DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

A Follow-up Review of the 

Transportation Security Officer 

Background Check Process

OIG-07-67 August 2007
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528

 August 16, 2007 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This review serves as a follow-up to our January 2004 report entitled A Review of Background 

Checks for Federal Passenger and Baggage Screeners at Airports. The current report was based on 

interviews with relevant agencies, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents and 

data. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................................1 

Background ..........................................................................................................................................2 

Results of Review .................................................................................................................................5 

Background Checks Do Not Reflect the Unique Nature of TSO Position ......................................5 

The Adjudication Process Is Designed to Identify Individuals Who Do Not Meet 

Employment Standards ..................................................................................................................13 

Pending Systems Improvements and Administrative Changes Should Improve the Process .......22 

An Internal Audit Procedure Could Enhance TSO Background Checks ......................................25 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis...............................................................27 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology .......................................................................32 

 Appendix B: Management Comments on Draft Report.............................................................33 

Appendix C: Recommendations from the January 2004 OIG Report .......................................39 

 Appendix D: Recommendations in This Report ........................................................................41 

Appendix E: 28 Disqualifying Felonies.....................................................................................42 

Appendix F: Survey Questions and Answers ............................................................................44 

Appendix G: Prehire Background Investigation Process ...........................................................47 

Appendix H: Posthire Background Investigation Process..........................................................48 

Appendix I: Major Contributors to This Report .......................................................................49 

Appendix J: Report Distribution ...............................................................................................50 

Tables 

TSA Basic Investigation Requirements.........................................................................................11 

Comparison of Three Background Checks....................................................................................13 

Five Bad Debt Cases From Our File Review.................................................................................16 

Abbreviations 

ANACI Access National Agency Check and Inquiries 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FSD Federal Security Director 

NACI National Agency Check and Inquiries 

OPM Office of Personnel Management 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

TSO Transportation Security Officer 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 
OIG

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

In February 2002, the Transportation Security Administration assumed 

responsibility for passenger and baggage screening at airports. Screening is 

performed by Transportation Security Officers. To ensure no officer presents 

a threat to national security or public trust, job applicants undergo a 

background investigation. In a January 2004 report, A Review of Background 

Checks for Federal Passenger and Baggage Screeners at Airports, we 

discovered a variety of limitations to this background check process. We 

conducted this follow-up review to determine the Transportation Security 

Administration’s progress in improving its background check process. 

We determined the process has improved since our 2004 report, but some 

important challenges remain. Officers still undergo a background 

investigation with employment standards exceeding most national security 

positions, and the checks are inefficient in some respects. We concluded the 

Transportation Security Administration has not implemented all necessary 

steps that would improve security and reduce costs. 

We are making nine recommendations to improve the management of the 

background check process. 

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Background 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established with the 

enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act in November 

2001. The Act requires TSA to hire a sufficient number of Federal 

employees, now known as Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) or 

screeners, to conduct the screening of all passengers and baggage at airports.1

The law requires TSOs to undergo a background investigation, including a 

criminal record check. TSA must ensure TSOs are U.S. citizens who have no 

convictions within the past 10 years for 28 specific disqualifying felonies (see 

Appendix E).2 The background check process for TSOs judges an 

individual’s credit and criminal history, honesty, use of intoxicants, and other 

factors. 

TSA was established as an agency with “excepted service” employees instead 

of “competitive service” employees. Such a designation was meant to provide 

greater flexibility in management of personnel.3 Congress decided to give 

TSA the latitude to determine the terms of employment of TSOs. The 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act grants TSA the power to employ, 

appoint, discipline, terminate, and fix the compensation for TSOs, 

notwithstanding any other provision of law.4

Starting in Fiscal Year 2004, Congress instituted a national cap of 45,000 full 

time equivalent TSOs.5 TSA has usually maintained a staffing level slightly 

below this threshold. Based on data we received from TSA, there were 

41,093 full-time equivalent TSOs in May 2007. 

To assess each applicant’s suitability for TSO positions, TSA takes 

information from various credit and criminal history checks and compares the 

individual’s record with the agency’s suitability standards. To expedite 

hiring, a prehire process is used that only evaluates an individual’s credit 

history and any fingerprint records held by the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. Successful completion of this phase allows the individual to 

begin work as a TSO while a more elaborate posthire background check is 

1

 49 U.S.C § 44901(a). Although the term TSO was developed in 2006 as the 

new title for passenger and baggage screeners, this report will use the term

TSO when referencing the position in prior years. 

2

 49 U.S.C. § 44935(e); 49 U.S.C § 44936(b).

3

 49 U.S.C. § 114(n); 49 U.S.C. § 40122(g)(1).

4 49 U.S.C. § 44935 note.

5

 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations for FY 2004 through 

2007; Pub. L. 108-90, Title II (Oct. 1, 2003); Pub. L. 108-334, Title II (Oct. 

18, 2004); Pub. L. 109-90, Title II (Oct. 18, 2005); Pub. L. 109-295, Title II 

(Oct. 4, 2006). 

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performed. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) performs the 

posthire background check, which can take several months. 

TSA has adopted hiring policies that exceed what is required by law: 

• Although few TSOs receive security clearances, they undergo the 

same kind of background investigation designed to grant secret or 

confidential clearances: an Access National Agency Check with 

Written Inquiries. 

• TSA has adopted and expanded on OPM’s suitability guidance to 

improve the agency’s ability to detect undesirable behaviors and 

potential security or public trust risks in its TSO workforce. 

In 2003, based on reports of incomplete and possibly flawed background 

checks, we reviewed TSA’s process for checking the backgrounds of TSOs. 

This led to a January 2004 report, A Review of Background Checks for 

Federal Passenger and Baggage Screeners at Airports. We noted that due to 

the rapid pace and high volume of hiring required getting the organization 

started, “TSA was hiring screeners before it was organized to do so.”6 We 

made 12 recommendations to improve the management of the background 

check process (see Appendix C). 

TSA created an action plan to resolve most of our recommendations. Because 

our 2004 report covered a period of intense hiring, TSA believed that many 

problems would be temporary. Because of incomplete documentation from 

TSA, three recommendations in the 2004 report were still open in September 

2006 when fieldwork for this follow-up review began. As this review 

progressed, we worked with TSA to close the 2004 recommendations. 

Although TSA has passed its initial hiring challenges, the agency still hires a 

large number of TSOs each year. TSA hired 32,527 TSOs, an average of 

more than 900 a month, from October 2004 through September 2006. One 

TSA manager said this degree of “attrition hiring” is necessary because of a 

high occurrence of staff turnover. GAO reported that TSOs in 2005 had an 

attrition rate of 23% overall, with turnover for part-time employees exceeding 

50%.7 Fortunately there are signs that this rate of turnover is abating. TSA 

hired 5,134 fewer TSOs in 2006 compared to 2004. 

TSA has moved toward a less centralized hiring system in order to meet the 

differing needs of the Nation’s airports. Meanwhile, the agency continues 

efforts to decrease turnover among TSOs. Additionally, six airports currently 

have privatized screening workforces under the Screening Partnership 

6

 DHS OIG, A Review of Background Checks for Federal Passenger and 

Baggage Screeners at Airports, OIG-04-08, January 2004, page 28. 

7

 GAO, Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked 

Baggage, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T, April 4, 2006, p. 9. 

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Program, which allows private companies to run screening operations at the 

approved airports. 

Other factors have drawn attention to TSA hiring practices. A FY 2005 OIG 

report was initiated due to thousands of incidents of alleged baggage theft at 

airports.8

 In April 2006, six TSOs at airports in Texas were arrested for 

falsifying employment forms. These employees did not disclose arrests that 

were later discovered. There have been other incidents across the country 

where TSOs were arrested for theft or other unlawful activities. 

8

 DHS OIG, A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts, 

OIG-05-17, March 2005. 

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Results of Review 

TSA has made some important improvements since our January 2004 report. 

One way we measured progress was through a survey of Federal Security 

Directors (FSDs), the people who manage TSA operations at airports. We 

learned that the movement away from centralized hiring was widely praised as 

an important reason for positive change in the TSO background check 

process. Survey respondents said that the process is “markedly improved” 

and “much better.” 

Additional changes and operational revisions are still necessary to ensure 

continued improvement and greater efficiency in the TSO background check 

process. The strategic limitations in the process TSA now uses to conduct 

TSO background checks have created some inefficiency. Our 

recommendations can improve the adjudication process by implementing TSA 

standards more quickly and making more efficient use of resources. Also, the 

interaction between TSA components can be enhanced to administer the 

background check process better. Improvements along the entire process 

continuum would offer more useful information, provide for faster decisions, 

and augment intra-agency communication. 

Background Checks Do Not Reflect the Unique Nature of TSO Position 

Statutory Foundation of the TSO Position 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires TSA to screen all 

passengers and personal property that will be carried aboard a passenger 

aircraft originating in the United States.9 This screening is to take place 

before passengers board an aircraft and must be carried out by a federal 

employee or a contractor under the Screening Partnership Program.

Although TSA was directed by the Act to follow the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s personnel management system, Congress also gave the 

agency latitude to determine the terms of employment of TSOs. According to 

Section 111(d) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law,” TSA may “employ, appoint, 

discipline, terminate, and fix the compensation, terms, and conditions of 

employment of Federal service” for TSOs.10 A number of legal cases have 

challenged the strength of this statute. Without exception, it has been 

determined that the notwithstanding clause overrides any other conflicting 

provisions.11

9

 49 U.S.C. § 114(n).

10 49 U.S.C. § 44935 note.

11 See, e.g., Brooks v. Department of Homeland Security, 95 M.S.P.R. 464, 

(2004); Schott v. Department of Homeland Security, 97 M.S.P.R. 35 (2004); 

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TSA is exempt from certain Federal personnel laws, including parts of Title 5 

of the United States Code. Subsections of Title 5 dealing with whistleblower 

protection, veterans’ preference, and antidiscrimination still apply to TSA. 

Some TSA employees, but not TSOs, have appeal rights to the Merit Systems 

Protection Board under certain conditions.12 

Congress specifically prohibited the hiring of an individual with a conviction 

in any of 28 disqualifying felonies in the previous 10 years.13 Background 

checks for TSOs must include a criminal record check, and a review of 

available law enforcement databases and records of other governmental and 

international agencies, as determined necessary by TSA. Other than these 

mandates in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the extent of the 

background check is within the discretion of TSA.14 

TSOs Are Generally Held to Standards Designed for Other Positions 

The TSO background check process does not take advantage of the statutory 

discretion granted by Congress. TSA has adopted policy identical to many 

statutes from which the agency is exempt. Title 5 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations, section 731.202, establishes criteria for making competitive 

service suitability determinations. The standards are referred to as the OPM 

Suitability Factors. TSA is not bound to implement these competitive service 

standards. The agency, nonetheless, has opted to use them for TSO 

adjudication. Based on our review of 36 ineligible files, 6 cases, or 17%, were 

denied in the posthire process based on parameters found in the OPM 

Suitability Factors. 

In addition to these general standards, TSA has adopted the “OPM Suitability 

Issue Ranking Chart,” which gives specific instructions on how to weigh 

issues of suitability. When determining the suitability of TSOs, TSA has also 

adopted the standards of Executive Orders 10450 and 12968, which apply to 

positions granted security clearances. Both executive orders are cited several 

times in guidance provided to those adjudicating TSO background checks, 

even though few TSOs need, or are granted, clearances. 

Decisions to adopt existing government standards were made, according to 

TSA policy, to “promote government-wide uniformity and fairness in 

suitability case processing and adjudication.” The agency may wish to alter 

these standards and can do so at any time. TSA should use existing federal 

Spain v. Department of Homeland Security, 99 M.S.P.R. 529 (2005); Conyers 

v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 388 F.3d 1380, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

12 Brooks v. Department of Homeland Security, 95 M.S.P.R. 464, ¶ 13 (2004); 

see, 49 U.S.C. § 44935.

13 49 U.S.C. § 44936(b).

14 49 U.S.C. § 44936(a)(1). 

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guidelines as a basis for its own determinations about suitability, but the 

unique nature of the TSO position requires specific suitability standards 

outside of OPM’s existing guidance. At a minimum, suitability standards 

designed for competitive service employees should be evaluated by TSA 

continuously. 

Although TSA is only required by the Act to disqualify an applicant who was 

convicted of one of the 28 specific felonies within the past 10 years, the 

agency has enhanced its standards to include some additional disqualifying 

felonies and misdemeanors. TSA standards are more stringent than OPM’s in 

two areas with a significant influence on public trust: misdemeanor and felony 

theft. Under TSA’s enhanced standards, any theft conviction within the past 

15 years is disqualifying. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

requires that felony theft be disqualifying only if the conviction occurred in 

the past 10 years. Under OPM suitability standards, a felony theft conviction 

by itself would be potentially disqualifying if it occurred in the past 3 years. 

In addition to these disqualifications, TSA policy allows adjudicators to look 

beyond the 15-year standard to consider conduct after age 18 that has a 

potential negative affect on suitability for a TSO position. Thus, a 50-year-old 

TSO could be dismissed as a result of a posthire adjudication for a pattern of 

theft committed two or three decades before. We did not see such cases in our 

file review. 

Based on our review of 36 ineligible files, 12 cases, or 33%, were denied in 

the post- hire process because of a disqualifying factor from the TSA 

enhanced standards. During our fieldwork, various interviewees noted that 

TSA is reviewing the utility of its enhanced standards. Abandoning the 

standards completely would weaken the agency’s ability to fully consider the 

impact of some undesirable behaviors in the TSO workforce. 

TSA Uses Inappropriate Forms to Solicit Information From Applicants 

TSA uses pre-existing government forms in the TSO hiring process. While 

these forms are appropriate for most federal employees, given the more 

exacting standards for TSOs, the forms do not provide TSA with sufficient 

information to make a determination, and can confuse applicants. By crafting 

a process specifically tailored to the TSO position, TSA can gain better 

information about applicants, make more accurate decisions on the suitability 

of individual candidates, and more efficiently manage its personnel security 

operations. 

The SF-86 is used as part of the TSO’s background check. Instructions on 

this form note that it is to be used “primarily as the basis for investigation for 

access to classified information.” Applicants are instructed to “complete this 

form only after a conditional offer of employment has been made for a 

position requiring a security clearance.” Thus, TSOs are using a form not 

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meant for their position. In the past, TSOs used the SF-85P, Questionnaire for 

Public Trust Positions, which is a form not used in granting security 

clearances. OPM requires that cases be submitted on an SF-86 to receive all 

services of an Access National Agency Check and Inquiries (ANACI) 

investigation. Thus, TSA instituted policy to have TSOs use the SF-86. 

The SF-86 does not contain questions tailored to determine suitability for the 

TSO position, making the form a poor choice for that purpose. The SF-86 

only questions the applicant about the past 7 years, less than half of the period 

reviewed under TSA’s 15-year enhanced standards. There were examples in 

case files of individuals questioning their dismissal because the termination 

standard was different from information requested on any pre-employment 

paperwork. 

Additional Work Is Required to Educate TSOs About Various Hiring 

Standards 

In addition to the OPM Suitability Factors and the 28 Disqualifying Felonies, 

TSA has adopted enhanced standards, additional disqualifying convictions, 

and an expanded period of review for certain types of conduct. Many of these 

enhanced standards are TSO-specific and designed to ensure the integrity of 

the workforce. 

Employment application materials do not provide information about specific 

standards used to judge an individual’s fitness for a TSO position. Applicants 

are not informed of the 28 Disqualifying Felonies or TSA’s enhanced 

standards. TSOs can therefore be surprised to learn they will be dismissed for 

theft-related arrests and other offenses committed within 15 years of the 

application. Applicants are asked to complete the Declaration of Federal 

Employment (OF-306) and self-disclose all convictions in the past 10 years 

when they begin the prehire investigation. The prehire adjudicators we spoke 

with said the review of the OF-306 is not sufficient to judge a person’s 

suitability for a TSO position. The Questionnaire for National Security 

Positions (SF-86) also asks an individual to self-disclose arrests and 

convictions in the past 7 years; however, the form is submitted after 

employment has begun. For a number of suitability issues, a posthire letter of 

interrogatory will be the first opportunity for an applicant to disclose 

potentially disqualifying information. 

In our survey of Federal Security Directors (FSDs), we asked their opinion 

regarding whether TSO applicants have sufficient knowledge of adjudication 

standards. Of the 66 FSDs who answered the question, 47, or 71%, said that 

TSO applicants are given adequate information prior to hiring about standards 

used in their background check. Nonetheless, improvements are needed in 

this area. One FSD used the survey to say, “I constantly get inquiries from 

candidates about what criteria will be used for the criminal and credit checks.” 

Another FSD suggested adding information about TSA’s standards to the 

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original computer assessment to identify ineligible applicants before hiring. 

Another FSD said, “I feel uncomfortable” granting an airport access badge 

“when I do not in fact know that a proper review has been conducted.” 

An individual’s financial responsibility is based on credit history, disregard 

for debts, or abuse of fiduciary trust. Currently, TSA uses a $5,000 “bad 

debt” threshold. Applicants who exceed this limit are disqualified from 

employment as a TSO. According to Kroll Government Services, which 

performs the prehire background check for TSA, this financial standard 

disqualifies 22% of the agency’s applicants. The team leader at TSA who is 

charged with implementing prehire adjudications said TSO applicants’ credit 

rejections are likely higher than the TSA average because of the relatively low 

pay of the TSO position. Bad debt rejections are also high in the posthire 

adjudication process. Several TSA officials speculate that the low pay TSOs 

earn might be a reason why credit problems develop after hiring. Based on 

our review of 36 ineligible files, 14 cases, or 39%, denied in the posthire 

process had bad debt as the primary disqualifying factor. 

Applicants are informed only once about TSA’s financial standards. We 

believe this is insufficient to fully inform potential TSOs of the agency’s bad 

debt standard. Online TSO job announcements were revised in 2006 to 

inform applicants: “If your credit check reveals that you have defaulted on 

$5,000 or more in debt (excluding certain circumstances of bankruptcy), owe 

any delinquent Federal or State taxes, or owe any past due child support 

payments, you will not be eligible for this position.” This additional language 

was a positive step, but thousands of individuals who exceed the $5,000 

threshold still apply for TSO positions. One FSD said, “TSOs need to know 

earlier in the process what the debt requirements are.” Because of the large 

number of applicants rejected for credit problems, TSA needs to do more to 

educate potential and current TSOs about the credit standard. If major credit 

issues are revealed in the prehire background check, a letter of interrogatory is 

the first opportunity for an applicant to disclose the information. 

By providing more information to applicants and collecting better data on 

individuals’ backgrounds, TSA would perform fewer checks, leading to 

financial savings and diminished workload for adjudicators. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, TSA: 

Recommendation #1: Create and implement employment forms that collect 

information on the applicant pursuant to eligibility standards. Adjudicators 

should review these forms prior to a TSO’s entry on duty. 

Risk Designation Process Was Driven by DHS and TSA Policy 

As an essential first step in planning background checks, agencies evaluate 

how much risk to the efficiency of federal service or to the national security is 

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involved in a position. The evaluation leads to a written position risk 

designation, which is required by Executive Order 10450. The position risk 

designation determines what kind of background check is required for various 

positions throughout the federal government. 

According to the TSA Personnel Security Manual, a sensitivity level is 

designated to all positions requiring access to classified information. Since 

TSOs generally do not access such material, it is unclear how to proceed with 

assigning a sensitivity level or whether one should be assigned at all. 

Positions requiring access to Confidential or Secret information are designated 

as at least “non-critical sensitive,” but there is no explanation on how to 

proceed with a position that does not require access to classified information. 

In January 2004, we recommended TSA complete screener position risk 

designations with input from DHS and TSA offices. TSO position risk 

designation records, position descriptions, and vacancy announcements were 

to reflect the correct designation. Since 2004, there has been a significant 

improvement in the consistency of risk designation. We checked vacancy 

announcements posted on three dates in late August, early October, and early 

December 2006, a total of nearly 400 different TSO job postings. Only two of 

these announcements did not include the “non-critical sensitive” designation. 

Although a TSO risk designation was conducted by TSA in 2004, the process 

did not determine the type of background check TSA should use for TSO 

positions. TSA provided us a Position Designation Record for the TSO 

position listing its “sensitivity level” as “non-critical sensitive” and its “risk 

level” as “moderate risk.” Additionally, TSA’s Office of Counsel said that 

the use of the current background check was “a question of policy.” The 

comments section of the designation record corroborates this view by stating, 

“DHS has mandated that all positions are classified as national security 

positions.” TSA implemented this standard by establishing that all employees 

must be “clearance eligible.” This required use of at least the Access National 

Agency Check and Inquiries background check. 

TSA’s process led to results that did not consistently show which risk 

designation was appropriate for TSOs. In its Position Designation Record, the 

TSO position was given an unadjusted “moderate” risk level. An 

investigation type of “minimum background investigation” was also 

designated on the form. According to the Manual, moderate risk positions 

require only a National Agency Check and Inquiries, a less rigorous review 

than the ANACI that would not suffice to make a TSO “clearance eligible.”15 

One individual in the Personnel Security Division said that “we couldn’t 

afford” the additional expense of a minimum background investigation, which 

is over twice the cost of an ANACI. Although the final adjusted risk level is 

15 TSA Personnel Security Manual, § 5.3.5. 

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“moderate,” a minimum investigation of ANACI is listed. Table 1 lists the 

basic investigation requirements. 

Table 1. TSA Basic Investigation Requirements 

Risk/Sensitivity Level Minimum Investigation Requirement 

Special or Critical Sensitive Single Scope Background Investigation 

Non-critical Sensitive Access National Agency Check with Written Inquires 

High Risk Background Investigation 

Moderate or Low Risk National Agency Check with Written Inquires 

Officials in TSA’s Personnel Security Division said the ANACI was chosen 

as an investigation level for TSOs “in case they need Secret Clearances in the 

future.” Thus, the decision to assign an ANACI investigation to the TSO 

position was based on DHS and TSA policy, not a risk analysis and 

designation. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, TSA: 

Recommendation #2: Complete a comprehensive screener position risk 

designation using criteria provided by personnel security officials in the 

Department of Homeland Security and appropriate TSA offices. 

The Current Background Check Process for TSOs Shows Signs of 

Inefficiency 

By not using its distinct legal authority to create a more unique process, TSA 

has created inefficiencies that need to be corrected. TSA’s risk designation 

system recommends that “moderate risk” positions should receive, at least, a 

National Agency Check and Inquiries (NACI) investigation. To comply with 

DHS policy, TSOs undergo an ANACI investigation, which is the minimum 

investigation for those who receive Confidential or Secret security clearances. 

Since very few TSOs receive clearances, we believe the use of the ANACI 

expends TSA resources needlessly for limited gain. As a result of the risk 

designation, TSA has elected to use processes and existing standards not 

suited to the unique nature of the TSO position. 

The NACI, which costs $100, is an investigation involving a national agency 

check and written inquiries to applicable local enforcement agencies, schools, 

and references. The ANACI investigation differs from the NACI in two 

major respects. The ANACI adds a credit check and a field investigation of 

local law enforcement records if the locality does not respond to a written 

inquiry. An ANACI costs $220 per investigation. Historically, NACIs are 

usually completed more quickly than the ANACI, but for Fiscal Year 2006, 

TSA’s ANACIs were completed by OPM 50 days faster than the NACI. 

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Before TSO applicants begin employment, they undergo a credit check and 

criminal record check that relies on court records. Kroll performs the prehire 

credit check at a cost of $26 per applicant. The ANACI’s credit check is then 

completed after the employee is hired. This credit check is usually completed 

in the first 2 days of the ANACI’s initiation, though adjudicators do not 

review the credit check until after the ANACI is completed. Interestingly, 

even with a prehire credit check, the posthire check completed by OPM still 

finds a large number of TSOs unsuitable based on TSA’s bad debt standard. 

TSA argues that the use of both the Kroll and OPM criminal record checks is 

justified. During the prehire phase of the TSO background check, Kroll 

performs a local court check that costs $56 per applicant. A local court check 

is different from a local law enforcement check; the former will list only 

charges and convictions while the latter also lists arrests. An arrest that did 

not lead to a charge or conviction is of limited use to adjudicators, because the 

arrest itself is not a disqualifying factor. 

Adjudicators and officials in the Personnel Security Division expressed 

frustration regarding ANACIs received from OPM in “closed pending” status. 

These cases include some pending or incomplete information. Adjudicators 

claimed such cases make their jobs difficult. One adjudicator said she often 

had to contact pending sources herself to confirm past employment and 

education of TSOs. All cases in our sample of eligible and ineligible TSO 

adjudication files contained at least one pending inquiry, and 16 percent of our 

sample contained evidence that some law enforcement agencies were not 

contacted for records. Such gaps in individuals’ records led a senior 

Personnel Security Division official to say that the ANACI was “worthless” in 

determining whether a TSO is suitable for employment. The Chief of the 

DHS’s Personnel Security Division told us that the ANACI is not used for 

headquarters employees in the department. 

Since the ANACI is held in low regard, TSA needs to reevaluate the utility of 

this type of check compared to others. Currently, the primary justification 

TSA adheres to for using the ANACI is the need to make TSOs “clearance 

eligible.” This is not sufficient justification where much less expensive or 

more useful checks are available. Paying to grant 42,000 individuals a secret 

clearance, and then not granting them, is an inefficient practice. Better 

options may exist. For example, the NACI is slightly less detailed, but it costs 

half of the ANACI’s amount, even after a $10 credit check is added. A 

Minimum Background Investigation would more than double the cost of the 

current ANACI, while providing the opportunity to evaluate an individual 

through a personal interview. 

Except for rare occurrences, ordering the more detailed Minimum Background 

Investigation for all TSOs is cost ineffective. Based on our interviews and 

data analysis, the ANACI is not valuable. The NACI check offers similar 

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information for half the cost. The Kroll criminal check offers a similar review 

at a much lower cost than the ANACI. By reviewing its options in more 

detail, TSA can find a more cost-effective method of background 

investigation, or determine if OPM even needs to perform a criminal record 

check, since Kroll performs one in the prehire process. 

Table 2 compares the three background checks. 

Table 2. Comparison of Three Background Checks 

National Agency 

Check and Inquiries 

and Credit Check 

Access National 

Agency Check 

and Inquiries 

Minimum 

Background 

Investigation 

Items covered by check Review of various 

federal systems and 

records; written 

inquiries into previous 

employment, education, 

and criminal records 

The NACI, plus 

personal follow-up 

if response not 

received to written 

inquiries. 

The ANACI, 

plus a 

personal 

interview 

Personal Interview No No Yes 

2007 cost for 8,747 TSOs 

(equal to number hired in 

Fiscal Year 2006) 

$962,170 $1,924,340 $4,592,175 

TSA recently took steps to eliminate a major expense. The $390 medical 

check was originally provided while the prehire credit check took place. 

Thus, thousands of annual applicants who were disqualified by the prehire 

credit check received a medical check. Assuming the 22% prehire rejection 

rate of the credit check and the hiring of 32,527 TSOs over the past 3 fiscal 

years, over 9,000 applicants were deemed ineligible by the credit check. 

Medical checks for these 9,000 individuals cost $3.5 million. A TSA memo 

delaying the medical evaluation was not finalized until November 2006. 

We believe that better application forms, a thorough risk designation 

mechanism, and continued oversight over implementation of the background 

check process will create a great deal of efficiency for TSA. As a revised 

process is implemented, TSA will be able to craft policies that relate directly 

to the unique TSO position, ensuring immediate and long-term improvements. 

Recommendation #3: Select the background check most appropriate for the 

TSO position based on the findings from the risk designation process. 

The Adjudication Process Is Designed to Identify Individuals Who Do Not Meet 

Employment Standards 

TSA’s Personnel Security Division administers the adjudication process for 

TSOs. Through both federal and contracted adjudicators, the Division 

conducts the numerous steps required to complete a background check, which 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

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ends with a determination of an individual’s suitability for a TSO position. 

The two primary factors leading to determination of a TSO’s ineligibility are 

criminal activity and bad debt exceeding $5,000. 

Letters of interrogatory are used to request additional information from 

applicants or TSOs when the agency wishes to know more about issues that 

could pose suitability problems. These letters can be sent to either applicants 

or employees, depending on the phase of the background check process that 

revealed questionable information. 

We examined the adjudication decisions made for 77 individuals. Of these, 

40 were hired and 37 were not hired. Our review of adjudication files 

illustrated for us the challenges TSA faces from the limitations discussed 

earlier in this report, but we did not find cases where TSA hired someone with 

obviously disqualifying criminal convictions. 

The TSO Adjudication Process Determines a Person’s Risk to Security 

and Public Trust 

According to the TSA Personnel Security Manual, adjudication is “an 

examination of a sufficient period a person’s life to make an affirmative 

determination that the person is an acceptable security risk.” After a TSO is 

hired and their ANACI is completed, an adjudicator reviews the results. The 

court records check performed by Kroll is also reviewed, as well as each 

person’s SF-86 and OF-306. Based on this material, the adjudicator will 

complete an adjudication worksheet that summarizes potentially disqualifying 

issues and recommends a course of action. If an adjudicator is concerned 

about an issue or additional information is needed, a letter of interrogatory is 

sent that requests further details from the TSO. An adjudicator approves an 

employee’s background check if the process ends without the existence of 

disqualifying issues. 

The 28 disqualifying felonies found in the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act do not offer discretion for adjudicators. Individuals with 

convictions in these areas cannot be hired. However, most criminal conduct is 

not automatically disqualifying. For example, one drunk driving conviction or 

even misdemeanor spousal abuse would not necessarily prohibit an individual 

from being a TSO. When faced with such issues from an individual’s file, an 

adjudicator weighs various factors, with special emphasis on more recent 

conduct. For example, a drunk driving conviction from a few months before 

would weigh more heavily than a conviction that occurred 10 years before. 

In October 2003, TSA published an adjudication guide for use in examining 

the criminal and credit history of TSOs. This document, the Screener 

Standardization Guide, was revised in September 2004. Adjudicators use the 

guide and other reference materials to make determinations of eligibility for 

TSO applicants and those on the job. Another document, the Personnel 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

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Security Manual, provides general guidance on how adjudicators are to make 

suitability determinations for TSA employees. 

The Personnel Security Division completes the prehire credit and fingerprint 

checks. If this process reveals no disqualification, the candidate begins work 

as a TSO, and the ANACI-based background check begins. After the ANACI 

is completed by OPM, depending on the location of the airport where the TSO 

works, the Personnel Security Division will use one of three regional teams to 

conduct posthire adjudications. 

The time needed to dismiss TSOs who are determined ineligible in the 

posthire phase can be significant. New employees have 2 weeks to submit 

their SF-86. An ineligible individual, who promptly fills out all necessary 

forms, responds to letters of interrogatory, or self-discloses disqualifying 

information, may still remain employed for a protracted period. An individual 

who does not fill out forms or is slow to reveal disqualifying information can 

remain employed for an even longer time. We view these delays as 

significant. 

Federal Security Directors differ in their views on the effect of this extended 

period. Forty-one of 66 FSDs said the process did not cause major problems, 

but it should be faster, while 14 said the time required to complete 

adjudications did not affect daily airport operations. Eleven of the 66 

responding FSDs said major problems are caused by the slow nature of the 

process. One FSD mentioned an employee fired for suitability reasons after 4 

1⁄2 years on the job. In some cases reported to us by FSDs, individuals who 

received several letters of interrogatory from TSA ended up resigning before 

TSA moved to terminate their employment. These included two cases where 

individuals worked for an extended period without even filling out forms 

necessary to begin the posthire background check. 

Adjudicators Use A Bad Debt Standard as Part of their Evaluation 

TSA has instituted a policy prohibiting the hiring or continued employment of 

an individual with more than $5,000 of bad debt. Several types of past due 

accounts can be considered bad debt, including items assigned to a collection 

agency or part of a dismissed bankruptcy. 

As the Personnel Security Manual notes, “An individual who is financially 

overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds.” 

We discovered evidence showing some cases where TSA took over 14 months 

to terminate individuals with ongoing credit problems. Because so many 

TSOs fail the adjudication process due to credit issues, consistent and timely 

implementation of the bad debt threshold is an important part of TSA’s 

personnel security efforts. 

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Adjudicating credit issues can be complicated. Personnel security staff must 

determine if specific overdue amounts qualify as bad debt. Also, a TSO may 

respond to an interrogatory letter with updated credit information, such as 

evidence of payment or proof of payment plans. This means the process could 

take longer than simply reviewing an individual’s credit report. 

Table 3 shows five cases from our file review where an extended period of 

time elapsed before an individual was terminated for credit reasons. In these 

and other instances, TSA pulled multiple credit reports and waited many 

months before taking action against TSOs with serious debt problems. The 

Screener Standardization Guide requires an individual to respond to a bad 

debt interrogatory letter within 30 days; however, TSA was slow to act when 

it failed to receive a response, or a TSO’s letter was incomplete. 

Table 3. Five Bad Debt Cases In Our Sample 

Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E 

First credit report date 2/1/05 6/4/04 9/30/04 9/26/05 9/15/05 

Days until first letter of 

interrogatory sent 

141 147 176 28 0 

Days until second credit 

report 

146 203 419 112 110 

Days until second letter 

of interrogatory 

104 N/A N/A 8 N/A 

Days until termination 

letter 

133 78 134 192 71 

Total days from first 

credit report to 

termination of TSO 

524 428* 729 340 181** 

* This individual resigned on the 428th day.

** This individual requested reconsideration of the termination decision, which was denied. 

For a reason not evident in the case file, the original termination letter was rescinded. A final 

termination letter was sent 6 months after the original termination letter. 

The file for Case B included an electronic mail message from an adjudicator 

to airport management noting, “I can not make a decision” in the applicant’s 

favor, and requesting that the TSO contact the adjudicator. This message was 

sent 10 weeks after a second credit report had been pulled with bad debt far in 

excess of TSA’s standard. Action should have been taken much sooner. 

These cases display the time that can pass between credit checks, letters of 

interrogatory, and TSA action. Neither the Screener Standardization Guide 

nor Personnel Security Manual envisions such a protracted process. Moving 

more quickly to terminate employees with ongoing debt problems gives TSA 

an opportunity to truly implement an important suitability criterion. The large 

number of applicants rejected because of credit problems highlights the need 

to close bad debt cases for TSOs who fail to meet TSA’s credit standard. 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

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Officials in TSA’s Employee Relations Office shared some suggestions on the 

general use of letters of interrogatory. These officials believe the letters need 

to be more direct, specifically outlining actions required by the recipient, as 

well as enforcing timeframes found in TSA policy. TSOs and applicants need 

to understand that failure to respond to the letters will have consequences. It 

was suggested that the letters inform TSOs or applicants that they will be 

dismissed or deemed ineligible in a certain number of days if a response to the 

letter of interrogatory is not received. 

Improvements to interrogatory letters are key to enforcing reasonable time 

frames. Letters of interrogatory are necessary to collect additional 

information from candidates, but they must not be a major source of delay in 

the adjudication process. Individuals who currently reply to the letters with 

disqualifying information are being terminated more rapidly than those with 

similar problems who game the system through a lack of response to TSA. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, TSA: 

Recommendation #4: Issue a notice of disqualification to applicants or a 

letter of termination to TSOs who fail to respond to letters of interrogatory 

within 30 days of receipt. 

TSA Adjudicators Need More Training About the Falsification Standard 

Adjudicators review the honesty of an applicant or employee by focusing on 

whether an applicant or employee falsifies information on their SF-86 or OF306 forms. If information is revealed during a background investigation that 

contradicts information on submitted documents, an accusation of falsification 

may arise. Falsification determinations are much more subjective compared 

to other types of suitability issues, such as bad debt or illegal behavior. 

Applicants are required to sign the SF-86 form. By signing the form, the 

applicants attest that they are aware that knowingly falsifying or concealing a 

“material” fact is a felony. According to the TSA-adopted “OPM Suitability 

Issue Chart/Characterization Chart,” falsification that is more recent is a 

disqualifying issue on level with armed robbery or murder and would keep 

someone from being employed in federal service for at least 3 years. One 

instance of falsification by itself may support a negative suitability 

determination. 

There are two major issues in determining whether an applicant has 

committed falsification. First, it must be clear the offense was intentional. 

Second, the information omitted or misrepresented must be classified as 

“material.” Proving an intentional omission or misrepresentation of fact can 

be difficult. For example, an applicant with a credit problem may not know 

that the bad debt exists, or the extent of the debt may be unknown. 

Additionally, individuals can be charged with an arrest when they are not 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

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present or they may believe a conviction was reduced or expunged. Also, an 

applicant may not understand a question asked on the SF-86 or may have 

simply forgotten to reveal information. 

For competitive service applicants, a “material” statement is one capable of 

influencing, or having a natural tendency to affect, an official decision.16 This 

definition does not apply to excepted service TSOs. For TSO adjudications, 

TSA has recommended the definition of “material” be a conviction of a 

disqualifying offense or a “substantial” and “major” issue as outlined in the 

OPM Issue Characterization Chart. A false but immaterial statement is 

considered a “minor” suitability issue. Thus, a TSO who does not display a 

pattern of dishonesty may be declared suitable and hired after making a false 

statement about an immaterial fact. 

OPM retains jurisdiction in all competitive service cases involving evidence 

of material, intentionally false statements, deception, or fraud.17 Agencies 

must refer these cases to OPM for adjudication. Since TSO positions are 

excepted service, TSA adjudicators must judge these cases. Unlike OPM, 

TSA officials and adjudicators receive no specialized training on falsification. 

Additionally, most applicants can appeal to a TSA disciplinary review board 

only if they have been employed by TSA for 2 years. 

In 2005, our investigation of Houston-area TSOs discovered 30 applicants had 

possibly falsified the SF-86. These falsifications involved the omission of 

arrests that were later revealed in the background investigation. After TSA 

sent interrogatory letters to the individuals in question, the agency concluded 

that 24 of the cases were not serious enough to be considered material 

falsifications. For the remaining six cases, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 

Southern District of Texas, working with our Office of Investigations, pursued 

criminal charges. Only one of the six falsification charges led to a conviction. 

The other cases were dismissed after the omission of fact was determined to 

be unintentional or immaterial. Two of the six individuals were determined to 

be eligible for employment by TSA; only one so far has pursued a return to 

duty. 

Our review of files led us to believe TSO adjudicators need a better 

understanding of how falsification criteria should be applied. This can come 

through formation of more complete policy guidance followed by additional 

adjudicator training. TSA adjudicators have applied accusations of 

falsification broadly and routinely. In some cases, letters of interrogatory 

accused individuals of falsification because criminal charges were not 

disclosed, but the information was never asked for on the SF-86. In other 

cases, TSA used the OPM competitive service definition of falsification in 

16 5 C.F.R. § 731.101(b).

17 5 C.F.R. § 731.103(a). 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

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termination letters and letters of interrogatory. In many bad debt cases, 

applicants were accused of falsification when no clear intent to falsify was 

established. The DHS Personnel Security Division Chief said falsification for 

bad debt is very difficult to sustain, an observation with which TSA 

adjudicators concurred. The existence of undisclosed bad debt is not 

necessarily evidence of intentional misrepresentation by the applicant. 

In December 2006, staff from various parts of TSA met to discuss the 

agency’s policy on falsification. Based on our subsequent discussions with 

some agency staff, the results of this meeting were a disappointment. Insight 

into how to deal with falsification cases was expected, but the meeting did not 

provide new guidance on how to deal with falsification, according to program 

managers in TSA’s Personnel Security Division. 

Issues of honesty remain in TSA’s criteria for evaluating all applicants, but 

falsification is a complicated issue that can usually be avoided by TSA. If an 

applicant fails to disclose disqualifying behavior, the behavior itself can be 

used to render the individual unsuitable for a TSO position. A senior member 

of the Personnel Security staff agreed that most cases can be resolved in this 

manner, but a small number of cases merit determinations of ineligibility on 

falsification alone. These more serious situations could include a felony 

involving “dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation,” which is one of the 28 

disqualifying offenses mandated by Congress. For most cases, however, 

accusations of falsification are unnecessary and can be addressed through 

existing suitability standards. 

For more severe cases where falsification alone may merit ineligibility, 

current or revised suitability guidelines offer an opportunity to help 

adjudicators. For instance, a “false statement” is a moderate issue that can be 

used to find an individual unsuitable. It does not require the same burden of 

proof as falsification. Additionally, it allows for mitigation and is not coupled 

with the potentially severe future employment prohibition and criminal 

penalties of falsification. Of course, TSA retains the authority to develop its 

own suitability standards for honesty outside of OPM’s current rules. 

Recommendation #5: Establish clear and objective policies for adjudication 

of false statements and omissions, including more specific suitability 

guidelines. 

Use of Internal Review Team Lessens the Chance of Adjudication Errors 

A single adjudicator does not always make the final suitability determination. 

The Personnel Security Division uses an internal review team to examine 

many adjudication decisions. The review process, which began in October 

2004, examines all initially ineligible cases and some eligible determinations. 

The internal review team leader said that TSA intends to review 30% of 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

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eligible determinations; however, the availability of files and other issues 

reduces the actual amount to less than 15%. 

After the internal review team examines a case, the team and the adjudicator 

will discuss cases where each reached a different conclusion. If the 

adjudicator is persuaded by the team’s decision, no further intervention is 

necessary and the original adjudication is changed. If consensus remains 

elusive, the Personnel Security Division Director would make the final 

decision. Over their first 2 years, internal review teams reviewed 2,386 

eligible cases and 1,637 ineligible cases. Only 16, less than one percent of the 

eligible cases, were ultimately overturned while internal review changed 106, 

less than seven percent of the ineligible cases, to eligible. These numbers 

include TSOs and other employees adjudicated by the Personnel Security 

Division. 

Although the rate of ineligible overturns from the internal review process is 

low, there is merit to a complete review of all cases. Adjudicators face a 

variety of decisions about each case; human error can be diminished through 

additional review. One prominent example occurred in an October 2003 

adjudication decision. This case, completed before the internal review team 

was created, was an unfortunate incident of mistaken identity. A local 

criminal check found a disqualifying conviction, but the individual’s name did 

not fully match the full name of the TSO. The jurisdiction’s court records did 

not have a date of birth, so the adjudicator erroneously determined the TSO 

should be terminated. The TSO was placed on administrative leave while he 

documented that the adjudication decision was erroneous. After 3 weeks, 

TSA confirmed the veracity of the TSO’s documentation and he was allowed 

to return to work. We are confident the internal review process described to 

us currently lessens the chance of such errors. 

Changes to the way TSA uses data would improve the efficiency of the 

internal review process. Data we reviewed on the rates of overturned 

adjudication decisions were not stratified by type of job. It might be useful 

for TSA to note the percentage of overturns and other data for TSOs 

compared to air marshals, for example. Additionally, the agency could benefit 

from analyzing the rate that individual adjudicators are overturned by internal 

review. Tracking overturns in this manner offers the ability to know if certain 

adjudicators need targeted training or if additional policies or resources may 

be needed to help adjudicators complete their work. 

TSA Should Focus on Decreasing the Number of Adjudication Decisions 

Overturned in the Reconsideration Process 

In 2004, we reported that 42% of TSOs won when they requested further 

review of their ineligible determination. In recent cases, an even higher 

percentage of ineligible adjudication decisions was overturned when 

individuals requested reconsideration. Between October 2004 and October 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

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2006, 1,031 individuals requested reconsideration of their post-adjudication 

ineligibility determination. That was 62% of the number determined 

ineligible for the period. A total of 514 of the 1,031 individuals were 

determined to be eligible after the reconsideration process. Thus, even with 

the internal review process examining every ineligible determination prior to a 

formal rejection, half of the decisions were reversed after individuals initially 

determined to be ineligible asked for a review of their cases. A Personnel 

Security Division official said that reconsiderations are not tracked by type of 

job, so we were not able to determine how many of these reconsiderations 

were TSOs. Since the bulk of the Division’s adjudications are for TSOs, the 

data is illustrative of the TSO reconsideration process. TSOs included in the 

above data would have still been in their probationary period, which, for most 

TSOs, would be two years. 

Various factors, some outside of TSA’s control, explain the high 

reconsideration success rate. The large number of closed-pending cases 

resulting from OPM’s review makes it difficult for TSA to get a complete 

picture of an individual. Adjudicators might make incorrect determinations as 

a result of this incomplete information. Second, matters that seem 

disqualifying to an adjudicator may have been minor or quickly corrected. An 

individual who documents such episodes has a good chance of prevailing in 

reconsideration. Third, some adjudicators might not have examined a case 

thoroughly enough, thereby failing to uncover exculpatory information. One 

Personnel Security Division official said this lack of “robust” adjudications 

hampers the process in some situations. An adjudicator said the existence of 

the internal review team makes one more likely to rule against a marginal 

case. This appears to be an unfortunate byproduct of the internal review 

system. Adjudicators should not see internal review as the means to avoid 

more difficult decisions. Finally, debt problems could get corrected before a 

credit report was adjudicated. 

Personnel Security Division leaders and adjudicators suggested that an 

applicant interview would be one way to gain information that could decrease 

the need for reconsiderations. An interview offers an interpersonal experience 

conducive to explanation and self-disclosure. As TSA conducts an 

examination of the TSO background check process as discussed earlier in this 

report, it should study the utility of a personal interview. 

When asked about the 50 percent reconsideration reversal rate, TSA pointed 

out that many are the result of TSO candidates submitting, only after an 

adverse decision, mitigating information that they should have provided 

earlier to TSA. Posthire letters of interrogatory are frequently not acted on 

with sufficient urgency by the TSO. The level of reconsideration overturns is 

elevated by TSOs failing to respond until a more stringent letter of termination 

is received. We agree that some reconsideration overturns occur because of 

good-faith ineligibility decisions that are later corrected in the light of 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

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additional information. Nonetheless, our interviews with adjudicators and 

leaders in TSA’s Personnel Security Division have led us to conclude that 

additional training for adjudicators would help address some of the issues we 

discovered, such as overuse of falsification allegations. We believe that a 

specific training program for TSO adjudications would also help to reduce the 

rate of reconsideration. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, TSA: 

Recommendation #6: Develop training specific to TSO adjudications to 

focus on ways adjudicators can make more complete and accurate decisions. 

Pending Systems Improvements and Administrative Changes Should Improve 

the Process 

One of the inefficiencies described in our January 2004 report noted TSA’s 

lack of an information technology infrastructure to track TSO background 

checks efficiently. We noted, “TSA had no comprehensive picture of the 

status of investigations” because of a limited use of computer systems. What 

was used to track the process was “wholly inadequate” to manage the 

process.18 Important progress has been made in this area. With additional 

work, communication, and resources, TSA can avoid some problematic 

situations and continue to improve the background check process. 

Tracking System Should Improve With Pending Redesign 

The Background Investigations Tracking System is now used by the Personnel 

Security Division to administer the background check process for TSOs and 

other positions. Each adjudicator uses the system to update the status of 

applicants from the beginning of the process. The internal review team also 

uses the system to track its work. TSA continues to update the system; a 

redesign is slated for completion in May 2007. 

The existence of a computerized tracking system is an area of improvement 

since 2004, but the Background Investigations Tracking System has important 

limitations in its current form. The system relies on information entered 

manually, which makes it difficult to ensure complete and consistent data 

entry by all adjudicators. Another defect is the inability to include more than 

one entry date per item for each individual. This can cause a great deal of 

confusion when tracking individual background checks. When TSOs resign 

and later reapply for another TSO position, nonsensical information displayed 

in the system makes tracking impossible. In our review of 40 eligible 

adjudication files, there were 15 individuals who started work in 2006, but had 

18 DHS OIG, A Review of Background Checks for Federal Passenger and 

Baggage Screeners at Airports, OIG-04-08, January 2004, p. 33. 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

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adjudications completed in 2003. This meant the 15 individuals worked as a 

TSO 3 years before, left the position, and returned in 2006. Since their more 

recent background investigation had not yet closed, the original determination 

remained the only date shown in the system. 

The Background Investigation Tracking System is not yet a truly precise 

picture of each individual’s adjudication status. Until the system can 

completely and accurately inform TSA staff at headquarters and airports about 

the adjudication status of applicants and employees, the system’s utility will 

be severely limited. 

The redesigned system will offer several important improvements including: 

• The ability to have more than one date for each entry field; 

• Extra storage space that will allow the inclusion of scanned 

documents; 

• Prompts to alert users about incomplete data fields; and 

• Less reliance on Social Security numbers as identifiers, in line with 

federal privacy standards. 

A program manager in Personnel Security Division said that Federal Security 

Directors are able to request access to certain Background Investigation 

Tracking System spreadsheets. This information allows airports to know 

about the status of potential hires and employees. TSA noted in its 2005 

Office of Security Annual Report that the system “provides timely 

information to field staff offices on the status of employee investigations.” 

Our survey demonstrated that further engagement with FSDs is necessary, 

since few see the Background Investigations Tracking System as important to 

operations. In our survey of the FSDs only 2 of 67 respondents, about three 

percent, said the system was very useful to their work, while 42, which is 63 

percent of respondents, noted they had no basis to judge or were not familiar 

with the system. One survey respondent even noted an inability to access the 

system despite repeated attempts. Involving FSDs in the further development 

of the Background Investigations Tracking System would help make the 

system useful to those hiring TSOs. 

Integration of Components’ Information Would Lessen the Chance of 

Conflicting Results in Adjudicaiton and Falsification Issues 

Both TSA’s Personnel Security Division and the Office of Human Capital are 

involved in the TSO adjudication process. Personnel Security completes the 

adjudications and sends letters of interrogatory, while different groups in the 

Office of Human Capital administer the hiring and termination processes. 

After our review of the process, we have concluded changes could be made to 

improve workflow and decrease redundancy. 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

Page 23
We reviewed the adjudication files for each of the six Houston TSOs who 

were indicted for providing false information on their background check 

paperwork. One of these individuals received an interrogatory letter from the 

Personnel Security Division asking that he explain the possible falsification 

issues. Just before that letter was sent, airport management fired the 

individual for not being truthful on his employment documents. In this case, 

different parts of TSA were not coordinating on that action. Six months after 

his dismissal, the TSO attempted to get his job back after being exonerated in 

court. In comments sent in response to our survey, a FSD provided a similar 

example. After planning to terminate some employees because of financial 

issues, the airport discovered that the Personnel Security Division was 

working with the TSOs to document mitigation of the concerns. The FSD 

said TSA looks “horribly incompetent” when different parts of the agency 

work in contradictory ways. 

The avoidable nature of these cases illustrates how TSA should use data 

available in one component to minimize mistakes made in the management of 

individual cases. Further integration of TSA components’ data should lessen 

the chance of such problems. To complete the hiring and termination process 

for TSOs, Employee Relations staff in the Office of Human Capital work on a 

system not directly linked to the Background Investigations Tracking System. 

Thus, airport management often does not know the status of the background 

investigation. Communication between airports and headquarters is important 

when adjudicators and airport management are simultaneously reviewing the 

same concern. If airports responsible for terminating employees knew when a 

TSO had a letter of interrogatory pending, TSA could avoid the deliverance of 

a termination letter for an issue being reviewed by the Personnel Security 

Division. 

Recommendation #7: Implement systems changes to ensure that the 

Personnel Security Division, the Office of Human Capital, and Federal 

Security Directors are concurrently aware of a TSO under review for 

termination as a result of the adjudication process. 

TSA Should Increase Resources for the Personnel Security Division and 

Move the Issuance of Termination Letters to that Division 

We discussed the TSO adjudication process with managers and team leaders 

in both TSA’s Personnel Security Division and the Employee Relations 

Division of the Office of Human Capital. The two divisions interact daily 

while hiring, and firing, TSOs. When TSA was working to fulfill hiring 

mandates in 2003, the Office of Human Capital was charged with issuing 

termination letters for those TSOs deemed ineligible by adjudicators. 

Personnel Security officials believe the human resources functions performed 

by the Employee Relations staff naturally fit the role of issuing termination 

letters. Conversely, Employee Relations leadership no longer wishes to 

perform the function of firing ineligible TSOs. 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

Page 24
Issuance of a termination letter starts when the Personnel Security Division 

officially completes its review of an ineligible case. At that point, Employee 

Relations staff in the Office of Human Capital receives the documentation in 

the case file and completes what one manager called a “quick internal review” 

to ensure the adjudication decision was “sufficient and appropriate.” Then, 

Employee Relations sends the case back to Personnel Security for a signature 

on the termination letter, which finally is sent back to Employee Relations for 

release to the Federal Security Director at the TSO’s airport. 

We believe this is an inefficient approach. A streamlined process where the 

Personnel Security Division issues the letters directly would lead to quicker 

action on TSO terminations. This would save TSA time and resources. The 

Division charged with conducting the adjudication of candidates should also 

directly send termination letters for those who are deemed ineligible by the 

adjudication process. 

There would be a need to ensure the Personnel Security Division gains 

sufficient legal and administrative expertise to fully effectuate this more 

efficient practice. This can be accomplished by fully grasping the Division’s 

overall needs first, then proceeding with the accumulation of sufficient 

knowledge that would allow the Division to issue termination letters directly. 

Further organizational changes may be warranted. Some senior members of 

the Personnel Security Division suggested their office be merged with the 

Office of Human Capital to provide maximum efficiency to the background 

check process. One individual noted, “I always thought suitability was a part 

of employee relations until I got to TSA.” There may be some merit to this 

idea, but we are not formally recommending such a course because it would 

touch on myriad administrative issues outside the scope of this review. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, TSA: 

Recommendation #8: Ensure sufficient resources exist in the Personnel 

Security Division to move the issuance of adjudication termination letters 

from Employee Relations in the Office of Human Capital to the Personnel 

Security Division. 

An Internal Audit Procedure Could Enhance TSO Background Checks 

TSA should institute an ongoing internal audit process to ensure continuing 

improvement in TSO background checks. This process could help discover 

problems at all levels. Internal audits would allow TSA to continually 

evaluate the efficiency and utility of the background check process. Knowing 

more about the validity of each step would allow TSA to make more informed 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

Page 25
decisions about needed revisions. At the micro level, internal auditing offers 

the ability to examine case files and other parts of the process to determine 

bottlenecks, overdue adjudications, and areas where TSA could benefit from 

additional staff training. 

Statutory Requirements Exist to Perform Internal Audits 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act required TSA to “review, and 

revise as necessary, any standard, rule, or regulation governing the 

employment of individuals as security screening personnel.”19 TSA is also 

required to “provide for the periodic audit of the effectiveness of criminal 

history record checks” done for the TSO population.20 Fully implementing 

these legal requirements grants TSA the opportunity to ensure ongoing 

improvement in the performance of TSO background checks. 

TSA components do examine their processes. For example, the Office of 

Human Capital has studied and changed various parts of the hiring process. 

Also, as noted, the Personnel Security Division initiated a review of 

falsification issues in an attempt to clarify TSA’s policy in the area. Congress 

envisioned TSA’s use of a more dynamic internal audit process, capable of 

providing insights into how the agency can make strategic and tactical 

changes to the background check process. 

An Internal Auditing Program Would Ensure More Consistent 

Implementation of TSA Policies 

We received information on an internal review conducted by TSA following 

the arrest of the six TSOs in Houston. TSA’s Office of Inspection, an 

independent internal unit reporting to the Assistant Secretary, completed this 

review to determine if the Houston arrests indicated a systemic problem. 

Although this type of review has value for TSA, staff in the Office of 

Inspection noted the office should not be seen as fulfilling the congressional 

intent of systematic reviews of TSO background checks. We concur. The 

Office of Inspection does not help run the operations of TSA’s components; it 

merely reviews problem areas on a generally ad hoc basis and offers 

suggestions. 

TSA needs an ongoing effort that can effect sustained and rigorous change 

throughout the background check process. The development of an internal 

auditing function for the background check process could build on the current 

internal review team in TSA’s Personnel Security Division. This would 

require an expanded mission and extra staffing for that unit. There may be 

merit in simply hiring new staff with expertise in compliance and internal 

auditing to ensure more rapid change. 

19 49 U.S.C. 44935(e)(3).

20 49 U.S.C. 44936(a)(3). 

A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 

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We agree with TSA’s November 2006 decision to refrain from medical testing 

of applicants until after completion of prehire credit checks. Ongoing internal 

review offers the chance to make such basic changes more quickly. TSA can 

use internal auditing to ensure that its resources are spent wisely and that 

components of the background check process, such as the pre- and posthire 

criminal checks, truly complement each other. 

More vibrant internal auditing presents TSA with an opportunity to realize 

efficiencies on an ongoing basis. Ad hoc efforts to examine particular 

problems are not as useful as an ongoing review of the overall background 

check process. Tracking information from adjudication files, systems, and 

other sources of data would provide a more complete picture of the 

background check system. The ability to detect problems can also ensure 

more consistent implementation of TSA policies. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, TSA: 

Recommendation #9: Construct and implement an internal auditing 

function that will study the overall background check process, including an 

ongoing review of the type of check performed for the TSO population, to 

maximize efficiencies and improve the administration of particular segments 

of the process. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

TSA provided general and technical comments on our draft report, including 

responses to the recommendations. We considered each of these comments 

and responses, and additional documentation provided, and made responsive 

edits and additions to some parts of the report, including revisions to one 

recommendation. 

In its response to our draft, TSA noted that the Enhanced Suitability Standards 

were rescinded on April 23, 2007. TSA noted that various parts of TSA 

concluded that the standards created “confusion and redundancies.” We 

believe that TSA’s lack of TSO-specific application materials, not the 

existence of the enhanced standards, was the source of the problem. Our 

report continues to note, “Abandoning the standards completely would 

weaken the agency’s ability to fully consider the impact of some undesirable 

behaviors in the TSO workforce.” Additional information from TSA on the 

process by which the enhanced standards were rescinded would provide 

clarification. 

TSA fully concurred with eight of the nine recommendations and concurred in 

part with one recommendation. Below is a summary of TSA’s response to 

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each recommendation, and our analysis. Appendix B contains a complete 

copy of TSA’s response. 

Recommendation 1: Create and implement employment forms that collect 

information on the applicant pursuant to eligibility standards. Adjudicators 

should review these forms prior to a Transportation Security Officer’s (TSO) 

entry on duty. 

TSA response: TSA has considered creating and implementing employment 

forms that would capture information regarding the disqualifying offenses and 

suitability factors, and to review these forms prior to a TSO’s entry on duty. 

TSA envisions that applicants will complete the new forms during the online 

application process. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. We 

agree that the online application process would be a favorable time for 

applicants to complete the new forms. Providing upfront information to 

applicants will serve to educate applicants more completely about the hiring 

process and permit those with disqualifications to identify themselves and 

withdraw from further consideration. We request that TSA inform us within 

90 days of their progress in implementing this change. 

Recommendation 2: Complete a comprehensive screener position risk 

designation using criteria provided by personnel security officials in the 

Department of Homeland Security and appropriate TSA offices. 

TSA response: TSA states that establishing an official screener position risk 

designation is currently a high priority. No estimation is offered for when it 

might be complete. 

OIG Analysis: The risk designation is key to TSA’s entire background check 

process. This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. We request that 

TSA inform us within 90 days of their progress in implementing this change. 

Recommendation 3: Select the background check most appropriate for the 

TSO position based on the findings from the risk designation process. 

TSA response: TSA agreed to select the background check most appropriate 

for the TSO position based on the findings from the risk designation process. 

TSA also plans to adjust use of forms based on the background check. No 

estimation is offered for when TSA actions will be taken. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. TSA has 

articulated a reasonable course that should aid in the final selection of the type 

of background check. Additional documentation on the risk designation 

process and the background check selected will be an important step in the 

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corrective action process. We request that TSA inform us within 90 days of 

their progress to implement this change. 

Recommendation 4: Issue a notice of disqualification to applicants or a letter 

of termination to TSOs who fail to respond to letters of interrogatory within 

30 days. 

TSA response: TSA states that letters of interrogatory issued to TSOs will 

will be revised to clearly define their responsibility to provide a timely 

response and will document consequences, up to and including removal from 

their position, for non-compliance. No estimation is offered for when these 

revisions will be made. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. The 

revision described by TSA will be responsive to the intent of the 

recommendation. We request that TSA inform us within 90 days of their 

progress in implementing this change. 

Recommendation 5: Establish clear and objective policies for adjudication of 

false statements and omissions, including more specific suitability guidelines. 

TSA response: TSA reported that they have established a monthly 

Adjudication Workshop to address issues of uniformity of adjudication 

practices and to provide clearer understanding of TSA considerations. 

Additionally, TSA’s policy on Personnel Security, currently in draft, will 

incorporate falsification considerations and application criteria. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. The OIG 

encourages TSA to include its falsification consideration and application 

criteria in the Personnel Security Manual for adjudicators to reference. We 

expect that TSA’s work in this area will decrease the number of falsification 

allegations made against TSOs and applicants, as well as provide a process to 

deal with obvious incidents of falsification. We request that TSA inform us 

within 90 days of their progress in implementing this change. 

Recommendation 6: Develop training specific to TSO adjudications to focus 

on ways adjudicators can make more complete and accurate decisions. 

TSA response: TSA’s response noted that the unique nature of the TSO 

hiring and vetting process creates the need for specialized adjudicator training. 

TSA has established a monthly Adjudication Workshop designed to improve 

consistency through communication of agency-specific policies. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. TSA’s 

new Adjudication Workshops appear to be an appropriate forum for 

establishing procedures that would lead to consistent and accurate decisions. 

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TSA’s response did not indicate how many adjudicators would attend these 

workshops, or how workshop improvements would be communicated to the 

adjudicators not in attendance. We request that TSA inform us within 90 days 

of their progress in implementing this change. 

Recommendation 7: Implement systems changes to ensure that the Personnel 

Security Division, the Office of Human Capital, and Federal Security 

Directors are concurrently aware of a TSO under review for termination as a 

result of the adjudication process. 

TSA response: TSA reports that it is currently developing policy that will 

respect privacy concerns of the officer and also notify Federal Security 

Directors when potentially disqualifying issues are identified during the 

background investigation. This new policy will require coordination with the 

Office of Law Enforcement, the Office of Human Capital, the Office of Chief 

Council, and the Office of Security Operations. No estimation is offered for 

when the policy will be implemented. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. The final 

process that develops should help to avoid difficulties encountered when 

TSOs receive contradictory information from different parts of TSA. We 

request that TSA inform us within 90 days of their progress in implementing 

this change. 

Recommendation 8: Ensure sufficient resources exist in the Personnel 

Security Division to move the issuance of adjudication termination letters 

from Employee Relations in the Office of Human Capital to the Personnel 

Security Division. 

TSA response: TSA concurred in part with this recommendation. The agency 

reports that it is conducting position management reviews of several offices 

within TSA. The review of the Personnel Security Division will specifically 

determine what resources that office will need to draft and issue suitability 

termination letters. No estimation is offered for when these reviews will be 

completed. 

OIG Analysis: Although TSA concurred in part, this recommendation is 

resolved, but remains open. The response indicates that the position 

management reviews have already commenced. The response further states 

that the Personnel Security Division should be given the resources it would 

require “to achieve its goals and objectives, including drafting/issuing 

suitability termination letters.” TSA did not describe how it non-concurred 

with this recommendation. We request that TSA inform us within 90 days of 

their progress in implementing this change. 

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Recommendation 9: Construct and implement an internal auditing function 

that will study the overall background check process, including an ongoing 

review of the type of check performed for the TSO population, to maximize 

efficiencies and improve the administration of particular segments of the 

process. 

TSA response: TSA reports that it will expand upon the internal review 

structure currently within the Personnel Security organization to enhance 

auditing of the background check process. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. We 

believe that this function is important to the background check process. 

Implementation of this recommendation will allow TSA find ongoing 

efficiencies. We request that TSA inform us within 90 days of their progress 

in implementing this change. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The purpose of our review was to determine whether TSA processed 

background checks of its Transportation Security Officers in an efficient and 

effective manner and according to applicable laws, federal regulations, 

guidelines, and standards. The scope of our review focused on background 

checks of Transportation Security Officers and included administrative and 

programmatic activities from September 2003 to January 2007. 

Our fieldwork was conducted from September 2006 to January 2007. During 

this period, we conducted 21 interviews. Among those interviewed were 

representatives from TSA’s Personnel Security Division, Office of Human 

Capital, Office of Counsel, and Office of Inspection. We also interviewed 

two TSA Federal Security Directors and representatives from two firms with 

Screening Partnership Program contracts. We used an Internet survey tool to 

collect data for a judgmental sample of various aspects of the background 

check process. Of 96 Federal Security Directors who received the survey, 67 

replied. We also spoke with officials from OPM, our field offices, and the 

DHS Personnel Security Division. 

We supplemented these interviews with extensive document review and 

analysis efforts. We studied related laws, regulations, executive orders, and 

legal opinions. We reviewed TSA manuals and policy directives, and 

analyzed TSA employment data. We also reviewed 77 adjudication files of 

current and former Transportation Security Officers. Lastly, we examined 

reports from GAO, relevant speeches, testimony, and news articles. 

This review was conducted under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 

1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections, 

issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments on Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments on Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments on Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments on Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments on Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments on Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

Recommendations from the January 2004 OIG Report 

Recommendations From the January 2004 OIG Report 

In our January 2004 report entitled, A Review of Background Checks for 

Federal Passenger and Baggage Screeners at Airports, we made the 

following 12 recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: Complete screener position risk designations with input 

from the personnel security officials of the Department of Homeland Security 

and from appropriate TSA offices, including the Credentialing Program 

Office, Human Resources Office, and Aviation Operations. Screener position 

risk designation records, position descriptions, and vacancy announcements 

should reflect the correct designation. 

Recommendation 2: Complete the comparison study of the effectiveness of 

Office of Personnel Management and private sector background checks. 

Incorporating the review’s results, the Administrator should modify screener 

background checks as needed to ensure they suit the position risk designation, 

meet Department of Homeland Security standards, and are cost-efficient. 

Recommendation 3: Ensure, without exception, that all screeners undergo a 

fingerprint-based criminal history records check and receive a favorable 

adjudication before they begin training and work. 

Recommendation 4: Incorporating guidance from the Department of 

Homeland Security, define the role that contract adjudicators will play in 

TSA’s background check process and the minimum requirements that TSA 

must meet to fulfill its oversight responsibilities. 

Recommendation 5: Institute precautions to protect against terminations that 

are based on incorrect information. 

Recommendation 6: Establish mechanisms to prevent and abort background 

checks on applicants and employees whom TSA disqualifies. 

Recommendation 7: Strengthen procedures for completing and retaining the 

Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9). 

Recommendation 8: Implement personnel security management policies and 

procedures and document departures from them. 

Recommendation 9: Document the Credentialing Program Office workload 

and then plan and hire staff to meet workload requirements. 

Recommendation 10: Ensure that TSA program managers formally document 

contract modifications and instructions, maintain a substantive presence with 

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Appendix C 

Recommendations from the January 2004 OIG Report 

contractors in order to provide guidance and oversight, and require status 

reports to track mission accomplishment. 

Recommendation 11: Create a personnel security management tracking 

system that provides management with accurate, timely, and integrated 

information on the status of security investigations. The information should 

reflect the complete cycle of personnel security management, including data 

on incoming staff, separations, and reconsiderations. 

Recommendation 12: Improve records management policies, procedures, and 

practices governing the content, organization, and storage of personnel 

security management case files. 

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Appendix D 

Recommendations in This Report 

Recommendations in This Report 

Our current report makes the following recommendations to the Assistant 

Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration: 

Recommendation #1: Create and implement employment forms that collect 

information on the applicant pursuant to eligibility standards. Adjudicators 

should review these forms prior to a TSO’s entry on duty. 

Recommendation #2: Complete a comprehensive screener position risk 

designation using criteria provided by personnel security officials in the 

Department of Homeland Security and appropriate TSA offices. 

Recommendation #3: Select the background check most appropriate for the 

TSO position based on the findings from the risk designation process. 

Recommendation #4: Issue a notice of disqualification to applicants or a letter 

of termination to TSOs who fail to respond to letters of interrogatory within 

30 days of receipt. 

Recommendation #5: Establish clear and objective policies for adjudication 

of false statements and omissions, including more specific suitability 

guidelines. 

Recommendation #6: Develop training specific to TSO adjudications to 

focus on ways adjudicators can make more complete and accurate decisions. 

Recommendation #7: Implement systems changes to ensure that the 

Personnel Security Division, the Office of Human Capital, and Federal 

Security Directors are concurrently aware of a TSO under review for 

termination as a result of the adjudication process. 

Recommendation #8: Ensure sufficient resources exist in the Personnel 

Security Division to move the issuance of adjudication termination letters 

from Employee Relations in the Office of Human Capital to the Personnel 

Security Division. 

Recommendation #9: Construct and implement an internal auditing function 

that will study the overall background check process, including an ongoing 

review of the type of check performed for the TSO population, to maximize 

efficiencies and improve the administration of particular segments of the 

process. 

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Appendix E 

28 Disqualifying Felonies 

28 Disqualifying Felonies 

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44936(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 1542.209(d), applicants 

convicted of one or more of the following 28 felony crimes within the past 

ten years are not eligible to serve as screeners: 

1. Forgery of certificates, false marking of aircraft, and other aircraft 

registration violation, 49 U.S.C. 46306; 

2. Interference with air navigation, 49 U.S.C. 46308; 

3. Improper transportation of a hazardous material, 49 U.S.C. 46312; 

4. Aircraft piracy, 49 U.S.C. 46502; 

5. Interference with flight crew members or flight attendants, 49 U.S.C. 

46504; 

6. Commission of certain crimes aboard aircraft in flight, 49 U.S.C. 

46506; 

7. Carrying a weapon or explosive aboard aircraft, 49 U.S.C. 46505; 

8. Conveying false information and threats, 49 U.S.C. 46507; 

9. Aircraft piracy outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United 

States, 49 U.S.C. 46502(b); 

10. Lighting violations involving transporting controlled substances, 49 

U.S.C. 46315; 

11. Unlawful entry into an aircraft or airport area that serves air carriers or 

foreign air carriers contrary to established security requirements, 49 

U.S.C. 46314; 

12. Destruction of an aircraft or aircraft facility, 18 U.S.C. 32; 

13. Murder; 

14. Assault with intent to murder; 

15. Espionage; 

16. Sedition; 

17. Kidnapping or hostage taking; 

18. Treason; 

19. Rape or aggravated sexual abuse; 

20. Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, or manufacture of an 

explosive or weapon; 

21. Extortion; 

22. Armed or felony unarmed robbery; 

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Appendix E 

28 Disqualifying Felonies 

23. Distribution of, or intent to distribute, a controlled substance; 

24. Felony arson; 

25. Felony involving a threat; 

26. Felony involving: 

a) willful destruction of property; 

b) importation or manufacture of a controlled substance; 

c) burglary; 

d) theft; 

e) dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation; 

f) possession or distribution of stolen property; 

g) aggravated assault; 

h) bribery; or 

i) illegal possession of a controlled substance punishable by a 

maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year; 

27. Violence at international airports, 18 U.S.C. 37; 

28. Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the criminal acts listed above. 

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Appendix F 

Survey Questions and Answers 

Survey Questions and Answers 

1. Please select the security category(ies) of the airport(s) under your jurisdiction 

Responses 

X 18 

I 39 

II 16 

III 17 

IV 18 

2. From your perspective, how well does TSA’s process for checking the backgrounds 

of screeners identify and reject applicants or employees with certain types of 

criminal or credit problems, or other potentially disqualifying factors? 

Responses 

5 (the process works very well) 6 

4 17 

3 (the process works adequately) 23 

2 17 

1 (the process works poorly) 3 

3. From your perspective, does the time required to complete a TSO’s background 

check cause staffing issues or other difficulties at your airport(s)? 

Responses 

No or very few problems, the process does 

not impact day-to-day operations 14 

A few problems, the process could be faster 41 

Many difficulties arise from the slowness of the process 11 

4. In your opinion, how easy is it to work with TSA Headquarters to resolve any issues 

related to the background check process for TSOs at your airport(s)? 

Responses 

5 (very easy) 5 

4 12 

3 (few or minor issues) 27 

2 10 

1 (very difficult) 9 

5. Do you have any concern about TSA’s ability to ensure that only U.S. citizens are 

eligible for employment as TSOs? 

Responses 

Yes 11 

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Appendix F 

Survey Questions and Answers 

No 56 

6. To what extent does TSA’s Background Investigation Tracking System (BITS) play 

a role in your management of the TSO hiring process or your ability to respond to 

applicant or TSO inquiries about their background check? 

Responses 

5 (BITS is very useful) 2 

4 4 

3 (BITS provides some help) 16 

2 3 

1 (BITS does not help by my airport(s) 4 

No basis to judge/not familiar with BITS 38 

7. Has a situation arisen where you were hesitant to dismiss TSOs with poor 

performance because of concerns that the background checks for replacement 

employees would take too long or lead to new hires with potentially disqualifying 

criminal or credit problems? 

Responses 

Yes 5 

No 62 

8. What is your assessment of TSA’s standard that $5,000 of bad debt is a 

disqualifying factor for a TSO position? 

Responses 

The standard does not need to be revised. It is 

a sufficient way to limit criminal conduct or 

diminish security concerns. 29 

There is some merit to keeping the policy or 

revising the amount to a limited extent. 21 

I recommend TSA consider revising this standard 

because it prohibits good employees from either 

becoming a TSO or keeping their job as a TSO. 10 

I recommend TSA consider revising this standard 

because it does not sufficiently detect criminal or 

security risks in the applicant or TSO population. 7 

9. In general, do you belive that TSO applicants are sufficiently informed about the 

credit and criminal standards that will be used to determine their suitability for 

work as a TSO? 

Responses 

Yes 47 

No 19 

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Appendix F 

Survey Questions and Answers 

10. Please share any additional comments you believe may be helpful in our review. 

This could include positive comments about TSA’s background check process, 

descriptions of specific cases in which you encountered difficulties with background 

checks, or you suggestions on how TSA could improve the background check 

process. 

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• 

• 

• 

• 

• -

• 

• 

• 

• 

Appendix G 

Prehire Background Investigation Process 

At airport assessment center, applicant completes: 

OF-306 

Fair Credit Reporting Act Authorization 

Authorization for Release of Medical 

Information 

Authorization for Release of Information 

Non disclosure Information 

Electronic fingerprints 

Electronic fingerprints are 

sent to the FBI 

Kroll performs 

Credit check 

Local court check 

TSA runs applicants’ names 

through terrorist watch lists 

and TSA no-hire list 

Prehire Background Investigation Process 

TSA receives results from all sources electronically. 

Personnel Security Division prehire adjudicator checks: 

Kroll credit check for $5,000 bad credit threshold 

• FBI fingerprint record for unsuitable or 

disqualifying felonies 

Interrogatory letter(s) clarify potential problems 

Personnel Security Division informs airport electronically 

of applicant’s status. If applicant is eligible, airport 

contacts applicant to schedule a start date. 

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• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

-

Appendix H 

Posthire Background Investigation Process 

After being hired, new TSOs fill out 

an electronic version of the SF-86 

form 

Electronically, OPM receives SF-86. 

OPM performs ANACI background 

investigation, which includes: 

National Agency Check 

Employment, education 

check 

Credit check 

Posthire Adjudicators check: 

ANACI results for suitability, 

disqualifying felonies and 

$5000 of bad debt 

Kroll Court Check for 

suitability, disqualifying 

felonies 

Interrogatory letter(s) clarify potential 

problems 

After adjudicator’s decision, internal 

review team checks posthire 

adjudicators’ work (all ineligible and 

some eligible determinations) Disciplinary review board 

can hear appeals for non 

probationary TSOs 

Background Investigation Tracking 

System informs airport electronically 

that the applicant has been fully 

cleared. 

Posthire Background Investigation Process 

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Appendix I 

Major Contributors to the Report 

Douglas Ellice, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

Darin Wipperman, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

W. Preston Jacobs, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

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Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Chief Security Officer 

Chief Privacy Officer 

TSA Audit Liaison 

DHS OIG Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS Program Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 

254-4199, fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or 

noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, Attention: 

Office of Investigations - Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, Washington, 

DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller. 

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