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24–238 PDF 2006

S. Hrg. 109–481

AFTER THE LONDON ATTACKS: WHAT LESSONS

HAVE BEEN LEARNED TO SECURE U.S. TRANSIT

SYSTEMS?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 21, 2005

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

KATHLEEN L. KRANINGER, Professional Staff Member 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

JOSHUA A. LEVY, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 2

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 4

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 6

Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................................... 14

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2005

Edmund S. Hawley, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security Transportation 

Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .................. 7

Michael Brown, Chief Operating Officer, London Underground ......................... 18

Polly L. Hanson, Chief, Metro Transit Police Department .................................. 22

Rafi Ron, President, New Age Security Solutions ................................................ 26

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Brown, Michael: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 18

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 58

Hanson, Chief Polly L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 22

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 66

Hawley, Edmund S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37

Post-hearing questions and responses ............................................................ 47

Ron, Rafi: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 26

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 76

(1)

AFTER THE LONDON ATTACKS: 

WHAT LESSONS HAVE BEEN LEARNED 

TO SECURE U.S. TRANSIT SYSTEMS? 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2005

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Lieberman, Levin, Carper, and Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. Today 

this Committee will examine the security and preparedness of 

mass transit systems in the United States. I particularly appreciate the chief operating officer of the London Underground traveling across the Atlantic to be with us this morning. He will share 

the lessons learned from his experience in leading his agency’s response to the terrible attacks in July in London. 

I would like to thank our distinguished Ranking Member, Senator Lieberman, for his initiative in recommending this hearing 

and our other expert witnesses for their appearance here today. 

I would also note that the American Public Transportation Association is hosting a meeting of security officials from a number of 

foreign transit agencies in Washington, and many of them have 

joined us at this hearing today. They represent a number of foreign 

countries, and we welcome them and look forward to hearing their 

views after the hearing. 

On the morning of July 7, terrorists exploded three bombs on underground trains in central London. A fourth bomb destroyed a 

double-decker bus. Fifty-two innocent people were murdered in 

those attacks. More than 700 were injured. Exactly 2 weeks later, 

on July 21, another attack was launched during London’s morning 

rush hour. Again, three trains and a bus were the targets. Fortunately, however, those bombs failed to detonate. 

The attacks on London’s mass transit have been described as a 

wake-up call to those responsible for the safety and security of our 

own mass transit systems, and they are not the first. They echo the 

alarms set off by earlier attacks on mass transit in Madrid, Moscow, Tokyo, Tel Aviv, and other cities around the world. In fact, the 

2

National Counterterrorism Center database reveals that in 2004, 

there were more than 150 deadly terrorist attacks on mass transit 

worldwide. 

Now that we have heard the alarm bells, it is time to act. In the 

jargon of counterterrorism, we often speak of soft targets. Soft targets are those locations and facilities that attract large numbers of 

people and that, by their very nature, must be open to easy public 

access, such as schools, shopping malls, hotels, restaurants, and 

sports arenas. The American mass transit system is among the 

softest of targets. Every year, according to the American Public 

Transportation Association, Americans take more than 9.6 billion 

trips on public transportation. Every weekday, approximately 6,000 

public transit systems carry more than 14 million passengers. In 

less than a month’s time, transit systems move more passengers 

than U.S. airlines transport in a year. Implementing security measures for these necessarily open systems is both a challenge and a 

responsibility borne by Federal, State, and local government officials, as well as private-sector owners and operators. Meeting this 

challenge requires a strategic vision and short- and long-term action plans developed among these parties, and it requires leadership from the Federal Government. 

I look forward to hearing today from the Department of Homeland Security regarding the Federal strategy for helping to secure 

our Nation’s mass transit systems. I am, however, disappointed 

that that strategy was initially classified, making access to it extremely difficult. In particular, I also question whether the Department may be focused too narrowly on aviation security at the expense of other modes of transportation. While it is understandable 

that after the September 11 attacks air security would command 

our immediate focus, I believe that it is now time to reassess priorities and evaluate our preparedness across all modes of public 

transportation. 

The answer, of course, is not merely to invest more in mass transit security, but to invest it wisely, to adopt and expand strategies 

and tools that have proven successful elsewhere. From communications, surveillance equipment, sensors, and access control systems 

to planning, training, additional transit police, and increased public 

awareness, the techniques by which mass transit security can be 

improved are known and in use, as our witnesses will testify today. 

I welcome the testimony. We will hear how these techniques can 

be employed to harden a target that remains far too soft. 

Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Thanks for your 

opening statement and thank you very much for convening this 

hearing. This Committee has been quite engaged as the oversight 

committee of FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security in 

the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. In fact, tomorrow we are holding a markup—I believe the first by a Senate Committee—to bring 

out emergency response legislation; that is, legislation that will assist the victims and their communities in their response and recovery to Hurricane Katrina. So I appreciate your decision to go ahead 

with this hearing as scheduled, and I think it reflects our shared 

3

conclusion that our transit systems remain vulnerable to terrorist 

attack and that the terrorists who struck us on September 11 are 

not going to take a holiday or a grace period because we have been 

hit by Hurricane Katrina. They are out there, and we have to do 

everything we can, urgently, to increase our defense, our homeland 

defense of targets that are vulnerable and may be therefore attractive to terrorists. 

Many of us have been concerned, as your opening statement suggests, Madam Chairman, since September 11 with the lack of an 

adequate response to the defense of our mass transit systems. As 

you said, it was understandable post-September 11 that we should 

focus first on aviation security, and quite appropriately so. But 

September 11 was a tragic wake-up call that should challenge us 

to better defend not just aviation, but other transit systems and 

other vulnerable parts of our society. The numbers here cry out, 

just as you said. The number I have—more than 14 million Americans ride our mass transit systems every day, as compared to 2 

million people who fly on airplanes. That does not mean we should 

not do everything we can aggressively to protect the 2 million. It 

just means that we better not forget the 14 million, and the response—perhaps this is too simple, but it is one measure—is how 

much money we have spent since September 11 on aviation security on the one hand and mass transit security on the other. You 

will get some debate about these numbers depending on how you 

calculate them, but there seems to be agreement that we have 

spent at least $15 billion on aviation security since September 11 

and that we have spent only $300 million on mass transit security. 

That cannot go on. We are inviting trouble if it does go on. 

For about 3 years, some of us have been trying to get the Administration to issue a National Transit Security Plan. Last year, finally, in the intelligence reform legislation which came out of this 

Committee and was adopted in December, there was a legal requirement to do that. It was due on April 1. A lot of months went 

by, but finally, after April 1, the plan was issued. And, as Senator 

Collins has said, it was classified, preventing many of the stakeholders in our mass transit system, for whom the document was 

issued, from being able to use it. I am pleased that the Department, hopefully—at least in part in response to the request made 

by Senator Collins and me—has now agreed to permit the stakeholders to view the strategy, but we are still unable to discuss the 

content of the document here today without restriction. 

I do want to discuss—with Mr. Hawley, particularly—the Federal 

Government’s vision for transit security and transportation security generally in a way that is constructive and meaningful without 

compromising any of the restrictions established by the Department. So I guess I would say right here at the outset to you, Mr. 

Hawley, and as far as it relates to any others, but it is really to 

you, that if at any point during the hearing in response to a question I or any of the rest of us ask, but I will say it about myself, 

you believe that a full answer would require you to discuss information that cannot be discussed publicly, then please indicate so 

and limit your answers to that which you can discuss publicly. I 

will say for my part I have reviewed the strategy, but I remain concerned that within it there is not an adequate sense of priorities. 

4

The vulnerabilities are listed in different areas of mass transit—

but there is not a sense that I got of priorities about which of those 

vulnerabilities are most significant and, therefore, which we should 

focus most resources on most quickly. 

Second, I share with you a general reaction, and want to ask you 

about it, that the plan continues to reflect an encouraging, 

proactive, aggressive, creative, comprehensive, can-do, must-do attitude toward aviation security, but it does not do the same with 

regard to mass transit. We understand, as Senator Collins said, 

that a lot of forms of mass transit are more open systems, harder 

to protect, but that is not a reason not to do a lot of things that 

are not being done now to push, if I can use an old metaphor, the 

security envelope here—it is probably not the appropriate one—to 

make sure we are doing everything we can, even allowing for the 

openness of the systems. 

In that sense, our witnesses today, I think, can be extremely 

helpful, and I am very grateful that they are here. Chief Brown, 

Mr. Brown, comes with the experience, not just of the tragedy of 

the attacks in London in July, but of all that the London system 

does to deter such attacks, well beyond what is done in most of our 

transit systems today. Mr. Ron brings considerable experience from 

Israel, unfortunately having lived with the clear and constant danger of terrorist attack, in other methods that can be used to deter 

those attacks in open mass transit systems. I look forward to hearing from him. And then Chief Hanson, from the Metro Police Department, is in some sense the consumer and the front-line first 

preventer, not to mention first responder, in mass transit security. 

I want to ask her about how she thinks we in the Federal Government are doing in helping her do her job. Bottom-line, I have, and 

I know everybody on the Committee does, a real sense of urgency 

about doing a lot better than we have done in protecting the American people when they ride mass transit in this country, and I am 

confident that from this hearing will come some good ideas that we 

can use together to accomplish that very important national security goal. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

I would now like to call upon a Committee member who takes 

mass transit every day and thus has a special interest in this topic 

and has had for some time. 

Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chair, and thanks very much 

to you and Senator Lieberman for holding this hearing. This is one 

that strikes close to home for all the members of the Delaware congressional delegation, Senator Biden, Congressman Castle, and myself, because we do commute on almost a daily basis to Washington 

along with hundreds or thousands of people who ride not just Amtrak, but the MARC systems, the SEPTA systems, and others up 

and down the northeast corridor, so we much appreciate your holding this hearing. 

I flew down to Charlotte, North Carolina, on Monday and was reminded again as I stood in line to go through security at PhiladelVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:57 Jul 19, 2006 Jkt 024238 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\24238.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
5

phia International to take my shoes off and to go through the process that we have all become familiar with in the last couple of 

years, how much air travel has changed in the last 4 years. Those 

of us who work the kind of jobs we do, we do fly a whole lot. So 

we are especially mindful of that. I am sure a lot of folks in the 

audience are mindful of that, as well. 

I think most of us agree that American air travelers are traveling with greater security and that some of the inconvenience we 

put up with is worth it. I feel safer. I hope others feel safer, as 

well. I noted before—I think in this Committee—that the bombings 

that we witnessed in the past year or so in Madrid and in London 

should have in a lot of ways been the same kind of wake-up call 

for us that September 11 has been on the air side. We have taken 

some steps to secure rail and transit systems since those two attacks, but I am telling you I am still not convinced that we have 

done everything that we can and should be doing to prevent a Madrid-style or a London-style bombing from occurring here close to 

home on our own shores. I am not suggesting that we take what 

we are doing at our airports and set up similar security systems 

in trains or bus stations. I am not interested in rushing into the 

Wilmington train station, taking off my shoes, and standing in line 

to go through screening devices any more than the other hundreds 

of thousands of people who take transit every day, but I think 

there are some things we can do, and hopefully as we come through 

today’s hearing we will identify some of them. 

I am pleased that we have finally given the Department of 

Homeland Security the money to distribute grants to rail and to 

transit systems to help them pay for some of the cost of additional 

security. It is my understanding that not very much of that money 

has been spent, and I am not sure why that is the case. We certainly hope to get some insights into that today. Since Amtrak and 

most transit agencies barely have enough money to operate from 

day to day, we probably ought to be putting up the money, and I 

am just curious as to why the money that we have appropriated 

has not gone out the door and actually been put to work. I am also 

pleased, though, that the Department of Homeland Security is 

spending money to train and deploy teams of rail inspectors and 

canine bomb-sniffing units. 

Whenever I talk to security folks within Amtrak, they always say 

one of the best buys that we can get for our money is dogs, just 

to have dogs that are trained with folks who know how to handle 

them to check for bombs aboard trains. I think we do need more 

information, however, about how these assets are going to be deployed and how they fit into a strategy to harden our defenses 

against an attack on our rail and our transit systems quickly before another attack forces us to take additional action. 

In closing, Madam Chairman and colleagues, I will just say that 

this is, I think, a very timely hearing and a topic that is worthy 

of our attention and has been for some time. There has been a lot 

of talk since the London bombings about whose job it is to do the 

brunt of the work to protect our Nation’s rail and transit infrastructure—the operators in the private sector, State and local level, 

or the Federal Government? I agree with those who say that rail 

and transit security should be a shared responsibility, but if, God 

6

forbid, there were an attack on an American subway system like 

the one that occurred in London, our constituents would demand 

that the Federal Government act decisively, and I hope that this 

hearing helps us flesh out at least a little bit more what the Federal role in transit security and rail security should be and speeds 

up our efforts to fulfill that role. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator Levin, we welcome you, as well. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, to you and Senator Lieberman as always for taking a leadership role in a very 

critical area. One of the issues that I am particularly interested in 

in the area of transit security, but frankly all security, is the development of technology that is capable of detecting explosives at a 

distance. If we can develop that technology so that we can identify 

explosives at a distance, we are going to be able to dramatically enhance our security everywhere. The technology does not yet exist, 

as far as I know, and yet we have—as Senator Carper mentioned—

dogs that sniff explosive material. Explosive residues can be detected on people and on clothing, and we should be able, if there 

are enough resources invested, to develop a technology which can 

spot explosive devices at some distance, and that would be a huge 

breakthrough in the fight against terrorism. So I know that the Department of Homeland Security is developing and coordinating an 

effort to detect the presence of explosives at a distance. I emphasize at a distance. We already can detect them at a few inches or 

feet. We need to be able to detect them at many yards away. 

We could have protected ourselves and other countries could 

have protected themselves against many of these explosions had we 

had this capability. I believe we put some additional funds in the 

budget this year to do that. I think we have gone from $22 million 

to $136 million for the High Explosives Countermeasures Office, 

but I would like to hear from Mr. Hawley and also our other witnesses if they have information on this subject as to what is the 

status of the efforts to research and develop a detection capability 

for high explosives at some distance. 

I regret that I am going to have to leave, so I will not hear their 

answers, but my staff will tell me whether or not either or any of 

these witnesses have been able to shed some light on this question 

as to where are the investments being made; what is the time line; 

do we have any hoped-for breakthroughs that are on the horizon? 

If so, with luck, can we be deploying these kind of detection devices 

or a detection device within a matter of a year or two, or is it 

longer range than that? How many companies do we think and how 

many institutions—academic institutions, commercial companies—

are involved? Is it a matter of a few or is it a matter of dozens or 

is a matter of hundreds looking for this capability? And from our 

witnesses from England, if they could also bring us up to date as 

to what England is doing in this area, as well, it would be helpful 

to me. Again, I only regret that I cannot stay to hear the answers, 

but it is a very important question I hope our witnesses might address. 

7

1The prepared statement of Mr. Hawley appears in the Appendix on page 37. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

I am pleased to welcome our first witness this morning, Edmund 

Hawley, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the 

Transportation Security Administration. This is the position for 

which the Committee confirmed him this past July. We are very 

pleased to welcome you back, and we look forward to hearing your 

testimony. Please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF EDMUND S. HAWLEY,1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HAWLEY. Thank you. Good morning, Madam Chairman, 

Ranking Member Lieberman, and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity on behalf of the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) to discuss our efforts in partnership with 

others in the Federal, State, and local governments, as well as the 

private sector, to provide essential security in public transportation. As has already been noted, 21⁄2 months ago, Londoners endured the ordeal of four nearly simultaneous suicide bombing attacks in the Underground system and a double-decker bus. Just 2 

weeks later, another four attacks in the Underground were attempted. 

This has been an opportunity for us to assess and enhance the 

level of security on our public transportation systems. Our review 

of that effort has provided valuable information on our security 

posture and insight into areas where improvements are needed. 

These learnings from London and insights from Secretary Chertoff’s second-stage review form the basis of my testimony today. 

Earlier this month, the Department delivered to Congress the national strategy for transportation security that you have mentioned. This was prepared in cooperation with the Department of 

Transportation and outlines the Federal Government’s approach in 

partnership with State, local and tribal governments and private 

industry to secure the U.S. transportation system from terrorist attacks and also to prepare the Nation by increasing our capacity to 

respond if an attack occurs. It describes how the Federal Government will manage transportation risks and discusses how the government will organize its resources to secure the transportation 

system. 

To implement the strategy, it is clear that we must enhance our 

coordination of security initiatives and our communication among 

the Federal, State, and local governments and industry stakeholders. Two significant developments in this area have already occurred. On September 8, TSA, FTA, and DHS’s Office of State and 

Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) completed the public transportation annex to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between DHS and DOT. This agreement defines the roles and responsibilities of the Federal Government parties in public transportation security. Additionally, earlier this 

month, as a direct result from our learnings from London, TSA initiated a pilot program with participants from DHS, DOT, and FTA 

to re-think the way in which we communicate with stakeholders on 

8

passenger rail and rail transit security issues. The objective of this 

program is for the Federal partners in passenger rail and rail transit security to coordinate ahead of time and speak with one voice 

to our stakeholders. This program will bolster passenger rail and 

rail transit security and provide the foundation for similar initiatives in other transportation modes. 

We are also bringing improvements to explosive detection procedures. We are increasing our canine explosives detection capability 

and have taken steps to expand the deployment of teams to some 

of the largest mass transit systems. That effort is now under way. 

TSA’s surface transportation inspection force is nearly fully fielded. 

Inspectors are already deployed and working to develop close liaison with mass transit and passenger rail operators. The inspectors 

provided timely services in the aftermath of the attacks on London, 

deploying to rail and mass transit operation centers throughout the 

Nation. The lessons learned and relationships developed will further enhance our security posture, as will the security system evaluations in mass transit systems. These initiatives are being integrated into the broader context of overall DHS initiatives and Secretary Chertoff’s strategy for the Department. These include real 

stakeholder engagement, networked information, development and 

leveraging of technology, a risk-based approach to the deployment 

of Federal resources, and the DHS program for grants to foster innovation at the State and local level and in the private sector. We 

will continuously strengthen our base of security programs in a 

manner that ensures freedom of movement for people and commerce. 

A common theme in this discussion is our effectiveness and security depends on the close working relationships among the parties. 

I would like to publicly express my gratitude to Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta for his support of this mission by letting us 

take a key member of his team, Deputy Transit Administrator Robert Jamison, who will join us at TSA as deputy administrator. He 

brings a wealth of experience in the public transportation environment and is acting administrator of the Federal Rail Administration. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear this morning. I look forward to working with Congress on these topics and would be happy 

to answer any questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for your statement. I want to 

begin my questioning today by exploring an issue that Senator 

Lieberman raised in his opening statement about the disparity in 

funding for aviation security versus other modes of transportation. 

My statistics are a little bit different from those of Senator 

Lieberman, but the point is exactly the same. Since September 11, 

2001, the Department of Homeland Security has allocated over $18 

billion in funding for aviation security and only $250 million for 

transit security grants. Now, I recognize that the funding for transit security grants does not represent all spending that benefits 

transit security, but it is the largest allocation of dedicated funding, and by any measure there is a huge disparity. At this stage 

and in light of the attacks on mass transit systems in other countries, should we be reallocating resources to beef up other modes 

of transportation? 

9

Mr. HAWLEY. The risk-based approach looks at the total transportation network, and clearly the Federal dollars that are spent 

in the aviation sector are very much larger than those spent in others. However, that does not reflect the relative importance of either 

the modes or the security available to them, and that it is a very 

high priority certainly in the Department and TSA to be involved 

in transit security. The numbers—there are a lot of different numbers, but I think your point is valid, whatever the specific numbers. 

But the way we look at the terrorist situation today is more on a 

person-based as opposed to a thing-based, which is to say that it 

is not, in our opinion, the right way to structure the security regime to look at specific attack points and develop solutions for 

every one of those individually, but rather to look at the whole system and say it is the people who are delivering these attacks, and 

things that we do in terms of border security, connecting the dots, 

so to speak, between ICE and Customs and border protection and 

TSA and FBI, and that the focus of finding the terrorists themselves who may decide to do a transit attack or an aviation attack 

or any of the other modes, that the focus is to stop the terrorist 

attack wherever it is, and certainly there are prudent things to do 

at the point of attack across the board, but there is also the other 

effort that does not lend itself to modal differentiation. 

Chairman COLLINS. I think that is something that the Department really needs to take a look at. The GAO has been critical of 

the Department, as you know, for not concluding a risk assessment 

of the Nation’s passenger rail system. And, there continues to be 

criticism of whether or not we are really prepared in this area. I 

also think we can learn a lot from the experience of other countries. In Michael Brown’s testimony, he notes the value of the 

closed-circuit television surveillance units that are widely deployed 

throughout the London Underground system, and it was those television images that enabled a swift, successful law enforcement investigation following the July attacks. What is the status in the 

United States of efforts to install similar surveillance and communication systems within our mass transit systems? 

Mr. HAWLEY. The camera systems and the communication systems are among the best security measures that the transit systems can do, and, of course, each system has its own particular 

characteristics and its own particular progress. The point that I always come to on that is that the capital expense of getting the camera installed is perhaps the easiest part, and then comes the part 

of, OK, how are we actually going to use them? Who is going to 

be watching the feeds? How are we going to analyze them, and 

what do we do when we see something that we are concerned 

about? From my point of view, as these issues are resolved on the 

capital dollars to put in these very excellent systems, that there 

needs to be a commensurate activity that integrates those new systems into the real world security process of an individual transit 

system or even transit station. So it is something that we feel is 

very important and a role that we can play that is helpful and directly applicable to increased security, but does not have a huge 

dollar cost associated with it. It is how to leverage those capital investments to get the best operating security. 

10

Chairman COLLINS. Are other countries ahead of us in this regard? It certainly seems that way, just watching the images on television versus our personal observations here in the United States. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, certainly the London Underground is among 

the best, if not the best in the world, in terms of the deployment 

of an integrated security system, and it is a cautionary tale that 

even with that level, that these attacks occurred, and also of concern is the fact that a short time later essentially the same method 

was used by similar attack methodology. So no system is invulnerable, no matter what the investment is. You just cannot take risk 

away, but you can do the prudent thing, and I think the systems 

that we have deployed in the United States and the operating procedures that go with them are as good as anywhere in the world, 

and I think the proof point of that was on July 7, when all of the 

transit systems in the United States came up on their own to a 

very high, very effective level of security, and all that work of preparation and vulnerability assessments and all of those things that 

have been going on for 3 years came up in an instant and was very 

effective. So I think the security for transit systems in the United 

States is outstanding. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks, Mr. 

Hawley, for your testimony. Incidentally, Senator Collins raised 

questions about the allocation of appropriations for mass transit. In 

fact, in the initial budget proposal by the Administration there actually was a cut from previous levels in mass transit funding, and 

Senator Collins and I have asked our colleagues on the Homeland 

Security Appropriations Subcommittee to at least appropriate for 

mass transit to the level of last year. I hope that you will support 

us on that. I hope in some sense that this hearing may encourage 

our colleagues to sustain the current level of funding and hopefully 

to go higher. 

I want to ask you a few questions about the national strategy, 

and I want to do so mindful of what I said in my opening remarks, 

that I expect that you will respect the limitations or I will respect 

the limitations of what you can say and cannot say publicly at this 

hearing. The strategy has been in the works for a long time, long 

before you became the Assistant Secretary for Transportation Security, and a lot has happened since it began. There is always a lag 

time in these kinds of things. I want to ask you this question, 

which is whether you would say that the National Strategy for 

Transportation Security, as it was released more than a week ago, 

reflects the Administration’s current thinking on transportation security strategy? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, it does. It is a very good baseline on which to 

build. As you get into it, there is tremendous depth to the information that is there that lays out a very comprehensive look at the 

total transportation system, and the key point being that in the resource-constrained world, risk-based priorities are the way to go, 

and that really is at the heart of Secretary Chertoff’s strategy for 

the Department and certainly ours at TSA, and it lays out a lot of 

the current processes that have been built up of solving the problem of how do we have an effective level of security across systems 

that operate geographically dispersed and are all interconnected? 

11

How do we connect those with so many different players having responsibility for different pieces? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you then to respond in general 

terms, or however specific you think you can, to my general reaction after having reviewed the strategy, which is that within the 

itemization in different forms of transportation, of vulnerabilities, 

there did not seem to be a sense of priorities among those. That 

is the first one. The second is my own feeling, somewhat explicit, 

maybe implicit, that the approach to the non-aviation transportation sectors remained much less aggressive, can-do, must-do, 

even if it is hard, than the strategy for the aviation sector. 

Mr. HAWLEY. I can tell you on the transit sector that the first 

London bombings occurred on a Thursday, and Secretary Chertoff 

had a number of us in on Saturday with, ‘‘OK, what are we doing 

right now to do what we can to have the level of security effectively 

increased?’’

Senator LIEBERMAN. Long-term, not just——

Mr. HAWLEY. Long-term, I think the strategy gets—it goes back 

to the point of looking for the terrorists before the attack is 

launched, and if the predominance of our defenses are only to protect the final end point of the attack, that is not a very good system, and so it is the multiple layers that go to stop an attack before 

the decision is made by the attackers as to which mode. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is exactly the point I was trying to 

make, which is—and I agree with this in part—that if somebody 

is going to come at a transit system or any other locale in our country, as unfortunately our friends from Great Britain and Israel 

know, strapped with bombs around their waist, once they get to 

that point it is hard to stop them, not impossible, as we have seen, 

but hard. Obviously, the best thing you can do is to have intelligence to stop them before they strike, but I do not want us to 

allow that reality to be a reason not to do everything we can to protect and defend the final targets, as the British and the Israelis do 

more than we do, I believe. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes. I think that is an excellent point, and the 

things that we can do long-term in terms of technology development and things that tend to be capital costs are not immediately 

available to us, but a lot of the things—the See Something, Say 

Something campaign that enlists the public to be alert, training of 

the employees of the transit operators, behavioral observation techniques. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That’s exactly the kind of stuff I am talking 

about. We are going to hear more about that on the second panel. 

Can I ask you one final question? After the threat level was raised 

to orange after the London attacks, local transit systems around 

the country raised their defense levels, and it put a lot of strain 

on them in terms of finances. There’s an article I have seen from 

the Atlanta Journal-Constitution that reports that raising the 

threat level to orange this summer cost the Atlanta transit system 

about $10,000 a day beyond its regular operating budget, which exhausted a quarter of its overtime budget within the first month of 

the system’s fiscal year and pushed the security personnel to work 

12-hour shifts even though they had the assistance of local police. 

12

In Connecticut, I can tell you that after the threat level was lowered back to yellow, the Governor announced that State Police officers and National Guard troops would no longer be deployed on the 

Metro-North trains or at the State bus and train stations. So in 

some sense the threat level was reduced, as I understood the Secretary’s decision, because local protection had gone up, but when 

the threat level was reduced nationally, the local protection left because of financial reasons. So I wanted to ask you whether the financial strain placed on transit systems by the lack of resources for 

transit security in any way influenced the Department’s decision to 

lower the threat level for mass transit this past August? 

Mr. HAWLEY. The funding source comes from the Urban Area Security Initiative, which has, I think, since September 11, $8.6 billion put into it, and from that pool local communities are able to 

draw down sources—money from that, particularly to offset overtime, etc.—and I think the issue on when it was time to come down 

to yellow from orange was based in large part on a sense that we 

could not keep a high level of alertness at every player across the 

system indefinitely, and that by the random application——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Because of financial stress? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, no, just the alert readiness. For instance, it 

was in the summer, and I saw guys who were in their Kevlar and 

their helmets, and the approach that seemed persuasive to us is 

that the random application of parts of orange that would not incur 

the cost of total orange everywhere, but that random increased patrol here, random dog team there, random different pieces that you 

did not have to sustain across the entire activity would give a higher delivered level of security than existed at yellow without incurring the cost that you had to have at orange. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I thank you. My time is up. Obviously, I 

hope you will think about this irony when you lower the threat 

level, then the locals got rid of the financial stress. I am going to 

want to ask the Metro police chief, from her perspective, about that 

whole experience. Thanks very much, Mr. Hawley. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Again, Mr. Secretary, welcome. In the airline industry, many 

technologies have been developed in the military and later made 

commercially available. Rail and transit systems, however, really 

do not have the same kind of research and development pipeline 

to draw from, at least not to my knowledge. How is the Transportation Security Administration working with other agencies in this 

country or even outside this country to create a similar pipeline for 

the detection of explosive, radiological, chemical, biological devices 

that might be deployed against our transit rail systems? How are 

you working with industry to make such technologies commercially 

available? 

Mr. HAWLEY. On the longer-term improvements in technology, 

the science and technology group at DHS specifically looks into the 

science piece to see promising areas. For instance, Senator Levin 

was talking about standoff detection of suicide bombers. What kind 

of science could apply to that mission? And so for the longer-term, 

looking at different, newer technologies and then turning those into 

13

products or providing seed money so that people can create pilots 

is very much the job of S&T. Within TSA, we have had a very effective explosives lab that is based in Atlantic City, and they spend 

a lot of time trying to figure out how a particular technology that 

works in one area could be applied to finding explosives in another. 

So there is a lot done there, a lot of connection with other parts 

of the government in other countries. It tends to be a 2-year lag, 

my guess, before we are going to see that effectively applied. 

Senator CARPER. All right. I understand from some discussions 

we had with folks who run rail and transit operations that they are 

approached—not besieged, but approached—by vendors frequently 

who are selling technologies that might help those rail and transit 

operators to better secure their systems. It is oftentimes difficult 

for the rail and transit operators to know a good investment from 

a bad one, as I am sure you can understand. Let me just give you 

an example: In the area of air quality, EPA has worked with transit agencies and bus manufacturers to set a standard, for example, 

for low-emission diesel engines that are commercially available. I 

just wonder how is the Transportation Security Administration 

doing this kind of thing with security technology? How does TSA 

determine what technologies are most effective, as well as how 

those products are most effectively utilized, and how do you get 

that information to the transit agencies to make sure that they 

know better how to spend their limited security funds? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Senator, I have heard the same comment from lots 

of people in the transit industry, and the Department, through the 

State and Local Government Office at the Department—they are 

the funding source; they are the people that provide the grants—

have a kind of Consumer Reports type function that they have 

where individual technologies are tested and evaluated, and so it 

is trying to draw the line between saying, ‘‘Here is our cookbook, 

the vendors you should be purchasing equipment from.’’ We do not 

want to get into making those choices, but we want to say, ‘‘Here, 

these are the technologies that are used in this way and they meet 

a common standard across the board,’’ so to give the individual 

transit systems the ability to fine-tune, but also to take the cost of 

evaluating all those vendors off their backs and let them focus on 

their own operations. 

Senator CARPER. I think you discussed in your testimony the importance of better utilizing canines to detect explosives. To date, 

TSA has augmented local law-enforcement canine capacity at 

events like the Democratic National Convention, Republican National Convention, and so forth. Do you have any idea how many 

canines TSA recommends that transit securities maintain? Is there 

some rule of thumb that is used in helping them determine that? 

Do you have any idea how many additional canines are needed for 

higher-level threat areas and how they have been deployed and 

prepositioned, and finally what is the cost of providing this level of 

canine presence and who should bear that cost? 

Mr. HAWLEY. The canine opportunity, we have talked about 

using technology that will join us in a couple of years, but that is 

a tremendous resource and a very flexible resource, and at TSA we 

have been on a pretty rapid incline where we expect to finish the 

year at around 470 dog teams. 

14

Senator CARPER. Any idea what that number might have been a 

couple years ago? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I know last year it was in the 300s, and I don’t 

know really beyond that, but I do know that since the July bombings, we have made 30 dog teams available to 10 large cities, that 

they will have those dogs by the end of the year. And now, as to 

the model of how the costs work with dogs, the way TSA does it 

today is that we have them trained at Lackland Air Force Base, a 

center of excellence for us for explosives detection, and we pay the 

operating costs or we reimburse local law enforcement who actually 

maintain the dog, and then a certain percentage of recipient of that 

we allocate. For instance, after July 7, we made available a certain 

number of our airport dog teams for transit operations, and I would 

say, going further, Senator, speaking specifically of Amtrak, that it 

is something we are looking at as to how to use any dog team that 

we have access to, on a random basis, apply it to, for instance, Amtrak or transit systems as requested by them. 

Senator CARPER. One last one: You discussed, I think in your testimony, the transit rail inspection pilot program that tested the 

feasibility of screening passengers, screening their luggage, screening cargo for explosives in transit and rail systems. I think you 

said this sort of technology might be best used when threats are 

made against a particular station or site. My question is how will 

the personnel and technology be deployed when such a threat is 

identified? Will it be available in every transit system or are you 

going to have it prepositioned throughout the country and redeployed when a threat is identified, and how also would this be paid 

for? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, the technology works. It is large and expensive 

and not terribly mobile. Dogs, on the other hand, are available, are 

mobile, and can be very effectively applied. So my solution is that 

we keep looking at the technology, keep trying to get the costs 

down and the flexibility up, but that we have tremendous resources 

in the canine arena that we are using today and will continue to 

use as a very effective, mobile, flexible, not terribly expensive force. 

Senator CARPER. Madam Chairman, rural southern Delaware 

has a saying that maybe they have in rural northern Maine about 

this dog won’t hunt, but when it comes to effectively ferreting out 

explosive threats and that sort of thing on trains and transit, these 

dogs do hunt, and they do a real good job. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am sorry 

that I missed an opportunity to make an opening statement, but 

I would ask that my full statement be included in the record. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Mr. Chairman, the natural disaster of Hurricane Katrina was compounded by a 

disastrous response. There was plenty of warning that a major hurricane could 

cause widespread flooding in New Orleans. And the warnings came true. 

15

We ignore warnings at our peril . . . but we continue to do so. This month marks 

4 years since September 11 . . . and 2 months since the London subway attacks. 

We know that our transportation system is a potential target of terrorists. 

Public surface transportation carries 16 times more passengers than airlines—but 

we focus almost all our security resources on aviation. In 2002, the FBI warned that 

Al Qaeda may directly target U.S. trains, rail bridges, and tracks. But despite the 

warnings, we still don’t have a plan to protect our nation’s railways. 

Since September 11, President Bush has not asked for one dime specifically to secure our rail transit systems. Not one dime. Rather, he asks for a broad Homeland 

Security fund for the Administration to pick and choose which industries they want 

to secure and which ones are left to fend for themselves. This is unacceptable. so 

each year Congress has to designate specific funds for rail transit security needs. 

The 9/11 Commission reported in detail how unprepared we were at that time for 

an attack on our transportation system. Unfortunately, we are still not prepared. 

I’m not suggesting airline-style baggage screening, but there are things we can 

be doing to protect passengers and employees of transit systems that won’t inhibit 

travel. Just like we passed legislation in the aviation sector, this Administration 

needs specific legislation on rail transit security or it simply won’t get the job done. 

So while we hold this hearing to discuss ‘‘Lessons from London,’’ I hope we understand that the warnings have been present long before July 2005.

Senator LAUTENBERG. As a prelude, very shortly, the natural disaster of Katrina was compounded by subsequent disastrous response, and there was plenty of warning that a major hurricane 

would cause widespread devastation in New Orleans and the surroundings, and the warnings came true, and we ignore these warnings at our peril, but unfortunately we continue to do so. 

This month marks 4 years since September 11, 2 months since 

the London subway attacks, and we know that our transportation 

system is a potential target for terrorists. Public surface transportation carries 16 times more passengers than airlines, but we focus 

almost all of our security resources on aviation. In 2002, the FBI 

warned that Al Qaeda may directly target U.S. trains, rails, rail 

bridges, and tracks, and despite those warnings we still do not 

have a satisfactory plan in place to protect our Nation’s railroads. 

The President, in his budget requests, does not dedicate a particular portion of the funds provided for transit security. Rather, 

our security is picked out of a group—I say our transit security—

out of a broad homeland security fund for the Administration to 

pick and choose which industries they want to secure and which 

ones are left to fend for themselves, and I am hoping that this 

hearing, Madam Chairman, is really timely and very important to 

bring attention to this exposure that we have. 

The funniest thing is when we look at potential attacks or some 

major incident happening in the rail system, for years we have 

looked at the transit agencies as having to deal with their own 

crime on their systems. Terrorist attacks are directed at our society 

as a whole and our American way of life, and I can think of no 

greater responsibility for the Federal Government than to protect 

us in this way. Instead, we have been kind of left to deal with it 

as part of the total security issue, and it is really not appropriate. 

I point out that the per-passenger cost for security and aviation is 

$9.60 per person. The London Underground that we are going to 

hear more about was over $2 dollars U.S. per passenger. U.S. transit, where we carry 9 billion trips annually, less than a penny per 

passenger, and it is really imbalanced, as everyone knows, when 

we saw the terrible tragedy that hit London and Japan in the transit systems, crippling the functioning of that society substantially 

for a long time, creating terrible problems. So, given your experiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:57 Jul 19, 2006 Jkt 024238 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24238.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
16

ence, Mr. Hawley, starting in your position soon after the London 

bombings, have you seen any sign that the Administration is going 

to request specific funds in fiscal year 2007 for rail transit? 

Mr. HAWLEY. On the issue of specific funds for transit, the Administration believes—and I believe—that the nature of the overlapping jurisdictions and operations in a region such as the National Capital Region or many others, that with so many players 

involved, that there needs to be some kind of an overview for the 

area. What is our strategy that is appropriate for this area? And 

that is why, on the targeted infrastructure protection grants, the 

Administration proposal for 2006 was up from $300 million to $600 

million. So there is a significant amount of money applied to this 

area, and I suspect that we may disagree on whether it should be 

targeted directly to a specific mode or made available for them to 

discuss and distribute as they decide. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, a common theme in the development 

of our intelligence system—the reform of our intelligence system 

and with the Department of Homeland Security—was focused on 

the debate as to whether or not the funds should be applied on a 

risk-based formula. Well, how can we then, Mr. Hawley, in fairness 

say, ‘‘OK, Washington Metro, here is a bunch of money. It is important. Divide it up in ways that you think are most susceptible or 

most risky’’? And to me that does not answer the problem, very 

frankly, because I assure you there are places in this city that get 

special funding even though they are perhaps the best protected facilities that we have in the country, but to ignore the damage—I 

mean, one need only—unless you get a chance to come by helicopter from home—if one gets in the car and drives across one of 

the bridges and so forth, sees what kind of damage could result 

from an attack on the Metro. I mean, this place would be in total 

chaos. So how do we assure that the facility that carries most of 

the people in the city and its environs is protected sufficiently? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, clearly the priority for me and TSA and DHS 

of protecting and being involved in excellent security in the transit 

sector is very high on all of our radar screens, and the issue of local 

decisionmaking—one of the 9/11 Commission report recommendations that we take very seriously is the connect-the-dots, and trying 

to get intelligence from the classified world directly to the operator 

in a way that they can use it, either by lowering the classification 

or finding a way to get it unclassified, is an operating way and an 

imperative that I have of get whatever intelligence that we have, 

whatever analysis, and network it widely within the industry as 

best you can from a security point of view, but always relating it 

to anything that would be tactically of interest and supported completely. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Does the subject of Amtrak ever come up, 

to your knowledge, under the rail security requirements? I have 

not seen it mentioned at all in any of the papers that I have seen. 

Is there anything there? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, sir, it is very much a part of it, and as we look 

at the overall application of our resources and trying to figure what 

can we use in a flexible way so that we do not focus all our attention on one particular aspect or one particular problem, we do want 

to have flexibility so we can apply random appearances and ranVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:57 Jul 19, 2006 Jkt 024238 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24238.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
17

dom security for Amtrak, transit, and all of our responsibilities. So 

I understand the issue about the funding of aviation versus that 

of transit, but I can assure you that at TSA and DHS the whole 

issue of transit security is one that we take very seriously. I spend 

a great deal of my personal time on it, and we were able to get the 

deputy transit administrator to come in as deputy at TSA. So we 

have a very high level, very deep operating experience at TSA, and 

it is a priority. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I am sure you have seen or heard the expression that came out of a major movie, and that was, ‘‘Show me 

the money,’’ and if we do not see the money we do not know how 

serious the thinking is. 

Thanks very much for your testimony. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. Hawley, before I let you go and we move on to the next panel 

this morning, I have to tell you that I keep thinking about your response to my last question. You said that, in your judgment, the 

security of mass transit systems in the United States is ‘‘outstanding.’’ I must say I don’t know how you could make that judgment when TSA has not finished risk assessments of U.S. systems, 

and I will ask you to respond either now or for the record. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Madam Chairman, let me just say that I totally agree with you, and everything we know continues to worry 

me, that our mass transit systems are more vulnerable than they 

should be today and that we have an urgent responsibility through 

strategy and through adequate funding to close those vulnerabilities to the best of our ability. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Sure. My basis for saying that was on July 7, the 

work that had been done over the prior 3 years of actually having 

written programs and very specific action plans for all of the top 

transit systems—I saw the top 100—and it was filled out with 

scorecards of how far they were on a whole variety of individual 

metrics, and it frankly was a surprise to me to see how ready the 

American transit system really is, and I make this point not about 

funding or anything else, but just to say that the work that has 

been done, consistently done over a 3-year period, has led to a 

measurable result. 

Chairman COLLINS. I think there is a lot of good work going on 

at the local, State, regional, and Federal level, and by private operators, but I think we have a long way to go, and I will look forward 

to discussing this further with the next panel. I think until TSA 

has completed its assessments, it really does not have a complete 

picture of the state of security for mass transit. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. I would now like to call forward the witnesses for our second panel. Our first witness, Michael Brown, is 

the chief operating officer of the London Underground. Mr. Brown 

has been with the London Underground for 16 years, serving in a 

variety of operations positions. In his current position, Mr. Brown 

is responsible for managing the Underground’s operations and seVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:57 Jul 19, 2006 Jkt 024238 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24238.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
18

1The prepared statement of Mr. Brown with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page 

58. 

curity, including emergency planning and response, technology deployment, and personnel. 

Our second witness, Polly Hanson, is the chief of the Washington 

Metro Transit Police. Her experience in law enforcement brings extensive knowledge to this Committee. In the year 2002, after 21 

years with the Transit Police, Ms. Hanson was sworn in as the 

chief. 

Our final witness, Rafi Ron, is the president of New Age Technology Solutions, a transportation security consulting firm. Mr. 

Ron was instrumental in developing and implementing new security policies at Logan Airport. His prior experience includes serving 

as the director of security at the Tel Aviv Airport in Israel and 30 

years in counterterrorism and intelligence services of the Israeli 

government. 

I feel very fortunate that we have such a prestigious international panel giving us a variety of perspectives here this morning. I thank you for being with us. 

Mr. Brown, we will start with you. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL BROWN,1 CHIEF OPERATING 

OFFICER, LONDON UNDERGROUND 

Mr. BROWN. Madam Chairman, thank you for your words of welcome, and thank you, Senator Lieberman, and other Members, as 

well. 

It is a great privilege to appear before you this morning. The 

London Underground is the world’s oldest underground railway 

network. It first opened in 1863. There are 253 miles of routes, 45 

percent of the network is in a tunnel system. There are 273 stations on the system served by underground trains, and of these, 

255 are operated by London Underground. London Underground 

provides a public transport railway service to London. It is part of 

Transport for London, which is a public transport authority under 

the direct control of the elected mayor of London. 

Approximately 3 million passenger journeys are undertaken each 

day on the Underground network, which is roughly the same number as the whole of the rest of the rail network across the United 

Kingdom. What I want to do briefly is talk about the security situation before July 7 and then go on to say some of the things that 

we have done since July 7. We have already heard some commentary about the CCTV systems in the London Underground. At 

present, the Underground has over 6,000 cameras on nearly all stations and in some of our trains. Within 5 years, that number of 

cameras will double to 12,000. There are five stations on the network which do not yet have CCTV coverage, but they will have it 

by June of next year, and that program has been brought forward 

since the events of July 7. 

For all new CCTV systems, every camera will be recorded. Work 

is also in place to monitor areas that are not effectively monitored 

at the moment, such as ventilation shafts, more monitoring of car 

parks and other potential entry points to the network; 6.3 million 

pounds is being spent on such investment. 

19

At present, policing of the Underground is carried out by over 

600 police officers. As of July 8, I ordered an additional 100 police 

officers, so there will be 750 police officers specifically dedicated to 

policing the Underground system within a year; 6,000 front-line 

station staff are deployed across the Tube stations. These staff 

work either on platform, ticket barriers in local station control 

rooms, or in control across one or more stations. 

All trains have a driver in their cab who is in contact by radio 

with a line control center. There are seven such rooms across the 

network. In terms of context, the majority of the attacks before 

July 7 were carried out by Irish Republican terrorists who had 

been involved in terrorism in all parts of the U.K., not just in 

Northern Ireland. They usually, although not always, gave a warning prior to their bombs exploding. So clearly the bombings of July 

7 were unprecedented in terms of the type of incident with no 

warning and being a suicide attack. The Underground is an environment where the millions of people we convey each day have no 

full check on their identity. No screening of their possessions take 

place, and there are only ticket gates to control movements in and 

out of the system. 

The phenomenon of the suicide bomber means any traditional 

measures of detection and interception are therefore likely to be ineffective. Response to the incident is therefore key. After the September 11 attacks in the United States of America, London Underground played a full part in the resilience planning process put in 

place by the U.K. Government and supported by the Mayor of London. We have seconded a senior manager to the London resilience 

team since it was established, and this is to ensure that the operational realities of a mass transport metro system can be properly 

considered in political and investment decisions. 

This team has led work in areas such as evacuation of parts of 

London, chemical, biological and radiological attacks, and most 

visibly has arranged tabletop and live emergency exercises. The 

largest of these was a weekend exercise at Bank London Underground Station which simulated a chemical attack at one of the 

largest, most complex stations on the network. This was a multiagency exercise which was also attended by political leaders. It is 

my view that the learning from all exercises played a vital role for 

Underground senior managers in revising training and in their 

own actions on July 7. 

The resilience team also enabled the joint development of a battery-powered track trolley designed to enable emergency service 

personnel to travel down the tunnel to an incident train while 

wearing heavy cumbersome protective suits. Although the events of 

July did not require such protective suits to be worn, these trolleys 

were deployed to help with casualty and later with body recovery. 

Also, emergency personnel have been trained to move trains in an 

emergency with instruction cards being available for emergency 

personnel to enable this movement of trains. As well as these larger-scale exercises, London Underground arranges every year a 

smaller-scale live incident gained with the full cooperation and involvement of police, fire, and ambulance services. This usually involves closing down a portion of the network during the weekend 

where the emergency exercise takes place. While these exercises 

20

cannot obviously involve all members of staff who might benefit 

from such practical training, in my view they do present a very 

real scenario for the senior and middle management team to experience and to learn lessons from. 

Let me go on to talk about the events of July 7. The three explosions that happened on the Tube network happened almost simultaneously at 08:49 and without warning across the Underground 

network. Two of the explosions were on trains in the Circle line, 

both of them in the second car, and one was on the much deeper 

level Piccadilly line on a train which just departed King’s Cross, St. 

Pancras Station. The tight, deep-level tunnel on the Piccadilly line 

led to a higher number of deaths and serious injuries here than 

elsewhere. The fourth explosion on the London bus, as you described, Madam Chairman, took place some hour later and also involved a large number of casualties. It was very close to the Piccadilly line train incident. 

In total, 38 people were murdered on the Underground and 52 

people in total if you include the bus incident. For upwards of halfan-hour after the incident, London Underground staff were the 

first responders to the incident before the emergency services arrived. Station staff, train drivers, cleaners, and a large number of 

managers recovered the dead and the dying in horrific circumstances at all sites. The drivers of all four trains—two were involved at Edgware Road—were among the many that performed 

with amazing courage, dedication, and compassion for several 

hours. 

As it became clear the scale and nature of the incidents, the entire Underground network system was evacuated. At the time of 

the explosion, just to put it in context, 500 trains were in service, 

2,500 staff were on duty, and the system was evacuated of over 

200,000 people in less than 1 hour after the call was made to evacuate (apart from one train that was stuck behind the incident train 

at Russell Square). This was particularly remarkable as the capacity of the mobile—or as you describe it, cell phone network—was 

unable to cope with the volume of calls being made by members of 

the public. So the communication systems in London were at 

breaking point. 

Within 24 hours, 80 percent of the service of London Underground was restored, and this was significant in that it gave a real 

confidence boost to London and Londoners in the resilience of their 

city. In accordance with our contingency plan, we put in place a recovery team immediately afterwards, and we restored all services 

within 4 weeks of the incident, the last part of the network being 

the Piccadilly line. Five cars remain under police control for forensic examination. Immediately after July 7, all staff were put in 

high visibility orange vests across the network, all managers with 

any operational experience were deployed across the network and 

also asked to wear orange vests. Police deployment was unprecedented with major patrols at the main central London stations, and 

over the next weeks there would be occasions when every station 

on the tube network had at least two police officers deployed 

throughout the operational day in addition to regular station staff. 

Enhanced staff briefings were instigated to ensure that train 

drivers and station staff had rapid access to information as it unVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:57 Jul 19, 2006 Jkt 024238 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24238.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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folded. This proved to be particularly important on July 21 when 

the three bombs failed to detonate on the Tube, but where the system was kept operational as we were able to describe to staff what 

the security situation was in real time. Some 17,000 CCTV tapes 

were removed by the police immediately after the events of July 7, 

and it obviously was vital that these tapes were replaced. This we 

did following our normal protocol, but clearly the system was heavily stretched. As you again said, Madam Chairman, the evidence 

was critical in capturing aspects of the July 21 attempted attacks. 

It is also important to note that since the July attacks the criticality of the radio system, the train radio system, has come into 

question, and what we have done is we have increased the spending on our radio system and have ensured that the delivery of a 

new system would be brought forward so that all lines would have 

a new radio system by the end of 2006. In the meantime, we have 

adjusted operational procedures to ensure that if a radio is inoperative, then we do not run trains in passenger service. 

I just want to talk briefly about investment, and I will be talking 

in pounds, so I apologize for that. Overall investment on the London Underground over the next 5 years will be 5.5 billion pounds. 

This reflects both London Underground directly managed investment and capital works delivered under our public-private partnership arrangements and public finance initiative contractors. At 

least 70 million pounds of the public-private partnership works will 

be spent on safety and security-related improvements over the next 

5 years. I have already talked about the CCTV enhancement works 

and the 6.3 million pounds will be spent on this area. Also, London 

Underground other works will include improved communication 

systems by station and train radios and also allow emergency services to use their radio systems underground. The day-to-day operational spent for security and British Transport Police operation 

has been enhanced following an increase of 100 additional police officers. The annual policing cost directly funded by London Underground is 50 million pounds, and in addition to this London Underground spends an additional 10 million pounds on other security 

and policing initiatives. 

It is worth noting that the estimated revenue impact for 2005–

2006 fiscal year of the attacks is of the order of 73 million pounds. 

As the network returned to normal, it is obvious that there should 

be a full review of all lessons learned from the event. Obviously, 

this is not yet in its final draft, Madam Chairman, but what I 

would wish to share with you is just a couple of things that we 

have already decided need to be looked at. The first one is car design. There has certainly been some feedback that the location and 

construct of the internal design of cars may have caused difficulty 

for some of the immediate rescue and recovery operation. Staff 

training is undergoing a full structural review within London Underground, and this review has now been extended to include a 

level of practical rescue and recovery training given to existing 

drivers and station staff. Already, all staff on the system undergo 

5 full days of refresher training every year. The content and duration of this is being reviewed. It is also true that we are reviewing 

our resource deployment in the event of such incidents and all the 

issues around multi-site incident management. 

22

1The prepared statement of Ms. Hanson appears in the Appendix on page 66. 

Thank you, Madam. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Chief Hanson. 

TESTIMONY OF POLLY L. HANSON,1 CHIEF, METRO TRANSIT 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA 

TRANSIT AUTHORITY 

Ms. HANSON. Good morning, Chairman Collins and Members of 

the Committee, and thank you for asking me to testify on the 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, or Metro, security initiatives. For the record, I am Polly Hanson, the chief of the 

Metro Transit Police. My written statement provides general background information on Metro and the Transit Police Department, 

so I will focus my remarks this morning on our security-related activities. 

As the largest transit provider for the National Capital Region, 

Metro does take its responsibility in homeland security with the seriousness it demands. WMATA’s approach to transit security involves a partnership between employees, customers, the transit police, and other public safety departments in the region, as well as 

the Federal Government. It is a strategic approach that merges the 

application of technology with enhanced operational awareness and 

puts an emphasis on training, public outreach, and the use of security assessments that take into consideration the unique features 

of transit and utilizes many of the industry’s best practices to implement these strategies. 

My written testimony provides a detailed summary of the security actions taken by WMATA prior to and after the attacks of September 11 in areas such as chemical and intrusion detection, perimeter security, explosives detection, our two federally sponsored 

security assessments, and other additional target hardening and 

emergency preparedness measures, so I would like to focus the majority of my statement on the more recent actions Metro has taken 

in response to the terrorist bombings that occurred in London and 

in Madrid last year. The actions taken in response to these attacks 

are designed to enhance both Metro’s and the region’s emergency 

preparedness capabilities. Some of the actions taken are the purchase of additional explosive ordnance detection equipment, increasing the frequency of station patrols by transit police special 

response teams—those are like SWAT teams—who patrol with specially trained explosive-detection canines and semi-automatic long 

guns. We have purchased additional radiological pages for use on 

patrol. We have created a multi-jurisdictional partnership with 

other law enforcement departments in the area to assist with rail 

and bus sweeps. We have assigned a Metro Transit Police captain 

to represent the whole transit industry on the FBI’s National Joint 

Terrorism Task Force, which adds to the detective we have had assigned to the FBI Washington Field Office, JTTF, since the late 

1990s, and additional security measures that are not visible and 

are designed that way. 

Aside from the actions taken by our transit police, Metro has 

constantly engaged our customers through a series of public announcements, campaigns, stressing the need to be attentive to their 

23

surroundings. During September, National Emergency Preparedness Month, Metro has been sponsoring numerous outreach events 

for our customers. We hosted an information booth and conducted 

canine and emergency evacuation demonstrations at the September 

1, 2005, DHS kickoff at Union Station. Our safety office has been 

offering emergency preparedness seminars at the offices of large regional employers, as well as conducting open houses at major rail 

stations on Tuesdays and Thursdays. During these events, members from the Metro Transit Police, our safety and communications 

departments, are on hand to answer questions from customers and 

distribute emergency preparedness brochures to explain emergency 

evacuation procedures and alternate route planning information 

that can also be found on our web site, MetroOpensDoors.com. We 

are also an active participant in the NCR’s just-launched emergency preparedness campaign, which has this zip card that allows 

you to document everything you would need to know in an emergency, and for the first time transportation is a component because 

of Metro’s request that it be a focus because it is so important. 

We also think that after Monday night’s football game, we might 

ask Joe Gibbs now to do a campaign because we think people 

would be willing to listen to him. [Laughter.] 

The recent events in London prompted a top-to-bottom reemphasis on our entire workforce on counterterror and emergency 

response training. Since 2003, Metro bus drivers, train operators, 

and other operational employees have been shown the National 

Transit Institute’s Warning Signs video, which covers systems security for transit employees, including what to look for and what 

to do regarding suspicious activity, packages, and substances. 

Warning Signs is also shown to all non-operational personnel, and 

we are supplementing our existing training for both operations and 

non-operations personnel with NTI’s terrorist activity recognition 

and reaction training classes, which focus on suspicious activity 

and behavior, which I think Mr. Ron will talk in great detail about. 

We continue to enhance and expand our training partnerships 

with the region’s first responders with Metro Transit Police-sponsored initiatives such as managing Metro emergencies and the 

Metro Citizens Corps, both one-of-a-kind programs, and also advanced behavioral assessment training for our regional law-enforcement partners. WMATA’s emergency management teams train an 

estimated 2,000 Federal, State, and local first responders a year at 

our emergency response training facility. All of this is covered in 

greater detail in my written testimony. 

The Department of Homeland Security and Congress have yet to 

make the protection of transit infrastructure a top homeland security priority. Less than $250 million of grant funding over 3 years 

has been allocated nationwide to transit since the creation of DHS 

in 2003. This amounts to an average of less than 0.3 percent of 

DHS’s annual budget of $30 billion, and prospects are not looking 

better for the upcoming year. 

The catastrophic consequences of Hurricane Katrina, highlighted 

by the breaching of the levees in New Orleans, serve as a stark reminder of the implications of neglecting to take action to protect 

critical infrastructure. Given the modest amount of Federal support 

for transit security to date, DHS could simplify the grant applicaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:57 Jul 19, 2006 Jkt 024238 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24238.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
24

tion process in fiscal year 2006 to ensure that already identified 

needs based on both external and internal security assessments are 

addressed in an expedited manner. 

Due to the amount of planning and the approval requirements 

associated with the fiscal year 2005 transit grant program, most of 

which replicates what transit systems are already doing, we are 

now almost a year after the enactment of the fiscal year 2005 DHS 

appropriations bill and 2 months after the London bombings, and 

we still have not gotten the green light from DHS to spend our fiscal year 2005 grant funds. At the very least, for fiscal year 2006, 

DHS should be able to evaluate all the risk assessment information 

submitted by transit agencies in the past years and provide specific 

allocations to each transit property based on risk rather than allocating funds on a regional basis. As part of our Metro Matters capital improvement campaign launched in the fall of 2003, WMATA 

identified $150 million of high priority outstanding security needs, 

yet WMATA has received only a total of $15 million in DHS transit 

security grants over a 3-year period. WMATA has allocated most 

of these funds toward beginning to address the need for redundancy and enhanced reliability for key operations control and communications functions, which was highlighted as a top priority by 

both our DHS and FTA security assessments. 

Other high priority security needs on the capital side include enhancing WMD detection capabilities, expanding intrusion detection 

and surveillance systems, enhancing decontamination response and 

recovery capabilities, and additional CCTV capability in rail stations and on buses. 

Transit systems around the country work in partnership with the 

American Public Transportation Association and have played a 

leadership role in developing security-related best practices in such 

areas as intelligence sharing, system safety and security guidelines, employee training, emergency preparedness, and the prioritization of transit research projects, but the energy and ingenuity 

exhibited by the transit sector since the tragedy of September 11 

4 years ago must be matched by a greater commitment of resources 

allocated on a risk basis and practical planning requirements by 

DHS in order to enhance the security of the more than 32 million 

customers who ride subways and buses every day. DHS could also 

do a better job of coordination and information sharing among internal agencies within the Department, such as ODP, TSA, IAIP, 

and the Science and Technology Directorate. 

The transit community also needs DHS’s help in the development of standards for detection and surveillance technologies and 

other security items applicable for target hardening in a transit environment. Metro continues to serve as a test bed for the Federal 

Government and a model for the country on new security initiatives. Metro’s chemical detection system, commonly referred to as 

PROTECT, has become a model for other transit agencies across 

the Nation and the world. Working with our Federal partners at 

DHS and the Departments of Transportation and Energy, WMATA 

continues to offer training and technical assistance on the PROTECT system to anybody interested in the transit industry. 

WMATA is actively engaging the Department of Homeland Security in efforts to leverage the advances obtained by the PROTECT 

25

program to other emerging applications in chemical, biological, and 

explosive detection areas. 

In January of this year, the Metro Transit Police and the Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration collaborated to enhance security at Metro stations and on 

trains for the Presidential Inauguration. The first-of-a-kind partnership with TSA included the use of Federal screeners equipped 

with explosive trace detection gear and canine teams 

supplementing Metro’s teams of officers and explosive detection canines. They performed without a hitch and the ops plan developed 

can be applied to other special events across the country. We were 

also working with DHS on expanding the application and training 

of personnel in the area of behavioral assessment screening of passengers in a transit environment. 

Early in 2004, WMATA was one of the first transit systems to 

subject itself to a comprehensive security risk assessment offered 

by the Office for Domestic Preparedness Technical Assistance Program. It is a useful tool, quantitative and scenario driven in nature 

and good for evaluating and ranking gaps in our infrastructure protection and response capabilities, and it represents the only example of a DHS agency approaching us with well-thought-out, riskbased process, which allows a property to assess outstanding security needs. And while the assessment methodology needed some 

tweaking, the ODP assessment team was receptive to our suggestions for improving the process and we recommend that other DHS 

agencies with responsibilities for accessing transit security such as 

TSA and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

Directorate work with ODP to enhance and expand the use of this 

risk assessment tool. 

WMATA has a long-standing productive relationship with the 

Federal Transit Administration on a wide range of emergency preparedness initiatives linked to training and exercises that are also 

summarized in my written testimony. As the recent events in the 

Gulf Coast illustrate, considerable coordination and planning 

among the region’s State and local government players, as well as 

the private sector, is necessary in order to ensure that WMATA’s 

own emergency preparations and security upgrades will provide 

benefits to the National Capital Region during an emergency. 

Using the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, or 

COG, as its primary coordinating body, the region has made 

progress with regional emergency response planning and coordination. As the lead transit agency in the region, WMATA continues 

to work with the rest of our partners in the transportation and 

public safety community to refine the plans in place. My written 

testimony summarizes other regional emergency preparedness activities that WMATA participates in, as well as our long-standing 

relationships with the region’s other law enforcement departments 

and emergency management agencies. 

We constantly reevaluate our top security needs based on new 

threat information, updated external and internal security assessments, and emerging technological innovations, and we are going 

to continue to pursue partnerships with the Department of Homeland Security and anybody else we can find to serve as a test bed 

for new initiatives in the areas of biological and chemical detection 

26

1The prepared statement of Mr. Ron appears in the Appendix on page 76. 

and enhanced security procedure for a transit environment. The 

tragic events in the Gulf region reinforce the importance of our 

need to work with all our regional partners to further enhance 

emergency preparedness in the National Capitol Region. 

Thank you, Chairman Collins, and the rest of the Members of 

the Committee for the opportunity to present these remarks and 

for your support of Metro over the years. I am happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Ron. 

TESTIMONY OF RAFI RON,1 PRESIDENT, NEW AGE SECURITY 

SOLUTIONS 

Mr. RON. As a private professional, I would like to especially 

thank you for inviting me to testify before the Committee. 

Over the past 50 years or so, it has become clear that transportation is a high priority target for terrorists and terrorist organizations. Since transportation systems constitute a critical infrastructure without which our modern industrial society cannot function, 

these systems are very likely to remain at the high-risk end in the 

foreseeable future. Key links in our transportation systems are vulnerable to attack, and the potential damage may cause a large 

number of casualties as well as long shutdowns which can lead to 

major system collapse with multiple economic and political repercussions. 

No other system combines such a high level of vulnerability with 

so many attractive goals for terrorists acting against the United 

States. As a result of the September 11 attack, aviation security 

has been given a great deal of attention, and the achievements are 

impressive. In less than 4 years, the United States of America has 

set itself as the global leader in aviation security and has become 

the driving force in making domestic and global aviation systems 

safer. Unquestionably, American aviation has become a harder target for terrorists to hit. For terrorists, this means that in order to 

ensure the success of an attack on aviation, they would have to 

meet much higher requirements than ever before in terms of effort 

and sophistication. Concurrently, the disruption of global terrorist 

organizational structure by the U.S. global war on terror is resulting among other things in the shift of responsibility for initiating 

and executing attacks to local terrorist cells, as we have seen in the 

cases of Madrid and the London attacks. 

The resources needed to mount successful attacks on hard targets are less readily available to terrorists operating on the local 

level. The important lesson to be drawn from this recent history of 

terrorist activity is that once high-priority targets are made harder, 

terrorist efforts tend to be diverted toward minor targets that are 

still perceived as being soft. Mass transit remains a vulnerable target, more difficult to protect because of its vast extension and accessible nature, because attacking it does not require extraordinary 

resources, and because technological solutions have only limited 

relevance to its protection. 

The turning of terrorist attention to urban mass transit systems 

is thus an expected consequence of our success in other domains. 

27

Implementing the aviation security model in the mass transit environment is not an option; 100-percent screening cannot be performed with the technology available today without creating a bottleneck at checkpoints. However, bottleneck checkpoints are not a 

proper solution because we need to allow high throughput without 

which mass transit cannot fulfill its role. 

The challenge facing us is to develop a system approach solution 

that combines technology, human resources, and procedures. This 

system approach solution must be designed to address the three 

stages of the security process: preparedness and routine management, incident management and first responding, and recovery. 

The system must have a so-called open architecture that will allow 

the shift of weight from one element to the other as more advanced 

and relevant technology becomes available and operational. At 

present, the most relevant available technology is in the video field. 

Traditionally, video systems are installed in the location of the expected crime scene. While this is an effective way to identify criminals and secure the necessary evidence to convict them in court, it 

is totally inadequate to deal with a terrorist attack because in the 

latter case, as soon as the attack takes place, terrorist success has 

been achieved and the damage has been done. 

What we need is a new approach to video application, as well as 

to the overall security planning. Prevention and deterrence must be 

the goal, rather than detention and conviction. This distinct goal 

dictates pushing the security measures to the perimeter of the 

mass transit system. Our focus must be on detection and response 

before the terrorist gains access to the target. In other words, we 

need to shift our efforts from the train and the ramp to the station 

entrances. 

While video technology is undoubtedly important, it does not provide us with the most critical information we need, explosive detection. At present, explosive detection systems are designed to meet 

the requirements of the aviation industry and are not applicable in 

the mass transit environment. With research and development that 

will recognize this need and is focused on operational application, 

such explosive detection systems solutions can be available in the 

next few years. Current ideas are in the area of air sampling techniques, as well as trace detection on tickets and body parts that 

come in contact with the system in the entry process. 

Appropriate technology is a critical factor for the protection of 

mass transit systems, but no technology can provide a solution 

without human individuals who can not only operate it effectively, 

but also provide appropriate immediate response. It is useless to 

detect an explosive device if you cannot act to stop the person who 

carries it from entering the system. Human resources would thus 

remain a critical element even when we have those future technologies at hand. At the present time, while these technologies are 

still in the works, the importance of the human factor is even more 

critical. 

In Israel, as well as in other parts of the world, the presence of 

trained security personnel at entrances to public facilities has proven to be a very effective preventive measure against terrorist attacks, including suicide attacks. Despite numerous attempts by suicide bombers to enter shopping malls in Israel, none has been sucVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:57 Jul 19, 2006 Jkt 024238 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24238.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
28

cessful. The terrorists were forced to carry out their attack outside 

the mall. The targets affected have been relatively minor, and the 

damage sustained was smaller in terms of human life, as well as 

property. 

In reference to the human factor, I would like to point out that 

the Achilles heel of the suicide terrorist is his behavior. A person 

intending to commit an extreme act of violence, in most cases for 

the first time in his or her life, as well as to terminate his own life, 

is most likely not to behave like the ordinary people around him 

going about their daily routine. An example is Richard Reid, the 

shoe bomber, who was clearly detected by both security and nonsecurity personnel as a very suspicious person before and during 

the boarding process to an American Airlines flight in Paris in December 2001. 

Behavior pattern recognition techniques implemented by trained 

security and non-security personnel have proven to be a valuable 

measure in the detection and prevention of terrorist attacks in public facilities. The training provides the skills and the confidence not 

only to law enforcement officers positioned at entry points, but also 

to employees who are present at every point and corner of the system. No one is in a better position to recognize irregularities on the 

ground than the people who regularly work there. 

Let me sum up by reiterating three major points: One, legacy security programs in mass transit systems must be reassessed in the 

light of the shift from the threat of conventional crime to the threat 

of terrorism, including suicidal terrorism. This means putting a 

higher focus on early detection and prevention. Two, there is a 

pressing need to invest in technological R&D that will result in effective early detection of explosives and chem/bio material without 

disruption of throughput. Three, security and non-security personnel in mass transit should undergo counterterrorist training 

that includes suspicious behavior recognition techniques. 

I thank you very much for your attention, and I will be happy 

to answer any questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. I want to thank all 

three of you for excellent and very helpful testimony from a real 

variety of perspectives. 

Chief Hanson, I want to begin my questioning with you. You did 

an excellent job of describing the funding inadequacy, as well as 

your frustration in the delays in the release of funding, something 

that Senator Lieberman and I will follow up with DHS on. I want 

to ask you, given your unusual position of running the Metro for 

the capital city for a major region with different jurisdictions and 

handling millions of tourists each year, whether you had any input 

into the national strategy for transportation security that the Department has recently put together? 

Ms. HANSON. WMATA reviewed the document in February and 

provided comments. I understand the final document is very different and we have not seen it. 

Chairman COLLINS. Do you think that you need to have access 

to this document in order to better understand the roles that different jurisdictions will be playing? 

Ms. HANSON. Well, if the document is not shared with the stakeholders, I am not sure I understand what the value is then. 

29

Chairman COLLINS. That is what troubled me as well. The fact 

that the strategy was initially—until we intervened—issued in a 

classified form defeats the whole purpose of coming up with a strategy that is supposed to be shared with all the stakeholders so that 

people understand what their roles and responsibilities are. 

Ms. HANSON. I also wanted to say I think right now, for the fiscal 

year 2005 grant process, there are regional transit strategies. So I 

am not sure what the relationship is between the national and the 

regional strategies, and if there is not one, then I do not understand that, either, because it would seem to me that there needs 

to be a relationship or a connection between those two strategies, 

otherwise I am not sure why we went through a huge exercise this 

last grant process in developing a regional strategy. 

Chairman COLLINS. I think that is an excellent point, as well, 

but it troubles me that if the national strategy has not been shared 

with you, as the person responsible for the security of the subway 

system in our Nation’s capital, then I don’t understand who it 

would be shared with. That strikes me as a real gap or lapse. 

Ms. HANSON. And I think most of my colleagues would suggest 

that we have clearances, so that would not have been an impediment. You did make reference to the fact that it was classified, but 

at this point most transit properties that have dedicated law enforcement personnel have folks in the agency that have top-secret. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Brown, I was very interested in hearing 

you describe in more detail what appeared to have been a first-rate 

response to the bombings in London. You have done the training. 

You had the surveillance cameras. Your response was swift, effective, and undoubtedly saved lives. What is your reaction to Mr. 

Ron’s suggestion that we need to put more resources in at the front 

end to try to detect and deter someone who is committed to suicide 

bombing? 

Mr. BROWN. Well, I would certainly accept that. I think it is a 

very valid point. I think part of our approach in terms of the major 

investment in even more closed-circuit television coverage across 

the network, as I said, doubling the number of cameras, is just designed to do that. Also, I think there is a need to ensure that all 

staff—we are compared to many other metro systems—we have a 

huge number of front-line operational staff visible on our stations. 

Every one of our stations has staff deployed on them every time 

that station is open operationally. None of our stations open with 

no staff on them, and I think we have a responsibility to review 

how we train those staff to be alert to strange behavior, to people 

doing different things. 

Our staff are pretty sharp. If they work in a station all the time, 

they know the difference between a lost tourist behaving in a bit 

of a strange way, looking where to get to Buckingham Palace or 

something, as opposed to someone who is behaving in a different 

type of suspicious way, maybe about to perpetrate a terrorist act. 

So I think absolutely we need to ensure that we do not just rely 

on police activity or technology, but we also rely on the human factor in terms of our detection capability. 

Chairman COLLINS. I think that is an excellent point, as well. 

Mr. Ron, what has been the reaction of the public transit agencies that you have approached with your ideas for improving secuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:57 Jul 19, 2006 Jkt 024238 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24238.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
30

rity at the front end, aiming at prevention, detection, and deterrence? 

Mr. RON. As Chief Hanson mentioned earlier, the Metro system 

here in Washington, DC, has adopted this approach and is conducting training programs along the lines that we laid down in 

Boston earlier for the airport environment, and I should compliment the chief for that. We have not seen a lot of that happening 

in other parts of the country yet, but we do hear about other metro 

systems around the country that are showing interest in this approach and are looking at the programs to be implemented. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks again, Madam Chairman. 

You have been an excellent panel, very helpful. Thank you. 

Chief Hanson, I was really troubled to hear your testimony that 

you have not gotten the green light to spend the transit money that 

you did get from the Federal Government for fiscal year 2005. I 

don’t know—Mr. Hawley, you were good enough to stay in the 

room—do you have a response to that? Just come up to the mike. 

Do you know what is going on? Is that a typical situation? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I do, and I would like to talk to the chief privately 

about that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. I hope the green light can go on soon 

because obviously you have significant needs. 

I wanted to ask you first a question that, in some sense, the testimony each of you have given has answered, but I want to ask it 

anyway because I have continued to worry, as we have heard testimony from our own DHS leaders on this, to some extent from Mr. 

Hawley today, although I think he was more reassuring, that there 

is a concern that because mass transit systems are more open than 

aviation, that it is very hard to defend them, so let’s not raise expectations too high, because I think that ends up creating a pessimism that also encourages less defense than we should have. And 

I understand the difference, obviously, between getting on a metro 

and a train, and getting on a plane, but I presume you agree that 

there are a lot of things nonetheless that we can do. I mean, it is 

great to say that better intelligence will stop a suicide bomber before he or she gets to the Metro or the Underground or the bus station, but some of them are going to get through and then we have 

to figure out how to stop them as they get closer. So am I correct 

in what I have heard? Do you agree that we have to approach this 

with a can-do, must-do attitude about mass transit security? 

Mr. BROWN. Absolutely, Senator. My view is—and I just go back 

to the comment I made—that if you think about the lost revenue 

that we have had as a network of 73 million pounds for this fiscal 

year—that in itself actually should be part of the investment decisionmaking process. This makes commercial sense, never mind all 

the human factor sense that it makes. I think things like the portable detection device, limited use of some screening of people coming into stations, is certainly something we are exploring on a targeted basis. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. There would be a random screening or a 

screening after some kind of behavioral identification? 

Mr. BROWN. Well, it could be either, and also it could be based 

on specific intelligence, because there’s no doubt there is intelVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:57 Jul 19, 2006 Jkt 024238 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24238.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
31

ligence in the background in all of this, and therefore it is minimizing your risk on these things. I think also, to the point that was 

made earlier on in terms of the amount of approaches that you get 

from all sorts of people who are selling you bits of kit that are 

going to solve all your problems, I have to say I think 99 percent 

of those that I get go straight in the trash can because really most 

of them are not worth the paper they are written on. So I think 

we have to, as an industry, work very hard to ensure that we have 

confidence, globally have confidence, to ensure that we are deploying the right technology, that we are using the right expertise, to 

ensure that we do target our resources effectively, but certainly not 

targeting any resources cannot be the right answer. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Chief Hanson, I was impressed by 

your description of some of the things the Metro system here is 

doing, and obviously—are you working at all with random 

searches? I know in Connecticut on the trains, when the orange 

alert went in after the London bombing, that there was some random searching of people done. Have you experimented with that? 

Ms. HANSON. We are analyzing that. We are putting together a 

package that I am actually going to present to both the CEO and 

the Board of Directors for Metro to discuss ideas that we have. I 

support Mr. Ron’s ideas—and WMATA has taken advantage of the 

training that is based on his philosophy and teachings. I have been 

very fortunate in this region to be able to access Urban Area Security Initiative money. I am the exception, not the rule. Many of my 

counterparts in the country do not have as much success accessing 

the regional money as I have. We have paid for some of that training with that money, and I have received money for the orange 

alert overtime. But as Mr. Brown mentioned, he has 8,000 operational employees. We have the same. It is very expensive to train 

operational employees, and I am not talking about the cops. There 

is reimbursement money for them. With your operational employees, you cannot take a bus driver off the bus and not replace him 

or her. If some of the training that is available through use of 

Urban Area Security Initiative money was there to support the 

training of operational employees, then that would be a more effective way of promoting prevention activities because then you are 

drilling down and using all your employees to be effective in the 

prevention or identification of suspicious activity. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well said. 

Mr. Ron, am I right that—I believe you talked about this, or at 

least in your written testimony—that in Israel the operational personnel, bus drivers, for instance, are trained in some of these detection techniques? 

Mr. RON. Yes, they are, and that actually comes into effect by 

more than one—the suicidal attack that was completely and successfully prevented on the field by bus drivers that identified the 

terrorist as he was boarding the bus——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. RON [continuing]. And responded immediately and correctly 

by either closing the door on the terrorist and not allowing him to 

board the bus or by even pushing him out of the bus if he was already on the bus, and we have more than a few cases where these 

tend to save a lot of lives and was very successful. 

32

Senator LIEBERMAN. I was struck by one thing you said, very 

sensible, it seems to me, that it’s a different way to go at the disproportionate allocation of funding to aviation security here, which 

we all support, but one of the effects of that is that it makes mass 

transit more of a target because it is softer, it is more vulnerable. 

On my time, which is running out, I want to ask you just to talk 

a little bit more about—you mentioned how security personnel are 

stationed now at the entrance points to major bus stations to deter 

terrorists from coming there so if they’re going to strike they will 

go to a bus stop where there are fewer people, same with the malls. 

I was fascinated by that. I assume you mean that they are trained 

in this behavioral pattern recognition that you have talked about. 

Just take a moment to tell us what does that involve and, in a very 

American context where there is always a debate about profiling, 

does it include profiling as part of that? 

Mr. RON. Well, I will start from the last point since I recognize 

the sensitivity of the issue of profiling, and I would like to emphasize that the program that we are advocating is not a racial 

profiling program, and I would like to make that very clear. This 

is behavioral conduct that has nothing to do with any racial or ethnic aspects, and I would even like to emphasize the point that our 

experience in Israel has taught us, especially at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, that terrorists do not come in the shape and color 

that everybody expects them to be. The two worst attacks on Tel 

Aviv Ben Gurion Airport, one was carried out by a group of Japanese terrorists and the other one was carried out by a German terrorist. Another attempt to take a bomb to an El-Al flight from London was carried out unknowingly by an Irish young pregnant girl. 

So this is very much as far as one can get from the racial profile 

of what we all expect to be a terrorist, and I strongly suggest to 

avoid racial profiling, also on professional background, not only on 

moral and legal background. 

Now, as far as the training that takes place in Israel to employees and the issue of positioning them at entrances to public facilities, training defers from one agency or one entity that carries out 

the security work to another, but the common denominator is the 

idea to detect a potential terrorist or to detect suspicious individuals before they manage to enter the premises or the facility that 

is being protected. In Israel, by law, every public facility, including 

coffee shops and restaurants, must have a guard at the door, not 

to mention the major bus stations and train stations, and this is 

carried out by the facilities. It is paid by the businesses. They protect themselves, and they are using private security companies. 

The level of training of the private security companies is not regulated in Israel, but there is common knowledge that is shared 

among the people in the industry, and this has proven to be very 

useful. 

As far as the government agencies that are in charge of protecting public facilities, including the railway system or the railway 

main terminals, the airport main terminals and etc., these are 

being trained in the same philosophy that I mentioned earlier, and 

this has proven to be very successful. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, thank all of you, the three of you, for 

what you are doing and for what you have helped to teach us about 

33

what more we can do here in the United States to protect riders 

on mass transit. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you again, Madam Chairman, for 

conducting this hearing and for being able to identify the excellent 

witnesses that we have had here today, different perspectives, but 

all focused on the same problem. I would have to say that the traditional perspective that the police chief is this tough, burly guy 

who has large muscles certainly does not seem to apply, and I feel 

very comfortable, however, and very safe with this very excellent 

presentation by this relatively, almost—I will not say harmless 

looking—but not menacing at all, and it is nice to see that. 

Ms. HANSON. You are too kind. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It is nice to see you and to hear what you 

have to say about the system, and you raise some very serious 

questions for me. And you say, at least in your testimony, for fiscal 

year 2006, DHS should be able to evaluate all the risk assessment 

information submitted by transit agencies in the past year and provide specific allocation to each transit system based primarily on 

risk rather than allocating funds on a regional basis. And Senator 

Lieberman took the liberty of referring a question to Mr. Hawley, 

because as I heard your remarks, Mr. Hawley, I thought that you 

were kind of accepting the fact that these funds have to be given 

out regionally and it is left to others to decide precisely how the 

distribution is going to be made. 

Now, in each case here, you have a different perspective on the 

transit systems. Israel, for instance, does not have, or maybe they 

have had and you never know quite what is on the agenda in Israel 

at any given time, but very little rail system use for commutation. 

I think that helps, doesn’t it, have a better control factor about who 

is coming and who is going? We have heard a lot about the heroic 

actions by bus drivers, by people who traditionally have a very limited responsibility, but reacting to danger and the reaction saving 

lots of lives and encouraging people that they can still use the system and believe that they are being protected. We had a woman 

from New Jersey killed some years ago on a bus, and I happened 

to have been traveling in Israel at the same time, and it was amazing—and I will venture to a side perspective. I was sitting, with 

several Senators, with Prime Minister Sharon, and all of a sudden, 

in the middle of the meeting—Senator Rockefeller was there, Senator Levin, Senator Reid—we were on our way to Iraq and notes 

were being passed to the Prime Minister, and he looked crestfallen 

all of a sudden. And he said, ‘‘We have just learned that there was 

an attack at Ashdod by a couple of suicide bombers, and they took 

a number of lives.’’ And I volunteered, and I said, ‘‘Mr. Prime Minister, you don’t have to continue this meeting. This is not urgent. 

This is informational, and we understand you have got other things 

to take care of.’’ And he said to me, ‘‘Senator, a Prime Minister in 

Israel knows only one thing, that whatever happens, he must carry 

on, and we are going to carry on this meeting.’’ I was struck by 

that, by that commitment. We all have the same commitment, expressed differently. 

Mr. Brown, the reaction of your people in London—I do not know 

whether you had seen the film—it was called ‘‘A Dirty Bomb’’—that 

34

was run some weeks before that, using London as an example, and 

I do not know whether that induced that violent behavior or what, 

but your performance was far better than that movie indicated. So 

I did not mean to use my time making a speech, but I wanted to 

ask how much help, for instance, does WMATA get from city police, 

from Capitol Police, in terms of your security? 

Mr. Brown, how much help do you get from London City Police 

or national police? Is that a significant part of your security network? 

Mr. BROWN. If Chief Hanson allows me to go first, yes, certainly 

in London the British Transport Police is responsible for policing 

the public transport network, but in times like July 7, the boundaries kind of disappear. So the Metropolitan Police actually were 

the ones that led the investigation. The Metropolitan Police across 

the whole of the United Kingdom has a particular role in 

antiterrorist activity and terrorism investigation, and therefore 

they took——

Senator LAUTENBERG. That was after—and I think, Mr. Ron, you 

made a point about having the intelligence. 

Mr. RON. Yes. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. The capacity to interrupt was something 

else. 

Mr. RON. Yes, absolutely. So there was a huge engagement of 

lots of policing, and, in fact, we had police officers down from Scotland and from all parts of the U.K. in London immediately after 

the events. So it was a national response to an attack on our nation’s capital. 

Ms. HANSON. Sir, we have also regional partners, and I would 

have to say you mentioned your own Chief Gainer, as well as Chief 

Ramsey, and part of the partnership initiative I discussed is something that we created right after the London bombings that we are 

sustaining—and it is police officers from jurisdictions throughout 

this area—Fairfax County’s helicopter, as well as bicycle cops from 

Montgomery County, or transit cops with Capitol Police officers, as 

well as MPD, do sweeps together of stations and buses. In fact, we 

also brought in commanders from the regional police departments 

to this initiative, and brought in our regional partners from VRE, 

MARC, and Amtrak to explain where our vulnerabilities and risks 

were so that folks in the region knew and created a document for 

regular police officers so they would be attentive to our critical infrastructure. And Mr. Ron’s training that he created, we actually 

shared with our regional partners that are a part of this sweep 

team, because we do want to share with anybody we can the 

vulnerabilities, the special features of transit, and the things that, 

if you are not a transit cop or a transit employee, you might not 

be attentive to. 

Our Managing Metro Emergencies was created to bring our regional law enforcement partners, fire department first responders, 

as well as other emergency managers together in a classroom setting to go over transit-specific incidents so that it would allow first 

responders who have to come to an incident to be well-versed and 

trained in the intricacies of transit so that we have a better, 

stronger first response in this region. So partnerships are not a 

problem for us, sir. 

35

Senator LAUTENBERG. I will conclude with—because I am frankly 

stuck on the fact that we all talk about how dangerous, how devastating an attack on a transit system could be, and we should be 

working so hard to prevent it. Again, I think, well, London, Madrid, Japan—I mean, we have seen it in all those places—creates—

as you said, Mr. Brown, it is the economic consequences, though it 

is secondary to the human consequence—the fact of the matter is 

that it affects people’s lives in adverse ways all over the area or 

the country. So when I look at Chief Hanson and your commentary, 

you say WMATA identified—as part of the Metro Matters capital 

improvement campaign launched in the fall of 2003, WMATA identified $150 million of high priority outstanding security needs, yet 

WMATA received only a total of $15 million in DHS grants and securities. Now, are you still lacking the kind of support that you 

think ought to be coming? And we recognize there is all kinds of 

competition, but what do you have to have to protect the people 

that use your system? It is a very efficient system. It is a very 

pleasant system to ride, and it has attracted a huge ridership as 

a consequence of that, and security seems to be a given there. 

Ms. HANSON. On the issue of the people we are transporting—

it’s worth noting that Metro was essentially created to support the 

Federal Government, and almost 50 percent of our riders come 

here to the core of the city and are Federal Government employees. 

We only have to look at the example of Hurricane Isabel. Metro, 

because of information we received, chose to shut down because we 

thought the winds sustained would be too much to run the rail and 

bus system safely. And when we shut down, this region shut down 

because folks had no other way to get to work. The effect on the 

economy and commerce in this region would be tremendous if 

Metro could not run. 

There is some operational flexibility that the London Underground has, as well as New York, because they are older systems, 

that WMATA does not have. We have a two-lane highway, one 

going one way, one going the other. We do not have another lane, 

and you know what happens on I–95 or even out here on Independence Avenue if you have something stuck in the roadway. So we 

are very vulnerable if we had something happen to our system. 

While we would run to the extent that we could, our ability would 

be really limited, and many of the things that are in our improvement plan, Metro Matters, have to do with capacity, have to do 

with our need to be able to carry not just the passengers we are 

challenged to carry now, but additional folks we might have to 

evacuate, and to improve our communication train control systems, 

which I think you had Mr. Brown saying were very important. So 

it is very important. We do need the support. We continue to use 

the funds that we get to go down the list of priorities as established 

by our risk assessment done by ODP, which is part of DHS. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman, 

we have had lots of discussions around these areas of how grants 

should be made, and when we hear it from such an authoritative, 

experienced voice and we see the result of a good performance—

and we admire what you have done, Mr. Brown, and you, Mr. Ron, 

and I am glad that Mr. Hawley was locked into his chair and could 

36

not leave the room—is Mr. Hawley here—because we are going to 

be back again and again and again. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Hawley, I do want to commend you for staying to listen to 

this panel. I know that you, as well as the Members of this Committee, have learned a great deal from their testimony, and we will 

look forward to having additional conversations with you. 

I very much appreciate the participation of all of our witnesses 

today. This is an extraordinarily important issue, and it should not 

take yet another attack on a mass transit system, whether here in 

the United States or somewhere else in the world, for us to focus 

on improving mass transit security. My hope is that this hearing, 

which was recommended by Senator Lieberman, will help to focus 

the attention of policy makers and make this a priority, as all of 

you have urged. 

I want to yield to Senator Lieberman for any closing remarks, 

but I very much appreciate your testimony. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman, a personal 

thank you for your focus on this problem. Even in the midst of all 

our work in responding to Hurricane Katrina, we cannot take our 

eye off of this because the terrorists are not—and I think this has 

been a very constructive hearing. 

Just to pick up from what you said a moment ago, there is always a danger—and I know when you are in an open society, as 

we are, and the two other countries represented here are, there are 

a lot of soft targets. You cannot protect everything, but there is a 

way in which we have got to, as I think we are all trying to do, 

get ahead of the terrorists. In other words, we cannot be always responding to the last attack and fortifying that previous target. We 

have to get on thinking—the 9/11 Commission, in its extraordinarily impressive report, said that, memorably, one of the great 

deficiencies here in the United States in terms of preventing such 

an attack was a failure of imagination, and what did they mean? 

They meant our inability to imagine that people would actually do 

what was done to us on September 11, and now, shame on us if 

we are not actively trying to put ourselves into the brains of these 

evil forces that hate us, to think what is next so that we can get 

ahead of them to stop it. 

I think the three of you have contributed both to the defense of 

the people you have the responsibility to protect, but have also 

helped us greatly. And I also thank Mr. Hawley for staying here, 

and I hope that it has been as valuable for him to hear your testimony as it has been for our Committee. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. The hearing record will remain 

open for 15 days for the submission of additional materials. I want 

to thank our staff for their hard work, as well, and this hearing 

is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12.15 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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