NWS Central Region Service Assessment

Joplin, Missouri, Tornado – May 22, 2011

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

National Weather Service, Central Region Headquarters 

Kansas City, MO

July 2011
Cover Photographs

Left: NOAA Radar image of Joplin Tornado. Right: Aftermath of Joplin, MO, tornado courtesy 

of Jennifer Spinney, Research Associate, University of Oklahoma, Social Science Woven into 

Meteorology.
ii

Preface

On May 22, 2011, one of the deadliest tornadoes in United States history struck Joplin, 

Missouri, directly killing 159 people and injuring over 1,000. The tornado, rated EF-5 on the 

Enhanced Fujita Scale, with maximum winds over 200 mph, affected a significant part of a city 

with a population of more than 50,000 and a population density near 1,500 people per square 

mile. As a result, the Joplin tornado was the first single tornado in the United States to result in 

over 100 fatalities since the Flint, Michigan, tornado of June 8, 1953.

Because of the rarity and historical significance of this event, a regional Service Assessment 

team was formed to examine warning and forecast services provided by the National Weather 

Service. Furthermore, because of the large number of fatalities that resulted from a warned 

tornado event, this Service Assessment will provide additional focus on dissemination, 

preparedness, and warning response within the community as they relate to NWS services. 

Service Assessments provide a valuable contribution to ongoing efforts by the National Weather 

Service to improve the quality, timeliness, and value of our products and services. Findings and 

recommendations from this assessment will improve techniques, products, services, and 

information provided to our partners and the American public.

Lynn P. Maximuk

Director, Central Region

National Weather Service

July 2011
iii

Executive Summary

On May 22, 2011, one of the most devastating tornadoes in the nation‘s history directly killed 

159 people and injured over 1,000 in Joplin, Missouri. From a National Weather Service (NWS) 

perspective, this was essentially a ―warned‖ event in that advance notice of the tornado was 

given, critical information was communicated and received, and most people sought the best 

shelter available to them. The timely actions of the ‖weather enterprise‖ (NWS, media, 

emergency management), and the eventual response of local businesses, churches, schools, and 

the general public undoubtedly saved many lives.

The NWS Springfield Weather Forecast Office was wellprepared and performed in an exemplary 

manner in both its provision of services and its application of scientific expertise. The 

professionalism and dedication of the staff members is clearly a credit to the communities they 

serve. 

Still, to learn what more can be done to help reduce fatalities from strong and violent tornadoes, 

the assessment team examined relevant issues ranging from internal NWS warning operations to 

dissemination strategies to public warning response. To help accomplish this, nearly 100 

interviews were conducted in Joplin with tornado survivors, local businesses, media, emergency 

management, NWS staff, city officials, and others.

Many of the key findings within this report involved societal aspects of warning response and 

risk perception. Responding to warnings is not a simple act of stimulus-response, rather it is a 

non-linear, multi-step, complex process. Relationships between false alarms, public 

complacency, and warning credibility are highly complex as well. 

The vast majority of Joplin residents did not immediately take protective action upon receiving a 

first indication of risk (usually via the local siren system), regardless of the source of the 

warning. Most chose to further assess their risk by waiting for, actively seeking, and filtering 

additional information. 

The reasons for doing so were quite varied, but largely depended on an individual‘s ―worldview‖

formed mostly by previous experience with severe weather. Most importantly, the perceived

frequency of siren activation in Joplin led the majority of survey participants to become 

desensitized or complacent to this method of warning. This suggests that initial siren activations 

in Joplin (and severe weather warnings in general) have lost a degree of credibility for most 

residents – one of the most valued characteristics for successful risk communication. 

Instead, the majority of Joplin residents did not take protective action until processing additional 

credible confirmation of the threat and its magnitude from a non-routine, extraordinary risk 

trigger. This was generally achieved in different ways, including physical observation of the 
iv

tornado, seeing or hearing confirmation, and urgency of the threat on radio or television, and/or 

hearing a second, non-routine siren alert. 

This report suggests that in order to improve warning response and mitigate user complacency, 

the NWS should explore evolving the warning system to better support effective decision 

making. This evolution should utilize a simple, impact-based, tiered information structure that 

promotes warning credibility and empowers individuals to quickly make appropriate decisions in 

the face of adverse conditions. Such a system should: 

a. provide a non-routine warning mechanism that prompts people to take immediate life-saving 

action in extreme events like strong and violent tornadoes

b. be impact-based more than phenomenon-based for clarity on risk assessment

c. be compatible with NWS technological, scientific, and operational capabilities

d. be compatible with external local warning systems and emerging mobile communications 

technology

e. be easily understood and calibrated by the public to facilitate decision making

f. maintain existing ―probability of detection‖ for severe weather events

g. diminish the perception of false alarms and their impacts on credibility

While the weather enterprise was generally successful in communicating the Joplin tornado 

threat in a timely manner, current communication and delivery mechanisms are not seamless and 

are somewhat antiquated. Specifically, many warning dissemination systems are not fully 

compatible with specific warning information provided by storm-based warning polygons—

occasionally resulting in untimely gaps and confusion during dissemination. To improve the 

warning dissemination system and provide a more coordinated warning message, the NWS 

should continue to advance the development and cultivate the use of GPS-based mobile 

communications technologies and Emergency Alert System/NOAA Weather Radio upgrades. 

Last, an important impediment to heightening the urgency of the severe weather message from 

the Weather Forecast Office was the WSR-88D Volume Coverage Pattern strategies available to 

forecasters. Low level rotational intensification and tornado genesis occurred very rapidly as the 

storm approached Joplin. Limited scans (every 5 minutes) at the lowest elevations slices likely 

impacted the WFO ability to quickly ascertain the magnitude of the event. To enhance the 

ability to monitor rapid tornado genesis, the NWS should develop and implement additional 

Volume Coverage Pattern strategies that allow for more continuous sampling near the surface 

(e.g., 1-minute lowest elevation sampling). 
v

Table of Contents

Introduction and Background ......................................................................................................1

Societal Aspects of Risk Perception and Warning Response.....................................................3

Methodology ................................................................................................................................4

Risk Signals: Receiving and Understanding the Warning ..........................................................4

Perception, Processing and Personalizing the Threat...................................................................6

Triggers for Decisions to Act.......................................................................................................7

Taking Protective Actions............................................................................................................9

Conclusions................................................................................................................................10

Warning Communications, Dissemination, and Community Preparedness..........................11

Storm-Based Warnings and Local Warning Dissemination Systems........................................11

NWSChat as a Coordination Tool..............................................................................................14

Community Preparedness...........................................................................................................14

WFO Springfield Products and Services...................................................................................15

Storm Prediction Center (SPC) Products and Services ...........................................................18

WFO Springfield Warning Operations .....................................................................................20

Appendices

Appendix A: Radar Imagery .....................................................................................................24

Appendix B: Upper Air Observations.......................................................................................27

Appendix C: Operational Enhanced Fujita (EF) Scale .............................................................28

Appendix D: Findings, Recommendations, and Best Practices................................................29

Appendix E: Acronyms.............................................................................................................33

Appendix F: Assessment Team Members.................................................................................34
1.Introduction and Background

On May 22, 2011, one of the most devastating tornadoes in the nation‘s history directly killed 

159

1

people and injured over 1,000 in Joplin, Missouri. The Joplin tornado was the first single 

tornado to result in over 100 fatalities since the June 8, 1953, Flint, Michigan, tornado.

The tornado was rated EF-5 on the Enhanced-Fujita Scale, with its maximum winds estimated at 

more than 200 mph. The path of the entire tornado was 22.1 miles long and was up to 1 mile in 

width. The EF-4/EF-5 damage path was roughly 6 miles long from near Schifferdecker Avenue

along the western portions of Joplin to near Interstate 44 east of Joplin, and generally 1⁄2 to 3⁄4 of a 

mile wide along the path (Figure 1). 

Figure 1: Storm Track and Intensities for May 22, 2011, Joplin Tornado

Because this was a warned event with an unusually high number of fatalities, this Service 

Assessment was initiated for the primary purpose of learning what more could be done to further 

limit fatalities and injuries from EF-4/EF-5 tornadoes. To this end, the assessment focus was on 

communication, dissemination, community preparedness, and the public warning response 

leading into and during the event. The assessment team interviewed over 60 survivors; local 

emergency management for Joplin and surrounding areas; local print, radio, and television 

media; NWS employees; Joplin city officials; fire and law enforcement dispatchers; and 

employees and patrons from area businesses, schools, and hospitals. In total, this was nearly 100 

 

1 As of the date of this report, there were 159 direct fatalities and 3 indirect fatalities. 
2

interviews. This report attempts to synthesize the most common responses, and occasionally 

highlight other responses that offer important insights. 

Not surprisingly, there was a full spectrum of responses on most key interview points, especially 

on issues concerning how people perceived and responded to warnings. For example, some 

people took shelter in appropriate locations, but did not survive. Others mistakenly drove their 

vehicles into the tornado path, but somehow lived to tell of it. 

Also, while these interviews and the assessment efforts sought insights on how to reduce violent 

tornado fatalities, it is worth noting that the actions of the ―weather enterprise‖

2

, local businesses, 

churches, schools, and the general public undoubtedly saved many lives on May 22, 2011. 

Generally speaking, advance warning of the tornado was given, information was communicated 

and received, and most people sought the best shelter available to them. It is difficult to quantify 

these impacts and place them in historical context with other comparable tornadoes. 

Several key decision points along the warning and response timeline are referred to throughout 

this report. As background, these are listed below in Table 1, Figure 2 (tornado warning 

polygons) and Appendix A (radar observations). 

130 pm CDT – NWS/SPC Tornado Watch issued for Southwest Missouri in effect until 900 pm

CDT

509 pm CDT - WFO Springfield Tornado Warning Polygon #30 issued for Western Jasper County 

MO (including northeastern Joplin) in effect until 600 pm CDT

511 pm CDT – Initial 3 minute siren alert sounded for Jasper County and Joplin

517 pm CDT – WFO Springfield Tornado Warning Polygon #31 issued for southwest Jasper 

County MO (and Joplin), northwest Newton County MO and southeast Cherokee County (KS) in 

effect until 600 pm CDT

534 pm CDT – Approximate initial Tornado touchdown 1⁄2 mile southwest of JJ Highway and 

Newton Road (southwest of Joplin City limits)

538 pm CDT – Second 3 minute siren alert sounded for Jasper County and Joplin. EF-4 Damage 

begins as tornado approaches Schifferdecker Avenue in western Joplin

548 pm CDT – WFO Springfield Tornado Warning Polygon #32 issued for southern Jasper County 

MO (including Joplin), northern Newton County MO and western Lawrence County MO in effect 

until 630 pm CDT

Table 1: Key Timeline of Events for Joplin Tornado Event 

 

2 Throughout this report, ―weather enterprise-‘‖ refers collectively to NWS, media, and emergency management. 
3

Figure 2: Tornado Warning polygons prior to and during the Joplin tornado and the 

tornado damage path

2. Societal Aspects of Risk Perception and 

Warning Response

A major portion of the Joplin Tornado Service Assessment was dedicated to understanding the 

societal response to NWS warnings and external local warning systems. The Service 

Assessment team went to Joplin, Missouri, between June 7-9, 2011, to interview residents about 

how they received, processed, and responded to the warnings leading up to the May 22 tornado. 

Finding #1: Recent NWS Assessments have addressed societal impacts of warnings, most 

notably the “Super Tuesday Tornado Outbreak of Feb. 5-6, 2008” and the “Mother‟s Day 

Weekend Tornado Outbreak of 2008.” Many of the societal impacts uncovered in previous 

Service Assessments were also evident in Joplin, suggesting the NWS should take a more 

aggressive stance in addressing warning response.

Recommendation #1: For future Service Assessments, NWS should plan a more structured 

approach to collecting information on societal aspects of warning response. This should include 

developing subteams well-versed in social science and NWS warning operations that can be 

quickly deployed to the field following any given severe weather disaster. 
4

a. METHODOLOGY

In order to meet the Assessment objectives, the team utilized ethnographic methods or 

techniques commonly used by social scientists to scientifically describe cultures and the people 

within these cultures3. In particular, the team strove to understand residents‘ points of views 

regarding the process of warning reception to warning response, and how decisions were made. 

The team carried out a series4of semi-structured interviews with residents and local businesses:

in-person, over the phone, or in group settings. Semistructured interviewing is a method of 

inquiry based on the use of an interview guide to provide consistency between interviewers, 

providing a menu of questions or topics that need to be covered in a particular order.This method

is useful in situations where interviewers have only one opportunity to conduct an interview. 

Questions for this Assessment were formulated in such a way as to minimize the influence of the 

interviewer, and perhaps most importantly, to allow each person to define the content of the 

discussion they felt was important. 

The findings in this Service Assessment represent a local case study, meaning that the societal 

responses to warnings that are described in this Assessment are meant to reflect the trends 

present in this particular sample. Because of limited sample size and distribution, interview 

responses are largely characterized in general terms, and occasionally in specific terms to 

highlight useful insights.

b. RISK SIGNALS: RECEIVING AND UNDERSTANDING THE WARNING

Response to severe weather warnings is a complex, non-linear process depending on perception 

of risk. Perception of risk is influenced first and foremost by the method in which the risk is 

communicated. The warnings, or risk signals5, that aroused Joplin residents‘ attention, prompted 

their belief in the threat of the tornado and informed their decisions to act included, in no 

particular order: broadcasts made on television and radio, NWS watches and warnings obtained 

via commercial and government web pages, the activation and deactivation of the 1st siren, the 

activation of the 2nd siren; text messages, posts to social media networking sites, information 

transmitted over NOAA Weather Radio (NWR), observations of the physical environment, and 

messages from family, friends, neighbors, and coworkers. Each of these signals, independently 

or in combination, were processed in varying ways over differing amounts of time, heightening 

 

3

Spradley, James P. (1979) The ethnographic interview. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston (17)

4 The results shared in this section of the report are based on the perspectives of 54 residents of Joplin. Nine of the 

63 interviews were not included because they were either second-hand accounts, wind interfered with the audio 

recording, or the interview did not contain relevant data.

5 Kasperson, Jeanne X., Roger E. Kasperson, Nick Pidgeon, and Paul Slovic (2003). The social amplification of risk: 

assessing fifteen years of research and theory. In The Social Amplification of Risk. N. Pidgeon, R. E. Kasperson and 

P. Slovic. (eds). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 13-46.
5

or diminishing perceptions of threat. 

Finding #2a: For the vast majority of surveyed Joplin residents, the first risk signal for an 

imminent severe weather threat came via the local community siren system. As a result, there 

was a significant degree of ambiguity associated with the first alert regarding the magnitude of 

the risk, the seriousness of the warning, and its potential impact. 

This did not necessarily mean that residents exclusively relied on these systems for their weather

information, only that the sirens were their first indication of a risk. 

In Joplin, it is community policy to sound sirens when either a tornado is reported to be moving

toward Joplin or severe thunderstorm winds are expected to exceed 75 mph. These triggers may 

or may not be associated with an NWS warning, and the Jasper County/Joplin Emergency 

Manager has discretion and uses professional judgment on when to activate sirens. These types 

of local warning system policies are by no means unique to Joplin. 

Once the decision is made to activate sirens, they are sounded in one, 3-minute burst and then 

shut off. For those that used the sirens as the initial alert tool, there was no way to immediately 

discern the magnitude and nature of the threat, or its potential impact. This lack of information 

makes it difficult for warning recipients to calibrate the severity of the situation, thus delaying 

their response. Also, several of those interviewed expressed confusion associated with the 

single 3-minute siren alert, thinking the threat was over once the sirens had ceased. 

Conceptually, warnings could be defined broadly as the number and combination of risk signals 

each person received and processed prior to their decision to take protective action. 

The interviews indicated that individuals received anywhere between two and nine risk signals

from the time they were aware of the possibility of severe weather to the time they engaged in 

protective action. This drastic difference is explained by a) the differing lengths of time that 

passed from first indication of threat to taking protective action, b) the differing ways individuals

received risk signals and interpreted the situation as threatening, and c) the effect of conflicting 

risk signals. 

The number of signals between first indication of severe weather and protective action markedly 

increased as information became conflicted or unclear. In the most extreme example, one 

resident‘s interview indicated nine risk signals identified before taking protective action:

1. Aware that thunderstorms were probably going to happen

2. Noticed the weather changing outside

3. Heard the 1st siren while driving to restaurant (approximately 30-minute lead time)

4. Restaurant shut doors and disallowed entry

5. Drove to a 2nd restaurant where business was carrying on as usual

6. Noticed the weather changing

7. Reports came from TV and radio
6

8. Patron indicated tornado in Joplin

9. Management instructed protective action

In this example, signals 4 and 5 are significant in that they heightened and diminished this 

resident‘s perception of risk, respectively. Once the restaurant shut its doors and refused entry,

this resident perceived the threat of severe weather as real and commented during the interview 

that he did not want to be in his car. Upon arriving at another restaurant close by, however, his 

perception of threat was diminished because business at this second establishment was carrying 

on as normal: he was escorted to a table and ordered a meal.

c. PERCEPTION, PROCESSING AND PERSONALIZING THE THREAT 

Finding #2b: The majority of surveyed Joplin residents did not immediately go to shelter upon 

hearing the initial warning, whether from local warning sirens, television, NWR, or other 

sources. Instead, most chose to further clarify and assess their risk by waiting for, actively 

seeking, and filtering additional information. 

In order to gain a sense for how social models of understanding influenced perceptions of risk 

and warning response, particular attention was paid to the ―worldviews‖ held by residents. 

Worldview6is defined as an overall perspective of how people interpret their environment or the 

world around them – and is generally informed by things like one‘s experience, education, and 

cultural values. 

Interviews showed aspects of worldview that influenced risk perception and warning response 

included: previous experiences with tornadoes, apathy, familiarity with seasonal weather 

patterns in southwest Missouri, optimism bias, perceived frequency of siren activation in Joplin,

social networks as mechanisms for warning dissemination, avid fear of tornadoes, and the 

number of deadly tornadoes earlier in the year. 

Previous experiences with tornadoes were shown to have an influence in the way residents 

perceived their risk and responded to the warnings. As one resident indicated, the tornado he 

experienced prepared him mentally for appropriate response action during this event. Another 

resident commented that time spent in Oklahoma City made him complacent to the possibility of 

a tornado in Joplin. 

Similarly, familiarity with seasonal weather in southwest Missouri played a major role in risk 

perception and warning response. Most individuals commented that severe weather in southwest 

Missouri during spring is common; however, tornadoes never affect Joplin or themselves 

 

6 Roncoli, Carla, Keith Ingram, Christine Jost and Paul Kirshen (2003) ―Meteorological Meanings: Farmer‘s 

interpretation of seasonal rainfall forecasts in Burkina, Faso.‖ In Weather, climate, culture. S. Strauss and B. Orlove 

(eds). Oxford; New York: Berghahn Books. Pp. 181-200.
7

personally. It was common in the interviews to hear residents refer to ―storms always blowing 

over and missing Joplin,‖ or that there seemed like there was a ―protective bubble‖ around 

Joplin, or ―there is rotation all the time, but never in Joplin.‖. One city employee stated, ―... 

don‘t think it can‘t happen in your community, because that‘s what I thought.‖ This sense in 

which people believe their personal risk from a hazard is less than the risk faced by others is 

referred to as optimism bias and can lead to diminished perceptions of threat and influence 

response. 

Although not as common, social networks as mechanisms for warning dissemination were found 

to generally amplify perceptions of risk and lead to warning response. For example, one woman 

reported eating dinner with family, receiving a text message about the tornado, and then 

receiving a phone call shortly after informing her of a storm travelling through Joplin. This 

heightened the woman‘s belief that a threat existed and prompted her and her family members to 

take shelter at the restaurant.

Similar to seasonal weather patterns, the perceived frequency of siren activation (false alarms) 

led an overwhelming number of participants to become desensitized or complacent to this 

method of warning. Many noted that they ―hear sirens all the time[sirens] go off for dark 

clouds,‖ they are ―bombarded with [sirens] so often that we don‘t pay attention,‖ ―the sirens have 

gone off so many times before,‖ ―sirens are sounded even for thunderstorms,‖ and ―all sirens 

mean is there is a little more water in the gutter.‖

The diminished severity or absence of a threat (complacency) held by Joplin residents can be 

understood as resulting from their normalization of the threat. Normalized responses toward 

severe impacts are likely to occur in groups frequently exposed to hazardous weather7. The same 

could be said for residents in Joplin who, based on their perceived frequent exposure to local 

warning systems (and NWS warnings) during spring, normalized their reactions to the activation 

of the first siren and characterized it as just another aspect of springtime in Joplin. 

Finding #2c: Familiarity with severe weather and the perceived frequency of siren activation 

not only reflect normalization of threat and/or desensitization to sirens and warnings, but they 

also establish that initial siren activation has lost a degree of credibility for many residents.

Credibility is considered to be one of the most valued characteristics for effective risk 

communication8.

 

7

Bankoff, Greg (2007)  ̳Living with risk; coping with disasters: hazard as frequent life experience in the 

Philippines‘. Education about Asia. 12(2): 26-29

8

Trumbo, Craig W., and Katherine A. McComas (2003) ―The functionality of credibility in information processing 

for risk perception.‖ Risk Analysis 23(2): 343-353.
8

It should be noted that stakeholders in the warning process, such as media or Emergency 

Managers, were less likely to think over-warning or desensitization to NWS warnings was an 

issue. During interviews, Emergency Managers in particular felt the frequency of warnings was 

appropriate, while media staff were split with some saying ―most warnings were  ̳cry wolf,‘‖, 

while others emphasized the importance of advance warning for all tornadoes regardless of false 

alarms. In general, these groups have a sense of obligation for the safety of their constituents 

which influences their worldview of the warning process and risk perception.

TRIGGERS FOR DECISIONS TO ACT

Though risk signals tended to elevate awareness, there were certain signals that stood out, added 

important credibility to the warning, and acted as triggers in prompting a belief in the threat and 

taking protective action. 

Finding #2d: The majority of surveyed Joplin residents did not take protective action until 

receiving and processing credible confirmation of the threat and its magnitude from a nonroutine trigger. 

While searching for additional information concerning the severe weather threat constitutes 

―taking an action,‖ the actions many residents described taking were not the immediate lifesaving measures desired with the issuance of a tornado warning. In most cases, these life-saving 

actions, or the decision to find shelter, were associated with additional extraordinary risk signals. 

This was generally achieved in different ways, including:

a. Physical observation of the environment (seeing the tornado approach). 

While significant numbers of people actually did this, the approach was complicated by 

having a ―rain-wrapped‖ tornado that made the tornado more difficult to recognize until it 

was very close. There were numerous accounts of people running to shelter in their 

homes just as the tornado struck, despite significant advance warning of the risk. 

b. Seeing or hearing confirmation of the threat on radio or television, seeing the large 

tornado on the air, or hearing on-air instructions to ―take cover now.‖ 

When the tornado began moving into Joplin, most local electronic media switched to 

―wall-to-wall‖ coverage of the event, which included live video from tower-cams. As 

coverage quickly evolved, and the magnitude of the event became clear, on-air

commentators implored those in the path to take cover immediately. This kind of media 

coverage helped convey the seriousness and urgency of the situation, and prompted many 

listeners and viewers to find shelter.

c. Hearing a second, non-routine, siren alert at approximately 538 pm CDT. 
9

It is the Joplin emergency management policy to sound the sirens onetime for a severe 

weather alert. Because of the length of time that had elapsed since the initial siren alert, 

and as reports came into central dispatch of a tornado moving into Joplin, the Emergency 

Manager made the decision to activate the local warning sirens a second time. This 

second siren activation came about 20 minutes after WFO Springfield issued the Tornado 

Warning for southwestern Jasper County, including Joplin (issued at 517 pm CDT). A 

large number of those interviewed noted that this non-routine second siren alert raised 

their level of awareness, confirmed the alert, indicated the seriousness of the warning, 

and prompted them to get to the best available shelter.

It is unclear how many of those killed in the tornado failed to take shelter, or if a change in 

response time and behavior would have impacted survival rates. In the case of the Joplin 

tornado, it was somewhat fortunate that the tornado was moving at a relatively slow forward 

speed (~20 mph), and the initial siren alert occurred more than 20 minutes before the tornado 

struck the city. 

Lastly, several of the people interviewed indicated a desire for different levels of warning 

(applied to local siren policies) as a means to clarify the seriousness/magnitude of the threat. 

Specifically, these comments spoke to some desired differentiation in warnings and siren tones 

between life-threatening emergencies and threats to property. These persons noted, ―maybe there 

should be two levels of warning... a regular warning and a panic button warning for when it will 

be really bad,‖ ―I wonder if there shouldn‘t be different types of sirens for different types of 

warnings,‖ and another noted that there is a difference between a warned big event and a warned 

small tornado or funnel cloud.

TAKING PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

After processing a variable number of risk signals and reaching a decision to act, the majority of 

surveyed Joplin residents took shelter in the most appropriate location available to them. This 

included basements, interior rooms or hallways, or crawl spaces. This suggests campaigns to 

promote severe weather safety practices are effective. 

Even if this action was taken in the last available seconds, in many cases it was a life-saving 

measure. Unfortunately, due to a number of factors, below ground shelters (basements) are not 

common in the Joplin area, and some people likely still found themselves in situations that were 

not survivable. It is unclear to what degree this contributed to the tornado mortality in Joplin. 

Preliminary analysis done by the Joplin Globe newspaper revealed that most fatalities occurred 

in residences (54%), followed by non-residential buildings (32%), and in vehicles or outdoors 

(14%). This type of analysis is beyond the scope of the Service Assessment and is being 

addressed in separate studies by both the National Institutes of Standards and Technology and 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
10

The majority of businesses interviewed had a plan for receiving warnings and sheltering patrons. 

While lives were lost in these non-residential buildings, the toll certainly would have been much 

higher if not for the action plans and employees in these businesses.

In addition, a significant number of fatalities in Joplin occurred in vulnerable populations such as 

the elderly, infirm, or disabled. These populations typically require additional time and/or 

assistance to get to the best available shelter. 

Best Practice #1: NWS outreach and severe weather safety education programs should 

continue to emphasize and assist area businesses with severe weather safety action plans via the 

StormReady program or other similar mechanisms. This kind of outreach and planning 

assistance should also be extended to vulnerable populations in nursing homes, group homes, 

hospitals, etc.

d. CONCLUSIONS

Responding to warnings is not a simple act of stimulus-response, rather it is a non-linear, multistep, complex process. Relationships between false alarms, public complacency, and warning 

credibility are highly complex as well. While residents of Joplin addressed these in terms of 

local warning siren systems, they also relate directly to the content and skill of NWS warnings 

and the weather enterprise as a whole. As a rudimentary evaluation of NWS warning skill, 

severe weather verification statistics were compiled for the period from 10/1/2007 to 4/1/2011. 

These are listed in Table 2. 

Probability of 

Detection

False Alarm Rate Initial Lead Time

All Tornado 70% 76% 12.5 minutes

All Severe 83% 46% 18.6 minutes

EF0-1 Tornado 68% NA 11.9 minutes

EF2-5 Tornado 84% NA 16.3 minutes

EF3-5 Tornado 94% NA 17.8 minutes

Table 2: NWS Severe Weather Warning verification statistics from 10/1/2007–4/1/2011

Finding #2e: Nationally, 76% of all NWS Tornado Warnings, in their totality, are false alarms. 

This means 24% of all tornado warnings are eventually associated with an observed tornado –

indicating limited skill in differentiating between tornadic and non-tornadic events; however, 

68% of EF0-1 tornadoes receive advance warning of near 12 minutes, while 94% of EF3-5 

tornadoes receive advance warning of near 18 minutes, indicating an ability to better detect

strong/violent tornadoes.

9

 Just over half (54%) of all severe weather warnings coincide with a 

 

9

Because NWS warnings do not differentiate between weak and strong/violent tornado warnings, a calculation of 

false alarm rate for strong/violent tornadoes is not possible. 
11

severe weather event, indicating moderate skill in distinguishing between severe and non-severe 

thunderstorms. 

While there are no guarantees that simply decreasing false alarms will significantly impact 

warning response behavior, the results of the Joplin residents interviews appear to indicate a

relationship between perceived false alarms, degree of warning credibility, and complacency in 

warning response. Nonetheless, as indicated by the report findings, there are a number of ways 

NWS can explore to improve effective decision making within the warning response process.

Recommendation #2: To improve severe weather warning response and mitigate user 

complacency, the NWS should explore evolving the warning system to better support effective 

decision making. This evolution should utilize a simple, impact-based, tiered information 

structure that promotes warning credibility and empowers individuals to quickly make 

appropriate decisions in the face of adverse conditions. This structure should:

a) lessen the number of risk signals processed before protective action is taken (finding 2b)

b) provide a non-routine warning mechanism that prompts people to take immediate life-saving 

action in extreme events like strong and violent tornadoes (finding 2d).

c) be impact-based more than phenomenon-based for clarity on risk assessment (finding 2a)

d) be compatible with NWS technological, scientific, and operational capabilities (finding 2e)

e) be compatible with external local warning systems and emerging mobile communications 

technology (finding 2a)

f) be easily understood and calibrated by the public to facilitate decision making (finding 2a)

g) maintain existing “probability of detection” for severe weather events (finding 2e)

h) diminish the perception of false alarms and their impacts on warning credibility and 

response (finding 2c)

3. Warning Communications, Dissemination, and 

Community Preparedness

The communication and dissemination of warning information during the Joplin tornado event 

was complex and involved the cooperation of several partners, as well as a variety of different 

systems. For this portion of the assessment, numerous interviews were conducted with local 

media, emergency management, local fire and law enforcement dispatch, and WFO Springfield 

staff. Also, as part of the evaluation, a well-attended media round-table meeting was held at the 

local Joplin television stations. These entities constitute much of the local weather dissemination 

enterprise, or weather enterprise. 

STORM-BASED WARNINGS AND LOCAL WARNING DISSEMINATION SYSTEMS

While the weather enterprise was generally successful in communicating the threat in a timely 
12

manner for the Joplin tornado, current communication and dissemination mechanisms are not 

seamless and are somewhat antiquated. This can lead to untimely gaps and confusion during 

dissemination. 

Storm-based warnings are an important feature of the warning process, and are designed to limit

the ―false alarm area‖ associated with severe weather warnings. All of the partners interviewed 

preferred storm-based warnings (also referred to as warning polygons), because of the more 

specific information they provide; however, while more specific, communicating storm-based 

warning information comes with challenges within the current dissemination infrastructure.

Finding # 3: Many current warning dissemination systems are not fully compatible with specific 

warning information provided by storm-based, warning polygons. 

Recommendation # 3: The NWS should continue to collaborate with partners who disseminate 

weather information to advance GPS-based warning dissemination systems that are compatible 

with more specific storm-based warning information. This change should include cultivating use

of mobile communications technologies (text messaging, smart phone apps, Commercial Mobile 

Alert System, etc.) and technological upgrades of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) and NWR. 

One local media outlet in Joplin reported some success using text messaging and social media 

(e.g., Facebook) as a method of disseminating warning information and receiving storm reports 

from residents. In addition, most television stations reported using their Facebook accounts to 

deliver and receive weather information, including warnings and storm reports; however, among 

residents interviewed in the field, only a small number stated that this was how they primarily 

received the warnings. 

Many current dissemination systems are based on geo-political boundaries and jurisdictions (e.g.,

counties), including EAS and NWR. This can inadvertently project a sense of over-warning or 

confusion for the general public when warning polygons overlap or multiple warning polygons 

are issued for a county. For better or worse, NWR and EAS alerted Jasper County (and Joplin) 

residents twice within a 10-minute period for tornado warning polygon #30 at 509 pm and 

polygon #31 at 517 pm CDT (Figure 2). 

These same considerations can impact other dissemination modes as well. Some NWS partners 

in the Joplin area have adapted their local warning systems in an attempt to be more specific, 

avoid confusion, and avoid possible warning fatigue created by multiple polygons over the same 

geographic area. Emergency Managers in Jasper and surrounding counties have local warning 

instructions that are based on reports and local discretion, and are not necessarily tied to NWS

warnings. 

For Joplin specifically, sirens were activated twice, based on reports rather than NWS warnings. 
13

According to the Emergency Manager, the first 3-minute siren activation, at 

511 pm CDT, resulted primarily from funnel cloud reports to the west of Joplin in southeastern 

Kansas. This activation roughly coincided with the 509 pm CDT issuance of tornado warning 

polygon #30 for a different thunderstorm cell affecting western Jasper County (and northeastern

Joplin). According to some interviews, slight confusion was created because of this overlap. 

Residents heard the initial siren activation and then the warning details for polygon #30, and 

assumed the activation was for the area to the north. 

In one example, a man was clearly confused by the string of warning information he received 

and processed from various sources. 

1. Heard first sirens at 511 pm CDT (estimated 30-35 minutes before tornado hit).

2. Went to the TV and heard NWR warning from TV override that indicated tornado near 

airport drive 7 miles north (polygon #30) of his location. 

3. Went on porch with family and had a cigar. Looked like a regular thunderstorm.

4. Heard second sirens (estimated 27 minutes later).

5. Thought something wasn‘t right so went inside and turned local TV stations on.

6. Saw on TV several colored counties for tornado warnings, but regular programming was 

still on and thought the threat was still to the north.

7. Heard his wife yell ―basement,‖ grabbed the cat and told son to put his shoes on.

8. Tornado hit as they reached the top of the basement stairs, destroying their home. 

NWS tornado warning polygon #31 was not issued for southwest Jasper County, including all of 

Joplin proper, until 517 pm CDT. Yet, because the sirens already had been sounded once, there 

was hesitation to do so again. Once reports were received of a tornado on the ground, the sirens 

were reactivated in Joplin at 538 pm CDT. While this prompted many people to action, by that 

time, the tornado was moving into western portions of the city and had started to produce EF-4

damage. 

Additionally, television meteorologists combined polygon warnings on air in an attempt to 

simplify the warning situation. Since tornado warning polygons #30 and #31 overlapped, 

covered portions of Jasper County, and both expired at 600 pm EDT, local television 

meteorologists combined the multiple tornado warnings into a broadcast summary. While the 

television meteorologists also prefer the specific information associated with warning polygons,

they sometimes find it difficult to communicate the threats when multiple polygons overlap

(Figure 2). 

Finding # 4: Partners adapt weather and warning information in their local warning systems in 

an attempt to communicate risk simply and unobtrusively. The result is sometimes a poorly 

coordinated warning message across the weather enterprise that can lead to confusing or mixed 
14

messages. 

Recommendation # 4: The NWS should collaborate with partners throughout the weather 

enterprise to provide a better coordinated warning message. Guidance should be developed to 

assist partners in the development of local warning system and siren strategies that work in 

conjunction with NWS warnings rather than independent of them.

Because of compatibility issues between NWS warning strategies and antiquated dissemination 

systems, NWS forecasters also need to remain cognizant of the service issues that occasionally 

may arise from their warning polygons.

NWSCHAT AS A COORDINATION TOOL

Many NWS partners, particularly Emergency Managers and television media, emphasized the 

interaction with WFO Springfield during the storm using NWSChat. They almost unanimously 

commented on how the interaction with WFO Springfield and surrounding WFOs was enhanced 

by the chat room and provided valuable information during the event. This communication link 

enabled them to make timely, accurate decisions at the local level. 

Best Practice #2: NWSChat should continue to be supported and encouraged as a valuable 

communication tool amongst the weather enterprise team members. 

Finding #5: Because the Joplin/southwest Missouri area lies near the intersection of multiple 

NWS County Warning Areas , there was some difficulty noted by NWS partners in following 

chats from many different offices. 

Recommendation #5 : The NWS should continue to improve collaboration tools for our 

partners. Partners requested improvements to the current NWSChat display to include a 

“dashboard” interface to allow them to more easily monitor multiple offices at the same time.

COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS

By most all accounts, WFO Springfield has a solid working relationship with various partners in 

and around the Joplin area. This relationship has been enhanced from the roughly two dozen 

outreach and spotter training events in the last year that were conducted in Joplin and 

surrounding areas. 

The city of Joplin is also a StormReady community. The Emergency Manager and city officials 

were interviewed about the StormReady process and the application was reviewed with them. In 

general, the StormReady program was a positive experience for the city and aided them in 

preparation for this storm event. The process highlighted the need for community leaders to help 
15

develop severe weather plans for businesses, schools, hospitals, and other entities. Several large 

businesses and public venues were struck during this tornado, with each facility having a varied 

degree of preparedness. The StormReady program could be a useful vehicle for facilitating

increased interaction with local businesses and public venues to develop severe weather plans 

within communities.

Finding #6: The StormReady renewal application for the city of Joplin had some discrepancies 

and incomplete information. WFO Springfield does not have a StormReady Advisory Board that 

consists of any individuals outside the local office.

Recommendation #6: NWS needs to maintain a credible structure to the StormReady program,

including local advisory boards, and adhere to established criteria for StormReady 

certifications.

4. WFO Springfield Products and Services

WFO Springfield issued a well-integrated product and service suite before, during, and after the 

tornado. These products and services allowed for advance planning by the general public and 

emergency management community, provided for effective and accurate warnings well in 

advance of the tornado, and undoubtedly saved numerous lives.

Hazardous Weather Outlooks (HWO) were issued frequently on Friday, May 20, and Saturday, 

May 21, and were consistent in notifying NWS users of potential severe thunderstorms for 

Sunday, May 22, for the Joplin area. A consistent message was also delivered on Friday and 

Saturday mornings via multimedia web briefings (MMWB) and website graphics. At that point, 

WFO Springfield was focused on large hail and damaging straight-line winds as the main severe 

weather threats, although isolated tornadoes were mentioned in all of the products.

The Area Forecast Discussion (AFD) issued at 235 am CDT on Sunday, May 22, included an 

excellent section addressing the expected severe thunderstorm development and evolution for the 

afternoon and evening hours. In this AFD, forecasters continued to focus on very large hail as 

the primary threat for later in the day, but continued to maintain a small tornado probability. The 

main objection to widespread tornado development was unfavorable lower level wind speed and 

direction forecast guidance. Once again, similar forecast and reasoning information were 

presented via HWO, MMWB and web graphic products created early Sunday morning.

By shift-change Sunday morning (8 am CDT) WFO forecasters recognized an increased threat 

for a more substantial severe weather outbreak later in the day and reflected that thinking with 

HWO and MMWB updates through the remainder of the morning hours. During this time, an 
16

important decision was made not to conduct a conference call with county and city Emergency 

Managers and media. WFO policy states that conference calls should be conducted when 

moderate or high confidence exists for a high impact event, such as widespread wind damage 

from derechos, or the possibility of damaging or otherwise long-track tornadoes. While 

confidence was high that very large hail would occur with some severe thunderstorms, forecaster

confidence that significant tornadoes would occur was too low to justify a conference call. The 

Emergency Managers and members of the media interviewed following the tornado all agreed 

that conference calls held by WFO Springfield prompt them to increase their awareness and 

preparation for anticipated severe weather events and result in a greater dissemination of 

information throughout the community. All groups stressed that conference calls raise 

awareness more than MMWBs and suggested that WFO Springfield initiate calls for moderate or 

higher risks of severe weather. Although the content is essentially the same in the MMWB, the 

personal contact provided by the conference calls conveys a greater sense of urgency to weather 

situations. 

Finding #7: Conference calls provided by WFO Springfield play a critical role in heightening

the preparedness levels of NWS partners and are requested by partners for scenarios with SPC 

Moderate Risk or greater. 

Recommendation #7: The NWS should ensure that tools and procedures are in place for WFO 

operational staff to easily conduct conference calls with NWS partners. These calls should be 

provided in a consistent manner and associated with SPC Moderate Risk or greater.

A series of complex meteorological events and interactions took place during the afternoon hours 

of May 22 that eventually resulted in the devastating EF-5 tornado. Forecasters at WFO 

Springfield discussed the ongoing and expected mesoscale evolution with an AFD issued at 

107 pm CDT with a headline of ―Mesoscale Convective Discussion.‖ Shortly thereafter, 

Tornado Watch #325 was issued at 130 pm CDT for all of southwest Missouri. A routine AFD 

was issued at 237 pm as well as another ―Mesoscale Convective Discussion AFD‖ issued at 

347 pm, which also discussed the results of a special 19Z radiosonde observation (RAOB). 

These afternoon discussions were timely, well-written and did a good job of keeping all users up 

to date with the latest meteorological reasoning on imminent storm development and convective 

mode. Forecaster focus remained on very large hail as the main severe weather threat, but 

isolated tornadoes were also deemed a possibility due to the very unstable air mass in place and 

sufficient low level wind structure. Updated HWOs were also issued at 114 pm CDT and 

347 pm CDT that included an upgrade in tornado probabilities.

Best Practice #3: WFOs should issue non-routine AFDs to discuss ongoing and expected 

mesoscale feature evolution when severe thunderstorms are anticipated.

The first thunderstorms of the day developed between 200 pm and 300 pm CDT over southeast 
17

Kansas and quickly became severe, prompting Severe Thunderstorm Warnings from WFO 

Springfield. As severe storms moved east, forecasters became increasingly concerned about 

their tornado potential and issued the first Tornado Warnings of the day at 425 pm and 451 pm

CDT for portions of Cherokee and Crawford Counties in southeast Kansas, west of Joplin. At 

433 pm CDT, forecasters briefed the Jasper County (which encompasses Joplin) Emergency 

Manager on the severe storms to the west. Additional thunderstorms then developed to the east 

near the Kansas and Missouri border and also rapidly became severe. These were identified by 

forecasters as having high tornado potential. Tornado Warning #30 was issued for one of these 

storms at 509 pm CDT for western Jasper County, including the northeast part of the city of 

Joplin but was for a different storm than the one that eventually hit the city. This alert was 

followed by Tornado Warning #31 at 517 pm CDT for the next storm to the south for 

southwestern Jasper County and portions of neighboring counties which included all of Joplin. 

Another coordination call was made to the Jasper County Emergency Manager at 525 pm CDT 

to update him on the Tornado Warning and latest information concerning the storm. At this 

point, the severe thunderstorm west of Joplin had become the dominant thunderstorm in the 

region and was poised to produce a violent tornado. 

Based on storm surveys and radar imagery, it was estimated that initial tornado touchdown 

occurred just west of Joplin at 534 pm CDT, moved into western portions of Joplin around 536

pm CDT and crossed Schifferdecker Avenue around 538 pm CDT. Thus, WFO Springfield

issued Tornado Warning #31 with 17 minutes of lead time for touchdown and 19 minutes lead 

time before entering Joplin. The entire path of the tornado was encompassed by warning 

polygons. 

Tornado Warning (#30) for Joplin was first updated with a Severe Weather Statement at 530 pm

CDT that indicated the storm had a history of funnel clouds. The first indication of a confirmed 

tornado was issued via another Severe Weather Statement at 539 pm CDT that stated, “At 

534 pm CDT...trained weather spotters reported a tornado near Galena” and that “This storm 

is moving into the city of Joplin.” At 542 pm CDT, WFO Springfield issued another Severe 

Weather Statement that stated, “At 538 pm CDT...trained weather spotters reported a tornado 

near Joplin.” This statement was followed by another Tornado Warning for southern Jasper 

County at 548 pm CDT in effect until 630 pm. This warning stated, “At 543 pm CDT...trained 

weather spotters reported a tornado near eastern Joplin” and “damaging and multiple vortex 

tornado was reported with this storm.” This warning was followed with one Severe Weather 

Statement as the tornado moved southeast of Joplin and eventually dissipated around 612 pm

CDT. Additionally, numerous Local Storm Reports were issued as the tornado moved through 

the city. 

Despite being focused mainly on very large hail as the primary severe weather threat prior to 

thunderstorm development, warning forecasters did an outstanding job of recognizing the 

tornado potential of the storm that moved through Joplin and issued an accurate Tornado 
18

Warning with sufficient lead time for people to take life-saving action. Unfortunately, the

tornado developed rapidly on the southwestern outskirts of a densely populated area and had 

moved through much of the city before the size and violence of the tornado was apparent to 

warning forecasters. Thus, they did not issue a Severe Weather Statement with a ―Tornado 

Emergency‖

10 headline for Joplin proper; however, radar imagery by 540 pm CDT certainly 

indicated a well-defined hook echo over Joplin accompanied by a very large and distinctive 

debris ball. Warning forecasters on duty at that time noted that this was their first indication of 

the size and strength of the tornado. It follows that the Severe Weather Statement issued at 542 

pm CDT and Tornado Warning issued at 548 pm CDT should have been more strongly worded 

and portrayed a greater sense of urgency. Instead the statement and warning were worded very 

much like previous warnings and statements issued that day. A quote from the Service 

Assessment for the Super Tuesday Tornado Outbreak applies here: “During tornadic episodes 

where the forecasters have a high level of confidence an immediate and widespread response is 

critical, statements such as „this is an extremely dangerous and life threatening situation‟ would 

increase the level of significance of these products.”

Finding #8: After the significance of this event was apparent, Tornado Warnings and Severe 

Weather Statements lacked enhanced wording to accurately portray that immediate action was 

necessary to save lives with this tornado.

Recommendation #8: WFO warning forecasters should use wording that conveys a sense of 

urgency in warnings and statements when extremely dangerous and life threatening weather 

situations are in progress.

5. SPC Products and Services

SPC forecasters correctly anticipated a threat of severe weather for Joplin more than 48 hours in 

advance, and anticipated a significant severe weather threat more than 24 hours in advance. As 

time progressed, SPC forecasters increasingly focused on the possibility of supercells with very 

large hail and tornadoes and issued a Tornado Watch about 4 hours prior to the Joplin tornado. 

A progression of pertinent SPC graphical forecasts is depicted in Figure 3. 

A slight risk of severe thunderstorms was mentioned by SPC for a broad area of the eastern 

United States, stretching from northeast Texas to the eastern Great Lakes, beginning with the 

Day 3 Convective Outlook issued during the early morning hours of Friday, May 20. This 

outlook also mentioned a 30% chance of severe weather for southwest Missouri, including the 

city of Joplin. The outlook text stated, ―...isolated supercells...a couple which may be capable of 

producing tornadoes...” would be possible on Sunday, May 22.

 

10 NWS Directive NWSI 10-511, Section 4.3.4, allows this product for rare situations when reliable sources confirm, 

or there is clear radar evidence, of a damaging tornado. 
19

This reasoning continued with the Day 2 Convective Outlooks issued on Saturday, May 21. A 

slight risk of severe thunderstorms (30% probability) was maintained for southwest Missouri in 

both outlooks issued that day. Additionally, the afternoon update mentioned significant severe 

weather for Sunday, May 22, in a narrow swath from south Texas to southwest and central 

Missouri. At this time, very large hail was expected to be the primary threat; however the 

outlook text also stated, “low level winds are expected to back later in the day...in response to 

southwestern U.S. trough...with a tornado or two possible.”

Figure 3: (A) SPC Day 3 Categorical Outlook issued 20/0730z valid 22/12z – 23/12z

(B) SPC Day 2 Combined Probability Outlook issued 21/1724z valid 22/12z – 23/12z

(C) SPC Day 1 Tornado Probability Outlook issued 22/1255z valid 22/13z-23/12z

(D) Tornado Watch #325 valid 22/1830z-23/0200z

SPC upgraded a portion of the severe thunderstorm slight risk area to a Moderate Risk with its

Day 1 Convective Outlook issued at 755 am CDT on Sunday, May 22. Joplin was included in 
20

the Moderate Risk area and was also in an area that was forecasted to have a 

10% chance of a EF2-EF5 tornado. The severe weather mode and locations of highest severe 

weather probabilities continued to be fine-tuned by SPC through the morning and early afternoon 

hours. An update to the Day 1 Convective Outlook, issued at 1117 am CDT, stated, “Currently 

the highest probability for diurnal thunderstorm development appears to be from northeastern 

Oklahoma into Missouri where area will be influenced by left exit region of upper jet streak 

stretching from the southern Rockies into southern plains.” A Mesoscale Discussion was issued 

at 106 pm CDT for southwest Missouri (and surrounding areas) which stated, “...and although 

low level shear is a bit marginal...it will be more than sufficient for tornadoes given extreme 

instability.” 

Tornado Watch #325 was issued by SPC (after coordination with WFO Springfield and other 

affected offices) at 130 pm CDT which included Joplin. The text of the watch indicated 

“explosive thunderstorm development” with a “strong tornado or two possible.” This watch 

provided about 4 hours of lead time prior to the tornado moving through Joplin. Another 

Mesoscale Discussion issued by SPC at 348 pm CDT specifically mentioned the possibility of 

cyclic tornadoes.

Interviews with partners and stakeholders, including WFO forecasters, media, and Emergency 

Managers, found SPC products and services very useful. In this particular case, the progression 

to a moderate risk on the morning of the 22nd was especially noted. All local television 

meteorologists stated they directly monitor and use SPC products frequently. Local Emergency 

Managers were more likely to get their convective outlooks and watch information through WFO 

products like the HWO. 

Amongst the general public, the majority of residents had little idea there was a threat of severe 

weather prior to Sunday, May 22. About half of those interviewed, reported learning of the 

possibility of severe weather in the hours leading up to the tornado. Just less than half reported 

their first indication of a severe weather threat was in the moments just prior to the tornado. 

6. WFO Springfield Warning Operations

WFO Springfield operations are well-established for severe weather and, from all accounts, those 

on duty performed in an exemplary manner, both in the provision of services and the application 

of scientific expertise. The station duty manual (SDM) contains several detailed plans for varied 

severe weather scenarios. The WFO has modeled its severe weather operations using the 

Incident Command System which creates a flexible structure that can be expanded depending 

upon the significance of the event.
21

For the Joplin tornado event, the WFO was staffed initially with six employees, and added an 

additional employee midway through the event. The Meteorologist in Charge and Warning 

Coordination Meteorologist were called in shortly after the Joplin impacts were known. The 

staffing profile was modeled after a moderate event detailed in the planning section of the Severe 

Weather SDM. WFO Springfield utilized two Radar Operators for this event as well as a 

coordinator, meso-analyst and a Verification/Communication Specialist. The office configuration 

was excellent and fostered good communications between the severe weather team. The severe 

weather team was placed in a cluster within a corner of the operations area and was selfcontained. Warning forecasters and radar operators were situated next to each other with the 

Severe Weather Coordinator behind them. 

The office maintains a situational awareness display that is in clear view of the warning 

operations team. The display is composed of two ceiling mounted projectors and screens. It is 

flexible and can display information from any of the Advanced Weather Interactive Processing 

Systems units as well as personal computers in the operations area. The WFO also recently 

added to its Situational Awareness Display a large screen television with access to various news 

outlets. This addition proved valuable during the Joplin tornado event because staff was able to 

follow, in real-time, local and national news accounts of the storm aftermath. 

The Verification Specialist was at a workstation across from the Radar Operators. The 

dedicated position of Verification/Communication Specialist is designed to encompass use of all 

of the avenues of social media including NWSChat, Facebook, and Twitter as well as collecting 

and disseminating real-time ground truth reports. This position was praised by the user 

community as an invaluable resource for rapid communication during severe weather. Local 

media in particular commented on the importance of rapid dissemination of real-time reports via 

chat and Local Storm Report products. At the time of the event, WFO Springfield had just 

recently activated its Facebook page, and this portion of verification/ communications position 

was not fully developed.

Best Practice #4: WFO Springfield employed a dedicated Verification/Communication 

Specialist position to communicate using chat and social media during the event.

The primary radar operator at WFO Springfield made excellent use of ―Bunkers Storm Motion 

Vectors‖

11 and other mesoscale tools early in the event. These techniques, in combination with 

observed storm behavior, suggested the storm motions were more deviant than originally 

anticipated. This fact signaled that localized low-level helicity was beyond values suggested by 

the available analyses, indicating an increased risk for tornadoes. This degree of situational 

awareness was extremely critical for anticipating the evolution of the tornado threat. This 

awareness, along with recognition of a cell merger over southeast Kansas, led directly to the 

 

11 Bunkers, et. al. (2000), ―Predicting Supercell Motion Using a New Hodograph Technique, Bunkers,‖ Weather 

and Forecasting.
22

early warning of the Joplin tornado. 

Once the primary Radar Operator recognized a significant storm was developing, WFO 

Springfield staff sectored radar responsibility. The primary Radar Operator maintained 

surveillance of the storms associated with the Joplin tornado and passed the remaining storms off 

to the secondary Radar Operator. While WFO Springfield did an excellent job of sectoring radar 

operations, one common WFO severe weather practice they did not employ is working in 

radar/warning teams of two. This requires more personnel to implement, but it allows one 

forecaster to concentrate on radar interrogation and the other to concentrate on the warning 

message and product composition at the text workstation, typically resulting in an improvement 

to both. Employing such a strategy may have led to enhanced product wording as suggested in 

Recommendation #8. 

The initial Tornado Warning decision for the Joplin tornado was made based on a combination 

of radar data from the WFO Tulsa (KINX) and WFO Springfield radar (KSGF). See Appendix 

A (Figure 4). 

Finding #9: Radar data acquisition was compromised across key geographic locations, mainly, 

owing from Volume Coverage Pattern (VCP) selection at both KSGF and KINX. In this case, 

velocity data was obscured on KSGF upstream of Joplin near a critical warning decision point–

and KINX velocity data was obscured over Joplin during the height of the tornado event.

The VCP 211 scanning strategy was employed at KSGF for the duration of the event. There are 

three notable impacts from this selection. First, the scanning strategy takes approximately 5 

minutes to complete versus 4.2 minutes for VCP (2)12. Over the course of the 90 minutes 

leading up to and including the tornado, there were roughly 4 fewer volume scans available for 

use. The reduced data frequency leads to a greater lag in sampling the rapid increase in the 

tornado circulation intensity. Second, the VCP (2)11 scanning strategy is less effective at 

capturing data in the lower portions of thunderstorms, especially at ranges comparable to Joplin 

from KSGF. Finally, velocity data was unnecessarily compromised from both KSGF and KINX 

during key times. In reference to the VCP selections at both sites (KSGF 211, KINX 212), the 

2XX series of VCPs presents substantial degradation in low-level velocity data at fixed ranges 

from the radar site, a direct result of employing a fixed Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF) on the 

lowest elevation scans.

Recommendation #9: WFO warning operations should make use of the more 

effective/adaptable VCP 12 and manually select appropriate PRF to remove range obscured 

velocity data and mitigate compromised radar datasets.

Also, concerning sampling frequency, it is very apparent that near surface processes responsible 

for both tornadogenesis and intensity escalation occur on time scales much shorter than the radar 
23

observes. Re-emphasizing, the average tornado exists on time scales shorter than one complete 

WSR-88D volume scan. Use of Federal Aviation Administration Terminal Doppler Weather 

Radar (TDWR) has exposed NWS field offices to a more effective means of gathering radar data 

at the lowest elevation level where time criticality is the greatest. The TDWR scanning strategy 

samples at the lowest elevation every minute while completing a volume scan, thus attempting to 

capture rapid changes near the surface.

Finding #10: Low-level rotational intensification and tornadogenesis occurred very rapidly 

with the Joplin tornado from 529 pm CDT to tornado touchdown around 534 pm CDT and the 

beginning of EF-4 damage around 538 pm CDT. Limited scans at lowest elevation slices during 

this time impacted the WFO‟s ability to quickly ascertain the magnitude of the tornado. 

Recommendation #10: To enhance the ability to monitor rapid tornadogenesis and tornado 

intensification, NWS should develop and implement additional hybrid WSR-88D VCP strategies 

that allow for more continuous sampling near the surface (e.g., 1-minute lowest elevation 

sampling).

Lastly, WFO Springfield continued to issue warnings and statements in a timely and effective 

manner even with the increased workload following the Joplin disaster. The office implemented 

a Public Information Officer position to handle the increased media calls and developed talking 

points for incoming staff. Storm survey teams were developed next day after the event to survey 

the tornado tracks. Inresponse to the increased workload within the office, staffing was 

increased in the short term to meet the demand. Due to the magnitude of the event, the increased 

workload and demands on the staff became increasingly more difficult to manage. During this 

phase, the Central Region Headquarters Regional Operations Center deployed two additional 

staff members and an onsite Incident Meteorologist to assist with WFO operations and provide

support for the local Emergency Operations Center. 

Best Practice #5: NWS offices should have a post-disaster plan and work closely with Regional 

Operations Centers on strategies for staffing and resource allocation after high profile weather 

events.
24

Appendix A – Radar Imagery
25
26

Figure 4: 

(A) KINX 0.5o Base Reflectivity valid 2011 May 22, 2209Z

(B) KINX 0.5oStorm Relative Velocity valid 2011 May 22, 2209Z

(C) KINX 0.5o Base Reflectivity valid 2011 May 22, 2216Z

(D) KINX 0.5oStorm Relative Velocity valid 2011 May 22, 2216Z

(E) KSGF 0.5o Base Reflectivity valid 2011 May 22, 2229Z

(F) KSGF 0.5oStorm Relative Velocity valid 2011 May 22, 2229Z

(G) KSGF 0.5o Base Reflectivity valid 2011 May 22, 2234Z

(H) KSGF 0.5oStorm Relative Velocity valid 2011 May 22, 2234Z

(I) KSGF 0.5o Base Reflectivity valid 2011 May 22, 2243Z

(J) KSGF 0.5oStorm Relative Velocity valid 2011 May 22, 2243Z

(K) KSGF 0.5o Base Reflectivity valid 2011 May 22, 2253Z

(L) KSGF 0.5oStorm Relative Velocity valid 2011 May 22, 2253Z
27

Appendix B - Upper Air Observations

Figure 5: Skew-T/log-P from Springfield, Missouri, at 1200z and 1900z
28

Appendix C – Operational EF Scale

EF Number 3 Second Gust (mph)

0 65-85

1 86-110

2 111-135

3 136-165

4 166-200

5 Over 200
29

Appendix D - Findings, Recommendations, and 

Best Practices

Findings and Recommendations

Finding #1: Recent NWS Assessments have addressed societal impacts of warnings, most 

notably the “Super Tuesday Tornado Outbreak of Feb. 5-6, 2008” and the “Mother‟s Day 

Weekend Tornado Outbreak of 2008.”. Many of the societal impacts uncovered in previous 

Service Assessments were also evident in Joplin, suggesting the NWS should take a more 

aggressive stance in addressing warning response.

Recommendation #1: For future Service Assessments, NWS should plan a more structured 

approach to collecting information on societal aspects of warning response. This should include 

developing sub-teams well-versed in social science and NWS warning operations that can be 

quickly deployed to the field following any given severe weather disaster. 

Finding #2a: For the vast majority of surveyed Joplin residents, the first risk signal for an 

imminent severe weather threat came via the local community siren system. As a result, there 

was a significant degree of ambiguity associated with the first alert regarding the magnitude of 

the risk, the seriousness of the warning, and its potential impact. 

Finding #2b: The majority of surveyed Joplin residents did not immediately go to shelter upon 

hearing the initial warning, whether from local warning sirens, television, NWR, or other 

sources. Instead, most chose to further clarify and assess their risk by waiting for, actively 

seeking, and filtering additional information. 

Finding #2c: Familiarity with severe weather and the perceived frequency of siren activation 

not only reflect normalization of threat and/or desensitization to sirens and warnings, but they 

also establish that initial siren activation has lost a degree of credibility for many residents.

Credibility is considered to be one of the most valued characteristics for effective risk 

communication.

Finding #2d: The majority of surveyed Joplin residents did not take protective action until 

receiving and processing credible confirmation of the threat- and its magnitude- from a nonroutine trigger. 

Finding #2e: Nationally, 76% of all NWS Tornado Warnings, in their totality, are false alarms. 

This means 24% of all tornado warnings are eventually associated with an observed tornado –
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indicating limited skill in differentiating between tornadic and non-tornadic events; however, 

68% of EF0-1 tornadoes receive advance warning of near 12 minutes, while 94% of EF3-5 

tornadoes receive advance warning of near 18 minutes, indicating an ability to better detect

strong/violent tornadoes. Just over half (54%) of all severe weather warnings coincide with a 

severe weather event, indicating moderate skill in distinguishing between severe and non-severe 

thunderstorms. 

Recommendation #2: To improve severe weather warning response and mitigate user 

complacency, the NWS should explore evolving the warning system to better support effective 

decision making. This evolution should utilize a simple, impact-based, tiered information 

structure that promotes warning credibility and empowers individuals to quickly make 

appropriate decisions in the face of adverse conditions. This structure should:

a) lessen the number of risk signals processed before protective action is taken (finding 2b)

b) provide a non-routine warning mechanism that prompts people to take immediate life-saving 

action in extreme events like strong to violent tornadoes (finding 2d).

c) be impact-based more than phenomenon-based for clarity on risk assessment (finding 2a)

d) be compatible with NWS technological, scientific, and operational capabilities (finding 2e)

e) be compatible with external local warning systems and emerging mobile communications 

technology (finding 2a)

f) be easily understood and calibrated by the public to facilitate decision making (finding 2a)

g) maintain existing “probability of detection” for severe weather events (finding 2e)

h) diminish the perception of false alarms and their impacts on warning credibility and 

response (finding 2c)

Finding # 3: Many current warning dissemination systems are not fully compatible with specific 

warning information provided by storm-based, warning polygons. 

Recommendation # 3: The NWS should continue to collaborate with partners who disseminate 

weather information to advance GPS-based warning dissemination systems that are compatible 

with more specific storm-based warning information. This change should include cultivating use

of mobile communications technologies (text messaging, smart phone apps, Commercial Mobile 

Alert System, etc.) and technological upgrades of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) and NWR. 

Finding # 4: Partners adapt weather and warning information in their local warning systems in 

an attempt to communicate risk simply and unobtrusively. The result is sometimes a poorly 

coordinated warning message across the weather enterprise that can lead to confusing or mixed 

messages. 

Recommendation # 4: The NWS should collaborate with partners throughout the weather 

enterprise to provide a better coordinated warning message. Guidance should be developed to 

assist partners in the development of local warning system and siren strategies that work in 

conjunction with NWS warnings rather than independent of them.
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Finding #5: Because the Joplin/southwest Missouri area lies near the intersection of multiple 

NWS County Warning Areas (CWA), there was some difficulty noted by NWS partners in 

following chats from many different offices. 

Recommendation #5: The NWS should continue to improve collaboration tools for our 

partners. Partners requested improvements to the current NWSChat display to include a 

“dashboard” interface to allow them to more easily monitor multiple offices at the same time.

Finding #6: The Storm-Ready renewal application for the city of Joplin had some discrepancies 

and incomplete information. WFO Springfield does not have a StormReady Advisory Board that 

consists of any individuals outside the local office.

Recommendation #6: The NWS needs to maintain a credible structure to the Storm-Ready 

program, including local advisory boards, and adhere to established criteria for Storm-Ready 

certifications.

Finding #7: Conference calls provided by WFO Springfield play a critical role in heightening

the preparedness levels of NWS partners, and are requested by partners for scenarios with SPC 

Moderate Risk or greater. 

Recommendation #7: The NWS should ensure that tools and procedures are in place for WFO 

operational staff to easily conduct conference calls with NWS partners. These calls should be 

provided in a consistent manner and associated with SPC Moderate Risk or greater.

Finding #8: After the significance of this event was apparent, Tornado Warnings and Severe 

Weather Statements lacked enhanced wording to accurately portray that immediate action was 

necessary to save lives with this tornado.

Recommendation #8: WFO warning forecasters should use wording that conveys a sense of 

urgency in warnings and statements when extremely dangerous and life threatening weather 

situations are in progress.

Finding #9: Radar data acquisition was compromised across key geographic locations, mainly

owing from Volume Coverage Pattern (VCP) selection at both KSGF and KINX. In this case, 

velocity data was obscured on KSGF upstream of Joplin near a critical warning decision point –

and KINX velocity data was obscured over Joplin during the height of the tornado event.

Recommendation #9: WFO warning operations should make use of the more 

effective/adaptable VCP 12 and manually select appropriate Pulse Repetition Frequencies 

(PRF) to remove range obscured velocity data and mitigate compromised radar datasets.
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Finding #10: Low level rotational intensification and tornadogenesis occurred very rapidly 

with the Joplin tornado from 529 pm CDT to tornado touchdown around 534 pm CDT and the 

beginning of EF-4 damage around 538 pm CDT. Limited scans at lowest elevation slices during 

this time impacted the WFO‟s ability to quickly ascertain the magnitude of the tornado. 

Recommendation #10: To enhance the ability to monitor rapid tornadogenesis and tornado 

intensification, NWS should develop and implement additional hybrid WSR-88D VCP strategies 

that allow for more continuous sampling near the surface (e.g., 1-minute lowest elevation 

sampling).

Best Practices

Best Practice #1: NWS outreach and severe weather safety education programs should 

continue to emphasize and assist area businesses with severe weather safety action plans via the 

Storm Ready program or other, similar mechanisms. This kind of outreach and planning 

assistance should also be extended to vulnerable populations in nursing homes, group homes, 

hospitals, etc. 

Best Practice #2: NWSChat should continue to be supported and encouraged as a valuable 

communication tool amongst the “weather enterprise” team members. 

Best Practice #3: WFOs should issue non-routine AFDs to discuss ongoing and expected 

mesoscale feature evolution when severe thunderstorms are anticipated.

Best Practice #4: WFO Springfield employed a dedicated Verification/Communication 

Specialist position to communicate using chat and social media during the severe weather event.

Best Practice #5: NWS offices should have a post-disaster plan and work closely with Regional 

Operations Centers on strategies for staffing and resource allocation for high profile weather 

events.
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Appendix E - Acronyms

AFD Area Forecast Discussion

CDT Central Daylight Time

EAS Emergency Alert System

EF Enhanced Fujita Tornado Scale

HWO Hazardous Weather Outlook

KINX Tulsa, Oklahoma Radar

KSGF Springfield, Missouri Radar

KS Kansas

LSR Local Storm Report

MMWB Multi Media Web Brief

MO Missouri

mph miles per hour

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NWS National Weather Service

PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency

RAOB Rawindsonde Observation 

SDM Station Duty Manual

SGF Springfield, MO

SPC Storm Prediction Center

TDWR Terminal Doppler Weather Radar 

VCP Volume Coverage Pattern

WFO Weather Forecast Office
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Appendix F - Team Members

Richard Wagenmaker Meteorologist in Charge NOAA/NWS Detroit, MI

Justin Weaver Meteorologist in Charge NOAA/NWS Lubbock, TX

Gary Garnet Warning Coordination 

Meteorologist

NOAA/NWS Cleveland, OH

Bethany Hale NOAA Central Region 

Collaboration Team 

Coordinator

NOAA/NWS Kansas City, MO

Jennifer Spinney Research Associate University of Oklahoma,

Social Science Woven into 

Meteorology 

Other Contributors

Bill Davis Meteorologist in Charge NOAA/NWS Springfield, MO

Steve Runnels Warning Coordination 

Meteorologist

NOAA/NWS Springfield, MO

Dr. Greg Mann Science and Operations Officer NOAA/NWS Detroit, MI