U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

68–007 PDF 2011

S. Hrg. 112–110 

BORDER CORRUPTION: ASSESSING CUSTOMS AND 

BORDER PROTECTION AND THE 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

INSPECTOR GENERAL’S OFFICE COLLABORATION 

IN THE FIGHT TO PREVENT CORRUPTION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY 

AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 9, 2011 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

NICHOLAS ROSSI, Minority Staff Director 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

JOYCE WARD Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY AND 

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JON TESTER, Montana 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

DONNY WILLIAMS, Majority, Staff Director 

JASON BOCKENSTEDT, Majority Professional Staff 

SEANA CRANSTON, Minority Legislative Assistant 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 1 

Senator Paul ..................................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 2011 

Hon. Alan D. Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 4 

Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General and Deputy Inspector General, 

Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............. 5 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Hon. Bersin, Alan D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19 

Edwards, Charles K.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

APPENDIX 

Chart referenced by Senator Pryor ................................................................. 41 

Chart referenced by Senator Pryor ................................................................. 42 

Questions and responses submitted for the record from: 

Mr. Bersin ......................................................................................................... 43 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

(1) 

BORDER CORRUPTION: ASSESSING CUSTOMS 

AND BORDER PROTECTION AND THE 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

INSPECTOR GENERAL’S OFFICE 

COLLABORATION IN THE FIGHT TO PREVENT 

CORRUPTION 

THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 2011 

U.S. SENATE,

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY AND,

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in 

room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark L. Pryor, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Pryor and Paul. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. I will call our meeting to order here. First I want 

to welcome Senator Paul to his Ranking Membership of this Subcommittee. This is the first time you have had a chance to sit in 

as the Ranking Member, so thank you for your service and for 

doing this, and I look forward to working with you. 

I would also like to thank our panelists today and the distinguished audience that is here today because many of you all have 

been following these issues for a long time, and I just want to 

thank everyone for their attendance. 

We are going to examine the progress of the U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) in preventing corruption in its workforce 

as well as the work of the Inspector General’s office at the Department of Homeland Security in investigating and prosecuting those 

individuals who have been accused of corruption. 

Securing the United States’ borders is a constant struggle for the 

residents of the border States and for the government officials who 

represent them. The Mexican cartels dominate drug trafficking into 

the United States. Their operations and methods are sophisticated, 

ruthless, and well funded. Their notorious presence and power in 

Mexico is made possible by bribery and corruption, intimidation, 

paramilitary force, and murder. The impact of their operations in 

the United States has been widespread. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

2 

This Subcommittee held a hearing in March 2010 at which we 

learned that the cartels’ operations are changing. They used to rely 

mostly on stealth techniques and the United States distribution 

network with operations in an estimated 230 American cities, according to the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Three of 

those cities are in Arkansas. 

The good news about the changing operations is that heightened 

U.S. border defenses have put a squeeze on the cartels. Unfortunately, these cartels are not easily deterred, and they seek to regain an advantage by exporting to the United States their experience and success in bribing and corrupting government officials 

who can facilitate their business. 

We must continue to do everything that we can to disrupt and 

prevent these gangs from penetrating our communities. That is 

why I am pleased that last year the Congress passed and the President signed the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010. This bill is designed to complement CBP’s Workforce Integrity Plan and prevent 

rogue border agents from being hired and retained. 

The bill requires that CBP follow its own employment policies requiring polygraph tests of all new applicants for law enforcement 

positions. It also directs CBP to initiate background checks on all 

backlogged employees within 6 months. Hiring new Border Patrol 

agents will help secure our borders only if these agents are truly 

committed to protecting our country. I look forward to hearing from 

Commissioner Bersin on the progress he has made in implementing 

this bill. 

Another area of interest today is the ongoing concern about the 

lack of true collaboration and information sharing between CBP 

and the Inspector General’s office when it comes to investigating 

alleged acts of corruption. Fighting corruption is vital to protecting 

our borders and securing our communities. We must aggressively 

attack and investigate these cases if we are going to end corruption 

within the U.S. law enforcement agencies. However, we must conduct these investigations in an efficient and collaborative way that 

leads to results in the quickest way possible. 

Based on reports, this does not seem to be the way we are currently operating when conducting these investigations. I also look 

forward to our witness comments in this area. 

Our witnesses today are both very experienced individuals: Commissioner Bersin of the CBP and Charles Edwards, the Acting Inspector General (IG) of the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS). These gentlemen are leading much of the U.S. Government’s efforts to fight against drug-related corruption. We welcome 

them. We look forward to their testimony, but first I would like to 

recognize Senator Paul. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL 

Senator PAUL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for coming to testify here today. I, like Senator Pryor, am concerned about the lawlessness south of our border and the extent to 

which that lawlessness creeps across the border. 

The lawlessness has become so severe that people fear traveling 

to Mexico. There are people who are now referring to Mexico as a 

‘‘failed nation State.’’ Is that an overstatement? I do not know. ReH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

3 

gardless, I am worried about the lawlessness coming across our 

border. 

Corruption of our law enforcement personnel is a problem, but I 

am also worried about their physical safety. Our Border Patrol 

agents, our sheriffs, and our citizens traveling across the border 

are frequent targets of violence. 

I am also concerned about legal immigration, the issuance of 

visas, and whether or not we are monitoring those who we let into 

our country. Just last week, in Bowling Green, the Federal Bureau 

of Investigations (FBI) captured two alleged terrorists who came to 

the United States on an asylum program. We admitted last year 

18,000 people from Iraq. This to me sounds like a large number. 

I wonder if we are adequately monitoring these people. Are we 

doing a good enough screening process? 

This goes for a lot of other people who are coming here legally. 

It is not just illegal immigration I am worried about. I am worried 

about legal immigration, whether or not it is being monitored properly. 

We have 40,000 students coming to this country from all over the 

world. Could some of them be potential attackers? The people who 

attacked us on September 11, 2001, were here on student visas. 

They were overstaying their visas. Was anybody monitoring them? 

Are we overseeing the whereabouts of students who are in our 

country now? Are we overseeing the refugee process? 

One of the men captured in Bowling Green had previously been 

in jail in Iraq. His fingerprints were found on an unexploded improvised explosive device (IED). His fingerprints were in our database for 2 years before we were able to arrest him. 

I do not know that we are doing a good enough job. I think as 

a country we are spending an amazing amount of resources on 

screening everyone universally as if everyone is a potential terrorist. I think that is a mistake. We are combing through 

everybody’s bank records. We are invading the privacy of everyone 

in our country. We are doing pat-downs and strip searches of 6- 

year-olds in our airports. But are we spending enough time and resources targeting those who are potential attackers of our country? 

I would like to learn more about how the visa process is working, 

whether or not we are overseeing the people who have been admitted to our country, and whether or not there are sufficient safeguards to protect our country from terrorists who enter our borders 

legally. Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Sometimes we say that these people do not need any introduction, and really on these two, you really do not. So I am just going 

to be very brief and just say our first witness today is Alan Bersin. 

He is the Commissioner at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. We look forward to hearing from you, Mr. Bersin. 

And then we will hear from our next witness, Charles Edwards. 

He is the Acting Inspector General at the Department of Homeland 

Security. Thank you very much for being here. 

We have a timing system today, and I think we are doing 5 minutes on the opening statements. So if you could keep yours to 5 

minutes, we will submit your written statements for the record, so 

those will be made part of the record. But we look forward to hearH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

4 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Bersin appears in the appendix on page 19. 

ing from you, and we look forward to a good discussion afterwards. 

Mr. Bersin. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALAN D. BERSIN,1 COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BERSIN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Paul. It is an important day for me to appear here before you to 

update you on the progress that U.S. Customs and Border Protection is making to combat corruption and maintain integrity with 

our workforce. 

Senator Pryor, you and this Subcommittee have been an important force in getting recognized the threat that we face on the U.S.- 

Mexican border and generally in terms of the men and women of 

CBP, now 60,000 strong, 48,000 of whom are on the front line of 

protecting this Nation and its borders. 

You recognize and we emphasize the commitment, bravery, vigilance, and character demonstrated by the vast majority of CBP 

agents and officers who indeed put their lives on the line to protect 

this Nation. 

Having said that, we recognize that there are bad apples in the 

barrel, and it is our job to minimize those, and it is our job to prevent corruption, detect it when it happens, prosecute it after investigating it, in concert with other Federal agencies and the United 

States Attorney’s Office and the Department of Justice (DOJ). 

Unfortunately, CBP employees have and will continue to be targeted by criminal organizations, as the Chairman suggested and as 

the Ranking Member confirms. As we continue to see successes in 

our efforts to secure our Nation’s borders, our adversaries continue 

to grow more desperate in their attempts to smuggle humans and 

illegal contraband into this country. 

Our most valuable as well as in some rare cases our most vulnerable resources are our employees. I am here today to candidly confront with you this vulnerability and the steps that we are taking 

with your assistance and the assistance of the Administration to 

mitigate this threat. 

Recently I put forward my first Statement of Intent and Policy 

as the Commissioner of CBP after a year of service outlining specific and high-level propositions to be incorporated into all aspects 

of CBP’s interactions with the public, with other law enforcement, 

and within our own institution. That Statement of Intent and Policy dealt with integrity. It outlined the absolute importance that we 

attach to integrity in the discharge of our duties. 

We pride ourselves on being a family. However, when one of our 

own strays into criminality, we do not forgive him or her. Such was 

the case with Martha Garnica, the Customs and Border Protection 

Officer (CBPO) who betrayed her country, betrayed her fellow officers, betrayed our trust, and now sits in Federal prison for 20 

years, as she so richly deserves. 

We recognize that we need to confront this, and we are doing so 

with the help of the resources and with the help of the Anti-Border 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

5 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Edwards appears in the appendix on page 30. 

Corruption Act that this Chairman and this Senate and Congress 

passed and the President signed. 

Since October 2004, 127 CBP personnel have been arrested, 

charged, or convicted of corruption. This breach of trust is something that we do not stand for, and while 7 years and tens of thousands of employees are besmirched by these evidences of corruption, we take each and every one of them seriously. 

The Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010, which the Chairman 

championed, is one of the first steps to address the issue of corruption within the workforce before it can take hold. I look forward to 

discussing with you this morning the steps that we have taken in 

order to implement that act and be prepared to meet its deadlines. 

We recognize that there is work to be done. We are committed 

to doing it, and I believe you will be satisfied that we have made 

a good start along the path to being able to meet these deadlines. 

We also need, frankly, Mr. Chairman, to recognize that our best 

defense against corruption are the men and women of CBP themselves and, therefore, we have taken on the so-called Code of Silence within our institution. When we ask our officers to uphold 

the honor and integrity of their service, we add security to the border. 

Mr. Chairman, again, let me thank you for the Anti-Border Corruption Act and the role you played in securing it. I look forward 

to answering your questions and the Ranking Member’s as we proceed this morning. Thank you, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Mr. Edwards. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS,1 ACTING INSPECTOR 

GENERAL AND DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. EDWARDS. Good morning, Chairman Pryor, Ranking Member 

Paul, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am 

Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General for the Department 

of Homeland Security. Thank you for inviting me today to testify 

about the Office of Inspector General (OIG’s) role in the effort to 

eliminate corruption in the CBP workforce, a threat that strikes at 

the foundation of securing our Nation’s borders. 

The smuggling of people and goods across the Nation’s borders 

is a large-scale business dominated by organized criminal enterprises. The Mexican drug cartels today are more sophisticated and 

dangerous than any other organized criminal group. They use torture and brutality to control their members and intimidate or 

eliminate those who may be witnesses or informants to their activities. The drug-trafficking organizations also turn to corrupting 

DHS employees. 

Border corruption impacts national security. A corrupt DHS employee may accept a bribe for allowing what appear to be undocumented aliens into the United States while unwittingly helping terrorists enter the country. Likewise, what seems to be drug contraband could be weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical or biological weapons. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

6 

OIG has made investigation of employee corruption a top priority. In accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978 and the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002, the OIG exists as an independent 

element within DHS tasked with coordinating, conducting, and supervising investigations relating to DHS programs and operations. 

These statutes vest the OIG with the primary responsibility within 

DHS for investigating allegations of criminal misconduct of DHS 

employees. 

The IG statutory independence and its dual reporting responsibilities to the Department and to the Congress make it ideally 

situated to address employee corruption. Inspectors General play a 

critical role in assuring transparent, honest, effective, and accountable government. The organizational independence of OIG criminal 

investigators, free to carry out their work without interference by 

agency officials, is essential to maintaining the public trust. 

The DHS Management Directive plainly establishes OIG’s right 

of first refusal to conduct investigations of criminal conduct by 

DHS employees and the right to supervise any such investigations 

that are conducted by DHS Internal Affairs components. 

It is the OIG’s policy to investigate all allegations of corruption 

of DHS employees or compromise of systems related to the security 

of our borders and transportation networks. The Department’s Internal Affairs offices play a useful role to the OIG by enabling the 

OIG to leverage its resources. 

CBP Office of Internal Affairs (IA) focuses on preventive measures to ensure the integrity of the CBP workforce through pre-employment screening of applicants, including polygraph examinations, background investigations of employees, and integrity briefings that help employees recognize corruption signs and dangers. 

These preventive measures are critically important in fighting corruption and work hand in hand with OIG’s criminal investigative 

activities. 

The OIG has been working tirelessly in an honest attempt to negotiate a cooperative working arrangement that will detail CBP IA 

agents to the OIG to participate in the investigation of CBP employees along with the Immigration and Customs Enforcements Office of Professional Responsibility (ICE OPR). These additional assets are especially necessary as the CBP workforce continues to expand significantly while OIG remains relatively flat. 

DHS OIG works cooperatively with external law enforcement 

agencies on border corruption matters involving DHS employees. A 

key component of our investigative strategy is to leverage our limited resources and share intelligence with other law enforcement 

agencies. DHS OIG participates with border corruption task forces 

in many parts of the country. These cooperative relationships serve 

to ensure that different law enforcement agencies are not pursuing 

the same targets which duplicates efforts and places law enforcement agents’ safety at risk. 

In conclusion, I appreciate the Subcommittee’s attention and interest in the work of the OIG to investigate corrupt employees 

within the DHS workforce. We will continue to aggressively pursue 

these investigations with all resources at our disposal and in cooperation with law enforcement at all levels to ensure that employee corruption does not jeopardize our national security. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

7 

1The chart referenced by Senator Pryor appears in the appendix on page 41. 

1The chart referenced by Senator Pryor appears in the appendix on page 42. 

Chairman Pryor, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be 

happy to answer any questions that you or the Ranking Member 

may have. Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Edwards. 

Let me start with you, if I may, Mr. Edwards. On this chart,1

my understanding is you provided these numbers to the Subcommittee as part of your testimony today, and I see a big upswing 

in the number of investigations. Do you know why that is? Why are 

you seeing a pretty dramatic spike there in the number of investigations? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, actually, there is a 38-percent increase in 

complaints against CBP since 2004 from 3,112 to 4,162. These increases are because we have the act that was passed last year and 

we need to go back and CBP needs to do the background investigations, the polygraphs of the employees, because we find 60 percent 

of the employees who go through this do not pass it because of the 

corrupt or criminal background in their background. So there is a 

big spike in that. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Say that again? As you are doing more of 

the polygraphs, more and more is showing up? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, we had a huge backlog—— 

Senator PRYOR. Right. 

Mr. EDWARDS [continuing]. And now CBP has gone back and has 

done that. Without doing that, there was a huge spike. 

Senator PRYOR. I see. 

Mr. EDWARDS. They still have not caught up. And we are hoping 

by 2012 we are able to do 100 percent. 

Senator PRYOR. I got you. Perfect. That makes sense. 

Now, there is also a pie chart1 that you provided to the Subcommittee as part of your testimony, and in this pie chart the navy 

blue, these are open, named CBP employee investigations, and I 

think the ‘‘named’’ is important because this does not mean it is 

all but it is one category of them, at least. So there are 613 total, 

and the navy blue is for corruption. It may be hard to see for the 

audience. That is 44 percent. And then red is civil rights, and the 

green is suspicious behavior. So if you add the corruption and the 

suspicious behavior together, you get 78 percent. Those seem like 

alarming numbers to me. Could you talk about that for a little bit? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, corruption is abuse of public power for private gain. Examples are bribery, smuggling, theft, disclosure of 

sensitive law enforcement information. The cartels, the drug business, organized criminal enterprises, they are becoming very sophisticated, so they are trying to infiltrate our CBP workforce, and, 

our investigations, we have to get to the root of the problem. If we 

just go ahead and get rid of that one employee, we still have not 

gotten to the bottom of the problem. And, there is a huge percentage of it unnamed, and we have recently established a Forensic 

Threat Analysis Unit to get to the bottom of this. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Did you want to comment on that, Mr. 

Bersin? 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

8 

Mr. BERSIN. Mr. Chairman, I think as we are openly confronting 

the issue and the challenges that we face, and I want to point out 

and I commend the OIG as well as CBP IA and the FBI in terms 

of actually the number of investigations that have started. I think 

we have to recognize, though, and put in perspective that it is the 

kind of emphasis that the agencies are giving to the problem, that 

put more resources into the problem, that begin in the first instance to see an increase in the number of cases that are open. So 

more cases have been referred by CBP IA to the JICMS, the Joint 

Information System, and, in fact, those cases are being taken at a 

greater rate by DHS OIG for which we are thankful. But this is 

an issue of attention and focus and resource allocation. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. Let me followup on that, if I can, Mr. 

Bersin, because one of the things that you have had a really large 

backlog on is your periodic reinvestigations, and I think you went 

through some numbers in your opening statement. Could you go 

through those again in terms of how many periodic reinvestigations 

you have completed so far. 

Mr. BERSIN. Yes, sir. We recognize that under the Anti-Border 

Corruption Act we are obliged as a matter of law to complete the 

period reinvestigations by the end of 2012. We will meet that objective by July 2012. We also understand the polygraph responsibilities. Every employee pre-employment will be polygraphed as of 

January 2013. 

Where we stand today—and as we have been working and keeping your staff and you informed of this—15,197 periodic reinvestigations previously backlogged, all of those have been initiated. 

And to be precise, as of May 31 of this year, 5,386 periodic reinvestigations have been adjudicated; 9,219 are pending investigation or 

adjudication. 

What we have done to be sure that we are online to meet this, 

notwithstanding the hiring requirements of the southwest border 

supplemental bill, is to have the Personnel Security Division of Internal Affairs that handles this have devoted the bulk of their resources to these periodic reinvestigations. 

So while the task has been complicated by the additional hirings 

that the supplemental bill have provided us, we do not complain 

about those, but it does add another 1,250 additional cases, so to 

speak, to the backlog. But we are on target, Mr. Chairman, to meet 

the requirements of the act. 

Senator PRYOR. How many do you think you will have completed 

by the end of 2011? 

Mr. BERSIN. We have in the area of 800 that are in adjudication 

now, so I suspect that we are talking between now and the end of 

the Fiscal Year perhaps 1,200. So we have a fair amount to do, but 

we expect that we will be online to meet the end of Fiscal Year 

2012 deadline. 

Senator PRYOR. If you do the reinvestigations and the polygraphs, what percentage of the employees turn up with an issue? 

What percentage are you catching? 

Mr. BERSIN. Well, in the last number, in the one that was referenced by my colleague, the Inspector General, was that 60 percent present an issue. It depends on the population that you polygraph. And the nature of the issue differs, and what we are atH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

9 

tempting to do because of the expense involved in polygraphing is 

actually to have a process in which we can see rise to the top those 

applicants who are less likely to face issues in a polygraph examination. But the number will depend on the actual population of 

applicants that you put through the examination. 

Senator PRYOR. So you are not saying those 60 percent is the 

number of folks that are showing corruption. You are just saying 

they are showing some sort of—— 

Mr. BERSIN. Absolutely not. 

Senator PRYOR. What is your sense of the number of applicants 

who somehow get tagged with corruption? Do you know that? 

Mr. BERSIN. I could not give you a specific number. I will tell 

you, in the course of reviewing these, we do come across cases in 

which people reveal themselves to either have criminal backgrounds or links to organized criminal elements based in Mexico or 

gangs based in the United States, which disqualifies them. But I 

think it would be a disservice to the applicant pool to suggest that 

this is a large or even significant percentage. 

What we have to do is be sure that we have the filter that 

catches each and every one of those. But particularly given my 

background in education, I do not think that this is a generation 

of young people that presents generally more problems than my 

generation did. 

Senator PRYOR. I am going to ask one more question, and then 

I will turn it over to Senator Paul here in just a second. This is 

a question really from another context, and that is the Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), is doing a pilot 

project for Mexican trucking companies to bring materials in, and 

I really have two questions for you. 

One, have you heard from FMCSA on this? And are you all taking any special precautions or any special procedures for these 

Mexican-owned trucking companies bringing goods into the United 

States? 

Mr. BERSIN. Mr. Chairman, this is the pilot program to move 

away from the drayage issue, which will permit Mexican long-haul 

carriers to actually cross the border, not have to reconnect, and 

continue on into the United States. 

In the first instance, this is a Department of Transportation 

(DOT) safety certification issue. We, of course, will be involved in 

clearing and inspecting cargo containers contained on those trucks, 

and we are keeping abreast of developments as this pilot unfolds. 

But it is a safety issue in the first instance, and then it presents 

the same issue of inspection, targeting, risk management that we 

do with regard to each of the 27,000 trucks that enter this country 

every day. 

Senator PRYOR. The reason I am asking, of course, is because if 

the Mexican drug cartels are successful in corrupting local officials, 

police, judges and the military, it seems to me pretty likely that 

they could also corrupt these Mexican trucking companies, and 

they could just bring matters in, unless we pay special attention 

to them. So that would be a concern of mine. 

The other question I have is something that I talked with DOT 

about. The challenges you have had in your agency about finding 

corruption there and the drug cartels trying to actively, in some 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

10 

cases successfully, corrupt our agents there and I have asked them 

to reach out to you about some of the lessons you have learned in 

terms of making sure that their workforce that is going to be down 

on the border maintains their integrity. 

Have they had a chance to reach out to you yet? 

Mr. BERSIN. We have not specifically talked, but we do work together on the interagency policy coordination on the border, and I 

will reach out to my colleague at the Department of Transportation. 

Senator PRYOR. That would be great. Mr. Paul. 

Senator PAUL. Mr. Bersin, do you keep a database on all those 

who are visiting our country on a visa, a travel visa or student 

visa? 

Mr. BERSIN. Senator Paul, what CBP does in terms of admissibility of everyone who crosses into the United States every day— 

and we have a million people coming into the United States every 

day whose admissibility is handled by CBP officers at airports, 

land ports, and seaports. So we have a record of every person entering into the country and the basis on which he or she does so. 

Yes, sir. 

Senator PAUL. OK. Do you also have a record of when they leave? 

Mr. BERSIN. We do not have a biometric exit system in place yet. 

We have been working within DHS to look at the exit system, and 

there have been a number of pilots that have been handled by USVISIT, TSA, and CBP in terms of coming up with a recommendation as to how an exit system can be reliably handled, recognizing 

that the airport context is one that is a manageable environment. 

The land borders are actually the environment that present the 

greatest challenge to our exit verification. 

Senator PAUL. You have to go through Customs on the way into 

the United States. Do you go through Customs when leaving the 

country? 

Mr. BERSIN. Only when we do outbound inspections, which we 

are doing on the U.S.-Mexican border in keeping with our new relationship with Mexico. But we do not for the most part do exit except on a surge basis in places like the northern border. 

Senator PAUL. So there are a million people coming into the 

United States every day from other countries. 

Mr. BERSIN. Yes, sir—well, and returning U.S. citizens. It is a 

mix. 

Senator PAUL. Right. The thing I am still concerned about is, 

once people enter the country, how do we know if they are overstaying their visas? Do we know if they are obeying the rules of 

their students visas? Under whose purview does that fall? Who is 

checking that? Is that ICE? Who is checking to see whether someone overstays their visa? 

Mr. BERSIN. This would be a responsibility of DHS in terms of 

Homeland Security Investigations on visa overstays. But this is an 

issue that, as you suggested in your opening remarks, has to be 

handled on a risk management basis. This has to be an ability to 

identify high-risk entrants into the country because we do not, obviously, have the resources nor should we be devoting equal resources to every one of those million people. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

11 

Senator PAUL. Those million people may also include a lot of U.S. 

citizens who are just coming back from a long-time trip to London 

so that is part of the million. Can you break the million down further? How many of them are visiting us from another country? 

Mr. BERSIN. I will supplement the record. I cannot give that off 

the top of my head. 

INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD 

FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2010

Total Passengers and Pedestrians 352,731,093 

Total Immigrants Processed (LPR) 53,954,941 

Total Non-Immigrants Processed 167,383,751 

Total Non-US Citizens Processed 221,338,692 

Total Inadmissible Aliens 231,197 

Senator PAUL. Yes, I think that is what we need to do. If you 

were looking at a million entrants, you would find out if 500,000 

of them are U.S. citizens traveling on business. Obviously they 

would not need as much scrutiny. Entrants from Middle Eastern 

countries might need a little more scrutiny, but we would have to 

do good police work to do that. Once you narrow that down, we 

need to know who comes in and who leaves, and the difference between the two is those who are overstaying their welcome. We live 

in such an electronic age that you would think even if you are driving across the border to or from Canada, that would be entered into 

a data bank and should be easily reconcilable with who is overstaying their welcome here. Since September 11, 2001, we have 

begun to treat everyone as a potential terrorist. Universally we 

have begun scrutinizing everybody to the nth degree, instead of 

doing what I think would be just good police work. It would be less 

expensive and less intrusive into our privacy to focus our efforts on 

the people who did attack us and who continue to attack us, instead of focusing on U.S. citizens. 

Mr. BERSIN. The essence of our system at CBP and across DHS 

increasingly is risk management. It is exactly that. It recognizes 

that we have limited resources and that we have to do targeted attention. And after making a risk assessment in terms of trusted 

shippers, high-risk shipper, trusted travelers, high-risk travelers, 

we then have to segment the traffic to permit us to deal with it 

in sequence. 

But just to indicate that your general point I could not agree 

with more, but when we look at a Faisal Shahzad, who is a U.S. 

citizen, naturalized, we have to recognize that this risk assessment 

system cannot just be cut into certain categories. 

Senator PAUL. Yes, it is not just citizenship status. If you are a 

U.S. citizen and you have been to Yemen three times in the last 

year and you are a not a businessman who has business, or a family, in Yemen, that might be a red flag for us. You are right. It is 

not as simple as what your religion is, the color of your skin, or 

any of that. It is more complicated. There is a whole host of figures 

that we need to look at and then excluding the people who are 

traveling frequently on business. It is the same what we are doing 

in our country, though, with the TSA. How many people fly every 

day within the United States? A million or more fly every day. I 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

12 

think we are wasting resources and not doing good enough police 

work. We are distracted from the real police work we could do because we have to treat everybody universally as a potential terrorist. 

I would recommend that at some point in time—and it sounds 

like this is an ongoing process that we do talk about monitoring 

who comes in and who leaves, and it should be very easy to determine from that. I do not get a good feeling that a decade after September 11, 2001, we know where everyone in the country is who 

is on a student visa, how often they are being checked, and whether or not they are in the country and obeying the rules of their 

entry. 

The other question I have—I do not know if you know the answer to this or not—is: What percentage of visas approved by the 

State Department and issued in another country, once they come 

through Customs are then rejected? Because that happens, right? 

Mr. BERSIN. Yes, when a visa is presented at a point of admission, there are circumstances in which the CBP officer will refuse 

admission, and based on information that would be available and 

would alert the officer, the visa can be set up for revocation. 

I would need to supplement in terms of the millions with which 

we deal what the actual percentage of revocation is. 

Senator PAUL. Yes, I would like to know. It is important to me 

to know not the exact number but the percentage. If you are rejecting 5 percent of State Department visas, maybe that means you are 

just doing a good supplementary job to the State Department. However, if you are rejecting 30 percent, maybe it means the State Department is not doing a very good job. I don’t want to point fingers, 

but we need to ask these questions, which gets us back to all these 

refugees and political asylum people we are letting in from Iraq. 

We need to know who is approving them, what kind of screening 

process they undergo. 

Now, do you have anything to do with the refugee admittance 

into our country? 

Mr. BERSIN. CIS handles the status issues. We would be involved 

in the initial admissibility issues, as we would be with anyone presenting themselves for admission into the United States. 

Senator PAUL. So they go through the State Department first 

and then are subject to screening by Customs and Border Protection when they come through the airport, you mean? 

Mr. BERSIN. To the extent that—yes, if there is an admissibility 

issue. But the actual refugee status would be State Department 

and a combination of Citizenship and Immigration Services at 

DHS. 

Senator PAUL. Right. So Customs and Border Protection is not 

actually actively doing extensive background checks on individuals. 

That is something the State Department is supposedly doing before 

they get to you. 

Mr. BERSIN. That is correct, Senator. But what we rely on is information that would give us an ability to make a risk assessment 

with regard to any of those people based on the collected data and 

databases available to the U.S. Government. 

Senator PAUL. All right. Thank you very much. If you can find 

any of that other information, I am interested in having it. I think 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

13 

there is a big picture here that we still need to be pursuing as far 

as the safety of our country is concerned. Thank you. 

Mr. BERSIN. Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Senator Paul. Good questions. 

Let me go ahead and dive into a little bit of a follow-up from previous hearings and other matters that we have worked on here together. I am interested in the way you two see your specific roles 

in investigations, and my understanding is—and I have talked to 

both of you and both your offices about this. In the past there has 

been some, I guess I would say, friction—or I do not know if I 

would say gaps, but some friction, some disagreement about what 

the roles should be. And my understanding is that you all have 

worked hard to try to address these. 

I also understand that you may be fairly close to doing some sort 

of written agreement on what your roles would be, and I would like 

to get a status report on that. Mr. Edwards, do you want to start 

there? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Sure. Well, there are three reasons. First, the Inspectors General play a critical role in assuring transparency, honest and effective and accountable government, both personal and 

organizational independence of OIG’s investigators to carry out the 

work. Second, it is the public trust and also, third, avoiding duplication. 

The statutory authority that IG has, we do all 100 percent of the 

criminal investigations on all allegations. Our position is CBP IA 

plays a complementary role by—and even Congress recognized that 

with the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010. CBP does the integrity work by doing the pre-employment screening of applicants, including polygraph and background investigations. 

Both myself and Alan have been working together trying to come 

up where CBP IA agents could work—could be detailed to OIG and 

work under the OIG’s supervision to work some of the cases. That 

gives Commissioner Bersin the information that he is looking for, 

and the agreement that I, in fact, last night signed and sent over— 

I am waiting still for Alan to sign it, because I have to look into 

my independence, the statutory authority, and the management directive where OIG has the lead. I think Alan recognizes that, but 

we just have—from his point I think he still has some differences, 

but I have done my part. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Mr. Bersin. 

Mr. BERSIN. First I should say, Senator, that what a difference 

3 months makes. So, yes, I think it is fair and the law enforcement 

professionals both in OIG and IA will know that I say this respectfully when I say that there was more than tension and friction. 

There was outright confrontation and an unacceptable situation. 

And in most situations like this, it makes no sense to try to fix the 

blame but, rather, fix the problem. And I want to compliment both 

offices for endeavoring to do precisely that. 

In April of this year, the Inspector General reached out very directly and said that he wanted to discuss this issue and he wanted 

to see that working together we could actually reverse the history 

of the last few years, which, again, was a function of people passionate about their duties and dedicated public servants who saw 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

14 

the world in a different way. I think we have made huge strides 

toward that goal. 

In January 2011, as the Senator knows, we entered into an unprecedented agreement within DHS with ICE, with Homeland Security Investigations, in which for the first time CBP IA agents are 

detailed into ICE offices and are working to supplement the resources of ICE, ICE’s Office of Professional Responsibility, to work 

down the investigative caseload, and we have seen tremendous 

progress in the first 5 months of that collaboration. 

When you put law enforcement professionals together in the field 

to work on a case, the work gets done without the kind of friction 

that often attaches to turf battles that occasionally surface in 

Washington. 

What we have seen already in the ICE-CBP collaboration is that 

the number of cases being worked have been decreased from 160 

to 127, and we have seen the clearing up of cases because of the 

additional resources. We recognize in that agreement, that memorandum of understanding with ICE, that the ICE lead case agent 

has supervisory responsibility. We have engaged in thus far I think 

very successful negotiations with OIG. Our staff members have 

brought us to the positive brink, so to speak, of entering into a 

similar agreement in which CBP acknowledges the responsibilities 

under the management directive of OIG and will be, I believe, welcomed into the OIG investigative effort as a full law enforcement 

member. That can only be to the good of the American people and 

to challenging and taking on the threat of corruption. 

So I think we are close, and I think we can overcome the remaining issues. Those issues, frankly, are not so much about the relationship between the CBP and OIG but, rather, the way in which 

OIG could be welcomed back within—recognizing its responsibilities under the Inspector General Act and its responsibilities under 

the DHS Management Directive, could be welcomed back into the 

Border Corruption Task Forces that exist in 22 sites in the United 

States that have been organized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice and are a critical element 

in a whole-of-government approach to taking on border corruption. 

Those issues need to be worked through. That happens to be a 

tripartite negotiation, and I am confident that over time we can address it and expect that we can overcome the issues. But that is 

where the issues are. That is where the remaining issues are in 

terms of closing off a chapter that all of us want to put behind us 

in terms of tension between CBP IA and DHS OIG. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Edwards, you said you sent a draft agreement over last night? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Yes. 

Senator PRYOR. Is it your intention that the draft agreement 

would cover all the outstanding issues—— 

Mr. EDWARDS. Yes. 

Senator PRYOR. Or are there still issues beyond that? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Right, well, first I must commend Secretary Janet 

Napolitano for her leadership in bringing us together. She has 

given pretty good advice to us to get this thing resolved. 

I have taken into account our independence, the statutory authority that we have. At the same time, we do not have the reH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

15 

sources necessary to—because we have to have one DHS. There 

has to be one face. And I recognize that, and my staff has been actively working with Alan’s staff, and we have overall an agreement, 

but there is still a sticking point, because we feel that if you are 

working along with us and you are having visibility to 98 percent 

of the cases, and then along with Border Corruption Task Force 

(BCTF) you are still there, then it is a duplicative effort. 

The reason we pulled out from BCTF last year was because it 

goes against the whole OIG statutory authority. Everybody is equal 

partners, but the statutory requirement says that we supervise, 

lead the investigations, and the FBI was the only lead. So we went 

back and for the last several months we have been working with— 

we have a similar situation in San Diego that for several months 

we worked together with the U.S. Attorney there and as a joint 

leadership between the FBI and OIG. The talks for a couple of 

months went ahead, and the U.S. Attorney agreed with us. But all 

the parties did not agree to that, so the U.S. Attorney has withdrawn from BCTF and has taken our cases directly. 

But having said that, there are several instances throughout the 

country, even though we have not signed an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the FBI on the BCTF, we are still working with them. So we are hopeful that we can resolve this and have 

CBP IA agents work under us and bring down the caseload. 

Senator PRYOR. From my standpoint this is just too important to 

get into a turf battle on. What you are talking about here is the 

security of our country and to make sure we do not have the corruption that may be rampant in other countries, but it is rare here. 

I just hope that you all will continue to work together to get this 

resolved. 

I have no idea, of course, what is in your proposed agreement, 

but, Mr. Bersin, certainly I know you just got it last night, so it 

is not fair to ask you about it today. But I hope that you all will 

look at it and continue to work to some understanding and get 

some agreement as quickly as possible. 

Mr. BERSIN. I am confident that we will continue to do that. As 

the Inspector General indicated, Secretary Napolitano has indicated very compellingly to both of us and to our offices that she expects a resolution. And as I said, I think for the most part we have 

a resolution as between our offices. What we need to do now is to 

see if we cannot take that spirit and create a whole-of-government 

approach. I do not think that it makes sense to see us in competition with the Department of Justice but, rather, to knit the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security into a 

satisfactory arrangement that maximizes our joint approach to the 

threat of border security and the challenges to that security posed 

by corruption. 

Senator PRYOR. I think if both of you are committed to working 

together and getting this done and closed I think that goes a long 

way. And like you, I appreciate Secretary Napolitano and her leadership on this. She and I have talked about this, and I know that 

she is concerned, and she knows I am concerned. So if you all can 

get this done as quickly as possible, I think it will do nothing but 

be a good thing for the country. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

16 

Let me ask just a few more questions—Mr. Bersin, let me start 

with you—on the current status today of the new hires receiving 

polygraphs. My understanding is you are not yet at 100 percent on 

the new hires. What percentage are you? And when will you get 

to 100 percent? 

Mr. BERSIN. In Fiscal Year 2011 we have polygraphed 22 percent 

of the applicants, and we currently are implementing a business 

plan that would move us from 35 polygraphers inside CBP to 52 

so that we can meet the January 2013 requirement set forth in the 

Anti-Border Corruption Act. 

We have solicited help from other Federal agencies in terms of 

providing polygraphers to us, and I am pleased to report to you 

that, as expected, the Federal law enforcement community has reacted by providing 20 additional polygraphers so that we can ramp 

up consistent with the business plan we have outlined. 

Senator PRYOR. Would that just be temporarily to help you with 

the backlog? Or you would retain those permanently? 

Mr. BERSIN. Those 20 would be temporary and help us until we 

built up our in-house capacity, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. And is there a concern about your backlog 

actually increasing at the beginning of 2011, 2012, and 2013? 

Mr. BERSIN. The challenge that we have is we have a fairly stable attrition rate, so we can project with some degree of certainty 

how many Border Patrol agents and how many CBP officers we are 

going to need to replace by reason of attrition. 

Where the challenges come in this year—but it is a challenge we 

welcome because it provides more border resources to accomplish 

the mission—is that the southwest supplemental bill, as you know, 

of $600 million provided that we hire an additional 1,000 Border 

Patrol agents and 250 CBPOs. The Fiscal Year 2012 budget provides an additional 350 CBP officers. So all of this gets added on 

to the attrition number that we replace each year, but that business plan that we have developed on polygraphers and on getting 

our periodic reinvestigations done, as well as the new background 

investigations, accounts for that bulge. 

Senator PRYOR. Once you get your backlog down to where it 

needs to be, do you see this as the backlog going away permanently? Or do you think it will rise again in the out-years? 

Mr. BERSIN. Senator, remember, CBP doubled in size between 

2004 and 2010, so what we are seeing in the issue of backlog really 

arises from this kind of jump in the size of the workforce, so that 

by the end of this year we expect to see 5,000 more periodic reinvestigations required because every 5 years we are required to do 

these investigations. So we will have to live through a period 

where, because of that steep slope in growth, we will see that same 

steep growth in the 5 years when the periodic reinvestigations are 

due, absent whatever attrition has taken place. 

What we need to develop within our agency is over the course of 

time we are going to need to even that out, and we are going to 

need to make some adjustments by having some periodic reinvestigations done in 3 years, some in 4 years, some in 5 years until 

we can actually get a much more even flow into internal affairs. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes, that makes sense. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

17 

Well, listen, I have some other questions. I think what I will do 

is submit those for the record. 

I appreciate both you all being here today, the fact that you are 

doing a better job and both of you are saying you are doing a better 

job in working together and coordinating and not having these internal struggles, I know we are not completely done yet, but I hope 

sometime soon we will get that written agreement done and everybody will be on the same page. So I want to thank you all for being 

here today. 

Like I said, we will have some additional questions for the 

record, and what we will do is we will keep the record open for 14 

days, and as Members of the Subcommittee may submit those, they 

will get them to Subcommittee staff, and we will get those to you, 

and we would just appreciate you getting those returned to us. 

Thank you very much for being here, and I want to again thank 

Senator Paul for his time here, and I look forward to working with 

him on this Subcommittee. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you. 

Mr. BERSIN. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 10:59 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

(19) 

A P P E N D I X 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.001
20 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.002
21 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.003
22 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.004
23 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.005
24 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.006
25 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.007
26 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.008
27 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.009
28 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.010
29 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.011
30 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.012
31 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.013
32 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.014
33 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.015
34 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.016
35 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.017
36 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.018
37 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.019
38 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.020
39 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.021
40 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.022
41 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.025
42 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.026
43 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.023
44 

Æ 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


68007.024