UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

VINCENT DEWAYNE GAYLORD, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF KANSAS, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 23-3075 

(D.C. No. 5:23-CV-04018-KHV-RES) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Plaintiff Vincent DeWayne Gaylord, appearing pro se, appeals the district 

court’s dismissal of his suit against the State of Kansas. The district court dismissed 

the complaint because sovereign immunity insulated the State and Plaintiff failed to 

state a claim upon which the district court could grant relief. Exercising jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 31, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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I. 

On March 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a form complaint for pro se litigants, twelve 

pages of exhibits, and a second form complaint for pro se litigants for employment 

discrimination claims. The district court construed these three documents as the 

complaint. Plaintiff asserted claims for defamation, false-light invasion of privacy, 

an employment discrimination violation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, and a civil rights violation under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The district court—

agreeing with the magistrate judge’s recommendations—dismissed the complaint on 

two grounds. First, the district court dismissed three of the four claims under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) because the Eleventh Amendment provides the State of 

Kansas sovereign immunity from suits for monetary damages. Second, the district 

court dismissed the remaining claim for a failing to state a Title VII claim under 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff appeals. 

II. 

“Questions involving Eleventh Amendment immunity are questions of law that 

this court reviews de novo.” Cornforth v. Univ. of Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, 263 

F.3d 1129, 1131 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Sturdevant v. Paulsen, 218 F.3d 1160, 1164 

(10th Cir. 2000)). 

We also review the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 

2007) (citing Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999)). 

“Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is 

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obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be 

futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Id. (quoting Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 

1278, 1281 (10th Cir.2001)). Just as with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

dismissals, “we must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and construe 

those allegations, and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them, in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 

1222, 1224 (10th Cir.2002)). And “we liberally construe pro se filings” though “we 

do not ‘assume the role of advocate.’” Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 

(10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187–88 

(10th Cir. 2003)). 

III. 

Liberally construing Plaintiff’s brief, Plaintiff objects to the district court’s 

dismissal of his claims. While Plaintiff does not clearly appeal the dismissal of each 

cause of action, he references the total damages for which he pleaded in his 

complaint and reiterates the same general facts from his complaint. Thus, we 

presume he appeals the dismissal of each cause of action. 

The district court dismissed most of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) because the Eleventh Amendment provides the State sovereign 

immunity from suits for monetary damages. Under the Eleventh Amendment, a 

plaintiff may not sue a state in federal court unless the state consents to the suit in 

unequivocal terms or if Congress unequivocally abrogates the state’s immunity. 

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Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1315 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Muscogee (Creek) 

Nation v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2010)). 

Here, Plaintiff demands two million dollars in damages and requests no other 

form of relief. Because this is a suit for monetary damages, sovereign immunity 

blocks Plaintiff’s claims if no exception exists. One claim—the employment 

discrimination claim—survives as we have recognized that Congress abrogated 

sovereign immunity for Title VII claims. Crumpacker v. Kansas Dep’t of Hum. Res., 

338 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 

n.2 (1976)). But Plaintiff cites no unequivocal consent to suit or congressional 

abrogation of sovereign immunity for his other claims. And we see no exception. So 

sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and a 

civil rights violation under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Thus, we address only his Title VII 

discrimination claim on the merits. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in employment discrimination in 

violation of Title VII because Defendant prevented him from obtaining a teaching 

job. “Title VII makes it unlawful ‘to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin.’” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 

(10th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Essential to this claim is an 

employment relationship with Defendant. See Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 

(10th Cir. 1991) (“Since plaintiff has no employment relationship with defendants, he 

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cannot pursue a claim for discrimination against them under [] Title VII. . .”) Even 

under the most liberal reading of the complaint, Plaintiff pleaded no such 

employment relationship. And without that relationship, Plaintiff states no Title VII 

claim against Defendant upon which relief may be granted. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the State is immune from suit on all but 

one of Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which a court 

may grant relief on the other. Thus, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal. 

Entered for the Court 

Joel M. Carson III 

Circuit Judge 

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