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i 

67–796 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–49] 

TEN YEARS ON: THE EVOLUTION OF 

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 12, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

KEVIN GATES, Professional Staff Member 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

JEFF CULLEN, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, July 12, 2011, Ten Years On: The Evolution of Strategic Communication and Information Operations Since 9/11 ............................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, July 12, 2011 ............................................................................................ 27 

TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2011 

TEN YEARS ON: THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 

AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 10 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ............................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Brooks, Rosa, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center ............................. 2 

Hamid, Dr. Tawfik, Senior Fellow and Chair for the Study of Islamic Radicalism, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies ..................................................... 6 

Paul, Dr. Christopher, Social Scientist, RAND Corporation ................................ 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Brooks, Rosa ..................................................................................................... 32 

Hamid, Dr. Tawfik ........................................................................................... 73 

Paul, Dr. Christopher ....................................................................................... 49 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac ...................................................................................... 31 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

TEN YEARS ON: THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS SINCE 

9/11 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, 

Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 12, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:05 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I call the hearing to order. 

And again, I apologize to the witnesses for the delay. But I appreciate you bearing with us during the time of votes. 

I want to ask unanimous consent that my opening statement will 

be made part of the record, and since nobody else is here at the 

moment that seems to be without objection in the interest of time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. As you all know, this has been an important 

issue for this subcommittee for some time. And there had been 

meetings even in recent weeks I have attended where Members 

had expressed various opinions on whether the area of strategic 

communications particularly in terrorism is an area where it is appropriate or productive for the United States government to be involved. 

And I think it is most appropriate for us to hear your views 

about whether we should be involved, how we are doing, and suggestions you have for the way forward. 

So I understand Mr. Langevin and other Members are on their 

way, but in the interest of time let me go ahead. And I am going 

to turn to our witnesses to summarize their opening statements. 

Without objection, your complete written statement will be made 

part of the record. 

And I will turn to our witnesses—Ms. Rosa Brooks, professor of 

Georgetown University Law Center; Dr. Christopher Paul from the 

RAND Corporation; and Dr. Tawfik Hamid, senior fellow and chair 

for the study of Islamic radicalism at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. 

So, Ms. Brooks, we will start with you. Again, thanks for being 

here. 
2 

STATEMENT OF ROSA BROOKS, PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN 

UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 

Ms. BROOKS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Chris. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now I can be heard. 

It is great to have an opportunity to be here. And let me just 

start by saying, as you said, I am a professor at Georgetown. Until 

a few weeks ago, I was an official at the Defense Department, 

where I worked very extensively on strategic communication and 

information operations [IO] issues. But I should emphasize that although I am very happy to talk to the extent that I can about those 

issues if there is interest and questions, I am here today just in my 

individual capacity. 

I believe Chris—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Would you pull the microphone just a little 

closer to you? It may be me, but—— 

Ms. BROOKS. Is this better? 

I think Chris is going to talk a little bit about the origin of the 

term ‘‘strategic communication’’ and the various meanings it might 

have in some detail so I won’t do much beyond saying that it is a 

bit of a corporate import. And indeed, people often use the term 

‘‘strategic communications’’ with an ‘‘s’’ on it just to mean the plural of all the different kinds of public relations, marketing, advertising. 

We have really struggled to give it a meaning at the Defense Department that adds some value that isn’t the same, because I don’t 

think it is particularly useful in the government context to have 

that term. 

It is just redundant if it means the same thing as public affairs, 

plus public diplomacy, plus what we used to call psychological operations [PSYOP] and now call MISO—military information support 

operations. So we have really struggled to make it a somewhat 

more robust concept, one that emphasizes the importance of engagement, listening, understanding the perception of others and 

aligning all of our tools, our actions, as well as our words in order 

to influence perceptions in a way that is in our favor. 

I think though that that corporate history of communication 

often creates a lot of misleading and overly simplistic impressions 

about what strategic communication can and can’t do in the government context. 

One of those impressions is that it is simple. It is like selling a 

soda. You want to be able to easily show success or failure. You 

want to be easily able to quantify it. 

But in the context of national security and foreign policy objectives, it is not a soda. It is much more complex. People’s bundles 

of cultural assumptions are very, very different. The timeframe for 

success is much, much longer. You are not talking about increasing 

sales over year one or year two. It is much harder to gauge. What 

you are doing is much more of an art than a science. 

I think that one phrase that you still very, very often hear repeated is the famous one of Richard Holbrooke’s, ‘‘How can the 

world’s greatest communication society be out communicated by a 

guy in a cave?’’ 
3 

And I think that imbeds some of those assumptions that the 

skills of Madison Avenue and Hollywood in a subcultural vacuum 

can nonetheless significantly change the perceptions, attitudes and 

behaviors of many, many people around the globe. 

Osama bin Laden, who, of course, was the man in the cave who 

Holbrooke was referring to, had a lot of advantages early on in a 

certain way when it came to strategic communication. One of them 

was the home court advantage. 

Compared to us, he knew the language, the culture, the history, 

the narrative, certainly far more than we did. They say all politics 

is local. Maybe all strategic communications is fundamentally local, 

at least, to be successful. 

He also had the underdog status, and I think we early on made 

a mistake and really playing into his hands, in some way giving 

him a prestige. The appearance of the whole U.S. military was preoccupied with this one man. 

We had a platform already. We unintentionally raised it a little 

bit higher for him by seeming obsessed with one man, one organization at the expense of other issues. 

With that said, Osama bin Laden in the end, I think, didn’t out 

communicate anybody. By the time of his death, he had really sunk 

into much greater irrelevance. I think he was overtaken by the 

events of the Arab Spring, a multiplicity of other voices. 

In a way he forgot that actions speak louder than words and that 

no amount of ringing appeals to Islamic unity or jihad could make 

up for the number of dead Muslim bodies in the streets and the 

squares in the Arab world and elsewhere. He was overtaken by 

many other voices that in many ways were rejecting extremism. 

What does all these mean to the United States, very, very briefly? 

I think there are some things when it comes to strategic communication that we need more of and some things that we need less 

of. 

One thing that we need more of still is we are still in the process 

of reforming some of our internal structures in the government to 

diminish confusion about just what it is we are talking about when 

we say ‘‘strategic communication’’ or ‘‘IO’’ or these various other 

terms. We need to increase our coordination, training, et cetera. 

We need to decentralize more and stop fixating on control of the 

message, which rarely works, and indeed, I think one of the reasons that we have seen, you know, in the Arab Spring, a multiplicity of voices, who aren’t that interested in the issues that we 

were interested in, in the end become much more influential than 

our efforts to change the conversation ourselves. 

We need more funding for good, old-fashioned public diplomacy, 

cultural exchanges, educational exchanges. They make a difference. 

They help with that decentralization by empowering those many 

other voices. 

There is some risk in that. You sometimes empower people you 

are not going to like very much, but I think it is one of those tactical risks for strategic gain situations, and long term it pays off. 

And we need more funding for linguistic training, regional area 

studies training. 
4 

What do we need less of? We need a little bit less of seeing all 

strategic communication through a counterterrorism lens. I think 

that that ends up doing us a disservice in our counterterrorism 

aims, ironically. I am happy to talk a little bit more about that. 

I think we need little bit less of an obsession with metrics and 

assessments. It is very hard, in fact, especially in the short run, to 

evaluate the success of strategic communication campaigns. 

I think we need less of a zero defect mentality. No question in 

my mind there are people in the name of U.S. government strategic 

communications doing stupid things right this minute. It is going 

to happen, but we can’t throw the baby out with the bathwater 

when it does happen. 

And finally, just the last point, I think that we need a little bit 

less obsession with who does what. One of the topics that in some 

ways I get most frustrated by is why is the DOD [Department of 

Defense] doing this when the State Department should be doing 

this in a different world. It seems to me if the phrase ‘‘whole of government’’ that we toss around a lot means anything at all, it has 

got to mean that when something is in the national interest, the 

government finds a way to do it. 

In a better world, I think the State Department would be better 

funded, have greater capacity. We are not there yet. In the meantime, I think, very clearly it is among other things a military mission to use the tools it has to prevent conflicts when possible. 

I will stop there. I know I have only skated over the surface, but 

I have used up my 5 minutes. 

So, thank you very much. I am happy to talk more in the questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Brooks can be found in the Appendix on page 32.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

We are a little liberal on the 5 minutes, because I do realize this 

is a big topic and we are asking you to summarize your statement. 

But I appreciate you doing so. 

Dr. Paul. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER PAUL, SOCIAL SCIENTIST, 

RAND CORPORATION 

Dr. PAUL. Thanks very much for inviting me here to testify 

today. 

It was, in fact, in 2001 that Vince Vitto coined the phrase ‘‘strategic communication’’ for use in the government as we are talking 

about it today, while serving as the chairman of the Defense 

Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination. 

So here we are 10 years later still using his phrase, but still 

struggling collectively to get our arms around the concept, let alone 

to do it well. So there is no official government-wide definition of 

‘‘strategic communication.’’ And in academia there is not an agreed 

definition, nor is there complete consensus about the boundaries of 

the concepts for agreements on priorities for moving it forward. 

In my research I have observed at least three differences, real, 

actual tensions in how people conceive strategic communication. 

These are: first, attention between broadcast and engagement; second, disagreements over the desired degree of control of the mes-
5 

sage, attention between balancing taped message automatons 

versus loose cannon in the ship of communication; and, third, attention between inform and influence. 

And I think it is this latter tension that is the most significant 

and pernicious, a tension between those who admit that the goal 

of strategic communication is influence and those who hold that the 

goal is just to inform without influencing. 

And I think this is a false dichotomy. Informing without influencing isn’t possible. There is no such thing in my view as valuefree information. Every provision of information depends on the attitudes and beliefs of the speaker and seeks to serve some purpose. 

Letting the facts speak for themselves presupposes first two 

things: first, that the facts have something to say and, second, that 

there is something that the speaker wants said. Every provision of 

information is an act of persuasion. 

Perhaps the more appropriate distinction to make would be between influence and manipulation. In my view, strategic communication should be unashamedly about virtuous persuasion, but 

should be completely devoid of falsehood, partial truths and spin. 

A wide range of definitions could successfully cover the concept, 

as long as they respect what I call the unassailable core of strategic 

communication, which has four tenets. First, informing, influencing 

and persuading is important. Second, effectively informing, influencing and persuading requires clear objectives. Third, coordination 

and deconfliction are necessary to avoid information fratricide. 

And, fourth, actions communicate. 

Now, this last point is particularly important, as far too often 

strategic communication efforts focus only on the traditional communicators and the traditional messaging to the exclusion of the 

messages and signals we send in other ways. 

So, if a definition of strategic communication doesn’t embrace 

those four points then in my view it is actually a definition of 

something else. 

I have a vision of what successful U.S. government strategic communication would look like. In this vision we have clearly stated 

national objectives, which contain nested subordinate objectives, 

which contain nested intermediate objectives, nesting all the way 

down to the operational and the tactical level. 

These clear statements make it easy to see where there is a way 

and a way for influence and persuasion to contribute and where 

there isn’t. 

In this vision commanders and decisionmakers have a communication mindedness. They consider the messages and signals that 

will be sent by their actions, their utterances, their plans, policies. 

Failing that—or as that is developing—these same commanders or 

decisionmakers have access to and respect for communication specialists, who advise them and sit at their right hand and bring the 

communication implications of their intentions to their attention. 

In this vision everyone in government speaks not with one voice 

like a robot or a parrot, but with their messages aligned in the 

same direction, because everyone understands the nested objectives 

and, most importantly, how their own efforts contribute to those 

objectives and because they have or have access to the requisite 

communication training and cultural knowledge. 
6 

In this vision communication isn’t exclusively one-way broadcast 

but also includes two-way communication, engagement and dialogue. In my vision this leads to policy shaped with our own interests, as well as the interest and preferences of others in mind. This 

is my vision. 

To support my vision I have six recommendations. I will give you 

the headline for each and refer you to my written testimony for the 

details. 

My recommendations: 

First, specify information end states. 

Second, build strategic communication following a crawl, walk, 

run progression. 

Third, build strategic communication from the bottom up as well 

as from the top down. We do need further leadership and guidance 

in this area from the highest levels, but better training and better 

practices at intermediate and lower levels can make important contributions that should not be overlooked. 

Fifth, make a distinction and separate virtuous persuasion from 

more pernicious deception and manipulation. 

And sixth and finally, create and disseminate a government-wide 

definition of strategic communication. 

I am happy to elaborate on anything I have touched on during 

questions and answers. 

Thank you for your time today. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Paul can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

Dr. Hamid. 

STATEMENT OF DR. TAWFIK HAMID, SENIOR FELLOW AND 

CHAIR FOR THE STUDY OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM, POTOMAC 

INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES 

Dr. HAMID. Thanks a lot. It is a pleasure and honor to be with 

you today. 

I will address first an important issue with the strategic communication, which is a need, and a vital need, for this topic in the war 

on terror, because the war on terror should not be seen as a war 

within a geographical border. We have seen terrorism developing 

from Afghanistan, Pakistan to homegrown terrorism in America 

here. 

So I see that the war on terror should focus on what I call 

‘‘Brainistan,’’ the impulse of hatred that is created in the mind of 

some individuals and causes them to do terrorism. So, if we ignore 

this part of the problem, then we will have major difficulty, really, 

to defeat terrorism at the end. 

The other point I would like to mention is that after September 

11 there were several setbacks in the relationship between the U.S. 

and the Muslim world. And in response to this the United States 

tried several ways to improve its image in the Muslim world, what 

they call winning hearts and minds. 

They used some phrases like ‘‘Islam is a religion of peace,’’ for 

example, to satisfy the Muslim society. They avoided using certain 

expressions like the word ‘‘jihad’’ in official communications for the 

same reason. 
7 

And they also tried in some situation to show what I call culture 

oversensitivity, not just sensitivity, by having some U.S. diplomats 

wearing the hijab, for example, the Islamic scarf, when they visit 

Muslim countries, or sometimes the female military personnel will 

wear the hijab in Afghanistan to satisfy the local community, 

thinking that this will improve the image of the United States. 

The outcome of many of these attempts were not really very significant improvement in the image of the United States in the 

Muslim world. I mentioned some reports in my statement to show 

that the outcome was not really so very promising of all these attempts. 

Weaknesses in the U.S. approach, as I see them, include the following: failure to achieve what I call a critical balance or crucial 

balance between showing respect to the Muslim world and not 

being perceived as weak. So the balance here is needed. 

For example, doing certain acts like the U.S. President, for example, bowing to the king of Saudi Arabia to show respect, he could 

have given him a hug, because bowing here can show sign of weakness that can impede the image of, the improvement of the image 

of the United States. In general the Muslim world prefers to have 

a strong friend rather than a weak friend. 

The other point is failure to remove obstacles that impede the 

process of improving the U.S. image, like, for example, failure to 

weaken the radical, or inability to weaken radical Islamic ideology 

itself which is a main obstacle to improving the image of the 

United States in the Muslim world. 

The ideology itself here is crucial. Without weakening it, the 

image of the United States will have always difficulty to be improved. And also failure to disassociate the U.S. government from 

the U.S. media in the minds of many in the Muslim world. 

In our parts of the world we don’t see the government here separate from the media, so the government can do great things to improve its image, yet we see someone in the media criticizing Islam, 

for example. This can ruin the whole image of the government. I 

believe sufficient effort should be given to disassociate the U.S. government from the media in the mind of many in the Muslim world. 

The recommendations in general—I give the outlines—we should 

work at three levels: the level of improving the message quality 

itself via the text. Sometimes use some Islamic text to really improve the strategic communication. I give some example here. 

There is a need to use certain cognitive psychology tactics to improve the U.S. image to create positive links to the U.S. 

Also, the U.S. needs to work on weakening the ideology of terrorism by properly calculated and adjusted psychological warfare 

operations. This is much more effective than just military confrontation. We need to balance this psychological warfare that is 

fundamental to weaken the mind of the terrorists. 

And, finally, addressing the perception issue so whenever certain 

acts or deeds or statements are released, they should be carefully 

done or stated in a way to avoid being perceived as weak on the 

other side. So you can still show respect as you—great, it is great 

to show respect, however you should do it in a way without being 

perceived as weak. 
8 

These are the frames of recommendations, and I mentioned more 

details in my statement. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hamid can be found in the Appendix on page 73.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Excuse me. 

Let me just ask each of you to comment on something I want to 

read, and then I will yield to Ranking Member Mr. Langevin. 

This is a quote from an article entitled ‘‘Ending Al Qaeda’’ which 

appeared in the July/August issue of the American Interest. And 

it says, ‘‘The center of gravity in our struggle with Islamist terrorism concerns Al Qaeda’s legitimacy in the context of Muslim 

perceptions of the West. Counter-narratives can enable Western 

and allied Middle Eastern governments to convince potential Al 

Qaeda recruits that violent extremism is both intellectually corrupt 

and politically counterproductive. If we combine these messages 

with a concerted effort to contest Al Qaeda’s strategic communications mastery of the Internet, we can end recruitment. We can thus 

destroy Al Qaeda as a self-regenerating worldwide proselytizing organization. Alas, we are not doing this very well. In some respects, 

we are not doing it at all. We need to change our ways lest we 

come to regret an opportunity missed.’’ 

I would be very interested to know your reaction to those statements. 

Ms. Brooks. 

Ms. BROOKS. I think it is both true and untrue. I think we are 

contesting the Internet, probably not as effectively as we could and 

should be, but I think I won’t go into detail, as you are probably 

already familiar with some of the Defense Department’s efforts, as 

well as the efforts of other parts of the U.S. government, but it is 

certainly an area that is getting a tremendous amount of attention 

and we care about very deeply. 

But the only part I would squabble with, I think, a little bit, we 

are not always the right ones to do it. And this goes back to the 

issue of who has the home court advantage, who has the right skill 

sets. 

We often don’t get it right, because we don’t have the linguistic 

skills. We don’t have the historical knowledge. And I think that 

there is a little bit of a Holy Grail fantasy that if we can only come 

up with this mystical alternative narrative, that somehow everyone 

will just say, ‘‘Oh, goodness me, extremism is a terrible idea.’’ 

I think that is dangerously simplistic. There is no Holy Grail alternative narrative that we will put out there and that the minute 

potential extremist recruits see or read they will go, ‘‘Gosh, I see 

the error of my ways.’’ 

It is so much more complicated than that and I think we barely 

understand the relationship between ideas, ideology, action, behavior, identity, group loyalties, family loyalties. All sorts of things can 

trump ideas. 

That said, I think that what we do need to do—this goes back 

to a point, I think, that we have all made in various ways—is empower other credible voices to make those arguments in a multiplicity of different ways, some of which we won’t like, some of 

which we won’t like, but which in sum total—they will be con-
9 

tradictory; it will be messy—but in sum total is often much more 

powerful in the Internet domain, as well as every other domain, 

than a controlled message to find the alternative narrative that we 

put out there. 

And I think this is in some ways the positive and negative lessons for us of the Arab Spring: that you poll protesters in Tahrir 

Square and elsewhere in the Arab world, they are not that interested in the United States. That is not what was getting them out 

there in the public squares. That is not what was motivating them. 

They weren’t that interested in extremism either. They were 

there for economic reasons. They were there for political reasons. 

They were there, because they wanted futures and jobs and better 

educational opportunities. You name it. 

And in some ways the best thing we could do is stand back, enable them to speak and shut up, other than saying, ‘‘We support 

you.’’ So I think getting over the notion that there is some quick 

fix that we, the United States government, will find is something 

that we need to do and put more energy into empowering and enable others to speak, recognizing that sometimes we won’t like 

what they have to say. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Dr. Paul. 

Dr. PAUL. I think the quote you read represents a laudable sentiment, but I think the devil is in the details. 

So, first, I would like to reiterate that strategic communication 

is good for things other than just countering violent extremism. 

There is a whole host of foreign populations with whom we need 

to sustain positive relationships. And then it is a lot easier to prevent violent extremism before it starts by having a positive relationship and having started a dialogue long before something like 

that emerges. 

Second, this is harder than it seems. As Rosa indicated, there is 

no silver bullet. There is a lot of cultural context and nuance. This 

is not a trivial undertaking that just involves getting a few right 

messages on the Internet, finding the right radical extremist 

boards and offering counter arguments. 

And third, even if we become better at that and we do more in 

that domain, it is very likely that an organization such as Al Qaeda 

will have a residual radical hard core that no amount of persuasion 

is going to work on. And so there is going to need to be the—we 

can’t talk our way out of this problem. 

Absolutely, the strategic communication piece is critical both in 

terms of making progress, necking Al Qaeda down to the radical 

hard core, who will need to be incarcerated or eliminated, hopefully, in such a way that it doesn’t engender further recruits, that 

that is framed in such a way as to be communicated as effectively 

as possible. 

These are just the few things I wanted to observe. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Thank you. 

Dr. Hamid. 

Dr. HAMID. Absolutely. 

I agree with the point that the counter narrative to Al Qaeda ideology has not been developed yet. And the United States may not 

be in a position or may not have the capability, really, to develop 
10 

it, because it depends on the culture, on the religious jargon, like, 

for example, here in the article mentioned, it is intellectually corrupt and terrorism and politically incoherent. This doesn’t make 

much sense in the mind of the jihadists. 

What makes sense in the mind of the Muslim world is if it is unIslamic or Islamic. They think differently. They think in terms of 

religion. So, I believe a counter narrative has to be created, but the 

U.S. may play a supportive role here, not necessarily to get directly 

involved within the process of the production itself. 

The second part is the use of Internet. It is crucial in winning 

the war on terror. First of all, it can help the reformation efforts. 

I wrote recently an op-ed to show that how the worst parts of the 

Muslim world when it comes to terrorism—Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan, in general—are the lowest in using the Internet, in 

Internet penetration. 

And not only that. The Internet can be used as a tool to launch 

a very powerful psychological warfare operation, as I mentioned, to 

fight here the impulse of hatred in ‘‘Brainistan,’’ so psychological 

warfare by using the Internet. 

The Internet is tremendous tool in our hands, but we need to develop the content that can be really effective, because what works 

in our mind does not necessarily mean it will work in their mind. 

So what we see effective and crystal clear it will work, may not 

work at all and may be actually doing the opposite, may produce 

the opposite of what we are expecting. 

So we need really to go forward with using the Internet effectively to launch psychological warfare. However, we need to be very 

careful on the message and the content of the material to be effective on the other side. So I agree, really, with the view of the article. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. 

Mr. Chairman, without objection, I would like to read my opening statement, then go into questions if I could? 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Sure. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Again, thanks to our witnesses for your testimony. I found it fascinating so far. 

And more than 2,500 years ago the great Chinese strategist, Sun 

Tzu, wrote, and I quote—‘‘To fight and conquer in all your battles 

is not supreme excellence. Supreme excellence consists in breaking 

the enemy’s resistance without fighting.’’ 

But his real words still hold true today. America’s interest 

abroad is not simply to rely on breaking enemy resistance, but also 

in enabling people around the world to share in the American 

ideals of protecting life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 

Since the horrible attacks of 9/11, our country has been forced to 

turn its focus on battles abroad to seek justice against those who 

murdered nearly 3,000 people. And while we have had recent vic-
11 

tories against Al Qaeda and its supporters, including the killing of 

Osama bin Laden and suppressing major elements of the Taliban, 

much of our effort has been falsely billed in the Muslim world as 

a quest for vengeance. 

Now, some in the U.S. have fanned these flames with similar 

rhetoric, only sparking greater violence and outrage. It is a vital 

lesson for those seeking to maintain America’s influence or leadership in the world community that words matter not only for the respect and image of our nation abroad but also our national security. 

Now, strategic communication must be a whole of government effort that employs American values of justice and liberty to 

strengthen ties with our friends and allies and influence or disrupt 

our competitors and foes. 

These goals are becoming increasingly difficult in a world of instantaneous global communication, where messages designed for 

one audience can easily spill over and be confused by another. 

Furthermore, these audiences are not simply empty vessels. No 

communication takes place in a vacuum, and certainly any American engagement overseas can and will be spun and used against 

us. 

We must also be aware that we are targets of other strategic 

communication efforts and must order our own impressions and 

views. Take, for example, the recent quote from the People’s Liberation Army Chief General Chen Bingde, who during Admiral 

Mullen’s recent visit to China, noted that America should reduce 

its spending on defense. 

Should the statement be taken as a legitimate expression of Chinese concerns with a strong and well-funded military, or rather is 

it intended as ammunition for another audience in the U.S., who 

would seek to stop any defense efficiencies, despite a massive deficit owed largely to China and declining force responsibilities in 

Iraq and Afghanistan? This is just one of the main challenges facing our strategic communications abroad. 

So with that, I just want to thank our witnesses, again, for your 

time today. Again, I have appreciated your testimony and look forward to continue to review the printed material that you have provided to us and I appreciate, you know, the challenges that we do 

face. The United States, obviously, has a good story to tell. It is a 

story of strength through pluralism and diversity and justice 

through fairness and compassion. 

We must not lose the opportunities to tell the story when we are 

able, so that our actions abroad may be rightly interpreted as supporting the ideals upon which our Constitution was based and 

which we wish for men and women around the world. 

With that, I would like to just turn to a question. Last Congress 

I introduced a bill to establish a quadrennial national security review that would basically take a whole of government look at our 

national security challenges and resources to meet these threats. 

My question is, how should strategic communications be synchronized with direct and indirect efforts, such as humanitarian assistance operations? And will we benefit from a high-level look at 

these priorities and resources across the board? 

Ms. BROOKS. Yes, we would. 
12 

I think that your idea of a quadrennial national security review 

is a very good one. I personally would also love to see us move towards a more unified national security budget, because I think that 

the increasingly archaic distinctions that we draw between what 

the State Department does, what the Defense Department does, 

which made sense in an era of rather different, more state-oriented 

threats, don’t make much sense any longer. 

And yet our committee processes here on the Hill, the way our 

executive branch is structured and certainly the way we present 

our budgets just sort of calcifies arbitrary lines that really are 

doing us a disservice. 

And I think that any effort—I think we are still obviously very 

far away from that—but any efforts to force the executive branch 

as well as invite people here on the Hill and in the media to think 

of this as a unified set of problems, not as a, over here you have 

got State, over here you have got AID [Agency for International Development], over here you have got the Defense Department, would 

be very valuable. 

I think that one of the tough institutional challenges that we face 

at the Defense Department and then I think is faced at every other 

executive branch agency has been sort of wresting strategic communication away from the communications experts, which is not to 

say that that is not extremely important. 

But your point about how do we better synchronize it with humanitarian assistance and other issues really goes to a point that 

I made and that Chris also emphasized, that strategic communication, to be effective, is about aligning all of the tools at our disposal, our actions, as well as our words. And humanitarian assistance among other things can be a vital strategic communication 

tool. If we stick it off in a closet with public affairs, we don’t tend 

to realize those synergies at all. 

So I think that that is partly just a bureaucratic and structural 

challenge for us and some of the internal reforms that while I was 

at the Defense Department we worked on. We are very much 

geared at how do you integrate strategic communication thinking 

across the departments so that it is not deemed as it is on the sort 

of theory of every marine as a rifleman, everyone should be a strategic communicator and be thinking about those issues, but it is 

very hard to do. 

Dr. PAUL. So a really excellent question, because it attacks two 

critical issues in this area—resources and this issue of synchronization of actions. So the question is very much mindful of the fact 

that actions communicate. 

I will echo Rosa. Yes, more resources are necessary for this. 

When USIA [United States Information Agency] was disestablished, we lost as a nation a lot of capability in this area. Some of 

it was rolled into State. Some of it was just lost. 

We have been building some capabilities in these areas, and I 

understand this is a time of fiscal austerity. And if public diplomacy and strategic communication are national priorities, and they 

should be, they need to be resourced like they are. 

Now, turning to the coordination and synchronization issue, that 

is a real challenge. Something inside individual departments that 

can help is the development of communication mindedness. If the 
13 

people who are doing humanitarian aid, who are doing other kinds 

of policy have become conditioned to ask the question, what are the 

communication implications of what I am about to do and who else 

might I need to coordinate with, that will go a long way. 

But at the end of the day, if there are different departments that 

have different portfolios, it is easy to say the phrase ‘‘whole of government.’’ It is very difficult to actually do whole of government integration. 

Part of the challenge there is within the executive departments. 

It is almost impossible for one executive department to have anything approaching authority over another executive department. 

The way it is structured just doesn’t allow that. 

So you definitely hit on the challenge. There are some possible 

solutions that can be achieved collaboratively and through training 

and through constant reminders of decisionmakers and reminders 

to decisionmakers and commanders that actions communicate and 

that these things need to be coordinated and integrated. But that 

is a real challenge and remains a challenge. 

Dr. HAMID. Okay. Thank you. 

Thanks for the question. I see two parts. My answer will be in 

two parts. The first is, when we have limited resources, I believe 

it is the time when we should focus on how to improve the efficacy 

and efficiency of using these resources. So it is not just the amount 

of resources. I believe what is more important is how to improve 

the same resources, even less resources, to be more efficient. 

Regarding the synchronization of the strategic communications 

and the humanitarian effort, this is absolutely needed. In cognitive 

psychology models in memory, in human memory, there is a concept called or a theory called the spreading activation model that 

means that when you remember something like the word ‘‘red’’ you 

remember apple or red car or blood, some related information. All 

information are like a network of related data. 

So when you remember in the Muslim world, for example, the 

word you say, it can be either linked to positive or negative things. 

Now it is more linked to negative things. That is why the image 

is not that good. The aim of using humanitarian aid can play a significant role in changing these links to make it positive. 

I will give you an example that happened in our country, Egypt, 

my country, my original country, Egypt, that in the 1980s after 

Yom Kippur war, after long period of hatred to America during 

Nasser’s time, the United States AID, USAID, used to send some 

chickens directly to the hands of people. And the color of the cover 

of the bag was—or the color of the bag there was something like 

the U.S. flag. It was not the flag, but with same colors. It represented America. We called it the American chickens. 

And what happened when Egyptians used to eat these chickens—believe me, this was happening—we used to pray, say, ‘‘God 

bless America.’’ The taste was so good, and it linked, it created a 

link in the human brain between the word ‘‘USA’’ and the good 

taste. So it was a positive link toward USA. 

And during that time, the image of U.S. was marvelous. So synchronizing the humanitarian aid with strategic communication, 

they should work together, because you can use the humanitarian 

aid more effectively when you, for example, add the image of the 
14 

flag, and you can put the two flags of the two countries so that it 

is not misunderstood in a negative way. So it creates a link toward 

the flag of the USA, the USA via using humanitarian aid more effectively. So I fully agree with this point. 

I call this chicken diplomacy, by the way. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you all for your answers. 

I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. West. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member. 

And thanks to the panel for being here. 

And Dr. Hamid, I absolutely applaud you for your stance—— 

Dr. HAMID. Thank you. 

Mr. WEST [continuing]. And your efforts. 

I spent 22 years in the military. And as an artillery officer, one 

of the things that we saw develop was the understanding that you 

have lethal fires, but then you also have this thing called nonlethal 

fires. And when you do your strategic studies, they will teach you 

that there are four elements of a nation’s power, and that is the 

DIME theory—diplomatic, informational, military and economic. 

So I think one of the things we have not really been able to do 

a good job of is really understand how do we leverage the nonlethal 

fires, the information operations, as part of our national power. 

And I think that when you look at the fact that we continue to talk 

about a war on terror, and I think you will agree that terror is a 

tactic, so our nation cannot really fight against a tactic. That is 

something down the tactical level. 

So I think we have missed the boat as far as our strategic communications, and until we can clearly understand and identify who 

the enemy is and their goals and objectives, that we are not going 

to be successful in bringing together a targeted, strategic type of 

communications message which, as you just said, should not be in 

the realm of communicators. It should be in the realm of operators. 

And I think that is an important thing. 

So my question to you all is this. Do you think in developing a 

strategic communications plan—and we have been at this for 10 

years now—that we have truly failed to understand the impetus 

behind which our enemy combats against us? 

And also, I would ask a second question. Do you think we are 

narrowly defining our enemy because if Al Qaeda was to change 

their name tomorrow, does that mean that we have won? 

Ms. BROOKS. That is a good question. 

I think that, as you said yourself in your comments, terrorism is 

a tactic. It is not an entity called ‘‘terror.’’ It is a method. It is an 

asymmetrical method of warfare, and those with less power will at 

times turn to it and that there is importance in being very precise 

about who we are talking about when we talk about the war on terror. 

So to the question of, do we understand the impetus behind our 

enemy, is I think it depends which one. The Taliban is different 

from Al Qaeda. Al-Shabaab is different from main Al Qaeda. 

Hamas and Hezbollah are very, very different from Al Qaeda. 

And I do think that we do ourselves a tremendous disservice 

when we lump them all together. They have elements in common, 

may draw on similar modes of support, may have similar ideolog-
15 

ical elements, but they are not the same. The grievances, the issues 

that motivate their adherents are fundamentally different. 

And I think that one of the, again, efforts that we have really 

certainly worked on, I know, during my time with the Defense Department, and I think that the U.S. in general has made some significant progress is in disaggregating and saying, ‘‘You know, you 

can’t fight if you don’t understand who you are fighting against.’’ 

I mean, you know, again, we do ourselves a real disservice if we 

don’t disaggregate. 

Actually, if you will indulge me, one other metaphor I really wish 

we could put to rest is the war of ideas metaphor which, again, I 

think, as with the war on terror, tends to confuse us more than it 

actually enlightens us. 

As we have said earlier, you know, there is no one meta-narrative that magically ends extremism or ends terrorism. We don’t 

really understand the relationship between ideas and action. 

There are lots of people who are exposed to and may be adherents of violent extremist ideas, but who don’t become terrorists or 

don’t fight against us. You know, to paraphrase the NRA [National 

Rifle Association] bumper sticker, you know, ‘‘Ideas Don’t Kill People. People Do.’’ 

And we need to understand that I think at times the fixation on 

extremist ideology can really blind us to that sort of down and 

dirty work of really disaggregating and saying, ‘‘What is going on 

in this country in this province with this demographic group that 

is motivating them to take action against us,’’ so that we can tailor 

our responses accordingly. 

Dr. PAUL. I think the way you framed your question provides a 

really important frame, the separation between fires—lethal fires 

and nonlethal fires. In the military we really understand how to do 

lethal fires. There is a protocol, there are targets, there is a desired 

effect, there is a variety of different ammunitions that might deliver that effect. We know and we understand that. 

Not so much in the nonlethal fire side, on the information operation side. It is harder to define the targets. It is hard to know 

what the desired effect really is. It is harder to articulate that, and 

it is harder to measure that. 

So, bringing that up to strategic communication—you asked 

about strategic communication strategies and strategic communication plans—I think on some level it would be best if we didn’t have 

a strategic communication plan, but just had a plan that included 

strategic communication. 

One of the recommendations I make—and if you will indulge me 

for a moment, I will elaborate—is that we should elaborate information end states. This is a piece of advice that comes from Professor Dennis Murphy at the U.S. Army War College. It is one of 

the best pieces of strategic communication advice I have heard, so 

I try to repeat it whenever I have the chance. 

Dennis Murphy says, ‘‘Hey, we should change the guidance for 

the commander’s intent such that commander’s intent be required 

to include an information end state.’’ 

So if the traditional commander’s intent, to give a simple example, is remove—or the desired end state is remove the insurgent 

presence from village X, if an information end state is required, the 
16 

commander might also make clear ‘‘remove the insurgent presence 

from village X whilst retaining the attitude of noncombatants as 

neutral or better towards the friendly force.’’ 

With that caveat, with that extra information end state, now 

subordinates have a lot more clear guidance to execute on. And if 

they don’t feel comfortable with the different approaches necessary 

to do that, then they know they need to reach outside their own 

stovepipe and go find someone who has that expertise. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you. 

Dr. HAMID. Thanks for the question. 

Regarding the first question, have we failed in our strategic communications with information warfare, my answer is, yes, we certainly have failed. Until today terrorists are generated in higher 

rates. We have homegrown terrorism here in the United States in 

the last couple of years that exceeded previous 8 years since September 11. So certainly, the evidence is showing that we are not 

very successful on this front. 

The other question, have we failed in defining, you know, the 

enemy, my answer is, certainly, yes. We failed basically to define 

the word ‘‘radical.’’ We are fighting like radical Islam sometimes, 

and we say we support moderates. 

But when you ask people how would you define ‘‘radical’’ and 

how would you define ‘‘moderate,’’ what are the parameters. It is 

like a doctor going to do surgery for cancer without defining the criteria for cancer. 

We failed to understand that relationship between the ideology 

and the actions. So we simply focus on like, the doctor focusing on 

the abscess and ignoring the diabetes that caused the abscess. 

You treat the abscess, you have another abscess. You treat it 

again, you have another abscess. Until you recognize the underlying cause and the mechanism of diabetes, obesity, aggravating it, 

you see the holistic picture, then you cannot cure the condition. 

And I see we ignore the common factor in all the groups whatever you call them, whatever their names are, they share one 

thing, a common ideology that tells them to kill the other or not 

to be tolerant to the other or to hate the other. And as long as we 

do not confront this ideology effectively and weaken it via education, via psychological warfare operations, via other means, we 

will not be able, really, to really control this problem. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to all of you for being here. 

I appreciate you talking about the whole of government approach 

because, you know, for years that was very frustrating, because 

one, you know, you could really see why we needed to do that, and 

yet it was clear that we weren’t quite there. 

But, I wonder if you could—is there an example, a positive example of where that whole of government across entities and with 

proper communication occurred and could be looked at as—and actually we would have even the results of what that might have 

changed in terms of—so can we look to any of that? What do we 
17 

learn from that or what do we learn from the fact that we can’t 

find an example like that? 

Dr. PAUL. I have one. Unfortunately it isn’t a U.S. one. But the 

Australian Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands, RAMSI, 

they went in there. It is a peace enforcement and governance restoration mission, I think, in the 2005/2006 timeframe. And they 

had amazing whole of government integration. 

How did they do it? They had the three commanders on the 

ground, the representative of their foreign ministry, their state department, the police representative they sent and the military representative. 

The three of them went around joined at the hip. If ever they 

spoke in public, one was at the podium, the other two sat behind 

him or her. If a question came up that required an answer that 

they hadn’t already reached a consensus on, they would turn 

around and put their heads together and get the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands answer. And so they always had integration. 

That may not always be practical, but there is one example of 

success. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Were they approaching that from the—were they understanding that within the context of strategic communication? Or 

they were doing that, perhaps they would say because it was the 

right thing to do, but because they needed to try and carry out a 

mission that required—I am thinking of, you know, the Africa 

Command, but maybe ‘‘command’’ is using the wrong word, you 

know, AFRICOM, but where we tried to put people forward who 

don’t only represent the military, the Pentagon, and—— 

Dr. PAUL. They didn’t use the phrase ‘‘strategic communication.’’ 

They did it in the name of unity of command, which is an important strategic communication principle, and they were very mindful 

of the message their force and their actions were sending within 

the separate command stovepipes, within the military stovepipe, 

within their civilian police forces. 

They were very cognizant of how their behaviors, how their 

dress, what kind of messages those sent to the civilian population. 

It was very important to them to not—to be internally consistent 

and not be contradictory. 

So while they might not have used the phrase ‘‘strategic communication,’’ I would argue that what they were doing was very much 

in that vein and with that intention, a whole of government continuity and coherence. 

Ms. BROOKS. I think it partly depends on the scale. I think it is 

easier to find good examples on a very small scale than on a very 

large scale just because, you know, the nature of this is a big government, it is a big country, it is a big world, the bigger the issue. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Right. 

Ms. BROOKS. You can say, ‘‘Here are areas where we did better 

or worse,’’ but it is very tough to say, ‘‘Here is a, you know, unequivocal, wholehearted success.’’ 

I can think of a couple of examples of things that I think that 

we got better or got right. I can think of more, but I will just mention a couple. 
18 

One which was something, a very difficult issue where I think we 

certainly got better, was in the context of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, where there was a very conscious shift, which was very 

much a whole of government shift, from saying our first reaction 

to press reports or other reports of civilian casualties caused by coalition forces is going to be to say, ‘‘We don’t know what you are 

talking about. We are going to do investigation. They were all bad 

guys anyway. What do you mean,’’ to shift to saying straight off the 

bat, everybody saying, ‘‘If our actions caused civilian casualties, we 

will do everything we can to correct it. We are so sorry if there has 

been any loss of innocent life. Nothing we can say can change the 

fact that people have lost loved ones. We know that.’’ 

I think that shift in itself was actually quite significant and took 

a real conscious effort to sound less defensive, to say, you know, 

loss of life is loss of life. It doesn’t matter if it was justified. The 

grieving parents or relatives are still grieving. I think that was getting it better and in reaction to learning the hard way that we 

were getting it wrong. 

Another more recent example of one, I think, all things considered, the government did a pretty good job with the death of 

Osama bin Laden. I think that we fumbled a little bit on the details of what happened in terms of how the story came out, but I 

think it was actually handled in precisely the right way across the 

government, which was supposed to say, ‘‘This is something we 

have been trying to do for a long time, we said we are going to do. 

We did it. This guy is a bad guy. He is not here anymore. Good 

thing.’’ 

But, also, without turning it into a moment of exulting in vengefulness or exulting in death, or lionizing him more than—inadvertently raising again the prestige and the profile of Al Qaeda, that 

it was the right degree of ‘‘bad guy, he is dead, we got him, we can 

do these things,’’ but also sort of saying, ‘‘And, you know what, he 

is not that important anymore. Move on.’’ 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. 

Dr. HAMID. I actually, I was going to give the bin Laden example 

also as a matter of cooperation, but I don’t really have several 

other examples, really, in my mind about this sort of cooperation. 

I see from the other side that actions of the U.S. government seem 

to be disassociated from one another. 

One part of the government is doing something. Another part is 

doing something else. Sometimes this is beneficial, because if someone did a mistake, the other one can try to correct it. But in general, things must be synchronized more effectively together, I believe. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, may I just ask one quick question, because I 

know we don’t have too many of us here. 

You know, I was really interested in your comments, Dr. Hamid, 

about weakness—respect and weakness. 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And particularly related to the hijab, the U.S. 

women going in—— 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. And wearing—— 
19 

Dr. HAMID. The hijab. 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. The hijab. And also thinking about how 

those of us who—women who go in also cover our heads. We don’t 

really—— 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. Wear the full, but we are told to do 

that, and we do that out of respect. 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Where is—how—— 

Dr. HAMID. Ah, how is it seen as weakness? 

Mrs. DAVIS. Where does one go for that information? 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. The other side simply sees it as you are subjugated to Islam. The word ‘‘Islam’’ means submission. It was supposed to be submission to God, but it is used politically in different 

ways to submit others to their values of their religion. 

You see, the radicals everywhere are trying to submit other people to their will. In Somalia, from Afghanistan, the Taliban, even 

in the Salafis in Egypt recently were trying to submit others. So 

they see you have submitted to their value system. So you see, they 

are bowing to us. This is how they will interpret it. We are winning. We are victorious. 

So whatever you do on one hand to really show victory and bring 

the psychology of defeat in the mind of the enemy, the enemy will 

always go and say, ‘‘Look, they are defeated. They are bowing to 

us. They are following our values.’’ 

So this is how it is seen as weakness. This is why what I am saying is to show respect, yes, absolutely, but be very careful of doing 

this without showing signs of weakness. So you can still achieve 

the positive value of showing respect to others and without the 

negative effect of showing weakness, and weakness from their side, 

from their point of view, not from your point of view. From your 

point of view you can’t see it, but this is how it is seen on the other 

side. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And after this question I unfortunately have to depart for a 

meeting that I have in my office, but it is important to stay. And, 

you know, I am fascinated by the discussion here today, and I understand how important these things are and how they matter. 

Obviously, the conflict in terms of where we are today has been 

years in the making, and particularly the conflict with violent 

jihad. 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How do we really turn this around? And one of 

the things that really that I struggle with and I think we are all 

challenged by is the fact that if you look at, for example, throughout the Quran there are numerous examples where it actually calls 

for followers to commit violent jihad, that it calls for acts of violence—— 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN [continuing]. To subjugate. And it is almost a 

duty—— 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN [continuing]. To do that. 
20 

It is not like in some cases in the Bible, as I understand it, there 

are certain cases where there might be call for acts of violence, but 

they are almost subject to interpretation. It might be more vague 

than it is in the Quran, which seems to be very direct—— 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN [continuing]. In calling for acts of violence. 

So, if that is the case, how do we turn this around? How do we 

win, you know, in the sense of—and achieve a peaceful outcome? 

Dr. HAMID. Thank you for this question, this vital question. And 

I noticed, for example, I read the Bible when I was young, and in 

Deuteronomy you will find, for example, fight against Amalek, for 

example, specific groups. So it is not a general fight for everyone 

else. 

But I will give you a personal story of mine. One day I was praying in Egypt when I was young, beginning my real story in religions and in thinking. And I read a verse in the Quran that says 

[Arabic]—‘‘Kill the infidels wherever you find them.’’ 

And my conscience couldn’t accept it, so I asked a Salafi friend 

of mine. His name was Ali. He was radical. And he said to me, 

‘‘Yes, we have to fight the infidels, and it is obligation on us.’’ 

I went to a Sufi scholar, which is a mystical form of Islam. He 

said to me, ‘‘Just love every human being and be good with every 

human being.’’ And this was not satisfactory. I said to him, ‘‘It is 

written. It is mentioned in the Quran. It is written here.’’ He said 

to me, ‘‘[Arabic],’’ which means ‘‘in the day of judgment you will understand the meaning.’’ 

So, for me I was not so patient to wait for the day of judgment. 

I just followed the one who is giving me the literal meaning. 

Later on in the reformation efforts I am doing, I realized that all 

the verses in the Quran that talk about jihad or violence use the 

expression ‘‘the’’ before the expression ‘‘infidels’’—al-kafioun, almoshaka. ‘‘Al’’ means ‘‘the’’ in Arabic. It is like telling you I am 

going tomorrow to a white house or I am going tomorrow to the 

White House. It is completely different. 

Just emphasizing the value of ‘‘the’’ or ‘‘al-a’’ before the word ‘‘infidel’’ in the Quran can simply solve this problem, because once you 

say ‘‘the,’’ you define the meaning, the violent text to this specific 

group in the early stages of Islam. You can’t generalize it to everyone else. 

So, there is a way within some linguistic analysis and interpretation really to limit the meaning of the violent jihad to some specific 

group only in the early stages of Islam. 

So, it is certainly possible to, through different ways of interpretations, through language, to really limit. And you take it literally 

from me, all the violent text of jihad can be limited to the early 

stages of Islam without being currently applicable in our modern 

times. 

So there are ways to do this. It is not impossible. It is certainly 

possible. 

Ms. BROOKS. If I can add a thought on that, I think I defer to 

Dr. Hamid about all of this, and I am sure it is right that there 

is a segment of the population for whom that sort of textual analysis can make an enormous difference. At the same time, I think 

there is a real danger of placing too much emphasis on ideology. 
21 

Islam has been around for 1,500 years, more or less, and the rise 

of extremist Islamic terrorism is a pretty new phenomenon. And 

even today the vast majority of Muslims in the world have nothing 

to do with it. 

So, I think, assuming that our problem is this pernicious ideology 

that comes out of the Quran can be very misleading, and this goes 

back to the earlier discussion of what is the relationship between 

ideas and behavior. 

You know, for the average recruit to extremist action, it may 

have far more to do with what their brother suggested that they 

do or economic need or fear or anger about a very specific policy, 

whether it is of the United States somewhere. 

They may be wrong. They may be misunderstanding it, but a 

perception about Palestine or Israel for instance. And I think that 

we would be wise to not overemphasize the role that ideology—religious or otherwise—plays in what are violent social movements 

that often have many complicated causes, some of which are nationalistic, some of which are economic. 

You know, again, not to suggest that there isn’t a very important 

role for a segment of people in doing that, but I sometimes think 

that we get so obsessed with that we have got to counter this ideology that we give too little attention to the other causes that motivate people to become a recruit. 

I know that I am not an expert on radicalization, but I have colleagues who spent a great deal of time looking very concretely at 

case studies of how does person A end up being radicalized, and it 

is pretty rare that ideology has much to do with it, you know, except as kind of a blanket justification that becomes convenient 

when someone asks. It usually has much more to do with who their 

friends are, who is paying them, et cetera, et cetera. 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. Would you mind? 

I am not denying the role of other factors. There are other facts 

that can play a role. However, we should ask ourselves a basic 

question. Why the socioeconomic and political factors that some 

people say it makes someone a terrorist? Why they do not affect, 

for example the Christians in the Middle East, who live under the 

same socioeconomic and political circumstances. Like we haven’t 

seen the Christians in Iraq, for example, being suicide bombing or 

beheading other people. 

So it is obviously the problem is coming from specific group here. 

So, if the factor, the external factor was the true cause of the problem, it shouldn’t distinguish between a Muslim or Christian or a 

Jew. It should affect all the population. 

So you see terrorism development in any poor area, like from 

Brazil to India for example, but that is not the situation. That is 

what makes the ideology playing the pivotal role, but yet I am not 

saying it is the only role. There are other contributing factors. 

Dr. PAUL. It is complicated. And I won’t pretend to have the answer. I will make two observations. 

First, given that this conflict was years in the making and did 

take a long time to brew, we should accept that it may well be 

years in the unmaking. 

And second, that the kinds of things that will help are kinds of 

things we are talking about—promoting engagements, encouraging 
22 

shared understanding, trying to identify and emphasize shared values, share information, and better understanding of radicalization 

processes and connecting engagements and promotion of shared understanding in programs to try to diminish radicalization processes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. 

Thank you all for your testimony today. It has been valuable. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. Appreciate it. 

Ms. Brooks, you all were really talking about this, and I acknowledge that there is no one factor that makes one go blow yourself 

up. But certainly during the cold war, we fought an ideological 

struggle as well as had troops in Europe and nuclear weapons. You 

know, there was a multi-front sort of effort to combat the evil, I 

will say, that was coming out of the Soviet Union. 

So isn’t there an ideological aspect to the fight against those who 

want to come kill innocent people in the name of religion also? 

Ms. BROOKS. Absolutely, and I don’t mean to suggest that there 

is no ideological aspect. I think I would just emphasize what you 

just said. It has got to be a multi-front battle. 

And I think that we err, I think, when we get a little overly simplistic and start thinking it is a magic bullet. If we could only refute the ideology, if we could only come up with the alternative 

narrative, that is when we start getting ourselves into trouble. 

It is a component. The nature of the component is probably different with different groups of people. At risk of repeating myself, 

it is sort of disaggregate, disaggregate, disaggregate. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. No, and I think that is a fair point. But I 

guess what we are trying to evaluate, as somebody said, 10 years 

on into this, is to what extent the ideological part of this is appropriate for the U.S. government and how well the U.S. government 

is doing it. 

And I think at least both of you have said, it is not just a 

counterterrorism issue. There is a strategic communications element to a whole variety of engagement with the world. 

Ms. BROOKS. Absolutely. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And I acknowledge that. 

But I guess we are kind of taking the terrorism as a case study 

here today mostly. But as that passage I read indicates, at least 

there are some who believe that if we can be more effective, we can 

decrease Al Qaeda’s recruitment and, to borrow a phrase, have it 

wither on the vine. 

Ms. BROOKS. Yes. I think it is a question of balance, as ever. I 

mean, can we be more effective at exactly that? Should we be? Yes, 

absolutely. And I think that there are actually some very interesting projects, some of which you are probably aware of, for instance the center at West Point that I can’t remember the name, 

Center for the Study of Terrorism, something like that—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Center for Combating Terrorism. Yes. 

Ms. BROOKS [continuing]. That does these extremely interesting 

studies, close readings of documents released by leading Al Qaeda 

figures. It points out contradictions, et cetera, et cetera. It puts 

them up on the Web. That one tiny little project, which is not very 

expensive, actually there is some clear evidence that that makes a 
23 

difference, and it gets them very upset that for the segment of people for whom ideology is important, that that matters. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. 

Ms. BROOKS. And so, I don’t at all mean to suggest that we 

shouldn’t do it and that we shouldn’t do it better. We absolutely 

can and should. I think it is just that when we overvalue the ideological component and forget to think about everything from that 

war via chickens, humanitarian assistance piece to—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. 

Ms. BROOKS [continuing]. To another piece of your question, 

thinking about what is it that we don’t do that well but that other 

people can do much better, and this goes back to empowering other 

voices, empowering both the U.S. private sector, because there are 

just things that the U.S. government shouldn’t do and—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. I want to get to that whole subject in a 

second. 

Ms. BROOKS. Yes. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. But I take your point. 

Dr. Hamid, we had witnesses at our last hearing—— 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. 

Mr. THORNBERRY [continuing]. Who suggested that one of the 

most effective messages, whether it is from us or from others, is 

the idea that these terrorist acts kill innocent Muslims. 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And so, the fact that you have innocent members of the same religion, who are being slaughtered—— 

Dr. HAMID. Yes. 

Mr. THORNBERRY [continuing]. With these acts, do you think that 

is effective to use? 

Dr. HAMID. Absolutely. Using this fact that the majority of the 

victims of terror are Muslims can be used effectively in strategic 

communications to show that the whole war against the terrorists 

is actually a war that protects the lives of many Muslim people. 

And, ideally, if there is some moderate Muslims coming this 

whole image to support what the U.S. is doing against the terrorists, it’s not just selfish action that only cares for the personal interest, but it is much broader than this. It is far more than just 

the security of America. It is security for the whole world, including 

many Muslim innocents. 

In fact, one of the best ways to achieve this is to show the Muslim world the impact of terrorism on the Muslim society. One of the 

very sensitive areas is the impact on women. Many of the terrorist 

acts in Pakistan and Afghanistan ended in orphans or widows. 

Some of them, for example, had to do some immoral things because 

of the poverty and the need. 

If these stories are emphasized to the Muslim world, they will 

really start to hate terrorism, and it can help a lot in preventing 

the process of radicalization. So, certainly, this is one of the most 

fundamental areas that could be used. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Dr. Paul, in your comments you said something about we need to make sure that what we do is more effective. Ms. Brooks says there is too much emphasis on metrics when 

we talk about strategic communications. My question is, how do 
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you know what is effective if you don’t have some way to measure 

the results? 

Dr. PAUL. Another really good question. 

Yes, it is very difficult to do effective measurement in this area. 

When we look at industry, they are engaging in similar kinds of 

challenges, sharing ideas and engagement pathways. But at the 

end of the day, they have a sales metric. Either their product is 

being bought or it isn’t. 

It is much harder to capture measures globally. It is an area we 

can get better at. There is something to learn from industry. There 

is something to learn from social science. When I speak to junior 

officers about things that they can do in smaller areas of responsibly, I talk about field expedient measurements. 

There is something to the old aphorism that the plural of ‘‘anecdote’’ is ‘‘data,’’ that if you collect impressions, patrol impressions, 

crowd impressions over time, and plot those kinds of events against 

exogenous factors, significant events and other areas of responsibility—elections, things like that—and if you can plot a trend over 

time, then you can see and compare that to the kinds of things you 

have been doing. 

And this is at a very small scale. There is some traction there. 

At the bigger scale, there is polling. It is not that we are completely 

ignorant of how to do measurement in this arena. There is room 

to get better and, of course, measurement isn’t free. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. Yes. 

Ms. Brooks, let me go back to the private sector for just a second. 

One of the things that struck my attention years ago on this was 

someone I knew in the political consulting world went to run a 

campaign in a Muslim country successfully for president and then 

wanted to come here and offer his services to the United States 

government for free. I mean, he made all the money he needed to 

make, you know, but there is no way for him to plug in. 

And in spite of knowing a lot of folks at the State Department 

at that time and around the administration, it was simply impossible. And so that is one of the reasons that somebody referred, I 

think, to the Defense Science Board study that I thought their suggestion of having a FFRDC [federally funded research and development center] that is separate from the government, where private 

industry could plug in, and some of those skills from Madison Avenue or international political consulting could be useful. 

When you did your review for the administration, did that figure 

in at all or is that all a pipe dream, that government is government, private sector is private sector, and if you want to come work 

for government you have got to come be a civil servant or something. 

Ms. BROOKS. I think on the level of principle, everybody agrees 

with that, that we ought to do more with the private sector, we 

ought to enable the private sector more effectively. I think where 

it breaks down is implementation, and I think it is quite shocking. 

I think we literally just have astonishingly few vehicles to enable 

private sector action even when, as in your example, we have people literally coming to us, you know, from very large corporations, 

universities, non-government saying, ‘‘How can we help?’’ 
25 

We don’t know what to do with them. We don’t know what to tell 

them. We say, ‘‘Thanks, we will get back to you,’’ and we never do, 

because we have no vehicles for using them. 

That is for a lot of different reasons. Some of them are reasons 

of bureaucratic rigidity and the usual stupidity. It is not in any— 

you know, it doesn’t help anyone to do it, so they don’t. It is not 

their job. 

Some of it has to do with legal and ethical restrictions that have 

been put there for very good reasons. It is if you are in the executive branch, it is actually quite astonishing when you make the 

mistake of asking a lawyer something like, ‘‘Well, could we ask 

Google to help us with,’’ or whatever the question may be. 

The answer is usually, ‘‘Don’t even think about it. Don’t you 

dare,’’ often because of legislative restrictions that are in place to 

prevent conflicts of interest, et cetera, et cetera. 

How we untangle that I don’t know. But I actually think it would 

be—a fabulous project for folks here to undertake would be to really do an evaluation of both the sort of the bureaucratic reasons and 

the statutory reasons. But that is so hard, because I absolutely 

agree our greatest strength of the country is not our amazingly 

streamlined executive branch, sadly. 

Our greatest strength as a country is our people and our organizations, and finding better and more effective ways to let them do 

what they are good at is something that strikes me as extremely 

urgent, and we are shockingly bad at it. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. 

Yes, Dr. Paul. 

Dr. PAUL. If I may, in my written testimony there is a brief reference to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation or Institute for International Scholars, SAGE Initiative, Strengthening America’s Global 

Engagement, that has taken about a dozen reports recommending 

reforms in public diplomacy and strategic communication, all of 

which advocate some kind of—like the Defense Science Board, 

some kind of semi-independent or independent entity. 

They have been working since September of last year with a 

large consortium of think tanks, individuals from industry, from 

governments, from advertising, from academia, to synthesize some 

of the best ideas in a no kidding business plan for such an entity 

and hope later this year in a bipartisan way to advance such a 

thing. 

If such an entity came into being, that would the perfect opportunity for a dollar-a-year man who wanted to come in and share 

expertise or provide skills to plug into that organization, making 

that expertise available to the government, leveraging the private 

sector, and getting public-private partnership benefits. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes, well, I look forward to seeing what they 

come up with. 

Now to pass something through the Congress, we have the same 

jurisdictional issues that you referenced earlier, but I think there 

are a number of us at least who are interested in exploring that. 

We haven’t talked about Smith-Mundt, Dr. Paul. How big an impediment is that just being effective in our communication? 

Dr. PAUL. It makes a difference. Just for background, the SmithMundt Act is actually the Information Exchange Act of 1948 
26 

amended a couple of times. The principal complaint about it isn’t 

that it established the foundation for public diplomacy, which it 

did, but some of the later amendments prohibit dissemination of information intended for foreign audiences to the domestic U.S. public. 

I was at a hearing for the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public 

Diplomacy earlier today. Sat next to me was Jeff Trimble, the executive director for the Broadcasting Board of Governors [BBG], the 

folks who do Voice of America and all the different Voice programs. 

And he reported some sad instances where domestic populations, 

domestic radio stations and broadcasting communities within the 

United States, wanted to have access to BBG Somali language 

broadcasts or BBG Urdu language broadcasts for domestic populations and when they made a formal request to the BBG for those 

broadcast, the BBG, because of the statutory constraints, had to 

say no. 

And he also related the sad story of just recently being abroad, 

being in Russia and talking to Russian administrators to try to encourage them to relax their policies regarding BBG products being 

disseminated in Russia. And the Russians pointed out, ‘‘Well, gee, 

you have the Smith-Mundt Act, so you can’t show these broadcasts 

to your people. Why should we let you show them to our people?’’ 

To which he had no answer. So, there is a concrete example. 

When you talk to folks from the Department of State, they don’t 

see it as much of a constraint. They are more inclined to—in my 

experience to laugh it off as kind of historical oddity that doesn’t 

get in their way very much. It gets in the way of BBG, and I have 

heard far too often of accounts of it getting in the way of the Department of Defense as well. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. Yes. So have I. And it seems to me it is 

a great example of an outdated law that has not kept up with 

change in technology. When you think about the Internet and how 

Smith-Mundt can possibly apply to that situation, it makes no 

sense to me. And, you know, I continue to hope and think that common sense will prevail at some point. 

Again, we are not interested in the government providing propaganda, as it is called, to try to influence decisions within the 

United States, but at the same time when you can’t even communicate basic information because of this, it makes no sense at all 

to me either. 

We may have a couple more questions that we will submit to you 

all in writing after we go through some of what we talked about. 

Again, let me thank each of you for being here and for your expertise and opinions that you have shared with us. This is a—as you 

can tell—as I think several of you said, it is harder than it seems. 

Recognize that. 

On the other hand, that doesn’t mean we should walk away from 

making the attempt, because I am of the view that it is an important component not only against the terrorists, but in a variety of 

aspects of U.S. foreign policy and national influence around the 

world. And we have got to get better at that. 

So thank you again for being here. 

And with that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JULY 12, 2011 

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JULY 12, 2011 

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