SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/ CERP

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Commander’s Emergency Response Program in 

Laghman Province Provided Some Benefits, but 

Oversight Weaknesses and Sustainment Concerns Led 

to Questionable Outcomes and Potential Waste

January 27, 2011 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page i 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

January 27, 2011

The Honorable Robert Gates

Secretary of Defense

General John N. Mattis

Commander, U.S. Central Command

General David Petraeus

Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and

Commander, International Security Assistance Force

This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) audit of selected Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects 

in Laghman Province, Afghanistan. This report includes recommendations to the Commander, U.S. 

Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), to improve oversight of CERP projects, including updating guidance and 

evaluating project outcomes, and to help ensure the sustainment of CERP projects. When preparing the 

final report, we considered comments from USFOR-A on a draft of this report. In their comments, 

USFOR-A generally concurred with the report’s findings and recommendations. These comments are 

reproduced in appendix IV of this report. 

A summary of this report is on page ii. SIGAR conducted this performance under the authority of Public 

Law 110-181, as amended, the Inspector General Act of 1978, and the Inspector General Reform Act of 

2008.

Kathryn H. Bernet

Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page ii

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR Audit-11-7 January 2011

Commander’s Emergency Response Program in 

Laghman Province Provided Some Benefits, but 

Oversight Weaknesses and Sustainment Concerns 

Led to Questionable Outcomes and Potential Waste

What SIGAR Reviewed

Since 2004, Congress has appropriated nearly $2.64 billion for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 

in Afghanistan. CERP is a Department of Defense (DOD) program managed by U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) that 

enables commanders to fund humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects to immediately assist the indigenous 

population. In recent years, Congress has expressed significant concerns over the rapid growth of CERP funding in 

Afghanistan, the use of CERP funds on large-scale development projects, and the capacity of the government of 

Afghanistan to absorb the influx of CERP-funded projects. SIGAR initiated this audit to examine the funding, outcomes, 

and oversight of 69 selected CERP projects in Laghman Province. As of November 2010, the total funding obligated for 

the 69 projects was more than $53 million. Specifically, SIGAR (1) assessed the projects’ status, including funds 

obligated and disbursed, whether the projects were meeting intended outcomes and, if applicable, were being 

sustained; and (2) determined whether project oversight was in accordance with applicable guidance. To accomplish 

these objectives, SIGAR reviewed relevant laws, regulations, standard operating procedures, and other guidance related 

to CERP and interviewed U.S. and Afghan officials. SIGAR also conducted file reviews for all 69 projects. SIGAR was able 

to assess the outcomes of 46 projects, which included site visits to 36 of these projects. SIGAR conducted work in Kabul 

and Laghman Province, Afghanistan, from July through December 2010 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards.

 

 What SIGAR Found

In Laghman Province, CERP project costs and outcomes were mixed and varied by project type. About $2 million was 

obligated (4 percent of the projects we selected) for 19 projects that had generally successful outcomes; however, 

about $49.2 million was obligated (92 percent of the projects we selected) for 27 projects that are at risk or have 

resulted in questionable outcomes. Most of the CERP investment in Laghman was used for large-scale projects, 

specifically for the construction of asphalt roads and new facilities. All asphalt road projects (about $44.6 million 

obligated) are at risk due to the lack of maintenance plans. In addition, we identified more than $3 million in obligations 

at risk for buildings that were completed but are not being used as intended, or the construction was ongoing and the 

government of Afghanistan has not agreed to a business plan to sustain the facilities after completion. 

SIGAR found that CERP project oversight was not in compliance with applicable requirements, which places CERP funds 

at risk of questionable outcomes and potential waste. For example, most project files lacked required legal reviews and 

sufficient documentation to substantiate payments. In addition, SIGAR identified two groups of related projects that 

were more in line with large-scale development efforts and had sustainment concerns. As SIGAR has reported, largescale projects require significant amounts of time and resources to monitor; however, CERP oversight officials rotate 

frequently and have been trained to implement smaller-scale projects. Finally, USFOR-A lacks a coordinated, resultsoriented approach to determine whether CERP projects have achieved their goals, are being used as intended, and are 

being sustained. Without adequate oversight and assessments of results, the U.S. investment is at risk for waste and the 

Afghan people may not receive the projects’ intended benefits.

What SIGAR Recommends

SIGAR is making five recommendations to the USFOR-A Commander to improve oversight and promote the sustainment 

of CERP projects in Laghman Province, establish criteria for the planning and approval of related CERP projects, and help 

assess whether CERP projects have met their intended outcomes. The recommendations address the following actions: 

(1) develop approaches to improve construction quality and sustainment plans for active CERP projects, or consider 

terminating or de-scoping active CERP projects and re-obligating the funds for better use, if it is in the best interest of 

the government to do so; (2) require contractors to repair any defective work for completed projects that are still under 

warranty; (3) work with Afghanistan government officials to develop sustainment plans for completed CERP projects 

that have not been sustained; (4) update CERP standard operating procedures to include criteria to help field 

commanders determine when groups of CERP projects should be considered related for project planning and approval 

purposes; and (5) develop a coordinated, results-oriented approach for evaluating CERP project effectiveness. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, USFOR-A generally concurred with the findings and recommendations. 

For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 602-8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background ................................................................................................................................................... 2

Although CERP Project Outcomes Were Mixed, Questionable Outcomes Exceed 

$49 Million in Obligations....................................................................................................................... 5

Oversight Weaknesses, Separate Planning for Related Projects, and Inadequate 

Performance Monitoring Increased Risks of Questionable Outcomes and 

Potential Waste....................................................................................................................................14

Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................19

Recommendations......................................................................................................................................19

Comments...................................................................................................................................................20

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology..........................................................................................................21

Appendix II: CERP Projects Reviewed Throughout Laghman Province.......................................................24

Appendix III: Permissible Categories of CERP Fund Usage .........................................................................64

Appendix IV: Comments from U.S. Forces-Afghanistan .............................................................................66

TABLES

Table 1: Reasons for Concern for 27 Projects with at Risk or Questionable 

Outcomes (dollars in thousands)........................................................................................................... 6

Table 2: CERP Projects by Project Type and Outcome (dollars in thousands).............................................. 6

Table 3: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Road Projects................................................................. 7

Table 4: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Facility Projects.............................................................. 8

Table 5: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Protection Wall, Gabion Wall, 

and Check Dam Projects.......................................................................................................................10

Table 6: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Canal Projects ..............................................................11

Table 7: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Bridge Projects.............................................................12

Table 8: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Security Wall Projects..................................................12

Table 9: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Equipment Projects......................................................13

Table 10: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Agricultural Supply Projects.......................................14

Table I: SIGAR Criteria for Determining CERP Project Outcomes...............................................................25

Table II: Summary of Selected CERP Project Outcomes by Project Completion 

Status....................................................................................................................................................26
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page iv

FIGURES 

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan, Highlighting Laghman Province.................................................................... 3

Figure 2: Obligations for 69 Projects by Location, Fiscal Years 2008 through 2010..................................... 3

Figure 3: Obligations for 69 Projects by Project Type, Fiscal Years 2008 through 

2010........................................................................................................................................................ 4

ACRONYMS

ADT Agribusiness Development Team

CBF Capacity Building Fund

CERP Commander's Emergency Response Program

DOD Department of Defense

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

FMR Financial Management Regulation

FOB Forward Operating Base

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

LEAF Laghman Empowerment Agricultural Facility

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

RC-E Regional Command-East

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

STANFINS Standard Finance System

USFOR-A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 1 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province Provided 

Some Benefits, but Oversight Weaknesses and Sustainment Concerns Led to 

Questionable Outcomes and Potential Waste

Since 2004, Congress has appropriated nearly $2.64 billion for the Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP) in Afghanistan. CERP is a Department of Defense (DOD) program managed by 

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) that enables commanders to fund humanitarian relief and 

reconstruction projects to immediately assist the indigenous population. In recent years, Congress has 

expressed significant concerns over the rapid growth of CERP funding in Afghanistan, the use of CERP 

funds on large-scale development projects, and the capacity of the government of Afghanistan to absorb 

the influx of CERP-funded projects.

1 SIGAR has conducted three audits related to CERP, which identified 

weaknesses in CERP oversight.

2

SIGAR initiated this audit to examine the funding, outcomes, and oversight of 69 selected CERP projects 

in Laghman Province, Afghanistan, that were approved in fiscal years 2008 through 2010. The 

69 projects we selected include 24 active, 42 completed, and 3 terminated projects. Among other 

factors, we selected Laghman Province because, based on USFOR-A data, it had the highest average 

CERP project obligations of the provinces in Regional Command-East (RC-E). As of November 2010, the 

total funding obligated for the 69 projects we selected was more than $53.3 million. Specifically, our 

objectives were to (1) assess the projects’ status, including funds obligated and disbursed, whether the 

projects were meeting intended outcomes and, if applicable, were being sustained;

 

3

To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations, standard operating procedures, 

and other guidance related to CERP. We interviewed CERP oversight officials from USFOR-A and the 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Agribusiness Development Team (ADT), and Task Force Iron Gray, 

which are co-located at the Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Mehtar Lam, the capital of Laghman. We 

also interviewed the provincial governor of Laghman. The 69 projects we selected represented 91 

percent of the $58.5 million obligated for CERP projects in Laghman Province during fiscal years 2008 

through 2010. We also conducted file reviews for all 69 projects and site visits for 36 of the 69 projects, 

which represented $39.8 million in obligations, or nearly 75 percent, of the total obligated for all 69 

projects we selected. We conducted our work in Kabul and Laghman Province, Afghanistan, from July 

through December 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I includes a discussion of our scope and methodology. 

and (2) determine 

whether project oversight by U.S. officials was in accordance with applicable guidance. 

 

1 See Senate reports 111-201 and 111-295.

2 See SIGAR, Increased Viability, Monitoring, and Planning Needed for Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

in Afghanistan, Audit-09-5 (Sept. 9, 2009); The Tojg Bridge Construction Is Nearly Complete, but Several Contract 

Issues Need to Be Addressed, Audit-10-7 (Mar. 1, 2010); and Weaknesses in Reporting and Coordination of 

Development Assistance and Lack of Provincial Capacity Pose Risks to U.S. Strategy in Nangarhar Province, 

Audit 11-1 (Oct. 26, 2010).

3 CERP standard operating procedures do not define a successful project outcome. Therefore, to assess project 

outcomes, we focused on whether the work performed was in compliance with contract requirements, including 

the quality of the work, and whether the government of Afghanistan is sustaining or plans to sustain the projects 

after they have been completed. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 2 

BACKGROUND

U.S. military commanders use CERP as a tool to promote counterinsurgency objectives, including 

supporting the government of Afghanistan, protecting the Afghan people, and defeating the insurgency. 

CERP is the primary source of funding available to PRT, ADT, and task force commanders4 to execute 

projects in their areas of responsibility. CERP’s authorizing legislation gives field commanders broad 

authority to spend CERP funds notwithstanding other provisions of law.

5

A DOD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) lists 20 authorized uses for CERP funds,

 As a result, projects funded by

CERP funds are not bound by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) or other procurement laws. 

6 including

electricity, education, transportation, and other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects. (See 

appendix III for a complete list of authorized CERP categories.) USFOR-A is responsible for providing 

oversight of CERP in Afghanistan and has issued standard operating procedures,

7 which have evolved 

over the years.

8

The 69 CERP projects we selected were managed by officials from the PRT, ADT, and task forces located 

at FOB Mehtar Lam in Laghman Province. Figure 1 shows the four districts and one municipality in 

Laghman Province. Twenty-seven of the 69 projects we selected were in Mehtar Lam, 15 in Alisheng, 

14 in Qarghahi, 10 in Alingar, and 3 in Dowlat Shah. 

Starting in May 2009, these procedures were included in USFOR-A Publication 1-06, 

which provides guidance for using money as a weapon system in Afghanistan. The FMR and standard 

operating procedures that applied to the CERP projects we selected required commanders to coordinate 

CERP projects with Afghanistan government representatives and to document Afghanistan’s

commitment to sustain the projects after completion. As of December 2009, CERP standard operating 

procedures required that all CERP projects adhere to the Afghanistan First Program, which encourages 

the use of Afghan contractors to the greatest extent possible. All the projects we selected were awarded 

to Afghan contractors. 

 

4 In this report we refer to PRT, ADT, and task force commanders as field commanders.

5 P.L. 108-106, Title 1, Section 1110.

6 DOD, Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, volume 12, chapter 27, Commanders’ Emergency Response 

Program (January 2009). 

7 USFOR-A assumed responsibility for CERP management in May 2009. Prior to that date, combined joint task 

forces in RC-E were responsible for CERP management in Afghanistan. 

8 We selected projects approved in fiscal years 2008 through 2010. The applicable CERP standard operating 

procedures include, Money as a Weapon System–Afghanistan, USFOR-A Publication 1-06, updated December 2009 

and May 2009; Commander’s Emergency Response Program Standard Operating Procedures, Combined Joint Task 

Force-101, updated September 2008; and Commander’s Emergency Response Program Standard Operating 

Procedures, Combined Joint Task Force-9, updated October 2007.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 3 

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan, Highlighting Laghman Province

Source:.SIGAR analysis of maps available on U.S. Agency for International Development website.

As shown in figure 2, Mehtar Lam received the largest amount of CERP funding, followed by Alisheng 

and Qarghahi. 

Figure 2: Obligations for 69 Projects by Location, Fiscal Years 2008 

through 2010

Source: SIGAR analysis of Department of the Army’s Standard Finance System (STANFINS), 

USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data.

Mehtar Lam

$21,071,175 

39%

Alisheng

$11,019,757 

21%

Qarghahi

$10,659,151 

20%

Dowlat Shah

$8,931,086 

17%

Alingar

$1,627,207 

3%
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 4 

Of the 69 projects we selected, 11 projects were for road construction; 17 were to build or renovate 

facilities; 30 were for other types of construction, such as building or renovating dams, walls, canals, or 

bridges; and 11 provided equipment, including agricultural supplies.9

Figure 3: Obligations for 69 Projects by Project Type, Fiscal Years 2008 through 2010

The projects ranged from $32,537 

to install two canal passageways in Kanda Village to $8.7 million for the construction of a paved road 

from the Alisheng District to the Dowlat Shah District. Road projects comprised about $44.8 million of 

the CERP funds obligated (84 percent of total obligations). Figure 3 shows the obligations for the 

69 projects by project type. 

Source: SIGAR analysis of STANFINS, USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data.

Note: The other construction type incudes projects to build or renovate protection walls, gabion walls, 

check dams, canals, bridges, and security walls.

In addition to CERP guidance, two initiatives in Laghman Province—the Go Green strategy and the 

Capacity Building Fund—influence the way field commanders executed CERP: 

• TheGo Green strategy rewards villages that support the government of Afghanistan with U.S. 

government-funded projects. Under the initiative, the PRT codes villages as green, red, amber, 

or violet to indicate the level of support the village provides the government of Afghanistan. 

Only villages coded green are eligible for U.S. government funding. Villages achieve a green 

rating when the community does not harbor insurgents, community/religious leaders do not 

advocate violence against Afghanistan or coalition forces, there are no attacks from the 

community against the Afghan National Security Forces or coalition forces, and the village elders 

have signed a contract agreeing to the aforementioned criteria. As of September 30, 2010, 

182 of the 596 villages in Laghman Province were green (i.e., eligible for new projects), 145 were

red (i.e., not currently eligible for new projects), 95 were amber (i.e., in the process of becoming 

eligible for new projects), and 174 were violet (i.e., no assessment of the village has been 

conducted yet to determine eligibility).

 

9 We created these project types for the purpose of summarizing the projects. 

Roads

$44,828,093 

84%

Facilities

$4,761,889 

9%

Other 

Construction

$2,791,107 

5%

Equipment and 

Supplies

$927,286 

2%
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 5 

• The Capacity Building Fund (CBF) initiative, previously called CERP as a Budget, is implemented 

throughout RC-E. Under this initiative, the PRT and ADT provides mentors to the provincial line 

directors and the task force provides mentors to the district governors. The mentors give the 

Afghan officials a notional budget to plan projects. The officials must provide a 1-year strategy 

for using the budget, and provide a viable sustainment plan for proposed projects. As part of the 

CBF initiative, no funds are transferred and no contracting authorities are given to Afghan 

government entities. When we conducted our site visits in September 2010, many of the 

projects funded under the CBF initiative in Laghman had not been completed, and it was too 

early to determine whether ministries were sustaining the projects. 

Our analysis did not take into account other factors that may determine a successful counterinsurgency 

outcome, such as the perceived legitimacy of government of Afghanistan, measures of corruption, 

differences in economic growth, or the number of insurgent attacks, because such assessments are 

beyond the scope of our review. Additionally, counterinsurgency guidance suggests that CERP projects 

should help promote stability in insecure areas.10 However, we did not attempt to assess project 

outcomes on this basis because such an analysis would require us to make decisions about military 

intelligence that are not in the scope of our audit responsibilities.11

ALTHOUGH CERP PROJECT OUTCOMES WERE MIXED, QUESTIONABLE OUTCOMES EXCEED 

$49 MILLION IN OBLIGATIONS

 

Based on our assessment of 46 projects,12

Table 1 summarizes the outcomes of the 27 projects with at risk or questionable outcomes and our 

reasons for concern. 

we found 19 projects with generally successful outcomes 

accounting for about $2 million in obligations (4 percent of total obligations), but we determined that

27 projects had or were at risk for questionable outcomes and they accounted for the vast majority of 

the funding—about $49.2 million (92 percent). For our analysis, we grouped projects by whether they 

were active or completed and according to project outcome. For active projects, we determined 

whether they were “generally successful” to date or “at risk,” and for completed projects we

determined whether they were “generally successful” or had “questionable” outcomes. See appendix II 

for a detailed description of our assessment criteria. The projects with questionable outcomes or at risk

included the highest cost projects, primarily the construction of asphalt roads. For example, 9 asphalt 

road projects (about $44.6 million) that we reviewed are at risk because of sustainment concerns. 

 

10 Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, outlines successful operational practices for a counterinsurgency, 

such as: focus on the population, its needs, and its security; establish and expand secure areas; isolate insurgents 

from the populace; and deny sanctuary to insurgent.

11 We were unable to visit 14 of the projects, having a total obligation of nearly $6.9 million, due to security 

concerns.

12 We did not assess 23 projects with total obligations of about $2.1 million. Five were active projects (about 

$500,000 obligated) for which the contract had not been awarded or the work was in its early stages when we 

conducted our site visits; 15 were completed projects (about $1.4 million) that we could not visit (due to security 

concerns or remoteness of the project site) or the project files contained insufficient evidence for us to determine 

the projects’ outcomes; and 3 projects (about $200,000) were terminated after funds had been disbursed.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 6 

Table 1: Reasons for Concern for 27 Projects with at Risk or Questionable Outcomes

 (dollars in thousands)

Reason for Concern

At Risk 

Projects 

At Risk 

Projects 

(Obligations) 

Questionable 

Projects

Questionable 

Projects

(Obligations) 

Total 

Obligations 

Construction Quality 2 $80 7 $788 $869

Sustainment Concerns 11 $38,623 5 $9,511 $48,133

Discrepancy with 

Requirements

0 $0 2 $238 $238

Total 13 $38,703 14 $10,537 $49,240

Source: SIGAR analysis of STANFINS, USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data; physical inspections; and project file reviews.

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

The highest-cost and most complex projects that we selected were projects to construct asphalt roads 

and new facilities. We found that these were most at risk or susceptible to questionable outcomes. Of 

the 11 road projects we assessed, 9 were asphalt roads (about $44.6 million), which are at risk or have 

resulted in a questionable outcomes due to the lack of plans and resources for their maintenance. In 

addition, nearly 75 percent (about $3.5 million) of the amount obligated for facilities is at risk or has 

resulted in questionable outcomes.

Table 2 is a summary of the 69 CERP projects we selected by the four project types. See appendix II for a 

more detailed discussion of each of the projects. 

Table 2: CERP Projects by Project Type and Outcome (dollars in thousands)

Outcome 

Category Roads Facilities Other Construction

Equipment and 

Supplies Total

Number Obligations Number Obligations Number Obligations Number Obligations Number Obligations

Generally 

Successful

1 $81 5 $656 4 $362 9 $830 19 $1,930 

At Risk 8 $35,827 4 $2,844 1 $33 0 0 13 $38,703 

Questionable 2 $8,920 3 $705 9 $912 0 0 14 $10,537 

Not 

Assesseda

0 0 5 $557 16 $1,484 2 $98 23 $2,138 

Total 11 $44,828 17 $4,762 30 $2,791 11 $927 69 $53,308 

Source: SIGAR analysis of STANFINS, USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data.

Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding.

a We did not assess 23 projects for multiple reasons. Five were active projects for which the contract had not been 

awarded or the work was in its early stages when we conducted our inspections; 15 were completed projects that we 

could not visit (due to security concerns or remoteness of the project site) or the project files contained insufficient 

evidence for us to determine the projects’ outcomes; and 3 projects were terminated after funds had been disbursed.

Discussions of each of the CERP projects we examined follows. Many of the projects we assessed are at 

risk for waste. Waste occurs when U.S. taxpayers do not receive reasonable value for their money from 

U.S. government-funded activities. Most waste does not involve a violation of law; it often occurs as a 

result of mismanagement or inadequate oversight.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 7 

Asphalt Road Projects Are at Risk for Waste

All except two of the road projects we selected—Gumain Road Rehabilitation and Charbagh Road 

Rehabilitation—were asphalt roads. The nine asphalt road projects may result in waste due to 

sustainment concerns and in some cases questionable construction quality.13

Table 3: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Road Projects

These projects were 

approved without adequate assurance that the Afghan government had the resources to maintain the 

roads after completion. According to PRT officials, the Directors of Public Works and Rural Rehabilitation 

and Development do not have resources to maintain roads, particularly asphalt roads, which require 

more resources and equipment to maintain than dirt roads. The nine asphalt projects account for about 

$44.6 million obligated. Most of the road projects we examined are ongoing, multiyear efforts in Mehtar 

Lam. Table 3 summarizes the results of our analysis of the 11 road projects.

Project Name Location Status and Outcome Obligation Disbursement

Alisheng Road Project 

Phase II (25 km.)

Dowlat 

Shah

Active

At Risk: Sustainment and 

Construction Concerns

$8,750,000 $5,345,220

North Ring Road Phase I 

(Duranta Bypass) 

(28.5 km.)

Qarghahi Active

At Risk: Sustainment 

Concerns

$8,372,760 $1,961,241

Alisheng Road Project 

Phase I (23 km.)

Mehtar 

Lam

Completed

Questionable: Sustainment 

Concerns

$8,050,000 $8,050,000

Mayl Valley Road (15 km.) Alisheng Active

At Risk: Sustainment 

Concerns

$5,816,712 $1,053,590

Mehtar Lam Road 

Modernization Phase 2 

(16.8 km.)

Mehtar 

Lam

Active

At Risk: Sustainment and 

Construction Concerns

$5,239,214 $4,400,940

Shamakat Road (11.9 km.) Alisheng Active 

At Risk: Sustainment 

Concerns

$4,162,877 $3,815,970

Administrative Zone Road 

Phase II (6.3 km.)

Mehtar 

Lam

Active

At Risk: Sustainment 

Concerns

$1,865,745 $1,554,353

Mehtar Lam Road 

Modernization Phase I 

(4.7 km.)

Mehtar 

Lam

Active

At Risk: Sustainment

Concerns

$1,459,220 $1,356,035

Administrative Zone Road 

Phase I (2.9 km.)

Mehtar 

Lam

Completed

Questionable: Sustainment 

and Construction Concerns

$870,134 $870,134

Gumain Road Rehabilitation Mehtar 

Lam

Active

At Risk: Sustainment 

Concerns

$160,169 $101,131

Charbagh Road 

Rehabilitation

Qarghahi Active

Generally Successful

$81,262 $73,388

Total $44,828,093 $28,582,002

Source: SIGAR analysis of STANFINS, USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data; physical inspections; and project file reviews.

 

13 The Gumain road is also at risk due to sustainment concerns. We observed a section of the road where an 

improvised drainage ditch had been cut, which raised concerns whether additional damage would occur. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 8 

Most Funds Obligated for Facilities Projects Are at Risk or Resulted in Questionable Outcomes

Projects to construct or renovate facilities comprise the next largest obligation of CERP funds that we 

examined (9 percent of total obligations). Seven of the 17 facilities projects are at risk or are 

questionable due to sustainment concerns, discrepancies between work performed and contract 

requirements, or poor construction. These 7 projects account for about $3.5 million obligated, which is 

nearly 75 percent of the total amount for facilities. All of the facility projects for which we had concerns 

were projects to construct new buildings.

We did not assess 5 facilities projects accounting for about 12 percent of the total amount obligated for 

facilities projects that we selected. Four of these five projects were completed school projects located 

in insecure or remote locations. Table 4 summarizes our results for the 17 facility projects.

Table 4: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Facility Projects

Project Name Location Status and Outcome Obligation Disbursement

Laghman Province Center of 

Excellence

Mehtar 

Lam

Active

At Risk: Sustainment 

Concerns

$1,252,897 $1,127,604

Alingar Community LEAF 

(Agriculture Storage 

Facility)

Alingar Active

At Risk: Sustainment 

Concerns

$771,463 $578,598

Qarghahi Community LEAF 

(Agriculture Storage 

Facility)

Qarghahi Active

At Risk: Sustainment 

Concerns

S771,463 $578,598

Mehtar Lam Community 

Cold Storage

Alingar Completed

Questionable: Sustainment 

Concerns

$273,437 $273,437

Agriculture Storage and 

Maintenance

Mehtar 

Lam

Completed

Questionable: Sustainment 

Concerns

$252,650 $252,650

Social Affairs Training Center Mehtar 

Lam

Completed

Generally Successful

$204,390 $204,390

Laghman Prison Security 

Upgrades

Mehtar 

Lam

Completed

Generally Successful

$199,446 $199,446

Sawati School Qarghahi Completed

Questionable: Work Does Not 

Meet Contract Requirements

$179,018 $179,018

Myakhan Kac School Qarghahi Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Remote 

Location

$172,128 $172,128

Mashala Kamar School Qarghahi Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Remote 

Location

$170,787 $170,787

Prosecutor's Building 

Refurbishment

Mehtar 

Lam

Completed

Generally Successful

$128,782 $128,782
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 9 

Project Name Location Status and Outcome Obligation Disbursement

Women's Affairs Facility 

Upgrade and Community 

Kitchen

Mehtar 

Lam

Active

Generally Successful

$88,741 $53,245

Tilli School Alisheng Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Security 

Concerns

$98,365 $98,365

Gonapal School Alisheng Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Security 

Concerns

$59,081 $59,081

Information, Culture, and 

Youth Directorate

Mehtar 

Lam

Active

Not Assessed: New Project

$56,298 $16,889

Nomad Affairs Conference 

Building

Mehtar 

Lam

Active

At Risk: Construction 

Concerns

$47,931 $32,927

Agriculture Ministry Building 

Remodel

Mehtar 

Lam

Completed

Generally Successful

$35,010 $26,082

Total $4,761,889 $4,152,026

Source: SIGAR analysis of STANFINS, USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data; physical inspections; and project file reviews.

Other Construction Projects Have Had Mixed Outcomes

Other construction projects had mixed outcomes. We grouped these projects into four sub-categories: 

(1) protection walls, gabion walls, and check dams; (2) canals; (3) bridges; and (4) security walls. Most 

canal projects had successful outcomes. The remaining categories had or are at risk for questionable 

outcomes or were not assessed due to security concerns or remoteness of the sites. 

Six of the 14 projects in the protection wall, gabion wall, and check dams sub-category had questionable 

outcomes, likely due to poor construction, and the remaining 8 were not assessed. These 6 projects 

represent 44 percent of the total obligations for protection wall, gabion wall, and check dam projects 

that we examined. We did not assess 8 projects that account for 56 percent of the amount obligated for 

this sub-category because the project files were incomplete and the projects were difficult to inspect 

due to security concerns or remoteness of the sites. Table 5 summarizes our results for the 

14 protection wall, gabion wall, and check dam projects.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 10

Table 5: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Protection Wall, Gabion Wall, and Check Dam

Projects 

Project Name Location Status and Outcome Obligation Disbursement

Mulayan Protection Wall Mehtar

Lam

Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Remote 

Location

$226,787 $226,787

Amin Abad Protection Wall Qarghahi Completed:

Questionable: Construction 

Concerns

$199,479 $199,479

Farooz Abad Protection Wall Qarghahi Completed:

Questionable: Construction 

Concerns

$199,413 $199,413

Alisheng Gabion Wall Alisheng Completed:

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Remote 

Location

$137,500 $137,500

Eslamabad Check Dam Alisheng Active

Not Assessed: New Project

$117,561 $29,390

Sangar Protection Wall Alingar Completed:

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Security 

Concerns

$103,092 $103,092

Maroof Khil Protection Wall Qarghahi Completed:

Questionable: Construction 

Concerns

$99,522 $99,522

Gamarden Bila Gabion Wall Mehtar 

Lam

Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Remote 

Location

$83,105 $83,105

Alisheng Oluswali Protection 

Wall

Alisheng Completed

Questionable: Construction 

Concerns

$60,390 $60,390

Upper Gomrei Check Dam Alisheng Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Security 

Concerns

$59,339 $59,339

Ghunde Gabion Wall Qarghahi Completed

Questionable: Construction 

Concerns

$56,835 $56,835

Gomrei Check Dam Alisheng Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Security 

Concerns

$51,588 $36,182

Dumlam Check Dam Alisheng Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Security 

Concerns

$44,415 $44,415
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 11

Project Name Location Status and Outcome Obligation Disbursement

Kanda Canal Check Dams Alingar Active

At Risk: Construction 

Concerns

$32,537 $8,134

Total $1,471,563 $1,343,583

Source: SIGAR analysis of STANFINS, USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data; physical inspections; and project file reviews.

Most canal projects that we examined had generally successful outcomes. We had concerns with two 

projects—Shahi Canal Improvements and Bagasarach Canal—one due to construction and the other 

because the canal had not been kept clean, even though the mayor of Mehtar Lam had signed a 

maintenance agreement. Table 6 summarizes our results for the seven canal projects. 

Table 6: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Canal Projects 

Project Name Location Status and Outcome Obligation Disbursement

Alikel Canal Refurbishment Mehtar 

Lam

Completed

Generally Successful

$172,208 $172,208

Shahi Canal Improvements Alingar Completed

Questionable: Construction 

Concerns

$83,150 $83,150

Badiabad Canal Intake Alingar Completed

Generally Successful

$79,714 $79,714

Bagasarach Canal Mehtar 

Lam

Completed

Questionable: Sustainment 

Concerns

$64,721 $64,721

Domlech Irrigation Canal Dowlat 

Shah

Completed

Generally Successful

$59,492 $59,492

Nora Kareem Canal Qarghahi Active

Not Assessed: New Project

$57,600 $0

Nahri Shahi Irrigation Canal Alingar Active

Generally Successful

$51,053 $25,527

Total $567,938 $484,812

Source: SIGAR analysis of STANFINS, USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data; physical inspections; and project file reviews.

One of four bridge projects resulted in a questionable outcome; we did not assess the other three. The 

Alisheng Oluswali Footbridge was damaged by floods after it was completed, likely due to poor 

construction. Two of the four bridge projects in our sample were terminated: the Seqanwateh 

Footbridge after it was destroyed by floods and the Karandali Footbridge due to improvised explosive 

device activity in the vicinity. Table 7 summarizes our results for the four bridge projects. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 12

Table 7: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Bridge Projects 

Project Name Location Status and Outcome Obligation Disbursement

Mia Khan Kas Suspension 

Bridge

Qarghahi Active

Not Assessed: New Project

$196,861 $0

Seqanwateh Footbridge Alisheng Terminated

Not Assessed

$124,524 $124,524

Alisheng Oluswali Footbridge Alisheng Completed

Questionable: Construction 

Concerns

$89,250 $89,250

Karandali Footbridge Alisheng Terminated

Not Assessed

$65,000 $65,000

Total $475,635 $278,774

Source: SIGAR analysis of STANFINS, USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data; physical inspections; and project file reviews.

The security wall projects had incomplete files and were difficult to inspect due to security concerns or 

project site remoteness. We questioned the outcome of the Provincial Council Security Wall because of 

discrepancies between the work we observed and the contract requirements. In addition, the building 

the wall surrounds appeared to have been occupied by squatters and not used as intended. The Busram 

School Wall project was terminated due to security concerns, but before termination, the contractor 

stopped work because of a dispute between the education department and the local villagers. Table 

8 summarizes our results for the five security wall projects.

Table 8: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Security Wall Projects 

Project Name Location Status and Outcome Obligation Disbursement

Parwai Girls School I 

Boundary Wall

Alingar Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Security 

Concerns

$60,000 $60,000

Parwai Girls School II 

Boundary Wall

Alingar Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Security 

Concerns

$60,000 $60,000

Mandrawar Girls Primary 

School Wall

Qarghahi Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Remote 

Location

$59,500 $59,500

Provincial Council Security 

Wall

Mehtar 

Lam

Completed

Questionable: Work Does Not 

Meet Contract Requirements

$59,432 $59,432

Busram School Wall Mehtar 

Lam

Terminated

Not Assessed

$37,039 $37,039

Total $275,971 $275,971

Source: SIGAR analysis of STANFINS, USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data; physical inspections; and project file reviews.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 13

Equipment Projects and Projects to Purchase Agricultural Supplies Were Generally Successful

The equipment purchase projects that we examined generally resulted in successful outcomes. Most of 

these projects were under $100,000. We categorized the outcome as successful if we found sufficient 

evidence in the project file that the equipment was purchased. We inspected two of the three projects 

with the highest obligations in this category—Rehabilitate Mehtar Lam Power Plant and State Radio 

Tower Upgrade—and the equipment was being used as intended. Table 9 summarizes the results of the 

eight equipment projects.

Table 9: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Equipment Projects 

Project Name Location Status and Outcome Obligation Disbursement

Laghman Rule of Law Office 

Equipment

Mehtar 

Lam

Completed 

Generally Successful

$127,840 $127,840

Rehabilitate Mehtar Lam 

Power Plant

Mehtar 

Lam

Active

Generally Successful

$123,700 $40,000

State Radio Tower Upgrade Dowlat 

Shah

Completed 

Generally Successful

$121,594 $121,594

Hajiabad/Ghaziabad Hydro 

Electric Village 

Rehabilitation

Alisheng Completed 

Generally Successful

$78,155 $78,155

Mehtar Lam City Power 

Transmission Repair 

Supply of Goods

Mehtar 

Lam

Completed 

Generally Successful

$58,504 $58,504

Arani Water Distribution Alisheng Completed

Not Assessed: Insufficient 

Evidence and Remote 

Location

$55,000 $55,000

Sorkahkan Pump House Qarghahi Active 

Not Assessed: Just Started

$42,522 $0

Nomad Affairs Center – 

Power

Mehtar 

Lam

Completed 

Generally Successful

$42,256 $42,256

Total $649,571 $523,349 

Source: SIGAR analysis of STANFINS, USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data; physical inspections; and project file reviews.

The agricultural supplies projects we selected were generally successful. Based on our inspections and 

reviews of the project files, it appeared that the supplies were purchased and used as intended. Table 10 

summarizes the results of agricultural supplies projects.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 14

Table 10: Location, Status, Outcome, and Costs of Agricultural Supply Projects 

Project Name Location Status and Outcome Obligation Disbursement

Alingar Saffron Project Alingar Active

Generally Successful

$112,760 $98,960

Mehtar Lam Saffron Project Mehtar 

Lam

Active

Generally Successful

$101,530 $75,840

Agriculture Sapling 

Protectors

Mehtar 

Lam

Completed

Generally Successful

$63,425 $63,425

Total $277,715 $238,225

Source: SIGAR analysis of STANFINS, USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data; physical inspections; and project file reviews.

OVERSIGHT WEAKNESSES, SEPARATE PLANNING FOR RELATED PROJECTS, AND INADEQUATE 

PERFORMANCE MONITORING INCREASED RISKS OF QUESTIONABLE OUTCOMES AND 

POTENTIAL WASTE

In Laghman Province, CERP funds were not managed in accordance with standard operating procedures 

that provide for oversight of project files and financial databases. For example, the CERP contract for the 

Alisheng Road Phase 1 project was not signed by a warranted contracting officer, which resulted in an 

unauthorized commitment of more than $8 million for the U.S. government. In addition, two groups of 

related projects were approved individually but appeared more in line with large-scale development 

efforts rather than small-scale projects. The related projects all had sustainment concerns and the

immediate benefits of these related projects are unclear. Finally, USFOR-A has in place aspects of a 

performance monitoring framework to identify CERP project benefits, but it lacks a coordinated and 

results-oriented approach to determine whether CERP projects have achieved their intended goals, are 

being used as intended, and are being sustained by the government of Afghanistan. 

Oversight Weaknesses over CERP Funds

The CERP project files and financial databases we reviewed did not all contain evidence of certain 

internal controls, which could lead to the mismanagement of funds. CERP standard operating 

procedures establish internal controls to ensure accountability for CERP funds; therefore, CERP project 

files and financial systems should contain evidence that these controls were followed. However, we 

identified examples of non-compliance with CERP procedures.

All CERP project files are required to contain evidence that CERP oversight officials followed the internal 

controls established by CERP’s standard operating procedures, including (1) initial project approval 

documents, such as a justification for the project and a commander’s approval to commit funds; (2) a 

project statement of work; (3) a legal review; and (4) evidence to substantiate payments. We found that 

the 69 project files generally contained the initial project documentation and statements of work, but 

most lacked legal reviews and contained insufficient evidence to substantiate payments. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 15

Examples of oversight weaknesses in the project files included: 

• $8 million unauthorized commitment

•

: Most CERP projects are awarded by project purchasing 

officers; however, CERP standard operating procedures require warranted contracting officers 

to award contracts that cost $500,000 or greater. The Alisheng Road Phase 1 project was 

administered by the Laghman purchasing officer and was not signed by a warranted contracting 

officer, which resulted in an unauthorized commitment of more than $8 million. An 

unauthorized commitment is a financial commitment that is not binding because the official

who made it lacked the authority to enter into the agreement on behalf of the U.S. government. 

Project purchasing officers have less training than warranted contracting officers, who have at 

least one year of experience and are required to take a significant amount of classroom training 

before they are allowed to award contracts. 

$4 million in unsupported costs

•

: For each payment made, CERP standard operating procedures 

require two forms of support: an invoice and a Materials Inspection and Receiving Report (also 

known as Form DD250). Thirty-five of the project files (over $11 million in disbursements) we 

reviewed had incomplete financial documentation; the files did not contain both an invoice and 

a Materials Inspection and Receiving Report for one or more payments made. Fifteen of these 

47 projects had over $4 million in disbursements without either the invoice or the Materials 

Inspection and Receiving Report in the project file.

$8.9 million obligated without documented legal reviews

•

: Three projects in our sample, 

representing $8.9 million obligated, did not contain evidence that a legal review had been 

conducted. CERP authorizing legislation and implementing regulations give commanders 

flexibility in responding to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements. To help 

ensure that commanders use CERP for authorized purposes, CERP standard operating 

procedures require commanders to obtain legal reviews for proposed projects. The absence of a 

legal review increases the risk that the proposed project does not meet statutory and regulatory 

requirements for the expenditure of CERP funds. 

$9.1 million disbursed with incomplete documentation of project monitoring: Forty files, 

representing $9.1 million in disbursements, contained minimal evidence that project monitoring, 

such as quality control and quality assurance reports, had occurred. According to the U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, properly managing and overseeing contractor performance is 

an essential element for achieving good acquisition outcomes.14

 

14 Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and 

Investments, GAO-08-568T, March 11, 2008.

CERP standard operating 

procedures applicable to projects in our sample required CERP oversight officials to ensure that 

proper quality assurance measures were in place for all projects. As CERP standard operating 

procedures were updated, CERP project monitoring requirements became more stringent. The 

most recent draft, dated November 2010, requires CERP oversight officals to conduct quality 

assurance assessments for projects costing more than $50,000 and to document the results of 

the assessments in the Combined Information Data Network Exchange, which is the official 

program database for CERP. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 16

Related Projects in Laghman Province Were Approved Individually; Immediate Benefits of 

Related Projects Are Unclear

CERP’s purpose is to enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction 

requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out small-scale projects that immediately 

assist the indigenous population.15 However, CERP has been used for large-scale projects. Out of the 

69 CERP projects we examined, the majority of CERP funds were obligated for multimillion dollar road 

projects. The 69 projects included two groups of related projects that were approved individually but 

appeared more in-line with large-scale development efforts: the Mehtar Lam administrative zone 

projects and Laghman agricultural storage and maintenance projects. As SIGAR previously reported, 

large-scale projects typically require several years to complete and require CERP oversight officials to 

devote significant amounts of time and resources to monitor their completion.16

•

 However, CERP 

oversight officials rotate frequently and have been trained to implement smaller-scale projects. In 

Laghman Province, we identified sustainment concerns for the majority of these related projects. In 

addition, the related projects did not appear to meet an urgent need or provide an immediate benefit.

Mehtar Lam administrative zone projects: Six projects totaling more than $4 million in 

obligations were related to an economic development effort to re-locate most of the 

governmental, educational, and medical facilities in Mehtar Lam from their current location in 

the city center to a sparsely populated area outside of Forward Operating Base Mehtar Lam. 

According to PRT officials, the rationale for these projects was to allow further expansion and 

economic development for the city. The 6 projects include Administrative Zone Road Phase II

(about $1.9 million); Laghman Province Center of Excellence (about $1.3 million); Administrative 

Zone Road Phase I (about $0.9 million); Information, Culture, and Youth Directorate renovation 

($56,298); Nomad Affairs Conference Building ($47,931); and Nomad Affairs Center power 

project ($42,256).17

•

We were unable to determine how the projects address an immediate need 

or provide immediate benefits to the local population. The individual projects that exceeded 

$1 million were approved in 2008 and 2009. The PRT officials who were involved in the decisions 

to fund the projects rotated before we began our review, and the files contained minimal 

evidence to document why the projects were selected. According to current PRT officials, 

allegations of corruption—related to the sale of land—have been made against the previous 

governor of Laghman. We could not independently verify the authenticity of these allegations, 

since the project files did not include land-use agreements. However, the project files contained 

evidence that the original scope of the Administrative Zone Phase II road project was changed

due to a land dispute between the Afghan National Army and the Provincial Governor. The PRT 

intervened and relocated sections of the road to other parts of the city.

Laghman agriculture storage and maintenance projects

 

15 Starting in September 2008, CERP standard operating procedures generally defined “small-scale” as any project 

less than $500,000 and “urgent” as any chronic or acute inadequacy of an essential good or service that, in the 

judgment of a local commander, calls for immediate action.

: More than $2 million has been 

obligated for 4 agricultural storage projects: the Mehtar Lam Community Cold Storage project 

($273,437), the Agriculture Storage and Maintenance project ($252,650), the Laghman 

Empowerment Agricultural Facility project in Alingar ($771,463), and the Laghman 

16SIGAR, Increased Viability, Monitoring, and Planning Needed for Commander’s Emergency Response Program in 

Afghanistan, SIGAR Audit-09-5, Sept. 9, 2009.

17 The area also includes two projects that were not in our sample: a fire house and a Women’s Affairs 

demonstration garden. According to PRT officials, these projects were constructed using U.S. funds and have not 

been used as intended.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 17

Empowerment Agricultural Facility in Qarghahi ($771,463). The Mehtar Lam Community Cold 

Storage project and Agriculture Storage and Maintenance project were completed in June 2010 

but have not been transferred to the Government of Afghanistan because a sustainment 

agreement was not in place. The PRT awarded the projects, and the ADT is working with the 

Director for Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock to sign a contract with a private business to 

operate the two completed facilities in Mehtar Lam. A similar agreement will need to be 

reached for the ongoing projects in Alingar and Qarghahi to ensure that the Afghan government 

sustains the projects after they are transferred. The investment made for these two facilities is 

at risk until such an agreement is finalized. In addition, the fact that the completed buildings are 

not used as intended calls into question the projects’ immediate benefits. A Center for Army 

Lessons Learned handbook, Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures (March 2008), suggests that commanders should request, or conduct for 

themselves, an assessment of local conditions before investing financial resources into potential 

relief and reconstruction programs. This was not done but may have provided a better 

understanding of Afghan government’s capacity to use and maintain the projects after 

completion. 

Most of these projects were approved in 2008 and 2009. In 2010, Commanders in Laghman did not use

CERP funds on new facilities and new large-scale development projects. Instead, they leveraged CERP as 

a means of engaging local Afghan government officials. For example, under the Capacity Building Fund

(CBF) initiative, PRT and ADT mentors give the provincial line directors a notional budget to plan 

projects, and the directors must provide a 1-year strategy for using the budget.

18

USFOR-A Lacks a Coordinated, Results-Oriented Approach for Evaluating the Effectiveness of 

CERP Projects

 

Commanders and CERP oversight officials lack a coordinated, results-oriented approach to determine 

whether CERP projects have achieved their goals, are being used as intended, and are being sustained 

by the government of Afghanistan. USFOR-A has aspects of a performance monitoring framework in 

place, but improvements are needed to determine whether CERP projects are achieving their desired 

effects.19

The U.S. Government Accountability Office has reported on the value of using a results-oriented 

approach to guide and evaluate the performance of agency operations.

20

 

18 As part of the CBF initiative, no funds are transferred and no contracting authorities are given to Afghan 

government entities.

Under such an approach, 

commanders at all levels would have the data needed to assess CERP project outcomes, determine 

whether projects meet the program’s intent, and determine whether CERP funds are being used in a 

19 Other oversight institutions also have reported on weaknesses in USFOR-A’s assessment of CERP outcomes. The 

U.S. Army Audit Agency recommended that USFOR-A take action to improve aspects of its performance monitoring 

system for CERP. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) agreed with the 

report’s findings and recommendations. See U.S. Army Audit Agency, Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program: U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, A-2011-0020-ALL, Nov. 16, 2010. Also, the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office recommended that the Secretary of Defense require impact evaluations for CERP-funded road projects. See 

GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact 

and a Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed, GAO-08-689, July 2008. 

20 See GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act,GGD-96-118, 

Jun. 1996; GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection for Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program and Improve Oversight in Iraq, GAO-08-736R, Jun. 23, 2008.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 18

fiscally responsible manner. The Government Performance and Results Act of 199321

USFOR-A includes the commander’s goals for CERP in Afghanistan in a quarterly report to the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). For fiscal year 2011, these goals describe the USFOR-A commander’s 

intent to emphasize small-scale projects, distribute funding authority to field commanders, improve predeployment training, and involve Afghan officials in construction projects. These goals are not resultsoriented because they focus on the process of awarding and executing CERP projects rather than on the 

projects’ impact. 

outlines criteria for

a program evaluation framework: (1) results-oriented goals; (2) balanced performance measures to 

mark progress toward goals; and (3) procedures to collect, analyze, and report on performance data.

DOD’s FMR identifies standard measures of effectiveness for CERP such as (1) the number of Afghans 

employed on the project, (2) the number of Afghans benefitting economically from the project, and (3) a 

description of the project’s benefits for the local population, among other data. The regulations require 

CERP project managers to document standard measures of effectiveness during the approval process, 

regardless of the project’s dollar value. The project files we reviewed primarily included estimates of the 

number of Afghans who will be employed or the number of Afghans who will benefit economically; 

however, the project files did not contain evidence to support the development of these estimates. The 

project files also included statements of anticipated project effects.

During the period covered by our review, CERP oversight officials at the USFOR-A level and in Laghman 

Province did not have formal mechanisms in place to track and assess project outcomes. Instead, CERP 

oversight officials in Laghman Province relied on anecdotal information from villagers to report 

problems with completed projects.

In August 2010, the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command drafted a strategy to 

determine the effectiveness of CERP expenditures. The draft strategy defines a successful CERP project 

as one that achieves counterinsurgency effects, which the draft documents defines as: 

• sustainable, 

• easily executed,

• timely,

• employing Afghans,

• supported by the Afghan government, and 

• managing expectations. 

The draft strategy requires regional commanders to develop CERP plans to (1) identify projects that 

meet the needs of local Afghans, Afghanistan government initiatives, and the USFOR-A Commander’s 

goals for the fiscal year and (2) assess the impact of projects. 

In addition, USFOR-A has drafted an update to the CERP standard operating procedures, which was in 

the approval process as of December 2010. The updated draft procedures require CERP oversight 

officials to conduct quality assurance reviews after CERP projects have been completed to ensure the 

projects are being sustained and are achieving their desired objectives.22

 

21 P.L. 103-62.

Under these new procedures,

CERP officials will be required to collect data on (1) local Afghan employment opportunities created by 

22 The draft standard operating procedures require project officers to prepare quality assurance reports 60 days, 

120 days, and 365 days after CERP projects have been completed. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 19

the project, (2) the government of Afghanistan’s satisfaction of the project, (3) satisfaction of 

community leaders, and (4) the number of attendees, users, or locals who experienced benefits from 

the project. It is too early to assess the impact the draft CERP strategy and the draft standard operating 

procedures will have on program oversight. 

CONCLUSION

Our analysis shows 27 of 69 CERP projects in Laghman Province are at risk or have questionable 

outcomes. Many of these projects were high-dollar value, representing about $49.2 million, or 

92 percent of the total obligations we reviewed, and may result in waste. Large-scale projects, such as 

roads and groups of related infrastructure projects, were approved without adequate assurance that the 

government of Afghanistan had the resources needed to operate and maintain them. Moreover, the 

overall effect of CERP in achieving the intended goals of the program is unknown because commanders 

and CERP officials lack results-based data to determine whether CERP projects are successful and can be

sustained. These issues raise questions about the adequacy of CERP oversight and the capacity of the 

Afghanistan government to sustain CERP projects after they are completed. Without better oversight 

and plans for sustainment, the United States’ investment is at risk for waste and the Afghan people may 

not receive the projects' intended benefits.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To improve CERP oversight and promote the sustainment of CERP projects in Laghman Province, we 

recommend that the USFOR-A commander direct the commanders of the PRT, ADT, or Task Force to:

1. Develop approaches to improve the construction quality and sustainment plans for active CERP 

projects; or consider terminating or de-scoping active CERP projects and re-obligating the funds 

for better use, if it is in the best interest of the government to do so;

2. Require contractors to repair any defective work, for completed projects that are still under 

warranty; and, 

3. Work with government of Afghanistan officials to develop sustainment plans for CERP projects 

that are completed and have not been sustained. USFOR-A should consider identifying steps for 

Afghanistan government officials in Laghman Province to take to sustain projects that have been 

transferred to their authority, prior to the commitment of additional CERP projects.

To better identify CERP-funded large-scale development efforts and ensure sustainment plans for these 

projects, we recommend that the USFOR-A commander:

4. Update CERP standard operating procedures to include criteria that would help field 

commanders determine when groups of CERP projects should be considered related for project 

planning and approval purposes. 

To help determine whether CERP projects have met their intended outcomes and the purposes of CERP, 

we recommend that the USFOR-A commander:

5. Develop a coordinated, results-oriented approach for evaluating the effectiveness of CERP 

projects. Such an approach should include goals that are objective, quantifiable, and 

measurable; criteria to define a successful CERP outcome; balanced performance measures to 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 20

mark progress toward the goals; and procedures to collect, analyze, and report on performance 

data both during project execution and after project completion. 

COMMENTS

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) provided comments on a draft of this report. The comments are 

reproduced in appendix IV. USFOR-A generally concurred with our findings and recommendations and 

stated that our recommendations, if properly executed, will ensure a more successful CERP program 

while protecting U.S. taxpayer dollars. USFOR-A also outlined actions that would address these 

recommendations, including:

• seeking input from local Afghans to include local building practices into project statements 

of work;

• enforcing contract warranties and withholding final payments until all deficiencies have 

been corrected; 

• working with district and provincial Ministry of Public Works to develop a budgeting 

mechanism for sustainment; 

• requiring commanders to review CERP databases before initiating projects to avoid 

duplication of efforts that wastes resources; and 

• developing outcome-based assessments following project completion. 

USFOR-A noted that it faces challenges in fully implementing the recommendations of this report, 

including: 

• limited capacity of local contractors, 

• limited time or resources for project managers to supervise the construction, and

• lack of budgeting mechanisms within the government of Afghanistan to fund recurring 

operations and maintenance costs. 

USFOR-A also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated where appropriate. In 

addition, in January 2011, USFOR-A provided copies of missing project documents that were not made 

available by CERP officials during the course of our audit. As a result, we updated our findings regarding 

oversight weaknesses over CERP funds. The challenges we faced in obtaining complete and accurate 

information during the course of our audit are due, in part, to the fact that USFOR-A has not maintained 

centralized record keeping systems, which limits USFOR-A’s monitoring and reporting capabilities. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 21

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

This report presents the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) review of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects in 

Laghman Province, Afghanistan. SIGAR initiated this audit to examine the funding, outcomes, and 

oversight of selected CERP projects in Laghman Province, Afghanistan, that were approved in fiscal years 

2008 through 2010. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) assess the projects’ status, including funds 

obligated and disbursed and whether the projects were meeting intended outcomes and, if applicable, 

were being sustained; and (2) determine whether project oversight by U.S. officials was in accordance 

with applicable guidance. 

To address these objectives, we selected 69 CERP projects to evaluate. As of November 13, 2010, the

total obligations for the 69 selected projects exceeded $53.3 million, and the total disbursements 

exceeded $35 million. 

We chose Laghman Province because, among other factors, it had the highest average project cost of 

the provinces in RC-E. Initially, we grouped CERP project data from USFOR-A’s Combined Information 

Data Network Exchange database by regional command, and noted that Regional Command-East (RC-E) 

had the highest dollar value for all CERP projects approved in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2010.23 

Within RC-E, Nangahar Province had the highest dollar value of all provinces, but we excluded Nangahar 

because SIGAR had ongoing audit work in that province, and the audit team did not want to duplicate 

efforts. 24

• approved in fiscal years 2008 through 2010; 

We selected CERP projects in Laghman Province that were

• committed for $50,000 or greater, since this is the threshold at which CERP regulations and 

operating procedures require detailed project justifications, coordination with government of 

Afghanistan representatives, and documentation that those representatives agree to sustain the 

projects; and

• awarded by the Laghman Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Laghman Agribusiness 

Development Team (ADT), or the various task forces (Iron Gray, Wild Horse, and Bayonet) that 

were co-located with the Laghman PRT.

In addition to cost considerations, the selection included a mix of active, completed, and terminated 

projects across the 20 categories of CERP assistance for which the use of CERP funds is permitted, as 

outlined in DOD’s Financial Management Regulation.25 Since we selected the projects we assessed on a 

judgmental basis, we cannot draw inferences to the entire population of CERP projects in Afghanistan. 

The following analyses formed the basis of our observations and findings.26

 

23In a previous CERP report, SIGAR found the data in CIDNE to be unreliable; however, CIDNE was the best 

available source for the purpose of selecting our judgment sample. 

 

24See Weaknesses in Reporting and Coordination of Development Assistance and Lack of Provincial Capacity Pose 

Risks to U.S. Strategy in Nangarhar Province, SIGAR-Audit-11-1, Oct. 26, 2010. 

25DOD, Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, volume 12, chapter 27, Commanders’ Emergency Response 

Program (January 2009).

26 The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction used a similar methodology in its review of a collection of 

CERP projects at the Baghdad International Airport. See Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Projects at 

Baghdad International Airport Provided Some Benefits, but Waste and Management Problems Occurred,

SIGIR 10-013, April 26, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 22

To determine the costs of the projects we selected for review, we analyzed obligation and disbursement 

data from contract documents in the project files and financial data from the Department of the Army’s 

Standard Finance System (STANFINS) and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan’s CERP checkbook. To assess the 

reliability of the computer-processed data, we (1) interviewed USFOR-A officials to discuss the reliability 

of the data; (2) conducted electronic testing and checked for missing data, erroneous entries, and 

duplicates; and (3) compared the financial system’s output with the documents in the project files, such 

as invoices, receiving reports, and other payment documents. On the basis of our reliability 

assessments, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to meet the audit’s objectives. 

Specifically, the data reported to us from STANFINS were sufficiently reliable for reporting obligations 

and disbursements for the projects in our sample when corroborated with financial data from the 

project files, and the data reported to us from the CERP checkbook were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of illustrating the magnitude of CERP obligations in Laghman province. 

To determine project outcomes, we conducted file reviews for all 69 projects and site visits for 36 of the 

69 projects we selected. Not all of the files contained sufficient evidence for us to make an assessment, 

and we were unable to visit all of the project sites; however, by conducting file reviews and site visits, 

we were able to assess the outcomes of 46 of the 69 projects we selected. For the file reviews, we 

analyzed quality assurance reports and additional documents in the project files that listed the projects’ 

requirements (such as the contracts and statements of work) and described the conditions of the 

projects. We conducted our site visits from September 26 through 29, 2010. The 36 projects we visited 

represented $39.8 million (nearly 75 percent) of the $53.3 million obligated for the 69 projects in our 

selection. We were aware that we would be unable to visit every project site. Consequently, we 

coordinated with key personnel at the PRT, ADT and the task force and gave them criteria to consider 

when scheduling site visits, such as project costs, security of the area, and remoteness of the project site. 

We asked them to prioritize the most expensive projects where security concerns would not prohibit us 

from visiting the project site and where the project locations were not too remote (some sites would 

take all day to reach). The PRT, ADT and task force identified 27 of the 69 projects that (1) were in areas 

that were too insecure to visit, (2) were too remote to visit in the time allotted, or (3) were eliminated 

for other reasons such as the projects were similar to other projects on the site visit schedule. 

Additionally, we could not visit 6 of the 42 project sites we planned to visit, primarily due to security 

concerns.

To present our analysis of project outcomes, we grouped the projects by completion status and subgrouped the projects by their outcomes. Table 1 of appendix II outlines our rationale for the categories 

we developed to group our analysis. 

Our analysis did not take into account other factors that may determine a successful counterinsurgency 

outcome, such as the perceived legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan, measures of corruption, 

differences in economic growth, or the number of insurgent attacks, because such assessments are 

beyond the scope of our review. Additionally, counterinsurgency guidance suggests that CERP projects 

should help promote stability in insecure areas.27 However, we did not attempt to assess project 

outcomes on this basis because such an analysis would require us to make decisions about military 

intelligence that are not in the scope of our audit responsibilities.28

 

27 Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, (Dec. 2006) outlines successful operational practices for a 

counterinsurgency, such as: focus on the population, its needs, and its security; establish and expand secure areas; 

isolate insurgents from the populace; and deny sanctuary to insurgent.

 

28 We were unable to visit 14 of the projects, having a total obligation of nearly $6.9 million, due to security 

concerns.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 23

To assess USFOR-A’s and field commanders’ oversight of the selected projects, including internal 

controls and accountability mechanisms in place to safeguard CERP funds, we reviewed relevant laws, 

regulations, standard operating procedures, and other guidance related to CERP. Additionally, we 

reviewed the completeness of the selected project files, USFOR-A’s financial database and electronic 

project management database, and the Army’s Standard Finance System. Due to time and resource 

limitations, we did not conduct our internal controls assessment or track every requirement in the CERP 

regulations and standard operating procedures. Instead, we adhered to the general principles outlined 

in SIGAR’s guidelines for conducting audits of contracts, and we limited our review to primary 

documents and other evidence that addressed our research objectives. In addition, we conducted 

interviews with U.S. officials involved with project planning, administration, and oversight. We also 

interviewed the Provincial Governor of Laghman and other Laghman government officials who were onsite during our site visits. Over the course of the audit, as appropriate, we also reviewed planning 

documents and documents that outline commanders’ goals for CERP in Afghanistan. We identified 

internal control weaknesses, which we present in the body of the report.

We conducted this review from July 2010 to December 2010 in Kabul and Laghman Province, 

Afghanistan, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. This audit was conducted by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, and 

the Inspector General Act of 2008.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 24

APPENDIX II: CERP PROJECTS REVIEWED THROUGHOUT LAGHMAN PROVINCE

This appendix summarizes the costs, outcomes, and other project data for the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) projects we selected for review throughout Laghman Province. Our sample 

includes all CERP projects with an initial commitment of $50,000 or greater that were approved by the 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Agribusiness Development Team (ADT), or various task forces 

located at Forward Operating Base Mehtar Lam29

CERP standard operating procedures

during fiscal years 2008 through 2010. The 69 projects 

we selected include 24 active, 42 completed, and 3 terminated projects; the total obligation was about 

$53.3 million, of which $35.8 million had been disbursed as of November 2010. 

30

To determine project outcomes, we relied primarily on reviews of documents in the project files and 

physical inspections we conducted during site visits. For all 69 projects we selected, we reviewed quality 

assurance reports and other documents in the project files that stated the projects’ requirements and 

described their conditions. Also, from September 26 through 29, 2010, we visited 36 of the 69 projects 

in Laghman; these represented $39.8 million (nearly 75 percent) of the amount obligated for all 69 

projects we selected.

establish criteria for selecting projects and determining the 

appropriateness of proposed projects; however, the procedures do not define a successful CERP 

outcome. To develop our criteria for categorizing project outcomes, we took into account the purpose 

of CERP, as defined in the standard operating procedures, which is to enable commanders to respond to 

urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their area of responsibility by 

carrying out programs that will immediately assist the indigenous population. Starting in September 

2008, CERP procedures defined “urgent” as any chronic or acute inadequacy of an essential good or 

service that, in the judgment of the local commander, calls for immediate action. The procedures 

updated on or after September 2008 also indicate that CERP is intended for projects that can be 

sustained by the local population or government and cost less than $500,000.

Using this approach, we assessed the outcomes of 46 projects in our sample. We grouped the projects 

by completion status (active and completed). Within each category, we grouped the projects into subcategories according to project outcome:

• Active projects • Completed projects

 Generally successful outcome to date  Generally successful outcome

 At risk  Questionable outcome

We did not assess 23 of the sample projects. These 23 projects had a total obligation of about 

$2.1 million and include 5 active projects (about $500,000 obligated) where the contract had not been 

awarded or the work performed was in early stages when we conducted our inspections in 

September 2010; 15 completed projects (about $1.4 million obligated) where we could not inspect the 

project due to security concerns or remoteness of the project site and the project files contained 

insufficient evidence for us to determine the projects’ outcomes; and 3 projects (about $200,000 

obligated) that were terminated after funds had been disbursed.

 

29 The municipality of Mehtar Lam is the provincial capital of Laghman.

30 Our review included projects that were approved in fiscal years 2008 through 2010. The applicable CERP 

standard operating procedures include Money as a Weapon System—Afghanistan, USFOR-A Publication 1-06, 

updated December 2009 and May 2009; Commander’s Emergency Response Program Standard Operating 

Procedures, Combined Joint Task Force—101, updated September 2008; and Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program Standard Operating Procedures, Combined Joint Task Force—9, updated October 2007.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 25

Table I outlines the criteria we used to determine CERP project outcomes. 

Table I: SIGAR Criteria for Determining CERP Project Outcomes

Outcome 

Categories Outcome Criteria by Project Status

Criteria for Active Projects 

Generally 

Successful

• Work performed is consistent with statement of work requirements,

• Project does not appear to have construction deficiencies, and

• Government of Afghanistan has a plan to sustain project after transfer 

At Risk • Work performed is inconsistent with statement of work requirements,

• Project has construction deficiencies or SIGAR is concerned with construction quality,

• Government of Afghanistan does not have a sustainment plan in place for the project 

after transfer, or

• Immediate need for the project and benefit to the population are unclear 

Not Assessed • Project was in its initial stages and minimal site work had been conducted at the time 

of our review

Criteria for Completed Projects

Generally 

Successful

• Work performed is consistent with statement of work requirements,

• Project does not appear to have construction deficiencies, and

• Government of Afghanistan has sustained the project 

Questionable • Work performed is inconsistent with statement of work requirements,

• Project has construction deficiencies or SIGAR is concerned with construction quality,

• Government of Afghanistan has not sustained project after its transfer, or the 

government of Afghanistan does not have a plan to sustain the project, or

• Immediate need for the project and benefit to the population are unclear

Not Assessed • SIGAR was unable to observe project outcome due to security concerns or remoteness 

of the project site, and

• Project file included insufficient evidence to assess the outcome (e.g., poor 

documentation of quality assurance reviews conducted)

Criteria for Terminated Projects

Generally 

Successful 

• N/A

Questionable • N/A

Not Assessed • Funds were expended but project was terminated

Source: SIGAR developed criteria based on CERP standard operating procedures and other factors.

Because CERP regulations allow commanders to fund projects using 20 broadly defined categories of 

assistance, we considered projects to meet the intent of CERP unless we had strong evidence to the 

contrary. We questioned the outcomes of two groups of related projects that were related to largerscale development efforts, where the immediate needs for the projects and the benefits to the local 

population were unclear. 

We were unable to observe 14 of the projects, having a total obligation of nearly $6.9 million, due to 

security concerns. Counterinsurgency guidance suggests that CERP projects should help promote 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 26

stability in insecure areas.31 However, we did not attempt to assess project outcomes based on this 

rationale because such an analysis would require us to make decisions about military intelligence that 

are not in the scope of our audit responsibilities.32

Table II summarizes our findings.

Additionally, our analysis also does not take into 

account other factors that may determine a successful counterinsurgency outcome, such as the 

perceived legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan, measures of corruption, differences in economic 

growth, or the number of insurgent attacks, because such assessments are beyond the scope of our 

review. 

Table II: Summary of Selected CERP Project Outcomes by Project 

Completion Status

Outcome Categories Number 

Obligation

(in millions)

Active Projects

Generally Successful Outcome 6 $0.6

At Risk 13 $38.7

Outcome Not Assessed 5 $0.5

Total Active 24 $39.8

Completed Projects

Generally Successful Outcome 13 $1.4

Questionable Outcome 14 $10.5

Outcome Not Assessed 15 $1.4

Total Completed 42 $13.3

Terminated Projects

Outcome Not Assessed 3 $0.2

Total Active, Completed, and 

Terminated

69 $53.3

Source: SIGAR analysis of STANFINS, USFOR-A, PRT, ADT, and task force data; physical 

inspections; and project file reviews. 

We discuss each of the projects, in descending order of obligation, by completion status, and by 

outcome category within each status group. 

 

31 Army Field Manual 3-24 (Dec. 2006), Counterinsurgency, outlines successful operational practices for a 

counterinsurgency, such as focusing on the population, its needs and security; establishing and expanding secure 

areas; isolating insurgents from the populace; and denying sanctuary to insurgents. 

32 We were unable to visit 14 of the projects, totaling nearly $6.9 million in obligated funds, due to security 

concerns. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 27

ACTIVE PROJECTS

As of November 2010, 24 of 69 projects, representing $39.8 million (74.6 percent) of total obligations, 

were active. Of the 24 active projects, we found that 6 were generally successful and 13 were at risk for 

unsuccessful outcomes. We did not assess 5 of the active projects because contracts had not been 

awarded or work had just been initiated.

Active Projects – Generally Successful Outcome

We determined that 6 of the active projects were likely to have generally successful outcomes, as of 

November 2010. These projects have a total obligation of about $600,000, which is 1 percent of total 

obligations for the projects in our review. 

Rehabilitate Mehtar Lam Power Plant

Obligation: $123,700

Disbursement: $40,000

Approval Date: April 2010 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Energy

CERP Category: Electricity

Project Type

Outcome: Purchases of Equipment Ongoing

: Equipment 

The purpose of this project is to improve the capacity of 

the existing diesel generator power plant that provides 

power to the city of Mehtar Lam. A new bulk storage fuel tank was installed at the plant; this eliminated 

the need to bring in fuel by drums on a daily basis. In addition, the original plan was to repair one of the 

existing two generators, install a third generator, and install a switchgear with an automatic transfer 

switch that would allow multiple generators to run simultaneously. Problems with generator 

compatibility required changing to a manual transfer switch, which added additional time to the project. 

According to PRT officials, the provincial governor determines how long the plant will run each day—

around 13 hours in the summer and around 6 hours in the winter due to lighter demand. Reportedly, 

1,068 metered, electrical customers are on the system and are billed bi-monthly, and, according to PRT 

officials, the revenues collected pay for most of the plant’s fuel costs.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 26, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 28

Alingar Saffron Project

Obligation: $112,760

Disbursement: $98,960

Approval Date: September 2009 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Alingar

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Alingar District

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Agricultural Supplies

Outcome: Training Sessions Ongoing

The project is a cooperative research effort that provided 

saffron bulbs and about 5 acres of demonstration plots 

in the Alingar District to teach local farmers how to cultivate and produce saffron as an alternative to

poppy. It takes the area of a football field to grow one pound of saffron, which is worth approximately 

$1,000, according to project file documents. As part of the project, local farmers were invited to the 

demonstration plots to learn saffron techniques and discuss opportunities for saffron production. We 

did not inspect the project site, however, evidence in the project files suggests that the bulbs were 

purchased and the plots were used as intended. 

Women's Affairs Facility Upgrade and Community Kitchen 

Obligation: $88,741

Disbursement: $53,245

Approval Date: February 2010 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Women's Affairs 

CERP Category: Food Production and Distribution, 

Gender

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Renovations Ongoing

The Women’s Affairs Facility Upgrade and Community 

Kitchen project includes renovations—such as installation of a well, construction of an outdoor 

classroom, and other additions—to an existing facility in the city of Mehtar Lam. The project 

experienced delays because the contractor had multiple projects with the PRT and did not have the 

capacity to work on multiple contracts at the same time. At the time of our inspection, the well was 

completed and work was ongoing on the septic tank and latrines. 

Source: Project file, October 17, 2009

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 26, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 29

Mehtar Lam Saffron Project

Obligation: $101,530

Disbursement: $75,840

Approval Date: September 2009 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Mehtar Lam Municipality

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Agricultural Supplies 

Outcome: Training Sessions Ongoing

The project is a cooperative research effort that provided 

more than an acre of demonstration saffron plots in the 

city of Mehtar Lam to teach local farmers how to cultivate and produce saffron as an alternative to 

poppy. We inspected the project site and observed the planted saffron field, which is leased from a 

village elder. The saffron bulbs harvested under the project will be split equally among the ADT, 

landowner, and a local cooperative that participates in training sessions. The ADT plans to use the bulbs 

to start another saffron project in the Qarghahi District.

Charbagh Road Rehabilitation

Obligation: $81,262

Disbursement: $73,388

Approval Date: May 2010 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Rural Rehabilitation and 

Development

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Road

Outcome: Construction Ongoing

The Charbagh Road project provided a 2.3-kilometer 

improved gravel road for Charbagh Village in Qarghahi District. The road links the Charbagh village 

bazaar to a suspension bridge that leads to another marketplace. When we inspected the project site, 

we observed a steady flow of pedestrian and motorcycle traffic. The road appeared well-constructed, 

and the contractor was in the process of building a masonry wall along one side of the road.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 29, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 30

Nahri Shahi Irrigation Canal

Obligation: $51,053

Disbursement: $25,526

Approval Date: May 2010 

Planned Completion: January 2011

Location: Alingar

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Canal

Outcome: Renovations Ongoing

The Nahri Shahi Irrigation Canal is 24 kilometers long; it 

diverts water from the Alingar River and flows through the city of Mehtar Lam. This project includes 

improvements along sections of the canal, such as the construction of a stone masonry wall along the 

downhill side of the canal and culverts over the canal. When we inspected the project site, water was 

not flowing through the canal. The work performed to date appeared well constructed. According to 

ADT officials, construction on the project slowed during Ramadan and Eid, which caused some delays, 

but, after the holidays, construction progressed nicely.

Active Projects – At Risk 

We determined that 13 of the active projects were at risk, as of November 2010. These projects have a 

total obligation of over $38.7 million, which is 72.6 percent of total obligations in our sample.

Alisheng Road Project Phase II (25 km.) 

Obligation: $8,750,000

Disbursement: $5,345,220

Approval Date: July 2008

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Dowlat Shah

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Transportation

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Road

Outcome: Sustainment and Construction Concerns

Phase II of the Alisheng Road project is a 25-kilometer 

asphalt road that runs from the Alisheng District center 

to the Dowlat Shah District center. During our 

inspections, we traveled briefly along the road but were unable to inspect the road due to security 

concerns. Based on our review of the project file, the PRT has performed quality assurance reviews 

although security has been an ongoing concern. According to PRT officials, the contractor generally 

performs well. However, in October 2010, the PRT noticed that the contractor incorrectly applied the 

prime coat of paving. As a result, according to project file documents, a section of the road is beginning 

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.

Source: Project file,September 4, 2010. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 31

to deteriorate; several places are easily disturbed by digging the heel of a foot into the road surface. Our 

main concern is with the sustainment of the road. Asphalt roads require equipment and supplies for 

their upkeep. According to CERP officials, a sustainment plan for roads does not exist and Laghman 

government officials do not have the resources to maintain the roads after they are completed. 

North Ring Road Phase I (Duranta Bypass) (28.5 km.)

Obligation: $8,372,760

Disbursement: $1,961,241 

Approval Date: August 2009 

Planned Completion: December 2011

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Public Works

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Road 

Outcome: Sustainment concerns

The Duranta Dam creates a choke point for traffic 

traveling along Highway 1A, which connects Kabul to 

Pakistan. The North Ring Road Phase I project is an 

asphalt road that bypasses the dam to create an alternate traffic route. We inspected the Charbagh 

village bazaar area of the project and found that the project was in the road-widening phase of the 

work. The road appeared to be properly graded and progress payments appeared in line with the work 

performed to date. The project is at risk because a sustainment plan is not in place and Laghman 

government officials do not have resources to maintain the road after it is completed. As of December 

2010, the road is not on track to meet the estimated completion date.

Mayl Valley Road (15 km.)

Obligation: $5,816,712

Disbursement: $1,053,590

Approval Date: March 2009 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Public Works

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Road 

Outcome: Sustainment concerns

The Mayl Valley Road is a 15-kilometer asphalt road 

between the Villages of Dumlam and Nuri in Alisheng. 

We did not attempt to inspect the road due to security 

concerns. Based on our reviews of quality assurance reports and project file evidence, the PRT has 

raised construction quality issues with the contractor and security is an ongoing issue. The project is at 

risk because a sustainment plan is not in place and Laghman government officials do not have resources 

to maintain the road after it is completed.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 29, 2010.

Source: Project file,May 27,2010. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 32

Mehtar Lam Road Modernization Phase II (16.8 km.)

Obligation: $5,239,214

Disbursement: $4,400,940

Approval Date: December 2009 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Public Works 

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Road

Outcome: Sustainment and Construction Concerns

The Mehtar Lam Road Modernization Phase II project is a 

16.8-kilometer series of asphalt roads in the city of 

Mehtar Lam. When we inspected the project site, the contractor was constructing drainage structures 

on both sides of the already paved road, which may result in damage to the asphalt. To construct the 

drains, the contractor rolled heavy equipment along the road, but the soil between the drainage 

channels and the existing pavement did not appear to be compacted. We observed that, in some areas, 

the asphalt at the edges had already begun to deteriorate, which is a sign that the underlying support 

for the asphalt edges may have been compromised. Additionally, the project is at risk because a 

sustainment plan is not in place and Laghman government officials do not have resources to maintain 

the road after it is completed.

Shamakat Road (11.9 km.) 

Obligation: $4,162,877

Disbursement: $3,815,970 

Approval Date: March 2009 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Public Works

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Road 

Outcome: Sustainment concerns

The Shamakat Road project is an 11.9-kilometer asphalt 

road in the Alisheng District that links Shamakat to 

Qalatak and Mehtar Lam. We could not inspect the 

project because the most direct route leading to the project was damaged by flooding in July 2010. As a 

result, we could not reach the project site in the time we allotted for our site inspections. Based on our 

review of the project file, the PRT conducted quality assurance reviews. The PRT reports raised some 

construction quality issues, but the documentation showed the contractor addressed those concerns.

The project is at risk because a sustainment plan is not in place and Laghman government officials do 

not have resources to maintain the road after it is completed.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 26, 2010.

Source: Project file, July 21, 2010
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 33

Administrative Zone Road Phase II (6.3 km.)

Obligation: $1,865,745

Disbursement: $1,554,353

Approval Date: March 2009 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Public Works 

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Road

Outcome: Sustainment Concerns 

The Administrative Zone Phase II project includes 

sections of paved road (totaling 6.3 kilometers) that are 

located throughout the municipality. We observed the main section, which extends from the 

Administrative Zone Phase I project and leads to the Laghman Province Center of Excellence and Afghan 

National Police headquarters. At the time of our inspection, the road was paved and included a sub-base 

shoulder. PRT officials reported concerns with the quality of the contractor’s work, which they required 

the contractor to redo. Also, the original scope of the work changed, due to a land dispute between the 

Afghan National Army and the Provincial Governor. The PRT intervened and relocated sections of the 

road to other parts of the city. This suggests the project may not have been thoroughly planned and 

coordinated with government of Afghanistan stakeholders. Additionally, the project is at risk because a 

sustainment plan is not in place and Laghman government officials do not have resources to maintain 

the road after it is completed.

Mehtar Lam Road Modernization Phase I (4.7 km.)

Obligation: $1,459,220

Disbursement: $1,356,035

Approval Date: November 2008 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Public Works 

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Road 

Outcome: Sustainment Concerns

The scope of the Mehtar Lam Road Modernization 

Phase I project is to design and construct 4.7 kilometers 

of asphalt roads in the Mehtar Lam city center. When we inspected the project, the paving was 

completed for most of the road. According to PRT officials, the original statement of work included 

concrete gutters, but the gutters will not be installed because they conflict with a project the United 

States Agency for International Development has planned to install water lines in Mehtar Lam. Rather 

than decreasing the cost of the project, the PRT and the contractor agreed to do additional work to 

remove excess organic material from the project site that was not suitable for supporting the roadway. 

According to PRT officials, as of December 2010, the construction is completed but the final payment is 

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 26, 2010.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 26, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 34 

pending. The project is at risk because a sustainment plan is not in place and Laghman government 

officials do not have resources to maintain the road after it is completed. 

Laghman Province Center of Excellence

Obligation: $1,252,897

Disbursement: $1,127,604

Approval Date: November 2008 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Education

CERP Category: Education

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Sustainment Concerns

The Center of Excellence is a post-secondary educational 

facility for boys that includes a two-level classroom 

building, a three-level dormitory building, a dining facility, and other construction such as a protective 

wall. The project also provides furniture, a generator, and solar panels. The facility was constructed 

using a standard Ministry of Education design, according to PRT officials. The project experienced 

significant delays, and upon inspection, we observed construction deficiencies such as leaking windows 

in the classroom, dormitory, and dining buildings, and weak welding joints on the metal handrails on the 

second-floor balcony of the classroom building. PRT officials included these and other deficiencies in a 

final inspection report and stated that the contractor would not be paid the remaining 10 percent until 

the deficiencies are satisfactorily resolved. The project was approved without adequate assurance that 

the Afghan government had a plan in place to use it as intended and sustain it. As of December 2010, 

the PRT reports that a ribbon cutting ceremony was held and students have moved in to the facility. 

However, the Afghan government has not provided fuel needed to run the waste system and students 

are living in unsanitary conditions.

Qarghahi Community LEAF (Agriculture Storage Facility)

Obligation: $771,463

Disbursement: $578,598

Approval Date: September 2008 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Sustainment Concerns

The Laghman Empowerment Agricultural Facility (LEAF) 

project in Qarghahi district includes a dry storage building, cold storage building, grain silo, flour mill, 

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 26, 2010.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 29, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 35

generator building, an electric tie to the municipal grid, other construction such as a security fence, 

office furniture, and equipment required to run the complex. When we inspected the project site, the 

facility was under construction. Overall, the construction appeared satisfactory and major equipment 

items, such as the flour mill, had been purchased and stored on site. This project is at risk because a 

sustainment plan is not in place. According to PRT and ADT officials, the Director for Agriculture, 

Irrigation, and Livestock has not developed an operating agreement for maintaining the facility after 

completion, and the facility will not be used until an agreement is reached. 

Alingar Community LEAF (Agriculture Storage Facility)

Obligation: $771,463

Disbursement: $578,598

Approval Date: September 2008 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Alingar

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Sustainment Concerns

The Laghman Empowerment Agricultural Facility (LEAF) 

project in Alingar has the same scope of work as the LEAF project in Qarghahi. We did not inspect this 

facility. Based on our review of project files, the PRT identified some construction concerns through the 

quality assurance process, which the contractor appears to have addressed. This project is at risk 

because a sustainment plan is not in place. According to PRT and ADT officials, the Director for 

Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock has not developed an operating agreement for maintaining the 

facility after completion, and the facility will not be used until an agreement is reached.

Gumain Road Rehabilitation

Obligation: $160,169

Disbursement: $101,131

Approval Date: May 2010 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Public Works

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Road

Outcome: Sustainment Concerns

The purpose of the Gumain Road project is to improve 

the surface of the 3.2-kilometer Gumain Road, which 

runs from Gumain Village to Shamati Village in Mehtar Lam. According to PRT officials, the road was 

impassable by vehicles before the project started. When we inspected the project site, we observed a

Source: Project file, August 2, 2010. 

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 26, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 36

section where an improvised drainage ditch had been cut across the road, apparently for irrigation 

purposes. This raised questions about whether additional destruction of the road will occur. 

Nomad Affairs Conference Building

Obligation: $47,931

Disbursement: $32,927

Approval Date: June 2010 

Planned Completion: October 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Nomad Affairs

CERP Category: Rule of Law and Governance

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Construction Concerns

The project is to construct a conference building 

adjacent to a new office building built by the Director of 

Nomad Affairs. At the time of our inspection, the contractor was in the process of erecting exterior 

masonry walls and concrete columns. The brick masonry was unreinforced and did not appear to have 

sufficient mortar. Due to the poor quality of the work performed, the PRT required the contractor to 

correct defective work. The contractor did not meet the planned completion date. Based on the 

construction deficiencies we and the PRT identified, the contractor appears to have limited capacity to 

fulfill the requirements of the contract, which increases the risk of unsuccessful outcomes. 

Kanda Canal Check Dams

Obligation: $32,537

Disbursement: $8,134

Approval Date: June 2010 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Alingar

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Water Management

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Dam

Outcome: Construction Concerns

The scope of this project includes the design and 

construction of two canal passageways to reinforce the 

Kanda Canal as it crosses a large wadi.33

 

33 A wadi is the valley of a stream that is usually dry except during the rainy season.

When we inspected the project site, the mortar did not appear 

well-mixed, and the wall had gaps due to an inadequate amount of cement. In certain areas, stones 

were stacked on top of other stones with virtually no cement holding them together. The ADT officials 

indicated that they had had problems with the contractor, and construction was delayed two times for 

poor quality. 

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 37

Active Projects -- Not Assessed

We did not assess 5 active projects that had a total obligation of nearly $500,000, which is less than 

1 percent of total obligations for all projects in our review. We did not assess the projects because the 

contracts had not been awarded or the work was still in the early stages. 

Mia Khan Kas Suspension Bridge

Obligation: $196,861

Disbursement: $0

Approval Date: July 2010 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Rural Rehabilitation and 

Development

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Bridge

Outcome: Not Assessed

The purpose of this project is to design and construct a 

suspension bridge for Mia Khan Kas Village in the Qarghahi District. Mia Khan Kas Village is 

geographically isolated by two rivers to the east and south and a mountain range to the north. The 

Qarghahi District Sub-Governor identified the project and the Director of Rural Rehabilitation and 

Development nominated it as a priority project under the Capacity Building Fund initiative. We did not 

inspect the project site because construction had not begun at the time of our scheduled inspection. 

Based on our project file review and according to PRT officials, the project costs may increase. Although 

originally intended as a walking suspension bridge, the bridge project is now intended for small vehicular 

traffic. The PRT has submitted a request for additional funds to widen the bridge to accommodate 

vehicular traffic. 

Eslamabad Check Dam

Obligation: $117,561

Disbursement: $29,390

Approval Date: July 2010 

Planned Completion: February 2011

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Water Management

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Dam

Outcome: Not Assessed

This project includes the refurbishment and 

reconstruction of two check dams and a canal in the 

vicinity of Eslamabad village that are badly damaged due to erosion. We did not inspect the project 

Source: Project file, May 22, 2010

Source: Project file, not dated.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 38

because the contractor had just started work at the time of our inspections. According to ADT officials, 

the project did not start until after Ramadan, and the project schedule was extended due to damage 

caused by flooding. Based on our project file review, ADT officials coordinated this project with the 

Director of Irrigation and village elders as part of the Capacity Building Fund initiative.

Nora Kareem Canal

Obligation: $57,600

Disbursement: $0

Approval Date: September 2010 

Planned Completion: April 2011

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Water Management and 

Village Elders

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Canal

Outcome: Not Assessed

The purpose of this project is to establish a major 

irrigation canal in the villages of Zafron, Nora Kareem, and Spijimat, which are near the Gamberi 

Garrison Base in Qarghahi district. We did not inspect the site, because the ADT was in the process of 

reviewing bid proposals for the contract at the time of our scheduled visits. According to ADT officials, 

the contract was awarded on October 23, 2010 and work did not start until November 10, 2010. Based 

on our review of the project file, the ADT coordinated this project with the Director of the Water 

Management Department as part of the Capacity Building Fund program.

Information, Culture, and Youth Directorate

Obligation: $56,298

Disbursement: $16,889

Approval Date: June 2010 

Planned Completion: September 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Information and Culture

CERP Category: Rule of Law and Governance

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Not Assessed

This project includes renovations to the Laghman 

Department of Information and Culture main facility in 

Mehtar Lam. The project includes the design and installation of a solar panel system, repairs to the 

interior and exterior of the facility, and other improvements. We did not inspect the project site because 

site work began about a month before our scheduled visits and minimal work had been performed, 

according to PRT officials. Based on our project file review, PRT officials coordinated this project with the 

Source: Project file, April 8, 2010.

Source: Project file, May 8, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 39

Director of Information and Culture as part of the Capacity Building Fund initiative. According to PRT 

officials, as of December 2010, the project has been completed and the final payment is pending.

Sorkahkan Pump House

Obligation: $42,522

Disbursement: $0

Approval Date: June 2010 

Planned Completion: December 2010

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Water Management

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Equipment

Outcome: Not Assessed

This pump house will supply water to the Sorkahkan 

Vocational and Technical Center and the village of 

Sorkahkan for irrigation. We did not inspect the project site because the contract had just been signed 

at the time of our scheduled inspection. According to ADT officials, the project started on September 23, 

2010, but due to issues with construction quality, the contractor had to tear down and re-lay all of the 

stone masonry work. Based on our review of the project file, the ADT coordinated this project with the 

Director of the Water Management Department as part of the Capacity Building Fund program. 

Source: Project file,not dated. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 40

COMPLETED PROJECTS

As of November 2010, 42 of 69 projects, representing $13.3 million (25 percent) of total obligations, 

were completed. Of the 42 completed projects, we found that 13 were generally successful and 

14 resulted in questionable outcomes. In addition, we did not assess 15 of the completed projects 

because (1) there was insufficient evidence in the project file to make a determination and (2) we were 

unable to inspect them due to security concerns or remoteness of the site.

Completed Projects – Generally Successful Outcome

We determined that 13 of the completed projects resulted in generally successful outcomes. These 

projects have a total obligation of $1.5 million, which is 2.8 percent of total obligations in our sample. 

Social Affairs Training Center

Obligation: $204,390

Disbursement: $204,390

Approval Date: July 2008 

Completion Date: April 2009

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Social Affairs

CERP Category: Rule of Law and Governance

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Construction Completed

The Social Affairs Training Center is located in the city of 

Mehtar Lam. The project included the construction of a 

15-room office building with latrine, guard room, septic system, and perimeter wall, as well as all 

equipment and furnishings. We inspected the facility and observed that the administrative offices for 

multiple social affairs programs were located at the center, and the facility appeared well-maintained 

and occupied. According to the director of the center, who was onsite during our inspection, the center 

provides services such as payment distributions under the martyr program. 

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 26, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 41

Laghman Prison 

Obligation: $199,446

Disbursement: $199,446

Approval Date: June 2009 

Completion Date: August 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Laghman Provincial Prison

CERP Category: Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Renovation Completed

The Laghman Prison project included security upgrades 

to the construction of three new guard towers, a latrine 

building, and a new perimeter wall at the front of the prison compound. The new stone wall attaches to 

an older wall the previous PRT built in 2007. We inspected the project site, and all upgrades appeared to 

be well constructed.

Alikel Canal Refurbishment

Obligation: $172,208

Disbursement: $172,208

Approval Date: June 2008 

Completion Date: April 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Canal

Outcome: Renovation Completed

Alikel canal provides irrigation water for families in and 

around Alikel village. The project included improvements to sections of the canal: intake, retaining walls, 

and sub-canal junctions. When we inspected the site, water was in the canal. According to PRT officials, 

farmers use the canal to irrigate their land by temporarily diverting the water flow through openings in 

the canal wall.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 27, 2010. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 42

Prosecutor's Building Refurbishment

Obligation: $128,782

Disbursement: $128,782

Approval Date: March 2008 

Completion Date: April 2009

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Laghman Chief Prosecutor

CERP Category: Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Renovation Completed

The project included internal and external improvements 

to the prosecutor’s building in the city of Mehtar Lam. 

When we inspected the project site, the facility appeared well-maintained and fully occupied. 

Laghman Rule of Law Office Equipment

Obligation: $127,840

Disbursement: $127,840

Approval Date: May 2009 

Completion Date: August 2009

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Justice

CERP Category: Rule of Law and Governance

Project Type: Equipment

Outcome: Equipment Purchase Completed

The project provided office equipment such as chairs, 

desks, file cabinets, computers, and printers. Purchased 

in July 2009, the equipment was distributed to the Laghman prosecutor’s office, the Laghman judge’s 

office, and other Ministry of Justice offices throughout the province. When we inspected the Laghman 

prosecutor’s office, the facility appeared to have sufficient office equipment to function as a judicial 

entity. We did not attempt to visit the other offices. 

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 27, 2010.

Source: Project file, not dated.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 43

State Radio Tower Upgrade

Obligation: $121,594

Disbursement: $121,594

Approval Date: July 2008 

Completion Date: June 2009

Location: Dowlat Shah

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Information and Culture

CERP Category: Telecommunications

Project Type: Equipment

Outcome: Equipment Purchase Completed

The project included upgrades to the broadcasting 

equipment at the radio tower in Laghman and included 

repeater towers in the Alisheng and Dowlat Shah District centers to ensure even coverage of the 

government-owned radio station. During our inspection of the Laghman station tower, officials onsite 

who operate the equipment confirmed that the repeater towers in Alisheng and Dowlat Shah were 

installed. They stated that the station provides multiple types of programming, including music, health 

education, and children’s programs. 

Badiabad Canal Intake

Obligation: $79,714

Disbursement: $79,714

Approval Date: January 2009 

Completion Date: February 2010

Location: Alingar 

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Canal

Outcome: Renovation Completed

The Badiabad Canal Intake project in Badiabad village is a 

stone masonry diversion wall that redirects a portion of the river flow into a 12-kilometer canal. When 

we inspected the project site, water was flowing in the canal, and the improvements to the canal 

appeared well-maintained.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 26, 2010.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 44

Hajiabad/Ghaziabad Hydro Electric Village Rehabilitation

Obligation: $78,155

Disbursement: $78,155

Approval Date: May 2009 

Completion Date: October 2009

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Power

CERP Category: Electricity

Project Type: Equipment 

Outcome: Equipment Purchase Completed

The purpose of the project was to build a microhydroelectric plant and provide equipment to run a flour 

mill in the Village of Hajiabad. The micro-hydroelectric plant also provides electricity to four villages. We 

were unable to access the site due to security concerns. Evidence in the project file suggests that the 

PRT conducted quality assurance reviews and that the villagers developed a plan to fund operations and 

maintenance costs. Each home receiving electrical power is to be charged a monthly fee for use.

Agriculture Sapling Protectors

Obligation: $63,425

Disbursement: $63,425

Approval Date: June 2009 

Completion Date: September 2009

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Food Production and Distribution

Project Type: Agricultural Supplies

Outcome: Equipment Purchase Completed

The Agriculture Sapling Protectors project provided 

2,950 empty metal barrels to protect saplings to test the feasibility of growing date palms in Laghman 

Province. We did not inspect the original project site because the samplings no longer needed to be 

protected. However, we saw some of the barrels that were used in the project when we inspected other 

projects in the Mehtar Lam city center. According to ADT officials, the Director of Agriculture, Irrigation, 

and Livestock plans to use the barrels for another sapling project. 

Source: Project file, August 31, 2009.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.

Turbine

Generator Flour Mill

Turbine

Generator Flour Mill
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 45

Domlech Irrigation Canal

Obligation: $59,492

Disbursement: $59,492

Approval Date: December 2009 

Completion Date: August 2010

Location: Dowlat Shah

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Canal

Outcome: Renovation Completed

The Domlech Irrigation Canal project is a 400-meter 

stone masonry canal in the Dowlat Shah district. We did not attempt to inspect the project site due to 

security concerns. Evidence in the project file suggests that the ADT conducted quality assurance 

reviews, which did not reveal significant construction deficiencies.

Mehtar Lam City Power Transmission Repair Supply of Goods

Obligation: $58,504

Disbursement: $58,504

Approval Date: November 2009 

Completion Date: January 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Energy

CERP Category: Electricity

Project Type: Equipment

Outcome: Equipment Purchase Completed

This was an equipment purchase project that supplied 

the city of Mehtar Lam with transformers and other 

equipment to improve electrical power transmission in the city. We did not inspect the project site; 

however, the project file included evidence that the equipment was purchased and provided to the 

Director of Power and Energy. During our visits to other project sites in September 2010, it appeared 

that electrical power was supplied throughout the city of Mehtar Lam.

Source: Project file, not dated.

Source: Project file,not dated. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 46

Nomad Affairs Center – Power

Obligation: $42,256

Disbursement: $42,256

Approval Date: May 2010 

Completion Date: August 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Nomad Affairs

CERP Category: Electricity

Project Type: Equipment

Outcome: Equipment Purchase Completed

The project included a solar-powered electrical system 

and submersible water pump to provide the center with 

sufficient power and water to conduct normal administrative operations. We observed the solar panels 

on the roof and an electrical fan operating inside the building when we inspected the project site. 

Agriculture Ministry Building Remodel

Obligation: $35,010

Disbursement: $26,082

Approval Date: May 2010 

Completion Date: November 2010 

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Renovations Completed

The project includes multiple repairs to the boundary 

wall and other internal and external improvements to the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock building in Mehtar Lam. When we inspected the project site, the height of the perimeter wall 

had been increased to approximately 4 meters. The roof repair for the main building had not yet begun 

because the ADT directed the contractor to finish work on the gutters first. According to ADT officials, 

after the roof repairs had been completed, the interior finish work would begin. After our inspection, 

the project was completed in November 2010.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 47

Completed Projects – Questionable Outcome

We found that 14 of the completed projects resulted in questionable outcomes. These projects have a 

total obligation of over $10.5 million, which is 19.8 percent of total obligations in our sample. 

Alisheng Road Project Phase I (23 km.)

Obligation: $8,050,000

Disbursement: $8,050,000

Approval Date: November 2007

Completion Date: May 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Transportation 

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Road

Outcome: Sustainment Concerns

The Alisheng Road Phase I project is a 23-kilometer 

asphalt road that connects the Mehtar Lam city center to 

the Alisheng district center. We traveled along the road for approximately 45 minutes. The paving 

appeared well done, with no noticeable problems. The shoulders of the road appeared to be wellmaintained, and we saw a steady flow of traffic along the road during our inspection. The project is at 

risk because a sustainment plan is not in place and Laghman government officials do not have resources 

to maintain the road.

Administrative Zone Road Phase 1 (2.9 km.)

Obligation: $870,134

Disbursement: $870,134

Approval Date: December 2008 

Completion Date: August 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Public Works 

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Road

Outcome: Sustainment and Construction Concerns

The Administrative Zone Road Phase I project is a paved 

road around the perimeter of Forward Operating Base 

Mehtar Lam that leads to the city center. The work is complete, but the project has not been closed out. 

Documents in the project file indicate that the road surface has become rough in a short period of time 

and that the concrete is failing due to improper mixing, placement and curing procedures during its 

construction. PRT officials contacted the contractor to discuss solutions for the poor work. The PRT will 

not close out the project until the contractor satisfactorily resolves the items; however, the PRT has 

disbursed the full amount of the contract and has little leverage over the contractor to address these 

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 27, 2010.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 26, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 48

items. The outcome of this project is questionable because a sustainment plan is not in place and 

Laghman government officials do not have resources to maintain the road.

Mehtar Lam Community Cold Storage

Obligation: $273,437

Disbursement: $273,437

Approval Date: July 2008

Completion Date: June 2010

Location: Alingar

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Sustainment Concerns

The Mehtar Lam Community Cold Storage project is co-located with the Agriculture Storage and 

Maintenance project. These two projects were the predecessors to the LEAF projects in Qarghahi and 

Alingar. The Mehtar Lam Community Cold Storage project was completed and appeared wellconstructed, but the storage rooms were empty when we inspected the facility. The project is under 

warranty until June 4, 2011. However, it is likely that the warranty will expire before the facility is used 

because the Director of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock has not finalized an agreement for 

maintaining the facility.

Agriculture Storage and Maintenance

Obligation: $252,650

Disbursement: $252,650

Approval Date: June 200734

Completion Date: June 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Sustainment Concerns

The Agriculture Storage and Maintenance project in 

Mehtar Lam was completed and appeared well-constructed but was not being used when we inspected 

it. The project is under warranty until June 4, 2011. However, it is likely that the warranty will expire 

before the facility is used because the Director of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock has not finalized 

an agreement for maintaining the facility.

 

34Documents in project file indicate that the project was proposed in June 2007 and awarded with fiscal year 2008 

funding; however, the approval document was not dated.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 49

Amin Abad Protection Wall

Obligation: $199,479

Disbursement: $199,479

Approval Date: August 2008

Completion Date: May 2009

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Not Documented

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Wall

Outcome: Construction Concerns

The purpose of the Amin Abad Protection Wall project 

was to construct a 600-meter long by 4-meter high gabion box wall in Amin Abad Village at the 

intersection of the Laghman and Kabul Rivers. We attempted to inspect the project site but were unable 

to do so due to security concerns.35

Farooz Abad Protection Wall

We inspected the Farooz Abad Protection Wall, a similar project the 

contractor had completed at the same time. The Farooz Abad Protection Wall project was within a few 

hundred meters of the Amin Abad Protection Wall on the same river. We observed construction 

deficiencies at the Farooz Abad Wall and questioned the outcome of the Amin Abad Protection Wall 

based on similarities between the projects.

Obligation: $199,413

Disbursement: $199,413

Approval Date: August 2008 

Completion Date: February 2009

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Not Documented

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Wall

Outcome: Construction Concerns

The Farooz Abad Protection Wall is a 400-meter gabion 

wall constructed to protect agricultural lands and homes 

at the intersection of the Laghman and Kabul Rivers. When we inspected the project site, a section of 

the wall had collapsed and water had run from the river to the back of the wall. It appeared that the 

gabions were laid without a suitable foundation, which led to the erosion.

 

35 While we were on site at the Farooz Abad Protection Wall, a villager warned us that the area where the Amin 

Abad, Farooz Abad, and Marof Khil protection walls are located is subject to ambush. After we visited the Farooz 

Abad Protection Wall, we evacuated the area and did not attempt to visit the two other projects.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 29, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 50

Sawati School

Obligation: $179,018

Disbursement: $179,018

Approval Date: May 2009 

Completion Date: May 2010

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Education

CERP Category: Education

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Work Does Not Meet Contract Requirements

The Sawati School project included the construction of a 

new educational facility in Qarghahi district. During our 

inspection, we observed an 8-classroom school building with two offices, a 6-stall latrine facility, a well, 

and a boundary wall. At the time of our inspection, the classrooms were not furnished and, the facility 

was not wired for electricity. The scope of work for the contract, however, included a 10-stall latrine, 

160 student desks and other office equipment, and requirements for the contractor to install a complete 

electrical system for the entire structure. We could not determine what caused the discrepancies due to 

the lack of documentation in the project file.

Maroof Khil Protection Wall

Obligation: $99,522

Disbursement: $99,522

Approval Date: October 2008 

Completion Date: March 2009

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Not Documented

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Wall

Outcome: Construction Concerns

The purpose of the Maroof Khil Protection Wall project 

was to construct a 400-meter long gabion box wall at the intersection of the Laghman and Kabul Rivers. 

We attempted to inspect the project site but were unable to do so due to security concerns. We 

inspected the Farooz Abad Protection Wall, which the contractor had completed at the same time, and 

was within a few hundred meters of the Maroof Khil Protection Wall on the same river. We observed 

construction deficiencies at the Farooz Abad Wall and questioned the outcome of the Maroof Khil 

Protection Wall based on similarities between the projects.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 29, 2010. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 51

Alisheng Oluswali Footbridge

Obligation: $89,250

Disbursement: $89,250

Approval Date: October 2007 

Completion Date: February 2009

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Not Documented

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Bridge

Outcome: Construction Concerns

The Alisheng Oluswali Footbridge is a 100-meter 

footbridge over the Alisheng River that links the villages 

of Alisheng-Oluswali and Dareshabad. When we inspected the project site, the bridge appeared to be 

severely damaged by flooding. Further, CERP funded another project for a 100-meter gabion wall to 

protect the footbridge, which we observed to be damaged. In its current state, the bridge is a safety 

hazard and susceptible to collapse.

Shahi Canal Improvements

Obligation: $83,150

Disbursement: $83,150

Approval Date: March 2009 

Completion Date: February 2010

Location: Alingar

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Local Leaders

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Canal

Outcome: Construction Concerns

The Shahi Canal walls were originally made of compacted 

earth. The PRT repaired the canal walls and made other 

improvements. When we inspected the project site, water was flowing in the canal; however, in one 

section, it appeared that the earthen wall had washed out. Based on evidence in the project files, the 

PRT observed water leakage during quality assurance reviews of the project. It appears that the 

contractor did not address the leaks properly, which likely caused the earthen wall to erode and 

collapse.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 27, 2010.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 52

Bagasarach Canal

Obligation: $64,721

Disbursement: $64,721

Approval Date: February 2010

Completion Date: August 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Mehtar Lam Municipality

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Canal

Outcome: Sustainment Concerns

The Bagasarach Canal is approximately 370 meters long 

and flows through the city of Mehtar Lam. When we 

inspected the project site, the canal contained large amounts of silt, which impeded the flow of water 

through the canal. According to a task force official, the city mayor signed a contract stating that he 

would maintain the canal or risk the loss of funding for future projects. The official stated he would call 

the mayor and remind him that he would receive no more projects until the Bagasarach Canal is

maintained.

Alisheng Oluswali Protection Wall

Obligation: $60,390

Disbursement: $60,390

Approval Date: March 2009 

Completion Date: February 2010

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Other Urgent Humanitarian or 

Reconstruction Projects

Project Type: Other Construction—Wall

Outcome: Construction Concerns

The Alisheng Oluswali Protection Wall was a 100-meter gabion wall that was constructed to protect the 

Alisheng Oluswali Footbridge. We inspected the project site and observed that sections of the wall had 

completely collapsed.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 27, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 53

Provincial Council Security Wall

Obligation: $59,432

Disbursement: $59,432

Approval Date: January 2008 

Completion Date: August 2008

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Provincial Council

CERP Category: Protective Measures

Project Type: Other Construction—Security Wall

Outcome: Work Does Not Meet Contract Requirements

The scope of this project included the design and 

construction of a 393-meter long by 3-meter high 

security wall around the Laghman Provincial Council building; 124 meters were to be constructed of 

brick masonry and 269 meters were to be constructed of steel bars with a stone masonry foundation. 

When we inspected the project site, we observed a steel bar fence around a building that appeared to 

have been occupied by squatters. The steel fence was only about 2-meters high, and there was no 

124-meter brick masonry fence at the project site. From the evidence available, we could not determine 

why these discrepancies occurred between the contract requirements and the work performed.

Ghunde Gabion Wall

Obligation: $56,835

Disbursement: $56,835

Approval Date: December 2007 

Completion Date: October 2008

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Not Documented

CERP Category: Construction

Project Type: Other Construction—Wall

Outcome: Construction Concerns

The scope of this project included the design and 

construction of a 210-meter gabion protection wall in 

Ghunde village. We were scheduled to inspect the project site. However, while we were at the Sawati 

School, a local villager told our military interpreter that the wall had been destroyed by floods in July 

2010. In light of this and security concerns earlier that day, we did not inspect the project site.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 28, 2010.

Source: Project file, not dated.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 54

Completed Projects -- Not Assessed

We did not assess 15 completed projects. These projects had a total obligation of more than 

$1.4 million, which is 2.7 percent of total obligations in our sample. We did not assess the outcomes of 

these projects because (1) there was insufficient evidence in the project file to make a determination 

and (2) we could not inspect the projects due to security concerns or the remoteness of the project 

sites. 

Mulayan Protection Wall

Obligation: $226,787

Disbursement: $226,787

Approval Date: August 2007 

Completion Date: July 2008

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Wall

Outcome: Not Assessed

The purpose of the Mulayan Protection Wall project was to reconstruct 500 meters of protection walls 

that were destroyed during heavy flooding in 2007. We were unable to inspect the project site due to its 

remote location. The project file did not contain sufficient evidence to determine what work had been 

performed under the contract or whether military officials had performed quality assurance reviews 

over the course of the project.

Myakhan Kac School

Obligation: $172,128

Disbursement: $172,128

Approval Date: July 2009 

Completion Date: July 2010

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Education

CERP Category: Education

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Not Assessed

The Myakhan Kac School project included the 

construction of an eight-classroom school in Myakhan Kac Village with a surrounding wall, 10-stall 

latrine, and a well. We were unable to inspect the project site due to its remote location. The project file 

contained minimal evidence of work performed and no evidence of quality assurance conducted.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 55

Mashala Kamar School

Obligation: $170,787

Disbursement: $170,787

Approval Date: May 2009 

Completion Date: May 2010

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Education

CERP Category: Education

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Not Assessed

The Mashala Kamar School project included an 

8-classroom school with 10-stall latrine, well, and boundary wall in the village of Mashala Kamar. We 

were unable to inspect the project site because it was too remote to inspect in the time allotted. The 

project file contained minimal evidence of work performed and quality assurance conducted.

Alisheng Gabion Wall

Obligation: $137,500

Disbursement: $137,500

Approval Date: October 2007 

Completion Date: October 2008

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Protective Measures

Project Type: Other Construction—Wall

Outcome: Not Assessed

The scope of the Alisheng Gabion Wall project included the design and construction of a 450-meter long 

Gabion Wall in Rayn Village to prevent flood waters from damaging agricultural fields and an adjacent 

road. We did not inspect the project site because it was too remote to inspect in the time allotted. The 

project file contained minimal evidence of work performed and no evidence of quality assurance 

conducted.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 56

Sangar Protection Wall

Obligation: $103,092

Disbursement: $103,092

Approval Date: September 2007 

Completion Date: June 2008

Location: Alingar

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Wall

Outcome: Not Assessed

The scope of the project included the design and construction of a 300-meter stone masonry flood 

protection wall and the design and repair of an existing 277-meter gabion wall. The project file 

contained minimal evidence of work performed and no evidence of quality assurance reviews 

conducted. We did not attempt to inspect the project site due to security concerns.

Tilli School

Obligation: $98,365

Disbursement: $98,365

Approval Date: December 2008 

Completion Date: February 2010

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Education

CERP Category: Education

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Not Assessed

The Tilli School project is a six-classroom school in the 

Mayl Valley in the northern end of the Alisheng District. 

The project file contained minimal evidence of work performed and quality assurance reviews 

conducted. We did not attempt to inspect the project site due to security concerns.

Source: Project file, not dated.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 57

Gamarden Bila Gabion Wall

Obligation: $83,105

Disbursement: $83,105

Approval Date: December 2007 

Completion Date: October 2008

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Not Documented

CERP Category: Protective Measures

Project Type: Other Construction—Wall

Outcome: Not Assessed

The scope of the project included the design and 

construction of a 250-meter gabion flood protection wall in Gamarden Bila Village. We did not inspect 

the project site because it was too remote to inspect in the time allotted. The project file contained 

minimal evidence of work performed and quality assurance conducted.

Parwai Girls School I Boundary Wall

Obligation: $60,000

Disbursement: $60,000

Approval Date: May 2009 

Completion Date: March 2010

Location: Alingar

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Education

CERP Category: Education

Project Type: Other Construction—Wall

Outcome: Not Assessed

The Parwai Girls School I project included the 

construction of a boundary wall and an 8-stall latrine. 

The project file contained minimal evidence of work performed and no evidence of quality assurance 

reviews conducted. We did not attempt to inspect the project site due to security concerns.

Source: Project file, October 2009.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 58

Parwai Girls School II Boundary Wall

Obligation: $60,000

Disbursement: $60,000

Approval Date: May 2009 

Completion Date: October 2009

Location: Alingar

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Education

CERP Category: Education

Project Type: Other Construction—Security Wall

Outcome: Not Assessed

The Parwai Girls School II project included the 

construction of a boundary wall and a well. We did not 

attempt to inspect the project site due to security concerns. The project file contained minimal evidence 

of work performed and no evidence of quality assurance reviews conducted. 

Mandrawar Girls Primary School Wall

Obligation: $59,500

Disbursement: $59,500

Approval Date: April 2009 

Completion Date: March 2010

Location: Qarghahi

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Education

CERP Category: Education

Project Type: Other Construction—Security Wall

Outcome: Not Assessed

The Mandrawar Primary School wall was constructed to 

bring the school into compliance with Ministry of 

Education standards and to shield the school from public view to allow girls to attend the school. Since 

the project site is in a remote location, we were unable to inspect the wall to verify its condition or 

determine whether girls now attend the school.

Source: Project file, not dated.

Source: Project file,not dated. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 59

Upper Gomrei Check Dam

Obligation: $59,339

Disbursement: $59,339

Approval Date: December 2009 

Completion Date: August 2010

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Community Development 

Council

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Dam

Outcome: Not Assessed

The Upper Gomrei Check Dam project included the 

construction of reinforced concrete check dams for watershed management in the village of Upper 

Gomrei. We did not attempt to inspect the project site due to security concerns. The project file 

contained minimal evidence of work performed and quality assurance reviews conducted.

Gonapal School

Obligation: $59,081

Disbursement: $59,081

Approval Date: August 2009 

Completion Date: May 2010

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Education

CERP Category: Education

Project Type: Facility

Outcome: Not Assessed

The scope of the Gonapal School project included the 

construction of a boundary wall and an 8-stall latrine, 

repairs to the roof, and other improvements to provide sufficient drainage around the school. We did 

not attempt to inspect the project site due to security concerns. The project file contained minimal 

evidence of work performed and quality assurance reviews conducted.

Source: Project file, February 2010 

Source: Project file, April 22, 2010. 
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 60

Arani Water Distribution

Obligation: $55,000

Disbursement: $55,000

Approval Date: June 2009 

Completion Date: March 2010

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Village Elders

CERP Category: Water and Sanitation

Project Type: Equipment

Outcome: Not Assessed

This project included a water tank to provide potable 

drinking water for the Arani village. The project also included the construction of a water reservoir for 

the village’s agricultural land. We attempted to inspect the project site; however, the project had been 

completed during a previous military rotation, and current military personnel could not locate the 

project site using the coordinates in the project file. The project file contained minimal evidence of work 

performed and quality assurance reviews conducted.

Gomrei Check Dam

Obligation: $51,588

Disbursement: $36,182

Approval Date: August 2009 

Completion Date: January 2010

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Dam

Outcome: Not Assessed

The Gomrei Check Dam project included the 

construction of reinforced concrete check dams for watershed management in the village of Gomrei. We 

did not attempt to inspect the project site due to security concerns. The project file contained minimal 

evidence of work performed and quality assurance reviews conducted.

Source: Project file, not dated.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 61

Dumlam Check Dam

Obligation: $44,415

Disbursement: $44,415

Approval Date: June 2009 

Completion Date: February 2010

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

CERP Category: Agriculture/Irrigation

Project Type: Other Construction—Dam

Outcome: Not Assessed

The Dumlam Check Dam project included the 

construction of reinforced concrete check dams for watershed management in the village of Dumlam. 

We did not attempt to inspect the project site due to security concerns. The project file contained 

minimal evidence of work performed and quality assurance reviews conducted.

Source: Project file, February 2010
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 62

TERMINATED PROJECTS

As of November 2010, 3 of 69 projects, representing $0.2 million (less than one percent) of total 

obligations, were terminated. We present descriptions of the projects, but we did not assess their 

outcomes. The original contract amounts for these projects exceeded $360,000. However, after the 

projects were terminated, military officials followed CERP oversight procedures and de-obligated the 

remaining balance for each project. 

Seqanwateh Foot Bridge

Obligation: $124,52436

Disbursement: $124,524

Approval Date: May 2009

Termination Date: October 2010

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Public Works

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Other Construction—Bridge

Outcome: Not Assessed

The PRT terminated the Seqanwateh Foot Bridge project 

for convenience after severe flooding in July 2010 

changed the course of the river and made construction of the bridge infeasible. When we inspected the 

project site, it appeared that the contractor had built two pylons before the floods occurred. The flood 

had destroyed one of the pylons.

 

36 The contract amount was $184,106. After the contract was terminated, the PRT de-obligated the balance of 

$59,581.

Source: SIGAR site inspection, September 27, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 63

Karandali Foot Bridge

Obligation: $65,00037

Disbursement: $65,000

Approval Date: February 2009 

Termination Date: March 2010

Location: Alisheng

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Public Works

CERP Category: Transportation

Project Type: Other Construction—Bridge

Outcome: Not Assessed

The scope of the project included the construction of a 

steel cable suspension bridge near Karandali Village in 

northern Alisheng District. Military officials suspended construction on the bridge in October 2009 due 

to improvised explosive device activity in the vicinity of the site. We did not attempt to inspect the 

project site due to security concerns.

Busram School Wall

Obligation: $37,03938

Disbursement: $37,039

Approval Date: May 2009 

Termination Date: March 2010

Location: Mehtar Lam

Responsible GIRoA Entity: Education

CERP Category: Education

Project Type: Other Construction—Security Wall

Outcome: Not Assessed

The scope of the project was to design and build a

security wall around Busram School. Based on evidence 

in the project file, the contractor stopped work on the wall in June 2009 due to a dispute between the 

education department and local villagers. The task force terminated the project in March 2010 due to 

security concerns. 

 

37 The contract was awarded for $130,000. When the task force terminated the contract, the remaining $65,000 

was de-obligated.

38 The original contract was for $49,385. When the contract was terminated, the task force de-obligated $12,346.

Source: Project file, not dated.

Source: Project file, not dated.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 64

APPENDIX III: PERMISSIBLE CATEGORIES OF CERP FUND USAGE

The Department of Defense’s Financial Management Regulation39

Agriculture/Irrigation: Projects to increase agricultural production or cooperative agricultural programs.

allows Commander's Emergency 

Response Program funds to be used under 20 broad categories of assistance. Overall, the categories 

have remained fairly constant since the initial CERP regulation was published in April 2005.

Battle Damage Repair: Projects to repair, or make payments for repairs of, property damage that results 

from U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations and is not compensable under the Foreign Claims 

Act.

Civic Cleanup Activities: Projects to clean up public areas; area beautification.

Civic Support Vehicles: Projects to purchase or lease vehicles by public/government officials in support 

of civic and community activities.

Condolence Payments: Payments to individual civilians for the death or physical injury resulting from 

U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations not compensable under the Foreign Claims Act.

Economic, Financial, and Management Improvements: Projects to improve economic or financial 

security.

Education: Projects to repair or reconstruct schools or to purchase school supplies or equipment.

Electricity: Projects to repair, restore, or improve electrical production, distribution, and secondary 

distribution infrastructure. Cost analysis must be conducted so that the village or district may collect 

revenues to ensure operation and maintenance of systems for long-term use.

Food Production & Distribution: Projects to increase food production or distribution processes to further 

economic development.

Former Detainee Payments: Payments to individuals upon release from Coalition (non-theater 

internment) detention facilities.

Healthcare: Projects to repair or improve infrastructure, equipment, medical supplies, immunizations, 

and training of individuals and facilities in respect to efforts made to maintain or restore health 

especially by trained and licensed professionals.

Hero Payments: Payments made to the surviving spouses or next of kin of Iraqi or Afghan defense or 

police personnel who were killed as a result of U.S. coalition or supporting military operations. 

Other Urgent Humanitarian or Reconstruction Projects: Projects to repair collateral damage not 

otherwise payable because of combat exclusions or condolence payments. Other urgent humanitarian 

projects not captured under any other category. For other urgent humanitarian projects, this category 

should be used only when no other category is applicable.

 

39DOD, Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, volume 12, chapter 27, Commanders’ Emergency Response 

Program (January 2009).
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP Page 65

Protective Measures: Projects to repair or improve protective measures to enhance the durability and 

survivability of a critical infrastructure site (oil pipelines, electric lines, etc.).

Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities: Projects to repair or restore civic or cultural buildings or facilities.

Rule of Law and Governance: Projects to repair or reconstruct government buildings such as 

administrative offices or courthouses. 

Telecommunications: Projects to repair or extend communication over a distance. The term 

telecommunication covers all forms of distance and/or conversion of the original communications, 

including radio, telegraphy, television, telephone, data communication, and computer networking. 

Includes projects to repair or reconstruct telecommunications systems or infrastructure.

Temporary Contract Guards for Critical Infrastructure: Projects to guard critical infrastructure, including 

neighborhoods and other public areas.

Transportation: Projects to repair or restore transportation to include infrastructure and operations. 

Infrastructure includes the transportation networks (roads, railways, airways, canals, pipelines, etc.) that 

are used, as well as the nodes or terminals (such as airports, railway stations, bus stations, and 

seaports). The operations deal with the control of the system, such as traffic signals and ramp meters, 

railroad switches, air traffic control, etc. 

Water & Sanitation: Projects to repair or improve drinking water availability, to include purification and 

distribution. Building wells in adequate places is a way to produce more water, assuming the aquifers 

can supply an adequate flow. Other water sources such as rainwater and river or lake water must be 

purified for human consumption. The processes include filtering, boiling, and distilling among more 

advanced techniques, such as reverse osmosis. The distribution of drinking water is done through 

municipal water systems or as bottled water. Sanitation, an important public health measure that is 

essential for the prevention of disease, is the hygienic disposal or recycling of waste materials, 

particularly human excrement.
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/ CERP Page 66

APPENDIX IV: COMMENTS FROM U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/ CERP Page 67
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/ CERP Page 68
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/ CERP Page 69
SIGAR Audit-11-7 Contract Performance and Oversight/ CERP Page 70

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-030A).
SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance 

oversight of programs for the reconstruction of 

Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective 

audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to 

provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, 

analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, 

U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make 

informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to: 

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs; 

• improve management and accountability over 

funds administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies 

and their contractors; 

• improve contracting and contract management 

processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and 

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing 

Afghanistan. 

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all 

released reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its 

Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and 

reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575 

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983 

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil 

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202