United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3433

___________________________

Travis Dwayne Chaney

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith

____________

 Submitted: September 23, 2015

 Filed: February 3, 2016 

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BYE and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

BYE, Circuit Judge.
Travis Chaney appeals the district court's1

 affirmance of the Social Security

Commissioner's decision to deny disability benefits and supplemental security income

under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. We affirm.

I

Chaney filed an application for disability benefits on April 20, 2006, alleging

disability beginning January 2, 2003. An administrative law judge ("ALJ") reviewed

Chaney's claim and held an evidentiary hearing on October 6, 2008. During the

hearing, Chaney testified as to his long-standing back pain, depression, and drug use. 

Chaney also testified regarding his activities, such as school, work, social life, and

custody of his four-year-old daughter. Chaney testified he has full physical custody

of his daughter, but he relies on the help of his parents to care for her, including

cleaning his home, financial support, and maintaining utilities in his home. Along

with other medical evidence, Chaney's treating physician submitted a questionnaire

to be considered by the ALJ.

The ALJ found Chaney engaged in substantial gainful activity in 2003, the

same year in which he graduated from massage therapy school. However, the ALJ

found Chaney did not engage in substantial gainful activity in the following years. 

The ALJ also noted Chaney's severe impairments, including chronic low back pain,

supported by MRI and other medical evidence; being overweight; hypertension;

potential liver damage; increased levels of lipids in the blood; and disc degeneration,

but that these impairments did not arise to an Appendix 1 listing. The ALJ found

Chaney's depression and other mental health concerns were not severe. The ALJ

assessed Chaney's residual functioning capacity ("RFC") and determined Chaney

could perform work and was not disabled.

1

The Honorable James R. Marschewski, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Western District of Arkansas, presiding by consent of the parties pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(c).

-2-
Chaney filed a timely request for review, and the Appeals Council denied the

request on October 29, 2009. Thereafter, Chaney filed a complaint in federal district

court seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision. On February 2, 2011,

the district court reversed and remanded with directions to request a mental RFC

assessment from Chaney's treating doctor and therapist. On May 31, 2011, the

Appeals Council vacated the prior ALJ decision and ordered a new hearing and

decision. The ALJ conducted a hearing on December 9, 2011, at which Chaney

testified again about his disabilities. Chaney testified he used methamphetamine

intravenously and by snorting it. Chaney also testified he had recently smoked

marijuana. Chaney testified he was not represented during child custody proceedings

against his ex-wife, and he drinks only one or two beers a month. Along with other

medical evidence, Chaney's treating psychiatrist submitted a questionnaire. At this

hearing, Chaney amended his alleged onset date of disability to January 1, 2004.

The ALJ again issued an unfavorable decision, determining Chaney had severe

impairments, including degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, small bilateral

calcaneal spurs, hypertension, obesity, anxiety, and mood disorder, but those

impairments did not arise to an Appendix 1 listing. The ALJ also found Chaney to be

less-than-fully credible. Regarding Chaney's RFC, the ALJ determined Chaney could

perform a limited range of light work involving occasional climbing of stairs,

stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds; no work at exposed heights or around dangerous moving machinery; and

unskilled work where the interpersonal contact is incidental to the work performed,

complexity of tasks is learned and performed by rote with few variables and little

judgment, and the supervision required is simple, direct, and concrete. The ALJ

determined Chaney could not perform any past relevant work and was limited to light

work. Accordingly, the ALJ determined Chaney had not been under a disability from

January 1, 2004, until the date of his hearing.

-3-
Chaney again requested review, which the Appeals Council denied. Pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Chaney filed the present action seeking judicial review of the

ALJ's decision. The district court agreed with the ALJ’s decision, finding although

the ALJ made some errors in drawing inferences from the record, the errors were

harmless because substantial evidence in the record as a whole supported a finding

Chaney was not entitled to disability benefits. Chaney appeals.

II

We review de novo the district court’s decision affirming the denial of benefits. 

Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 2012). The court "must affirm the

Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a

whole." Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006). "Substantial evidence

is less than a preponderance but . . . enough that a reasonable mind would find it

adequate to support the conclusion." Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir.

2015) (alternation in original). On review, "we must consider evidence that both

supports and detracts from the ALJ's decision." Id. "If, after review, we find it

possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those

positions represents the Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm the decision of the

Commissioner." Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003).

In order for an individual to qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act

and the accompanying regulations, he or she must be disabled. Halverson v. Astrue,

600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010). "Disability is defined as the inability 'to engage

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.'" Id.

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)). Disability is determined according to a fivestep process, considering whether: (1) the claimant was employed; (2) he was

severely impaired; (3) his impairment was, or was comparable to, a listed impairment;

-4-
(4) he could perform past relevant work; and if not, (5) if he could perform any other

kind of work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a) (2016). In this case, the

ALJ, after completing the proper five-step process, acknowledged Chaney suffered

from various medial issues, but determined Chaney was less-than-fully credible and

could perform light work. Consequently, the ALJ determined Chaney was not

disabled and was not entitled to benefits.

Chaney contends there is not substantial evidence in the record as a whole

supporting the Commissioner's decision because: (1) the ALJ drew erroneous

inferences from the record, and without these inferences the ALJ would not have

found Chaney less-than-fully credible; (2) the ALJ did not appropriately consider the

effectiveness or side effects of Chaney's medications or third-party observations; and

(3) the ALJ did not properly evaluate the opinion evidence presented.

A

Chaney argues the erroneous inferences from the record caused the ALJ to find

him less-than-fully credible, and without the erroneous inferences, substantial

evidence does not support the ALJ's credibility finding. Assessing and resolving

credibility is a matter properly within the purview of the ALJ. See Edwards v.

Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Our touchstone is that [a claimant's]

credibility is primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide.").

Chaney points to several factual errors made by the ALJ. For example, the

ALJ improperly found Chaney was motivated to seek benefits because he had

separated from his wife and did not want to pay child support. The record does not

support such a finding—Chaney filed for disability benefits before separating from

or divorcing his wife. The ALJ also incorrectly stated Chaney was a user of

Oxycontin, rather than Oxycodone. When an ALJ draws erroneous inferences from

the record, this Court will reverse if the record does not weigh so heavily against the

-5-
claimant's credibility that the ALJ would have necessarily disbelieved the claimant

absent the errors drawn from the record. Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir.

2008). However, reversal is warranted only where the remainder of the record does

not support an ALJ's credibility determination. Id. In the present matter, other

evidence supports the ALJ's less-than-fully credible determination.

The ALJ found Chaney's subjective complaints of back pain were not supported

by the record. "[T]he ALJ may disbelieve subjective complaints if there are

inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole." Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 792 (8th

Cir. 2005). The ALJ determined Chaney's complaints were inconsistent with other

evidence, including that Chaney was able to inject methamphetamine between his

toes; stopped exercising despite testifying that exercise helped his pain; refused

weight loss consultation despite being advised to do so based on his obesity; and

failed to complete physical therapy. The ALJ also discussed Chaney's activity level

in assessing his level of pain and ability to perform gainful activity, including

participating in his child's church group. An ALJ may view "[a]cts which are

inconsistent with a claimant’s assertion of disability" to "reflect negatively upon that

claimant’s credibility." Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir. 2001); see

also Riggins v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 689, 693 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding activities such as

driving his children to work, driving his wife to school, shopping, visiting his mother,

taking a break with his wife between classes, watching television, and playing cards

were inconsistent with claimant’s complaints of disabling pain).

In determining Chaney's credibility, the ALJ also relied on evidence from the

consultative psychologist who believed Chaney was exaggerating and falsifying

symptoms. In addition, the ALJ found Chaney non-compliant with taking his

medication and was seeking out pain medications. Chaney argues there was no noncompliance and posits reasons for all of the medication abnormalities the ALJ found

relevant—such as needing a new prescription after jail because he lost half of his

medications. However, when evidence presented to the ALJ could support two

-6-
inconsistent positions and the ALJ adopts one of those positions, we must affirm the

ALJ's determination. Dixon, 353 F.3d at 605. Substantial evidence supports the

position that Chaney misused his medication, and "misuse of medication is a valid

factor in an ALJ's credibility determinations." Anderson v. Barnhart, 344 F.3d 809,

815 (8th Cir. 2003).

Considering the ALJ’s findings regarding other evidence, including Chaney's

work history, schooling, activities, health, and non-compliance with medication and

physical therapy, it is apparent the ALJ sufficiently considered Chaney’s complaints

but discredited them for good cause because they were inconsistent with the evidence

as a whole. Accordingly, the ALJ provided valid reasons for discounting Chaney’s

subjective complaints and we hold the ALJ's less-than-fully credible determination is

supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Chater, 87 F.3d 1015, 1018 (8th

Cir. 1996) ("[W]e will not substitute our opinions for th[ose] of the ALJ, who is in a

better position to assess a claimant's credibility.").

B

Chaney next argues the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole because the ALJ did not appropriately

consider the effectiveness and side effects of Chaney's medications and did not

appropriately consider third-party observations. Chaney asserts the ALJ failed to

consider the extent of Chaney's pain treatment and did not consider the comments of

Susie Byrd, the Director of the Edge School of Massage, which Chaney attended.

Regarding Chaney's pain treatment, Chaney argues the ALJ, in making its RFC

determination, failed to take into account the strength of the drugs and their side

effects. Specifically, Chaney argues the strength of his pain medications would

prevent basic tasks needed for any employment, and his psychiatric prescription

would cause drowsiness. However, the ALJ found Chaney misrepresented himself

-7-
to his treating physicians—for example, by not self-reporting illegal drug use—and

the treating physicians therefore were not aware of Chaney's actual level of pain. 

Additionally, the ALJ did take into account Chaney's medication in its limitations,

including: "Because of his medication, he should not work at exposed heights or

around dangerous machinery." Such an opinion is substantially supported by the

entire record, and we refuse to overturn the ALJ's RFC determination because of

Chaney's pain medications.

Regarding Susie Byrd, Chaney points to a letter from Byrd discussing Chaney's

performance during two separate continuing massage education courses, which

occurred in 2007 and 2008. Byrd reported Chaney exhibited substantial pain during

both courses. During the 2008 hearing, the ALJ questioned Chaney about the Byrd

letter, but only for the purpose of dating the letter. The ALJ did not discuss the Byrd

letter in its written decision. However, even if an ALJ fails to discuss a report, "an

ALJ's failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that it was not considered." 

England v. Astrue, 490 F.3d 1017, 1022 (8th Cir. 2007). The ALJ met its obligation

to "develop the record fully and fairly" when it admitted Byrd's letter into evidence

and established its date. Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000). Even if

the ALJ failed to consider Byrd's letter, the decision would still be supported by

substantial evidence—the letter tends to show Chaney could not perform the

semiskilled medium-level work of massage therapy, but does not demonstrate he

could not perform the unskilled light work with limitations as recommended by the

ALJ.

C

Finally, Chaney contends there is not substantial evidence in the record as a

whole supporting the ALJ’s decision because the ALJ did not give proper weight to

the opinions of Chaney’s treating physicians, Drs. Walker and Wooten. In a physical

residual functioning questionnaire prepared prior to the first ALJ hearing, Dr. Wooten

-8-
reported he saw Chaney about twice a year between 2003 and 2006. Dr. Wooten

noted Chaney's back pain and feelings of depression, Chaney spent most of his time

in bed, and Chaney could do very little activity. In a mental residual functional

capacity questionnaire prepared prior to the second ALJ hearing, Dr. Wooten reported

he met remotely with Chaney ten times from 2008 until 2011. Dr. Wooten noted

Chaney sometimes responded to treatment, was currently on medication which caused

drowsiness, but had difficulty taking his medication.

The ALJ considered but did not give controlling weight to the opinions of Drs.

Walker and Wooten because their opinions were not supported by the record as a

whole. The ALJ determined Dr. Walker's opinion was not consistent with the other

evidence, in part because Chaney reported to Dr. Walker he spent most days in bed,

but other evidence indicated Chaney was relatively active. The ALJ also discounted

Dr. Walker's opinion because Dr. Walker did not know Chaney was a user of illegal

drugs. The ALJ discounted Dr. Wooten's opinion because Dr. Wooten failed to

reference Chaney's use of illegal drugs, and the form indicated only moderate

symptoms which did not support the limitations suggested by Dr. Wooten.

Since the ALJ must evaluate the record as a whole, the opinions of treating

physicians do not automatically control. Turpin v. Colvin, 750 F.3d 989, 993 (8th Cir.

2014). To determine if a treating physician's opinion should control, "[t]he record

must be evaluated as a whole" and the opinion must not be "inconsistent with the other

substantial evidence." Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2005). After

evaluating the record as a whole, we agree with the ALJ's determination that other

substantial evidence was inconsistent with the opinions of Drs. Walker and Wooten. 

First, Chaney failed to comply with taking his prescribed medications. "[A] claimant's

noncompliance can constitute evidence that is inconsistent with a treating physician's

medical opinion and, therefore, can be considered in determining whether to give that

opinion controlling weight." Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 2010)

(alteration in original); see also Kelley v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 2004)

-9-
("[A] failure to follow prescribed medical treatment without good cause is a basis for

denying benefits."). Second, Chaney apparently failed to report to either treating

physician that he was a user of illegal drugs. The ALJ was justified in refusing to give

controlling weight to the opinions of Chaney's treating physicians because neither had

the opportunity to assess Chaney with the knowledge of his illegal drug use.

Given the ALJ's full development of the record, we find the ALJ's

determinations were fully supported by the record as a whole. Accordingly, there is

substantial evidence to support the denial of benefits.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision affirming the

denial of benefits.

______________________________

-10-