### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A U G U ST 15, 200 5 S es sio n
VICKI LYNN GASS NI CHOL S v . LYNN ALLEN SCHUBE RT, ET AL 

### .

Direc t Appeal from the P robate C ourt for Davidson County Nos. 03-3892-I & 02P -1470 Randy Ke nnedy, Ju dge

No. M2004- 02567-COA-R 3-CV- F iled Dece m ber 28, 2005

T h e w i f e d i e d i n 1 9 9 8 , a n d h e r h o l o g r ap h i c w i l l w a s a d m i t t e d t o p r o b a t e a n d t h e e s t a t e c l o s e d

. In 20 02 , th e hu sb and di e d, a ndhis fo rm a lly e xec ute d w ill wa s a dmi tte d to pr ob a te . T he re a ft e r, his executrix determined that a question existed concerning the owner ship interest in the marital residenc e held by

the husband at his death. As a r esult, the executrix filed a de clar atory judgme nt action in the probate court to construe the wif e’s holog raphic will. At trial, the wife ’s daug hter by a pre vious marriag e attempted to pr ove that the wif e’s holog raphic will was a for g ery . The trial c ourt de te rm ine d tha t th e daug hte r’ s p ro of wa s n ot c re dib le , a ndthe c ou rt ru le d th a t th e wi fe ’s ho log ra ph ic will vested fee simple tit le of the ma rital reside nce in the husband following her de ath. The w ife’s daug hter filed a

motion for a new trial. Whil e the motion wa s pending , the daug hter filed an a ction in the chanc ery court ag ainst the husband’s c hildren fr om a pre vious marriag e asse rting , in essence , the s ame alleg ations she raised in the probate court a ction. The probate court subsequently denied the daug hter’s motion for a new tria l. I n turn, the chancery court tra nsfer

red the complaint to the probate court, a nd the probate court enter ed an or der dismissing the c omplaint. The daug hter filed
an appea l to this Court raising numerous issues re lated to the dec laratory judgme nt action and the compliant filed in cha ncer y cour t

. As fo r t he dec laratory judgme nt action, we a

re w ithout jurisd ic tio n to e nte rt a in i ssu e s r e la te d to that c a se sin c e the daug hte r faile d to f ile a tim e ly app e a l. As fo r the c omp laint

the daug hte r f

ile d in c ha nc e ry

c ou rt , w e fi ndthat it

is, in e sse nc e , a n a c tio n to
c on te st the va lid ity

of the ho log ra

ph ic wi ll o f h e r m oth e r. As su ch, it is b arr e d b y the app lic able statut e of lim itati on s. Th e re fo re , th e pr ob a te c ou rt wa s c or re c t in dis mis sin g the c omp la int

. Moreove r, we rema nd this case to the tria l court for the e n t ry o f an aw ard of damag es to the Ap pe lle e s f

or the Ap pe lla nt’ s f

ili ng of a frivo lou s a

pp e a l.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of the P r oba teCo ur t A ffirm e d and Rem anded

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Dennis L . Tomlin, Hendersonville, TN, f or Appe llantJ u d g e C le m e n t w a s a p p o inte d to the T e n n e sse e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls in S e p te m b e r o f 2 0 0 3 b y G o v e rn o r P h il 1
B re d e se n

. T e n n e sse e A d m inistra tive O ff ic e o f t h e C o u rts, h ttp :// w w w .tsc .sta te .tn.u s/g e n info /B io /A p p e a ls/B io tc a .htm (la st visite d O c t. 2 4 , 2 0 0 5 ).
-2- Andra J . Hedrick; J ennife r Orr

L ocklin, Nashville, TN, f or Appe llees

OP IN ION

I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

Ed se l R. Al le n, Sr . ( “ Mr . A lle n” ) andEn ola Ma ri e Al le n ( “ Mr s. Al le n” ) w e re marrie d inJuly of 1977. The c ouple neve r had a ny children of their m arriag e. Howeve r, Mr. Allen had two children from a pr evious marriag e, Edsel R. Allen, Jr. and Ly nn Allen Schubert (“Ms. S chubert” or, collectively

with Edsel R. Allen, J r., “Mr . Allen’s Children”) , and Mrs. Allen had two children f rom a pr e vio us marria g e , A nth on y L a ng le y a ndVi c ki N ic ho ls ( “ Ms. Ni c ho ls” or, col lec ti ve ly wi th Anthony L ang ley , “Mrs. Allen’ s Children ”)

. I n November of 1977, Mr. Allen and Mrs. Allen purcha sed a h o m e l ocate d on Gay lemore D rive in Goodlettsville, Tenne ssee ( here inafter the “Goodlettsville Property ”) as tenants bythe entire ty . I n 1990, Mr. Allen executed a quitclaim deed conveying his intere st in the Goodlettsvill e Property to Mrs. Allen.

Mrs. Allen died in June of 1998. I t was orig inally believed that Mrs. Allen died intestate. Shortlyafte r her death, J udg e Frank Clement, J r. of t he P robate Court of Davidson County issued 1

a n o rd e r p ro vid ing a s f

oll ow s:

I t appearing to the court . . . that the de cede nt left no will; that pe tit ion e r is the hu sb a nd of the de c e de nt andis the pe rs on e nti tle d to
se rv e a s a dmi nis tr a tor ; that decede nt owned no real property at her death and per sonal property i n the appr ox imate amount of $50,000.00, which is subject to a court supervised administration by this Court . . . . I T I S, THEREFORE, ORDERED, AD J UDGED and DECREED by

the Court that the cler

k be dire cted to issue letter s of administration to Edsel Ray Allen . . . .
(empha sis added). N ot long a fter the probate court e ntere d the orde r, Mr. Allen f iled a petition pr ov idi ng , in re le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s:

Rece ntly petitioner visited a friend who prese nted him with a document date d Fe bruary 1 4 , 1997, which appe ars to be in the handwriting of Enola M ar i e Allen. It bear s her sig nature and the
s ig n a tu r e o f

[t w o w it n e s s e s ].A p p arent l y , M rs

. A l l en was ant i ci p at i ng a set t l em ent fr o m a l awsui t agai nst t hi s co m p any fo r com p l i cat i o ns 2

re la te d to he r b re a st im p la n ts.
-3-

. . . .
PRE MI SES C ON SI DE RED , p e tit ion e r p ray s: 1. That the document dated Fe bruary 14, 1997, bearing the sig nature of Enola Ma rie Allen and [t he two wi t n es ses] be
a dmi tte d to pr ob ate as the L a st Wi ll a ndTe stame nt o f E no la Ma ri e Allen.
Specifica lly , the handwritten document stated, in re levant part, that “I Enola Marie Allen in sound mind request that my

Husband Edsel R. A llen

. . . to g et my Dow Corning monies or estate he is the 2 one that has put up with and taken ca re of me when no one else would.”

I n light of this new doc ument, the probate court enter ed an order on April 14, 1999 finding
a s f oll ow s:
[I ]t appea

ring to the Court . . . that said paper was written i n the lifetime of the decea sed and signe d by the wit nesses in t he pre sence and at the r equest of the d ec ea s ed and in the pre sence of ea ch other and as attesting witnesse s thereto, a nd that said i n s t ru m ent was executed by

the dec ease d who was at the time of sound mind and disposing memory

. . . . I T I S, F U RT H E R, O RDERED, ADJUDGED and DE CREED by the Court that s ai d instrument is the true and L ast Wil l and T es t am en t of the de cea sed, and the Clerk of this Court is hereby direc ted to file and r ecor d the same, and that t h e said Edsel Ray Al le n, wh o w a s h e re tof

or e app oin te d a dmi nis tr a tor of the e state is
app oin te d A dmi nis tr a tor , c .t. a . to se rv e a ndno a dd iti on a l bo ndsh a ll be re quired.

Mr . A lle n s ub se qu e ntl y

su bmi tte d a n “ Es ta te I nv e nto ry ” lis tin g a ll o f Mr s. Al le n’ s p e rs on a l pr op e rt y valued at $29,000, but the inventor y d i d n o t reveal any rea l property

owned by

Mrs. Allen at he r death. In any

event, Mrs. A llen’s estate was e ventually closed, a nd her pe rsonal prope rty was distributed. Howeve r, the Goodle ttsvil le Property remained titled in Mrs. Allen’s name f ollowing the probate of he r holog raphic will. Mr. Allen continued to live at the Goodle ttsvil le Property paying double the mortg ag e pay ment eac h month, pay ing the prope rty taxes, and pay ing f

or the maintena nce expenses on the prope rty . Ms. Nichols beg an re siding at the Goodlettsville Property with Mr. Allen in J anuary

of 2002 following her r elea se fr om prison.
On Aug ust 22, 2002, Mr. Allen died a resident of

Davidson County , Tenne ssee. Mr. A llen le ft a fo rm a lly e xec ute d “ L a st Wi ll a ndTe stame nt” wh ic h p ur po rt e d to n ame Ms. Sc hu be rt a s h isS ec t i o n 2 9

- 1 4

- 1 0 5 o f t he T en ne ssee C o d e p ro vid es a s fo l l o w s: 3

A ny per s on i nt er es t ed as or t hroug h a n e xec ut or, admi ni s t r at or, t r us t ee, guardian, or o t her f

i d uci ary , credit o r, d e v is ee, l egat ee, hei r, next of ki n, or cest ui q u e tru st, i n the a d m inistra tio n o f a tru st, o r o f t h e e sta te o f a d e c e d e n t, a n infa n t, l un at i c, or i ns ol ven t may ha ve a d ec l ar at i on of r i gh t s or l ega l r el at i ons i n r es pect t h er et o t o:

. . . . ( 3) de t er mi n e an y qu es t i on a r i s i n g i n t h e admi n i s t r at i on of t he est at e or t rust, i nc l ud i ng q ue st i o ns o f co nstructi o n o f

wil l s and o t he r writ i ng s.

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 2 9

- 1 4

- 1 0 5 (3) (20 0 3 ).

-4- e xec utrix an d to de vis e to M r. Al len ’s Ch il dren a ny re a l pr op e rt y

he ow ne d at hi s d e a th. Sho rt ly
a f t e r M r

. A l l e n ’ s d e a t h , M s

. S c h u b e r t f i l e d a “ P e t i t i o n t o P r o b a t e W i l l a n d f o r L e t t e r s T e s t a m e n t ar y” in the Probate Court of Da vidson Countywher ei n s h e st ated that, “ [a] t the time of death, the dece ased ow ned no re al prope rty .” Ms. Schubert subseque ntly filed a motion seeking to have the pr ob a te c ou rt

c on str ue Mr s. Al le n’ s ho log ra

ph ic wi ll. Th e re in, Ms. Sc hu be rt no te d th a t th e pr ob a te court d idn o t d is p o s e o f th e G o o d le tt s v il le Pr o p e r ty w h e n it p r o b a te d M r s

. A ll e n ’ s e state. Spe c if ic a lly , sh e a sk e d the pr ob a te c ou rt to de te rm ine if Mr

. Al le n ow ne d the Go od le tts vil le Pr op e rt y in f e e simple a t hi s d e a th or if he me re ly he ld a n in te re st i n th e pr op e rt y a lon g wi th o the r p e rs on s.

Th e pr ob a te c ou rt su bs e qu e ntl y ru le d th a t a mot ion to c on str

ueMr s. Al le n’ s h olo g ra

ph ic wi ll
was not the proper pleading and that Ms. Schube rt neede d to f ile a complaint. I n turn, Mr. Allen’s Children filed a de clar atory judgme nt action, pursua n t to section 29-14-105(3) of the Te nnessee Code, ag ainst Mrs. Allen’s estate and Mrs. A llen’s Children seeking construction of Mr s. Allen’s

3 hologr aphic will to asce rtain the owne rship interests in the Goodlettsville Prope rty

. On September 23, 2003, J udg e Clement conducte d a hearing on the decla ratory judgme nt c omplaint f iled by Mr. Allen’s Children. No c ourt reporter attended the tria l, and we ha ve no statemen t o f the e vidence fi le d o n a pp e a l su mma

ri zing the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d b e low . A t the he ari ng , M s. Ni c ho ls a pp are ntl y att emp ted t o pr ov e that the do c ume nt a dmi tte d to pr ob a te a s Mr s. Al le n’ s ho log ra ph ic wi ll wa s a fo rg e d in str

ume nt. Ms. Ni c ho ls pr e se nte d he r ow n tes tim on y a nd that of L ois Ma rl e ne Slo a n ( “ Ms. Slo a n” ), on e of

the wi tne sse s to the ho log ra ph ic wi ll, in an e ff

ort to pr ov e the do c ume nt w a s a forg ery . Acc ording to Ms. Nichols, M rs . Allen kept her “re al will” behind a c lock at the Go o d l et t s v i l l e P ro p er t y

. T h e “ re al wi l l ” w as n ev erp ro d u ce d at tri al

. On Oc t o b er6 , 2 0 0 3 , J u d ge Cle me nt e nte re d a n o rd e r f ind ing a s f

oll ow s:

2

. T h e h o l o g r ap h i c w i l l o f E n o l a M ar i e A l l e n w a s p r o p e r l y admitted to probate by this Court . . . as the L ast Wil l and Testame nt of Enola Ma

rie Allen; . . . a nd the t ime period in which any interested party could contest such w ill has ex pired.-5- 3. Under t h e hologr aphic will . . . Ms . A lle n in te nd e d to de v ise
a n d b eq ueath, and did devise and bequeath, he r entire estate, including the [ Go od le tts v ill e Pr op e rty ], to her hus b a n d, Edsel R. Allen, Sr. The Court’s determination as to the intention of Ms. Allen is ba sed on an e x amination of the four corne rs of Ms. Allen’s w ill, the words used by

Ms. Allen in her will, p ar t icularly the word “ estate,”
a ndthe te rm s of e nd e arm e nt u se d b y Ms. Al le n in he r w ill re la tiv e to the ca re that Ms. Allen rec eived from her husband. I n making such de te rm inatio n, the Cou rt

a lso re lie d on the le g a l pr e su mpt ion a g a ins t i n t e s t a c y. 4. At the de a th of Ed se l R. Al le n, Sr ., a ll rig ht, tit le , a ndint e re st owned by E d s el R. Allen, Sr. passed under his L ast Wil l and Te sta me nt, wh ic h h a s b e e n d uly a dmi tte d to pr ob a te by

thi s Co urt .

. . , to [M r

. A ll e n ’ s Ch il d r e n ]. (empha sis added).

On Oc tob e r 22 , 20 03 , Ms. Ni c ho ls fi le d a “ Mo tio n fo r Ne w Tria l” in the pro bat e court

. Th e re in s he arg ue d that the c ou rt e rr e d in a dmi tti ng Mr s. Al le n’ s w ill int o p ro bate be c a us e it w a s a f o r g e r y

. M s

. N i c h o l s a s s e r t e d t h a ts h e h a d n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e o f t h e a l l e g e d f

o r g e r y

. In support of her

motion, Ms. Nichols subm itted h er o wn af fidavit which, in esse nce, r ecounte d her te sti mon y a t tria l. She po int e d to the fa c t tha t, sin c e sh e wa s in c arc e rate d in19 99 , s he wa s u na ble to c on te st t he a lle g e dly

fo rg e d h olo g ra

ph ic wi ll u nti l he r r e le a se fr om p ri so n. Ms. Ni c ho ls a lso
re c ou nte d in he r m oti on the te sti mon y of Ms. Slo a n off

e re d at tri a l. I n a dd iti on to h e r o wn a ff ida vit , Ms. Nichols submitt ed the a ffidavit of Rebe cca Swift (“Ms. Swift”), Mrs. Allen’s sister, stating that the handwriting on the holog raphic will was not that of her sister. Ms. Swift indicated that she ha d ob t a i n e d c e r t a i n w r i t i n g s o f h e r s i s t e r w h i c h c o u l d b e u s e d t o p r o v e t h e h o l o g r ap h i c w i ll w a s a forg ery . When Ms. Nichols filed her “ Motion for New Trial,” Judge Mary As h l ey Ni chols was sitti ng as a substitut e probate court judge until the vacanc y cre ated by

J udg e Clement’s a

ppointment to the Tenne ssee Court of Ap peals c ould be filled. Judge Nic hols, being unfamiliar with the particula rs of the c ase, c ontinued the hea ring on the motion.

On Oc tob e r 2 7, 20 03 , c ou ns e l f or Ms

. Nic ho ls s e nt “ po st- jud g me nt i nte rr og a torie s” to counsel for Mr. All en’s Chi ldren. I n the i nterrog atories, c ounsel for Ms. Nic hols sought information reg arding , among other thi ng s, the facts surrounding the l ocation of the hol og raphic will when it was discovere d, who discover ed it, the individual who prese nted it to Mr. Allen, who tra ced Mr s. Allen’s signature on the pr obate d h o l o graphic will, and who destroy ed Mrs. Allen’ s persona l paper s. Cou ns e l f or Ms. Ni c ho ls a lso se nt a le tte r to co un se l for Mr . Alle n’ s Child re n sta tin g that he “ ne e d[s] to know the identity of t he man who allege dly g ave the alleg ed W ill to Mr. All en so I can f ind out who prin t ed t h e all eg ed Will.” Enclosed in the letter w as a r equest that Mr. A llen’s Children “produc e all docume nts or Wil ls y ou, y our ag ents, repr esentativ es or Attorney s have w hich ar e dif f e r e n t th a n th e o n e f

il e d f o r p r o b a te

. ” Co u n s e l f

o r M r

. A ll e n ’ s Ch il d r e n r e s p o n d e d to the discovery reque sts by

sending a letter

to co u n sel for Ms. Nic hols stating that they would “not be-6-

a ns we ri ng the I nte rr ogato ri es a s th e y are un tim e ly

a ndare wh oll y

un wa rr a nte d at th is t ime a s th is matter is no long er in fr ont of the Court due to the judg ment in favor of my clients.”

Whil e Ms. Nichols’s motion for a new tria l was pending in the prob ate court, she filed a complaint ag ainst Mr. Allen’s Children in the Chance ry Court of Davidson County on Dec ember 31, 2003 asserting, in esse nce, the same leg al ar g uments raised in her moti on for a new tria l filed in the probate co u rt. I n support of her complaint, Ms. Nichols submitt ed the a ffidavit of a potential ha nd writi ng e xpe rt statin g that the ho log ra ph ic wi ll w a s n ot i n th e ha nd writi ng of Mr s. Al le n. Ms. Ni c ho ls a sk e d th e c ha nc e ry c ou rt to award he r d a ma g e s a ndto s e t a sid e the or de rs of the pr ob a te
c ou rt . T he re a ft e r, c ou ns e l f or Mr . A lle n’ s Ch ild re n s e nt a “ Rul e 11 No tic e L e tte r” to c ou ns e l fo r M s. Ni c ho ls a sk ing Ms. Ni c ho ls to eithe r pr ov ide su pp ort for the a lle g a tio ns in he r co mpl a int or dis mis s the c omp la int

. Cou ns e l f

or Ms. Ni c ho ls s ub mit te d a

le tte r i n r e sp on se a sse rt ing the he c omp lie d w ith Rule 11 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure. O n Fe bruary 10, 2004, counsel for

Mr. Allen’s Children sent a letter

to J udg e Clement, a judg e on the Te nnessee Court of Appea ls at the time,
asserting that, since no transcript of the trial of the de clar atory judgme nt action filed by

Mr. Allen’s Children exis ted, all of the attorney s were reque sting that Judge Cleme nt hear Ms. Nichols’s motion for a new tria l as a spec ial judge pursuant to sec tion 17-2-109 of the Te nnessee Code.

On Fe bruary

19, 2004, J udg e Clement ente red an order addre ssing Ms. Nichols’s “Motion fo r N e w T ri a l,” pr ov idi ng a s f oll ow s:
Since the under signe d presided over the trial at issue, it is incumbent
u p o n the under signe d to rule upon the Motion For New T rial. The Davidson County

L ocal Rules of Court permit the Court to waive or al arg uments. Finding oral arg uments would be of no be nefit, the Court
e le c ts t o r ule on the mot ionwi tho ut o ra l arg ume nts

. The issue is ba sically a question of whether the alleg ations of forg ery an d fraud alleg ed by Ms. Nichols, which we re r aised previously

and testimony

for which was pre sented at the trial at issue, justifies gr anting a new trial pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Fo l l o wi n g t h e t ri al , t h e C o u rt m ad e n u m er o u s fi n d i n gs in clud ing wi tho ut l imi ta tio n th a t th e pr oo f w a s in su ff ic ie nt t o substanti at e the alleg ations of forg ery or fr aud. Particula

rly , the Court found t hat t h e testimony of Ms. Nichols and Lois Marlene Sloan, w h o w ere the principal witnesses providing testimony

conce rning the allegations of f o rgery or fraud, to be less than credible and wholly inadequate to substant iate the allegations of f o r g ery or fraud

. T h e Co u r t h a s r e v ie w e d th e M o ti o n F or a N ew Tria l, the a ff

ida vit s in su pp ort th e re of a ndfi ndthe m insu ffi c ie nt t o justify g ranting a new trial. After consideration of all relevant f ac t o rs, and reca lling the pe rt ine nt te sti mon y pr e se nte d a t tr ia l, the Cou rt fi nd s that th e mov a ntsB y t he t i me t he probat e c our t en t er ed t he order , Judge R andy K enn edy had been a pp oi nt ed t o f i l l t he vac anc y 4

cre ated wh en Ju d ge C l em en t wa s eleva t ed t o t he T en ne ssee C o urt o f A p p ea l s.
-7- had more than ample opportunity to present their

case on September 23, 2003, the evidence presented at the trial was wholly insufficient to s us ta in the a lle g a tio ns of fo rg e ry or fr a ud , a ndthe g ro un ds se t f orth in the m otion and the fac ts set forth in the affidavits in support there of fail to c onvince the Court that the trial should be set as i d e o r a n ew trial should be g rante d. The movants simply want a se cond bite at the apple but have failed to provide a justification for another bite.
(empha sis added).

There afte r, M r. Al l en’s Chi ldren filed a motion in t he chancery

court see king Rule 11 sanctions ag ainst Ms. Nichols and her counsel asserting that the complaint fil ed in cha ncery court was “ fac tually

frivolous and/or pr esente d for an improper purpose.” Mr. Allen’s Children a lso filed a motion seeking to have the c omplaint dism issed pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tenne ssee Rules of C iv il Pr oc e du re fo r f

a ilu re to s ta te a

c la im u po n w hic h r e lie f c ou ld b e g rante d. Ms. Ni c ho ls
su bs e qu e ntl y

fi le d a mot ion in the pr ob a te c ou rt se e kin g to a me nd he r mot ion fo r a ne w t ri a l, d e sp ite the fa ct that J udg e Clement had a lrea dy issued an orde r denying the motion. I n an y ev ent, t he chanc ery court e ntere d an order transferring Ms. Nichols’s complaint to the probate court pur suant to the ag ree ment of the judg es of the pr obate a nd chanc ery courts.

On c e the c a se wa s re turne d to the pr ob a te c ou rt , c ou ns e l f or Ms. Ni c ho ls f

ile d a re sp on se to the motion for Rule 11 sanctions filed by Mr. Allen’s Children, whe re i n h e as s erted that it was pe rm iss ibl e to fi le the c omp la int in c ha nc e ry c ou rt se e kin g to se t a sid e the pr ob a te c ou rt ’s o rders. Ms. Nichols also filed an a mended c omplaint in the probate court alleg ing that Mrs. Allen wrote a ho log ra ph ic wi ll ( the “ re a l wi ll ”) leavi ng he r e nti re e state to M s. Ni c ho ls, sh e sa w the “ re a l w ill ” be hin d th e c loc k at the Go od le tts vil le Pr op e rt y a nd re a d the wi ll, a nd re c ou nte d he r pr ior arg ume nts that the will submitt ed to probate was a forg ery and that Mr. Allen’s Children had eng ag ed in fra ud by probating the will. I n response to the amende d complaint, Mr. Allen’s Children filed a motion to d ism iss th e amend e d c omp la int pu rs ua nt t o Ru le 12 .0 2( 6) of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du re . O n O c tob e r 8 , 2 00 4, the pr ob a te c ou rt e nte re d an or de r g ranti ng the mot ion to d ism iss 4 fi l ed b y M r. Al l en ’s C h i l d re n , s t at i n g:

1. The fa cts and c auses of action alleg ed in the Plaintiff’s “Amende d and Substit u t ed C omplaint” have be en previously

hear d and ad

j u d i cate d by

this Court. W hen this Court issued its pre vious O rder

. . . denying the Plaintiff’s “Motion for Ne w T ri al , ” t h e P l ai n t i ff

co u l d h av e e l ec t ed t o ap p ea l t h e C o u rt ’s ru l i n g. Ho we ve r, the Pla int if

f c ho se no t to app e a l th e Cou rt ’s ruli ng bu t, instead, filed a

second la wsuit . . . in the Chanc ery Court (which wa s subsequently

transfe rre d to this C ourt) in an attempt to r e-litig ate the-8- matters previously adjudicate d by this Court. As the matters at issue
are substantially

identical to th ose pre viouslyadjudicate d by the Court, the Court finds that the relief soug ht by the Plaintiff is barre d
un de r the le g a l do c tr ine of c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l. 2. The ha ndwritten last will and testament of E nola Marie A llen, dated F ebrua ry 14, 1997, was a dmitted to p robate by thi s Co urt on Ap ri l 14 , 1 99 9, a t w hic h ti me the Pla int if f a dmi tte dly
re c e ive d n oti c e of

sa me a nda

c op y of sa id la st w ill a ndte stame nt. Tennessee Code Annot ated Sec tion 32-4-108 imposes a two year sta tut e of lim ita tio ns on the br ing ing of w ill c on te sts whi c h, with respec t to the last wi ll and testament of Enola Marie Allen, ex pired on April 14, 2001 . To the extent that the P l ai n t iff’s “ Amended and Substit u te d Co mp lain t” is a n a tt e mp t to c o n te s t th e la s t w il l and testament of Enola

Marie A llen, such attempt is untimely and barred as the applicable statute of limitat ions has expired

. (empha sis added). In response to the order di smissi ng her complaint, Ms. Nichols filed an a ppeal to this Cou rt

.
II. D I S CUS S I ON

On app e a l, M s. Ni c ho ls has rai se d n ine te e n ( 19 ) s e pa rate iss ue s to c on te st v ari ou s a sp e c ts of the a fo re me nti on e d p ro c e du ra l hi sto ry of thi s c a se . M a ny

of the iss ues rai sed b y

Ms. Ni c ho ls addre ss the propriety

of ce rtain ac tions t aken by J udg e Clement in adjudicating the de clar atory judgme nt action filed by Mr. Allen’s Children in the pr obate co u rt to construe Mr s. Allen’s hologr aphic will. The r emainder of the issues raised by

Ms. Nichols on appea l addre ss the dispositi on of the c omplaint she filed in the cha ncery court follo wi n g the re solution of the de c la r a to r y ju d g me n t a c ti o n

. We f in d e a c h o f th e is s u e s r a is e d b y M s

. N ic h o ls o n ap p e al to be wi tho ut m e ri t. Reg arding the jurisdiction of t he courts of t his state t o hear probate matters, the leg islature
enac ted the following statute:

In all counties where not ot h er wise specifically provided by pu bli c , p riv ate , s

pe c ial or loc al a c ts , all juris d i ct i o n relating to the probate of wil ls and the administration of estate s of eve ry nature

. . . is hereby vested in the chanc ery court of the respe ctive counties. The chanc ery court in such counties shall have e x clusive jurisdiction over the probate of wills and the administration of estates of every nature

. . . .-9-

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16- 1 6 -2 01(a) (2003) ( emphasis adde d). “Expressly excluded from the application of the [st atute] confer ring probate jurisdiction on the c hance ry court a re c ounties having p r o b a te c o u r ts o th e r w is e p r o v id e d b y g e n e r a l l a w , o r

s p e c ia l, lo c a l, o r

p r iva te acts. ” 1 Ja c k

W. R o b i n s o n , S r

. a n d J e f

f M o b l e y, Pr itc ha rd on the Law of W ill s a nd Ad mi nis tra tio n o

f E sta te s § 39,
a t 65 (5 th e d. 19 94 ). I n 1 96 3, the Te nn e sse e Ge ne ra l Asse mbl y c re a te d, by private a c t, the Pr ob a te Court o f Da v i d s o n C o unty . 1963 Tenn. Priv. ch. 124, § 1. Thus, the Probate Court of Da vidson Cou nty pr op e rl y ha d ju ri sd ic tio n o ve r the pr ob a te of Mr . A lle n’ s a ndMr s. Al le n’ s e state s.

We fi rst addre ss our ability to enterta in issues raised by Ms. Nichols relating to the de c laratory

jud g me nt a c tio n f

ile d b y Mr . A lle n’ s Ch ild re n in the pr ob a te c ou rt to con str ue Mr s. Al le n’ s h olo g ra

ph ic wi ll. Sho rt ly

a ft e r M r. Al le n’ s “ L a st Wi ll a ndTe stament ” was adm itt e d in to probate , Mr. Allen’s Children f iled a dec larat o ry j u dg ment action in the probate court to construe the meaning of Mrs. Allen’s hologr aphic will. J udg e Clement held a hearing on t h e d ec l ar atory judgme nt action on September 23, 2003, and he issued an order in f avor of Mr. Allen’s Children on October 6, 2003. Ms. Nichols filed her “Motion for Ne w Trial” o n Oc t o b er 22, 2003, which the probate court de nied on Fe bruary 19, 2004. Ms. N ichols did not file the instant appea l until October 13, 2004.

“ T h i s C o u rtm a y s u a s

p o n te re v i ew the rec ord on appe al to determine if we pr operly have jurisdiction.” Hun tington Na t ’l B a n k v. Hooker , 840 S.W .2d 916, 922 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) ( c i t i n g T e n n

. R

. A p p

. P

. 3 ( a )) ; see also Tenn. R. A pp . P. 13 (b ) ( 20 05 ) ( “ Th e app e llate c ou rt sh a ll also consider

whether the trial and a

ppellate court have jurisdiction ove r the subject matter , whether or not prese nted for r eview[.]”)). When cr eating the Probate Court of Da v i d s o n C ounty , the leg islature provide d “[t] hat all appea ls f rom the Probate Court shall lie to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court in the same ma nner a s appea ls from cha ncery courts.” 1963 Priv. Ac ts c h

. 1 2 4 , § 5. “I n an appeal as of rig ht to the . . . Court of Appea ls . . . the notice of a ppeal r equire d by

Rule 3 shall be filed with and rec eived by the cler k of the trial c ourt within 30 day s after the date of

entry of the judg ment appea led from[.]” Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) ( 2005). “In a civil action, if a timely motion
un de r the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Proc e du re is fil e d in the tr ia l cou rt by a ny pa rt y

. . . u nd e r R ule 59.02 for a

new tria l . . . the time for appe al for a ll parties shall ru n fr o m t h e en t ry of the orde r deny ing a new tria l or g ranting or denying any other such motion.” Tenn. R. App. P

. 4(b) ( 2005). “The thirty -day

time limit se t out in Rule 4 is jurisdictional in civil case s.” Bink le y v . M e dling , 117 S.W .3d 252, 255 (Tenn. 2003)

. Ms. Nichols did not file a notice of appea l i n this case until well over thirty day s after

the pr ob a te c ou rt ent eredthe or de r d e nying he r “ Mo tio n f or Ne w T ri a l.” Ac c or din g ly , th is C ou rt is wi tho ut j urisd ic tio n to e nte rt a in any of the iss ue s pre se nte d by Ms. Ni c ho ls re la tin g to the pr ob a te court’s a ctions in disposi ng of the de clar atory judgme nt action filed by Mr. Allen’s Children.

We n ow turn o ur

a tte nti on to the re mai ni ng iss ue s p re se nte d b y Ms. Ni c ho ls o n a

pp e a l. Di ssatis fi e d w ith the re su lt s he re c e ive d inthe pr ob a te c ou rt , M s. Ni c ho ls fil e d a complaint a g a ins t Mr. Allen’s Children in the Chanc ery Court of Davidson County on Dec ember 31, 2003, just prior to the e ntry

of the or de r by the pr ob a te c ou rt de nying he r “M oti on fo r Ne w Tr ia l.” I n he r c omp la int ,-10-

Ms. Nichols sought to have t he probate of Mrs. Allen’s hologra phic wil l set aside. S pecif ically , she
asserted that Mr. Allen, Mr. A llen’s Children, and their attorney s committed fraud (1) in proc uring the pr ob a te of

the wi lls by

faili ng to d isc los e Mr s. Al le n’ s o wn e rs hip of the Go od le tts vil le Pr op e rt y and (2) in their attempt to probate Mr s. Allen’s alleg edly forg ed h o l og raphic will. Therea fter, the chan cery court tra nsfer

red the case to the probate court. The probate court ultimately enter ed an order dismiss ing Ms. Nic hols’s complaint on October 8, 2004, and Ms. Nichols filed he r notice of appea l to this Court on October 13, 2004. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain those issues related to the dismissal of her c omplaint since she filed he r appe al within the thir t y d ayperiod allowed unde r the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) (2005).
On appe al, Ms. Nichols raise s numerous issues surrounding the disposition of her complaint
a g a ins t Mr . A lle n’s Ch il dren

. Ho we ve r, we ne e d o nly a dd re ss t wo of

the se iss ue s in or de r t o proper ly dispose of this case :
1. Did the cha ncery

court e rr in tra nsfer

ring Ms. N ichols’s complaint to the probate court; and 2. Whe the r the pr ob a te c ou rt e rr e d indis mis sin g he r c omp la int on c e it h a d b e e n tr a ns fe rr e d to the pr ob a te c ou rt

.
For the following rea sons, w e aff irm the probate court’s decision to dismiss M s. Nichols’s complaint ag ainst Mr. Allen’s Children.

“Af ter a will has been admitted to probate , only a will contest can prese nt any question of the
v a li d it y o f th e w il l. ” 9 5 C. J .S. W

il ls § 497 (2001). The purpose f or a w ill contest action ca n be state d a s f oll ow s: The purpose of a w ill contest is to s how that a testator wa s me n ta ll y in c ap ab le o f

e n te r in g in to th e w il l o r th a t th e w il l i s n ot
rea lly the testator’ s last will and testament bec ause it was proc ured by
un du e inf lue nc e or fr a ud , su c h that the wi ll s ho uldbe de c lare d v oid and the testator’s estate should be ad m i n i s t ered under the laws of desce nt and distribution.

Id. ; s e e a ls o I

n re Es ta te o

f Eden , 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d 82, 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) ( discussing the dif fe re nc e s b e tw e e n a

wi ll c on te st a c tio n a nd a wi ll co ns truc tio n ac tio n)

. Th e a lle g a tio ns se t f orth in Ms. Nichols’s complaint cle arly establish that it is an action to contest the validity of Mrs. Allen’ s hologr aphic will. “I t is well s ettled t hat s uch persons only as would be e ntitled to share in the re al
or pe rs on a l e state of

the de c e a se d if

the re we re no wi ll, or

if the wi ll w e re se t a sid e , a re e nti tle d to impeach its validity .” Go re v . Ho war d , 3 0 S. W. 7 30 , 7 31 (Ten n. 18 94) ( c itatio n o mit te d) . A s a person e ntitled to share in Mr s. Allen’s rea l pr operty if her hologr aphic will were decla red inva lid, Ms. Nichols was entitled to attempt to impeach the validity of the will by filing a will contest action.-11-

“ Th e pr ob a te a ndc on tes t of wi lls are ba sic a lly

statut ory ri g hts a ndstatut ory

pr oc e e din g s, derive d not from common law, but f rom the ecc lesiastical courts of Eng land.” Gree n v. Higdon , 870 S.W. 2d51 3, 52 0 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 3) ; se e als o 95 C.J.S. Wills § 49 7 (2 00 1) (“ Th e ri g ht t o c on te st a will is not a rig ht exi sting at common law, but a rig ht confe rre d solely by statute which a ffor ds the exclusive mode of setti ng aside a will.”). Reg arding an action to contest t he validit y of a pr obated wi ll, the le g isl a tur e pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s:

I f the va lidityof any

last will or testam en t , written or nuncupative, is c ontested, then the court hav ing probate jurisdi ction
ov e r su c h la st w ill

or te sta me nt must enter an or der sustaining or de nying the c on te sta nt’ s ri g ht to c on te st the wi ll. I f the ri g ht t o c on te st the wi ll i s su sta ine d, the n th e c ou rt mus t: (1 ) R e qu ir e the c on te stant to en te r int o bon d, wi th sur e ty , in the pena l sum of five hundre d dollars ($ 500), pay able to the e x ecutor mentioned in the will, conditioned for the faithful prosec ution of the suit, and in case of

failu re there in, to pay

all costs that may

acc rue there on; and (2 ) C a us e a

c e rt if ic a te of the c on te st andthe orig ina l w ill to be fi le d w ith the app ro pria te c ou rt fo r t ri a l. As us e d in thi s se c tio n, the te rm “ the app ro pria te c ou rt f or tr ia l”
me a ns the c ou rt

e le c te d b y

the c on te stant, in the no tic e of c on te st, to
c on du c t a tr ia l up on the va lid ity

of thewi ll.

Te nn . Co de A nn . § 32 -4 -1 01 (2 00 3) (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also 1 J ack W. Robinson, Sr. and J eff M o b l e y, Pr itc ha rd

on the Law o

f W ill s a nd Ad mi nis tra tio n o

f E sta te s § 368, at 562 (5th ed. 1994) (“The action is commenc ed by a complaint addr essed to and f iled in the probate court in which the will was admitted to probate.” ).

B a se d o n th e c le ar d ir e c tiv e in s e c tio n 32 -4 -1 01 of the Te nn e sse e Cod e , M s. Ni c ho ls i nit ia lly filed her complaint in an incorre ct court. See 95 C.J .S. W ills § 497 (2001) (“The statute [permitti ng an ac tion to contest a will] , bein g i n d erog ation of common law, must be strictly construed, and a p r o c e e d i n g i n i t i a t e d u n d e r a g o v e r n i n g s t a t u t e m u s tc o m p l y exac tly with the require ments of that statute.”). The P robate Court of Davidson Count y , pursuant to the private ac t promulgated by the leg islature, wa s the court that pr obated Mrs. A llen’s holog raphic will. The ref ore, Ms. Nic hols was require d to file her

complaint with the probate court a nd g ive the court the opportunity to sustain or deny her right to conte st Mrs. Allen’s holog raphic wi l l

. R ule 3.04 of the D avidson County L ocal Rul e s o f P ra c tic e pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s:
Th e P r e s i d i n g Ju d g e m a y tr a n s f e r a c a s e f

r o m o n e c o ur t to another or fr om one division to another. The Judges and Chance llors of the 20 th Jud ic ia l D ist

ri c t may transfer cases among them selve s by mutual consent ex cept in case s of recusal

. It is not nece ssary that the parties or their counsel consent to such a transfer

.T her e i s no i ndi cat i on i n t he r ecor d bef ore t hi s Co ur t t hat M s

. N i chol s s uf fer ed f r om an y di s abi l i t y wh i ch 5

wo ul d t o l l t he runni ng of t he st at ut e o f l i m i t at i o ns ap p l i cab l e t o her wi l l co nt est act i o n.

-12- (e mph a sis a dd e d) . A c c or din g ly , w e fi ndthat th e c ha nc e ry c ou rt di d no t e rr

by tr a ns fe rring Ms. Ni c ho ls’ s c omp la int

to the pr ob a te c ou rt

. Next, we examin e wh et h er the probate court e rre d in dismi ssing Ms. Nichols’s c omplaint following the transf

er. A fter Ms. Nic h o l s fi led her amende d complaint in the probate court, Mr. Al le n’ s Ch ild re n f

ile d a motio n to dismi ss pur su a nt to Rule 12 .0 2( 6) of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Procedur e for

failure to state a c laim upon wh i ch re l i ef could be g rante d, which the pr obate c ourt subsequently

g rante d. As counsel f

or Ms. N ichols conce ded at or al ar g ument, the cor rec tness of the probate co u rt ’s d ec i s ion to dism iss her complaint is the cr ux of this appea l. When reviewing the
corr ectne ss of a trial court’s decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12.02(6), we employ the following standard of revie w:

A R u le 1 2

. 0 2 ( 6 ) mo ti o n te s ts th e le g a l s u f f ic ie n c y o f th e p lain ti f

f ’s complaint and not the streng th of the plaintiff’s evidenc e. Riggs v. Burson , 941 S.W .2d 44, 47 (Tenn. 1997) . I n ruling on such a motion, courts must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, a cce pt the alleg ations of fa ct as true, and deny the motion unless it appears that the plaint if

f c a n e sta blish no fact s su pp ortin g the c la im that w ou ld
war rant re lief. Id . When the trial court’ s g rant of a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss is a

ppeale d, we must take the fac t u al al leg ations contained in the c omplaint as true and r eview the lower courts’ le g al
c on c lus ion s de n o vo wi tho ut a pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss. Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co. , 945 S.W .2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997)

.
Do e v . Sund

qui st , 2 S.W. 3d91 9, 92 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; s e e a ls o I n re Es ta te o

f Ra mey , No. E2003- 00544-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Te nn. App. LEXI S 8, at *4–5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2004).

Actions to c ontest the validity of a pr obated will must also be filed within the time allowed by statute. See 1 J a c k W

. R o b i n s o n , S r

. a n d J e f f M o b l e y, P ritchard on the Law of W ills and Ad mi nis tra tio n o

f E sta te s § 3 66 , at 55 9 ( 5th e d. 19 94 ). Th e le g isl a tur e dir e c ts that a c tio ns to c on te st the va lid ity

of a pr ob a te d w ill mus t c omp ly wi th the fo llo wi ng statut e of lim itatio ns :
Al l a c tio ns or

pr oc e e din g s to se t a sid e the pr ob a te of a ny wi ll, or petitions to certify such will for an issue of devisavit vel non, mu st be brought withi n two (2) years from e ntry of the order admitting the will to probate, or

be forev er barred , saving , howeve r, to persons
un de r the a g e of

e ig hte e n ( 18 ) y e ars or

of un so un d mi nd , at th e tim e the cause of a ction acc rues, the rights c onfer red by § 28-1-106. 5T he p rec urso r t o sec t i o n 3 2

- 4

- 1 0 8 o f t he T en ne ssee C o d e c o ntained a sev en (7 ) year statut e o f l i m i t ati o ns. 6
In 1 9 8 5 , t h e leg islatu re c h a n g e d the li m itatio n s p e rio d to two (2 ) ye a rs

. See 1985 T en n

. Pub. Act s c h

. 228, § 2.
-13- Tenn. Code Ann. § 32- 4-108 (empha sis a dded). As previously noted, the probate court entere d an order admitting Mrs. Allen’s hologr aphic will to probate on April 14, 1999, and Ms. Nichols filed her c omplaint in the chance ry court to conte st the validityof the will on Dec ember 31, 2003.

Our re solution of this issu e i s g overne d by our supre me court’s decision in Phill ips v. Phill ips , 526 S.W .2d 439 (Tenn. 1975) . I n Phillips , our supreme court was asked to de cide whe ther
an ac tion to set aside the probate of a dece dent’s will was barr ed by the af oreme ntioned statute of limit ations. Id. at 439. The decede nt died in 1965, and her will was probate d that same y ear

. Id. The de cede nt left her e ntire estate to one of he r brother s. Id. I n 1 97 3, the br oth e r die d le a vin g his entire e state, including the prope rty he ac quired fr om his sis ter, to his wife. Id. I n May of 1974, the de c e de nt’ s othe r sib lin g s file d an a c tio n ag a ins t the ir de c e a se d bro the r’ s wif e , h is e xec uto r, a ndhis estate a lleg ing that the probate d will of their s ister was a forg ery

. Id. The siblings a lleg ed that, af ter the death of their brothe r, they inquired into the owner ship of their sister’s property and discove red that her will had been probated. Id. The siblings secur ed the service s of a ha ndwriting expert who opined that the sig nature on their sister’s will was a forg ery

. Id.
Turning to the prec ursor of se ction 32-4-108 of the Ten n e s s e eCo d e , the supreme court noted 6 that th e sib lin g s’ a c tio n to c on te st the va lid ity of the de c e de nt’ s w ill wa s f ile d w e ll b e y on d th e tim e statutorily allowed for fil ing such actions. Id. at 440. I n resolving the issue pre sented for revie w, the su pr e me c ou rt

he ld a s f oll ow s: No exception is made whe re the probate of a will is soug ht to be set
a s id e o n th e g r o u n d th a t the wil l i s n o t th e tr u e w il l o f th e te s tatrix, with the alleg ation being that the will was a re sult of either fr aud or forg ery as is char g ed in this case. The pre sent ac tion was filed more than seve n y ear s after the will of [th e d e c e d e n t] w a s p r o b a te d

. F u r th e r , th e r e c o r d s h o w s th at
no n e o f th e p lain ti f

f s c o me s w ith in th e e xc e p ti o n s tate d in T

. C. A. 32-410 as e ach wa s of sound mind and was more than twenty -one y ear s of ag e whe n the will was probated. The que sti o n is do they come within an e x ception implicit in T.C.A. 32-410? I n considering g ener al statutes of limitation, thi s court has
rec og nized an ex ception not voiced in the statutes and which tolls the statute wh er e, due to fra

udulent conce alment, a plaintiff is una war e of his cause of ac tion. W oodfolk v. Ma rley , 9 8 T e n n

. 4 6 7 , 4 0 S. W. 47 9; Porter’s Lessee v. Cocke , 7 Te nn . 2 9; Shelby’ s Heirs v. She lby , 3 Tenn. 179. How ever , while fra u d ulent conce alment of a cause of action will toll a ge nera l statute of limitations , fra ud in a nd of i tse lf will not

.-14- “It is not t he fr aud, but its conce alment by the party perpe trating it, unmixed with fault or neg lige nce on the pa rt of him wh o c omp la ins , w hic h w or ks thi s re s u lt.” W

oodfolk v. Marley , 9 8 T e n n

. 4 6 7 , 4 7 1 , 40 S.W . 479, 480 (1896).

We know of no basic re ason why the fra udulent conce alment exception should not be applicable to the specia l statute of limitations voiced in T.C.A. 32-410. Howeve r, i n this case no f acts a re a lleg ed which would su p p o rt a finding of f raudule nt conce alment. To the contra ry , the re cord shows the re w as no co n ce al m ent of the w ill of [the de c e de nt] or of the sig natur e on the wi ll. Th e wi ll w a s o f p ub lic
rec ord for

more than nine y ear s befor e plaintiff s filed this action. Be ing of public rec ord, the wi ll was ava ilable at all times for examination bythe plaintiffs or a ny h an d wr iting expert chose n by them. The plaintiffs, howe ver, e lected not to make inquiry i nto the authenticity

of the will until after the death of their brother . . . who was the principal bene ficiary of the will of [the dece dent]. By then, the seve n y ear

li m i t ation on the bring ing of actions to set aside the probate of a w ill had passed and pla intiffs’ ac tion was barr ed.

Id. (empha sis added).

A s in Phillips , the re cord in the instant ca se is devoid of a ny evidenc e showing that Mr. Allen, Mr. Allen’s Children, or their attorney s sought to conc eal Mrs. A llen’s holog raphic will. To the c on tr ary , th e wi ll w a s a dmi tte d in to p ro bate in A pril o f 1 99 9 a ndre maine d a p ub lic re c or d at a ll times therea fter. In fac t, Ms. Nichols admitted in an aff idavit filed wit h the probate court that she “did re ceive a copy

of the a fore said Wil l of [ her] mother i n 1999 while [ she] was in the State Pen. [S he] did not have any

money to retain a n attorney

to contest the Will and at that tim e [ she] did not
rea liz e [her] mother’s Will had to be totally in he r handw riting.” Moreove r, Ms. Swift, Mrs. Allen’s sis te r andthe princ ipa l w itn e ss Ms . N ic ho ls n ow re lie s o n to pr ov e that th e ho log ra ph ic wi ll i s a fo rg e ry , a lso su bmi tte d a n a ff ida vit statin g that sh e “ wa s pr e vio us ly se nt a c op y of the a lle g e d Wil l
o f M s

. A ll e n a s a

p ar t o f th e p r o b a te o f

h e r a ll e g e d Wi ll in 1 9 9 9 a n d a t th a t t im e [s h e ] d idn o t r e a li ze that all of her Wil l had to be written totallyin her own handwriting or printing and that is the re ason [she ] didno t obj ect to same in 1 99 9. ” Th e jus tif ic a tio ns fo r the de la y

in b ri ng ing the a c tio n to contest the va lidityof Mrs. Allen’ s will put forth by Ms. N ichols and Ms. Swift do not warr ant the application of the narrow ex ception for tolling t he applicable st atute of limit ations enunciated by our supreme c ourt in Phillips . Pursuant to the two (2) y ear limit ations period set forth in section 32-4- 108 of the Te nnessee Code and our supr eme c ourt’s holding in Phillips , we affi rm th e pr ob a te
c ou rt ’s de c isi on to d ism iss Ms. Ni c ho ls’ s c omp la int

. Finally , Mr. Allen’s Children a sk this C ourt to awa rd them dama g es pursua nt to section 27-1- 12 2, wh ic h p ro vid e s a s f

oll ow s:-15- When it appear s to any revie wing court that the appea l from any court of r ecor d was frivolous or taken solely for delay , the court
ma y , e ith e r u po n mo tio n o f a pa rt y or of its ow n mot ion , a wa

rdjus t damag es ag ainst the appe llant, which may i n cl ude, but nee d not be limit ed to, costs, interest on the j udg ment, and expenses incur red by the app e lle e a s a

re su lt o f the app e a l.

Tenn. C o d e An n

. § 2 7-1-122 ( 2003). “Succ essful parties should not have to bear the cost and vexation of basele ss a

ppeals.” J

a ckson v. Aldridge , 6 S.W .3d 501, 504 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted). An appe al is f rivolous when it “has no r easona ble cha nce of

succe ss,” Davis v. Gul f I ns. Gr oup , 546 S.W .2d 583, 586 (Tenn. 1977) , or is “ so utterly devoid of merit as to justify imposit ion of a penalty ,” Com busti on En g’g, Inc. v. Kennedy , 562 S.W .2d 202, 205 (Tenn. 1978)

. Th e de c isi on a s to wh e the r t o a wa rdda ma g e s for the fi lin g of a frivo lou s a

pp e a l li e s so le ly

wi thi n the discre tion of this C ourt, see Banks v. St. Fran cis Hosp. , 697 S.W .2d 340, 343 (Tenn. 1985) , and
we exercise such discretion sparing ly so as not to discourag e leg it i m at e a p p eals, se e Da v is , 546 S.W .2d at 586. A leg itimate fac tual or leg al dispute will preclude an aw ard of damag es for

the filing of a frivolous appe al. In re Estate of Filyaw , N o

. 0 3 A 0 1

- 9 8 1 0

- P B

- 0 0 3 6 0 , 1 9 9 9 T e n n

. A p p

. LE X IS 7 0 6 , at * 1 3 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. Oc t

. 1 8 , 1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g Anderson v. De an Truck Lin e, Inc. , 682 S.W .2d 900, 902 (Tenn. 1984) ). Converse ly , failure to even c ite to or arg ue for a jus tifiable ex tension of the law contr olling the r esolution of a g iven case i s an indication that an a ppeal may

be frivolous. See Jackson , 6 S

. W

. 3 d at 5 0 4 (c i t i n g Wells v

. Sentry Ins. Co. , 834 S.W .2d 935, 938–39 (Tenn. 1992) ).

I n th e ins ta nt c a se , M s. Ni c ho ls a tte mpt s to arg ue that the a lle g a tio ns of fr a udc on ta ine d in he r c omp la int

c on sti tu te a

dis tin c t c a us e of

a c tio n w hic h a llo w h e r t o p ro c e e d w ith he r l a ws uit ag ainst Mr. Allen’s Children. Ou r s u p reme court has c lear ly stated that, “w hile fraudulent
conce alment of a

cause of ac tion will t oll a g ener al statute of limitations, fra ud in a nd of i tse lf wi ll not .” Phill

ips v. Philli

ps , 5 26 S.W. 2d43 9, 44 0 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Ms. Ni c ho ls f a ils to cite to or even at t empt to disti ng uish the supreme c ourt’s dec ision in Phillips on app e a l. Moreove r, despite the pr obate c ourt’s re liance on the statute of limit ations found in se ction 32-4-108 of the Te nnessee Code when dismissing he r complaint as untimely filed, Ms. N ichols fails to even cite to the statute in her brief or attempt to arg ue how the facts in the prese nt case war rant a tolling of t he st atute. Se e Da v is , 546 S.W .2d at 586 (finding an appe al to be frivolous where it pre sented
no de bata ble qu e sti on of

la w) ; T a yl o rv. C it y o f C hattan ooga , N o

. E 2 0 0 4

- 0 0701-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXI S 16, at *5–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. J an. 13, 2005) (aw arding damage s fo r a frivolous
app e a l w he n “ the re is c omp e lli ng a nd we ll- se ttl e d c a se la w a dv e rs e to a pp e lla nt’ s p os iti on s” ); Shar p v. Allstate In s. Co. , No. 02 A0 1- 92 04 -C V- 00 10 7, 19 92 Te nn . A pp . L EX I S 86 0, a t *6 –7 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Oct. 16, 1992) (ruling that d am age s fo r frivolous appeal we re w arr anted whe n the appe llant failed to distinguish the c ontrolling leg al authority or cite to any authority modify ing or

overr uling
su c h auth ority ). I ns te a d, a ma jority of Ms. Ni c ho ls’ s arg ume nts on app e a l fo c us up on the c or re c tne ss of the trial court’s actions when adjudicating the declaratory judgme nt action filed by Mr. Allen’s Children to construe Mrs. A llen’s holog raphic will. The probate co u rt fo und all of the e vidence prese nted by

Ms. Nichols in that procee ding to be lacking in cre dibilit y , and she ne ver f iled an appe al to this Cou rt

c on te sti ng the tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt in that c a se

. We fi ndthat th e arg ume nts pu t f orth-16-

by Ms. Nichols in the instant appea l constitute nothing more than an attempt to re- litigate issues ove r wh ic h w e ha ve no jurisd ic tio n o r a re ba rr e d b y the app lic able statut e of

lim itatio ns

.
Acc ording ly , we f

ind that Mr. Allen’s Children ar e entitled to dam age s fo r M s. Nichols’s actions in filing a

frivolous appe al. We r emand this c ase to the trial court f or the e ntry

of an a war d of dama g es in favor

of the Appe llees pursua nt to section 27-1-122 of the Tenne ssee Code.

III
. C ONCL US I ON

For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the probate court’s de cision to dismi ss the Appellant’s c omplaint. Cost s of this appea l are to be taxed to the Appellant, Vicki Nichols, a nd her sur ety , for whic h execution may issue if nec essary . Moreove r, we find this appeal to be frivo lou s. As su c h, we re ma ndthi s c a se to the tr ia l c ou rt fo r the e ntry

of a n a wa rdof da ma g e s to the Ap pe lle e s.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE