Filed 6/29/16 Pirouzian v. Superior Court CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

AMIR PIROUZIAN,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA,

Real Party in Interest.

 B266015

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BS148788)

 OPINION AND ORDER 

 GRANTING PEREMPTORY

 WRIT OF MANDATE

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for writ of mandate. James C. Chalfant, 

Judge. Petition granted.

Law Offices of William J. Kopeny and William J. Kopeny for Petitioner.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gloria L. Castro, Assistant Attorney General, 

Thomas S. Lazar and Martin W. Hagan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in 

Interest.

No appearance for Respondent.
2

The Medical Board of California (the Board) revoked Amir Pirouzian, M.D.’s 

medical license. Dr. Pirouzian filed a petition in the superior court for a writ of 

administrative mandamus to set aside the Board’s decision, which the trial court denied. 

Dr. Pirouzian then filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court. We requested 

opposition and notified the parties of our intention to issue a peremptory writ. (See 

Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180 (Palma).) We now 

grant the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Board granted a medical license to Dr. Pirouzian in 1996. Before the actions 

that gave rise to this proceeding, Dr. Pirouzian had no record of disciplinary action

against him. It is undisputed that he is, as the administrative law judgment (ALJ) found, 

“a highly skilled, competent physician and surgeon who has never been found 

responsible for causing any patient harm.”

In 2006, Dr. Pirouzian began working as a pediatric ophthalmologist at Children’s 

Specialists of San Diego (CSSD). CSSD provided him with a group disability insurance 

plan from Northwestern Mutual. Dr. Pirouzian purchased additional disability insurance 

from the same insurer. 

On August 1, 2006, Dr. Pirouzian took a medical leave of absence from CSSD due 

to depression. A psychiatrist, Dr. Brett Johnson, diagnosed Dr. Pirouzian as suffering 

from a recurring “major depressive disorder,” and certified him as being totally and 

temporarily disabled. While on leave, Dr. Pirouzian submitted claims for and received 

disability insurance benefits from Northwestern Mutual.

In October 2006, Dr. Johnson released Dr. Pirouzian to return to CSSD on a 

part-time basis, and Northwestern Mutual reduced his disability payments. In late 

December 2006, Dr. Pirouzian applied for full-time employment with Kaiser Permanente 

Santa Clara Medical Hospital (Kaiser). He accepted an offer for the position in 

May 2007 and began working at Kaiser as an ophthalmologist in July. At the same 

time, CSSD placed Dr. Pirouzian on unpaid medical leave. Meanwhile, he failed to 
3

disclose to Dr. Johnson, CSSD, or Northwestern Mutual that he had applied for, and 

accepted, the position at Kaiser. 

For approximately three months—from July 2007 to October 2007—Dr. Pirouzian

made a series of affirmative misrepresentations regarding his employment status to 

Dr. Johnson, CSSD, Northwestern Mutual, and the California Employment Development 

Department (EDD). Specifically: (1) he failed to tell Dr. Johnson or CSSD that he 

had accepted the position with Kaiser; (2) two weeks after Dr. Pirouzian began working 

at Kaiser, he falsely told a Northwestern Mutual benefits specialist that he was not 

working, and repeated this falsehood in a letter to Northwestern Mutual the next day; 

(3) approximately one week later, Dr. Pirouzian spoke by telephone with another 

Northwestern Mutual benefits specialist and falsely told her that he had been visiting 

family in Iran in July and would be spending more time with them in August; (4) in a 

written financial statement that called for information about Dr. Pirouzian’s salary for 

each of his employers, he identified CSSD as his employer (from whom he received no 

income), and did not disclose his employment with Kaiser; (5) in early September, 

Dr. Pirouzian signed an EDD form stating that he had worked “0” hours from July 30 

to August 12, had no earnings, and was unable to work as a result of a disability; and 

(6) in late September, Dr. Pirouzian falsely told a Northwestern Mutual benefits specialist 

that he was in Europe. As a result of Dr. Pirouzian’s misrepresentations and the 

concealment of his employment with Kaiser, Northwestern Mutual continued to pay 

disability benefits to him.

Northwestern Mutual discovered the misrepresentations in October 2007 and 

cancelled Dr. Pirouzian’s insurance. He had received approximately $10,700 in disability 

payments that should not have been paid.1 During an investigation by the Department of 

 

1

In his petition, Dr. Pirouzian stated that the “actual amount” he received was 

approximately $8,600, and indicated that references to larger amounts are due to interest

on that amount. Dr. Pirouzian did not provide any record citations to support this

information.

The court’s order denying Dr. Pirouzian’s petition stated on page four that 

Dr. Pirouzian “received a total of approximately $10,000 in disability payments to which 
4

Insurance, Dr. Pirouzian said that he had repaid some of the disability payments and was 

willing to pay the remaining sum.

In June 2011, Dr. Pirouzian left Kaiser and, the following month, began a research 

fellowship with Gavin Herbert Eye Institute at the University of California, Irvine.

In November 2011, the San Diego County District Attorney charged Dr. Pirouzian

with two counts of insurance fraud. (Pen. Code, § 550, subds. (a)(1) & (b)(1).2 A third 

count was later added: willfully delaying a public officer in the discharge of official 

duties, a misdemeanor, under Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1).3 After the 

criminal complaint was filed, Dr. Pirouzian paid Northwestern Mutual $10,700.

As part of a plea agreement, Dr. Pirouzian pled guilty to the misdemeanor count 

and the District Attorney dismissed the insurance fraud counts. Dr. Pirouzian agreed 

to pay $5,000 in restitution to the Department of Insurance. The plea agreement and 

the court’s minutes indicated that full restitution had been paid to Northwestern Mutual. 

The trial court placed Dr. Pirouzian on three years probation, which was later reduced to 

60 days. The court subsequently expunged the conviction.

 

he was not entitled,” and on page nine that Dr. Pirouzian “received $18,633 in 

overpayments.” The court’s order did not cite to the record as to the latter fact.

2 Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 550 provides: “It is unlawful to do any 

of the following, or to aid, abet, solicit, or conspire with any person to do any of the 

following: [¶] (1) Knowingly present or cause to be presented any false or fraudulent 

claim for the payment of a loss or injury, including payment of a loss or injury under a 

contract of insurance.”

Subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 550 provides: “It is unlawful to do, or 

to knowingly assist or conspire with any person to do, any of the following: [¶]

(1) Present or cause to be presented any written or oral statement as part of, or in support 

of or opposition to, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, 

knowing that the statement contains any false or misleading information concerning any 

material fact.”

3 Subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 148 provides in pertinent part: “Every 

person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, peace officer . . . in 

the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or employment, when 

no other punishment is prescribed, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one 

thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or 

by both that fine and imprisonment.”
5

Dr. Pirouzian did not report his conviction to the Board based on the advice of his 

counsel that he was not required to do so.

Dr. Pirouzian completed his fellowship with the Gavin Herbert Eye Institute 

in July 2012, then worked as a consultant for Tayani Institute through March 2013. 

He thereafter worked at a hospital in Saudi Arabia.

In February 2013—more than five years after his misrepresentations came to 

light—the Board filed an accusation alleging four causes for discipline based on: (1) acts 

of dishonesty or corruption (cause 1); (2) conviction of a crime (cause 2); (3) failure to 

report a conviction (cause 3); and (4) unprofessional conduct (cause 4).

4

 A hearing took 

place over four days in December 2013. During that hearing, Dr. Pirouzian admitted 

that he acted dishonestly and intended to do so. He explained that he lied about his 

employment with Kaiser in order to continue the lie that he was disabled and to keep 

his employment options with CSSD open. He also admitted that he always knew that 

concealing his Kaiser employment was wrong, and that his dishonesty was motivated by 

self-interest.

The ALJ found that although Dr. Pirouzian testified that he was ashamed and 

remorseful, he expressed no regret for the victims of his dishonesty; his “most evident 

concern was the impact [the] disciplinary action might have on his future academic and 

employment opportunities.” The ALJ also noted “Dr. Pirouzian’s ability to plan ahead 

and blame others for his own misconduct” and that he “exploited his mental condition to 

get his way.”

Dr. David Sheffner, a psychiatrist retained by the Board, and Dr. Martin Williams, 

a psychologist retained by Dr. Pirouzian, testified as to Dr. Pirouzian’s mental state and 

motivations during the relevant time. Dr. Sheffner opined that Dr. Pirouzian’s actions 

reflected logical thinking and a cognitive strategy designed to hide his employment with 

 

4 The accusation also alleged a “First Cause for Fine,” based on the alleged 

failure to report to the Board within the time required by Business and Professions Code 

section 802.1 the bringing of a criminal information or his misdemeanor conviction. The 

ALJ rejected this cause because Dr. Pirouzian’s failure to provide the required report was 

based on “the mistaken advice of a licensed attorney.” 
6

Kaiser and to preserve the possibility of returning to CSSD. Dr. Williams testified that 

Dr. Pirouzian “ ‘was thinking poorly and was in a confused mental state.’ ” He believed 

that Dr. Pirouzian was motivated to preserve his employment option at CSSD; he was not 

motivated by financial gain.

The ALJ determined that there was cause to discipline Dr. Pirouzian based on 

causes 1, 2, and 4, but no such cause under cause 3. Dr. Pirouzian, the ALJ explained,

“engaged in a pattern of dishonest behavior between July 2007 and October 2007 

that included, but was not limited to, receiving disability insurance benefits from 

Northwestern Mutual by representing that he was unemployed when that was not the 

case,” and that such “dishonesty is substantially related to the qualifications, functions 

and duties of a physician and surgeon.” The ALJ further found that his conviction of 

willfully delaying a public officer in the discharge of official duties was “substantially 

related to the qualifications, functions and duties of a physician and surgeon.”

The ALJ noted that there was no evidence that Dr. Pirouzian’s dishonesty caused 

harm to any patient.

In imposing the discipline of revocation, the ALJ stated: “Not enough time has 

passed since the most recent misconduct to conclude that Dr. Pirouzian is rehabilitated to 

the extent that it would be in the public interest to permit him to retain his certificate, 

even on a probationary basis. Given all that has happened the only measure of discipline 

that will protect the public is the outright revocation of Dr. Pirouzian’s medical 

certificate.”

The Board adopted the ALJ’s decision and revoked Dr. Pirouzian’s license. 

Dr. Pirouzian filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Board denied.

Dr. Pirouzian sought review in the superior court on the grounds that the ALJ was 

biased, the Board’s decision was “irrational” and “internally inconsistent,” and that

revocation was grossly disproportionate to his actions. The court denied the petition.

Regarding revocation of Dr. Pirouzian’s license, the court stated that “the ALJ was 

entitled to rely on [Dr.] Pirouzian’s repeated dishonesty as ‘very serious,’ and couple the 
7

misconduct with [Dr.] Pirouzian’s lack of remorse and less than candid testimony to 

conclude that license revocation was required.”

Dr. Pirouzian filed a petition for a writ of mandate in this court pursuant to 

Business and Professions Code section 2337. We stayed the revocation of his license 

pending resolution of the petition and informed the parties that we were considering the 

issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance (see Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171). We

requested briefing on two issues: (1) Given the facts and circumstances of this case, was 

it a manifest abuse of discretion for the Board to impose any penalty? (2) If it was not a 

manifest abuse of discretion for the Board to impose a penalty, was it a manifest abuse of 

discretion to impose as harsh a penalty as revocation of Dr. Pirouzian’s license? Each 

side filed the requested briefs.

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Legal Principles and Standards of Review

The Board is authorized to discipline a medical licensee who commits 

“unprofessional conduct.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2234.)5 Unprofessional conduct 

includes: (1) the “commission of any act involving dishonesty . . . that is substantially 

related to the qualifications, functions, or duties of a physician and surgeon”; (2) the 

“conviction of any offense substantially related to the qualifications, functions, or duties 

of a physician and surgeon”; and (3) “conduct which breaches the rules or ethical code of 

a profession, or conduct which is unbecoming a member in good standing of a 

profession.” (§ 2234, subd. (e); § 2236, subd. (a); Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners

(1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 564, 575.)

When a licensee is found to have committed unprofessional conduct, the Board 

has the authority to discipline the licensee with a public reprimand (which may include a 

requirement that the licensee complete relevant educational courses), probation, 

suspension, or revocation of the physician’s license. (§ 2227, subd. (a).) The maximum 

discipline—revocation—deprives the licensee of a “fundamental right[]” to practice his 

 

5 All subsequent statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
8

or her profession (see Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143 (Bixby); cf. Meyer v. 

Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390, 399 [due process protects the right of individuals “to 

engage in any of the common occupations of life”]), and is considered a “drastic penalty” 

(Cooper v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners (1950) 35 Cal.2d 242, 252). If the Board 

decides to revoke a license, it may stay the revocation subject to specified terms and 

conditions. (See Grannis v. Board of Medical Examiners (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 

551, 563-564; Medical Board of California Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders and 

Disciplinary Guidelines (11th ed. 2011) pp. 9 & 27.)

In exercising its disciplinary authority, the Board is required to give “highest 

priority” to “[p]rotection of the public.” (§ 2229, subd. (a); see Landau v. Superior Court

(1998) 81 Cal.App.4th 191, 218 (Landau).) Priority shall also be “given to those 

measures, including further education, restrictions from practice, or other means, that will 

remove” the physician’s “demonstrated deficiencies in competency.” (§ 2229, subd. (c).) 

In addition, the Board “shall, wherever possible, take action that is calculated to aid in 

the rehabilitation of the licensee, or where, due to a lack of continuing education or other 

reasons, restriction on scope of practice is indicated, to order restrictions as are indicated 

by the evidence.” (Id., subd. (b).) As one court stated, the object of the Board’s 

discipline “is not to punish” the physician, but “rather, ‘to protect the life, health and 

welfare of the people at large and to set up a plan whereby those who practice medicine 

will have the qualifications which will prevent, as far as possible, the evils which 

could result from . . . a lack of honesty and integrity.’ [Citation.] In short, the 

purpose of discipline is to make the [physician] a better physician.” (Windham v. Board 

of Medical Quality Assurance (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 461, 473 (Windham), quoting 

Furnish v. Board of Medical Examiners (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 326, 331.) 

Review of a Board decision is by petition for administrative mandamus in the 

superior court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5; see Landau, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 198.) 

The trial court is required to review the Board’s decision to determine whether the Board 

“proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and 

whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, 
9

subd. (b).) “Abuse of discretion is established if the [Board] has not proceeded in the 

manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the 

findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Ibid.)

When, as here, the Board’s decision affects a petitioner’s fundamental rights, 

the trial court exercises its independent judgment based on the administrative record. 

(Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 143.) Although the “starting point” for the trial court is 

a presumption of correctness concerning the Board’s decision, the trial court “is free 

to substitute its own findings after first giving due respect to the agency’s findings.” 

(Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817-818.) 

Appellate review of a superior court’s decision is by a petition for an extraordinary 

writ. (§ 2337; Sela v. Medical Bd. of California (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 221, 230.) 

We review challenges to the court’s factual findings to determine whether the findings 

are supported by substantial evidence. (Cassidy v. California Bd. of Accountancy (2013) 

220 Cal.App.4th 620, 627.) Pure questions of law and “issues regarding the nature or 

degree of an administrative penalty are given a de novo review, the latter being examined 

to determine whether the administrative agency abused its discretion.” (Antelope Valley 

Press v. Poizner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 839, 851; see also Deegan v. City of Mountain 

View (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 46 [appellate court gives no deference to trial court’s 

determination of the discipline the agency imposed].) An abuse of discretion may be 

found if, under all the facts and circumstances, “the penalty imposed was . . . clearly 

excessive.” (Szmaciarz v. State Personnel Bd. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 904, 921.) 

II. Unprofessional Conduct

Here, Dr. Pirouzian does not dispute the ALJ’s findings that he committed 

numerous acts of dishonesty in 2007 with respect to his employment status and disability 

insurance benefits. Such acts of dishonesty can be the basis for disciplinary actions if 

they were related to his fitness or competence to practice medicine. (See Hughes v. 

Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 788; Griffiths v. Superior Court

(2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 757, 769 (Griffiths); Foster v. Board of Medical Quality 

Assurance (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1606, 1610.) Although there is no evidence that 
10

Dr. Pirouzian was dishonest or acted improperly with respect to any patient, the Board 

may conclude that intentional dishonesty, even toward persons outside the practice 

of medicine, relates to the qualifications for practicing medicine and can be the basis 

for imposing discipline. (See, e.g., Matanky v. Board of Medical Examiners

(1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 293, 301-302 (Matanky); Windham, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d 

at pp. 469-470.) As stated in Griffiths, although a “physician who commits income tax 

fraud, solicits the subornation of perjury, or files false, fraudulent insurance claims has 

not practiced medicine incompetently[,] that physician has shown dishonesty, poor 

character, a lack of integrity, and an inability or unwillingness to follow the law, and 

thereby has demonstrated professional unfitness meriting license discipline.” (Griffiths, 

supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 771-772.) The ALJ could, therefore, reasonably conclude 

that Dr. Pirouzian’s series of intentional misrepresentations to his psychiatrist, his 

employer, his disability insurance carrier, and the EDD are substantially related to the 

qualifications for practicing medicine. 

III. The Discipline

Dr. Pirouzian contends that revoking his license to practice medicine was 

excessive and an abuse of discretion. We agree.

Although the Board has discretion in determining the discipline to impose for 

unprofessional conduct, such discretion “ ‘ “is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power, but 

a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal principles governing the 

subject of its action.” ’ [Citations.]” (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 

1287, 1297.) Here, the Board’s discretion is subject to the Legislative mandate that the 

Board’s highest priority be protection of the public; and, secondarily, discipline should 

“aid in the rehabilitation of the licensee.” (§ 2229, subds. (a) & (b).) Punishment is not a 

goal. (Windham, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d at p. 473.) 

As the ALJ noted, the Board’s Medical Practice Regulations provide the following 

criteria for determining whether a physician has been rehabilitated: the nature and 

severity of the acts or offenses; the total criminal record; the time that has elapsed since 

commission of the acts or offenses; whether the licensee has complied with any terms of 
11

parole, probation, restitution or any other sanctions lawfully imposed against the licensee; 

evidence of expungement; and evidence of rehabilitation. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, 

§ 1360.1.) 

In this case, the Board’s imposition of the maximum discipline of revoking 

Dr. Pirouzian’s license to practice medicine is inconsistent with these priorities because 

it was not necessary to protect the public and did nothing to help make Dr. Pirouzian 

“a better physician.” Dr. Pirouzian’s dishonest acts, while serious, were focused on his 

efforts to obtain disability insurance benefits and preserve the possibility of returning 

to work at CSSD. Significantly, there is no evidence that his dishonesty involved or 

affected the treatment or care of any patient, or the billing of clients. His probation for 

his misdemeanor conviction was reduced from three years to 60 days, and the conviction 

was ultimately expunged. The amount of disability payments he received based upon his 

fraud was relatively small, and he eventually made full restitution to Northwestern 

Mutual (albeit not until he was charged with a crime). 

Dr. Pirouzian’s acts of dishonesty took place over a discrete period of several 

months in 2007, during a period of time when he was diagnosed with depression. Prior to 

and since that time, there was and has been nothing (so far as the record discloses) 

to indicate that Dr. Pirouzian behaved unprofessionally in any way. Indeed, his record 

is otherwise unblemished. After his series of related falsehoods were discovered in late 

2007, he continued his work as a physician and medical research fellow without incident. 

As the ALJ noted in 2014, “six years have passed since the last act of dishonesty.” There 

is nothing in the record to suggest that Dr. Pirouzian would repeat his dishonest conduct

or to indicate that he is now a danger to the public. 

Without diminishing the seriousness of Dr. Pirouzian’s conduct, our review of 

the entire record, in light of the applicable criteria and legislative priorities, compels the 

conclusion that outright revocation of Dr. Pirouzian’s license was unnecessary to protect 

the public and contrary to the goal of making him “a better physician.” (Windham, supra, 

104 Cal.App.3d at p. 473.) The discipline was excessive and, therefore, an abuse of 

discretion.
12

Two cases upon which the Board relies are instructive and distinguishable. 

In Matanky, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d 293, the Board revoked the medical license of a 

physician who had been convicted of 39 counts of Medicare fraud arising from the 

physician’s fraudulent statements concerning services to 13 convalescent hospital 

patients. (Id. at pp. 297-298.) The revocation was not an abuse of discretion, the court 

explained, because although the federal government, which paid the fraudulent claims,

“was not a patient,” it “was nonetheless a ‘client’ in the professional practice of Matanky. 

He also defrauded the patient [because] the federal government only pays on behalf of 

the patient.” (Id. at p. 306.) In contrast to the physician’s conviction of 13 counts of 

Medicare fraud in Matanky, Dr. Pirouzian was convicted of one misdemeanor count, 

which was unrelated to Medicare or client billings and ultimately expunged. Even 

if Dr. Pirouzian’s actions constituted insurance fraud, it cannot be said, as it was in 

Matanky, that he “defrauded the patient.” (Ibid.) 

In Windham, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d 461, the physician was convicted of 

two counts of federal tax fraud. The total tax deficiency was about $65,000. The 

Board found him guilty of unprofessional conduct and ordered his license revoked, 

but stayed the revocation and placed him on probation for three years, conditioned 

upon his performance of professional services for a community health institution. 

(Id. at pp. 464, 467-468, 473.) The court upheld the disciplinary order and rejected the 

physician’s argument that the probation condition “was too severe.” (Id. at p. 473.) 

The “charitable work,” the court explained was “right in line with the purpose of the 

proceedings below.” (Id. at pp. 473-474.) Here, by contrast, although Dr. Pirouzian’s 

dishonest acts are no more egregious—and arguably far less egregious—than the tax 

fraud in Windham, the career-ending revocation without a stay imposed on Dr. Pirouzian 

is significantly more severe than the revocation and stay imposed in Windham. (See also 

Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 570 [where physician 

made sexually-explicit remarks, unrelated to diagnosis or treatment, to patients he had 

hypnotized, Board suspended his license and gave him the opportunity to resume medical 

practice after submitting to a psychiatric examination, subject to five years probation].)
13

Finally, our conclusion that the revocation constitutes an abuse of discretion is 

supported by the ALJ’s statements during the hearing and in his written findings that 

indicate the discipline was imposed for the improper purpose of punishing Dr. Pirouzian. 

During the hearing, the ALJ informed Dr. Pirouzian that his plea bargain was “a great 

deal,” that his criminal defense “lawyer did a wonderful job,” and that Dr. Pirouzian 

received “better treatment from the criminal justice system than virtually any man that 

has walked the streets of San Diego County since 1900.” This sentiment was followed in 

the ALJ’s proposed order, which states that Dr. Pirouzian obtained “extremely favorable 

treatment by the criminal justice system” and that the misdemeanor conviction was “not 

an accurate measure of his wrongdoing.” These statements indicate that the ALJ believed 

that Dr. Pirouzian had not been sufficiently punished for his actions, and strongly suggest 

that the ALJ’s disciplinary decision was improperly motivated by a desire to make up for 

the “[in]accurate” punishment Dr. Pirouzian received from the criminal justice system. 

This is inconsistent with purposes of a disciplinary proceeding that has as its object 

“not to punish” the physician. (Windham, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d at p. 473.)

For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Board abused its discretion by 

revoking Dr. Pirouzian’s license without staying the revocation. 
14

DISPOSITION

The petition is granted. The trial court is directed to vacate its order denying 

Dr. Pirouzian’s petition for administrative mandamus and to enter a new order granting 

the petition and commanding the Board to set aside its order revoking Dr. Pirouzian’s 

license and to determine the discipline to be imposed in light of this opinion. 

All parties shall bear their own costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

JOHNSON, J.