IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LAURA HOLMES,

1500 Ocean Drive, Unit 1105, 

Miami, Florida 33139,

and

PAUL JOST,

1500 Ocean Drive, Unit 1105, 

Miami, Florida 33139

Plaintiffs,

v.

Federal Election Commission,

999 E Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20436

Defendant.

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COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

I. NATURE OF ACTION

1. Plaintiffs Laura Holmes and Paul Jost challenge the bifurcated contribution 

limits under the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) and its amendments. 

FECA distinguishes contributions given for primary elections from contributions 

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given for general elections, and provides independent caps on contributions per 

election type. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (“no person shall make contributions...to 

any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to any election 

for Federal office....”) (emphasis supplied); see also 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(6) 

(separating primary and general elections for purposes of contribution limits).

2. Plaintiffs’ case arises under the First Amendment’s protection of the 

freedom to associate. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

3. Plaintiffs’ case also arises under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause, in the context of equal protection of the law. U.S. CONST. amend. V; 

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 

347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause applies to the federal government in the same way the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applies to the states).

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This Court has jurisdiction because this action arises under the First and 

Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and a federal statute. 28 

U.S.C. § 1331.

5. Under, 2 U.S.C. § 437h, this court has jurisdiction under FECA and its

amendments to make necessary findings of fact and then to certify the 

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constitutional issues in the case immediately to the United States Court of Appeals 

for the District of Columbia Circuit for en banc consideration.

6. This Court has jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2201, 2202.

7. Venue in this Court is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2) and (e).

III. PARTIES

8. Plaintiffs Laura Holmes and Paul Jost are married to one another. Plaintiff 

Laura Holmes sometimes uses the name “Laura Holmes-Jost” when contributing to 

candidates. Plaintiffs are residents of Florida and citizens of the United States.

They reside at 1500 Ocean Drive, Unit 1105, Miami, Florida 33139. Each plaintiff

wishes to associate with a candidate in the amount up to the overall candidate 

contribution limit allowed for primary and general elections combined. Each

wishes to donate to the victor of a primary election in the full amount that has 

already been donated by many contributors to that victor’s incumbent opponent, 

who was unopposed in the primary by a member of his own party and whose 

contributors have effectively given money solely for the general election.

9. Defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) is the federal government 

agency charged with administering and enforcing FECA and its amendments. 2 

U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1). 

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IV. FACTS

10. FECA splits the candidate contribution limits “to any candidate and his 

authorized political committees with respect to any election for Federal office...” 2 

U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 

11. “Election” is defined to include general, special, primary, or runoff contests. 

2 U.S.C. § 431(1)(A); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.2.

12. The primary and general elections are considered separate elections for the 

purposes of individual candidate contribution limits. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(6) (“the 

limitations on contributions to a candidate imposed by paragraphs (1) and (2) of 

this subsection shall apply separately with respect to each election...”).

13. Pursuant to §§ 441a(a)(1)(A) and 441a(a)(6), the FEC has promulgated rules 

for determining whether a contribution is considered to have been given for the 

primary or general election. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b).

14. A contributor may earmark which election his contribution is intended to 

benefit. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(2)(i). Otherwise, contributions are presumed to be for 

the “next election.” 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(2)(ii).

15. Earmarked contributions made after the designated election may only be 

used to retire outstanding debts; all other such contributions must be returned. 11 

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C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(3)(i)(A). Detailed FEC rules define what obligations constitute

outstanding debts in this context. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(3)(iii).

16. Thus, even if a contributor has not reached the contribution limit with 

respect to a given candidate and his primary election, the debt of that candidate’s 

committee delineates the extent to which the contributor may associate with the 

candidate after the primary election. 

17. Alternatively, the candidate’s committee may seek to have the contribution 

redesignated to the next election (i.e., the general election). 11 C.F.R. § 110.1 § 

110.1(b)(3)(i)(B); see also 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(5) (detailing redesignation

process).

18. Plaintiffs Laura Holmes and Paul Jost wish to contribute to individual 

candidates after their primaries. They wish to do so up to the full amount allowed 

under FECA and its amendments without regard to the artificial distinction 

between primary and general elections found in 2 U.S.C §§ 441a(a)(1)(A) and 

441a(a)(6). 

19. Plaintiff Laura Holmes supports Carl DeMaio, a candidate to represent 

California Congressional District 52 (“CA-52”), Federal Election Commission 

Candidate ID H4CA52051. Mr. DeMaio came in second during the primary 

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election on June 3, 2014, ensuring him a place on the ballot in the general election 

on November 4, 2014.

20. On November 4, 2014, under California’s “top two” primary system, Carl 

DeMaio will face incumbent and first-place primary finisher Scott Peters in the 

contest to represent CA-52. Congressman Peters was the only member of the 

Democratic Party on the ballot to represent CA-52 during the June 3, 2014 

primary, and thus, did not face any significant primary challengers.

21. Ms. Holmes contributed $2,600 to Mr. DeMaio after the California primary. 

She wishes to contribute an additional $2,600 at this time, for a total of $5,200, 

because she did not contribute to Mr. DeMaio during the primary.

22. Plaintiff Paul Jost supports Mariannette Miller-Meeks, a candidate to 

represent Iowa’s Second Congressional District (“IA-02”), Federal Election 

Commission Candidate ID H8IA02043. Dr. Miller-Meeks won her primary 

election on June 3, 2014.

23. On November 4, 2014, Dr. Miller-Meeks will face incumbent David 

Loebsack in the contest to represent IA-02. Congressman Loebsack was the only 

candidate to represent IA-02 listed on the ballot in the 2014 Democratic primary, 

and thus, did not face any significant primary challengers.

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24. Mr. Jost has already contributed $2,600 to Dr. Miller-Meeks for the general 

election. He wishes to contribute an additional $2,600 at this time, for a total of 

$5,200. He did not contribute to Dr. Miller-Meeks during the primary.

25. Plaintiffs do not wish to exceed the base candidate contribution limit over 

the combined primary and general election periods. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) 

(currently $5,200-$2600 for the primary, and $2600 for the general—as indexed 

for inflation per 11 C.F.R. § 110.5(b)(3)-(4) at Price Index Adjustments for 

Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure 

Threshold, Federal Election Commission, 78 Fed. Reg. 8530, 8532 (Feb. 16, 

2013)). 

26. Instead, Plaintiffs Laura Holmes and Paul Jost each wish to give the full 

$5,200 they are allowed to contribute to a candidate with whom they wish to 

associate, but do so entirely for the general election. Mr. Jost and Ms. Holmes wish

to fully associate with candidates, unencumbered by the artificial distinction 

between primary and general elections, and the arbitrary and discriminatory rules 

defining primary election debt.

V. CAUSES OF ACTION

Count 1

Declaratory judgment that 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A) and 441a(a)(6) are

unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs because they violate their First 

Amendment freedom of political association. 

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27. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-26.

28. Contribution limits implicate fundamental First Amendment interests. 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976).

29. In Buckley, the Supreme Court identified campaign contributions as a 

component of the “right to associate” and therefore determined that limits on such 

contributions are subject “to the closest scrutiny.” 424 U.S. at 25 (citing NAACP v. 

Ala. ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)).

30. While the right to associate and participate in politics “is not absolute,” the 

government must “demonstrate[] a sufficiently important interest and employ[] 

means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational 

freedoms.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

31. Prevention of quid-pro-quo corruption, or the appearance of such corruption, 

is the only constitutionally sufficient justification for contribution limits.

McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014); Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 25, see also, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000). 

32. The Supreme Court in McCutcheon was clear: “[c]ampaign finance 

restrictions that pursue other objects [not aimed at preventing quid-pro-quo

corruption]...impermissibly inject the Government into the debate over who 

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should govern. And those who govern should be the last people to help decide who 

should govern.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441-1442. (emphasis in original).

33. The government may not merely assert a “corruption” interest to justify a

burden on the fundamental right to associate via contribution limits. Shrink Mo. 

Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 392 (citing and discussing Colo. Republican Fed. 

Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996) (opinion of Breyer, J.)). 

34. In other words, a contribution limit must be properly tailored to vindicate the 

government’s interest, otherwise it is unconstitutional. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 

1444; see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006).

35. The novelty and plausibility of the asserted harm to be avoided will 

determine how much empirical evidence is required to justify the government’s 

regulation. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 391. 

36. McCutcheon discussed the FECA framework that bifurcates contribution 

limits between primary and general elections. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442. 

Together, the Court referred to these as “base limits.” Id.

37. In discussing the base limits in the corruption context, the Court considered

the total limit, without respect to the artificial distinction between primary and 

general elections. See, e.g., id. at 1448 (“if all contributions fall within the base 

limits Congress views as adequate to protect against corruption. The individual 

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may give up to $5,200 each to nine candidates...”); at 1451 (“under the dissent’s 

view, it is perfectly fine to contribute $5,200 to nine candidates but somehow 

corrupt to give the same amount to a tenth.”)

38. The Court considered the total $5,200 as the “base limit” at or below which 

there is no threat of actual or apparent corruption. Id. at 1452 (“[b]ut Congress’s

selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that contributions of that amount 

or less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption”).

39. The bifurcated candidate contribution limit prevents contributors from 

giving the full, non-corrupting contribution amount, at the time they feel is most 

critical in the electoral cycle. That is, the law allows a contributor to associate with 

an individual candidate up to $5,200 per election cycle. Ms. Holmes and Mr. Jost

will abide by that limit. They do not wish, however, to split their contributions

between the primary and general elections in order to fully exercise their 

associational rights. Instead, they wish to give to candidates challenging 

incumbents who did not face significant opposition from within their own political 

party.

40. Artificially bifurcating the $5,200 between general and primary elections

does not further any anticorruption interest. This is particularly so where, as in both 

CA-52 and IA-02, the incumbent faced no substantial primary challenger.

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41. Because the government lacks a cognizable interest in artificially bifurcating 

the $5,200 individual candidate contribution limit, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) is 

unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs’ planned contributions. 

Count 2

Declaratory judgment that 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A) and 441a(a)(6) are

unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs because they violate their Fifth 

Amendment rights to equal protection of the law.

42. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-41.

43. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees equal protection of 

the law, and the analysis thereof is the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93; Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499. 

44. The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of bifurcated individual 

candidate contribution limits. McCutcheon struck down the aggregate limits while 

emphasizing that the $5,200 base limit was not corrupting. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 

at 1462, 1451. 

45. Buckley only upheld FECA’s contribution limits on their face. 424 U.S. at 35 

(“[i]n view of these considerations, we conclude that the impact of the Act's $1,000 

contribution limitation on major-party challengers and on minor-party candidates 

does not render the provision unconstitutional on its face”).

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46. The Court specifically allowed for the possibility of a subsequent challenge 

due to “invidious discriminat[ion].” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31 n. 33. (“[s]ince an 

incumbent is subject to these limitations to the same degree as his opponent, the 

Act, on its face, appears to be evenhanded. The appearance of fairness, however, 

may not reflect political reality”).

47. Buckley’s facial decision focused on the candidates—both challengers and 

incumbents—in the record before it. It did not squarely address the issue of the 

rights of contributors. Id. at 33. 

48. In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. Pub. L. 

107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (“BCRA”). BCRA increased the contribution limits 

and indexed them for inflation. BCRA § 307, 116 Stat. at 102 (codified at 2 U.S.C. 

§ 441a(a)(1)). It did not modify the distinction between primary and general 

elections found at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(6). 

49. After BCRA’s enactment, it faced an omnibus challenge in McConnell v. 

FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).

50. McConnell did not address the issue of bifurcated contribution limits. Some 

of the plaintiffs challenged the increase in contribution limits, but the Court 

declined to reach the issue on jurisdictional and standing grounds. Id. at 227-29.

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51. In 2008, the Supreme Court considered asymmetrical contribution limits, 

again in the context of a candidate’s challenge. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744 

(2008). 

52. Davis involved some of BCRA’s substantive changes to the law, including

the “millionaire’s amendment.” Id. at 729 (discussing BCRA § 319(a), 116 Stat. at

108 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a))). BCRA § 319(a) permitted candidates who 

faced a self-financed opponent to raise money at three times the base contribution 

limit. BCRA § 319(a); Davis, 554 U.S. at 738. 

53. The justification asserted in support of the asymmetrical contribution limit in 

Davis was to level the playing field by artificially inflating the resources of nonwealthy candidates. Id. at 741. 

54. The Court explained that “[w]e have never upheld the constitutionality of a 

law that imposes different contribution limits for candidates who are competing 

against each other.” Id. at 738.

55. The Court found this asymmetry in the contribution limits to be a First

Amendment harm. Id. at 739; cf SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 697 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010) (noting that Davis found “asymmetrical contribution limits were

unconstitutional”). 

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56. Because the Court resolved Davis under the First Amendment, it did not 

reach the Fifth Amendment claims. 554 U.S. at 744 n. 9. 

57. Just this year, the Court reiterated this reasoning in McCutcheon.

Considering the associational rights of contributors, the Court held that any

government interest in “reduc[ing] the amount of money in politics” or 

“restrict[ing] the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative 

influence of others” is insufficient to justify contribution limits. McCutcheon, 134 

S. Ct. at 1441.

58. Just before the Court released its McCutcheon opinion, the Tenth Circuit 

faced a similar problem of bifurcated limits in construing a state statute. In Riddle 

v. Hickenlooper, contributors to a campaign challenged Colorado’s preferential 

treatment of candidates of “major parties” over minor party candidates, 

independent candidates, and write-in candidates. Riddle v. Hickenlooper, 742 F.3d 

922, 924 (10th Cir. 2014).

59. The law at issue in Riddle

effectively removed any potential time limitations on when a 

candidate committee could accept contributions when a primary is 

involved. For money ostensibly given for the primary, the candidate 

committee could accept the contribution and spend it during the 

general election; and, for money ostensibly given for the general 

election, the committee could accept the contribution and spend it 

even before the primary.

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Id.

60. However, this applied only to “major party” candidates—minor party, 

independent, and write-in candidates did not receive such a benefit. Id. at 924-25.

61. The case came before the Tenth Circuit on appeal from cross motions for 

summary judgment based upon equal protection claims. Id. at 925-926. 

62. In determining the “threshold issue” of “whether the ‘disfavored parties’ [] 

are similarly situated to the ‘favored parties,” the Tenth Circuit held that the focus 

is on the contributors, not the candidates in the race. Id. at 926. 

63. The Colorado law at issue did “not set contribution limits based on who has 

a primary and who doesn’t. Instead, the statute blurs the distinction by allowing 

Republican and Democratic candidates to collect and spend the entire 

[contribution] after the primary.” Id. 

64. In short, the Colorado statute “create[d] a basic favoritism between 

candidates vying for the same office.” Id at 929.

65. However, the Tenth Circuit did note

We do not suggest that the constitution would forbid any contribution 

limits based on an election cycle. But here the State of Colorado has 

created different contribution limits for candidates running against 

each other, and these differences have little to do with fighting 

corruption.

Id. at 930.

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66. Functionally, the federal system is the same as Colorado’s in Riddle—if one 

of the federal candidates does not face a substantial primary opponent. Such a

candidate can use the “primary” contributions to run advertisements promoting his 

campaign or attacking candidates of the opposing party. Yet opposing party 

candidates—if locked in a primary contest—enjoy no such luxury.

67. Ms. Holmes and Mr. Jost wish to support the victor of the primary against 

the incumbent. As a result, they can give only half the money as many contributors 

who have already supported the opposing party candidate. The result is 

asymmetrical contribution limits based upon factors entirely out of the 

contributor’s (or even the candidate’s) control. Thus, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) 

artificially favors some contributors (and candidates) over others. This artificial 

distinction is made worse by the fact that incumbents may begin raising money for 

the 2014 election immediately after the November 2012 election—or, in the case 

of a senate race, immediately after the November 2008 election—well before the 

time the vast majority of challengers have declared their candidacy for the 2014 

election. Thus, contributors to some challengers are permitted to associate over a 

longer period of time and to a greater extent than others, denying equal protection 

of the campaign finance laws. 

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68. Further, the dates for primaries are not uniform across the United States. 

Public Disclosure Division, “2014 Congressional Primary Dates and Candidate 

Filing Deadlines for Ballot Access,” FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (2014) 

available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2014/2014pdates.pdf.

69. Thus, the contributions may need to stretch further or be compressed as 

compared to other races in other states. The effectiveness of the association created 

by the contribution changes based upon individual state primary dates. This may be 

alleviated by allowing Plaintiffs to contribute the full $5,200 in a single 

contribution to the candidate of his choice regardless of the date of the primary. 

70. As in Riddle, the government has no corruption interest in deciding, 

artificially, how money is contributed so long as it is under the limits found by 

Congress to be non-corrupting. 

71. Congress may set contribution limits, but it must make these limits the same 

for everyone. Allowing for “extra” contributions by contributors supporting a 

candidate running unopposed in the primary is functionally the same as the

differing contribution limits reviewed in Davis and Riddle. Such asymmetry denies 

Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment. 

VI. PRAYERS FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief: 

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A. A declaratory judgment that 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A) and 441a(a)(6) are

unconstitutional as-applied to Plaintiffs because they violate Plaintiffs’ freedom of 

political association guaranteed under the First Amendment.

B. A declaratory judgment that §§ 441a(a)(1)(A) and 441a(a)(6) are

unconstitutional as-applied to Plaintiffs because they violate the equal protection of 

the law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

C. An injunction barring enforcement of §§ 441a(a)(1)(A) and 441a(a)(6)’s 

artificial bifurcation of individual candidate contributions.

D. Reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees.

E. Such equitable or other relief as this Court may consider just and 

appropriate.

Respectfully submitted this the 21st day of July, 2014.

/s/ Allen Dickerson

Allen Dickerson

Center for Competitive Politics

124 S. West Street

Suite 201

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Phone: 703.894.6800

Facsimile: 703.894.6811

adickerson@campaignfreedom.org

Counsel for Plaintiff

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 21st day of July, 2014, the foregoing document 

was served on the following, via first class mail:

Lisa J. Stevenson, 

Deputy General Counsel – Law

Federal Election Commission

999 E Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20436

Phone: 202.694.1650

Facsimile: 202.219.0260

Counsel for Defendant, FEC

Eric H. Holder,

United States Attorney General

U.S. Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

Civil Process Clerk

U.S. Attorney’s Office

555 Fourth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

s/ Allen Dickerson

Allen Dickerson

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