Filed 2/24/21; certified for publication 3/2/21 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re I.R., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

_________________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.R.,

Defendant and Appellant;

I.R.,

 Appellant.

 B307093

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP03478)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Judge Pro Tempore. 

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant E.R.
2

Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Appellant I.R., a Minor.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, Acting County Counsel, Kim 

Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Jane Kwon, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________________

Following an incident of domestic violence between R.R. 

(Mother) and E.R. (Father) witnessed by their infant daughter, 

I.R., and Mother’s son, D.R., the Los Angeles County Department 

of Children and Family Services (DCFS) instigated dependency 

proceedings on behalf of both children. After a combined 

jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found 

jurisdiction over the children under Welfare and Institutions 

Code1 section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and ordered I.R. removed 

from Father and released to Mother. On appeal, both Father 

and I.R. challenge the removal of I.R. from Father. We conclude 

the evidence does not support either of the findings necessary to 

justify removal under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). Specifically, 

the record does not contain substantial evidence that I.R. would 

be in “substantial danger” in Father’s care, nor does it contain 

substantial evidence that there were no “reasonable means” 

to protect I.R. other than removing her from Father. (§ 361, 

subd. (c)(1).)

I.R. further challenges the dispositional order to the extent 

it requires Mother, who is not a party to this appeal, to submit to 

drug testing only upon reasonable suspicion of drug use. Given 

the lack of any connection between drug use and the domestic 

1 All subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

violence underlying the petition, we conclude the court was acting 

within its discretion in denying I.R.’s request that Mother submit 

to more extensive drug testing. 

Accordingly, we reverse the dispositional order to the 

extent it removes I.R. from Father.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. Family Circumstances and Incident Leading to 

Juvenile Court Jurisdiction

I.R., born in September 2018, is the daughter of Father and 

Mother. Mother is not a party to this appeal. I.R. has a maternal 

half sibling, D.R., born in November 2008, Mother’s son from a 

previous relationship.2 Prior to the instant dependency 

proceedings, Father either lived in the family home with Mother, 

D.R., I.R., and the maternal grandmother, or was a frequent 

overnight guest there.3

On May 9, 2020, Mother called law enforcement and 

reported a domestic violence incident with Father. I.R. and 

D.R.—then 20 months old and 11 years old, respectively—were 

in the home when Mother and Father got into a loud argument. 

Hearing the yelling, D.R. left his room and saw Father throw a 

baby shoe at Mother’s chest and slap one side of her face. Father 

hit Mother with enough force to knock her earring off her ear, 

causing redness and swelling on the side of her face. Father fled 

the home before law enforcement arrived.

2 The whereabouts of D.R.’s father are unknown, and he 

did not participate in the dependency proceedings below.

3 The record contains inconsistent statements by Mother 

and Father as to whether Father ever lived in the family home.
4

Law enforcement instigated a referral with DCFS based 

on the incident and on Mother’s statement the night of the 

incident that Father had physically assaulted her approximately 

eight months earlier as well. The children remained in the 

family home in Mother and the maternal grandmother’s care.

B. Pre-Petition Investigation and Efforts to 

Locate Father

Approximately two weeks later, social workers visited the 

children’s home and interviewed Mother. At that time, Mother 

told DCFS that “more [was] being made out of this than needs 

to be.” Mother stated that she had anger management issues, 

and that Father had slapped her only after she “said ‘something 

terrible’ ” to him. Mother said the previously unreported 

domestic violence incident eight months prior had not been 

physical, and that the more recent incident was the first time 

Father had hit her. Social workers interviewed D.R. as well. 

D.R. said that Father is “not nice” to Mother, that Mother 

and Father yell a lot, and that another time in the past Father 

told him to go into his room with I.R. and shut the door, after 

which D.R. heard a loud slap. D.R. stated he was scared by both 

incidents, but that he felt safe around Father and in his home. 

D.R. also stated that Father was nice to him and his sister, and 

that Father had never mistreated either of them.

Neither child showed any signs of abuse or neglect, and I.R. 

appeared healthy and developmentally on target. D.R. reported 

that he is receiving individual therapy for anger management 

issues because “sometimes he gets so angry that he just wants 

to yell or hit something.” D.R.’s mental health issues were 

the subject of a previous DCFS referral. The social worker who 

handled that referral indicated D.R.’s aggressive behavior was in 
5

response to being bullied at school, and that Mother had 

addressed these issues appropriately and enrolled him in 

counseling.

Both Mother and D.R. reported to social workers that 

Father had come to visit I.R. almost every day since leaving the 

home the night of the May 9 incident, and that he played with 

D.R. during these visits as well. D.R. stated that Father spoke 

with Mother during these visits, and that the two did not fight. 

Mother denied being home when Father came for visits.

DCFS learned that neither Mother nor Father had any 

criminal history. Mother had a number inconclusive prior 

child welfare referrals with regard to physical abuse and neglect, 

primarily involving D.R. For example, a referral from December 

2015 alleged that Mother hit D.R. with the metal portion of a 

belt; another referral from February 27, 2019 (by the maternal 

grandmother) alleged that Mother had been using drugs. Father 

had no history of child welfare referrals.

DCFS was unable to make contact with Father during its 

pre-petition investigation despite numerous attempts. The social 

worker called Father several times and left detailed messages 

with call-back requests, mailed an “[a]ttempt to [c]ontact” letter 

to Father at the paternal grandmother’s address, visited the 

paternal grandfather’s home where the paternal grandfather 

indicated Father was living, and asked the paternal grandfather 

to instruct Father to contact DCFS. At DCFS’s request, Mother 

also gave Father the social worker’s card and asked he contact 

DCFS. Father did not contact DCFS in response to any of these 

efforts.

On June 25, 2020, DCFS obtained a removal warrant, 

which effectively prohibited Father from having contact with 
6

I.R. before further proceedings. DCFS informed Father of 

the removal warrant via a detailed phone message (which 

also requested a call back) and by mailing him a copy of the 

removal order and notice of hearing. According to the maternal 

grandmother, Father stopped visiting I.R. after the removal 

warrant issued.

C. Section 300 Petition and Detention Hearing

On June 29, 2020, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to 

section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), alleging that Mother and 

Father have a history of engaging in violent verbal and physical 

altercations, including specifically the May 9, 2020 incident, and

that Mother failed to protect the children by allowing Father 

unlimited access to the children and their home.

The detention hearing took place on July 2, 2020. Father 

personally participated in the hearing, which participation 

constituted his first interaction with DCFS. In the detention 

report provided to the juvenile court that day, DCFS 

recommended I.R. continue to be detained from Father 

and remain in the Mother’s care during a period of family 

reunification efforts. The report identified risk factors requiring 

detention that implicated both Mother and Father, but also

described Mother as having a “history of protective capacity 

for her children and [as] ha[ving] addressed DCFS concerns in 

a positive way during past referral investigations.” It further 

noted that Mother took responsibility for her role in the domestic 

violence. The report viewed Father’s avoidance of DCFS and 

law enforcement as demonstrating an unwillingness to take 

responsibility for his role in the domestic violence. DCFS was 

also concerned about the effects of the domestic violence on

D.R., who struggled with his own anger management issues.
7

The juvenile court found Father to be I.R.’s presumed 

father, found prima facie evidence that I.R. was a child described 

by section 300, and denied Father’s request for I.R.’s release 

to his custody. I.R. was detained from Father and released 

to Mother’s custody, with Father to receive six hours per week 

of monitored visitation. No visits were to occur in the Mother’s 

home, Mother was prohibited from monitoring the visits, and 

DCFS had discretion to liberalize.

D. Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing

At the July 29, 2020 combined jurisdiction and disposition 

hearing, the juvenile court received into evidence DCFS’s 

detention and jurisdiction/disposition reports, as well as a letter 

verifying Father had enrolled in a 36-week domestic violence 

education course on July 13, 2020, 11 days after the detention 

hearing.

1. The jurisdiction/disposition report

The jurisdiction/disposition report described interviews 

with Father and the maternal grandmother, as well as additional 

interviews with D.R. and Mother.

a. Father’s statements

The report contained Father’s description of the May 9 

incident. He recalled Mother “got loud,” and that he ignored 

her and tried to grab I.R. and walk away, but Mother already 

had the child. Father then started to walk outside, when 

Mother pushed him, and “it just happened. I just flipped.” 

Father acknowledged slapping Mother but denied throwing a 

shoe at her. Father stated Mother is easily triggered and starts 

screaming, but that he is a very calm person and that “walking 
8

away” had “always worked” in the past. He denied any prior 

domestic violence incidents with Mother and stated he felt 

“really bad” about the situation. He said, “[i]t was only a onetime thing. I don’t get aggravated. I’m not a bad parent to 

my daughter. I have never been a threat.” Father stated he 

no longer has a relationship with Mother, because he does 

not “want that to happen again,” and wants to “focus on [I.R.]”

Father provides financially for I.R., and buys her food and 

clothes whenever needed.

The report reflected Father had been visiting I.R.

consistently, five days per week, for two and one-half hours per

visit, without incident. It further acknowledged that, although 

Father had avoided contact with DCFS during the detention 

investigation, he had since been cooperative with the DCFS 

dependency investigator and was open to receiving services.

b. Mother’s statements

Mother stated that she and Father fought “a lot,” and 

that during the May 9 incident she had “us[ed] ugly cuss words 

towards [Father]” and pushed him. Consistent with Father’s 

statements, she described him as a person who avoided conflict 

and did not often yell.

Mother stated Father was a great father and confirmed 

he provided financially for I.R. Mother stated she knew what 

Father did was wrong, but she did not consider their relationship 

to be one involving domestic violence. Mother said she had 

exaggerated the May 9 incident to the police because she was 

upset, and that “[i]t was fine the way it was before.” Mother 

said she was not currently in a relationship with Father. She 

acknowledged her prior DCFS referrals, but said they were 

all false allegations.
9

Regarding her substance use, Mother said she had started 

using methamphetamine at age 17 and used it “all day, every 

day” until she became pregnant with D.R. at 22 years old, at 

which time she quit “cold turkey.” She said she now smoked 

marijuana after the children were asleep at night. Mother had 

not enrolled in any programs, but stated she was open to doing 

so.

Mother reported that, during the period in her life when 

she was heavily using methamphetamine, she had been a 

victim of domestic violence at the hands of D.R.’s father. On 

one occasion (in approximately 2008), D.R.’s father physically 

assaulted her while she was pregnant with D.R., beating her so 

severely that it resulted in a cracked skull and black eyes.

c. The maternal grandmother’s statements

The maternal grandmother said she never witnessed the 

domestic violence between Mother and Father, but that D.R. had 

told her “a while back” that “he saw [F]ather hit [M]other before 

and push her, and that this happened a few times.” She was 

scared of Father because he was always terse, rude to her, and 

she believed his family members were gang affiliated.

d. D.R.’s statements 

D.R. told DCFS he felt safe with Mother, but that she was

easily triggered and yelled a lot. D.R. described Father as “the 

best,” because Father never hit, yelled, or argued with him. 

D.R. began crying when he told the social worker that he never 

had contact with his biological father, that this “really hurts his 

feelings,” and that he was worried about losing Father as well. 

D.R. reported that he continued to have difficulty managing his 

anger and controlling his violent reactions to severe bullying at 
10

school. He remained in individual therapy to address these 

issues.

2. Parties’ arguments and the juvenile 

court’s ruling

At the jurisdictional portion of the hearing, the juvenile 

court sustained the section 300, subdivision (b)(1) failure to 

protect count in the petition as to both parents,4 based on their 

failure to make progress in addressing the domestic violence 

leading to dependency jurisdiction.

At the disposition portion of the hearing, I.R.’s counsel 

argued that clear and convincing evidence did not support 

removal from Father. I.R.’s counsel specifically argued that “the 

safety plan to allow [I.R.] to remain in Father’s custody is that 

the father and the mother are not to be together,” something they 

had been doing since the removal warrant issued. Counsel noted 

that two paternal relatives had been approved as monitors, and 

they could facilitate Mother and Father avoiding contact with one 

another while transferring I.R. I.R.’s counsel further argued that 

the evidence did not suggest Father was violent by nature, and 

that, despite his initial evasion of DCFS, he was now cooperating 

with DCFS and had enrolled in a domestic violence course. I.R.’s 

counsel also asked that, because of Mother’s substance use and 

I.R.’s young age, Mother be ordered to present three consecutive 

clean drug tests to assure I.R. was safe in her care. Counsel 

noted that even without a sustained drug count in the petition, 

Mother had a history of drug use that could contribute to 

domestic violence issues.

4 The court dismissed the section 300, subdivision (a) count 

alleging risk of nonaccidental physical harm.
11

Father’s counsel reiterated the arguments made by I.R.’s 

counsel in requesting I.R. be placed with him. Counsel further 

argued that Father had “acknowledged the situation” and 

“moved out of the house,” that Mother and Father now had a good 

coparenting relationship and did not argue, and that it would be 

in I.R.’s best interests to be placed with Father.

Mother joined Father and I.R.’s requests that I.R. not 

be removed from Father, noting Father “is a good father to not 

only [I.R.] but also to [D.R.]” Mother objected to any drug testing, 

given the lack of any nexus between drug use and the allegations 

in the petition, and that “there’s no indication [Mother] currently 

uses.”

DCFS’s counsel argued that I.R. should remain removed 

from Father, noting the multiple prior referrals “on this family” 

(although none of these involved Father and most predated his 

involvement with the family by several years), that “Mother 

and Father really can’t stay away from each other,” and that 

neither had addressed the underlying domestic violence issues, 

something Father’s recent enrollment in a program could not 

alone achieve. Counsel explained DCFS was only comfortable 

permitting I.R. to remain with Mother “because of the safeguards 

that were put in place.” Counsel suggested unmonitored visits 

for Father in a neutral setting as a compromise.

The juvenile court agreed with DCFS counsel that Father 

enrolling “very late” in domestic violence training and the 

“numerous referrals” indicated Father had not addressed the 

underlying domestic violence issues to the extent that the court 

would feel comfortable releasing the child to him. The court 

found by clear and convincing evidence that it was reasonable

and necessary to remove I.R. from Father, because there existed 
12

a substantial danger to I.R. if it did not do so, and there was 

“no reasonable means by which the child’s physical health can 

be protected without removing the child from . . . Father.”

The court ordered I.R. be removed from Father and 

released to Mother under a home-of-parent-mother order, 

explaining that “the reason why the child is being placed with . . . 

Mother is because she is demonstrating that she is cooperating 

with [DCFS] and availing herself of the services and showing 

that she is developing that protective capacity.” The juvenile 

court ordered services for both parents. The court noted that 

it “appreciate[d] that [Father’s] a very devoted father, and that 

he has been staying away from . . . Mother,” and for that reason 

ordered unmonitored visits over DCFS objection. The court 

ordered the visits not occur in the family home and that Mother 

not be present. The court declined to order the drug testing I.R.’s 

counsel had requested, instead ordering “testing upon reasonable 

suspicion . . . only because the child is young. I don’t think 

there’s any evidence of any kind of present use that’s concrete.”

Both I.R. and Father timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Father and I.R. challenge the court’s removal of I.R. from 

Father. They argue that the record supports neither the court’s 

finding that I.R. would be in substantial danger in Father’s 

custody, nor the finding that removing I.R. from Father’s custody 

was the only reasonable means of protecting her. For the reasons 

set forth below, we agree.

We disagree, however, with I.R.’s additional argument that 

the trial court abused its discretion by refusing her request that 

Mother be ordered to submit to three consecutive drug tests.
13

A. Substantial Evidence Does Not Support 

the Court’s Removal Order 

“Maintenance of the familial bond between children and 

parents—even imperfect or separated parents—comports with 

our highest values and usually best serves the interests of 

parents, children, family, and community. Because we so abhor 

the involuntary separation of parent and child, the state may 

disturb an existing parent-child relationship only for strong 

reasons and subject to careful procedures.” (In re Henry V. (2004) 

119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530–531 (Henry V.).)

Accordingly, “ ‘[i]n dependency proceedings[,] the burden of 

proof is substantially greater at the dispositional phase than it is 

at the jurisdictional phase if the minor is to be removed from his 

or her home’ ” or the physical custody of a parent. (Henry V., 

supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 528–529.) The applicable statute, 

section 361, subdivision (c), “ ‘is clear and specific: Even though 

children may be dependents of the juvenile court, they shall not 

be removed . . . unless there is clear and convincing evidence 

of a substantial danger to the child’s physical health, safety, 

protection, or physical or emotional well-being and there are no 

“reasonable means” by which the child can be protected without 

removal.’ ” (In re Ashly F. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 803, 809 

(Ashly F.); § 361, subd. (c)(1) [requiring “a substantial danger to 

the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional 

well-being of the minor” and “no reasonable means by which the

minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the 

minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody”].)

A finding of parental abuse cannot alone provide the clear 

and convincing evidence necessary to justify removing a child.

(See In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 77 [“Juvenile Court 
14

Law restricts judicial power to remove a child from the care 

and society of even an abusive or abuse-tolerant parent”]; 

Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 531.) Rather, the juvenile 

court must determine whether a child will be in substantial 

danger if permitted to remain in the parent’s physical custody, 

considering not only the parent’s past conduct, but also current 

circumstances, and the parent’s response to the conditions that 

gave rise to juvenile court intervention. (See In re Alexzander C.

(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451–452; In re N.M. (2011) 197 

Cal.App.4th 159, 170.)

“On appeal from a dispositional order removing a child

from a parent we apply the substantial evidence standard 

of review, keeping in mind that the trial court was required 

to make its order based on the higher standard of clear and 

convincing evidence.” (Ashly F., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 809; Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005 

[“when presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing 

evidence, the court must determine whether the record, viewed as 

a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable 

trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability 

demanded by this standard of proof”].) “ ‘ “The ultimate test is 

whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in 

question in light of the whole record.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” 

(In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.)

The sole source of potential danger to I.R. while in Father’s 

care that is supported in the record derives from his history of 

domestic violence with Mother, at least one instance of which 

was in I.R.’s presence. We recognize the serious threat domestic 

violence poses to a child’s physical and emotional well-being. 
15

Nevertheless, nothing in the record suggests Father has ever 

been violent or aggressive outside the context of his relationship 

with Mother, nor that he is a generally violent, aggressive, 

or abusive person. The nature and frequency of the domestic 

violence incidents—two instances in which Father slapped 

Mother, the second of which also involved him throwing a baby 

shoe at her—do not support a reasonable inference that he is 

a generally violent or abusive person.5 The “numerous [DCFS] 

referrals in the past” that the court erroneously attributed to

Father were against Mother only and had nothing to do with 

him; he has no DCFS history, no prior referrals, and no criminal 

record. The record thus contains only evidence suggesting danger 

to I.R. if the domestic violence between Mother and Father 

continues—not danger resulting from I.R. being in Father’s care.

Whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

removal order thus depends on whether the record contains 

substantial evidence that the domestic violence between Mother 

and Father is likely to continue if I.R. is placed in Father’s care. 

We conclude it does not. Father does not live in the family home. 

The juvenile court recognized that Father has “stay[ed] away 

from . . . Mother,” and the record does not reflect any contact 

between Father and Mother since the court’s orders at detention 

that Father not visit I.R. in the family home or in Mother’s 

presence. Father has not even expressed a desire or willingness 

to reconcile with Mother. Mother has neither expressed nor 

demonstrated an unwillingness to keep her distance from Father. 

Nor does the record suggest that the logistics of sharing custody 

would require Father to have contact with Mother, given that 

5 By so concluding, we do not mean to condone slapping 

one’s partner. 
16

both parents live with relatives who have been approved as 

monitors and could assist with handing off the child. There is 

thus no basis on which the court could reasonably accept DCFS’s 

argument that “Mother and Father really can’t stay away from 

each other,” meaning there is no basis for concluding there will 

be occasion for the domestic violence between them to continue. 

Given the lack of any other basis on which the court could 

conclude Father poses a danger to I.R., substantial evidence 

does not support a finding of such danger.6 In so concluding, 

our substantial evidence review is informed by the heightened 

clear and convincing evidence standard below (see Ashly F., 

supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 809), and the general premise of 

our dependency system that “keeping children with their parents 

while proceedings are pending, whenever safely possible, serves 

not only to protect parents’ rights but also children’s and society’s 

best interests.” (Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 530.)

B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Denying I.R.’s Request for More Extensive Drug 

Testing of Mother

Section 362, subdivision (d) authorizes the juvenile court to 

“direct any reasonable orders to the parents” of a dependent child 

as the court deems necessary and proper to ensure appropriate 

care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support 

6 In reaching this conclusion, we do not rely on I.R.’s 

and Father’s arguments that the risk of danger to I.R. is 

comparatively higher when in Mother’s care, as opposed to 

Father’s. The propriety of the juvenile court’s decision not to 

remove I.R. from Mother is not the subject of this appeal, and 

even if we were to assume it is true that Mother poses a danger 

to I.R., that is not a basis for concluding that Father does not.
17

of the child (§ 362, subd. (d)), and the juvenile court enjoys broad 

discretion in crafting a dispositional case plan to this end. (In re 

D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1071.) We review the juvenile 

court’s disposition case plan for an abuse of discretion. (In re 

Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.) 

The court did not act in excess of that discretion by 

declining to impose more onerous drug testing requirements 

on Mother. In arguing to the contrary, I.R. points to evidence 

that Mother abused methamphetamines for several years and 

continues to use marijuana, that she has not participated in any 

drug treatment programs, and that she was using drugs while in 

a domestic violence relationship with another man over 10 years 

ago. Although these facts could potentially have justified an 

order requiring more extensive drug testing for Mother, they 

do not establish that the court’s refusal to issue such an order 

was arbitrary or capricious. The record does not contain evidence 

supporting any link between any current drug use by Mother 

and the incidents of domestic violence with Father. Nor does 

it indicate that Mother’s drug use has ever placed her children 

at risk. As such, the court acted well within its discretion in 

denying I.R.’s request for additional drug testing requirements. 
18

DISPOSITION

The dispositional order of the juvenile court is reversed 

to to the extent it removes I.R. from Father. Upon remand, the 

court shall issue a new order setting forth the terms and extent 

of Mother’s and Father’s shared custody and impose whatever 

additional restrictions or requirements the court deems 

reasonable and appropriate in order to assure the safety and 

well-being of I.R. while in Father’s care. 

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, J.
Filed 3/2/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re I.R., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

_________________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.R.,

Defendant and Appellant;

I.R.,

 Appellant.

 B307093

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP03478)

 CERTIFICATION AND

 ORDER FOR PUBLICATION

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on February 24, 

2021 was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For

good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be published

in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

______________________________________________________________

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J. BENDIX, J.