15-2721 

Tang v. Lynch 

BIA 

Zagzoug, IJ 

A205 043 333

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

31st day of August, two thousand sixteen. 

PRESENT: 

JON O. NEWMAN,

DENNIS JACOBS, 

GERARD E. LYNCH,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

JINFEN TANG, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 15-2721 

 NAC 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Mouren Wu, New York, New York. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General; Anthony 

C. Payne, Assistant Director; Lauren 

E. Fascett, Trial Attorney, Office 

of Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C. 
2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 Petitioner Jinfen Tang, a native and citizen of the 

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 4, 2015, 

decision of the BIA affirming a January 2, 2014, decision of 

an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Tang’s application for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jinfen Tang, No. A205 043 333 

(B.I.A. Aug. 4, 2015), aff’g No. A205 043 333 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. 

City Jan. 2, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with 

the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. 

See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 

(2d Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we do not address the IJ’s 

pretermission of Tang’s asylum application as untimely because 

the BIA declined to affirm that ruling. Id. As a result, the 

denial of the application for asylum, as well as the denial of 

the claims for withholding of removal and relief under CAT, will 

be considered. Supporting denial of those claims are the 
3

agency’s adverse credibility determination and the conclusion 

that Tang failed to establish a pattern or practice of 

persecution of Christians. The applicable standards of review 

are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); See Yanqin 

Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 

 We first note a serious deficiency in petitioner’s brief. 

Although the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require an 

appellant’s brief to contain “a concise statement of the case 

setting out the facts relevant to the issues submitted for 

review, with appropriate references to the record,” FRAP 

28(a)(6), the relevant section of petitioner’s brief reads in 

full as follows: 

IV. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review 

 The facts in this case are disputed since the IJ found Petitioner 

 incredible and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. 

 Petitioner based her asylum application upon her fear of future 

 persecution by the Chinese government for her religious activities. 

A.R. 76-87. 

Br. for Petitioner 5. Obviously saying only that the facts are 

disputed is a totally inadequate way of “setting out the facts.” 

 We have previously warned the bar that submission of an 

inadequate brief risks the imposition of sanctions. “Counsel 
4

is cautioned that the future filings of such an inadequate 

submission will be grounds not only for rejection of the brief 

but for formal reprimand or other sanction.” Shunfu Li v. 

Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). We repeat that 

admonition in this case. 

 The IJ found Tang’s testimony “replete with evasive 

responses, unresponsive responses, [and] rote memorized 

responses.” CAR 79. The record sufficiently supports this 

assessment of her testimony. The adverse credibility 

determination is further supported by an inconsistency between 

Tang’s application and her testimony. The application stated 

she had been detained for ten days between June 13 and June 23. 

CAR 319-20. She testified, however, that she was both arrested 

and released on June 13. Then she testified that both her arrest 

and release occurred on June 23. Also supporting the IJ’s 

credibility finding is the lack of reasonably available 

corroboration – testimony from relatives who Tang said were 

aware of her arrest in China and her pastor who could have 

corroborated her church attendance in the United States. 

 The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of Tang’s 

asylum claim to the extent it is based on past persecution or 
5

future persecution on account of the Chinese government’s 

awareness of her Christianity. Moreover, the adverse 

credibility determination is dispositive of withholding of 

removal and CAT relief to the extent those forms of relief were 

based on these grounds. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 

(2d Cir. 2006). 

 The remaining question before us is whether Tang showed 

that the Chinese government has a pattern or practice of 

persecuting Christians. “[T]o establish a well-founded fear 

of persecution in the absence of any [credible] evidence of past 

persecution, an alien must make some showing that authorities 

in [her] country of nationality are either aware of [her] 

activities or are likely to become aware of [her] activities.” 

Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008). 

An alien may make this showing by “prov[ing] the existence of 

‘a pattern or practice in his or her country . . . of persecution 

of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant.’” 

Kyaw Zwar Tun v. U.S. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir. 2006) 

(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)). To establish a pattern 

or practice of persecution of a particular group, a petitioner 

must demonstrate that the harm to that group is “systemic or 
6

pervasive.” In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005); 

see Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2007) (deferring 

to BIA’s standard). 

 The agency reasonably concluded that Tang failed to 

establish a pattern or practice of persecution. The 2012 State 

Department report in the record states that there are between 

23 and 67 million Protestants in China, and that government 

repression of unregistered religious groups is sporadic, with 

local authorities in parts of the country tacitly approving of 

unregistered religious practice. This evidence does not 

establish that Tang’s religious activities will be discovered. 

See Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009). 

Moreover, the agency reasonably required locality-specific 

evidence of persecution in Tang’s home province of Fujian. 

Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2008). The 

2012 State Department report does not mention any persecution 

in Fujian, and the 2010 China Aid study Tang submitted reported 

only one raid on a house church in that province. This evidence 

does not establish “systemic or pervasive” persecution. In re 

A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 741. Accordingly, the agency 

reasonably concluded that Tang failed to show that the Chinese 
7

government has a pattern or practice of persecuting Christians. 

 Because Tang is unable to show a well-founded fear of 

persecution, as needed to make out an asylum claim, she is 

necessarily unable to meet the higher standard required to 

succeed on claims for withholding of removal or CAT relief. 

Paul, 444 F.3d at 156. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

34.1(b). 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk