1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

)

THE HISPANIC LEADERSHIP )

FUND, INC., ) Civ. No. 1:12-893-TSE-TRJ

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) ADDITIONAL BRIEFING

)

Defendant. )

)

ADDITIONAL BRIEF OF HISPANIC LEADERSHIP FUND IN SUPPORT OF ITS 

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

On August 31, 2012, this Court ordered additional briefing from the parties. Plaintiff

Hispanic Leadership Fund responds to the Court’s order below.1

In its Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, HLF explained that this asapplied challenge is necessary to provide “clarity on what constitutes a reference to a ‘clearly 

identified candidate,’ which is one of the four statutory elements of an ‘electioneering 

communication’ under the law and a prerequisite to invoking its corresponding disclosure and 

reporting requirements.” HLF.’s Brief at 2 (ECF 4, 2). In recognition of previous facial 

challenges compelling narrowing judicial constructions of “clearly identified candidate,”2 HLF 

noted that it “does not, in this matter, challenge the constitutionality of the electioneering 

communications provisions.” Id. This note was intended to disclaim only a full facial challenge 

 1 For the convenience of the Court, HLF has attached Proposed Order as Attachment A hereto

that narrowly grants HLF’s request without deciding any questions of law beyond those 

specifically posed by the Complaint.

2 As HLF notes below, the phrase clearly identified candidate is contained throughout the FECA, 

and this Court’s interpretation of the term of art will have a significant impact on the future 

application of these provisions of law as well.

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to BCRA’s electioneering communication provision.3 HLF does not argue that the 

electioneering communication provision is unconstitutional when properly applied. Rather, HLF 

argues that the FEC’s interpretation of the component statutory definition at issue here, as 

applied to HLF’s proposed advertisements, unconstitutionally expands the scope of what the 

Supreme Court has previously held is the proper constitutional interpretation of the phrase 

“clearly identified candidate.”

I. HISPANIC LEADERSHIP FUND HAS ARTICLE III STANDING TO BRING 

THIS AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE

HLF has Article III standing to bring this as-applied challenge because it satisfies the 

Lujan factors: (1) plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected 

interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical; (2) there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of 

— the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the 

independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to 

merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal citations omitted)

Although the Supreme Court resolved a facial challenge to BCRA’s electioneering 

communications provisions in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), the Court subsequently 

held that these provisions remain subject to as-applied challenges. See FEC v. Wisconsin Right 

To Life, (WRTL II) 551 U.S. 449, 456-57 (2007). Accordingly, HLF is not precluded from 

 3 HLF’s disclaimer of any facial challenge is clear in Paragraph 1 of HLF’s Complaint: “This is a 

pre-enforcement, as-applied challenge to a [FECA] definitional statute at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(18) 

and 434(f) and the [FEC’s] parallel implementing regulations at 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.17 and 

100.29...”

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challenging the constitutionality of the FEC’s statutory interpretation and application of the term 

“clearly identified candidate” to its proposed advertisements. 

In the special realm of First Amendment speech, the Supreme Court made clear that 

relaxed standing requirements apply to pre-enforcement challenges. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. 

Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (explaining the expansion of standing principles as-applied for 

First Amendment challenges); Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 393 

(1988) (holding that self-censorship is a sufficient allegation of harm); Chamber of Commerce v. 

FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 603-04 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“A party has standing to challenge, preenforcement, even the constitutionality of a statute if First Amendment rights are arguably 

chilled, so long as there is a credible threat of prosecution”). The allegations set forth by HLF in 

its Complaint and its Brief satisfy each of the required elements of standing.

A. HLF’S INJURY IN FACT IS ESTABLISHED BY THE CREDIBLE 

THREAT OF PROSECUTION

HLF satisfies the injury in fact requirement for standing by showing “an invasion of a 

legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal citations omitted). HLF is not 

required to subject itself to prosecution in order to present a justiciable case or controversy. 

Rather, pre-enforcement challengers must allege their “intention to engage in a course of conduct 

affected with a constitutional interest” and must satisfy the court that there is a “credible threat of 

prosecution” under the challenged law. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 

289, 298 (1979). In establishing standing in a First Amendment pre-enforcement challenge, HLF 

is also entitled to the presumption of a credible threat of prosecution where the challenged law 

as-applied clearly “restricts a party from engaging in expressive activity.” Virginia Society for 

Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2001).

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HLF intends to distribute the proposed communications as constitutionally-protected 

“issue advocacy” communications that do not trigger the reporting, disclaimer, and disclosure 

requirements of the “electioneering communications” provisions because the communications do 

not “refer to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office.” Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 7. However, 

under the view of three FEC Commissioners, as represented by the FEC’s counsel as the 

Commission’s position,

4 HLF’s proposed communications would qualify as electioneering 

communications, and HLF’s failure to include allegedly required disclaimers and file certain 

disclosure reports would violate federal campaign finance laws.

HLF faces several specific threats. First, the Commission may commence an 

investigation by majority vote pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g.

5

 Second, a private right of action 

exists pursuant to Section 437g for individuals dissatisfied with the FEC’s inaction.

6

 Finally, we 

have no indication that the Department of Justice would refrain from prosecuting HLF for failing 

to report and disclose in the manner required by statute for electioneering communications.

In North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 709 (4th Cir. 1999), the 

plaintiff refrained from distributing communications and sought declaratory pre-enforcement 

relief from the District Court after receiving advice from the State Elections Commission that 

was unclear. Id. at 709-11. The Fourth Circuit rejected defendant’s arguments that no case or 

 4 As noted in the initial Brief of HLF and in the Statement of Commissioner McGahn on 

Advisory Opinion 2012-19, the position being advocated here by the FEC is contrary to the 

position it has previously advanced before numerous courts. Under the Supreme Court’s 

decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012), this raises serious 

due process issues.

5 Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (recognizing a cognizable 

injury despite the Commission’s split vote on whether to issue an Advisory Opinion: “Nothing . . 

. prevents the Commission from enforcing its rule at any time with, perhaps, another change of 

mind of one of the Commissioners. The rule constitutes the purported legal norm that binds the 

class regulated by statute.”).

6 See id. citing FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982).

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controversy existed, explaining: “In this case, NCRL has discontinued distributing its voter guide

and NCRLPAC has stopped soliciting without providing a disclaimer because of a credible threat

of prosecution. Consequently, a case or controversy inheres in each provision.” Id. at 711. 

Similarly, in Virginia Society for Human Life, the Circuit Court held that a case or controversy 

existed even where the FEC adopted a policy of nonenforcement of a particular regulation at 

issue. In these circumstances, the court determined that a credible threat of prosecution still 

existed. Virginia Society for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 387-90 (4th Cir. 2001).

7

 

Further, there is no impediment to HLF’s standing due to the fact that a particular 

interpretation of a statute would precede the initiation of any future prosecution. See American 

Booksellers, 484 U.S. at 392 (“If [the state’s] interpretation of the statute is correct, [the speaker] 

will have to take significant and costly compliance measures or risk criminal prosecution.”). The 

uncertainty of the interpretation that will be applied to HLF’s proposed communications is clear 

from the FEC’s failure to render a determination on the advisory opinion request (“AOR”) 

submitted by American Future Fund (“AFF”). Compl. at 31-40. HLF attested that its proposed 

advertisements are materially indistinguishable from those proposed by AFF in AOR 2012-19. 

HLF’s Brief at 7. 

 7 See also South Carolina Citizens for Life, Inc. v. Krawcheck, 301 Fed. Appx. 218, 220 (4th Cir. 

2008) (unpublished opinion). In that case this Circuit reversed and remanded to the District 

Court for failure to recognize the existence of a case or controversy. Id. at 220 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(internal citation omitted). The Circuit Court extended its analysis of ripeness as to also establish 

standing pursuant to North Carolina Right to Life and Virginia Society for Human Life. See id. 

at 220, 222 n. 6 (“The justiciability doctrines designed to assess whether an actual case or 

controversy exists” include “ripeness, along with standing . . . as doctrines that cluster about 

Article III”). Here, as in Krawcheck, a case or controversy exists in the first amendment preenforcement context based on the analyses set forth in North Carolina Right to Life and Virginia 

Society for Human Life.

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The Commission’s failure to provide an affirmative four-vote, binding advisory opinion 

in response to the bulk of AFF’s AOR leaves HLF, as a similarly situated organization, exposed 

to particularized civil enforcement actions and/or criminal penalties pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g 

for its proposed conduct.8 See Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121, 127 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting 

“the six-member Commission failed to issue a binding four-vote advisory opinion . . . . As a 

result, the Commission left [requestors] liable for possible enforcement actions against them” 

should requestors proceed with their proposed activity). 

Because First Amendment speech is chilled prior to enforcement, HLF need only show 

the credible threat of prosecution that is apparent in its proposed communications that are 

materially indistinguishable from those that were the subject of AFF’s AOR. See 2 U.S.C. § 

437f(c)(1)(B); Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1206 (4th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the FEC has 

failed to rebut the presumption of a credible threat of prosecution established by HLF in its 

alleged course of conduct.

B. THIS COURT’S FAVORABLE DETERMINATION PROTECTS HLF 

FROM FURTHER INJURY, EVINCING A CAUSAL CONNECTION 

BETWEEN INJURY AND CONDUCT.

The credible threat of prosecution HLF faces is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the” conduct 

HLF intends to take, and is not “the result [of] the independent action of some third party not 

before the court.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal citations omitted). Further, it is at least 

“likely, as opposed to merely speculative,” that the credible threat of prosecution, as it applies to 

HLF, will be “redressed by a favorable decision” of this Court. Id. This Court’s determination, 

as a matter of constitutional interpretation, that HLF’s proposed communications do not “refer to 

 8 Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437f(c)(1)(B), “Any advisory opinion rendered by the Commission . . . 

may be relied upon by— (B) any person involved in any specific transaction or activity which is 

indistinguishable in all its material aspects from the transaction or activity with respect to which 

such advisory opinion is rendered.”

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a clearly identified candidate for Federal office,” will free HLF from possible civil and criminal 

prosecution under the electioneering communications provisions of the FECA and its 

implementing provisions. 

In the absence of the Court’s intervention and issuance of a determination, HLF must 

censor itself from engaging in constitutionally protected issue advocacy. See Minnesota Citizens

Concerned for Live v. Swanson, no. 10-3126, slip op. at 14-15 (8th Cir., September 5, 2012) 

(“Unlike compliance with the mandatory tax laws, the laws at issue here give Minnesota 

associations a choice—either comply with cumbersome ongoing regulatory burdens or sacrifice 

protected core First Amendment activity. This is a particularly difficult choice for smaller 

businesses and associations for whom political speech is not a major purpose nor a frequent 

activity. Such a disincentive for political speech demands our attention.”) (reversing denial of a 

preliminary injunction). Accordingly, there is a clear causal connection between HLF’s 

proposed conduct and the credible threat of prosecution for undertaking such conduct.

HLF’s injury in fact is the credible threat of prosecution for engaging in the proposed 

conduct, and HLF is entitled to the presumption that such a threat exists. This Court’s favorable 

determination would, as a matter of law, redress HLF’s injury by removing that threat of 

prosecution. Thus, HLF’s standing to bring this as applied pre-enforcement constitutional 

challenge under Article III is well established and supported by the allegations contained in 

HLF’s pleadings.

II. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IS PROPER 

AND SHOULD BE GRANTED

Granting Plaintiff a declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2201-2202, would be a proper exercise of the court’s power. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) provides, 

“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon 

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the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any 

interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 

This Court has discretionary power to grant a declaratory judgment if the case presents an 

actual controversy, is within the court’s jurisdiction, and exercising jurisdiction is not an abuse of 

discretion.9

 The Fourth Circuit opined that “this discretion should be liberally exercised to 

effectuate the purposes of the statute and thereby afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity 

with respect to rights, status and other legal relations.” Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 

92 F.2d 321, 324 (4th Cir. 1937)

A court’s power to decide actual controversies in the Declaratory Judgment Act is 

consonant with the power to hear cases and controversies under Article III of the Constitution. 

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). As such, the controversy must be 

“one that is appropriate for judicial determination,” which means it is “definite and concrete, 

touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests” and not merely “of a 

hypothetical or abstract character.” Id. at 240-41; see also Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 130 S. 

Ct. 576, 581 (2009). “It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief 

through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the 

law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” Aetna Life Ins., 300 U.S. at 241.

An actual controversy exists in this case. After Defendant FEC failed to reach a decision 

in Advisory Opinion 2012-19 (American Future Fund) on the applicability of 2 U.S.C. §§ 

431(18) and 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(I) to advertisements that are materially indistinguishable from 

HLF’s proposed advertisements, HLF’s constitutionally protected free speech was and is chilled 

by the threat of possible legal action against it. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 

 9 See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287-88 (1995); Volvo Constr. Equip. North 

America v. CLM Equip. Co., 386 F.3d 581, 592 (4th Cir. 2004). 

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(2010); American Booksellers, 484 U.S. at 393. This controversy is definite and concrete and

not hypothetical or abstract – it concerns the applicability of specific provisions of law to 

specific proposed advertisements. If HLF airs its advertisements with the understanding that 

they are not electioneering communications, it could be subjected to lengthy and costly 

government investigations, civil penalties, and potential criminal liability. With a declaratory 

judgment on which to rely, HLF could proceed with airing its advertisements without the threat 

of investigation and prosecution that is, at present, causing HLF to self-censor its speech.

For the Declaratory Judgment Act to apply, a case must also be within a court’s 

jurisdiction and a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a case must not be an abuse of discretion. 

This court clearly has jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this case arises 

under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and federal statutory law (the 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended). Further, this court is the proper venue for 

hearing this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Defendant is an entity of the United States 

Government and Plaintiff resides in this district.

When deciding whether to grant a declaratory judgment in the context of administrative 

decision-making, a court must consider “both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and 

the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 

387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) (portions of the court’s opinion not affecting its declaratory judgment 

analysis have been overturned by statute, see Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)). 

“Fitness for judicial decision means, most often, that the issue is legal rather than factual. 

Sufficient hardship is usually found if the regulation . . . chills protected First Amendment 

activity.” Minnesota Concerned Citizens for Life, 113 F.3d at 132.

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Here, the administrative decision-making process is complete and the issues for 

determination are solely legal issues. Defendant FEC fully considered materially 

indistinguishable advertisements in Advisory Opinion 2012-19 and failed to reach a decision 

regarding the applicability of the federal campaign finance laws to most of those advertisements. 

HLF may rely on the FEC’s failure to reach a determination on materially indistinguishable 

advertisements in Advisory Opinion 2012-19; no circumstances have changed to indicate that the 

FEC would vote differently on a materially indistinguishable advisory opinion request. See 2 

U.S.C. § 437f(c)(1)(B). Accordingly, no further action by Defendant FEC is pending or 

available. No facts are in dispute in this case. The legal issues in this case, the application of the 

law to Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, are fit for judicial decision. If court consideration is 

withheld, HLF is harmed through risking investigation and prosecution by airing its 

advertisements as issue advocacy rather than electioneering communications, or by selfcensoring and being irreparably harmed through deprivation of its First Amendment rights. 

Legend Night Club v. Miller, 637 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 

993, 995 (4th Cir. 1978).

In the Fourth Circuit, a declaratory judgment action “is appropriate ‘when the judgment 

will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and . . . when it 

will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to 

the proceeding.’” Centennial Life Ins. Co. v. Poston, 88 F.3d 255, 256 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting 

Quarles, 92 F.2d at 325). A declaratory judgment action is inappropriate when used “to try a 

controversy by piecemeal, or to try particular issues without settling the entire controversy, or to 

interfere with an action which has already been instituted.” Quarles, 92 F.2d at 325.

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The nature of HLF’s legal rights and responsibilities is currently unclear, and a 

declaratory judgment would clarify and settle them and remove all uncertainty. Under Fourth 

Circuit standards, exercising the court’s discretionary power to issue a declaratory judgment in 

this case would be an entirely appropriate exercise of this Court’s discretion. Invocation of the 

Declaratory Judgment Act in the context of challenges to federal campaign finance law is 

routine.10 Further, it is not uncommon for district courts to grant declaratory judgments in 

matters involving issues of campaign finance law.11 For these reasons, this court is empowered 

to grant Plaintiff the declaratory judgment it requests.

III. BCRA’S SPECIAL RULES REGARDING THREE-JUDGE PANEL REVIEW 

ARE OPTIONAL AND PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEEM THAT OPTION TO BE 

THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS FOR RESOLUTION

Section 403 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) provides 

“special rules for actions brought on constitutional grounds” and specifies that “[w]ith respect to 

any action initially filed on or before December 31, 2006,” “[i]f any action is brought for 

declaratory or injunctive relief to challenge the constitutionality of any provision of this Act,” 

“[t]he action shall be filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and 

 10 See, e.g., Verified Compl. for Decl. & Inj. Relief at 19, Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. 

D.C. 2011) (No. 11-259) (requesting declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent 

injunctions; court granted preliminary injunction); Verified Compl. for Decl. & Inj. Relief at 19, 

Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 736 (E.D. Va. 2011) (No. 08-483), aff’d 

sub nom Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012) (requesting 

declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions; court dismissed all of 

plaintiff’s claims); Compl. for Decl. & Inj. Relief at 12, Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d. 22 (D. 

D.C. 2007) (No. 06-1185), rev’d Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (requesting declaratory 

judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions; court dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims).

11 See, e.g., Virginia Soc’y. for Human Life, 263 F.3d at 390-94 (upholding district court’s 

declaratory judgment regarding unconstitutionality of “express advocacy” definition but limiting 

application of the accompanying injunction to plaintiff alone); Minnesota Citizens Concerned for 

Life v. FEC, 113 F.3d 129, 130 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s declaratory judgment 

holding requirements for exemption to independent expenditures prohibition unconstitutional). 

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shall be heard by a 3-judge court . . . .” BCRA § 403(a), (d), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 

113-14 (2002). 

However, “[w]ith respect to any action initially filed after December 31, 2006, the 

provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to any action described in such section unless the 

person filing such action elects such provisions to apply to the action.” BCRA § 403(d)(2) 

(emphasis added). Since January 1, 2007, BCRA’s special review rules have not been 

mandatory, but are still available at the plaintiff’s election. Early cases challenging BCRA were 

reviewed by a three-judge panel in the District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to 

BCRA’s mandatory judicial review provision.

12 In cases filed since January 1, 2007, however,

three-judge panel review is no longer mandated by the statute, and some cases have been 

considered by three-judge panels, while others have been considered by a single judge.13

A three-judge panel of the District Court for the District of Columbia was available in 

this case at, and only at, Plaintiff’s election. Plaintiff believes this matter involves a narrow, 

discrete issue that can be most expeditiously resolved by a single judge sitting in the Eastern 

District of Virginia. In addition, given the nature of the narrow and discrete issue involved, 

Plaintiff did not believe this matter to be one that would benefit greatly from the prospect of an 

“appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.” BCRA § 403(a)(3). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff exercised its option under BCRA § 403(d) to have its case reviewed under normal 

procedures in this court.

 12 See, e.g., FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 460 (2007); Davis, 554 U.S. at 

732 (filed June 28, 2006); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 132 (2003) (filed Mar. 27, 2002).

13 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010) (filed Dec. 13, 2007; three-judge 

panel); Real Truth About Abortion, 681 F.3d at 546-48 (filed July 30, 2008 in E.D. Va.; single 

judge); Koerber v. FEC, 583 F. Supp. 2d 740, 743-44 (D. N.C. 2008) (filed Oct. 3, 2008; single 

judge); McCutcheon v. FEC, No. 12-1034 (D. D.C. filed June 22, 2012; three-judge panel); 

James v. FEC, No. 12-1451 (D. D.C. filed Aug. 31, 2012; three-judge panel).

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IV. IN PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED ADVERTISEMENTS, THE PHRASES AT ISSUE

DO NOT REFER TO A CLEARLY IDENTIFIED CANDIDATE FOR FEDERAL 

OFFICE

The statutory language directly at issue in this matter, “refers to a clearly identified 

candidate” and “clearly identified,” originates in the FECA’s provisions regulating contributions 

and expenditures. Specifically, FECA’s original provisions prohibited a person from spending 

more than $1,000 in a calendar year “relative to a clearly identified candidate.” Buckley v. Valeo, 

424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976). The statute defined “clearly identified” to mean:

(A) the name of the candidate involved appears;

(B) a photograph or drawing of the candidate appears; or

(C) the identity of the candidate is apparent by unambiguous reference.

2 U.S.C. § 431(18).14

In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of FECA and 

provided critical constitutional constructions of key terms that have guided campaign finance law 

for decades. With respect to the independent expenditure provision described above, the Court 

emphasized that the statutory language must be precise so that potential speakers may be aware 

of their potential liabilities. Otherwise, a potential speaker is left:

[W]holly at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and consequently of 

whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent and meaning. “Such a distinction offers 

no security for free discussion. In these conditions it blankets with uncertainty whatever 

may be said. It compels the speaker to hedge and trim.” 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945). 

 14 The term “clearly identified candidate” is used in numerous sections of the FECA and its 

implementing regulations, and this court’s construction of the provision here will impact these 

other portions of the FECA and its implementing regulations as well. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. 

431(17)(A) (definition of independent expenditure); 2 U.S.C. 431(20) (definition of federal 

election activity); 2 U.S.C. 441i(b)(2)(B)(i-ii) (exceptions for state, district and local political 

committees); 11 C.F.R. 100.22(b) (definition of expressly advocating); 11 C.F.R. 100.25 

(definition of generic campaign activity); 11 C.F.R. 100.134 (internal communications by 

corporations, labor organizations, and membership organizations); 11 C.F.R. 109.21 (definition 

of coordinated communication).

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The Court further explained, 

The constitutional deficiencies described in Thomas v. Collins can be avoided only by 

reading § 608(e)(1) [regarding limits on making an expenditure “relative to a clearly 

identified candidate”] as limited to communications that include explicit words of 

advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate, much as the definition of “clearly 

identified” in § 608(e)(2) requires that an explicit and unambiguous reference to the 

candidate appear as part of the communication. 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43. In footnote 51 of Buckley, the Court provided further explanation as to 

what is meant by an “explicit and unambiguous reference to the candidate”:

Section 608(e)(2) defines “clearly identified” to require that the candidate’s name, 

photograph or drawing, or other unambiguous reference to his identity appear as part of 

the communication. Such other unambiguous reference would include use of the 

candidate’s initials (e.g., FDR), the candidate’s nickname (e.g., Ike), his office (e.g., the 

President or the Governor of Iowa), or his status as a candidate (e.g., the Democratic 

Presidential nominee, the senatorial candidate of the Republican Party of Georgia).

Id. at 44 n.51. 

This clear formulation, requiring that individuals actually be identified has 

been applied without subsequent judicial construction or re-interpretation, 

including by the FEC.15 In FEC Matter Under Review 1830 (NRCC), the FEC’s 

Office of General Counsel wrote:

The [advertisement] contains no visual image or verbal identification of anyone

purporting to be a Democratic Congressman. Nor does this ad make apparent any 

candidates’ identity by unambiguous reference, because the ad simply makes no 

reference at all to a candidate by name, photograph, or office. The ad does use the word 

“House” in referring to Democratic control thereof. However, this is a reference to the 

institution, as opposed to a reference to the office or office holder. The primary focus of 

this ad is the Democrats’ tax program, as distinguished from [another] ad which focuses 

on the support of the program by the viewer’s “Congressman.” 

 15 See, e.g., North Carolina Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 298-99 (4th Cir. 2008)

(“Indeed, BCRA § 203 only regulates communications that refer to specific individuals (‘clearly 

identified candidates’”)) (emphasis added); Unity08 v. FEC, 596 F.3d 861, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(“we find that Unity08 is not subject to regulation as a political committee unless and until it 

selects a ‘clearly identified’ candidate”); FEC v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 713 F. Supp. 428, 433 

(D. D.C. 1989) (requiring that to clearly identify a candidate, “[a]n explicit and unambiguous 

reference to the candidate must be mentioned in the communication”).

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15

First General Counsel’s Report in MUR 1830, at 8 (1985) (emphasis added). The Commission 

voted 6-0 to find no reason to believe there had been a violation, accepting the recommendation 

of the General Counsel. HLF’s proposed ads are no different in that they also reference 

institutions (the White House, the government and the administration) as opposed to “the office 

or officeholder.”16 The weight of both judicial and agency interpretation makes plain that a 

candidate is “clearly identified” only by an explicit and unambiguous reference to a specific 

office or individual.17 No such references are present in HLF’s proposed ads.

B. “EXPLICIT” EXCLUDES CONTEXT-BASED INTERPRETATIONS AND 

REFERENCES WHICH ARE MERELY IMPLIED OR APPARENT

Under Buckley, the Supreme Court’s construction of the aforementioned “expenditure” 

provisions limited “express advocacy” to “explicit words of advocacy,” and “clearly identified 

candidate” to an “explicit and unambiguous reference to the candidate.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43 

(emphasis added). With respect to the scope of “express advocacy,” the Fourth Circuit 

determined that “code words” were insufficient to trigger the “express advocacy” provision, 

which covers only explicit words of advocacy for or against a candidate’s election. FEC v. 

Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049, 1062-64 (4th Cir. 1997) (“CAN”). 

The television advertisement in CAN included the following language:

 16 See also Advisory Opinion 2004-33 (Ripon) ("The Commission determines that, unlike the

examples listed in section 100.29(b)(2) (i.e. 'the President,' 'your Congressman,' 'the Republican 

candidate for Senate in the State of Georgia,' or 'the incumbent'), 'Republicans in Congress' does 

not constitute an unambiguous reference to any specific Federal candidate.); Advisory Opinion 

1985-14 (DCCC) (determining that advertisements using the taglines “your Republican 

Congressman” or “the Republicans in Congress” are not subject to the Act’s limitations on 

expenditures for political advertisements under a standard that required such advertisements to 

depict “a clearly identified candidate” in order to come within the Act’s limitations).

17 See Statement of Commissioner McGahn on Advisory Opinion 2012-19 at 11-12 for a 

compilation of representations the FEC made to the judiciary previously in defending the 

electioneering communications statute against constitutional challenges.

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16

Bill Clinton’s vision for America includes job quotas for homosexuals, giving 

homosexuals special civil rights, allowing homosexuals in the armed forces. Al Gore 

supports homosexual couples’ adopting children and becoming foster parents. Is this your 

vision for a better America? For more information on traditional family values, contact 

the Christian Action Network.

Id. at 1058. 

The FEC contended, among other things, that the language of the advertisement above 

expressly advocated the defeat of President Clinton because it used “codewords” such as 

“vision” and “quota” and the “issues raised . . . are relevant only if candidate Clinton became 

president.” FEC v. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946. 956 (W.D. Va. 1995), aff’d

CAN, 110 F.3d at 1062-64. The court rejected the FEC’s argument, repeatedly noting the 

advertisement’s lack of “any explicit words or language advocating Governor Clinton’s defeat.” 

CAN, 110 F.3d at 1056. The Court ruled that the use of “codewords” “cannot, by its very 

definition, be said to express a direct message.” Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. at 956.

Of the FEC’s position in CAN, the Fourth Circuit wrote:

Stripped of its circumlocution, the FEC’s argument was (and is) that the determination of 

whether a given communication constitutes “express advocacy” depends upon all of the 

circumstances, internal and external to the communication, that could reasonably be 

considered to bear upon the recipient’s interpretation of the message. The right to engage 

in political speech would turn on an interpretation of the “imagery” employed by the 

speaker . . . . This is little more than an argument that the FEC will know “express 

advocacy” when it sees it.

CAN, 110 F.3d at 1056-57. The FEC urges the exact same kind of standard here in an effort to 

do away with Buckley’s requirement that a candidate reference must be “explicit and 

unambiguous.” The analysis set forth in Draft B, and defended by FEC counsel here, appeals to 

the full “context” of the proposed advertisements and contends that implied, apparent, or 

ambiguous references are actually explicit and unambiguous references to an unidentified, but 

nevertheless clearly identified, candidate. In addition, the FEC advances the exact same kind of 

argument that the Fourth Circuit criticized and rejected in CAN: 

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The FEC’s enforcement action against the Christian Action Network in this case brings 

into relief the extent to which, under the FEC’s interpretation of “express advocacy,”

political speech would become hostage to the vicissitudes of the Commission, because, 

although a viewer could interpret the Network’s video as election advocacy of the defeat 

of Governor Clinton, another viewer could just as readily interpret the video as issue 

advocacy on the question of homosexual rights. . . . [T]he FEC’s interpretation of these 

advertisements is exactly that contemplated by the Court when it warned of the 

constitutional pitfalls in subjecting a speaker’s message to the unpredictability of 

audience interpretation.

Id. at 1057 (emphasis added).

18

C. THE ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATION STANDARD

In 2002, partly in response to the limited scope of the “express advocacy” standard, 

Congress enacted BCRA, which included the electioneering communication provision at issue 

here. That provision covers any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that:

(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office;

(II) is made within--

(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the 

candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or 

caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought 

by the candidate; and

(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than 

President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate. 

2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 

Thus, while unquestionably intended to expand the scope of Congress’s regulation 

beyond “express advocacy,” the second element of an “electioneering communication” is 

 18 The FEC distinguishes its position in CAN and this case. In CAN, the FEC contends, it relied 

on codeword analysis where an expert analyzed alleged “codewords” such as “vision” and 

“quota” that the expert claimed “had particular meanings at the time of that election that would 

resonate with viewers by associating certain policies and issues with the candidates.” In this 

case, however, the FEC contends that HLF is using “synonyms for other terms,” and is therefore 

subject to FEC regulation. Def.’s Opp. To Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 17 n.4 (ECF 14, 20). The 

difference between “codewords” and “synonyms” notwithstanding, the FEC appears to fully 

acknowledge in the aforementioned footnote that HLF’s proposed advertisements do not contain 

“explicit and unambiguous references to a candidate” but instead contain “synonyms.” (At least 

one FEC Commissioner disagrees with this assessment, making the rather obvious point that 

with respect to “the government” and “President Obama,” “the two are not synonymous.” 

Statement of Commissioner McGahn on Advisory Opinion 2012-19 at 14.)

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described with an established term of art drawn from the well-known world of “express 

advocacy.” In choosing this language, Congress adopted and incorporated the phrase’s history 

and meaning into the new provision.19 Accordingly, the presence or absence of a reference to a 

clearly identified candidate within the “electioneering communications” context is to be 

determined by the same rigorous standard required by footnote 51 of Buckley v. Valeo, and 

upheld and applied by courts ever since. 

The incorporation of this rigorous standard is not simply the unintended result of a 

judicial rule of construction. Rather, it is readily apparent from BCRA’s legislative history that 

Congress consciously adopted this term and its prior judicial construction. During the Senate 

floor debates, Senator Feingold, one of the main sponsors of BCRA (known colloquially as the 

McCain-Feingold Act), made absolutely clear that the “clearly identified candidate” standard 

used in the electioneering communication provision was the same standard that had long existed:

In the bill, the phrase “refers to” precedes the phrase “clearly identified” candidate. That 

latter phrase is precisely defined in the Federal Campaign Election Act to mean a 

communication that includes the name of a federal candidate for office, a photograph or 

drawing of the candidate, or some other words or images that identify the candidate by 

“unambiguous reference.” A communication that “refers to a clearly identified 

candidate” is one that mentions, identifies, cites, or directs the public to the candidate’s 

name, photograph, drawing, or otherwise makes an “unambiguous reference” to the 

candidate’s identity.

148 Cong. Rec. S2144 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 

 19 See Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944) (noting “the general rule 

that adoption of the wording of a statute . . . carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of 

the wording”).

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Senator Snowe, one of the original sponsors of the electioneering communications 

(Snowe-Jeffords) provision, was well aware of the legal theory supporting the constitutionality 

of that provision20 when she stated: 

Already I have established how our provision is not even remotely vague. . . . Any 

sponsor will know, with absolute certainty, whether the ad depicts or names a candidate . 

. . . There is little danger that a sponsor would mistakenly censor its own protected 

speech out of fear of prosecution under such a clear standard . . . .Snowe-Jeffords keys 

in on the naming of candidates as one of the triggers of our disclosure regulations.

148 Cong. Rec. S2136 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Snowe) (emphasis added).

The FEC first adopted regulations implementing BCRA’s electioneering communication 

provision in 2002. The Explanation and Justification for those regulations makes clear that 

disputes like the one before this Court were never supposed to arise. The FEC explained:

“[C]learly identified” means the candidate’s name, nickname, photograph, or drawing 

appears, or the identity of the candidate is otherwise apparent through an unambiguous 

reference such as “the President,” “your Congressman,” or “the incumbent,” or through 

an unambiguous reference to his or her status as a candidate such as “the Democratic 

presidential nominee” or “the Republican candidate for Senate in the State of Georgia.”

The final rule tracks the language of the current rule in 11 CFR 100.17.

Final Rule on Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65190, 65192 (Oct. 23, 2002). By 

tying the phrase “clearly identified” as used in the electioneering communications statute to the 

definition of that phrase already present at 11 C.F.R. § 100.17, the FEC made clear that the 

definition of the phrase had not changed and was to have the same meaning in both the 

electioneering communication and express advocacy/independent expenditure context. Second, 

the FEC emphasized that the definition of “clearly identified” “would not be based on the intent 

or purpose of the person making the communication.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 65192. Thus, there was no 

 20 See 147 Cong. Rec. S2456 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (statement of Senator Snowe) (“We must 

recognize that, as a legal matter, Congress is not foreclosed from adopting a definition of 

‘electioneering’ or ‘express advocacy’ that goes beyond the ‘magic words’ test . . . as long as 

vagueness and overbreadth concerns are met . . . .”) (quoting a 2000 Brennan Center report).

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question at the time that the FEC’s regulation reflected the required objective, bright-line test 

that was supposed to be easily applied in practice by any would-be speaker.

The constitutionality of the electioneering communications provision was challenged on 

its face in McConnell v. FEC and the plaintiffs argued that Buckley v. Valeo had established a 

constitutional rule limiting government regulation of electoral speech to express advocacy. The 

Supreme Court rejected this argument and explained that Buckley’s introduction of the express 

advocacy concept was a matter of statutory construction undertaken to save the constitutionality 

of the statute. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 190-191 (2003). In defending the new law, the 

FEC explained that the electioneering communication criteria did not suffer from the same 

vagueness concerns that were at issue in Buckley. Brief of Government Defendants at 131-32, 

McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. 02-0582) (“FEC Brief”). The FEC 

wrote, “These criteria are absolutely clear, individually and collectively, and no one wishing to 

avoid violations of BCRA need guess at where these four defining characteristics have drawn the 

line . . . . ‘[P]erfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations 

that restrict expressive activity.’ Yet ’perfect clarity’ and ’precise guidance’ are exactly what 

BCRA provides.” FEC Brief at 155 (internal citation omitted). Similarly, the Solicitor General 

contended that the absence of a candidate’s name in an advertisement provided the speaker a 

“safe harbor.” During oral argument in McConnell, Justice Souter asked the Solicitor General, 

“[D]oesn’t the primary definition today, in effect, give a corporation or a union that wants to run 

an issue ad a safe harbor simply by virtue of not mentioning the name? Say, let’s hear it for 

nuclear power and don’t let anybody else tell you otherwise. That’s safe, isn’t it?” The Solicitor 

General responded, “That’s exactly right. That is safe . . . .” Tr. of Oral Argument at 164, 

McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (No. 02-1674) (emphasis added). In other words, and directly contrary 

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to what the FEC argues now, the Government has previously maintained that one may rather 

easily avoid application of the “electioneering communications” provisions “simply by virtue of 

not mentioning the name.” 

The Supreme Court upheld the electioneering communication statute against the 

McConnell plaintiffs’ facial challenge precisely because it was not unconstitutionally vague:

[W]e observe that new FECA § 304(f)(3)’s definition of “electioneering communication” 

raises none of the vagueness concerns that drove our analysis in Buckley. The term 

“electioneering communication” applies only (1) to a broadcast (2) clearly identifying a 

candidate for federal office, (3) aired within a specific time period, and (4) targeted to an 

identified audience of at least 50,000 viewers or listeners. These components are both 

easily understood and objectively determinable.

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194.

The Supreme Court, however, has since held that the electioneering communication 

provisions of BCRA remain vulnerable to constitutional as-applied challenges. See, e.g.,

Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 456-57.

21 

As originally conceived, drafted, and implemented by regulation, the validity of BCRA’s 

electioneering communication has always been understood to rest on its precision and clarity. In 

defending the provision against assertions of unconstitutionality, the Government assured the 

courts that there was no danger of unconstitutional vagueness because the electioneering 

communication standard is a perfectly clear, bright-line standard that offers precise guidance. In 

the absence of this precision and clarity, the electioneering communication provision loses its 

central (and perhaps only) virtue and is re-opened to vagueness challenges. Here, however, 

when asked to apply a provision that allegedly offers “perfect clarity” and “precise guidance,” 

the FEC divided 3-3. 

 21 Both times since the Supreme Court’s decision in WRTL II regarding as-applied challenges 

that the electioneering communication law has been before the Court, the challengers have 

substantially prevailed. See WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 456-57; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914. 

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Three Commissioners supported Draft B, which reflects a view of the law that is wholly 

detached from the requirements of footnote 51 of Buckley, BCRA’s legislative history, prior 

enforcement actions, and the prior representations the Government made to the courts. These 

three Commissioners’ views are now represented here by the FEC’s counsel, who continues to 

advance a view of the law that is wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation, and which in turn 

raises the very First Amendment vagueness concerns that are supposed to be altogether absent. 

This unsupported view of the law alters both the long-established understanding of 

“clearly identified” and the intended scope and operation of the “electioneering communication” 

statute and does so with absolutely no prior notice to would-be speakers. Administrative 

agencies cannot simply change the law without prior notice to the public through the notice and 

comment rulemaking process.22 “A fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which 

regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.” FCC

v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012). The Supreme Court continued:

This requirement of clarity in regulation is essential to the protections provided by the 

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It requires the invalidation of laws that are 

impermissibly vague. . . . Even when speech is not at issue, the void for vagueness 

doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that 

regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; 

second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in 

an arbitrary or discriminatory way. When speech is involved, rigorous adherence to 

those requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Prior to the FEC’s consideration of Advisory Opinion 2012-19, the FEC never gave any 

notice whatsoever that references consisting of something other than the candidate’s name, 

nickname, photograph or drawing, or a genuinely unambiguous reference such as “the President” 

 22 The FEC’s own statute specifies that “[a]ny rule of law which is not stated in this Act or in 

chapter 95 or chapter 96 of the Internal Revenue Code . . . may be initially proposed by the 

Commission only as a rule or regulation pursuant to procedures established in [2 U.S.C. § 

438(d)] [describing formal rulemaking procedures].” 2 U.S.C. § 437f(b).

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or “the incumbent,” could still be treated as referencing a “clearly identified candidate,” thereby 

triggering FEC regulation of the advertisements at issue. This failure to provide fair notice that 

three of six current Commissioners could at any time find that inherently ambiguous 

terminology, when used in a certain “context” or by some disfavored organization, is actually a 

reference to a “clearly identified” candidate renders that position impermissibly vague on Due 

Process grounds. (All but one current Commissioner is serving an expired term, meaning that 

new Commissioners could be appointed and confirmed at any time, including a fourth vote for 

the views objected to herein). The FEC is free “to modify its current . . . policy” and expand the 

scope of its electioneering communication regulations to include references to clearly identified 

candidates that are not especially clear, but it must adhere to established law while it revises its 

regulations through the normal rulemaking process. Fox Television Stations, 132 S.Ct. at 2320. 

A modified regulation would then be subject to normal review under the Administrative 

Procedures Act.

D. THE ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATION STANDARD AS 

APPLIED TO PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED ADVERTISEMENTS

1. ADVERTISEMENT 1

Advertisement 1 contains references to “this Administration,” “the Administration,” and 

“the White House” (by both image/visual and words) and is an issue advertisement that asks 

viewers to contact government officials at “the White House” to change current energy policy. 

However, Draft B concluded, 

In the context of Advertisement 1, each of the voice-over references to “this 

Administration,” “the Administration,” “the White House,” and the instruction to “Call 

the White House,” as well as the visual depiction of the White House, are references to a 

clearly identified candidate for federal office, President Barack Obama. The terms “the 

Administration,” “this Administration,” and “the White House” are commonly 

understood as references to “the President.” . . . The references to “the Administration” 

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and “this Administration” likewise unambiguously reference President Obama. Those 

terms are merely short-hand for the Obama Administration . . . .”

Draft B at 4. The FEC’s assessment of Advertisement 1 makes perfectly clear that the terms at 

issue do not explicitly and unambiguously refer to a clearly identified candidate when it 

acknowledges that the terms are merely “commonly understood as references to ‘the President’” 

and “merely short-hand.” The Oxford Dictionary defines “explicit” as “stated clearly and in 

detail, leaving no room for confusion or doubt.” Oxford Dictionaries Online, Explicit,

http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/explicit?region=us&q=explicit (last visited 

Sept. 6, 2012). These terms (“White House” and “Administration”) simply do not satisfy the 

requirement that the reference be “explicit.” Rather, the advertisements refer simply to the 

institutions at issue. See First General Counsel’s Report in MUR 1830, at 8 (1985). 

Contrary to the FEC’s contentions, the terms at issue are not “unambiguous.” The word 

“unambiguous” means clear, precise, and not open to more than one interpretation. The FEC 

even uses the term in its regulation defining “express advocacy,” and the relevant portion reads: 

“The electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of 

only one meaning.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b)(1).

In the context of Advertisement 1, the terms at issue are easily and reasonably interpreted 

as references to the Executive Branch of the United States Government, or perhaps to the 

politically-appointed, decision-making personnel within the Executive Branch, or to the 

institution rather than any individual. There are dozens or hundreds, if not more, persons within 

the Executive Branch that have control over, or the ability to impact, U.S. energy policy.23 

 23 In 2006, the FEC conceded that an advertisement that refers to “Your Senator” is not a 

reference to a clearly identified federal candidate because the term could potentially refer to 

either of two individuals. See Tr. of Mot. Hearing at 27, Christian Civic League of Maine, Inc. v. 

FEC, 433 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 2006). If language that could be understood as referring to 

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The controlling standard does not ask what the best interpretation of a communication is, 

or whether someone might believe a candidate has been referenced; the constitutionally-required 

question is whether the terms used are “explicit and unambiguous” such that they may only be 

reasonably interpreted as referring to a Federal candidate. As explained in detail above,

Congress knowingly incorporated the “explicit and unambiguous” standard into the 

electioneering communications statute when it used the phrase “refers to a clearly identified 

candidate for Federal office” to describe an element of an electioneering communication. The 

Government represented to the courts that the electioneering communications standards offered 

“perfect clarity” and “precise guidance,” and the Solicitor General indicated that the standard 

provided “a safe harbor simply by virtue of not mentioning the [candidate’s] name.” The 

Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the electioneering communication statute because 

the “definition of ‘electioneering communication’ raises none of the vagueness concerns that 

drove our analysis in Buckley” and the “components are both easily understood and objectively 

determinable.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194. However, the standard applied in Draft B, which 

permits “inferential reference, tied to the subjective impression of viewers and listeners,”24

presents a far different case. 

If the “vagueness concerns” present in Buckley, with respect to the term “clearly 

identified candidate,” were cured by construing that term to require an “explicit and 

unambiguous” reference to that clearly identified candidate, then it is clear that that same 

limiting construction is a vital aspect of the electioneering communication standard’s 

constitutionality. The electioneering communications provision was not drafted as a broad, 

 

either of two people is not “explicit and unambiguous,” HLF fails to see how terms that refer to 

thousands of individuals could ever be thought to be “explicit and unambiguous.”

24 Statement of Commissioner McGahn on Advisory Opinion 2012-19 at 18.

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catch-all mechanism designed to result in the maximum possible amount of disclosure of 

“political” advertising – despite the fact that the Commissioners who supported Draft B treat it 

that way. Rather, it was drafted to capture a very narrow class of communications that 

“explicitly and unambiguously” refer to a candidate during short periods of time before elections 

for the sake of satisfying constitutional demands. The introduction of vagueness into the 

statutory definition by ignoring the “explicit and unambiguous” reference requirement – as is 

evident throughout Draft B – is therefore contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling and represents 

an unconstitutional application of the statute to HLF’s proposed advertisement. To interpret this 

statute as the FEC suggests here is to adopt an unconstitutionally vague standard. 

2. ADVERTISEMENT 2

Advertisement 2 includes references to “the government,” and calls on viewers to “Tell 

the government it’s time for an American energy plan . . . that actually works for America.” The 

term “the government” is even less precise than the terms “Administration” and “White House.” 

Whereas the latter terms encompass the Executive Branch, or the political appointees within the 

Executive Branch, “the government” consists of each person working within the three branches. 

A term that literally refers to several million individuals cannot possibly be an “explicit and 

unambiguous” reference to President Obama, in this or any context. 

The FEC’s position with respect to the term “the government” is altogether unclear. 

Plaintiff initially believed that Draft B determined the reference to “the government” in 

Advertisement 2 was a reference to a clearly identified candidate, although the FEC’s counsel 

contends that it was not. Def. FEC’s Mem. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 17 n.5. 

Draft B concluded that an advertisement that refers to “the government” and tells viewers to 

“Call Secretary Sebelius” does not contain a reference to a clearly identified candidate. 

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However, Draft B also concluded that Advertisement 3, which closes with instructions to “call[] 

the White House to tell ‘the government’ about the need for a different energy policy,” does refer 

to a clearly identified candidate. Draft B seems to take the position that “the government” may 

refer to a clearly identified candidate in some contexts but not others, or when used in

combination with certain words. The FEC’s confused position illustrates that the term “the 

government” cannot possibly satisfy the “explicit and unambiguous” requirement because it is 

very obviously neither, and therefore, this position cannot stand under the First Amendment.

Advertisement 2 also includes unidentified audio of President Obama’s voice. Whether 

this is an “unambiguous” reference to President Obama depends entirely on the listener’s or 

viewer’s subjective perception (whether he actually recognizes the voice of the person speaking). 

As the FEC itself represented to the courts, “the definition of electioneering communications is 

simple, objective, and unambiguous – a classic bright-line test that entirely avoids placing 

speakers ‘wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding’ of their listeners.” FEC Brief at 156. 

Accordingly, unidentified audio cannot, by definition, be “unambiguous.”25 

3. ADVERTISEMENT 3

Advertisement 3 includes references to “the government,” “the White House,” and 

unidentified audio of the White House Press Secretary’s voice. Advertisement 3 contains the 

same voice-over call to action as Advertisement 2, but the following also appears in text onscreen: “Call the White House at (202) 456-1414.” Draft B posits that: 

 25 Audio recordings also appear to fall outside of Congress’s understanding of “clearly 

identified” references, which are limited to “words or images.” Senator Feingold explained that 

a candidate is “clearly identified” where “a communication . . . includes the name of a federal 

candidate for office, a photograph or drawing of the candidate, or some other words or images 

that identify the candidate by ‘unambiguous reference.’” 148 Cong. Rec. S2144 (daily ed. Mar. 

20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 

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If viewers were to follow this command by calling the White House to tell “the 

government” about the need for a different energy policy, they would necessarily be 

seeking to convey that message to the President, the “government” official who resides 

and maintains his office at the White House and the only person at the White House with 

executive authority to change the “American energy plan.” 

However, absolutely no one is under the impression that a member of the general public 

who “calls the White House” to convey a message will actually speak with the President. 

Rather, that person will speak with someone who answers the outside lines and who may take a 

message and pass that message along to someone else whose job it is to aggregate messages from 

the public. The command to “call the White House” is quite accurate: one who does so will 

speak to and leave a message with someone – not the President – who works there. The caller’s 

subjective intention or hope that someone will “convey that message to the President” is utterly 

irrelevant to the issue of whether there is an explicit and unambiguous reference to a clearly 

identified candidate in the proposed advertisement. 

For the reasons set forth above, the electioneering communications statute cannot be 

constitutionally applied to Advertisement 3. To do otherwise would present vagueness problems 

rendering the statute as applied unconstitutional.

4. ADVERTISEMENT 4

Advertisement 4 (referred to as Advertisement 5 in Draft B) includes a reference to “the 

Administration,” imagery and footage of the White, and concludes by telling viewers to “Call 

Secretary Sebelius, tell her its wrong for her and the Administration to trample the most basic 

American right.” According to Draft B, by identifying “the Administration” as separate from 

Secretary Sebelius, and by “clarif[ying] any potential ambiguity regarding the reference to ’the 

Administration’ by providing video ’footage and images’ of the White House,” Advertisement 4 

“unambiguously references the President.” Draft B at 8. Draft B therefore concedes that there is 

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“potential ambiguity” in the term “the Administration,” which would seem to conclusively 

establish that that term is not “explicit and unambiguous.” Nevertheless, according to Draft B, 

this “potential ambiguity” is somehow cured by a picture of the White House. 

For the reasons set forth above, the electioneering communications statute cannot be 

applied as the FEC argues to Advertisement 4 without being unconstitutionally vague

5. ADVERTISEMENT 5

Advertisement 5 (referred to as Advertisement 6 in Draft B) includes references to the 

“White House” in the context of discussing the two-year anniversary of the Patient Protection 

and Affordable Care Act (referred to in Advertisement 5 as “national, government run 

healthcare”). Draft B contends that one of the news articles cited in the advertisement includes 

the language “’President Obama has no plans to mark the two-year anniversary of the 

Affordable Care Act’s passage,’ making explicit that the term ‘White House’ is being used . . . in 

that advertisement as a reference to President Obama.” Draft B at 9. Advertisement 5, however, 

does not include the words “President Obama” – those words were omitted from the language 

quoted in Advertisement 5. As a result, Draft B concludes that the reference to the “White 

House” is made “explicit” by language that does not actually appear in the advertisement 

because it was omitted. 

There can be no question that this analysis focuses on the subjective intent of the speaker 

rather than on the language actually used in the proposed advertisement. The position taken in 

Draft B makes absolutely clear that Draft B’s purpose was not to faithfully apply the law, but 

rather, to stretch and twist the law in whatever way was necessary to ensure regulation of the 

proposed communications. This approach stands in stark contrast to the FEC’s position in its 

brief to the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC: “BCRA’s primary definition of electioneering 

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communications presents an empirical test that ignores this type of self-serving ex post facto

rationalization by focusing on purely objective criteria.” Brief for the Federal Election 

Commission, et al. at 109, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (No. 02-1674) (quoting 

McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 574 (D. D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).

For the reasons set forth above, the electioneering communications statute cannot be 

constitutionally applied to Advertisement 5.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, HLF respectfully requests that the Court find in its favor and 

issue a permanent injunction in accordance with its Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

Dated: September 6, 2012 

Respectfully submitted,

By: /S/

Shawn Sheehy (VA Bar 82630)

ssheehy@hvjlaw.com

Jason Torchinsky (VA 47481), pro hac vice

jtorchinsky@hvjlaw.com

HOLTZMAN VOGEL JOSEFIAK PLLC

45 North Hill Drive, Suite 100

Warrenton, VA 20186

Phone: 540-341-8808

Fax: 540-341-8809

Counsel for The Hispanic Leadership Fund, Inc.

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