No. 233, September 2008 Strategic Forum 1

plans to consolidate basing structures and 

downsize the armed forces—has sparked 

serious criticism. Influential figures across the 

political spectrum have suggested, in effect, 

that the reforms will widen the gap between 

France’s defense and foreign policy ambitions 

and its limited capabilities.

At stake is more than the shape of 

France’s defense establishment. French policies, capabilities, and overseas commitments 

help to shape those of its European partners. 

Moreover, French influence remains consequential in regions beyond Europe, including 

parts of Africa. Thus, while the United States 

has limited ability to influence the French 

defense transformation, it has an important 

interest in the outcome.

“La grande nation” Still? 

French President Nicolas Sarkozy pledged 

that France “will remain a great military 

power” when he unveiled the White Book on 

Defense and National Security and endorsed 

its wide-ranging reforms.2

 The next day, a 

group of anonymous general officers condemned it as an “amateurish” and “incoherent” exercise that “cannot mask the downgrading of our military in a more dangerous world,” 

and former conservative Prime Minister Alain 

Juppé criticized Sarkozy’s intention to enhance 

France’s role in the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) as a “fool’s bargain.”3

Behind such rhetorical volleys lies the 

complex, costly, and occasionally humbling 

France has embarked on a transformation of its national security strategy, structures, capabilities, and relationships with 

Allies and other international partners. At its 

core, this transformation reflects a growing 

French consensus that globalization—especially the emergence of new, less predictable 

threats and vulnerabilities—has profoundly 

altered defense requirements since the last 

comprehensive review in the mid-1990s. But 

President Nicolas Sarkozy, faced with a large 

budget deficit, is determined to meet those 

requirements without near-term increases in 

defense spending.

The White Book on Defense and National 

Security, which Sarkozy commissioned in 

August 2007 and approved in June 2008, is 

designed to serve as the overall blueprint for 

the transformation process.1

 Supported by its 

analysis, Sarkozy has reiterated earlier highprofile policy shifts—his declared intent, for 

example, to see France “take its full place” in 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—and 

ruled on some contentious investment and reform issues. Other pieces of the transformation 

puzzle, notably the new 5-year defense budget, 

depend on parliamentary approval.

Domestic reaction has been mixed. The 

White Book’s description of the global security 

environment and French strategic priorities 

has generated relatively little controversy. 

However, the reform package—in particular, 

 Strategic Forum No. 233

September 2008

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Defense Transformation à la 

française and U.S. Interests

by Leo G. Michel

process of defense transformation à la française: the Sarkozy government’s attempt to 

refashion the strategy, structures, capabilities, and international engagements of the 

only European Ally, except for the United 

Kingdom, that aspires to be a global actor 

able to act independently, if needed, to promote or defend its interests.

Sarkozy launched the effort with ambitious terms of reference for the White Book: a 

prospective analysis, covering a 15-year horizon, of the international security environment 

and priority missions of French armed forces; a 

comprehensive strategy that emphasizes synergies between defense and nondefense structures 

and capabilities (such as economic and diplomatic tools) and between external operations 

and homeland defense; and recommendations 

on future force structure, equipment, financing, 

human resources, intelligence organization, 

and industrial and research policy.4

Moreover, the White Book was to be the 

product of a relatively transparent, inclusive, 

and bottom-up process—unlike the White 

Books of 1972 and 1994, which were essentially defense ministry products carefully 

guided by the president’s staff. To prepare the 

document, Sarkozy appointed a commission 

of some three dozen civil servants, military 

officers, parliamentarians and local elected 

officials (of the majority and opposition parties), and eminent representatives of civil society. He encouraged the commission to hold 

open hearings with French and international 
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specialists and to solicit public input through 

an Internet forum.

In some respects, the White Book fell short 

of expectations. Sarkozy effectively preempted 

the commission process on a few contentious 

issues—notably nuclear weapons policy, France’s 

future role in NATO, and whether to construct a 

second aircraft carrier. Some critics, including 

the aforementioned group of anonymous general officers, charged that the military’s viewpoints were not sufficiently represented in the 

commission’s work, although General Jean-Louis 

Georgelin, Chief of the Defense Staff and a commission member, asserted otherwise.

Still, the White Book placed on the table 

key questions facing the government and 

public that for too long had escaped critical 

analysis by all but a relatively small circle of 

officials and experts. The commission’s open 

hearings, Internet forum, and spinoff meetings held by defense-oriented think tanks created an important record for journalists and 

researchers and served as a welcome supplement to closed-door meetings with parliamentarians and military leaders.

France’s defense transformation is a work 

in progress. But based on the White Book, 

statements by government and military officials, and reactions from leading politicians 

and nongovernment analysts, a reasonably 

clear picture has emerged on three questions:

■ How do the French assess the future 

strategic environment?

■ How do they intend to adapt their 

strategy, capabilities, and international partnerships to deal with that environment?

■ What are the implications for the 

United States?

Threat Perceptions

The threats of international terrorism, weapons proliferation, and deepening 

ties between state and nonstate actors—

arrayed, according to the White Book, in 

an “arc of crisis from the Atlantic to [the] 

Leo G. Michel is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National 

Defense University. Comments or questions may be sent to the author at michellg@ndu.edu. 

Indian Ocean”—are at the top of French 

strategic concerns. Sarkozy has singled 

out terrorism as the “immediate threat” 

against France and called the Iranian 

“crisis”—referring to Iran’s suspected program to acquire nuclear weapons—as 

the “leading threat weighing on the world 

today.”5

 The White Book seems to go one 

step further, hinting at a possible causeand-effect relationship between a potential 

war “in one of the zones of European strategic interest” and a catastrophic terrorist 

attack on European territory.6

But French strategic concerns do not 

stop there. The White Book also evokes the 

possibility of sudden and “devastating” 

state-on-state crises in Asia and warns of 

volatile, nonmilitary threats ranging from 

cyberattacks to pandemics, mass migration (exacerbated by climate change), and 

interruptions in energy supplies. And while 

the White Book does not suggest that Russia 

poses a direct security threat to France, 

Russia is said to be staging a return on the 

international stage, using a disquieting 

mix of its “energy weapon” and political 

and security leverage on its neighbors—an 

assessment that likely has hardened in the 

wake of the Russian-Georgian conflict in 

August 2008.

According to the White Book, nearly all 

of these security concerns devolve from, or 

are accentuated by, globalization. Moreover, 

they contribute to a blurring of past distinctions between external and internal security. 

Indeed, French officials privately have acknowledged that one of the White Book’s key messages for the public is that French territory, 

while safe from invasion, can be directly targeted by an array of state and nonstate actors. 

This is another change from the 1994 White 

Book, which focused on external military operations and paid scant attention to links between 

domestic security and external threats.

Strategic Themes

Not surprisingly, the country’s national 

security interests, as defined by the White 

Book, follow classical lines in French strategic thinking: defending France’s territory and population; assuring its contribution to European and international security; 

and protecting its democratic principles, 

such as individual liberty and human dignity. However, the White Book’s concept of 

“national security strategy” is broader than 

previous government formulations, since 

it encompasses external security as well as 

internal security and advocates integration 

of military and nonmilitary means (such 

as diplomatic and economic tools) to confront “all risks and threats that can harm the 

nation’s life.”

Like the White Book’s threat assessment, neither the definition of national 

security interests nor the need for an integrated national security strategy has provoked serious domestic debate. Still, the 

White Book contains noteworthy shifts in 

strategic emphasis.

Foremost among these are the articulation and prioritization of five “strategic functions” necessary to respond to increasingly 

volatile and unpredictable crises. The “knowledge-anticipation” function—which covers a 

range of intelligence and other informationgathering, analysis, and forecasting activities—is to receive special priority, given its 

importance to all defense and national security–related decisionmaking, missions, and 

military, intelligence, and police services. The 

threats of international 

terrorism, weapons 

proliferation, and 

deepening ties between 

state and nonstate actors 

are at the top of French

strategic concerns
No. 233, September 2008 Strategic Forum 3

White Book emphasizes that greater investment in, and more efficient organization of, 

the knowledge-anticipation function is critical 

to preserving French “autonomy”—a theme 

that appears repeatedly, explicitly or implicitly, 

throughout the document.

Two other strategic functions, “prevention” and “protection,” underscore the 

need for improved interagency and international coordination in the application of diplomatic, economic, financial, military, and 

rule of law capabilities across the spectrum 

of crisis management, including emergency 

response to manmade or natural threats to 

the French homeland.

The “intervention” function reflects an 

evolution in French thinking on the criteria 

for military action. As a rule, previous official 

statements regarding such criteria were cast 

in broad terms to give decisionmakers (above 

all, the president) the widest possible discretion. The White Book, however, offers somewhat more systematic criteria. For example:

■ The document posits a clear demarcation between situations where unilateral 

military action is “plausible”—these are the 

protection of French citizens overseas, implementation of bilateral defense accords, and a 

specific, fast-breaking event “directed against 

[French] interests”—and “all other cases,” 

where French intervention will take place in a 

multilateral framework with “the legitimacy 

conferred by international law.”

■ It states that, given the uncertain international environment, France must shape 

its defense structure keeping in mind that its 

engagement in a state-on-state conflict “can 

still be envisaged.” Thus, it rejects the notion 

of organizing French forces to perform only 

stabilization missions.

■ The document also establishes seven 

criteria, or “directing principles,” to determine the legitimacy and effectiveness of a 

French military intervention. Some are unexceptional, such as the requirements to explore 

all other options before the use of force 

and, if force is necessary, to apply it within 

“respect for international legality.” Another, 

however, suggests that interventions need 

not be tied directly to the defense of French 

“national interests.” And still another suggests that the “democratic legitimacy” of an 

intervention is just as important as its international legality.

Official statements on French nuclear 

doctrine traditionally have been opaque, 

and the White Book is no exception. Indeed, 

leading French strategists argue that “strategic ambiguity”—that is, an element of 

unpredictability in the French response—

strengthens deterrence. The “dissuasion” 

function described by the White Book deals 

exclusively with nuclear weapons issues and 

tracks closely with Sarkozy’s earlier pronouncements.7

 France’s nuclear deterrent 

remains the “ultimate guarantee of national 

security and independence” to be used for 

“strictly defensive” purposes. Consistent with 

past official declarations, the White Book 

affirms that to exercise deterrence and make 

clear its determination to safeguard “vital 

interests,” France will maintain the capability to “proceed to a nuclear warning.”

The White Book, however, does not tie the 

president’s hands. True, it appears at times to 

limit the application of deterrence—and, by 

extension, the possible use of nuclear weapons—to an act of aggression by another 

state. However, it does not specify that only 

a nuclear aggression would trigger a French 

nuclear response. Moreover, it also emphasizes the president’s responsibility to determine the “limits of [French] vital interests in 

a world that is constantly changing and where 

there will be many attempts to go around our 

means of defense and security.” While ambiguous, the formulation hints that the president 

would enjoy a degree of flexibility in deciding whether to exercise a nuclear option in 

response to a catastrophic attack originating 

from the territory of another state but not necessarily sanctioned by the latter’s government.

Acting Alone or with 

Others? 

A longstanding tenet of France’s defense 

policy has been that it must maintain the 

capability to act alone if its bilateral agreements or vital interests should so dictate. 

However, the practical as well as political limits on military operations taken in a 

“national framework” (that is, unilaterally) 

have narrowed over the past decade. That 

the White Book would deal carefully with 

this inconvenient truth comes as no surprise, 

given the strong attachment of the French 

polity to the notion of “independence.” 

Indeed, the document suggests that increasing French “freedom of action” is a core 

objective of military strategy.

Nevertheless, the White Book strongly 

implies that, in practice, French military operations undertaken on a national basis would 

henceforth be limited to “special” operations 

(for example, to free hostages or pursue terrorists) and “middle-scale” operations (evacuation of nationals in a nonpermissive environment). “Significant” operations (peacekeeping 

or peace enforcement) would be undertaken 

either in a bilateral or multinational framework, and “major” operations (high-intensity joint and combined warfare taking place 

at considerable distance from France) would 

necessarily take place as part of an alliance 

or coalition. In the latter case, the White Book 

further specifies that France must be able to 

serve as a “framework nation”—that is, capable of commanding a joint and combined 

force; lead any one of its components (land, 

air, maritime, special forces); and be among 

the “first entry” forces.

In this context, the White Book specifies 

that France must be capable of simultaneous

deployment of the following forces:

■ A force of some 30,000 soldiers, able 

to be deployed in 6 months and sustained 

for 1 year, for operations ranging from several “lesser included” contingencies (such 

France’s nuclear deterrent 

remains the “ultimate 

guarantee of national

security and 

independence” to be 

used for “strictly 

defensive” purposes
4 Strategic Forum No. 233, September 2008

and sustain them for at least a year in operations ranging from humanitarian and rescue to peacekeeping or separation of warring parties. The White Book also suggests 

that the EU should be able to simultaneously 

plan and conduct two to three peacekeeping 

or peace enforcement missions and several 

civilian ESDP operations in different theaters. 

Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, addressing an EU Presidency seminar on NATO–EU 

relations in July 2008, seemed to raise the 

bar even higher.10

On the other hand, these ambitious 

objectives for ESDP are coupled with a formidable list of EU capability shortfalls, including strategic and tactical air transport; 

refueling aircraft; common intelligence platforms (including space-based) and analysis capability; rapidly deployable nonmilitary 

personnel (such as police, judges, and border 

customs and logistics experts); and “autonomous” operational planning and command 

and control capabilities.

French officials have long hectored fellow 

EU members to significantly increase their 

defense spending, especially in investment 

and operational accounts, and frequently 

have carped at their unwillingness to do so. 

But over the past year, French military leaders also have become more outspoken regarding the serious strains on French and other 

EU members’ resources. For example, General 

Henri Bentégeat, former Chief of the Defense 

Staff and now chairman of the EU Military 

Committee, acknowledged in December 

2007 that in terms of European forces available for overseas interventions, “We are close 

to the limit, not in theoretical capacity, but 

in acceptability by the public and financial 

responsibility.” And General Georgelin stated 

in May 2008, “We have a pressing obligation 

to build European defense, but make no mistake, it will involve more costs than savings 

for a long time to come.”11

A growing appreciation for the limits of ESDP likely has reinforced Sarkozy’s 

moves toward rapprochement with NATO, 

which eventually would include boosting 

France’s relatively limited participation in 

its military structures.12 His principal motivation is said to be political in nature: to 

reinforce the transatlantic links—and 

as limited stabilization or peacekeeping 

operations) to an extended stabilization 

mission or a major regional conflict. While 

this is a reduction from the existing “operational contract” of 50,000 soldiers, which 

French officials have acknowledged is unrealistic, the new target nevertheless represents approximately twice the number of 

French military currently deployed on overseas operations.

■ A force of some 5,000 soldiers for 

“autonomous” quick reaction in a separate 

theater, with another force of up to 10,000 

soldiers to respond, in support of civilian 

agencies, to an emergency on French territory. The latter, in particular, would represent 

a sizeable expansion of existing capabilities.8

■ An air component of some 70 combat aircraft capable of a “high” operational 

tempo during initial stages of a major conflict and a “sustained” tempo during a stabilization phase, with some 10 combat aircraft 

available for a rapid and “autonomous” (that 

is, national or French-led) external operation.

■ An aircraft carrier task group (with 

aircraft, escort ships, and nuclear submarines) and one or two amphibious or maritime security groups available for various 

force projection missions.9

European Union and NATO 

Considerations. In the event of a “major” 

operation, the French appear to prefer working with NATO and/or the United States rather 

than a European Union (EU) framework. For 

“significant” operations, either a NATO or an 

EU framework might be preferred, depending 

on the political and military context at hand. 

The White Book eschews a neat division of 

labor between NATO-led and EU-led military 

operations, perhaps reflecting concerns within 

the defense establishment regarding the level 

of ambition attributed to the EU’s European 

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) by their 

civilian leadership.

On one hand, the White Book suggests 

rejuvenating the EU’s “Helsinki headline 

goal” agreed to in 1999, that is, the capability to deploy up to 50,000 to 60,000 military to a distant theater within 60 days, along 

with necessary air and maritime components, 

especially bilateral relations between France 

and the United States—that were badly 

stressed over the invasion of Iraq; and to 

garner greater support among European 

Allies for the French vision of ESDP.

French proponents of a closer relationship with NATO have long bemoaned their 

public’s limited understanding of how the 

Alliance works and France’s role within its 

structures, but they have begun working to 

correct that problem. The White Book offers 

the most comprehensive official exposition to 

date of the strategic rationale for Sarkozy’s 

policy shift toward NATO. Describing NATO 

as “essential to French security,” the White 

Book emphasizes that the Alliance has transformed itself over the past 15 years, permitting France to steadily increase its participation in civilian and military structures as 

well as force generation for NATO-led operations and the NATO Response Force (NRF) 

without encumbering sovereign control of its 

military forces. The White Book also emphasizes the complementary relationship between 

NATO and ESDP and acknowledges, in effect, 

that France’s limited participation in NATO 

military structures does not enhance its stature or influence with the other 20 EU member states that belong to NATO and participate 

fully in those structures.

Although the White Book does not 

explicitly recommend a course of action—

according to press reports, a few commission members disagreed on the NATO 

issue—it notes that French “engagement 

in NATO has no a priori limit, provided 

there are safeguards for the independence 

of [French] nuclear forces, freedom of opinion for [French] authorities and freedom of 

decision regarding engagement of [French] 

the Alliance has 

transformed itself over 

the past 15 years, 

permitting France to 

steadily increase its 

participation in civilian 

and military structures
No. 233, September 2008 Strategic Forum 5

forces.” And to counter conservative and leftist critics who argue that a French “return” 

to NATO would constitute an unacceptable 

“alignment” with U.S. policies, Sarkozy has 

reminded the public that “[t]his alliance 

between Europeans and the United States is 

also—this is not said enough—an alliance 

among the European nations.”13

Some French military officers have speculated privately on pragmatic advantages of their 

increased participation in NATO structures. 

These include the possibilities of exercising 

operational command of an EU mission conducted under NATO–EU “Berlin Plus” arrangements, a role reserved for the Deputy Supreme 

Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR); and 

operational command of an NRF mission, a 

role currently reserved for a commander of 

NATO’s joint force commands in Brunssum and 

Naples and joint command in Lisbon. Some 

advisors also apparently believe that increased 

French participation in NATO’s operational and 

defense planning structures would enhance 

interoperability with the U.S. and other allied 

militaries and afford greater French influence over the strategic direction of the Alliance. 

Moreover, given the overlapping NATO and EU 

membership, interoperability and capability 

improvements generated through NATO would 

benefit ESDP as well.14 The White Book does not 

discuss such considerations, however; nor have 

they been part of the public debate.

Indeed, French officials are inclined to 

play down the practical implications of full 

French participation in NATO structures, perhaps calculating that domestic resistance 

would be muted if the policy shift were perceived as more symbolic than substantive. 

Others grudgingly accept rapprochement 

with NATO as a potentially important political card but contest its practical value. One 

former French Permanent Representative to 

NATO recently told a parliamentary commission that while France should insist on top 

military posts, placing “600 French officers 

in NATO command structures, as mentioned 

in press reports, would be absurd.”15

Much will depend on how the Sarkozy 

government approaches detailed discussions 

on where, when, and at what level France 

might increase its presence in NATO structures. 

Among French opinion leaders, support for any 

change likely will remain lukewarm, at best. 

This probably accounts, in part, for the differing emphasis in official statements on this subject. For example, Sarkozy spoke in seemingly 

definitive terms at NATO’s Bucharest Summit of 

“completing the transformation of the French 

role in NATO.”16 However, when unveiling the 

White Book, he reiterated previous statements 

suggesting that achieving important advances 

on ESDP during the French EU presidency (July 

through December 2008) is a precondition of 

movement on NATO. In the event Sarkozy cannot credibly claim an ESDP success at the end 

of the French EU presidency, his domestic critics 

will no doubt remind him of that precondition.

Moreover, in the wake of base closures 

and personnel reductions at home, the prospect of assigning up to several hundred officers and noncommissioned officers to NATO 

staff billets and increasing French contributions to the organization’s civilian and military budgets will be politically delicate, absent 

a more concerted effort to convince parliamentarians and other opinion leaders of the 

value-added—for intra-European and transatlantic cooperation—of such a move. While 

domestic factors will tend to push Paris to seek 

several prestigious flag officer posts in NATO, 

other Allies sympathetic to a greater French 

role—including France’s key European military partners, the United Kingdom and 

Germany—will be wary of French “overreaching.” One solution might be to adopt a 

phased approach, providing for a scheduled 

increase in French command responsibilities and a multiyear rotation arrangement for 

some key posts, such as the DSACEUR position 

traditionally held by a European flag officer.

Africa’s Significance. According to 

the White Book, Africa will remain a top strategic concern for France, especially as its 

many security challenges—from regional and 

ethnic conflicts to terrorist threats (particularly in the Sahel), drug trafficking, and mass 

dislocation of populations—have direct and 

indirect impact on French interests. The conditions of French military presence, however, 

are set to change. Bilateral agreements negotiated in the early postcolonial period, some 

of which contained confidential provisions for 

French intervention to maintain public order, 

will be scrapped; new agreements, based on a 

more cooperative partnership, will be negotiated and, for the first time, submitted to the 

French parliament for approval.

The White Book also foresees an adjustment of French “prepositioned” military 

forces in Africa, where France currently stations some 4,900 personnel under bilateral 

agreements with three countries—Djibouti, 

Senegal, and Gabon. (As of July 2008, another 

5,000 personnel were engaged in operations 

in Africa, principally in Côte d’Ivoire, under 

United Nations auspices, and Chad, under separate bilateral and EU auspices.) Specifically, 

the prepositioned forces are to be reorganized 

around two “poles”—likely to be Djibouti 

and, possibly, Senegal—that will serve, in 

part, as support bases for expanded aerial 

and maritime surveillance activities in their 

respective regions. In addition, French military assistance, training, and cooperation 

activities in Africa are to be better integrated 

with other security sector reforms (involving 

police, gendarmerie, and judicial bodies) and 

increasingly embedded in regional partnerships (with organizations such as the African 

Union) and EU-led efforts.

Capabilities Conundrum

By far, the most intensely debated aspect 

of the defense reform effort involves its reprioritization of capabilities and associated 

allocation of resources.

In the course of the White Book’s 

preparation, complaints over shortfalls in 

needed capabilities and training were raised 

with unaccustomed candor. For example, 

in May 2008, a respected retired general 

the most intensely 

debated aspect of 

France’s defense 

reform effort involves 

its reprioritization of 

capabilities and 

associated allocation 

of resources
6 Strategic Forum No. 233, September 2008

Notwithstanding pledges by Sarkozy and 

Defense Minister Morin, it is not certain that 

these capabilities targets will be met due, in 

large part, to resource and structural constraints. Sarkozy’s government inherited a 

difficult situation: to fully execute all of the 

defense investment programs begun by its predecessor, the investment budget would have 

required an injection of an additional 2 to 3 

billion euros annually during 2009–2010 and 

4 to 5 billion euros annually beginning in 

2011.19 This was patently impossible, given the 

size of the government’s deficit—at the time 

of the White Book’s release, the deficit was 

expected to reach 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by the end of 2008—and 

political pressure to spread cutbacks across the 

entire government.

Sarkozy has pledged not to reduce the 

defense budget (36.8 billion euros in 2008, 

including pensions, or around 2 percent of 

GDP), adding that he would adjust it as necessary to keep pace with inflation. But he also 

has stated that his government cannot afford 

to increase defense spending in real terms 

before 2012, when he promises to begin a 1 

percent annual real increase.20

Morin’s far-reaching organizational 

reforms—to include increased outsourcing, 

rationalizing administrative services, and pooling top ministry and military service staffs in 

a new “French Pentagon” in southern Paris—

are intended to reduce the “tooth to tail” 

imbalance, with the expected savings to be 

invested in new capabilities. Yet even when coupled with the projected consolidation of some 

450 military installations to some 90 multirole 

defense bases, the promised savings from organizational reforms might be difficult to realize.

One reason is that parliamentarians 

and local officials, including those within 

and land forces commander, Jean-Claude 

Thomann, blamed a “mediocre financial 

situation and pressures from aerospace, 

naval and nuclear lobbies” for systematically underfunding the army. “Today,” he 

wrote in a leading daily, “we have the least 

well-equipped ground units in the West, as 

our soldiers can attest when alongside their 

peers in Afghanistan.”17

The government, for its part, has not 

hidden important challenges in the area of 

capabilities. The White Book lists the high 

average ages of obsolescent major land, sea, 

and air platforms. Defense Minister Hervé 

Morin has complained openly about “worn 

out” equipment, inadequate training (“a 

Leclerc tank regiment operates its vehicles 

for an average of two hours a week”), and 

a defense manpower system that devotes 60 

percent of its personnel to general administration or support functions and only 40 

percent to operational forces.18

To correct capability gaps and position 

French forces to meet projected threats out to 

2025, the White Book emphasizes the following:

■ Intelligence/space. A major effort will 

be made to expand and modernize French 

observation, communications, signals intelligence, and missile early-warning satellites, 

in cooperation with EU partners where possible. This will involve a doubling of annual 

national funding, now at 380 million euros, 

for this purpose, and the creation of a dedicated Joint Space Command (under air force 

management) to oversee space-related doctrine, operations, and programs.

■ Nuclear deterrent. The principal modernization programs for the maritime and aviation components of the nuclear force will be 

maintained; these include deployment, beginning in 2010, of a new submarine-launched 

intercontinental ballistic missile for France’s 

four ballistic missile submarines and, beginning 

in 2009, deployment of a new air-ground missile to be carried by Rafale and Mirage 2000 aircraft. Consistent with French declaratory policy of maintaining the nuclear force at a level of 

“strict sufficiency,” the aviation component will 

be reduced by one-third (from 60 to 40 aircraft). 

These moves will bring the total of nuclear warheads to fewer than 300. Simulation programs 

(for weapons reliability and safety in the absence 

of nuclear explosive testing) and efforts to 

improve missile range and precision will be pursued. Although the White Book does not provide 

budget projections in this area, nuclear weapons 

programs currently represent approximately 20 

percent of defense investments.

■ Army. Land forces will be configured 

for full-spectrum operations, capable of transitioning from “first entry” and high-intensity 

combat to stabilization missions. Modernization priorities will include force protection (for 

example, armored vehicles, anti–improvised 

explosive device equipment, and nuclear-chemical-biological-radiological defense) and additional mobility (for example, transport helicopters.) The French goal is to be capable of 

commanding a corps-size land component in 

a major operation and form the backbone of a 

reinforced NATO division (two or three French 

brigades plus one or two allied brigades). Over 

the next 6 to 7 years, however, army personnel 

will be reduced from 157,000 (including 26,000 

civilians) to 131,000; the latter figure will 

include an “operations” pool of 88,000 soldiers.

■ Air Force. The air component will 

be modernized and downsized to consist of 

300 Mirage 2000 and Rafale aircraft, including those dedicated to a nuclear role. Other 

modernization priorities will include some 70 

A400M strategic transporters (deliveries are projected to begin in 2010–2011), some 14 refueling aircraft, and 4 airborne warning and control aircraft. The air force is to be capable of 

commanding a joint forces air component 

command and projecting a 1,500-man force, 

with associated equipment, up to 8,000 kilometers within 5 days. Personnel will be reduced 

from around 63,000 (including nearly 5,000 

civilians) to 50,000 over the next 6 to 7 years.

■ Navy. In addition to its nuclear role, 

the navy’s modernization priorities will 

include new nuclear attack submarines, antisubmarine warfare frigates, deep-strike naval 

cruise missiles, and command and control ships. Like its army and air force counterparts, the navy is to be capable of commanding a maritime component command. 

Meanwhile, the navy is slated for the deepest 

personnel cuts—from some 55,000 (including nearly 10,000 civilians) to 44,000.

Sarkozy has pledged not 

to reduce the defense 

budget, adding that he

would adjust it as 

necessary to keep pace 

with inflation
No. 233, September 2008 Strategic Forum 7

Sarkozy’s political family, have warned that 

the base consolidation will deal a hard blow 

to their constituents; many will press for 

expensive compensation packages from the 

government beyond the 340 million euros in 

assistance promised to local governments in 

metropolitan France and its overseas departments and territories. Meanwhile, some 

defense industry experts fret that reduced 

equipment orders will increase unit costs, 

inhibit investments in leading technologies, 

and hurt arms exports.

An additional complicating factor: French growth and deficit projections 

used to calculate projected defense spending have worsened since the White Book’s 

release. As of late August, official estimates 

of GDP growth for 2008 dropped from 2.25 

percent to a range of 1.7 to 2 percent, with 

private economists predicting it will not 

surpass 1.3 percent. And according to press 

reports, the overall government deficit likely 

will remain close to the theoretical EU limit 

of 3 percent of GDP.21

Moreover, Sarkozy’s endorsement of 

the White Book’s recommendation to cut 

personnel is drawing fire, especially from 

within army ranks. Morin’s assurance that 

such cuts will not degrade operational commitments in Afghanistan, the Balkans, 

Africa, and Lebanon reportedly has not 

convinced some senior military officers. 

Indeed, some officers privately complained 

of overstretch and inadequate equipment 

even before Sarkozy promised, in April, to 

dispatch 700 soldiers to reinforce NATO 

in eastern Afghanistan. Thomann likely 

echoed their sentiments when he observed 

ruefully, “While our American and British 

friends, learning the lessons of operations 

for which they are paying in blood, step 

up their defense effort to benefit their land 

forces, we are preparing to take the opposite course.”22 Similarly, in their published 

critique, the anonymous officers argued 

against the projected downsizing of the 

navy and air force, even warning, “We are 

abandoning Europe’s military leadership 

to the British who, everyone knows, have a 

special relationship with the United States. 

From now on, France will play in the same 

league as Italy.”23

Implications for the 

United States

The United States has important 

interests in the success of French defense 

transformation. In terms of operations, the 

French and American militaries cooperate 

today—most importantly, in Afghanistan 

and Kosovo—and no doubt will cooperate in the future in diverse missions, theaters, and frameworks inside and outside Europe. To do so, they must be able 

to communicate, exchange information, 

train together, offer mutual support, and, 

when needed, fight side by side. Extensive 

cooperation between the United States and 

France also exists in an array of nonmilitary areas important to the national security of both countries, including intelligence, counterterrorism, and emergency 

response to civil disasters.24

Moreover, French defense and national 

security policies and capabilities influence, 

directly or indirectly, those of other key U.S. 

Allies and partners. Political or tactical differences between Washington and Paris periodically surface in NATO, NATO–EU relations, and operational theaters, as they do, 

on occasion, with other Allies. Yet overall U.S. 

interests are better served by a more capable, 

responsive, and cooperative French defense 

and national security structure that encourages other Europeans, through deeds as well 

as rhetoric, to increase their military capabilities and make them available for NATO as well 

as EU missions. It would be an overstatement 

to suggest that the U.S. route to a more capable European partner goes through Paris, notwithstanding the latter’s clout in the EU. But it 

would be wrong to underestimate the benefits 

of greater convergence between American and 

French approaches to defense issues.

The question for U.S. policymakers 

remains: Does the transformation process 

promised by the White Book stand a good 

chance of producing the desired effects? 

The answer depends, of course, on how the 

Sarkozy government executes its design. 

While the overall direction of the French 

transformation process is positive from a 

U.S. perspective, some aspects might be 

problematic and bear watching.

Greater Strategic Convergence.

The White Book’s description and prioritization of future threats are similar to 

those found in key U.S. strategy documents. 

Potential linkages between international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction were acknowledged by 

the previous French government, but arguably with less emphasis. This is true, as well, 

for the treatment of Iran. French officials 

point out, for example, that the White Book’s 

graphic depicting Iranian ballistic missile 

capabilities represents the first time that an 

authoritative French government publication 

estimates that Iranian missiles could reach 

most of Europe by 2015.

In this context, leading French strategists seem to have adjusted their view of 

the United States. Under previous governments, official statements and assessments 

commonly hinted at risks posed by a seemingly unconstrained or overconfident United 

States—a problematic “hyperpower,” according to former Socialist Foreign Minister 

Hubert Védrine. This is no longer the case. 

The White Book warns against underestimating American dynamism, but nonetheless 

suggests that over the next 15 years, one likely 

will see several changes: a relatively diminished U.S. capacity to shape global events, due 

in part to the rising influence of China and 

a more assertive Russia; a shift in American 

focus from Europe toward pressing crises in 

the Middle East and Asia; and, albeit less certain, a more inward focus among part of the 

American population. And leading French 

strategists, like many of their American counterparts, are increasingly attuned to the 

national security implications of growing 

global competition from non-Western powers 

French strategists are 

increasingly attuned to 

the national security

implications of growing 

global competition from 

non-Western powers
8 Strategic Forum No. 233, September 2008

for energy supplies and other raw materials 

as well as the effects of climate change.

The White Book’s assessment of a more 

diverse, less predictable threat environment 

and, at least implicitly, a reduced U.S. global 

dominance buttresses its call for greater 

French and European investment in military 

and civilian capabilities across the spectrum 

of crisis prevention, intervention, stabilization, and reconstruction. This approach tracks 

closely with growing U.S. Government emphasis on the need for better coordination among 

all the tools of American power—including 

diplomatic, financial, economic, intelligence, 

and military tools—as well as among principal international actors (such as NATO, the 

EU, the United Nations, and nongovernmental 

organizations) to prevent conflict, minimize 

its consequences if conflict is unavoidable, 

and begin reconstruction as soon as possible in the postconflict phase. Hence, the perceived gap between French preference for “soft 

power” wherever possible and the presumed 

U.S. predilection for “hard power” appears to 

have narrowed. Pushed together by changing circumstances and lessons learned in the 

Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, 

Paris and Washington have joined forces in 

support of a “Comprehensive Approach” to 

complex stabilization operations, even if they 

do not always agree on its specific modalities.

Improved Capabilities. Having 

encouraged the European Allies over many 

years to restructure their forces and defense 

budgets in ways that produce more deployable and interoperable capabilities to handle post–Cold War contingencies, the United 

States has reason to welcome the overall 

White Book approach. In particular, France’s 

intention to improve its capabilities to participate in the full spectrum of military operations is good news; among the European 

Allies, only the United Kingdom has a comparable range of capabilities. If the White 

Book’s targets for air forces (combat as well 

as transport, aerial refueling, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) 

and naval forces are met, France will have a 

substantial additional capability to conduct 

and sustain expeditionary operations alongside U.S. forces in an Alliance, coalition, or 

bilateral framework.

The effects of the proposed restructuring 

of land forces are less certain. The promised 

capabilities enhancements would improve, 

over time, French flexibility and effectiveness in stabilization operations such as 

Afghanistan. If, however, the army’s military 

personnel bear the lion’s share of the planned 

reductions, it is not clear that the current 

level of French operational commitments in 

areas of interest to the United States can be 

sustained indefinitely, much less expanded.25

French plans to double annual funding for space-related programs and to seek 

increased EU support for such programs 

bear watching. The French argument that 

improved intelligence-gathering and communications capabilities are essential to 

their—and EU—decisionmaking “autonomy” is not new; nor is the implied suggestion that U.S.-supplied intelligence or 

other space-based data, such as the Global 

Positioning System, might not always be reliable or available to meet French or EU priorities. Moreover, French officials, experts, and 

industrial leaders make no secret of their 

desire to boost France’s leadership role in 

European space efforts, and increased French 

government and EU funding for spacerelated programs of national security interest 

stands to produce technological spinoffs for 

commercial purposes.

However, other key EU players might not 

share French enthusiasm for large injections of 

funds for space-related programs ostensibly for 

intelligence-gathering, especially when their 

defense budgets are straining to meet near-term 

operational needs. Moreover, some EU governments already have shown impatience with 

French proposals—for example, within the 

European Defense Agency—that appear to disproportionately favor French industry. In addition, broader European support for French 

space-related programs depends, in part, on 

U.S. policies and practices affecting intelligence 

exchanges in bilateral and/or multilateral 

channels; such support likely will be inversely 

related to European perceptions of U.S. “openness” in this sensitive area.

The White Book’s passing mention of 

missile defense indicates that there will be no 

near-term change in French policy to support NATO “architecture” studies of a possible Alliance-wide system while avoiding any 

commitment to its construction. According to 

French officials, their government does not 

oppose missile defense, which it has come to 

believe can complement deterrence. They add, 

however, that numerous technological and 

command and control issues (including rules 

of engagement) need further consideration, as 

do issues involving cross-border implications, 

such as the possible effect of debris from intercepted missiles and warheads. Some have intimated as well that the potential cost of missile 

defense systems is by far the major impediment to significant French investment in 

this area, although the White Book does call 

for reinforcing French missile detection and 

warning capabilities.

Contributions to NATO. Notwithstanding self-imposed limitations on their participation in NATO structures, the French have 

made important force contributions to Alliance 

operations, especially in the Balkans and 

Afghanistan, at times serving as force commander for those operations. France also has 

been a major contributor to the land, air, and 

maritime components of the NRF. In addition, France’s expeditionary orientation, regional 

expertise (for example, in parts of Africa), and 

willingness to exhort fellow Europeans to meet 

their political commitments to improved military 

capabilities, multilateral cooperation, and rationalization in defense industries complement U.S. 

policies in many ways.

Increased French participation in 

Alliance structures—or, as a senior French 

officer has put it, ending his country’s “one 

foot in, one foot out” status—likely would not 

produce any significant short-term boost in 

their troop contributions to NATO operations 

but likely would help the Alliance over time.

26

the perceived gap 

between French 

preference for “soft 

power” and the presumed 

U.S. predilection for 

“hard power” appears to 

have narrowed
No. 233, September 2008 Strategic Forum 9

An influx of talented French officers and noncommissioned officers into the integrated 

military structure would bring additional 

command and planning skills that stand to 

improve NATO performance in its increasingly 

demanding and complex operations.

Similarly, on the civilian side, if France 

were to return to its seat on the Defense 

Planning Committee (or a refashioned and 

renamed committee that fulfills essentially similar functions), it could improve 

the coherence of the force planning process 

through which NATO identifies the military 

requirements—in terms of national force 

levels, structures, readiness, and capabilities—to meet the level of ambition agreed by 

the Alliance political leadership and periodically reviews Allies’ performance in meeting 

their agreed force goals.

The Alliance’s transformation as a 

whole would benefit from a more positive 

and proactive French engagement. As Morin 

acknowledged in September 2007, “We are 

too often those who quibble and bargain 

as if we wanted to appear to prevent NATO 

from transforming itself.”27 In the coming year, NATO is expected to launch the 

process of reformulating a new Strategic 

Concept. Although U.S. and French positions might differ on specific issues likely 

to be covered in a new Strategic Concept, 

a higher French profile in NATO structures 

probably would give Paris a greater stake in 

a successful outcome.

Similarly, while French officials have 

not publicly floated their vision of a new 

headquarters and command structure, they 

appear sympathetic to such a realignment 

and reductions in NATO’s military staffs. 

This would open the possibility of close U.S. 

and French cooperation with other Allies to 

update NATO structures in ways that improve 

efficiency and equitably redistribute responsibilities and burdens. And in line with the 

White Book analysis and Sarkozy’s declarations, fuller French participation in NATO 

more than likely would facilitate rather than 

inhibit an improved NATO relationship with 

the EU. Indeed, French officials insist that 

improved NATO–EU relations are an important goal of their EU presidency.

In addition, there are two areas where 

an evolution in French strategic thinking, 

as reflected in the White Book, might open 

interesting possibilities affecting France’s role 

in NATO and U.S. interests.

One possibility involves nuclear weapons issues. The White Book notes that France 

is the only Ally that does not participate in 

NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), but 

recalls previous NATO statements recognizing that the French deterrent contributes to 

“the overall deterrence and security of the 

Allies.”28 Those statements, according to the 

White Book, “continue to be the only references as far as the relationship between [the 

French] deterrent force and NATO’s nuclear 

doctrine are concerned”—a phrase intended 

to signal, according to some French analysts, 

that France would not join the NPG. At the 

same time, the White Book states that France 

proposes to conduct a “dialogue on the role 

of deterrence and its contribution to common security” with interested “European 

partners.” As written, the proposal does not 

specify whether any such dialogue would be 

conducted bilaterally or multilaterally, but 

several EU member states (including states 

that, in their Alliance capacity, participate 

in the NPG) have made known their objection to discussing nuclear matters within an 

EU context.

The White Book’s proposed “dialogue” 

might be interpreted as an acknowledgment 

that public support for nuclear deterrence 

appears to be waning in Europe, including 

in key French partners such as Germany. The 

French government probably has a strong 

interest in stopping any such trend, given 

its longstanding wariness of even rhetorical 

commitments to nuclear disarmament and its 

commitment to modernizing its deterrent.

Should French officials conclude that 

European political support for nuclear 

deterrence is under serious strain, they 

might reconsider the merits of joining a 

NATO body where nuclear issues can be 

discussed. This might be a renamed and 

restructured NPG that includes a remit on 

counterproliferation and missile defense 

policy—areas where France has keen interests. In this way, France could help sustain a European consensus on the need for 

a nuclear component as part of a broader 

NATO deterrence and defense strategy. 

Moreover, this could be done, in principle, 

without crossing any of the White Book’s 

“red lines” regarding respect for French 

nuclear “independence” and “autonomy.” 

In this regard, the United Kingdom (UK) 

policy on nuclear issues might be a relevant 

model for France, as it underscores that 

“decision-making and use of the [nuclear] 

system remains entirely sovereign to the UK 

[and] only the Prime Minister can authorize the use of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, 

even if the missiles are to be fired as part of 

a NATO response.”29

A second possibility involves Africa. 

As the White Book makes clear, France 

will prefer to use the EU, wherever possible, to leverage European cooperation on 

African security matters. That said, EU 

member states have an uneven commitment to engagement in Africa, particularly 

involving military operations. As a former 

senior EU official recently wrote, “It is not 

only the Germans who will look for a hidden national agenda when France advocates a European intervention in Africa.”30

Meanwhile, the Sarkozy government 

appears more inclined than its predecessor to work bilaterally or in ad hoc arrangements with the United States in African 

security matters. Over the past year or so, 

for example, France has been an active participant in the U.S.-led African Partnership 

Station initiative to improve maritime 

safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea.

France has been leery of any NATO 

involvement in Africa. However, after a rocky 

start in mid-2005, French officials reportedly came to appreciate NATO’s role (loosely 

coordinated with the EU) in assisting African 

the Alliance’s 

transformation as a 

whole would benefit 

from a more positive 

and proactive 

French engagement
10 Strategic Forum No. 233, September 2008

Union peacekeepers in Darfur. More recent 

French frustrations with EU force generation for its current “autonomous” operation 

in Chad and the Central African Republic 

might spur Paris to reconsider the merits of improved NATO–EU coordination in 

African contingencies and capacity-building efforts. Among other advantages, NATO’s 

involvement might facilitate cooperation 

with the recently established U.S. Africa 

Command (USAFRICOM), which, under current U.S. policy guidelines, does not coordinate directly with the EU. If the Allies were to 

agree on a prominent French role in African 

affairs within a reconfigured NATO command structure, this might be an additional 

incentive for Paris to improve NATO–EU 

cooperation in this increasingly important 

region. In principle, this would not foreclose 

the option of direct coordination between 

USAFRICOM and Europeans who provide 

concrete and valuable assistance in Africa; 

such an option would apply, for example, to 

a specific case where NATO would focus its 

involvement on areas where it adds value 

while others, such as the EU, work in a parallel and coordinated fashion to deliver comprehensive international assistance.

No Quick Fixes

When former President Jacques Chirac 

announced plans to downsize and professionalize the French armed forces in 1996, he 

encountered stiff pockets of resistance across 

the political spectrum and parts of the military establishment. For many, the short-term 

negative impacts of personnel reductions 

and base closures at a time of relatively high 

unemployment outweighed the prospects of a 

French military better adapted to meet post–

Cold War contingencies. In retrospect, however, the Chirac reforms, while imperfect and 

chronically underfunded, produced a more 

capable and deployable force.

That Sarkozy’s more ambitious transformation agenda has had a mixed reception is 

hardly surprising. In some respects, the current French president faces even greater challenges than his predecessor. French operational commitments are more demanding and 

expensive than a decade ago. In Afghanistan, 

for example, the French military in recent 

months has expanded its presence in regions 

and operations that involve more frequent 

and intense contact with opposing militant forces. Despite the serious losses suffered 

by French forces in late August, few mainstream political and opinion leaders have 

called for a withdrawal of troops, although 

worries about the nature of French participation in the International Security Assistance 

Force and long-term prospects for stabilizing Afghanistan are clearly mounting.31

Meanwhile, French peacekeeping commitments in Africa and Lebanon are not risk-free 

or likely to end any time soon.

Even absent a new shock to the strategic environment, the realignment of French 

defense structures and investment budgets 

will take years, in some cases, to produce 

appreciably greater capabilities. Meanwhile, 

French aspirations for a more capable 

and ambitious EU defense dimension will 

depend on parallel engagement by their 

major European partners. It is premature 

to judge whether the French EU presidency 

will produce hard-and-fast commitments 

to boost near-term military capabilities in 

critical areas, but relatively low (and, in 

some cases, declining) European defense 

budgets do not bode well for dramatic progress. Moreover, French officials might find 

it harder to rally EU members to do more 

if their own defense establishment is perceived as “hitting the wall.”

The United States, for its part, can play 

a positive but limited role in French defense 

transformation. Increased military-to-military 

contacts in the context of operations (as in 

eastern Afghanistan), training exercises, and 

concept development are helpful in promoting better bilateral—and, in turn, Alliancewide—interoperability. High-level U.S. statements of support for EU defense capabilities, 

an expanded French role in NATO structures, 

and a complementary NATO–EU relationship 

have helped Sarkozy handle domestic critics; their judicious repetition during the U.S. 

Presidential transition would improve chances 

of a “win-win” outcome at the NATO Summit 

in April 2009. (Such statements are welcomed, 

as well, by many European officials anxious 

to see greater French participation in NATO.) 

In addition, a visible and credible U.S. commitment to a two-way street in transatlantic 

defense industrial trade and technology flows 

would counterbalance those in France and 

elsewhere in Europe who favor defense cooperation programs within the EU that could disadvantage U.S. competitors.

In the end, however, France’s defense 

transformation fundamentally depends on 

a sustained national commitment, in political support and necessary resources, to the 

goals set by Sarkozy and the White Book. In 

presenting the White Book, the French president acknowledged that protests and demonstrations likely will ensue but insisted that his 

government would stay the course. France’s 

Allies will be watching closely to see if it does.

Notes

1 “Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale,” June 17, 2008. All references to the “Livre blanc” 

(White Book) are drawn from the integral French version 

available at <www.defense.gouv.fr/livre_blanc/les_conclusions__1/le_livre_blanc_l_integrale/le_livre_blanc_l_

integrale__1>.

2 “Speech of the President of the Republic on Defense 

and National Security,” June 17, 2008, available at <www.

elysee.fr/documents/index.php?mode=cview&press_

id=1568&cat_id=7&lang=fr>.

3 “Surcouf,” “Livre blanc sur la défense: une 

espérance déçue,” Le Figaro, June 18, 2008; see also, “Le 

scud d’Alain Juppé contre la politique de défense de 

Nicolas Sarkozy,” Le Monde, June 19, 2008.

4 White Book, 336. This Strategic Forum focuses on 

defense issues. The Sarkozy government also is overhauling governmental structures to improve intelligence, crisis 

management, and coordination among defense and domestic security ministries and agencies, and several of these 

reforms are recommended in the White Book.

5 “Speech of the President of the Republic.”

6 White Book, 39.

7 Ibid., 69–70. Sarkozy perhaps never intended the 

White Book commission to reexamine fundamental questions 

even absent a new 

shock to the strategic 

environment, the 

realignment of French 

defense structures and 

investment budgets 

will take years
No. 233, September 2008 Strategic Forum 11

related to French nuclear weapons. He pointedly noted, in an 

August 2007 speech to commission members, that “dissuasion remains an absolute imperative on which I already have 

clearly pronounced [my views].” Available at <www.elysee.

fr/documents/index.php?mode=cview&press_id=262&cat_

id=7&lang=fr>.

In a March 2008 speech in Cherbourg, Sarkozy underscored his personal authority over the nuclear dossier by outlining 

his views on deterrent strategy, announcing a cutback in fixed-wing 

nuclear delivery capabilities, and proposing modest additional steps 

related to nuclear nonproliferation and arms reductions. Available 

at <www.elysee.fr/documents/index.php?mode=cview&press_

id=1203&cat_id=7&lang=fr>.

8 Under the “Vigipirate” plan launched in 1995, some 

1,000 military personnel would be available for ground operations inside France in the event of a “red alert” of serious and multiple attacks. See French Defense Staff Web site, 

available at <www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/enjeux_defense/

missions_interieures/vigipirate/vigipirate>.

9 Ibid., White Book, 221–222. In May 2008, Sarkozy 

announced he would delay, until 2011–2012, his decision on 

whether to construct a second aircraft carrier.

10 Statement by Bernard Kouchner to EU presidency 

seminar on NATO–EU relations, July 2, 2008, available at <www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_830/

onu-organisations-internationales_1032/organisationsinternationales-europe_1126/otan_1134/seminairehaut-niveau-ue-otan-7-juillet-2008_19024/discours-m.

bernard-kouchner_64303.html>.

In his remarks, Kouchner said that over the next 

decade the EU should be capable of simultaneously (emphasis added) conducting two large stabilization operations of up 

to 10,000 military personnel each, for at least 2 years, with a 

civilian component for reconstruction work; two rapid reaction operations for a limited duration, using the 1,500-man 

EU battlegroups; an emergency evacuation operation for EU 

citizens; an air or maritime interdiction operation; a civilmilitary humanitarian assistance mission lasting 90 days; 

and around 10 civilian police and justice missions. The first 

two categories alone would involve up to 23,000 troops—

approximately four times the number of troops engaged in 

ESDP operations (in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chad, and the 

Central African Republic) as of August 2008.

11 For Henri Bentégeat’s statement, see his interview with Europolitics, December 14, 2007. For Jean-Louis 

Georgelin’s, see his speech to French parliamentary conference “Peace and Defense” on May 14, 2008, available at 

<www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/layout/set/print/content/view/

full/127539>.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Patrick M. Cronin

James A. Schear Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press

12 For further background and figures on French military presence in NATO structures, see Leo G. Michel, “Getting 

to Oui,” in International Politik (Global Edition), May 2008, 

and “NATO’s ‘French Connection’: Plus ça change?” Institute 

for National Strategic Studies monograph, April 13, 2007. 

Both available at <www.ndu.edu/inss>.

13 “Speech of the President of the Republic.”

14 In addition to the 21 EU members that belong to 

NATO, 5 EU members—Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and 

Sweden—are members of Partnership for Peace and (except 

for Malta) participate, to varying degrees, in NATO-led operations and other military activities.

15 Statement by Benoit d’Aboville before the National 

Assembly Commission on National Defense and Armed 

Forces, June 3, 2008, available at <www.assembleenationale.

fr/13/cr-cdef/07-08/c0708031.asp>.

16 Statement at Bucharest Summit, April 3, 

2008, available at <www.elysee.fr/documents/index.

php?mode=cview&press_id=1243&cat_id=7&lang=fr>.

17 Jean-Claude Thomann, “Ménace sur notre capacité 

militaire,” Le Monde, May 13, 2008.

18 See White Book, 210; and Hervé Morin, “Prenons 

une défense d’avance,” Le Monde, June 17, 2008. Morin 

compared the French performance with the United Kingdom, 

which he asserted has a 40:60 ratio of administrative and 

support personnel to operational personnel.

19 Statement by Morin before the National Assembly 

Commission on National Defense and Armed Forces, April 15, 

2008, available at <www.assembleenationale.fr/13/cr-cdef/07-08/

c0708023.asp>.

20 “Speech of the President of the Republic.” The White 

Book uses the 36.8 billion euros figure (p. 289), including 6.7 

billion euros in pensions. The overall defense ministry budget, including gendarmerie costs and pensions, approximates 

44 billion euros, but most of the gendarmerie force is devoted 

to domestic security missions. Although Sarkozy and Morin 

have used the 2 percent of GDP figure to describe the French 

defense effort, the figure would be closer to 1.7 percent if pensions and most of the gendarmerie figure were excluded. 

Authoritative French Defense Ministry figures on defense 

expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (using 

NATO and non-NATO definitions) are found in the Annuaire 

statistique de la défense 2007/2008, available at <www.

defense.gouv.fr/sga/content/download/121455/1062606/file/

annuire_stat_2008_chap5.pdf>.

21 “Endettée et peu compétitive, la France n’a 

guère de marge de manœuvre face au ralentissement de 

l’activité,” Le Monde, August 18, 2008.

22 Thomann, “Ménace sur notre capacité militaire.”

23 “Surcouf,” “Livre blanc sur la défense: une 

espérance déçue.”

24 See, for example, Dana Priest, “Help from France Key 

in Covert Operations,” The Washington Post, July 3, 2005.

25 According to Morin, his ministry downsized by 

6,000 employees in 2008 by replacing only a part of departing personnel; of these, 5,000 were military and 1,000 

were civilians. If the same ratio were applied to the proposed army reductions of some 26,000, the total number of 

active duty soldiers will drop from some 120,000 to around 

100,000—or only 12,000 above the planned “operations” 

pool of 88,000. While defense ministry officials claim that 

the reductions of uniformed soldiers will affect only “back 

office” personnel, some French defense experts point out 

that logistics and administrative functions performed by soldiers—as opposed to civilian functionaries or contractors—

are relevant to operational needs.

26 Interview with Bentégeat, Le Figaro, September 26, 2007.

27 Speech by Morin at Toulouse Summer Defense 

Conference, September 11, 2007, available at <www.defense.

gouv.fr/ministre/prises_de_parole/discours/discours_de_m_

herve_morin_ministre_de_la_defense_toulouse_le_11_septembre_2007>.

28 See “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” April 1999, 

available at <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>. 

See also “The Ottawa Declaration,” June 1974, available at 

<www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b740619a.htm>.

29 Ministry of Defence, “The Future of the United 

Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent: Defence White Paper 2006,” 

available at <www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/

CorporatePublicationsPolicyStrategyandPlanning

/HeFutureOfTheUnitedKingdomsNuclearDeterrent

DefenceWhitePaper2006cm6994.htm>.

30 Nick Witney, “Re-energising Europe’s Security and 

Defence Policy,” European Council on Foreign Relations, July 

29, 2008, available at <www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/european_

security_and_defence_policy>.

31 The French suffered 10 deaths and 21 wounded in 

combat on August 20, 2008—the bloodiest day for the army 

since 9 soldiers were killed and some 30 wounded in the 

bombing of Bouaké (Côte d’Ivoire) in November 2004. Before 

the recent incident, France had lost a total of 14 soldiers in 

Afghanistan since 2001.
12 Strategic Forum No. 233, September 2008

The Caucasus: Charting a New Course

Eugene B. Rumer

(Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

Occasional Paper 6, forthcoming) 

Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for 

Civil-Military Relations

Patrick M. Cronin

(Strategic Forum No. 234, forthcoming)

Energy Security in South Asia: Can 

Interdependence Breed Stability?

Joseph McMillan

(Strategic Forum No. 232, September 2008)

The Role of Medical Diplomacy in 

Stabilizing Afghanistan

Donald F. Thompson

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 63, 

May 2008)

International Partnerships to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Paul I. Bernstein

(Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Occasional Paper 6, 

May 2008)

Choosing War: The Decision to Invade 

Iraq and Its Aftermath

Joseph J. Collins

(Institute for National Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper 5, April 2008)

China’s Rising Influence in Asia: 

Implications for U.S. Policy

Ellen L. Frost, James J. Przystup, and 

Phillip C. Saunders

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Time: Ecological Models and 

Counterinsurgency Operations 

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Robert E. Armstrong

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February 2008)

After the Surge: Next Steps in Iraq?

Judith S. Yaphe

(Strategic Forum No. 230, February 2008)

Cyber Influence and International 

Security

Franklin D. Kramer and Larry Wentz

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 61, 

January 2008)

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