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NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN RAILROAD

SAFETY AND SECURITY

(109–15)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

RAILROADS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

TRANSPORTATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 28, 2005

Printed for the use of the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

(
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice-Chair

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

SUE W. KELLY, New York

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

GARY G. MILLER, California

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

TED POE, Texas

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

CONNIE MACK, Florida

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana

VACANCY

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

BOB FILNER, California

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado

(II)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

GARY G. MILLER, California

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

JON PORTER, Nevada

TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia, ViceChair

DON YOUNG, Alaska

(ex officio)

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

BOB FILNER, California

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

(ex officio)

(III)

(V)

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY

Page

Chipkevich, Robert J., Director of Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Investigation Department, National Transportation Safety Board ........ 8

Collins, Daniel M., President, Operation Respond Institute, accompanied by

James Boone, Vice President, and Gerald Lynch, Executive Director of

Regional Information Sharing System ............................................................... 145

Hamberger, Edward R., President, Association of American Railroads ............. 131

Hill, Jeremy, Senior Vice President, Union Switch and Signal Company .......... 145

Pickett, William D., President, Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen .................. 131

Rader, Thomas, President, Colorado Railcar Manufacturing .............................. 145

Samuels, Dr. John, Vice President, Operation Planning Support, Norfolk

Southern ............................................................................................................... 131

Strang, Jo, Deputy Associate Administrator for Railroad Development, Federal Railroad Administration .............................................................................. 8

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 180

Johnson, Hon. Eddie Bernice, of Texas .................................................................. 206

Menendez, Hon. Robert, of New Jersey ................................................................. 209

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 212

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Chipkevich, Robert J ............................................................................................... 156

Collins, Daniel M ..................................................................................................... 168

Hamberger, Edward R. ........................................................................................... 182

Hill, Jeremy .............................................................................................................. 194

Pickett, William D ................................................................................................... 209

Rader, Thomas ......................................................................................................... 219

Samuels, Dr. John ................................................................................................... 231

Strang, Jo ................................................................................................................. 244

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Chipkevich, Robert J., Director of Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Investigation Department, National Transportation Safety Board, response to a question from Rep. Menendez, National Transportation Safety

Board public hearings .......................................................................................... 75

Samuels, John, Vice President, Operation Planning Support, Norfolk Southern, response to a question from Rep. Menendez, type of laser ....................... 143

Strang, Jo, Deputy Associate Administrator for Railroad Development, Federal Railroad Administration:

Response to a question from Rep. Menendez, Accident/Incident Details ........ 14

Response to a question from Rep. Menendez, Cirumstances in other Incidents for 2004, and type person involved by decending frequency .............. 21

Response to a question from Rep. Menendez, Positive Train Control ............. 71,73

Response to a question from Rep. Miller of California, crashworthiness

research on tables in passenger cars .............................................................. 83

Response to a question from Rep. Johnson, rail infrastructure ....................... 118

Response to a question from Delegate Norton DHS and rail security ............ 123

Response to a question fred Rep. Sodrel, rail passenger fatalities .................. 129
Page

VI

ADDITION TO THE RECORD

Ohio Rail Development Commission, James Seney, Executive Director, statement ...................................................................................................................... 256
(1)

NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN RAILROAD SAFETY

AND SECURITY

Thursday, April 28, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION, SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS AND INFRASTRUCTURE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve LaTourette

[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Good morning. The hearing of the Railroad

Subcommittee will come to order.

I want to welcome all of our members and our witnesses here

today, the first meeting of the Railroad Subcommittee in this Congress, and especially the new members of our Subcommittee that

I want to speak briefly about, and hopefully they will join us a little bit later.

On the Republican side, our new Vice Chair is Lynn Westmoreland of Georgia. Lynn, I understand, has quite a background in

contracting and construction, and I am sure he is going to be a valuable resource to the Subcommittee as we move forward with our

discussion of rail in America.

Next, Mike Sodrel of Indiana. I am told that Mike’s family started in the transportation and logistics business back in 1867. So it

looks like Mr. Sodrel has transportation in his blood, and I know

that he is also going to be a great asset to the Subcommittee and

we welcome him aboard.

Also joining us as a new member is Tom Osborne of Nebraska.

The sports fans in the audience will probably recognize Tom. Before coming to Congress, he played professional football for the

Washington Redskins and San Francisco 49ers, and of course he

also served as head coach of the Nebraska Cornhuskers for 25

years, where he enjoyed winning seasons every year. We are happy

to have Tom with us as well.

Today’s hearing is on the subject of new technologies in railroad

safety and security. According to data published by the Federal

Railroad Administration, railroad safety has improved significantly

over the past two decades. The latest statistics show that the overall accident rate has decreased 16 percent between 2000 and 2003.

The rate of employee injuries has declined nearly 21 percent during

that same period, and railroad employees have an injury rate lower

than many other heavy industries. Working on the railroad is a difficult and often physically demanding job, and so I want to give

credit to our railroad employees who strive to make safety a top

priority.
2

Today we are going to hear testimony about new technologies in

railroad safety, some of which are already yielding benefits to railroad employees, freight carriers, and the traveling public. In particular, we want to hear about some of the new technologies being

developed by the FRA such as Positive Train Control and the signal systems being developed in Europe by Union Switch and Signal. I would be grateful to hear any comments regarding these

technologies from the fellows in the front lines, the Brotherhood of

Railroad Signalmen.

This hearing is not just about infrastructure, it is about rail

transportation. I have heard several positive comments regarding

a new generation of self-propelled railcars, and hope that we will

hear details from Colorado Railcar.

A couple of housekeeping items before I yield to our distinguished Ranking Member. I want to ask unanimous consent to

allow all members to have 30 days to revise and extend their remarks and to permit the submission of additional statements and

materials by the witnesses. So ordered, without objection.

And then I am also advised that later during the hearing Ms.

Norton of the District of Columbia may join us. Although a member

of the full Committee, she is not a member of the Subcommittee,

and would ask unanimous consent that she be permitted to participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered.

And lastly, our distinguished Ranking Member, our regular distinguished Ranking Member, Ms. Brown of Florida is unavoidably

detained in other parts of the world and will not be with us today.

But we are lucky and honored to have with us Mr. Menendez from

New Jersey to fill in ably for her.

At this time it is my pleasure to yield to you for any comments

you may wish to make.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to sit in

for our distinguished Ranking Member who, as you said, is unavoidably detained. I am happy to be a member of the Rail Subcommittee in this session of Congress.

However, I am not terribly happy about the status of rail safety

and security in this country. I know our witnesses are here today

to talk about new technologies that will make our trains safer and

more secure, and I look forward to hearing what they have to say.

But I would also like to see this Subcommittee hold a hearing on

rail safety oversight, particularly in light of a number of recent accidents and the series of Pulitzer Prize winning articles in the New

York Times last year regarding the cozy relationship between the

Federal Railroad Administration and Union Pacific.

An Inspector General report from December brought to light a

number of disturbing questions about FRA’s regulatory oversight

process and whether that process is sufficient to ensure public safety. I think this Subcommittee is exactly the right place to address

that, but I think we are long overdue since we have not had a true

rail safety oversight hearing in almost three years. However, that

is for another day.

Today, we are here to discuss how technology can better protect

the people that work, ride, or live alongside our Nation’s railways.

This is an extremely important issue for me since my district is

tightly packed with freight and passenger rail lines, including the
3

Northeast corridor. If you add in subways, light rail, and commuter

railroads, there are millions of people on the rails everyday in this

country and we have not been spending nearly enough to ensure

their safety.

That is why I introduced the Rail and Public Transportation Se- curity Act earlier this year, which provides over $10 billion to address critical operating and capital needs for Amtrak, freight rail,

and public transportation security, including $300 million for research, development, and field testing of new technologies.

In addition, my bill includes a welded rail and tank car safety

improvement program that was developed in response to the derailment in Minot. The recent tragedy in South Carolina also shows

us how seriously we need to take tank car safety and how we have

to make a serious Federal commitment in order to protect people

from both accidental and malicious disasters.

I am amazed that the Federal Government has not made this investment already. Rail systems are extremely vulnerable to terrorists attack, as shown by last year’s attacks in Madrid. In fact, since

September 11, there have been over five times as many attacks on

public transportation targets than on airplanes.

I would ask my colleagues to imagine what we would have done,

what action we would have taken if the Madrid train bombings had

occurred in our homeland on our soil. What immediate investments

would we be ready to make? What urgent action would we be willing to take? The new technologies we will hear about today are a

first step towards that action, but we need to do more and we need

to do it sooner rather than later.

I thank the witnesses for being here today. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman, for holding this hearing.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentleman very much.

We have been joined by some additional members at this time.

I see the distinguished Chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee,

Mr. Mica of Florida, has joined us and he has also brought guests,

which we thank you very much for swelling the audience. It would

be my pleasure to yield to you, Mr. Mica, for any observations you

would like to make.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your recognizing my guests. I have students from the Geneva Academy in Central Florida in the 7th congressional district, and several other voting age constituents, and I am always pleased to see them here and

welcome them. But I want to also thank you, Mr. Chairman, for

holding this hearing today, and also for your focus on new technologies and railroad safety and security issues. I think you have

a great list of panelists.

The rail industry is facing some very serious challenges. I spoke

with a group yesterday and liability is certainly one of the challenges that they face, along with others. But also providing new

systems for safety which will provide less exposure for accidents

and for the challenges that they face in providing a cost-effective

alternative to paving over our country and providing a good means

of moving commodity, freight, and other goods through our communities.

There are also challenges we know now by attempts to move hazardous and other materials through some of our communities. We
4

need to find ways to assist them to move those much-needed items

through our communities, including even basic things like chlorine

which we rely on for safe water supplies to our local municipalities

and other water systems that need those chemicals.

So we face a number of challenges. I think this hearing will enlighten us as to what the Federal Railroad Administration and others have done to come up with new safety techniques. We will also

hear recommendations I think that are necessary from the industry.

Finally, I am excited, I think you have got some folks from Colorado Railcar. I have taken a great interest in getting the United

States into producing technologies that will take some of the cars

off of our roads or at least give us some alternatives, and actually

manufacture once again in the United States some of the essential

equipment for the future.

So, again, I thank you. I look forward to hearing from the panelists. And I again welcome our guests.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Johnson of Texas,

any remarks?

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking

Member, for holding this hearing. It is my first one on this Subcommittee and it is an important one to me because, as we know,

our Nation’s transportation system is the backbone of our economy

and our way of life. Every day various modes within the Nation’s

transportation system transports millions of people and tons of

goods throughout the country. So critically important to this equation is the role of secure freight and passenger rail systems.

While the tragic events of September 11, 2001 have forced us to

take a hard look at how we secure our various modes of transportation, rail security remains a significant challenge. According to

GAO, a number of positive steps have been taken by rail stakeholders to bolster the Nation’s rail security since that time, such as performing risk assessments, emergency drills, and developing security plans. However, one only needs to turn to the news or pick up

a local newspaper to realize that our Nation’s rail systems still remain extremely vulnerable to the possibility of terrorist attacks

that could jeopardize countless lives and cause serious economic

disruption. For example, on June 28th of last year two freight

trains carrying chlorine gas collided in my State killing three people. Only one of the dead was aboard; the others died as a result

of gas drifting over a residential neighborhood over a mile away.

Further, we must never forget the horrific Madrid train bombings

last year that left 200 commuters dead and 1,500 wounded.

These incidents and countless others highlight the unique challenges and risks associated with the rail system. So while I am

heartened by GAO’s findings, more work remains to be done, particularly in resources invested toward surface transportation concerns. I feel strongly that as policymakers we must revive our resolve to approach rail security challenges with a sense of urgency.

To do otherwise only serves to further compromise the safety of the

American public. According to the Mineta Institute, globally, surface transportation systems were the target of more than 195 terrorist attacks from the 1997 through the year 2000.
5

As I close, I want to thank our witnesses that have come before

us to testify this morning. I look forward to your testimony. I am

particularly interested in learning more about the latest security

innovations, the level of coordination among rail stakeholders, and

what we as a body may do to further assist them to help bolster

freight and passenger security efforts. So thank you again, Mr.

Chairman, for this hearing.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentlelady very much. In a moment I will yield to Mr. Miller, Westmoreland, and Osborne for

comments they would like to make. But I see we have been lucky

enough to be joined by the distinguished Ranking Member of the

full Committee. And so this must be an important hearing if Mr.

Oberstar is here.

Mr. Oberstar, I would yield to you for any observations you

would like to make.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, all of your hearings are important

ones. But when it comes to safety, whether in rail, or aviation, or

highways, maritime, it gets my attention. And it is a very promising initiative on your part to explore in the context of a hearing

new technologies that may improve both safety and security. But

I think to deal with the issue fully, we need to go beyond technology.

We have seen in recent years there is an increase in rail accidents, not an alarming increase, but an increase that gets my attention and that of the National Transportation Safety Board and

the Federal Railroad Administration. There were over 3,100 accidents in 2004. That was up from just under 3,000 in 2003, 2,700

accidents in 2002. The trend is in the wrong direction. And then

we had the catastrophic accident in Graniteville, South Carolina,

that the NTSB said was a result of improperly lined switches. The

IG at the Department of Transportation said that the trend of rail

safety data indicates improperly lined switches are the second leading cause of rail accidents and the principal cause of accidents resulting from human error.

Technology helps, technology is vitally important, but in the end,

people make these decisions. Properly trained people, properly experienced people can avoid accidents with the right technology. The

IG Report in February of this year on Safety Findings and Recommendations at the FRA show that serious safety problems have

been present for all four of our major railroads, and that despite

an increase in the civil penalties that FRA has assessed on those

railroads.

But the IG also highlights prior audit report recommendations

that the Federal Railroad Administration has failed to implement.

The IG’s 2002 report recommended that FRA make greater use of

inspection results developed in the Safety Assurance and Compliance program. Now the RSAC was initiated many years ago, almost a decade ago. It initially had good results. But if the recommendations from RSAC are not implemented, then they do not

do any good, there is not a life-saving benefit.

Now I am very encouraged that at the outset of your tenure as

Chairman of the Subcommittee you are putting this spotlight on

safety. I hope that it will not be a momentary event, that this will

be followed up with further inquiries suggested by the information
6

we will receive in the course of today’s hearing. I have read the testimony in advance. If my time permits, I will have some questions

about various elements.

Just recently, for example, the problems with Acela, the rotor

brakes that have demonstrated slim, spider-like cracks that have

migrated into major failures raise questions about the underlying

technology—was the metal cast properly, at the proper temperature, was it cooled properly in the sequential cooling that is necessary to ensure that bubbles do not develop in the interior of the

casting.

I am reminded of the disaster of United Airlines DC-10 over

Iowa, when the rotor in the tail engine, the titanium block into

which the fan blades are inserted, catastrophically failed. One hundred and ten people lost their lives. It was a miracle that pilot was

able to bring that aircraft down; it had lost all hydraulics. That

was because of a number of failures that started with the casting

of that titanium block.

Now, we have 131 rotors in the Acela that have failed, for a combination of reasons perhaps going back to the original design specifications, but also the subsequent inspection and perhaps over-ambitious five-year life schedule for those rotor brakes, and perhaps

also, as some are suggesting, our design specification of a railcar

that is twice as heavy as European railcars where this technology

originated.

If our Federal Railroad Administration is not being vigilant on

these matters and is not looking at these matters in depth and is

not following up on them, then this Committee has a responsibility

to do it. And you have made a good start today, Mr. Chairman, and

I thank you very much.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentleman very much. I would tell

the distinguished Ranking Member it is our intention to have a

rather vigorous schedule of hearings, working with you and Ms.

Brown and Chairman Young, and the Acela rotor issue will be the

subject of a hearing occurring on May the 11th and we will explore

that issue in detail.

Mr. Miller, anything you care to say?

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Rail safety is extremely

important in my district because of the increase in California we

are going to experience in freight movement. My district seems to

be the largest gateway for trade in the country. We have both the

Long Beach and the L.A. harbors that all those ships are coming

into each year, and about $250 billion worth of cargo either comes

through my district or most of my district via train or truck. It is

very problematic.

We are looking by 2020 at about two and a half to three times

the amount of trains we experience today will be basically impacting our districts. We have a tremendous problem with at-grade

crossings. Most of my communities, which really surprised me, over

the last eight or ten years have pretty much been up in arms and

trying to be proactive about the issue of the amount of impact that

they face trying to cross those at-grade crossings, whether it is

trucks trying to deliver goods, or people trying to get back and

forth to work or take their kids to school.
7

Rail safety is becoming a huge issue. We just recently, on January 26th, in Glendale had a Metrolink train that slammed into an

SUV killing 11 people. It also clipped a northbound Metrolink

train, which could have been very disastrous. In April of 2002, we

had 3 people killed and 260 people were injured in Placentia, in my

district, when a freight train missed a light and ran into a commuter train. And in June 2003 we had a runaway train in Commerce that went through my district and it destroyed six houses.

It was a miracle that nobody really was injured in that accident.

But what that has done is brought an acute awareness of the situation we face in California. Rail safety is absolutely something that

has to be addressed.

In California, about $802 billion worth of goods are shipped from

our State each year. That is either going on a truck or most of it

is going on a train, especially through the central part of the

United States. So we have a challenge with increased freight movement and we need to be ready to deal with the issue as it increases, and safety is something that is paramount. I trust that our

economy is going to continue to grow, that nothing will happen to

that. And if it does, and I believe it will, we are also going to be

increasing the amount of freight and goods that are going to be

moved.

So I am looking forward to the testimony today, and I am glad

you are here. Welcome.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you, Mr. Miller.

Coach Osborne and Mr. Sodrel, you missed the glowing introductions I gave of you at the beginning of this hearing. We would like

to get to the witnesses, but if there are brief comments you would

like to make. Mr. Osborne, first to you? Mr. Sodrel?

Mr. SODREL. I would just like to thank the witnesses for coming

here today. I spent my professional life in highway transportation,

so I will be getting an education on rail, although I have a brotherin-law, retired UTU conductor and several friends who were engineers that started out on the old Louisville-Nashville railroad years

ago. So I thank the witnesses for being here, and I thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentleman.

Today’s hearing is comprised of three panels. The first panel has

Ms. Jo Strang, the Deputy Associate Administrator for Railroad

Development at the Federal Railroad Administration, and also Bob

Chipkevich, who is the Director of Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Investigations Department at the National Transportation Safety Board. We thank both of you for coming. We have

received your written observations and we look forward to your testimony.

Ms. Strang, welcome. We will start with you.
8

TESTIMONY OF JO STRANG, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION; BOB CHIPKEVICH, DIRECTOR OF

RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD

Ms. STRANG. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before

you today, on behalf of Secretary Mineta and Acting Administrator

Robert Jamison, on the subject of new technologies in railroad safety. I would appreciate your submitting my full statement for the

record; I plan to summarize it.

I supervise the Federal Railroad Administration’s research, development, and demonstration efforts, so I pay a great deal of attention to new technologies in safety. Prior to this, I supervised the

National Transportation Safety Board’s rail and rail transit accident investigations, so I am familiar with the consequences of railroad safety problems.

Safety is our top priority, and the promise that technology holds

to improve safety is compelling. Recent statistics show that the industry as a whole is getting safer, but the spate of recent accidents

shows that we still have room to improve, and we must accelerate

the rate of progress.

In general, the safety trends on the Nation’s railroads are favorable. The data for calendar year 2004 show that since 2003 total

rail accidents and incidents are down slightly, and employee casualties are down about 8 percent.

However, not all trends are positive. Improvements in the rate

of train accidents have slowed, and bad accidents continue to occur.

FRA is committed to improving this record, and we are focusing on

ways to prevent, eliminate, or minimize the harm resulting from

train accidents. I will focus my testimony on new technologies that

hold great promise to improve rail safety.

Track defects accounted for 34 percent of derailments over the

last five years. FRA has an active research program for developing

and deploying enhanced track inspection systems as a preventative

approach to reducing track accidents. I will describe some of the

key systems that FRA is currently developing.

This is a picture of a crack in a joint bar. First, is an automated

joint bar inspection system. Current joint bar inspection practices

rely mostly on visual inspection and, in a few cases, hand mapping

with ultrasonic probes. These methods are time-intensive and

prone to human error. FRA is developing an automated photo inspection system that will identify cracks in joint bars.

This is a picture of the completed joint bar inspection system.

Our initial tests showed that a prototype system mounted to a rail

vehicle and operated at 30 miles per hour was able to detect all

cracked bars identified by visual inspection, as well as additional

cracks undetected by the human eye.

Internal rail defects due to fatigue remain a serious problem

which has been exacerbated by recent trends in increasing freight

axle loads. Internal defects can be identified only by specialized ultrasonic or induction measurement cars that still cannot be oper-
9

ated at more than 10 miles per hour. Defects in the web or the

base of the rail are also extremely difficult to detect.

So far I have only talked about the parts of the rail you can see.

But we also need a way to inspect the subgrade, or the part beneath the track. FRA has identified ground-penetrating radar as a

promising technology for finding poor track conditions that are hidden below the surface, and is working on developing a prototype

system which will produce quantitative indices of track subsurface

conditions. Once the prototype is completed, it will be installed on

FRA’s T-18 car for field testing in the spring of 2006.

Collisions and overspeed derailments must also be prevented.

PTC is an advanced train control technology that can prevent train

collisions with automatic brake applications. It also provides for

automatic compliance with speed restrictions and enhanced protection of roadway workers.

FRA’s final rule enabling Positive Train Control became effective

in March 2005. The rule is a performance standard for a system

railroads may choose to install, but does not require it to be installed. FRA is promoting the implementation of PTC by sponsoring development of technologies through partnerships with States

and railroads, and by helping to provide NDGPS, a satellite-based

navigation aid.

FRA is also working on projects in Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin,

and Alaska. A significant challenge for FRA and the railroads in

developing all such systems is to lower the cost of implementation.

A fundamental technology for enabling the implementation of

PTC systems is a network of reference stations that monitors GPS

and transmits correction signals to an unlimited number of users,

known as the Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System,

or NDGPS. Any NDGPS receiver can then use these signals to improve the accuracy and integrity of GPS. When complete, there will

be dual coverage throughout the United States to ensure the signals are always available.

GPS has an accuracy of about 36 meters. Since parallel railroad

tracks are only 4 meters apart, GPS accuracy does not meet our

needs. Basic NDGPS improves the accuracy to 1 to 2 meters. Similarly, the GPS system takes two to four hours to recognize that a

satellite is out of tolerance and to notify the users. This is referred

to as ‘‘time-to-alarm integrity.’’ Basic NDGPS improves the time-toalarm integrity to six seconds. So, if a GPS satellite malfunctions,

the NDGPS system eliminates the bad satellite from the position

solution within six seconds, preventing any disruption to railroad

operations.

While we are trying to find ways to protect against derailments

and collisions, we also need to protect train occupants now. In contrast to European and Asian rail systems, traffic on the U.S. rail

system is dominated by private freight traffic. FRA continues to address the crashworthiness of passenger equipment and passenger

and crew protection through our crash test program.

Computer models have been developed to simulate a variety of

passenger rail car crash scenarios. These models, combined with

the results of crash tests and field investigations of passenger train

accidents, are being used to develop strategies for increasing occupant protection.
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FRA is now testing components of structural crash worthiness for

passenger rail equipment. We have completed both designs and

test of the crush zone design for coaches. The results from the impact tests show that crash energy management design has superior

performance over conventional equipment design.

I would like to show a few videos now. The first one is a single

car impact test. The first clip you will see is conventional equipment with no modification.

[Video presentation.]

Ms. STRANG. You can see the result of the impact. Clearly, there

would be loss of survival of space. The car was crushed severely.

In the next clip, you will see a crash energy modified system

which FRA has developed. By using design components to modify

the energy, survival space remains much better preserved.

[Video presentation.]

Ms. STRANG. The next video will show two cars coupled together

and using crash energy management. In a conventional train-totrain coupling, the lateral forces force the train out of alignment

and you get the typical accordion type of derailment that you have

seen. This keeps the train cars in line with each other so that they

are less likely to derail.

[Video presentation.]

Ms. STRANG. You could see at the end, this is an overhead, how

the cars remained together instead of being out of alignment.

The next video is a train-to-train collision. We have planned another test in February, we hope, of this year that will have all

crash energy modified cars, and we will be able to see what will

happen.

[Video presentation.]

Ms. STRANG. I would like to invite anybody on this Committee

if you would like to see the next crash test.

I would also like to point out that Metrolink, a commuter railroad in California, is working with us to deploy crash energy management systems in their next purchase.

FRA is also actively addressing the crash worthiness of freight

locomotives. Participants include the passenger and freight railroads, rail labor organizations, and locomotive builders.

I have additional videos if time permits. Thank you, and I will

be happy to answer your questions.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you very much. I think, before we go

to Mr. Chipkevich, one of us did have a question. That second

train-to-train, was it 30 miles an hour?

Ms. STRANG. It was 26.4.

Mr. LATOURETTE. It was 26.4. Thank you very much.

It is now my pleasure, Mr. Chipkevich, to ask you for your observations. Just again, without objection, all of the witnesses full

statements will be made part of the record of this hearing and I

would ask you to summarize your remarks as best you can. Thank

you.

Mr. CHIPKEVICH. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman LaTourette

and members of the Subcommittee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the National Transportation

Safety Board on an important rail safety issue, Positive Train Control.
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The NTSB has been investigating train collision and over-speed

accidents for over 35 years and issued our first recommendation related to this issue after a 1969 head-on collision between two Penn

Central commuter passenger trains in Darien, Connecticut. The

Safety Board in 1970 recommended that the Federal Railroad Administration study the feasibility of requiring a form of automatic

train control at points where passenger trains are required to meet

other trains.

Since 1970, the Safety Board has issued numerous safety recommendations related to positive train separation. Our most recent

safety recommendation was issued in 2001, following a collision between three Conrail freight trains in Bryan, Ohio. The trains were

operating in fog, when a faster moving train missed a signal and

hit the rear-end of a train that had slowed because of the poor visibility. A third train, coming in the opposite direction, struck the

two derailed trains. The Safety Board has recommended that the

FRA facilitate actions necessary for the development and implementation of Positive Train Control systems that include collision

avoidance, and require implementation of Positive Train Control

systems on main line tracks, establishing priority requirements for

high-risk corridors such as those where commuter and intercity

passenger trains operate.

This safety recommendation was reiterated to the FRA after a

Burlington Northern Santa Fe freight train collided head-on with

a Metrolink passenger train in Placentia, California in 2002.

In the past six years, NTSB has investigated 38 accidents where

Positive Train Control is a safety issue. Causal factors have been

attributed to train crew mistakes and failure to operate trains in

accordance with operating rules. Human factor causes have included fatigue, sleep-apnea, use of medication, reduced visibility,

and distractions such as cell phone use. Further, FRA accident

data show that for 2003 and 2004 human factor causes to head-on,

rear-end, and side collision accidents were about 91 percent.

NTSB is currently investigating five accidents involving freight

train collisions. As a result of a collision between two trains in

Macdona, Texas, on June 28, 2004, a tank car filled with chlorine

was breached, resulting in three fatalities and a significant public

evacuation. NTSB will examine whether Positive Train Control

could have prevented the Macdona accident and another accident

that occurred in Graniteville, South Carolina, on January 6, 2005.

After the Graniteville accident, a switch on the main track was

found in the open position to a siding. As a result of this accident,

a tank car filled with chlorine was breached, resulting in nine fatalities.

Progress on Positive Train Control has been slow. This safety

issue has been on the NTSB’s list of Most Wanted Transportation

Safety Improvements since 1990. Notwithstanding the slow

progress on Positive Train Control, the FRA has issued standards

to address modern electronic systems and emerging technology in

the signal and train control arena. The final rule should provide

safety-critical standards that equipment must meet for use in Positive Train Control systems, but it will not provide interoperability

standards that need to be addressed when equipment operated by

different railroads is used on the same track. The FRA, the Asso-
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ciation of American Railroads, and the Illinois Department of

Transportation are funding the North American Joint Positive

Train Control Project to help address equipment and operational

issues that occur when different railroads use the same track.

Positive Train Control systems can prevent human factor caused

accidents, and the NTSB will continue to urge implementation of

PTC systems through our accident investigations and the attention

of our list of Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you very much for not only your testimony, but summing it up before the red light came on. That was

very nice of you. I appreciate that.

Ms. Strang, I think you answered this question in your testimony, but I just want to be clear. When you were talking about

Positive Train Control systems, the rulemaking that the FRA is

currently undergoing, it is my understanding that you said the

rulemaking would make those systems optional and the intention

is not to make them mandatory at this time.

Ms. STRANG. That is correct. The rule was published on March

7, 2005, as a final rule. It is an operational standard, if you will.

It just sets the conditions and requirements for Positive Train Control systems, but it does not mandate it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Ms. Strang also, the passenger survivability in

a crash is influenced by a number of factors—standees in a coach,

for instance, can become projectile, harming or killing other passengers; the location of the crash also matters as to whether it is

in an urban center where medical attention is more readily available or a rural setting. Is the FRA considering all of those factors

as you look at passenger survivability?

Ms. STRANG. Yes. Actually, in 1999 we issued comprehensive

standards on passenger crashworthiness that included emergency

preparedness and egress types of standards, so that we would have

available windows and doors that function well in an emergency

and people can exit. We continue to work on passenger crashworthiness and survivability through the American Public Transportation Association, their passenger requirements group, that

sets the industry standards for public transit. These can then be

incorporated into the next revision of the passenger crashworthiness rule.

Mr. LATOURETTE. It is my understanding, though, that your rulemaking may not include an examination of interior materials such

as padding, is that right?

Ms. STRANG. No. We have done fire testing, and we have also

done injury testing at tables.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right. That was one of my questions I think,

the whole issue of whether

Ms. STRANG. Actually, table design is important. We have done

tests where we took different types of tables and looked at how

their edges were and how they were fixed. They are popular with

commuters.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Menendez, in his opening remarks, correctly called upon the issue of tank car safety. Can you tell us a

little bit about what the FRA is doing relative to tank cars?
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Ms. STRANG. Sure, I would be delighted to. FRA is currently undertaking tank car research that resulted from the Minot, North

Dakota, accident in 2002. We are working with the Volpe National

Transportation Systems Center and the AAR Tank Car Committee

to do several things.

One, we have to understand how tank cars fail when they are in

a derailment. So we are doing a three-phase model that includes

a physics model, a kinematics model, using finite element analysis,

and then we will validate the model. Once we have a better understanding of how tank cars fail in derailments and collisions, we will

be able to address the structural concerns through design.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Later in the hearing when Mr. Pickett testifies, he expresses concern that the visual inspection of the track is

sometimes conducted at too high of speeds. During your testimony,

I think I wrote down that it was your feeling that 30 miles an hour

was a safe speed. I believe in his testimony, I think he is proposing

a limit of 15 miles an hour. Could you share your view on that?

Ms. STRANG. Certainly. The 30 miles per hour was with a highspeed automatic photographic system, not a human eye. I do not

believe the human eye is designed to detect small cracks at 30

miles an hour.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And so what about his observation that he will

make later that 15 miles an hour is more appropriate?

Ms. STRANG. It seems reasonable to me. But I am not on the regulatory side of things.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Okay. Thank you very much. Mr. Menendez?

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Strang, in your testimony you say that the data for 2004

shows that the total accidents and incidents are down 3.9 percent

from 2003. However, the data that I have seen from the FRA

website, which is the same data that Mr. Oberstar referred to in

his statement, show that the total number of accidents is increasing. It showed that highway-rail incidents also increased from 2003

to 2004, and that the only other statistic that improved is something labeled ‘‘other incidents.’’

Ms. STRANG. It depends on which—there are a lot of different

categories.

Mr. MENENDEZ. I have not gotten to my question yet.

Ms. STRANG. Oh, I am sorry.

Mr. MENENDEZ. So my question is, if we extracted out the accident category alone, what would the number be?

Ms. STRANG. I do not have that number with me, but I can provide it to you. I do know that collisions have increased. But the

total train accident/incident rate has decreased. But I will provide

those to you.

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Mr. MENENDEZ. Would you extract the accident category alone

and then let the Committee know?

Ms. STRANG. Absolutely.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you. What is the ‘‘other incidents‘‘ category?

Ms. STRANG. Other incidents are things like cows on the track,

or an object that is there. It is not something that is normal.

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Mr. MENENDEZ. Okay. Positive Train Control has been on the

NTSB’s list of Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements

since 1990. Why did it take the FRA 15 years to issue a final rule

on PTC?

Ms. STRANG. That is a very good question. And since I am not

on the regulatory side of things, I cannot answer. But I can have

somebody provide the answer to you for the record.

Mr. MENENDEZ. If you would, I would appreciate it.

[The information received follows:]
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Mr. MENENDEZ. Since you are not on the regulatory side, you are

going to give me the same answer to one of my other questions, but

I am going to ask it so that you get me an answer. You cite human

factors as one of the causes at the very outset of your testimony.

So I would also like to know when you have investigated 38 railroad accidents where PTC could have prevented or mitigated an accident, despite that it will save lives, the rule that you issued in

March is voluntary and not a requisite for railroads. I would like

to get an answer as to why the regulators did not insist on something that can be life-saving at the end of the day and dramatically

reduce the number of incidents. So if you would get that for us as

well.

Ms. STRANG. Yes, sir.

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Mr. MENENDEZ. Do you know about dark territory, is that something you can answer?

Ms. STRANG. I know what it is.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Okay. What can you answer for me?

Ms. STRANG. I can answer questions about technology.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Technology, okay. Let me move on to something

else then.

Mr. Chipkevich, when an accident occurs it is critical that the

community, the railroad industry, its workers, and in some cases

the victims are provided timely and accurate information identifying what caused the accident and what measures parties involved

in the accident should take to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future. How long does it take the NTSB to conduct an

accident investigation? And why did it take you over two years to

investigate and issue recommendations on the deadly accident in

North Dakota? Why did it take you over three years to investigate

and issue recommendations on the CSX freight tunnel derailment

and fire in the Howard Street tunnel?

Mr. CHIPKEVICH. It is primarily the workload and the staff resources that we have had to be able to address and do the accident

investigations. There was significant work in the Howard Street

tunnel accident investigation we did because there was no clear-cut

cause that we could identify for that accident. So we did extensive

testing and additional work that did take an extended period of

time in that particular accident.

Mr. MENENDEZ. So, in other words, if you had a greater staffing

capability, we would truncate the time and get the results quicker,

and we would get action, hopefully, quicker on that?

Mr. CHIPKEVICH. Yes, sir, that would help.

Mr. MENENDEZ. How many hearings has the NTSB held since

2000, public hearings?

Mr. CHIPKEVICH. I can provide that for the record. We held a

public hearing, we finished the last two days on the Macdona accident where we had a board of inquiry taking testimony from 12

witnesses. We had also had a public hearing in the rail area on the

Minot accident investigation. But I would certainly be glad to provide that information.

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Mr. MENENDEZ. My information is it is only one. Now you have

had some things called symposiums, but those are not public hearings. I would like to know the number so that we can respond to

it in the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Miller?

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Strang, where does the FRA stand on the use of control

coaches after the recent fatal crash of Metrolink? Would it not be

safer to use a locomotive on the front of the train? I understand

that Amtrak has even converted some old locomotives into control

cars. They removed the diesel motor and use the space to basically

carry baggage. A working locomotive is placed at the other end of

the train to power it. Is this not a safer setup than lightweight control cars?

Ms. STRANG. That is a good question. Actually, we are conducting

a study on that now. There is some debate over the Glendale incident, whether or not it could have been made worse by a locomotive because they are heavier and it adds mass to the crash.

Those are all things that we are considering carefully, and we

should be publishing a study by the end of the year.

Mr. MILLER. Okay. Can you give us some more details concerning

what the FRA is doing on tank car safety.

Ms. STRANG. Actually, we have several things we are doing on

tank car safety. One of them deals with emergency responders and

making sure that they get emergency response information as

quickly as possible. We are working through the emergency responder community, Railinc Operation Respond, and others to provide better communications infrastructure to get information to

emergency responders that is accurate as quickly as we can, because the first several minutes of the emergency response are very

critical.

We are looking at tank car research that I talked about on the

kinematics modeling, where we will be looking at tank car design

to make tank cars more puncture-resistant and less likely to have

any kind of failure during a collision or derailment.

We are also looking at a spray-on coating that is known as

′′Dragon Shield′′ that has got the capability of self-sealing if it gets

punctured, and it also adds impact resistance.

Mr. MILLER. They have recently included tables in passenger

cars. I know you did a study on that. I have heard that really is

dangerous and that it creates a less safe situation. What is your

finding on that?

Ms. STRANG. It can be. The way that the table is fastened to the

floor and the edges of the table, and whether or not they are resistant or flexible, really make a difference. So we have done tests on

table configurations and expect to have standards and recommendations on how tables should be affixed. Tables are very

popular with commuters. They like them a lot. So most commuter

railroads like to have them.

Mr. MILLER. When are your studies going to be released, do you

have any idea on that?
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Ms. STRANG. We have conducted the tests on the tables, and I

believe a report will be coming out later this year. But I can get

back to you with the expected date.

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Mr. MILLER. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you. Ms. Johnson?

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. In the accident in South

Carolina, it raised a number of questions about Dark Territory.

Has there been some technology that has been used to maybe deal

with Dark Territory?

Ms. STRANG. Actually, there have been several things. First of

all, we issued something called a broad agency announcement,

which is a funding mechanism, looking for people to come to us

with proposals on how to cure this problem. So we are looking for

ways that we can make sure that switches are in the correct position even in dark territory and that appropriate alerts can be given

to the train crews and others.

Ms. JOHNSON. You indicated that most of the accidents are

caused by human factors. Can you name others that have been

prominently noted?

Ms. STRANG. I am sorry. I am not sure I understand your question.

Ms. JOHNSON. You indicated that most of the accidents are

caused by human factors. Has there been some observation that

makes the human factors more common, and if so, has there been

the application of any technology that can solve that, or are you

still looking?

Ms. STRANG. There are technical solutions to human factor accidents. As Mr. Chipkevich mentioned, Positive Train Control is one

of them. Basically, if you are relying on a person that does not have

a redundant backup system, technology is probably going to provide the best solution. So we are looking at ways to improve switch

position indicators, because that is the second-leading cause of accidents, and also track inspection information that can be gathered

through better technologies. Track causes are the second-leading

cause of train accidents.

Ms. JOHNSON. What is the infrastructure like with the rails,

tracks?

Ms. STRANG. Well, do you mean how much is there?

Ms. JOHNSON. Well, what is the age? Do they need some type of

attention or repair or change?

Ms. STRANG. Okay. The railroad has been around for a long time,

180 years, so there are various ages of track and rail components

throughout the system. Railroads have made a lot of efforts to improve the strength, or the poundage, of the rail, going up to a heavier weight, up to 136 pounds, as they have increased axle loads.

And it is a combination, I believe probably Dr. Samuels will talk

about it a little more, that it is a combination of heavy axle loads

and heavy rail that are needed to provide safe transportation.

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Ms. JOHNSON. I am curious, because it seems to me that we are

hearing more and more about rail accidents, and I was trying to

see if there was a way in which to focus in on the common cause

and if there was some technology or an improvement of the infrastructure or whatever to see if they could be avoided.

Ms. STRANG. I think there is. I believe some of the things we discussed today will go towards reducing those accidents as soon as

we can get them deployed and out in use.

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentlelady.

Ms. Strang, before I yield to Mr. Graves, for the benefit of the

record and maybe some in the audience, could you just tell us what

Dark Territory is.

Ms. STRANG. Dark territory is territory on a railroad that does

not have a signal system, so you usually rely on track warrants or

a paper system to control the operation of the train.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much. Mr. Graves?

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What I am curious about, and you barely touched on it in your

written testimony with some of the private initiatives being undertaken, I am interested in the electronic train management system,

which is an overlay system that the BNSF is in the middle of. Can

you talk to me about an overlay system, how that works? Can you

also tell me how involved you are in that, and also where we are

in that process as far as development goes?

Ms. STRANG. Sure. Okay. There are a number of efforts underway in the private sector. BNSF has the ETMS, or Electronic Train

Management Systems; CSX is using Communications-Based Train

Management, CBTM; the Alaska Railroad is pursuing another system. In the private sector, not a government partnership like the

North American Joint Positive Train Control Program, BNSF’s

project is the furthest along.

An overlay system is a non-vital system that uses a communications base to control trains. It has an office segment, a communications part, equipment on the locomotive, and wayside detectors.

BNSF’s project is 130 miles in Illinois, I think it is around

Beardstown. They began their project a couple of years ago; right

now, they are at phase two of a three-phase test. So they are running trains with the train control system turned on under a waiver

from FRA. FRA has been involved in helping them test in all

phases of it. We actually have a test monitor that is out there

riding trains with them all the time. We are also doing a humanmachine interface study with them, where we are looking at the

human aspect of their interface with the system.

Mr. GRAVES. What do you mean by non-vital, you said non-vital?

Ms. STRANG. ′′Non-vital′′ means that it is an overlay. The existing

train control components are all still there: they are not taken

away.

Mr. GRAVES. Talk to me about cost. Are these not a little bit less

complex?

Ms. STRANG. They are less costly than a vital system in some

ways; they are new. Because you do not have a vital system, some

of the testing requirements are a little bit less, and the component

communications part of it costs much less.
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Mr. GRAVES. But there are, and I guess what I was getting at

as much as anything else, there are a lot of things out there besides just what you all are doing, that the private industry is doing

a lot to try to alleviate some of their accidents and doing some of

the things that are going on, too.

Ms. STRANG. That is correct.

Mr. GRAVES. So there is a pretty heavy initiative going on?

Ms. STRANG. That is correct.

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Graves. Ms. Norton?

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

the opportunity to sit with this Subcommittee. Of course, I am a

member of the full Committee.

I am sure that all of you are aware that as we speak there is

a hearing going on which I think really says a great deal to us,

should send a message to us about Federal inaction post-9/11 on

rail and freight.

The District of Columbia, one jurisdiction, unable to see any action by the Federal Government, but also seeing freight carrying

hazardous substances going within four blocks of the Capitol of the

United States and throughout heavily congested neighborhoods,

took action on its own and passed a law and said you have got to

reroute that stuff. The Railroad Administration said, well, we do

when there is a big event in the District of Columbia such as on

the Mall. But of course when Congress is in session and the rest

of that is going on, we had no evidence that had been done.

Some of us tried to get hearings. We wrote to Secretary Ridge

and tried to get information. No information. The judge indicated

that perhaps this thing could be negotiated and the information

could be shared with the District and they would be able to understand that something had been done. The Government did not

want to do that.

So the judge looked at it and the judge must have said the equivalent of is this it, because here you had a Federal District Court

judge ruling against the railroad in this instance, although everybody thought it was a slam dunk on interstate commerce grounds.

The judge found when there is a gap in the law and the Federal

Government sits there and takes no action, then it must mean that

a local jurisdiction can move.

Many of us in the Congress had thought that the better way

would be to look at dangerous freight traveling throughout the

United States and to try to look at all the options to try to in fact

see what could be done. And as far as I can tell, the Railway Administration, the Department of Homeland Security have taken no

action whatsoever. This is post-9/11, when everybody is rushing to

take action to shore up various modes of transportation. We are

talking about the transportation that most people use—rail, and of

light rail, subways, and the rest.

Yesterday at the markup of the Homeland Security Authorization, there were two provisions—one was report language, and one

was a provision actually added. One had to do with passenger

trains, to say, that would require DHS, presumably you to do what

can only be called the basics, to take what you have learned, and

I know that there is great deal of consultation and work that has
122

been done with the railroads, and disseminate what best practices

should be post-9/11.

And the other was something that of course we have already

done with air travel, and that is to take what you know and disseminate it to operators of trains so that they know how to prepare

employees and the public to understand what to look for. Now here

we are four years after 9/11 and we are asking part of our Government that regulates trains to do these basics.

On freight, there is probably going to be report language on matters like pre-notification, for example, of local jurisdictions when

hazardous substances come through. Our own Fire Department

here in the District of Columbia, you would think that if you did

not notify anybody you would be notifying the EMSes, said, when

the council bill was being shepherded through, he did not have a

clue as to what was coming through so that he could at least be

alerted in case something happened. There may be language on

setting protocols for effective communication between the authorities and operators, training for employees so that they know what

to do, the kind of training that has taken place with respect to air

travel.

I simply would like your response about the inaction of DHS on

trains, especially freight and passenger, especially when compared

with a great deal of action that has been taken within DHS, TSA,

et cetera, with air travel, and especially considering large numbers

of people who use rail travel and the extent to which our country

is dependent upon the transport of dangerous toxic substances.

No one wants to stop it from happening, but, again, unrebutted

testimony that one car right here in the national capital, one car

successfully attacked could emit gases that would travel 14 miles

throughout the entire region, causing 100,000 deaths within a half

hour if the wind is going in the right direction. That is what caused

a local jurisdiction to move. And you are going to see, if there is

continued Federal inaction, you are going to see people popping up

all over the United States saying I am not going to sit here and

wait for something to happen.

So I would simply like to take this opportunity to get your response to what has happened here in the District of Columbia, and

to ask you what you intend to do to begin to take the kind of action

for trains and freight post 9/11 that we have seen in air travel.

Ms. STRANG. Thank you. We are not part of the Department of

Homeland Security or the Transportation Security Administration

that has the lead in this effort. We are taking numerous steps to

make---

Ms. NORTON. Is this the Railway Administration?

Ms. STRANG. This is the Federal Railroad Administration.

Ms. NORTON. Well, the Federal Railroad Administration has a

very heavy lead in what I am asking you about.

Ms. STRANG. We do, but it is through the Toxic Inhalation Hazard Project that is managed by the Office of Safety. I will be very

happy to get a response for you from them. It is not something that

I have expertise in.

[The information received follows:]
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Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say in closing, you

see the answer was, duh. When I think Mr. Quinn was Chair of

this Subcommittee, the Railway Administration was before us and

I sat in on a hearing. This was before South Carolina. And in the

process of examining someone like yourself from the Railway Administration, I asked the Chairman if before the end of the year

he would agree that the Railway Administration would provide a

plan, particularly given the considerable work they had already

done, to the Chairman. Then Chairman Quinn went on record and

said I want it, and I want it before the end of the year.

And Mr. Chairman, as you take over the chairmanship of this

Subcommittee, I want you to know that no such plan has come forward.

I think it is a clear and present danger to our country. And I

think, frankly, that what is happening on freight and passenger

travel is more of a security risk today than what we might expect

on air travel, because we at least have begun to take preventative

actions there and we see no consistent preventative action on the

part of the Railway Administration and others who should be involved. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentlelady very much. I will check

with the staff as to what that status was last year and be happy

to follow up with the FRA.

Just a couple of observations. On a personal level, my fear has

always been when we create these parallel universes, that is, a

Federal Rail Administration and a Department of Homeland Security that seems to be like an octopus, we have several poorly funded agencies all running around in different directions rather than

dealing with what I consider, and I know the gentlelady when she

was the distinguished Ranking Member of our last Subcommittee

assignment, consider an all-hazards approach.

You also get silly regulations, such as the folks that thought up

why do we not take off the hazardous material warning labels on

tanker cars, so that nobody knows, especially the firefighter who is

first on the scene, that he or she is actually there to clean up chlorine, so that we can trick the terrorist. I think that is an example

of something stupid. And lastly, I hope that the District of Columbia’s action is not replicated across the country. I have difficulty

finding out why the judge was able to find it not at odds with the

commerce clause, and we can have an honest disagreement about

that.

But I think the gentlelady’s points are well taken, that we have

spent a lot of time making sure that terrorists cannot take over airplanes, we have spent precious little time dealing with train travel

in this country.

There is a vote on. Mr. Sodrel, do you think that you have less

than five minutes of questions, or should we recess and come back?

It is your pleasure.

Mr. SODREL. We are about to vote. I guess I could ask the questions and get answers in writing, if necessary.

Mr. LATOURETTE. If that is suitable with you. And that brings

up something Mr. Menendez has asked me to do as well, and that

is ask unanimous consent that all members of the Subcommittee

have the same 30 days which we had under the previous unani-
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mous consent request to submit additional questions to this and

the remaining panels, and we would appreciate the answers when

you can get them to us. Thank you very much.

That being said, there is a vote on the House floor. We will stand

in recess and return immediately after the vote.

[Recess.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. We are going to bring the Subcommittee back

into order. The good news is I think this vote we just had on the

House floor may be the last for a while. There seems to be a problem with the vote count on the Budget Resolution. So I think we

are good to go for not only the rest of this panel, but also the other

two panels. So, hopefully, we will not be interrupted.

Before we left, Mr. Sodrel, you were kind enough to say that you

might want to submit the questions. But we have held the first

panel back, so fire away.

Mr. SODREL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, in the highway industry we have statistics that we use on accidents. There

are accidents, incidents, then there are DOT reportable accidents.

DOT reportable would be ones where the vehicle is towed, it cannot

be driven away on its own; you have an injury or a fatality. I have

heard that the accidents are up, and I have heard that the accidents are down on the railroad.

So my question is, how many deaths do you have per passenger

mile traveled on railroads? How does that compare with intercity

motorcoach, or air travel, or private automobile, or some other

standard where you have deaths per passenger mile? Do we know?

And if we do not, if you can get the answer, I would appreciate it.

Ms. STRANG. I think I do. I just need to look to see if I have got

it.

Mr. SODREL. I just occurs to me, we kill somewhere north of

40,000 people a year in automobiles. It seems to me that railroad

travel

Ms. STRANG. Over the past five years, there have been 22 passenger fatalities. So the rate is very low. But I will have to get back

to you with the actual rate per million passenger miles.

[The information received follows:]
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Mr. SODREL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you very much. And again, subject to

the questions that Mr. Menendez had where you were going to supply some additional information, and also the unanimous consent

request we made a little bit earlier, there may be additional questions coming your way from other members of the Subcommittee or

from members of the Subcommittee that were here. We would appreciate your timely response.

Also, when Ms. Norton was here, we will follow up at a staff

level here on the Subcommittee relative to what Mr. Quinn may

have asked of the FRA during the last Congress. But if you could

sort of poke around the agency and if you can figure out what it

is he was looking for and let us know, we would appreciate that

as well.

So we thank you, and you go with our thanks.

It is now time to hear from our second panel. Our second panel

is comprised of Mr. Edward Hamberger, who is the President of the

Association of American Railroads; Dr. John Samuels, who is the

Vice President of Operation Planning Support for Norfolk Southern; and Mr. William Pickett, who is the President of the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen. I thank you all for coming. We have

received all of your written testimony. If you could summarize your

testimony to the best of your ability, we would appreciate that.

Mr. Hamberger, you are on.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS; JOHN SAMUELS, VICE

PRESIDENT, OPERATION PLANNING SUPPORT, NORFOLK

SOUTHERN; WILLIAM D. PICKETT, PRESIDENT, BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD SIGNALMEN

Mr. HAMBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in your first hearing as Chairman of the

Railroad Subcommittee. And I would like to echo Mr. Oberstar’s

opening comments, that it is indeed very appropriate that the first

hearing focus on railroad safety and security. I would like to make

a few brief opening remarks and then transfer my time to Dr. Samuels to go into a little bit more detail on some of the new technologies emerging.

I would like to also thank the Committee for the leadership and

vision it has shown during the reauthorization of TEA-21. There is

no more vexing safety problem faced by railroads than that posed

by grade crossing accidents and trespassers. We would like to

thank the Committee for its strong support for increased funding

for the Section 130 Grade Crossing Safety Program, and we ask

you to continue to demonstrate such support in conference with the

Senate.

Nothing is more important to the Nation’s freight railroad than

the safety of their employees, customers, and the communities in

which we operate. That is demonstrated by the scope and intensity

of the industry’s safety efforts. These efforts have resulted in dramatic improvements in railroad safety.

Since 1980 the train accident rate has been reduced by 65 percent, and the employee casualty rate has declined by 78 percent.
132

Last year, 2004, in fact was the safest in history in terms of both

the number of employee casualties and the employee casualty rate.

Let me try to address Congressman Sodrel’s comments and Mr.

Oberstar’s. Mr. Oberstar is, in fact, correct that the absolute number of accidents has gone up in 2004 over 2003, but the rate of accidents, the rate as measured in million train miles, has gone down

slightly. Similarly, while the number of highway-rail incidents has

gone up, the incident rate, as measured in terms of million train

miles, is the lowest on record, and that rate does not take into account the fact that highway traffic has also been increasing.

We work continuously to improve all aspects of rail safety, including that related to hazardous materials. Railroads move about

1.8 million carloads of hazardous material annually, and 99.998

percent reach their destination without a release due to an accident. Rail hazmat accident rates are down 90 percent since 1980.

We work continuously to assist communities in preparing emergency response plans, we provide emergency training for emergency responders, work with tank car owners, users, and builders

to improve tank car safety, and work with rail labor to try to identify ways to improving operating safety.

The source of much of our past success and a critical foundation

for future gains is the implementation of new and improved technology. The industry funds an extensive research and testing program centered at the Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo,

Colorado, which we operate under contract to the FRA. It is widely

considered to be the finest rail research and test facility in the

world, and the crash tests that you saw the tapes of from Ms.

Strang’s testimony were actually performed at Pueblo at TTCI. And

I would echo her invitation to this Subcommittee to visit Pueblo either independently or as part of the next crash test in February.

Let me now turn over two minutes and fifty-three seconds to Dr.

John Samuels to testify on behalf of the AAR about some of the advances in rail technology. He is senior Vice President, Operations

Planning and Support with Norfolk Southern, and just as importantly, serves as Chairman of the industry’s Railway Technology

Working Committee.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Dr. Samuels, thank you very much for coming.

The last time I saw you you gave a presentation that included coefficient of frictions and yaws and things like that. Maybe if you

could dumb it down for me today, I would appreciate it very much.

[Laughter.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. But thank you for coming.

Mr. SAMUELS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege to be

here today with you. I would like to talk a little bit about the

science behind safety in railroading.

Those of us in the scientific community that have dedicated our

lifetime to making railroads safer for everyone appreciate the time

we are going to have to talk to you about some of our advanced

technologies. Time does not permit me to cover the wide variety of

things we are doing, and I echo what Ed said, but I certainly would

personally love to be out at TTCI when you and your Committee

visit TTCI to be able to take you through all the good things that

we are doing in terms of improving railroad safety.
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Let me start at the beginning, though, for today. The first slide

I want to show you is a slide that shows the wheel-rail interface.

You might think it is interesting that I would show this slide. But

in my mind this is the most important slide to understand if you

want to understand the foundations of safety on railroading.

You can see from this slide, which is a cross-sectional view of a

wheel-rail interface, the red area is the wheel, the blue area is the

rail. You notice it is labeled ‘‘vertical force’’ and ‘‘lateral force.’’

There are two major forces that we must contend with and control

in railroading to control the safety of the environment, and that is

those two forces. You will see from this slide also that we have

above rail programs called Advanced Technology Safety Initiative,

ATSI, which is from this interface upward into the railcar, including the wheel set and the suspension system, and then we have a

similar set of initiatives from the rail down, which is called Performance Based Track Standards. Today, I am going to give you a

view of the most advanced technologies we are working with and

the reasons why we are working with those.

I bring to your attention first this cross-section of a piece of rail.

What we really have at this interface is this rail in interfacing with

the wheel does so, and I am going to put just a dime on the top

of the rail surface here. All the stresses generated by the railcar

go through an area the size of a dime. And in railroading today the

stresses that go through there is 36,000 pounds per wheel set, on

average.

So we put the weight of approximately seven large SUVs through

that dime into the rail infrastructure. And through the life of the

assets, both the wheel and the rail, what we need to do is to control, believe it or not, that contact patch. One of the challenges of

engineering science in railroading is to make sure that patch, when

it starts out with new wheels and new rails and is the size of a

dime, stays the size of a dime. Because if that contact patch varies

or gets smaller, the stress goes up exponentially that is transmitted

from the wheel to the rail. It is very important to do that.

Now you see this cross-sectional rail. When we wear a rail out

the ultimate wear-out rate depends on the strength of the rail and

the entire track system. But this is a piece of rail that is at the

condemning limit and is worn out. You can see that the geometry

of the head is very much different than a brand new piece of rail.

In a rail’s life between brand new and this condition, we continuously monitor the rail and we look for things that will cause that

rail to fail. And I am going to cover some of the latest technologies

both from a rail standpoint and a wheel standpoint.

On the next slide I would like to show you what we are trying

to prevent. This slide is a picture of a fractured wheel. So let us

talk about the wheel up for just a moment. This is a fractured

wheel set. This is a real wheel that broke on our railroad. We did

a complete metallurgical analysis of this wheel and it turns out in

the metallurgical analysis that a small crack initiated at a defect

in the casting. This wheel was about 12 years old when this occurred. So these wheels can stay out a great length of time before

a crack initiates. There is a whole body of science on crack initiation and growth. In this particular case, the crack over time perpetuated to the point where the stress at the wheel-rail interface
134

that was transmitted up into the wheel caused the crack to grow

to a point where the wheel failed.

One of the sciences we are trying to look at is, and it has been

brought to your attention here, that many of these cracks that first

initiate and grow cannot be seen by the human eye. And so no matter how hard you inspect these from a human standpoint, you cannot find them. So I want to tell you a little bit about the science

we are using to get to the vital few areas where the human being

really does not help that much any more and we have to use

science.

On the next slide, I portray for you the latest in laser acoustic

testing. Now, let us keep it simple, like you said. What we have

here is the diagram and in the upper left is a cross-section of a

wheel. The little rectangle above it is a laser. It is a similar image

on the right-hand side except you can see the little piece of a crack

there that is growing at the surface of the wheel. The principle involved here is very simple: if these cracks grow and perpetuate

through the wheel and ultimately fail, how can we find the crack

before the failure occurs. What we do is we hit the wheel with a

laser, the laser creates a mechanical pulse through the wheel.

The image down below on the left shows a very strong return signal to the transducer, which says that the wheel is sound. The

image on the right down below shows that the initial pulsing of the

wheel with the laser was dispersed, significantly increasing that

there is a crack in the wheel. So we are using this technology,

which is brand new, by the way, to look at better ways of finding

cracks in the wheel.

On the next slide is our demonstration project at TTCI. To impinge the laser on the wheel and then to get the reflected sound,

you have to follow the wheel as the railcar rolls by the transducer.

So we have actually built a prototype system where we have a carriage that does the laser impingement and follows with the transducers as the wheel rolls over the rail, because we cannot find

these things productively and efficiently unless we do it dynamically as the car rolls. And so we are working on this technology.

While we are still speaking about the wheel, let us talk about

this patch the size of a dime. If a wheel wears non-uniformly, that

patch can get very small at the contact point. Now the picture on

the right shows a wheel that is worn to what we call a hollow. That

is a natural phenomena, the wheel is softer than the rail. And so

in railroading the wheel does prematurely wear out.

But what we need is technologies that will allow us to watch the

wheel wear-out and pick the wheel off the car and remove before

any accident occurs because of that geometry. The picture in the

lower left-hand side shows a hollow wheel riding on a rail. If you

look closely, you can notice that when the wheel is hollowed only

a piece of the wheel contacts the rail. That creates a contact patch

that is about one-quarter of the size of a dime, which increases the

stress state of the railroad and can cause potential damage and

failure of components.

Now, how do we find hollow wheels? If we put human beings

under the rail cars when they are stationary, it is very labor intensive and, quite frankly, in all kinds of weather and conditions it is

very difficult to do. We are using new technology here. In the left-
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hand picture in this chart you see a bunch of lasers and laser cameras. In the lower right-hand picture with the red diagnostics, you

see that what we do is we shine a laser on a wheel on a train going

50 miles an hour over this detector.

The laser image is captured on cameras digitally and we rotate

that image in three dimensional space, and within milliseconds we

do a complete dimensional check of the wheel while the train is

going over the detector at 50 miles an hour. And this development

is now being put in place on railroads and will be used to watch

wheels as they wear out.

We also have, on the next slide, a train going over what we call

a wheel impact detector. This is some transducers in the track that

measure the vertical force that the wheel exerts on the track all

around its circumference. We can pick out heavy hitting wheels

that cause excessive stresses and route those cars to the car shop

for wheel removal before they do damage or cause a derailment.

Also on this slide you can see some boxes there in the lower lefthand side. That is an acoustical detector. While we are checking

the vertical impact load of the wheel, we can also check whether

the bearing is going bad. Right now on the railroad every 20 miles

we have an infrared detector that looks at heat for a bearing going

bad. Sometimes that is too late. And so what we try and do is find

bearings before they fail. This is an acoustical detection system.

Here is the frequency which we have correlated to defects in the

wheel. And so we will just play one of these to show you what it

sounds like.

[Audio presentation.]

Mr. SAMUELS. Now, if you have not heard that lately, that is a

cupsball on the wheel. That says that the wheel bearing has a fretted surface that is beginning to fail. We can find through these

sounds, believe it or not, bearings that are on their way to failure

but nowhere near failing. And so we can take them out of service

early.

On the next slide what I am showing you is that we have now

put these detectors I have told you about into a network of detectors in the United States. All railroads have a standard detector

design. We have deployed these detectors nationwide and we are

in the process of gathering all this data and putting it into one

computer and accumulating it by rail car, by wheel, by axle.

And so what we have in the next two to three years is we will

have a system in place to actually watch rail cars wear out over

their lifetime, understand the stresses that they cause at the

wheel-rail interface, that contact patch, and control those forces.

Finally, I would just like to talk about one thing above the topper

rail. If you look at the wheel rail interface, a lot of the forces that

are transmitted, are transmitted on curves. I will show you the

worn rail, and this comes from a curve, because the geometry is

very different.

We have recently developed top of rail lubrication, which is an

inert material that is put on the top of the rail. As you can see on

the upper right hand side, you only put a mono-layer of this lubricant on the rail. It changes the coefficient of friction, and Mr.

Chairman, you said, I love coefficient of friction, as you know. It
136

actually has been found to cut the lateral forces on curves by 40

percent. That is being perfected.

The next slide is just some data that shows you that in taking

gauge widening on the rail, the actual spreading of the rails, which

can cause derailments if it is not controlled, in actually looking at

that, we have data over a year’s period to show that when you lubricate the top of rail and change the coefficient of friction, we have

actually gauge widening that has occurred on a very severe curve

and in coal territory in West Virginia.

Then finally, I would just like to say that we are multiplying the

scientific effect of these various detectors, by taking what we learn

from this laser acoustics in the wheel that I just showed you, and

we are looking at rail, as you see here.

Here, this rail has a vertical split or crack in it. A human being

inspecting the track could not find this crack. But what we are

doing is, we are perfecting that laser acoustics, so we can run down

the track and find that accurately, every time. That is just some

of the advance science that we are using to improve railroad safety.

Thank you very much.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Dr. Samuels, thank you very much, that was

a very good use of Mr. Hamberger’s two minutes and 54 seconds.

[Laughter.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Pickett, thank you for coming, and we look

forward to hearing from you.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

Committee. It is an honor for me to testify today on new technology

and rail safety. It is a subject that is of great concern to this country and to all of our the employees on the Nation’s railroads.

Throughout our entire existence, the BRS and other rail unions

have dedicated themselves to making the railroad work place safer,

not for just rail workers, but also for the public at large.

The rail industry is moving more freight with fewer employees

than at any time in the history of railroading. Through mergers

and the railroad management’s never-ending quest to eliminate

workers, railroad staffing levels are at an all-time low, and in some

crafts, the numbers continue to drop.

Those railroad employees that are left are working longer hours,

and for many days at a long stretch at a time. A 12 to 16 hour day

is not unusual for a railroad worker, and in many cases, it is the

norm.

On March 7th of this year, the Federal Railroad Administration

issued the Final Rule for the Development and Use of ProcessorBased Signal and Train Control Systems. With this Final Rule,

FRA is issuing a performance standard for the development and

use of processor-based signal and train control systems. The rule

also covers system which interact with highway-rail grade crossing

warning devices.

I want to say personally that this change is a great step in rail

technology. Signal systems currently in use today are designed to

protect the safety and integrity of the railroad’s operations on a

section of track that provides for broken rail protection, track defects, track obstructions, proper switch and derail alignment protection, route integrity protection, and protection against train collisions.
137

Signal systems are designed to mitigate the dangers caused by

human error and acts of vandalism or terrorism. Clearly, it is in

the best interest of the railroad and the local residents to have the

protection of a signal system.

A good example of the benefits of a signal system can be seen

when we look back to January 6th of this year. The derailment

that many of us have talked about today happened in Graniteville,

South Carolina, which the preliminary investigation has indicated

was a result of an improperly aligned switch. Nine people died, 318

needed medical attention, and 5,400 residents within a one mile radius of the crash site were forced to evacuate.

The segment of the track where the accident occurred was called

Dark Territory. A basic signal system would have prevented this

accident. A switch monitoring device would have noted that the

hand throw switch was not properly aligned, and the train would

have had a stop signal.

The BRS does not believe that improper planning by the railroads and their failure to properly maintain a signal system can be

reasons for the FRA to grant a waiver request to increase the

amount of non-signal territory in our Nation’s railroads.

Positive train control systems are just one facet of the signaling

revolution that is occurring. Many current signal systems benefit

from the changing technology. We must work to ensure that any

new technology that the railroad industry contemplates to implement, that the proper risk analyst and proper steps are taken to

make sure that the new devices introduced do not create more new

hazards than we eliminate.

The rail unions consider it equally important to provide advanced

training and education to improve the skills of the professional

men and woman that install the safety devices on our rail systems.

In addition to craft-specific training, security training must be

mandated. While some rail carriers might claim progress in this

area, I have talked to too many workers who are not receiving any

training, or might be allowed to watch some video that tries to be

a one-size-fits all.

The railroads transport the most toxic and dangerous materials

in the country. Most every freight train in the United States transports some types of hazardous material. The train crews are given

very limited training in understanding what to do in case of a hazardous material leak or explosion.

After 9/11, each railroad was required to develop and implement

security plans. The Transportation Security Administration has apparently approved most of the plans on the railroads. The problem

is that the employees have never been brought into the loop.

The bottom line is that the TSA and the railroads must promptly

begin an intense training program to educate and prepare railroad

employees to recognize potential terrorist and safety security risks.

In addition to training, we must also ensure that workers who

report and identify a security risk will not face retribution or retaliation from their employers. A rail worker should not have to

choose between doing the right thing on security and his or her job.

If Congress considers rail security legislation, it must address

this problem, by strengthening the current whistle blower protections. Over three and-a-half years have passed since 9/11, yet
138

amazingly little has been done to secure our Nation’s transportation network, especially in rail.

Sufficient resources have not been allocated. Common sense requirements have not been imposed. Too often, employees and their

unions have never been enlisted in the process. Amtrak alone requires $110 million in one-time security upgrades.

One way that we can improve the infrastructure inspection is to

direct the Secretary to issue rules requiring that no visual track inspection be conducted from a vehicle traveling at a speed of more

than 15 miles per hour.

The incorporation of a nationwide telephone notification system

would greatly improve safety for our Nation’s grade crossing signal

system. This Nationwide telephone notification system could also

be used by anyone to report derailments or other events that affect

safety and security on the property. The Transportation Security Administration is spending $4 billion this year on aviation security, an investment that we, of

course, support. But passenger rail and transit are being left with

just $10 million for their security.

There are over 100,000 miles of rail in the United States, and

22,000 miles of it are used by Amtrak in 46 states and the District

of Columbia. New technology will not cure all that is wrong in the

rail industry. There is much to accomplish to make the Nation’s

railroads safer for communities across the country and for our rail

employees.

Experience teaches us that it is Congress that must provide the

leadership to make safety a reality. I hope we can work with you

in seeing that the improved safety practices become a reality.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you very much, Mr. Pickett. Your last

observations, I certainly share, and I suspect most of the folks on

the Subcommittee share. It occurs to me that we sort of respond

to something that happens. We spent a lot of money making sure

that terrorists cannot hijack planes. But once we harden targets,

they begin to look at other areas. I think you are right to alert us

to the issue of railroad security.

Dr. Samuels, I mentioned at the outset of this hearing, on May

11th, we are going to be looking at what happened with the Acela

train and the disks that are under some scrutiny today. Bombardier will be here and others to talk a little bit about what is going

on.

You talked about the new technology focusing on not only deficiencies or rails wearing out, but you also mentioned that the

wheels are softer than the rails. So you are watching wheels as

they wear out. Is there a rule of thumb, life expectancies for wheels

on a rail car, or is it all different?

Mr. SAMUELS. It depends on a lot of different things, obviously.

But it is the percent of time that the car is loaded. It is the number

of miles that the car has. So it basically is in miles more than it

is in years. Depending upon the load empty ratio, you can get a

wheel that goes for 250,000, or you could get a wheel that goes for

a half a million miles.

The life expectancy normally on wheels is very long though, in

the time frame of 8 to 15 years. The rail that I showed you here
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on tangent track could last 40 years, and on curves, it is anywhere

from 6 to 12 years.

So these assets have very long lives, and that is why it is critical

that we develop these dynamic monitoring systems to make sure

we understand the stresses that the car is imparting on the rail,

and know the condition of the rails, so that we can put the appropriate amount of maintenance money into both the rolling stock

and the rail infrastructure, to keep that contact patch at the size

of a dime.

Mr. LATOURETTE. These monitoring devices that you have outlined for us as part of the new technology, I saw the map of the

United States. Is there a spacing that they are going to be every

100 miles, every 1,000 miles? How do you figure out where they go?

Mr. SAMUELS. What we have done is this. I will take Norfolk out

as an example. We have done a complete analysis of the ton miles

on all of our routes, and where cars flow. We have looked at the

origin destination pairs. We are locating these detectors to pick up

the majority of cars that transit our system.

In other words, what we are trying to do is make sure that we

get the maximum amount of cars over these detectors. Now these

detectors are not inexpensive. When you install these detectors,

you are talking about at least a half a million to one million dollars

per detector.

They are detectors that are meant to find defects before they

occur; in fact, so far before they occur, that the science we are imparting on this is that we are going to find the defect with this detector network. In other words, we are going to track the car and

watch a defect grow. Then we are going to take the car out of service way before that defect ever becomes a safety problem.

It is being integrated now. Each railroad is integrating that advance data into their data systems that will automatically route

the cars to a car shop. This is going to happen way before you have

an incident with that defect.

Mr. LATOURETTE. You mentioned that the laser technology is

new and you showed us a picture of a split rail. I thought I understood you to say that you are testing it so that it is 100 percent

and you always find the split that you cannot find by visual inspection. Is that still in the testing phase, or have you ruled that out?

Mr. SAMUELS. No, it is still very much in the testing phase. I do

not want to give you the impression that we do not ultrasonically

test the rails today. We do. It is a very slow process.

We have cars called generically Sperry cars, which the name

comes from the original company that started ultrasonic testing.

But we test the main line rails at least once or twice a year. We

have the mathematics to look at the number of defects we find. If

we find a lot of defects in a given stretch of rail, we come back

sooner to test that again.

So the testing frequency depends upon what you are continuously finding. In that way, we continuously hone in on those parts

of the rail infrastructure that need to be changed out.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Samuels.

Mr. Pickett, I asked the woman from the FRA a little bit about

this portion of your testimony where you talk about cars traveling

no greater than 15 miles an hour for the inspection of tracks. I
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would just ask you how it is that you arrived at that as being the

safe speed?

Mr. PICKETT. The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way is the one

who proposed that. That is one of the other unions that I am here

testifying on their behalf, also. But one of the things that we are

seeing is the visual testing, not the testing of where the electronic

devices are used. They normally are used at 30 miles per hour.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I also read recently that in India, the Indian

rail has a signalmen’s college. I would ask you, you mentioned

training. I think you indicated that you did not think some of the

training, and particularly security training, was where you and

your membership thought it would be.

Can you discuss a little bit with us how signalmen are trained

in the United States, and if there is a technical school where they

go to, to learn the trade that they are to embark on? How does a

signalman get his or her training in the United States today?

Mr. PICKETT. Most training on the Class 1 railroads are done on

the property. They have their own signal schools set up on each individual property.

The requirements to become a signalman got more and more

stringent because of the technology. A lot of the railroads are asking for some background in electronics, or at least an Associate’s

Degree in electronics.

But then that becomes a problem, because initially, our people

work out on the construction gangs. That means travel, and a lot

of people that are in technical are not willing to do that.

But the training goes from Associate training, and on most of the

railroads, some of the Class 1s have what they call advanced signal

training, that the signal people go return to.

Mr. LATOURETTE. That leads to a follow-up. I think it was yesterday, the full Committee marked up RIDE-21, which makes available $60 billion over the life of the bill for new rail infrastructure,

and hopefully can help with some of the capacity problems we have

in the United States, as well as looking at high speed rail opportunities.

Do you feel that there is a sufficient reservoir of qualified rail

work force to take us into this next century, or do we need to do

more?

Mr. PICKETT. No, I feel that we are going in the wrong direction

for qualified people, especially with the next few generations. There

are a lot of retirements being faced in the next 10 years. The hiring

is going down in a lot of the crafts, rather than up in the crafts

for the people to get qualified.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I know in Ohio, we have an electric company

that is called First Energy. They come in and they indicate that the

average age of their electricians and linemen is about 55 or 56

years of age. Do you know what the average age of your membership is?

Mr. PICKETT. Our average age is 44 and one half.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Okay, thank you very much.

Mr. Menendez?

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank

the witnesses.
141

Mr. Hamberger, I want to ask you this. I heard what you said,

but I do not understand how we reconcile what you said with the

number of accidents that have gathered national attention, from a

series of Union Pacific accidents in Texas, to the BNSF accidents

in California, to the deadly accident involving Norfolk Southern’s

train in Graniteville, South Carolina.

How do you reconcile your assertion? I heard about track mileage

and all that. But I am looking at actual hard numbers of accidents.

So how do you reconcile your assertion that rail safety is improving, when the FRA data shows an increase in accidents, if you look

at from 2002 to 2004, of 380 more accidents?

Mr. HAMBERGER. Yes, Mr. Menendez, thank you for that opportunity to clarify. I have that data in front of me, as well. The point

I was trying to make in my opening statement was that the number of accidents has indeed increased, as you so indicate.

But the rate of accidents, I think, is perhaps a better measure

of whether or not safety is improving or not improving. That is, the

more train miles you have moving, from a statistical standpoint,

there are going to be some accidents that, when measured to page

two of the data, indicate that when measured as a percentage or

the number of accidents per million train miles that the rate, we

should probably say it is about the same.

It is 4.03 accidents per million train miles in 2003 and 4.01 per

million train miles in 2004. So I think it is that rate that really

indicates whether or not safety is increasing, rather than the actual number.

Mr. MENENDEZ. I appreciate that categorization of it. When we

look at accidents by car in this country, we look at the total number of accidents, period. We make judgments as to whether we are

moving towards greater success or failure by the virtue of the number of accidents that we have.

I heard one of our colleagues suggest that comparison of your

success rate in the industry and accidents versus that of automobiles. I am not quite sure that that is a fair comparison, considering not only volume, but also the fact that we use multiple lanes

and a variety of other factors that go into car traffic. It does not

seem to me like we compare apples and apples in that case.

I know that the industry wants to do this, because obviously, it

costs it money, consequences, and reputation and all of that. So I

assume that there are good efforts, in addition to all the technology

things that are being done. But I hope we deal with the work force

side, as well, to help you, as an industry, achieve what should be

some mutual goals.

Let me ask you specifically, the title of the hearing is also about

rail security. In that context, what has the rail industry done specifically to improve security, and what have you done to work with

the workers in terms of rail security training? How do you get your

rail security alerts, as an industry?

Mr. HAMBERGER. Again, thank you for the opportunity. It is a bit

of a rambling answer coming, I am afraid. We began in September

of 2001, immediately after the 9/11 incidents, recognizing that the

material that we haul is, in fact, hazardous.
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So we quickly put together five different critical action teams

that take a look at all aspects of the operations of the railroad, focusing one of those on the transportation of hazardous materials.

We realized very quickly, that we needed help in this regard, and

we contracted with a local group called EWA, comprised primarily

of former military and civilian intelligence officers. They came in

and worked with us to take a look at the rail network the way they

were trained, and the way they thought that a terrorists would

look at the network.

They brought with them best practices from the intelligence community. In December of 2001, we came up with four levels of alert,

prior to Secretary Ridge coming up with his five. We identified and

implemented immediately about 50 different ways of operating.

For example, leading up to that point, we had been trying to

make our operations more transparent for our customers. We let

them dial in and find out where their shipment is. We realized that

that was not very secure, and that anyone had access to that information. So we cut back and made that much more difficult for

those who do not have the right to know, to try to tap into that.

Then at each level of alert, we have a very specific set of actions

that we will take; for example, posting guards at fuel depots. We

have reached out and are working with local police forces, the National Guard. When we went into Iraq, the National Guard helped

protect and guard about 17 bridges around the country.

We are the only industry that I am aware of that on our nickel

has somebody sitting, a badge to sit, 24/7, at the National Joint

Terrorism Task Force Intelligence Desk at the FBI, as well as at

the intelligence desks out here in Herndon, that TSA and DHS run.

These are people under contract to us. They are at top secret

level, and they are sitting there, hoping to help the intelligence

community interpret data that they pick up, the so-called chatter.

It also is a two-way street.

Mr. MENENDEZ. So primarily, it is informational.

Mr. HAMBERGER. It is based on intelligence.

Mr. MENENDEZ. It is reactive to a potential incident.

Mr. HAMBERGER. It is based on intelligence. That is correct.

Mr. MENENDEZ. But it is not proactive in the context that you

have done certain hardening?

Mr. HAMBERGER. No, that is not correct. We have certainly done

that, as well. For example, we have made it much more difficult

to approach the yards. I get e-mails every day, rail fans around

America, saying, you know, you are not letting me take pictures of

trains. That is what I like to do.

So that is something we have also been proactive in. Certainly,

here in D.C., working with the Capitol Police, working with the

D.C. police, working TSA, CSX has spent millions of dollars on intrusion detection devices and other high tech applications to make

this particular corridor much harder and a hardened asset.

Mr. MENENDEZ. If I may, Mr. Chairman, very briefly, Mr. Pickett, rail security as it is viewed from rail workers, what do you

think needs to be done?

Mr. PICKETT. They need to be trained. I mean, a lot of the stuff

that Mr. Hamberger talked about, it is the first I have heard about

it. I did not know they had any type of thing. Most of the workers
143

in the rail industry will tell you the same thing; that they are not

aware of any type of training that is going on for the security.

Mr. MENENDEZ. These are the people who are obviously out there

in the system.

Mr. PICKETT. They are out on the property every day.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Why do you not do that, Mr. Hamberger?

Mr. HAMBERGER. Well, I guess I would disagree, respectfully,

with that characterization. The individual companies, in fact, have

made security part of the daily safety briefing. There have been

briefings on what to look for, for the operators of the locomotive.

If they see anything unusual, they are to report that back to the

dispatch center, back to the train master. They are not punished

for doing that.

As far as the fact of the hazardous materials that we handle,

there have been years and years of training as to how to respond

to that. You do not want the operator of the locomotive to get out

and be the emergency responder. You want the team that is

trained to be the emergency responder to be the first on the scene

to know how to handle and respond to some HAZMAT spill. So I

guess I respectfully disagree with that.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Well, I have some additional questions, and I do

not want to belabor the time. I do have one for Dr. Samuels. I have

two quick ones. Is it a helium or neon laser that you are using, or

some other form of laser?

Mr. SAMUELS. No, I do not know the exact power source generation of the laser that we are using.

Mr. MENENDEZ. If you could let us know, I would like a verification of it.

Mr. SAMUELS. Okay, I will do that.

[The information received follows:]

Dr. Samuels: Congressman Menendez the type of laser that is used in the detection device I mentioned is a Class IV 800 mili-joules light yang laser.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Lastly, is there any technology that you are

using, since we talked about rail safety, in your ambient of what

you are doing for the association as it relates to rail security, that

you are providing or studying right now?

Mr. SAMUELS. There is a lot of work going on in looking at technological scans on what could possibly be used in terms of rail security.

What we have done, and I echo what Ed Hamberger said, we

have had tried to educate our people as to how to be alert and what

to be alert for.

We have a lot of eyes. In the case of Norfolk Southern, there are

28,000 people out there every day working. That is a lot of eyes

watching the railroad and watching what goes on.

So what we have tried to do is set up police emergency numbers,

police emergency desks. There are calls on safety and security

among our management team. I have personally been trained in security matters. I went to this terrorism training because I was

deemed to be too nice a guy, and did not know how terrorists think.

In formulating our plans on the railroad and our educational

processes, what we have tried to do is say, how much prevention

can we put in place by educating our people? There are not 28,000
144

policemen. But there are 28,000 people watching what goes on, and

we have a mechanism to report what they see.

There are a couple of specific technologies, if I might, Mr. Menendez. We are working on one that would be a database that would

have within it the profile of all 1.5 million rail cars operating on

the system.

As the rail car would go by, it would match, through visual imaging, and do not ask me what that means. As the car goes by, it

would match the visual image of the car with what is in the database, to see whether or not, for example, a bomb has been planted

in the bottom of that rail car. That is something that is being tested out in TTCI.

In addition, as Ms. Strang mentioned, there is research going on

for some sort of a liquid armor, that looks as though it actually has

self-sealing capabilities, if a breach did occur. This obviously would

have not only security, but safety implications, as well. That research is being done at TTCI with DHS funding.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you, Mr. Menendez. I have just one

quick follow-up question, Mr. Hamberger. I was surprised when

Ms. Norton was here, on this issue about the D.C. legislation that

is now in litigation. She opined that the fire chief from the District

did not have advance information of what kind of traffic was going

through his town.

I understand from my fire chiefs that there is, in fact, technology

and a program. I do not know if they subscribe to it or somebody

gives it to them free. But my fire chiefs in Ohio indicate to me that

they know when a train is coming through town that has chlorine

or some other substance, that maybe they have got to perk up

about. Am I wrong?

Mr. HAMBERGER. I think Mr. Collins probably should respond,

and the next panel can get into some more of the specifics. Let me

tell you what I think I know. That is that we do not provide prenotification on a train-by-train basis.

What we have agreed, and I will double check on this during the

break, it is our understanding that the fire chief has been briefed,

probably perhaps subsequent to his conversation with Delegate

Norton. But we believe that we have briefed the D.C. fire chief.

I met this morning actually with a representative from the International Association of Fire Fighters, who concurs with our view,

that with 1.8 million carloads of hazardous material moving around

the country, that most fire departments could not deal with the

blizzard of information. It would just overwhelm them and become

so commonplace that it would not, in fact, perk their ears up.

Therefore, what we have offered, as an industry, is that we

would sit down with the appropriate emergency responders in a

community, to let them know what are the kinds of things that

come through their community, so that they can be trained on

those specific hazardous materials. But the pre-notification is not

on a train-by-train, car-by-car basis, because of the overwhelming

nature of it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you for that. The other comment I

would make is this. It is apparent from the questions by Mr.

Menendez and your conversation, Mr. Pickett, that there is a dis-
145

connect between the organizations that represent railroad employees and the railroads, at least as represented by you today, about

whether or not there has been security training.

I often find it to be more instructive, rather than for us to have

more hearings and find this out; maybe you could initiate a conversation with Mr. Pickett and his fellow folks.

Mr. HAMBERGER. We have worked well together on other issues,

and I am sure we will reach out and talk on this one, as well.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, I appreciate that very much. Is there

anything else?

Mr. HAMBERGER. If I might, just for the record, thank you for

your indulgence in letting us go a little bit longer in the presentations.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I did not even notice. Thank you for coming.

Mr. HAMBERGER. Thank you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Our third and final panel today consists of

three witnesses. First will be Mr. Daniel Collins, who is the President of the Operation Respond Institute. Second will be Mr. Thomas Rader, who is the President of the Colorado Railcar Manufacturing Company; and lastly, Mr. Jeremy Hill, who is the Senior Vice

President of the Union Switch and Signal Company.

I want to thank you all for coming. Thank you for your patience

as we got through our other two panels. We are anxious to hear

from you, and we will begin with you, Mr. Collins.

STATEMENTS OF DANIEL M. COLLINS, PRESIDENT, OPERATION RESPOND INSTITUTE, ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES

BOONE, VICE PRESIDENT, AND GERALD LYNCH, EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEM;

THOMAS RADER, PRESIDENT, COLORADO RAILCAR MANUFACTURING; JEREMY HILL, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,

UNION SWITCH AND SIGNAL COMPANY

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the carriers and emergency responders that support Operation Respond,

in partnership with the Federal agencies, I am honored to provide

the following testimony on new technologies for railroad safety and

security.

Accompanying me here today is Dr. James Boone, our Vice President, and also Mr. Gerald Lynch, the Executive Director of the Regional Information Sharing System, one of our strong law enforcement partners.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to express the gratitude of the Operation Respond Team for inviting us to participate in this hearing.

I would also like to acknowledge your acceptance to serve on the

Operation Respond International Steering Committee, along with

your esteemed colleague, the Honorable Nick J. Rahall.

Operation Respond has been involved in developing software

products for first responders since 1995. We could not have accomplished all that we have without the assistance of the fire chiefs,

the fire fighters, the National Volunteer Fire Council, the chiefs of

police, and the International Union of Police Associations.

These response agencies, the Association of American Railroads,

and the American Public Transportation Association have been
146

there for us, time and time again, to fine tune our products, and

assist with dissemination and training.

Our software, Operation Response Emergency Information System, is currently deployed in over 26,000 emergency response agencies in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, reaching an estimated one million responders.

The largest component of these installations is the RISS-NET

system. Mr. Lynch’s organization thought so highly of the OREIS

software, that they placed it right next to the Amber Alert System,

inside of RISS.

The software OREIS provides a direct link to the software user

and the manifests of participating railroads. Responders can obtain

verification of hazardous materials contents of leaking rail cars in

less than one minute. Our goal is to make sure the first responder

is not the first victim.

All Class 1 railroads in the United States and Canada have

signed license agreements with Operation Respond. Also, many regional and short line railroads participate, such as the Alaska Railroad and Montana Rail Link.

Basically, Mr. Chairman, the freight railroads have stepped up

to the plate. They provide, through our secure software, all the information they have on chemical contents to responders along their

routes.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, deviate here a second, this is not preinformation that is supplied. This is live information that is gained

by the responder accessing the software, if and when something

happens. It is an exception based system that is generated by a

query by the responding agency that has our software.

Now, Mr. Chairman, to address the topics specifically mentioned

in your letter requesting this testimony, we are going to address

three issues. On improved infrastructure technologies, we believe

responders to rail transportation incidents often need help to confirm the exact incident location and how best to reach it.

Railroad infrastructure landmarks are not always understood by

responders, and have led to responders wasting valuable time finding trains. For example, a railroad milepost may not be directly related to a mile marker located along a nearby highway.

Operation Respond has found that a searchable database of railroad features, designed to overlay on aerial and satellite imagery

and street maps, enables emergency responders to quickly and reliably reach an incident site.

In fact, in 2004, under sponsorship from the Department of

Homeland Security, Operation Respond developed such a system,

an enhanced GIS and overlaid imagery system for the Department

of Homeland Security and Amtrak police. The project was a highly

focused effort along the Northeast Corridor, and it was completed

prior to both the Republican and Democratic conventions.

Operation Respond believes that a cooperative effort with some

Federal funding can identify and develop a standardized geospatial

database of essential railroad features. The benefits would include

allowing carriers to determine the appropriate response organizations in an emergency; assisting railroad police and emergency operations desks to communicate with public agency dispatchers; and
147

last, to help those responders locate trains in distress in a timely

fashion.

The other issue is better emergency planning. Our approach has

been to improve emergency planning by bridging the gap between

the responders and the carriers. Through easy-to-use software,

complicated railroad data is simplified. So a 19 year old volunteer

fire fighter can quickly and easily obtain what they need.

Also, I would like to introduce new technology that we have been

working on. Our goal is to turn the Operation Respond user base,

now 26,000 strong and growing, into a transportation incident alert

and messaging system. What we are working on with the AAR and

the individual carriers is the capability that sends alerts and messages to those responders and to the carriers’ 24/7 operations

desks.

These alerts or messages could be directly associated with incidents or based on a potential threat, such as an explosive device

or a possible terrorist action.

Last is modern passenger coach technologies. Law enforcement

has been particularly interested in Operation Respond passenger

coach software. This component of OREIS features passenger car

and locomotive schematics, highlighting emergency information,

such as emergency windows and doors.

The law enforcement component views these schematics as a

very effective tool for dealing with on-board incidents. These could

range from identifying locations for hiding bombs and how to approach an on-board hostage situation.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, I have four recommendations. Number one, all railroads should participate in Operation Respond. I respectively request that this should be a voluntary initiative.

Second, a national railroad infrastructure search engine should

be developed. The priority should be DOD routes, hazardous material routes, AMTRAK, and commuter train routes.

Third, a national transportation incident alert and messaging

system needs to be developed. Operation Respond software users

are the ideal group to serve as the network foundation.

Finally, while the OREIS software deployments are indeed growing, the goal needs to be universal coverage. At the present time,

we are essentially half the way there.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and when the questions are

ready, we will try to answer them.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Collins. Mr. Rader,

welcome, and we look forward to hearing from you.

Mr. RADER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am here on behalf of

Colorado Railcar Manufacturing to talk a minute about emerging

technologies in passenger equipment.

We really have two emerging technologies to talk about. One is

the development of double-decker vehicles. The second is the development of the U.S. DMU. I am going to focus primarily on the U.S.

DMU.

DMU stands for Diesel Multiple Unit. It simply means a car

which is self-propelled and has diesel engines underneath it. It

does not require a locomotive, and is capable of being hooked together in multiple units to make various sizes and types of train

sets.
148

They are very common in Europe. There are thousands of them

operating throughout the world. It is a technology, however, that

has not been in the United States since the late 1960s.

The reasons are multiple, but one of the chief reasons, as Joe

Strang presented earlier, in 1999, there were new regulations enacted that required stronger, safer passenger cars.

On the other hand, there were no large orders, no transit agency

wanted to order a speculative order of a new self-propelled car that

had not been run anywhere.

My company decided that there was an opportunity here to make

a United States car that met United States regulations. We went

to the Federal Railroad Administration. We got wonderful cooperation. We spent a year and a half working with them, and the result

was a U.S. DMU.

Why are we so interested in this? It is very simple. The U.S.

DMU uses 50 percent less fuel per passenger mile than a locomotive-hauled train when it is being used in an appropriate service. That is energy security. We are talking about trains using millions upon millions less gallons of fuel per year.

Because we have a lighter train, but still build to the regulatory

safety standards, we can use less fuel and we can use more modern

engines. So we produce 68 percent less pollutants or emissions per

passenger mile. So instantly, we can reduce the emissions from

trains.

Because of the noise design and the size of the engine, we actually produce 75 percent less noise. So these benefits are very real

when it comes to security and safety.

But interestingly, they do not typically cost millions of dollars

more. In point of fact, the operational cost savings from a U.S.

DMU, over the 30 year life of the car, is two to three times the

value of the car. So a $10 million train set, over 30 years, will save

as much as $35 million in operating costs.

They are redundant systems. Unlike a locomotive that has one

large engine, they have two or more per train set. So they are not

blocking the track when you have an engine failure; and if someone

is capable of messing up, if you please, a system, we can still get

it off the track and get it home safely.

Lastly, in spite of all these other savings, it has another great

benefit in savings in infrastructure costs. We can reduce infrastructure costs because we have shorter trains, so we need shorter platforms. We have fewer cars because they are double deck, so we

need fewer maintenance bays and we need fewer parking tracks.

So all of these benefits come without any increase in capital cost.

Thanks to the hard work of a member of your Committee, this

double deck car development is now in production, and will be in

operation in Florida, starting in the middle of July. It is presently

in completion, and will be going to TTCI for testing in the whole

month of June.

We invite you to come see it. It is a real opportunity for us to

maintain the safety level, the only self-propelled vehicle in the

world that meets United States’ standards.

When you saw those crash pictures, I think it is very important

to understand, the first cars you saw do not meet the current
149

standards. Only the reinforced car met the current standards.

These cars meet the current standards.

When it is finally delivered, it will look like this, on the next to

the last one there. I want to thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before the Committee.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Radar, thank you very much for coming.

We would like to identify the hard working members of our Committee. So is that Mr. Mica you were talking about?

[Laughter.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Hill, thank you for coming, and we look

forward to your testimony.

Mr. HILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LaTourette,

Ranking Member Menendez, and Committee members, thank you

for the opportunity to present information on technologies that are

available today for increasing safety, security, and efficiency of railroad operations.

Our company is part of Ansaldo Signal and the Finmeccanica

group of companies. As Union Switch and Signal, we have served

the rail industry in the control system business as a leader in the

development and deployment of technology throughout our 125

year history.

Development of new products for rail safety and security is a primary focus of the Finmeccanica family of companies throughout the

world. We are headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, with

manufacturing facilities for our products in Batesburg, South Carolina, and have many representative offices throughout North America. We currently employ about 900 people within the United

States.

The rail safety solutions that I am presenting today are currently

available in our portfolio. They do provide improved infrastructure

inspection and security, positive train control, and better operational planning and emergency coordination.

Let me first discuss our railroad track integrity system. This system, which is based on a proven technology already in service in

North America, checks track integrity. That is a broken or missing

rail in dark or unsignaled territory.

It can incorporate switch point position detection, and provide

communication directly to a train or to a centralized management

center.

Many secondary lines are not equipped with train control systems, as we have already heard. There are, in fact, 68,000 miles

of Dark Territory in North America. Signal systems not only control the flow of rail traffic, but they can also warn an approaching

train of a broken rail or improperly aligned switch. Unfortunately,

signal systems tend to be expensive and, therefore, generally uneconomical on light density rail lines.

At Union Switch, we have developed this new implementation,

which has the potential to dramatically improve security and safety

on these light density rail lines. The system is relatively low cost,

and could prevent a reoccurrence of accidents, such as the tragic

derailment in Graniteville, South Carolina, earlier this year.

The second topic is positive train control. This system also utilizes proven Union switch technology, which will be deployed on

the Alaska railroad for revenue service by summer of the year
150

2007. Deployment will improve operational efficiency, and prevent

train-to-train collisions through the use of GPS tracking and location determination, and on-train operator enforcement.

In our terminology, this system is vital. That is, any system failure automatically results in an overall known safe state.

The third technology is the advanced speed enforcement system.

This system provides an improved level of safety. It ensures that

trains actually stop at red signals. The system has been implemented on Amtrak in the Northeast Corridor, and also on New Jersey transit commuter operations.

This technology, originally introduced in Scandinavia by one of

our Ansaldo Signal sister companies, can be implemented in any

territory, and is ideally suited to mixed traffic operations.

We are also exploring a new technology called the Common Operational Picture. Currently, railroad operations planners in cities

like Chicago and New Orleans plan inter-line operations the same

way they did when railroads were introduced, basically with paper,

telephones, and faxes.

Our Common Operational Picture would enable these personnel

to see on a geographically-oriented overview, all train operations in

these heavily-trafficked, congested areas. The end result will be

better planning, coordination, and a reduction in the transit time

of the Nation’s freight in heavily congested areas.

We are also working on an optimization traffic planner. As you

are aware, there areas in the Nation where railroads are already

at full capacity. Without the need for adding additional infrastructure, this software-based tool plans overall train operations in real

time, taking operational information on the railroad, such as track

outages or defective equipment into consideration, to provide the

most optimum train plan possible, based on established business

objectives; for example, maximizing overall railroad velocity.

The system has been in development at Union Switch for five

years, and although not currently deployed on any railroad, the

technology has been demonstrated, and we are anticipating deployment on a Class 1 railroad in the near future.

Our civil advisor system was originally conceived for use by 911

emergency responder dispatchers. The system provides secure realtime train information and location on a geographical information

system map. Train locations are displayed, relative to detailed

highway and street information and other physical infrastructure;

for example, public buildings, hospitals, stadiums, et cetera.

Most importantly, the system can provide information on blocked

highway crossings, and in the event of a railroad emergency, it can

provide additional information, such as train manifest information,

HAZMAT detail, and the correct emergency responder contact information. The potential users are enormous: 911 dispatchers, police, railroad and transit agencies, Department of Defense, Homeland Security and Transportation, the Federal Emergency Management, the Federal Railroad and Transportation Security Administrations, to name a few.

We look forward to the further implementation and deployment

of these technologies, and encourage your Committee to enact the

legislation necessary to establish the innovative public/private partnerships, such as the Create Project in Chicago, that will provide
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a mechanism for immediate implementation for the benefit of the

rail industry and the public at large.

As always, one of the biggest challenges in deploying new safety

technology on rail systems continues to be funding. Before I conclude, I would request permission for the document I have submitted, detailing these new technologies to be included in the record.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Without objection.

Mr. HILL. Once again, I would thank the Committee for the opportunity to present today on behalf of Union Switch and Signal

and the railroad’s signal and control systems supply community.

Thank you very much for your time and support. I would be happy

to answer questions that you may have, thank you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Hill, thank you very much for your testimony. I am sure both Mr. Menendez and I will have questions.

Mr. Rader, my first question would be to you. How fast do your

trains go?

Mr. RADER. The initial train that we have designed is 110 miles

an hour.

Mr. LATOURETTE. It is my understanding that aside from the

good work that is going on in Florida, that you have also introduced, or plan to introduce, or started to introduce, a new fleet of

cars up in the Alaskan railways. Is that right?

Mr. RADER. That is correct. They were just delivered. I got a call

yesterday in route to this meeting.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Can you tell us a little something about the

cars that were delivered yesterday, and what kind of operation is

going to be conducted up in Alaska?

Mr. RADER. Yes, they are double deck, full-length, glass dome

cars, the largest passenger cars in the world, and they are designed

for the luxury tourism market. The Alaska railroad, well, let me

see, I should know, I started it, in 1983, has been towing the cars

behind their scheduled services of the various cruise companies to

Alaska.

They have now made sufficient profits from that operation to reinvest in building their own luxury tour cars, and they are entering

the market. The combined operation of all of those tour cars together has taken an operation that was losing millions of dollars

in 1983 on passenger service, and turned it into one which has a

substantial positive cash flow from passenger service.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I am glad you mentioned that. There is sort of

a great myth in this country that you cannot turn a profit with

passenger rail service. I just heard you describe what is going on

in Alaska. I mean, should we be thinking about separating passenger rail service from sort of the tourism side, as opposed to the

getting people to work side of things?

Mr. RADER. Yes, I think they are certainly two different operations, two different markets, and must be approached mentally

differently. How one approaches that, I am not sure I have the answer.

But the recognition is that, as an example, long distance trains

are not transit, but are really, I think, the tourism kind that the

Alaskan railroad has. Tourism supports the essential transportation service. So the challenge we all know is to make essential

transportation pay for itself.
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Mr. LATOURETTE. How many people can fit in one of your cars?

Mr. RADER. The double-deckers upstairs are usually 90 to 120,

and downstairs they are about 20 less. So they can fit 200 passengers comfortably.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Collins, can you give me a real world example of where Operation Respond might have assisted in an emergency situation?

Mr. COLLINS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the first one that comes to

mind is an incident in Rochester, New York. It basically ended up

on a short line railroad, where the Rochester Fire Department did

not have access to that short line railroad’s database, but they had

access to the CSX database.

They were able to go in and get the information on that particular leaking tank car to help them understand what chemicals they

were dealing with in this incident in Rochester, New York.

Similarly, in the Salt Lake City incident that just happened out

in Utah, where they had to evacuate 6,000 people with the confusion over the chemicals, the Midvale Fire Department actually

queried on our system. They queried the Union Pacific, the BNSF

and the Utah Railway, the three that we have in that jurisdiction,

to obtain information on the contents of those cars that were leading to the evacuation.

Last year, in 2004, on the freight railroad side, we had over

1,800 queries of the system. Some of this is training and some of

this is testing, which is good, because it is familiarizing people with

how to use the system. But it also is an indication of the concern

by the communities over issues that they need data on.

Mr. LATOURETTE. You mentioned, I think, that all seven Class

1 railroads have voluntarily signed agreements with you. What do

you think the reach is of Operation Respond? That would be part

one of my question. Then two, do you also cover commuter lines,

such as Metro North in New York?

Mr. COLLINS. Yes, that is true for all the Class 1 railroads in

Canada and the United States, and we recently signed an agreement with the TFM in Mexico, although we have not launched that

service yet, until we get the full Spanish version working.

The reach is going to be the reach of the full extent of the Class

1 railroads. The example that I mentioned with the short line situation, it is really the Class 1s that are originating this hazardous

materials.

They have the data. Even though they may pass it off to a short

line that is not in our system, the people that use our software understand that they can query on all railroads, for that matter, to

find out what chemical they are dealing with.

Now with the passenger train side of things, I am very pleased.

Particularly along the Northeast Corridor, we have the Virginia

Railway Express. We have MARC. We have Amtrak. We have the

Long Island Railroad in New York. We have the New Jersey Transit in New York. We have Metro North in New York. We have a

real solid base along the Northeast Corridor of all the commuter

operators that have joined our system.

We have several out west, as well. We have one in Toronto, Go

Transit, that is now in our system. There are several voids there
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that we would like to fill. We have been working with APTA on

programs to try to encompass that particular industry.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Hill, I think you mentioned that your Advance Speed Enforcement System is already deployed in the Northeast Corridor. Is

that right?

Mr. HILL. That is correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. It is my understanding that most commuter

rail systems in the country have, I think they are called wayside

signals, which are basically traffic lights at the site. But some of

the higher speed corridors like the Northeast Corridor, require cab

signals, which are more expensive to install. Does your system require the use of cab signals, or can you use it without?

Mr. HILL. It can be used definitely without. It can be installed

without any other signaling infrastructure that would be existent

today. In the Northeast Corridor, we have deployed it in conjunction with the cab signaling that is there. So you have both continuous and what we call intermittent cab signaling, which is the speed

enforcement system.

But outside of the Northeast Corridor, generally on Class 1 and

other operating railroads, there is very little cab signaling deployed.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Lastly, with the Railroad Track Integrity System that you talked about, I think it would be very important to

know if there is a missing track up ahead. Can you tell us just a

little bit about how that system works in comparison to what we

have in existence today?

Mr. HILL. Basically, the Track Integrity System is a technology

that was developed at Union Switch many years ago. It was latent.

We had not used it.

The system actually sleeps most of the time, and really is woken

up when a train would come along in Dark Territory. So it is specifically for dark or unsignaled territory.

We have deployed this technology on a trial basis, as your colleague, Mr. Graves, indicated, on the Burlington Northern Santa

Fe. There is a 50 mile test area there, where this technology is

being deployed.

Basically, as a train approaches, the technology wakes up. It

checks the track ahead, to make sure that there are no broken or

missing rails. Then the information is communicated back to the locomotive, to indicate that everything is clear ahead.

In that particular demonstration on the Burlington Northern

Santa Fe, they have already recognized or detected eight broken

rails in the period that the equipment has been installed. This obviously can be a cause for major derailments.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How far ahead can it see? I mean, is it the

whole 50 miles that you have wired, or how does it work?

Mr. HILL. One particular track circuit of this technology can

reach nearly five miles. Over a 50 mile territory we would have

like 10, what we call track circuits, or individual sections of track

that we check.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Menendez?
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Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, in Mr. Hill’s response to your question, Mr. Chairman, I thought there was only one broken rail

around here.

Mr. LATOURETTE. That is one too many.

[Laughter.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. I want to thank all the panels. Mr. Collins, let

me ask you, based on the work you have done with the industry

to develop a Railroad Incident Location Program, what would it

take, if you have any estimates, for a national program? What

would it cost and how long would it take to implement?

Mr. COLLINS. Okay, I would like to turn this over to Dr. Boons,

since he is running this program for us.

Mr. BOONE. Thank you very much, Dan. This is a good example

of taking advantage of the technology changes that are going on in

the 911 arena and with the advent of the cellular telephone.

There is a great deal of activity, as I am sure all of you on the

Subcommittee know, going on to address locations, take imagery at

the county level, and do a great deal of work in determining streets

and roads. All of this is being done to improve emergency response

as a general matter.

One of the things that we believe can be done is to take advantage of the excellent engineering data that the railroad industry already has, as Mr. Hill described, literally locating a lot of the major

features that would be needed for a responder to adequately match

a highway mile post or a street intersection with where to go to

reach a railroad incident.

This is particularly important, as the railroads have done an outstanding job in reducing grade crossings, which are the traditional

way to determine where rail and highway intersections occur, and

also locates where you are on the railroad.

That is a long way around to say that a good deal of the work

is already underway by the emergency community, and a lot of the

data exists within the railroads themselves.

We think, with a cooperative program, recognizing the security

needs of the data itself, and the fact that it is proprietary data and

needs to be brought into a uniform format, that over a period of

four to five years, we do not think it would be in excess of $30 million to $50 million to do the entire Nation.

Now, having said that, not every piece of every railroad needs to

have high resolution imagery or needs to have the same level of detail that you would have, for example, in metropolitan New Jersey

or along the shore in Ohio. But you would want to have a practical

way of doing this sufficient to meet the needs of the 911 centers

and the others who have to literally figure out how do I locate

where it is and then how do I get to it.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, I understand it is a response and

safety enterprise. Do you see any applications as it relates to security?

Mr. COLLINS. I think in the testimony, I tried to address the security side, and particularly our work with the passenger train-carrying railroads, where the schematical presentations of their equipment are contained within our software.

Then if there are incidents on board those particular pieces of

equipment, the responding law enforcement agencies could obtain
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the data, even before they went into the car: the width of the

aisles, if there were incidents with windows, understanding what

the fabrication of the windows are; all kinds of critical information

they might need.

The SWAT teams, for example, might need this before they went

in and actually put their plan of action in place.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Collins.

Mr. Rader, based upon your presentation, you should be selling

like hotcakes.

[Laughter.]

Mr. MENENDEZ. It sounds like you are on your way. I am just

wondering have you experienced, for example, in your double deck

cars, any challenges or any obstacles?

Mr. RADER. Certainly, we have. The biggest challenge we face is,

if you pick up a railroad specification today for new cars, it will ask

for five to ten years of railroad-proven service. I do not have five

to ten years of railroad-proven service in a new car.

However, that is the wonderful thing about what Congressman

Mica has helped put together in Florida. We will have that demonstration over the next two years. Then, yes, I think it will go like

hotcakes.

In fact, I think one of the real opportunities here, if you look at

the economics, the savings on these cars would literally pay the

principle and interest over the life of the car, if you were financing

it at Treasury rates.

Mr. MENENDEZ. I have just one technical question for myself.

They are self-propelled, and you talked about how there are different ones on different cars. What happens when, for argument’s

sake, one goes out? Does it continue to self-propel itself through the

independent power?

Mr. RADER. Yes, they are independently controlled. That is the

joy of it. If one goes down, the computer on the adjoining engine

says, I am not hearing from my friend. I am in control, and it takes

over.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you, Mr. Menendez. I want to thank

this panel, and I want to thank all of the witnesses on all three

panels. I learned a number of things today, and I appreciate your

being willing to share with us. I want to thank Mr. Menendez for

filling in so ably for Ms. Brown, who hopefully will be back with

us next time.

As with the other panels, there may be some questions that people may have that we will forward to you, and if you will be so kind

as to respond, we would appreciate that. There being no further

business to come before the Subcommittee, we stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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