of area 

task forces.

China’s future naval development, in terms of 

doctrine, procurement, and operations, can head in 

many directions as is true for any navy; fortunately, 

it would seem that the Chinese appear to have relied 

very heavily on a single case study as a model for its 

future navy—a single model that seems to apply both 

to a Taiwan contingency and an “Out of Area” power 

projection campaign. One of the unanswered questions regarding China’s naval development is: despite 
107

the evidence that the PLA has learned from the Falklands/Malvinas case, why has it taken the PLAN so 

long to develop these capabilities? Despite the positive trends that this chapter has noted, the pace of 

some of these developments has been relatively slow. 

Of the five new classes of destroyers introduced by the 

PLAN, only one or two have been commissioned for 

each new class. In addition, the PLAN commissioned 

no new destroyers in 2008, 2009, and 2010. Despite 

the importance of underway replenishment ships and 

aerial refueling to Chinese power projection missions, 

the PLA and PLAN orders of battle for these platforms 

remain very modest. The reasoning behind this gradualist approach may lie in higher leadership decisions 

regarding tradeoffs, assignment of higher priorities 

to missions other than out of area power projection, 

and, yes, budget shortfalls. Despite the to-date glacial 

movement of the PLAN toward the development of a 

power projection capability, nonetheless, our observations of PLAN force structure development seem to 

suggest that the PLAN is applying the broader lessons 

of that 1982 naval conflict. It would be prudent here 

in the West to pay closer attention to the Falklands/

Malvinas case.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, 

Problems, and Prospects, Berkeley, CA: University of California 

Press, 2002, pp. 1-6.

2. Lyle Goldstein, “China’s Falklands Lessons,” Survival, Vol. 

50, No. 3, June-July 2008, pp. 65-82.

3. Ibid., p. 66.
108

4. Anti-access and area denial are not Chinese terms. The Chinese tend to describe operations associated with Taiwan and operations related to the prevention of U.S. interference in Chinese 

internal affairs (e.g., Taiwan) in terms of “Near Seas” defense. 

The phrase “Anti-Access/Area Denial”—entirely a U.S. conception—was first introduced in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

The terms are meant to characterize efforts to impede or prevent 

the U.S. military from intervening should China decide to attack 

Taiwan. The basic concept is to take operational steps to prevent 

approaching U.S. Navy carrier strike groups from getting within 

operating ranges of tactical aircraft. It has also been used broadly 

to mean preventing U.S. military forces from operating freely in 

the region without accepting high degrees of risk. For a fuller description and discussion of Anti-Access/Area Denial, see Jan Van 

Tol et al., Air Sea Battle: A point of Departure Operational Concept, 

Washington, DC: Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessment, 

May 2010, footnote 1, p. 1. See also Michael McDevitt, “The PLA 

Navy Anti-Access Role in a Taiwan Contingency” Paper written 

for the 2007 CAPS-RAND-CEIP-NDU Conference on PLA Affairs, November 2007. 

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. “Isn’t calling the islands ‘Malvinas Islands’ Violating International Law?” available from webcache.googleusercontent.com/

search?q=cache:QpOGjZ726NcJ:www.tianya.cn. In interviews with 

at the PRC State Oceanic Administration and the China Society 

of Law of the Sea in September 2010, our interviewees noted that 

such cases as the Falklands/Malvinas conflict could possibly be 

relevant to China’s sovereignty claims. The interviewees refused 

to speculate, however, on exactly how the two cases are similar. 

8. Zhou Ming, “Argentina, England Malvinas Islands Conflict” (The Malvinas Problem), available from news.xinhuanet.com/

ziliao/2007-03/28/content_5906424_2.htm.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.
109

11. Ibid.

12. Pan Pangui, “马岛战争的经验和启示“ (“Experience and 

Insights from the Malvinas Wars”), 军事历史 (Military History), 

January 2001, p. 17.

13. Zhou Ming.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid. For a similar assessment of Argentinean command 

and control, see also Fang Fang, “Kuaisheng Nandaxiyang: Madao 

Zhizhanzhong Kongzhong Liliang Yunyong Fenxi” (“Rapid Victory 

in the South Atlantic: An Analysis of Application of Airpower in 

the Malvinas War—Part 1 of 3”), Guoji Zhanwang (World Outlook), 

May 2006, p. 47.

20. Zhou Ming.

21. Fang Fang, p. 53, as seen in Goldstein, p. 68.

22. Zhou Ming.

23. Ibid.

24. Xie Jingfang and Duan Guangda, eds., “The Union Jack 

Rises Again,” International Famous Campaigns (血溅奇谋: 中外著

名战役实录), Harbin, China: Harbin Publishing House, 1993, pp. 

1224.

25. Ibid. See also Wang Hongguang, ed., Analyses of Classical 

Battles, Beijing, China: Military Science Publishing House, 2009, 

p. 288.
110

26. “England-Argentina Malvinas Conflict: 1982, April 2 to 

June 14,” Wang Hongguang, ed., Analyses of Classical Battles, p. 

288.

27. Xie Jingfang and Duan Guangda, eds., “The Union Jack 

Rises Again,” p. 1225.

28. Ibid., pp. 1226-1227.

29. “England-Argentina Malvinas Conflict: 1982, April 2 to 

June 14,” p. 288.

30. Xie Jingfang and Duan Guangda, eds., pp. 1225.

31. Ibid.

32. “England-Argentina Malvinas Conflict: 1982, April 2 to 

June 14,” p. 297.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Zhou Ming.

36. Ibid.

37. Xie Jingfang and Duan Guangda, eds., p. 1230.

38. Ibid., pp. 1224.

39. Ibid.

40. Zhou Ming.

41. “England-Argentina Malvinas Conflict: 1982, April 2 to 

June 14,” p. 297.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.
111

44. Zhou Ming.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Shambaugh, p. 56. See also David Finkelstein, “China’s 

National Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic 

Guidelines’,” Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell eds., Right 

Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s 

Military, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 2007, pp. 69-140.

49. Jianxiang Bi, “Joint Operations: Developing a New Paradigm,” James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art 

of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, jointly published by Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, and Alexandria, VA: Center for 

Naval Analyses, 2003, p. 64. 

50. Full text: China’s National Defense in 2008, available from 

news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/20/content_10688124_5.htm.

51. Jianxiang Bi, “Joint Operations: Developing a New Paradigm,” James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of 

the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, p. 66-67. 

52. Full text: China’s National Defense in 2008.

53. Mark A. Stokes, “The Chinese Joint Aerospace Campaign 

Strategy, Doctrine and Force Modernization,” James Mulvenon 

and David Finkelstein, eds., p. 237.

54. Ibid., pp. 239-240.

55. Ibid.

56. Ronald O’Rourke, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for 
112

Congress,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

February 2008, p. 22.

57. Ibid., p. 23.

58. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress, Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, 2010, p. 30; Yoichi Kato, “U.S. Commander Says China Aims to Be “Global Military Power,” Asahi 

Shimbun, December 28, 2010, available from www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012270241.html.

59. O’Rourke, p. 21.

60. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

61. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

62. See reporting from Xinhua, July 1, 2010.

63. O’Rourke, p. 26.

64. Ken Allen, “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment,” 

James Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, 

Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1997, pp. 

230-232. 

65. Christopher Weuve, “PLAN CV Initial Thoughts,” Evolving Maritime Roles for Chinese Aerospace Power, Conference paper 

presented at the China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War 

College, Newport, RI, December 10-11, 2008, pp. 1-9.

66. In March 2007, a PLA General speaking to the press at 

the National People’s Congress indicated that the Chinese carrier 

program was underway. That same month, an official of China’s 

Commission of Science and Technology in National Defense 

(COSTIND) stated that China will soon acquire an aircraft carrier 

and the development program was underway. See Nan Li, “What 

Are Required for China to Acquire Aircraft Carriers,” Evolving 

Maritime Roles for Chinese Aerospace Power, pp. 1-2.

67. O’Rourke, pp. 9-14.
113

68. Michael McDevitt, “The Strategy and Operational Context Driving PLA Navy Building,” Kamphausen and Scobell eds., 

Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army, pp. 500-501.

69. Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 24, 2009, available from www.

defence.pk/forums/china-defence/25667-china-publicly-displays-shangclass-ssns.html.

70. Colonel (USAF) Gabe Collins, Mike McGauvran, and 

Lieutenant Colonel (USAF) Tim White, “Chinese Aerial Refueling Development,” Evolving Maritime Roles for Chinese Aerospace 

Power, pp. 8-9. O’Rourke, pp. 9-14.

71. Ibid.

72. Phillip C. Saunders and Erik Quam, “Future Force Structure of the Chinese Air Force,” Kamphausen and Scobell eds., pp. 

392-393.

73. Bernard Cole, “Right Sizing the Navy: How Much Naval 

Force can Beijing Deploy?” Kamphausen and Scobell eds., Right 

Sizing the People’s Liberation Army, p. 532.

74. Shambaugh, p. 100.

75. Ibid., p. 102.

76. Ibid.

77. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters 

the Twenty First Century, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

2001, pp. 130-132.

78. Ibid., p. 130.

79. Andrew Erickson, “Chinese Seapower in Action: the 

Counter-Piracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond,” Paper 

presented at the National Bureau of Asian Research, Strategic 

Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, and Texas A&M 

University’s Bush School Conference, “The PLA at Home and 

Abroad,” Carlisle, PA, September 25-27, 2009, pp. 8-18.
80. “Yin Zhuo: The PLAN Should Build a Long-Term Supply Base in Djibouti,” China Gongying Shang, December 28, 2009, 

available from cn.china.cn/article/n494656,fe393f,d2477_12053.html.

81. Greg Torode, “Exercises off Japan and Taiwan Show PLA’s 

New Prowess; Flotilla Practising off Japan and Taiwan,”South 

China Morning Post, April 18, 2010.

114
115

CHAPTER 4

THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY’S 

SELECTIVE LEARNING: LESSONS OF THE 

IRAN-IRAQ “WAR OF THE CITIES” 

MISSILE DUELS AND USES OF MISSILES 

IN OTHER CONFLICTS

Christopher Twomey

The author wishes to thank Eric Heginbotham, 

David Shlapak, Thomas Christensen, David Lai, Roy 

Kamphausen, Travis Tanner, and Michael Glosny 

who provided invaluable guidance on both conceptual and empirical points. The author also gratefully 

acknowledges the research support of Daniel Alderman, Ginger Blanken, Eben Lindsey, Lyle Morris, and 

Chris Siegel.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter finds that China has “learned” few 

lessons from ballistic missile usage per se in other 

historic cases. Instead, it has engaged in a degree of 

doctrinal innovation that moves well beyond the traditional “terror” attack usages of ballistic missiles.

MAIN ARGUMENT

China has not imported lessons directly from Iranian and Iraqi use of ballistic missiles in the 1980s, 

or Iraqi use in either 1991 or 2003. It has certainly 

examined those cases, and portrays a relatively accurate assessment of the military role they played. That 

said, it does dress up those attacks in typical inflated 
116

language about their political utility for sowing terror and thereby attacking the adversary’s morale. 

Nevertheless, these lessons are not then analytically 

extrapolated to China’s strategic situation. Instead, 

the substantial innovation that China has undertaken 

with regard to its ballistic missile force, and apparently its missile doctrine, moves orthogonally away 

from such brute terror attacks. Thus, precision attacks 

on key nodes of military utility are the core of Chinese 

missile strike strategy. This suggests a degree of innovative doctrinal development. The Chinese appear 

to be extrapolating from American standoff precision 

strike campaigns in the 1990s and 2000s, to be sure, 

but nevertheless adapting these lessons to areas of 

their own relative technology competency.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This analysis raises some operational implications 

and calls for further research as well.

• The flexibility with which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) developed distinct technical 

answers to doctrinal demands is likely to be 

disconcerting for the U.S. military that uses a 

different approach, rendering problematic the 

anticipation of likely future such innovative developments by the PLA.

• China is likely to continue to emphasize and 

diversify the roles for its missile forces beyond 

traditional strategic roles.

• Further examination of the interaction of 

demand-pull of operational needs and the 

supply-push of existing bureaucratic and technical expertise is warranted. This would help 

anticipate future likely directions for emphasis 
117

in deployment of capabilities and development 

of doctrine for the PLA.

INTRODUCTION

Conventionally-armed ballistic missiles (CABMs) 

are an important set of Chinese military capabilities 

today. The question of how China thinks about using 

them is of critical importance for the United States; 

regional partners including Japan, Taiwan, South 

Korea; and others. However, understanding how 

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) sees this issue 

remains more contested than one might expect. This 

chapter will begin a preliminary examination of one 

set of influences on Chinese operational doctrine for 

CABMs: learning from abroad. First, it examines the 

limited lessons that China has drawn from the IranIraq War of 1980-88 and Iraq’s use of CABMs in 1991 

and 2003. Then it turns to a characterization of the 

Second Artillery Force’s (SAF) missile doctrine as best 

as it can be adduced. In so doing, the linkages and distinctions from U.S. precision strike attacks are noted. 

Finally, it concludes with some implications for how 

we understand the sources of doctrinal innovation in 

the Chinese system. 

Clearly, the PLA values CABMs; at the very least, 

the increase in the number of CABMs indicates this. 

According the Pentagon’s Annual Report of Chinese 

Military Power, Beijing has been engaged in rapid 

buildup of short-, and to a lesser extent, medium- and 

intermediate-range missiles. Most prominent of these 

are the DF-11 and -15 missiles that would be used as a 

primary means to threaten and engage in conflict with 

Taiwan in the event of a sharp deterioration of relations. According to the Pentagon’s 2010 report, these 
118

have doubled in number from 2003 to 2007—from 400 

to 800—and grew by nearly the same number of missiles over the next few years, to approximately 1100 

today.1 Other missiles, such as the DF-21, are also important, both as vehicles for anti-ship, anti-satellite, 

or anti-ballistic missile interceptor operations and 

possibly for attacking targets on U.S. military bases in 

Guam and Japan. 

CABMs are widely believed to be at the core of 

China’s strategy to deter or compel Taiwanese behavior. A recent RAND report emphasizes CABMs’ potential utility in a coercive air campaign, for instance.2

Other studies analyze the interaction of missile defenses (MD) against longer-ranged Chinese CABMs.3

And, of course, CABM launches were the culminating 

points in the PLA Nanjing Military Region exercises 

of 1995 and 1996, although the effects of that crisis are 

much contested.4

Beyond its strict military utility, China’s missile 

buildup has important political connotations as well. 

For instance, the growth in missiles is routinely highlighted as an important marker of China’s aggressive 

intentions toward Taiwan, both in the United States 

and Taiwan. Even Taiwanese referenda criticizing 

China’s missile buildup are viewed as problematic in 

Beijing, serving as a political challenge despite lack of 

tangible effects on the military balance. Consequently, 

the missile buildup rates and potential deployment 

locations are offered for consideration as early confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) across 

the Taiwan Strait.5

 All of these emphasize the political role of missiles in the cross-strait relationship that 

transcends narrower military calculations.

Yet our understanding of the potential role that 

CABMs might play, in Beijing’s hands in particular, 
119

but even more generally, is based on a somewhat thin 

historical record.6 The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 provides the most intense example of such weapons being used.7

 The “war of the cities” in the later stages of 

that war began with aerial assaults on urban areas, but 

soon attrition of manned aircraft was found to be too 

costly. Thus, a moderate sized missile duel was carried out in the final years, beginning in 1985. The effect of the entire “war of cities” was relatively modest 

by the standards both of strategic conflict and even the 

more conventional battles in the Iran-Iraq War. Some 

500 Iraqi missiles were launched, but only about 2,000 

Iranians were killed in the campaign.8

 But the campaign had a broader effect than numbers alone show: 

The significance of the assaults was their psychological impact, as they provoked a panic among urban 

dwellers leading to mass exodus from cities such as 

Tehran. The regime had simply lost control of events, 

as it could neither offer assurances to a frightened 

public nor meaningfully retaliate against Iraq’s latest 

act of aggression.9

Similarly, 

From a military point of view, the value of the attacks 

on Iranian population centers, the “war of the cities,” 

has been virtually nil. The only real value of these 

attacks has been their effect on morale. Even an ineffective Iraqi raid on Tehran boosts Iraqi morale—in 

much the same way as the ineffective Doolittle raid 

on Tokyo boosted American morale in early 1942. The 

enemy capital is the preferred target in this kind of exchange.10

(The Iranian arsenal was smaller, with fewer than 

200 missiles launched, causing even fewer casualties.)
120

There are other CABM campaigns one might draw 

upon for learning the relative advantages and disadvantages. Over 3,000 V-1 and -2 rockets were launched 

by Germany against London, United Kingdom (UK); 

Antwerp, Belgium; and other urban targets in the waning days of World War II. Additionally, Hezbollah and 

Hamas have used Katyusha rockets against civilian 

targets in Israel over a sustained period.11 Hezbollah 

was reported to use longer range systems imported 

from Iran in the 2006 war against Israel.12 The 1982 

Lebanon War also saw the use of these shorter-range 

rocket systems. In all these cases, you have standoff 

munitions of somewhat limited accuracy: this is precisely the case for much of China’s CABM arsenal.13

However, the most important other case to consider is the 1991 Gulf War, and to a lesser extent, the 

related 2003 campaigns in the current Iraq War. These 

modern cases also saw strategic use of CABMs both 

against U.S. forces and Israeli and other neighboring 

civilian centers.

Thus, it is worth asking the question, what has 

China learned from these campaigns? Since a similar terror campaign is often regarded as an important element of China’s strategy against Taiwan, it is 

important to look at how these campaigns, the most 

substantial campaigns we have available, are viewed 

in Beijing and Wuhan, home to the Second Artillery 

Force’s Command College. In addition to the question outlined by the editors of this volume regarding 

the observations and lessons drawn by the PLA and 

the implications of those observations and lessons for 

contemporary capabilities and doctrine, in this case 

it is also particularly interesting to ask what lessons 

were not learned that might otherwise have been. This 
121

gives us some ability to assess the relative importance 

of different sources of Chinese doctrine.14

A brief word on scope is warranted. While the IranIraq War represents the largest usage of CABMs by 

both combatants, it is still a fairly narrow case. Thus, 

in contrast to the focus of some other chapters in this 

volume on a single historical case, this chapter will 

broaden its focus. It will consider the PLA’s lessons 

regarding ballistic missile usage against ground targets in a number of cases. However, this chapter does 

not assess the more esoteric—and potentially revolutionary—weapons under development for the DF-21 

platform in particular, such as the anti-ship ballistic 

missile (ASBM)15 or the anti-satellite (ASAT) system16

that China is fielding. (That said, as the conclusion 

suggests, this chapter finds SAF doctrine is influenced 

by bureaucratic factors, and the continued development of DF-21 variants is consistent with that finding.)

While other applications of the DF-21 are not considered in this chapter, what does emerge from an examination of the Chinese literature is the closely associated lessons one might draw from the employment 

of long-range cruise missiles. Similar to CABMs, these 

systems are challenging to defend against and can 

strike rear area targets. Additionally, in most cases, 

as with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are more useful against static than mobile targets. They have been 

used in a wider range of recent conflicts and their inclusion in this study seems appropriate without excessively expanding the chapter’s scope. 

Beijing does not appear to see the launching of 

ballistic missiles against “soft” targets as its preferred 

model. Further, authoritative Chinese doctrinal documents make clear this is not how the PLA plans to use 

such weapons, despite the existence of some positive 
122

historical experience by others.17 Instead, the primary 

driver for Chinese CABM usage seems to be a desire 

to emulate the effects of U.S. air-launched precisionguided munitions systems (cruise missiles and shorter 

ranged systems) using different systems. 

Viewing the Iran-Iraq “War of the Cities” from 

Beijing.

Chinese military authors working on missile doctrine, asymmetric strategies, and strategic coercion 

have examined the Iran-Iraq War. However, the relevance of the lessons appears to be quite limited. The 

propagandistic tone in Chinese writings (i.e., missiles 

as powerful weapons of the weak and less developed 

combatants) colors the historic evaluations, as does an 

emphasis on political morale that is common to Chinese strategic thought. Still, there is little discernable 

carryover from those evaluations to contemporary 

Chinese doctrine. 

In overview, Chinese analysts note that the war exemplified the potential utility of CABMs. Thus: 

From World War II up to today, although Surface to 

Surface tactical ballistic missiles have only been in existence for 50-plus years, their use in the Fourth Middle East War [of 1982], the Iran-Iraq War [of 1980-88], 

and Gulf War [of 1991], has made people appreciate 

their power.18

That article goes on to characterize the Iran-Iraq War 

as a particularly strong example of this phenomenon:

The ‘war of the cities’ began when Iraq used groundto-ground Tactical Ballistic missiles in their primary 

attack on Iran’s capital...close to 10,000 people were 
123

blown up, and 1,000 buildings and structures were 

destroyed. The huge power of the missile war of the 

cities amazed people all over the world.19

Another study noted Iraq’s missile attacks were 

successful in “killing 1,700 Iranians and flattening 

buildings in the process.” It went on to note that 

Iran’s retaliation “was not as effective as Iraqi SCUDB result,” given accuracy issues.20 The attacks were 

regarded as “the most impressive, influential and effective use of missiles ever seen since then [WWII].”21

The Jiefangjun Bao’s précis of the war emphasizes the 

economic costs that these strategic attacks imposed.22

Indeed, earlier CABM campaigns are assessed 

similarly; for instance, the German V-1 and -2 attacks:

During the period between June 1944 and March 

1945, the German military launched a total of 8,090 V1 

rockets and 4,320 V2 rockets at the British capital London and continental Europe. The technology of these 

rockets was rudimentary, and their accuracy was very 

poor. Although they failed to completely change the 

fate of defeat for Germany, the V1 and V2 rockets did 

deliver psychological shocks to the Allied forces and 

badly terrorized the residents.23

A history web page on the Chinese Ministry of Defense web site echoes these conclusions about the coercive utility of the weapons.24

More definitive Chinese sources echo these conclusions but do little to extrapolate them forward to 

contemporary Chinese circumstances. The Science of 

Second Artillery Campaigns (SSAC) is regarded as the 

definitive official statement available to scholars to 

assess how China conceives of the role of its Second 

Artillery Force, the military element responsible for 

all land-based and strategic missiles.25
124

The SSAC notes that a range of limitations prevented a more substantial set of military effects from 

being achieved in the “war of the cities,” but nevertheless, highlights the important political and coercive

successes derived from the campaign.

[In the campaign] several thousand buildings were 

destroyed. Iran also fired 60 “Scud-B” missiles which 

struck more than 20 cities centered around Baghdad. 

It killed and wounded several thousand people. Due 

to almost total destructions of missile warning and 

command control systems during the war, the missile 

forces lacking proper trainings, and many problems 

in target selections and applications of tactics on the 

missile strikes on both sides, they did not fully utilize 

the functions and power of the expensive and modern 

ground-to-ground missiles. However, by whatever element we use to assess, analyze, and judge this “Raids 

against cities” with missiles, it possessed significant 

campaign characteristics. It not only brought both sides 

mentally, economically, and militarily insufferable pressure 

and great losses but also became the catalyst in ending the 

war between Iraq and Iran.26

Thereafter, as will be seen below, SSAC spends 

little time focusing on the use of missiles against cities 

per se, and likewise does not much consider the coercive use of missiles against populations and—thereby—political will. 

Nevertheless, there is some extrapolation of this 

sort of approach to the contemporary era. One analysis from the Jiefangjun Bao evaluates successes in both 

the Iran-Iraq War, and in the U.S. campaign against 

Yugoslavia over Kosovo’s status. It concludes that 

rear area strikes seem to be viable against economic 

infrastructure targets and are able to achieve compellence:
125

In this type of no-contact war, the goal of launching 

air strikes is not just to eliminate the opponent’s effective military strength but to weaken the opponent’s 

integrated national strength through strategic air 

strikes, thereby causing the opponent to basically lose 

its resistance and confrontational ability.27

While that source was also evaluating air power more 

broadly, missile strikes were one component considered.

Still, beyond official channels, there are some 

sources that emphasize the limitations of such coercive strategies aimed at populations. In a glossy publication from the commercial press, World Affairs (世界

知识出版社), a very pessimistic view of the utility of 

such attacks against cities is laid out:

During the Iran-Iraq War, many offensive strategies 

against cities and towns were used, but in actuality, 

this was a tactical mistake in the sense of putting the 

incidental before the fundamental. High ranking officers on both sides seem to delight in comparing themselves to those famous ancient generals, wanting was 

only to dominate a city, but this is only a superficial 

achievement of feeling completely “triumphant” and 

instead ignored the effectiveness of annihilating the 

enemy forces. They did not value concentrating the 

great amount of military superiority to annihilate enemy soldiers and focused on destroying cities. Because 

of this the battle was repeatedly stopped and started, 

creating a stalemate. The stalemate caused the war to 

drag out without a decision, and this situation, besides 

causing enormous consumption on each side, did not 

inflict heavy casualties on the enemy’s strength. Therefore both sides’ military strength remained in relative 

balance, and neither side was able to achieve decisive 

victory.28
126

Beyond the contested utility of a coercive effect 

achieved through missile attacks on urban areas, a 

range of nonauthoritative Chinese sources assert other 

direct implications of the Iran-Iraq war. One recurring, 

if erroneous, theme on internet sites and discussion 

boards is that actual combat operations have created 

greater interest in CABMs. Thus: 

the Iran-Iraq War saved China’s tactical missiles . . . 

providing a few lessons: first, tactical ballistic missiles 

with conventional warheads are useful [up to that 

point], China had not considered that arming these 

with explosives had practical application other than 

intimidation.29

Other discussions on Chinese military web sites suggest the same linkage.30

However, such internet speculation is patently 

inaccurate, illustrating the importance of careful use 

of authoritative Chinese sources and evaluating those 

in the context of other empirically observable forms 

of Chinese behavior, procurement, and policy. To be 

sure, the earliest work on conventionally armed missiles does occur in the 1980s:

Commercial interests served as the primary impetus 

for development of conventional tactical ballistic missiles. . . . During the mid-1980s, Beijing’s senior leadership began to develop options for arming solid fueled 

ballistic missiles with conventional warheads.31

However, the emphasis on conventional missiles 

in the Second Artillery Force’s own arsenal is a relatively recent phenomenon; linking the emphasis on 

CABMs solely to the Iran-Iraq War is simply not correct for several reasons. First, as Kenneth Allen and 
127

Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise note, “it was not until 1998 

that Second Artillery developed the concepts referred 

to in [their chapter] as the ‘conventional missile attack 

campaign’ and compiled its first instructional textbook.”32 Without such doctrine, it would have been 

hard to impute any causal element to a war a decade 

earlier. Moreover, Mark Stokes puts the shift in priority to developments at the end of the 1990s: 

A series of events that occurred between March and 

August 1999 sharpened PRC focus on the United States 

and Taiwan in its strategy and force planning. There is 

a large body of evidence that suggests an important 

high level decision was made in the early to mid-May 

1999 time frame to accelerate key weapons systems 

R&D and production programs. After the initiation of 

the NATO air campaign in March 1999, media reporting suggests the CMC [Central Military Commission] 

lobbied for funding to accelerate several programs, 

including new ballistic missile variants, land attack 

cruise missiles, and other systems.33

Elsewhere he argues, “during annual meetings at 

Beidaihe in August 1999, China’s senior leadership 

decided to accelerate the production and deployment 

of enough ballistic missiles to outfit four short-range 

ballistic missile (SRBM) brigades by 2002.”34 Additionally, the Science of Military Campaigns [战役学] of 

2000 suggests an increase in importance of CABMS.35

Finally, John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue date the shift 

as beginning in 2001.36

As Figure 4-1 shows, the large increase in arsenal 

size also begins to occur around the turn of the century. Surges in 1999-2001 and in 2006-2009 seem consistent across the two data sets. As doctrine and increase 

in numbers of systems occur at the end of the 1990s, 
128

this suggests other key drivers beyond the Iran-Iraq 

“war of the cities” in the development of CABMs.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 

Military Balance, various years; U.S. Department of Defense 

(DoD) Annual Report on Chinese Military Power, various years. 

The DF-11 and -15 systems, those relevant to Taiwan and only 

Taiwan, are included.

Figure 4-1. Chinese SRBMs by Year.

Other Cases Teach More?

It does seem that other cases beyond the Iran-Iraq 

“war of the cities” use of missiles have been more influential in shaping PLA perceptions about the utility 
129

of CABMs. The Iran-Iraq war is not even mentioned 

in the 2006 edition of the Science of Military Campaigns

(战役学) and receives only passing mention, as discussed essentially in its entirety above, in the Science 

of Second Artillery Campaigns. As noted above, the German experience receives occasional commentary, although again, its lessons seem rather limited.

The 1995-96 exercises in the Taiwan Strait likewise 

appear to have had little influence on these debates. 

This may be due to the politically sensitive nature of 

these exercises: since the handling of the crisis is generally viewed as a failure for Beijing, discussion of it 

is likely to be muted. (It is often viewed as a loss for 

Beijing since it provoked a clear signal of American 

support for Taiwan through the deployment of two 

carriers to the region.) Even fairly benign references 

were confined to the Hong Kong PLA-affiliated press, 

such as: the exercises were “intended to show that the 

Chinese communists have the capacity and the mastery to carry out attacks on, and blockade multiple 

targets.” 37 The treatment of the crisis in authoritative 

military internal documents available outside of China is again exceedingly superficial: “In order to strike 

against the expansion of the Taiwan independence 

forces, the PLA organized missile training, launched 

joint campaign exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, and 

effectively suppressed the rampant arrogance of the 

Taiwan independence forces.”38 This is essentially the 

only mention of the Taiwan Strait crisis in the aforementioned PLA National Defense University (NDU) 

report,39 and hardly constitutes strategic analysis.

Similarly, interviews with Chinese analysts by 

Robert Ross emphasize similar broad-brush conclusions by Chinese interlocutors: “missiles may be the 

only weapon China can use to deter Taiwan independence, because it is the only Chinese conventional 
130

weapon that the United States cannot defeat.”40 That 

is far from a detailed assessment of how those missiles 

serve Chinese interests, what they threaten, what they 

can defeat and what that defeat means militarily. It 

is likely, as Ross notes, that such discussions are too 

politically sensitive to be evaluated, contested, and 

debated within the Chinese military system.

However, the Gulf War of 1991 and a few other 

American post-Cold War campaigns do serve as important fodder for PLA and civilian military analysts.41

The two most important implications for the missile 

area — the coercive role of CABMs and the implications of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) for the 

utility of advanced, accurate, conventionally armed 

ballistic missiles — are discussed first.

Coercive Power for the Weak? One theme from Chinese analysis of the Gulf War is the role that CABMs 

served as a weapon of the weak, one of the few tools 

that Iraq had at its fingertips that it could use. 

According to incomplete statistics, in the Gulf War, 

Iraq launched 83 SCUD B missiles against multinational army stations and within Israel. Even though 

this kind of missile has only a 300 meter target precision and some were intercepted by American “Patriot” 

missiles, in the Iraq and multinational army mutual 

resistance process, they still were a huge deterrent....

During the Gulf War, Iraq sustained an early attack by 

the American-led multinational forces, and under conditions whence the Navy forces could not dock, the Air 

Force jumped one by one to safety, and ground forces 

had no choice but to dig holes for cover, the only missile that could hit back was the SCUD missile.42

While such analysis seems to raise many unanswered questions (A huge deterrent to what? What 
131

value was there in “hitting back” at the end of the 

day?), similar assertions were made by others. Researchers at the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Command 

College write such attacks “caused the multinational 

forces and allied countries tremendous psychological 

pressure.”43 Similarly, Lewis and Xue found that: 

Senior PLA officers maintained that a “huge psychological impact on the enemy” would result from even 

a conventional missile attack and that a conventional 

missile force could “deter the outbreak of a conventional local war in a time of peace and contain the 

expansion and escalation of a conventional local war 

after it had broken out.”44

And indeed, within China there is some discussion of 

the role of positive utility for “backward weapons” 

within the Second Artillery units:

Therefore, if the old-type missile forces are ready to 

use the weapons in their hands, train hard to become 

crack troops, tap into their potential in a scientific 

manner, and consistently keep the old armaments in 

perfect operating condition, they can also achieve the 

goal of “fighting and winning” a future war.45

Even here, and consistent with critiques of western 

militaries’ faith in the coercive power of strategic 

bombing, the logic is not laid out precisely.46

This is a lesson that draws directly from the sort of 

assessment of the Gulf War:

From the aforementioned war, we can see that even a 

small country without air or sea superiority, poor and 

weak countries, if they possess [ballistic missiles], can 

still pose a threat to powerful enemy countries. This is 

because in a war, ballistic missiles can attack population centers, industrial bases, and other economic and 
132

political targets, inflicting psychological pressure on 

the opponent and acting as a deterrent. In terms of war 

tactics, you can strike a military’s rear assembly positions, bridge positions, fuel depots, airports, and command/control centers, allowing you to complement or 

even replace aircraft missions. Therefore, large, small, 

strong, weak, rich and poor countries all scramble to 

obtain ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles have turned 

into the modern weapons of the gods.47

While these sorts of arguments are indeed laid out regarding Iraqi use of ballistic missiles, as noted below, 

they find little manifestation in contemporary doctrinal statements from the Second Artillery. 

Threatening to Expand the War through Terror Attacks. A second area of emphasis in Chinese writings 

is the Iraqi attempt to use ballistic missiles to expand 

the U.S.-Iraq War to involve Israel. This is mentioned 

pervasively.48 For instance, an authoritative PLA history concludes: 

These missile attacks by Iraq not only created psychological fear for the people of Saudi Arabia and Israel, 

but also nearly led to a serious crisis which could have 

ruptured the multinational coalition. . . . From a military point of view, the 42 missiles that Iraq fired at 

Israel did not create many casualties, however, their 

political implications were enormous. Iraq’s goal in

firing missiles into Israel was to lure Israel into joining 

the war, to achieve the strategic objective of destroying and dividing the hastily established anti-Iraq coalition.49

Similarly, a TV military affairs news report on Phoenix 

TV updates the same point: It argued that Iran draws 

significant deterrent value from its ballistic missiles 

that could be used against Israel and that China, too, 

benefits from the deterrent value of its force.50
133

Again, one problem here for drawing any such 

positive conclusions for the Chinese is that these attacks, in the end, did not work. Thus, SSAC takes a 

rather defensive tone: 

The missile strikes did not reverse the fate of failure of 

the Iraqis, but it did demonstrate that the strike campaign of missile forces could have its functions in the 

modern high tech warfare. On the contrary, under the 

circumstances that the coalition forces had great superiority . . . the ballistic missile forces fought alone and 

implemented the “Sacred Orders” of Saddam Hussein 

from the beginning to the end. It also had frightened 

the enemy and displayed important status and functions of missile forces’ strike campaign in future high 

tech localized warfare.51

Beyond that, another limitation is that this strategic 

context lacks any direct analogue for China. Drawing 

additional parties in does not have the same implication outside the Middle East; China would certainly 

prefer to contain any conflict (with Taiwan, Japan, or 

others) rather than expand it (to the United States or 

any other regional actor). Thus, this facet of the Middle East experience is simply irrelevant despite being 

frequently mentioned in the Chinese literature. 

Tactical Lessons. Finally, and most promisingly 

from the perspective of this chapter, a few tactical 

lessons are both discussed in the military literature 

and seem to have some focus within Chinese practice. 

First, there is recognition among Chinese writings of 

the value of missile launcher mobility and on survivability more generally. This likely has fed into some of 

Beijing’s emphasis on mobility of its own forces: 

Iraq’s ability to launch its Scud missiles throughout 

the war despite repeated U.S. air strikes to destroy 
134

them gave [Beijing’s] leaders some confidence in the 

survivability of China’s mobile missiles. That confidence in turn motivated the Second Artillery to concentrate ever harder on mobile operations.52

The 2006 edition of the Science of Military Campaigns, 

as well as other scholars of China’s military, echo this 

point.53 The Chinese writings also implicitly recognize 

the challenges these necessary changes (mobility, etc.) 

poses for command and control.54

Second, a related lesson was the need to achieve 

quick launching missiles, given the existent threat of 

air strikes. As discussed below, this concern played 

something of a circular role in shaping Chinese thinking about the utility of CABMs,55 but nevertheless it 

was a driver of one particular element of technical 

development, namely the use of solid fuel propellants. There were other parallel drivers here as well, of 

course: “Thus in 1982, Zhang Aiping, speaking for the 

Central Military Commission at a gathering in Dalian, 

noted that there was a worldwide trend toward solid 

propellant missiles and called for a comprehensive 

development of these rockets in China.”56

Finally, some Chinese analysts traced limitations 

in Iraq’s ability to effectively use its missiles to Iraqi 

military limitations in training:

But Iraq kept piled up a small mountain of common 

types of advanced guided munitions within its barracks up until the war ended. It is just that these advanced munitions didn’t have anyone who knew how 

to use them. When the Iraqis charged enemy lines, 

they were still using hand grenades and Molotov 

cocktails. Why did this happen? Although they had 

much advanced equipment, they lacked the officers 

and soldiers trained to use it.57
135

The Jiefangjun Bao article goes on to note that China 

needed to do better. There is certainly substantial emphasis on improving the quality of training and technical capacity throughout the Second Artillery Force 

today.58

A strategic lesson of the importance of “seizing 

the initiative” also flows from the Gulf War in China’s 

writings.59 However, this is a broad lesson regarding 

modern warfare and is not drawn to the Gulf War 

missile campaign per se.

Core Tenets of Second Artillery Doctrine Are 

Different and Innovative. 

The above “lessons learned” are rather thin gruel. 

The core elements of Chinese missile strategy today 

are, at least at first blush: precision attack, joint attack, 

and the missile’s role in suppressing enemy strike capabilities. These components are essentially missing 

from the historic record and found nowhere in the 

discussion of historic ballistic missile usage described 

above. Nevertheless, they seem central to China’s missile strategy today. This suggests that genuine internal innovation is a more important driver of doctrinal 

thinking in the PLA in this area.

As laid out by the SSAC, the goals of the missile 

force are: “penetrating the enemy’s air defense system, striking the enemy’s in-depth targets, and seizing 

air and naval dominance in future local wars under 

informationized conditions.”60 The 2006 edition of 

Zhanyi Xue (Science of Campaigns) writes of the role of 

missiles in attacking airfields and ports through “missile firepower blockades.61 Civilian analysts in China 

explicitly link this to Taiwan:
136

But, if the fighting started across the Taiwan Straits, 

these planes will never get a chance to take off. Considering the narrowness of Taiwan Straits and the firepower from the Chinese mainland, their airports are 

so vulnerable. All airports will be destroyed in the first 

attack. Even if some of them can take off, they can’t 

land.62

In order to achieve this, precision is key. This is 

clearly recognized within the Second Artillery. Again, 

SSAC makes the point forcefully:

Due to the transition from the industrial era to the information era, operational measures also start to develop toward the direction of large-scale operations to 

long-range precision operations. Precision operations 

are the objective requirements of the intense development of military technology and weapons and equipment. It is also the developmental trend of Second 

Artillery campaign operations.63

Similarly, in the PLA NDU’s internal military text, 

Intimidation Warfare, the study’s editorial board concludes the entire study with a section on the “rise of 

long range precision strike” in the final chapter on 

“Developing Trends in Military Deterrence using 

Missile Forces.”64 The point is made widely across the 

military literature.65

To emphasize the point, precision—or lack thereof—is rarely mentioned as an important limitation in 

the earlier ballistic missile campaigns (in World War 

II and Iran-Iraq, or even the Gulf War).66 What is emphasized, repeatedly, is the importance of accuracy 

for cruise missile strikes: 

Over the past 10 years, cruise missiles have been used 

many times in battle, acting as a first strike weapon 
137

that startles the enemy that has achieved many military successes. The below examples highlight their use 

in battle: During the Gulf War, America launched a total of 323 cruise missiles. On January 17, 1993, America 

launched 45 Tomahawk missiles from destroyers and 

cruisers . . . aimed toward 7 Iraqi nuclear development 

facilities in Baghdad. On June 27, America launched 

23 Tomahawk missiles from destroyers, destroying 

Iraq’s intelligence headquarters. On September 10, 

1995, America launched 13 Tomahawk missiles from 

cruisers in the Adriatic Sea, destroying Serbian air defense radar, communication and command centers. . . . 

[5 additional similar examples are also listed].67

Beyond that, precision is regarded as the way of 

the future heading into the 21st century, and this is directly applied to the needs of China’s ballistic missile 

forces at all levels.68

Another aspect addressed is the issue of the missiles’ ability to penetrate tough air defense environments:

The PLA’s conventional missiles will be used exclusively against the enemy’s key military targets which 

the weapons of other services cannot reach. These 

targets include the communications hubs, weapons 

delivery platforms, and most practically, the aircraft 

carrier battle groups. Since these systems are under 

heavy protection, the demand for the conventional 

missiles is thus very high. Moreover, how to use these 

missiles is a matter of military art in solving the optimum timing and smart selection of targets.69

Clearly, missile defenses complicate this, leading to an 

emphasis on ensuring the penetrability of warheads.70

Closely related, there is an emphasis in Chinese 

writings on a new form of “noncontact warfare”: 
138

“Noncontact warfare will become the main style of air 

warfare for strong countries.”71 This depends on the 

role of precision (e.g., see the passages above), but also 

emphasizes long-range, stand-off attack. Thus, cruise 

missiles are seen as a useful means of attacking such 

air defense systems.72

Joint operations receive increasing focus in contemporary Chinese military affairs, and these two 

find little emphasis in the retelling of foreign countries’ military experience with CABMs. The point here 

is that neither is the existence of joint and integrated 

operations trumpeted in assessing successful CABMs 

operations elsewhere historically, nor is their absence 

noted as a central cause of failure. Instead, they go unmentioned. But clearly, the role of integrating Second 

Artillery campaigns with the rest of China’s military is 

an emphasis today.73

A final area worth mentioning is that the Chinese 

believe CABMs and long range cruise missiles give 

China an escalatory option short of nuclear weapons 

use, which would both be of limited credibility and 

would violate no-first-use rhetoric. 

One of the uses of conventional cruise missiles in 

long-range ground attacks is to attack the enemy targets that are far inland, which may help postpone or 

avoid using nuclear weapons in battle, thereby raising 

the nuclear threshold. Cruise missiles have the ability 

to intimidate as well as yield strategic advantages in 

battle. They have the ability to target most depths of 

targets, sometimes even having the ability to cover all 

depths of the enemy on the battlefield. The objective of 

cruise missile strategy is similar to nuclear strategy, in 

that when a battle starts, the target will be decapitation 

of the head organs of war, missile bases and economic 

centers, etc, and not the enemy army itself.74
139

A similar view about the utility of “long-range deterrent based missiles” is expressed by other Chinese 

authors at official research centers.75 Lewis and Xue 

highlight a similar logic:

Based on a review of [high tech] wars in the 1990s, 

senior PLA officers concluded that “strategic missiles had not played their predicted deterrent role in 

local wars,” and the burning question for them was 

how to prevent or conduct a high-tech war. After 

investigating the outcome of recent armed conflicts, 

they understood that revolutionary increases in the 

destructive power and operating ranges of modern 

air-delivered conventional weapons could cripple an 

adversary’s command-and-control system and destroy its war making potential. . . . However, China’s 

plans for a high-tech local war contained a major flaw, 

the failed modernization of the PLA Air Force. . . . Despite a guiding principle that calls for air dominance, 

the PLAAF falls far short of its implementation even 

on its own territory. For the PLA, therefore, the only 

alternative is to adapt its strategic missiles to fight a 

conventional war. Caught between the doctrine and 

reality, the CMC has been forced to bet on the shortand medium-range missiles of the Second Artillery to 

fight and win a high-tech local war.76

The logic here is reminiscent of the recent U.S. emphasis on prompt global strike as providing additional 

options in dealing with “rogue states.”77

Thus, the key elements in China’s missile strategy 

today find little linkage to the main global experiences 

with such weapons. Instead, they represent something 

far more worrisome to Beijing’s potential competitors: 

indigenous innovation and adaptation.
140

Sketching Implications for Understanding China 

and for U.S. Policy. 

Given the paucity of data regarding the nature of 

doctrinal development in a military that lacks basic 

transparency, one must be modest in drawing conclusions. However, the tentative end points here are interesting and do raise important questions about the 

nature of doctrinal innovation. 

In this case, thus, Chinese doctrinal development 

seems less affected by the direct lessons learned from 

similar militaries’ ballistic missile usage patterns than 

from an extrapolation lessons from other military capabilities and an adaptation of them to areas where 

China has traditionally excelled in technology development. China has also adapted such lessons to its 

unique strategic environment. Rather than drawing 

on “terroristic” usage of ballistic missile campaigns 

in the 1980s and 1990s to inform the development 

of Chinese CABMs, Beijing looked elsewhere. That 

China studied and learned from American military 

interventions in the 1990s and 2000s in general is not 

contentious. What is interesting, however, is that Beijing appeared to adapt seemingly unrelated aspects 

of American lessons learned to Chinese strategic contingencies. One might infer that Beijing recognized it 

would be a decade or two before it was able to control 

the airspace over Taiwan to engage in an Americanstyle coercive precision strike strategic campaign. This 

appears to have led China to move its missile force 

in the direction of serving that precision strike role 

in a way its air force will be unable to do for many 

years. This seems a deliberate choice to invest heavily in accurate guidance systems for precision-guided 
141

munitions with Chinese characteristics: Beijing is using expensive missiles to deliver its PGMs rather than 

cheaper guided warheads launched from reusable 

strike aircraft.

Beyond the strategic rationales for this shift toward a precision missile strike force, bureaucratic and 

organizational sources of doctrine may be important 

factors.78 Lewis and Xue highlight a number of related 

dynamics in the case of the Second Artillery: reforms 

in the nature of science and technology development 

in the Second Artillery Force, a “budgetary bonanza,” 

and domestic political changes.79 Clearly, the lessons 

of U.S. military campaigns in the air delivery of PGMs 

are closely related to the Chinese innovations on the 

missile side. Disentangling the demand-pull of military expediency and supply-push of organizational 

and political options would be of great value for anticipating future developments in China’s military. 

Given that China’s missile force—both cruise and ballistic—has long been among the most advanced technologies fielded in China, it is not surprising that the 

PLA chose to take advantage of these technologies to 

respond to a new operational goal: precision strike. 

(Similarly, it is not surprising, through this lens, to 

find that when faced with an operational goal of holding at risk American carriers, China would again turn 

to missiles in its nascent anti-ship ballistic missile system.)

These multiple sources of causality suggest further 

examination of the interaction of demand/pull of operational needs and the supply/push of existing bureaucratic and technical expertise is warranted. This 

would help anticipate future likely directions for emphasis in deployment of capabilities and development 

of doctrine for the PLA. 
142

Additionally, this analysis suggests that China 

is likely to continue to emphasize and diversify the 

roles for its missile forces. To some extent, there is a 

sound military rationale for this.80 Nevertheless, China is likely to continue to rely on this area above and 

beyond that necessity. Even in cases where China’s 

missiles might not be the optimal weapon, we should 

expect an over-reliance on such systems. 

Most generally, this chapter also makes clear that 

the flexibility with which the PLA developed distinct 

technical answers to doctrinal demands is disconcerting for the U.S. military, which is often the explicit enemy of such development. While constrained in some 

dimensions, the PLA is displaying a degree of flexibility in innovation that is worthy of some admiration. 

While further examination of this process of innovation is challenging given the general opacity in the 

Chinese system and the high degree of classification 

of such issues in most countries; nonetheless, comparative study of Chinese doctrinal innovation in other 

areas might deepen our understanding of this process.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report on the 

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China: Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization 

Act,” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 28, 2003; 

“Military Power of the People’s Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress,” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 

23, 2006; Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Annual 

Report to Congress,” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 

August 16, 2010.

2. David A. Shlapak et. al., A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute, Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND, 2009.
143

3. Thomas J. Culora, “The Strategic Implications of Obscurants,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2010; and Marshall Hoyler, “China’s Antiaccess’ Ballistic Missiles and US Active Defense,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 4, 2010, pp. 

84-104.

4. Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: 

Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security, 

Vol. 25, No. 2, 2000, pp. 87-123; and Arthur Ding, “The Lessons 

of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Developing a New Strategy 

Toward the United States and Taiwan,” Laurie Burkitt, Andrew 

Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of History: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003.

5. For discussion of the state of play in such confidence and 

security building measures (CSBM) discussions, see Bonnie S. 

Glaser, “Building Trust across the Taiwan Strait: A Role for Military Confidence-building Measures,” A Report of the CSIS Freeman 

Chair in China Studies, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, January 2010.

6. One attempt to assess the utility of missile strikes in a Taiwan scenario can be found in Yitzhak Shichor, “Missile Myths: 

China’s Threat to Taiwan in a Comparative Perspective,” CAPS 

Papers, No. 45, 2008.

7. For a good overview of the war, including its diplomatic 

elements, see Ray Takeyh, “The Iran-Iraq War: A Reassessment,”

The Middle East Journal, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2010, pp. 365-83. For an 

earlier, more limitary focused assessment, see David Segal, “The 

Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 

5, 1988, pp. 946-963.

8. Takeyh, “The Iran-Iraq War.”

9. Ibid., p. 380.

10. Segal, “The Iran-Iraq War,” p. 598. 
144

11. While the Katyushas are of very short range, more properly considered rockets than missiles, given the condensed strategic geography of Israel and the surrounding combatants, they 

play a similar role to the longer ranged systems in more expansive 

terrain.

12. For a good summary of the range of possible systems, 

see BBC, “Hezbollah’s rocket force,” July 18 2006, available from 

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5187974.stm.

13. Note that the technology level varies considerably between a Katyusha and a DF-21D variant. Nevertheless, the bulk 

of China’s arsenal is not that advanced system, and instead serves 

a role similar to many of those earlier systems.

14. Thus, this chapter, and the broader project, speaks to the 

debates raised in an earlier generation of military affairs theorists 

who asked: What are the sources of military doctrine? Barry R. 

Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany 

Between the World Wars, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.

15. See Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “On the Verge 

of a Game-Changer,” USNI Proceedings 135, No. 5, 2009; and Craig 

Hooper and Christopher Albon, “Get Off the Fainting Couch,”

USNI Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 4, 2010.

16. See the three articles in China Security’s special issue regarding arms races in space: “China’s ASAT Test and Space Deterrence,” China Security, No. 5, 2007.

17. See discussion in final section of this chapter.

18. Hou Yunli (侯云礼), “陆军地面战的’杀手锏’” (“Surface 

War’s Assassin’s Mace”), PLA Daily, August 22, 2001.

19. Ibid. The casualties claimed in this article are excessive 

relative to most accepted Western sources.

20. Lian Lujun (连鲁军), “波斯长矛: 伊朗流行弹道导弹家族“ 

(“Iran’s Shooting Star Clan of Ballistic Missile”), 国际展望 (World 

Outlook), No. 518, June, 2005. World Outlook is published by the 

Shanghai Institute of International Studies, which is associated 
145

(from afar, but certainly administratively linked) with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

21. Zhou Yi (周义), Wang Zhongyi (王忠义), and Wang Ziyan 

(王自焰), “从飞毛腿到蜘蛛B” (“From ‘Scud’ to ‘Spider B’”), 军事

装备 (Military Equipment), Issue 1, 2004. 

22. Zhong Jing (仲晶), “两伊战争“ (“Iran-Iraq War”), PLA Daily, January 17, 2001.

23. Li Yuankui, ed., 高技术与现代战争 (High Tech and Modern Warfare), Beijing, China: Junshi Yiwen Chubanshe, January 

1998, Open Source Center, CPP20061220320004.

24. Nie Yun (聂云), “看美国人怎么抢战利品“ (“See How 

Americans Fight for War Spoils”), 中国国防报 (China National 

Defense), available from www.mod.gov.cn/hist/2009-07/17/content_4004941.htm.

25. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (SSAC) has a restricted circulation within China, but is publicly available elsewhere in Asia and the United States. It is apparently used to guide 

Chinese training on these and related issues.

26. 第二炮兵战役学 (The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns), 

Beijing, China: PLA Publishing House, 2004, pp. 49-50. Emphasis 

added.

27. Xu Sining, “Analysis on New Characteristics of Rear Counter-Air-Strike Operations,” PLA Daily (Internet Version), June 19, 

2001, p. 6, Trans. by Open Source Center, CPP20010619000052.

28. 北京大陆桥文化传媒 (Beijing Continental Bridge Cultural 

Media), “中东战火” (“War in the Middle East”), Beijing, China: 

世界知识出版社 (World Affairs Press), 2004, p. 223.

29. See essay entitled “中国战术弹道导弹的一些情况“ (“The 

Status of Chinese Guided Missile Tactics”), available from a number of military bulletin boards. A clean copy can be found at www.

cnread.net/CNREAD1/jszl/y/yiming/zglj/122.htm. 
146

30. For instance, see essay entitled “两场战争与中国二炮的 ‘核

常兼备’” (“The Two Wars and China’s Second Artillery’s ‘Nuclear and Convention Preparedness’”), available from www.360doc.

com/content/09/1017/14/88979_7410637.shtml. 

31. Mark Stokes, “The People’s Liberation Army and China’s 

Space and Missile Development: Lessons From the Past and Prospects for the Future,” Burkitt, Scobell, and Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of History, p. 212. Stokes draws on a wide range of published 

Chinese sources to come to this conclusion, including a range of 

official materials.

32. Kenneth Allen and Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms,” James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., China’s Revolution in Doctrinal 

Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army, Washington, DC: CNA Corporation, December, 

2005, p. 163. Note that if the debates above are correct, it is both interesting and disturbing that the political guidance to emphasize 

such strategy succeeded the development of doctrine rather than 

the other way around.

33. Stokes, “The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Space 

and Missile Development,” pp. 215-216.

34. Mark Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age 

of Global Missile Defense: Challenges and Responses,” Andrew 

Scobell and Larry Wortzel, eds., China’s Growing Military Power, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2002, p. 114. 

35. See Chapter 14 in particular. Note this is an internally circulated document, suggesting it is more authoritative.

36. John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue, Imagined Enemies: China 

Prepares for Uncertain War, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 

Press, 2006, p. 311, note 83. 

37. Huang Tung, “M-Series Missiles and New Navy Equipment—New Weapons in Taiwan Strait Exercises,” Kuang Chiao 

Ching, April 16, 1996, trans. by OSC, FTS19960416000022.
147

38. Zhao Xijin (赵锡君), 摄战: 导弹威慑纵横谈 (Intimidation 

Warfare: A Comprehensive Discussion on Missile Deterrence), Beijing, 

China: NDU Press, 2003, p. 166. 

39. The other mention is no more analytic: 

Determination in applying military deterrence by missile 

force is the most important factor in the power of deterrence. . . . It is built on the basis of objective strength, 

and also on the degree of self-confidence in applying 

that strength. . . . [For another example] when Taiwan 

authorities vainly attempted to proclaim “Taiwan’s Independence” in 1995 and 1996, the Chinese government 

conducted test launches of missiles to the Taiwan Straits 

to defeat the strength of ‘Taiwan Independence’.

Ibid., p. 253. 

40. Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: 

Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security, 

Vol. 25, No. 2, 2000, p. 121.

41. See the other papers in this volume, in particular that by 

Dean Cheng, for an overview of some of these.

42. Hou Yunli (侯云礼), “陆军地面战的’杀手锏’: 21世纪的地地

战役战术弹道导弹 “ (“The Army’s Surface War’s Assassin’s Mace: 

21 Century Field Campaign Tactical Ballistic Missile”),中国军网

(chinamil.com.cn), June 18, 2008.

43. Zhang Jian (章俭) and Guan Youxun (管有勋), eds., 15场

空中战争 (15 Air Wars), Beijing, China: Liberation Army Press, p. 

262.

44. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, 269. 

45. “Missile Brigade Commander On How to Win A War 

From An Inferior Position,” Huojianbing Bao (Rocket Forces News) 

in Chinese, 07 Jul 2001, CPP20011126000202.

46. For one take on this, see Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air 

Power and Coercion in War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 

1996. 
148

47. Li Chenglong (黎成龙), “现代武库中的佼佼者—弹道导弹” 

(“Leader in the modern arsenal—ballistic missiles”), PLA Daily, 

November 20, 1995.

48. In addition to the below, see SSAC, pp. 51-52; 世界传奇, 

中东战火 (War in the Middle East), Beijing, China: 世界知识出版

社 (World Affairs Press), 2005, pp. 234-235; and Yang Xuhua, 

Xin Zhan Ce, Psychological Warfare Strategy, Beijing, China: National Defense University Press, 2004, Open Source Center, 

CPP20100729658001001, pp. 14, 33, 94.

49. 军事科学院军事历史研究部 (Military History Research 

Department, Academy of Military Science), 海湾战争全史 (The 

Complete History of the Gulf War), Beijing, China: PLA Press, 2000, 

pp. 319-320.

50. See video clip from Phoenix TV available from v.ifeng.com/

mil/200902/ea41bb1c-f5f5-4232-8796-ec1600fcbf55.shtml.

51. SSAC, p. 52.

52. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Palo Alto, 

CA: Stanford University Press, 1994, p. 190.

53. Zhanyi Xue, p. 178; You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, New 

York: I.B. Tauris, 1999, p. 88. 

54. Allen and Kivlehan-Wise, p. 166.

55. See Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, p. 243.

56. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, 187. 

57. Lu Chen (鲁晨),“从一场‘另类战争’说起 “ (“Perspective from A Different Type of War”), PLA Daily, May 24, 2003.

58. See Second Artillery Force chapter in Lewis and Xue, 

Imagined Enemies. 

59. See both Chapter 12 in SSAC, which emphasizes the role 

of missile forces in doing so, and Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, p. 42. 
149

60. SSAC, p. 318.

61. Ibid., pp. 94, 303.

62. “PRC Expert Tells Global Times: Taiwan’s Military Strategy Naïve and Dangerous,” Global Times Online, February 4, 2010, 

CPP20100205722007.

63. SSAC, p. 84.

64. Zhao (赵), 摄战 (Intimidation Warfare), Beijing, China: 

PLA Publishing House, 2005, p. 244ff.

65. Cui Jicheng (崔继承), Cao Xueyi ( 曹学义), and Ding Jun 

(丁军), “精确制导武器新发展“ (“New Developments in Precision 

Guided Weapons”), PLA Daily, November 27 , 2002; Zhou Liang (

周梁), Jiang Dong (姜东), and Zhang Limin (张利民), “导弹智能化

新趋势“ (“New Trends in Smarter Guided Missiles”), PLA Daily, 

July 17, 2002; Zhan Haoming (詹皓名), “陆战火龙“ (“Fiery Dragon 

of Ground War”), 国际展望 (World Outlook), Vol. 16, 2000, p. 42; 

Hou Yunli (侯云礼), “陆军地面战的’杀手锏’: 21世纪的地地战役

战术弹道导弹“ (“The Army’s Surface War’s Assassin’s Mace: 21 

Century Field Campaign Tactical Ballistic Missile”).

66. For an exception, although not one from a particularly authoritative source, see Zhou Yi (周义), Wang Zhongyi (王忠义), 

and Wang Ziyan (王自焰).

67. Yuan Jun (袁俊), “国外巡航导弹防御的发展动态“ (“The 

Development and Cruise Missile Defense in Foreign Countries”), 

中国航天 (Aerospace China), March, 2000. Aerospace China is licensed by the PRC Ministry of Aerospace, and Yuan Jun, the author, is an analyst at its China Aviation Combined Technology 

Institute in Beijing.

68. Xu Hong (徐宏) and Li Wei (李伟), “21世界战略导弹是

啥样?”(“What Will Strategic Missiles Look Like in the 21st Century?”), 环球军事 (Global Military), Vol. 5, 2001. Global Military is 

published by the PLA Press in Beijing. 

69. Quoting a 1997 PLA National Defense University (NDU)

report, You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, p. 99. 
150

70. Hou Yunli (侯云礼), “陆军地面战的’杀手锏’: 21世纪的

地地战役战术弹道导弹“ (“The Army’s Surface War’s Assassin’s 

Mace: 21 Century Field Campaign Tactical Ballistic Missile”).

71. 军事科学院军事历史研究部 (History Research Department, AMS), 海湾战争全史 (A Comprehensive History of Gulf 

War I), p. 337.

72. Yuan Jun (袁俊), “国外巡航导弹技术发展综述“ (“Summary of Cruise Missile Technology in Foreign Countries”), 航空兵

器 (Aviation Weaponry), Vol. 6, 2000. The military-affiliated China 

Aviation Missile Research Institute publishes Aviation Weaponry.

73. SSAC, p. 72. Also see Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, pp. 

134, 137, 200-201, 262; and Allen and Kivlehan-Wise, “Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal Reforms, p. 166. 

74. Yuan Jun (袁俊), “现代巡航导弹的威胁特点及其对作战的

影响“ (“Modern Cruise Missiles’ Specific Effects on Coercion and 

Operations”), 中国航天 (Aerospace China), January 1999. 

75. Qu Dongcai (曲东才) and Zhou Shengming (周胜明), “战

争中的开路急先锋: 讯航道” (“The Vanguard of Battle: The Cruise 

Missile”),中国航天 (Aerospace China), July 2000. 

76. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, p. 212. Interestingly, 

later, the two authors turn this argument on its head. Above, the 

weakness of the air force is a reason to develop conventional ballistic missiles. But subsequently, Lewis and Xue note: 

the CMC [Central Military Commission] would prefer to 

threaten or “blockade” Taiwan by the use of missiles fired 

in measured numbers close to but not on the island itself. 

PLA generals hold that for such a calculated demonstration to force to work, the missile bases would have to be 

protected. That military requirement in turn would make 

the PLAAF [People’s Liberation Army Air Force] Taipei’s 

first target. If Taiwan’s planes could easily destroy the air 

based protecting China’s missile bases, the missile forces 

would face the fearsome use-it-or-lose it predicament. . . .

Ibid., p. 243.
151

77. As well as time sensitive terrorist targets. On the potential 

here, see Bruce M. Sugden, “Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” International Security, 

Vol. 34, No. 1, 2009, pp. 113-146.

78. Christopher P. Twomey, The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations, Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 2010. 

79. Lewis and Xue, Imagined Enemies, pp. 179-181. 

80. Again, this author is persuaded by the cost benefit and 

strategic calculations in a number of studies suggesting offensive 

missiles have advantages over missile defenses. Culora, “The 

Strategic Implications of Obscurants”; and Hoyler “China’s ‘Antiaccess’ Ballistic Missiles and US Active Defense.” For a broader 

assessment of these issues, see Paul Bracken, “Technology and the 

Military Face of Asian Security,” Sheldon Simon, ed., The Many 

Faces of Asian Security, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001.

153

CHAPTER 5

CHINESE LESSONS FROM THE GULF WARS

Dean Cheng

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter analyzes Chinese military writings 

about U.S. wars with Iraq to determine what possible 

lessons the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

may have learned from them.

MAIN ARGUMENT

PLA writings suggest that these two wars have 

been very influential, affecting Chinese tactical, operational, and strategic thinking. Not only have these 

wars affected Chinese military doctrine, promoting 

greater jointness, but they have also underscored the 

impact of information technology. This is reflected not 

only in an emphasis on increasing access to information within all aspects of Chinese military operations 

(the “informationalization” of the PLA), but also has 

led to renewed emphasis on political warfare, as embodied in the concepts of psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. 

POLICY IMPLICATIONS 

The PLA, given its lack of combat experience, 

seems to be trying to compensate through the close 

study and analysis of other nations’ wars—especially 

those of the United States. Especially influential have 

been the two Gulf Wars between the United States 

and Iraq. 
154

PLA analysis of American military experience includes examination of the tactical, operational, and 

strategic levels of war. The resulting lessons learned 

affect the full range of Chinese military activities, including not only weapons acquisition, but doctrinal 

development and training. As important, it is leading 

Chinese military leaders to rethink their strategic approach to conflict. 

PLA writings suggest that they consider political 

support from both elites and the public to be a key 

strategic center of gravity. These writings also suggest 

that the Chinese are likely undertaking measures in 

peacetime to influence domestic, American, and thirdparty elite and broader perceptions. This includes 

trying to create a legal environment that will be supportive of Chinese positions in the event of conflict, as 

well as influencing public opinion through media and 

public diplomacy.

INTRODUCTION

In thinking about the lessons the People’s Republic 

of China (PRC), and especially the PLA, are likely to 

have derived from other nations’ major wars, perhaps 

two of the most influential wars are those conducted 

by the United States in the Middle East: Operation 

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1991 and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. 

These two wars, set almost exactly 10 years apart, 

provided indications of what war in the post-Cold 

War environment, unconstrained by the superpower 

stand-off, might entail. They marked how the leading military power, the United States, fought what the 

Chinese term “local wars,” and showcased modern 

military technology, not only in terms of long-range, 
155

precision strike weapons, but also command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Indeed, the two 

wars highlighted for the PLA the evolving role of information, not only at the tactical level, but also at the 

operational and strategic levels. 

In examining the two wars, there is a wide range 

of Chinese discussions of the potential lessons that 

might be derived from each of these wars. To reduce 

this problem to manageable size, this chapter will focus on the high-intensity phase of operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, lasting from March to April 

2003 (sometimes termed “the march to Baghdad” in 

American writings). This will allow for some degree 

of comparability, since the problems of counterinsurgency are very different from those of high-intensity 

conflict; consequently, potential lessons learned are 

also likely to be less comparable with each other. 

This chapter will examine these two major American wars in the Middle East and what lessons Chinese 

analyses would seem to have derived from these wars. 

It will begin with a brief survey of the two wars. It 

will then discuss some of the lessons that the Chinese 

military seems to have derived from both wars. It will 

then focus what the Chinese may have learned from 

the second Gulf War (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), 

focusing on those lessons relating to the “three warfares.” 

Background: Two Clashes Between America and 

Iraq1

The first Gulf War began after Iraq invaded its 

neighbor, Kuwait, on August 2, 1990. Iraq’s forces 

rapidly overwhelmed the small Kuwaiti military, 
156

and Iraqi president Saddam Hussein announced the 

incorporation of Kuwait into Iraq. On August 7, U.S. 

President George H. W. Bush decided that the Iraqi invasion required a U.S. response, and U.S. forces began 

to deploy to Saudi Arabia the next day. 

Meanwhile, a series of 12 United Nations Security 

Council (UNSC) resolutions were passed, beginning 

on August 2 (UNSC Resolution 660), condemning the 

Iraqi invasion and culminating with UNSC Resolution 678, passed on November 29, which authorized 

all necessary means to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.2

With Iraq refusing to withdraw from Kuwait, the 

U.S.-led coalition commenced hostilities on January 

17, 1991. After 38 days of aerial bombardment, Coalition ground forces (dominated by American units) 

began the ground offensive on February 24, 1991. After approximately 100 hours of ground combat, Iraq 

agreed to a cease-fire on February 27. 

For the United States, victory was achieved at very 

low cost. U.S. casualties amounted to only 148 killed 

in action.3

 By contrast, most of the Iraqi forces that had 

been in Kuwait were shattered. Only five to seven of 

the 43 Iraqi divisions were still capable of offensive 

actions.4

 Iraqi casualties in the 6-week air and ground 

war were proportionately higher than those suffered 

in the Iran-Iraq War, which had lasted 464 weeks.5

According to the PLA Encyclopedia, the first Gulf 

War showed the importance of: 

• Securing dominance of the electromagnetic 

spectrum.

• Aerial attacks as a strategic factor.

• Deception, coordinated operations among different services, and deep attacks in the rapid 

attainment of campaign objectives (战役目的).

• Fortifications and minefields.
157

• Logistical support to sustain high-technology 

weapons.6

Twelve years later, and a year and a half after the 

attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 

the United States and Iraq found themselves again at 

war. 

In the wake of the al-Qaeda attacks, the United 

States had toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan. Planning began soon thereafter for war with Iraq. In January 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush labeled Iraq, 

Iran, and North Korea as an “Axis of Evil.”7

 American 

officials began to enunciate the argument that, in the 

face of potential terrorist threats, nations had a right 

to preemptive self-defense, with the clear implication 

that Washington would be justified in attacking Iraq 

for fear of the latter’s support for terrorism. 

Washington sought to garner international support for action against Iraq, while Baghdad attempted 

to forestall any such coalition. In January 2003, Saddam Hussein decided to allow United Nations (UN) 

weapons inspectors back into Iraq, to demonstrate his 

compliance with UN resolutions mandating his surrender of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD).8

Saddam’s offer did not satisfy the U.S. Government, and in February 2003, U.S. Secretary of State 

Colin Powell addressed the UN to make the case for 

war. Despite his eloquence, the UNSC refused to approve a U.S.-United Kingdom (UK)-Spanish proposal 

to authorize force should Saddam and his sons refuse 

to depart Iraq and enter into exile.9

 The United States 

then chose to proceed anyway, forming a “coalition 

of the willing” to invade Iraq (composed primarily of 

itself and the UK). This coalition ultimately did not 

include Turkey, which foreclosed the possibility of a 

“northern” front of operations. 
158

On March 20, 2003, U.S. forces bombed Dora 

Farms, where it was reported that the top Iraqi leadership, including Saddam Hussein, had gathered.10 This 

effort, which was planned and executed in 6 hours, 

was intended to decapitate the Iraqi leadership.11 It 

failed, as the reports of Iraqi leaders gathering at the 

site were false. 

Unlike the first Gulf War, the ground war in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM began on March 21, after 

only a day of preliminary aerial bombardment. The 

U.S. 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) led a force ultimately totaling some five divisions (three Army, one 

Marine, one British) from Kuwait into Iraq. The 3rd 

Division advanced to An Nasariyah, then turned left 

towards Karbala and onwards to Baghdad, following 

the west bank of the Euphrates. Supporting it was the 

Marine 1st Division, which advanced along the east 

bank of the Euphrates. Despite massive sandstorms 

and sometimes fierce resistance, U.S. forces rapidly 

advanced on Baghdad. Saddam International Airport 

fell on April 3. On April 5, elements of U.S. Army units 

rolled into Baghdad. The move startled many Iraqi 

commanders, who had no idea that the U.S. ground 

forces had advanced so rapidly. The relative lack of 

resistance led U.S. commanders to abandon plans 

for a protracted siege of Baghdad, and instead push 

harder into the city. A subsequent incursion on April 7 

resulted in U.S. forces occupying downtown Baghdad 

and led to the city’s capitulation on April 9. By May 1, 

high-intensity combat operations in Iraq had ended. 

PLA Lessons from the First Gulf War.

According to General Wang Baocun, “the Chinese 

military followed the progress of the [first Gulf] war 
159

closely. . . . It had a great effect on the PLA.”12 From 

this war, the PLA appears to have derived a range of 

lessons, from the strategic, through the operational, to 

the tactical. 

At the strategic level, perhaps the most fundamental lesson is that the nature of warfare had radically 

changed. Whereas previous conflicts had been industrial wars that, like World War II, entailed the application of masses of manpower and equipment, the 

advent of new technologies had brought about Local 

Wars Under High-Technology Conditions (高技术条

件下局部战争), also referred to as High-Technology 

Local Wars (高技术局部战争). 

Such wars are marked by several characteristics, as 

evidenced in the first Gulf War: 

• They are the product of advances in a broad 

range of scientific and technical fields. They 

generally involve the large-scale use of information technology, advanced materials, aerospace systems, and other advanced technologies in weapons systems.13

• These weapons systems do not operate in isolation, but instead are integrated with each 

other. Combat operations involve the linkage 

of reconnaissance, communications, command, 

weapons, and logistics systems into an integrated or unified combat system (一体化作战系

统).14

• Local wars under high-tech conditions often 

cover vast expanses, which requires much 

more extensive command and control capability.15 Chinese writings note that the Gulf War 

involved forces spread over some 140,000,000 

square kilometers.16
• The rate of expenditure of weapons is much 

higher in such wars. In the Gulf War, the expenditure of munitions is assessed as 10 times 

that of the Korean War, and four times that of 

the Vietnam War.17

In order for the PLA to prepare for such wars, there 

was set forth in 1993 a new national military strategy, 

embodied within the “Military Strategic Guidelines 

for the New Period” (“新时期国家军事战略方针”). In 

addition to assessing the international security situation confronting the PRC and clarifying the role of 

the military in the context of overall national development, the Military Strategic Guidelines for the New 

Period laid out an assessment of the new nature of 

modern war and how the PLA should deal with the 

resulting challenges.18 Embodied within these new 

Military Strategic Guidelines were the main areas for 

PLA modernization and reform. These included the 

incorporation of more science and technology within 

the PLA; enhancing the quality of PLA personnel; improving the PLA’s organization and logistical infrastructure; and continued emphasis on ideological and 

political work.19

The 1990s then saw the PLA moving to fulfill these 

reforms. One essential achievement for the PLA was 

the incorporation of the operational level of war, embodied in greater thinking about campaigns, into their 

overall approach to conflict. The operational level of 

war is the linkage between the tactical level of war 

(where battles occur) and the strategic level of war 

(which sets out ultimate war aims). For the PLA, the 

operational level of war is comprised of campaigns, 

which are not simply large battles, but a series of battles, undertaken to achieve ends that are strategically 

160
161

significant.20 In some cases, an entire local war may be 

resolved in one or a few campaigns.21

The importance of campaigns can be seen in the 

new combat regulations published in 1999, generically referred to as the “New Generation Operations 

Regulations” (“新一代作战条令”). These represented a 

wholesale change to PLA doctrine, placing campaigns 

at the forefront of the conduct of future operations. 

Furthermore, the capstone of these new operational 

directives is The Essentials of Joint Campaigns of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (中国人民解放军联合战

役纲要). These regulations make it clear that the PLA 

must be prepared to fight future wars through the interplay of all of its services and the Second Artillery, 

rather than primarily relying on the ground forces. 

That is, for the PLA, future wars would be joint wars, 

fought at the campaign level. 

Chinese interest in joint operations did not begin 

with the Gulf War. The PLA had already begun to adjust its organization in the mid-1980s, in light of what 

it had observed in the Fourth Middle East War, the 

American war in Vietnam, and the British experience 

in the Falklands.22 Moreover, the PLA had also twice 

convened all-army conferences to discuss campaignlevel theory (战役理论研讨会) in 1986 and 1988 and 

had also introduced the concept of joint operations as 

a topic of study in August 1987. 

But the first Gulf War raised the prominence of 

joint operations. One PLA officer wrote that “the form 

of joint operations appearing in it [the Gulf War], of 

coordination among all service arms, will undoubtedly be a key trend of future war developments.”23

Another PLA analyst notes that the “characteristics of 

a joint operation of all branches of the military displayed in that war [the Gulf War] gave us a glimpse 
162

of things to come in the early 21st century.”24 This was 

echoed by the then-deputy director of the Academy of 

Military Science (AMS):

The Gulf War marked a big step forward in both military theory and practice. For instance, strategy and the 

battles were closely interwoven, with the latter playing a major role, sometimes overlapping with strategy 

and tactics.25

Joint operations are essential given the much expanded modern battlefield. Local Wars under HighTech Conditions includes not only operations on land, 

at sea, and in the air, but also in outer space and the 

electromagnetic sphere. Similarly, they require not 

only traditional land, sea, and air forces, but also missile forces, special operations forces, and psychological warfare units.26

Within this context, the Gulf War also led to a variety of tactical and technological shifts. One is the establishment of a new “three attacks, three defends.” In 

the 1970s, the “three attacks, three defends” referred 

to fighting against tanks, aircraft, and paratroopers 

while defending against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. By 2001, this had evolved to fighting against cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, and attack 

helicopters, while defending against precision strike, 

electronic interference, and enemy surveillance and 

reconnaissance.27

Just as the 1970s “three attacks, three defends” 

were a reflection of the greater importance of focused 

training, the new “three attacks, three defends” are 

described as reflecting the new situation confronting 

the PLA and represent an essential means of fighting 

and winning Local Wars Under High-Tech Conditions 

through joint operations.28 In particular, the first Gulf 

War displayed the heightened importance of electron-
163

ic and intelligence warfare, and of stratagem, as they 

“permeate campaigns and battles from beginning to 

end.”29 Similarly, General Wang Baocun suggests that 

a key PLA lesson from the first Gulf War was the focus 

on destroying Iraqi military command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems, in pursuit 

of the “decapitation principle.”30 This included strikes 

against military and civilian communications sites in 

both Iraq and Kuwait, as part of the opening salvo.31

A technological lesson from the first Gulf War was 

the enormously greater importance placed upon precision guided munitions (PGMs). While representing 

only 8 percent of the weapons expended, PGMs are 

said to have destroyed 40 percent of the high-value 

targets.32 Such weapons, using a variety of guidance 

systems, may be launched from a variety of platforms, 

often at great distances. They are a fundamental reason why the battlefield is more expansive and more 

deadly.33

A final tactical and technological lesson was the 

enormously greater importance of space and electronic operations. In the Gulf War, for example, it is 

noted that the United States brought some 70 satellites 

to bear against Iraq. By PLA estimates, these satellites 

provided the United States with about 90 percent of 

its strategic intelligence and a substantial portion of 

its targeting information. Space systems also carried 

about 70 percent of all transmitted data for allied 

forces.34 The ability to exploit space is seen as a major 

contributing factor to the Coalition’s victory.35

PLA Lessons from the Second Gulf War.

In some ways, the second Gulf War served to reinforce and refine the lessons from the first Gulf War. 

Thus, at the strategic level, Chinese assessing the sig-
164

nificance of the Iraq War seem to conclude that the 

world marked by “Peace and Development” is not 

very peaceful. Instead, the war against Iraq is seen as 

a warning to both the “Axis of Evil” nations and nearpeer competitors not to challenge American leadership and dominance.36

Furthermore, according to a group of PLA officers 

drawn from the Academy of Military Sciences and 

the National Defense University, weakness or backwardness means that one will be beaten (落后就要挨

打). In this regard, weakness refers not only to military 

capabilities, but to the full range of factors comprising comprehensive national power. At the onset of 

the first Gulf War, the American-led coalition isolated 

Iraq by imposing what amounted to a global cut-off 

of its trade. These sanctions remained in place even 

after the end of the war, limiting Baghdad’s access to 

modern technology and weapons. Iraq was therefore 

badly outmatched in every way, economically and 

diplomatically as well as militarily, even before hostilities began in the second Gulf War.37

In addition, the second Gulf War further refined 

the PLA’s understanding of local wars. From Local 

Wars Under High-Tech Conditions, the PLA transitioned to viewing future conflicts as Local Wars 

Under Informationalized (or Informationized, or Informatized) Conditions (信息化局部战争). This was 

reflected in the 2004 PRC Defense White Paper, which 

observes, “The forms of war are undergoing changes 

from mechanization to informationalization. Informationalization has become the key factor in enhancing 

the warfighting capability of the armed forces.”38 In 

a sense, the PLA has sharpened its focus from hightechnology writ large to those that are associated with 

information. 
165

At the operational level, this means a greater emphasis on information and the range of technologies associated with it, as well as operations to exploit the 

related advances that information technology has 

generated. As with the earlier interest in joint operations, this increased PLA attention to the potentials 

of information technology predates the second Gulf 

War. Wang Baocun, writing in 2001, notes five areas 

the PLA was already investigating: 

1. Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) modernization;

2. Network-based wargaming;

3. Training of personnel in information warfare;

4. Conduct of information exercises;

5. Introduction of informationalized equipment.40

The second Gulf War highlighted the major advances the United States had already taken in these 

areas, and demonstrated how they had been operationalized and incorporated into U.S. forces. In particular, American forces seem to be operating in a 

more integrated, rather than just coordinated, form 

of joint operations. “With the arrival of informationalized warfare, integrated-style has already become a 

necessary form of joint operational command development.”41

Subsequent Chinese writings also began to emphasize that PLA joint operations needed to move from 

multi-service planning to actual multiservice operations. That is, jointness was previously discussed in 

terms of creating a thorough joint campaign plan that 

would allow the disparate services to maximize their 

contribution. In the wake of the second Gulf War, 

though, the discussion shifted to joint forces actually 

operating together (rather than each simply contribut-
166

ing individually to the overall operation), as a function of shared information. 

To achieve this greater jointness, PLA authors 

wrote that command and control structures should 

exploit the advances in information technology. One 

PLA analyst observed that, by virtue of more capable 

telecommunications equipment, the Anglo-American 

coalition forces in the second Gulf War were able to 

operate even more jointly than their predecessors had 

a decade earlier.42 This was enhanced by the development and adoption of common software, standards, 

and engineering, which allowed both weapons and 

command systems across services to operate as a relatively seamless whole, and behave more like a truly 

joint organization.43

Reports suggest that the PLA began to increase 

both informationalization and integrated jointness 

after the second Gulf War. The Nanjing Military Region (MR), for example, “organized a war-zone jointcombat communications training” event in July 2004 

to discuss army, navy, air force, and Second Artillery 

combat communications requirements.44 As the news 

report observed, this is only part of the overall effort 

undertaken throughout the Nanjing MR to transition 

from coordinated joint operations towards integrated

joint operations (从协同性联合作战向一体化联合作战

方向发展).

Informationalization does not only benefit joint 

command and control, however, but assists decisionmaking in general. According to Chinese analyses, 

the Iraqi battlefield was virtually transparent—for the 

Coalition forces. U.S.-led forces had unrivaled access 

to space systems for reconnaissance, communications, 

navigation, weather forecasting, and global positioning. This allowed Coalition forces to accurately un-
167

derstand the battlefield situation, especially enemy 

dispositions, and then strike at essential targets with 

great precision. As a result, Iraqi forces could not hide, 

while Coalition forces could apply precision-guided 

munitions to maximum effect.45 Recent Chinese military articles suggest that there is some effort underway to apply these lessons in their military exercises.46

Improvements in information technology have 

also accelerated command decisionmaking, allowing 

for more rapid actions and responses. Whereas the 

United States had needed 72 hours in the first Gulf 

War to establish targets for air strikes, this had been 

substantially reduced in the more recent war. The 

time required for selecting targets, gathering targeting 

information, transmitting it to strike units, and actually implementing an attack is measured in seconds, 

so that even mobile systems could now be targeted.47

Not surprisingly, reliance on informationalized 

weapons is increasing. Whereas only 8 percent of 

weapons used in the first Gulf War were precision 

munitions, in the second Gulf War, this had risen to 

over 90 percent, with over 7,000 PGMs fired in the first 

week alone.48 Moreover, these weapons were generally more accurate and more powerful than their predecessors. As a result, what required 16-18 aircraft to 

destroy in the first Gulf War could be eliminated with 

one in the second; similarly, a carrier air wing could 

strike four times as many targets in the second Gulf 

War as in the first.49

In the view of the PLA, precision munitions will 

only become more important in the future, given their 

accuracy and lethality. Employed against an enemy’s 

command and control infrastructure, as they were 

in the second Gulf War, an enemy’s defenses will be 

rapidly disrupted, reducing their ability to resist and 

shortening the length of the conflict. 
168

Why Did Iraq Do So Poorly?50

Given the imbalance of comprehensive national 

power, including economic strength, diplomatic access, and military capabilities, PLA analysts would 

seem to agree that Iraq’s loss was a foregone conclusion. Iraqi strength was further sapped by nearly 20 

years of war (including the Iran-Iraq War), and 13 

years of economic sanctions. Iraq’s military forces suffered from a “generation gap,” when comparing their 

equipment with that of the Anglo-American coalition. 

But some PLA analyses nonetheless conclude that 

Iraq could have waged a better defense. In particular, 

a more resolute resistance might have inflicted more 

losses on the American forces. Some believe that a 

more effective defense might have led to more American deaths, striking at the American “center of gravity 

(重心),” which is the desire to limit casualties.51 Consequently, the Iraqi failure to inflict greater losses on 

Coalition forces, due to their half-hearted defense efforts, has attracted further PLA analysis. 

Some of the Iraqi failures are attributed to conditions unique to their political situation. For example, 

Iraq clearly had not engaged in sufficient preparations 

for war. As the Coalition had required 3 months to 

build up their forces, the Iraqis could have taken advantage of that period to improve their own defenses, 

yet failed to do so. Most glaringly, they failed to convert their urban centers into defensive bastions. They 

did not construct fortifications and obstacles inside 

or outside the cities, nor did they lay minefields or 

build tunnels and other underground facilities to undergird their defenses. Even after the war began, the 

Iraqi military did not engage the American forces with 
169

heavy concentrations of firepower; instead, they dispersed their forces and assets (partly in order to avoid 

destruction by allied airpower). 

Much of this failure to prepare is attributed to 

Saddam Hussein. As the dictator of Iraq, his strategic 

decisions hampered the defense. His underestimation 

of the Anglo-American intent to go to war retarded 

Iraqi war preparations, as well as defensive measures 

once the war had begun, such as the destruction of key 

bridges across the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. 

Furthermore, Saddam himself was a problematic 

figure. His actions against the Kurdish and Shi’ite 

populations ensured that the nation would not be 

unified when confronted with an external threat. His 

imposition of a dictatorship and a cult of personality 

also detracted from his domestic legitimacy.52 Moreover, his previous invasions of Iran and Kuwait had 

both failed, resulting in a 20-year legacy of military 

defeat, yet it also meant that he was seen as a regional 

hegemon by many other nations.53 This resulted in a 

lack of support for his regime, even from nations that 

opposed the U.S. decision to go to war. 

These weaknesses were exacerbated by allied efforts at undermining the will of the Iraqi military, population, and leadership. According to PLA analysts, 

the United States paid special attention to this “soft” 

form of warfare (软战). It sought, through a variety of 

means, to coerce Iraq to separate the government from 

the military, and both from the people, and to demoralize the military. American military operations were 

linked, in the Chinese view, to this “soft” war, engaging in “shock and awe” tactics once the decapitation 

effort had failed.54 Thus, if the Iraq War was an opportunity to test advanced physical weaponry, it also 

provided an opportunity to test soft measures aimed 

at attacking an opponent’s will. 
170

THE THREE WARFARES AND THE SECOND 

GULF WAR

If information technology contributed substantially to both Gulf Wars (and markedly more so during the second than the first), the role of information 

shifted from the tactical and operational to the strategic in the second Gulf War. Informationalized warfare 

is marked by the struggle of stratagem, of policy, of 

morale, of thought, and of psychology. The ability to 

mold how information is perceived is now integral to 

warfare. As a result, both sides sought to weaken their 

opponent’s will and support, maintain their own popular and military morale, and influence global views 

and positions. 

These efforts to influence the popular will and 

shape perceptions, according to PLA writings, constitute “political combat styles under informationalized 

conditions” (“信息条件下的政治性作战样式\”). That 

is, they are forms of operations or campaigns.55 They 

involve the use of national and military resources, 

consistent with military strategic guidance, to secure 

the political initiative and psychological advantage 

over an opponent, through strengthening one’s own 

will, gaining allies, and debilitating an opponent.56

Broadly speaking, these “styles” may be categorized 

as psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and 

legal warfare, which are generally referred to as the 

“three warfares (三战).”

The PLA’s interest in the three warfares predates the second Gulf War. In 2003, the PLA had set 

forth the “Chinese People’s Liberation Army Political Work Regulations” (“中国人民解放军政治工作条

例”). Among the tasks of political work, in Chapter 2, 
171

Section 18, is conduct of the “three warfares” of psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal 

warfare. The “three warfares” were not established 

due to the second Gulf War, but it would seem that 

additional impetus was imparted to their development by the recently concluded conflict. 

Psychological Warfare.

The most basic of the “three warfares” is psychological warfare (although it is intimately linked to 

public opinion warfare and legal warfare). Psychological warfare is defined as conflict in the spiritual and 

psychological area (精神心理领域) and may be implemented at the tactical, operational, or strategic level. It 

operates with real and potential military power in the 

background, and employs various types of information as the main weapon. The purpose is to influence, 

constrain, and/or alter an opponent’s thoughts, emotions, and habits, while at the same time strengthening friendly psychology.57

There are myriad targets and objects of psychological warfare; it is applied against the enemy, but also 

against friends; it is targets externally, but also internally; it must deal with allied countries, but also the 

entire globe, and one must rely on the media acting in 

multiple directions jointly, with effective coverage of 

many areas, in order to comprehensively realize the 

various goals.58

Although much of the focus is on commanders 

and key decisionmakers, psychological warfare is 

also aimed at the broader civilian and military populations. It includes, but goes beyond, public opinion 

warfare and encompasses the range of actions that 
172

will affect an opponent’s population, social groups, 

military, government, and/or leadership, in terms 

of their beliefs and attitudes, including their will to 

resist. Thus, psychological warfare is seen as more 

than simply military propaganda, but is a reflection 

of comprehensive national power and overall national 

strength in psychological terms.59

In general, psychological warfare efforts can either 

narrowly focus on battlefield operations (e.g., through 

leaflets and broadcasts), or can operate more broadly, 

through propaganda measures and news and public 

opinion warfare. The narrower, tactical application requires understanding an opposing military’s strengths 

and weaknesses, focusing on eroding the enemy military’s psychology. The broader, more strategic forms 

of psychological warfare involve all the elements of 

national power, and are employed not only to bolster 

one’s own military and population, but also seek to 

secure confidence and support from third parties and 

friendly states, and ideally to convert opponents to 

one’s own cause.60

The strategic forms of psychological warfare have 

especially benefited from the proliferation of information technology, especially telecommunications and 

the Internet, as these allow one side to directly address 

the other side’s civilian population and decisionmakers without having to first defeat their armed forces. 

Modern psychological warfare operations can have a 

real strategic impact, and have therefore grown from 

being a supplement to being a full partner for conventional military operations.61

Political mobilization of the populace is intimately 

linked with psychological warfare. Mobilization of 

the masses is one of the tools of strategic psychological warfare; conversely, enemy psychological warfare 
173

measures can obviate efforts at mobilizing the masses 

to support one’s own efforts. For this reason, one PLA 

analysis concludes that it is essential to emphasize the 

justice of one’s cause in order to secure both domestic and potential foreign popular support.62 An opponent’s psychological warfare efforts will conversely 

seek to call this justice into question. 

To maximize effectiveness, Chinese writings suggest that psychological warfare will often begin before 

the formal commencement of open hostilities. This is 

based in part on the assessment that the purpose of 

psychological warfare measures is to influence the 

audience’s emotions and assessment capacity, which 

will eventually influence their actions.63 In order to do 

so, it needs to operate not only in the military and diplomatic realms, but also the political, economic, cultural, and even religious arenas, which cannot easily 

be done on short notice. 

Psychological Warfare in the Second Gulf War. In the 

view of PLA analysts, the second Gulf War saw psychological operations conducted at an unprecedented 

scale and intensity, from the tactical to the strategic 

level, and engaging a range of both military and nonmilitary measures. In particular, the United States 

factored psychological warfare into all of its thinking 

from strategic decisions to operational plans, to actual 

tactical employment and military battles.

In the Chinese view, the United States began psychological warfare operations long before March 2003. 

The incessant claim that Iraq possessed WMD helped 

isolate Iraq from the rest of the international community. President Bush’s description of Iraq as part 

of an “Axis of Evil” further linked Iraq with Iran and 

North Korea in the minds of many as a threat to global 

peace.64 (These measures were also effective examples 
174

of public opinion warfare.) Meanwhile, the United 

States used a variety of diplomatic and economic 

means to try and isolate Iraq. 65

As the onset of open hostilities drew closer, the 

United States directly called senior Iraqi officers on 

their personal cell phones and sent emails to their 

personal accounts, trying to induce them to surrender or otherwise not operate at full effectiveness. In 

other cases, the United States threatened Iraqi officers, 

should they employ WMD. Such measures sought to 

sow seeds of discord and mistrust within the senior 

Iraqi leadership, thereby dissipating solidarity at the 

very top.66 The American government ensured that 

Iraq could not respond in kind by limiting Iraqi access 

to international media. For example, the United States 

pressured international satellite communications 

companies to limit Iraqi access, effectively implementing a strategic information blockade.67

Once the war began, the United States tried “decapitation” (“斩首行动”) against Iraq by eliminating 

Saddam Hussein at the very outset. Having failed 

to kill Saddam, they then moved to “shock and awe 

operations” (“震慑作战”), bombing a range of Iraqi 

targets. 68 Unlike previous wars, however, the United 

States did not engage in a protracted aerial bombardment, but commenced ground operations within a 

day of the start of the bombing campaign. In doing so, 

it further underscored the massive scale of force being 

applied against Iraq. All of these efforts were intended 

not only to create military gains, but also sought to 

cripple Iraqi resistance by undermining their will to 

fight.

Psychological warfare was not one-sided, however. Chinese authors observe that, within the more 

constrained resources available to it, the Iraqi govern-
175

ment also sought to employ psychological warfare, 

both to inspire greater resistance against the invaders 

and also to garner more support from abroad—or at 

least condemnation of the Anglo-American leaders of 

the coalition. 

Once the war started, Saddam regularly appeared 

on television to show that he was, in fact, still alive 

and regularly exhorted the populace to resist the invaders. Iraqi Information Minister Muhammed Saeed 

al-Sahhaf, meanwhile, would highlight any American 

casualties or setbacks in his regular news briefings, 

and warned that if U.S. forces did not surrender, they 

would die in Iraq. These efforts not only countered 

American propaganda and helped stiffen Iraqi resistance, but in the Chinese view also gave the impression globally of stubborn Iraqi resistance and held 

forth the potential of major allied losses.69

However, in the end, the preponderance of coalition resources told, even in the psychological warfare 

arena. While Iraqi efforts could highlight credibility 

gaps in the American message, Iraq simply did not 

have the wherewithal to make its own message heard. 

PLA lessons. For the PLA, the employment of psychological warfare operations in the second Gulf War 

offers a number of lessons. On the one hand, as PLA 

writings note, the human factor, the focus of psychological warfare efforts, remains the center of gravity. 

The Coalition forces, through their various psychological warfare efforts, caused the Iraqi military and 

civilian populace to lose faith in their ability to win.70

Despite advances in technology, the human factor 

has not been eclipsed, and the failure to mobilize the 

masses, a crucial part of psychological warfare operations, can still lead to defeat. 

On the other hand, popular support cannot be taken 

for granted. Despite fighting a defensive war against 
176

an external aggressor, the Iraqi government was not 

able to successfully mobilize the larger populace and 

sustain their support against the Anglo-American coalition.71 This implies a continuing importance for political mobilization measures, a defensive component 

of psychological warfare. 

Public Opinion Warfare.

Public opinion warfare (舆论战) refers to the use of 

various mass information channels, including the Internet, television, radio, newspapers, movies, and other forms of media, in accordance with an overall plan 

and with set objectives in mind, to transmit selected 

news and other materials to the intended audience. 

The goal is to generate public support both at home 

and abroad for one’s own position and create opposition to one’s enemy. It seeks to guide public perceptions and opinion so as to affect shifts in the overall 

balance of strength between oneself and one’s opponent.72 Although public opinion warfare employs the 

media and news organizations, in the Chinese context 

the two are distinct areas of study and have been since 

the 1990s.73

Just as advances in information technology allow 

one side to apply psychological pressure without 

having to first defeat the other side’s military, it also 

significantly improves the ability to influence public 

opinion of both sides and of neutrals. Consequently, 

the media’s role has advanced from being a strategic 

supplement, focusing on battlefield reports, to a type 

of “combat multiplier” that can help affect and decide 

the outcomes of conflicts.74 In this view, public opinion is now a distinct, second battlefield, almost independent of the physical one.75
177

Public opinion warfare is linked to the issue of 

values; faced with the pressure of public opinion, few 

nations or political authorities would risk the opprobrium associated with being an aggressor. Instead, 

both sides will seek to employ various forms of media, 

including news broadcasts, to guide public opinion, 

obtain popular support, and try to influence third parties for support and sympathy. This is true not only in 

the pre-war phase, but even during a war, as modern 

media will subject every military action to close scrutiny.76

Public opinion warfare has already been employed 

in a number of local wars. When Mohammed Aideed’s 

men dragged the bodies of American troops through 

the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, in front of television cameras, this was an effective form of public 

opinion warfare, turning the American public against 

the war.77

Public opinion warfare was used by both sides, to 

some extent, in the first Gulf War. Iraq sought to justify 

its invasion of Kuwait by charging the Kuwaitis with 

siphoning oil illegally from disputed oil fields that underlay both countries. It also claimed that Kuwait was 

engaged in unreasonable territorial demands, referring to the disputed islands of Warbah and Bubiyan.78

Both of these claims were used to influence global and 

regional public opinion. 

The Coalition engaged in extensive public opinion warfare in the first Gulf War. An initial example 

is the claim that Iraqis had killed infants in Kuwaiti 

hospitals, taking them out of incubators.79 Then, the 

Coalition obtained overwhelming UN support for the 

use of force to eject Iraq from Kuwait, signaling that 

Iraq was isolated and universally condemned and 

clearly calling into question the legitimacy of Iraq’s ac-
178

tions. Once the conflict began, the U.S. side effectively 

flooded the airwaves with their version of developments. Although the war only lasted 42 days, the U.S. 

side held 98 news conferences.80 Meanwhile, western 

news media constantly reported on the capabilities of 

advanced western weapons and munitions, further 

undermining Iraqi confidence.81

PLA Lessons. The second Gulf War demonstrated 

to the PLA how much further the state of the art had 

advanced in public opinion warfare. On the coalition 

side, public opinion warfare began long before hostilities were formally initiated. Since the first Gulf War, 

American media had constantly bombarded the U.S. 

audience, and much of the world, with messages demonizing Saddam Hussein and Iraq.82 These negative 

messages had embedded themselves throughout the 

American body politic, and even in the larger international consciousness. President Bush’s charge that 

Iraq was part of an “Axis of Evil” thus fell on fertile 

ground, after nearly a decade of acclimatization. To 

further support these efforts, in August 2002, the United States, with the help of Iraqi dissident groups and 

exiles, created a satellite television station. 83

Once the decision was made to go to war, the 

media aspect of public opinion warfare intensified 

further. An “Office of Global Communications” was 

established in the White House to plan, coordinate, 

and manage news and information. This office helped 

create a public opinion and propaganda plan, based 

on, and in coordination with, the evolving war plans.84 

American spokesmen regularly provided talking 

points to both American and foreign news organizations, while senior officials regularly took to the airwaves. 
179

Meanwhile, the United States also deployed a variety of assets to influence Iraqi public opinion. One is 

the EC-130E aircraft, an airborne television and broadcasting station capable of transmitting across a wide 

spectrum of frequencies including shortwave and 

television. These aircraft were deployed outside Iraq 

in December 2002, 3 months prior to the initiation of 

open warfare.85 In addition, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) 

also engaged in massive leaflet drops, employing 158 

aircraft to scatter 81 different types of leaflets. 86 Many 

Iraqi troops deserted their posts, after being warned 

by some of the leaflets that only areas that resisted 

would be bombed. 

An especially effective means of influencing the 

global perception of the war was the “embed” program, and specifically the inclusion of foreign correspondents. On the one hand, there was a heavy presence of American journalists, whom Chinese analysts 

presumed will take a more pro-American stance. But 

by incorporating foreign journalists, including Chinese and other press who were skeptical of the United 

States, American public opinion warriors were able 

to project an image of objectivity and transparency. 

The United States effectively exploited these foreign 

voices, which as outsiders would be more readily accepted, to effectively speak on their behalf.87

Once hostilities began, public opinion warfare actively complemented military operations. The American media regularly aired claims that Saddam had 

been wounded, or that senior Iraqi leaders had been 

killed or had surrendered. These reports served to 

undermine Iraqi morale and helped precipitate the 

desertion or surrender of Iraqi troops, often without 

having to fight them.88 This served the larger goal of 

eliminating Iraqi resistance with minimal bloodshed. 
180

Similarly, when the U.S. advance slowed, there was 

extensive reporting by the press that this was rooted 

in Anglo-American concern about creating civilian 

casualties. “American media used reality to disguise 

their real goals and perspective, and invisibly guided 

public opinion.”89 Thus, one PLA volume concludes, 

given “the American military ability to easily take 

Baghdad, and the ‘evaporation’ of several hundred 

thousand Iraqi troops, it should be noted that American broadcasting strategy had achieved fairly good 

results.”90

This complementarity was not one-way, however. 

Military operations were apparently at times undertaken in order to provide suitable material for public 

opinion warfare. Thus, Chinese observers note that, 

unlike in previous wars such as the Balkan conflict, 

the United States in this conflict did not immediately 

destroy the Iraqi communications and broadcasting infrastructure, even as it did interfere with Iraqi 

broadcasts. Instead, these facilities were allowed to 

remain on the air, so that the United States could exploit their frequencies to broadcast false messages and 

inaccurate information to further sap Iraqi will and 

foment societal disruption. Preserving Iraqi broadcast 

facilities also allowed the United States to claim that 

it was fighting a “clean” war, since Iraqi broadcasts 

aided in “transparency.”

Iraqi efforts at public opinion warfare were effective, albeit limited. Indeed, Iraq made adroit use of its 

limited resources, as well as third party assets such 

as al-Jazeera, to access the Arab and Muslim world in 

the effort to win more public support.91 One author 

observes that, when Iraqi chemical warfare experts 

appeared on television on March 27, the resulting 

images of American troops putting on their protec-
181

tive gear was greatly embarrassing, as no chemical 

or biological attacks were forthcoming. Meanwhile, 

Iraqi officials regularly appeared on television, not 

only to present the Iraqi version of events, but also 

to disprove American allegations that some had been 

killed or had defected.92 Both sides were engaged in a 

struggle for credibility, an essential element of public 

opinion warfare. 

Ultimately, however, Iraqi efforts were insufficient. 

Part of this was because of the capabilities available 

to the United States. Images and information were 

now digitized and easily transmitted and were often 

passed in real-time. Western media organizations, exploiting advances in modern technology, provide unprecedented reach for public opinion warfare efforts. 

The United States employed dozens of satellites to 

transmit information globally so as to influence both 

public opinion and the psychology of foreign leaders 

and populations while denying the Iraqis the ability to 

counter their efforts.93 Indeed, at times the only source 

of information was British or American sources. 

Not only was Iraq over-matched, but also their 

efforts were mostly concentrated at the tactical level. 

Unlike the Americans, the Iraqi leadership lacked 

the broader vision to undertake strategic level public 

opinion warfare.94

PLA lessons. From observing the second Gulf 

War, PLA analysts emphasize that it is essential that 

public opinion warfare be undertaken carefully and 

with a strategic perspective that looks at the overall 

objectives of a conflict. Public opinion warfare should 

complement psychological warfare, as well as general 

military operations. Similarly, military operations, 

or leaks of information relating to them, may be undertaken to support psychological and public opin-
182

ion warfare efforts. Overall, public opinion warfare 

strategy should incorporate and address political, 

diplomatic, military, economic, scientific and technical (S&T), and other aspects. It should also take into 

account Party interests.95

Within this perspective, Chinese analyses suggest 

that public opinion warfare must follow an established plan and operate under a command structure. 

Only an integrated policy and unified command approach can allow such a complex piece of systems engineering to succeed. But the actual decisionmaking 

needs to be rapid and flexible, because in the world 

of public opinion, the first impression is key. Public 

opinion warfare must therefore assume a more offensive stance. 

Moreover, as seen in the second Gulf War, “before 

the troops and horses move, public opinion is already 

underway (兵马未动,舆论先行).”96 The leadership 

and coordination structure for public opinion warfare needs to be put in place prior to the outbreak of 

hostilities, because the scale of planning, as well as 

implementation, of public opinion warfare cannot be 

achieved on the fly. 

The creation of the Ministry of National Defense 

Press Affairs Office (also known as the Ministry of 

National Defense Information Office) in 2008 was 

potentially motivated, in part, by the interest in shaping domestic and foreign views of China’s military, 

including in peacetime. PLA officers assigned to this 

office now regularly give press briefings, answer 

questions, and release official statements.97 The formation of this office may constitute an organizational 

response to lessons learned from the second Gulf War. 

Similarly, courses that teach Chinese military officers 

how to talk to the foreign press are being incorporated 

into Chinese professional military education (PME).98
183

Another lesson that PLA analysts seem to have 

drawn is that the United States, with its media strength, 

has an overwhelming advantage in the ability to shape 

public opinion to its own ends. “American media has 

strong real strength, operates on a large scale, and advanced technology.”99 In the recent war, the United 

States rapidly put those strengths to work by rapidly 

creating a public opinion warfare campaign plan and 

implementation structure. 

These strengths and advantages were further 

magnified because, as Chinese writings consistently 

suggest, the Western media, especially American and 

British news organizations, were aligned with, if not 

actively subordinate to, the Anglo-American authorities. The U.S. Government is described as employing 

CNN and NBC to influence both American and global 

public opinion in support of the war with Iraq.100 Another volume describes the American media as attacking Iraq and accusing Saddam of possessing WMD because it was under the control of the government and 

the military (美国媒体又在政府和军方的操控下).101

This is not necessarily described in pejorative 

terms. Rather, crafting public opinion is seen as an essential role of the media. 

In the period of preparing for war . . . not only do 

media make it appear to the masses/public that there 

are few choices, but also inevitably will describe the 

enemy as posing a serious threat, so that one’s own nation has no choice but to engage in self defense. Clear 

evidence of this is that after the “9-11” incident, the 

U.S. government and the media both widely discussed 

the “Axis of Evil.”102

For developing nations, not only must they research how to counter the military advantages of a he-
184

gemon, but also how to handle the public opinion and 

broadcasting advantages of a hegemon. As one Chinese 

article puts it, wartime news and propaganda guidelines should seek to establish news dominance (新闻

权), and information dominance (信息权), on the path 

to obtaining psychological dominance (心理权).103

In this regard, it is therefore interesting to consider the recent Chinese decision to create a 24-hour 

English-language global news service under the aegis 

of Xinhua.

 104 Given the concern about shaping public 

opinion, and the belief that such news organizations 

as CNN and Fox News are in the service of the U.S. 

Government, it may well be that this new news entity 

reflects a major “lesson learned” from the Gulf War. 

Legal Warfare.

Legal warfare (法律战) is defined as the use of both 

domestic and international law, as well as the laws of 

armed conflict (武装冲突法), to garner international 

and domestic support by presenting oneself as the 

more just or virtuous side in legal terms.105 The basic 

form (基本样式) of legal warfare is described as arguing that one’s own side is obeying the law, accusing 

the other side of violating the law (违法), and making 

arguments for one’s own side in cases where there are 

also violations of the law. Legal warfare appears to 

have gained more prominent public attention beginning in 2003, although it is not clear whether this is 

linked to the second Gulf War.106

The essence of legal warfare, as with the other two 

warfares, is political warfare, with the aim of helping 

one’s own side to secure the initiative in wartime. Legal warfare also seeks to gain greater support, both at 

home and abroad, by helping one’s own side claim to 

be in the right. 
185

Implementing “legal warfare” is to gain the right in 

warfare. Regardless of whether a war is just or not 

(正义与否), the two sides in a war will both make every effort to develop “legal warfare,” and seek out 

means of constructing legal bases for undertaking the 

war, and confirm that they themselves are the reasonable and legal side.107

Also as with the other two warfares, legal warfare is 

seen as closely linked with typical military operations. 

Military conflict encompasses legal warfare, while legal warfare permeates the entire course of military 

conflict. However, legal warfare often precedes military conflict, and will frequently be sustained after the 

military conflict has concluded.108

In its recent local wars, the United States has sought 

to use international law to explain and justify its actions. This was evident in the first Gulf War, where 

the United States exploited its reputation as a nation 

that abides by international law to justify its involvement in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Thus, the United 

States sought UN authorization at the very outset of 

that conflict, and by gaining it, fought the war under 

putative UN, and not simply American, auspices. 109

The tables were turned in the Kosovo War, when, 

in the Chinese view, the United States bypassed the 

UN in implementing a military solution. However, 

the United States employed the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization’s (NATO) common defense stipulation 

to address the legal issue. It broadly propagandized 

that this action was “consistent with the law” (“合法

性”). It deluded many people in the Western nations 

and caused the Kosovo War to be considered a “legal” 

war in the West.110
Legal warfare in the second Gulf War. In the second 

Gulf War, the United States linked legal warfare to 

psychological and public opinion warfare. It began 

by demonizing the Iraqi regime as part of the “axis 

of evil,” and exploiting the media to develop popular 

support for war with Iraq. It also began to promulgate 

the doctrine of “preemption” (“先发制人”), which 

it claimed was legal. The right of preemptive selfdefense to counter terrorism thus was inserted into 

the American consciousness, which the administration exploited to persuade the American Congress to 

pass an authorization of the use of military force. The 

Americans then used this domestic construct to seek 

support from other nations. 

When the United States was nonetheless unable to 

secure UNSC approval for war, it then claimed that 

Iraq was in violation of previous UNSC resolutions regarding weapons inspections. These prior resolutions 

were portrayed as justifying the American issuance of 

an ultimatum to Iraq prior to commencing hostilities. 

By contrast, Iraq was much better able to engage in 

legal warfare, at least in the pre-war phase. In particular, by agreeing to UN inspections during the debate 

over UNSC Resolution 1441, Iraq short-circuited UN 

approval of the United States going to war. It therefore 

effectively frustrated American legal warfare efforts. 

Subsequently, when the United States demanded UN 

authorization to issue an ultimatum to Baghdad, the 

Iraqi diplomats at the UN rebutted that demand with 

reference to the UN Charter.111

It was during the war, however, that the American 

use of legal warfare came into its own. For example, 

the United States contacted senior Iraqi officers to 

warn them that any use of WMD would result in war 

crimes trials after the conflict, and that “I was only fol186
187

lowing orders” would not be a defense. U.S. officials 

also implied that Iraqi deployment of forces in urban 

areas endangered civilian lives, and therefore also 

potentially violated the laws of armed conflict. Such 

measures, it is suggested, may have not only provided 

legal cover for U.S. actions, but also sapped the will of 

Iraqi military officers. 

Meanwhile, the United States also used legal warfare to defend its own actions. For example, Coalition 

forces claimed that they had minimized collateral 

damage by employing PGM. At the same time, citing 

exceptions to various international laws, Coalition 

forces at times also attacked other civilian targets on 

the grounds that Iraq had exploited civilian facilities 

or hidden weapons in residential areas. 

PLA lessons. One of the lessons that PLA authors 

mention is the need to integrate legal warfare efforts 

into the broader psychological warfare effort and with 

military operations.112 The tenor of some of the Chinese writings on this subject seems to imply that legal 

warfare is less of an independent military operation 

than psychological warfare or public opinion warfare, 

although it supports both of those other forms of political warfare. This is not to denigrate the importance 

of legal warfare, however. 

Indeed, considerations of legal warfare may have 

been a fundamental motivation for the creation of the 

PRC Anti-Secession Law of 2005. This law essentially 

argues that any attempt at seceding from China is fundamentally illegal. The creation of such a law would 

seem to be consistent with one PLA analysis that emphasizes the need to “pay attention to legal warfare 

requirements, and then promptly supplement domestic laws in key areas where there are gaps, so that legal 

warfare has laws it can rely upon.”113 Indeed, the pub-
188

licity China accorded this piece of legislation suggests 

that they were also conforming with the recommendation that domestic laws be publicized to the world, 

”so that domestic laws’ relevant regulations are recognized by the international community.”114 China has 

essentially informed both Taiwan and the world of the 

consequences of attempting to secede. It may be that 

Chinese claims to various territories such as the South 

China Sea and the Arctic, in addition to setting out 

Chinese interests, may also constitute a form of legal 

warfare, as other nations are notified of China’s interests and, to some extent, their intentions. 

INTERIM CONCLUSIONS

The two U.S.-Iraq wars have been key milestones 

for PLA analyses of the state of the art of local wars. 

The first Gulf War provided key contributions for the 

development of the current gangyao (纲要) that govern 

PLA operations. It is likely that lessons from the 2003 

march to Baghdad have provided further material for 

PLA analyses, and those conclusions will be incorporated into the next iteration of Chinese regulations—if 

they have not been already.

Both wars, in the Chinese estimation, were decisively affected by high technology. In the second Gulf 

War, this aspect was brought into higher relief. The 

key form of high technology is information technology. The collection, control, management, transmission, and exploitation of information is the key to 

modern warfare—and not just by military authorities, 

but by the strategic decisionmakers and the masses. 

The impact of information at the tactical and operational levels was the most visible, with video images of precision-guided munitions striking various 
189

targets, and American forces advancing incessantly, 

even in the face of massive sand storms. But PLA 

writings suggest that an essential lesson for Chinese 

officers is that information warfare is as much a strategic level action with tactical effects as it is tactical or 

operational level efforts that may lead to strategic consequences. Thus, what seems to bind Chinese analyses 

of the two Iraq Wars together is an evolving understanding that the true “key point” (“重点”) of Local 

Wars Under Modern Conditions is information at the 

tactical, operational, and strategic level. Each of the 

“three warfares” represents a different way of exploiting and manipulating that information for a variety of 

audiences. 

One of the interesting implications of this emphasis on information manipulation (and at some level, 

perception management) is that it could jeopardize the 

efficacy of People’s War. As one PLA volume notes, 

the most outstanding characteristic of people’s war is 

the broad participation of the masses.115 Modern technology offers the masses more ways to participate in 

local wars, as well as to express their support. But the 

willingness of the masses to participate in a conflict, to 

lend their support, assumes a population that is and 

remains supportive of the conflict. 

The very focus of the three warfares is to generate 

divides within the population and between the population and the leadership and to demoralize the population as it fragments, also through the use of modern 

information technology. Successfully applied against 

a population, the three warfares are, in some ways, antithetical to the concepts of People’s War. One would 

therefore expect the PRC to develop counters to the 

three warfares. It may be that the reputed “Great Fire-
190

wall of China” and the recent controversy involving 

Google reflect precisely such efforts. 

Policy Implications for the United States. 

At this point in time, there is no reason to believe 

that the Chinese military or political leadership seek a 

conflict with the United States, but, like any rational 

politico-military leadership, they are almost certainly 

hedging against that possibility. Given what the Chinese seem to have learned from American military 

operations in Iraq over two wars, it is important for 

American policymakers to recognize that the Chinese are likely engaging in “combat preparation” in 

not only the physical and cyber arenas, but also the 

political. Therefore, American military and political 

planners should not only be engaging in traditional 

military planning for conflict (including continued research and development into the next generation of 

advanced weapons), but as important, should be considering how they will engage China in the political 

realm. 

In this light, American policymakers, both military and civilian, must recognize that, in the event of 

a conflict with the PRC, the ability to gain domestic 

and international support can no longer be taken as a 

given. Indeed, China seems to already be taking steps 

to ensure international neutrality, if not support, and 

will be seeking to influence American opinion, both 

elite and popular, while safeguarding their own public from foreign influence. By contrast, American public diplomacy, much less psychological warfare and 

“military information support to operations (MISO),” 

are subject to a variety of laws such as the SmithMundt Act of 1948. Formulated in the heyday of print 
191

and radio journalism, these laws and regulations inevitably fail to take into account the realities of today’s 

far more interconnected world, much less the Internet 

and social media. Modernization of the equipment of 

the American armed forces should therefore be complemented by updating both policies and legislation 

regarding political influence and outreach. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. In order to differentiate between the two wars, the first war, 

comprising Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, will 

be referred to as “the Gulf War,” or “the first Gulf War.” The second, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, will be referred to as “the Iraq 

War,” or “the second Gulf War.”

2. Bruce W. Watson, Bruce George, Peter Tsouras, and B. L. 

Cyr, Military Lessons of the Gulf War, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 

1991, p. 223. 

3. Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War, Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1995, p. 

201. More Americans died in accidents during the war than in 

combat. Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm, New York: Routledge Press, 1992, p. 397. 

4. Schubert and Kraus, eds., p. 201.

5. Hiro, p. 396. 

6. PLA Encyclopedia Committee, Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Vol. VII, Beijing, China: Academy of Military Science Publishing House, July 1997, p. 404. 

7. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II, New 

York: Pantheon Books, 2006, p. 36. 

8. Ibid., p. 119. 

9. Ibid., p. 165. 
192

10. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco, NEW YORK: Penguin Books, 

2007, p. 118; and Gordon and Trainor, pp. 169-177. 

11. Gordon and Trainor, p. 169. 

12. Major General Wang Baocun, “China and the Revolution 

in Military Affairs (1)” China Military Science, No. 4, 2001 (English 

language Ed.), p. 151. 

13. Gao Hongchun, ed., National Defense Knowledge, National 

Defense Teaching Materials, Vol. III, Beijing, China: AMS Publishing, January 2003, p. 120, 124. 

14. Ibid., p. 125.

15. Ibid., pp. 125-126. 

16. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, The Science of Campaigns, Beijing, China: NDU Publishing House, 2000, p. 400. 

17. Gao Hongchun, ed., p. 127. 

18. For a full discussion of the Military Strategic Guidelines 

for the New Period, including what is encompassed within them, 

see David Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: An 

Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines,” in Right-Sizing 

the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, pp. 69-

140. 

19. Finkelstein, Kamphausen and Scobell, eds., pp. 118-123. 

20. Xue Xinglin, ed., Campaign Theory Learning Guide, Beijing, 

China: National Defense University Publishing House, November 2001, p. 36.

21. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, Chief eds., The Science 

of Campaigns, Beijing, China: National Defense University Publishing House, May 2000, p. 9. 

22. He Tiaoqing, chief ed., Campaign Teaching Materials, Beijing, China: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 2001, p. 71. 
193

23. Gao Yubiao, chief ed., Joint Campaign Teaching Materials, 

Beijing, China: Academy of Military Science Publishing House, 

2001, pp. 11-12. 

24. Lieutenant Colonel Wu Jianchu, “Joint Operations—The 

Basic Form of Combat on High-Tech Terms,” China Military Science , No. 4, 1995, Foreign Broadcast Information Service - China

(FBIS-CHI), April 1996. 

25. Colonel Zhou Xiaopeng, “On the Development of Joint 

Operations Theory,” China Military Science, May, 1996, in FBISCHI, May 1996. 

26. Shi Yukun, “Lt. Gen. Li Jijun Answers Questions on Nuclear Deterrence, Nation-State, and Information Age,” China Military Science , No. 3, 1995, in FBIS-CHI, August 1995.

27. Gao Hongchun, ed., pp. 127-130. 

28. “PLA Displays New ‘Three Attacks, Three Defends,’” 

Chen Bao, Hong Kong, August 1, 2001, available from military.

china.com/zh_cn/head/83/20010806/10073959.html.

29. Tan Wenhu, “Large Scale Joint Use of Forces for Disaster 

Relief Leads to Military Training Innovation and Development,” 

People’s Liberation Army Daily, July 1, 2008, www.chinanews.com.cn/

gn/news/2008/07-01/1298392.shtml. 

30. Guo Meichu, Discussion of High-Tech Local Wars, Beijing, 

China: AMS Publishing, 2003, pp. 174-176. 

31. Wang Baocun, “China and the Revolution in Military affairs (1),” p. 151. 

32. Ma Yu, “Informationalized Warfare and Communications 

Mobilization,” China Defense Newspaper, September 29, 2003. 

33. Wang Baocun, “China and the Revolution in Military affairs (1),”p. 151. 

34. Li Yinglian, Hong Xiangsheng, Gao Zhen, “The Categories 
194

of Forms of High-Tech Operations,” China Military Science, No. 2, 

1995, pp. 104-109. 

35. Gao Yubiao, chief ed., p. 54. 

36. Chang Xianqi et al., Military Astronautics, 2nd Ed., Beijing, 

China: National Defense Industries Press, January 2005, p. 249. 

37. He Zhu, Experts Discuss the Iraq War, Beijing, China: AMS 

Publishing, January 2004, pp. 176-177. 

38. Ibid., pp. 141, 144. 

39. PRC State Council Information Office, China’s National 

Defense in 2004, Beijing, China: State Council Information Office, 

2004. 

40. Wang Baocun, “China and the Revolution in Military Affairs (2),” China Military Science, No. 5, 2001, p. 149. 

41. Ren Haiquan, “Exploring the Path of Integrated-Style 

Joint Operations Command,” People’s Liberation Army Daily, September 20, 2005.

42. Li Daguang, “Space Dominance: The Basis for Victory in 

Information War,” China Defense Newspaper, January 6, 2004. 

43. Li Yingming et al., “An Analysis of Integrated Joint Operations,” People’s Liberation Army Daily, April 12, 2005. 

44. Sun Xi’an and Wang Xiongli, “PLA Nanjing MR Conducted Tri-Service Communications Exercise in July,” People’s Front 

Line, July 15, 2004, FBIS-CHI. 

45. He Zhu, Experts Discuss the Iraq War, pp. 82-83. 

46. See, for example, Li Yandong et al., “PLA Exercise Involves 

Real-Time Intelligence Collection, Involving 20+ Types of Recon 

Techniques,” People’s Liberation Army Daily, December 27, 2010; 

and “Jinan PLA Exercise Greatly Successful,” People’s Liberation 

Army Daily, January 25, 2011. 
195

47. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 261. 

48. Fang Qiumin, “Four Major Aspects of Lessons from the 

Iraq War for Modern Warfare,” National Defense, No. 9, 2003. 

49. Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, p. 261. 

50. This section draws heavily upon He Zhu, Experts Discuss 

the Iraq War, pp. 93-96, 141-146.

51. Ibid., p. 111. 

52. Ibid., pp. 143-144. 

53. Ibid., p. 142. 

54. Ibid., p. 86. 

55. He Diqing, chief ed., Campaign Studies Teaching Materials, 

Beijing, China: AMS Press, 2001, p. 50. 

56. Academy of Military Sciences Operations Theory and 

Regulations Research Department and Informationalized Operations Theory Research Office, Informationalized Operations Theory 

Study Guide, Beijing, China: AMS Press, November, 2005, p. 403. 

57. Ibid., p. 404. 

58. Nanjing Political Academy Military News Department 

Study Group, “Study of the Journalistic Media Warfare in the Iraq 

War,” China Military Science, No. 4, 2003, p. 30. 

59. National Defense University Research Section, New Concepts of the Military Transformation, Beijing, China: PLA Press, 

2004, pp. 196-197. 

60. Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide, pp. 404-

405. 

61. National Defense University Research Section, New Concepts of the Military Transformation, Beijing, China: PLA Press, 

2004, p. 199. 
196

62. Wang Yongming et al., Research on the Iraq War, Beijing, 

China: AMS Publishing, June 2003, p. 229. 

63. Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide, p. 405. 

64. Nanjing Political Academy Military News Department 

Study Group, “Study of the Journalistic Media Warfare in the Iraq 

War,” China Military Science, No. 4, 2003, p. 28. 

65. Fan Gaoming, “Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological 

Warfare, and Legal Warfare, the Three Major Combat Methods to 

Rapidly Achieving Victory in War,” Global Times, March 8, 2005.

66. Nanjing Political Academy Military News Department 

Study Group, “Study of the Journalistic Media Warfare in the Iraq 

War,” China Military Science, No. 4, 2003, p. 30. 

67. Fan Gaoming.

68. He Zhu, pp. 73-74. 

69. Ibid., p. 111. 

70. Liu Gaoping, Study Volume on Public Opinion Warfare, 

Beijing, China: NDU Press, 2005, p. 197.

71. Tang Qunshen et al., “Why Did We Not See People’s War 

in Iraq?” Guofang, No. 8, 2003.

72. Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide, p. 405; and 

Liu Gaoping, pp. 16-17. 

73. Liu Gaoping, p. 5. 

74. Ibid., p. 68. 

75. Nanjing Political Academy Military News Department 

Study Group, “Study of the Journalistic Media Warfare in the Iraq 

War,” China Military Science, No. 4, 2003, p. 28. 

76. Academy of Military Sciences Operations Theory and 

Regulations Research Department and Informationalized Opera-
197

tions Theory Research Office, Informationalized Operations Theory 

Study Guide, Beijing, China: AMS Press, November, 2005, p. 406. 

77. “In Modern Warfare, Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare Are All Frenetically Developing,” 

People’s Liberation Army Daily, April 1, 2004.

78. Those islands were at the heart of the 1961 conflict between Iraq and the then newly independent state of Kuwait. 

79. Liu Gaoping, pp. 160-161. 

80. Ibid., p. 69. 

81. Ibid. 

82. Nanjing Political Academy Military News Department 

Study Group, p. 28.

83. Ibid., p. 29.

84. Ibid.

85. Liu Gaoping, p. 71. 

86. Fan Gaoming.

87. Nanjing Political Academy Military News Department 

Study Group, p. 32. 

88. Liu Gaoping, p. 107. 

89. Nanjing Political Academy Military News Department 

Study Group, p. 31.

90. Liu Gaoping, p. 70. 

91. Nanjing Political Academy Military News Department 

Study Group, p. 32.

92. Liu Gaoping, pp. 72-73. 
198

93. Fan Gaoming.

94. Nanjing Political Academy Military News Department 

Study Group, p. 29.

95. Liu Gaoping, pp. 87-93. 

96. Nanjing Political Academy Military News Department 

Study Group, p. 28. 

97. For further discussion of this office, see Matthew Boswell, 

“Media Relations in China’s Military: The Case of the Ministry 

of National Defense Information Office,” Asia Policy, No. 8, July 

2009, pp. 97-120. 

98. Thomas Bickford, “Trends in Education and Training, 

1924-2007: From Whampoa to Nanjing Polytechnic,” in The “People” in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military, Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner, eds., 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2008, p. 38. 

99. Nanjing Political Academy Military News Department 

Study Group, p. 33. 

100. Fan Gaoming. 

101. Liu Gaoping, p. 27. 

102. Ibid., p. 161. 

103. Nanjing Political Academy Military News Department 

Study Group, p. 30.

104. “Xinhua Launches CNC World English Channel,” Xinhua, July 1, 2010, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/

china/2010-07/01/c_13378575.htm.

105. Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide, p. 406; 

and Cheng Hui, “China’s Military Begins Research and Training in Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal 

Warfare,” Xinhuanet, June 22, 2004. 
199

106. Han Yanrong, “Legal Warfare: Military Legal Work’s 

High Ground: An Interview with Chinese Politics and Law University Military Legal Research Center Special Researcher Xun 

Dandong,” Legal Daily, PRC, February 12, 2006. 

107. Fan Gaoming. 

108. Cheng Hui.

109. Fan Gaoming.

110. Ibid.

111. Liu Kexin, chief ed., Legal Warfare Knowledge Study Volume, Beijing, China: National Defense University Press, 2006, pp. 

298, 310-311. 

112. Liu Jiaxing, “General’s Views: Legal Warfare—Modern 

Warfare’s Second Battlefield,” Guangming Daily, November 3, 

2004.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. Luo Youli, National Defense Theory, National Defense 

Teaching Materials, Vol. II, Beijing, China: AMS Press, 2003, p. 

112. 

201

CHAPTER 6

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY LESSONS 

LEARNED FROM RECENT 

PACIFIC COMMAND OPERATIONS

AND CONTINGENCIES

Frank Miller

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter highlights lessons learned by the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from its studies of 

and interactions with the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), including their evolving motivations and areas 

of interests.

MAIN ARGUMENT

China’s main purpose for interacting with the U.S. 

military was to assist in the modernization of the PLA. 

As the combatant command responsible for the AsiaPacific Region, PACOM is the face of the U.S. Military 

to the PLA. The PLA readily engaged with PACOM 

when its interests could be met, or when PACOM offered entrée to more strategic, national-level lessons 

resident elsewhere in the United States. As the PLA’s 

shi, or strategic positioning increased, other factors detracted from their desire to engage, but not their need 

to study, PACOM and its subordinate forces. These 

factors include a shared sense of competition for military primacy in Asia and the need in Beijing to protect 

the viability of their strategic message, even within 

the PLA’s own ranks. Thus, the bilateral military rela-
202

tionship entered a phase of downward spiraling to the 

point now where the primary lessons the PLA wants 

to learn from PACOM is how to defeat it.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

• Pacific Command and its forces, are increasingly seen by the PLA as a tool for surrounding 

and containing China’s peaceful development. 

The PLA will engage with PACOM only when 

Beijing feels its strategic position in a particular issue is weak, when their studies assess 

PACOM can offer them lessons of value, and 

when engaging does not undermine another, 

seemingly unrelated but no less important, issue.

• The reduction of PACOM’s voice in the bilateral relationship is a loss to Washington of a 

key component of the Department of Defense 

(DoD) global engagement strategy in dealing 

with China.

— Where PACOM used to be a source for cooperation, it is now seen more as a potential 

enemy.

— Where proponents of PLA modernization 

and transformation used to seek best practices and lessons from the U.S. military 

through PACOM, they are increasingly 

turning to other sources for the same information, not willing to pay the political price 

for dealing directly with the United States.

— Where Washington used to have the ability to dial up or down the rhetoric in bilateral communications, the loss of PACOM as 

an accepted component in the relationship 
203

has forced an unhealthy formality in what 

should be normal messaging between two 

militaries.

• Washington can no longer depend on PACOM 

to send objective messages to the PLA, because 

Beijing is too busy studying how to counter 

their operations to listen.

Traditional Chinese strategy is based on relative 

strengths and positions between antagonists. Given a 

known set of their own capabilities, the Chinese seek 

to learn everything possible about a potential rival’s 

capabilities, and then modify their strategic approach 

accordingly.1

 China’s preferable application of their 

foreign and security policies traditionally relies on 

the demonstration of a capability to coerce or force 

militarily other parties to adopt measures favorable 

to China.2 When they cannot achieve a “Strong State” 

balance of power for lack of shi, they fall back on 

“weak state” strategies of delay, deceit, and development of domestic capabilities along with foreign allies.3

 China currently sees itself in this latter state and 

has been taking diplomatic4 steps to achieve easy solutions along its periphery while delaying the harder 

issues. This diplomatic approach is designed to buy 

time for their economic and informational strategies 

to establish friendly (and in some cases, dependent) 

ties around the world, build deceptive perceptions of 

a China deserving of reestablishing its past glory and 

set the conditions for a return to the preferred strong 

state shi. The military dimension of this strategic shift 

requires completely overhauling a backwards, domestically-focused, and politically-driven military to meet 

the conditions of a modern deterrent force capable of 

influencing potential threats both along their periph-
204

ery and in global areas of interest. It is this overhaul 

that is being seen by western and Chinese observers at 

all levels of the PLA over the past 40 years, but which 

seems to have accelerated in the last decade.

While other chapters of this volume will outline 

the global nature of China’s studies, this chapter will 

focus on what they may have learned specifically from 

watching PACOM contingency and engagement operations in their own neighborhood. The author will 

attempt to answer why the PLA would seek to learn 

anything from an organization that has such a different structure and which they seemingly have no interest in emulating, are continuously complaining about, 

and whose every action seems to violate all of the 

Chinese principles for foreign relations. Following the 

pattern that whatever is adopted from external sources will be modified to have “Chinese characteristics,” 

which parts of PACOM’s organization and operations 

are they interested in, and why? And what evidence is 

available to make a direct linkage?

The short answer for the first question is obvious. 

PACOM is the face of the strongest military China sees 

every day, and whether the lessons they seek are for 

better understanding of a potential rival or for further 

development of their own armed forces, it is natural 

to pay attention to PACOM forces in the Asia-Pacific. 

Of course the PLA does not just watch PACOM; they 

watch all of the U.S. military,5

 but for purposes of this 

chapter, the author assumes PACOM is the model being studied.6

 To answer the other questions, though, 

requires a quick look at the PLA itself.
205

PLA Today.

The PLA is a learning organization7 in that it is constantly searching itself and looking externally for the 

“best practices and efficiencies in its personnel, command and control, acquisition, training and operations 

systems.” It is, however, a learning organization with 

Chinese characteristics, meaning it does not create an 

environment conducive to the upward flow of new 

ideas. The legacy of the Confucian taboo against correcting one’s senior8

 prevents it from becoming a true 

learning organization in the Senge definition.9

 Instead, 

the PLA created two high-level organizations with the 

charter to advise the Central Military Commission 

(CMC) on external and internal army building issues 

of interest. These two institutions are located next to 

each other in northwest Beijing and report directly 

to the CMC. When studying what and how the PLA 

learns, these two organizations are key. 

The Academy of Military Science (AMS) has hundreds of staff scouring military issues globally for anything of interest. AMS is not as much an educational 

academy as it is a research think tank. It offers no undergraduate programs and its graduate-level fellows 

are hand-picked to study in detail a specific topic. 

The National Defense University was formed in 

December 1985 to develop and oversee the instruction 

of military theory and PLA doctrine to high-ranking 

officers,10 specifically at the group army level or above 

for ground forces and army level for air and sea forces. Following an April 1998 Enlarged Meeting of the 

CMC to discuss decisions of the 15th CPC National 

Congress, the National Defense University (NDU) 

was tasked to support the CMC plan for the “Fostering of High-Ranking Officers of the 21st Century,” 
206

which included a 30 percent reduction of the PLA’s 

educational institutions.11 The focus of NDU’s mission 

planning broadened to ensure the PLA officer corps 

was both trained and educated at all stages in their 

career. 

To expand the instruction to its officer corps at all 

levels, the PLA has thousands of officers and civilian 

instructors throughout a Professional Military Education (PME) system disseminating all that was learned 

and adapted. This PME system was one of the first 

to modernize into the “informationized” era through 

the consolidation of unit-run military academies into 

universities that direct studies at several regional colleges and schools, complete with distance-learning 

programs for remote units unable to attend a formal 

campus-based course of study.12

The manner in which AMS and NDU take lessons 

and develop doctrine or direct equipment development makes it hard to make any direct linkage to specific lessons. It is not only hard to determine exactly 

what may be learned from PACOM, but just as hard 

to determine what is being learned by the PLA at all. 

Many Chinese writers who are willing to discuss potential lessons are not directly linked to the military, 

while those who are often feel constrained by secrecy 

laws. So despite the assertion by Ministry of Defense 

Foreign Affairs Office Director, Major General Qian 

Lihua, that the PLA is “more transparent than the U.S. 

military,”13 outside observers have a difficult time seeing though the opaqueness of PLA modernization.

There seems, however, to be a recognizable pattern 

of reform that matches the focus of People’s Republic 

of China (PRC) leadership. The decision to change was 

first promulgated by Deng Xiaoping’s recognition of 

China’s need to modernize, though defense modern-
207

ization was placed lowest among his four modernizations. 14 Under Deng, strategic issues were tackled 

first, such as China’s version of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA),15 along with the 4-year project to 

update the AMS 1987 version of The Science of Military 

Strategy. Not completed until 2001, this study clearly 

shows that the PLA studies all sources globally available for lessons that can be applied to Chinese objectives. AMS published an official English translation in 

2005.16 Deng’s modernization goals intersected well 

with U.S. means of engagement in the early stages of 

the bilateral relationship, primarily through arms sales 

and joint development programs. All three services 

assisted the PLA in upgrading their weapons systems, 

including the Air Force Peace Pearl project avionics 

upgrade for the F8-II, the Navy’s provision of Mk 46 

torpedoes and the Army’s support to the PLA’s artillery capabilities through the sale of the AN/TPQ-37 

Firefinder counterbattery radar system and upgrades 

to their large-caliber ammunition. According to Lieutenant Colonel Jer Donald Get, the Chinese were also 

interested in man-portable anti-tank and anti-air missile systems and helicopters of all types.17 The sale of 

Sikorsky “Blackhawk-like” S-70C medium lift transport 

helicopters was conducted through Direct Commercial Sales. PACOM-specific contacts during the Deng 

era included port calls to Qingdao and Shanghai, 

while hosting PLA Navy (PLAN) port calls twice; and 

tactical demonstrations by the 25th Infantry Division 

to high-level PLA visitors to Hawaii.18

Under Jiang Zemin, who sought to regain central 

control of Deng’s openness and reform programs, the 

PLA developed how to modernize. He began making 

the PLA more professional by forcing them to divest 

of all commercial entities, promising a greater share 
208

of the central budget, and later making the PLA more 

available to the outside world through his 1997 New 

Security Concept. That he backed off of this concept a 

mere 2 years later does not negate the progress made 

in the PLA’s acceptance that transnational problems 

belonged in their mission set.19 Under Jiang’s sponsorship and encouragement, the PLA embarked on 

an intensive two-track modernization program by attempting to upgrade their hardware and software simultaneously. Major weapons systems for all services 

were planned, either for purchase or development. 

While the United States was no longer a viable partner in the hardware track, the PLA decision to gain 

knowledge (software) when hardware is not available 

allowed significant increases in contacts with PACOM, such that, had the 1999 bombing of the Chinese 

Embassy in Belgrade not occurred, the potential to 

conduct more than 8 of the 81 planned and agreedto contacts for that year was high.20 The mid-to-late 

1990s saw a significant increase in PLA attendance at 

multilateral conferences sponsored by PACOM or its 

subordinate commands.21

The recovery in engagement following the double 

dip in contacts caused by the Embassy bombing in 

Belgrade, Serbia, and the J-8/EP-3 collision, combined 

with a mutual concern that then Taiwan President 

Chen Shui-bian was going to cross the PRC’s red line 

toward independence, all spurred a mutual desire to 

increase contacts and mutual understanding. Hu Jintao’s “harmonious world” approach seems to have 

brought PLA modernization out of the Jiang-era crisis mode and under a long-term planning construct, 

described in the 2008 Defense White Paper as “the new 

stage in the new century.”22 Residual programs that 

began under Jiang, however, especially in support of 
209

equipment and capability development, will remain 

in effect through at least 2020. Still, as the PLA sought 

to modernize its organizational structure in this period, the United States was more than happy to offer 

advice and assistance where doing so did not raise legal and policy concerns.23 PACOM led the way for the 

U.S. side, maintaining contacts through the Military 

Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), lowering the level of interaction with the Mid-Level Officers 

Exchanges, and conducting multiple humanitarian relief efforts throughout the region, including in China.

But all actual changes have been dutifully anchored 

in Chinese traditional strategic thought, including 

the avoidance of war if possible, and when it is not 

possible to avoid war, to use every effort available to 

minimize the expenditure of resources and manpower 

to achieve a quick victory. Lessons that can be applied 

to their acquisition or development tasks are largely 

a “Title 10” issue for the United States, meaning the 

lessons come from the individual services, rather than 

from an operational command like PACOM.24 Despite 

the comment attributed to Jiang Zemin that he would 

“prefer a good soldier waiting for good equipment 

over good equipment waiting for a good soldier,” it 

was the acquisition and development of better equipment that allowed the lessons sought to shift in focus 

from the hardware begun under Deng and accelerated 

under Jiang, to the softer operational and tactical concepts the PLA is seeking around the world today. 

To learn joint operations from the United States 

would require more focus on PACOM and its subordinate commands’ operations. So where are they 

now? In this author’s opinion, they are on the verge 

of fielding a comprehensive defense mechanism designed to prevent conventional interference in the 
210

maintenance of their security policies all along their 

periphery; focused primarily on their eastern coastline 

and borders, but deployable to any border region if 

needed. Doctrinally called the anti-access air defense 

(A2AD) strategy, it is designed to keep PACOM as far 

from the Chinese coast as possible, thereby negating 

the perceived strengths of a maritime littoral presence 

strategy. What they intend to learn from PACOM, 

therefore, is how to defeat it at the least possible cost.

The PLA last saw major combat during their attempt to force Vietnam out of Cambodia, 1979 to 

1987.25 For China watchers trying to ascertain the 

extent of modernization and whether doctrinal lessons have been learned, the lack of conflict means no 

direct demonstration of lessons learned. They have 

conducted very few deployments, often unhelpfully 

to this study by following the United Nations (UN) 

flag and standards, but there are some significant ones 

to note. The ongoing naval deployments to the Gulf 

of Aden are perhaps the most notable for both their 

duration and distance. Both attributes were honed 

through multiple ship visits to U.S., Canadian, and 

South American Pacific ports. A 4-month round the 

world cruise conducted in 2002 offered the PLAN excellent opportunities to develop long-range logistics 

and communications procedures.26 Equally of interest, 

though, is the inclusion of the UN Convention on the 

Law of the Sea’s Article 95, “Immunity of warships on 

the high Seas” on the website dedicated to the PLAN 

Anti-Piracy deployments. Though probably intended 

to support the legality and “just-operations” aspect 

of their deployment, this posting highlights the lesson learned that working outside of one’s territorial 

waters requires adherence to international law.27 Participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises such 
211

as Pakistan’s AMAN (Peace) series of multinational 

maritime exercises offered them experience in multiship formations and tactical operations.28

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) deployments, 

while promoting peace for the antagonists, also offer international prestige. As Chinese peacekeepers 

continue to become ever more useful (meaning lethal—which offers a greater deterrent to breaking the 

peace and is more useful in a peace building mission), 

China’s voice grows in the leadership of the UN PKO 

Office.29

Chinese planners have received opportunities to 

learn how a large operation is planned, coordinated, 

and managed through Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Peace exercises, such as with Russia in 

2005, 2007, 2009, and the latest in September 2010. The 

Chinese have often requested to observe U.S. exercises 

and did observe the Valiant Shield naval exercise in 

June 2006, but have expressed disappointment in the 

relative lack of access to U.S. operational activities, 

increasing their paranoia that U.S. exercises target 

China. 

But some lessons that have applicability to army 

building can be loosely tracked chronologically, based 

on the PLA’s history of engagements with PACOM 

since 1990.30 In general, an initial focus to improve 

training regimens led to the realization that their personnel and education systems did not allow for expected benefits from modernized training concepts. 

This study led further to the realization that cooperation and coordination, both domestically and with regional neighbors, are essential to gaining greatest efficiencies in both deterrence and defense. The below 

case studies will follow in rough chronological order.
212

Organization.

The Chinese recognized in the mid-1980s that their 

bloated personnel system and top-heavy officer corps 

detracted from the professional military they sought 

to establish. Personnel management had to improve, 

including development of a noncommissioned officer 

(NCO) corps, officer education, and targeted recruitment of college graduates with high-tech degrees. 

They needed to find a model. West Point, which has 

long been popular both to visit and study, embodied 

all the PLA wanted; a high-technology curriculum in 

direct support of the U.S. Army’s officer recruitment 

needs that attracts top tier high school graduates.31

The establishment of a Cadet Exchange between West 

Point and the Nanjing Polytechnic Institute under 

the sponsorship of China’s Ministry of Education has 

helped solidify this relationship, and demonstrates its 

importance to the Chinese by protecting it somewhat 

from the ups and downs of the overall bilateral military relationship. Additionally, the PLA dispatched 

numerous study teams to the United States and other 

countries to learn how modern societies attract, recruit, and retain the human capital required to run 

a modern military.32 These trips included numerous 

visits to U.S. military NCO academies and hosting of 

NCO-led PACOM delegations to China. 

 A second organizational restructuring idea centered on PACOM itself—the regional command’s war 

zone concept. This concept has been widely debated 

in China since the 1980s as a potential replacement for 

their military regions, but has yet to be fully implemented. The term took off in popularity around 1995-

96, according to research by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA).33 Interestingly, this is about the time that 
213

PACOM engagements with the PLA began to grow. 

One of these PACOM engagements offered a unique 

look at a newly-refurbished Guangzhou Military 

Region Command Center in December 1997, where 

the Commander, General Tao Bojun, noted his span 

of control was similar to that of the visiting PACOM 

Commander and that he saw himself as PACOM’s 

counterpart.34 This assessment seemed unusual at the 

time since the host for this visit was Lieutenant General Kui Fulin, whose position as Deputy Chief of the 

General Staff was seen in Hawaii as the appropriate 

counterpart for the PACOM commander.35

The PLA now considers PACOM’s protocol rank 

as equivalent to a military region. Whether the reason for this downgrade in counterpart status was an 

internal determination of where PACOM fit into the 

overall U.S. National Defense hierarchy or whether it 

was in response to the increased access to the civilian 

leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense is 

unknown. The pattern is clear though, that since the 

passage of the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) in 2000, the rank of China’s interlocutors 

with DoD has dropped proportional to the rise in U.S. 

interlocutors’ ranks, and the opportunities for the PACOM commander to interact with the PLA leadership 

have been significantly reduced. This author believes 

the resultant loss of interaction, while unintended by 

the drafters of NDAA 2000, has lessened the cooperative nature of PACOM’s relationship with the PLA, 

undermined a key component of PACOM’s regional 

engagement strategy, and thereby impacted negatively on the way in which the PLA leadership views 

PACOM and its activities in the region.36
214

Equipment.

PLA studies of PACOM no doubt include the assigned equipment and how it is employed. PACOM 

operations that could be applied to the modern (in this 

case mechanized) era began during World War II. A 

lesson the Chinese clearly have taken from this conflict 

is the importance of the aircraft carrier when seeking 

to extend one’s operational reach beyond the range of 

land-based bombers. The Chinese observed that until 

the U.S. Pacific Fleet developed and employed carrierbased attack capabilities, the Japanese carrier-based 

fleet dominated the Western and Central Pacific. The 

lesson learned then, was that aircraft carriers were essential to shift the fight away from one’s own shores 

to the open ocean or even to the opponent’s home waters. This is a lesson they teach as early as universitylevel military studies.37 But as they teach the need for 

a more modern military, they also study the need to 

defend it. In some cases, by studying how the United 

States defends its ships from various threats, they also 

study ways to defeat the U.S. systems. This is perhaps 

easiest to see not by the studies themselves, but by the 

source of the studies. Two studies of U.S. shipborne 

weapons systems (precision-guided missiles by the 

PLA Air Force [PLAAF] Engineering University’s College of Missile Engineering and optical-electronic anti-ship missile countermeasures by the PLA Electronic 

Engineering Institute) show direct correlations to development of PLA strategies to defeat these systems.38
215

Training Centers.

The PLA sought information on the establishment 

and use of the Army’s National Training Centers, 

Combined Arms training, Opposing Forces, and the 

development and use of Laser Engagement systems. 

Engagement with PACOM, specifically the subordinate service commands, gave the PLA entrée to the 

national-level U.S. military, their ultimate counterpart 

and learning platform.39 Today, the PLA has multiple large training centers with maneuver room for 

Brigade-size mechanized units, centrally controlled 

and monitored using remote sensors and cameras that 

enable precision feedback on the effectiveness of unit 

rotations.

Regional Engagement.

The PLA has also learned a great deal from PACOM’s Security Cooperation Operations, which they 

call Military Diplomacy.40 PACOM’s exercise series 

with allies and partners throughout the area of responsibility (AOR) may have inspired a similar approach with their Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO) partners. Building peacetime bilateral relations 

through engagement in Central Asia, for example, 

not only supports China’s counterterrorism goals, but 

also helps support a goal to prevent U.S. encirclement 

of China by maintaining close ties with Central Asian 

counterparts. It was through this series of exercises 

that the PLA deployed officially its first units abroad, 

demonstrating another trait common in PACOM engagement strategies—the importance of presence.

Multilateral engagements by the PLA support 

both diplomatic and modernization goals. They avidly participate in all key security forays in the region, 
216

including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) and Shangri-La Dialogues. Unlike their Foreign Affairs Ministry, however, the PLA rarely matches the ranks of the other 

attendees, citing a wide range of other responsibilities 

as the reason their principal invitee could not attend.41

Whether this common decision is portfolio related or 

intended to send a diplomatic message of superiority in the region is unknown. Their attendance at the 

functional multilateral conferences is usually both 

professional and participatory, indicating a strong interest in the subject. This author’s hypothesis is that 

conference attendance shows not only which subject 

areas the PLA is interested in learning, but where they 

are in their own development. The AMS seems to be 

tapped if they are seeking new ideas. As stated earlier 

in this chapter, their NDU develops the lesson plans 

and instructional packets for new doctrine, so if an 

NDU fellow attends a multilateral conference, it will 

usually be the second and subsequent years, and indicates the need to confirm, update, or build on the AMS 

report from the previous year. 

If no expertise exists in either of the schools, however, the attendees usually hail from the appropriate 

general departments or service. The Pacific Area Special Operations Conference (PASOC) is a prime example of this phenomenon; since no Special Operations 

curriculum seems to exist in their central schools—

probably due to the lack of a national level Special 

Operations Command structure—doctrine and training both are developed in the General Staff Department’s (GSD’s) Training and Doctrine Bureau.42 One 

unknown is whether the end of conference attendance 

signals a shift in interest on the subject or a rebalancing of interests against concerns that the United States 
217

has lead for the issue. Stated differently, other than 

when attending a conference for diplomatic reasons, 

do they pre-plan a finite period of attendance or base 

the decision on some other external factor? This author believes the case of the PLA’s attendance at the 

Asia Pacific Center for Strategic Studies supports the 

latter, though not depending on the external factor often cited by the PLA themselves.

Military Diplomacy/Global Relations.

Nothing demonstrates better the PLA’s use of 

PACOM’s multilateral conference opportunities as 

models for future behavior than their attendance at 

the Asia Pacific Center for Strategic Studies (APCSS). 

Established in 1996 as an engagement tool to encourage regional awareness and cooperation on issues of 

common concern, APCSS continually hosts conferences and seminars in their Waikiki, Hawaii, facility, inviting defense and security professionals from 

around the Asia-Pacific Region to venues lasting from 

1 day to 9 weeks. The PRC at first resisted attending 

the seminars, and only started sending fellows about 

the time their NDU first offered its own International 

Symposium Course (ISC) in late 1999 (U.S. Fiscal Year 

2000). Besides serving and former attachés, the PLA 

participation alternated between AMS and NDU faculty. The timing of their attendance, and the choice of 

fellows, points strongly to their intent to learn from 

APCSS how to better develop their own ISC.

The purpose of the ISC is, according to its introductory class, to introduce China’s perspectives on the 

regional and global security issues of the day.43 The 

PLA’s simultaneous development of the ISC, which 

included adjusting its length and scope each year for 
218

the first 4 years, matches well with their attendance at 

APCSS. Although they would be reluctant to admit 

it, this course seems to have been modeled after PACOM’s APCSS, which the Chinese military attended 

from late 1999 until mid-2002, when, according to 

Chinese military scholar Senior Colonel Wang Baofu, 

a new foreign policy strategy was adopted to “refuse 

to treat Taiwan in isolation from other aspects of the 

relationship.”44

Official Chinese talking points blame the presence 

of Taiwan officers in attendance at other APCSS venues, as well as the continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, 

as the reason for boycotting APCSS. This argument 

is supported somewhat by Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office (MND-FAO) interlocutors 

continuing to research ways to make the PRC seem 

a more valuable invitee than Taiwan, but weakened 

by the PLA’s willingness to send participants to both 

West Point and the U.S. Air Force Academy during 

International Cadet Exchange Weeks. Taiwan attendance at the Academies is well-known by the PLA 

but apparently overlooked. While the PLA continues 

to boycott the Center, Chinese nonmilitary organizations without access to the ISC, including the Border 

Control Forces, have attended APCSS since mid-2008. 

Apparently, the appreciation and value other PRC 

government organizations seem to have for interacting with regional neighbors outweighs the PLA’s arguments and undermines Wang’s claim of a new foreign policy strategy. 

While the presence of Taiwan fellows may have 

caused the PLA to end its participation earlier than 

planned, another factor seems to have played a part 

in the decision, the APCSS message itself, and the 

danger to the political purity of any officer sent to at-
219

tend. This author, who attended the fifth ISC class in 

2003, believes the Chinese reluctance to attend APCSS 

seminars has more to do with liking the model well 

enough to emulate it, while being concerned that their 

message was not competitive in the Hawaii venue, 

even to their own officers.45

Humanitarian Operations. 

The PLA was an early supporter of including how 

PACOM conducted Humanitarian Operations in the 

military engagement program. Having been the recipient of several PACOM-run operations in support 

of Chinese natural disasters and embarrassingly dependent on the U.S. Navy to deliver Chinese relief 

supplies to Indonesian Tsunami victims, the PLA 

embarked on a period of study and building. In one 

study, authors from the PLA’s Military Transportation 

Academy termed the U.S. support to China’s Wenchuan Earthquake relief effort as “inspiring,” and noted 

the lessons learned would help improve the PLA’s intelligence mechanisms, quick-reaction and long-range 

strategic mobility capabilities, all-weather day-night 

operations, safety equipment, and integration of their 

emergency management systems.46 The lack of heavy 

lift fixed and rotary wing aircraft was quickly learned 

in the immediate response period following the earthquake. China has attempted to resolve that problem 

since 2005 with purchase requests to Russia for both 

Il-76MD strategic transport jets and more heavy lift 

Mi-17V7 Search and Rescue helicopters, but to date 

continues to face problems in negotiating with the 

Russians. They have also lobbied the United States to 

sell repair parts for the S-70C helicopters sold them 

in the 1980s, while allegedly seeking the same parts 
220

through espionage and illegal trading.47 Nirav Patel 

points out that the “winning hearts and minds” lesson was learned from observing PACOM’s Tsunami 

relief operations in 2004, and included a version of 

this well-known American strategy in the 2006 Defense 

White Paper. 48

Since the mid-90s restart of military engagements, 

the PLA has exchanged disaster relief exercise observers with U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (USARPAC) and 

the Hawaii National Guard, with more scheduled but 

cancelled in response to U.S. Taiwan arms sales announcements. The PLAN has also constructed two 

hospital ships. After briefing Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead on these new ships in 

2009, the PLA accepted an invitation to send doctors 

to join the U.S. Navy’s next humanitarian cruise. This 

cruise happened to be in the Caribbean, so no direct 

connection can be made to PACOM forces, but doctrinally, the lessons learned would be the same. The 

Zhoushan, a 10,000 ton Chinese hospital ship, recently 

sailed on its inaugural friendship tour to the Gulf 

of Aden, ready to dispense their own brand of humanitarian aid in a very familiar manner. The ship’s 

complement of 428, including medical staff, stopped 

in the African and Asian nations of Djibouti, Kenya, 

Tanzania, the Seychelles, and Bangladesh during its 

87-day voyage.49

Civil-Military Coordination.

The PRC has long recognized the need to coordinate defense missions with those of other security 

strategies and civil defense organizations. The Chinese 

Ministry of Civil Affairs notes in its information paper 

posted to the International Civil Defence Organisation 
221

(ICDO) website that while the regional governments 

should manage disaster response, it also stresses the 

“commando” roles performed by the members of the 

PLA, the Armed Police, the Public Security Forces, 

and Militia Reserves.50

The establishment of a “Coast Guard,” expanding 

roles, and consolidating various organizations into a 

Maritime Security Force is just one example that the 

Chinese have studied the United States for lessons 

learned, though it is doubtful they will pursue to the 

degree the United States has. If the recent interest in 

securing energy routes and joint fishery patrol agreements with neighboring countries (including the United States) proves anything, it is that the PRC recognizes that trade tops all51 and that military interests must 

remain subordinated to security of trade relations and 

positions.52 More likely are the recent indications that 

the five civilian patrol agencies may all be taking on a 

paramilitary support role. While troubling, the trend 

matches the history of the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Joint Exercises.

PACOM engagement strategies are designed in 

part to gain regional participation, with the desire 

of fostering greater regional cooperation. At times, 

however, PACOM forces conduct unilateral exercises, 

providing opportunities for internal training, but often timed for their deterrent effect. A long-held theory 

of engagement by PACOM has included the impact 

of deterrence to maintaining peace and stability in the 

region. This has been an especially important part of 

the command’s engagement strategy vis-à-vis China 

and the potential for another cross-Strait crisis and 

includes elements of strength (barge tours in Pearl 
222

Harbor), surprise (unannounced deployments of 

B-52s to Guam), and a little American craziness (officially called ambiguity).53 As early as 1998, however, a Chinese officer attending a Harvard University 

program for PLA Officers noted that the deployment 

of two carrier battle groups into the waters off Taiwan, ostensibly to deter a continuation of the March 

1996 Missile-firing exercises into the Taiwan Strait, 

not only did not deter further launches, but was received in Beijing as confirmation that their message 

had been received. “Had the U.S. sent fewer than two 

carrier groups,” he said, “China would have been 

disappointed.54”Perhaps the most important lesson 

learned to date by the PLA about PACOM also came 

from this event. The deployment of two aircraft carriers into the waters near Taiwan, described by David 

Shambaugh as “the greatest show of strength directed 

at China since the Sino-American rapprochement of 

1971,” signaled in the most unambiguous way that 

the United States—and PACOM—is prepared to intervene should China attempt to reunify Taiwan by 

force.55

Additionally, this event showed the Chinese the 

importance of submarines. According to an article in 

the Taiwan-based “Defense International” (“全球防卫

杂志”) in February 1997, the “disappearance at sea” of 

the PLAN nuclear submarines forced the U.S. battle 

groups to remain 300 nautical miles off-shore. The article credits the 1996 decision to stay outside China’s 

claimed territorial waters to a 1994 encounter between 

the USS Kitty Hawk and a Han class submarine west of 

Japan’s Kyushu Island that showed China’s seriousness in defending its 200 nautical miles (nm) Exclusive 

Economic Zone (EEZ).56 The idea that small, quiet submarines can exploit a vulnerability in Navy fleet de-
223

fenses was reinforced by Liu Jiangping in a thorough 

analysis of RIMPAC 2010, during which Japanese 

and Republic of Korea (ROK) submarines were able 

to penetrate the anti-submarine shields and directly 

engage the aircraft carrier. The Rim of the Pacific 

Exercise (RIMPAC) is a multinational naval exercise 

hosted by PACOM that China has never been invited 

to, according to Liu.57

A related lesson derived from a more recent U.S exercise is illustrative of another problem of intentional 

messages being misconstrued; that many deterrencefocused activities only serve to inspire. In a 2007 reference to a U.S. exercise “Dragon Roar” (“龙啸”), the 

main lesson the author opined should be learned was 

that the PLA needed to have the capability to fight a 

regional threat. This exercise was described by the author as a rehearsal of the “mass bombing” of China’s 

coastal cities from [airfields in] Guam and Okinawa. 

The author concluded that “we can’t wait foolishly 

for a surprise enemy attack on our cities.”58 This perceived threat could be one motivation for studying 

U.S. dependence on remote communications lines, 

from seabed to space-based. Over-dependence on 

long logistic lines was first noted as a disadvantage of 

the U.S. forces deployed in Korea by Mao Zedong.59 In 

a conclusion with a more direct and modern application to PACOM, NDU Institute for National Strategic 

Studies (INSS) research indicates western scholars believe a primary motivation for China’s development 

of an anti-satellite capability was the ability “to exploit potential U.S. vulnerabilities . . . and reduce the 

American ability to operate in the Western Pacific.”60

The PLA has learned lessons from watching PACOM exercises, engagements, and operations. Some 

of these lessons have been encouraged (high availabil-
224

ity disaster recovery [HADR], education reform, NCO 

Corps, Gulf of Aden anti-piracy patrols); some were 

unintentional. The outside observer has to also expect 

that some lessons have been independently derived 

(such as the need for regional supply bases for long 

range deployments of naval ships), but it is hard to 

believe in too many coincidental developments that 

just happen to be near copies of PACOM capabilities. 

Some lessons would most certainly not have been intended to be taught by PACOM or any other U.S. military organization.

So I return to my original question, why would 

the PLA want to take lessons from an organization 

they seemingly have no desire to emulate? In his 1998 

monograph, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Lawrence Freedman opined that the significance of new 

technologies developed by the United States in the 

1990s was not to create the ability of the United States 

to dominate all of its adversaries, but that its adversaries would find new ways of fighting. “It was therefore likely that those in conflict with the Americans 

would use other methods short of challenging them 

to an unwinnable regular war.”61 Beijing was shocked 

at the effectiveness of other military campaigns discussed in this volume. Combined with the knowledge 

that U.S. forces in the Pacific are combat-ready and 

available for any contingency, Beijing has to conclude 

that for all of its emphasis on deterrence and stability 

operations, PACOM forces will be sent into combat 

by Washington if needed. Beijing has to study them, 

therefore, in order to develop an asymmetric counter 

against PACOM interference in Chinese goals and 

objectives. This represents the single most important 

lesson the PLA seems to have learned from its interaction with PACOM; the importance of finding another, 
225

asymmetric, way of dealing with them.62 Whether 

they learned the right lessons will, it is hoped, never 

be known.

Implications for U.S. Policy.

The Sino-U.S. military-to-military relationship has 

shifted from the engagement strategy of regional actors centered (for the U.S. side) on Hawaii to a more 

strategic, globally-focused engagement directly between the capitals. The PLA seems to seek engagement with PACOM only when its strategic position 

in a particular issue is weak, when their studies assess 

PACOM can offer them lessons of value, and when 

engaging does not undermine another, seemingly 

unrelated but no less important issue (like Taiwan or 

strategic communications). 

Beijing’s lowering of the PACOM Commander’s 

counterpart level, significant reduction of approved 

high-level PACOM-PLA exchanges, and increasingly 

vocal criticism of PACOM’s military operations in 

the western Pacific all indicate the loss to Washington of a key component of DoD’s global engagement 

strategy in dealing with China. Where PACOM used 

to be a source for cooperation, it is now seen more as 

the potential enemy whose mission is surrounding 

and containing China’s peaceful development and 

against which to base contingency planning. Where 

proponents of PLA modernization and transformation used to seek best practices and lessons from the 

U.S. military through PACOM, they are increasingly 

turning to other sources for the same information, not 

willing to pay the political price for dealing directly 

with the United States. And where Washington used 

to have the ability to dial up or down the rhetoric in 
226

bilateral communications, the loss of PACOM as an 

accepted component in the relationship has forced an 

unhealthy formality in what should be normal messaging between two militaries. Washington can no 

longer depend on PACOM to send objective messages 

to the PLA, because Beijing is too busy studying how 

to counter their capabilities to listen to their entreaties.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. The well-known quote from Sunzi, “know yourself and 

know your enemy . . .” is applied in every facet of life by the Chinese. A recent case of its application is the July 2010 Asia Regional 

Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, where, after repeated 

attacks from U.S. and Association of Southeastern Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) delegates on China’s South China Seas policies, Foreign 

Minister Yang Jiechi seemed to threaten Singapore by reminding 

their Head of Delegation that China was a “big country,” and they 

were not. When this type of relativity is used with U.S. delegations, the comparison is that China is a “developing country” and 

the United States is not. 

2. Peng Guanqian and You Youzhi, eds., The Science of Military 

Strategy, Beijing, China: Military Science Publishing House, 2005, 

p. 469. See also Colleen K. Holmes, “What the Chinese Learned 

from Sun-Tzu,” unpublished monograph for the Army War College, Carlisle, PA, April 10, 2000, p. 9. Holmes uses the term “calculative strategy” to indicate Beijing’s awareness of their current 

geo-political position and intent to improve on it. 

3. While the Chinese do not enter alliances in the western 

sense, they do depend on short-term alliances of interests to 

build voting blocs. See Han Xudong (韩旭东), “中国军队要学会打

‘全球战争’” (“China should learn to fight a ‘global war’”), Global 

Times online, June12, 2010, available from opinion.huanqiu.com/

roll/2010-06/853891.html. The usage of shi as “strategic position/

advantage” is derived from Holmes, p. 1. For a more in-depth 

study of shi, see David Lai, Learning From the Stones: A Go Approach 

to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi, Carlisle PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2004.
227

4. The author is using the western concept of Diplomacy, Informational, Military, and Economy (DIME) to address Chinese 

relations with the world, recognizing that the Chinese would 

use their domestically-derived Comprehensive National Power 

(CNP) calculations. With eleven major categories, the CNP is seen 

by the Chinese as a more precise means of determining relationships between nations. 

5. See, for example, the direct translation of an Industrial 

College of the Armed Forces guidebook for the Joint Staff. Liu 

Weiguo, Ruan Yongjun, and Wang Jianhua, (刘卫国,阮拥军,

王建华), 美军联合参谋军官指南 (The Joint Staff Officers Guide), Beijing, China: PLA Press, 2001. 

6. For examples of lessons attributed to the U.S. military but 

clearly meaning U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) see Sun Jian 

and Wan Licheng (孙健 and 万里程), “美军欲进驻马六甲海峡的意

图及影响“ (“An Analysis of U.S. Military Intentions Toward the 

Malacca Strait”), 东南亚纵横 (Southeast Asia Affairs), January 2007; 

and Zhang Xin, Li Mengyan, Zhou Dongyang, Wu Yang, and 

Chen Yuxun (张昕, 李孟研, 周东阳, 吴洋, and 陈玉勋), “透视

‘5·12’ 美军非战争军事行动及对我军的启示” (“Inspiration of the 

U.S. Army’s Non-war Military Operation in the ‘May 12’ Earthquake to Its Chinese Equivalent”), 国防交通工程与技术 (Journal of 

Traffic Engineering and Technology for National Defense), May 2009, 

available from CNKI.net, November 11, 2010.

7. With apologies to Peter Senge, B. Garratt, and Arlie de 

Geus, primary developers of the “Learning Organization” model. 

8. Readers will be familiar with the required bonfires of any 

formalized Chinese military modernization concept, which has 

grown over the years to now being based on the guidance of 

Mao Zedong’s military thinking, Deng Xiaoping’s thinking on 

building the army in the new period, Jiang Zemin’s thinking on 

strengthening the national defense and the army, and on the important guidelines of Comrade Hu Jintao on national defense and 

the army under the new circumstances.

9. For an easy-to-read summary of Senge’s theory, see Mark 

K. Smith, “Peter Senge and the Learning Organization,” available 
228

from http://www.infed.org/thinkers/senge.htm. For the original, see 

also Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline. The Art and Practice of the 

Learning Organization, London: Random House (1990). 

10. Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A McVadon, “China’s Foreign 

Military Relations,” Stimson Center Report #32, Washington, DC, 

October 1999, p. 21.

11. Kuan Cha-chia, “Military Commission Instructs National 

Defense University to Undertake New Mission of Training New 

High-Ranking Military Officers of 21st Century,” 广角镜 (Wide 

Angle) Magazine, Hong Kong, trans. by Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS). Author’s copy is not dated.

12. Briefing to author while touring the Lanzhou Military Region’s Army Academy, Xi’an. The briefing included a description 

of the education network that extended to all remote outposts in 

the Lanzhou MR, allowing the officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to take courses and exams online. Author’s notes, 

September 2005.

13. Statement made in author’s presence by Major General 

Qian Lihua, Director General of the Ministry of National Defense 

Foreign Affairs Office, during U.S.-PRC Defense Policy Consultative Talks, held in Beijing, China, February 2009. 

14. See Edward C. O’Dowd, “Chinese Military Strategy in the 

Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War,” for a comprehensive 

description of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) inadequacies 

for modern, professional warfare.

15. Implies a Directive Manager in Senge’s concept established 

in the PLA. Western engagement sees General Xiong Guangkai in 

this role as primary promoter of China’s Revolution in Military 

Affairs (RMA), but does he represent others?

16. Peng, p. 503.

17. Lieutenant Colonel Jer Donald Get, What’s With the Relationship Between America’s Army and China’s PLA? An Examination 

of the Terms of the U.S. Army Strategic Peacetime Engagement with 

the PLA of the PRC, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College 

Fellowship Research Project, March 25, 1996, p. 3.
229

18. For more detailed discussion of U.S. Army interactions 

with the PLA during this period, see Colonel Jer Donald Get, 

What’s with the Relationship Between America’s Army and China’s 

PLA?

19. See David Finkelstein, “China’s New Security Concept: 

Reading between the Lines,” Washington Journal of Modern China, 

Spring 1999/Vol. 5, No 1. Author used Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Project Asia Issue Paper publication of the same title, 

dated April 1999.

20. In a 2004 meeting with a visiting U.S. Professional Military 

Education delegation, Major General Yao Youzhi of AMS noted 

that since 1990, the PLA was studying the U.S. style of joint services to replace what he described as “coordinated branch/service 

operations.” Author’s notes, Beijing, China, June 18, 2004.

21. Personal notes. At the time, author was the J-5 China Desk 

Officer for U.S. Pacific Command.

22. “China’s National Defense in 2008,” Information Office of 

the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, January 2009, 

p. 8.

23. The Pentagon’s need to meet requirements under the 1979 

Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8), and the National Defense 

Authorization Act 2000 (Public Law 106-65, Sec 1201) are often 

perceived as restrictive to the U.S.-PRC Military relationship. 

Nothing in either of these laws, nor the pertinent implementing 

policies, prevents outright any interaction with the PLA, calling 

instead only for due consideration in each case.

24. At least one western observer has noted the structure of 

the PLA’s new Self-Propelled Gun (SPG) battalion seems to be a 

copy of the U.S. Army’s Paladin SPG battalion. See Martin Andrew, “GI Zhou Newsletter,” July 22, 2006, available from www.

oldwardogs.us/2006/07/tongzhimen_shub.html. For an assessment of 

the critical components needed to employ an aircraft carrier and 

how the PLA currently compares to the United States and other 

military capabilities, see Liu Peng and Ma Xiaojing (刘鹏 and

马晓婧), “浅析航空母舰与中国海军装备能力建设“ (“Superficial 
230

Analysis of Aircraft Carriers in the Building of Chinese Navy’s 

Equipment Strength”), 法制与社会 (Journal of Legal System and Society), July 2010, pp. 179-183, available from www.cnki.net. Author 

is indebted to David Lai for pointing out this article. 

25. For an excellent account of this conflict, see Edward C. 

O’Dowd, Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The 

Last Maoist War, London, UK: Routledge, 2007. 

26. “Naval Expert Yin Zhuo: Chinese Navy Can Explore Establishment of Long-Term Shore Supply Bases,” Beijing National 

Radio, December 26, 2009. In Chinese, trans. by Open Source Center, CPP20091230702007.

27. The article states, “Warships on the high seas have complete immunity from any State other than the flag State.” See 

“Chinese Navy Fights Pirates,” available from eng.mod.gov.cn/Spe

cialReports/2009hjdjhd/2008-12/22/content_4008196.htm. The author 

could not find the equivalent posting on the Chinese language 

site. 

28. See www.paknavy.gov.pk/AMAN/Intro.htm for information 

and photos on the series of AMAN (Peace) exercises hosted by the 

Pakistan navy. According to the site, China sent ships in 2007 and 

ships and Special Operations Force (SOF) teams in 2009. The 2011 

exercise is currently scheduled for March 2011. Photos of Chinese 

SOF and the “Guangzhou” in AMAN 09 are available from news.

xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/08/content_10969930_1.htm. 

29. For the most recent compilation of Chinese involvement 

in United Nations Peacekeeping (UN PK) operations, see Bates 

Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: 

Prospects and Policy Implications, SIPRI Paper No. 25, November 

2009. 

30. Frank Miller, “Benefits and Challenges to the U.S.-China 

Military to Military Relationship,” Speech to the Security Forum, 

2007 George Bush China-U.S. Relations Conference, Washington, 

DC, October 23-24, 2007.

31. See, for example, Zhang Jinou (张金欧), “美国军官学校的

军事思想教育“ (“The Education of Military Thoughts in the U.S. 
231

Service Academies”), 比较教育研究 (Comparative Education Review), May 2009, available through CNKI:SUN:BJJY.0.2009-05-016.

32. As Army Attaché to Beijing 2003-06, the author was the 

senior Army representative in country and therefore the sponsor 

for all exchanges with West Point leadership and cadets during 

that time. This passage is from author’s notes and memory. 

33. Kenneth W. Allen, Dean B. Cheng, David M. Finkelstein, 

and Maryanne Kivlehan, “Institutional Reforms of the Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army: Overview and Changes,” CNA Project 

Asia Report, May 2002, pp. 32-34.

34. This visit and briefing were last in a multi-service tour 

of China for Admiral Joseph Prueher that, from author’s notes, 

seemed designed to play up the strengths of the PLA. The author 

is indebted to Larry Wortzel for reminding me of this visit and the 

theme that in both word and deed pointed to the PLA’s emulation of the Geographical Combatant Commander (GCC) concept. 

Whether the intent was to include the flexibility and freedom of 

action included in the “combatant” aspect of the U.S. GCC model 

in the scope of the PLA MR Commander is debatable. Guangzhou, PRC, December 16, 1997.

35. At the time, the counterpart pairings were SecretaryMinister, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)-Chief of General Staff (COGS), and Commander in Chief, Pacific Command 

(CINCPAC)-Deputy Chief of General Staff (DCOGS). 

36. See, for example, Cao Linlin and Wang Yunxiang (曹琳

琳,王运祥), “美国加强关岛军士基地建设的战略解读“ (“Interpreting the Strategic Connotation of the U.S. Improving its Military base in Guam”), 广东外语外贸大学学报 (Journal of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies), January 2010, available from 

CNKI:SUNGDWY.0.2010-01-015; also Sun Jian and Wan Licheng 

(孙健 and 万里程), “美军欲进驻马六甲海峡的意图及影响“ (“An 

Analysis of U.S. Military Intentions Toward the Malacca Strait”), 

东南亚纵横 (Southeast Asia Affairs), January 2007, available from 

CNKI:ISSN:1672-3953.0.2006-04-004.

37. Li Yu (李雨), ed., 大学军事学教程 (University Course in 

Military Studies), Shanghai: Shanghai University Press, 2006, p. 
232

27. The editor, a PLA colonel and graduate of PLA National Defense University (NDU), cited PLA NDU’s 普通高等学校军事课教

程 (Course Lectures for General College Level Military Studies) 

and relevant General Staff Department directives and specifically 

acknowledged the assistance of AMS Deputy Commandant Lieutenant General Qian Haihao (钱海皓中将) for his institute’s help 

with the book. 

38. Wu Jing, Deng Kun, and Liu Shikao (吴静,邓堃,柳世考), 

“美军精确制导武器及其对抗技术的分析“ (“Analyzing U.S. Military Precision Guided Weapon and Its Countermeasures Technique”), 兵工自动化 (Journal of Ordnance Industry Automation), 

April 2007, available from CNKI:ISSN:1006-1576.0.2007-04-035; 

Xiong Liang, and Zhu Li (熊良, 祝利), “美军舰载光电对抗系统

现状与发展分所“ (“Current Situation and Development Analysis of the Ship borne Optical-electronic Countermeasure System in U.S. Military Force”), 舰船电子对抗 (Journal of Shipboard Electronic Countermeasure), April 2006, available from 

CNKI:SCN:32-1413.0.2006-04-006. These are representative examples of intensive studies of every component of PACOM’s force 

structure.

39. Get, Appendix B, p. 24.

40. For a quick explanation of the uses of military diplomacy, 

see Nan Li, “From Revolutionary Internationalism to Conservative Nationalism; The Chinese Military’s Discourse on National 

Security and Identity in the Post-Mao Era,” Peaceworks, No. 39, 

Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, May 2001, p. 

30-31. It is also interesting to note that the Chinese language version of the Chinese Ministry of Defense website does not have 

a separate sub-page for Military Diplomacy like its English language counterpart has. Compare mod.gov.cn with eng.mod.gov.cn. 

41. Author’s notes.

42. Author’s conversations with PLA attendees to Pacific Area 

Special Operations Conference (PASOC), 2004-06.

43. Author’s notes from the Fifth ISC, September-November 

2003.
233

44. Author’s notes. Wang was speaking to the Seventh RANDChina Reform Forum Conference, Beijing PRC, August 2004.

45. Author’s notes, September 2003.

46. Zhang Xin, Li Mengyan , Zhou Dongyang, Wu Yang, and 

Chen Yuxun.

47. See “China spy sought Blackhawk helicopter parts, F-16 

engines,” World Tribune.Com, April 25, 2008, available from www.

worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2008/ea_china0088_04

_25.asp.

48. Nirav Patel, “Chinese Disaster Relief Operations: Identifying Critical capability Gaps,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 52, 1st 

Qtr 2009, p. 113. The 2006 Defense White Paper can be found at eng.

mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2006.htm. 

49. See Bi Mingxin, ed., “Chinese navy hospital ship sets sail 

on first overseas medical mission,” Xinhua online, available from 

www.gov.cn/english/2010-08/31/content_1692806.htm. 

50. While I do not know the purpose for using the term “commando” to describe the armed forces’ role, the importance of 

civil-military cooperation is clear. See www.icdo.org/Directory%20

ORIGINAL/Directory-english/China.maj.2006.ang.pdf.

51. The linkage between a nation’s military and its economy is 

discussed in He Xin and He Zhengbin (何鑫 and 何正斌), “从美国

经济看其军事战略走向“ (“Viewing the Trend of the U.S. Military 

Strategy from Its Economy”), 国际问题研究 (Journal of International Studies), April 2005.

52. See as an example of their study of the Coast Guard, the 

translation of “The Pentagon’s Fifth Side: The Coast Guard Transfers to the Department of Defense,” 五角大楼的第五边:海岸警

卫队转隶国防部,Ordnance Knowledge Vol. 11B, November 15, 

2008, AMS Researcher Major Wang Baocun (王保存少校), trans. 

The subordination of the Chinese armed forces to the national 

economy is clearly stated in the 2008 Defense White Paper, available 

from eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2008.htm. I am indebted 

to Dennis Blasko for pointing this out. 
234

53. See for example, Federal News Service transcript of “The 

Heritage Foundation Lecture with Admiral Timothy Keating, 

U.S. Navy, Commander, United States Pacific Command,” July 

16, 2008, in which Admiral Keating, responding to a question, 

stated, “We hope to be a very powerful deterrent. And every day 

[that] goes by that missiles aren’t flying across the strait, I believe 

our deterrence is effective.” This position is not unique to Admiral Keating, however. It is a standard set of metrics by which 

PACOM has measured success under every commander before 

and since.

54. Author’s interviews with participants of the two seminars. 

Harvard’s Kennedy School ran two Executive Seminars for Senior 

Chinese Military Officers in 1998. The nonattributable comment 

cited reportedly was made in the second seminar, March 7-21, 

1998.

55. David Shambaugh, “Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects,” Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 3.

56. The encounter was listed as a 70-hour event on October 27, 

1994, without making it clear if that date was the start or end of 

the encounter. See “PLA Navy-Transforming From a Brown Water to a Blue Water Navy,” Defence International, Taipei, Taiwan, 

February 1997, pp. 36-46. 

57. Liu Jiangping, “Joint Military Exercise Messes Up AsiaPacific Situation,” Modern Navy Magazine, September 2010, Open 

Source Center trans.

58. Dai Xi (戴旭), “中国需要什么样的新型军队“ (“What Kind 

of New Military Does China Need?”), Global Times, No. 1426, May 

31, 2007, p. 11. The author, a PLAAF colonel, is described as Senior Strategy Commentator, presumably for Global Times. 

59. Peng, p. 473.

60. Phillip C. Saunders and Charles D. Lutes, “China’s ASAT 

Test: Motivations and Implications,” INSS Special Report, Washington, DC: Institute for National Defense Studies, National Defense University, June 2007, p.g 2. 
235

61. Monograph was published IISS, as cited in Lawrence 

Freedman, “On War and Choice,” The National Interest, No. 107, 

May/June 2010, pp. 10-11.

62. Christopher P. Twomey, “Chinese Doctrines as Strategic 

Culture: Assessing their Effects,” Strategic Insights, Vol. IV, Issue 

10, October 2005, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA.

237

CHAPTER 7

THE INFLUENCE OF U.S. 

COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

IN AFGHANISTAN ON THE PEOPLE’S 

LIBERATION ARMY

Martin Andrew

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter looks at the influence of U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan on the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

MAIN ARGUMENT

The PLA has learned many lessons from U.S. 

COIN operations in Afghanistan, but the primary 

areas involve battlefield fire support, interdiction, 

the importance of low collateral damage, helicopters, 

unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and fixed-wing close 

air support in the conduct of conventional operations. 

These lessons have been applied to the overall development and modernization programs of the PLA, and 

not exclusively to the development of a Chinese-style 

COIN capability and doctrine.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

China has transferred the COIN mission from the 

PLA to the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP). It implies that the China sees this mission in an exclusively 

domestic context. The PLA itself is not preparing to 

conduct external COIN operations on the scale of 
238

U.S. operations in Afghanistan. It is unclear how the 

PLA would respond if it were called upon to perform 

COIN-like roles in an overseas context. 

The PLA has nonetheless used the lessons learned 

by the U.S. military to inform the developing “jointness” of its own operations. Combined arms operations, with realistic training, have been emphasized to 

increase the capability of the PLA. 

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) does not have close 

air support and low collateral damage weapons comparable to those of the United States but fully appreciates U.S. advances in these areas and is trying to replicate them where it can. The PLA also has grasped the 

importance of helicopter assault, attack, and lift roles 

as well as the importance of battlefield fire support, 

especially from fixed-wing close air support assets. 

Moreover, the PLA sees unmanned systems as having 

ever-greater importance on the modern battlefield. 

INTRODUCTION

The PLA entered the 21st century in the midst of 

a transformation from essentially an infantry based 

force into one designed around combined arms mechanized operations. A decade into the new century, 

the PLA is redesigning its forces into battle groups, 

using modular force structures and logistics to support operations in high altitude and complex terrains, 

conduct out of area operations, and develop the core 

for its vision of a hardened and network-centric army. 

In the same period, the U.S. military and other 

agencies have been involved in an extended COIN 

campaign in Afghanistan. Operating in a high altitude 

complex terrain, U.S. forces have employed network 

centric methods and equipment in wide-ranging op-
239

erations that feature joint fire control; intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and decapitation operations with heavy involvement of UAVs to 

establish information dominance and to enable targeted strikes of a widely distributed adversary. 

The PLA has followed the campaign closely, not 

least because China shares a short border with Afghanistan, but also because the study of U.S. operations in Afghanistan provides an opportunity to inform the ongoing modernization and development of 

the PLA. The coincidence of ongoing reforms in the 

PLA and U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan has 

allowed for an opportunity for the latter to inform the 

ongoing transformation in the PLA, ranging in form 

from inferential lessons learned to a direct application 

of U.S. operations. This chapter finds that the chief 

lessons learned for the PLA from U.S. operations in 

Afghanistan relate more broadly to the development 

and refinement of PLA conventional operations rather 

than to a more narrow application to Chinese-style 

COIN. In part, this is because the PLA sees traditional 

COIN missions as having only a domestic application, 

and the mission responsibility for domestic COIN has 

been delegated to the paramilitary PAP.1

This chapter examines how the PLA is “piggy 

backing” on the lessons learned by U.S. forces in their 

own COIN operations in Afghanistan to accelerate 

the modernization of the PLA’s own force structure, 

strategy, and tactics. Chief lessons learned from U.S. 

operations in Afghanistan include the importance of 

helicopter assault, lift, and attack roles; fixed-wing 

close air support; and transformed battlefield fire support and organizational models. 
240

BACKGROUND

The PLA’s well-known 1990s pursuit of xinxihua 

zhan (信息化战) “informationalized warfare” has added the supporting concepts of peishu or modularization (配属), and zhichi or support (支持).2

In the early years of this century, the Beijing and 

Shenyang Military Area Regions main force mechanized infantry divisions conducted exercises utilizing 

the concepts of peishu and zhichi to develop the PLA’s 

new brigade/battle group structures in urban and 

other operational scenarios, with Xinjiang-based units 

tasked to apply these in high altitude operations.3

These and subsequent trials developed new doctrine 

and structures for complex operations in high altitude 

or plateau regions, and in urban warfare.4

These trials coincided with the start of U.S. operations in Afghanistan (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM [OEF]) in late 2001, operations that demonstrated that the combination of precision guided munitions, 

rapid aerial maneuver, and information dominance 

could quickly change the dynamics of ground combat. 

Consequently, the timing and effectiveness of U.S. operations in Afghanistan have had a profound effect 

on the PLA’s own doctrinal concepts and equipment 

developments, but the impact has been on its broader 

conventional forces doctrine, tactics and equipment, 

rather than more narrowly on COIN operations alone. 

The key observations that the PLA has drawn from 

U.S. COIN in Afghanistan about the nature and conduct of war include: 

• Maneuver from the air is still a powerful means 

of power projection.

• Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are now viable for both ISR and precision attack. New roles 

will continue to be found and utilized.
241

• Information and joint operations allowing for 

precision strikes are the keys to modern warfare. This enables a small-sized force, employing information operations and precision fire 

power, to achieve disproportionate effects on 

an adversary.

• Space control now has a direct influence on the 

modern battlefield, down to the lowest tactical 

levels, in such areas as global positioning system (GPS) and satellite communications.

This chapter will examine each of these elements 

in turn. 

AVIATION OPERATIONS

One of the biggest weaknesses of the PLA, which 

has plagued it since the Korean War, has been the 

movement and sustainment of forces on China’s periphery. This shortcoming was painfully exposed during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War5

 and has continued 

to bedevil the PLA until the present day, including 

notable aerial support failures in the PLA’s response 

to the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake.6

 Two of the biggest 

issues currently facing the PLA are the ability to move 

forces quickly by air and high altitude helicopter support.7 Consequently, force sustainment has become a 

priority under PLA’s modernization in the first decade 

of the 21st century. Zhichi and the creation of a corpslevel logistics able to supply and support forces deep 

inside an enemy’s rear area are two ways in which this 

priority manifests itself.8 

From the very beginning of the U.S. forces deploying to Afghanistan, the PLA has taken notice of the 

impact both of strategic transport and the employ-
242

ment of large helicopters both for tactical mobility as 

well as long-range operations.9 The PLA, as with other 

professional military observers, doubtless paid attention to the 640 kilometer (km) air assault operation 

by U.S. Marines to secure the opium distribution center and runway in the Registan Desert on November 

23, 2001, which showed the PLA the combat value of 

large, air-refueling capable helicopters. Once secured, 

the airfield was very quickly made operational, and 

long range C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft rapidly 

provided support to build up the base. The base itself 

was totally supplied by air during its operation. 

Transport Helicopters. The Chinese aircraft company AVIC has developed the AC313 medium lift helicopter, an advanced development of the old Z-8, itself 

a copy of the old Aerospatiale Super Frelon helicopter.10

With composite materials comprising 50 percent of 

the helicopters to reduce its empty weight, and with 

three Pratt and Whitney Canada PT6B-67A turboshaft engines delivering 20 percent more power, the 

AC313 can fly up to 6,000 miles (m) and operate in 

temperatures from -400 Celsius (C) to +500C, enabling 

it to operate on the Tibetan Plateau with ease.

 The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) use 

of Mi-8/17 transport helicopters would also been of interest as the PLA’s current high altitude transport and 

utility helicopter is the Russian Mi-17 transport helicopter, the export designation of the Mi-8MTV-2 helicopter. The PLA version incorporates a chin-mounted 

radar enabling bad weather operations, has a limited 

self-defense capability, and extra engine capacity. Despite the extra power, the Mi-8MT/Mi-17MT can only 

carry six to eight combat-laden soldiers (each carrying 

35 to 40 kilograms (kg) of equipment in addition to his 

weapon and uniform) below 3,000 meters, and this de-
243

creases to only four or five at 3,000 to 4,000 meters altitude.11 By comparison, the CH-47D Chinook transport 

helicopters deployed in Afghanistan can carry 30 passengers and five tons of cargo at the same altitudes.12

Armed Helicopters. As the U.S. military were deploying assets for operations in Afghanistan, the PLA 

deployed its first army airborne regiment to Xinjiang 

ostensibly to combat Uyghur separatists.13 The unit 

was initially equipped with approximately 30 Chinese-built Z-9G helicopters. The PLA would have taken particular interest in the U.S. operations at high altitudes in Afghanistan, as this new unit’s mission was 

to develop tactics and doctrine for heliborne operations, including night time combat search and rescue, 

as well as conducting counter terrorist and insurgency 

missions.14 Its organization and mission profile was 

similar to a hybrid mix of a U.S. Army Ranger battalion in combination with the 160th Special Operations 

Aviation Regiment (Airborne). 

The use of attack helicopters in Afghanistan was of 

particular interest, as the PLA were developing armed 

WZ-9G helicopters and were deciding on a purposely 

designed attack helicopter. The WZ-10 attack helicopter similar in size to AH-1W and will be the linchpin 

of the PLA Aviation’s modernization plans. Besides 

anti-armor, its missions will include escort, armed reconnaissance, and force protection, the latter against 

enemy attack and reconnaissance helicopters and 

UAVs.15

The PLA continues to have a shortage of long 

range heavy transports and air-to-air refueling tankers which will continue to plague the PLAAF for many 

years to come. In 2005, the PLAAF ordered 34 new Ilyushin Il-76MD transports and 4 Il-78 tankers; however, 

the production line in Uzbekistan has closed down, 
244

and it remains uncertain as to whether the order will 

be filled. (See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of 

the capabilities and characteristics of various helicopter and fixed wing assets.)

Observable Change or Development.

In January 2006, PLA aviation assets were ordered to develop into a rapidly mobile force adapted 

to integrated joint operations and to transition from 

a supporting to a combat arm with both attack and 

maneuver roles by the year’s end.16 The PLA had already started to practice long-range aerial maneuver 

and massed helicopter raids behind enemy lines, as an 

October 2005 exercise report from a Jinan mechanized 

infantry division indicated. The ability to both launch 

and then defeat a helicopter landing were practiced at 

that time. A large-scale helicopter-borne insertion was 

successfully undertaken; however, it was detected by 

an unmanned aerial system being used in a reconnaissance role, resulting in a notional long-range fire strike 

defeating it.17

UNMANNED AIR SYSTEMS AND 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND 

RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance were 

the primary goals for Chinese UAS until the U.S. forces employed them in various roles, even in the early 

days of U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The PLA has 

been very interested in any UAS developments, and 

Chinese defense industries have developed nearly 

all of the UAS used by the PLA.18 The notable exception might well be the HARPY attack UAV, sold by 
245

Israel to the PLA in the late 1990s. PLA special forces 

have operated UAS since the mid-1990s. Photographs 

in the Chinese press show the Chinese-produced 

CH-801 hand-launched micro-UAS to be in service.19

Larger UAS have also been developed, primarily for 

the ISR role; the W-50, an older design, has already 

achieved “combat effectiveness.”20 In the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, at least one Chinese-developed small 

UAV was deployed to survey the damage.21 The other 

operational UAS system is the Z-5, which has the appearance of a large remote control model helicopter. 

Increased Use of UAS by the PLA. 

In late 2005, the PLA experimented with the use 

of UAS for the targeting as well reconnaissance and 

surveillance in night operations. UAS were deployed 

on operations with thermal imaging equipment and a 

data link to transmit their images back to a joint operations cell to coordinate strikes based on the data 

received, which was then distributed to various artillery batteries.22

Although these trials were deemed successful, they 

were not declared combat effective, perhaps due to an 

incomplete supporting infrastructure and the absence 

of a long-range guided multiple rocket systems that 

could exploit the capability of an UAS. The success of 

the U.S. UAS in Afghanistan may well have spurred 

the Chinese defense industry to develop new designs, 

as recent Zhuhai (珠海) air shows and symposia have 

demonstrated.23 

In recent Chinese natural disasters, small UAS 

have been used in disaster relief roles in which they 

can provide a rapid ability to survey large areas rapidly and require little infrastructure to deploy and op-
246

erate. The PW-1 close range reconnaissance UAS and 

the larger PW-2 are recent examples of this trend. (See 

Appendix A for further details on UAS systems.) 

Observable Change or Development of UAS 

Systems. 

The most recent observable change or development 

that the PLA has adopted from U.S. COIN operations 

in Afghanistan may well be the development of an indigenous armed unmanned combat system (UCAS).24

The first Chinese UCAS shown in public was the CH3, designed by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and unveiled in November 2008.25 

BATTLEFIELD FIRE SUPPORT AND COMBINED 

ARMS TASK ORGANIZATION

Joint Fire Strike. 

As part of its informationalization initiative, the 

PLA has introduced the concepts of joint firepower 

strike (联合火力打击) and precision strike (精确打

击).26 The former describes the idea of all arms striking, 

with precision strike referring to the use of advanced 

targeting equipment and/or precision-guided munitions. These concepts provide insight into the priority 

the PLA has given to modernizing its doctrine, organization, and equipment in order to reduce the time 

taken for targets to be identified and destroyed. In 

particular, the new armored battle groups can bring 

improved target acquisition and fire control; the U.S. 

experience in Afghanistan has no doubt provided 

some insights.

For many years, it appeared that the PLA used a development of the Russian concept of Reconnaissance-
247

Combat Operations (RBD) in high altitude COIN 

operations. This involves the extensive use of signals 

intelligence, special forces, and helicopters supported 

by ready reaction forces and artillery to provide blocking forces and prosecute attacks.27 Recent material 

suggests that they have been more influenced by the 

ability of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to provide rapid 

and highly accurate on-call firepower, especially via 

close air support (CAS) and tube artillery. If they 

started out using RBD, the PLA appears now to have 

transitioned to a joint fire support model that looks 

more like a U.S. approach and may be based on the 

observations of U.S. operations in Afghanistan.28 

Moreover, the PLA has internalized how GPS and 

high technology communications give the United 

States a huge situational awareness advantage as well 

as the ability to provide almost immediate accurate 

PGM strikes on an identified target. In 2004, PLA 

special forces reconnaissance teams were tasked with 

providing intelligence information for larger forces 

and fire coordination for long range fire support, developing their tactics on China’s western periphery.29

The PLA now employs GPS in its armored vehicles 

for both navigation and to assist in targeting precision 

guided munitions. Any maneuver platoon can call in 

fire support on a seamless fire support command and 

control net.

The PLA has taken on board the use of their equivalent of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) and 

their attendant equipment, which were first seen in 

Afghanistan.30 The PLA employs battalion level scouts 

to enable rapid destruction of battlefield targets, with 

close air support now available through the battalion 

level scouts and artillery fire controllers with their attendant targeting equipment who can be employed at 
248

the platoon level when required or operate ahead of 

the battalion. The PLA changed the structure of their 

mechanized infantry battalion for the first time since 

its introduction in the 1960s to allow for this change, 

going away from the triangular Soviet model to a 

Western four-vehicle platoon. 

The PLA has also been particularly impressed 

by the U.S. forces’ ability to hit small targets in both 

urban and rural areas quickly and with minimal collateral damage, whether through close air support or 

artillery.31 Multiplatform mini-air-to-ground missiles 

like the Israeli Spike and U.S. Viper Strike are of considerable interest and have been commented upon 

and written about.32 The PLA have noticed that the 

use of too much fire power in urban and high altitude 

terrain reduces the avenues of approach and provides 

better defensive positions to an enemy.33 Destroying 

mountain passes, which are a good spot for an ambush, denies their use, and rubble in cities from destroyed buildings restricts maneuver while providing 

excellent concealment for ambushes and improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs). 

The concept of the informationalization of the battlefield saw the PLA change from kinetic warfare to 

warfare in which nodes and systems are attacked to 

break down an enemy’s ability to resist by destroying 

their command and control centers. Noncontact combat—using sensors to identify a target deep behind 

the battlefield and then using long-range precision 

munitions to destroy them—became a valid concept.34 

However, a recent article in the PLA Daily indicates that the PLA is adapting the joint fire strike 

concept as used by the U.S. military to its own ends. 

Specifically, the PLA appears to treating the concept 

as a tool of operational level, rather than tactical, war-
249

fare.35 This may be due to a shortage of the battlefield 

command and control equipment and munitions required to conduct a joint fire strike, requiring the PLA 

to husband its resources to get the most effective use 

out of these assets. This does not preclude the use of 

joint fire strike in tactical operations, but such tactical 

operations must have an operational level effect, such 

as destroying a headquarters or communications node 

and thereby creating massive disruption in the adversary’s command and control net. 

Influence of U.S. developments in Afghanistan:

New Organization of the Mechanized Infantry 

Brigade. 

As noted earlier, the PLA thorough informationalization envisions combat formations being flatter, 

networked, smaller, and more versatile. The ability of 

small U.S. forces to call in all the available firepower 

or just a single aircraft no doubt has provided a model 

for how the new PLA structure might operate, not 

least because informationalization trials inside the 

PLA were being developed concurrently with U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Informationalization and the 

incorporation of U.S. concepts of operation necessarily 

require better command and control in the PLA. The 

Type 89 (equivalent to the U.S. M577-series) armored 

command vehicle attached to every infantry company 

and above, as well as to mortar and air defense platoons, helps address the demands of better command 

and control capability. Importantly as well, a fourth 

infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) has been added to the 

mechanized infantry platoon for the platoon headquarters. 

The PLA conducted an exercise combining informationalization concepts with the peishu and zhi-
250

chi concepts and formed a reconnaissance/cavalry 

battle group for the August 2007-Exercise Peace Mission-2007. The first of its type in the PLA, this reconnaissance/cavalry battle group could have been used 

to test the aviation brigade and reconnaissance brigades, which are to be part of the new corps. While 

its exercise mission was asserted to be a counterterrorism role, the scale of the exercise meant it also 

involved COIN and out of area entry operations. The 

battle group was composed of:

• A light (wheeled) mechanized infantry battalion comprising 40 Type 92 wheeled infantry 

fighting vehicles. (For system details, see Appendix.)

• Two companies of 18 PTL02 assault guns.

• One battalion of 16 Z-9W attack helicopters, 

some with an under-nose turret mounting a 

laser range-finder/designator and thermal imager.

• One battalion of 16 Mi-17 transport helicopters, 

each capable of carrying up to six 57 millimeter 

(mm) rocket pods containing 32 rockets each or 

around 16 troops.

• One company of 12 ZBD05 airborne combat vehicles mounting a 30 x 165mm automatic cannon and a co-axial 5.8 x 42mm machine gun and 

capable of carrying four soldiers in the rear.

The Type 92s could transport a mechanized infantry battalion of three companies with the support provided by two companies of the PTL-02 assault guns, 

which was an unusually large amount of firepower 

(火力) for a mechanized infantry battalion. A company 

of the PTL-02 assault guns could have been used in the 

traditional cavalry roles of reconnaissance and flank 
251

protection, with the Type 92As providing the vehicles 

for the battalion headquarters and company support 

weapons. Infantry support weapons deployed included the QBZ87 35mm automatic grenade launcher, 

PF98 anti-tank rocket launcher, and Type 74 backpack 

flame throwers. The Mi-17s could lift two infantry 

companies with their support elements, providing the 

brigade commander with six company level maneuver elements. The Z-9W attack helicopters provided 

aerial reconnaissance, fire support and liaison. 

Besides being the PLA’s new heavy corps reconnaissance and screening force—providing flank protection and serving as the aviation assault brigade—

the group is ideally suited for the cavalry’s traditional 

mission of COIN. 

Future Developments—Close Air Support. 

The PLA is finally achieving the capability for oncall close air support, which previously its personnel 

in combat have never had. By incorporating the same 

battlefield command, control, and communications 

(C3) technology as used for precision strike, the PLA 

will shortly be able to exercise real time aerial fire support. 

Fixed wing close air support is just starting to become reality in the PLA. The Q-5, developed from the 

Russian MiG-19, has been equipped with the hardware and software to enable the use of the LT-2 laserguided 500kg bombs. The more advanced LT-3, which 

is a 500kg bomb mated to a laser seeker in the nose 

with a GPS guided bomb kit mounted on the rear, is 

also available and analogous to the U.S. EGBU-24.36

Presently the PLA uses UAS for ISR and targeting 

with long range GPS rockets used for prosecution of 

the target.37
252

COIN Strategy.

Reducing Collateral Damage and Non-Combatant Casualties. As noted in the sections above, U.S. COIN 

operations in Afghanistan have appeared to influence 

the PLA in several ways, but mostly in the modernization and development of general PLA efforts to 

become a better joint operating force. However, there 

have been some likely impacts on Chinese efforts at 

COIN. Most notably, these are in the importance of 

minimizing collateral damage in both people (both 

combatants and innocents) and materiel. In 2005, in 

the wake of the media coverage of U.S. operations in 

Afghanistan and elsewhere, the PLA was reaffirmed 

in its judgment about the power of the media to rapidly shape events. In an article on modern combat, the 

authors noted that that ”killing too many of the enemy 

on the battlefield may be strongly condemned by international public opinion.“38

The PLA has undoubtedly observed that U.S. 

forces employ a range of means to minimize civilian 

casualties, including using weapons that are accurate 

and have warheads designed for minimal damage to 

other than the intended target. More importantly, U.S. 

forces receive additional training in the requirements 

to use force proportionately in COIN operations, so as 

not to overreact to fire directed at them by calling in 

a disproportionate response, whether using their own 

weapons, artillery, or airpower. The Central Military 

Commission (CMC) has definitely taken measures in 

COIN operations to reduce noncombatant casualties 

by employing a wider range of less than lethal munitions and by expanding the role of the PAP. By law, 

the PLA cannot undertake nondisturbance operations 
253

without the express permission of the CMC, and protocols are enshrined in law to ensure the PAP is called 

out only for recognized anti-disturbance operations. 

No longer can the PAP be called on by a local official 

to provide muscle for a property developer who cannot get rid of people who will not move.39

Are there observable adjustments that the PLA has 

made in response to the lessons learned?

The war in Afghanistan has seen the U.S. military’s 

joint operation capabilities reach a new level. When 

people clearly see from the television screen U.S. special forces and Marines using a satellite phone, calling 

the air echelon up against newly discovered targets, 

they feel the real power of joint action.40

Joint operations through the PLA’s development 

of ”informationalization” in the entire military is seen 

as the keystone to the PLA’s way of fighting in the future. The notion permeates all levels of the four services and reflects the PLA goal of a military that can conduct network-centric warfare. U.S. joint operational 

capabilities are deeply respected by PLA commanders 

and planners and consequently have had an impact 

on the development of PLA warfighting doctrine. 

As the PLA was already undertaking trials on informationalization and the future structure of its combat units, U.S. COIN operations in Afghanistan have 

shown the PLA the value of maneuver from the air 

and the power of informationalization in the fields of 

fire support, ISR, and command and control of joint 

operations.41 The U.S. ability to provide on-call precision guided munitions strikes and CAS is often cited 

as an example of the value of informationalization. 

Although in peacetime doctrinal change often takes a 

long time to investigate and implement, the combina-
254

tion of the fortuitous timing of ongoing exercises and 

the lessons learned from observing U.S. operations 

sped up this process. 

In 2005, in response to CMC Chairman Hu Jintao’s 

call for an increased emphasis on training, the PLA 

changed the focus of its training to one that examined 

and built on a realistic appreciation of the modern battlefield.42 As joint operations were the focus for PLA 

training in 2006, lessons learned from U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan were being incorporated into 

PLA training regimes. Along with a continued emphasis on realistic training “with regards to the modern battlefield,” the priority of these exercises was to 

be on joint operations, combat capability, modularization (peishu), and sensor fusion to try and create a 

nascent battle management network-centric capability.43 In addition, in 2006 the PLA introduced a new 

mechanized infantry structure as well as a change in 

the mission and roles of the PLA aviation from a support to a combat arm.44 These developments resulted 

in significant changes to the combat structure of the 

PLA, especially in its use of battle groups within the 

mechanized infantry brigade, which has become the 

linchpin of PLA combat power.45

UAS were being developed prior to U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, but it was not until the United 

States started using them in both an ISR and an armed 

reconnaissance role that the PLA deployed them beyond trials.46 The PLA continues to develop new UAS 

vehicles, including an armed model, and may well see 

an armed UAS (UCAS) in service in a close air support 

role before a manned CAS system comes on line. 
255

WHAT OTHER UNIQUE LESSONS, PERHAPS 

IN OTHER FIELDS, DID THE PLA LEARN FROM 

STUDYING THIS CONFLICT? 

Exploiting the Achilles Heel—Anti-Ballistic Missile 

and Satellite Systems.

The then Secretary of the U.S. Air Force James J 

Roche, in a speech at the 2002 Massachusetts Institute 

of Technology Doolittle Award, noted that a bandwidth of 40 gigabytes was required just for the early 

days of U.S. operations in Afghanistan. He warned 

that the increasing use of satellites could lead to issues 

if they became unavailable. The Chinese had already 

focused on this key vulnerability, the Achilles heel of 

information operations, and started developing their 

nascent national missile defense (NMD) system in 

1990.47 The anti-satellite test of January 11, 2009, was 

a cover for the third of a series of anti-ballistic missile 

tests, the first two having been conducted on July 7, 

2005, and February 6, 2006. It showed that the PLA 

was also capable of knocking out satellites and an intermediate range ballistic missile, the former showing 

they could interfere with U.S. information dominance. 

Of course, the United States is capable of doing the 

same with its NMD systems. 

Infantry Weapons.

By studying the new infantry weapons systems in 

use by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the firepower of the 

PLA infantry soldier has benefited.48 Selected units 

now have weapons mounting laser markers, night 

sights, and other add-on systems via a rail interface 

system. This is particularly prominent in counterter-
256

rorist and special forces units involved in close quarter battle operations and training. 

Rail Interface System and Accessories. The U.S. Special Forces that went into Afghanistan had accessories 

attached to their M4 assault rifle such as reflex and 

optic sights, visible laser pointers, and night aiming 

devices/illuminators attached by a rail interface system. These accessories enable more rapid acquisition 

of targets and greater accuracy in both close quarter 

battle and at extended ranges in low light conditions. 

Referring to these, the Chinese weapons designers 

started work on accessories suitable for close quarter 

combat work by counterterrorist units. This tied in 

with an increase in funding for personnel and equipment for anti-disturbance duties.49 Chinese special 

forces (机动部队) counterterrorist (反恐) personnel 

have add-on kits for their Type 81 and 95 assault rifles 

similar to the U.S. Special Operations Peculiar Modification (SOPMOD) system, utilizing a rail attachment 

system akin to the Knight’s Armament Company rail 

interface system (RIS).50

CONCLUSION

The start of U.S. COIN operations in Afghanistan 

coincided with the PLA undertaking trials for the restructure of their mechanized infantry and operations 

in complex terrain, specifically urban warfare and at 

high altitudes. The PLA was able to piggy back extensively on the lessons learned from the United States 

in high altitude operations and to improve and accelerate modernization and development of the PLA, 

especially its informationalization emphasis. This is 

reflected in the company and platoon structures of the 

PLA. Others areas that benefited were strategic trans-
257

port, army rotary wing aviation, battlefield fire support, and, above all, UAS. It may also be the case that 

the amount of satellites required to provide sufficient 

bandwidth for even the early days of U.S. operations 

in Afghanistan informed PLA efforts to focus China’s 

anti-ballistic missile program to provide a near term 

anti-satellite capability. 

Conversely, the direct impact on PLA COIN appears to be much less significant. In part, this may be 

the case because the PLA understands COIN to be 

solely a domestic issue for China. The Chinese entity 

responsible for the domestic COIN mission is the PAP, 

thereby further diminishing the connection to U.S. 

conventional forces. The two areas that appear to have 

been informed by U.S. operations include the importance of decapitation operations and the requirement 

to reduce unnecessary casualties during COIN operations to avoid international criticism, both of which 

can be applied in a domestic context. The fallout from 

the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident would appear to 

have been forgotten or not discussed.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. On August 27, 2009, the 11th National People’s Congress 

passed a law codifying the roles and responsibilities of the PAP, 

which is part of China’s armed forces under the dual command 

of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the State Council. 

(See www.china-defense-mashup.com/china-tightens-restrictions-toprevent-abuse-using-of-armed-police-force.html.) The law designated 

the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP) as solely responsible for 

internal anti-disturbance or fang bao (防暴) to deal with the three 

“isms” of terrorism, extremism (religious), and separatism. As the 

PAP is solely responsible for internal counterinsurgency (COIN) 

security and is part of the Chinese armed forces under the command of the CMC, the PAP is the component responsible for conducting COIN. 
258

2. Peishu translates to “attaching troops to a subordinate 

unit,” meaning the creation of independent battle groups within 

the division using modular force groups, as well as augmenting a 

division or larger structure seamlessly with heavier forces. Zhichi

translates as “to support,” which has seen the creation of a battlefield logistics organization able to supply and support forces deep 

inside an enemy’s rear area.

3. “中国增强机械化步兵师攻击能力“ (“China’s Strengthened 

Mechanized Infantry Division’s Assault Capability”), 坦克 装甲装

甲 (Tank and Armoured Vehicle), Issue 11, 2006, No. 249, pp. 12 -13.

4. Ibid., p. 12. 

5. Deng Xiaoping, “Streamline the Army and Raise Its Combat Effectiveness,” March 12, 1980),” cited in “Deng on Raising 

Army’s Combat Effectiveness,” Foreign Military Broadcasting Service Daily Report: China, July 26, 1983, pp. K2-K7. 

6. “军用运输机: 翱翔蓝天的‘鲲鹏’”(“Military Transport 

Aircraft: Flying the Blue Sky of the ‘Roc’”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), 

March 11, 2010, available from chn.chinamil.com.cn/xwpdxw/wqzbxw/2010-11/15/content_4334392.htm.

7. Li Haijun (李海军), “切实提高我军战略投送能力”

(“Effectively Improve the Delivery Capacity of Our Military Strategy”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), March 11, 2010, available from chn.

chinamil.com.cn/xwpdxw/gdylxw/2010-03/11/content_4151489.htm. 

8. “Logistics in the PLA,” Army Sustainment, March-April 

2010, pp. 46-50.

9. “陆军是否需要战略投送力量” (“Does an army need strong 

strategic airlift?”), 兵器 知识 (Ordnance Knowledge), December 

2007, No. 242, pp. 16-19; “重型直升机三种枸型的对比” (“Comparing three types of heavy helicopters”), 兵器知识 (Ordnance Knowledge), Issue 10A/2009, No. 278, pp. 16-19.

10. “开往蓝天的直升机___由 AC313首飞想到的”” (“Watching a Helicopter Heading for the Heavens___Thinking Flying and 

by AC313”), 兵器知识 (Ordnance Knowledge), Issue 5A/2010, No. 

292, pp. 35-37.
259

11. L. W. Grau, The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military 

Studies office, 2005, p. 101.

12. Patrick Walters, “Hard-working Chinooks: The pack horse 

of the frontline,” in “Special Report on Defence,” Weekend Australian, November 29-30, 2008, p. 3.

13. Licensed produced Eurocopter AS 565 Panther 2 helicopters. See “China Dispatched 30 Z-9G helicopters to the SinoAfghan Border to Prevent Terrorists from Entering China and to 

Annihilate Terrorists Associated with Eastern Turkestan,” World 

Journal, October 23, 2001, p. A7. 

14.“Xinjiang Military District Holds Anti-Terrorist Drill,” 中

国国防报在线 (China National Defense Dailyon-line), December 12, 

2004; Wei Chuan and Liang Yongli, “Xinjiang MD Army Air Regiment Conducts Nighttime Search-and-Rescue Training,” 中国国

防报在线 (China National Defense Daily on-line), May 4, 2005.

15. “国外媒体热评 中国 武直-10 直升机” (“Foreign Media 

Heatedly Evaluate Chinese WZ-10 Helicopter”), 坦克装甲装甲 

(Tank and Armored Vehicle), Issue 1/2008, No. 263, pp. 29-31.

16. “PLA Army Aviation Units seek New Development,” 解

放军报 (PLA Daily), January 8, 2006.

17. “Jinan MR Mechanized Infantry Division Improves Reconnaissance,” 前卫报 (Vanguard Daily), September 28, 2005.

18. Du Wenlong (杜文龙), “无人机时代真的到来了吗 “ (“Are 

We Genuinely Approaching the Age of the Unmanned Vehicle?”) 

兵器知识 (Ordnance Knowledge), Issue 5A/2010, No. 292, pp. 64-65.

19. “Chinese Army takes on New Look,” People’s Daily on-line, 

June 19, 2002, available from english.peopledaily.com.cn/200206/19/

eng20020619_98094.shtml; “CH-801 Micro UAV System,” China 

Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, 2008 brochure.

20. “PLA’s UAVs achieve “combat effectiveness,” 中国国防报

(China Military Online) and 中国日报 (China Daily), June 11, 2010, 

available from eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-militarynews/2010- 06/11/content_4237629.htm.
21. “华鹰翱翔抗震救灾“ (“Chinese Eagle soaring providing 

support to earthquake victim”), 兵器知识 (Ordnance Knowledge), 

July 2008, No. 249, pp. 20-21.

22. “Jinan MR Mechanized Infantry Division Improves Reconnaissance,” 前卫报 (Vanguard Daily), September 28, 2005.

23. “New type China made unmanned plane debuts at exhibition,” China Military Online (Source: Xinhua), June 10, 

2010, available from eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/photo-reports/2010-06/10/content_4236847.htm.

24. “百花齐放 ___ 异军突起军团中国的UAV军团” (“Let a 

Hundred Flowers Bloom___ a Different Army Suddenly Appears: 

the Chinese UAV Army Group”), 坦克装甲装 (Tank and Armored 

Vehicle), Issue 4B1/2011, No. 330, pp. 31-35.

25. “China’s pilotless aircraft CH3,” People’s Daily Online, November 3, 2008, available from chn.chinamil.com.cn/90002/95730/

index.html; “CH-3 Medium Altitude Reconnaissance /Strike UAV 

System,” China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, 2008 

brochure. 

26. “解放军大 规模演练夜间炮兵火力精确打击“ (“People’s 

Liberation Army Artillery Fire Massive Drill Precision Strikes at 

Night”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), June 30, 2010, available from chn.

chinamil.com.cn /xwpdxw/2010-06/30/content_4249695.htm.

27. For an explanation and Chinese development of the 

concept, see Valeriy Kiselev, “Acquired–Destroyed,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest), No. 8, 2001, pp. 35-39; “Learn how to 

fight battles in exercise—Analysis of PLA’s training reform from 

military exercises in 2009 (III),” China Military Online, December, 

15 2009, available from eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/chinamilitary-news/ 2009-2/15/content_4095956.htm; “‘Eagle Owls’ Over 

Chechnya,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Independent Military Review), No. 20, June 21-27, 2002, p. 2.

28. Han Jun (韩军),Chong Guang (重光),Chun Xiao (春晓),

and Lan Bai (蓝白),“如何实施近距空中支援” (“How to execute close air support”), 兵器知识 (Ordnance Knowledge), Issue 

9A/2008, No. 252, pp. 16-19; “目标瞄准命中摧毁的区别” (“Distinguishing, Tracking, Aiming at Targets within Range and Destroy-
261

ing”), 兵器知识 (Ordnance Knowledge), Issue 7A/2009, No. 272, pp. 

16-19; “如何攻击小目标 “ (“How to Assault a Small Target”), 兵器

知识 (Ordnance Knowledge), Issue 3/2008 No. 245, pp. 16-19.

29. “Airborne Unit Begins Winter Drill to Retrain Troop,” 北

京空军报 (Beijing Air Force Daily), December 11, 2004.

30. “Scouts in target reconnaissance,” China Military Online,

April 30, 2010, available from eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/

photo-reports/2010-04/30/content_4212152.htm.

31. Han Jun (韩军), Chong Guang (重光), Chun Xiao (春晓), 

and Lan Bai (蓝白), “如何实施近距空中支援“ (“How to execute 

close air support”), 兵器知识 (Ordnance Knowledge), Issue 3/2008, 

No. 245, pp. 16-19.

32. “迷你长钉: 世界最小的‘射后不管’导弹” (“Mini-Spike: 

The World’s Smallest ‘Fire and Forget’ Guided Missile”), 兵器知

识 (Ordnance Knowledge), Issue 7A/2009, No. 272, pp. 50-52; “城

市作战的难点” (“Difficult Points of Urban Combat”), 兵器知识, 

(Ordnance Knowledge), Issue 8A/2010, No. 298, pp. 16-19. 

33. “Difficult Points of Urban Combat.”

34. “New Characteristics of Annihilation Warfare on Future 

Informatized Battlefields,” 人民前线, (People’s Frontline), September 30, 2005.

35. Zhou Xuejun (周学军), “联合火力战斗—战术层次的战略

影响” (“Joint Fire Fighting—The Strategic Impact of Tactical Level”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily), September 2, 2010, available from chn.

chinamil.com.cn/xwpdxw/gdylxw/2010-09/02/content_4290006.htm.

36. Carlo Kopp, “PLA Guided Bombs,” Air Power Australia, 

Technical Report APA-TR-2009-0808, available from ausairpower.

net/APA-PLA-GBU.html.

37.“济南军区某部开展远程火力打击力量体系作战演练” (“Jinan Military Region to Carry out Long Range Firepower to Combat the Power System Operations Training”), 解放军报 (PLA 

Daily), June 14, 2010, available from chn.chinamil.com.cn/xwpdxw/2010-06/14/content_4239188.
262

38. Zhang Zhiyu, “New Characteristics of Annihilation Warfare on Future Informatized Battlefields,” 人民前线 (People’s 

Frontline), September 30, 2005.

39. “Reinforce armed police with legal backing,” Global Times 

online, August 27, 2009, available from opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2009-08/461560.html. 

40. Zhang Xu, (张旭), “美军 ‘联合训练能力’ 解析 ” (“Analysis of U.S. Military ‘Joint Training Capability’”), 中国军事网站

(China Military Online), April 8, 2010, available from chn.chinamil.

com.cn/xwpdxw/gdylxw/2010-04/08/content_4173915.htm.

41. Ibid. 

42. “GSD Military Training Chief on Characteristics of PLA 

Military Training,” 解放军画报 (PLA Magazine), January 2006.

43. Cheng Sixun, “Exploration and Practice of Integrated 

Training of Military Units, Part III,” 战旗报 (National Defense Daily), February 14, 2006. 

44. “PLA Army Aviation Units Seek New Development,” 解

放军报 (PLA Daily), January 8 , 2006. 

45. H. Wang, “China’s Strengthened Mechanized Infantry 

Division’s Assault Capability ZTZ-98,” 主战坦克 装甲 (ZTZ-98 

Main Battle Tank and Armor), Hailar, Mongolia: Inner Mongolia 

Cultural Publishing Company, 2002, pp. 73, b 74.

46. “PLA’s UAVs Achieve ‘Combat Effectiveness’,” 中国国

防报 (China Military Online) and 中国日报 (China Daily), June 11, 

2010, available from eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2010-06/11/content_4237629.htm.

47. “‘CNMD’ 亮相了! ___ 解读 我国初次反导挡截试验” 

(“’CNMD’ Revealed! ___ Deciphering Our Country’s First AntiMissile Interceptor Experiments”), 坦克 装甲装甲 (Tank and Armored Vehicle), Issue 3/2010, No. 303, pp. 50-53. 
263

48. “系列高技术装备提升保障能力” (“Series of High-tech 

Equipment to Enhance Security Capabilities”), 解放军报 (PLA 

Daily), May 31, 2010, available from chn.chinamil.com.cn /xwpdxw/2010-05/31/content_4228434.htm. Numerous articles in 轻兵

器 (Small Arms) show new Chinese developed weapons and their 

counterparts in the west, often near copies or adaptations of U.S. 

equipment.

49. “China sets up riot police units,” BBC Asia-Pacific News 

Online, August 18, 2005. 

50. “中国95式自动步枪展新颜” (“Chinese Type 95 Automatic 

Rifle Displays New Appearance”), 轻兵器 (Small Arms), Issue 12 

2008, No. 285, p. 2; “Chinese Type 81-1 7.62mm automatic rifle 

new appearance,” p. 3.
264

CHAPTER 7 - APPENDIX

SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

AVIATION SYSTEMS 

MI-17. 

The PLA’s current high altitude transport and 

utility helicopter is the Russian Mi-17 transport helicopter, the export designation of the Mi-8MTV-2 helicopter. The PLA version incorporates a chin-mounted 

radar enabling bad weather operations, and can carry 

up to six 57mm UB-32 rocket pods containing a total 

of 192 57mm rockets providing transport helicopters 

a limited ability to suppress enemy air defenses.1

 The 

Mi-17 in PLA and PLAAF service has two 1,900 horsepower (hp) turbine engines compared to the Mi-8’s 

engines rated at 1,700hp. The Mi-17 helicopter also 

carries an auxiliary power plant, which feeds the air 

starters to the engines, ensuring reliable starting of 

the main engines up to 4,000 meters (m) depending on 

the engine type. (During the ill-fated Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Mi-8 was severely 

underpowered at high altitudes. Due to the problems 

of flying in mountains at high altitudes, helicopters 

could only fly between 5 and 10 hours in a day, the 

Mi-8’s maximum cargo never exceeded 400 kilograms 

(kg) and was often dropped at an altitude of between 

5 and 30m at a speed ranging between 20 and 70 kilometers per hour (km/hr.)2 Despite the extra power, the 

Mi-8MT/Mi-17MT can only carry six to eight combatladen soldiers (each carrying 35 to 40kg of equipment 

in addition to his weapon and uniform) below 3,000m 

which decreases to only four or five at 3,000 to 4,000m 

altitude.3

 By comparison, the U.S. CH-47D Chinook
265

transport helicopters deployed in Afghanistan can 

carry 30 passengers and five tons of cargo at the same 

altitudes.4

The Z-10 attack helicopter is similar in size to AH1W and will be the linchpin of the PLA Army Aviation’s modernization plans. Besides anti-armor, its 

missions will include escort, armed reconnaissance, 

and force protection, the latter against enemy attack 

and reconnaissance helicopters and UAVs.5

 The Z-10 

is in the size and weight range of the Italian A129 Mangusta, with many design features directly copied from 

it including the cockpit. It is awaiting a new engine, 

because the current 1,531hp Pratt and Whitney Canada PT6C-6TC engine used with the prototype is not 

available for military use under the post-Tiananmen 

Square embargo. High horsepower rating is important, because of the negative effect that heat and high 

altitudes have on helicopter performance.6 The poor 

performance of helicopters at high altitudes is why the 

CH-47D and later versions has become the primary 

helicopter for delivery of cargo and personnel by air 

in Afghanistan. 

Transport Helicopters. 

The Chinese aircraft company AVIC has developed the AC313 medium lift helicopter, an advanced 

development of the old Z-8, itself a copy of the old 

Aerospatiale Super Frelon helicopter.7 With composite 

materials comprising 50 percent of the helicopter to 

reduce its empty weight, and with three Pratt and 

Whitney Canada PT6B-67A turbo-shaft engines delivering 20 percent more power, the AC313 can fly up to 

6,000m and operate in temperatures from -40° Celsius 

(°C) to +50°C, enabling it to operate on the Tibetan 

Plateau with ease. 
266

With a maximum takeoff weight of 13.8 tons, the 

AC313 can carry four tons in its 1.83m high, 23.5 cubic 

meter cabin or five tons slung externally below the helicopter. The maximum passenger capacity is 27, with 

two crew members and 15 stretchers with attendant 

crew sitting in chairs. It is not supposed to be used in 

a military role as the engines are embargoed for military missions. If it were, it could carry a crew of four, 

including a starboard door gunner, and around 14 or 

15 fully equipped combat troops entering and exiting 

by the rear ramp.

Interestingly, no helicopters in the PLA Army Aviation Force have been seen mounting any type of door 

gun to provide suppressive fire when the helicopters 

come into land during an assault. Placing a machine 

gun with mount, ammunition, and dedicated gunner 

to provide suppressive fire at high altitudes would severely restrict the amount of personnel or cargo that a 

Z-9 or Mi-17 helicopter could carry.

UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

CH-801. 

A hand-launched micro-UAS is already in service. 

The wingspan is 900 milimeters (mm) it has an overall length of 800mm, a gross weight of 1.75kg, and a 

200 grams (g) payload. It looks like a plastic F-22 with 

oversized tail fins. Of a pusher configuration, its electric motor gives the CH-801 a maximum air speed of 

80km/hr and maximum endurance of 60 minutes. Its 

cruise altitude is between 50 and 1,000m, with a maximum ceiling of 3,500m. Its L-band control/data link 

has a maximum line of sight of 10km, with the images 

viewed on a lap top screen with the UAS control system mounted in a separate back pack.
267

W-50. 

Developed by the Nanjing Research Institute on 

Simulation Technique, the W-50 has the ability to remain aloft for up to 6 hours and has an operational 

radius of 100 kilometers, depending on the payload. 

Nanjing has also developed the Z-3 helicopter unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) which weighs 130kg 

with a 30kg payload, and incorporates GPS navigation for pre-planned reconnaissance missions.8

 Of 

pusher configuration with twin booms connecting a 

‘V’ shaped rear fin 2.1m long, the W-50 has a wingspan of 2.6m and weighs 20kg. It can travel at 110km/

hr, reach an altitude of 3,500m and has GPS assisted 

guidance.

Z-5. 

The Z-5 has an all up weight of 450kg including 

a 100kg mission payload.9 It has a cruising speed of 

160 km/hr, an endurance of between 4 to 6 hrs, and a 

maximum hover height of 2,500m. It uses automatic 

controls as well as being command guided. 

PW Series.

The PW-1 is similar in shape and size to the Israeli 

Aerosky lightweight UAV.10 Of twin-boom pusher 

configuration, it missions include surveillance, reconnaissance, fire control, and target positioning. With a 

wingspan of 4.4m and 3.8m long, its 16.4Kw piston 

engine gives the UAV a maximum speed of 170km/

hr and an endurance of between 4-6 hrs. The gross 

take off weight is 130kg with a 20kg payload, and its 

cruising altitude is 1-3km with a maximum ceiling of 
268

4,600m. The L-band control/data-link has a maximum 

line of sight range of 100km with its launch being by 

a small rocket booster that falls away after launch. 

Landing is by parachute as it only has skids.

The PW-2 is essentially an enlarged PW-1.11 With 

a wingspan of 6m and an overall length of 4.1m, its 

36.7 kilowatt (Kw) piston engine gives it a maximum 

speed of 180 km/hr and an endurance of between 

6-8 hrs. It has a maximum ceiling of 5,000m with its 

cruising altitude being between 1,000 and 3,000m. Its 

gross takeoff weight is 220kg with a 30kg payload. Its 

S-band control/data-link has a line of sight range of 

200km.

PV-2.

The Israeli Aerostar UAV, the PV-2, lacks both 

range and payload.12 With a wingspan of 6.5m and a 

length of 4.5m, the Aerostar weighs 10kg less, yet carries a 50kg payload with endurance over 12 hrs. It also 

takes off and lands conventionally, unlike the PW-2 

which uses rocket assisted take off and a parachute 

recovery like the smaller PW-1.

CH-3. 

Of tailless canard design, with the flaps mounted 

on the tips of rear double delta wings. The wingspan 

is 8m, and it has an overall length of 5.5m. Its 85Kw 

engine, mounted in the rear of fuselage, has a triple 

blade propeller giving the CH-3 a maximum air speed 

of 256km/hr. Missions envisaged include surveillance, reconnaissance, fire control, target positioning, 

and precision strike. Their possible future use in operations is examined in the next section under battle-
269

field fire support. The projected cruising altitude is between 3-5km, and the device has a maximum ceiling 

of 6km. It has an 8m wingspan, is 5.5m long, and its 

85Kw engine gives it a reported maximum endurance 

of 12hr. The maximum gross take-off weight is 630kg 

with a 60kg payload. The CH-3 utilizes a blended fuselage and incorporates a stabilized targeting turret 

under the forward fuselage that contains a laser ranger/target designator coupled with a charge-coupled 

device (CCD) or thermal imaging camera. The S band 

control/data-link has a maximum line of sight range 

of 200km.

There is a large pylon under each rear wing, which 

on the mockup mounts an AR-1 air-to-surface missile 

purposely designed for UAVs. Compared to the U.S. 

MQ-1C Warrior, it appears similar in size although it 

incorporates a chisel nose instead of the bulbous nose, 

which contains a Synthetic Aperture Radar/Ground 

Moving Target Indicator (SAR-GMTI) system, and an 

AN/AAS-52 Multi-spectral Targeting System (MTS) 

under the nose. It takes off and lands on grass conventionally with a fixed tricycle undercarriage. 

The biggest issue facing the PLA in its use of UAS 

systems is the Chinese industry’s lack of lightweight 

fuel-efficient engines, composites, and avionics. 

BATTLEFIELD FIRE SUPPORT 

Close Air Support.

The Q-5, developed from the Russian MiG-19, has 

been equipped with the hardware and software to enable the use of the LT-2 laser-guided 500kg bombs. 

The more advanced LT-3 is also available, which is a 

500kg bomb mated to a laser seeker in the nose with 
270

a GPS guided bomb kit mounted on the rear, and is 

analogous to the U.S. EGBU-24.13 The Q-5 is similar to 

the 1970s Harrier GR-3 in capability except that it uses 

conventional take off and landing. The use of an external pod with a thermal imager and the LT-3 would 

bring the aircraft up to the early 1990s in capability 

but the airframe is still old and in need of replacement.

MANEUVER

Armored Group Task Organization.

• Type 92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles each 

with a one-man turret with an overhead 25 x 

137mm automatic cannon and co-axial Type 

80 7.62 x 54Rmm machine gun; and 15 Type 

92A wheeled armored personnel carriers, each 

mounting a semi-enclosed turret with a 12.7 x 

108mm Type 54 heavy machine gun.

• PTL02 assault guns, each mounting a turret 

with a Type 86 100mm smoothbore high-velocity cannon, co-axial Type 80 7.62 x 54mm 

machine gun, and a cupola-mounted 12.7 x 

108mm QJC88 heavy machine gun.

• Z-9W attack helicopters, some with an undernose turret mounting a laser range-finder/

designator and thermal imager. Depending on 

electronics fit, a Z-9W can carry either eight 

Hong Jia-8 anti-tank guided missiles; eight TY90 lightweight air-to-air missiles; or two 57mm 

rocket; or two cannon pods.

• Mi-17 transport helicopters, each capable of 

carrying up to six 57mm rocket pods containing 32 rockets each or around 16 troops.

• ZBD05 airborne combat vehicles mounting a 30 
271

x 165mm automatic cannon and a co-axial 5.8 x 

42mm machine gun and can carry four soldiers 

in the rear.

INFANTRY WEAPONS

Rail Interface System and Accessories. 

Chinese special forces (jidong budui) counterterrorist (fan kong) personnel have add-on kits for their 

Type 81 and 95 assault rifles similar to the U.S. Special 

Operations Peculiar Modification (SOPMOD) system, 

utilizing a rail attachment system akin to the Knight’s 

Armament Company rail interface system (RIS).14 The 

Type 81 squad automatic weapon has a forward rail 

interface system to which is attached a forward folding bipod with telescopic legs and a night aiming device on the left hand side towards the end of the RIS. 

A reflex sight, similar to the U.S. advanced combat 

optical gunsight (ACOG) reflex sight is also fitted. The 

Type 95 assault rifle has the same type of reflex sight 

fitted to the top of the carrying handle giving a poor 

cheek weld and appears to be used for instinctive instead of aimed fire. The Type 84 sub-machine gun has 

a RIS with the same bipod and night aiming device 

(NAD) as on the Type 81 squad automatic weapon. 

Both have forward handgrips. The bipod is just extra 

weight on the Type 81 assault rifle, but the system is 

similar to the close quarter battle kit above. The Type 

81 RIS mount fitted to the left side of the weapon incorporates an under barrel RIS. Besides mounting a 

torch and bipod, the mount above the receiver can fit 

an ELCAN Wildcat sight.
272

Type 95 Under Barrel 18.4 x 70mm Shotgun.15

This weapon is still a prototype but is expected to 

go into production. Very much like the XM26, it uses 

a straight pull bolt and connects under the barrel of 

the Type 95 5.8mm assault rifle. There is no muzzle 

brake or flash suppressor fitted and it is fed from a box 

magazine that appears to hold three cartridges.

XL-Z01 4x4 and XL-Z02 6x6 Prototype Protected 

Mobility Vehicles-Light.16

The Chinese defense industries in Wuhan has developed two new protected mobility vehicles-light 

(PMV-L), the XL-Z01 4 x 4 and XL-Z02 6 x 6. The latter is an extended version of the former and has the 

four rear wheels grouped together. They are similar in 

concept to the Australian Bushmaster PMV-L, rather 

than the much larger MRAP-L, as the hull is of monocoque construction with the underneath having a ‘V’ 

shape to deflect mine blast. The hull is a very clean 

design, with arrow shaped angled sides which do not 

allow Molotov cocktails to pool or offer a place for 

satchel charges to hang onto the vehicle. Other than 

a turret, the only external protrusions are the heavily 

reinforced hinges and extended driver’s side mounted 

rear view mirrors. Both vehicles are amphibious with 

two small shrouded propellers behind the rear wheels. 

Both are armored against penetration by standard 5.45 

x 39mm, 5.56 x 45mm North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 5.8 x 42 DBP87 projectiles and two 

German DM41 grenades exploding simultaneously 

against the hull. Both are equipped with an anti-lock 

braking system (ABS) and can climb a 300 slope. The 

engine on both is mid-mounted on the right side, and 
273

doors are provided on either side and at the rear of 

the hull. Both driver and front passenger have roofmounted hatches. The XL-Z01 weighs 5 tons and can 

carry a crew of five. Powered by an 188Kw V8 diesel 

engine, it has a maximum road speed of 140 km/hr 

and can be fitted with a small one-man turret that can 

be fitted with weapons up to and including a QJG02 

14.5 x 114mm machine gun. Other weapons can include a 35mm automatic grenade launcher or sniping 

rifle. The turret includes six Type 85-2 76mm smoke 

grenade dischargers and a small external rack around 

the rear of the turret. The XL-Z02 weighs 9t and can 

carry a maximum of 12 personnel. The vehicle has the 

same turret ring as the WZ501/Type 86 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) enabling it to field any weapons the 

Type 86 can. Its 6.4 liter (L) 240Kw V8 diesel engine 

gives it a maximum road speed of 130 km/hr. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7 - APPENDIX

1. S. Dolgov, “On a Wing and a Prayer,” in S. Roshchin, S. 

Reznichenko, and S. Saoylyuk, “War Doesn’t Sleep,” Armeyskiy 

Sbornik, (Army Digest), October 2000, p. 59. 

2. L. W. Grau and Michael A. Gress eds., The Soviet-Afghan 

War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost: The Russian General Staff, 

Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2002, p. 287. 

3. L. W. Grau, The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military 

Studies office, 2005, p. 101. 

4. Patrick Walters, “Hard-working Chinooks: The pack horse 

of the frontline,” in “Special Report on Defence,” Weekend Australian, November 29-30, 2008, p. 3.

5. “国外媒体热评 中国 武直-10 直升机” (“Foreign Media 

Heatedly Evaluate Chinese WZ-10 Helicopter”), 坦克装甲装甲 

(Tank and Armored Vehicle), Issue 1/ 2008, No. 263, pp. 29-31.
274

6. After the paper was presented, the Z-10 program was replaced by the Sino-Russian Z-19 which uses the transmission, tail 

assembly, and possibly other components from the Z-9W.

7. “开往蓝天的直升机___由 AC313首飞想到的” (“Watching a 

Helicopter Heading for the Heavens___Thinking Flying and by 

AC313”), 兵器知识 (Ordnance Knowledge), Issue 5A/2010, No. 292, 

pp. 35-37.

8. “’W-50 Unmanned Air Vehicle’, Nanjing Research Institute on Simulation Technique,” available from www.nrist.com/

english/e-wurenji-w-50.asp; Wu Xiaochun, “NRIST Keeps Forging 

Ahead-Part II,” Military Training & Simulation News, Vol. 5, Issue 

6, November 2003, pp. 54-55.

9.“第五届中国国际警用装备博览会新品收视”(“The Fifth Annual China International Police Use of Equipment Exhibition 

Viewing New Products”), 轻兵器 (Small Arms), Issue 5, 2010, No. 

319, p. 21.

10. “PW-1 Close Range Reconnaissance UAV System,” China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, 2008 brochure; 

“Aerosky,” Israeli Weapons, available from www.israeli-weapons.

com/aircraft/uavs/aerosky/Aerosky.hml. 

11. “PW-2 Close Range Reconnaissance UAV System,” China 

Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, 2008 brochure.

12. “Aerosky.” 

13. Carlo Kopp, “PLA Guided Bombs,” Air Power Australia, 

Technical Report APA-TR-2009-0808, available from ausairpower.

net/APA-PLA-GBU.html.

14. “中国95式自动步枪展新颜”(“Chinese Type 95 Automatic 

Rifle Displays New Appearance”), 轻兵器 (Small Arms), Issue 12, 

2008, No. 285, p. 2.

15. “95式自动步枪首次下挂18.4mm霰弹枪”(“Type 95 Automatic Rifle with Suspended 18.4mm Shotgun”), 轻兵器 (Small 

Arms), Issue 5, 2010, No. 319, p. 2.
275

16. “无惧坎坷路___武汉 ‘枭龙’ 越野车旌演示试验参观记”

(“No Fear Rough Road___‘Brave Dragon’ Cross Country Vehicle 

Observe and Record Demonstrate Test Vehicles”), 兵器 (Weapon), 

Issue 7/2010, No. 134, pp. 34-38; “特种 甲车显峥嵘 2010年 中国国

际警用装备上的装甲车”(“2010 Chinese International Police Use 

Equipment Vehicles Exhibition Special Type Event Top Equipped 

Vehicles Display”), 坦克装甲装甲 (Tank and Armored Vehicle), Issue 6/2010, No. 309, pp. 43-45. 

277

CHAPTER 8

LEARNING FROM THE NEIGHBORS:

THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

EXAMINES THE SMALL WARS

AND COUNTERINSURGENCIES WAGED BY 

RUSSIA

Yu Bin

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter examines the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) assessment of the Russian counterinsurgency (COIN) operations from the 1990s and beyond.

MAIN FINDINGS

In the absence of large-scale insurgencies in the 

People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past 40 

years, and the distant experience of China’s own COIN 

operations in the 1950s-60s, the PLA pays close attention to the COIN operations of the Russian military, 

particularly the two Chechen wars (1994-96 and 1999-

2009). The PLA analysts seem to have reached a consensus regarding the socio-politico-economic origins 

of the post-Soviet insurgency and terror issues in Russia. That is, terrorism and insurgencies are forms of 

“political violence” caused by deeper social ills. They 

have debated, however, about the effectiveness of the 

tactics, use of firepower, intelligence gathering, and 

processing of the Russian COIN operations. While the 

PLA academia display more favorable views of the 

Russian operations in the second Chechen War, the 

PLA intelligence, including their counterparts in the 
278

People’s Armed Police (PAP), are more critical about 

Russia’s approaches, particularly about the weakness 

of the Russian intelligence in COIN operations, as well 

as in dealing with terror groups in the broader sociopolitical milieu. 

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

• PLA analysts clearly favor broader and more 

comprehensive treatment of the terror and insurgency issues.

• They attach great importance to intelligence 

gathering, sharing, processing, and disseminating in anti-terror and COIN operations.

• The PLA discourse over the Russian experience, particularly the structural deficiency of 

the Russian intelligence community, is perhaps 

a detour for some analysts, such as in the PAP, 

to argue for more effective and independent intelligence gathering and processing ability and 

infrastructure.

• Some, particularly the Intelligence Department 

of the PLA General Staff, favor the American 

approach of high-tech reconnaissance and information analysis, something that the Russians seem incapable of doing. It is unclear how 

this is operationalized.

• The focus on the tactical aspects of the Russian 

COIN operations by some analysts remains relevant for the PLA in the event that such militarized COIN operations become necessary.

• Recent discussion of anti-terror and COIN 

shows that PLA is getting interested in crossborder operations.
279

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps more than anything else, Russia represents a special case for the PLA regarding small wars 

and COIN operations for at least four reasons. First, 

Russia as a large land power on the Eurasian continent happens to share long borders with China. On 

many occasions in the past, what happened in Russia has tended to have an impact on its relationship 

with China. The stability, or instability, of the border 

regions has always been a security issue for China. 

Second, Russia has undergone major socio-politicoeconomic transformations since the end of the Cold 

War, with wide-spread social inequality, instability, 

and even political and ethnic violence. Third, Russia 

(including those former Soviet republics) happens to 

border China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region where 

ethnic tensions have been on the rise since September 11, 2001 (9/11) and even culminated in 2009 with 

large-scale urban riots. Last, if not least, China and 

Russia are multi-ethnic nation-states where ethnic 

identity has been on the rise in the brave new post9/11 world of globalized terrorism, insurgency, and 

cross-border criminal activities; and Russia has waged 

COIN operations against long-term and large-scale 

ethnic violence (Chechnya, etc.). 

How does Russia wrestle with its internal tension 

and conflicts? To what extent do the Russian military 

and security apparatus cope with the increasingly 

asymmetrical and deadly violence perpetrated against 

innocent people? What is the relationship between 

those operations and the broader socio-economic environment in Russia? Will these developments in Russia have a spillover effect in China? How relevant is 

Russia’s experience for the Chinese situation?
280

These questions, among others, will be addressed 

in four specific steps. This chapter begins with a brief 

survey of China’s own experience with COIN operations in both traditional and modern periods. The focus is on the PRC’s experience after 1949. This will 

lead to the examination of how the PLA defines the 

concept of COIN in both Chinese and non-Chinese 

terms, and in both traditional and contemporary periods. This paves the way for systematic survey of how 

the Chinese military and civilian intelligence organizations perceive and assess COIN operations in Russia. In conclusion, some policy relevant issues will be 

addressed.

THE DYNAMICS OF INSURGENCY AND COIN 

IN CHINA

The phenomenon of COIN is no stranger to the 

Chinese. Indeed, insurgency and COIN were enduring features in traditional Chinese politics as almost 

all of the dynasties were overthrown by rebellions 

(造反) and/or insurgencies (叛乱). In most cases, insurgent leaders installed themselves as the next dynasties until their dynasties were toppled by another 

wave of protest-turn-to-insurgency/rebellion. In the 

minds of the ordinary Chinese, this cycle of dynastyrebellions was even “normal,” because it was legitimate to rebel against the emperor if he was deemed to 

have lost the mandate of heaven. These types of violent rebellions ended the despotic rule of the first Qin 

Dynasty (221-206 BC), and fatally weakened the last 

Qing Dynasty.1

 Throughout China’s dynastic history, 

it was not uncommon to see the drastic role-switching 

between rebels and rulers, and vice versa. Insurgency, 

therefore, was but a symptom of much larger and 

deeper social illness.
281

To a large extent, the political history of 20th century China was one of a central government fighting 

localized forces ranging from heavily armed warlords, disorganized bandits, to organized insurgencies such as Communist guerrillas. From the very 

beginning, the Republic of China on the Mainland 

(1911-49) was plagued by its own internal division in 

the form of Warlordism (1916-26). Many provincially 

based generals became de facto independent from the 

central government, and fought constantly against 

one another for territory and influence. It was not until 1927 that Chiang Kai-shek was able to pacify most 

of these that warlords. After Chiang took Shanghai 

in 1927, he turned against Communists in the major 

cities. Those who survived Chiang’s “white terror” 

fled to the countryside where they gradually set up 

Communist base areas. For Chiang’s government, 

the Communists were simply “bandits” (共匪). From 

1930 to 1934, Chiang launched five “extermination,” 

or COIN, campaigns against Communist base areas 

in Jiang Xi Province. The Fifth Campaign crushed the 

Communists. Their main forces were forced to embark upon the “Long March” to the northern Chinese 

Shaanxi Province where they consolidated, expanded, 

and emerged from the 8 years of war with Japan to 

confront the Nationalist government. In less than 4 

years, eight million Nationalist troops were wiped 

out, surrendered, or fled to Taiwan. Then, the victorious Communist government started to use the terms 

“bandits” (Chiang’s bandits, [蒋匪]; or KMT bandits, 

[国民党匪徒]) to describe the Nationalist troops and 

government in Taiwan. 

Militarily, however, the new PRC government 

would have to engage in its own large-scale “bandit 

extermination” campaigns (剿匪) to mop up remnants 
282

of the Nationalist troops and local bandits whose 

forces had grown considerably, because of the weak 

central government in the 1930s-40s. Recently disclosed archives in China indicate that the Nationalists, 

in anticipating Communist victory on the Mainland, 

started to train more than 3,000 guerrilla warfare experts in June 1949 and Chiang Kai-shek activated a 

comprehensive plan for covert and insurgency activities shortly before he left for Taiwan. As a result, there 

was a deluge of insurgent activities throughout China 

between late 1949 and early 1950. In a matter of 8 days, 

February 6-13, 1950, more than 20 counties, prefectures, and provincial governments were attacked by 

the insurgents, leading to the deaths of tens of thousands of PLA and local government personnel. These 

numbers, however, do not include large casualties of 

local masses who supported the new Communist government. Mao, who just returned from a 3-month visit 

to Moscow, was reportedly stunned by the scale and 

intensity of the insurgency. Between 1950 and 1952, 

the PLA launched two nationwide campaigns and 

“annihilated” (歼灭) some 2.4 million insurgents and 

Nationalist agents.2

The PRC’s 3-year COIN operations paralleled 

much of the Korean War (1950-53), which was a heavy 

commitment for the young republic with a seriously 

damaged economy after decades of wars. The PLA 

would have to engage in both foreign and domestic 

operations to consolidate much of the ungovernable 

parts of China, particularly in the border areas. Despite these constraints, major COIN operations were 

essentially over in late 1952 in most Chinese territories 

except in three border regions. In the northwestern 

parts of China (Qinghai, Xinjiang, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces), COIN operations dragged on until 
283

late 1953.3 In Tibet, resistance to the Chinese rule was 

on and off, and culminated in the 1959 open rebellion. 

Much of these insurgencies were financed and facilitated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 

whose covert operations did not come to an end until 

the early 1970s.4

 Along the Sino-Burmese borders, the 

small wars against the Nationalist troops located in 

Burma continued until 1966.5

At the turn of the century, Xinjiang and Tibet became restless again. Several riots occurred in the late 

1980s in Tibet and harsher policies were imposed 

following the crackdown. In the 1990s, Xinjiang witnessed more incidents ranging from bus bombings 

to violent demonstrations and crackdowns, several of which took place in Xinjiang’s capital city of 

Urumqi. An armed insurgency reportedly broke out 

in Xinjiang in April 1990, and in 1996-97, more riots 

were reported.6 In the new millennium, ethnic tension 

in Tibet and Xinjiang began to escalate in both scale 

and intensity, which peaked prior to the 2008 Beijing 

Olympics, for example: the March 14 riot in the Tibet 

capital of Lhasa, the largest since 1988-89; an aborted 

bombing of Flight CZ6901 of China Southern Airline 

enroute from Urumqi to Beijing on March 7;7 and the 

terrorist attacks 4 days before the opening of the Beijing Olympics, which killed 16 and wounded 16 PAP.8

Two sets of factors—internal and external—apparently contributed to the recent trend of terrorism 

in China. In the first place, the reform decades, while 

considerably improving the living standards of Chinese people, including that of the minorities, have 

meant different things for the minorities in Tibet and 

Xinjiang. In the 1980s, General Secretary Hu Yaobang 

encouraged more autonomous rule by the minorities. Following several high-profile riots in the mid-
284

1980s, however, the central government switched to 

harsher policies. Economic reforms and development 

also brought in large numbers of Han businessmen 

and workers, leading to a sense of relative deprivation 

among the locals, hence the growing ethnic tensions. 

Externally, the rise of Islamic separatism in the 

adjacent Central Asia after the Soviet collapse has 

also enhanced Uyghurs’ cultural identity and ethnic 

tension in Xinjiang. According to PLA General Xiong 

Guangkai (熊光楷), pro-Eastern Turkistan separatists 

launched more than 260 terror attacks inside China in 

1990-2003, killing 170 and wounding 400.9

 The year 

1996 witnessed two separate developments in this 

regard. In April, the heads of state of Kazakhstan, 

China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan created the 

Shanghai-Five by signing “The Treaty on Deepening 

Military Trust in Border Regions.” In September, the 

Taliban came to power and increasingly turned Afghanistan into a hotbed of religious extremism and 

even terrorism, thus threatening the stability and security of its neighbors, including China. External influence on China’s domestic ethnic tension is not new. 

Of the more than 20 large-scale insurgencies in Xinjiang during the last Qing Dynasty (1616-1911), most 

of them had external connections. In the 20th century, 

according to Chinese analysts, Xinjiang’s disturbances 

and separatism were also connected with “the forces 

that dominated Central Asia,” meaning the former Soviet Union.10

Given these historical experiences and recent developments, the Shanghai Five adjusted their mission 

from force reduction and military confidence building along the border regions to a multidimensional 

one, including combating the “three forces”: terrorism, national separatism, and religious extremism. 
285

In their third summit in July 1998, the Shanghai Five 

declared in a joint communiqué to strike against the 

“three forces” and against arms and drug smuggling 

activities in the region. In the fourth Shanghai Five 

summit in Kyrgyzstan in August 1999, the organization made it explicit that members of the organization 

would not allow the actions from their own countries 

to jeopardize the sovereignty, security, and social order of any other member state.11 This item was particularly important for China because there are large 

Uyghur communities in the Central Asian countries, 

particularly in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.12 By the time the Shanghai Five evolved itself 

into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 

in June 2001, which was fully 3 months before 9/11, 

fighting the “three forces” had become an integral 

part of the SCO’s policy. Ten days prior to 9/11, the 

China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) in Beijing officially put into operation its 

Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies (CCTS) with the 

publication of its first study of international terrorism, 

Global Terrorism and Counter-Terrorist Campaign.

13

The Chinese, as well as their counterparts in the 

SCO, had a heightened sense of international terrorism, while the new Bush administration was preoccupied with the “vestigial Cold War concerns,” such 

as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and downgrading U.S. counterterrorist institutions and ignoring the emerging threat against America.14

In retrospect, the issues of insurgency and COIN 

for China have always been part of a broader orderdisorder context and they have represented recurring 

challenges for generations of politicians, officials, and 

ordinary Chinese. What separates the past and current insurgencies is perhaps the result of heightened 
286

ethnic identity, on a globalized scale, and the fluidity 

of the situation as a result of the revolution of worldwide transportation and communication technologies. 

In other words, the speed at which information/disinformation is disseminated and the “virtual” space 

that insurgency forces can operate in make it much 

harder for established authorities to maintain security 

and order. All of this, plus the growing trend to target innocent people, has been occurring while China 

has been steadily growing as a world power over the 

past few decades. The inexperience and deficiencies of 

China’s anti-terror and COIN operations were clearly 

revealed during the 2008 Tibet and 2009 Xinjiang riots, 

particularly in regard to their intelligence, knowledge, 

preparation, and coordination of and between political and military authorities and between various military and paramilitary units.15

It is within this context of the fear of chaos, the 

long history of insurgency and COIN, the efficiency 

and power of the modern means of communication, 

the heightened sense of cultural and religious identity in the post-9/11 world, and the lack of first-hand 

experience in dealing with contemporary large-scale 

and sudden riots/ insurgencies that the PLA perceives 

other “peoples’ wars” and defines the scope and substance of their own concept of insurgency and COIN. 

Among China’s neighbors, Russia draws particular 

attention of China’s defense and security community 

for both practical and vigilant purposes.

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND DEFINITIONS 

There is a significant gap between the way that 

China and the U.S./West define terrorism, insurgency, 

and COIN at three separate but related levels. At the 
287

global level where most of the existing definitions of 

terrorism and insurgency are constructed by the West, 

PLA analysts believe that they are highly normative 

and Western-centered.16 Like their civilian counterparts, PLA analysts also reject the West’s “double 

standard” in defining certain violent actions against 

the West as acts of terror while ignoring or dismissing 

those against other peoples and governments.17 At the 

regional level such as the SCO, Beijing clearly specifies 

the target of its anti-terror operation in the “Shanghai 

Agreement for Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and 

Extremism” in 2001 (打击恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端

主义的上海公约).18 In domestic debates, most Chinese 

analysts focus on terrorism, while virtually bypassing 

or dismissing the concept of insurgency and COIN.19

One of the reasons for this is perhaps the near absence 

for several decades of any large-scale insurgency 

inside China. An implicit reason may well be a historical fact of life that the PLA actually evolved from 

the insurgent-style of guerrilla forces that conducted 

asymmetrical warfare against much stronger enemies, 

be they the Nationalists or the Japanese. Some in the 

PLA, therefore, do not want to call guerrilla warfare 

terrorism.

PLA analysts do recognize the similarities between 

terrorism and guerrilla tactics in revolutionary wars, 

that is, both terrorism and guerrilla tactics involve 

asymmetrical tactics against much stronger foes. 

There are, however, two crucial differences between 

terrorism and guerrilla warfare. One is that the former targets innocent civilians, while the latter avoids 

such tactics. The second difference is the goals of the 

fighting: guerrilla warfare strives to achieve military 

victory; terrorism aims at expanding political impact 

through terror because military victory against the 
288

much more powerful enemy is impossible. In a way, 

the difference between guerrilla tactics and terrorism 

is a matter of degree: the former is a weapon for the 

weak; the latter is a weapon for the weakest. Despite 

these differences, the line between the two may become blurred if guerrilla forces use terror tactics by 

attacking innocent civilians.20

Despite the above-mentioned disparities with 

the West, Chinese analysts do recognize terrorism as 

a form of political violence. In 2002, three PAP analysts separately used the Clausewitzian treatise to describe terrorist actions as extension of politics by other 

means.21 This was a year before Robert Pape’s provocative writing regarding the strategic and political goals 

of contemporary terrorism22 and is in sharp contrast 

to popular beliefs in the West that terrorism is driven 

by, and pursues, religious extremism. “[T]errorism 

is a kind of asymmetric violent practice with political logics,” according to Zhang Jiadong, a prominent 

scholar on terrorism in Fudan University, Shanghai.23

Since such an act is targeted against innocent people, 

it is a crime against humanity. This is similar to many 

Western definitions.24

Beyond this, however, Chinese security experts 

have deliberated on both the substance and boundaries of politically motivated terrorism. The trend 

seems to embed various forms of terrorism into the 

broad paradigm of nontraditional threats. A cursory 

look at published Chinese works show that Chinese 

security experts and institutions began to pay attention to the issue in the early 21st century when Lu 

Zhongwei—who was director of the influential CICIR 

(1999-2009)—in 2003 published On Nontraditional Security.

25 By the end of the decade, the topic attracted 

more attention from both academic and military cir-
289

cles in China.26 In 2009, Beijing’s Shi Shi Publishing 

House (时事出版社), which is directly administrated 

by CICIR, published Armed Forces and Nontraditional 

Security Issues, a co-authored volume by two apparent 

PLA experts on security issues. Not only does it define 

the nontraditional security issues for the PLA, but for 

the first time it also provides a comprehensive survey 

of how armies of various major powers, including 

Russia, deal with nontraditional threats including terrorism.27 It is clear that the PLA realizes that an effective approach to dealing with nontraditional threats 

including terrorism and its sources cannot be fully developed without gaining insights into the experiences 

of other militaries, particularly that of Russia.

ASSESSING RUSSIA 

The PLA pays close attention to the Russian military’s counter-terror and COIN operations primarily 

regarding the Chechen wars (1994-96 and 1999-2009), 

and Chechnya related high-profile terrorist incidents 

that have occurred throughout Russia, which embodied various types of nontraditional threats including 

terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, urban terrorism, separatism, etc., almost all of which can be found 

in China, though to a lower degree. PLA analysts have 

expressed particular interest in the origins, types, and 

consequences regarding the Chechen wars and the 

lessons drawn from them.

Origin and Evolution. 

Many PLA analysts noted the long and complicated history that gave rise to the Chechen issue. They 

identified several root causes of the Chechen terror-
290

ism: Czarist expansion into the Caucasus region in the 

19th century; the 2-day forced relocation of half a million Chechens and Ingushens to Central Asia and Siberia in 1944 as a way to “punish” their collaboration 

with the Nazis, which resulted in the deaths of nearly 

half of those deported within the first 18 months of 

their relocation; the mismanagement of Russia’s relations with Chechnya following the Soviet collapse in 

1991, etc. 28

Russia’s mismanagement started immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 

26, 1991. As the Soviet power structure was melting 

away, Boris Yeltsin continued to champion democratization and local autonomy, further weakening Russia’s already flimsy control of the localities including 

Chechnya. On November 1, 1991, Chechen independence was officially declared by the radical separatist 

leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was a former Soviet 

Air Force general, even though Russia’s Supreme Soviet dismissed the Chechen “presidential election” a 

few days before as illegal. At the time, Yeltsin paid 

little attention to the events in Chechnya because of 

his preoccupation with political infighting in Russia. 

This was tantamount to acquiescing Dudayev’s de facto

control of Chechnya.29 Indeed, a de facto independent 

Chechen state was allowed to exist for two 3-year periods in the 1990s (1992-94 and 1996-99), and this was 

perhaps one of Russia’s biggest mistakes. It encouraged and enabled the Chechen separatist movement 

to grow, expand, and consolidate during this period 

to the point of open confrontation with the central authorities, threatening to “Balkanize” not only the Caucasus, but also the entire Russian Federation.30

Perhaps the biggest mistake Yeltsin made, according to Yu, was that Russia signed and implemented 
291

an agreement with Chechnya to withdraw all troops 

from Chechnya and to divide the remaining Soviet armament in Chechnya. According to the agreement, the 

Dudayev government would receive 50 percent of the 

Russian weapons that were deployed in Chechnya. By 

the time of the official ending of the Soviet Union in 

late December 1991, Dudayev issued a “presidential 

order” that the Chechens have the right to bear arms. 

In February 1992, there was widespread looting of 

the Russian military posts and armories in Chechnya. 

According to Russian sources, the Chechen military 

was well armed on the eve of the first Chechen War 

in August 1994, with more than 100 T-62 and T-72 

main battle tanks, 260 war planes, 100 antiaircraft 

machine guns, 18 sets of BM-21 rocket launchers (40 

tube - 122mm rockets), and more than 60,000 rifles. 

Dudayev was quoted as saying that: “The ammunition left by the Russians will be enough for a 20-year 

war with Russia.” It was not a surprise that Russia’s 

first Chechen War ended with huge casualties and a 

ceasefire on August 31, 1996.31

Assessment of “External” Connections. 

Like many foreign-assisted ethnic insurgencies in 

China, PLA analysts find strong foreign affiliations 

in the Chechen case. During Gorbachev’s time, some 

Chechen Muslims traveled to Saudi Arabia where 

they were indoctrinated by Wahhabbism. They returned to Chechnya and started to preach this Islamic 

extremism to the Chechens, Dagestans, and Ingushens. As a result, in the early 1990s, Chechnya became a 

sanctuary and training ground for Islamic extremists. 

For example, in 1995, Afghan terrorist leaders set up 

a “Caucasus Institute” in Chechnya with 40 Afghan 
and Arabic teachers. In 2 months, the school graduated 160 students well trained in Wahhabbism. Many 

of them later conducted terrorist operations in both 

the Caucasus and Russia. Foreign Islam extremists 

also joined Chechen separatists. According to an intelligence estimate by the Russian Defense Ministry 

at the end of 2004, some 150-200 foreign mercenaries 

from 52 countries were still operating in Chechnya.

A major external connection was foreign financing 

of the Chechen separatist and terrorist insurgencies, 

and a greatly deregulated Russian financial system, 

which collectively created plenty of opportunities for 

such transactions. In 2000 alone, the London-based 

International Muslim Brotherhood provided the 

Chechen separatists $2.5 million. Bin Laden himself 

donated $15 million in 2000-01. The Russian government claimed that as many as 60 Islamic extremist 

groups from more than 30 nations financially supported Chechen terrorism. Many of these groups operated 

from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, 

Jordan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 

Kuwait, Qatar, etc. 32

Both Yang and Yu cited Russia’s deep concern 

about the “Western factor” behind the Chechen separatist and terrorist operations. The West, particularly 

the United States, tolerates, harbors, and even supports 

some separatist and terrorist groups for geopolitical 

and energy-political reasons, that is, to weaken and 

even end Russia’s influence in the Caucasus region. 

For this goal, the United States has historically supported many terrorist groups including the Taliban, 

the Kosovo Liberation Army, and the Macedonian 

National Liberation Army. Many Chechen extremists 

reside inside America’s allies such as Saudi Arabia, 

Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, etc. Yang cited Russian De292
293

fense Minister Sergei Ivanov’s 1999 statement that the 

United States made sure “to incite controllable conflict in order to weaken Russia’s hold of the Northern Caucasus and to strengthen the U.S. posture in 

the region.”33 The U.S. State Department spokesman 

insisted that the United States maintain contact with 

some Chechen political figures after the 2004 Beslan

terrorist siege, which led to the death of 350 school 

children and teachers. Yu went as far as to conclude 

that the Chechen terrorist and separatist movement 

could not sustain itself without the financial, human, 

and spiritual support from the West.34

Terror Tactics and Russia’s Dilemma. 

Terrorism in Russia is known for its cruelty, violent nature, destructiveness, and disrespect of life, 

which are largely derived from the rugged character 

of the Chechen mountaineers and the ferociousness of 

Islamic extremism. Russian chauvinism and the tradition of political extremism are also said to contribute to the extreme violent character of Chechen terrorism. Moreover, Chechen terrorists are well armed 

and skillful in choosing their time and targets for 

maximum impact in order to force Russian authorities to change their minds and to grant independence 

for Chechnya. PLA analysts also noticed that Chechen 

militants often have good intelligence about the Russians and are able to obtain inside information from 

all levels of the Russian governmental agencies and 

local security forces. As a result, they would be able to 

obtain in advance Russia’s operation plans and to get 

prepared to respond to those plans. In actual combat, 

the Chechens seldom confront the Russians head-on, 

but divide themselves into smaller units with specific 
294

assignments such as reconnaissance, early warning, 

firepower preparation, etc. Some units are dispatched 

to attack Russian supply lines or to cut off Russian 

units from the rear. These small Chechen units are 

well coordinated with one another and are very flexible in their maneuvering. Chechen asymmetrical 

warfare is also assisted by the local population, and 

many terrorists are ordinary Chechens during the day 

and engage in combat at night. In contrast, the Russian intelligence community has often failed, particularly in 1994-2004, to gather, analyze, and disseminate 

information regarding the terrorist groups and their 

pending operations. One of the reasons for these intelligence failures was the tightly knitted terror groups, 

which were hard to infiltrate. Inability, or even unwillingness, to coordinate between different security 

apparatus also led to poor intelligence gathering.35

These characteristics of the Chechen terrorists, plus 

the complexities of the socio-political environment that 

give rise to the Chechnya issue, made Russia’s COIN 

operations extremely difficult. Even today, Chechen 

terrorists continue to engage in terrorist actions all 

over Russia. In his analysis, Yang cited figures from 

the Russian Interior Ministry showing a significant 

increase of terror attacks in Russia: 326 in 2001, 561 

in 2003, culminating on September 1, 2004, with the 

Beslan school siege of 1,100 people (including 777 children and their parents and teachers). One day before 

the Beslan siege (August 31), a female suicide bomber 

killed nine in addition to herself and wounded 51 others outside a subway station in Moscow.36 For the rest 

of the first decade of the 21st century, Chechen terrorists continued to hunt and kill Russians. On March 

29, 2010, explosions—set off by two female Chechen 

suicide bombers in two landmark subway stations in 
295

Moscow—killed 39 people and wounded more than 

70.37 The terror threat in Russia, in the eyes of PLA 

analysts, remains serious even though the Russians 

prevailed in the second Chechen War.

Russian COIN Operations. 

The PLA’s assessments seem to fall into two categories when evaluating Russia’s COIN operations: 

the evolution of Russia’s COIN operation and the lessons learned; and the more tactical operations such 

as the use of fire power, urban warfare, etc. Within 

the first category, there are optimists and pessimists. 

Wang Shaomin, an analyst in the PLA’s Academy of 

Military Sciences in Beijing, divides Russia’s COIN, or 

counter-guerrilla operations into three separate but 

interrelated phases: the Afghan war (the early phase, 

萌芽期); the first Chechen War (developing phase, 发

展期); and the second Chechen War (mature phase, 成

熟期). In the early stage of the Afghan War, the Red 

Army suffered heavy losses because it employed 

heavily armed motorized divisions against the more 

agile Afghan guerrillas. The Soviets were then forced 

to adapt to the Afghan situation by dispatching small 

units of special forces and paratroopers supported by 

attack helicopters and fixed-wing fighter-bombers. 

The Soviet 103rd Airborne Division, for example, was 

divided into battalion-size units that operated independently. The main Soviet forces were used only in 

large-scale “combing” operations. These new tactics 

helped the Soviets to win a series of battles such as 

those in the Panjshir Valley where the Afghan guerrillas suffered some 10,000 casualties. 

During the first Chechen War (1994-96), the Russians repeated the mistakes that they made in the 
296

early stages of the Afghan War. That is, they quickly 

occupied the Chechen capital of Grozny, while leaving many Chechen guerrillas in the mountains where 

they were able to regroup and to launch surprise attacks at the times and places of their choosing. Even in 

the occupied cities, Russian troops were not familiar 

with the urban environment. Nor did they prepare 

themselves for street fighting. The Russian military 

units reportedly did not even have detailed city maps. 

Once in the city, the Russian units were harassed and 

attacked from all sides and suffered heavy losses. The 

131st Motorized Brigade alone lost more than half of 

its men in addition to the destruction of 20 tanks and 

102 armored personnel carriers. Eventually, the Russian forces were forced to withdraw. 

Because of the failures of the first Chechen War, 

the Russian military significantly revamped its tactics. 

With careful planning, thorough preparation, and 

accurate intelligence, the attacking Russian troops 

divided Grozny into 15 “zones of responsibility” controlled by individual Russian elite units. The Russians 

also used many long-range precision guided weapons 

to soften and devastate Chechen resistance before employing their infantry, whose mission was essentially 

to clear the remnants of the Chechen forces. Because 

of these effective tactics, the Russian forces were able 

to clear Grozny and drive the Chechen forces to the 

mountainous areas in the South.38

Several questions can be asked about Wang’s rather positive assessment of Russian COIN operations. 

Despite a rather steep and quick learning curve during the war, the Soviet forces eventually lost control of 

most of the Afghan territories and had to withdraw. 

How and why did this final outcome relate to how 

the Soviets adjusted their operational behavior? Wang 
297

simply skips the role of outside assistance to the Afghan guerrillas, which eventually deprived the Soviets of their air superiority. Another question regards 

the first Chechen War, which was a clear defeat. It is 

not so clear how and why the PLA analyst defines it 

as a “developing phase” in Russia’s COIN operations, 

particularly when Russia is said to have repeated the 

mistakes made during the Afghan War. Russian domestic disarray—and the reorientation of the Russian 

military—in the first half of the 1990s may be explanations for the clumsiness of its first Chechen operation. 

In both cases—the Afghan War and the first Chechen 

War—Wang seems to be interested only in the tactical, but not the broader strategic aspects of the Soviet/

Russian COIN operations.

In contrast to Wang’s somewhat “benign” treatment of the Russian COIN operations, PLA General 

Yang Hui, Director of the Intelligence (2nd) Department of the PLA’s General Staff and Director of the 

Anti-terrorist Center at the China Institution for International Strategic Studies (中国国际战略学会, CIISS),

tends to be more critical of these Soviet/Russian COIN 

wars. In his discussion of the “lessons,” Yang parallels 

Russian casualties as shown in Figure 8-1.
298

Figure 8-1. Parallels of Russian Casualties

between the First and Second Chechen Wars.

The average annual casualty rate of the Russian 

military during the second Chechen War was considerably less than its predecessor. Yang, however, argues 

that the lessons learned from both wars were similar 

and very costly. Indeed, in terms of the Russian and 

Chechen losses, the second Chechen War was not necessarily more successful than the first one. There are, 

however, several key differences in terms of the background and outcomes. In terms of the final outcome, 

the first war was simply “unfinished,” argues Yang. It 

was unfinished largely because Russia’s unsettled domestic political situation, politicking among the political elite, and the hesitations of the Russian leadership, 

which seriously undermined the decisionmaking and 

execution. Besides, Yeltsin’s war was waged for “restoring constitutional order,” a term that tends to be in 

the gray areas of the post-Soviet politics ranging from 

self-determination, independence, local autonomy, 

democratization, to elite politicking for selfish interests. There was also a strong anti-war movement and 

draft resistant tendency. In contrast, Putin’s war on 

terror enjoyed more support because of the fear of terrorism and subsequent terrorist actions that pervades 

much of the Russian population.39

Death Wounded Total

First Chechen War (1992-1994): 5,200 20,000 25,200

Second Chechen War (1999-2009): 4,100 16,000 24,100
299

Yang, therefore, argues that both Chechen wars 

suffered from a series of similar deficiencies as follows:

• Lack of preparation and the underestimation of 

enemy strength. After the secret operation to 

overthrow Dudayev failed, top Russian leaders 

decided to send in Russian troops. At the onset of the war, Russian Defense Minister Pavel 

Grachev boasted that the city of Grozny could 

be captured with only one paratroop regiment. 

Yeltsin, meanwhile, went as far as to declare 

that Grachev was “the best defense minister of 

the decade.”40 The Russian civilian and military 

leadership, therefore, were out of touch with 

the poor condition of the Russian military and 

the power of the Chechen guerrillas. Although 

the lessons of the first Chechen War led to Russia’s military reform, the different views of the 

Defense Ministry and General Staff on how to 

reform the military seriously hampered the reform process. The 1998 Russian financial crisis 

further delayed the reform. By the time of the 

second Chechen War in 1999, the combat capability of the Russian military had not notably 

increased from that of the first Chechen War. 

Meanwhile, the Russian military once again 

underestimated the insurgency’s resilience. 

General Valentin Marilov publicly claimed, 

shortly after the end of Russia’s first offensive 

operation in the second Chechen War, that it 

was the last winter for Chechen illegal forces. 

In the next 3 years, Russian military officials 

repeated this belief several times. Each was 

followed by an escalation of the terrorist activities. No matter what the Russian military did—
300

be they a blitzkrieg offensive, occupying cities 

and transportation lifelines, etc.—the core of 

the Chechen insurgency survived.41

• Lack of coordination among Russian units and unclear definition of responsibilities. Yang finds that 

in both COIN wars, the Russians never fully resolved the issue of command, control, and coordination between various participating units 

of the different services of the military, or those 

of the security, interior, and border control. 

Even though the first Chechen War revealed 

many problems in the area of coordination, the 

second war was still plagued by similar problems. Yang argues that these problems have 

their roots in the structure of the Russian military. For example, in March 1994 the Russian 

military established a joint corps consisting of 

the units of the Northern Caucasus Military Region and those of the Interior Ministry, which 

was expected to take the command of the operation. Once the first shot was fired, however, 

the Russian military units refused to be led by 

the Interior Ministry’s commanders. The 1998 

“Anti-terror Law” attempted to divide the zone 

of responsibility for the military and the Interior units. As a result, the second Chechen War 

began with operations by regular military units 

and the Interior units followed to mop up the 

remnants of the resistance and to provide security. By January 2001, however, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB, or ФСБ) took over 

Chechnya. In 2003, the jurisdiction went to the 

Interior units. Meanwhile, the FSB sent its own 

officials to handle the Chechnya operation. For 

Yang, the constant shift of command among 
301

those agencies created unnecessary hurdles 

and confusion, and was not conducive to the 

success of the COIN operation.42

• Structural deficiency of the Russian military. Yang 

points out that in both of the Chechen wars, 

the Russian military failed to create a special 

force for mountain and jungle warfare. Instead, 

regular infantry, tank, and artillery units were 

thrown into the asymmetrical war. Their heavy 

equipment, which required good roads and 

bridges, was difficult to supply and maintain, 

and was incapable of dealing with the flexible 

and agile Chechen forces. The conventional 

Russian forces became easy targets. Worse, 

most Russian units still used communication 

equipment from the 1970s. Their opponents 

were armed with advanced communication 

devices from abroad. This was the main reason 

for the destruction of a company of the 76th Airborne Division in the spring of 2000. For 3 days, 

the company was surrounded by the Chechen 

insurgents and was unable to communicate 

with the outside until almost all of them were 

killed.

• Lack of training and discipline. Yang notices that 

in both Chechen wars, the Russian military 

tended to deploy their forces in a conventional 

and rigid format. The way some officers coordinated between the different services was 

similar to the manner utilized in World War 

II. Officers at all levels lacked knowledge and 

training of COIN operations. When facing 

the hit-and-run tactics of the small insurgent 

groups, the Russians failed to adapt themselves 

to the situation. Besides, the participating units 
302

of the Russian military, particularly the Interior and special forces, had serious discipline 

problems such as looting, rape, smuggling oil, 

selling weapons and munitions, human trafficking, and even treason. Yang cites a Kremlin 

official who stated that there were 748 criminal 

cases against military personnel from August 

1999 to December 2000. These discipline problems not only weakened the combat power of 

the Russian military, but also jeopardized relations with the locals.

Due to these lessons and problems, Yang cites Russian military experts who came to the conclusion that 

joint operations between Defense, Interior, FSB, and 

Border units must be optimized and better coordinated; the use of heavy weapon systems must be selective 

and limited in order to avoid civilian casualties; priority should be given to high-tech weapons; battalion 

and company levels of operation should be the force 

level for COIN operations; and finally, mountain units 

need to be established. 

Yang argues that these operational problems of the 

Russian military were set against a backdrop of Russia’s political transition. As a result of the steep decline of Russia’s economic power, the Russian military 

lacked adequate funding for procurement, training, 

and salaries. Vladimir Putin, for example, would have 

to go to the front himself in order to solve the salary 

shortage for the participating Russian units.

At the socio-political level, Yang argues that the 

Russian COIN experience indicates the limited utility of the military means in anti-terror operations. It 

is, and should be, a long-term mission with multiple 

interventions in the political, economic and social are-
303

nas. In the case of Chechnya, some military operations 

may be able to deal inflict a heavy blow on some separatists and terrorists, but it cannot eliminate the complex origins of the problems. The misuse of the military instrument of power may even backfire. Yang, 

therefore, believes in “comprehensive” treatment of 

the COIN issues.44

Yang’s analysis separates itself from the majority 

of the PLA experts in their assessments of Russia’s 

COIN operations. It is more critical of the Russian approach to the use of military power, and it argues for 

more nonmilitary means for the long-term eradication of terrorism and insurgency. Part of the reason 

for Yang’s critique is perhaps the time of his research, 

which was around 2005 when the Russians were in the 

middle of the second Chechen War (1999-2009) with 

no victory in sight. This was also shortly after the September 2004 Beslan terror siege in Russia’s Northern 

Ossetia, during which more than 300 hostages died 

(among some 1,200 hostages). Even the Russian special forces suffered more than 40 casualties. What is 

not clear in Yang’s writing are the sources for most of 

his analysis. Unless Yang clearly indicates or directly 

cites Russian sources, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 

detect if Yang cites a Russian assessment or expresses 

his own view. With the exception of a few PLA writers, this group of PLA analysis of the Russian COIN 

operation does not have references at all. 

Tactical Aspects of Russian COIN Operations.

In more recent years, the bulk of the PLA’s analyses focused on the tactical issues of the Russian COIN 

operations such as the use of firepower, offense formation and process, urban warfare, etc. In their as-
304

sessment of the Russian use of firepower, Li Hongfeng 

and Pan Menghua, both from the Graduate Department of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, 

give high marks to Russia’s tactics during the second 

Chechen War. They notice that the Russians failed to 

utilize their superior firepower in the first Chechen 

War largely due to the lack of coordination between 

different services, units, and weapons systems. The 

Russians realized that any one of these weapon systems accomplished fairly little in confronting the insurgents and must be comprehensively combined 

into a coherent format (综合立体). Some of the specific 

Russian tactics are as follows:

• Li and Pan describe that the Russians unified 

the command and control mechanism during 

the second Chechen War. This was also the 

case for the use of their firepower and they 

assigned different weapon platforms to different roles. For example, Su-25 ground attack 

jets, and attack helicopters such as Mi-24s and 

Ka-50s, would provide close-range support at 

mid-low altitude, while the Su-24M would provide precision and area bombing at all altitudes 

and from variable distances. Ground artillery 

and rocket launchers would provide saturated 

bombing to soften insurgent positions. Other 

small weapons such as grenade launchers, 

flamethrowers, and sniper rifles would be used 

in mountain fighting.

• The Russian military always maximized the use 

of aerial and ground artillery bombardment in 

what the two PLA researchers refer to as “unconventional” (非常规), “over-saturation” (超

饱和), or “repeated over-saturated bombing 

(连续超饱和轰炸). They cite one case in which 
305

the Russian infantry called in 24 aerial support 

requests against certain insurgent positions. In 

another operation, Russian bombing almost 

leveled the entire village before the infantry 

moved in and combed every house and street. 

This way, the Russians were said to have almost completely annihilated the insurgents in 

the village. In still another case, a Russian artillery company was instructed “not to save any 

ammunition” in its round-the-clock firing. Li 

and Pan also cite statistics that the Russian Air 

Force actually carried out 70-80 percent of the 

bombing missions. In order to avoid hitting civilians, 65 percent of the attacks used precisionguided munitions (1,300 sorties out of some 

2,000). The overuse of firepower, according to 

Li and Pan, helped reduce Russian casualties 

throughout the second Chechen War.45

In many ways, this analysis of the Russian use of 

firepower directly contradicts the findings and arguments in Yang’s earlier writing (2006). What Li and 

Pan promote is exactly what Yang questions. Just a 

year and a half apart, the same PLA military journal 

produced radically different assessments over the 

same issue, i.e., the excessive use of firepower in COIN 

operations. Again, this dramatically different view of 

the second Chechen War has no references and its 

description sounds more like textbook/manual approach, that is, what each weapon system is supposed 

to do. 

Within the same journal in which Li and Pan praise 

Russia’s use of firepower in the second Chechen War, 

two other PLA analysts, Mao and Wang, who are 

from the same Graduate Department of the Chinese 
306

Academy of Military Sciences, assess the “strength 

and weakness” of the Russian military in its offensive 

operation in the “special military campaigns.” Their 

piece focuses on the tactical side of the second Chechen 

War and how the Russian military greatly improved 

its performance from the first Chechen War. Specifically, they notice how the Russian military achieved 

surprise in their battle of Grozny. Mao and Wang also 

discuss how the Russians used deception by deliberately leaving open the southern side of the city while 

tightly sealing the three other sides. As a result, 3,000 

Chechen rebels were ambushed while fleeing to the 

south, most of whom were either killed (about 1,000) 

or captured (1,500). Like Li and Pan, Mao and Wang 

also speak highly of the Russian use of firepower to 

help reduce infantry casualties, and the higher level of 

coordination during the second Chechen War. Beyond 

this, Mao and Wang point out how the Russian military “re-used” some of the Soviet-style political work 

to boost troop morale to promote patriotism, and to 

win over the local populace. They say that this was 

very different from the first Chechen War. They do, 

however, criticize the Russian army for relying too 

much on firepower, Russia’s difficulties in servicing 

and supplying a high-tech military during COIN operations, and Russia’s antiquated communication system, etc.46

Urban COIN operation is another key PLA area of 

interest. In their 2008 analysis, Fan Lili and Hua Yan 

examine large-scale urban warfare and anti-terror operations during the second Chechen War and detect 

six improvements from the first Chechen War:

1. Sealing and squeezing (封锁合围, 逐步挤压). 

Instead of driving directly to the city center and occupying key installations as were the tactics in the 
307

first Chechen War, the Russian military in the second 

Chechen War would first attack the peripheries of the 

key cities and gradually squeeze the insurgents into 

isolated urban areas. The besieged insurgents were 

therefore under tremendous psychological pressure, 

and some actually gave up and surrendered. The 

Russians used this strategy in attacking the Chechen 

capital, Grozny; the second largest Chechen city, Gudermes; and Shali (south of Grozny).

2. Using precision-guided munitions against urban 

targets (火力拔点, 精打要害). This strategy aimed to 

pick up those scattered urban positions, commandcontrol-communication centers, and weapon platforms of the insurgents. It also reduced civilian casualties. In the battle of the Grozny, the Russian air force 

launched 100 sorties per day and sometimes 150-200 

sorties, 80 percent of which employed precisionguided attacks. The Russian military also distributed 

ground artillery pieces to smaller units for timely and 

flexible support. Meanwhile, laser-guided artillery 

shells were widely used in urban fighting.

3. Cutting urban insurgents into smaller and isolated pockets while driving toward city center (向心突

击, 边打边割). This would severely limit the coordination between insurgents.

4. Small units responsible for combing assigned areas (小群多路, 分区清剿). The Russian military split 

into many small “attacking groups” (攻击群), each 

with its own armor unit, flamethrowers, engineers, 

and an Interior unit for area combing. Each attacking 

group was responsible for eliminating insurgents in 

the assigned city blocs. Many times, the same area(s) 

would be combed several times.

5. Using deception and ambush (巧用谋略, 设伏

歼敌). In the battle of Grozny, the Russian military 
308

deliberately left the city’s southern flank open while 

deploying heavily on the north, west, and east sides of 

the city. 3,000 insurgents were ambushed while fleeing to the south.

6. Using militia and coordinating with them (重用

民兵, 协同作战). Militia forces were used in the first 

Chechen War for logistics and security purpose. In 

the second Chechen War militias were widely used in 

combination with the Interior forces, because the main 

attacking units and were responsible for the postwar 

stabilization. The biggest advantage of using militias 

was that they knew the territory and they could identify the insurgents.

Implications for the PLA’s Own COIN and 

Anti-Terror Operations.

As discussed above, the PLA analyses indicate 

some interesting and obviously different schools of 

thought in assessment of the Russian COIN experience, not just between the critics and supporters, but 

also between PLA academics (Li, Pan, Mao, Wang, 

Fan, and Hua) and the military intelligence branch 

(Yang). One possible explanation of these differences 

is the fact that many of the PLA weapon systems are of 

the same Russian/Soviet designs with identical specifications, capabilities, and perhaps problems. Some 

PLA researchers therefore may be more receptive to 

Russian experience and lessons. Another reason is the 

gradual normalization and development of the SinoRussian military-military (mil-mil) relations. Additionally, Russia and China have to deal with similar 

threats from the “three forces” (separatism, terrorism, 

and religious extremism), and a growing number of 

these threats and actual incidents of terrorism occur 
309

in urban areas, where COIN or anti-terror operations 

are far more difficult to deal with than in remote and 

rural areas. 

In a way, these different assessments of Russia’s 

COIN operations in Chechnya represent a typical 

bottle half-full/empty debate. While supporters tend 

to see the differences between the first and second 

Chechen wars, critics always point to the high cost of 

Russia’s COIN operations, the outdated strategy, and 

the persistence of the terrorist attacks to date. Last, 

but not least, the PLA debate may be driven by the 

evolution and progress of Russia’s COIN operations. 

In the second half of 2007, the Russians seemed to 

have turned the corner, as China’s civilian intelligence 

experts observed that the Russians had basically controlled domestic terrorism thanks to a series of policies 

including its sustained economic growth and progress 

in Chechen reconstruction; more accommodating policies toward Muslims in Russia; and the strengthening 

of their anti-terror mechanism, etc.47

These PLA and China’s civilian intelligence community assessments of Russia’s COIN operations are 

far from conclusive. More recent analyses seem to 

point to a quite different trajectory. In 2008, General 

Yang Hui, the intelligence “czar” of the PLA, published a comparative study of Russian and American 

anti-terror operations. His description clearly favors 

the more high-tech, better funded, better educated 

and trained, more flexible and agile American forces. 

Yang goes as far as to claim that the Chechen wars 

were the “fourth generation” of wars based on the 

mechanized technology (机械化), while America’s 

war in Afghanistan today belongs to the “sixth generation” of warfare based on information technology 

(信息化). Nuclear war is what Yang defines as the 
310

“fifth generation” of war. Yang does point to certain 

improvements in Russia’s COIN operations, particularly in Russia’s conduct of psychological warfare, use 

of special force units, and the use of high-tech weapons 

during the second Chechen War. The Russian military, 

however, is still prioritizing its “attacking” function 

(以打为主), while the United States depends more on 

reconnaissance and information analysis (以侦为主). 

As a professional intelligence officer, Yang clearly favors the latter.48

In a different venue, PAP analyst Liu Xiaoyan also 

echoed Yang’s critique of the Russian approach. Liu 

points to 69 large-scale terrorist attacks in Russia in 

1994-2004, leading to the death of some 1,400 people. 

The high frequency of the attacks indicated the incapability of the Russian intelligence community, according to Liu, a professor of military intelligence in the 

PAP academy. In most cases, Russian intelligence had 

no prior knowledge of many of the terror groups, their 

network, means of violence, intended targets, finance, 

etc. But even when some information was obtained, 

various anti-terror organizations usually did not communicate nor coordinate well. There were multiple 

reasons for Russia’s intelligence failure, including 

the highly secret and tightly organized terror groups, 

distrust of government among the local population, 

and structural deficiencies of Russia’s intelligence system.49

Does this indicate the PLA’s future trajectory toward developing its own COIN capabilities along the 

American path? To certain degree, the recent questioning of Russian COIN operations does not necessarily mean that the PLA pays less attention to Russia. Russia was considered part of the broader war on 

terror even before 9/11 in 2001. This was the case of 
311

CICIR’s publication, Global Terrorism and Counter-Terrorist Campaign, published 10 days before 9/11, and 

the official debut of its CCTS.50 In more recent PLA 

publications on the non-traditional threat, Russia is 

prominently featured.51

The history of Russia’s COIN efforts, however, 

must be considered in the Chinese context. At China’s 

domestic level, the PLA’s more critical evaluation of 

Russia’s experience may also be intended for a domestic audience. Liu’s strong critique of Russia’s intelligence failure may well be an effort to bargain for more 

independent intelligence gathering capabilities for the 

PAP, which has until recently depended on other governmental institutions—such as military intelligence 

(Second Department of the General Staff, [总参二部], 

Ministry of State Security [安全部], and public security 

[公安部门])—for intelligence and information regarding terrorism.52 Even with the creation of the PAP Intelligence Bureau (武警情报局) within the PAP headquarters (武警总部), it is unclear how various military 

and civilian intelligence gathering organizations will 

coordinate their effort for COIN and anti-terror purposes. Meanwhile, the issue of command, control, and 

coordination between the various branches of the PLA 

in complex anti-terror operations remains an open 

space for inter-service maneuvering.

Beyond intelligence, various branches of the PLA 

seem to have developed a certain division of work in 

relation to their respective Russian counterparts. For 

example, regular PLA units formed the bulk of the 

participating forces in multilateral exercises such as 

SCO’s “Peace-Mission” in 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2010;53

while the PAP units, particularly its special forces 

such as the Snow Leopard commando unit (雪豹突

击队), participated in bilateral training exercises with 
312

their foreign counterparts such as units from Russia’s 

Interior.54 These exercises do not necessarily imply 

what the “final solution” for the type of forces that 

should be used for large-scale COIN operations or 

smaller, yet high profile, counterterrorist operations 

will look like. A PAP analyst, for example, argues that 

China’s anti-terror operations should be the work of 

public security institutions and PAP units; regular 

PLA units should not be overloaded with anti-terror 

assignments, which may divert their attention from 

bigger responsibilities such as safeguarding China’s 

territorial integrity, i.e. Taiwan. An “obsession” with 

the anti-terror issue may cause China to fall into the 

trap like that of the United States.55

In closing, the Russian COIN experience has been 

both valuable and limited for the PLA. It is valuable 

because both Moscow and Beijing confront the complexities and difficulties of the growing terrorist threat 

in the post-9/11 world. China’s own experiences in 

COIN operations in traditional, modern, and contemporary times are simply not adequate in this new world 

of identity sensitivity, clash of civilizations, weapons 

of mass destruction, and preemption. It is limited because of the two totally different domestic settings. 

Terrorist and insurgency activities in China, which 

have been considerably lower than those in Russia in 

terms of severity and frequency, have been essentially 

countered with public security and PAP forces. This 

was the case even for the recent large-scale urban unrests (in Tibet in 2008) and riots (in Xinjiang in 2009). 

This, however, may change in the future if transborder terrorist activities escalate with increasing 

destabilizing effects on China’s domestic situation, 

and if Chinese nationals abroad increasingly become 

the targets of terrorist activities. Already, the PLA’s 
313

ground and air units have been dispatched to join various anti-terror exercises in SCO member states and 

beyond. More recently, the PAP is paying increasing 

attention to the experience of its foreign counterparts, 

including that of Russia, in conducting anti-terror 

operations outside their respective national boundaries.56 It remains to be seen how the PLA and PAP 

will coordinate their operations outside China should 

there be such a necessity.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. This includes the Taiping Rebellion (太平军起义, 1851-

1864), the White Lotus Rebellion (白莲教起义, 1774-1804), the 

Nian Rebellion (捻军起义, 1853-68), and the two Muslim rebellions (1855-73 and 1862-78). These rebellions led to the death of 

perhaps as many as 100 million people, and the Qing never recovered from the destruction. See Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing 

China: from Revolution through Reform, 2nd Ed., New York: W. W. 

Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 20-21; Keith Schoppa, “From Empire to People’s Republic,” in William A. Joseph, ed., Politics in 

China: an Introduction, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010, 

pp. 40-41.

2. Qu Deqian (屈德骞), “共和国史册上的大匪患” (“Major Insurgencies in PRC History”), 当代中国研究所 (Institute of Contemporary China), 中华人民共和国国史网 (History of the People’s 

Republic of China), October 15, 1995, available from www.hprc.org.

cn/cnki/zdsj/200906/t20090610_9805.html.

3. 中国人民解放军第一野战军战史 (History of the First Field 

Army of the People’s Liberation Army), Beijing, China: PLA Press, 

1995, p. 363.

4. Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, The CIA’s Secret War 

in Tibet, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002; Robert 

Barnett, “Tibet,” in William A. Joseph, ed., pp. 321-23; Li Ye and 

Wang Zhongchun (李晔, 王仲春), “美国的西藏政策与‘西藏问题’

的由来” (“The U.S. Tibet Policy and the Origin of the ‘Tibet Problem’”), 美国研究 (America Studies), No. 2, 1999, available from 

www.tibet328.cn/zxss/01/200902/t264002.htm.
314

5. Li Jian (李健), 共和国之战, 上卷 (Wars by the Republic, Vol. 

1), Beijing, China: China Social Press, 1996, pp. 336-82; “打击逃缅

国民党军窜扰的作战”(“Combat against the Hit-and-run Operations by Nationalist Troop Fled to Burma”), available from baike.

baidu.com/view/1151353.html. 

6. Guardner Bovingdon, “Xinjiang,” in William A. Joseph, 

ed., p. 348.

7. “警方通报针对南航班机未遂恐怖袭击案” (“Police Report 

on Aborted Attack of the China Southern Airline”), 新华网 (Xinhua Net), March 28, 2008, available from news.xinhuanet.com/

mrdx/2008-03/28/content_7874040.htm. 

8. “新疆喀什市发生一起严重暴力袭警案件 16人死亡“ (“A 

Violent Attack of Policy in Ka Shi City, Xinjiang, 16 Dead”), 新

华网 (Xinhua Net), August 4, 2008, available from news.sohu.

com/20080804/n258578985.shtml. 

9. Xiong Guangkai (熊光楷), 国际战略与新军事变革 (International Strategy and Revolution in Military Affairs), Beijing, China: 

Qinghua University Press, 2003, p. 20. Xiong is former PLA Deputy Chief of Staff (1996-2005) and former Director of the General 

Staff Intelligence Department (1988-92).

10. See Zheng Yu (郑羽) ed., 中美俄在中亚:合作与竞争 (Cooperation and Competition: China, Russia, and the U.S. in Central 

Asia), Beijing, China: Social Science Academic Press, 2007, p. 381.

11. “Shanghai Five” (“上海五国”), 百度百科 (Baidu Encyclopedia), available from baike.baidu.com/view/259646.htm. 

12. It is estimated that China is home for some 8.5 million Uyghurs, while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have some 

200,000. See Zheng Yu (郑羽), ed., 中美俄在中亚:合作与竞争

(Cooperation and Competition: China, Russia and the U.S. in Central 

Asia), Beijing, China: Social Science Academic Press, 2007, p. 375.

13. 国际恐怖主义与反恐怖斗争 (Global Terrorism and Counter-Terrorist Campaign), Beijing, China: Shi Shi Chubanshe, 2001, 

available from www.wl.cn/1265254.
315

14. Lewis Clarke, Against All Enemies, New York: Free Press, 

2004, pp. 234, 230-231.

15. There was a sense of overconfidence among certain experts of Tibetan issues in managing local affairs at the end of 2007. 

This was the author’s impression while attending the conference 

“China’s Geopolitics,” sponsored by School of International Affairs and Public Policy, Fudan University, Shanghai, December 

15-16, 2007. Regarding Xinjiang, some analysts actually anticipated the increase of religious extremist activities prior to the 2009 

Urumqi riots. Actual information sharing and policy coordination, however, were inadequate. See Pan Guang and Zhao Guojun 

(潘光,赵国军), “9/11以来东突势力的新变化及其动因” (“Eastern 

Turkistan Terrorist Organizations’ Development and Causes After 9/11”), 现代国际关系 (Contemporary International Relations), 

No. 10, 2008, pp. 47-54.

16. Pan Menghua and Wang Fang (潘孟华, 王芳), “恐怖主义与

游击战概念辨析” (“On the Definition of Terrorism and Guerrilla 

Warfare”), 外国军事学术 (Foreign Military Science), No. 5, 2008, 

pp. 74-75.

17. Pan Menghua and Wang Fang, p. 76; Wang Shuyou (王

树友), “恐怖主义感念体系研究” (“The Conceptual Frameworks of 

Terrorism”), 武警学院学报 (Journal of the Chinese People’s Armed 

Police Force Academy), Vol. 18, No. 6, December 2002, p. 60; Yu 

Shujie (于淑杰), “俄罗斯对恐怖主义的界定” (“Russia’s Definition 

of Terrorism”), 外国军事学术 (Foreign Military Science), No. 11, 

2003, pp. 21-24.

18. One of the most comprehensive definitions of China’s version of terrorism is articulated by Wang Shuyou (王树友), associate professor of the People’s Army Police (PAP) Academy, in his 

“恐怖主义感念体系研究” (“The Conceptual Frameworks of Terrorism”).

19. A notable exception is made by Zhang Liwei (张立伟) in 

his analysis of the similarities of anti-terror and counter-guerrilla 

operations of the Soviet and U.S. militaries. See “现代反恐怖作战

反游击战理论初探” (“Initial Theoretical Exploration of Modern 

Anti-terrorist and Anti-guerrilla Warfare”), 武警学院学报 (Journal 

of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Academy), Vol. 20, No. 5, 

June 2004, pp. 87-89.
316

20. Ibid, pp. 74-76.

21. Wang Shuyou (王树友); Xia Mingxing and Xu Daqiang 

(夏明星,许大强), “当代恐怖主义活动浅析” (“On Contemporary 

Terror Activities”), in Ibid., pp. 61-62, 68.

22. Robert Pape, “Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, August 2003, pp. 343-

361.

23. Zhang Jiadong (张家栋), 恐怖主义论 (On Terrorism) Beijing, China: Shi Shi Chubanshe, 2007, p. 1. Also see, Zheng 

Shouhua and Ren Jian (郑守华 任剑), “国际恐怖主义活动特点与反

恐怖措施” (“The Operational Features of International Terrorism 

and Counter Measures”), 外国军事学术 (Foreign Military Science), 

No. 11, 2003, pp. 16-20.

24. See Randall Law, “Terrorism: A History,” Polity, 2009; 

Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American 

Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, August 2003, pp. 343-361.

25. Lu Zhongwei (陆忠伟), 非传统安全论 (On Nontraditional 

Security), Beijing, China: Shi Shi Chubanshe, 2003.

26. See, for example, Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe and Wang Jiangli 

(余潇枫, 潘一禾, 王江丽), and 非传统安全概论 (Nontraditional 

Security: An Introduction), Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang Renmin 

Chubanshe, 2006. In the same year, The Zhejiang University set 

up the Center for Non-Traditional Security and Peaceful Development Studies, which is China’s first think tank on nontraditional 

security issues (www.nts-pd.org/center_intro.php). Also, see Gao 

Taicun (高太存), “中国非传统安全面临的挑战及思考” (“Challenges to China’s Non-traditional Security”), 武警学院学报 (Journal of 

the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Academy), Vol. 23, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 6-8; 国家安全与非传统安全 (National Security and 

Nontraditional Security), Shanghai: Institute of World Economics 

and Politics, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 2008; Li Luping and Xian Fengli (李陆平,贤峰礼), 军队与非传统安全 (Armed 

Forces and Nontraditional Security Issues), Beijing, China: Shi Shi 

Chubanshe, 2009. The journal, Foreign Military Science, even published a piece by a Singapore scholar on the use of military against 

nontraditional threats, see Wang Yuling (王毓麟), “运用军队应对
317

非传统安全威胁” (“Using Armed Forces in Dealing with Nontraditional Threats”), 外国军事学术 (Foreign Military Science), No. 5, 

2009, pp. 42-45.

27. Other militaries include the United States, the countries of 

the European Union, and Japan. See Li Luping and Xian Fengli, 

Ibid.

28. Yang Hui (杨晖), “俄罗斯反恐怖斗争研究” (“Russia’s Anti-terror Struggle”), 外国军事学术 (Foreign Military Science), No. 

5, 2006, p. 1; Yu Nina (于尼娜), “俄车臣恐怖主义产生的主要根源” 

(“Main Sources of Chechen Terrorism”), 外国军事学术 (Foreign 

Military Science), No. 1, 2005, p. 16. Yu is a member of the Graduate program, Chinese Academy of Military Science.

29. Yu Nina, p. 17.

30. Yang Hui, p. 1.

31. Yang Hui, p. 2; Yu Nina, p. 17.

32. Yang Hui, p. 3; Yu Nina, pp. 18-19.

33. Yang Hui, pp. 3-4.

34. Yu Nina, p. 19.

35. Liu Xiaoyan (刘肖岩), “俄罗斯反恐情报失误研究” (“Russian Anti-terrorism Intelligence Failures”), 武警学院学报 (Journal 

of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Academy), Vol. 26, No. 5, 

May 2010, pp. 90-93. 

36. Yang Hui, p. 4-5.

37. Clifford Levy, “Moscow Attack a Test for Putin and His 

Record against Terror,” New York Times, March 29, 2010, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/world/europe/30moscow.html.

38. Wang Shaomin (王绍民), “俄军反游击战浅析”(“Russian 

Military’s Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Operation”), 外国军事学术

(Foreign Military Science), No. 10, 2006, pp. 10-11.
318

39. The Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) is a “civilian think tank” for the PLA’s General Staff, 

which was established in 1979, available from gb.cri.cn/27824/200

9/06/24/1965s2544429.htm.

40. Yang Hui, p. 9.

41. “Pavel Grachev,” Wikipedia, available from en.wikipedia.

org/wiki/Pavel_Grachev.

42. Yang Hui, p. 10.

43. Ibid.

44. Yang Hui, p. 11.

45. Li Hongfeng and Pan Menghua (李红峰, 潘孟华), “俄军

反恐作战中火力运用的特点研究” (“Russia’s Use of Firepower in 

Anti-terror Operations”), 外国军事学术 (Foreign Military Science), 

No. 11, 2007, pp. 45-47.

46. Mao Xiang and Wang Jiliang (毛翔, 王继亮), “俄军特种战

役背景下进攻战斗的强弱点” (“Strength and Weakness in Russian 

Military’s Offensive Operations under Special Operation Environment”), 外国军事学术 (Foreign Military Science), No. 11, 2007, 

pp. 48-50.

47. Fan Lili (范莉丽), “俄军大规模城市反恐作战方法探析” 

(“Tactics of the Russian Military in its Large-scale Urban Antiterror Operations”), 外国军事学术 (Foreign Military Science), No. 

3, 2008, pp. 55-58.

48. Zhang Jian (张建), “国际反恐战略研讨会纪要” (“Summary 

of the International Anti-terror Strategy Conference”), 现代国际

关系 (Contemporary International Relations), No. 10, 2007, pp. 61-62.

49. Yang Hui (杨晖), “俄美反恐怖军事行动比较研究” (“A 

Comparative Study of Russian and American Anti-terror Military 

Operations”), 外国军事学术 (Foreign Military Science), No. 4, 2008, 

pp. 1-7.

50. Liu Xiaoyan (刘肖岩). 
319

51. 国际恐怖主义与反恐怖斗争 (Global Terrorism and CounterTerrorist Campaign), Beijing, China: Shi Shi Chubanshe, 2001, available from www.wl.cn/1265254.

52. Li Luping and Xian Fengli (李陆平, 贤峰礼), 军队与非传

统安全 (Armed Forces and Nontraditional Security Issues), Beijing, 

China: Shi Shi Chubanshe, 2009.

53. For PAP’s lack of its own independent intelligence gathering mechanism, see Wang Hongjun (王洪军), “警卫部队应对恐

怖主义的对策研究” (“PAP Units’ Counter-terror Measures ”), 武

警学院学报 (Journal of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Academy), Vol. 18, No. 6, December 2002, pp. 66-68; Wang Hongjun 

(王洪军), “我国反恐怖斗争对策研究” (“China’s Anti-terror Measures”), 武警学院学报 (Journal of the Chinese People’s Armed Police 

Force Academy), Vol. 20, No. 5, October 2004, pp. 83-86.

54. Peace Mission-2005, which involved 10,000 troops, Russian strategic bombers and China’s submarine-launched missiles, 

and was not a typical anti-terror exercise.

55. See 新华网 (Xinhua Net), “中国武警司令: 演习提高中俄内

卫部队反恐能” (“PAP Commander: Drill Increases Terror-fighting Capabilities of the Chinese and Russian Interior Forces”), 

September 6, 2007, available from mil.news.sina.com.cn/2007-09-

06/1803463036.html.

56. See Wang Hongjun (王洪军), 2004.

57. See Zhang Liwei (张立伟), “境外反恐行动的理论研究和实

践探索” (“Theories and Practices Regarding Anti-terror Operations outside National Boundaries”), 武警学院学报 (Journal of the 

Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Academy), Vol. 25, No. 9, September 2009, pp. 84-87.

321

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

MARTIN ANDREW was a member of the Royal 

Australian Air Force from February 1977 to February 

2005. His Air Force career was primarily in the areas 

of education and training, and included postings to 

the Australian Joint Warfare Establishment and the 

Royal Australian Air Force Staff College. For the period 1991 to 2003, he was in the Northern Territory, 

a highlight of his service was being an International 

Military Liaison Officer in Darwin with the Foreign 

National Support Elements for their deployed forces 

in East Timor from November 1999 to July 2000. He 

publishes a monthly GI Zhou Newsletter on the Chinese military, and the second edition of his book, How 

the PLA Fights: Weapons and Tactics of the People’s Liberation Army, was released in September 2009. He has 

also conducted research on insurgencies in Southeast 

Asia, the origins of Communist guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 

among other topics. He received a Ph.D. in philosophy in February 2009.

DEAN CHENG is a research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs at The Heritage Foundation. 

He specializes in China’s military and foreign policy, 

in particular, its relationship with the rest of Asia and 

with the United States. Cheng has written extensively 

on China’s military doctrine, technological implications of its space program and “dual use” issues associated with the communist nation’s industrial and 

scientific infrastructure. He previously worked for 13 

years as a senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), the Fortune 500 specialist for defense and homeland security, and then 
322

with the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses – a federally funded research institute. 

Before entering the private sector, Cheng studied 

China’s defense-industrial complex for a congressional agency, the Office of Technology Assessment, 

as an analyst in the International Security and Space 

Program. Cheng has appeared on public affairs shows 

such as John McLaughlin’s “One on One” and programs on National Public Radio, CNN International, 

BBC World Service, and International Television 

News (ITN). He has been interviewed by or provided 

commentary for publications such as Time Magazine, 

The Washington Post, Financial Times, Bloomberg News, 

Jane’s Defense Weekly, South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo and 

Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post. Cheng has 

spoken at the National Space Symposium, the National Defense University (NDU), the Air Force Academy, 

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and 

the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies. Cheng earned a bachelor’s degree in politics from 

Princeton University in 1986 and studied for a doctorate at MIT.

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER is a Professor of Political 

Science at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida. Dr. Dreyer is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy 

Research Institute, a member of the Board of Scholars 

of the U.S.-China Research Institute of the University 

of Southern California, and a member of the Institute 

for Strategic Studies. She was appointed Commissioner of the United States-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission by Speaker of the House Dennis 

Hastert, and served three terms thereon. She formerly 

served as Senior Far East Specialist at the Library of 

Congress and as an Asia advisor to the Chief of Naval 
323

Operations. Her research work centers on ethnic minorities, the Chinese military, Asian-Pacific regional 

relations, cross-strait relations, and Sino-Japanese relations. Dr. Dreyer is the sole author of China’s Forty 

Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration 

in the People’s Republic of China and China’s Political 

System: Modernization and Tradition, which is being 

prepared for its eighth edition. Her current project is 

a book on Sino-Japanese relations. Her articles have 

appeared in numerous scholarly journals. She is also a 

co-author and/or editor of numerous other books, including the 2005 Report to Congress of the United States 

Economic and Security Commission. Dr. Dreyer has 

served on official observation groups for four Taiwan 

elections. She has also testified at numerous U.S. congressional hearings. She serves on the board of editors 

of Orbis and the Journal of Contemporary China, and has 

received numerous teaching awards. She received a 

joint Ph.D. in government and East Asian studies from 

Harvard University. 

ROY KAMPHAUSEN is a Senior Associate for Political and Security Affairs (PSA) at The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and an adjunct faculty 

member at George Washington University and Columbia University’s School of International and Public 

Affairs. He advises and contributes to NBR research 

programs on political and security issues in Asia. Mr. 

Kamphausen previously served as Senior Vice President for Political and Security Affairs and Director of 

NBR’s Washington, DC, office. Prior to joining NBR, 

Mr. Kamphausen served as a U.S. Army officer, a career that culminated in an assignment in the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as Country Director 

for China-Taiwan-Mongolia Affairs. Previous assign-
324

ments include the Joint Staff as an intelligence analyst 

and later as China Branch Chief in the Directorate 

for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5). A fluent Chinese 

(Mandarin) linguist and an Army China Foreign Area 

Officer (FAO), Mr. Kamphausen served two tours at 

the Defense Attaché Office of the U.S. Embassy in the 

People’s Republic of China. He is a member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Asia 

Society, and the Council for Security and Cooperation 

in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). His areas of professional 

expertise include China’s People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA), U.S.-China defense relations, U.S. defense and 

security policy toward Asia, and East Asian security issues. Mr. Kamphausen co-authored the chapter 

“Military Modernization in Taiwan” in Strategic Asia 

2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, with Michael Swaine; he was the co-author of the 

chapter “PLA Power Projection: Current Realities and 

Emerging Trends” in Assessing the Threat: The Chinese 

Military and Taiwan’s Security (2007), with Justin Liang; 

he co-edited the volume Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military

(2007), with Andrew Scobell; he co-edited the volume 

The People in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military (2008), with Andrew Scobell 

and Travis Tanner; and he co-edited the volumes Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan (April 

2009), and The PLA At Home and Abroad: Assessing the 

Operational Capabilities of China’s Military (July 2010) 

with David Lai and Andrew Scobell. Mr. Kamphausen 

holds a B.A. in political science from Wheaton College 

and an M.A. in international affairs from Columbia 

University. He studied Chinese at both the Defense 

Language Institute and Beijing’s Capital Normal University. 
325

DAVID LAI is a Research Professor of Asian Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) 

of the U.S. Army War College. Before joining the SSI, 

Dr. Lai was on the faculty of the U.S. Air War College. 

Having grown up in China, Lai witnessed China’s 

“Cultural Revolution,” its economic reform, and the 

changes in U.S.-China relations. His teaching and research interests are in international relations theory, 

war and peace studies, comparative foreign and security policy, U.S.-China and U.S.-Asian relations, and 

Chinese strategic thinking and operational art. Dr. Lai 

is a co-editor with Mr. Kamphausen and Dr. Scobell of 

The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational 

Capabilities of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2010). 

Dr. Lai holds a bachelor’s degree from China and a 

master’s degree and Ph.D. in political science from the 

University of Colorado.

FRANK MILLER, is a retired U.S. Army colonel 

currently serving in the Defense Intelligence Agency 

as the Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia. He 

has over 30 years of active duty in the Infantry, Special 

Forces, and as a China Foreign Area Officer with 23 

years of extensive interaction with all Asian militaries 

in or focused on Asia at the local, regional, and national levels. Mr. Miller previously served as a military 

attaché (Vietnam and China), a regional security assistance officer (Pacific Command [PACOM]), and as 

a political-military analyst (PACOM and Joint Staff). 

His last assignment was as Director, Northeast Asia 

Division, Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5). 
326

ANDREW SCOBELL is Senior Political Scientist at 

RAND’s Washington, DC, office. Prior to this he was 

an Associate Professor of International Affairs at the 

George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public 

Service and Director of the China Certificate Program 

at Texas A&M University located in College Station, 

TX. From 1999 until 2007, he was an Associate Research 

Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College and an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College, both located in Carlisle, 

PA. Dr. Scobell is the author of China’s Use of Military 

Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge University Press, 2003), he co-authored China’s 

Search for Security, with Andrew J. Nathan, (Columbia 

University Press, forthcoming, 2012), he has written 

more than a dozen monographs and reports, as well 

as several dozen journal articles and book chapters. 

He has also edited or co-edited 12 volumes on various aspects of security in the Asia-Pacific region. He 

is a co-editor with Mr. Kamphausen and Dr. Lai of 

The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational 

Capabilities of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2010). 

Dr. Scobell holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. 

CHRISTOPHER P. TWOMEY is currently an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the 

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. His 

previous assignments were as an Associate Chair for 

Research and as Director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict from 2007-09. He works closely with 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the 

State Department on a range of diplomatic engage-
327

ments across Asia and regularly advises the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), the U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM), and the Office of Net Assessment. He 

has previously taught or researched at Harvard, Boston College, RAND, the Chinese Academy of Social 

Sciences, and Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), and is currently a Research Fellow at 

the National Bureau of Asian Research. Dr. Twomey 

is the author of The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations

(Cornell, 2010), which explains how differing military 

doctrines complicate diplomatic signaling, interpretations of those signals, and assessments of the balance of power. He edited Perspectives on Sino-American 

Strategic Nuclear Issues (2008), and his articles have appeared in journals such as Asian Survey, Security Studies, Arms Control Today, Contemporary Security Policy, 

Asia Policy, Current History, and the Journal of Contemporary China. Dr. Twomey holds a Ph.D. in political 

science from MIT.

YU BIN is a professor of political science and the 

director of East Asian studies at Wittenberg University in Springfield, Ohio. He is also a Senior Fellow in 

the Shanghai Association of American Studies. He is 

the author and coauthor of six books in both Chinese 

and English, more than 100 articles/chapters in academic and policy journals and books, and numerous 

op-ed pieces in English and Chinese media outlets. 

He is also a regular contributor to the Pacific Forum 

and its online journal Comparative Connections (on 

Russian-China relations), as well as a senior writer for 

Asia Times online. His research interests include international relations, Sino-Russian relations, and East 

Asian security and politics, among other topics. Yu 
328

served in the PLA infantry from 1968-72 and was a 

research fellow at the Center of International Studies, 

State Council in Beijing from 1982-85. He received his 

MA in journalism from the Chinese Academy of Social 

Sciences in Beijing and his Ph.D. in political science 

from Stanford University. He is currently working on 

a book about Western studies of the Soviet Union and 

Russia to be published by the Eastern China Normal 

University Press in Shanghai in 2012.

CHRISTOPHER D. YUNG is a Senior Research 

Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies 

(INSS), National Defense University. Dr. Yung provides insights and counsel for the Office of Secretary 

of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commanders concerning Chinese defense and national 

security decisionmaking; Chinese force structure and 

doctrinal developments; Chinese military capabilities 

and current operations; Chinese engagement activities 

with the United States; and China’s political-military 

relations with other nations in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Prior to his entering into government service, Dr. 

Yung was a Senior Research Analyst at the Center for 

Naval Analyses (CNA). While at CNA, Dr. Yung led 

projects or was involved in analysis related to China, 

Northeast Asia security, the Chinese Navy, the Chinese Military, and U.S. inter-operability with the militaries of the Far East. In addition to Dr. Yung’s China 

and Asia-related expertise, he also has direct Military 

Operations Analysis experience. Between 1998 and 

2001 he was a special assistant and operations analyst 

for the Commander, Amphibious Group Two—the senior U.S. Navy amphibious command in the Atlantic 

Fleet. This was followed up with an assignment as a 

special assistant and operations analyst for the Com-
329

mander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Atlantic—the highest ranking Marine Corps operational command on 

the East Coast. Dr. Yung holds a Ph.D. in international 

relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 

International Studies (SAIS). He also holds a master’s 

degree in East Asian and China studies from the same 

institution. He received language certificates from Columbia University and the Beijing Foreign Language 

Teacher’s Institute, where he studied Mandarin Chinese. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Editors

Dr. Andrew Scobell

Dr. David Lai

Mr. Roy Kamphausen

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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