[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-10126

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-02968-WSD

WILLIE G. SMITH, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, US DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN 

DEVELOPMENT, 

INDEPENDENT LIFESTYLES, INC., 

a.k.a. Phillips Winters Apartments Hallmark Management, 

ETHAL JACKSON, 

JANET STRICKLAND, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(February 14, 2017)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Willie G. Smith appeals pro se the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his

complaint asserting breach of contract claims. The district court ruled that Smith’s 

claims against Independent Lifestyles, Inc., Ethal Jackson, and Janet Strickland 

were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because he had previously sued those 

defendants for Fair Housing Act violations and the claims in that earlier lawsuit

had been dismissed as time barred. The district court also ruled that Smith’s 

claims against Julian Castro in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department 

of Housing and Urban Development were time barred. Smith contends that both of 

those rulings in this lawsuit were erroneous.

Smith’s claims arose from his time living in an apartment for which he was 

receiving housing assistance from HUD. He alleged that between January 1, 2005 

and September 10, 2008, the defendants breached certain provisions in his lease. 

The last alleged breach came in the form of the defendants terminating the lease, 

which ultimately led to his eviction. 

We review de novo the district court’s application of the doctrine of res 

judicata. Griswold v. Cty. of Hillsborough, 598 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2010). 

We also review de novo the district court’s application of a statute of limitations. 

Berman v. Blount Parrish & Co., 525 F.3d 1057, 1058 (11th Cir. 2008).

A claim is barred under the doctrine of res judicata if, in a prior litigation: 

“(1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by a 

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court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them, are 

identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action is involved in both cases.” 

Griswold, 598 F.3d at 1292 (quotation marks omitted). Smith’s claims against 

Independent Lifestyles, Jackson, and Strickland are barred by that doctrine. The 

first element is met because “[a] ruling based on the statute of limitations is a 

decision on the merits for res judicata purposes.” Mathis v. Laird, 457 F.2d 926, 

927 (5th Cir. 1972). Smith does not contend that the district court in the prior 

litigation lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, so the second element is met. 

The third element is met because Independent Lifestyles, Jackson, and Strickland 

were defendants in the prior litigation and are defendants in this case, and both 

cases were brought by Willis. 

The remaining issue is whether the fourth element is met. “In determining 

whether the causes of action are the same, a court must compare the substance of 

the actions, not their form.” In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th 

Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). Generally, “if a case arises out of the same 

nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the same factual predicate, as a former 

action, . . . the two cases are really the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action’ for 

purposes of res judicata.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The fourth element

embraces “claims that could have been raised in the prior litigation,” even if they 

were not raised at that time. Griswold, 598 F.3d at 1293. 

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Smith’s prior litigation and his current case arose from “the same nucleus of 

operative fact” based on the “same factual predicate” because both raised claims 

based on the defendants’ pursuit of and ultimate success in obtaining Smith’s 

eviction from his home. Both lawsuits relied on facts asserting a retaliation- and 

discrimination-based conspiracy involving the termination of his lease. While

Smith asserted a Fair Housing Act claim in his first lawsuit and now asserts breach 

of contract claims, that difference does not matter because his contract claims arise 

from the same facts that gave rise to his Fair Housing Act claim, and he could have 

raised his contract claims in that earlier lawsuit. See id. As a result, the district 

court did not err in finding that Smith’s claims against Independent Lifestyles, 

Jackson, and Strickland were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

The district court also did not err in dismissing as time barred Smith’s claims 

against Castro. Smith agrees that his contract claims are governed by Georgia’s 

six year limitations period. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 (“All actions upon simple 

contracts in writing shall be brought within six years after the same became due 

and payable.”). Under that provision “[t]he discovery rule is not applicable,”

meaning that “with respect to a breach of contract claim, the statute of limitation 

runs from the time the contract is broken rather than from the time the actual 

damage results or is ascertained.” Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt., Inc., 649 

S.E.2d 779, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). 

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While Smith argues that he was evicted on September 17, 2008, his 

complaint asserts that the defendants breached the contract “[f]rom January 1, 

2005 . . . to September 10, 2008.” As a result, the six year limitations period 

would have begun to run no later than September 10, 2008, when he has alleged 

that the final breach, termination of the contract, occurred. Smith filed this action 

on September 16, 2014, more than six years after the statute of limitations began to 

run on his contract claims. Although Smith contends that the limitations period 

has not expired because the breaches of his lease are continuing violations, he cites 

no law indicating that the continuing violation doctrine is applicable to Georgia 

breach of contract claims. The district court did not err in dismissing as time 

barred Smith’s claims against Castro.

AFFIRMED.

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