FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-1021

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MARLON EDGARDO LARACASTILLO,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.

Michael C. Overstreet, Judge.

April 18, 2018

WINSOR, J.

Marlon Lara-Castillo was convicted of lewd or lascivious 

molestation. The court sentenced him to twenty-five years. On 

appeal, Lara-Castillo contends the trial court should have granted 

his motion for judgment of acquittal and, alternatively, that he 

deserves a new trial because the prosecutor made improper 

arguments below. We affirm.

Lara-Castillo’s victim, a girl who lived nearby, was eight years 

old at the time of the crime. She was nine when she testified at 

trial that Lara-Castillo touched her “under and over” her clothes. 

She explained that she visited Lara-Castillo’s apartment one 

morning to meet her younger sisters, who were eating breakfast
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there. After she arrived, Lara-Castillo had her sit on his lap, and 

he asked her how old she was and if she had any friends. Then he 

touched her. She and her sisters ran home, where she immediately 

told her mother what happened.

The child’s mother testified too. She said the child came home 

that morning “afraid and crying.” The mother explained that she 

did not immediately call police because she could not speak 

English and had no one to translate for her. Instead, she went to 

see her pastor. The pastor arranged a meeting with himself, the 

mother, and Lara-Castillo. Both the mother and the pastor 

testified that Lara-Castillo admitted at the meeting that he 

touched the child, (the pastor said he admitted touching the child 

“in her parts . . . between her legs”), and that he asked for 

forgiveness. But they both acknowledged Lara-Castillo insisted 

the touching was accidental. 

About a week after the meeting with the pastor, the mother 

contacted police through a friend. Police soon found Lara-Castillo, 

just as he was leaving his apartment with a duffel bag containing 

clothes, his passport, and $900 in cash. After waiving his Miranda

rights, Lara-Castillo answered officers’ questions and admitted 

touching the child, maintaining the touching was accidental. But 

he gave officers inconsistent details: He first said he touched only 

the upper part of the child’s body and only with the back of his 

hand. But he later said he it was the front of his hand and her 

thigh, near her private area. 

After the State presented this and other evidence at trial,

Lara-Castillo moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing there was 

no evidence he touched the child in a “lewd or lascivious manner.” 

See § 800.04(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016); cf. also Chesebrough v. State, 

255 So. 2d 675, 677 (Fla. 1971) (“The words ‘lewd’ and ‘lascivious’ 

behavior when used in a statute to define an offense has been held 

to have the same meaning, that is, an unlawful indulgence in lust, 

eager for sexual indulgence.”); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.10(c)

(“The words ‘lewd’ and ‘lascivious’ mean the same thing: a wicked, 

lustful, unchaste, licentious, or sensual intent on the part of the 

person doing an act.”). Lara-Castillo argued that the child never 

testified to intent and that the only evidence of intent was his

statement that the entire incident was an accident. The court 
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denied the motion, and Lara-Castillo raises the same argument 

here. We review de novo. Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 

1992).

The problem with Lara-Castillo’s argument is that intent is 

almost always established through circumstantial, rather than 

direct, evidence. Green v. State, 90 So. 3d 835, 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2012) (“Intent, a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof. 

It is almost always shown solely by circumstantial evidence.”); 

Manuel v. State, 16 So. 3d 833, 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“[D]irect 

evidence of intent is rare, and intent is usually proven through 

inference . . . .”). And while no witness testified that Lara-Castillo 

touched the child for “sexual indulgence” or with “sensual intent,”

jurors could have found he did, based on the evidence: LaraCastillo placed the girl on his lap before touching her under her 

clothes and between her legs. The girl ran home scared and crying. 

Lara-Castillo gave inconsistent accounts of what happened, and 

police found him carrying a duffel bag with items consistent with 

an effort to flee. Cf. Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 196 (Fla. 2010) 

(holding that “evidence of flight . . . after the fact of a crime is 

admissible as ‘being relevant to consciousness of guilt which may 

be inferred from such circumstances.’” (quoting Straight v. State, 

397 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 1981))). Considering all the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the State, see Ibeagwa v. State, 141 So. 

3d 246, 246–47 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), we conclude a reasonable jury 

could find Lara-Castillo touched the child “in a lewd or lascivious 

manner.”

Finally, we reject Lara-Castillo’s separate argument that he 

is entitled to a new trial based on allegedly improper comments in 

the State’s closing arguments and during his cross-examination. 

As Lara-Castillo acknowledges, he presented no objection to the 

comments below, and we conclude that there was no fundamental 

error.

AFFIRMED. 

JAY and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Victor D. Holder, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.