DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Lessons Learned from the 

August 11, 2007, Network Outage at 

Los Angeles International Airport
 

(Redacted) 

Notice: The Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, has redacted 

this report for public release. A review under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 

552), will be conducted upon request. 

OIG-08-58 May 2008
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

May 28, 2008 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses lessons learned from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s 

management of the network outage at Los Angeles International Airport on 

August 11, 2007. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant 

agencies and institutions, direct observations, and reviews of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is 

our hope that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical 

operations. We express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the 

preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 

. 
 CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

 CIO Chief Information Officer

 DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol

 DHS Department of Homeland Security 

IT Information Technology 

 LAN Local Area Network

 LAX Los Angeles International Airport 

NOC Network Operations Center 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

 

PDT Pacific Daylight Time

 SOC Security Operations Center 

 TECS Treasury Enforcement Communications System 

 

. 

Abbreviations 

 Bradley Terminal Tom Bradley International Terminal

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary............................................................................................................ 1 

Background......................................................................................................................... 2 

Results of Review ............................................................................................................... 3
 

Actions Taken During the Network Outage................................................................... 3 

Lessons Learned ............................................................................................................. 6 

Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 11 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis................................................................. 12 

Other CBP Ports of Entry May Experience Similar Outages....................................... 13 

Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 14 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis................................................................. 14 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology .....................................................15 

Appendix B: Management Comments to Draft Report ...........................................16 

Appendix C: August 11, 2007, LAX Network Outage Timeline ............................17 

Appendix D: Major Contributors to This Report.....................................................18 

Appendix E: Report Distribution ............................................................................19 
 

OIG
 Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

We evaluated actions taken by US Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) to address the network outage at Los Angeles 

International Airport (LAX) on August 11, 2007. We also 

evaluated actions CBP took to prevent a similar outage from 

occurring again. We performed onsite inspections at the airport, 

interviewed department staff, and conducted technical tests of 

workstations involved in the outage. We also reviewed applicable 

department policies, procedures, and other appropriate 

documentation. 

The August 11, 2007, network outage at LAX prevented CBP from 

conducting its normal operations for approximately 10 hours and 

affected more than 17,000 passengers. CBP has taken actions to 

ensure that a similar outage does not recur at this airport. These 

actions include updating its network topology and ensuring that 

backup systems can be deployed quickly. 

We are recommending additional actions that CBP could 

implement to manage network outages more effectively. For 

example, the CBP Network Operations Center (NOC) could use 

onsite support staff more effectively to isolate and resolve outages. 

Additionally and automatic error 

notification messages should be established. Further, contingency 

planning documentation for the network at LAX should be 

updated. 

While CBP has taken actions to prevent an outage from recurring 

at LAX, the conditions that gave rise to the outage may also exist 

at other ports of entry. We are recommending that CBP determine 

whether their actions taken at LAX should also be taken at other 

ports of entry. CBP management concurred with our 

recommendations. 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 1 
 

Background 

On August 11, 2007, the CBP network at LAX experienced an 

outage that started at approximately 1:00 p.m. Pacific Daylight 

Time (PDT) and lasted until 11:45 p.m. PDT.1 At first, CBP staff 

experienced response time delays with the computer system used 

to process passengers. Specifically, CBP reported response time 

during the outage as averaging 2 to 3 minutes when normal CBP 

computer system response time is under 5 seconds. 

Starting at 4:16 p.m. PDT, CBP officers were not able to perform 

any queries of their remote databases. At that point, CBP was 

unable to process arriving passengers using remote systems. 

Further, full deployment of a backup system was delayed until a 

field technician started assisting with the deployment an hour later. 

According to CBP estimates, this outage affected up to 17,000 

passengers. Due to the delays in processing passengers, the 

international arrival areas filled with passengers and the LAX fire 

marshal restricted the number of people that were allowed in the 

waiting areas and jet ways. As a result, new arrivals were not 

allowed to disembark. These passengers sat on approximately 60 

planes on the tarmac for several hours. Other operations at LAX, 

including international departures, were also affected. 

Additionally, several international flights were diverted to Ontario 

International Airport, California, approximately 55 miles away. 

1 See Appendix C, August 11, 2007, LAX Network Outage Timeline, for details. 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport
 

(Redacted) 

Page 2 
 

Results of Review 

Actions Taken During the Network Outage 

CBP staff and their communications vendor Sprint took various 

actions to resolve the outage of the CBP network at LAX on 

August 11, 2007. Specifically, individuals at LAX and remote 

locations worked together to identify the cause of the outage and to 

restore processing. 

12:50 p.m. PDT to 2:00 p.m. PDT 

On August 11, 2007, at 12:50 p.m., PDT, CBP staff at LAX first 

reported a delayed response time when querying the Treasury 

Enforcement Communications System (TECS).2 Additionally, 

CBP’s NOC was alerted that they could not access the LAX router. 

At 1:16 p.m., PDT, the NOC reported the problem with accessing 

the router to its communications vendor, Sprint. The CBP Help 

Desk and Duty Officer were notified of the problem. 

The NOC instructed the CBP onsite technician at LAX to restart 

the communications devices leading to the router by turning them 

off and on. However, restarting these devices did not resolve the 

problem. CBP reported query response time was now averaging 

2 to 3 minutes, approximately 30 times slower than normal. At 

1:55 p.m., PDT, Sprint reported to the NOC that its 

communications lines were active and its routers at LAX 

responded electronically. Sprint suggested that CBP restart its 

communications equipment. 

2:00 p.m., PDT to 3:00 p.m., PDT 

The NOC again asked the CBP onsite technician to restart the 

communications devices and also to verify that there was power to 

the router. Sprint confirmed that the circuits were not 

disconnected. The CBP Duty Officer was notified. At 2:48 p.m., 

the NOC called Sprint and verified that there was power to CBP’s 

communications equipment. The NOC was to call Sprint back 

when CBP verified that there was power to the Sprint router. 

2

 TECS is a CBP mission-critical law enforcement application designed to identify people and businesses 

suspected of or involved in violation of federal law. TECS is also a communications system permitting 

message transmittal among DHS law enforcement offices and other national, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies. 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 3 
3:00 p.m., PDT to 4:00 p.m., PDT 

CBP onsite staff confirmed that there was power to the router. The 

CBP Duty Officer requested a status update. 

 The NOC established a teleconference call with Sprint 

that Sprint dispatch a technician to the airport. 

and the CBP onsite technician. At 3:57 p.m., PDT, the NOC 

reported to Sprint that there was power to its router and requested 

4:00 p.m., PDT to 5:00 p.m., PDT 

The CBP Acting Port Director and the CBP local area 

network (LAN) field manager for Southern California requested a 

status update. The last query of the CBP database from LAX was 

at 4:16 p.m., PDT. The Sprint technician was dispatched to LAX 

at 4:20 p.m., PDT. 

5:00 p.m., PDT to 6:00 p.m., PDT 

A second CBP onsite technician arrived at LAX and started 

assisting 

 in terminals 4 

and 5. The NOC provided status information on the outage to the 

CBP Duty Officer and LAX LAN administrator. 

6:00 p.m., PDT to 7:00 p.m., PDT 

A CBP field technician started assisting 

at the Tom Bradley International Terminal (Bradley 

Terminal). CBP’s Duty Officer set up a conference call on the 

outage and provided the number to Sprint and the NOC. CBP’s 

LAX Deputy Field Officer, Southern California area manager, 

deputy area manager, and Office of Field Operations Duty Officer 

were provided with a status update. 

The Sprint technician arrived at the airport and verified that the 

Sprint equipment was working correctly. Specifically, while the 

Sprint router had been responding electronically, Sprint was not 

able to remotely administer the router. When the Sprint technician 

restarted the router, it restarted in a “busy” state. However, when 

the Sprint technician disconnected the LAX LAN and then 

restarted the router, Sprint was able to remotely administer the 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 4 
 

 

 

 

router. This confirmed that the problem was with the CBP LAX 

LAN and not with Sprint equipment. 

7:00 p.m., PDT to 9:00 p.m., PDT 

Sprint remote network support staff joined the conference call and, 

with the onsite Sprint technician, started assisting CBP in 

identifying the problem with the CBP LAX LAN. Sprint remote 

network support instructed the Sprint technician to connect his 

laptop computer with a modem to the CBP switch. 

Communicating through the modem, the Sprint remote network 

support staff evaluated the traffic on the switch with the laptop’s 

HyperTerminal software.3 

9:00 p.m., PDT to 11:00 p.m., PDT 

By approximately 9:00 p.m., PDT, all terminals were now 

processing passengers by accessing the CBP databases except for 

the Bradley Terminal. 

CBP field technicians started activities to isolate the problem. 

They disconnected a wireless network and a media converter from 

the network, but this action did not resolve the outage. At the 

Bradley Terminal, the CBP field technicians continued troubleshooting by removing and replacing components of a 

communications device without first turning the power off, a 

process known as “hot-swapping” components. During this effort, 

the device burned out, filling the telecommunications closet with 

smoke. However, the CBP technicians located a decommissioned 

switch from another section of the airport, restored functionality, 

and then continued their problem resolution activities. 

3

 Hyper Terminal is a program that comes with the Microsoft Windows operating system. 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 5 

4 
11:00 p.m., PDT to 11:45 p.m., PDT 

CBP field technicians disconnected a circuit at the Bradley 

Terminal containing 12 devices. CBP staff at the Bradley 

Terminal could then perform database queries. The 12 devices 

remained disconnected from the LAX LAN and full processing 

resumed at 11:40 PM PDT. 

Lessons Learned 

CBP has taken actions to ensure that the outage on the LAX LAN 

does not recur, or if it recurs, that the impact will be minimized. 

 However, further actions are necessary to 

expedite recovery efforts following a network outage. 

Specifically, during future events, the CBP NOC should establish 

conference calls to keep all interested parties informed of the 

recovery efforts. The NOC also could more effectively use onsite 

support staff as well as other information sources. Additionally, 

CBP should provide diagnostic tools, 

and establish automated messaging to help identify network 

problems in a timely fashion. Further, CBP should update the 

LAX LAN contingency plan to provide better guidance during an 

outage. Finally, CBP’s Security Operations Center (SOC) should 

improve procedures for controlling devices that may be the cause 

of an outage. 

According to Appendix III of the Office of Management and 

Budget Circular A-130, Management of Federal Information 

Systems: 

“Inevitably, there will be service interruptions. Agency 

plans should assure that there is an ability to recover and 

provide service sufficient to meet the minimal needs of 

users of the system.” 

********** 

“Normally the Federal mission supported by a major 

application is critically dependent on the application. 

Manual processing is generally NOT a viable back-up 

option. Managers should plan for how they will perform 

their mission and/or recover from the loss of existing 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 6 
 

 

application support, whether the loss is due to the inability 

of the application to function or a general support system 

failure. Experience has demonstrated that testing a 

contingency plan significantly improves its viability. 

Indeed, untested plans or plans not tested for a long period 

of time may create a false sense of ability to recover in a 

timely manner.” 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 7 
 

Network Operations Center 

CBPs NOC manages CBP’s wide area network from a central 

location. However, on August 11, 2007, the NOC could not 

remotely access the CBP LAN at LAX 

 If a similar outage were to 

occur in the future, the NOC could take additional steps to keep 

staff informed, resolve the outage sooner, and identify the source 

of the outage. 

For example, during the outage on August 11, 2007, several people 

called the NOC to ask about the status of the outage. These callers 

included the CBP Duty Officer, the local LAN administrator, and 

CBP Field Operations staff. However, it was the CBP Duty 

Officer at LAX who initiated a conference call so that all 

resolution efforts. 

concerned parties could find out the status. In the future, if an 

outage is not resolved quickly, the NOC should establish a 

conference call to keep all parties informed of the status of 

Additionally, the CBP NOC could use onsite CBP field support 

staff more effectively in future outages. For example, the NOC 

then back on, to various communications devices. However, 

restarting these devices did not resolve the outage. At that point, 

the NOC could have instructed the onsite support staff to perform 

more “‘trouble-shooting” activities. Specifically, the NOC could 

have instructed the onsite field support staff to remove connections 

and isolate devices in an effort to identify the cause of the outage. 

had the onsite CBP field support technician turn the power off, 

Further, CBP could provide network management tools to assist in 

identifying and resolving network problems. 

 The NOC could provide similar tools to onsite 

support staff. 

 Placing network management tools onsite would allow the 

NOC to use the onsite support staff more effectively when the 

network is not accessible from a remote location. 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 8 
 

Further, the DHCP server may be able to provide the CBP NOC 

with specific information about the cause of an outage. 

 

 

•	 The TECS database provided information on whether 

queries were being received from CBP’s LAX LAN; and 

•	 CBP’s Automated Operations Division received network 

traffic information from CBP’s LAX LAN;
 

The NOC also could use additional information sources when 

diagnosing problems with a remote network. For example, during 

the outage on August 11, 2007, the CBP NOC was concerned that 

the Sprint circuits to LAX had been disconnected. However, the 

NOC could have determined that the circuits were active through 

three different CBP informational sources. Specifically, 

Additional Information Sources 

•

Field Support Procedures 

CBP should ensure that field support staff have the training and 

information necessary to effectively service hardware components. 

Specifically, these procedures should list which devices are not 

“hot-swappable.” This information would assist onsite support 

technicians when they are trying to resolve a network outage. For 

example, a CBP LAX LAN communications device burned out 

and filled the LAN room with smoke when CBP field technicians 

erred by removing and replacing components of a communications 

device without first turning off the device. 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 9 
 

 

 

Contingency Planning Documentation 

CBP should ensure that contingency planning documentation is 

sufficient to guide staff in the event of a general support system 

failure. 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 10 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Security Operations Center Procedures 

CBP’s SOC should improve procedures for controlling devices that 

may be the cause of an outage. For example, the CBP SOC’s and 

our evaluations of workstations that may have been involved in the 

outage were inconclusive. Specifically, the SOC noted that 

rebooting one of the machines may have eliminated critical 

information. 

Improved SOC procedures for impounding devices and 

maintaining a chain of custody would assist CBP when performing 

diagnostics on other workstations that may be involved in a similar 

outage. 

Recommendations: 

We recommend that the CBP Chief Information Officer (CIO) take 

the following actions for CBP activities at LAX: 

Recommendation #1: Establish and test procedures to use NOC 

support staff. 

and onsite field support staff more effectively during a network 

outage. 

Recommendation #3: Provide network diagnostic tools for onsite 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 11 
Recommendation #6: Improve procedures for impounding and 

maintaining the chain of custody for computers to be evaluated. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the 

CBP Office of Policy and Planning. We have included a copy of 

the comments in their entirety at Appendix B. 

In the comments, CBP concurred with recommendations one 

through six. These recommendations will be considered resolved 

but open pending verification of all planned actions. 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 12 
 

 

 

Other CBP Ports of Entry May Experience Similar Outages 

According to CBP staff, there is a high risk that a similar outage 

could occur at other CBP ports of entry. For example, according to 

an August 2007 briefing CBP provided to the Congress, 

CBP has taken various actions to ensure there is no repeat of the 

August 11, 2007, outage on its LAN at LAX. 

Further, CBP has updated its systems security plans to include 

devices operating at LAX. Finally, we have made 

six recommendations in this report to assist CBP in improving 

system operations at LAX. CBP should determine whether these 

improvements should also be applied at other ports of entry. 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 13 
 

 

 

System Documentation 

CBP has taken steps to ensure that all known information 

technology assets are included in the system security plan for the 

LAX LAN. These include refugee fingerprint processing 

machines and a network monitoring workstation operated by the 

Automated Operations Division. These assets may be operating at 

other ports of entry and may not be included in the appropriate site 

security plan. 

According to DHS 4300 Sensitive Security Handbook, 

Attachment D – Type Accreditation, 

“To account for unique physical and logical variations at 

the site level, a description of any differences and the 

associated risks at each site are documented, and the sitespecific documents are incorporated as attachments or 

appendices to the master C&A package.” 

Recommendation: 

We recommend that the CBP CIO: 

Recommendation #7: Determine whether the corrective actions 

taken at LAX should also be taken at other CBP ports of entry. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

In the comments, CBP concurred with recommendation seven. 

This recommendation will be considered resolved but open 

pending verification of all planned actions. 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 14 
 

 

 

Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Our purpose was to determine whether actions taken by CBP to 

address the August 11, 2007, outage at LAX were sufficient to 

minimize the effects of a potential future outage. Specifically, we 

evaluated whether the controls that CBP implemented would assist 

in identifying the cause of an outage, facilitate deployment of 

backup systems, and recover from the outage. 

We coordinated the implementation of this technical security 

evaluation program with the DHS Chief Information Security 

Officer. We mutually agreed to the wording for the Rules of 

Engagement for the technical testing.5 We reviewed applicable 

DHS and CBP policies, procedures, and CBP’s responses to our 

site surveys and technical questionnaires. Prior to performing our 

onsite review, we used CBP’s responses to identify occupied 

space, server rooms, and telecommunications closets. Our onsite 

review included a physical review of CBP space and interviews 

with CBP staff. Our technical review included reviews of 

workstations that may have been involved in the outage at LAX.6 

We provided CBP with briefings concerning the results of 

fieldwork and the information summarized in this report. We 

conducted this review between August 2007 and March 2008. 

We performed our work according to the Quality Standards for 

Inspection of the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency, 

and pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. 

We appreciate the efforts by DHS management and staff to provide 

the information and access necessary to accomplish this review. 

Our points of contact for this report are Frank Deffer, Assistant 

Inspector General for Information Technology, (202) 254-4100, 

and Roger Dressler, Director for Information Systems and 

Architectures, (202) 254-5441. Major Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) contributors to the review are identified in Appendix D. 

5

 The Rules of Engagement established the boundaries and schedules for the technical evaluations. 

6 Our analysis of three devices that may have been involved in the August 11, 2007 outage was 

inconclusive. 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 15 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to Draft Report 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 16 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to Draft Report 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 17 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to Draft Report 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 18 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to Draft Report 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 19 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to Draft Report 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 20 
12:50 p.m .

12:00 

1:00 p.m. PDT PDT 

1:16 

1:55 

2:00 

3:00 

3:53 

3:57 

4:00 

4:16 

4:20 

5:00 5:00 

6:00 6:00 

7:00 7:00 

7:50 

8:00 

8:13 

9:00 

10:00 

11:00 

11:40 

Appendix C 

August 11, 2007 LAX Network Outage Timeline 

First report of a problem 

NOC reports problems to Sprint. CBP onsite technician powers 

equipment off /on and stays in contact with CBP NOC. 

Sprints reports to NOC that its circuits are active. 

Between 2PM PDT and 3PM PDT, CBP onsite technician powers 

equipment off /on. Sprint reports that its circuits are active. 

CBP requests that Sprint sends a technician to LAX. 

No further queries against the CBP database from this point 

until 8:13 PM PDT 

Sprint dispatches a technician to the airport. 

CBP onsite technician starts helping in Terminals 4 and 5. 

CBP onsite technician starts helping in Tom Bradley 

International Terminal (Bradley Terminal). Sprint technician arrives 

onsite and verifies that Sprint equipment is working correctly. 

Sprint assisting CBP in trouble-shooting the CBP LAN at 

LAX. 

 CBP 

starts to isolate problem. Bradley Terminal subnet removed from 

circuit. 

CBP database gets first queries since 4:16 PM PDT. All 

terminals can now access remote databases accept for the 

Bradley Terminal. 

During efforts 

 a switch burns out between 9PM PDT and 11PM PDT. 

CBP field technicians find replacement parts and continue efforts to 

isolate and resolve the problem. 

 

 CBP LAX LAN operates 

normally. 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 21 
Appendix D 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Roger Dressler, Director, Department of Homeland Security, 

Information Technology Audits 

Kevin Burke, Audit Manager, Department of Homeland Security, 

Information Technology Audits 

Domingo Alvarez, Senior Auditor, Department of Homeland 

Security, Information Technology Audits 

Beverly Dale, Senior Auditor, Department of Homeland Security, 

Information Technology Audits 

Matthew Worner, Program Analyst, Department of Homeland 

Security, Information Technology Audits 

Sammer El-Hage, Program Management Assistant, Department of 

Homeland Security, Information Technology Audits 

Syrita Morgan, Program Management Assistant, Department of 

Homeland Security, Information Technology Audits 

Richard Saunders, Director, Department of Homeland Security, 

Information Technology Audits 

Steve Matthews, Department of Homeland Security 

Information Technology Audits 

Pamela Williams, Referencer/Senior Auditor, Department of 

Homeland Security, Information Technology Audits 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 22 
Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Under Secretary for Management 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs 

Chief Information Officer (CIO) 

Chief Privacy Officer 

Deputy CIO 

Chief Information Security Officer 

Commissioner, CBP 

Information Systems Security Manager, CBP 

CBP Audit Liaison 

DHS Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS Program Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 

(Redacted) 

Page 23 
 

 

 

 

 

Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4199, fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web 

site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of 

criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations – Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.