U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

68–223 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 112–85 

NOMINATION OF WILLIAM J. BURNS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 24, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Burns, Hon. William J., of Maryland, nominated to be Deputy Secretary 

of State .................................................................................................................. 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by: 

Senator John F. Kerry .............................................................................. 22 

Senator Barbara Boxer ............................................................................. 38 

Senator James E. Risch ............................................................................ 39 

Senator Robert Menendez ......................................................................... 40 

Senator Marco Rubio ................................................................................. 44 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3 

(III)

(1) 

NOMINATION OF WILLIAM J. BURNS 

TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Hon. William J. Burns, of Maryland, to be Deputy Secretary of 

State 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Rubio, 

and Lee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

I am very, very happy to welcome Under Secretary, former Assistant Secretary, Ambassador, so many titles, and we hope Deputy 

Secretary of State shortly Burns here. He has been nominated by 

the President to serve as Deputy Secretary of State, taking the position that Jim Steinberg has been filling ably. 

And, Mr. Secretary, we are really happy that you are accompanied. I know Lisa Carty and your two daughters, Elizabeth and 

Sarah, are here, and we are really happy to welcome you. I hope 

you are not missing work or school or anything too critical to be 

here. But we are really happy to have you here. 

And may I thank you, as well as the Secretary, for your service 

to our country. The hours, the days, the trips, the long time away 

from home, all the things that public service involves are really demanding and taxing on families, and if your family is anything like 

my family, I missed a few plays and a few games and a few things 

here and there. So we say thank you to you on behalf of everybody. 

We know Ambassador/Secretary Burns very, very well, both in 

his current job as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, as 

well as the prior positions which he has so ably filled, including 

Ambassador to Russia and Assistant Secretary of State for Near 

East Affairs. 

It really is not an exaggeration to say that Secretary Burns has 

been at the center of some of the toughest issues of our time over 

the course of the last years. He has brought a steady hand, responsible leadership, thoughtful analysis to multiple crises and chalVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:43 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 HEARINGS GONE TO PRESS\68223.TX
2 

lenges, and he will need all of his talents and skills and experience 

in his new job. 

We are, as we know, at a really important transitional moment 

in history, one of those moments that you get every so often. I cannot recall another era certainly since the fall of the Berlin Wall as 

fraught with peril and uncertainty, as well as presenting us such 

great potential. We have been inspired by the people in Tunisia 

and Egypt who called peacefully for freedom and for dignity and 

who managed to change their governments in the most impossible 

to predict manner. 

We have been moved also by the courageous uprising in Libya 

where people are defiantly fighting an authoritarian dictator whose 

time in office has long since expired. 

But we also watch with trepidation as a brutal crackdown takes 

place in Syria which threatens to spiral out of control and to lead 

to even more civilian killings. 

And that is just the Middle East. 

We cannot overlook our foreign policy challenges in other parts 

of the world. This committee is currently holding a series of hearings on how to deal with our engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We will spend approximately $120 billion in Afghanistan this 

fiscal year alone, and that affects our ability to deal with other 

things across the planet. 

On the broader horizon, we face significant economic and political challenges not only from China, India, and Brazil, but from 

emerging powers like Indonesia and Turkey as well. Indeed, we understand now better than ever how our national security and our 

economic security are integrally linked. 

In Europe, we see how economic crises risk destabilizing governments and aggravating political divisions. All in all, the idea of a 

multipolar world is no longer a catch phrase. It is a very real phenomenon with direct implications for the United States and for our 

foreign policy. 

Our own budgetary constraints will also force increasingly painful tradeoffs. We can no longer afford to be the world’s first responder whenever a crisis arises. Yet, we also cannot afford to 

withdraw from the world. Without a robust international affairs 

budget, our war effort in Afghanistan will be undermined and fragile progress in Iraq will be jeopardized, not to mention hundreds 

of other efforts that we are engaged in around the globe. 

This budget also provides vital humanitarian assistance. It fights 

hunger and the scourge of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis in poor countries around the world. And it helps to show people the real values 

and aspirations of Americans. It prevents the spread of cholera in 

Haiti, distributes food to refugees in northern Kenya, and finances 

shelter for flood victims in Pakistan. 

Ambassador Burns, we will need to use your experience and expertise to be a powerful voice in defense of these kinds of efforts 

and of the President’s budget and programs. And I cannot think of 

anybody with better experience from a career in diplomacy and 

foreign policy who could carry that with greater authority and 

credibility up here on the Hill. So we thank you for your continued 

dedication to public service and your willingness to help lead the 

3 

Department of State through a very decisive period of foreign 

policy. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to join you in welcoming Ambassador Burns once again to the Foreign Relations 

Committee. 

Just as a point of personal privilege, I would mention that 

Ambassador Burns is a good friend. I was thrilled with the nomination. It brings back wonderful memories of his hospitality in Moscow, and if I can stretch things even further, to his dad, General 

Burns, who went with Sam Nunn and me on the first trip after the 

passage of the Nunn-Lugar legislation to Russia, Belarus, and 

Ukraine to try to think through what the implications of the act 

were, and what the United States could do physically. And so it is 

a marvelous, patriotic family. It is represented once again here 

today, and we are so delighted that you have accepted this new 

challenge. 

We have often benefited from Ambassador Burns’ analysis on 

some of the most important issues facing the United States. He is 

an outstanding choice to be the Deputy Secretary, and the State 

Department and our Nation are fortunate that he will be taking on 

this responsibility. Ambassador Burns would be the first Foreign 

Service officer to serve as Deputy Secretary in nearly 30 years. His 

nomination is a testament not only to his individual talents, but 

also to the commitment and service of the many career officers who 

serve our Nation every day in dangerous and challenging circumstances around the world. 

Ambassador Burns’ deep base of experience in the Middle East 

is critical as the United States forges new relationships with governments in the region and responds to transformational events. I 

appreciate also, as I have mentioned, his time as Ambassador to 

Russia. He has a thorough understanding of nuclear and arms control issues, Security Council dynamics, energy issues, and other 

global conditions that bear heavily on United States security and 

our relationship with Russia. 

When Deputy Secretary Nides was before this committee last 

November, I stressed the importance of making our foreign policy 

less reactive and promoting management of the State Department 

that does not lose sight of global priorities. This committee has 

worked to promote a more strategic approach to American diplomacy. We have attempted to ensure that financial resources are efficiently utilized in support of our national objectives. I believe that 

policy choices must be subject to the same analysis. There is limited bandwidth within any administration to advance foreign policy 

priorities. While the crisis of the moment may garner press attention, lasting relationships and effective diplomacy require hard 

work each day. 

As the Department of State manages the shifting sands of the 

Arab Spring and the complex transitions from military to civilian 

engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, we must not miss opportunities to make strategic, long-term gains related to nonproliferation, 

4 

energy security, and international trade. It is incumbent on the 

Deputy Secretary of State to ensure this strategic horizon is maintained within the Department of State. 

I look forward to today’s discussion and to many future conversations with the nominee as we work to advance American interests 

and security around the world. I thank you for holding this hearing 

so promptly, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

Secretary Burns, as you know, we are happy to place your formal 

testimony in the record and it will be there as if read in full. And 

we would appreciate probably just a summary if that is amenable 

to you. And we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. BURNS, OF MARYLAND, 

TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE 

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, sir. Well, thank you very much, and I 

promise I will be brief. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, it truly is an honor to appear before you today as President 

Obama’s nominee to become Deputy Secretary of State. I am grateful to the President and to Secretary Clinton for their confidence 

in me and in our diplomatic service in which I have proudly served 

for 29 years. If confirmed, I will do my best to live up to their trust 

and to work closely with all of you on this committee as I have 

throughout my career. 

I would like to begin by expressing deep appreciation to my family, to my wife, Lisa, and our daughters, Lizzy and Sarah. As in 

so many Foreign Service families around the world, their love and 

sacrifice are a very large part of why I am here today. I can never 

repay them adequately. 

This is the fifth time, Mr. Chairman, that I have appeared before 

this committee for confirmation. I approach this new challenges 

with considerable humility, with great respect for Jim Steinberg 

and all those who have come before me, with an abiding commitment to public service, with faith in the power of clear-eyed diplomacy in the pursuit of American interests and human freedoms, 

and with few illusions about the complicated world around us. 

It is a world with no shortage of troubles, but also plenty of 

opportunities for creative and determined American leadership. It 

is a world which faces the spreading dangers of weapons of mass 

destruction, unresolved regional and sectarian conflicts, extremist 

violence and terrorism, global economic dislocation, and transnational health, energy, and environmental concerns. It is a world 

in which American vision and drive are essential in crafting relations with emergent and resurgent powers and deepening their 

stake in global institutions and a stable international system. 

It is a world in which other people and other societies will inevitably have their own realities, not always identical to ours. That 

does not mean that we have to accept those perspectives or agree 

with them or indulge them, but it does mean that understanding 

them is the starting point for sensible policy. It is a world in which 

there is still no substitute for setting careful priorities in the application of American power and purpose, having clear goals, and connecting means to ends. 

5 

But it is also a world in which the power of our example and our 

generosity of spirit can open the door to profound advances, from 

supporting the universal aspirations fueling the Arab Spring to 

promoting global health and food security. We have our share of 

problems, but it is a mistake to underestimate our enduring 

strengths and our capacity to do big and difficult things. 

That capacity will be tested in the months and years ahead. It 

will be tested across the Middle East where revolutions which are 

only just beginning will be as consequential in their own way for 

global order as 1989 was for Europe and Eurasia. It will be tested 

across Asia and the Pacific, in many respects the most dynamic 

and significant part of the world for American interests in the next 

half-century, with the rise of China, the growth of our partnership 

with India, the strengthening of our ties in Southeast Asia, and the 

deepening of our relationships with traditional allies like Japan 

and South Korea, all enormously important. 

It will be tested in different ways in Europe where NATO remains the strongest link in our chain of overseas security partnerships, where the European Union still constitutes 30 percent of the 

global economy, where Turkey is an increasingly influential partner at the intersection of several crucial regions, and where the 

reset of relations with Russia has produced tangible results despite 

lingering differences. It will be tested in Afghanistan and Pakistan 

where success against bin Laden brings us to an important and extraordinarily challenging crossroads. It will be tested in Africa, 

soon to be a continent of a billion people, nearly half born since 

1995. And it will be tested in our own hemisphere where the 50th 

anniversary of the Alliance for Progress this year is a fitting moment to focus more of our diplomatic energy and attention closer 

to home, and where growing partnerships with countries like Brazil 

and Colombia, which I visited last week, hold great promise. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward, if confirmed, to doing all I can to 

help President Obama and Secretary Clinton meet all these tests. 

I will work hard with my friends and colleagues in other agencies 

to promote an effective policy process. I will work hard with all of 

you to ensure the closest possible cooperation with Congress. And 

I will also work hard to support Secretary Clinton’s efforts to transform and strengthen America’s diplomatic capabilities for the new 

century unfolding before us. Taking care of our people, of the members of the Foreign and Civil Services and the Foreign Service 

nationals who serve our country with such dedication and courage 

in so many difficult places around the world, is not only the right 

thing to do, but also a powerful contribution to America’s best 

interests. 

Thank you very much again, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Lugar, members of the committee, for your consideration. I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, it is an honor 

to appear before you today as President Obama’s nominee to become Deputy Secretary of State. I am grateful to the President and Secretary Clinton for their confidence in me, and in our diplomatic service, in which I have proudly served for 29 

6 

years. If confirmed, I will do my best to live up to their trust, and to work closely 

with all of you on this committee, as I have throughout my career. 

I’d like to begin by expressing deep appreciation to my family—my wife, Lisa, and 

our daughters, Lizzy and Sarah. As in so many Foreign Service families around the 

world, their love and sacrifice are a very large part of why I am here today. I can 

never repay them adequately. 

This is the fifth time, Mr. Chairman, that I have appeared before this committee 

for confirmation. I approach this new challenge with considerable humility; with 

great respect for Jim Steinberg and all those who have come before me; with an 

abiding commitment to public service; with faith in the power of clear-eyed diplomacy in the pursuit of American interests and human freedoms; and with few illusions about the complicated world around us. 

It is a world with no shortage of troubles, but also plenty of opportunities for creative and determined American leadership. It is a world which faces the spreading 

dangers of weapons of mass destruction; unresolved regional and sectarian conflicts; 

extremist violence and terrorism; global economic dislocation; and transnational 

health, energy, and environmental concerns. It is a world in which American vision 

and drive are essential in crafting relations with emergent and resurgent powers, 

and deepening their stake in global institutions and a stable international system. 

It is a world in which other people and other societies will inevitably have their 

own realities, not always identical to ours. That doesn’t mean that we have to accept 

those perspectives or agree with them or indulge them, but it does mean that understanding them is the starting point for sensible policy. It is a world in which there’s 

still no substitute for setting careful priorities in the application of American power 

and purpose, having clear goals, and connecting means to ends. 

But is also a world in which the power of our example and our generosity of spirit 

can open the door to profound advances, from supporting the universal aspirations 

fueling the Arab Spring, to promoting global health and food security. We have our 

share of problems, but it is a mistake to underestimate our enduring strengths, and 

our capacity to do big and difficult things. 

That capacity will be tested in the months and years ahead. It will be tested 

across the Middle East, where revolutions which are only just beginning will be as 

consequential in their own way for global order as 1989 was for Europe and Eurasia. It will be tested across Asia and the Pacific, in many respects the most 

dynamic and significant part of the world for American interests in the next halfcentury, with the rise of China, the growth of our partnership with India, the 

strengthening of our ties in Southeast Asia, and the deepening of our relationships 

with traditional allies like Japan and South Korea all enormously important. 

It will be tested in different ways in Europe, where NATO remains the strongest 

link in our chain of overseas security partnerships; where the EU still constitutes 

30 percent of the global economy; where Turkey is an increasingly influential partner at the intersection of several crucial regions; and where the reset of relations 

with Russia has produced tangible results, despite lingering differences. It will be 

tested in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where success against bin Laden brings us to 

an important and extraordinarily challenging crossroads. It will be tested in Africa, 

soon to be a continent of a billion people, nearly half born since 1995. And it will 

be tested in our own hemisphere, where the 50th anniversary of the Alliance for 

Progress this year is a fitting moment to focus more of our diplomatic energy and 

attention closer to home—and where growing partnerships with countries like 

Brazil and Colombia, which I visited last week, hold great promise. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward, if confirmed, to doing all I can to help President 

Obama and Secretary Clinton meet all these tests. I will work hard with my friends 

and colleagues in other agencies to promote an effective policy process. I will work 

hard with all of you to ensure the closest possible cooperation with Congress. And 

I will also work hard to support Secretary Clinton’s efforts to transform and 

strengthen America’s diplomatic capabilities for the new century unfolding before 

us. Taking care of our people—of the members of the Foreign and Civil Services and 

the Foreign Service Nationals who serve our country with such dedication and courage in so many difficult places around the world—is not only the right thing to do, 

but also a powerful contribution to America’s best interests. 

Thank you very much again, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee for your consideration. I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary, we look forward 

to having a good dialogue. I do not think there is any great controversy here and I am not sure we have to take all that long. 

7 

But let me ask you, first of all, with Tom Nides filling the position of the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and 

Resources, now you are coming in in the Steinberg position, can 

you share with the committee how you guys will divide up responsibilities of what, if anything, new might accompany your portfolio 

that was not there with Secretary Steinberg? 

Ambassador BURNS. Well, thank you very much, Senator Kerry. 

I look forward very much to working with Tom Nides who is a terrific partner as the Deputy Secretary primarily responsible for 

management and resources issues, which is no small challenge, as 

both you and Senator Lugar indicated earlier. 

I look forward very much to continuing the work that I have 

been involved in in trying to strengthen relations with emerging 

and reemerging powers around the world—India, Brazil, Russia; 

look forward to doing more work on China issues and Asia and the 

Pacific, given the significance of that part of the world. I hope to 

remain very much involved in Middle East issues, particularly with 

the challenges posed by the Arab Spring, as you had mentioned 

earlier. 

But in truth, I think there is no shortage of challenges, policy 

challenges, before us around the world, and I look forward to doing 

my very best to help Secretary Clinton make progress in all those 

areas. 

The CHAIRMAN. What, in any of those things that you just 

listed—is there anything in there that is different from where 

Secretary Steinberg was focused? 

Ambassador BURNS. No, sir. I have spent a good deal of time 

over the last 2 years on relations with Russia, which I hope to continue; relations with India, which the Secretary and the President 

have invested a lot of time; and as I said, given my own background in what is never a dull part of the world in the Middle 

East, I expect to continue to be engaged on those issues as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of the Middle East, in light of Prime 

Minister Netanyahu’s speech this morning and concluded visit, 

what is your sense of whether we can get a meaningful IsraeliPalestinian track going? Where would you say that is in your judgment after this visit? 

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Mr. Chairman, the President last 

Thursday laid out a very clear vision, I think, of how the United 

States at least thinks that a resumption of negotiations ought to 

be framed. That is based, as the President emphasized, on an appreciation strategically that the resumption of diplomatic movement toward a two-state solution is deeply in our interest, but it 

is also deeply in the interest of Israel and its future as a democratic Jewish state and its own security, given demographic and 

technological realities. 

I think it is also technically important as well to try to resume 

diplomatic movement simply because I think all of our experience 

in the Middle East is that when vacuums exist to the peace process, they tend to get filled by unhelpful ideas and unhelpful actions 

such as the notion of moving in September in New York in the 

U.N. General Assembly toward a kind of symbolic isolation of 

Israel and movement toward declaration of an independent Palestinian state. The truth, as the President emphasized, is that that 

8 

state desperately needs to be produced, but it can only be produced 

through negotiations, and that is the vision that the President has 

tried to lay out and that we are going to work very hard to make 

progress toward. 

The CHAIRMAN. And your reaction to the statement in the speech 

about tearing up the pact with Hamas? Where do you think that 

leaves President Abbas in terms of options and us? 

Ambassador BURNS. Well, I think the reconciliation agreement, 

which we have all read about, between Hamas and Fatah is something the Palestinians are going to have to sort through. What 

President Obama did last Thursday was to pose, I think, a very 

clear and very legitimate threshold question for Palestinians. What 

is that reconciliation aimed at? What kind of Palestinian partner 

can Israel look at across the table? And none of us can expect 

Israel to sit down at the negotiating table with a party that is 

sworn to its own destruction. So it seems to us that the Palestinian 

leadership has some very important questions to address in the 

weeks and months ahead. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would agree with that. I think the Prime 

Minister put the question to them pretty effectively today. 

Coming back to the State Department for a minute, having spent 

years there and understanding it as you do, what do you see as the 

biggest challenge now for the Department itself in the context of 

these changes that are taking place globally and some of the demands being placed on it and us, particularly in light of the budget 

right now? Can you speak to the internal challenge that we do not 

see every day but which you are wrestling with? 

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Clinton has 

addressed this, I think, very clearly and very eloquently in the 

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Initiative Review which 

she has launched, modeled on what the Pentagon has done for the 

last couple of decades. And that is aimed at making the best possible use of what we recognize are going to be increasingly tight 

resources, strengthening the civilian capacities of the American 

Government to promote American economic interests overseas, to 

promote important global initiatives, whether related to global 

health or to food security, to ensuring that within the State 

Department the regional bureaus and the so-called functional 

bureaus, those responsible for economic issues, energy, as well as 

human rights, work closely and effectively together, aimed at the 

President’s priorities. In the past, there has sometimes been a kind 

of artificial tension between those bureaus, and I think a lot of that 

has been broken down through the Secretary’s efforts in the last 

couple years, and I will do everything I can to help in that respect 

as well. 

So I think it is incumbent upon the Department to demonstrate 

the best possible use of the resources that we have, to make the 

clearest arguments that we can about what is at stake for the 

United States at a moment in history when our own economic wellbeing depends more and more on interactions within the global 

economy, on trade with countries overseas, and on the efforts that 

our embassies and diplomatic missions can make to promote those 

kind of interests. So it is a tall order. It is much easier said than 

9 

done, but I think that is something over the next couple of years 

that is going to be extraordinarily important. 

The CHAIRMAN. The last question because I know my time is running out here. 

Egypt. I am uncomfortable with the amount of money that is 

being put on the table. I just do not think it is enough for not just 

us but the global community to be committing to a transition as 

critical as the one that is taking place in Egypt, a quarter of the 

world’s Arab population in one country. It does not have all of the 

sectarian struggles of other places, but it has a very clear economic 

challenge ahead of it. 

It seems to me, in chatting with some of the leaders within the 

Gulf States and the region, there is a preparedness to step up, but 

I do not see the kind of concentrated program or initiative that 

brings people together to do that. Could you speak to that for a 

minute? 

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, sir. Well, Senator Kerry, first I would 

stress or reinforce the point that you made that I think Egypt’s 

transition is going to be as consequential as any challenge that we 

face across the Middle East in the coming years. Egypt is by far 

the largest of the Arab countries, and I think if Egypt makes a successful transition, which I believe Egyptians are entirely capable of, 

it is going to have an enormously positive demonstration effect in 

the rest of the region. That political transition cannot succeed without a sense of economic possibility, economic modernization, which 

Egyptians themselves have to lead in but which we have a deep 

stake in assisting, as do other Arab States, as do our European 

partners, is going to be extremely important. And that is why the 

President last Thursday emphasized a number of initiatives that 

the United States intends to undertake and where we will welcome 

support from others. 

These relate, first, to the enterprise funds that you and others 

in the Congress have suggested based on our experience in Central 

and Eastern Europe 20 years ago, proven vehicles for supporting 

the expansion of small- and medium-sized enterprises, a significant 

amount of debt relief, as much as a billion dollars over the next 3 

years aimed and making use of creative ideas like debt swaps, and 

helping to create jobs on infrastructure projects which are desperately needed in Egypt, and also more ambitiously in the 

medium term, a wider trade initiative that could involve Egypt in 

particular but also other countries in the region, as well as our 

European partners and the United States. 

The dirty little secret about the Arab world in recent years has 

been that Arab countries do not trade much with one another, and 

I think we can do a lot to support successful political transitions, 

democratic transitions, in the Arab world by holding out the possibility of those kind of ambitious trade initiatives. And I think we 

have a lot of interest in Europe and the President will be following 

up on this at the G8 summit over the course of the coming days. 

So there is a lot of possibility here, but there is an enormous 

amount at stake too. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is good to hear. I am glad that it will be 

a topic in Deauville. I think that is great. 

Senator Lugar. 

10 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I want to raise a question really 

hypothetically today, in order to take advantage of this opportunity 

to talk about State Department funding for both the rest of this fiscal year, and the coming year. As you have noted, Secretary Burns, 

on the Senate floor we have been preoccupied almost entirely 

throughout the year thus far with the questions of the budget, of 

deficits, and debt ceiling issues. This occupies almost all of our 

time with a few interruptions for votes on nominations and those 

sorts of things. 

On the other hand, here in our Foreign Relations Committee 

hearings, we are talking about very substantial challenges. It 

comes as no surprise, because you will have to be working through 

what we are going to be doing with regard to our Embassy in Iraq 

and likewise in Afghanistan, as well as all the contractors that are 

going to be coming over to do various things. All of these things 

are budget items and they cost money. It would appear that about 

$8 billion has been cut from the State Department’s budget request 

just for the rest of this fiscal year. 

I met with a delegation of people from AIPAC after Mr. Netanyahu’s speech today, and they wanted assurance that $3 billion in aid to Israel is there. I had to respond, as I am telling it 

to you now, that we are not discussing for the moment precisely 

what is in any of these budgets. We are not even sure anybody has 

presented a budget from the standpoint of the Senate to the 

Congress. 

So how do you manage expectations in the various countries that 

we serve, quite apart from anxieties, I would think, of Foreign 

Service officers and other personnel who are going to be in these 

embassies and elsewhere when you have really no idea what the 

budget is going to be for the State Department? And when these 

resolutions finally happen, how do you go about informing people 

or making necessary adjustments? Is any sort of back room planning going on for the contingencies that might be involved in all 

this? 

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Senator Lugar, it is certainly a challenge, as you described, and there is a great deal of back room 

thinking going on about how best to deal with that challenge. As 

I said before, it is essential for the Department to demonstrate the 

most effective possible use of the resources that we are provided, 

to make the best possible case for why we believe the resources we 

have requested, especially for fiscal year 2012, are in the best interests of the United States. I think, obviously, the so-called overseas contingency operation part of our request focused mainly on 

Afghanistan, on Iraq, is extremely important so that we can build 

on the success that has been achieved at such cost in recent years, 

but build on that responsibly. 

I think it is important to remember that the State Department 

budget represents something like 1 percent of the total Federal 

budget. It is a relatively small investment. We are very well aware 

of the pressures on the U.S. Federal budget across the board, and 

again, we want to do our part very effectively. 

If you look at a place like Iraq and the kind of civilian expenditure that we are requesting for fiscal year 2012, which is admittedly an increase from the request level of fiscal year 2010, you 

11 

have to weigh that, it seems to me, against the reality that the 

Defense Department request for OCO, for overseas contingency operations, is going to be about $45 billion less as it transitions to 

civilian leadership. So the net result to that I think is a pretty good 

deal for the American taxpayer and a good investment of American 

funds in what is a crucial moment in our relations with Iraq and 

with that part of the world. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, needless to say, we hope you will stay 

closely in touch throughout these months. This committee is tremendously interested, as you are, in the policies in both Iraq and 

Afghanistan, the safety of Americans who are serving there, and 

the continuity of the influence we have. 

I want to pick up one other controversial point, and that is on 

May 12, Deputy Secretary Steinberg, when he was before our committee, said the President has conducted U.S. military operations 

in Libya in a manner consistent with the War Powers Resolution 

and will continue to do so. Last Friday, the President wrote to the 

congressional leadership, indicating that U.S. military operations 

will continue beyond the 60-day deadline specified by the War 

Powers Resolution, although the Congress has not authorized these 

operations. 

This is a point of discussion and some debate. I know our chairman has offered a resolution going through various thoughts about 

Libya and essentially commending the President for his activities. 

I will not get into an argument about that. I would just say it 

appears to me that potentially a precedent is being set here that, 

in terms of our overall foreign policy history, is not a good one. 

Now, specifically people may come to a conclusion that foreign 

policy can be directed at humanitarian goals, namely stopping civilian killings that could occur all over the world at various times. 

The President might say that we need to act quickly because otherwise people are going to be lost. But conceivably this could fit 

under the War Powers Resolution even though there is not a declaration of war or a commitment to use military power of the 

United States. 

But our engagement in Libya is drifting well beyond 60 days. 

Calls to the administration to clarify what we have spent already 

in Libya, in addition to what we are about to spend and what we 

might spend to help reconstruction efforts in Libya at some point 

in the future have not been forthcoming. You cannot solve that 

during this hearing today. 

Let me just say that it is a source of concern for me and I think 

for others. It ought to be, I think, a concern for everybody. I think 

it is important to pin down when the United States is going to use 

military force, to have the proper checks and balances with the 

Congress, to use even the leeway of the 60 days, which the War 

Powers Act does, but not to move well on beyond that with almost 

imagination. So I am hopeful that you will convey my serious concerns to the State Department, as you are confirmed, and that we 

can have more conversation about it. 

Ambassador BURNS. I certainly will, Senator. And I appreciate 

the importance and seriousness of the concerns that you raise. I 

also appreciate the fact that there has been longstanding debate, 

including within the Congress, about the War Powers Resolution. 

12 

As the White House press secretary said last Friday, the President 

believes that our actions regarding Libya have been and remain 

consistent with the War Powers Resolution. The President also indicated in the letter that he sent to the congressional leadership 

last Friday his firm conviction that it is extremely important, when 

engaged in any military action, even a limited military action of 

the sort that we are engaged in in support of the coalition in Libya, 

that we engage with, consult with, and have the support of the 

Congress. And that is why the President welcomed the introduction 

last night of the bipartisan resolution cosponsored by Senator 

Kerry, Senator McCain, and other members along those lines. But 

I will certainly convey the concern. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Lugar. 

Mr. Secretary, I ask your indulgence. I have a meeting that I 

need to go to in a few moments. Senator Casey is going to preside 

in my absence. 

I just want to thank you again. I think it is obvious from the 

tone and questions here that there is no issue of your being confirmed, I think, and we want to try to move to get it done as rapidly as we can and look forward to continuing our relationship with 

you once you get in there formally. 

So, Senator Casey, I recognize you and I thank you for chairing 

in my absence. 

Senator CASEY [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Under Secretary Burns, we are grateful for your public service, 

your appearance here today and your ongoing commitment to engage in and accept the responsibility of public service yet again. We 

do not have enough time to list all of the positions that you have 

held, but they have all been difficult and they have all been positions of significant responsibility. So we thank you for that. 

Also, thank your family as well. As you pointed out in your statement, when you serve the public, they do as well by extension, and 

I know the support they give you. So we are grateful for that. 

I wanted to turn first to Iran. I do not need to recite for you the 

challenges that Iran presents for the region and the Middle East 

and the world. We are, of course, concerned about two basic areas. 

One is their nuclear capability and their determination to have a 

nuclear weapon in my judgment and I think in the judgment of 

others. In addition to that, even absent that, even if that were not 

a threat, as it is, their demonstrated support for terrorism throughout the region and well beyond the region, especially when it comes 

to their support for Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as others. 

So I would ask you a couple of questions in this area. There was 

a 2011 annual worldwide threat briefing by our director of national 

intelligence, and it states ‘‘Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a 

weapon in the next few years if it chooses to.’’ 

We know that one strategy alone does not a successful solution 

make, but we know that we have sanctions in place. I am one of 

the Senators cosponsoring legislation today to further enhance 

those sanctions. But we know that sanctions are part of it and they 

are working and they are necessary even though we want to do 

more in that area. 

13 

We also know that diplomacy plays a huge role here, and your 

work has demonstrated that. 

So we have got more to do to hold the regime accountable. I just 

wanted to get your sense based upon your experience and also in 

light of the position that you are going to be assuming in the event 

of your confirmation, which I am confident about. What can you 

tell us about how you will use the position of Deputy Secretary of 

State to be able to push forward an agenda that would lead to both 

a diplomatic strategy, as well as to keep the pressure on the 

Iranian regime in other ways? 

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you very much, Senator. 

I think we remain very firmly committed to enforcing all of the 

many laws that we have available to us now, as well as international understandings, such as U.N. Security Council Resolution 

1929, to maximize the pressure on the Iranian regime to engage 

seriously in diplomacy on the nuclear issue, something we have not 

seen to date. 

Earlier today, we announced a series of significant new measures 

with regard to sanctions against Iran, including seven new entities, 

companies, designated under CISADA, as well as 16 new entities 

or individuals designed under the so-called INKSNA sanctions 

against Iran, North Korea, and Syria. I think those are significant 

steps forward and we are continuing to look at other steps that we 

can take to demonstrate our seriousness and, beyond our seriousness, the seriousness of the international community on these 

issues. 

It is instructive that the European Union yesterday also announced about 100 new companies or firms that they are sanctioning in continuation of the international effort against Iran. 

We have a strong platform on which to build over the course of 

the last year, I think an unprecedented set of sanctions built on 

Resolution 1929, what the EU did after that, what we did nationally, what a number of our other partners around the world have 

done. It is having an impact on Iran. It has not yet produced the 

kind of serious willingness to engage in diplomacy that we had 

hoped for, and in the absence of that indication of seriousness, we 

are going to continue to try to step up the pressure in every way 

that we can. 

Senator CASEY. The question that Middle East peace—or I 

should say the challenge that that presents to us got, I think, more 

difficult in the last couple of weeks. We could point to the last couple of months as being a time period within which it got more difficult, more complicated, even as complicated as it always is because of a number of developments. One of the developments which 

in my judgment makes it exceedingly more difficult is the unity 

government between Hamas and Fatah and the decision made by 

President Abbas to form that unity government, what that means 

for the region and for any kind of successful peace process. 

In the aftermath of that, I and a number of Senators sent a letter to President Obama. This letter is dated May the 6th. I will not 

read all of it, obviously, but the one line that I think is particularly 

relevant and important—and I wanted to get your reaction to 

this—is we say in the last paragraph of this May 6 letter—and I 

am quoting—‘‘we urge you’’—urging the President here—‘‘to make 

14 

clear to President Abbas and to the international community the 

United States opposition to a Fatah-Hamas unity government that 

does not fully accept the Quartet Principles.’’ Those principles, 

meaning that Hamas must renounce violence, recognize Israel, and 

agree to abide by past agreements. 

In light of that condition or set of conditions not having been 

effectuated or agreed to, what can you tell us about how the administration views not just the peace process more generally but specifically the peace process through the lens of this difficult question? 

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator. 

It is obviously a very serious concern. The President was quite 

clear in his speech last Thursday in posing what is really a threshold question for Palestinians about what efforts at reconciliation or 

unity are really aimed at because none of us can expect Israel to 

sit down at the negotiating table with a party that is sworn to its 

destruction, as the President underscored. And so I think in the 

coming days and weeks, the Palestinian leadership has some very 

important questions before it about what this reconciliation agreement means, about how it is going to translate into a unity government, about what the policies and positions of that government are 

going to be, and whether or not that makes it possible for there to 

be a resumption of negotiations. We have made clear that we are 

prepared to do our part, but the Palestinians need to demonstrate 

their willingness to be that kind of a partner in negotiations. 

Senator CASEY. I am out of time, but I would urge you, of course, 

and the State Department, as well as the administration overall 

and the President, to continually reassert that policy because repetition on a question like this is very important to get that message 

out. 

Thank you very much. 

We will move to Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Congratulations. The fact that this is not full today is a good sign 

that your nomination is going well. I wanted to personally thank 

you for your service to our country and to your family for the sacrifice that being in the Foreign Service means to families. So we 

are grateful for that. 

I have three quick questions. One is really more of your impressions on something. 

In the time that I have been here and on this committee, which 

has been a great experience so far, it is obviously very apparent the 

world faces some major issues, big problems. And clearly no nation 

on earth can solve any of these problems by themselves. The IsraelPalestinian issue, Syria, Libya, Egypt, North Korea. I mean, you 

name it. It takes coalitions to basically address these. And coalitions have to be put together and they have to be led. And right 

now, we probably are the only nation on earth that can do that. 

My impression—and this is just something that I think others 

have discussed in the past, but I was wondering what your impressions are—is many of the international institutions that are now 

in place are really creatures of the cold war, post World War II. 

What is your assessment? It may not be a fair question in this 

forum. Maybe we could talk about it later. Maybe you have not 

15 

given it a tremendous of thought, and perhaps you have. But what 

is your assessment of our existing institutions in terms of their 

ability to deal with the realities of the 21st century? It is dramatically different than just 20 years. And I mean all of them. They are 

all important, but the United Nations, NATO, here in this hemisphere, the OAS. Have we reached a point where maybe we should 

start on a global scale having a conversation about either retooling 

some of these organizations and institutions to really kind of line 

up more with the realities of the 21st century and the kind of challenges we are facing? 

Ambassador BURNS. That is a very important point, Senator. I 

think some of that is underway already, but I think it needs to be 

approached with greater vigor and determination because whether 

you look at some of the important regional organizations like the 

OAS, for example, which I think has itself made clear the importance of reform and updating to meet a different set of challenges 

in the 21st century or at global institutions like the United Nations, the U.N. Security Council where the administration has 

made clear the importance of updating the Security Council to reflect the realities of the 21st century, or looking at the global financial institutions, the World Bank, where a great deal of work has 

gone into this already, but where, if you look at the kinds of economic challenges that we and countries around the world face, 

those institutions are going to need to adapt. So it is a longer conversation, but I think it is a very important one. 

Senator RUBIO. Just kind of building on that, obviously there is 

a lot of concern and you hear a lot of talk about the rise of China, 

what that means, but also in the context of that, I think there is 

opportunity to find real partners to take on some of these issues. 

And not just China. I mean, Turkey and Brazil, India. I mean, 

these are countries we hope to encourage to get involved with other 

nations to deal with some of these issues. That is a real challenge. 

What are your thoughts on what we can do here in the Senate and 

beyond to be constructive in that regard? 

Ambassador BURNS. I do not think we face a bigger challenge, 

and I think that is why you have seen in this administration and 

also in the last administration a lot of effort focused on some of 

those relationships like India, Brazil as you mentioned as well, 

both in terms of strengthening our own bilateral relationships and 

partnerships with those countries, but also encouraging them to 

play a more active role, in the case of India, across Asia and the 

Pacific where I think India is emerging as a more and more influential player. And in the case of Brazil, working not only on issues 

in our own hemisphere, but also increasingly on the kind of global 

issues, whether it is in food security or energy or other areas where 

we have a great deal in common. 

So I cannot think of a bigger challenge as we look out over the 

coming years and decades than spending a lot of time and attention on those relationships and helping to deepen the stake of those 

countries in the kind of stable international system that serves our 

interests and promotes our values as well. 

Senator RUBIO. I have two quick questions on specifics. 

The first is a couple of weeks ago we met with some of the folks 

that were here on behalf of the Libyan transitional council. I apoloVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:43 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 HEARINGS GONE TO PRESS\68223.TX
16 

gize if this was covered in the testimony earlier. They had come 

and basically what they asked for is access to some of these funds 

that have been frozen, either direct access to the funds or a line 

of credit secured by those funds. Is there any update? I know Senator Kerry was working on some legislation of some sort regarding 

that issue. What is the latest on efforts, if any, to provide those 

funds or make something available? 

Ambassador BURNS. It is something which we are very much 

committed to. We are working with the Congress with a variety of 

committees here to try and develop legislation which will enable us 

to do this, in other words, to get access in one way or the other, 

as you described, to frozen assets so that it can be used to meet 

the humanitarian needs of the Libyan people. And we are confident 

that we will be able to do that. We want to work very closely with 

the Congress to do it because there is a real sense of urgency connected to this. 

Senator RUBIO. And the last question—and it is one that I think 

we are doing well on and should continue to build on—is the State 

Department’s view globally as a leader on trafficking in modern 

day slavery, largely in part to the Trafficking in Persons report 

that has demonstrated an ability to influence governments’ capacity and their willingness to combat this kind of criminal activity. 

What do you envision are some of the steps we can take to institutionalize these policies and procedures and continue to make that 

a core principle of our foreign policy? I think it is an important 

issue. I think we have taken the leadership on it globally, and I 

would imagine you would consider that to be a priority as well. Any 

thoughts on how we build on our successes there already? 

Ambassador BURNS. I think it is a difficult challenge, and we 

have work to do in not only streamlining the process but ensuring 

that it is a high priority in our agendas with other governments. 

And I think as you said, Senator, we have made good deal of 

progress in countries where, in their own self-interest, not as a 

favor to us or to the trafficking in persons process, countries that 

made significant strides to deal with this problem. 

Senator RUBIO. And I am going to sneak one quick one in. It is 

important but it is topical. 

Yemen. A careful balancing act between a nation whose resources have been used to assist in the war on terror but also an 

increasingly dysfunctional situation that looks untenable. It is a 

much broader question. I know the administration is grappling 

with what the right approach there is. Any updates on that? 

Ambassador BURNS. No, I mean, just to express at this moment 

anyway deep disappointment with the fact that President Saleh in 

Yemen chose once again not to follow through on his commitment 

to make a peaceful transfer of power. This is an issue on which we 

have worked closely with the Gulf Cooperation Council states. We 

will continue that. But this is a very fragile moment, as you said, 

and we will do everything we can to encourage movement in the 

direction of a peaceful transition. There is a lot at stake here in 

Yemen. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. Congratulations. 

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

17 

I will be relinquishing my gavel to Senator Menendez who is our 

next questioner. 

Senator MENENDEZ [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, thank you for your service to our country. I appreciate what you have done over a long period of time. 

Let me start off by saying something positive on the State 

Department. I have been one of those who have been pressing 

really hard about our sanctions regime on Iran, and I am very 

pleased to see that the Department has listed about seven different 

companies who are engaged in activities related to the supply of refined petroleum products to Iran, including the supply of gasoline, 

and they come from various countries. So that is a very good step 

forward, and I am thrilled to see it. 

Yesterday I introduced legislation, that I coauthored with Senators Kyl and Lieberman, with Senators Casey, Gillibrand, Collins, 

and Kirk, among others as cosponsors, to further pursue the closing of loopholes that we believe exist particularly with the Iran 

sanctions regime. Part of what we call for in that legislation is for 

the State Department to undertake a diplomatic initiative to qualitatively expand the U.N. sanctions against the regime. 

Are you committed, if you are confirmed, to robust enforcement 

of our sanctions regime and pursuing more vigorous efforts at the 

United Nations and in our bilateral relationships to ensure that we 

are doing everything in our power to prevent Iran from acquiring 

nuclear weapons capability? 

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, sir, I certainly am. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And since you are going to be, in essence, 

the chief counselor to the Secretary of State, is that what you will 

be advocating for in that position? 

Ambassador BURNS. I certainly will, Senator. And I think, as you 

mentioned, the further actions that we took this morning under the 

CISADA sanctions, the seven entities designated there, as well as 

16 under the INKSNA, I think underscores the commitment of this 

administration to follow through. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, I want to follow up on your answer to 

Senator Casey about the Fatah-Hamas. I was also the author of 

that letter. 

I listened to the President’s speech very intently. I read it once 

it was printed. And when he gets to the point about Fatah-Hamas, 

he says the Palestinian Authority will have to convince Israel that 

in fact—how am I supposed to deal or negotiate with someone who, 

as part of that entity, is committed to obliterate my existence? 

But he did not say that we will invoke U.S. law which says that 

if you have an unreformed Hamas, U.S. taxpayer dollars will not 

flow to such an entity. Is it your understanding that if, in fact, we 

have an unreformed Hamas, that U.S. law calls for the suspension 

of those funds to a Palestinian Authority that includes Hamas? 

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, we are certainly committed to applying U.S. law, and our view of Hamas has not changed. It is a 

foreign terrorist organization and we do not engage with Hamas. 

We will have to see how the so-called reconciliation agreement 

translates in terms of a government of unity, as well as the policies 

and positions of that government. There is a distance between 

where we are today and seeing those realities. And we will cerVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:43 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 HEARINGS GONE TO PRESS\68223.TX
18 

tainly have to make our judgments accordingly, but we will 

certainly apply U.S. law. 

And I think in the meantime, it is important for us, until we 

reach that point, to continue to plan to provide support to the very 

worthwhile efforts of people like Prime Minister Fayyad who has 

made enormous progress over the last few years that would have 

been very hard to predict a few years ago in creating the institutions for an eventual Palestinian state. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate your answer. Let me just say I 

think it will be very hard for those of us who have cast votes in 

support of helping the Palestinian Authority, as part of a Middle 

East package, to be voting to send U.S. taxpayer dollars to an entity that includes an organization recognized by the United States 

Government as a terrorist one. And I always understand the diplomatic speak and I get nervous about it. I think it should be very 

clear that there will be a very strong will in the Congress of the 

United States to not have U.S. taxpayer dollars go to such an 

entity. The definition of a unity government may be of interest to 

the State Department. What is of interest to those of us who have 

a fiduciary responsibility to the taxpayers of this country is not to 

have U.S. dollars flow to a terrorist organization. And so I understand distinctions, but I hope distinctions at the end of the day do 

not get so blurred that we will be on a collision course. 

Let me ask you about a different part of the world. We are losing 

our Assistant Secretary for the Western Hemisphere. I chair that 

subcommittee. We do not have an Ambassador to Mexico. These 

are incredibly important assignments. And I do not get a sense 

that at a time in which the hemisphere is continuously a challenge 

to us that we are as committed as is necessary. I know one just 

became a reality, but the other one has existed. What is your 

expectation, and what is it that you will do when you get to the 

State Department to make this a critical focus? 

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, you are absolutely right. They are 

extremely important posts. The Secretary is firmly convinced of the 

high priority that needs to be attached to both of those posts, and 

we are moving as quickly as we can, working with the White 

House, toward sending up nominations because it is very important 

to fill those posts for all the reasons that you said. This is a critical 

moment for the hemisphere and for our interests in it. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Especially on Mexico, which has been open, 

I hope we will get someone who both understands the United 

States-Mexico relationship, will not have the challenge that we had 

most recently, and can be very meaningful. And I will be pursuing 

that with the Secretary’s office and hopefully with you upon your 

confirmation. 

There is something that is pretty outrageous going on at State 

that I have been pursuing for the 19 years that I have been in the 

Congress—House and Senate. And that is diversity at the State 

Department. It has the worst record of any of the Federal Departments, which is incredibly disappointing to me. And what demonstrates the Department’s indifference to this issue is that the 

State Department failed to even provide data for 2009 at the OPM 

for its annual report to the President on Hispanic employment in 

19 

the Federal Government. It was the only—‘‘only’’ underlined— 

Federal agency not to respond. 

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Senator, I am not aware of the lack of 

response, but if that is the case, we will fix that because the 

Secretary is certainly not indifferent to the issue of diversity and 

has made extraordinary efforts to try and ensure that the State 

Department, both the Foreign and Civil Services, reflect one of the 

great strengths of the United States, which is its diversity. Certainly the Department, the Foreign Service in particular, is a more 

representative place than it was when I joined the Foreign Service 

29 years ago. And this is the result not only of the efforts of Secretary Clinton but Secretary Powell, Secretary Rice before. So I 

promise to make this a high priority because I share your conviction that it is extremely important, and I do believe we have made 

progress in recent years and we will keep at it. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that, and I raise it because 

you are going to be in a position to affect it. I chaired—and I will 

close on this—the nomination hearing for Deputy Secretary Nides 

when his confirmation process was before the committee. And I 

asked him about the Department’s dismal record. This is a record 

that goes back in time. It is not this Secretary, but the Department’s history. It still is the worst Department in the Federal 

Government. 

And in Nides’ oral and written response, he agreed that this was 

a priority for the Department, that there is more that could be 

done, and that the Department was going to find innovative ways 

to improve minority recruitment, retention, and the subjectivity as 

to whether or not you can orally express yourself, which I always 

found interesting. But yet, we do not even have a response to OPM. 

The only Federal Department that did not respond. 

So I hope we can change that and I look forward to working with 

you to do so. 

Ambassador BURNS. I will certainly do everything I can working 

with Tom Nides and with the Secretary on this issue because it is 

a high priority and we need to demonstrate that—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I prefer that we get a response that we can 

work with instead of a legislative response. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Burns, congratulations. I can think of no one who is 

better qualified to do the job that you are about to undertake. I 

have great admiration for your adroitness as a diplomat, but also 

your wealth of knowledge. 

I want to get in three or four questions here, not in terms of 

great length of prefatory remarks. 

First, I have two serious concerns about the Libyan situation as 

you will recall. In fact, the last time you were before this committee was the day before, or the day of, the U.N. vote on the 

Libyan situation. This is sort of in the middle of an exchange that 

we had. I had said that in terms of international law it becomes 

rather awkward when we support a movement yet to be fully defined in its attempt to overthrow a government which we still formally recognize. And your answer was that yes it is certainly a 

20 

complicated proposition, which is very ‘‘Burnsian,’’ shall we say, 

but precise. 

Do we still have diplomatic relations with the Qadhafi government under the definition of international law? 

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Senator, we have suspended our diplomatic operations—— 

Senator WEBB. So is it basically where we still were on March 

18, 2011? 

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, sir. 

Senator WEBB. We have diplomatic relations but we have suspended them. We have not broken them. 

Ambassador BURNS. That is correct, sir. 

Senator WEBB. Are we then considering recognizing this other 

entity? Has it been vetted? What is going on here? 

Ambassador BURNS. Well, we have the issue of recognition under 

review of the transition national council. What we have done over 

the last couple of months I think is strengthened the practical ties 

we have to the group. We have developed a much clearer understanding of it. I think it is a credible representative of a wide spectrum of Libyans. We have a diplomatic office in Benghazi now. 

Senator WEBB. To cut to the chase, we still have not severed diplomatic relations with the Qadhafi government against which we 

are participating in the use of military force. 

Ambassador BURNS. That is right, sir. We have suspended our 

diplomatic operations. 

Senator WEBB. But not broken; not severed them. 

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, sir. 

Senator WEBB. I just find that extremely odd. 

The second concern that I have is with respect to the precedent 

for the unilateral decision by a President of the United States to 

use force in an environment where we were not under attack, not 

under a threat of attack, not actually implementing a treaty, not 

rescuing American citizens, and we were not responding directly to 

an incident as we were in 1986, when I was at the Pentagon. We 

retaliated in Libya, as far as I can tell, for the notion of a humanitarian situation that existed outside of the realm of the United 

States vital interests if you listen to what Secretary Gates was 

saying. That disturbs me in terms of precedent. What comes out of 

this? Have we established a new precedent, or what is your 

thought on that? 

Ambassador BURNS. Well, I think what led to the President’s decision was a variety of factors. I mean, first, you did have an imminent humanitarian catastrophe. I have no doubt but that you 

would have seen a blood bath in Benghazi had there not been outside intervention. 

Second, you had an unprecedented call from the Arab League to 

the Security Council to intervene to protect civilians. 

Third, you had a number of our closest NATO partners, the same 

people we look to for cooperation in places like Afghanistan, who 

were urging us to join them in acting. 

Fourth, you had a wider set of stakes, you know, the countries 

on either side of Libya, Egypt and Tunisia going through their own 

revolutions in very fragile states themselves. And the unrest in 

Libya could easily have further aggravated those—— 

21 

Senator WEBB. I understand the logic that was given, and I am 

empathetic with a good bit of it. But there were a lot of countervailing logics as well. There were key U.N. abstentions—China, 

Russia, India, Germany—I think there were five but cannot pull 

the fifth one up out of my head right now. I find it really troubling, 

and particularly now 2 months later, that a unilateral decision by 

a President of the United States in an environment when these 

other factors were not present that has been ongoing and could set 

a very disturbing precedent for how decisions are made for the use 

of force. I am going to lay that down. It is something for further 

discussion. 

The TIP report was mentioned. I want to commend to you the 

results of a hearing that I held on this. I hope you will look at it 

because I think the legislation is getting ready to be renewed. I 

think there are some inconsistencies in the way that we are 

carrying out an otherwise well-intentioned policy that have particular implications in Asia. This was the focus of the hearing. The 

benchmarks that we have been using are convictions rather than 

a nation with a very settled rule of law that does not actually get 

to convictions and also comparing a country against itself, when 

the implication is that they are being compared against other 

countries. 

The classic example that came up in that hearing was that we 

have given Nigeria a 1 in our TIP reports, we have given Japan 

a 2 and Singapore a 2 Watch List. As you know, these are very stable societies who are able to deal with the rule of law in a way 

comparable, in many cases, to our own. I think that we need to fix 

the law so that we measure the right things as we put these policies forward because it is causing a great deal of resentment among 

people who are otherwise our close friends. 

Ambassador BURNS. No. Senator, I read the transcript of that 

hearing, and I think it was very helpful. I mean, it is a complicated 

process to go through, but I think you raise some very legitimate 

questions which we will sort through. 

Senator WEBB. I hope we can work with you on that because we 

are going to come up with some suggestions as to how we can implement the intentions of this policy but in a way that our friends 

and people whose governmental systems are pretty stable can 

understand. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

Seeing no other members, Ambassador, thank you for your 

appearance here today; your answers. 

The record will remain open for 48 hours. We urge you, if you 

get any questions, to answer them as expeditiously as possible 

so that we can have your nomination move as expeditiously as 

possible. 

And with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

22 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM J. BURNS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

ROLE AS DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Question. With Tom Nides filling the position of Deputy Secretary of State for 

Management and Resources, how will the two of you coordinate policy initiatives 

and resource capabilities? What issues do you expect to oversee in relation to Deputy Secretary Nides? 

Answer. I look forward to close and continuous coordination with Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Nides on the full range of issues on 

the U.S. foreign policy agenda. I also seek the closest possible cooperation with Congress as we pursue a robust agenda to advance U.S. interests and promote prosperity, security, and universal human freedoms throughout the world. 

LIBYA

Question. I understand that the formal recognition of the Transitional National 

Council would have important legal and political ramifications. But the administration seems to be inching toward a kind of political recognition. Members of Congress 

and senior administration officials have engaged with Council members, the administration has begun to provide the Council with nonlethal assistance, and the State 

Department has established a de facto diplomatic presence in Benghazi. On May 19, 

2011, the President of the United States, referring to the Council, stated that ‘‘the 

opposition has organized a legitimate and credible interim council.’’ What are the 

practical and political implications of the President’s statement about the TNC? 

What are the factors being considered and potential obstacles with regard to a more 

formal political recognition? 

Answer. The issue of recognition remains under review and we are continuing to 

assess the capabilities of the TNC as we deepen our engagement with the opposition. Last month, we welcomed TNC Executive Council President Jibril and Finance 

Minister Tarhouni in Washington. We also have sent our highest level representative yet to Benghazi with a personal message of support from President Obama and 

an invitation to open a representative office in Washington—an offer the TNC accepted. We continue to encourage other nations to do the same. We have recognized 

the TNC as a legitimate and credible interlocutor for the Libyan people. Special 

Envoy Chris Stevens continues to meet with as broad a spectrum as possible of 

Libyans involved in the opposition writ large, not just the TNC. 

International support for the TNC is deepening, through steps we have taken collectively in the context of the Libya Contact Group and beyond, on the economic and 

diplomatic fronts. We together are working to put the TNC on firmer financial footing, taken steps to license oil sales by the TNC, and embraced the idea that a future 

Libyan Government should honor any financial obligations the TNC assumes on behalf of the Libyan people. The international community is providing nonlethal 

supplies and deepening diplomatic ties. 

The TNC has consistently rejected terrorism and extremist influences and declared their respect for the human rights of all Libyans. The TNC and other members of the opposition have also truly opened up parts of Libya to the international 

community and NGOs for the first time in 40 years. The TNC has expressed its 

dedication to a peaceful transition to an inclusive, democratic government. In that 

regard, it has announced a roadmap that sets out its vision to bring democracy to 

Libya, including convening an interim national assembly and drafting a constitution 

after Qadhafi has left power. 

Question. What sorts of assistance if any is the administration prepared to offer 

the TNC at this stage? 

Answer. We are assessing and reviewing options for the types of assistance we 

could provide to the Libyan people, and are consulting directly with the opposition 

and our international partners. The President has directed up to $25 million in 

transfers of nonlethal items from U.S. Government stocks to key partners in Libya 

such as the Transitional National Council (TNC). The list of potential ‘‘non-lethal 

commodities’’ that have been or will be provided was developed based on consultations with the TNC and our own assessment of what is useful and available, and 

includes medical supplies, boots, tents, personal protective gear, and prepackaged 

rations. The first shipment, including Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) arrived in 

Benghazi on May 10. The Departments of State and Defense will continue to work 

closely with our partner nations and the Libyan TNC to coordinate on the types of 

23 

nonlethal assistance to be provided, in an effort to make the assistance as effective 

as possible and minimize duplication of effort. 

In terms of financial assistance, we have been supporting the Libya Contact 

Group’s efforts to establish a Temporary Finance Mechanism (TFM) and a Libyan 

Information Exchange Mechanism (LIEM) that would facilitate much-needed financial contributions and other in-kind assistance to the TNC. We are strongly encouraging our international partners to assist the TNC directly or through one or both 

of these mechanisms. 

The administration is also discussing legislation with Congress that would permit 

the use of a portion of frozen regime assets for broadly humanitarian purposes in 

Libya. Under proposed legislation, humanitarian assistance would include basic lifesaving and life-support help, including commodities and subsidies needed to maintain basic living conditions among the populatio—for example, access to water, sanitation, food, shelter, and health care. This list is necessarily nonexhaustive, as 

circumstances could arise that would make other types of assistance, e.g., utilities 

(electricity, fuel), necessary to maintain basic living conditions among the population. This would not include offsetting the cost of our military action in Libya. 

Question. What planning is underway to support a stable political transition in 

post-Qaddafi Libya? 

Answer. As we continue to deepen our engagement with the Libyan opposition, 

we are encouraged by their commitment to democratic principles and their roadmap 

for a political transition following the departure of Qadhafi from power. It will ultimately be up to the Libyan people to choose their own leaders and government 

structures, and to address the reconciliation of a Libya marred by 40 years of dictatorship and the regime’s use of brutal force against civilians. Any transition will 

have to look at creating institutions that respect the integrity and sovereignty of a 

united Libya and that reflect the Libyan people’s genuine aspirations for freedom, 

democracy, and a responsive and transparent government. We believe that the U.N. 

should have the lead role in coordinating international support for a political transition in Libya. We are working very closely with our international partners to explore the goals and priorities in a post-Qadhafi Libya, and develop the most effective 

ways in which the international community can contribute. As the TNC has pointed 

out, Libya is an oil-rich country and will be well positioned to bear many of the costs 

of a post-Qadhafi transition. 

Question. How would you assess NATO’s performance in operations over Libya? 

Are members of NATO in full agreement as to the scope of the Security Council’s 

authorization to use force in Libya? For example, are there differences of opinion 

among coalition members as to the extent to which targeted attacks on regime 

forces are authorized by Resolution 1973? If so, please describe those differences. 

Answer. We have made significant progress in Libya since NATO, acting in response to an unprecedented call from the Arab League to the United Nations Security Council, launched Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) on March 27, 2011. 

Since that date, NATO and its coalition partners have flown more than 9,000 

sorties, including 3,443 strike sorties. Within days, we had averted an imminent humanitarian catastrophe in Benghazi, where there would likely have been a bloodbath were it not for outside intervention. In addition, we have loosened the regime’s 

grip on Misrata and have significantly degraded Qadhafi’s naval, air, and land 

forces. Throughout OUP, NATO has exercised great care to minimize the danger to 

civilians. 

Regarding alliance cohesion, on April 14 NATO Foreign Ministers made clear the 

three military objectives of the NATO mission: NATO and our partners will keep 

up the pressure until all attacks and threats of attack against civilians have ended; 

the regime has verifiably withdrawn all military and paramilitary forces; and full, 

safe, and unhindered humanitarian access is guaranteed to all Libyans in need of 

assistance. NATO Allies and partners are united in recognizing these objectives. 

Other coalition members also strongly back NATO’s efforts in support of UNSCRs 

1970 and 1973, though they recognize—as do we—that this crisis cannot be resolved 

by military means alone. The international community has also imposed a variety 

of sanctions and pressure on the Qadhafi regime. Moreover, NATO decided June 1 

to extend the mission for another 90 days beyond June 27. 

EGYPT, TUNISIA, AND THE ARAB SPRING

Question. Rampant unemployment, particularly among youth, has been one of the 

drivers of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions earlier this year and remains a 

significant challenge for both countries going forward. How will the administration 

24 

use economic support to help facilitate long-term economic and political stabilization 

in Egypt and across the region? 

Answer. The events of the past 5 months provide us a historic opportunity to help 

the Egyptian and Tunisian Governments close the gap between their current economic realities and their citizens’ aspirations. Although both countries face significant challenges, economic modernization is consistent with, and can help reinforce, 

their democratic transitions. 

We recognize the importance of helping both governments meet their short-term 

economic stabilization requirements as well as longer term economic modernization 

needs. These two objectives are not mutually exclusive, but they do require flexible, 

creative approaches—including, where appropriate—repurposing our current and 

planned assistance programs to meet new requirements. For example, in Egypt we 

are restructuring our economic support around four key pillars: support for economic 

policy formulation, support for economic stability, support for economic modernization, and the development of a framework for trade integration and investment. 

Support for economic policy formulation: We will offer the Egyptian people concrete support for economic policy formulation alongside our democratization efforts. 

We will use bilateral programs to support economic reform preparations, including 

outreach and technical assistance from our government, universities, and think 

tanks to individuals, NGOs, and political parties. 

Support for economic stability: President Obama announced that the United 

States will provide Egypt with up to $1 billion in debt relief under a debt swap arrangement. This package can help turn the debts of the past into investments in 

Egypt’s future. 

This bilateral initiative is part of a broader multilateral strategy in which we are 

working closely with our international counterparts to leverage resources. In light 

of the economic dislocations associated with regional transitions, we are galvanizing 

financial support from international financial institutions, multilateral investment 

banks, and other regional actors to help meet near-term financial needs. 

On May 27, G8 leaders initiated the Deauville Partnership, which will maximize 

G8 and multilateral support behind Egypt’s and Tunisia’s transitions. It commits 

Partnership Countries to help address underlying economic challenges and meet 

financing needs through a multifaceted approach. These international efforts will 

ensure that there is a multiplier effect to our bilateral assistance. 

The G8 also called on the IMF to respond to the Arab Spring by developing a 

sound macroeconomic program to help meet external financing needs, as well as for 

multilateral development banks to deliver enhanced, front-loaded and coordinated 

assistance in support of Egypt’s reform program and development goals. 

Recognizing the role that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 

(EBRD) played in Central and Eastern Europe’s transitions, we are committed to 

working with our international counterparts to support a reorientation of the EBRD 

to support transitions in the region. 

Support for economic modernization: Egypt and Tunisia will need to build a 

stronger private sector, which will increase entrepreneurial activity and generate 

new jobs. To this end, we would like to establish Enterprise Funds for Tunisia and 

Egypt to stimulate private sector investment, promote projects that support competitive markets, and encourage public/private partnerships. In addition, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) will create a 10-year loan guarantee 

facility (LGF) in Egypt which could provide up to $700 million in loans to smalland medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), supporting over 50,000 local jobs. OPIC will 

also seek to provide up to $1 billion in guarantees and/or loans to public/private 

partnerships in order to promote growth in mutually agreed-upon sectors of the 

Egyptian economy. As in all similar structures, OPIC will stipulate the uses of the 

funding and ensure that there will be no budget cost to OPIC or the American taxpayer. Through the interest rate charged, the Egyptian Government will bear the 

cost of the financing. 

Support for trade: Because Egypt and Tunisia have not enjoyed the benefits of 

trade integration, we are prepared to begin robust discussions with Egypt and Tunisia and their regional counterparts on a set of strategic trade initiatives. 

Question. How satisfied is the administration with the ongoing political transition 

occurring in Egypt? 

Answer. The interim Egyptian Government, led by the Supreme Council of the 

Armed Forces (SCAF), has taken some important steps in the right direction. For 

example, the SCAF has stated its commitment to lasting reform and free and fair 

elections. The SCAF has also begun clarifying procedures for September’s parliamentary elections. A new political parties law has reduced the burden on political 

25 

parties applying for registration, and the elections will likely include participation 

from a wide range of political parties, some of them new. 

The SCAF has also revised the political participation law to include the right to 

vote using a national identification card and to ensure full judicial supervision of 

elections. These reforms will promote the transparency required for effective elections that instill public confidence. 

We welcome these signs of democratic progress, even as we recognize that the 

SCAF faces no shortage of challenges. Egypt’s youth leaders and new political parties must scramble to organize themselves in time for the September elections. The 

draft electoral regulations do not address whether the 64-seat quota for women in 

Parliament will remain in effect. The SCAF met with representatives of youth 

groups on June 1, but many activists continue to criticize the lack of transparency 

in SCAF decisionmaking. Recent interrogations of bloggers, journalists, and judges 

critical of the SCAF and military raise further concerns about the military’s commitment to freedom of expression. Concerns also remain about the military’s treatment 

of protesters and the use of military courts to try civilians. The U.S. Government 

continues to raise these concerns with SCAF officials. 

Question. President Obama stated in his speech on May 19 that the United States 

must prioritize Tunisia and Egypt as they transition to people-powered democracies. 

Egypt has always held a priority position, however, Tunisia has not. How will the 

Department increase resources to match the potential in Tunisia to become a successful and independent democracy in North Africa? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain this administration’s commitment to helping 

secure a transition that delivers democratic results and sustainable economic development for the people of Tunisia. The administration has identified approximately 

$30 million to help Tunisians prepare for the series of elections on their horizon, 

to increase participation in a pluralistic, competitive political culture, to promote 

transparency and accountability, to support indigenous justice and rule of law processes, to support youth employability, and to advance private sector development. 

Of the approximately $30 million in assistance we have identified for Tunisia, the 

Department of State’s Office of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is 

providing $20 million to support Tunisian efforts during their democratic transition. 

These funds are being channeled through Tunisian and international NGOs to 

shape an independent, professional, and pluralistic media sector, build a vibrant 

civil society, strengthen democratic political parties, develop a sound framework for 

free elections, enact economic reforms, and expand entrepreneurship. MEPI has already awarded initial grants to both Tunisian and international NGOs and continues to seek innovative proposals through a year-long open competition. 

USAID is providing approximately $10 million in support for elections and inclusive political processes. For example, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives is 

starting a program to encourage a peaceful and lasting political transition in the 

interior governorates of Tunisia. This program will encourage new and emerging 

groups to contribute to the national dialogue and will also promote stabilization 

through small-scale community development projects. 

Finally, because trade and investment will be critical to creating jobs and building 

a more robust Tunisian economy, we are working with the Department of Commerce, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), and private sector business advocacy groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to promote increased 

interest and opportunity for American businesses in Tunisia. We are working with 

the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to facilitate financing for small 

to medium enterprises (SMEs) and startup companies. We are also working with the 

Departments of Commerce and Treasury to encourage the legal and economic reforms needed to facilitate more open trade and private sector investment. 

In addition, we continue to support the establishment of a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund to stimulate private sector investment, promote projects that support 

competitive markets, and encourage public/private partnerships, and look forward 

to continuing our work with Congress on this effort. 

Question. What changes will be made within the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 

and at U.S. Embassy Tunis? 

Answer. Embassy Tunis and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs have established 

a new political/economic reporting officer position in Tunis, and have requested a 

political analyst position that we expect to be filled for 2012. Public Diplomacy is 

funding the creation of a new locally engaged staff member to work on outreach, 

particularly engaging Tunisian youth and exploring new technologies and social 

media. Embassy Tunis has also requested an additional Assistant Regional Security 

26 

Officer position to meet new requirements created by an ever-changing security 

environment. 

Two Foreign Service officers will travel to Tunis on temporary duty to assist with 

increased demand for political and economic reporting in the leadup to the Tunisian 

elections. An officer from the Secretary’s office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization’s Civilian Response Corps will cover a 12-week gap this summer, 

focusing on investment and bilateral economic issues, requests for assistance and 

advocacy from U.S. businesses, and outreach to U.S. companies doing business or 

considering doing business in Tunisia. The political reporting officer from the Civilian Response Corps will develop relations with new political party activists within 

the Islamist Nahda party and observe the elections scheduled for July 24. With the 

increase in bilateral assistance, USAID’s Office of Civilian Response has provided 

two officers on a temporary basis to assist post with elections assistance and grants 

administration. 

Question. In light of Tunisia’s unique importance as the first country in the region 

to undergo a revolution and begin the transition to democracy, what is the U.S. Government doing to foster a sustainable political transition and long-term economic 

stability in that country? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain this administration’s commitment to helping 

secure a transition that delivers democratic results and sustainable economic development for the people of Tunisia. The administration has identified approximately 

$30 million to help Tunisians prepare for the series of elections on their horizon, 

to increase participation in a pluralistic, competitive political culture, to promote 

transparency and accountability, to support indigenous justice and rule of law processes, to support youth employability, and to advance private sector development. 

Of the approximately $30 million in assistance we have identified for Tunisia, the 

Department of State’s Office of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is 

providing $20 million to support Tunisian efforts during their democratic transition. 

These funds are being channeled through Tunisian and international NGOs to 

shape an independent, professional, and pluralistic media sector, build a vibrant 

civil society, strengthen democratic political parties, develop a sound framework for 

free elections, enact economic reforms, and expand entrepreneurship. MEPI has 

already awarded initial grants to both Tunisian and international NGOs and 

continues to seek innovative proposals through a year-long open competition. 

USAID is providing approximately $10 million in support for elections and inclusive political processes. For example, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives is 

starting a program to encourage a peaceful and lasting political transition in the 

interior governorates of Tunisia. This program will encourage new and emerging 

groups to contribute to the national dialogue and will also promote stabilization 

through small scale community development projects. 

Finally, because trade and investment will be critical to creating jobs and building 

a more robust Tunisian economy, we are working with the Department of Commerce, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), and private sector business advocacy groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to promote increased 

interest and opportunity for American businesses in Tunisia. We are working with 

the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to facilitate financing for small 

to medium enterprises (SMEs) and startup companies. We are also working with the 

Departments of Commerce and Treasury to encourage the legal and economic reforms needed to facilitate more open trade and private sector investment. 

In addition, we continue to support the establishment of a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund to stimulate private sector investment, promote projects that support 

competitive markets, and encourage public/private partnerships, and look forward 

to continuing our work with Congress on this effort. 

Question. In his May 19 speech, President Obama said ‘‘we must also build on 

our efforts to broaden our engagement beyond elites.’’ How does the State Department plan to translate that statement into policy? 

Answer. The popular movements for democracy, economic opportunity, justice, 

and dignity across the Middle East and North Africa are empowering new actors— 

many of them ordinary citizens never before involved in politics—who are challenging traditional elites. Throughout the region, youth, civic activists, women, and 

entrepreneurs are finding their political voices and helping to shape the future of 

their countries. If confirmed, I will continue the Department of State’s engagement 

with and support for these nonelite actors through a broad range of outreach tools 

and assistance programs. As we leverage this unique moment in history, we will 

maximize every opportunity to engage with people in the region who share our values and our commitment to democracy. 

27 

Our Ambassadors and Embassy officials are engaging actively emerging actors 

across the region, encouraging meaningful political and economic reform, and 

stronger commitments to respect the rights of all men, women, and children. We are 

using the expertise, leverage, and partnerships developed by democracy assistance 

programs, through the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), to 

provide support to individuals and organizations throughout the region. These programs enable locally led change and pave the way for civil society actors and organizations to lead democratic change in their countries. 

In Tunisia and Egypt, we are moving U.S. civil society support into the countryside and out of the capitals and larger cities. In Egypt, current DRL programs focus 

on: coalition-building, party-strengthening, and public opinion research and analysis 

training in advance of upcoming parliamentary and Presidential elections, advocacy 

training and capacity-building for independent organized labor, and professional 

training for independent citizen journalists and bloggers. All of these programs include women and youth components. In Egypt, MEPI’s local grants program is expanding in size and providing civic education training to women in rural areas to 

help them become advocates for their communities’ needs, and imparting entrepreneurial and business skills to girls from poor regions of Cairo. In Tunisia, MEPI has 

invested $20 million through local and international Non-Governmental Organizations. With high unemployment in the Middle East, especially among young people, 

we believe that our outreach must capture the youth’s entrepreneurial spirit, reward creativity and promote skills that lead to jobs and opportunity. For example, 

MEPI funds the ‘‘Generation Entrepreneur Project,’’ which empowers 22,000 young 

people throughout the Middle East to begin their own entrepreneurial ventures. A 

MEPI funding recipient, the Education for Employment Foundation (EFE), provides 

fellowship and internship programs to place Arab youths in EFE’s employable-skills 

training at affiliate organizations throughout the Middle East and North Africa, as 

well as in Washington, DC, and Spain. MEPI currently funds successful EFE 

projects in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 

Additionally, MEPI funds programs for nonelite students. For example, the Student Leaders program has brought over 1,000 young people from the region to the 

United States for training, most of whom have never traveled outside of their home 

countries. They develop leadership skills and expand their understanding of civil society, as well as the democratic process and how both may be applied in their home 

communities, and upon their return home, they are eligible to apply for seed funds 

for relevant projects. Additionally, MEPI’s Tomorrow’s Leaders Scholarship Program 

provides scholarships per year to high school students in the Middle East and North 

Africa who are economically disadvantaged, but who have the drive and energy to 

be leaders. They learn in a U.S.-accredited university in the region, take a civic engagement course and study abroad in the United States, participating in an internship in the United States. MEPI has recruited an additional 51 students for the upcoming fall semester. 

Furthermore, we have focused on utilizing technology to maximize our outreach 

to nonelites, including youth. For example, in Egypt, we are focusing on online voter 

education and rights education, and are helping to create an online monitoring and 

watchdog presence in advance of the elections. 

Additionally, MEPI’s initiative, E-Mediat: Electronic Media Tools, Technology & 

Training is a public/private partnership that helps grassroots organizations in the 

Middle East and North Africa use digital technology to tell their stories, build membership and connect to others around the world. 

SYRIA

Question. President Obama signed Executive orders on April 29 and May 18 imposing sanctions on Syrian individuals and entities, including President Bashar alAssad himself. What effects do you anticipate the sanctions and mounting international political pressure will produce? 

Answer. We expect that our sanctions, and those imposed by the EU and other 

countries, will make clear to the Syrian people, the Syrian Government, and its allies that the international community will not stand idly by while human rights 

abuses are committed, and that we will hold individuals accountable for human 

rights violations. As Secretary Clinton has said, ‘‘Every day that goes by, the position of the government becomes less tenable and the demands of the Syrian people 

for change only grow stronger.’’ We believe that the mounting international pressure 

will underscore to the Asad regime that it must end its use of violence and commence a process of political transition that responds to the aspirations of the Syrian 

people. 

28 

Question. How is the United States coordinating sanctions efforts with the EU, 

Turkey, and Arab countries? What about organizations like the United Nations, the 

GCC, and the OIC? 

Answer. We are working closely with numerous countries that share our aim of 

ending the violence and support a democratic transition in Syria. We have coordinated directly with our allies in the European Union, who imposed an arms embargo and their own targeted sanctions on May 9 and May 23. 

We led the call for a special session on Syria at the U.N. Human Rights Council 

in Geneva on April 29. That session passed a strong resolution condemning the Syrian Government and calling for an investigation by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In addition, we actively lobbied at the United Nations to 

prevent Syria from being elected to the U.N. Human Rights Council. Our lobbying 

efforts against the wholly inappropriate Syrian candidacy resulted in Syria withdrawing its candidacy on May 11. We will continue to look at other multilateral for 

additional opportunities to pressure Asad and his regime. We also are in frequent 

contact with our regional partners in the GCC and Turkey, and at senior levels are 

urging them to use their influence over the Asad regime to cease its human rights 

abuses and begin the transition to democratic and representative government. 

Question. What tools beyond sanctions are being considered to further pressure 

the Syrian Government to refrain from using violence against protestors and address the legitimate demands of its people? 

Answer. We continue discussions with our U.N. Security Council partners on action to condemn the Syrian Government’s brutal repression of its citizens. Another 

session of the U.N. Human Rights Council is underway and we are working with 

our partners on the Council on next steps there, as well. As the demonstrations and 

the violence against them has shown no signs of abating in more than 12 weeks, 

it is critical to hold Syria’s leaders accountable for the unjustified and reprehensible 

violence they persist in using against peaceful protestors as well as the widespread 

arrests of activists and their family members. If we do not see any movement toward ending the violence and the implementation of a meaningful democratic transition, we will continue to work with our international partners on how we can 

apply additional pressure. 

HAMAS-FATAH UNITY

Question. In his May 19 speech, President Obama said, ‘‘the recent announcement 

of an agreement between Fatah and Hamas raises profound and legitimate questions for Israel: How can one negotiate with a party that has shown itself unwilling 

to recognize your right to exist?’’ Have senior PLO and PNA officials offered a response to this question? 

Answer. As the President made clear in his May 19 remarks, this is a threshold 

question for the Palestinians, one that the Palestinian leadership will need to address in the weeks and months ahead. We believe that President Abbas remains 

committed to peace. President Abbas has made clear that he supports PLO commitments renouncing violence and recognizing Israel. He has remained firm in his faith 

that an independent Palestine living side by side with Israel in peace and security 

is both possible and necessary. 

While we understand the general outline of the Fatah-Hamas agreement, many 

substantive, and vital, details that could affect our peace efforts remain undetermined or subject to further negotiation or implementation. What is important now 

is that the Palestinians ensure implementation of that agreement advances the 

prospects of peace rather than undermine them. We will continue to watch as President Abbas and the Palestinians make these important choices. 

Question. How will a potential Fatah-Hamas interim government impact American support for the Palestinian institutions? What factors will the State Department use in evaluating this new government? 

Answer. We will ensure that U.S. policy is fully consistent with U.S. law. 

Our position on Hamas has not changed; Hamas is a designated Foreign Terrorist 

Organization. As the new Palestinian Government is formed, we will assess it based 

on its policies and will determine the legal and policy implications for our relations 

with, and assistance to, the PA. Right now, the current Palestinian Authority government remains in place under the leadership of President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad. As such, U.S. assistance to and contact with the PA is continuing. 

Our assistance funding has been critical to progress in building capable Palestinian institutions, including the improvements to the PA Security Forces (PASF). 

The PASF play an essential role in helping to ensure public security for both 

29 

Israelis and Palestinians. The PASF remain under standing orders to maintain law 

and order and pursue terrorist elements, and security cooperation between the 

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the PASF continues. 

Question. Debates are ongoing in both Washington and Baghdad on whether there 

should be a successor agreement to the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement, which requires that all U.S military forces withdraw from Iraq by December 31, 2011. Does 

the State Department have an opinion on the advisability of renegotiating the terms 

of this agreement? How does uncertainty about the future American presence in 

Iraq impact on planning for size and scope of the State Department mission in 2012 

and beyond? 

Answer. The President is committed to implementing the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security 

Agreement by withdrawing all of our troops by the end of 2011, and we continue 

to work toward this transition. 

Any post-2011 U.S. military mission would require a formal request from the 

Iraqi Government, and to date, no such request has been made. If the Iraqi Government were to make such a request, it would be given serious consideration. 

Whether we get an Iraqi request for some continued U.S. military support beyond 

2011, it is essential that we continue with our currently planned civilian presence 

so that it will be mission-capable by October 1, 2011. Our civilian-led mission after 

2011 will continue to support the President’s goal of a sovereign, stable, and selfreliant Iraq, through engagements and programs that will help solidify our longterm economic, political, and cultural partnership and support Iraq’s reintegration 

into the region and the global economy. 

YEMEN

Question. What factors will the United States use in evaluating assistance in 

Yemen going forward with regard to economic assistance, security cooperation, and 

democracy and governance? 

Answer. The United States employs a two-pronged strategy in delivering assistance to Yemen: We provide military equipment and training in support of counterterrorism (CT) operations while also delivering economic and governance assistance 

that curbs the long-term drivers of instability and extremism. We are constantly assessing the needs of the Yemeni people and the strategic priorities of the United 

States. For our security assistance, we will continue to evaluate the threat of terrorism against the U.S. homeland—most prominently manifested in al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—as well as the capacity and willingness of the Yemeni 

Government to tackle this threat. We believe that AQAP represents a clear and 

present danger to the U.S. homeland as exemplified by recently attempted attacks; 

however, we will closely monitor and evaluate our assistance to ensure we meet all 

legal requirements and that it is not misused. 

Yemen suffers from extreme poverty and soaring unemployment and population 

growth rates. The Yemeni riyal is declining against world currencies, the Central 

Bank of Yemen is printing riyals to finance government programs, and prices of key 

commodities are rising. The ongoing political crisis has exacerbated the already 

challenging economic conditions. Yemen’s future economic recovery will require a 

comprehensive stabilization and investment plan supported by substantial international assistance. As the needs will be great, we will work to ensure that our programming is coordinated with other international donors and will continue to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of our program as we help the Yemeni people 

meet these challenges. Our humanitarian and development programming continues 

to the extent possible in the operating environment. We are prepared to increase 

our democracy and governance assistance in a period of political transition that 

would lead to elections and capacity-building for a newly formed government. 

Question. How has the ongoing unrest in Yemen affected U.S. assistance efforts 

and bilateral counterterrorism cooperation? 

Answer. As a result of the ongoing unrest, our Embassy in Sana’a is on departure 

status and has reduced its personnel. Our assistance, as well as program monitoring 

and evaluation, is necessarily limited by our minimized presence and a lack of freedom of movement. However, we continue our programming and counterterrorism cooperation to the extent possible in the fluid environment. 

IRAN

Question. What effects have the Arab Spring had on the pro-democracy movement 

in Iran? 

30 

Answer. As in other parts of the Middle East, there continues to be deep-rooted 

dissatisfaction among the Iranian people with their government. As President 

Obama recalled in his speech on the Middle East, peaceful protests in the region 

began in the streets of Iran 2 years ago. While the opposition movement in Iran 

has not been able to stage any significant antigovernment protests in recent 

months, a substantial divide continues to exist between the government and the 

governed. While it hypocritically applauds the universal rights of others in the region, the Iranian Government continues to restrict the free flow of information, and 

intimidates, arrests, and convicts those Iranians whose views are known to be at 

odds with the ruling establishment. It also assists Syria in suppressing its opposition. 

As we do throughout the region, the administration provides training and tools 

to civil society activists to foster freedom of expression and the free flow of information on the Internet and via other communication technologies. These new technologies empower citizens to achieve their own aspirations by helping people raise 

their voices, share information, and strengthen their ability to act collectively. 

Question. What is the status of the P5+1 process? 

Answer. Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon continues to be one of 

the administration’s top foreign policy priorities. Our P5+1 partners (China, France, 

Germany, Russia, and the U.K.) and we are committed to a negotiated solution to 

resolving concerns over the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. The P5+1 remains 

unified and committed to the dual track approach of clear-minded engagement and 

pressure to persuade Iran to abide by its international obligations and bring transparency into its nuclear activities. 

The United States and our P5+1 partners have made clear our genuine commitment to dialogue, and came prepared to negotiate with Iran when we met in December 2010 in Geneva and again in January 2011 in Istanbul, but it has been clear 

Iran is yet unwilling to engage seriously. The May 8 letter from Supreme Security 

Council Secretary Jalili to High Representative Ashton contained nothing new to indicate any change in Iran’s willingness to negotiate seriously with the P5+1. In the 

interim, we will continue to work closely with our partners in the P5+1 and beyond 

to vigorously implement UNSCR 1929, to coordinate further measures, and to implement U.S. sanctions law. 

The United States and its P5+1 partners remain committed to pursuing a diplomatic solution. The door remains open, and the choice is Iran’s to make. 

Question. Does the State Department have an opinion on S. 1048, the ‘‘Iran, North 

Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011’’? 

Answer. We strongly support the goal of preventing Iran, North Korea, and Syria 

from acquiring nuclear weapons. For example, we have assembled a strong international coalition and have secured the toughest multilateral sanctions against Iran 

to date. In addition, we have been using all the tools provided by Congress. On May 

24, the Secretary imposed sanctions on 7 companies for violations of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA), enacted 

on July 1, 2010, and also imposed sanctions on 14 entities and 2 individuals under 

the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act. 

The administration is always looking for additional ways to prevent the spread 

of nuclear weapons. The Department is closely examining S. 1048, and we look forward to working with you and other Members of Congress on this and any other 

legislation aimed at achieving our shared goals. 

BAHRAIN

Question. On May 17, incumbent Deputy Secretary James Steinberg visited Bahrain with Near Eastern Affairs Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman and National 

Security Council Senior Director Puneet Talwar. What message did Secretary Steinberg deliver to Bahraini Government officials and what was their response? What 

was the reason for not including nongovernmental figures on his schedule? 

Answer. Deputy Secretary Steinberg, Assistant Secretary Feltman and NSC Senior Director Talwar met King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, Prime Minister Khalifa bin 

Salman Al-Khalifa, Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa and other senior 

Bahraini officials during their brief visit to Manama May 17. Deputy Secretary 

Steinberg stressed U.S. Government concerns regarding the Government of Bahrain’s crackdown, including detentions of opposition figures and demolitions of 

places of worship, and emphasized the need for accountability for those responsible 

for human rights violations. He also urged the Government of Bahrain to take 

proactive steps to create a positive environment for reconciliation and credible dialogue, noting that a resolution to the crisis in Bahrain requires a political solution, 

31 

not a security solution. Deputy Secretary Steinberg also reinforced the longstanding 

strategic ties between our two countries, including our cooperation on confronting 

the threat posed by Iran. 

Deputy Secretary Steinberg’s visit was focused on sharing U.S. Government concerns with the Bahraini leadership. Assistant Secretary Feltman has conducted several meetings in recent months with civil society representatives, including leaders 

of the mainstream opposition and the National Unity Gathering. Additionally, our 

Embassy maintains regular contact with a broad spectrum of actors in Bahraini 

society. 

Question. How have Bahraini Government officials and citizens responded to 

President Obama’s call last Thursday to release peaceful protestors and engage in 

a national dialogue? 

Answer. King Hamad lifted the State of National Safely on June 1, which has resulted in a shift of responsibility for maintaining law and order from the Bahrain 

Defense Forces (BDF) to the civilian Ministry of Interior. Our Embassy has noted 

a reduction in the deployment of military assets in Manama and other parts of Bahrain. On May 29, King Hamad delivered a televised speech, in which he stated that 

comprehensive and unconditional dialogue will begin in early July. We consider 

these two developments to be positive initial steps in creating a positive environment for reconciliation and credible political dialogue, as well as addressing human 

rights concerns. I should emphasize that leadership is needed from all sides to make 

such a dialogue possible. 

Question. Will the government’s recent actions have any implications on the 

United States-Bahraini relationship? 

Answer. As the President noted on May 19, mass arrests and brute force are at 

odds with the universal rights of Bahrain’s citizens and will not end legitimate calls 

for reform. Senior Bahraini officials’ recent public statements indicate that the Government is taking steps to create a positive environment to foster reconciliation and 

meaningful political dialogue. We welcome such statements and strongly support 

participatory processes that lead to concrete reforms that meet the aspirations and 

needs of all Bahraini citizens. Bahrain remains an important strategic ally of the 

United States though, as a longstanding friend and partner, we will continue to 

speak up if actions on the ground do not lead to reconciliation and credible dialogue. 

AFGHANISTAN

Question. How important is it to prevent al-Qaeda from reconstituting in Afghanistan, as opposed to doing so in Pakistan, in Yemen, or elsewhere? 

Answer. Our goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda everywhere. It is 

particularly important that we prevent al-Qaeda from reconstituting in Afghanistan, 

where it would not only be in a position once again to plan attacks against the U.S. 

homeland—as it did before 9/11—but also to threaten Afghanistan’s young democracy, our allies and partners, regional stability and our interests worldwide. The 

targeting of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is one of our primary goals—the group’s return 

would be a significant strategic victory for the group, emboldening it to plot globally 

and drawing new recruits to its cause. 

Question. Every war needs an end point, and this one is unlikely to come in the 

form of an enemy’s unconditional surrender. Could the death of Osama bin Laden 

provide a legitimate pivot-point marking the end of major U.S. combat operations? 

Answer. The core goal of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan remains to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and to prevent its return to Afghanistan. Osama bin 

Ladin’s death deals a significant strategic blow to al-Qaeda. It sends an unmistakable message about the strength of the resolve of the United States and the international community to stand up against extremism and those who perpetuate it. It 

also provides a unique opportunity to make progress on ending the conflict in 

Afghanistan through the mutually reinforcing processes of transition, reconciliation, 

and reintegration. 

Our aim is to assist in achieving a responsible and irreversible transition to full 

Afghan responsibility by 2014. Pursuant to this goal, we are committed to begin a 

drawdown of our forces in Afghanistan in July, though the pace and scope has not 

yet been determined. Concurrently, our diplomatic surge aims to bring the Afghan 

conflict to an end and chart a new and more secure future for the region by supporting an Afghan-led political process to split the weakened Taliban off from alQaeda and reconcile those who will renounce violence and accept the Afghan Constitution with an increasingly stable Afghan Government, leaving al-Qaeda isolated 

and on the run. We will continue working toward achieving these important goals. 

32 

Question. What should our core goal be for an end state in Afghanistan after 

2014? What is our absolute barebones requirement in terms of American national 

security interests? What level of American troop presence would be required after 

2014 to safeguard these national security interests, and for how long? 

Answer. The core goal of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan remains to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and to prevent its return to Afghanistan. We are 

actively working to achieve the conditions in Afghanistan that would support this 

outcome. We are committed to achieving a responsible and irreversible security 

transition to full Afghan responsibility by 2014, beginning with an initial drawdown 

of our forces in July, at a scope and pace yet to be determined, and a shift in the 

civilian mission away from stabilization activities to an even greater focus on capacity-building and long-term, sustainable development. We are in discussions with the 

Government of Afghanistan to define our enduring commitment through and beyond 

the end of transition in 2014. Our aim is a normalized relationship with an increasingly stable and fully sovereign Afghanistan. 

Regarding the American troop presence, the Department of Defense is best placed 

to answer questions about specific troop strength and the duration necessary to 

maintain our national security interests in Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond. The 

Secretary noted in her February 18 speech to the Asia Society: ‘‘The United States 

will always maintain the capability to protect our people and our interests. But in 

no way should our enduring commitment be misunderstood as a desire by America 

or our allies to occupy Afghanistan against the will of its people. We respect 

Afghans’ proud history of resistance to foreign occupation, and we do not seek any 

permanent American military bases in their country or a presence that would be 

a threat to any of Afghanistan’s neighbors.’’ 

PAKISTAN

Question. Are the goals of the United States and Pakistan regarding Afghanistan 

reconcilable, or are they so divergent that serious tension is inevitable? 

Answer. Our relationship with Pakistan has never been an easy one, and it is no 

secret that we have not always seen eye to eye on all issues. Tensions in such a 

consequential relationship are inevitable. Nevertheless, Pakistan has been a key 

partner in our common struggle against al-Qaeda and, like us, is committed to its 

defeat. 

In Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan share a commitment to working 

together to achieve peace and reconciliation. Pakistan shares our understanding 

that Afghanistan is the keystone to regional stability. As Secretary Bashir said on 

May 23, ‘‘peace and stability in both countries is interdependent and there can be 

no peace in Afghanistan if there is turmoil and instability in its neighborhood and 

vice versa.’’ In the trilateral process that Secretary Clinton launched in May 2009, 

and which has met twice this spring, we are jointly pursuing a vision of an Afghanistan that is secure, stable and economically prosperous. During his trip to Kabul 

in May, Foreign Secretary Bashir reiterated Pakistan’s solidarity, support, and partnership with Afghanistan. 

In her speech to the Asia Society in February, Secretary Clinton laid out the U.S. 

strategy on reconciliation and identified Pakistan as a pivotal player in that effort. 

Pakistan has welcomed the opportunity to work with us on achieving a political settlement in Afghanistan and we are both committed to continuing our regular trilateral discussions with Afghanistan to enhance cooperation and to lay the groundwork for an effective reconciliation process. 

Question. If we want to send a message to the Pakistani military, do you think 

the decisionmakers in the security establishment would be most influenced by potential cuts to military aid, or development assistance? 

Answer. U.S. civilian and military assistance support the United States national 

security interests by strengthening Pakistan’s stability and prosperity, and its capacity to combat extremism. Cutting or reducing aid at this time would significantly 

and negatively influence Pakistani capability and willingness to coordinate with us 

on key national security goals. Further, it would feed into the narrative that the 

United States is not committed to a long-term partnership with Pakistan—reducing 

our ability to achieve our national security goals and stabilize Pakistan. 

Developmental assistance improves Pakistan’s capacity to address critical infrastructure deficits and basic civic needs, improves economic opportunity in areas 

most vulnerable to extremism, and strengthens Pakistan’s capacity to implement 

economic and political reforms that reinforce stability. Enhancing the Government 

of Pakistan’s capacity to provide key public services to its citizens weakens the 

insurgency’s appeal. 

33 

Likewise, instability in Pakistan caused by a failure of the security establishment 

in its campaign against violent extremists would be a great victory for terrorist organizations that are a serious threat to Pakistan, its neighbors, and U.S. interests. 

In the long term, U.S. assistance promotes a more tolerant, democratic, pluralistic 

Pakistan. In addition to the immediate counterterrorism benefits of our civilian and 

military assistance, it is in our long-term national security interest to continue to 

seek and strengthen Pakistan’s currently weak civilian government while also 

equipping the security services to actively fight insurgents and terrorists that 

threaten the country’s stability. 

Question. There has been much discussion of whether the actions of Pakistan 

might trigger conditions of Kerry-Lugar-Berman or other laws—but the administration is always able to cut back on security aid as a matter of policy rather than law. 

Are there any specific actions we would have to see from the Government of Pakistan to avoid a cutback in security assistance? 

Answer. The Secretary has been clear and consistent about our expectations for 

this relationship. We look to the Government of Pakistan to take decisive steps 

against al-Qaeda and its affiliates that will make Pakistan, America, and the world 

safer and more secure. When Secretary Clinton was in Pakistan in late May she 

had direct, candid, and constructive conversations with Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership about our interests in the region, and I believe they are aware of 

our hopes and expectations. Additionally, through the Enhanced Partnership With 

Pakistan Act of 2009, we impose baseline conditions that Pakistan must satisfy, 

through specific actions, to ensure continued security assistance. Our cooperation 

with Pakistan has led to significant progress in our common struggle against terrorism, and we hope this progress will continue. 

SOMALIA

Question. Somalia poses the greatest security threat on the African continent to 

American interests. That same situation makes it a very dangerous place, but other 

missions nonetheless have been able to maintain a diplomatic presence there. The 

safety of our personnel is of paramount importance, but these personnel are the 

very people who point out the high price we pay in terms of crafting and overseeing 

a Somalia policy by not having a diplomatic presence on the ground. What can be 

done to help establish such a presence in Somalia? 

Answer. The security environment in Mogadishu is tense as al-Shabaab attacks 

continue against the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and African 

Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). While AMISOM has recently expanded its 

area of operation and U.S. security sector reform efforts are underway in support 

of the TFG National Security Force (NSF), local conditions do not yet support a 

more permanent U.S. diplomatic presence. Reestablishing a U.S. diplomatic presence in Somalia depends on developments within Somalia and the continued improvement of political and security institutions. Of note, AMISOM is already providing security at the airport, sea port, Villa Somalia and other key sites in 

Mogadishu. The United Kingdom and France transit Mogadishu regularly, as do 

U.S. contract companies, though no Western nation has an embassy in Mogadishu 

at this time. U.N. and African Union (AU) staff transit there as well. As security 

permits we will seek to expand the ability of U.S. personnel to travel into Somalia, 

including Mogadishu, Bosssasso, and Galcayo, for brief visits. 

Pending a decision to establish a formal, permanent presence in Somalia, a security assessment would need to take place to find a viable location from which to operate. The U.S. Government does own a 178-acre compound in Mogadishu—site of 

the U.S. Embassy that was completely destroyed in 1991—but we do not know who 

controls the compound or its condition. In addition, appropriate host nation security 

elements, or augmenting forces, would have to provide the necessary protection for 

any U.S. diplomatic facility. The operating environment would need to be permissive 

enough to carry out diplomatic operations in pursuit of U.S. policy goals. Last, adequate funding would also need to be provided to stand up and maintain any fixed 

diplomatic presence in Somalia. 

Even without a permanent presence, we continue our outreach efforts in Somalia 

under the Dual Track policy. On Track One, we continue to support the Djibouti 

Peace Process, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and the African Union 

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as our primary effort to stabilize Somalia and to 

repel al-Shabaab’s advances in Mogadishu. We are continuing our political and security sector support to the TFG and AMISOM in close partnership with the U.N., 

AU, and other international stakeholders. On Track Two, we are deepening our engagement with the regional Governments of Somaliland and Puntland, as well as 

34 

with local and regional administrations throughout South-Central Somalia who are 

opposed to al-Shabaab, but who are not affiliated with the TFG. 

SUDAN

Question. The new Republic of South Sudan will face enormous challenges. What 

do you see as the top priorities for state-building in the new South Sudan after 

July? How can the United States help promote an inclusive approach to government 

and a participatory and transparent approach to the creation of a constitution to 

safeguard the rights of all South Sudanese? 

Answer. The Southern Sudan Referendum was a historic milestone in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the Government of South 

Sudan (GOSS) has made progress in building the backbone of a functioning government since the signing of the CPA in 2005, with the assistance of United States and 

other stakeholders. Moving forward, it is critical for the new Government of South 

Sudan, with ongoing support from international partners, to continue this long-term 

process and to institutionalize inclusion, transparency, and accountability, while improving the delivery of basic services. The government also needs to prioritize the 

adoption of long-term security and economic arrangements with the North, and deal 

with internal armed movements and militias. Support from the international community will be imperative for the newly independent state of South Sudan to 

emerge as a stable and prosperous member of the community of nations, and for 

a peaceful coexistence with the North. 

Managing the expectations of its people will be central to the government’s efforts, 

as improvements in transparency, accountability, delivery of basic services and security will take time. This will require the South to refocus on investing in people, 

building a healthy political discourse, and setting spending priorities. We are encouraging the Government of Southern Sudan to demonstrate its commitment to democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights to its people and the international community by fostering inclusive, democratic institutions; encouraging the 

development of robust civil society; fully involving opposition groups in the political 

process; and rooting out corruption. 

CHINA AND INDIA

Question. China’s and India’s potential rise to great power status may be the defining story of the 21st century. With its growing economic clout, China needs to 

do more than abide by international norms, although that is important. We need 

Beijing to help contribute to strengthening the international system that has helped 

it prosper. China can play an enormously influential role in addressing regional 

challenges in the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Afghanistan, and in Sudan. Encouraging 

China to see that its own interests will be served by assuming greater responsibility 

in the international system will be one of your most important tasks—it’s certainly 

one that has occupied a lot of time for your predecessor. Given how much China’s 

leaders remain focused on addressing significant domestic challenges, how would 

you engage China to take on greater responsibility in securing peace, stability, and 

prosperity in the international system? 

Answer. While Beijing has made clear that domestic challenges such as continuing China’s economic development are a top priority, Presidents and Obama 

agreed during Hu’s January state visit that our two countries must continue to 

work together to solve common challenges. The United States engages China on a 

broad range of key global issues such as producing balanced global growth, stopping 

the spread of nuclear weapons, and combating climate change. Our two nations are 

also working together on a range of shared security challenges, including our efforts 

to prevent Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, realize a denuclearized 

North Korea, counter violent extremism that threatens our stability and prosperity, 

and support the North-South peace process in Sudan while also addressing the 

human rights situation in Darfur. The United States appreciates the positive contributions China has made on these issues. The administration recognizes that 

much more needs to be done, however, and repeatedly raises this in meetings with 

senior PRC officials. During the recent Strategic & Economic Dialogue, Secretary 

Clinton had in-depth discussions of regional and global security issues with her 

counterpart, State Councilor Dai Bingguo. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I will 

continue to press Beijing for greater progress in these areas. 

Question. In recent years, a bipartisan consensus has emerged that India’s rise 

is in America’s interest. Our two countries are also in the early stages of building 

stronger habits of cooperation, and can ill-afford to take this relationship for 

granted. There is a risk that, amid a crowded foreign policy agenda full of daunting 

35 

challenges, we do not pay adequate attention to building this partnership, allowing 

relations with India’s neighbors to define our interactions with New Delhi. You 

spoke at great length about this very subject during the first United States-India 

Strategic Dialogue launched last summer in Washington. If confirmed, what steps 

will you take to realize the potential of this growing friendship? 

Answer. I couldn’t agree more that India’s rise is deeply in the strategic interest 

of the United States. We are fortunate to enjoy a bipartisan consensus on this issue. 

Over the last decade, three U.S. administrations and two Indian Governments led 

by different parties have transformed the relationship. Growing connections between our societies—over 100,000 Indian students study at American universities, 

bilateral trade quadrupled in the last decade, and 3 million Indian-Americans are 

playing a vibrant role here at home—have provided further ballast to the relationship. We are the world’s two largest democracies, both diverse, tolerant societies; 

two of the world’s largest economies; both increasing our stake in global stability 

and prosperity, especially across Asia-Pacific. Relationships thus anchored are not 

easily blown off course. 

We are indeed faced with unprecedented foreign policy challenges and competing 

priorities, especially in South Asia, but over the last several years we have carved 

out for India a prominent place. India’s neighbors are indeed important, but as I 

said last year, ‘‘We refuse to accept the notion that somehow we can have strong 

relations with only one country in South Asia at a time . . . the only ‘hyphen’ that 

we will pursue with respect to our relationship is the one that links the United 

States and India.’’ 

Developing the habits of cooperation required to make our partnership with India 

succeed will continue to take hard work and patience, which I believe the President, 

the Secretary, and I are fully committed to maintaining. The administration has 

made clear since the outset that the United States-India relationship was a cornerstone of our engagement in Asia and ‘‘a defining partnership of the 21st century.’’ 

The longest single foreign visit of President Obama’s administration to date was a 

3-day visit to India in November 2010, the first stop on a trip to four major Asian 

democratic partners. Secretary Clinton will build on President Obama’s successful 

visit when she returns to New Delhi for the second annual Strategic Dialogue this 

summer. Our Strategic Dialogue is the centerpiece of our effort to elevate India to 

the ranks of our most important global partners. Its initial phase has achieved its 

goal of broadening engagement on bilateral, regional, and global challenges, and 

generated meaningful, sustained interaction with a wide array of officials, business 

figures, and civil society representatives. This year’s Strategic Dialogue will consolidate these gains, showcase our accomplishments, and refocus on our strategic priorities.There remains still greater potential in this relationship. The administration 

attaches great importance to our strategic consultation with India on regional affairs, including the broader Indian Ocean and Pacific region. The Strategic Dialogue 

will present a key opportunity to underscore our support for India’s potential as an 

engine of economic prosperity and integration in the South Asia region. 

I am also committed to advancing the United States-India trade and economic relationship, which is already moving ahead by leaps and bounds: India is now our 

12th-largest trading partner, up from 25th in 2000, and has the potential to become 

one of our top five trade and investment partners, with particular success in the 

area of high technology trade. Another objective will be to expand our consultations 

with India on security challenges, including maritime security, counterpiracy, and 

ensuring free access to other ‘‘shared domains,’’ including outer space and cyber 

space. We also hope to achieve even more on defense sales. India has purchased 

more than $8 billion of U.S. military equipment over the past decade and we are 

well positioned to help India achieve its goals as it spends more than $35 billion 

on defense over the next 5 years. The recent finalization of the $4.1 billion tender 

for 10 C–17 aircraft illustrates how American technology companies are learning to 

navigate the Indian procurement system. 

EUROPE, RUSSIA, AND TURKEY

Question. Vladimir Putin has recently been signaling his interest in returning to 

the Russian Presidency. What would the implications of the removal of the ‘‘tandem’’ and Putin’s return to sole power for U.S.-Russian ‘‘Reset’’? What are the natural next steps in the ‘‘Reset’’? 

Answer. The question of who will lead Russia after the 2012 Presidential elections 

is a matter for the Russians themselves to determine. We will continue to cooperate 

with Russia, regardless of who sits in the Kremlin, precisely because our policy toward Russia is based on our interests rather than our assessment of individual officials. 

36 

In terms of the ‘‘reset,’’ President Obama has announced that our two headline 

goals for 2012 are resuming missile defense cooperation with Russia and finalizing 

Russia’s accession to the WTO. At the recent G8 summit in Deauville, President 

Obama and President Medvedev committed to working together to find an approach 

to missile defense that is consistent with the security needs of both countries, maintains the strategic balance, and deals with the potential threats we both face. Cooperation on missile defense is a priority within the broad scope of our engagement 

to address mutual security challenges, bilaterally and through multilateral channels. Of course, even as we pursue cooperation with Russia, the Obama administration remains committed to deploying all four phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe to protect our European allies and 

deployed troops against the Iranian missile threat. 

On WTO, we believe that Russian membership will benefit U.S. economic interests directly not only by increasing market access for U.S. exports, but also by integrating Russia into a system of fixed rules governing trade behavior and providing 

the means to enforce those rules and Russia’s market access commitments. The 

Peterson Institute, a nonpartisan think tank, estimates that U.S. exports to Russia 

could double as a result of that country’s accession to the WTO. Lifting JacksonVanik and extending Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to Russia is also 

a key component of this year’s legislative trade agenda and necessary for the United 

States to benefit from the WTO disciplines and improved market access resulting 

from Russia’s accession. 

Question. In the past 10 years Turkey has pursued a far more assertive foreign 

policy in the Middle East. How would you characterize Turkey’s position in the region given the events of the past year: the impact of the Arab Spring and the further deterioration of its relations with Israel following the flotilla incident? Do all 

of these recent events strengthen Turkey’s position or weaken it? 

Answer. Turkey is an increasingly influential partner at the intersection of several crucial regions. Its growing economy, active foreign policy agenda, and stable 

democratic system all contribute to its growing influence in the region. 

Turkey has used its influence to good effect during the Arab Spring. For example, 

Turkey has assumed a leading role in delivering humanitarian assistance to Libyans. Elsewhere in the region, Turkey has declared its commitment to abide by 

UNSCR 1929—a commitment we continue to urge them to implement vigorously— 

and Turkey shares our goal of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. 

Turkey continues to work closely with us to promote regional stability, and Turkey remains an important and committed ally of the United States and member of 

NATO. As with any ally, we sometimes have different perspectives, yet the strength 

of our bilateral relationship allows us to address such differences forthrightly when 

they arise. We continue to encourage Turkey to improve relations with Israel, and 

have been candid with Turkey about our concerns over its contacts with Hamas, 

though we have welcomed Turkish support for a two-state solution. Turkey’s tensions with Armenia and Cyprus also diminish its regional influence, and we have 

urged Turkey to improve relations with each of these countries. 

Question. Is there a window of opportunity to secure the unification of Cyprus in 

the coming months? What is an appropriate U.S. role in that process and will we 

have an Ambassador ready to take advantage of that window when the current U.S. 

Ambassador rotates out this summer? 

Answer. The United States strongly supports the Cypriot-owned, Cypriot-led negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Good Offices Mission led by Alexander Downer to reunify the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation. The talks 

have been ongoing for over 21⁄2 years, and while some progress has reportedly been 

made, the parties have yet to reach convergence on a number of salient issues, including property, territory, and security and guarantees. President Obama noted in 

his 2010 Cyprus National Day statement that ‘‘the United States is confident that 

a resolution meeting the aspirations of both communities is attainable.’’ We continue 

to hold this view. 

United Nations Secretary General Ban ki-Moon is scheduled to meet with the 

leaders on July 7 in Geneva. We are hopeful that the leaders of both communities 

will take advantage of this meeting and seize the opportunity in the coming months 

to intensify their efforts. 

The U.S. Government is not a participant in the negotiations, but we have offered 

to provide any help that both sides would find useful. As a friend to all the people 

of Cyprus, we will continue to urge the leaders of both communities to engage constructively in the negotiations and support the Cypriot-owned process as the best 

way to reach an agreement. 

37 

It is our aim, with the consent of the Congress, to have a new Ambassador in 

place in a timely manner. 

CYBERSPACE AND CYBERSECURITY

Question. The President just released an ‘‘International Strategy for Cyberspace,’’ 

which, among other things, asserts that the United States will ‘‘respond to hostile 

acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country,’’ including reserving the right to use all necessary means to defend the country. This represents one 

of the administration’s boldest assertions of the use of force when it comes to cyber 

issues. Given problems of attribution (determining which country is responsible for 

initiating cyber attacks) and definitional ambiguity (i.e., does a denial of service attack that knocks out phone service for 8 hours in Detroit constitute a material attack on the United States?), is such a statement premature? 

Answer. The International Strategy makes clear that there is a possibility of ‘‘hostile acts’’ in cyber space, and the United States will respond to such hostile acts as 

it would to any other threat, using appropriate standards of evidence of sponsorship. 

The International Strategy does qualify that we will exhaust all options before military force whenever we can and that we will act in a way that reflects our core values and is in accord with international law. Based on threats and capabilities seen 

today from adversaries’ actions in cyberspace, such a statement is not premature 

and hopefully will contribute to the development of a framework of deterrence in 

the cyber arena. 

Question. Is there a formal decisionmaking process in place to determine a potential military response to a cyber attack? Which agencies would be responsible for 

determining a U.S. response to such an attack? 

Answer. We foresee no difference in the decisionmaking process for responses to 

a hostile act in cyberspace than in response to hostile acts occurring through other 

means. Any military operation requires careful review for consistency with policy, 

laws, and regulations (such as the Law of Armed Conflict). Foreign policy considerations always play a prominent role in such deliberations. 

U.N./MULTILATERAL/G20

Question. The United States has seen significant success in the Human Rights 

Council, since joining in 2009. Unfortunately, most lawmakers and most Americans 

are unaware of the successes. How do you characterize the importance of the USG 

work on the Council, and the importance the Council’s work plays in changing the 

behavior of states, and promoting and protecting fundamental freedoms in individual countries? Should the State Department do more to publicize these successes? 

Answer. The recent successes in the Human Rights Council—especially victories 

on freedom of religion/expression (by ending the ‘‘defamation of religions’’ resolution), LGBT rights and the human rights situations in Libya, Iran, and Syria—have 

been extremely important, both in terms of USG efforts to improve the Human 

Rights Council as an institution and in terms of USG overall goals for the promotion 

and protection of human rights around the world. 

These recent successes are a direct result of U.S. engagement at the Human 

Rights Council. Until the United States joined the Human Rights Council in 2009, 

it was unable to effectively focus on human rights situations in any specific country 

other than Israel. Now other countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya, Kyrgyzstan, 

Sudan, and Tunisia account for more than half of the country-specific situations 

addressed by the Council. Until this year, the ‘‘defamation of religions’’ resolution— 

a resolution that legitimized blasphemy laws and other restrictions on free speech— 

was the Council’s primary response to questions of religious intolerance. U.S leadership brought an end to this resolution and made sure it was replaced with a 

consensus resolution that supports dialogue and education. 

The Human Rights Council is still far from perfect. In addition to the biased, disproportionate focus on Israel, it still has a membership that consists of several countries that work to shield themselves and each other from scrutiny of their human 

rights record. Our focus is on session-by-session improvements, which so far has 

yielded impressive results, but more work needs to be done. 

However, the real benefit of U.S. engagement with the Human Rights Council is 

the effect it has on the promotion and protection of human rights around the world. 

On this point, the protests of censured governments and the praise from human 

rights defenders for U.S. successes on the Human Rights Council provide overwhelming proof that the victories in the Council actually matter and have real effect. Human rights defenders from all over the world tell us it really makes a difference to them when the Human Rights Council takes action. 

38 

With respect to publicity, U.S. successes in the Human Rights Council have received more attention from the media in recent months, especially after the special 

sessions on Libya and Syria and the March regular session. The successful efforts 

at the regular Council session in March to establish a Special Rapporteur for Iran, 

to end the ‘‘defamation of religions’’ resolution and to deliver a cross-regional statement in support of LGBT rights received significant and widespread press coverage, 

including in the New York Times, the Economist, and the major wire services. The 

Economist’s article was particularly complimentary, saying that the defeat of the 

defamation resolution ‘‘vindicated’’ the administration’s view that both the Human 

Rights Council and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference ‘‘can respond well 

to constructive engagement.’’ After the special session on Syria, National Public 

Radio ran two pieces—one on ‘‘All Things Considered’’ and another on ‘‘Weekend 

Edition Saturday’’—that not only recounted the successful special session, but also 

highlighted U.S. efforts over a 2-year period to improve the Human Rights Council 

as an institution. 

However, the level of press attention to U.S. efforts in the Human Rights Council 

is not yet commensurate with the significance of recent successes, and the Department will continue to explore ways to publicize these important victories for both 

human right and U.S. foreign policy. 

TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

Question. Trafficking in humans is one of the most horrific crimes and abuses on 

our planet. We are about to see the release of the 2011 Trafficking in Persons report. That annual report has been credited both with vastly improving the behavior 

of governments, and with creating a negative perception of the issue in many countries. How do you perceive the TIP report as a tool? 

Answer. The annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report is a comprehensive assessment of governments’ efforts, including those in the United States, during the 

reporting year to prosecute traffickers, protect trafficking victims, and prevent trafficking. It serves as a unique diplomatic tool to initiate bilateral and multilateral 

discussions and collaboration, to assess patterns and trends in human trafficking in 

order to confront it more effectively at home and abroad, and to identify specific priority areas and countries for anti-TIP foreign assistance. Over the last 10 years, we 

have seen a great deal of progress, including the passage of new antitrafficking laws 

in more than 120 countries, improvements in victim identification and services, and 

increasing numbers of prosecutions. Countries are increasingly taking significant 

strides against trafficking, not as a favor to us, but because they recognize it is in 

their own self-interest to deal with this problem. The TIP Report will continue to 

serve as our primary tool to assess human trafficking and to promote sustained 

efforts by governments to combat trafficking. 

Question. Moreover, it is well known that the process within the Department is 

combative and adversarial. How can regional bureaus be incentivized to feel greater 

ownership over the issue? 

Answer. Under Secretary Clinton’s leadership, the Department of State has made 

this issue a foreign policy priority and incorporated it into our bilateral and multilateral engagement. As the Secretary has stated, we are ‘‘raising this issue at the 

highest diplomatic levels abroad.’’ This includes the efforts of regional and functional bureaus, as well as our officials in embassies abroad. Through several regionspecific TIP reporting officer conferences we have brought together Washington and 

embassy officials working on TIP to review emerging trends, as well as reporting 

requirements and evaluative criteria for the TIP Report. These conferences enable 

reporting officers to share best practices on engaging foreign governments and encouraging real progress on the country-specific issues identified in the TIP Report, 

and contributed to greater collaboration in compiling the annual report. 

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM J. BURNS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. Mr. Burns, as you know, the State Department is currently considering 

a Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL pipeline. Some concerns have been raised 

about the impacts of the pipeline and the adequacy of the State Department’s analysis of its impacts under the National Environmental Policy Act (or NEPA). 

One concern is the safety of the pipeline and whether the potential for pipeline 

spills has been fully evaluated. According to recent news reports, the existing Keystone pipeline, which commenced operation in June of last year, has already experienced spills, which pose environmental and public safety threats. Will you commit 

39 

to ensure that the safety of the pipeline is fully evaluated and addressed, in consultation with appropriate Federal agencies that oversee pipeline safety and oil spill 

response? 

Answer. The State Department is committed to evaluating all safety concerns 

related to the proposed pipeline and ensuring those concerns are addressed. The 

Department has been in consultation with cooperating federal agencies throughout 

its review of the Presidential Permit application for the Keystone XL pipeline. To 

address pipeline safety concerns, the Department has consulted extensively with the 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and reviewed 

the measures put forward by the applicant to ensure the pipeline’s safety. Further, 

TransCanada has agreed to 57 additional conditions regarding the construction, operation, and maintenance of the pipeline developed in close consultation with 

PHMSA, as is detailed in Appendix C of the Supplemental Draft Environmental 

Impact Statement. 

On April 15, 2011, the Department made available for public comment a SDEIS 

on the Keystone XL pipeline Web site, ‘‘www.keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov,’’ and subsequently issued a Federal Register notice of this public comment period, which expires on June 6, 2011. 76 Fed. Reg. 22744 (April 22, 2011). Section 3.13 of the 

SDEIS provides a review of pipeline safety considerations, standards, and regulations, and reviews potential types of releases and spills for the proposed pipeline. 

This section of the SDEIS provides further information regarding recent spills and 

incidents associated with TransCanada and Keystone as well as a review of U.S. 

pipeline spill incident history. 

Question. Mr. Burns, in granting a Presidential Permit for a pipeline, the State 

Department must determine whether the project is in the national interest. Questions have been raised about whether the pipeline will increase air pollution and 

whether the pipeline will help to advance the administration’s clean energy goals. 

Given these concerns, what factors will your agency be weighing when determining 

if this project is in the national interest? 

Answer. Factors that have been considered in previous national interest determinations on major crude oil pipelines include: 

• Environmental impacts of the proposed projects; 

• Impacts of the proposed projects on the diversity of supply to meet U.S. crude 

oil demand and energy needs; 

• The security of transport pathways for crude oil supplies to the United States 

through import facilities constructed at the border relative to other modes of 

transport; 

• Stability of trading partners from whom the United States obtains crude oil; 

• Impact of a cross-border facility on the relations with the country to which it 

connects; 

• Relationship between the United States and various foreign suppliers of crude 

oil and the ability of the United States to work with those countries to meet 

overall environmental and energy security goals; 

• Impact of proposed projects on broader foreign policy objectives, including a 

comprehensive strategy to address climate change; 

• Economic benefits to the United States of constructing and operating proposed 

projects; and 

• Relationships between proposed projects and goals to reduce reliance on fossil 

fuels and to increase use of alternative and renewable energy sources. 

See Supplemental Draft EIS, Section 1.3, pp. 1–6. This list is not exhaustive, and 

the State Department may consider additional factors in the process of determining 

the ‘‘national interest.’’ 

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM J. BURNS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. While I am glad the administration applied the Comprehensive Iran 

Sanction, Accountability, and Divestment Act sanctions law and sanctioned several 

foreign companies, it appears we continue to sanction companies in countries where 

the United States does not have close ties, such as Venezuela and Belarus. Chinese 

firms continue to conduct business in the Iranian energy sector while other international companies withdraw and President Obama’s Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Robert Einhorn admitted as much in March, saying 

‘‘clearly [Chinese firms] have some investments in Iran.’’ 

40 

• Would you agree with Mr. Einhorn that Chinese companies have made investments in Iran’s energy sector? • Has the State Department opened investigations into Chinese companies for 

violating the Iran Sanctions act? Please identify which ones. 

Answer. We watch developments in Iran’s energy sector extremely closely, including possible Chinese investment. We intend to continue to implement and aggressively enforce our sanctions laws in pursuit of our shared goal of keeping Iran from 

developing nuclear weapons. 

We have seen reports that Chinese companies have made investments in Iran’s 

energy sectors, although we have not seen credible evidence that any Chinese companies have finalized new upstream investments or refinery construction projects 

since the July 1, 2010, passage of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability 

and Divestment Act (CISADA). 

As you may know, Secretary Clinton made a decision related to some foreign companies and the rationale for that decision was communicated to Congress via a classified report. We would be happy to brief you on the details in a classified setting. 

Question. I understand several companies received waivers from the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act sanctions under existing authorities. When the waiver authority expires, will State sanction the companies that 

are currently receiving waivers? 

Answer. To date, the Secretary has not waived sanctions on any entity. We would 

be happy to discuss the Secretary’s use of other authorities under ISA in a classified 

setting. 

Question. Is it true that of the 16 companies sanctioned under the recently announced Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) sanctions, 13 

of the companies targeted had already been sanctioned by the United States? 

Answer. The United States had previously sanctioned 12 of the foreign persons 

that were just sanctioned under the recent INKSNA. The United States sanctioned 

the following foreign persons for the first time under the recently announced 

INKSNA sanctions: Belarusian Optical Mechanical Association (Belarus), Dalian 

Zhongbang Chemical Industries Company (China), SAD Import-Export Company 

(Iran), and Xian Junyun Electronic (China). 

Question. When will the State Department send the 2008, 2009, and 2010 Iran, 

North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) Reports to the Hill? 

Answer. The Department submitted the 2008 INKSNA report to the Hill on May 

23, 2011. The Department will send the 2009 and 2010 reports to the Hill once it 

completes assembling and evaluating the information required by the act. Currently, the Department is clearing and coordinating the candidate 2009 INKSNA 

cases with the Intelligence Community and we are working to identify cases that 

meet the criteria for reportabililty for the 2010 INKSNA. We would be happy to 

brief you in greater detail. 

Question. When will the State Department send the latest Arms Control Compliance Report to the Hill as required by 22 U.S.C. 2593? 

Answer. This administration is committed to ensuring that Congress receives a 

rigorous and comprehensive report. This year’s report, primarily reflecting activities 

in 2009 and 2010, is undergoing final State Department and interagency review and 

should be submitted to Congress soon. 

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM J. BURNS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

FATAH-HAMAS

Question. What is your view on whether the United States should work with a 

Palestinian Authority government that includes an unreformed Hamas? Do you support, pursuant to U.S. law, suspending aid to the Palestinian Authority, if after 

reviewing the situation it is determined that Hamas will not comply with Quartet 

conditions? 

Answer. We understand there is real concern in Congress about the implications 

of the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement signed on May 4. The administration 

has similar concerns. We will ensure full compliance with U.S. law. 

Many substantive, and vital, details of the agreement remain undetermined or 

subject to further negotiation, and we are in constant dialogue with the Palestinians 

about how the deal will be implemented. We are not opposed to reconciliation per 

41 

se, but to Hamas involvement in a Palestinian Authority government if it does not 

accept Israel’s right to exist, renounce violence and terror, and agree to abide by 

previous commitments. 

Until a new Palestinian government is formed and we have an opportunity to assess it based on its policies and positions, it is important for us to continue to support the very worthwhile efforts of the current Palestinian Authority government, 

under the leadership of President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad, to build the 

institutions for an eventual Palestinian state—an area of enormous progress over 

the last several years. 

Question. Where do you see the peace process heading in light of President Abbas’ 

decision to reconcile with an unchanged Hamas? 

Answer. As the President said on May 19, the drive for a lasting peace that ends 

the conflict and resolves all claims is more urgent than ever. The status quo between Israelis and Palestinians is not sustainable. Neither Israel’s future as a 

democratic Jewish state, nor the legitimate aspirations of Palestinians to govern 

themselves in a sovereign state can be secured without a two-state solution that is 

achieved through serious and credible negotiations that address issues of concerns 

to both sides. 

The reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah poses a vital question for 

the Palestinians, one to which Palestinian leaders will have to provide a credible 

answer. None of us can expect Israel to sit down at the negotiating table with a 

party that is sworn to its destruction. 

Ultimately, the lack of a resolution to this conflict harms Israel, harms the Palestinians, and harms the interests of the U.S. and the international community. 

That is why, even though we know how hard it will be to get beyond the current 

impasse, we will continue to press ahead with the parties to resolve the core issues 

in the context of a peace agreement. 

Question. Please comment on Egypt’s role in bringing about the agreement and 

whether their involvement foreshadows a change in their longstanding relationship 

with Israel? 

Answer. The United States supports reconciliation efforts that enhance the prospect for peace. The Egyptian Government has reaffirmed many times since the beginning of the revolution its commitment to all international treaties and obligations, including the Treaty of Peace with Israel, which is the basis of Egypt’s longstanding relationship with Israel. We have made clear to the Egypt Government the 

importance of this treaty to peace and stability in the region. We do not believe that 

Egypt’s role in facilitating the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation agreement foreshadows 

a change in that country’s relationship with Israel. 

DIVERSITY AT STATE

Question. For many years I have urged, advocated, and legislated on behalf of enhancing Hispanic diversity at the Department within the civil service and Foreign 

Service. Despite my efforts and the commitment of successive Secretaries of State, 

today, Hispanics make up just 5 percent of all State Department employees and just 

3.9 percent of Foreign Service officers. The average amongst Federal agencies is 8 

percent. State’s numbers are disappointing. 

What is even more disappointing—and which seem to demonstrate the Department’s continued indifference to this issue—is that the State Department failed to 

even provide data for 2009 to OPM for its annual report to the President on Hispanic Employment in the Federal Government. It was the ONLY Federal agency to 

not respond. 

• What specifically are you doing to improve diversity at the Department in the 

Foreign and Civil Service? Are you attempting to limit ‘‘in status’’ postings for 

civil service jobs that inhibit diversification? Do you have a diversification goal 

and a plan at how to arrive at that goal by a specified date? Are you working 

to increase the number of Hispanic Presidential Management Fellows or Hispanic students participating in cooperative education programs? Will the 

Department comply with OPM’s request for 2010 data for their annual report 

to the President on diversity? 

Answer. The Department of State’s continuing recruitment goal is to identify, inspire, and employ qualified Americans with diverse backgrounds and experiences to 

effectively carry out our foreign policy. We aim to have a workforce that represents, 

at a minimum, the diversity found in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Professional 

Workforce demographic. 

42 

Hispanics make up 5 percent of State Department Civil Service employees, 3.9 

percent of Foreign Service officers, and 6.1 percent of Foreign Service Specialists. 

The number of self-identified Hispanics who took the Foreign Service Officer Test 

during FY10 was 2,219, up from 1,465 in FY09 or 10 percent of the total (approximately a 50 percent increase). In 2010 the Department hired 36 Hispanic Foreign 

Service Specialists, or 7.4 percent of all new Specialist hires, and 32 out of 826 Foreign Service Generalists, or 3.9 percent. 

Department of State’s large-scale recruitment efforts 

We recognize there is still much work to be done to ensure the Department reflects the rich diversity of our Nation. Several of our efforts are often cited as ‘‘best 

practices’’ and are successful in attracting outstanding diverse talent to pursue 

Department careers. We use a combination of ‘‘high tech’’ and ‘‘high-touch’’ tactics 

to identify and encourage the diverse talent we seek. 

Sixteen senior Foreign Service officers, also known as Diplomats in Residence, are 

based at targeted campuses around the United States. Each Diplomat in Residence 

has regional responsibilities, collectively visiting hundreds of colleges and universities and meeting with professionals seeking to change careers. On campus, Diplomats in Residence work in partnership with career counselors, diversity coordinators, and directly with students to identify talented career candidates from a range 

of backgrounds and experiences. The Diplomats in Residence work in partnership 

with Washington, DC-based recruiters to identify and contact potential candidates 

for all Department careers through Web-based resources and strategic partnerships 

with like-minded educational and professional organizations serving diverse populations, including Hispanics. In FY 2010, the Department spent $40,000 on advertising in Hispanic print and 

electronic media. Marketing studies demonstrate that minority professionals use social media at higher rates than nonminority professionals. Our public outreach is 

integrated with a comprehensive marketing and recruiting program that includes 

leveraging new media and networking technologies (Facebook, Linked-In, Twitter, 

YouTube), direct sourcing, e-mail marketing, and online and limited print advertising with career and niche-specific sites and publications (Hispanic Business, 

NSHMBA, LatPro, Saludos, LATINAStyle). In addition, the Department spent over 

$250,000 on general diversity media and Department-specific diversity networking 

events. 

The Department’s Recruitment Outreach Office developed and hosted Diversity 

Career Networking Events as a tool to target a diverse range of professionals for 

Department of State careers, specifically highlighting deficit Foreign Service career 

tracks. In FY 2010, events were hosted in Los Angeles; Denver; Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Las Cruces, NM; Miami; New York and Washington, DC, reaching 

over 1,000 candidates including African-Americans, Asian-Americans, Hispanics, 

Native Americans, and women. 

In addition, over 900 Department employees have volunteered to support our strategic outreach, highlighting the diversity of our existing workforce and leveraging 

existing networks of internal affinity groups like the Hispanic Employment Council 

in Foreign Affairs Agencies (HECFAA). 

‘‘In status’’ postings for Civil Service jobs 

All Department of State vacancy announcements are advertised according to 

merit procedures. Under those procedures managers have the option of determining 

the area of consideration. This area of consideration ‘‘Status Only’’ versus ‘‘Open to 

Public’’ is determined by how widely the manager feels he/she needs to recruit in 

order to obtain a reasonable pool of well-qualified candidates. Approximately half of 

our vacancy announcements are advertised ‘‘Open to the Public’’ which provides 

many opportunities for applicants outside of the Federal workforce to apply for positions at the Department of State. The Department continues to urge managers to 

be as inclusive as possible and to properly consider all candidates when making 

selections for positions. 

Cooperative education programs 

The Department strives to achieve diversity throughout its workforce through various career-entry programs, including the Presidential Management Fellowship program. All qualified applicants referred to the Department by the Office of Personnel 

Management are given full consideration. The Office of Recruitment conducts regular outreach to institutions that serve Hispanics in order to increase the pool of 

applicants from the Hispanic community and promote awareness of entry-level employment opportunities. 

Our outreach to college students plants the seeds of interest in global public service and promotes a long-term interest in our internships, fellowships, and careers. 

43 

In FY 2009 the Department funded an additional 100 paid internships for recruitment purposes. In 2009 and 2010, with the support of the Director General, our 

Diplomats in Residence identified outstanding, diverse candidates for those internships, providing them the chance to experience work in Washington, DC, and embassies and consulates around the world. 

Twenty-three percent of these 100 paid interns were Hispanic. Through this program one Hispanic employee, a first generation American, had the opportunity to 

experience diplomacy in action working in our Embassy in Guatemala last summer. 

Another Hispanic employee, a Gates Millennium Scholar and recipient of a paid internship, had the opportunity to represent the United States at our mission to the 

Organization of American States. Both of these outstanding students are still working at the Department in student positions even after their internships ended. 

Two particularly successful student programs are the Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs Undergraduate and Graduate Fellowships and the Charles B. Rangel 

International Affairs Fellowship. These ROTC-like programs provide financing for 

graduate school and paid professional experience in Washington and at our embassies to highly qualified students, in exchange for their commitment to the Foreign 

Service. Diplomats in Residence help recruit candidates for these fellowships, which 

have been essential to increasing the presence of underrepresented groups in the 

Foreign Service. In FY 2010, 17 out of 120 (14.17 percent) Pickering Fellows and 

7 out of 40 (17.5 percent) Rangel Fellows were Hispanic. 

Compliance with OPM’s request for 2010 data for Annual Report to the President 

on Diversity 

The Department of State has been working closely with the Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM) to ensure that it is compliant with the diversity data reporting 

requirements. In 2009, we experienced complications with our submission (Attachment A). This was partially due to a change of formatting requirements, and partially due to the complexity of reporting data about our different workforces, the 

Civil Service and the Foreign Service. 

Unfortunately, by the time these issues were resolved, the publication deadline 

had passed. These issues have since been addressed with OPM and the Department 

has submitted its information for the 2010 diversity report (Attachment B). 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The above mentioned attachments were too voluminous to include 

in the printed hearing but will be retained in the permanent record of the committee.] 

PAKISTAN

Question. Our relationship with Pakistan has reached a strategic turning point. 

U.S. security-related assistance to Pakistan has increased by 140 percent since 2007 

to $2.7 billion in FY 2010. In terms of total assistance we are in for more than $4 

billion annually and they seem to dislike us more than ever. At a time when we 

are contemplating cutbacks to foreign assistance programs and scrutinizing every 

domestic program to ensure maximum effectiveness, it is incongruous to be providing enormous sums to the Pakistani military unless we are certain that it is 

meeting its commitment to locate, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist threats inside its 

borders. 

• Do you believe the Pakistani military is committed to ceasing support to extremist and terrorist groups and preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated terrorist groups from operating on the territory of Pakistan? • Will you be undertaking a review of security assistance for Pakistan in light 

of recent events and under what condition would you consider withholding 

assistance? 

• Are you concerned that the tremendous growth in U.S. Security assistance to 

Pakistan could further destabilize relations between Pakistan and India? How 

certain are you that reimbursement funds provided to Pakistan under CSF are 

not being used to bolster Pakistan’s aggression toward India? 

Answer. Our relationship with Pakistan has never been an easy one. It is no secret that we do not always see eye to eye, including about how to most effectively 

counter shared threats to our security. Nevertheless, Pakistan has been a key partner in our common struggle against terrorism and is committed to fighting terrorist 

groups, including al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. As President Obama has 

said, ‘‘the fact of the matter is that we have killed more terrorists on Pakistani soil 

than just about any place else. We could not have done that without Pakistani 

cooperation.’’ 

The key question now is whether Pakistan is prepared to do more. We know that 

al-Qaeda and its affiliates have been a source of great pain and suffering to PakiVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:43 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 HEARINGS GONE TO PRESS\68223.TX
44 

stan’s leadership, people, and security forces. We are also confident that joint action 

by Pakistan and the United States against al-Qaeda and its affiliates will make 

Pakistan, America, and the world safer and more secure. We have made clear that 

we look to the Government of Pakistan to urgently take decisive steps against 

al-Qaeda and its affiliates. 

The Department is continually reviewing its security assistance programs to ensure that disbursements are meeting our foreign policy goals and objectives, and 

benefiting the U.S. taxpayer. This is certainly the case with respect to our assistance to Pakistan. 

The Department remains committed to ensuring that U.S. security assistance and 

military sales do not significantly alter the prevailing military balance in any region. We carefully review all military sales to ensure they do not contribute to instability in South Asia. The careful consideration is also given to the review of all 

requests for reimbursement through Coalition Support Funds, to ensure that 

reimbursements are made only for expenditures that support Operation Enduring 

Freedom. 

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM J. BURNS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. The administration has taken steps that indicate growing support for 

the Transitional Council, and Ambassador Cretz has said that they are ‘‘worthy of 

our support.’’ Yet, the administration refuses to recognize the Council as the legitimate Government of Libya. 

• How is U.S. nonrecognition of the Council impacting our choices and freedom 

of action to promptly end the conflict in Libya? • Would recognition of the Council facilitate the issue of providing assisting to the 

Council by transferring ownership of and confiscating the frozen Libyan assets? 

Answer. While we have not officially recognized the TNC, we have taken significant steps to bolster its legitimacy, including high-level meetings, inviting it to open 

an office in Washington, appointing an envoy to Benghazi and providing it with up 

to $25 million in nonlethal military assistance. The President is also discussing legislation with Congress that would permit the use of a portion of frozen regime assets for humanitarian and civilian purposes. As proposed, authority would be given 

to vest frozen assets within U.S. jurisdiction, consisting of directly owned property 

of the Government of Libya and its related entities, including the Central Bank of 

Libya. In addition, we have also taken steps to strip legitimacy from Qadhafi’s diplomatic presence, including suspending Libyan Embassy operations in Washington 

(and U.S. Embassy operations in Tripoli); and urging countries worldwide to do likewise. 

The issue of recognition remains under review and we are continuing to assess 

the capabilities of the TNC as we deepen our engagement with the opposition. As 

part of that effort, our Envoy to Benghazi continues to meet with members of the 

TNC, as well as a broad spectrum of civil society groups and Libyans involved in 

the opposition. The TNC has consistently rejected terrorism and extremist influences and declared their respect for the human rights of all Libyans and we believe 

that it is a legitimate and credible interlocutor for the Libyan people. We continue 

to highlight the TNC’s role as a legitimate and credible interlocutor for the Libyan 

people in international fora like the Libya Contact Group, the U.N., and elsewhere. 

Question. The Gadhafi regime relies heavily on foreign mercenaries to perpetuate 

its regime in Libya. Recent reports indicate that these mercenaries include members 

of POLISARIO Front—a separatist group that claims certain Moroccan territory and 

whose members live in camps within Algerian territory. 

• What is Algeria’s role in the rebellion against the Gadhafi regime? 

• Is the United States aware of POLISARIO presence in the Libyan conflict? 

• What specific measures is the administration taking to keep Libya’s neighbors 

from providing support to Gadhafi? 

Answer. We are working closely with the Government of Algeria to ensure that 

UNSCR 1973, which Algeria has committed to supporting through the Arab League, 

is fully implemented. Algeria shares our desire to see an end to the bloodshed and 

violence in Libya and has long been a strong bilateral partner and a regional leader 

in counterterrorism efforts. 

The United States cannot corroborate any reports of a presence of the 

POLISARIO Front in the conflict in Libya. 

Working together with our partners in the Libya Contact Group, the United 

States is taking political, economic, and diplomatic measures to isolate the Qadhafi 

45 

regime. Since the conflict began in February, we have been in regular contact with 

other countries in the region, emphasizing the importance of implementing strong 

sanctions against the regime, including enforcement of the arms embargo, asset 

freeze, and travel bans under UNSCRs 1970 and 1973. We have also demarched 

countries worldwide, encouraging them to suspend diplomatic ties with the regime 

and to refuse to receive Qadhafi’s envoys, unless those envoys were willing to discuss the departure of Qadhafi from power. We are continuing to work with the Contact Group, African Union, and Arab League to increase the pressure on the regime 

and set the stage for an inclusive political transition in line with the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people. 

Question. Since 2003, Congress has provided more than $30 billion in U.S. assistance to Pakistan, nearly $20 billion in economic aid. This has been explained as an 

effort to build up an enduring relation with Pakistan and to improve their civilian 

capacity. 

• Through what process or metrics is the administration ensuring that development projects funded through the Pakistan Partnership Act enjoy meaningful 

input from the recipient communities? 

• What metrics is the administration applying to assess the success or failure of 

its development policies in Pakistan? 

Answer. The USG has provided approximately $6.4 billion in civilian assistance 

to Pakistan since FY 2002. In executing that assistance, we work closely with Pakistan to strengthen the civilian government’s ability to foster growth and meet the 

needs of its own people over the long term. 

A little over half of the FY 2010 planned civilian assistance will be implemented 

through Pakistani organizations, including federal or provincial government agencies and nongovernment organizations. We have established consultative processes 

on implementation, design, and accountability mechanisms. We consult with a range 

of local stakeholders to ensure their buy-in and input. 

As an illustration of how metrics are used in implementation, USAID has a performance management plan that lays out both short-term and long-term goals for 

each sector in which they manage assistance, and track progress against those 

goals. For example, in the energy sector a high-level goal is ‘‘increased domestic energy supply’’ with a lower level goal of ‘‘improved efficiency of current power generation and distribution,’’ measured by ‘‘the megawatts of energy added as a result of 

USG-supported efforts.’’ 

USAID is also putting in place a stand-alone project that will provide third-party 

monitoring evaluation across the entire USAID portfolio. 

Question. Pakistan’s security agencies have been under scrutiny for its alleged 

links with and even material support for Islamist militants operating both inside 

and out of Pakistan. U.S. Government suspicions have peaked with the circumstances surrounding bin-Laden’s death. 

• What is the most effective way for the United States to convince Pakistan’s security institutions to embrace more proactive counterterrorism cooperation? 

• Would a strong U.S. commitment to success in Afghanistan help on that 

matter? 

Answer. The United States and Pakistan have worked together on many counterterrorism programs and activities in recent years that have increased pressure on 

al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This cooperation has been due, in large part, to Pakistan’s vital interest in protecting its own territory and people, who have been 

ravaged by terrorism. Pakistan remains a key ally in our common struggle against 

terrorism and continues to battle terrorist groups . However, both we and the Government of Pakistan recognize that much more needs to be done immediately. 

Recent terrorist attacks in Pakistan against both security forces and civilians remind us once again of the sacrifices Pakistan has made in its fight against insurgents who seek to destabilize the country, and of the necessity of proactive, resolute 

action against all violent extremists. Joint action against al-Qaeda and its affiliates 

will make Pakistan, its neighbors, the United States and the world safer and more 

secure. We have made clear that we will do our part and we look to the Government 

of Pakistan to urgently take decisive steps. 

We have also made clear to Pakistan our enduring commitment to achieving peace 

and reconciliation in Afghanistan and of Afghanistan’s importance to regional stability. We will continue working with Pakistan to achieve those goals, including 

through the trilateral process that Secretary Clinton launched in May 2009, and 

which has met twice this spring. 

46 

Question. President Lobo and former President Zelaya of Honduras signed an 

agreement that has opened the way for Honduras to be finally reinstated to the 

Organization of American States. President Lobo has agreed not to pursue corruption charges against Zelaya, who has returned to Honduras. 

• (A) What role did the United States have in those negotiations? 

Answer. The U.S. Government followed with great interest the developments that 

led to an accord signed on May 22 by Honduran President Porfirio Lobo and former 

President Jose Manuel Zelaya. Since the June 2009 coup d’etat that removed President Zelaya from power, the United States has remained an active player behind 

the scenes and in public, in Washington, through our Embassy in Honduras, and 

several of our overseas posts. We worked with the international community, as well 

as our partners in the hemisphere to underscore that the conditions that led to Honduras’ suspension from the OAS had been resolved, and that the time had come for 

Honduras to be fully reintegrated into the organization. 

The initiatives by the Governments of Colombia and Venezuela were undertaken 

in the context of efforts to reintegrate Honduras by the Central American Governments, the United States, and Canada that made possible the May 22 agreement. 

Central American Governments and the Dominican Republic helped create the climate that enabled the Colombian and Venezuelan effort to succeed. The Organization of American States played a constructive role in advancing this initiative. 

• (B) What is the effect of this situation on the rule of law and independent institutions in Honduras? 

Answer. The political crisis in 2009 revealed weaknesses in Honduras’ democratic 

institutions. Furthermore, the economic slowdown caused in part by the political crisis deprived the Government of Honduras of the necessary resources to enable its 

law enforcement and judicial institutions to confront the menace of youth gangs and 

drug trafficking organizations. 

While we remain very concerned about the human rights situation, since the inauguration of President Porfirio Lobo in January 2010, following the successful negotiation of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord and the holding of free and fair elections, 

Honduras has made significant progress in fortifying its rule of law institutions. 

Much work still needs to be done, and the U.S. Government has resumed its widereaching assistance programs, which include resources and technical support for 

Honduran police and prosecutors to help bolster their efforts to adequately investigate and prosecute alleged human rights abuses. Additionally, Honduras’ reintegration into the OAS means Honduras will benefit fully from the OAS capacity 

to promote good governance. 

• (C) How confident are you that Mr. Zelaya will play a positive role in Honduras? 

Answer. We welcomed the decision of the Honduran Supreme Court resolving the 

criminal cases against former President Zelaya in accordance with Honduran law. 

While the United States Government did not take a position on how the cases 

should be decided, we hope that their resolution, and former President Zelaya’s return to Honduras on May 28, have contributed to national reconciliation. We will 

continue to urge former President Zelaya to remain constructive in whatever role 

he chooses to play. 

• (D) What impact would this situation have on the political process and the integrity of democratic institutions in neighboring countries? 

Answer. The unanimous condemnation by Western Hemisphere governments of 

the 2009 removal of former President Zelaya demonstrated commitment by those 

governments to the rule of law. That universal opprobrium, coupled with Honduras’ 

suspension from participation in the Organization of American States and the loss 

of vital foreign assistance and foreign direct investment, provided a cautionary tale 

to actors in neighboring countries who might contemplate antidemocratic activities. 

The response to the political crisis in Honduras has shown that regional states and 

multilateral institutions stand ready to defend democracy in a region that once 

tolerated long periods of authoritarian rule and repeated military interventions in 

civilian rule. Honduras’s neighbors understand that the health of democratic institutions in one Central American country has implications for the democratic institutions in all of them. 

Question. There is a perception for regional bureaus and embassies that working 

against human trafficking is a zero-sum game and that they should fight for improved rankings in the TIP report even if the evidence is marginal. 

47 

• Will you commit to work to ensure that embassies and assistant secretaries recognize that this is an important issue to you and that they should intensify 

their work to foster progress in human trafficking in their country or region? 

Answer. The fight against human trafficking is important not only to me, but also 

to Secretary Clinton, and it is a major policy priority for this administration. One 

of the most important tools we have in addressing Trafficking in Persons (TIP) is 

the annual Trafficking in Persons Report, which takes into account not only the 

findings of our colleagues at embassies around the world, but also information submitted by foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations, and a wide range 

of civil society actors. The end result is a report that represents Department-wide 

collaboration and consensus, with critical input from our officers and ambassadors 

in the field. 

These efforts do not constitute a zero-sum game. Over the 10 years since the report was first published, more than 120 countries have adopted new antitrafficking 

measures, victim identification has improved, and prosecutions are on the rise. Time 

and again, governments have credited the TIP Report as a factor motivating consistent action to address trafficking. If confirmed, as Deputy Secretary of State, I 

will ensure that fighting human trafficking remains a foreign policy priority, and 

I will work to strengthen our international efforts to combat this heinous crime. 

Question. An international arbitration panel has determined that the Russian 

Government expropriated Yukos and owes compensation to all investors in Yukos. 

As you stated in February, 2011, ‘‘there are a number American investors in Yukos 

with several billion dollars’ worth of investments at stake. However, U.S. shareholders do not have an investment treaty under which they can bring claims against 

Russia. I understand that some U.S. shareholders in Yukos have petitioned the 

State Department to espouse their claims against Russia. 

• Since there is no other effective means of redress, will the State Department 

use espousal to secure compensation for the U.S. shareholders in Yukos? 

Answer. Promoting the rights of U.S. investors is one of the U.S. State Department’s top priorities in Russia and worldwide. The Department is monitoring closely 

the significant claims brought by Yukos investors from many different countries in 

international court and arbitration proceedings. We expect these decisions to shed 

light on many of the complex legal issues at stake in this matter. While the United 

States does not have a bilateral investment treaty with Russia, the Department has 

raised the matter of American shareholders’ claims with the Russian Government 

and will continue to stress the interest of the USG in seeing these claims addressed 

in a manner consistent with customary international law protections for foreign 

investments. 

Æ