NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

SCOTT NELSON, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0604 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017-152007-001 

The Honorable Laura Johnson Giaquinto, Judge Pro Tempore

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joshua C. Smith

Counsel for Appellee 

Celia Rumann Attorney at Law, Tempe 

By Celia Rumann, Michael P. O’Connor, appearing Pro Hac Vice

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 6-17-2021
STATE v. NELSON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Scott Nelson appeals his conviction for aggravated driving 

under the influence while required to have an ignition-interlock device in 

the vehicle.1 Because we conclude his ignition-interlock order was in effect 

on the day of his offense and conclude he was given sufficient notice, we 

affirm the superior court on these issues but vacate and remand consistent 

with the contemporaneously filed opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the jury’s verdict, resolving all reasonable inferences against 

Nelson. See State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. 280, 283, ¶ 2 (App. 2015).

¶3 On September 15, 2015, after Nelson was convicted of 

misdemeanor extreme driving under the influence (DUI), the Department 

of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) ordered him to install a 

certified interlock device in any motor vehicle he operated. Based on 

Nelson’s conviction, the order was to last for eighteen months from the date 

his driving privileges were reinstated with an interlock-restricted driver 

license. See A.R.S. § 28-3319.D.2. On December 1, 2015, after Nelson 

provided proof of compliance, MVD reinstated his driving privileges with 

the interlock restriction. Accordingly, Nelson was eligible to remove the 

interlock device on June 1, 2017.

¶4 On March 18, 2016, an interlock installer notified MVD the 

interlock device was removed from Nelson’s vehicle when he sold it. MVD 

then sent Nelson a notice of corrective action, stating he was out of 

compliance and MVD would suspend his license until he submitted proof 

an interlock device was installed in all vehicles he operated. The notice said 

1 A separate opinion filed simultaneously with this memorandum 

decision vacates his conviction on jury-instruction grounds. See Ariz. R. 

Sup. Ct. 111(h); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(f).
STATE v. NELSON

Decision of the Court

3

“[t]he device must be installed for one year from the date that proof is 

received, unless a different time period is specified.” On April 1, an 

interlock installer submitted proof to MVD showing it had installed an 

interlock device in a BMW Nelson had just purchased. When Nelson 

appeared in person and provided proof of compliance on May 12, MVD 

gave him a second restricted driver license with “ignition interlock” printed 

on it.

¶5 When MVD issued Nelson his second restricted license, MVD 

determined Nelson would not be able to remove the interlock device until 

November 12, 2017—a full eighteen months after Nelson provided proof of 

compliance. MVD’s standard practice is to inform individuals of the 

expiration date of their interlock-device requirements when they go to 

MVD to prove compliance and receive their restricted licenses. Though 

MVD mailed the first interlock order expiration date to Nelson, it did not 

do so with the revised November 12 date, and the record contains no 

document signed by Nelson acknowledging the new date.

¶6 On November 10, 2017, law enforcement stopped Nelson for 

speeding. Nelson produced his license with the interlock restriction printed 

on it. Nelson was not driving the BMW, but another vehicle that lacked an 

interlock device. The officer arrested Nelson on suspicion of aggravated 

DUI, for operating a vehicle without an interlock device, and for being 

under the influence of alcohol. Seven days later, on November 17, 2017, 

Nelson removed the interlock device from his BMW.

¶7 The State charged Nelson with aggravated DUI while 

impaired to the slightest degree and while required to have an interlock 

device installed in the vehicle (count 1) and aggravated DUI with a blood 

alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 while required to have an interlock 

device installed in the vehicle (count 2). See A.R.S. §§ 28-1381.A.1, 

.A.4; -1383.A.4.

¶8 Before trial, Nelson filed a motion in limine asking the 

superior court to rule as a matter of law he was not required to have an 

interlock device in his vehicle on the day he was stopped. The motion also 

argued MVD deprived him of due process by failing to mail him notice his

restriction had been extended to November 12, 2017. The superior court 

denied the motion, finding the interlock requirement was in effect on the 

date of the offense but not expressly ruling on the due process argument.

¶9 A jury convicted Nelson on count 1 but failed to reach a 

verdict on count 2.
STATE v. NELSON

Decision of the Court

4

¶10 Nelson timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction under 

article VI, section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, 13-

4033.A.1.

ANALYSIS

¶11 Nelson argues: (1) he was not subject to the interlock-device

requirement at the time of the offense; and (2) he was denied due process 

because MVD did not give him proper notice of the new interlock order and 

its expiration date.

I. The interlock-device requirement was in effect on the date of the 

offense.

¶12 Nelson advances two reasons he was not subject to an 

interlock requirement on the date he was pulled over for aggravated DUI. 

First, Nelson argues his eighteen-month interlock requirement began on 

April 1, 2016, not May 12, 2016. Second, Nelson contends MVD lacked 

statutory authority to impose a new eighteen-month interlock requirement 

after it received notice he had installed an interlock device in the BMW. 

¶13 Both arguments involve matters of statutory interpretation, 

which this court reviews de novo. See State v. Potter, 248 Ariz. 347, 349, ¶ 9 

(App. 2020). The statute’s text is the most reliable indicator of its meaning. 

Id. If the text is clear and unambiguous, this court does not resort to other 

methods of statutory interpretation. Id. at 349–50. Plain language analysis, 

however, “does not focus on statutory words or phrases in isolation.” Glazer 

v. State, 244 Ariz. 612, 614, ¶ 10 (2018). Rather, “we look to the statute as a 

whole and we may also consider statutes that are in pari materia . . . for 

guidance and to give effect to all of the provisions involved.” Id. (quoting 

Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509, ¶ 7 (2017)).

¶14 We note, the legislature amended many of the relevant 

statutes in May 2017, but with an effective date after Nelson’s November 

2017 offense. See 2017 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 331, § 13 (1st Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 

1150) (“This act is effective from and after June 30, 2018.”). Accordingly, all 

statutory citations are to the versions in effect at the time of Nelson’s offense

on November 10, 2017. 

A. A new interlock-device requirement started on May 12, 

2016.

¶15 MVD did not issue Nelson a new restricted driver license 

until May 12, 2016, when Nelson personally notified MVD an interlock 
STATE v. NELSON

Decision of the Court

5

device was installed in the BMW. Nelson argues the period for his new 

interlock order should have begun on April 1, 2016, when MVD received 

notice from the installer. We disagree and conclude the DUI statutes

unambiguously placed the burden on Nelson—not the installer—to notify 

MVD when the new device was installed as a condition of reinstating his 

driving privileges and interlock order. See A.R.S. §§ 28-1461.A.2, -1463.A, -

1464.I.

¶16 The duration of an interlock order began when MVD 

reinstates a person’s driving privileges suspended following a DUI 

conviction. A.R.S. § 28-3319.E. Defendants—such as Nelson—who have 

been convicted of certain DUI crimes must notify MVD an interlock device 

has been installed in any vehicle they operate before MVD may issue them 

restricted driver licenses. See A.R.S. §§ 28-1461.A.2, -1463.A. Paragraph 28-

1461.A.2 said “[t]he department shall not reinstate the person’s driving 

privilege or issue a special ignition interlock restricted driver license until 

the person has installed a functioning certified ignition interlock device in 

each motor vehicle operated by the person and has provided proof of

installation to the department.” Subsection 28-1463.A went on to say, “[i]f 

a person . . . does not submit proof of compliance to [MVD] as prescribed 

in section 28-1461, [MVD] shall suspend the person’s driving privilege until 

proof of compliance is submitted to [MVD].” These obligations are logical 

because Nelson alone—not the interlock installer—has knowledge of all the 

vehicles he may operate. 

¶17 The DUI statutes treated the removal of an interlock device 

differently. Subsection 28-1464.H required an ignition-interlock “installer” 

to notify MVD if an installer removed a device from a vehicle. In such a 

situation, “[i]f the person does not provide evidence to [MVD] within 

seventy-two hours that the person has installed a functioning certified 

ignition interlock device in each vehicle operated by the person,” MVD must 

suspend the person’s driving privileges “as prescribed in § 28-1463.” A.R.S. 

§ 28-1464.I (emphasis added).

¶18 Sections 28-1461, 28-1463, and 28-1464 drew a distinction 

between a “person” subject to an interlock order and the other actors in the 

statutory scheme—here, principally installers. An “installer” was “a person 

who is certified by [MVD] to install ignition interlock devices and provide 

services to the public related to ignition interlock devices.” A.R.S. § 28-

1301(5). The relevant statutes did not use “person” to refer to installers 

when the term “installers” was used. See A.R.S. §§ 28-1461, -1464. 
STATE v. NELSON

Decision of the Court

6

¶19 “[W]hen the legislature chooses different words within a 

statutory scheme,” this court presumes the distinction is meaningful. State 

v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 407, ¶ 19 (App. 2015). The legislature placed a burden 

on installers to notify MVD when they removed an interlock device. See

A.R.S. § 28-1464.H. Here, the interlock installer fulfilled its statutory 

obligation when it notified MVD the ignition-interlock device was removed 

from Nelson’s first vehicle. This obligation is independent of the 

requirement placed on a person whose “driving privilege is limited” from 

previous DUI convictions to personally “[p]rovide proof to [MVD] of 

installation of a functioning certified ignition interlock device in each motor 

vehicle” he or she operated. See A.R.S. § 28-1461.A.1(b); see also A.R.S. §§ 

28-1463.A; -1464.I.

¶20 Nelson’s argument fails because it ignores how MVD’s 

mandate to “suspend the person’s driving privilege until proof of 

compliance is submitted to [MVD]” was prefaced with a clause triggering 

such an event “[i]f a person whose driving privilege is limited . . . does not 

submit proof of compliance to [MVD] as prescribed in § 24-1461.” A.R.S. § 

28-1463.A. (emphasis added). Though subsection 28-1463.A used passive 

wording to suggest proof of compliance could be submitted by anyone, the 

“prescribed” text in section 28-1461 did not. Rather, paragraph 28-1461.A.2 

plainly prohibited MVD from reinstating Nelson’s “driving privilege or 

issu[ing] a special ignition interlock restricted driver license until [Nelson]

ha[d] installed a functioning certified ignition interlock device in each 

motor vehicle operated by [Nelson] and [had] provided proof of installation 

to [MVD].” See A.R.S. § 28-1461.A.2; see also A.R.S. § 28-1463.A.

¶21 “We presume the legislature says what it means.” Garcia v. 

Butler, 247 Ariz. 366, 369, ¶ 8 (App. 2019) (quoting Chavez v. Ariz. Sch. Risk 

Retention Tr., Inc., 227 Ariz. 327, 330, ¶ 9 (App. 2011)). If the legislature 

wanted MVD to reinstate an interlock-restricted driver license upon proof 

provided by an installer, it would have said so. 

¶22 Accordingly, the statutes’ plain language required Nelson to 

provide proof of compliance to MVD himself. Nelson did not do so until 

May 12, 2016, when he applied for a new restricted license. Nelson’s new 

interlock period commenced then, as it was “the date [Nelson] submit[ted] 

proof of compliance as prescribed in § 28-1461.” See A.R.S. § 28-1463.A. 

Until then, MVD could not reinstate Nelson’s restricted driver license or his 

interlock order. See id.
STATE v. NELSON

Decision of the Court

7

B. MVD permissibly imposed a new eighteen-month 

interlock-device requirement. 

¶23 Nelson argues MVD lacked authority to impose a new 

eighteen-month restriction once he was back in compliance. He contends 

MVD instead should have credited him for the previous time he complied.

¶24 Nelson was convicted of extreme DUI under paragraph 28-

1382.A.2. After Nelson’s conviction, MVD was required to impose an 

eighteen-month interlock order and ensure compliance with § 28-1461. See 

A.R.S. § 28-3319.D.2. Subsection 28-1461.A, in turn, required Nelson to 

provide MVD with proof of installation of an interlock device in each 

vehicle he operated and required on-going proof of compliance at least once 

every ninety days. As discussed above, the removal of Nelson’s first 

interlock device triggered his requirement to submit proof of compliance to 

MVD. See A.R.S. § 28-1464.I. His failure to comply with this requirement 

obligated MVD to suspend his driving privilege, “as prescribed in § 28-1463,” 

until he submitted proof of compliance to MVD. See id. (emphasis added).

¶25 Under subsection 28-1463.A, once a non-compliant person 

provided proof an interlock device is installed in each vehicle the person 

operated, MVD was to: (1) reinstate the person’s limited driving privilege 

and (2) require the person to use the interlock device for one year from the 

date the person submits proof of renewed compliance, “[u]nless a different 

time period is specified.” As already noted, the original time period 

specified under subsection 28-3319.D for Nelson’s extreme DUI was

eighteen months. 

¶26 “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is 

determined by . . . the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Glazer, 244 

Ariz. at 614, ¶ 10 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). 

Subsection 28-1464.I expressly incorporated § 28-1463 and its procedures 

for MVD. Section 28-1463, in turn, provided two distinct consequences for 

non-compliance: the suspension of driving privileges and the use of an 

interlock device. Having received proof of compliance from Nelson on May 

12, MVD reinstated his driving privileges, fulfilling the first consequence. 

MVD then required Nelson to use an interlock device for eighteen months 

from May 12—the “different time period [] specified.” See A.R.S. §§ 28-

1463.A; -3319.D.2. We do not read the “statutory words [and] phrases [of 

subsection 28-1463.A] in isolation.” See Glazer, 244 Ariz. at 614, ¶ 10. Instead, 

analyzing the statutory scheme as a whole, we conclude MVD permissibly 

looked to the time periods specified in paragraph 28-3319.D.2 for Nelson’s 

interlock order. See id.
STATE v. NELSON

Decision of the Court

8

¶27 Nelson asserts MVD lacked statutory authority to reimpose 

an eighteen-month interlock-device requirement after he submitted proof 

of compliance to MVD. To the contrary, the DUI statutes required it. Under 

§§ 28-1382 and 28-3319, Nelson was subject to the requirements of § 28-1461. 

He triggered § 28-1464 by failing to provide proof of compliance after an 

interlock installer notified MVD the interlock device was removed from his 

first vehicle. Consequently, MVD suspended his driving privileges as 

required under §§ 28-1464, 28-1463, and 28-1461. 

¶28 In short, the only way for Nelson to be relieved of the 

interlock order was to complete eighteen full months without falling out of 

compliance. See A.R.S. § 28-3319.D. Finding the statutes’ plain language 

clear and unambiguous, we conclude MVD permissibly set November 12, 

2017, as the expiration date for Nelson’s new interlock restriction.

II. MVD did not violate Nelson’s due process rights. 

¶29 Nelson argues MVD should have given him notice it had 

extended his interlock restriction until November 12, 2017, and it violated 

his due process rights when he was convicted in the absence of such notice. 

¶30 The court reviews due process claims de novo. State v. O’Dell, 

202 Ariz. 453, 457, ¶ 8 (App. 2002). If a defendant did not know of a duty 

“and where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he 

may not be convicted consistently with due process.” Lambert v. California, 

355 U.S. 225, 229–30 (1957). 

¶31 Nelson cites Lambert and State v. Garcia, 156 Ariz. 381 (App. 

1987), for the proposition he could not have been convicted absent proof he 

had notice of the MVD order extending his interlock restriction to 

November 12, 2017. He argues the text of the statutes alone did not provide 

him adequate notice. Nelson, however, did have notice beyond the statutes. 

MVD sent Nelson a notice when it imposed his initial interlock order. MVD 

then sent Nelson a notice of corrective action after learning Nelson removed 

his interlock device, notifying him it would suspend his license until he 

submitted proof of compliance. That notice stated “[t]he device must be 

installed for one year from the date that proof is received, unless a different 

time period is specified.” When Nelson provided proof to MVD showing 

he had an interlock device installed in the BMW, MVD gave him a new 

restricted license indicating he was under an interlock order.

¶32 To suggest, as Nelson does, he is being punished for not 

having an interlock device in his vehicle “without any notice of that duty 

other than the statute itself” ignores the repeated notices he was given. 
STATE v. NELSON

Decision of the Court

9

MVD put Nelson on actual notice of the new order in its notice of corrective 

action, and at a minimum, put him on constructive notice as to the order’s 

duration. Accordingly, “the probability of such knowledge” exists. See 

Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229.

CONCLUSION

¶33 We affirm the superior court’s order on the above issues but 

vacate and remand consistent with the contemporaneously filed opinion.