Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

FEMA's Acquisition of Two Warehouses to 


Support Hurricane Katrina 


Response Operations
 

OIG-09-77 June 2009 
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

June 5, 2009 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, was established by the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 

1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibility to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s acquisition of two 

storage/maintenance buildings by the Emergency Housing Unit Program. It is based on interviews 

with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and analyses 

of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed according to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We trust this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

 Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 1

 Background......................................................................................................................................3 

Results of Review ............................................................................................. 7 

 Conclusions and Recommendations ...................................................................... 12

 Management Comments and OIG Analysis ............................................................. 13
 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology....................................................................14 

Appendix B: Management Response to the Draft Report ......................................................15 

Appendix C: Major Contributors to This Report....................................................................18 

Appendix D: Report Distribution............................................................................................19 

Abbreviations 

ADA Anti-deficiency Act 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

EHU Emergency Housing Unit 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GSA General Services Administration 

HSAM Homeland Security Acquisition Manual 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OLC Office of Legal Counsel (Department of Justice) 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

Stafford Act Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 

U.S.C. United States Code 
OIG
 Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

In the summer of 2006, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

contracted to have two large warehouse-type structures built on leased 

properties in Selma, Alabama and Cumberland, Maryland. FEMA had no 

authority to construct these buildings and, therefore, violated federal laws, as 

described in this report. Contrary to procedures, FEMA spent disaster relief 

funds to pay for one building, and spent restricted-use sales proceeds to erect 

the other. The cost of the two buildings exceeded $7 million. Following an 

internal inquiry, FEMA attempted to take corrective steps in 2007 to use 

appropriate funding sources. 

The predecessor program office of FEMA’s Logistics Management 

Directorate took steps to acquire the buildings, apparently without notifying 

the Office of the Administrator, which has gone on record stating that senior 

agency leadership disallowed both project proposals. Documents indicate that 

the program office nevertheless moved forward with the projects and certified 

funding availability. Some senior FEMA managers were briefed on the 

proposed projects before construction began, and the Office of Acquisitions 

managed the contracts. By early 2007, FEMA imposed a stop-work order for 

a month while an internal review of the procedures that had been followed 

was conducted. Construction eventually resumed, and the projects were 

completed in 2007. 

We conducted this review at the request of FEMA senior management, who 

asked us to examine several issues involving the Logistics Management 

Directorate and its Emergency Housing Unit program. This report is the 

second phase of our review. An earlier OIG report, Review of FEMA’s use of 

Proceeds from the Sales of Emergency Housing Units, OIG-08-23, dated 

February 23, 2008, addressed the agency’s use of proceeds from the sales of 

emergency housing units. 

We are making six recommendations to the Administrator, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency. FEMA needs to: (1) determine whether 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 1 
the acquisition of the two warehouses constituted a legal violation that 

requires reporting to Congress, in accordance with the law; (2) develop and 

implement a more robust management review process for major purchases; 

(3) return sale proceeds funds to the U.S. Treasury, as required by law; 

(4) develop and implement agency policy and standard operating procedures 

for the preparation, review, and approval of major purchases; (5) determine 

the appropriate disposition of the two subject buildings; and, (6) record the 

two buildings in agency financial reports. 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 2
 
Background 

Following the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) established a dozen emergency housing unit 

(EHU) storage sites in seven states to accommodate the thousands of travel 

trailers and mobile homes that had been purchased to shelter displaced 

disaster victims. Once the hurricane victims vacated temporary housing, 

FEMA moved the used trailers and mobile homes to the EHU sites for 

cleaning, repair, and refurbishing. To support the repair and refurbishment 

effort, FEMA managers proposed erecting maintenance buildings at two of 

the sites. Initially, large tents were considered, but by April 2006, the 

decision was made to erect prefabricated buildings in lieu of the tents. 

Of the dozen EHU locations, FEMA managers selected Selma, Alabama and 

Cumberland, Maryland as sites for the buildings. Those sites were on leased 

land, not owned by the government, where FEMA chose to construct “Butlertype buildings,” which consist of a concrete foundation and a rigid girder 

frame covered with steel panels that are prefabricated in a factory and 

assembled on site to the customer’s specifications. 

Although some FEMA officials have said that senior agency leadership 

initially disallowed both project proposals, eventually the projects were 

approved and funded. Senior FEMA managers were briefed on the projects 

before construction began, and the Office of Acquisitions managed the 

contracts, which were awarded in August and September 2006. 

Laws and Regulations 

During Presidentially declared disasters that involve widespread dislocation, 

Section 408 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 

Assistance Act (Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.) authorizes FEMA to 

use disaster relief funds to provide temporary housing units to shelter disaster 

victims. The Stafford Act does not specifically authorize construction of such 

buildings by FEMA. Authority to construct buildings and to improve leased 

land is specifically granted to the General Services Administration (GSA), in 

40 U.S.C. § 581 and § 583. Agencies need specific statutory authority (41 

U.S.C. § 12) to construct buildings or to construct them on leased property; 

however, FEMA did not have this authority. 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 3
 
 

 

Federal statute (31 U.S.C. § 1301(a)) requires that “Appropriations shall be 

applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as 

otherwise provided by law.” Charging authorized items to the wrong federal 

funds source or charging unauthorized items to any federal funds source is 

therefore prohibited. The Anti-deficiency Act (31 U.S.C. § 1341) prohibits 

agencies from using appropriated funds in excess of fund availability or in 

violation of a statute. 

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Title 48 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations, establishes government-wide acquisition policies and procedures. 

The Homeland Security Acquisition Manual (HSAM), which establishes 

policies and procedures that govern acquisitions, contains no specific 

guidance on the preparation, review, and approval process of purchase 

requisitions. Nevertheless, prudent business principles dictate that FEMA 

management has a fundamental responsibility to develop and maintain 

effective internal controls on major purchases, as set forth in the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123, Management’s 

Responsibility for Internal Controls, dated December 21, 2004. 

The Buildings 

The Selma building is a 150’ x 300’ (45,000 sq. feet) free-span (unobstructed 

interior) structure, which was originally justified as urgently required for 

storage of emergency group site supplies. As delivered, the “turn-key” 

(ready-to-use) building included site preparation, concrete foundation, and 

was outfitted with electricity, lighting, plumbing, heat, air conditioning, fire 

sprinklers, and security systems. The building includes workspace and 

storage areas, as well as offices, restrooms, showers, and an employees’ 

lunchroom. The final cost of the building was $3,744,180. 

The Cumberland building was unfinished as delivered. It is a 145’ x 400’ 

(58,000 sq. feet) free-span structure, with the stated mission of providing 

under-roof capabilities to allow for storage and repair operations. It also was 

initially described as a “turn-key” project, but it is not ready to use. As 

delivered, the building was not mission-capable, did not have electricity, 

lighting, and other utilities and it could not be used for repair operations. 

FEMA’s statement of work, on which the contract was negotiated, did not 

include provisions for utilities. This incomplete building is what FEMA 

contracted for. Final cost for the Cumberland building was $3,536,819. 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 4
 
Prefabricated Buildings 

Location Size (Sq. Ft.) Cost 

Selma 45,000 $3,744,180 

Cumberland 58,000 $3,536,819 

Total 103,000 $7,280,999 

According to the project officer, FEMA planned to install the building’s 

utilities using in-house staff, instead of paying the contractor to perform those 

tasks. Consequently, those building subsystems were intentionally not 

included in the project’s statement of work. Although the Cumberland 

building did not have electrical or other utilities at the time of our fieldwork, 

FEMA has informed us that they since arranged to have electrical, lighting, 

heating, and fire sprinkler systems installed. 

Photographs of the two buildings (at the time of our review) FEMA purchased 

are shown below. 

Exterior Cumberland Prefabricated Building 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 5 
Interior Cumberland Prefabricated Building 

Exterior Selma Prefabricated Building 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 6
 
 Interior Selma Prefabricated Building 

Results of Review 

FEMA had no authority to use appropriated funds to construct the two 

buildings and, therefore, violated the “Purpose Statute,” 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a); 

the law against entering into contracts in excess of available appropriations, 

41 U.S.C. § 12. The prerogative to construct the buildings and improve leased 

land belongs to GSA under 40 U.S.C. § 581 and § 583, but FEMA failed to 

obtain GSA’s permission for the warehouses. 

Acquisition regulations were not followed, the justifications were ambiguous 

and misleading, and furthermore, the accounting codes used did not clearly 

match the expenditures. Building deficiencies were noted by a FEMA civil 

engineer, and one of the “completed” buildings was delivered without 

lighting, electricity, or any other utilities. Both contracts were awarded 

approximately 1 year after Hurricane Katrina struck; consequently, there was 

no urgent or compelling reason to relax established policies or regulations. 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 7
Purchase Requisitions 

The purchase requisition (FEMA Form 40-1) that was used to commit disaster 

relief funds for the Selma building was created and approved in late 2005, 

months before the decision was made in 2006 to acquire the building. The 

stated purpose on the requisition form was to commit funds for “electrical 

component support items...” for emergency group shelters in Purvis, 

Mississippi, using funds from the Hurricane Katrina disaster declaration in 

Louisiana. At some point, the decision was made to use this funding and 

requisite justification to construct the building in Selma. Senior management 

did not question the inconsistency between the purpose for which the funds 

were originally committed and the project’s objectives and location. 

Selma Building Timeline 

November 21, 2005 Purchase Requisition for “Electrical components” 

August 31, 2006 Contract for Selma building, citing above requisition 

October 2006 Project begins 

December 12, 2007 Selma building accepted by FEMA 

According to the purchase requisitions used to commit funds for the building 

in Cumberland, the purpose was a “tent erection project.” In this case, a large 

tent had been initially proposed for the Cumberland site, but FEMA project 

managers later decided to contract for a building instead, because of earlier 

troubles experienced with storage tents at the Cumberland site. Previously, 

large storage tents at that location collapsed in the high winds that are not 

uncommon in that area. By April 2006, the project managers decided to have 

a building erected instead of a tent. But, despite that decision, the requisitions 

were never modified to reflect the change, and two subsequent requisitions for 

additional construction funds continued to list the justification as a tent. It 

was still described as a “large tent” as late as June 2006, 2 months after the 

project managers decided to erect a building. 

Similar to the building in Selma, documents authorizing this project used 

erroneous accounting information. FEMA used restricted-use funds, received 

from the sale of used travel trailers and mobile homes, to finance the erection 

of the Cumberland building. These funds can only be used to acquire property 

similar to that sold, i.e., travel trailers and mobile homes. This topic is 

discussed in detail in our report, OIG-08-23, Review of FEMA’s Use of 

Proceeds from the Sales of Emergency Housing Units, dated February 2008, 

which focused on the use of sales proceeds to purchase goods and services 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 8
 
other than buildings. Sales proceeds that are not used for such purposes must 

be returned to the U.S. Treasury. 

Cumberland Building Timeline 

March – June 2006 Four purchase requisitions for “Tent erection 

project” 

September 13, 2006 Contract for building citing above requisitions 

October 2006 Project begins 

August 9, 2007 Cumberland building accepted by FEMA 

As with the building in Selma, FEMA attempted to take corrective steps in 

2007 to use appropriate funding sources for the Cumberland building. 

Sound internal controls require adequate separation of duties. In this case, the 

individual that certified funds availability for the project also approved the 

project. All of the signatories on the requisition form were in the program 

office chain of command and reporting to the same individual. Such internal 

control weaknesses violate the principles set forth in OMB Circular A-123, 

Management’s Responsibility for Internal Controls. 

Use of Funds 

As indicated above, FEMA used disaster-specific funds, intended to provide 

relief to Hurricane Katrina’s victims in Louisiana, to fund the building in 

Selma. The building project in Cumberland used funds that should only have 

been used to acquire replacement emergency housing units. Although FEMA 

eventually attempted to correct the errors by charging different accounting 

codes, additional controls are needed to prevent the situation in future events. 

Under 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a), FEMA may only spend appropriated funds for the 

purposes delineated in the appropriations statute. The Comptroller General 

has long held that an agency violates 41 U.S.C. § 12 by constructing buildings 

or constructing them on leased property without special authority, but FEMA 

did not have this authority. Therefore, FEMA violated 31 U.S.C. § 1301 and 

41 U.S.C. § 12. Because none of the appropriations used were available for 

the warehouses, FEMA may have also violated the Anti-deficiency Act, 31 

U.S.C. § 1341. 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 9
 
 

Contracts 

Both projects were planned in mid-2006, and the contracts were awarded 

within a few weeks of each other, in August and September of that year. 

However, the contractual approaches on the two projects were quite different. 

FEMA acquired the Selma building through the GSA Schedule, which is an 

arrangement whereby GSA has thousands of pre-established, unfunded 

contracts with various vendors, from which any federal agency may directly 

order goods and services, including prefabricated buildings. This approach 

allows an agency to streamline the procurement process because GSA already 

has performed the required planning, market research, competition, contractor 

review, and negotiation. In the case of the Selma building, the contracting 

officer selected from the GSA Schedule a vendor that specialized in 

prefabricated structures, and is a subsidiary of the building manufacturer. The 

contract was awarded on August 31, 2006, and included constructing the 

concrete slab and erection of the prefabricated building with appropriate 

utilities at a cost of $3,744,180. 

Instead of using the GSA Schedule for the building in Cumberland, FEMA 

chose a small disadvantaged business (8a) that was recommended to the 

program office by a FEMA contractor who had hoped to become the 

subcontractor on the project. FEMA recommended the 8a contractor to the 

Small Business Administration, which certified that the firm qualified under 

the provisions of Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act (Public Law 85-536, 

as amended), which is a business development program created to help small 

disadvantaged businesses compete in the market place. FEMA “split” the 

procurement into two contracts in order to avoid competition that FAR section 

19.805-1(a)(2) specifically requires on 8a contracts in excess of $3,500,000. 

FEMA issued one contract for $789,673 to prepare the pre-existing concrete 

slab and a second contract for $2,806,615 to erect the prefabricated Butler 

building. Both contracts were awarded to the same vendor on September 13, 

2006. Separately, each contract was below the $3,500,000 threshold, thus 

FEMA avoided competition on the project. 

The 8a contractor had no experience in constructing buildings, but proceeded 

with a non-8a subcontractor which performed most of the work. This violated 

the 8a program regulations, 19.703(a). Some of the contractual problems 

could have been avoided had FEMA submitted the Cumberland contract for 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 10
 
 

 

 

legal review, as required by HSAM (Subchapter 3004.7003). However, the 

contracting office waived the requirement for legal review. 

Stop-Work Orders 

In January 2007, after senior officials became aware of some of the projects’ 

problems, the Logistics Management Directorate conducted an internal 

inquiry into events surrounding the acquisition of the two buildings, and reassigned staff in the EHU section who had been involved with the projects. In 

connection with that inquiry, FEMA issued a series of stop-work orders on 

both the Selma and the Cumberland projects. 

The contractors at both locations were ordered to suspend work from 

January 29 through February 27, 2007, a total of 30 calendar days, or 22 

workdays. However, the suspension was ordered in four weekly installments 

as the inquiry progressed, so the contractors did not re-assign their staff to 

other projects, but continued to pay their people so they would be available to 

resume work on the FEMA projects. Furthermore, because the suspensions 

were each only for a week, the contractors at both locations kept heavy 

equipment, such as tractors, cranes, and other machinery on site, rather than 

returning the rental units, so they would be on hand to continue the project 

when the stop-work order was lifted. The table below shows the cost for the 

buildings, the stop-work orders, and the total cost for both projects. 

Cost – Building Cost - StopWork Order Total Cost 

Selma $3,744,180 $151,142 $3,895,322 

Cumberland $3,536,819 $351,957 $3,888,776 

Total $7,280,999 $503,099 $7,784,098 

As provided by FAR sections 42.1303 and 52.242-15(b), contractors are 

entitled to equitable adjustment for expenses incurred during a stop-work 

order. Consequently, interim contractor claims against FEMA for incurred 

costs during the stop-work period for both projects amounted to more than 

$500,000. 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 11
 
 

 

 

 

Conclusions and Recommendations 

FEMA had no authority to use appropriated funds to construct the two 

buildings and therefore violated the “purpose” statute (31 U.S.C. § 1301(a)); 

the law against entering into contracts in excess of available appropriations 

(41 U.S.C. § 12). The prerogative to construct the buildings and improve 

leased land belongs to GSA under 40 U.S.C. § 581 and § 583, but FEMA 

failed to obtain GSA’s permission for the warehouses. 

FEMA needs to establish and enforce a system of controls over construction, 

leasing, and building activities. Absent these controls, multi-million dollar 

construction projects moved forward with vague or misleading purchase 

requisitions. Furthermore, FEMA needs to strengthen oversight on the 

program office’s use of funding codes and appropriation expenditures. 

Additionally, FEMA officials need to take action to avoid such situations in 

the future by introducing more discipline in the acquisition process. Steps are 

needed to prevent the misuse of disaster-specific and restricted-use funds, and 

policies and standard operating procedures are needed governing the 

preparation and approval of major purchases. Furthermore, FEMA needs to 

record the cost of the two buildings and associated depreciation in their 

financial reports. 

We recommend that the Administrator, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency: 

Recommendation #1: Determine whether the acquisition of the two 

warehouses constituted a legal violation that requires reporting to Congress, in 

accordance with the law1

. 

1

 The Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) recently found that the Anti-deficiency Act’s (ADA) 

prohibition on excess expenditures only applies when the restriction is found in the appropriation itself, not in a separate 

statute. 31 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2007). Under this analysis, FEMA's acquisition of the two warehouses would not constitute an 

ADA violation because the spending restriction is not contained in an appropriation. OLC’s decision appears to negate 

Comptroller General precedent of at least 50 years. See, e.g., 39 Comp. Gen 388 (1959) (violation of 41 U.S.C. § 12 

also constitutes ADA violation). The Comptroller General vigorously disputes the OLC holding. See B-317450 (March 

23, 2009) (responding to request from Senators Byrd and Cochran). OLC decisions are legally binding on the executive 

branch while Comptroller General decisions are not, though the latter ordinarily are accepted as authoritative. FEMA 

should analyze the potential ADA violation in light of these decisions. 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 12
 
Recommendation #2: Develop and implement a management review 

process, including policy and standard operating procedures for the 

preparation, review, and approval of major purchases that will incorporate 

adequate separation of duties and approvals. 

Recommendation #3: Return the exchange/sale authority funds that were 

initially used for the Cumberland pre-fabricated building to the U.S. Treasury, 

as required by law. 

Recommendation #4: Develop and implement procedures to ensure that 

disaster-specific fund and restricted-use fund guidelines are followed. 

Recommendation #5: In consultation with GSA, determine an appropriate 

disposition of the buildings, and whether and how they may be used to support 

the FEMA mission. 

Recommendation #6: Record the two buildings in agency financial reports 

and include associated depreciation. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We discussed the results of our findings with FEMA officials on May 6, 2008, 

and provided an initial draft of this report on August 14, 2008, for review and 

comment. Due to scheduling conflicts and the challenges presented by an 

active 2008 hurricane season, FEMA officials did not formally respond to the 

draft report within 30 days. Subsequent to our meeting with FEMA on the 

draft report, we had discussions with OIG Office of Counsel and incorporated 

changes that resulted in a revised draft report. 

On November 17, 2008, we again met with agency officials to discuss our 

determination that FEMA violated 31 U.S.C. § 1301, 41 U.S.C.§ 12, and may 

have violated 31 U.S.C. § 1341, and ignored 40 U.S.C. § 581 and § 583 when 

it constructed the pre-fabricated buildings on leased land, using appropriated 

funds. As indicated in management’s response to our revised draft report (see 

Appendix B), FEMA concurs with our recommendations. Proposed 

corrective actions address our concerns and will satisfy the intent of our 

recommendations when implemented. 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 13
 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope and Methodology 

We conducted this review in response to a request from the FEMA Deputy 

Administrator. Our objectives were to examine the events surrounding the 

acquisition of large, prefabricated warehouse buildings at FEMA logistics 

sites in Selma, Alabama and Cumberland, Maryland, and to evaluate the 

agency’s EHU’s acquisition practices at headquarters, and at field locations. 

Our review covered all transactions associated with the warehouse 

acquisitions during the period March 2006 to July 2007. 

Audit fieldwork was conducted in the Washington, DC area, where we 

interviewed responsible officials from pertinent FEMA offices including the 

Logistics Management Directorate, the Office of Chief Counsel, and the 

Office of Facilities Management. We also spoke with GSA officials regarding 

the applicable regulations on prefabricated buildings. We visited the building 

sites in Selma, Alabama and Cumberland, Maryland. In addition, we 

reviewed contract files and interviewed staff at the FEMA Acquisition 

Management Offices in Emmitsburg, Maryland, and Montgomery and 

Anniston, Alabama. As part of our review, we performed a limited 

assessment of the effectiveness of FEMA management controls. 

We conducted our review from September 2007 through February 2008, 

under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and 

according to generally accepted government auditing standards for 

performance audits. 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 14
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 15
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 16
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 17
 
Appendix C 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Gina Smith, Director 

John Meenan, Senior Program Analyst 

Donald Norman, Senior Program Analyst 

Kristofer Hensley, Program Analyst 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 18
 
Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff for Operations 

Chief of Staff of Policy 

Acting General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Under Secretary for Management 

DHS Chief Financial Officer 

FEMA OIG Liaison (Project Code DP7R12) 

FEMA Assistant Administrator, Logistics Management Directorate 

FEMA Director, Office of Management/Chief Acquisition Officer 

FEMA Chief Financial Officer 

FEMA Office of Chief Counsel 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

FEMA’s Acquisition of Two Warehouses to Support
 

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations 

Page 19
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4199, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.