U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Multiple Fatality SingleFamily Dwelling Fire

St. Cloud, Florida

USFA-TR-142/June 2001

Homeland

Security

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by Varley-Campbell & 

Associates, Inc. Miami and Chicago, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the Fire 

Administration in carrying out the Fire Reports Program.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States Fire Administration gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of the Fire Chief and members of the City of St. Cloud Fire Rescue Department. 

Everyone who assisted in the preparation of this report was generous with his or her time, expertise, 

and counsel.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton 

Avenue, Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report and the photographs in color are available on the 

Administration’s Web site at http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Multiple Fatality

Single-Family Dwelling Fire

St. Cloud, Florida

Investigated by: John Lee Cook, Jr.

This is Report 142 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted 

by Varley-Campbell and Associates, Inc./TriData Corporation under 

contract EME-97-CO-0506 to the United States Fire Administration, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Homeland

Security

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Homeland

Security

Table of Contents

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Summary of KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE ST. CLOUD FIRE RESCUE DEPARTMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

BUILDING CONSTRUCTION AND OCCUPANCY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE INVESTIGATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

LESSONS LEARNED (RELEARNED). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

APPENDIX A: Maps and Diagrams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

APPENDIX B: List of Photos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

1

Multiple Fatality

Single-Family Dwelling Fire

St. Cloud, Florida

Local Contacts: Charlie Lewis, Fire Chief

City of St. Cloud Fire Rescue Department

4700 Neptune Road

St. Cloud, Florida 34769

407-891-6781

Bill Johnston, Assistant Chief

407-891-6782

Ron Hood, Lieutenant

Incident Commander

Jim Grenus, Acting Officer

First Arriving Engine Company

OVERVIEW

On June 21, 2001 a fire in a single-family detached dwelling resulted in the death of six occupants, 

five of whom were children ranging in age from twenty-two months to seven years old. The fire was 

reported at approximately 2:00 a.m. and everyone was reported to have been asleep at the time that 

the fire was discovered. According to the sole surviving resident, there was no operational smoke 

detector in the home. As a result, the fire reached sufficient intensity as to make the rescue of the 

victims impossible. By the time firefighters arrived, the structure was heavily involved and fire had 

broken through the doors and windows and was threatening nearby exposures.

Firefighters quickly extinguished the blaze and were left with the grim task of searching for and 

recovering the bodies of the six victims: a twenty-four year old female, her twenty-two month old 

baby girl; the five-year-old son and seven-year-old daughter of her housemate; and the six-year-old 

son and seven-year-old daughter of her housemate’s sister.

Investigators determined that a battery charger had been left plugged into an electrical outlet on the 

enclosed front porch of the dwelling and had caused the fire. The battery charger was not in use at 

the time of the fire, but had been covered by clothes and apparently overheated, igniting the blaze.

Fire fatalities are rare in St. Cloud and the number and age of the victims deeply impacted both the 

firefighters and the community as a whole. A number of fundraisers were held to assist the families 

of the victims and a local funeral home donated the funeral services. The demand for smoke detectors also dramatically increased immediately following the fire.
2

Summary of KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Absence of a Functioning Smoke 

Detector in the Residence

While a smoke detector was reported to have been in place when the occupants rented 

the house, the sole survivor indicated that it was not operable at the time of the fire. The 

absence of an operational smoke detector continues to be a significant factor in residential fire fatalities. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reports that 3,445 

fire deaths occurred in the home in 2000, eighteen percent more than the year before. 

Residential fires accounted for 75.1 percent of all structure fires and 85.2 percent of all 

deaths (72.2 percent occurred in single-family dwellings).

According to the NFPA, the term catastrophic fire refers to fires that kill five or more 

people in a residential property or three or more in a nonresidential or nonstructural 

property. In 2000, residential fires were responsible for eight of the thirty-four catastrophic 

fires (53%). Fifteen occurred in single-family dwellings and three occurred in apartment 

buildings. Combined, the fires killed ninety-nine people. Twenty-five of the victims were 

children under the age of six. Ten of the eighteen homes did not have a smoke alarm and 

one had an alarm with no battery. Sixteen of the fires occurred between 11:00 p.m. and 

07:00 a.m..

Age of the Victims Five of the victims were children, the eldest of which was seven. Three of the victims were 

five or younger. Although children five and younger make up only nine percent of the total 

population, they comprise nineteen percent of all fire fatalities according to the NFPA. The 

United States Fire Administration has specifically targeted children fourteen and younger 

in a special effort to reduce the number of fatalities and injuries in this age group.

Community Impact The number and the age of the victims made this a particularly difficult event for not only 

the firefighters, but for the community as well. Following the fire, a number of fundraisers 

were held to assist the families of the victims and a local funeral home donated funerals 

for each of the victims. There also was an immediate, but temporary surge in the demand 

for smoke detectors.

Complacency The St. Cloud Fire Department had given away smoke detectors for years prior to this 

incident. The demand had been relatively low to the point that the Department was experiencing problems with batteries going bad before the detectors could be given away.

Time of Day The fire was reported at 2:07 a.m.. All of the occupants were asleep at the time the fire 

was discovered and the absence of an operational smoke detector allowed the fire to 

burn undetected until it grew in size and intensity to prevent the escape of the occupants 

in the upstairs bedrooms.

THE ST. CLOUD FIRE RESCUE DEPARTMENT

The City of St. Cloud is located in the central part of the Florida Peninsula in Osceola County. St. 

Cloud was founded in 1909 as a land development to improve properties south of the City of 

Orlando. Billed for its health, climate, and productiveness of the soil, the Town of St. Cloud was 

incorporated in 1911 as a soldiers’ colony for veterans of the Civil War. St. Cloud is a diverse community of approximately 20,000 residents and covers a growing 8.5 square mile service area.

Fire and emergency medical services are provided by the City’s Fire Rescue Department, which is an 

all career service with an annual budget of approximately $3 million. Firefighters are deployed in two 

stations and work a rotating 24-on/48-off shift. Each of the three platoons staff two engine com-
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 3

panies and two ALS rescue units (ambulances). Normally, minimum staffing is ten, which includes 

an operations shift commander. The department responds to approximately 3,000 incidents each 

year with EMS calls constituting 78% of the total call volume. The normal alarm assignment for a 

structure fire is the entire on-duty shift.

BUILDING CONSTRUCTION AND OCCUPANCY

The house was located at 1409 Maryland Avenue, between 14th and 15th Streets and was a two-story 

single-family detached dwelling with a detached one-car garage. Built in the 1920’s, the wood-frame 

structure had a metal roof. Based upon the appearance of the home (see photo no. 4, page 18) it is 

believed that the upstairs portion of the house had been enlarged at some point. Florida has a very 

mild climate and the washer, dryer, and hot water heater were all located on the back porch, which 

was open on three sides.

The house also had a front porch, which had been enclosed at some point. Total square footage was 

approximately 1,500 square feet including the enclosed front porch, but excluding the open back 

porch (see diagram no. 1, page 12). There was a bedroom, bathroom, living room, and kitchen 

on the first floor and two bedrooms and a bathroom on the second floor. A single, interior straight 

stairway provided access to the second floor.

THE FIRE

A 9-1-1 call was received by the St. Cloud Emergency Communications Center at 02:07 a.m. 

from a male occupant of 1409 Maryland Avenue who reported that his house was on fire and that 

there was the possibility that a number of the occupants were trapped in the burning structure. 

Telecommunicators dispatched a structure alarm assignment consisting of two engines, two rescues, 

and the operations shift commander. A total of ten firefighters responded on the initial alarm.

St. Cloud Station One is located nearby (see map 2, page 11) at 915 Massachusetts Avenue and 

arrived within four minutes of being dispatched. Commanded by an acting officer; the firefighters 

could see heavy flames two blocks from their location and radioed the operations shift commander. 

The commander requested that additional companies be dispatched due to the magnitude of fire 

and the travel distance of the second due engine company. The Osceola County Fire Department, 

upon receipt of a request for assistance, dispatched a career engine company, a rescue (ambulance), 

an attack (squad), a battalion chief, and a volunteer engine company. The volunteer engine company 

was later cancelled while still enroute, but the other companies continued on to the fire location and 

assisted with extinguishments and recovery of the victims.

There were eight people who resided at 1409 Maryland Avenue and seven were at home when the 

fire occurred. Six of them died. A woman, aged twenty-four, lived in the house with her twentytwo month old baby girl and both perished. She was babysitting the other children who were in 

the home when the fire occurred and shared the home with another woman, aged twenty-six. Her 

housemate lived in the home with her five-year old son and seven-year-old daughter. The twenty-six 

year old female was at work when the fire occurred. Both of her children died.

The twenty-six year old female’s younger sister worked at the same nightclub and had left her sixyear-old son and seven-year-old daughter in the care of the twenty-four year old female while they 

both were at work. Her children perished as well. The brother of the two club employees, aged 

twenty-three, also lived in the house. He too was at home at the time of the fire and is the only 

person to have survived.
4

St. Cloud Engine 101, with a crew of three firefighters, was the first company on the scene and 

took up position on the west side of the house on Maryland Avenue, almost directly in front of the 

burning structure. The Department’s standard operating procedure is to use the water from the tank 

(750 gallons) on the first apparatus to make the initial attack and to have the second company lay 

the supply line, if needed.

While Engine 101’s crew was pulling an attack line, the officer began to make a 360-degree size-up, 

but encountered a downed power line on the south side of the structure. Unable to complete his 

walk around, the officer ordered that the 1-3/4-inch attack line be used to protect the exposure on 

the north side of the fire because the siding on the exposed single-family dwelling was beginning 

to melt.

Upon arrival, the firefighters had been told by the occupant of the exposure on the north side of the 

house that there were five kids inside and that an adult male had escaped with minor cuts and smoke 

inhalation. Fire was visible in every window of the house and there was heavy fire on the enclosed 

front porch, which led firefighters to believe that no one could possibly be alive in the house. The 

volume and intensity of the fire made the structure untenable. Since a rescue was out of the question, 

their efforts were directed at extinguishment and the recovery of the bodies of the victims.

A second 1-3/4-inch attack line was deployed to protect the single-family dwelling on the south side 

of the fire. After the exposures were adequately protected, firefighters began to attack the fire in the 

downstairs portion of the house and quickly began to achieve knockdown. Meanwhile, three police 

officers assisted in the extinguishments effort by dragging a 5-inch supply line approximately 300 

feet to the hydrant (color coded green) that was located on the northeast corner of 14th Street and 

Maryland Avenue.

When the second St. Cloud engine arrived; that crew pulled a 2-1/2-inch pre-connect from Engine 

101 and made an exterior attack on the second floor. The operations shift commander was the next 

to arrive on the scene and he established command using the department’s ICS procedure. After 

achieving approximately an 80% knock-down from the exterior, firefighters donned their SCBA’s, 

entered the structure and conducted a primary search of the first floor. Not finding anyone, they 

advanced a 1-3/4-inch line up the interior stairwell not realizing that there was a victim at the base 

of the stairs. All exterior attack lines were shut down as the interior attack began.

The firefighters knocked down the fire on the second floor and discovered what they initially thought 

was two victims. Upon entering the second bedroom, firefighters found two more bodies by the rear 

window (see diagram 1 for the location of the victims, page 12). At this point, the IC requested that 

the department’s Chaplin, the Medical Examiner from Orange County; the State Fire Marshal; and the 

local fire marshal be dispatched to the incident.

Firefighters began to exhaust the contents of their first bottle of air and backed down the stairs at 

which point they were advised by the officer of the Engine 201 that there was an additional victim at 

the base of the stairwell, bringing the total victims to five. The body had been difficult to recognize 

due to severity of burns.

The sixth victim, a baby girl, was later found under the body of her mother who had been found 

lying face down. Firefighters have postulated that she had tried to cover the baby with her own body 

in a vain attempt to save her. It is believed that the mother could have easily escaped since she was 

sleeping in the downstairs bedroom, but had taken her baby upstairs to try and rescue the four kids 

that were sleeping upstairs.
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 5

The weather at the time of the fire was not an issue. Skies were clear with a light breeze and the 

temperature was in the low 70’s.

After the fire had been extinguished, firefighters learned that the adult male occupant of the house 

had been asleep on a couch in the living room. He woke up, discovered the fire, and called 9-1-1. 

According to him, there was no operating smoke detector to alert the occupants that the house was 

on fire. He allegedly went upstairs, but was driven back by heavy smoke. Before exiting the second 

floor, the man stated that he broke a window that he could not open. He then went back downstairs 

and exited via the rear of the structure, leaving the door open. Then, he climbed up to roof of the 

back porch, broke out the window, and called to the children. When he left the house, he had picked 

up a portable phone, which he used to call 9-1-1 from the roof of the back porch. Records indicate 

that a total of three 9-1-1 calls were made from the burning residence.

The dispatcher reported that she could hear the children screaming in background. Allegedly, the 

fire had flashed over and knocked the man over backwards. Suffering from smoke inhalation, cuts, 

and burns, the man then exited the roof of the porch.

An attendant at a gas station located two blocks away told fire officials that he was taking out the 

trash when he saw the fire and called 9-1-1. He stated that he then ran to the location with a portable 

fire extinguisher and attempted to extinguish the blaze. Several neighbors also used garden hoses 

in an attempt to bring the fire under control. After the attempt at extinguishing the fire failed, the 

attendant got the male occupant who had escaped away from fire.

Fire officials were told that the adults slept downstairs and that the kids all slept upstairs. The mothers 

of four of the children who died in the fire worked at a local nightclub and were at work when the 

fire occurred. When they were informed of the fire, they went to the scene and had to be restrained. 

One of them became so distraught that she had to be sedated and transported to a hospital. Other 

family members also began arriving and the scene quickly became very emotional. The police had 

to tape off the area for crowd control. A large number of the people in the neighborhood also began 

to congregate at the scene.

The St. Cloud Fire Chief was not in town when the fire occurred. Therefore, the Assistant Chief 

responded to the fire and functioned as the Public Information Officer, while the operations shift 

commander continued in his role as Command. The media became an issue even though they 

responded late in the incident. Operations had been conducted on a county radio channel because 

of mutual aid. The channel is not normally monitored by the media. Once the media learned of the 

incident, they began to congregate at the scene. A number of satellite television trucks showed up 

and the major television networks and the print media began to call and to make inquiries.

After extinguishment, firefighters covered the remains of the victims and secured the scene until 

the arrival of the Medical Examiner. They then assisted with the removal of the bodies, which were 

placed in body bags. Firefighters held up sheets to screen the victims from the vision of the many 

onlookers and the members of the media that had gathered at the scene. The bodies of the victims 

were all transported to the morgue in Orlando.

At 7:30 a.m. the next morning, the on-coming shift relieved the crews at the scene of the incident. 

By 10:00 a.m., all but one of the companies was released to return to service. A single engine company remained at the incident site in order to secure the scene.
6

Table One – Chronology of Events

Thursday, June 21, 2001

Time Event

02:07 9-1-1 call reporting fire and possible entrapment at 1409 Maryland Avenue

02:11 Engine 101 and Rescue 101 on location, reports working fire and requests mutual aid

02:14 Engine 201 and Rescue 201 on location

Friday June 22, 2001

Time Event

05:00/06:00 Assisted ME in removal of victims

07:30 On-coming shift relieved fire crews at scene

10:00 One engine held, others released

10:50 Last unit, Engine 101, cleared the scene

15:30 Held press conference

Because of the age and condition of structure, which was rendered uninhabitable as a result of the 

fire, the house was destroyed following conclusion of the investigation. A demolition permit was 

issued on July 2, 2001.

While there were no problems evident at scene, a number of the firefighters had young children of 

their own. To mitigate the possibility of a delayed reaction to the stress of the incident, the department held a CISD debriefing, which included the dispatchers and the members of the fire and police 

departments as well as the sheriff’s department. Chaplains and firefighters with CISD training conducted the debriefing.

The incident was very difficult for many of the emergency responders to handle and fire officials 

stated that they will always wonder what could they have done differently that would have prevented 

this, or possibly saved someone? As a matter of routine, the fire department had made smoke detectors available to anyone that wanted one, but the low demand had resulted in a problem with the 

batteries expiring before the detectors could be given away.

Immediately following the incident, there was a very positive community response (see photos 

of teddy bears). A number of fund-raisers were held for the victims and their families and a local 

funeral home donated funeral services. There also was very positive coverage of the incident by the 

local media and the demand for smoke detectors increased dramatically, for a brief period of time 

following the incident.

THE INVESTIGATION

The fire was investigated by the State Fire Marshal’s Office and the St. Cloud Fire and Police Departments. 

After ruling out all other causes, including possible criminal activity, investigators concluded that 

the fire was caused by a battery charger (see photos, page 40) that had been left plugged in to an 

electrical outlet on the front porch. The battery charger had not connected to anything at the time of 

ignition, but had been covered by clothes, which apparently overheated and then ignited.
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 7

In Florida, an investigator from the State Fire Marshal’s Office routinely investigates any fire involving 

a fatality. Local fire marshals do not have police powers. Therefore, the St. Cloud Police Department 

assisted in the investigation. Due to the sensitive nature of the loss, police provided both a crime 

technician and an investigator to collect evidence and to assist in the determination of cause and 

origin.

Officials also used an accelerant dog and took a number of samples from the burned structure. The 

investigation was prolonged for several days as investigators brought in an electrical expert to assist 

them in making their determination of the cause and origin of the fire.

LESSONS LEARNED (RELEARNED)

1. The absence of a functioning smoke detector within the residence contributed to the severity of the incident.

Hearsay evidence suggested that the smoke detector had been disconnected three days prior due 

to the fire due to a malfunction. The owner of the home was able to document that a functioning 

smoke detector had been present when the house was occupied. Evidence continues to suggest, 

that an operable smoke detector is one of the best tools in the prevention of death in a fire in 

a residence and that the absence of an operable smoke detector continues to be a factor in the 

numerous deaths that do occur.

The local fire department had a very aggressive public education program in effect prior to the 

fire that included providing free smoke detectors and replacement batteries. Prior to the fire, 

batteries would often expire before they could be given away. After the fire, the average daily 

demand increased to twelve smoke detectors and six batteries per day.

2. The time of day worked to the disadvantage of the emergency responders.

The fire was reported at approximately 2:00 a.m. when the majority of occupants of a residence 

would normally be asleep. The absence of an operational smoke detector contributed to both a 

delay in the discovery of the fire and allowed the fire to become large enough to prevent all but 

one of the occupants from escaping. Data collected by both the USFA and the NFPA continue 

to demonstrate that time of day and the absence of an operational smoke detector is a deadly 

combination, which contributes to a significant number of fatalities in residences each year in 

the United States.

3. Socioeconomic factors continue to be a major factor involving fire fatalities in residential 

occupancies.

Fires continue to kill the very young, the very old, and those in the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum in disproportionate number when compared to the general population. 

Five of the six victims were seven or younger. The home was located in a modest, working class 

neighborhood, once again meeting the profile that all too commonly present in catastrophic 

events such as these.

People at socio-economic disadvantage are more likely to share living quarters designed for 

fewer occupants, thereby increasing the rescue and response burden to the fire department.

9

APPENDIX A

Maps and Diagrams

Map One: Location of the fire: 1409 Maryland Avenue

Map Two: Location of St. Cloud Fire Station One proximity to the fire

Diagram One: Sketch of the Floor Plan

Diagram Two: Relationship of the victims
10    U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Map One: Location of the fire: 1409 Maryland Avenue
USFA-TR-142/June 2001    11

Map Two: Location of St. Cloud Fire Station One proximity to the fire
12    U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

 Sketch of the Floor Plan ram One: Diag
USFA-TR-142/June 2001    13 Relationship of the victims o:wTram Diag

15

APPENDIX B

List of Photos

Unless otherwise indicated, all photos were furnished by the St. Cloud Fire Department.

Photo Description

#1 Night view of northwest corner (front) of house

#2 Night view of front entrance on west side of house; note firefighters and hose lines on 

front porch

#3 Daylight view of front of house; investigators at work

#4 View of north side of house; note multiple roof lines indicating possible enlargement of 

second floor

#5 Day time view of south side of structure; open back porch is located behind lattice; note 

electric meter in center of wall to the left of the second window

#6 Day time view of rear of house and open back porch; note: this is where male occupant 

climbed up and broke out rear window and called for children; two bodies located just 

inside the rear window on second floor

#7 Exterior view of enclosed front porch

#8 Exterior view of second floor window of rear bedroom; note charring pattern

#9 North view of exterior; note ground ladder extended to second floor 

#10 Another view of north wall of house; note ladder and char patterns above all three 

windows

#11 Night view of southern wall; again pattern of exterior side indicative of former enlargement of second floor

#12 Northern exposure; note melting of exterior vinyl siding

#13 Northern exposure; note melting of exterior vinyl siding

#14 Hose line extending up interior stairwell; note accumulation of debris

#15 View up the stairs from first floor; note deep charring on stairs

#16 View from second floor down the stairs

#17 View from second floor down the stairs

#18 View from underneath the stairs

#19 Day time view of base of stairs, which has been cleaned to the floor. Fifth victim was discovered at this location by Engine 201
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#20 Second day time view of base of stairs and view of southern exposure

#21 Location of victims one and two (ultimately six) just inside landing of stairs on second 

floor, note lack of burns and smoke pattern on carpet

#22 Additional view of victims one, two, and six; note lack of burn/smoke on baseboard due 

to adult female’s head coming to rest against wall

#23 Additional view of the location of victims one, two, and six

#24 View of rear window on east side alleged to be broken by male survivor; victims three and 

four found just inside the window

#25 Additional view of rear window

#26 View of tarp covering bodies of victims three and four

#27 View of tarp covering bodies of victims three and four and relationship to rear window

#28 Point of origin on front porch

#29 Debris at point of origin

#30 Northwest corner of front porch; note debris

#31 Electrical outlet and battery charger at point of origin

#32 Porch cleaned to floor

#33 Southwest corner of porch cleaned to floor

#34 Southeast corner of porch prior to cleaning; note stairs just inside

#35 Electrical outlet with battery charge still plugged into the outlet

#36 Close-up of the outlet

#37 Close-up of the outlet, with plug still in tack

#38 See number #37

#39 Plug removed

#40 Point of origin, with outlet box

#41 Outlet

#42 Teddy bear memorial left at scene

#43 Teddy bear memorial left at scene

The following photos were taken after the incident by John Lee Cook, Jr.:

#44 North exposure: note melted siding

#45 Front of house: note sign advertising the relief fund

#46 Rear of house: note appliances on back porch

#47 South side of residence
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 17

#1 Night view of northwest corner (front) of house

#2 Night view of front entrance on west side of house; note firefighters and 

hoselines on front porch
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#3 Daylight view of front of house; investigators at work

#4 View of north side of house; note multiple roof lines indicating possible 

enlargement of second floor
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 19

#5 Day time view of south side of structure; open back porch is located behind lattice; 

note electric meter in center of wall to the left of the second window

#6 Day time view of rear of house and open back porch; note: this is where male occupant 

climbed up and broke out rear window and called for children; two bodies 

located just inside the rear window on second floor
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#7 Exterior view of enclosed front porch

#8 Exterior view of second floor window of rear bedroom; note charring pattern
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 21

#9 North view of exterior; note ground ladder extended to second floor

#10 Another view of north wall of house; note ladder and char patterns above all 

three windows
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#11 Night view of southern wall; again pattern of exterior side indicative of former 

enlargement of second floor
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 23

#12 Northern exposure; note melting of exterior vinyl siding
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#13 Northern exposure; note melting of exterior vinyl siding
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 25

#14 Hose line extending up interior stairwell; note accumulation 

of debris
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#15 View up the stairs from first floor; note deep charring on stairs
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 27

#16 View from second floor down the stairs
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#17 View from second floor down the stairs
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 29

#18 View from underneath the stairs
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#19 Day time view of base of stairs, which has been cleaned to the floor. Fifth victim was 

discovered at this location by Engine 201
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 31

#20 Second day time view of base of stairs and view of 

southern exposure
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#21 Location of victims one and two (ultimately six) just inside landing of stairs 

on second floor, note lack of burns and smoke pattern on carpet

#22 Additional view of victims one, two, and six; note lack of burn/smoke on 

baseboard due to adult female’s head coming to rest against wall
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 33

#23 Additional view of the location of victims one, two, and six

#24 View of rear window on east side alleged to be broken by male survivor; 

victims three and four found just inside the window
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#25 Additional view of rear window
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 35

#26 View of tarp covering bodies of victims three and four
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#27 View of tarp covering bodies of victims three and four and 

relationship to rear window
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 37

#28 Point of origin on front porch
38 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#29 Debris at point of origin, window on left
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 39

#30 Northwest corner of front porch; note debris
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#31 Electrical outlet and battery charger at point of origin

#32 Porch cleaned to floor
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 41

#33 Southwest corner of porch cleaned to floor
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#34 Southeast corner of porch prior to cleaning; note stairs just inside
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 43

#35 Electrical outlet with battery charge still plugged into the outlet
44 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#36 Close-up of the outlet
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 45

#37 Close-up of the outlet, with plug still in tack

#38 See number #37
46 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#39 Plug removed

#40 Point of origin, with outlet box
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 47

#41 Outlet
48 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#42 Teddy bear memorial left at scene
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 49

#43 Teddy bear memorial left at scene
50 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

#44 North exposure: note melted siding

#45 Front of house: note sign advertising the relief fund
USFA-TR-142/June 2001 51

#46 Rear of house: note appliances on back porch

#47 South side of residence