2020 IL 124863 

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

(Docket No. 124863) 

MATT SHARPE v. CRYSTAL WESTMORELAND, Appellee 

(Kris Fulkerson, Appellant). 

Opinion filed September 24, 2020. 

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Kilbride, Karmeier, Theis, Neville, 

and Michael J. Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 After A.S.’s father passed away, his civil union partner filed a petition in the 

circuit court of Madison County seeking visitation and an allocation of parental 

responsibilities as A.S.’s stepparent. The circuit court, after initially granting leave 

to intervene, certified two questions to the appellate court, both of which asked, in 

essence, whether a civil union partner is a “step-parent” as defined by the Illinois 

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act’s (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

et seq. (West 2016)) provisions that grant stepparents standing to seek visitation 

and parental responsibilities of their stepchildren. The appellate court answered the 

certified questions in the negative, and we granted leave to appeal. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 The facts of this case are straightforward. Matt Sharpe and Crystal 

Westmoreland were married and had a child, A.S. The marriage was dissolved in 

January 2013, and as part of that dissolution, Sharpe and Westmoreland agreed to 

a joint parenting agreement. The parents shared equal parenting time, but A.S.’s 

legal residence was with Sharpe. In November 2013, Sharpe entered into a civil 

union with Kris Fulkerson. A.S. continued to reside with Sharpe, Fulkerson, and 

Fulkerson’s three children. Sharpe passed away on January 2, 2017. After Sharpe’s 

death, Westmoreland no longer let A.S. live with or visit Fulkerson and Fulkerson’s 

children, so Fulkerson filed petitions seeking visitation and an allocation of parental 

responsibilities for A.S. 

¶ 4 The circuit court granted Fulkerson leave to intervene before granting 

Westmoreland’s motion to certify a question of law to the appellate court and 

staying proceedings. Ill. S. Ct. R. 308 (eff. July 1, 2017). The court certified two 

questions: whether a party to a civil union has standing to request visitation with 

her deceased partner’s child as a stepparent and whether that party has standing to 

request parental responsibilities. The appellate court answered both questions in the 

negative. 2019 IL App (5th) 170321, ¶ 11. After initially filing its decision as a 

Rule 23 order (Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(b) (eff. Apr. 1, 2018)), the appellate court granted 

Westmoreland’s motion to publish. We granted leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 

(eff. July 1, 2018). We allowed the National Association of Social Workers and 

The Illinois Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers to file 

amicus curiae briefs. 

¶ 5 ANALYSIS 

¶ 6 This appeal is from the appellate court’s answers to two questions certified 

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. July 1, 2017). “By definition, 

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certified questions are questions of law subject to de novo review.” Rozsavolgyi v. 

City of Aurora, 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21. 

¶ 7 The Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act (Civil Union 

Act) (750 ILCS 75/1 et seq. (West 2016)) defines a civil union as “a legal 

relationship between 2 persons, of either the same or opposite sex, established 

pursuant to this Act.” Id. § 10. Individuals who are prohibited from marrying are 

also prohibited from entering into a civil union. Compare id. § 25, with 750 ILCS 

5/212 (West 2016). Westmoreland does not dispute that Sharpe and Fulkerson 

validly entered into a civil union pursuant to the Civil Union Act. She likewise does 

not dispute that they remained civilly united at Sharpe’s death. Rather, she argues 

that a party to a civil union is not married to her partner and cannot be a stepparent 

as defined by the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution 

Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2016)). Therefore, Westmoreland argues, 

Fulkerson lacks standing under the Dissolution Act to petition for visitation and 

allocation of parental responsibilities. 

¶ 8 We start by looking at the relevant statutory provisions. The Dissolution Act 

strictly limits who may file a petition for visitation or allocation of parental 

responsibilities for a child. Stepparents are treated somewhat preferentially in 

relation to other persons who are not the natural parent of the child in that they may 

seek an allocation of parental responsibilities under certain circumstances if the 

parent to whom he or she was married dies or becomes disabled. Id. § 601.2(b)(4). 

They may also seek visitation—a right granted to only three other classes of 

nonparents: grandparents, great-grandparents, and siblings—if one of the listed 

circumstances are present. Id. § 602.9(c)(1). The Dissolution Act defines a “stepparent” as “a person married to a child’s parent, including a person married to the 

child’s parent immediately prior to the parent’s death.” Id. §§ 600(l), 602.9(a)(3). 

¶ 9 A party to a civil union is “a person who has established a civil union pursuant 

to [the Civil Union] Act.” 750 ILCS 75/10 (West 2016). “[A]ny definition or use 

of the terms ‘spouse’, ‘family’, ‘immediate family’, ‘dependent’, ‘next of kin’, and 

other terms that denote the spousal relationship, as those terms are used throughout 

the law,” includes a “ ‘[p]arty to a civil union.’ ” Id. “A party to a civil union is 

entitled to the same legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits as 

are afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to spouses, whether they derive 

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from statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil 

or criminal law.” Id. § 20. The Civil Union Act is to be “liberally construed and 

applied to promote its underlying purposes,” which expressly include providing 

civil union partners with those obligations, responsibilities, protections, and 

benefits. Id. § 5. 

¶ 10 To answer both certified questions, we must answer the same question of law: 

whether the legislature intended for a person civilly united to a parent to fit within 

the definition of a “step-parent” under the Dissolution Act. To do this, of course, 

we look to the statutory language, which, given its plain and ordinary meaning, is 

the most reliable indicator of the legislative intent. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 

159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994). We give the words of a statute their plain, ordinary, 

and accepted meaning unless doing so would defeat the legislative intent. Accettura 

v. Vacationland, Inc., 2019 IL 124285, ¶ 11. 

¶ 11 In this case, the legislature expressly stated the purposes of the Civil Union Act, 

one of which is to “provide persons entering into a civil union with the obligations, 

responsibilities, protections, and benefits afforded or recognized by the law of 

Illinois to spouses.” 750 ILCS 75/5 (West 2016). It expressed its intent that the 

Civil Union Act be liberally construed to promote that purpose. Id. It declared that 

the “legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits” to which a party 

to a civil union was entitled could “derive from statute, administrative rule, policy, 

common law, or any other source of civil or criminal law.” Id. § 20. The legislative 

intent is thus clear and unambiguous: the General Assembly intended to create an 

alternative to marriage that was equal in all respects and, important at that time, 

open to two persons of the same sex. By way of the Civil Union Act, it changed the 

definition of the word “spouse” and any “other terms that denote the spousal 

relationship” throughout the Illinois Compiled Statutes to include a party to a civil 

union. Id. § 10. 

¶ 12 Westmoreland argues that the Civil Union Act only refers to “obligations, 

responsibilities, protections, and benefits” of partners vis-à-vis each other. She 

argues that the legislative intent of the language equating civil union partners to 

spouses was that they be deemed equivalent only for purposes of their own 

relationships. She points to certain provisions in the Dissolution Act that reference 

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civil union partners, all of which, she claims, address the partners’ rights in relation 

to one another. 

¶ 13 Westmoreland does not cite any statutory provision in either act that expressly 

excludes a civil union partner from any obligation, responsibility, protection, or 

benefit to which a spouse is entitled. Rather, she relies on express references to the 

Civil Union Act in other provisions of the Dissolution Act and statements during a 

legislative debate of the Illinois House of Representatives. “When the drafters’ 

intent can be ascertained from the statutory language, it must be given effect 

without resort to other aids for construction.” Illinois Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d at 479. 

We find the language of the Civil Union Act clear and thus do not consider 

Westmoreland’s arguments about the legislative history. 

¶ 14 Moreover, she asks us to read a limitation into the statute. A “person married to 

a child’s parent” (750 ILCS 5/600(l) (West 2016); id. § 602.9(a)(3)) is the parent’s 

spouse. The Civil Union Act entitles a partner to a civil union to the “same legal 

obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits” as a spouse (750 ILCS 75/20 

(West 2016)), even when the statute uses “other terms that denote the spousal 

relationship” (id. § 10) as the Dissolution Act does here. Nowhere in either act is 

that entitlement expressly limited in any way. “We do not depart from the plain 

language of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that 

conflict with the expressed intent.” Accettura, 2019 IL 124285, ¶ 11. The limitation 

for which Westmoreland advocates conflicts with the Civil Union Act’s expressed 

intent to put civil union partners on equal ground with spouses. We therefore 

decline Westmoreland’s invitation to read this limitation into the statutes. 

¶ 15 Westmoreland also argues that granting a natural parent’s civilly united partner 

standing to intervene as a stepparent violates her constitutional right to parent her 

child. Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising and caring for their 

children, which includes the right to make decisions involving the care, custody, 

and control of their children. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶¶ 24-25 (citing Troxel 

v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000)). Westmoreland does not challenge the 

Dissolution Act’s grant of standing to stepparents as unconstitutional but rather 

argues that interpreting the statutes to allow a civilly united partner to request 

visitation and parenting time as a stepparent would unconstitutionally expand its 

scope. 

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¶ 16 We again note the legislature’s intent in enacting the Civil Union Act was to 

create an alternative to marriage that is equal in all respects. No difference exists 

between a civil union and marriage other than the name, including the qualifications 

for entry into the relationship. We find that a civilly united partner is a “step-parent” 

as defined in the Dissolution Act. Because the General Assembly created an 

equivalent marriage alternative that is limited to individuals who are otherwise 

eligible to marry, we find that it did not expand the Dissolution Act’s definition of 

“step-parent” and thus also find that granting Fulkerson’s petitions would not result 

in an unconstitutional expansion of the scope of the Dissolution Act. 

¶ 17 An important distinguishing factor between our analysis in this case and the 

relevant analysis in In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904, is that 

Fulkerson and Sharpe entered into a state-sanctioned form of a committed 

relationship—which the legislature created and deemed equivalent in all respects 

to a marriage. Granting civilly united partners standing as stepparents will not, as 

Westmoreland argues, open the door to other parties who are otherwise not granted 

standing by the Dissolution Act. Rather, our holding today is limited only to those 

parties who have chosen to enter into a civil union instead of a marriage. This legal 

change was a policy decision made by the legislature, not the court. See id. ¶ 68 

(noting that “[l]egal change in this complex area must be the product of a policy 

debate that is sensitive not only to the evolving reality of ‘non-traditional’ families 

and their needs, but also to parents’ fundamental liberty interest embodied in the 

superior rights doctrine”). 

¶ 18 We express no opinion on the merits of the remainder of Fulkerson’s petitions 

for visitation and allocation of parental responsibilities. We merely find that she is 

A.S.’s “step-parent” as defined by the Dissolution Act and therefore meets that 

aspect of the standing requirement therein. 

¶ 19 CONCLUSION 

¶ 20 We find that, in enacting the Civil Union Act, the General Assembly intended 

to create an alternative to marriage that was equal in all respects. This intent was 

not limited to partners’ rights as to each other. When a child’s parent enters into a 

civil union with an individual who is not the child’s other parent, that individual 

becomes the child’s stepparent as defined by the Dissolution Act and thus meets 

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that aspect of the standing requirement to petition the court for visitation, allocation 

of parental responsibilities, or both as allowed therein. We answer both certified 

questions in the affirmative. 

¶ 21 Certified questions answered. 

¶ 22 Reversed and remanded. 

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