www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 262 1 

I

n recent years, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has become increasingly interested in the potential of small (less than 300 megawatts 

electric [MWe]) nuclear reactors for military use.1 DOD’s attention to 

small reactors stems mainly from two critical vulnerabilities it has identified in 

its infrastructure and operations: the dependence of U.S. military bases on the 

fragile civilian electrical grid, and the challenge of safely and reliably supplying 

energy to troops in forward operating locations. DOD has responded to these 

challenges with an array of initiatives on energy efficiency and renewable and 

alternative fuels. Unfortunately, even with massive investment and ingenuity, 

these initiatives will be insufficient to solve DOD’s reliance on the civilian grid 

or its need for convoys in forward areas. The purpose of this paper is to explore 

the prospects for addressing these critical vulnerabilities through small-scale 

nuclear plants.

Several Congressional and DOD actors have already indicated an interest in 

military applications of small reactors. In early 2008, the Air Force, at the behest 

of former Senators Pete Domenici and Larry Craig, considered a pilot program 

to deploy small reactors on at least one of its bases.2

 In late 2009, the National 

Defense Authorization Act authorized a study on the feasibility of developing 

nuclear power plants on military installations. Additionally, a handful of defense 

analysts have publicly advocated using nuclear power plants for military electricity and mobility, and a joint DOD–Department of Energy (DOE) working 

group, in cooperation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), is now 

studying options for small nuclear reactors on DOD installations.

Small Nuclear Reactors 

for Military Installations:

Capabilities, Costs, and 

Technological Implications

by Richard B. Andres and Hanna L. Breetz

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

Center for Strategi

c

ReSEARCH

About the Author

Richard B. Andres is Professor of 

National Security Strategy at the 

National War College and a Senior 

Fellow and Energy and Environmental 

Security and Policy Chair in the Center 

for Strategic Research, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, at the 

National Defense University. Hanna L. 

Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the 

Department of Political Science at The 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Key Points

◆ Without Department of Defense 

(DOD) intervention, the United 

States runs the risk of a small 

reactor market dominated by 

foreign countries, further eroding U.S. commercial nuclear 

power capabilities and damaging U.S. control over nuclear 

energy proliferation.

◆ DOD has recently expressed interest in the possibility of integrating small nuclear reactors on military bases as part of its strategy 

to “island” bases from the fragile 

civilian power grid.

◆ Small nuclear reactor technology 

offers a host of benefits over traditional large reactors—namely, a 

smaller footprint, scalable design, 

factory-based construction, portability, and passive safety features.

◆ DOD has a chance to become a 

“first mover” in the emerging 

small reactor market; by providing 

assistance and guidance to the 

private sector, DOD can ensure 

that successful designs meet its 

operational needs.

February 2011
2 SF No. 262 www.ndu.edu/inss

All current proposals and discussions center on microreactors (small, modular, and potentially transportable) 

rather than on the megareactors that have been the focus 

of commercial nuclear energy development.3

 These kinds 

of innovative small reactors have been rapidly generating 

interest outside the military as well. The NRC held stakeholder workshops in October 2009 and February 2010 to 

begin discussing novel licensing issues, and it released a 

paper on potential policy, licensing, and technical issues in 

March 2010.4 DOE conducted a June 2010 workshop on 

small reactors, including technical panels on assessment, 

instrumentation, materials, modeling, and policy.5 Three 

bills related to small reactors have been making their way 

through the Senate: the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative Improvement Act and the Nuclear Power 2021 Act 

were placed on the Senate legislative calendar in September 2010, while the Clean Energy Act of 2009 remains in 

the Energy and National Resources Committee. Moreover, 

President Barack Obama’s 2011 budget request included 

$39 million for the development of small modular reactors. 

It should be emphasized that none of the small reactor 

designs currently under consideration for commercial development have been licensed by the NRC, let alone constructed, demonstrated, or tested. Given the early stage of 

the technology, DOD’s “first mover” pursuit of small reactors could therefore have a profound influence on the development of the industry. DOD does have substantial experience with nuclear energy—historically, both the U.S. Army 

and Navy have incorporated nuclear reactors into their 

operations6

—that could make it particularly well suited to 

taking a leading role in testing small reactors. 

The initial analysis offered in this paper suggests that 

small reactors could be instrumental in addressing DOD’s 

DOD’s “first mover” pursuit of small 

reactors could have a profound 

influence on the development of 

the industry

challenges of grid insecurity at domestic installations and 

fuel supply at forward operating bases. The next step is to 

conduct more fine-grained analysis to answer questions 

about costs, personnel needs, technological options, and security and transportability issues. The Secretary of Defense’s 

feasibility study and the research undertaken by the DOD/

DOE/NRC working group are crucial steps forward. We 

recommend that DOD continue to invest in research and 

analysis on small reactor options, with a goal of building a 

demonstration plant as soon as the technical, financial, and 

regulatory hurdles have been adequately resolved.

Small Reactors and Energy Security

The DOD interest in small reactors derives largely 

from problems with base and logistics vulnerability. Over 

the last few years, the Services have begun to reexamine 

virtually every aspect of how they generate and use energy with an eye toward cutting costs, decreasing carbon 

emissions, and reducing energy-related vulnerabilities. 

These actions have resulted in programs that have significantly reduced DOD energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions at domestic bases. Despite strong 

efforts, however, two critical security issues have thus far 

proven resistant to existing solutions: bases’ vulnerability 

to civilian power outages, and the need to transport large 

quantities of fuel via convoys through hostile territory to 

forward locations. Each of these is explored below.

Grid Vulnerability. DOD is unable to provide its 

bases with electricity when the civilian electrical grid is 

offline for an extended period of time. Currently, domestic military installations receive 99 percent of their 

electricity from the civilian power grid. As explained in a 

recent study from the Defense Science Board:

DOD’s key problem with electricity is that critical 

missions, such as national strategic awareness and 

national command authorities, are almost entirely 

dependent on the national transmission grid . . . 

[which] is fragile, vulnerable, near its capacity 

limit, and outside of DOD control. In most cases, 

neither the grid nor on-base backup power provides 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 262 3 

sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical 

national priority functions and oversight of 

strategic missions in the face of a long term (several 

months) outage.7

The grid’s fragility was demonstrated during the 2003 

Northeast blackout in which 50 million people in the 

United States and Canada lost power, some for up to a 

week, when one Ohio utility failed to properly trim trees. 

The blackout created cascading disruptions in sewage 

systems, gas station pumping, cellular communications, 

border check systems, and so forth, and demonstrated the 

interdependence of modern infrastructural systems.8

More recently, awareness has been growing that 

the grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks. A report sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security suggests that a coordinated cyberattack on the grid 

could result in a third of the country losing power for 

a period of weeks or months.9 Cyberattacks on critical 

infrastructure are not well understood. It is not clear, for 

instance, whether existing terrorist groups might be able 

to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack. It 

is likely, however, that some nation-states either have or 

are working on developing the ability to take down the 

U.S. grid. In the event of a war with one of these states, 

it is possible, if not likely, that parts of the civilian grid 

would cease to function, taking with them military bases 

located in affected regions.

Government and private organizations are currently 

working to secure the grid against attacks; however, it is 

not clear that they will be successful. Most military bases 

currently have backup power that allows them to function for a period of hours or, at most, a few days on their 

own. If power were not restored after this amount of time, 

the results could be disastrous. First, military assets taken 

offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief. Second, during an extended blackout, global 

military operations could be seriously compromised; this 

disruption would be particularly serious if the blackout 

was induced during major combat operations. During the 

Cold War, this type of event was far less likely because the 

making bases more resilient to 

civilian power outages would reduce 

the incentive for an opponent to 

attack the grid

United States and Soviet Union shared the common understanding that blinding an opponent with a grid blackout could escalate to nuclear war. America’s current opponents, however, may not share this fear or be deterred 

by this possibility.

In 2008, the Defense Science Board stressed that 

DOD should mitigate the electrical grid’s vulnerabilities by turning military installations into “islands” of 

energy self-sufficiency.10 The department has made efforts to do so by promoting efficiency programs that 

lower power consumption on bases and by constructing 

renewable power generation facilities on selected bases. 

Unfortunately, these programs will not come close to 

reaching the goal of islanding the vast majority of bases. 

Even with massive investment in efficiency and renewables, most bases would not be able to function for more 

than a few days after the civilian grid went offline.

Unlike other alternative sources of energy, small reactors have the potential to solve DOD’s vulnerability to 

grid outages. Most bases have relatively light power demands when compared to civilian towns or cities. Small 

reactors could easily support bases’ power demands separate from the civilian grid during crises. In some cases, 

the reactors could be designed to produce enough power 

not only to supply the base, but also to provide critical 

services in surrounding towns during long-term outages.

Strategically, islanding bases with small reactors 

has another benefit. One of the main reasons an enemy 

might be willing to risk reprisals by taking down the 

U.S. grid during a period of military hostilities would 

be to affect ongoing military operations. Without the 

lifeline of intelligence, communication, and logistics 

provided by U.S. domestic bases, American military 
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operations would be compromised in almost any conceivable contingency. Making bases more resilient to 

civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for 

an opponent to attack the grid. An opponent might 

still attempt to take down the grid for the sake of disrupting civilian systems, but the powerful incentive to 

do so in order to win an ongoing battle or war would 

be greatly reduced.

Operational Vulnerability. Operational energy use 

represents a second serious vulnerability for the U.S. 

military. In recent years, the military has become significantly more effective by making greater use of technology in the field. The price of this improvement has been 

a vast increase in energy use. Over the last 10 years, for 

instance, the Marine Corps has more than tripled its operational use of energy. Energy and water now make up 

70 percent of the logistics burden for troops operating in 

forward locations in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

This burden represents a severe vulnerability and is costing lives. In 2006, troop losses from logistics convoys became so serious that Marine Corps Major General Richard Zilmer sent the Pentagon a “Priority 1” request for 

renewable energy backup.11 This unprecedented request 

put fuel convoy issues on the national security agenda, 

triggering several high-level studies and leading to the 

establishment of the Power Surety Task Force, which 

fast-tracked energy innovations such as mobile power 

stations and super-insulating spray foam. Currently, the 

Marine Corps is considering a goal of producing all nonvehicle energy used at forward bases organically and substantially increasing the fuel efficiency of vehicles used in 

forward areas.

Nevertheless, attempts to solve the current energy 

use problem with efficiency measures and renewable 

sources are unlikely to fully address this vulnerability. 

Wind, solar, and hydro generation along with tailored 

cuts of energy use in the field can reduce the number 

of convoys needed to supply troops, but these measures will quickly reach limits and have their own challenges, such as visibility, open exposure, and intermittency. Deploying vehicles with greater fuel efficiency 

will further reduce convoy vulnerability but will not 

solve the problem.

A strong consensus has been building within planning circles that small reactors have the potential to significantly reduce liquid fuel use and, consequently, the 

need for convoys to supply power at forward locations. 

Just over 30 percent of operational fuel used in Afghanistan today goes to generating electricity. Small reactors 

could easily generate all electricity needed to run large 

forward operating bases. This innovation would, for instance, allow the Marine Corps to meet its goal of selfsufficient bases. Mobile reactors also have the potential 

to make the Corps significantly lighter and more mobile 

by reducing its logistics tail.

Another way that small reactors could potentially be 

used in the field is to power hydrogen electrolysis units 

to generate hydrogen for vehicles.12 At forward locations, ground vehicles currently use around 22 percent 

imported fuel. Many ground transport vehicles can be 

converted to run on hydrogen, considerably reducing the 

need for fuel convoys. If the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are indicative of future operations, and fuel convoys 

remain a target for enemy action, using small reactors at 

forward locations has the potential to save hundreds or 

thousands of U.S. lives. 

Technical Background: Small-scale 

Nuclear Reactors

Small-scale nuclear reactor technology is not entirely new, but it is evolving rapidly. Small reactors played a 

major role in the early development of the nuclear power 

if the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 

are indicative of future operations, 

using small reactors at forward 

locations has the potential to save 

U.S. lives
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 262 5 

industry. The earliest commercial reactors in the United 

States were essentially scaled-up versions of the Navy’s 

Pressurized Light Water Reactors, and most of the U.S. 

reactors commissioned through 1973 were small or medium reactors.13 Economies of scale in siting, licensing, and construction eventually drove the commercial 

nuclear power industry toward increasingly large reactors up to 1,300 MWe. 

In recent years, global interest in small reactors has 

returned. A major factor in this resurgence has come 

from developing countries, where expressed and projected demands for electricity are rapidly growing and 

limited infrastructural and investment capacity generates 

interest in reactors that can be deployed rapidly and incrementally.14 Most of the innovative small reactor designs, however, are meant for a broad variety of applications—including baseload electricity generation, process 

heat applications, seawater desalination, and hydrogen 

production—that can be useful to industrial, municipal, 

and institutional actors in developed countries.15 The 

wide range of emerging designs is confronting potential 

civilian and military users with both significant opportunities and risks.

Range of Designs. In anticipation of projected demand, small reactor developers are taking action (see 

table). The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported on nearly 60 small and medium reactor concepts 

under development in 13 countries, about half of which 

are small reactors without on-site refueling (the kind that 

is commonly discussed in U.S. policy debates).16 Many of 

the concepts are simply scaled-down versions of conventional large light water reactor (LWR) designs. However, 

an important subset are deliberately designed as small 

or “mini” reactors, some as small as a residential hot tub, 

which take advantage of their compactness to achieve 

specific fabrication and performance goals (for example, 

integrated cooling systems, factory-based construction, 

portability, and passive or inherent safety features). 

Two general points about these reactors should be 

emphasized. First, even within the category of small 

reactors without on-site refueling, there are significant 

variations in electrical output (10–335 MWe), coolants 

(water, sodium, lead, molten salt), refueling times (2–30 

years) and procedures (returning the entire module to 

the factory, changing out the cassette, recharging the 

in-situ pebble bed), construction types (factory-built versus location-built), site footprints, portability, modularity, 

staffing requirements, and technological readiness. Small 

reactor concepts range from designs like Westinghouse’s 

International Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS) 

model, which mostly uses mature LWR technology in 

a stationary, site-constructed 335 MWe plant, to Hyperion’s Power Module, which has been designed as a factorysealed, truck-transportable, 25 MWe “nuclear battery” with 

minimal in-core moving mechanical components.17

Second, these reactors today exist only on paper; 

as Ingersoll explains, “None of the designs are ready 

for construction today or have even initiated the design 

certification review process.”18 This means that there are 

unresolved economic, technical, and regulatory issues associated with these designs. For some of the more novel 

concepts, it may be a decade or more before they get design approval from the NRC.19

Capabilities, Costs, and Uncertainties. Although generalizing about the next generation of small 

reactors is difficult, this category of reactors promises a 

number of unique benefits and capabilities. Small reactors tend to have a strong reliance on passive and inherent20 safety design features due to faster removal of 

decay heat and a lower or even eliminated risk of coolant pipe breaks.21 Many of the designs promise to be 

proliferation-resistant due to their use of low-enriched 

or even spent fuel and/or sealed reactor cores, which 

can be returned intact to the factory after use.22 The 

most small reactor designs are 

meant for a variety of applications 

that can be useful to industrial, 

municipal, and institutional actors
6 SF No. 262 www.ndu.edu/inss

ability to add reactors on a faster schedule and with a 

modular approach provides greater flexibility and lowers investment risk. Many have simplified operational 

requirements and, therefore, lower risks of human 

maintenance error. Some designs do not use heated 

water and are not under high pressure. Their smaller 

footprint and lower cost mean that the reactors can be 

built in closer proximity to end-users, reducing transmission losses and providing greater opportunities for 

cogeneration and heat process applications.23 These 

features have the potential to remove many of the risk 

factors associated with larger reactors. 

The small size and newness of these reactor concepts 

have projected downsides as well. From a financial perspective, small reactors represent substantial losses in economies 

of scale. They are likely to be less economical domestic 

energy sources per kilowatt-hour than larger reactors—although at forward locations where liquid fuel used to power 

Small Nuclear Reactors: Three Design Examples

Name Manufacturer Generating 

Capacity Fueling Cycle Transportable

Hyperion Power 

Module

Hyperion Power 

Generation

25 megawatt 

(MW), scalable

8–10 years, 

returned to 

factory for 

refueling and 

waste removal

Ship, rail, or truck

NuScale NuScale Power 45 MW, scalable

2 years, onsite refueling 

and spent fuel 

cooling

Ship, rail, or truck

mPower

The Babcock 

and Wilcox 

Company

125MW, scalable

4.5 years, onsite refueling 

and waste 

storage

Ship or rail

Sources: <www.hyperionpowergeneration.com/product.html>; <www.nuscalepower.com/otFacts-NuScale-System-Technology.php>; <www.babcock.com/products/modular_nuclear/>.

Small Reactor Design Safety Features: The reactors highlighted above carry features that make 

them significantly safer than prior generations. Generation IV technology is less prone to accidents by design as many flaws and problematic features of generation II and III reactors have 

been eliminated. Small reactor designs are simpler than their larger predecessors, allowing for 

fewer moving parts, fewer systems to monitor, and fewer points of potential failure. Small 

reactor models are also generally buried in independent underground containment facilities, 

creating an additional layer of physical protection. To further guard against proliferation risks, 

many of these reactors are factory sealed with a supply of fuel inside, run longer between 

refueling cycles, and feature on-site waste storage—all of which serve to insulate and secure 

the units. Finally, due to their small size, the reactors do not require the vast water resources of 

large reactors and in the event of an emergency are easier to isolate, shut off, and cool down.
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 262 7 

generators is more expensive, they may be more economical than traditional methods.24 Making reliable projections 

about these reactors’ economic and technical performance 

while they are still on paper is a significant challenge. 

Furthermore, the regulatory timeline and costs for 

licensing are also sources of financial uncertainty. NRC licensing processes have historically evolved around LWRs, 

and although NRC officials have begun dialogue on licensing for small reactors, they have estimated in the past that 

it could take a decade to develop new regulatory guides and 

licensing reviews.25 The NRC fee structure is also a barrier 

for small reactors. Under current regulations, the annual fee 

to operate each licensed nuclear reactor is $4.5 million—a 

prohibitive cost for many small reactor developers and users. 

The NRC is considering a variable fee structure based on 

reactor output, but it has deferred any actions or decisions 

until a licensing application is submitted.26

Small reactors used on domestic military bases are 

likely to face a number of additional siting hurdles. As a 

distributed energy source, they are likely to face substantial “not-in-my-backyard” battles. Moreover, dispersing a 

large number of reactors leads to questions about longterm nuclear waste disposal.27 Arguably, reactors should be 

relatively safe on domestic military installations, certainly 

more secure than, for instance, the reactors situated in developing countries or intended for processing tar sands. 

Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple. 

Institutional and technical uncertainties—such as the security of sealed modules, the potential and unintended 

social and environmental consequences, or the design of 

reliable safeguards—make dispersing reactors across the 

country challenging. Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how 

terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully 

considering the social and environmental consequences of 

dispersing reactors, and determining whether Permissive 

Action Links technology could be used to safeguard them. 

Using the emerging technology at expeditionary locations carries far greater risks. Besides the concerns outlined 

above, forward located reactors could be subject to attack. 

Today, forward operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan 

are regularly subjected to mortar attacks, suggesting that 

reactors at such locations could make these bases prime 

targets for attack. Since forward bases are also subject to 

capture, any design proposal that envisions deployment 

at forward operating bases must incorporate contingency 

plans in the event that reactors fall into enemy hands.

Despite these potential events, a cost-benefit analysis should shape any decisions regarding the use of small 

reactors domestically or at forward locations. The real 

risks of deploying this technology should be put in perspective. The Navy has deployed more than 500 nuclear 

reactors since 1948 and never experienced a reactor accident. Further, in the current global context, every year the 

United States allows to go by without deploying small 

reactors represents a strategic gamble: domestic bases 

risk losing power should a competent opponent attack 

the U.S. domestic electric grid, while forward operating 

bases endanger American convoy support personnel who 

must deliver fuel.

DOD as First Mover

Thus far, this paper has reviewed two of DOD’s most 

pressing energy vulnerabilities—grid insecurity and fuel 

convoys—and explored how they could be addressed by 

small reactors. We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors. On the 

other hand, failing to pursue these technologies raises its 

own set of risks for DOD, which we review in this section: 

first, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the 

United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the 

private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and 

third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated 

in foreign countries. By taking an early “first mover” role in 

the Navy has deployed more than 

500 nuclear reactors since 1948 

and never experienced a 

reactor accident
8 SF No. 262 www.ndu.edu/inss

the small reactor market, DOD could mitigate these risks 

and secure the long-term availability and appropriateness of 

these technologies for U.S. military applications. 

The “Valley of Death.” Given the promise that 

small reactors hold for military installations and mobility, DOD has a compelling interest in ensuring that 

they make the leap from paper to production. However, if DOD does not provide an initial demonstration and market, there is a chance that the U.S. small 

reactor industry may never get off the ground. The leap 

from the laboratory to the marketplace is so difficult 

to bridge that it is widely referred to as the “Valley 

of Death.” Many promising technologies are never 

commercialized due to a variety of market failures—

including technical and financial uncertainties, information asymmetries, capital market imperfections, 

transaction costs, and environmental and security externalities—that impede financing and early adoption 

and can lock innovative technologies out of the marketplace.28 In such cases, the Government can help a 

worthy technology to bridge the Valley of Death by 

accepting the first mover costs and demonstrating the 

technology’s scientific and economic viability.29

Historically, nuclear power has been “the most 

clear-cut example . . . of an important general-purpose 

technology that in the absence of military and defenserelated procurement would not have been developed at 

all.”30 Government involvement is likely to be crucial 

for innovative, next-generation nuclear technology as 

well. Despite the widespread revival of interest in nuclear energy, Daniel Ingersoll has argued that radically 

innovative designs face an uphill battle, as “the high 

capital cost of nuclear plants and the painful lessons 

learned during the first nuclear era have created a prevailing fear of first-of-a-kind designs.”31 In addition, 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology reports on the 

Future of Nuclear Power called for the Government to 

provide modest “first mover” assistance to the private 

sector due to several barriers that have hindered the nuclear renaissance, such as securing high up-front costs 

of site-banking, gaining NRC certification for new 

technologies, and demonstrating technical viability.32

It is possible, of course, that small reactors will 

achieve commercialization without DOD assistance. As 

discussed above, they have garnered increasing attention 

in the energy community. Several analysts have even argued that small reactors could play a key role in the second nuclear era, given that they may be the only reactors 

within the means of many U.S. utilities and developing 

countries.33 However, given the tremendous regulatory 

hurdles and technical and financial uncertainties, it appears far from certain that the U.S. small reactor industry 

will take off. If DOD wants to ensure that small reactors 

are available in the future, then it should pursue a leadership role now. 

Technological Lock-in. A second risk is that if 

small reactors do reach the market without DOD assistance, the designs that succeed may not be optimal for 

DOD’s applications. Due to a variety of positive feedback and increasing returns to adoption (including demonstration effects, technological interdependence, network and learning effects, and economies of scale), the 

designs that are initially developed can become “locked 

in.”34 Competing designs—even if they are superior in 

some respects or better for certain market segments—

can face barriers to entry that lock them out of the market. If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred designs 

are not locked out, then it should take a first mover role 

on small reactors. 

It is far too early to gauge whether the private 

market and DOD have aligned interests in reactor designs. On one hand, Matthew Bunn and Martin Malin argue that what the world needs is cheaper, safer, 

more secure, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear 

reactors; presumably, many of the same broad qualities 

many promising technologies 

are never commercialized due to 

a variety of market failures
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 262 9 

would be favored by DOD.35 There are many varied 

market niches that could be filled by small reactors, 

because there are many different applications and settings in which they can be used, and it is quite possible that some of those niches will be compatible with 

DOD’s interests.36

On the other hand, DOD may have specific needs 

(transportability, for instance) that would not be a high 

priority for any other market segment. Moreover, while 

DOD has unique technical and organizational capabilities that could enable it to pursue more radically innovative reactor lines, DOE has indicated that it will 

focus its initial small reactor deployment efforts on 

LWR designs.37

If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred reactors 

are developed and available in the future, it should take 

a leadership role now. Taking a first mover role does not 

necessarily mean that DOD would be “picking a winner” 

among small reactors, as the market will probably pursue multiple types of small reactors. Nevertheless, DOD 

leadership would likely have a profound effect on the industry’s timeline and trajectory. 

Domestic Nuclear Expertise. From the perspective of larger national security issues, if DOD does not 

catalyze the small reactor industry, there is a risk that 

expertise in small reactors could become dominated 

by foreign companies. A 2008 Defense Intelligence 

Agency report warned that the United States will become totally dependent on foreign governments for future commercial nuclear power unless the military acts 

as the prime mover to reinvigorate this critical energy 

technology with small, distributed power reactors.38

Several of the most prominent small reactor concepts 

rely on technologies perfected at Federally funded 

laboratories and research programs, including the Hyperion Power Module (Los Alamos National Laboratory), NuScale (DOE-sponsored research at Oregon 

State University), IRIS (initiated as a DOE-sponsored 

project), Small and Transportable Reactor (Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory), and Small, Sealed, 

Transportable, Autonomous Reactor (developed by a 

team including the Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and 

Los Alamos National Laboratories). However, there 

are scores of competing designs under development 

from over a dozen countries. If DOD does not act 

early to support the U.S. small reactor industry, there 

is a chance that the industry could be dominated by 

foreign companies. 

Along with other negative consequences, the decline 

of the U.S. nuclear industry decreases the NRC’s influence on the technology that supplies the world’s rapidly 

expanding demand for nuclear energy. Unless U.S. companies begin to retake global market share, in coming 

decades France, China, South Korea, and Russia will dictate standards on nuclear reactor reliability, performance, 

and proliferation resistance. 

Conclusion

The preceding analysis suggests that DOD should 

seriously consider taking a leadership role on small reactors. This new technology has the potential to solve two 

of the most serious energy-related problems faced by the 

department today. Small reactors could island domestic 

military bases and nearby communities, thereby protecting them from grid outages. They could also drastically 

reduce the need for the highly vulnerable fuel convoys 

used to supply forward operating bases abroad.

The technology being proposed for small reactors 

(much of which was originally developed in U.S. Government labs) is promising. A number of the planned 

designs are self-contained and highly mobile, and could 

meet the needs of either domestic or forward bases. 

Some promise to be virtually impervious to accidents, 

with design characteristics that might allow them to be 

if DOD does not support the U.S. 

small reactor industry, the industry 

could be dominated by 

foreign companies
10 SF No. 262 www.ndu.edu/inss

used even in active operational environments. These reactors are potentially safer than conventional light water reactors. The argument that this technology could 

be useful at domestic bases is virtually unassailable. The 

argument for using this technology in operational units 

abroad is less conclusive; however, because of its potential to save lives, it warrants serious investigation. 

Unfortunately, the technology for these reactors is, 

for the most part, caught between the drawing board and 

production. Claims regarding the field utility and safety 

of various reactors are plausible, but authoritative evaluation will require substantial investment and technology 

demonstration. In the U.S. market, DOD could play an 

important role in this area. In the event that the U.S. small 

reactor industry succeeds without DOD support, the 

types of designs that emerge might not be useful for the 

department since some of the larger, more efficient designs 

that have greater appeal to private industry would not fit 

the department’s needs. Thus, there is significant incentive 

for DOD to intervene to provide a market, both to help 

the industry survive and to shape its direction.

Since the 1970s, in the United States, only the military has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors. This will probably be the case with 

small reactors as well. If DOD leads as a first mover 

in this market—initially by providing analysis of costs, 

staffing, reactor lines, and security, and, when possible, 

by moving forward with a pilot installation—the new 

technology will likely survive and be applicable to 

DOD needs. If DOD does not, it is possible the technology will be unavailable in the future for either U.S. 

military or commercial use. 

Notes

1 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) classifies nuclear reactors as small if their equivalent electrical output is 

under 300 megawatts electric (MWe) and medium if their output 

is 300–700 MWe. These designations are often grouped into one 

category of small and medium reactors (SMRs). Unfortunately, 

the acronym SMR has also started to be used for small modular 

reactors. It is not clear where this semantic shift originated, but 

the effect is confusing. In this paper, we primarily use the term 

“small reactors,” which, in any case, is more specific since most of 

the reactors under discussion are below or near 300 MWe and are 

not all modular. Where the SMR acronym is used, it is with the 

IAEA’s usage. 

2 The Air Force was preparing a Letter of Intent for a privately 

designed, constructed, and operated reactor on an Air Force base, but 

the initiative was dropped during a change of administrative leadership in summer 2008. 

3 Robert A. Pfeffer and William A. Macon, Jr., “Nuclear 

Power: An Option for the Army’s Future,” Army Logistician 33, 

no. 5 (September–October 2001), 4–8; William A. Macon, Jr., 

“Nuclear Power Plants on Military Installations,” Manuscript, 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2009; Marvin Baker Schaffer 

and Ike Chang, “Mobile Nuclear Power for Future Land Combat,” 

Joint Force Quarterly 51 (1st Quarter, 2009), 49–55.

4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Potential 

Policy, Licensing, and Key Technical Issues for Small Modular 

Nuclear Reactor Designs,” SECY–10–0034 (Washington, DC: NRC, 

March 2010).

5 Conference agenda and proceedings are available at <www.

ne.doe.gov/smrworkshop/agenda.html>. 

6 The Army’s Nuclear Power Program (1954–1977) developed, 

constructed, and operated eight compact reactors at remote installations from Alaska to Antarctica, including a 10 MWe reactor on a 

barge moored in the Panama Canal Zone. The Navy launched its first 

nuclear submarine in 1954 and continues to operate more than 100 

reactors aboard nearly 80 submarines and aircraft carriers. 

7 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task 

Force on DOD Energy Strategy: More Fight—Less Fuel (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2008), 18.

8 Ibid.

9 MITRE Corporation, “Power Grid Security,” JSR–07–125 

(McLean, VA: MITRE, January 2008).

10 Defense Science Board.

11 Mark Clayton, “In the Iraqi War Zone, U.S. Army Calls for 

‘Green’ Power,” The Christian Science Monitor, December 7, 2006, available at <www.csmonitor.com/2006/0907/p01s04-usmi.html>.

12 Pfeffer and Macon; Schaffer and Chang.

13 Daniel T. Ingersoll, “Deliberately Small Reactors and the 

Second Nuclear Era,” Progress in Nuclear Energy 51 (2009), 589–603.

14 IAEA, Status of Small Reactor Designs without On-site Refuelling (Vienna: IAEA, 2007).

15 Vladimir Kuznetsov, “Design and Technology Development 

Status and Design Considerations for Innovative Small and Medium 

Sized Reactors,” Journal of Engineering for Gas Turbines and Power 131 

(2009), 064001-1–064001-2.

16 IAEA, Innovative Small and Medium Sized Reactors: Design 

Features, Safety Approaches and R&D Trends (Vienna: IAEA, 2005); 

IAEA, Status of Small Reactor Designs with On-site Refuelling (Vienna: 

IAEA, 2006); and IAEA, Status of Small Reactor Designs without Onsite Refuelling. 

17 The IAEA reports (2005, 2006, 2007) provide a comprehensive overview of all active designs. For more accessible summaries 

of the most prominent designs discussed in the United States, see 

Ingersoll and Kuznetsov.

18 Ingersoll, 602.

19 Ibid. 

20 On the semantics of “inherently safe” reactors, see Arjun 

Makhijani and Scott Saleska, The Nuclear Power Deception: U.S. 

Nuclear Mythology from Electricity “Too Cheap to Meter” to “Inherently 

Safe” Reactors (New York: Apex Press, 1999), who argue forcefully that 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 262 11 

there is nothing inherently safe about nuclear reactors, regardless of 

design, because of the underlying radioactive material.

21 Ingersoll.

22 Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin, “Enabling a Nuclear 

Revival—and Managing Its Risks,” Innovations 4, no. 4 (2009), 

173–191.

23 IAEA, 2007.

24 Kuznetsov.

25 Macon.

26 Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

27 A full treatment of this challenge is beyond the scope of this 

paper. A number of recent sources, such as the highly influential “Future of Nuclear Energy” reports from The Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology (MIT), can provide an informative overview of the waste 

issue. See MIT Nuclear Energy Study, The Future of Nuclear Power

(Cambridge: MIT, 2003) and MIT Nuclear Energy Study, Update of 

the MIT 2003 Future of Nuclear Power (Cambridge: MIT, 2009); and 

Bunn and Malin. 

28 Robin Cowan and David Kline, The Implications of Potential 

“Lock-In” in Markets for Renewable Energy, NREL/TP–460–22112 

(Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 1996).

29 There are numerous actions that the Federal Government 

could take, such as conducting or funding research and development, stimulating private investment, demonstrating technology, 

mandating adoption, and guaranteeing markets. Military procurement is thus only one option, but it has often played a decisive role 

in technology development and is likely to be the catalyst for the 

U.S. small reactor industry. See Vernon W. Ruttan, Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? (New York: Oxford University Press, 

2006); Kira R. Fabrizio and David C. Mowery, “The Federal Role 

in Financing Major Inventions: Information Technology during the 

Postwar Period,” in Financing Innovation in the United States, 1870 

to the Present, ed. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff 

(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), 283–316. 

30 Ruttan; Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in 

Technological Lock-In,” Journal of Economic History 50, no. 3 (1990), 

541–567; Robert Pool, Beyond Engineering: How Society Shapes Technology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

31 Ingersoll, 601.

32 MIT, 2003, 2009.

33 Ingersoll; Robert Bryce, “Nukes Get Small,” Energy Tribune, July 16, 2008, available at <www.energytribune.com/articles.

cfm?aid=948>.

34 Cowan; Cowan and Kline.

35 Bunn and Malin, 2009.

36 Kuznetsov.

37 U.S. Department of Energy, “Small Modular Reactors,” fact 

sheet produced by the Office of Nuclear Energy (Washington, DC: 

Department of Energy, February 2010). This turns the conventional 

story about nuclear lock-in on its head. The dominance of light water 

reactor designs, which was a spillover from the Navy nuclear submarine program, has been used as a paradigmatic example of technological lock-in (Cowan; Ruttan). Here we raise the possibility that the 

military could be constrained by commercial lock-in rather than the 

other way around. 

38 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Foreign Government Ownership 

of Future U.S. Nuclear Power Plant Production?” September 16, 2008.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

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briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

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by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

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