U.S. International Trade Commission

In the Matter of

Publication 4115 December 2009

Washington, DC 20436

Investigation No. 337-TA-582

Certain Hydraulic Excavators And 

Components Thereof
U.S. International Trade Commission

Address all communications to 

Secretary to the Commission 

United States International Trade Commission 

Washington, DC 20436

COMMISSIONERS 

Shara L. Aranoff, Chairman 

Daniel R. Pearson, Vice Chairman 

Deanna Tanner Okun 

Charlotte R. Lane 

Irving A. Williamson 

Dean A. Pinkert 
U.S. International Trade Commission

Washington, DC 20436 

www.usitc.gov

In the Matter of

Publication 4115 December 2009

Investigation No. 337-TA-582

Certain Hydraulic Excavators And 

Components Thereof


On September 9,2008, the ALJ issued an initial determination, Order No. 67, granting 

Caterpillar’s motion for summary determination concerning violations of section 337. No 

petitions for review were filed. 

On October 8,2008, the Commission determined to extend the deadline for determining 

whether to review the subject ID to October 30,2008. 

On October 30,2008, the Commission determined to review Order No. 67. 73 Fed. Reg. 

65,879. The Commission requested briefing by the parties, based on the record, on several 

questions and solicited comments from the parties, interested government agencies, and any other 

interested parties on the issues of remedy, the public interest, and bonding. 

On November 18,2008, the Commission received comments from Caterpillar, the LA, 

and from interested party Volvo Construction Equipment North America, Inc. (“Volvo”) Volvo 

filed additional comments on November 25.2008. 

Having examined the relevant portions of the record in this investigation, including the 

ALJ’s ID, the trademarks at issue, and the written submissions on violation, remedy, the public 

interest, and bonding, the Commission has determined to issue a general exclusion order 

prohibiting sale and use in the United States, unlicensed entry for consumption in the United 

States, entry for consumption from a foreign trade zone, or withdrawal from a warehouse for 

consumption, of certain hydraulic excavators and components thereof that infringe United States 

Trademark Registration Nos. 2,140,606; 2,241,077; 2,140,605 and 2,448,848, which cover the 

“CAT” and “Caterpillar” marks. In so doing, the Commission determined that the public interest 

factors enumerated in section 337(g)(l) do not preclude the issuance of the aforementioned 

remedial order and that the bond during the period of Presidential review shall be IO0 percent of 

the entered value of the articles in question. The Cornmission’s order was delivered to the United 

States Trade Representative on the day of its issuance. 

The authority for the Commission’s determination is contained in section 337 of the 

TariffAct of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. fj 1337), and in sections 210.16(~)(2), 210.45,210.49, 

and 210.50 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (19 C.F.R. $3 210.16(~)(2), 

210.45, and 210.49). 

By order of the Commission. 

Issued: January 14,2009 

2 
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 

Washington, D.C. 20436 

In the Matter of 

CERTAIN HYDRAULIC EXCAVATORS 

AND COMPONENTS THEREOF 

Inv. No. 337-TA-582 

GENERAL EXCLUSION ORDER 

The Commission has determined that there is a violation of section 337 of 

the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. tj 1337) based on the unlawful importation and 

sale of certain hydraulic excavators that infringe United States Trademark Registration Nos. 

2,140,606; 2,241,077; 2,140,605 and 2,448,848, which cover the “CAT” and “Caterpillar” 

marks. 

Having reviewed the record in this investigation, including the written submissions of the 

parties, the Cornmission has made its determination on the issues of remedy, the public interest, 

and bonding. The Commission has determined that a general exclusion &om entry for 

consumption is necessary because there is a pattern of violation of section 337 and it is difficult 

to identify the source of the infringing products. Accordingly, the Commission has determined to 

issue a general exclusion order prohibiting the unlicensed importation of infringing gray market 

hydraulic excavators bearing the trademarks at issue. 

The Commission has further determined that the public interest factors enumerated in 19 

U.S.C. tj 1337(d) do not preclude issuance of the general exclusion order, and that the bond 

during the Presidential review period shall be in the amount of 100 percent of the entered value 

of the articles in question. 
Accordingly, the Commission hereby ORDERS that: 

(1) Hydraulic excavators manufactured by or under authority of Caterpillar Inc. for 

sale and use outside the North America Commercial Division (United States and Canada) which 

(a) bear one or more of the following U.S. Trademark Reg. Nos. 2,140,605; 2,140,606; 

2,42 1,077; and 2,448,848 and (b) are materially different from hydraulic excavators 

manufactured by or under authority of Caterpillar Inc. for sale and use in the United States, are 

excluded from entry for consumption into the United States, entry for consumption from a 

foreign-trade zone, or withdrawal from warehouse for consumption, except if imported by, under 

license from, or with the permission of the trademark owner, or as provided by law, until such 

date as the trademarks are abandoned, canceled, or rendered invalid or unenforceable. This 

paragraph shall apply to hydraulic excavators exported, shipped, sold, purchased, or imported by 

any and all persons, including authorized Caterpillar dealers. 

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Order, the aforesaid hydraulic excavators 

excludeable under paragraph 1 of this Order are entitled to entry into the United States for 

consumption, entry for consumption from a foreign trade zone, or withdrawal from a warehouse 

for consumption, under bond in the amount of 100 percent of entered value pursuant to 

subsection 0') of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 4 13370)), and the 

Presidential memorandum for the United States Trade Representative of July 2 1 , 2005 (70 Fed. 

Reg. 43251) from the day after this Order is received by the United States Trade Representative 

until such time as the United States Trade Representative notifies the Commission that this Order 

is approved or disapproved but, in any event, not later than 60 days after the date of receipt of 

this Order. 

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(3) In accordance with 19 U.S.C. tj 1337(1), the provisions of this Order shall not 

apply to hydraulic excavators bearing the asserted trademarks that are imported by and for the 

use of the United States, or imported for, and to be used for, the United States with the 

authorization or consent of the Government. 

(4) Complainant Caterpillar Inc. shall file a written statement with the Commission, 

made under oath, each year on the anniversary of the issuance of this Order stating whether 

Caterpillar Inc. continues to use each of the aforesaid trademarks in commerce in the United 

States in connection with hydraulic excavators, whether any of the aforesaid trademarks has been 

abandoned, canceled, or rendered invalid or unenforceable, and whether Caterpillar Inc. 

continues to satisfy the economic requirements of Section 337(a)(2). 

(5) The Commission may modify this Order in accordance with the procedures 

described in section 2 10.76 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (1 9 C.F.R. 4 

210.76). 

(6) The Secretary shall serve copies of this Order upon each party of record in this 

investigation and upon the Department of Health and Human Services. the Department of 

Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 

(7) 

(8) 

Notice of this Order shall be published in the Federal Register. 

At the discretion of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) and pursuant to 

procedures it establishes, persons seeking to import hydraulic excavators that are potentially 

subject to this Order may be required to certify that they are familiar with the terms of this Order, 

that they have made appropriate inquiry, and thereupon state that, to the best of their knowledge 

and belief, the products being imported are not excluded from entry under paragraphs 1 through 7 

3 
of this Order. At its discretion, Customs may require persons who have provided the certification 

described in this paragraph to furnish such records or analyses as are necessary to substantiate the 

certification. 

By Order of the Commission. / 

Issued: January 14,2009 

4 
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 

Washington, D.C. 20436 

In the Matter of 

CERTAIN HYDRAULIC EXCAVATORS 

AND COMPONENTS THEREOF 

Inv. No. 337-TA-582 

CEASE AND DESIST ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Frontera Equipment Sales (“Frontera”) cease and 

desist from conducting any of the following activities in the United States: importing, selling, 

marketing, advertising, distributing, marketing, offering for sale, transferring (except for 

exportation), or soliciting US. agents or distributors for certain hydraulic excavators, as 

described below, in violation of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 4 

1337, except as provided in Section IV. 

I. Definitions 

As used in this Order: 

(A) 

(B) 

‘“Commission” shall mean the United States International Trade Commission. 

“Caterpillar” shall mean Caterpillar Inc., 100 N.E. Adams Street, Peoria, Illinois 

61 629-73 10, complainant in this investigation, and its successors and assigns. 

(C) “Respondent” shall mean Frontera Equipment Sales, U.S. Expressway 83, 

Donna, Texas 78537. 

(D) “Person” shall mean an individual, or any non-governmental partnership, firm, 

association, corporation, or other legal or business entity other than Respondent or its majority 

owned or controlled subsidiaries, their successors, or assigns. 
(E) “United States” shall mean the fifty States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto 

Rico. 

(F) The terms “import” and “importation” refer to importation for entry for 

consumption, entry for consumption from a foreign-trade zone, and withdrawal from warehouse 

for consumption under the Customs laws of the United States. 

(G) The term “covered product” shall include hydraulic excavators that are 

manufactured abroad by or on behalf of, or are imported by or on behalf of, Respondent, and are 

materially different from hydraulic excavators manufactured by or under authority of Caterpillar 

hc. for sale and use in the United States that infringe the following federally-registered U.S. 

trademarks: U.S. Registration Nos. 2,140,605; 2,140,606; 2,421,077; and 2,448,848, and that are 

not imported by, under license from, or with the permission of the trademark owner, or as 

provided by law. 

11. Applicability 

The provisions of this Cease and Desist Order shall apply to Respondent and to any of its 

principals, stockholders, officers, directors, employees, agents, licensees, distributors, 

contractors, controlled (whether by stock ownership or otherwise) and/or majority owned 

business entities, successors, and assigns, and to each of them, insofar as they are engaging in 

conduct prohibited by Section 111, infra, for, with, or otherwise on behalf of Respondent. 

111. Conduct Prohibited 

The following conduct of the Respondent in the United States is prohibited by the Order. 

While the trademarks remain valid and enforceable, and are not abandoned, canceled, or rendered 

invalid or unenforceable, Respondent shall not: 

2 
(A) import or sell for importation into the United States covered products except under 

license of the trademark owner; 

(B) market, distribute, offer for sale, sell, or otherwise transfer (except for exportation), 

in the United States imported covered products except under license of the trademark owner; 

(C) advertise imported covered products except under license of the trademark owner; 

(D) solicit U.S. agents or distributors for imported covered products except under license 

of the trademark owner; or 

(E) aid or abet other entities in the importation, sale for importation, sale after 

importation, transfer, or distribution of covered products in the United States except under 

license of the trademark owner. 

IV. Conduct Permitted 

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Order, specific conduct otherwise prohibited 

by the terms of this Order shall be permitted if, in a written instrument, the owner of US. 

Trademark Registration Nos. 2,140,605; 2,140,606; 2,42 1,077; and 2,448,848, licenses or 

authorizes such specific conduct, or such specific conduct is related to the importation or sale of 

covered products by or for the United States. 

V. Reporting 

For purposes of this reporting requirement, the reporting periods shall commence on 

January 1 of each year and shall end on the subsequent December 3 1. However, the first report 

required under this section shall cover the period from the date of issuance of this Order through 

December 3 1 , 2009. This reporting requirement shall continue in force until such time as 

Respondent will have truthfully reported, in two consecutive timely filed reports, that it has no 

3 
inventory of covered products in the United States. 

Within thirty (30) days of the last day of the reporting period, Respondent shall report to 

the Commission the quantity in units and the value in dollars of covered products that the 

Respondent has imported or sold in the United States after importation during the reporting 

period and the quantity in units and value in dollars of reported covered products that remain in 

inventory in the United States at the end of the reporting period. 

Any failure to make the required report or the filing of any false or inaccurate report shall 

constitute a violation of this Order, and the submission of a false or inaccurate report may be 

referred to the U.S. Department of Justice as a possible criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. 9 1001. 

VI. Record Keeping and Inspection 

(A) For the purpose of securing compliance with this Order, Respondent shall retain 

any and all records relating to the sale, offer for sale, marketing, or distribution in the United 

States of covered products, made and received in the usual and ordinary course of business, 

whether in detail or in summary form, for a period of two (2) years from the close of the fiscal 

year to which they pertain. 

(B) For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with this Order and for no 

other purpose, and subject to any privilege recognized by the federal courts of the United States, 

duly authorized representatives of the Commission, upon reasonable written notice by the 

Commission or its staff, shall be permitted access and the right to inspect and copy in 

Respondent's principal office during office hours, and in the presence of counsel or other 

representatives if Respondent so chooses, all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, 

memoranda, and other records and documents, both in detail and in summary form as are 

4 
required to be retained by subparagraph VI(A) of this Order. 

VII. Service of Cease and Desist Order 

Respondent is ordered and directed to: 

(A) Serve, within fifteen (1 5) days after the effective date of this Order, a copy of this 

Order upon each of its respective officers, directors, managing agents, agents, and employees 

who have any responsibility for the importation, marketing, distribution, or sale of imported 

covered products in the United States; 

(B) Serve, within fifteen (1 5) days after the succession of any persons referred to in 

subparagraph VI1 (A) of this Order, a copy of the Order upon each successor; and 

(C) Maintain such records as will show the name, title, and address of each person 

upon whom the Order has been served, as described in subparagraphs VII(A) and VII(B) of this 

Order, together with the date on which service was made. 

The obligations set forth in subparagraphs VI(B) and VII(C) shall remain in effect until 

such date on which the trademarks are abandoned, canceled, or rendered invalid or 

unenforceable, whichever is later. 

VIII. Confidentiality 

Any request for confidential treatment of information obtained by the Commission 

pursuant to Sections V and VI of the Order should be in accordance with section 201.6 of the 

Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure, 19 C.F.R. ij 201.6. For all reports for which 

confidential treatment is sought, Respondent must provide a public version of such report with 

confidential infomation redacted. 

5 
IX. Enforcement 

Violation of this Order may result in any of the actions specified in section 210.75 of the 

Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 19 C.F.R. 0 210.75, including an action for civil 

penalties in accordance with section 337(f) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 0 1337(f), and 

any other action as the Commission may deem appropriate. h determining whether Respondent 

is in violation of this Order, the Commission may infer facts adverse to Respondent if 

Respondent fails to provide adequate or timely information. 

X. Modification 

The Commission may amend this Order on its own motion or in accordance with the 

procedure described in section 2 10.76 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 19 

C.F.R. 0 210.76. 

XI. Bonding 

The conduct prohibited by Section III of this Order may be continued during the sixty 

(60) day period in which this Order is under review by the United States Trade Representative 

under authority delegated by the President, 70 Fed Reg 43251 (July 21,2005), subject to 

Respondent posting a bond of in the amount of 100% of entered value per unit of the covered 

products. This bond provision does not apply to conduct that is otherwise permitted by Section 

IV of this Order. Covered products imported on or after the date of issuance of this order are 

subject to the entry bond as set forth in the general exclusion order issued by the Commission, 

and are not subject to this bond provision. 

The bond is to be posted in accordance with the procedures established by the 

Cornmission for the posting of bonds by complainants in connection with the issuance of 

6 
temporary exclusion orders. See Commission Rule 210.68, 19 C.F.R. 9 210.68. The bond and 

any accompanying documentation is to be provided to and approved by the Commission prior to 

the commencement of conduct which is otherwise prohibited by Section 111 of this Order. 

The bond is to be forfeited in the event that the United States Trade Representative 

approves, or does not disapprove within the review period, this Order, unless the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in a final judgment, reverses any Commission final 

determination and order as to Respondent on appeal, or unless Respondent exports the products 

subject to this bond or destroys them and provides certification to that effect satisfactory to the 

Commission. 

The bond is to be released in the event the United States Trade Representative 

disapproves this Order and no subsequent order is issued by the Commission and approved, or 

not disapproved, by the United States Trade Representative, upon service on Respondent of an 

order issued by the Commission based upon application therefor made by Respondent to the 

Commission. 

By Order of the Commission. 

Marilyn R. A 

Secretary to the Commission 

Issued: January 14,2009 

7 
CERTAIN HYDRAULIC EXCAVATORS AND 

COMPONENTS THEREOF 

337-TA-582 

PUBLIC CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Marilyn R. Abbott, hereby certify that the attached NOTICE OF FINAL 

DETERMINATION OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 337 AND ISSUANCE OF A 

GENERAL EXCLUSION ORDER AND CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS; 

TERMINATION OF THE INVESTIGATION has been served by hand upon the 

Commission Investigative Attorney, Rett Snotherly, Esq., and the following parties as 

indicated, on January 14 9 2009 

I /-------- 

500 E Street, SW 

Washington, DC 20436 

ON BEHALF OF COMPLAINANT CATERPILLAR 

- INC: 

Cecilia H. Gonzalez, Esq. 

HOWREY LLP 

1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20004-2402 

P-202-783-0800 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS RITCHIE BROS. 

AUCTIONEERS, INC., RITCHIE BROS. 

AUCTIONEERS (AMERICA) INC., PACIFIC RIM 

MACHINERY, INC., MUSSELMAN 

CONSTRUCTION CO., DBA MUSSELMAN 

RENTALS AND SALES, DEANCO AUCTION 

COMPANY OF MISSISSIPPI, INC., TRACTOFUAND 

EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC., AND PETROWSKY 

ACTIONEERS, INC.: 

Victor M. Wigman, Esq. 

BLANK ROME LLP 

600 New Hampshire Ave, NW 

Washington, DC 20037 

P-202-772-5894 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

ia First Class Mail 

ther: 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

mia First Class Mail 

( )Other: 
Page 2 - Certificate of Service 

F-202-772-1682 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS KUHN 

EQUIPMENT SALES, PRIMA INTERNATIONAL 

SALES HAC, SOUTHWESTERN MACHINERY OF 

FLORIDA, INC, AND UNITED EQUIPMENT 

COMPANY: 

TRADING, DOM-EX LLC, MMS EQUIPMENT 

Lyle B. Vander Schaaf, Esq. 

BRYAN CAVE LLP 

700 Thirteenth Street, NW 

Washington DC 20005 

P-202-508-6000 

F-202-508-6200 

RESPONDENT 

Frontera Equipment Sales 

U.S. Expressway 83 

Donna, Texas 78537 

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: 

Edward T. Hand, Chief 

Foreign Commerce Section 

Antitrust Division 

U.S. Department of Justice 

450 5th Street NW - Room 11000 

Washington, DC 20530 

P-202-5 14-2464 

George F. McCray 

Office of Regulations and Rulings 

U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 

Mint Annex Building 

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20229 

P-202-622-2000 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

$$Via First Class Mail 

( )Other: 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

RVia First Class Mail 

( )Other: 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

aVia First Class Mail 

( )Other: 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

Wia First Class Mail 

( )Other: 
Page 3 - Certificate of Service 

Elizabeth Kraus, Deputy Director 

International Antitrust, Office of 

International Affairs 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Room 498 

Washington, DC 20580 

P-202-326-2649 

Richard Lambert, Esq. 

Office of Technology Development Services 

Dept. of Health & Human Services 

National Institutes of Health 

66 10 Rockledge Drive - Room 407 1 

Bethesda, MD 20892 

P-301-496-2644 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

($Via First Class Mail 

( )Other: 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

WVia First Class Mail 

( )Other: 

PUBLIC VERSION 

[Wlhether there is a violation of subsection (a)(l)(C) of section 

337 in the importation into the United States, the sale for 

importation, or the sale within the United States after importation 

of certain hydraulic excavators or components thereof by reason of 

infringement of U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2,140,606, US. 

Trademark Registration No. 2,421,077, US. Trademark 

Registration No. 2,140,605, or US. Trademark Registration No. 

2,448,848, and whether an industry in the United States exists as 

required by subsection (a)(2) of section 337. 

71 Fed. Reg. 58577 (2006). 

Caterpillar, Inc. (“Caterpillar”) of Peoria, Illinois is the complainant. Id. The respondents 

named in the Notice of Investigation were: Alex Lyon & Son Sales Managers and Auctioneers, 

Inc. of Fayetteville, New York; Barkley Industries, LLC of Litchfield Park, Arizona; Deanco 

Auction Company of Mississippi, Inc. of Philadelphia, Mississippi; Dom-Ex, Inc. of Hibbing 

Minnesota; Frontera Equipment Sales of Donna, Texas; Hoss Equipment Co., Inc. of Irving, 

Texas; Key Equipment, LLC of Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Kuhn Equipment Sales Co., Inc. of 

Summerville, South Carolina; MMS Equipment Sales LLC of Three Way, Tennessee; 

Musselman Construction Co., d/b/a Musselman Rentals and Sales of Lewiston, Idaho; Pacific 

Rim Machinery, Inc. of Gig Harbor, Washington; Petrowksy Auctioneers, Inc. of North Franklin 

Connecticut; Prima International Trading of Fayetteville, New York; Ritchie Bros, Auctioneers 

Inc. of British Columbia, Canada; Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers (America) Inc. of Lincoln, 

Nebraska; Southwestern Machinery of Florida of Port St. Lucie, Florida; Tractorland Equipment 

Company, Inc. of Morena Valley, California; United Equipment Company, Inc. of Turlock, 

California; World Tractor & Equipment Company of Charlotte, North Carolina; Worldwide 

Machinery, Inc. of Houston, Texas; and Yoder & Frey Auctioneers of Holland, Ohio. Id. The 

Commission Investigative Staff (“Staff ’) of the Commission’s Office of Unfair Import 

2 
PUBLIC VERSION 

Investigations is also a party in this investigation. Id. The investigation was originally assigned 

to Administrative Law Judge Robert L. Barton, Jr. Id. 

On July 5,2007, the Commission reassigned the investigation to Administrative Law 

Judge Charneski. (See Notice of a Commission Decision to Permanently Reassign Certain 

Section 337 Investigations (July 5,2007).) On October 16,2007, the Commission again 

reassigned the investigation to this ALJ. (See Notice of a Commission Decision to Reassign 

Certain Section 337 Investigations (October 16,2007).) 

Of the 2 1 respondents listed above, only two respondents, namely Barkley Industries, 

LLC (“Barkley”) and Frontera Equipment Sales (“Frontera”) (collectively “Defaulting 

Respondents”), failed to answer the Complaint and default judgments against both were granted. 

(See Order No. 8 (December 1,2006).) Thereafter, the Commission determined not to review 

the order. (See Notice of Commission Decision Not to Review an Initial Determination Finding 

Respondents Barkley Industries LLC and Frontera Equipment Sales in Default (December 26, 

2006).) The other 19 respondents filed responses to the Complaint, have entered into settlement 

agreements with Caterpillar and have been terminated from the investigation. (See Order Nos. 

18, 19,38,49,61 and 66.) The Commission determined not to review any of these orders. (See 

Notice of Commission Decision Not to Review Initial Determinations Granting Joint Motions to 

Terminate Investigation as to Certain Respondents (March 30,2007); Notice of Commission 

Decision Not to Review Initial Determinations Granting Joint Motions to Terminate 

Investigation as to Certain Respondents (May 17,2007); Notice of Commission Decision Not to 

Review Initial Determinations Granting Joint Motions to Terminate Investigation as to one 

Respondent (Sept. 1 1,2007); Notice of Commission Decision Not to Review Initial 

Determinations Granting Joint Motions to Terminate Investigation as to two Respondents (June 

3 
PUBLIC VERSION 

10,2008); Notice of Commission Decision Not to Review Initial Determination Granting Motion 

to Terminate as to Three Respondents (July 30,2008).) 

B. Theparties 

Caterpillar is a designer and producer of heavy duty earthmoving, construction and 

materials handling machinery, heavy duty diesel and gas engines, gas turbines, and financial 

products. [ 1 

Respondent Frontera Equipment Sales Co. is in the business of buying and selling used 

heavy construction and earth moving equipment from a wide variety of manufacturers including 

Caterpillar and is located in Texas. (Compl. at f 3.5.) Frontera failed to answer the Complaint 

and was found to be in default. (See Order No. 8.) 

Respondent Barkley Industries, LLC is an Arizona corporation in the business of buying, 

selling, and renting used construction and earth moving equipment from a wide variety of 

manufacturers including Caterpillar. (Compl. at f 3.2.) Barkley faifed to answer the Complaint 

and was found to be in default. (See Order No. 8.) 

C. The Products at Issue 

The products at issue in this investigation are certain Caterpillar-branded hydraulic 

excavators and components thereof bearing Caterpillar’s trademarks. [ 

] A hydraulic excavator is 

a hydraulically-controlled excavating system. Hydraulic excavators are used to excavate and 

load earth, blasted rock, sand, and other types of aggregate into trucks, concrete mobiles, and 

rock-crushing units. [ 1 

4 
PUBLIC VERSION 

11. SUMMARY DETERMINATION 

Pursuant to Commission Rule 2 10.18, summary determination “ ... shall be rendered if 

pleadings and any depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to a summary determination as a matter of law.” 19 C.F.R. 0 21 O.l8(b); 

see also DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Wenger 

Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Machinery Systems, Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The 

evidence “must viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion . . . with 

doubt resolved in favor of the nonmovant.” Crown Operations Int ’I, Ltd. v. Solutia, Inc., 289 

F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see alsoXerox Corp. v. SCom Corp., 267 F.3d 1361, 1364 

(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Whep ruling on a motion for summary judgment, all of the nonmovant’s 

evidence is to be credited, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the nonmovant’s 

favor.”). “Issues of fact are genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable [fact finder] 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id at 1375 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1 986)). The trier of fact should “assure itself that there is no reasonable 

version of the facts, on the summary judgment record, whereby the nonmovant could prevail, 

recognizing that the purpose of summary judgment is not to deprive a litigant of a fair hearing, 

but to avoid an unnecessary trial.” EMI Group North America, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887, 

891 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “Where an issue as to a material fact cannot be resolved without 

observation of the demeanor of witnesses in order to evaluate their credibility, suinmary 

judgment is not appropriate.” Sandt Technology, Ltd. v. Resco Metal and Plastics Corp., 264 

F.3d 1344, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Dyk, C.J., concurring). “In other words, ‘[s]ummary 

judgment is authorized when it is quite clear what the truth is,’ [citations omitted], and the law 

requires judgment in favor of the movant based upon facts not in genuine dispute.” Paragon 

5 
PUBLIC VERSION 

Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v. KLM Laboratories, Inc., 984 F.2d 1 182, 1 185 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 

Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v. KLM Laboratories, Inc., 984 F.2d 1 182, 1 185 (Fed. Cir. 

1993). 

A violation of Section 337 may not be found unless supported by “reliable, probative, and 

substantial evidence.” 35 U.S.C. 5 559; see also Certain Ink Markers and Packaging Thereof, 

Inv. No. 337-TA-522, Order No. 30 at 13-14 (July 25,2005) (Unreviewed Initial Determination); 

Certain SildenaJl or any Pharmaceutically Acceptable Salt Thereox Such as SildenaJI Citrate 

and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-489, Com. Op. Remedy, the Public Interest, 

and Bonding at 4-5 (July 2004). 

111. VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY 

A. Validity 

On June 20,2007, Administrative Law Judge Barton issued an initial determination 

finding that of U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2,140,606, U.S. Trademark Registration No. 

2,421,077, U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2,140,605, and U.S. Trademark Registration No. 

2,448,848 (collectively “Caterpillar Trademarks”) are valid. (See Order No. 45 (June 20,2007).) 

The Commission determined not to review the order. (See Notice of Commission Decision Not 

to Review the Initial Determination Contained in Order No. 45 (July, 26,2007).) (See also SOF 

44-6 1 .) 

B. Enforceability 

Caterpillar argues that its Trademarks are enforceable. (Memo. at 8.) Caterpillar argues 

that the only challenge to enforceability came from the “Bryan Cave Respondents” who have 

since been terminated from the investigation based on settlement agreement. (Id.) Caterpillar 

6 
PUBLIC VERSION 

argues that no other challenges to the enforceability of its Trademarks remains. (Id.) Staff 

agrees. (Staff Br. At 4.) 

The ALJ finds that Caterpillar Trademarks are enforceable. The evidence shows that 

Caterpillar has actively protected and enforced its trademarks. (See Statement of Undisputed 

Facts (“SoF”) at 62-64.) 

IV. IMPORTATION 

Section 337(a)(l)(C) declares unlawful “the importation into the United States, the sale 

for importation, or the sale within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or 

consignee, of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States trademark registered 

under the Trademark Act of 1946.” 19 U.S.C. $1337(a)(l)(C). 

On June 20,2007, Administrative Law Judge Barton issued an initial determination 

finding that certain respondents imported hydraulic excavators. (See Order No. 45 (June 20, 

2007).) The Commission determined not to review the order. (See Notice of Commission 

Decision Not to Review the Initial Determination Contained in Order No. 45 (July, 26,2007)) 

Caterpillar argues that the Defaulting Respondents imported, offered for sale and/ or sold 

foreign excavators. (Memo. at 13.) Caterpillar contends that Frontera sold several gray market 

excavators on its website, which were manufactured for and sold in either the Asian Pacific 

market or Latin American market, and bear one or more of the Caterpillar Trademarks. (Id.) 

Similarly, Caterpillar contends that Barkley sold several gray market excavators on its website 

that were manufactured for and sold in either the Japanese market or Asian Pacific market, and 

bear one or more of the Caterpillar Trademarks. (Id. at 14.) Staff agrees. (Staff Resp. at 4.) 

7 
PUBLIC VERSION 

The ALJ finds that the evidence shows that the Defaulting Respondents have imported, 

offered for sale and/or sold grey market excavators. Specifically, the evidence shows that 

Frontera offered four 320CL model excavators for sale on its website. [ 

]The excavator with the serial number ANB-03705 was manufactured for and sold in the 

Asia Pacific market and those with serial numbers ANB-02869, ANB-02871 and BER-00484 

were manufactured for and sold in the Latin American market. (Compl. 7 7.) As Caterpillar 

products, each of the Caterpillar gray market excavators offered for sale, andor sold by Frontera 

bears the asserted “CAT” and/or “CATERPILLAR” trademarks. [ ll 

1 

The evidence fhther shows that Barkley offered several excavators for sale on its website. 

[ 

with serial number CLK-00752, three 320C model excavators with serial numbers AKH-02694, 

FBA-02754, and AKH-01450, two 320CU model excavators with serial numbers APA-00371 

and APA-00544, a 330CL model excavator with serial number HAA-00468, and a 345BII model 

excavator with serial number AMD-00327, which were all manufactured for and sold in the 

Japanese market. (Id.; Compl. 7 7.) Additionally, Barkley also offered for sale a 330CL model 

with serial number KDD-00470, which was manufactured for and sold in the Asia Pacific market. 

(Id.) As Caterpillar products, each of these excavators Barkley offered for sale, and/or sold bears 

the asserted “CAT” and/or “CATERPILLAR” trademarks. [ 

3 Barkley offered a 3 1 1 CU model excavator 

] Therefore, the ALJ finds that the importation requirement has been 

satisfied. 

8 
PUBLIC VERSION 

V. INFRINGEMENT 

A. Applicable Law 

Infringement of a U.S. registered trademark occurs when, inter alia, any person, without 

the consent of the trademark owner, uses “in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 

colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, 

or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause 

confL1sion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. 0 11 14(1). “The test for infringement 

of a federally registered trademark is likelihood of confusion.” Certain Woodworking Machines, 

Inv. No. 337-TA-174, Initial Determination at 24 (Feb. 6, 1985) (unreviewed in relevant part). 

Gray market goods are genuine goods that are imported without the consent of the U.S. 

trademark holder. Gamut Trading Co. v. US. International Trade Comm ’n, 200 F.3d 775,778 

(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Gamut”). Although gray market goods are genuine goods -- meaning they are 

not counterfeit goods -- and legitimately bear the trademark in their country of origin, the goods 

are gray because the goods are materially different from the trademarked goods that are intended 

for sale in the United States. Id. at 778-79. In Gamut, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 

basic question in determining infringement in gray market cases concerning goods of foreign 

origin is “whether there are differences between the foreign and domestic product and if so 

whether the differences are material.” Id. at 799. Thus, when the gray market goods are 

identical to the products authorized for domestic sale by the trademark holder, the markholder 

cannot prevent the importation of gray market goods. “As such, the basic question in gray 

market cases ‘is not whether the mark was validly affixed’ to the goods, ‘but whether there are 

differences between the foreign and domestic product and if so whether the differences are 

material.’ We have applied ‘a low threshold of materiality, requiring no more than showing that 

9 
PUBLIC VERSION 

consumers would be likely to consider the differences between the foreign and domestic 

products to be significant when purchasing the product.’” Bourdeau Bros. v. Int ’I Trade Comm ’n, 

444 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Gamut Trading Co. v. US. International Trade 

Comm ’n, 200 F.3d 775,777). 

The existence of material differences creates a legal presumption that consumers are 

likely to be confused as to the source of the gray market product, resulting in damage to the 

markholder’s goodwill. Certain Agricultural Tractors Under 50 Power Take-OffHorsepower, 

Inv. No. 337-TA-380, Commission Opinion (March 5,1997), USITC Pub. 3026 (March 1997) 

(“Tractors”) at 4,5. When there are material differences between domestic products and foreign 

products bearing the same marks, exclusion of the gray market goods is warranted on grounds of 

both: (1) protecting consumers from confusion or deception as to the source, quality, and nature 

of the product bearing the marks; and (2) safeguarding the goodwill of the domestic enterprise. 

Gamut, 200 F.3d at 780. When the same trademark appears on gray market goods that are 

materially different from authorized goods, but nonetheless bear strong similarities in appearance 

or function, the likelihood of consumer confusion is heightened. Certain Agricultural Tractors 

Under 50 Power Take-OffHorsepower, Inv. No. 337-TA-380, Initial Determination at 21, citing 

Nestle, 982 F.2d at 641. Differences that would be readily apparent to consumers of the 

products when the products are side-by-side can be material. Gamut, 200 F.3d at 781. 

Differences need not be physical, but can include nonphysical differences such as warranty 

protection or service commitments. SKF, 423 F.3d at 13 13. In addition, the unlawful act 

defined by section 337 is the “importation into the United States, the sale for importation into the 

United States, or the sale within the United States after importation” of an article that infringes a 

registered trademark. 19 US. C. $1337(a)( l)(C). Thus, for purposes of establishing a violation 

10 
PUBLIC VERSION 

of section 337, the question of whether an item is infringing should be determined “at the time of 

its importation or sale, not in some later point of time.” Tractors, Comm’n Op. at 9. 

The Federal Circuit has also held that a plaintiff in a gray market trademark infringement 

case must establish that “all or substantially all” of its sales are accompanied by the asserted 

material difference in order to show that its goods are materially different. SKF United States, 

Inc. v. Int ’I Trade Comm ’n, 423 F.3d 1307, 13 15 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Court reasoned that 

“[ilf less than all or substantially all of a trademark owner’s products possess the 

material difference, then the trademark owner has placed into the stream of 

commerce a substantial quantity of goods that are or may be the same or similar 

to those of the importer, and then there is no material difference. . . a trademark 

owner’s argument that consumers would be confused by gray goods lacking an 

asserted material difference from the authorized goods is inconsistent with the 

owner’s own sale of marked goods also lacking that material difference from its 

own authorized goods. To permit recovery by a trademark owner when less than 

“substantially all” of its goods bear the material difference from the gray goods 

thus would allow the owner itself to contribute to the confusion by consumers that 

it accuses gray market importers of creating. 

Id. (internal citations omitted.) The Federal Circuit further held that the “all or substantially all” 

test recognizes that something less than 100% compliance will suffice and permits a small 

amount of nonconforming goods. Id. at 13 16. “[A] trademark owner must show that all or 

substantially all of its authorized goods are accompanied by each of the claimed material 

differences to satisfy that standard.” Id. 

Complainant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is 

infringement of the trademarks in issue. See, e.g., Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components 

Thereox Inv. No. 337-TA-487,2004 ITC LEXIS 257, *22-23 (January 13,2004) (citing Conroy 

v. Reebok International, Ltd., I4 F. 3d I5 70, I5 73 (Fed. Cir. 1994). ) 

11 
PUBLIC VERSION 

B. Material Differences 

Caterpillar argues that its hydraulic excavators that are sold in the United States (“U.S. 

Excavators”) are accompanied by standard features that are not present in foreign excavators. 

(Memo. at 10.) Specifically, Caterpillar argues that the U.S. Excavators contain certain physical 

differences, namely (1) English language warning labels; (2) English language operation and 

maintenance manuals; (3) travel alarms; (4) seat belts; and (5) lift table stickers. (Id. at 10-12.) 

Caterpillar further argues that the U.S. Excavators contain certain non-physical differences, 

namely its product support and product improvement programs (“PIP”) through which 

Caterpillar contacts owners to implement various updates. (Id. at 12.) Caterpillar argues that the 

excavators sold by the Defaulting Respondents do not contain one or more of these differences 

and that these differences are material. (Id at 13-1 9.) 

. 

Staff agrees with Caterpillar on almost every difference. (Staff Resp. at 7-1 3.) Staff, 

however, argues that Caterpillar has failed to show that the grey market excavators do not 

contain a seat belt and, therefore, this is not a material difference between the U.S. Excavators 

and grey market excavators. (Id. at 9- 10.) 

1. English language warning labels 

Caterpillar argues that its U.S. Excavators are sold with English language warning labels, 

while the grey market excavators are sold with warning labels in the language of the region for 

which they were intended for sale. (Memo. at 10.) Caterpillar further argues that this difference 

is material because the appropriate language labels are important for safety and liability purposes. 

(Id. at 18.) Staff agrees. (Staff Resp. at 7-8.) 

12 
PUBLIC VERSION 

The ALJ finds that the grey market excavators sold by Defaulting Respondents are not 

accompanied by this difference. The US. Excavators are sold with English language warning 

labels, which are required by US. regulations. 

[ ] The evidence shows that grey market 

excavators sold by the Defaulting Respondents were sold with labels in the language 

predominant in the country in wich they were first sold, which was not English. [ 

3 The ALJ further finds that these differences are material because 

English language warning labels required by U.S. regulations and failure to have English 

language warning labels would result in a liability issue for the owner, operator and maintenance 

personnel of the excavator. [ 1 

2. English language operation and maintenance manuals 

Caterpillar argues that its U.S. Excavators are sold with English operation and 

maintenance manuals that are physically attached by a wired cable to each excavator, while the 

grey market excavators are sold with warning labels in the language of the region for which they 

were intended for sale. (Memo. at 1 1 .) Caterpillar further argues that this difference is material 

because the appropriate language labels are important so that customers can properly maintain 

the excavators and also because they are important for safety and liability purposes. (Id. at 16, 

18-19.) Staff agrees. (Staff Resp. at 8.) 

The ALJ finds that the grey market excavators sold by Defaulting Respondents are not 

accompanied by this difference. The US. Excavators are sold with English operation and 

maintenance manuals. [ 1 

13 
PUBLIC VERSION 

The evidence shows that grey market excavators sold by the Defaulting Respondents 

were sold with operation and maintenance manuals in the language predominant in the country in 

which they were first sold, which was not English. [ 

3 The ALJ further finds that these differences are 

material to a U.S. customer because English language operation and maintenance manuals allow 

them to properly care for their excavators, avoid downtime, and because failure to do so would 

result in a liability issue for the owner, operator and maintenance personnel of the excavator. 

[ 1 

3. Travel alarm 

Caterpillar argues that its U.S. Excavators are sold with travel alarms, which sounds an 

audible warning alarm when the excavator moves, as required by U.S. laws, while the grey 

market excavators intended for sale elsewhere do no include travel alarms as a mandatory 

attachment and may not even include them as an optional attachment. (Memo. at 1 1 .) 

Caterpillar further argues that this difference is material because it is an important safety feature 

and required by U.S. regulations. (Id. at 16.) Any failure to include this feature could result in a 

fine to the owner of the excavator as well as more downtime. (Id. at 17.) Staff agrees. (Staff 

Resp. at 9.) The ALJ finds that the grey market excavators sold by Defaulting Respondents are 

not accompanied by this difference. [ 

3 The ALJ further finds that this is material to a U.S. customer because it is 

required by OSHA regulations and failure to have such a feature can result in downtime. [ 

1 

14 
PUBLIC VERSION 

4. Seat belt 

Caterpillar argues that its U.S. Excavators are sold with seat belts as required by federal 

regulations, while the grey market excavators intended for sale elsewhere do no include seat 

belts as a mandatory attachment and may not include them as an optional attachment. (Memo. at 

1 1 .) Caterpillar further argues that this difference is material because it is an important safety 

feature and required by U.S. regulations. (Id. at 16.) Staff argues that Caterpillar has failed to 

show that the hydraulic excavators abroad are not manufactured with safety seat belts. (Staff 

Resp. at 9.) 

The ALJ agrees with Staff. Caterpillar has pointed to no evidence that the grey market 

excavators imported by the Defaulting Respondents fail to have seat belts. (See SoF 77 93-121 .) 

Therefore, the AW finds that Caterpillar has failed to meet its burden with respect to the seat 

belts. 

5. Lift table sticker 

Caterpillar argues that its U.S. Excavators are sold with lift table stickers, which identify 

the lifting capacity, in pounds, of the excavator, as required by U.S. laws, while the grey market 

excavators intended for sale elsewhere may not include such stickers if they are not rated for 

lifting or may include lift table stickers in a foreign language or in metric measurements, 

depending on the region for which they are intended. (Memo. at 11-12.) Caterpillar further 

argues that this difference is material because it is an important safety feature and required by 

U.S. regulations. (Id. at 16.) Any failure to include this feature could result in a fine to the 

owner of the excavator as well as more downtime. (Id. at 17.) Staff agrees. (Staff Resp. at 10.) 

The ALJ finds that the grey market excavators sold by Defaulting Respondents are not 

accompanied by this difference. The US. Excavators are sold with lift table stickers that use the 

15 
PUBLIC VERSION 

English system, e.g. pounds, for measurement and comply with federal regulations. [ 1 

The evidence shows that the grey market excavators sold by the Defaulting Respondents would 

not have had lift table stickers if they were not rated for lifting [ 

3 and, in some cases, would not have had a lift 

table sticker because they were intended for sale in Japan and thus not rated for lifting.2 [ 

3 The ALJ further finds that this is material to a U.S. customer because 

it is required by OSHA regulations and failure to have such a feature can result in downtime. [ 

1 

6. PIP 

Caterpillar argues that the PIP are programs through which Caterpillar contacts the 

owners of excavators to implement various updates and are administered by the Marketing 

Business Unit for each of the individual marketing regions. (Memo. at 12.) Caterpillar argues 

that the PIPS are generally not available on excavators intended for sale elsewhere and their 

administration is problematic because imported gray market excavators will not receive the 

appropriate support because the machine is no longer within the territory of the marketing 

Caterpillar excavators intended for sale in Japan do not have lift table stickers because, in Japan, excavators are 

not considered legal lifting devices. [ 

1 

16 
PUBLIC VERSION 

organization that originally sold the machine or any dealer within the original territory. (Id.) 

Caterpillar argues that the PIPs are significant because without it the customer’s excavators may 

not get the necessary updates, and customers may experience significant delays in getting 

appropriate service and parts support resulting in downtime at their job sites when compared to 

the service and parts support given to owners the U.S. Excavators. (Id. at 17.) Staff agrees. 

(Staff Resp. at 10- 1 1 .) 

The ALJ finds that the grey market excavators sold by Defaulting Respondents are not 

accompanied by this non-physical difference. Caterpillar’s North American Regional 

Department administers the PIPs on the U.S. Excavators. [ 

shows that because the grey market excavators sold by the Defaulting Respondents were not first 

sold in the United States, a customer would likely not receive the appropriate updates, and even 

if it did, would have not gotten the same level of service or support as a customer that owned an 

excavator intended for and first sold in the United States. 

[ 

that this is material to a U.S. customer because without PIPs, customer’s excavators may not get 

the necessary updates and could experience significant delays and downtime when compared to 

the service and parts support given to owners of U.S. excavators. 

3 The evidence 

] The ALJ further finds 

[ 1 

Therefore, the ALJ finds that the Defaulting Respondents have imported, offered for sale 

and/or sold after importation grey market hydraulic excavators that fail to contain one or more of 

the material differences listed above, namely English language warning labels, English language 

operation and maintenance manuals, standard travel alarms, English unit lift table stickers and 

PIP support services. 

17 
PUBLIC VERSION 

C. All or Substantially All 

[ 

1 

The Federal Circuit recently dealt with the issue of whether an authorized dealers’ sales 

could be included in the “all or substantially all” analysis stating that the ITC “must presume that 

sales by authorized dealers were in fact authorized.” Bourdeau, 444 F.3d at 1327. The Federal 

Circuit reasoned that to hold otherwise would allow the mark holder to disclaim sales by simply 

18 
PUBLIC VERSION 

stating that they were not authorized. Id. The Court noted, however, that the mark holder could 

rebut the presumption. Id. The Court fiu-ther stated that the mark holder could still prevail if it 

showed that the sales of the grey market goods by the dealers was so small that substantially all 

of the domestic sales bore the material differences. Id. 

First, the ALJ finds that all or substantially all of Caterpillar’s domestic sales of U.S. 

Excavators were accompanied by all of the material differences. [ 

1 

As for the sales of Caterpillar’s subsidiaries and dealers, the ALJ finds that the sales of 

grey market excavators by these subsidiaries and dealers should not be included in the “all or 

substantially all” analysis. Caterpillar has met its burden of rebutting the presumption that the 

sales of its subsidiaries and dealers were authorized sales. [ 

19 
PUBLIC VERSION 

] Therefore, since Caterpillar and its 

subsidiaries are separate corporate entities, the ALJ finds that the sales of Caterpillar’s 

subsidiaries should not be included in the all or substantially all analysis. See Certain 

Agricultural Vehicles And Components Thereox Investigation No. 337-TA-487,2006 ITC 

LEXIS 862, at *46 (December 20,2006) (finding that the complainant John Deere should not be 

held accountable for the actions of its wholly owned subsidiary because they are two separate 

and distinct corporate entities). 

Regarding Caterpillar’s dealers, [ 

20 
PUBLIC VERSION 

3 Therefore, the ALJ finds that Caterpillar has met its burden of rebutting the 

presumption that the sales of its dealers was authorized and, thus, the dealers’ sales should not be 

included in the “all or substantially all’’ analysis. 

21 
PUBLIC VERSION 

Therefore, the ALJ finds that all or substantially all of Caterpillar’s sales of hydraulic 

excavators are accompanied by the material differences and that the sales of Caterpillar’s 

subsidiaries and dealers should not be included in the “all or substantially all” analysis.3 

In sum, Caterpillar has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

Defaulting Respondents have infringed the Caterpillar Trademarks through the unauthorized 

importation, sale for importation andor sale after importation of grey market hydraulic 

excavators. 

VI. DOMESTIC INDUSTRY 

On June 20,2007, Administrative Law Judge Barton issued an initial determination 

finding that Caterpillar has satisfied the domestic industry requirement. (See Order No. 44 (May 

23,2007).) The Commission determined not to review the order. (See Notice of Commission 

Decision Not to Review an Initial Determination Granting In Part and Denying in Part 

Complainant’s Motion for Summary Determination (June 20,2007).) 

VII. REMEDY AND BONDING 

A. General Exclusion Order 

Under Section 337(d), the Commission may issue either a limited or a general exclusion 

order. A limited exclusion order instructs the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) to 

exclude from entry all articles that are covered by the patent at issue and that originate fiom a 

The ALJ notes, however, that even if the sales of Caterpillar’s subsidiaries and dealers were to be 

considered in the “all or substantially all” analysis, all or substantially all of the excavator sales of Caterpillar, its 

subsidiaries and dealers are accompanied by the material differences. [ 1 

22 
PUBLIC VERSION 

named respondent in the investigation. A general exclusion order instructs the CBP to exclude 

from entry all articles that are covered by the patent at issue, without regard to source. 

A general exclusion order may issue in cases where (a) a general exclusion from entry of 

articles is necessary to prevent circumvention of an exclusion order limited to products of named 

respondents; or (b) there is a widespread pattern of violation of Section 337 and it is difficult to 

identifl the source of infringing products. 19 U.S.C. 0 1337(d)(2). The statute essentially 

codifies Commission practice under Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and Components 

ThereoJ; Inv. No. 337-TA-90, Commission Opinion at 18-19, USITC Pub. 119 (Nov. 1981) 

(“Spray Pumps”). See Certain Neodymium-Iron-Boron Magnets, Magnet Alloys, and Articles 

Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-372 (“Magnets”), Commission Opinion on Remedy, the 

Public Interest and Bonding at 5 (USITC Pub. 2964 (1 996)) (statutory standards “do not differ 

significantly” from the standards set forth in Spray Pumps). 

In Magnets, the Commission confirmed that there are two requirements for a general 

exclusion order: a “widespread pattern of unauthorized use;” and “certain business conditions 

from which one might reasonably infer that foreign manufacturers other than the respondents to 

the investigation may attempt to enter the U.S. market with infringing articles.” The 

Commission went on to state the following factors as relevant to determining whether there is a 

“widespread pattern of unauthorized use”: 

(1) a Commission determination of unauthorized importation of the infringing article 

into the United States by numerous foreign manufacturers; or 

(2) the pendency of foreign infringement suits based on foreign patents corresponding 

to the U.S. patent; [or] 

(3) other evidence which demonstrates a history of unauthorized foreign use of the 

patented invention. 

23 
PUBLIC VERSION 

Magnets, Commission Opinion on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding at 6 (citing Spray 

Pumps). 

In addition, the Commission listed the following factors as relevant to showing whether 

“certain business conditions” - the second Spray Pumps factor - exist: 

the existence of an established demand for the article in the U.S. market and 

conditions of the world market; 

the availability to foreign manufacturers of U.S. marketing and distribution 

networks; 

the cost for foreign entrepreneurs to build a facility that can produce the patented 

articles; 

the number of foreign manufacturers whose facilities could be converted to 

manufacture the patented article; and 

the foreign manufacturers’ cost to convert a facility to produce the patented 

articles. 

Caterpillar seeks the issuance of a general exclusion order that prohibits the importation 

of grey market excavators bearing the Caterpillar Trademarks. (Memo. at 30.) 

1. Widespread Pattern of Unauthorized Use 

Caterpillar argues that there is a widespread pattern of unauthorized use as evidenced by 

(1) the Defaulting Respondents’ and other settled respondents importation, offer for sale after 

importation and sale after importation of grey market excavators; (2) the sheer number of grey 

market excavators offered for sale or sold and the hundreds of customers that purchased the grey 

market excavators; (3) the hundreds of other domestic and foreign companies, in addition to the 

24 
PUBLIC VERSION 

named respondents, involved in the importation, sale for importation and sale afler importation 

of grey market excavators; and (4) the number of foreign entities from which companies can 

acquire grey market excavators. (Memo. at 30-33.) Staff agrees. (Staff Resp. at 18.) 

The ALJ finds that Caterpillar has sufficiently demonstrated a widespread pattern of 

unauthorized use. The evidence shows that there are hundreds more domestic and foreign 

companies involved in the importation, sale for importation, and sale after importation of grey 

market excavators in addition to the named respondents. [ 

1 

Therefore, the ALJ finds that the evidence shows that there is a widespread pattern of 

unauthorized use of Caterpillar Trademarks. 

2. Business Conditions 

Caterpillar argues that certain business conditions exist that warrant a general exclusion 

order, namely that there is a demand for hydraulic excavators as evidenced by Caterpillar’s and 

respondents’ success; that it is good business to import and sell grey market excavators; and that 

there are numerous sources from which to obtain grey market excavators. (Memo. at 33-35.) 

Staff agrees. (Staffs Resp. at 18.) 

25 
PUBLIC VERSION 

The ALJ finds that certain business conditions exist that warrant a general exclusion 

order. The evidence shows there is demand for the accused excavators, and there are hundreds, 

if not thousands, of potential customers in the United States. [ 

] The evidence further shows that the importation of grey 

market excavators is extremely profitable [ 

1 

26 
PUBLIC VERSION 

Therefore the ALJ finds that certain business conditions exist that would warrant a 

general exclusion order. Based on the foregoing, the ALJ finds that the evidence supports the 

issuance of a general exclusion order. 

B. Cease and Desist Order 

Section 337 provides that in addition to, or in lieu of, the issuance of an exclusion order, 

the Commission may issue a cease and desist order as a remedy for violation of section 337. See 

19 U.S.C. 0 1337(f)(l). The Commission generally issues a cease and desist order directed to a 

domestic respondent when there is a “commercially significant” amount of infringing, imported 

product in the United States that could be sold so as to undercut the remedy provided by an 

exclusion order. See Certain Crystalline Cefadroxil Monohydrate, Inv. No. 337-TA-293, USITC 

Pub. 2391, Comm’n Op. on Remedy, the Public Interest and Bonding at 37-42 (June 1991); 

Certain Condensers, Parts Thereof and Products Containing Same, Including Air Conditioners 

for Automobiles, Inv. No. 337-TA-334, Comm’n Op. at 26-28 (Aug. 27, 1997). 

27 
PUBLIC VERSION 

Caterpillar argues that cease and desist order is warranted against the Defaulting 

Respondents as they are domestic entities that are presumed to maintain significant inventories in 

the United States. (Memo. at 35-36.) Staff agrees. (Staff Resp. at 19.) 

The ALJ finds that a cease desist order against Defaulting Respondents is warranted. The 

evidence shows that the Defaulting Respondents are located in the United States and maintain 

inventories of grey market excavators bearing the Caterpillar Trademarks in the United States. 

(Ex. 47,48.) 

C. Bonding 

The Administrative Law Judge and the Commission must determine the amount of bond 

to be required of a respondent, pursuant to section 337(j)(3), during the 60-day Presidential 

review period following the issuance of permanent relief, in the event that the Commission 

determines to issue a remedy. The purpose of the bond is to protect the complainant from any 

injury. 19 C.F.R. 9 210.42(a)(l)(ii), 0 21OSO(a)(3). 

When reliable price information is available, the Commission has often set the bond by 

eliminating the differential between the domestic product and the imported, infringing product. 

See Certain Microsphere Adhesives, Processes for Making Same, and Products Containing Same, 

Including Self-stick Repositionable Notes, Inv. No. 337-TA-366, Comm’n Op. a 24 (1995). In 

other cases, the Commission has turned to alternative approaches, especially when the level of a 

reasonable royalty rate could be ascertained. See, e.g., Certain Integrated Circuit 

Telecommunication Chips and Products Containing Same, Including Dialing Apparatus, Inv. No. 

337-TA-337, Comm’n Op. at 41 (1995). A 100 percent bond has been required when no 

effective alternative existed. See, e.g., Certain Flash Memory Circuits and Products Containing 

28 
PUBLIC VERSION 

Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-382, USITC Pub. No. 3046, Comm’n Op. at 26-27 (July 1997)(a 100% 

bond imposed when price comparison was not practical because the parties sold products at 

different levels of commerce, and the proposed royalty rate appeared to be de minimis and 

without adequate support in the record). 

Caterpillar argues that a bond of 100% is appropriate in this investigation due to the wide 

variety of price points. (Memo. at 37-38.) Staff agrees. (Staff Resp. at 20.) 

The ALJ finds that there is insufficient evidence of an appropriate royalty rate or reliable 

price information. Therefore, the ALJ recommends a bond of 100%. 

Based on the reasons set forth above, the ALJ finds that Caterpillar has shown by reliable, 

probative and substantive evidence that a violation of Section 337 has occurred. The ALJ flurther 

finds that a general exclusion order, cease and desist order and a bond of 100% are appropriate. 

Therefore, Caterpillar’s motion for summary determination is hereby GRANTED. 

Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. 3 210.38(d), the ALJ hereby CERTIFIES to the Commission the 

record in this investigation. 

Pursuant to 19 C.F.R.3 210.42(h), this Initial Determination shall become the 

determination of the Commission unless a party files a petition for review of the Initial 

Determination pursuant to 19 C.F.R. 0 210.43(a), or the Commission, pursuant to 19 C.F.R. tj 

2 10.44, orders, on its own motion, a review of the Initial Determination or certain issues herein. 

Within seven days of the date of this document, each party shall submit to the office of 

the Administrative Law Judge a statement as to whether or not it seeks to have any portion of 

29 
PUBLIC VERSION 

this document deleted from the public version. The parties' submissions must be made by hard 

copy by the aforementioned date. 

Any party seeking to have any portion of this document deleted from the public version 

thereof must submit to this office a copy of this document with red brackets indicating any 

portion asserted to contain confidential business information by the aforementioned date. The 

parties' submission concerning the public version of this document need not be filed with the 

Commission Secretary. 

SO ORDERED. 

Theodore R. Essex 

Administrative Law Judge 

30 
CERTAIN HYDRAULIC EXCAVATORS AND 

COMPONENTS THEREOF Inv. No. 337-TA-582 

PUBLIC CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Marilyn R. Abbott, hereby certify that the attached ORDER 67 INITIAL DETERMATION 

GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY DETERMINATION CONCERNING VIOLATION 

OF SECTION 337 REMEDY, BONDIN, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST has been served by 

hand upon Commission Investigative Attorney, Kecia Reynolds, Esq.,, and the following parties 

on February 6, 2009. 

500 E Street, SW, Room 112A 

Washington, D.C. 20436 

COMPLAINANT CATERPILLAR, INC.: 

Margaret D. Macdonald, Esq. 

HOWREY LLP 

1299 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 

Washington, D.C. 20004 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

69 Via Overnight Mail 

( ) Via First Class Mail 

( )Other 
CERTAIN HYDRAULIC EXCAVATORS AND 

COMPONENTS THEREOF Inv. No. 337-TA-582 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - PAGE 2 

PUBLIC MAILING LIST 

Sherry Robinson 

8891 Gander Creek Drive 

Miamisburg, OH 45342 

LEXIS - NEXIS 

Kenneth Clair 

Thomson West 

1100 Thirteen Street, NW, Suite 200 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

Qcs Via Overnight Mail 

( ) Via First Class Mail 

( )Other 

Hand Delivery 

V'a Overnight Mail 

) Via First Class Mail 

( )Other 

PUBLIC VERSION 

goods. The Commission finds, however, that in light of our Remand Opinion in Agricultural 

Vehicles and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-487 (Aug. 25,2008) (“Agricultural Vehicles 

Remand”), additional analysis is necessary. We provide that analysis here and determine (1) to 

reverse the ALJ’s finding that Caterpillar did not authorize the sale of certain gray market 

excavators in the United States; but (2) to affirm the ALJ’s alternative finding that these sales, if 

authorized, were so small in number that “substantially all” of Caterpillar’s authorized sales of 

hydraulic excavators in the United States were materially different from the gray market 

excavators of which it complains. With respect to remedy, the Commission has determined to 

issue a general exclusion order against the infringing goods and to issue cease and desist orders 

against two defaulting respondents. 

A. The Original Investigation 

The Commission instituted this investigation on September 6,2006, based on a complaint 

filed by Caterpillar. 71 Fed. Reg. 52577 (Sept. 6,2006). The complaint, as supplemented, 

alleged violations of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 0 1337, in the importation 

into the United States, sale for importation, and sale within the United States after importation of 

certain hydraulic excavators and components thereof by reason of infringement and dilution of 

U.S. Registered Trademarks Nos. 2,140,606; 2,421,077; 2,140,605; and 2,448,848 (“the 

Trademarks at issue”). Twenty-one respondents were named in the Commission’s notice of 

investigation. Nineteen were terminated from the investigation on the basis of settlement 

agreements and consent orders (the “Settled Respondents”). Two respondents, Barkley 

Industries, Inc. (“Barkley”) and Frontera Equipment Sales (“Frontera”) (collectively, the 

2 
PUBLIC VERSION 

“Defaulting Respondents”) were found to be in default. See Order No. 8 (Dec. 1,2006). On 

December 26,2006, the Commission issued notice that it had determined not to review Order 

No. 8. 

Specifically, this case involves sales for importation of certain Caterpillar-branded 

hydraulic heavy duty earthmoving and construction equipment and components thereof 

(“hydraulic excavators”), bearing Caterpillar’s trademarks, by official and independent 

Caterpillar dealers in the United States and abroad, as well as by certain wholly owned 

Caterpillar affiliates in the United States. Many of the excavators sold and imported by official 

Caterpillar dealers were purchased by the former respondents who reached settlement agreements 

with Caterpillar in this case (the “Settled Respondents”), all of whom are independent dealers of 

used equipment, and the two Defaulting Respondents. The ALJ found, and the Commission 

affirmed, that the Caterpillar Trademarks at issue are valid. See Order No. 45 (June 20,2007); 

Notice of Commission Decision Not to Review Initial Determination Contained in Order No. 45 

(July 26,2007). 

On September 9, 2008, the ALJ issued his final ID, granting Caterpillar’s motion for 

summary determination of violation of Section 337 and finding that Caterpillar has actively 

protected and enforced its trademarks and that they are thereby enforceable. No party active in 

the investigation challenges the enforceability of the Trademarks at issue. It is also undisputed 

that the Settled and Defaulting Respondents imported gray market hydraulic excavators that were 

materially different from those intended for sale by Caterpillar in the United States market. 

3 
PUBLIC VERSION 

The ALJ also found that Caterpillar had met its burden to rebut the presumption that it 

had authorized its official dealers to sell gray market hydraulic excavators in the United States. 

In particular, he found that Caterpillar did not authorize such sales because its dealers were 

separate corporate entities with separate headquarters, employees and business records and 

therefore should not be included in the analysis of whether all or substantially all of Caterpillar’s 

sales in the United States were materially different from the gray market goods. ID at 19-20. [ 

1. ID at 20. [ 

1. ID at 20-2 1. Without expressly saying so, the ALJ applied the actual authority 

standard for authorization, i. e. an express manifestation of authorization made by the principal to 

the agent. The ALJ, on that basis, found that Caterpillar had met its burden to rebut the 

presumption that the sales of its dealers were authorized; therefore, he did not include these sales 

in the “all or substantially all” analysis. ID at 2 1. The ALJ concluded that substantially all of 

Caterpillar’s authorized sales in the United States were materially different from the gray market 

goods at issue. 

The ALJ also recommended the issuance of a general exclusion order, cease and desist 

orders, and a bond during the period of Presidential review in the amount of 100 percent of the 

entered value of the goods. No party requested review of the ID. 

B. The Commission’s Review 

The Commission determined to review the ID sua sponte on October 30,2008, and to 

4 
PUBLIC VERSION 

request additional briefing from the parties on certain questions and on the issues of remedy, 

bonding and the public interest. 73 Fed. Reg. 65879 (Nov. 5,2008). 

The Commission asked the parties to brief three issues. First, the Commission asked 

whether Caterpillar had rebutted the presumption, established by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit in Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 444 F.3d 13 17 

(Fed. Cir. 2006) on appeal of the Commission’s Determination in Certain Agricultural Vehicles 

and Parts ThereoJ 337-TA-487 (December, 2004) (Agricultural Vehicles), that any sales of gray 

market goods by official dealers of a complainant were authorized by the complainant. To the 

extent that the existing record is insufficient to permit that showing, the Commission asked 

whether Caterpillar could rebut the presumption if given the opportunity to supplement its 

motion for summary determination of no violation. Second, the Commission asked whether any 

of Caterpillar’s overseas affiliates, subsidiaries, and/or official dealers sell gray market hydraulic 

excavators to or in the United States and, if so, if Caterpillar rebutted, or if given the opportunity 

could Caterpillar rebut, the presumption that these dealers had actual or apparent authority to sell 

these excavators in the United States. The Commission also asked how many gray market sales 

were made to or in the United States by Caterpillar’s overseas affiliates, subsidiaries, and official 

dealers. Finally, the Commission inquired whether the record indicates the total quantity of gray 

market sales made in the United States from 2000 to 2006 and, if not, whether Caterpillar could 

provide this information if given the opportunity to supplement its motion for summary 

determination of no violation. 73 Fed. Reg. 65879 (Nov. 5,2008). 

5 
PUBLIC VERSION 

11. DISCUSSION 

A. Summary of Conclusions 

The Commission, after carefully considering the standard for authorization in a gray 

market context and applying the correct standard to the record in this case, has determined that 

Caterpillar did not rebut the presumption that gray market sales by its official dealers and whollyowned subsidiaries were authorized. ’ However, given the relatively small number of authorized 

sales, compared both to the size of the gray market and to the total quantum of Caterpillar sales 

during the period at issue, and given the very large number of foreign suppliers and domestic 

importers involved in the gray market trade, the Commission finds that Caterpillar’s acts and 

omissions did not materially contribute to consumer confusion. Caterpillar has therefore met its 

On March 30,2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“the Federal 

Circuit”) vacated and remanded certain parts of the Commission’s final determination in Certain 

Agricultural Vehicles and Parts ThereoJ; 337-TA-487 (December, 2004) (“‘Agricultural 

Vehicles ”) on appeal of the Commission’s Determination in Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. 

International Trade Commission, 444 F.3d 13 17 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Bourdeau”) . The Federal 

Circuit remanded the case to the Commission to determine whether complainant Deere & 

Company (“Deere”) authorized the sale of any Deere European-version self-propelled forage 

harvesters in the United States and, if so, whether all or substantially all of the Deere 

self-propelled forage harvesters sold in the United States by Deere were North American 

versions. The Federal Circuit found that the Commission in its original determination had 

improperly placed the burden of proof concerning gray market infringement on respondents 

Erntetechnik Franz Becker; Sunova Implement Company; Bourdeau Bros., Inc. and OK 

Enterprises (collectively, the “Bourdeau respondents”), when that burden properly lay with 

Deere. Bourdeau, 444 F.3d at 1327. In its remand determination, the Commission held that 

Deere had not met its burden to rebut the presumption that all sales by its official dealers, 

whether in the United States or in Europe, were authorized. The Commission further held that 

the appropriate agency standard to apply under such circumstances is that of apparent authority: 

i. e. whether a reasonable third party businessperson, based upon the conduct of the trademark 

owner, would have reasonably believed that the sales activities of the official dealers were 

authorized by the trademark owner. Agricultural Vehicles Comm ’n Op. on Remand at 13. 

6 
PUBLIC VERSION 

burden to demonstrate that “all or substantially all” of Caterpillar’s sales of hydraulic excavators 

in the United States during the period examined were U.S.-market versions of these machines. 

Accordingly, as discussed in greater detail below, the Commission affirms, albeit on 

different grounds, the ALJ’s initial determination, Order No. 67, granting Caterpillar’s motion 

for summary determination concerning violation of Section 337. With respect to remedy, the 

Commission has determined to issue a general exclusion order and two cease and desists orders. 

B. Caterpillar Has Not Rebutted the Presumption That Its Affiliated Entities 

and Dealers Had Apparent Authority to Sell Gray Market Excavators in the 

United States 

Caterpillar has admitted that its wholly-owned affiliates Carter Machinery Inc. (“Carter”), 

Caterpillar Financial Services Corp. (“CAT Financial”) and Caterpillar Redistribution Services, 

Inc. (“CRSI”) imported gray market hydraulic excavators and sold them in the United States 

during the period under examination (2000 to 2006). Caterpillar Resp. at 12-19. These three 

entities collectively were responsible for the sale of [ ] gray market hydraulic excavators in the 

United States. In addition, Caterpillar admits that its foreign affiliates were responsible for the 

sale of an additional [ 3 gray market excavators in the United States during the same period. Id. 

In total, then, [ ] hydraulic excavators were imported and/or sold for importation by 

Caterpillar’s wholly-owned affiliates/subsidiaries. Caterpillar Resp. to Comm ’n Det. to Review 

at 13, 16 (Nov. 18,2008). Given the close corporate structure of Caterpillar and its whollyowned affiliates, and the fact that Caterpillar did not take affirmative steps to prevent those 

affiliates fiom selling gray market hydraulic excavators in the United States, we find that 

7 
PUBLIC VERSION 

Caterpillar has not met its burden to rebut the presumption that the importation and sale of [ 

gray market hydraulic excavators by Caterpillar’s U.S. and foreign affiliates/subsidiaries were 

authorized by Caterpillar. 

] 

Caterpillar also admits that its official dealers sold [ ] gray market excavators in the 

United States during the period under examination. Caterpillar Resp. at 17. However, 

Caterpillar asserts that it did not authorize these sales. Id. at 4-9. We agree with the ALJ that 

there is no evidence that Caterpillar expressly granted actual authority to its official dealers to 

sell gray market hydraulic excavators in the United States. ID at 21. However, as discussed in 

Agricultural Vehicles, when a trademark owner’s official dealers also sold gray market goods in 

United States, it must overcome the presumption that the dealers had auparent authority to sell 

the gray market goods and thereby contributed to consumer confusion. Agricultural Vehicles 

Remand at 48-5 1. 

The focus of the Commission and the courts in cases involving apparent authority is on 

the conduct and actions of the principal and how it is perceived by third parties. See Agricultural 

Vehicles Remand at 17. Caterpillar’s stress on the formal legal relationship between the 

company and its official dealers ignores this important aspect of the Commission’s apparent 

authority inquiry in these cases. Apparent authority is created when: 

[Tlhe principal, either intentionally or by lack of ordinary care, induces third 

persons to believe that an individual is his agent even though no actual authority, 

express or implied, has been granted to such individual. 

Wells Fargo Business Credit v. Ben Kozlofi Inc., 695 F.2d 940,945 (5th Cir. 1982). Courts, like 

the Commission, have defined the central query as whether: 

8 
PUBLIC VERSION 

[Slome manifestation by the principal causes a third person to reasonably believe 

an agent possesses authority to act as he does ... such that a reasonably prudent 

businessman would be led to believe an agency was created. 

General Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 676 F. Supp. 1421, 1430, 1431 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (emphasis 

added) (rev’d on other grounds); see also Minskoffv. American Exp. Travel Related Co., 98 F.3d 

703, 708 (2d Cir. 1996) (apparent authority arises from the written or spoken words or any other 

conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes a third person to believe that the 

principal consents to have an act done on its behalf by the person purporting to act for him). 

Caterpillar characterizes the evidence as demonstrating an absence of apparent authority 

on the part of its affiliates and official dealers to sell hydraulic excavators. We believe, contrary 

to Caterpillar’s representations, that the record is mixed with respect to whether third parties in 

this case reasonably believed, based on the acts or omission of Caterpillar, that Caterpillar’s 

dealers had apparent authority to sell gray market hydraulic excavators in the United States. 

For example, [ ] the president and co-owner of respondent World Tractor 

and Equipment, LLC, testified at his sworn deposition [ 

9 
PUBLIC VERSION 

1 

10 
PUBLIC VERSION 

1 

In sum, a preponderance of the evidence indicates that at least some independent and 

official dealers of used gray market Caterpillar hydraulic excavators, based on the acts and 

omissions of Caterpillar’s wholly-owned affiliates, believed that Caterpillar authorized the sale 

of gray market excavators in the United States. Those dealers appear to have based their belief, 

in particular, on their knowledge of the active sale and purchase of gray market goods by CRSI 

11 
PUBLIC VERSION 

(undisputed by Caterpillar) and the apparent knowledge of CAT Financial that gray market goods 

were being sold in the United States. Taken in conjunction with Caterpillar’s failure to express 

an objection to at least some of the Settled Respondents’ business practices as gray market 

importers, Caterpillar’s conduct led some dealers to believe that Caterpillar authorized the 

importation and sale of gray market excavators in the United States. 

Based on this record, the Commission therefore finds that Caterpillar has not met its 

burden of proof to rebut the presumption of authorization that attaches to [ ] gray market sales 

made by its official dealers and wholly-owned affiliates of gray market hydraulic excavators in 

the United States. 

C. Substantially All of the Caterpillar’s U.S. Sales of Hydraulic Excavators 

Contained the Material Differences 

As the Federal Circuit recognized in SKF, in order to show that its goods are materially 

different from the gray market goods, a complainant in a gray market trademark infringement 

case must establish that all or substantially all of its sales are accompanied by the asserted 

difference. SKF United States v. Int ’I Trade Comm ’n, 423 F.3d 1307, 13 15 (Fed.Cir. 2005). The 

“‘all or substantially all’ benchmark recognizes that something less than 100% compliance will 

suffice and certainly permits a small amount of nonconforming goods.” Id. at 1316. However, if 

the record shows that “the trademark owner has placed into the stream of commerce a substantial 

quantity of goods that are or may be the same or similar to those of an importer, then there is no 

material difference.” Id. at 13 15 (emphasis added). 

Relief for the trademark owner is not appropriate, therefore, when the trademark owner 

12 
PUBLIC VERSION 

has sold a substantial quantity of goods in the United States that are the same or similar to the 

gray market goods of which it complains because “[tlo permit recovery by a trademark owner 

when less than ‘substantially all’ of its goods bear the material difference from the gray goods 

thus would allow the owner itself to contribute to the confusion by consumers that it accuses gray 

market importers of creating.” Id. at 13 15. What quantum of nonconforming sales by the 

trademark owner constitutes a “substantial quantity,” however, varies according to the facts and 

circumstances of a given case, including actual evidence of consumer confusion. As courts have 

explained, “[a] ‘trademark’ is not that which is infringed. What is infringed is the right of the 

public to be free of confusion and the synonymous right of a trademark owner to control his 

product’s reputation.” James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266,274 (7th 

Cir. 1976). 

The Court in SKF did not define what constitutes a “substantial quantity” of nonconforming product sales by the trademark owners. The Commission has made this 

determination by taking into account the particular facts and circumstances of each case, 

eschewing a bright-line quantitative test. Here, substantial evidence on the record supports a 

finding that the presumptively authorized [ 

I. 

The Commission in Agricultural Vehicles Remand found salient that the gray market 

sales for which John Deere was responsible accounted for somewhere between 40 percent and 57 

percent of the approximately 350 gray market sales made in the United States during the period 

13 
examined in that case. Id. at 50-5 1. Under those circumstances, the Commission concluded that 

Deere was responsible for introducing a “substantial quantity” of nonconforming goods into the 

stream of commerce and “thereby contributed significantly to the confusion for which they blame 

the respondents.” 

Unlike Agricultural Vehicles, the present case involves a very large gray market for the 

goods at issue [ 

affiliates and dealers was very small [ 

conforming sales were very small compared to its overall sales of hydraulic excavators in the 

United States during the same period [ 1. The relative quantity of nonconforming sales in this case is sufficiently low, in light of evidence of a very large number of 

foreign suppliers of gray market hydraulic excavators and a wide network of domestic importers, 

that the Commission finds that Caterpillar, its affiliates, and its official dealers, have not 

contributed significantly to the consumer confusion for which Caterpillar blamed the Settled 

Respondents and Defaulting Respondents. We therefore affirm the ALJ’s determination that “all 

or substantially” all of Caterpillar’s sales of excavators during the period were conforming goods 

that contained the material differences. 

12, compared to which the role played by Caterpillar’s 

1. Moreover, Caterpillar’s non111. REMEDY3 

’[ 

1 

Where a violation of Section 337 has been found, the Commission must consider the 

issues of remedy, the public interest, and bonding. 19 U.S.C. 0 1337 (d) and (0. 
The Commission has broad discretion in selecting the form, scope, and extent of the 

remedy in a Section 337 proceeding. See Fuji Photo Film v. US. Int’l Trade Comm ’n, 386 F.3d 

1095, 1 106-1 107 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Unless the Commission’s choice of remedy constitutes an 

abuse of discretion, the Federal Circuit will sustain the Commission’s determination on remedy. 

Id. In this case, the Commission has determined to issue a general exclusion order that prohibits 

entry of Caterpillar’s gray market hydraulic excavators for consumption in the United States. 

The Commission has also determined that the public interest factors do not preclude issuance of 

this order and has set a bond during the period of Presidential review in the amount of 100 

percent of the entered value of the infringing excavators. Finally, the Commission has 

determined to issue cease and desist orders to the Defaulting Respondents. 

A. General Exclusion Order 

Complainant Caterpillar requests that the Commission issue a general exclusion order 

directed to gray market hydraulic excavators. In the ALJ’s recommended determination on 

remedy, he found that Caterpillar established a widespread pattern of unauthorized use of the 

Caterpillar trademarks, and that there were numerous foreign sources of the gray market goods, 

as well as domestic companies willing and able to import and sell the goods. ID at 25-28. For 

these reasons, he recommended that the Commission issue a general exclusion order in this case. 

ID at 28. For the reasons discussed below, the Commission agrees with the ALJ’s 

recommendation that a general exclusion order should issue. 

The Commission may issue a remedial order excluding the goods of the person(s) found 

in violation (a limited exclusion order) or, if certain criteria are met, against all infringing goods 

15 
regardless of the source (a general exclusion order). The Commission’s authority to issue a 

general exclusion order in a default case such as this one is found in Section 337(g)(2), which 

provides that the Commission may issue a general exclusion order when no one appears to 

contest the allegation of violation, a violation is established by substantial, reliable, and probative 

evidence, and the requirements of Section 337(d)(2) have been met. Section 337(d)(2) grants the 

Commission the authority to exclude offending articles regardless of their source when certain 

conditions are met. Kyocera v. Int ’I Trade Comm ’n, 545 F.3d1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also 

Vastfame Camera Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm ’n, 386 F.3d 1108, 11 13 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Section 

337(d)(2) provides that: 

The authority of the Commission to issue an exclusion from entry of articles shall 

be limited to persons determined by the Commission to be violating this section 

unless the Commission determines that-- 

(A) a general exclusion from entry of articles is necessary to prevent 

circumvention of an exclusion order limited to products of named persons; 

or 

(B) there is a pattern of violation of this section and it is difficult to identifl 

the source of infringing products. 

19 U.S.C. 0 1337(d)(2). 

In recommending a general exclusion order, the ALJ recited the statutory basis for issuing 

a general exclusion order set forth in Section 337(d)(2). His analysis, however, was partially 

based on the Commission’s Opinion in Airless Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 

337-TA-90, Commission Opinion at 18-1 9, USITC Pub. 1 19 (Nov. 198 1) (“Spray P~mps”).~ 

In Spray Pumps, the Commission held that a complainant seeking a general exclusion order 

must show (1) a widespread pattern of unauthorized use of its patented invention and (2) certain 

business conditions from which one might reasonably infer that foreign manufacturers other than 

16 
Consideration of some factual issues or evidence examined in Spray Pumps may continue to be 

useful for determining whether the requirements of Section 337(d)(2) have been met. However, 

we do not view Spray Pumps as imposing additional requirements beyond those identified in 

Section 337(d)(2). Moreover, notwithstanding his reference to Spray Pumps, we find that the 

ALJ in his ID addressed the requirements for issuance of a general exclusion order that appear in 

Section 337(d)(2)(B). In particular, he found that (1) there is a large and established market for 

the trademarked products in the United States; (2) there exists a large number of domestic and 

the respondents to the investigation may attempt to enter the U.S. market with infringing articles. 

Spray Pumps at 18. The Commission further stated that the evidence which might be presented 

to prove a “widespread pattern of unauthorized used of the patented invention” includes: 

(1) a Commission determination of unauthorized importation into the United States of 

infringing articles by numerous foreign manufacturers; or 

(2) the pendency of foreign infringement suits based upon foreign patents which 

correspond to the domestic patent in issue; [or] 

(3) other evidence which demonstrates a history of unauthorized use of the patented 

invention. 

Id. 

Evidence which the Commission has identified as relevant to the “business conditions’’ 

criterion for issuance of a general exclusion order includes: 

(1) an established demand for the patented product in the U.S. market and 

conditions of the world market; 

(2) the availability of marketing and distribution networks in the United Stated for 

potential foreign manufacturers; 

(3) the cost to foreign entrepreneurs of building a facility capable of producing 

the patented article; 

(4) the number of foreign manufacturers whose facilities could be retooled to 

produce the patented articles; or 

(5) the cost to foreign manufacturers of retooling their facility to produce the 

patented articles. 

Id. 

17 
foreign entities other than the named respondents who are involved in the importation, sale for 

importation, and sale after importation of infringing excavators; and (3) and there is a widespread 

pattern of unauthorized use of the Caterpillar trademarks. ID at 25-26. Based on these findings 

related to Section 337(d)(2), as well as his consideration of additional Spray Pumps factors, the 

ALJ recommended that the Commission issue a general exclusion order if it finds a violation of 

Section 337. 

In our judgement, Caterpillar has satisfied the requirements of Section 337(d)(2)(B) by 

showing that “there is a pattern of violation of this section and it is difficult to identifv the source 

of infringing products.” 19 U.S.C. 3 1337(d)(2)(B) (emphasis added). With respect to the 

“pattern of violation,” Caterpillar has identified “thousands” of gray market excavators present in 

the United States, as well as the existence of hundreds “if not thousands” of customers who have 

purchased, owned, or served these gray market excavators. See Caterpillar Br. at 23, Caterpillar 

Statement of Facts (SOF) at para. 223. It notes that inventory lists provided by the Settled 

Respondents have identified [ 

SOF at para 224. Significantly, the [ 

Respondents between 2000 and 2006 represent a small fraction of the [ 

Caterpillar hydraulic excavators that Caterpillar estimates to have been sold in the United States 

from 2000 to 2006. Caterpillar Resp. at 2, 17. Consequently, we find that Caterpillar has met its 

burden to establish the existence of a “pattern of violation” under the statute. 

] of customers who bought gray market excavators. Id., 

] gray market hydraulic excavators sold by the Settled 

] gray market 

Caterpillar also has met its burden to establish that “it is difficult to identify the source of 

infringing products.” Caterpillar points to record evidence to substantiate its claim that there 

18 
were “numerous foreign sources of the gray market excavators unauthorized dealers and brokers 

offering for sale for importation and/or importing Caterpillar hydraulic excavators into the 

United States.” Caterpillar Resp. at 23. In particular, Caterpillar relies on deposition testimony 

by the Settled Respondents that there were [ ] of foreign sources from which the Settled 

Respondents obtained gray market excavators. Caterpillar Br. at 23, SOF at para. 225. In 

addition, Caterpillar cites to testimonial evidence that in addition to a multitude of foreign 

sources, there were “[ 

] .” Caterpillar 

SOF at para. 222, [ 

] The Commission therefore finds that Caterpillar has established that it would be difficult 

to identify the source of the infringing products. 

In sum, the Commission finds that the statutory requirements for a general exclusion 

order have been satisfied in this case under Section 337(d)(2)(B) and that it is appropriate to 

issue a general exclusion order that prohibits entry of Caterpillar’s gray market hydraulic 

excavators for consumption in the United States. 

B. 

The Commission has also determined to issue two cease and desist orders under 19 

Whether Cease and Desist Orders Should Issue 

U.S.C. 9 1337(f). The Commission’s practice is to find that cease and desist orders are 

warranted with respect to domestic respondents that maintain commercially significant U.S. 

inventories of the infringing product. See Certain Agricultural Tractors Under 50 Take-Off 

Horsepower, Inv. No. 337-TA-380, Comm’n Op. at 31 (Mar. 12, 1997). Where, as here, 

19 
domestic respondents are in default - Defaulting Respondents Frontera and Barkely are located, 

respectively, in Texas and California - the Commission’s practice is to presume that the 

defaulting respondents maintain commercially significant inventory. Certain Digital 

Multimeters, and Products with Multimeter Functionality, Inv. No. 337-TA-588, Comm’n Op. at 

7. Consequently, we find that cease and desist orders against the Defaulting Respondents are 

warranted. 

IV. THE PUBLIC INTEREST 

The ALJ recommended cease and desist orders against the Defaulting Respondents, and 

the Commission has determined to issue a default remedy under 19 U.S.C. 3 1337(g), which is 

conditioned on consideration of the public interest. Specifically, the Commission must consider: 

[Tlhe effect of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive 

conditions in the United States economy, and production of like or directly 

competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers. 

Section 337(g)( 1). The public interest analysis does not concern whether there is a public interest 

in issuing a remedial order, but whether issuance of such an order will adversely affect the public 

interest. Id. 

In this case, there is no argument or evidence to suggest that exclusion of the infringing 

hydraulic excavators would not be in the public interest. The ITC Office of Unfair Imports 

Investigations (“OUII”) argues that there are no public health or welfare implications from the 

exclusion of the infringing excavators, or that U.S. demand for such equipment could not be met 

by the current supply of non-gray market machines. It also argues that there is a U.S. public 

interest in the protection of intellectual property rights. OULI Comments at 16. Caterpillar’s 

20 
position in support of a general exclusion order was supported by a letter from Volvo 

Construction Equipment North America (“Volvo”). Volvo argues that the importation of gray 

market machines, which were produced for other markets, can itself pose safety and quality risks 

for U.S. consumers, as well as environmental concerns due to differing emissions standards, 

which are contrary to the public interest. Consequently, the Commission finds that issuance of a 

general exclusion order is not precluded by consideration of the public interest factors set out in 

Section 337(g)(l). 

V. BOND DURING PERIOD OF PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW 

During the period of Presidential review, imported articles otherwise subject to a 

remedial order are entitled to conditional entry under bond, pursuant to Section 337Cj)(3). The 

amount of the bond is specified by the Commission and must be an amount sufficient to protect 

the complainant from any injury. 19 U.S.C. 3 1337(j)(3), 19 C.F.R. 0 210.50(a)(3). The ALJ 

recommended a bond of 100 percent during the period of Presidential Review. The record here 

lacks sufficiently reliable information as to price levels for hydraulic excavators in the United 

States. When the pricing information is insufficient, the Commission has set the amount of the 

bond at 100 percent of entered value. See e.g. Certain Neodymium Iron-Boron Magnets, Magnet 

Alloys, andArtides Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-372, Comm’n Op. on Remedy, 

Bonding and the Public Interest at 5 at 15. Accordingly, the Commission has determined to set 

the bond at 100 percent of the entered value of infringing hydraulic excavators to prevent any 

harm to Caterpillar during the period of Presidential review. 

VI. ORDERS 

21 
The Commission has determined to issue a general exclusion order that excludes certain 

hydraulic excavators manufactured by or under the authority of Caterpillar Inc. which bear one or 

more of U.S. Trademark Reg. Nos. 2,140,605,2,140,606,2,421,077, and 2,448,848 and are 

materially different from hydraulic excavators manufactured by Caterpillar for sale and use in the 

United States, from entry for consumption into the United States, entry for consumption from a 

foreign-trade zone, and withdrawal from warehouse for consumption, until such date as the 

trademarks are abandoned, canceled, or rendered invalid or unenforceable, except under license 

of the patent owner or as provided by law. The general exclusion order also provides that during 

the period of Presidential review the referenced hydraulic excavators are entitled to entry into the 

United States for consumption, entry for consumption from a foreign trade zone, and withdrawal 

from warehouse for consumption, under bond in the amount of 100 percent of the value of such 

articles. The order provides the standard exception from exclusion for excavators imported by or 

for the United States, and to be used by or for the United States. 

The Commission has also determined to issue cease and desist orders to the Defaulting 

Respondents. 

By order of the Commission. 

Marilyn R. Abbott W 

Secretary to the Commission 

Issued: February 3,2009 

22 
CERTAIN HYDRAULIC EXCAVATORS AND 

COMPONENTS THEREOF 

337-TA-582 

PUBLIC CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Marilyn R. Abbott, hereby certify that the attached COMMISSION OPINION has 

been served by hand upon the Commission Investigative Attorney, Rett Snotherly, Esq., 

and the following parties as indicated, on February 3 2009 

US. International Trade Commission 

500 E Street, SW 

Washington, DC 20436 

ON BEHALF OF COMPLAINANT CATERPILLAR 

- INC: 

Cecilia H. Gonzalez, Esq. 

HOWREY LLP 

1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20004-2402 

P-202-783-0800 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS RITCHIE BROS. 

AUCTIONEERS, INC., RITCHIE BROS. 

AUCTIONEERS (AMERICA) INC., PACIFIC RIM 

MACHINERY, INC., MUSSELMAN 

CONSTRUCTION CO., DBA MUSSELMAN 

RENTALS AND SALES, DEANCO AUCTION 

COMPANY OF MISSISSIPPI, INC., TRACTORLAND 

EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC., AND PETROWSKY 

ACTIONEERS, INC.: 

Victor M. Wigman, Esq. 

BLANK ROME LLP 

600 New Hampshire Ave, NW 

Washington, DC 20037 

P-202-772-5894 

F-202-772-1682 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

KVia First Class Mail 

( )Other: - 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

wia First Class Mail 

( )Other: 
Page 2 - Certificate of Service 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS KUHN 

EQUIPMENT SALES, PRIMA INTERNATIONAL 

SALES LLC, SOUTHWESTERN MACHINERY OF 

FLORIDA, INC, AND UNITED EQUIPMENT 

COMPANY: 

TRADING, DOM-EX LLC, MMS EQUIPMENT 

Lyle B. Vander Schaaf, Esq. 

BRYAN CAVE LLP 

700 Thirteenth Street, NW 

Washington DC 20005 

P-202-508-6000 

F-202-5 08-6200 

( ) Via Hand Delivery 

( ) Via Overnight Mail 

Mia First Class Mail 

( )Other: 

requested that the Commission issue a general exclusion order and cease and desist orders. The 

complaint named twenty (20) firms as respondents, including Barkley and Frontera. 

On October 23,2006, Caterpillar filed a motion for an order to show cause why Barkley 

and Frontera should not be found in default for failure to respond to the complaint and notice of 

investigation. Complainant's motion also requested issuance of an ID finding these two 

respondents in default upon failure to show cause and an immediate entry of a limited exclusion 

order, cease and desist order, and/or other appropriate relief upon finding the above named 

respondents in default. No party opposed the motions. The Commission investigative attorney 

supported the motions, but submitted that Caterpillar's request for the immediate entry of 

exclusion orders and cease and desist orders against Barkley and Frontera should be rejected 

because there are other active respondents in this case and limited remedial orders should not be 

issued seriatim prior to the final determination by the Commission. 

On November 3,2006, the ALJ issued Order No. 6, in which he required Barkley and 

Frontera to show cause by November 23,2006, why they should not be found in default, and to 

serve discovery statements, as required by Order No. 5, on the ALJ and the other parties. Neither 

Barkley nor Frontera responded to the show cause order or served discovery statements. On 

December 1,2006, the ALJ issued the subject ID, finding Barkley and Frontera in default. With 

respect to remedy, the ALJ found the immediate entry of an exclusion order and cease and desist 

order against the two default respondents to be unnecessary. No party petitioned for review of 

the ID. 

Having examined the record of this investigation, the Commission has determined not to 

review the &J's IT> finding Barkley and Frontera in default. 

The authority for the Commission's determination is contained in section 337 of the 

Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 0 1337), and in section 210.42 of the Commission's 

Rules of Practice and Procedure (19 C.F.R. 0 210.42). 

By order of the Commission. 

&irilfi R. Abbott 

Secretary to the Commission 

Issued: December 26,2006 

2 
CERTAIN HYDRAULIC EXCAVATORS AND COMPONENTS THEREOF 337-TA-582 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Marilyn R. Abbott, hereby certify that the attached NOTICE OF COMMISSION DECISION NOT 

TO REVIEW AN INITIAL DERTERMINATION FINDING RESPONDENTS BARKLEY 

INDUSTRIES LLC AND FRONTERA EQUIPMENT SALES IN DEFAULT has been served on upon 

the Commission Investigative Attorney Rhett Snotherly, and all parties via first class mail and air mail 

where necessary on December 26,2006. 

&W 

Marilyn R. Abboff, Secretary 

U.S. International Trade Commission 

500 E Street, SW 

Washington, DC 20436 

ON BEHALF OF COMPLAINANT 

CATERPILLAR INC: 

Cecilia H. Gonzalez, Esq. 

Gilbert Ketelkas, Esq. 

Mark L. Whitaker, Esq. 

Margaret D. Macdonald, Esq. 

Thomas Burns, Esq. 

HOWREY LLP 

1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20004-2402 

P-202-783-0800 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS RITCHIE 

BROS. AUCTIONEERS, INC., RITCHIE 

BROS. AUCTIONEERS (AMERICA) INC., 

PACIFIC RIM MACHINERY. INC., 

MUSSELMAN CONSTRUCTION CO., DBA 

MUSSELMAN RENTALS AND SALES, 

DEANCO AUCTION COMPANY OF 

MISSISSIPPI, INC., TRACTORLAND 

EOUIPMENT COMPANY, INC., AND 

PETROWSKY ACTIONEERS, INC.: 

Victor M. Wigman, Esq. 

Leslie J. Polt, Esq. 

Susan B. Flohr, Esq. 

Michael D. White, Esq. 

Denis C. Lane-White, Esq. 

Jennifer K. Gershberg, Esq. 

BLANK ROME LLP 

600 New Hampshire Ave, NW 

Washington, DC 20037 

P-202-772-5894 

F-202-772-1682 

Kenneth L. Bressler, Esq. 

Denise Lane-White, Esq. 

BLANK ROME LLP 

The Chrysler Building 

405 Lexington Avenue 

New York, NY 10 174-0208 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS HOSS 

EOUIPMENT CO., KUHN EQUIPMENT 

SALES, PRIMA INTERNATIONAL 

TRADING WORLD TRACTOR & 

EQUIPMENT COMPANY, LLC, 

WORLDWIDE MACHINERY, INC.. ALEX 

EX LLC. MMS EOUIPMENT SALES LLC, 

SOUTHWESTERN MACHINERY OF 

FLORIDA, INC, UNITED EOUIPMENT 

COMPANY AND YODER & FREY 

AUCTIONEERS: 

LYON & SON SALES MANAGERS, DOMLyle B. Vander Schaaf, Esq. 

Joseph H. Heckendorn, Esq. 

Corey L. Norton, Esq. 

Kelly A. Slater, Esq. 

BRYAN CAVE LLP 

700 Thirteenth Street, NW 

Washington DC 20005 

P-202-508-6000 

F-202-508-6200 

KEY EQUIPMENT, LLC: 

John F. Gaebler, Esq. 

GODFREY & KAHN, S.C. 

780 North Water Street 

Milwaukee, WI 53202 
Page 2- certificate of service 

RESPONDENTS: 

Barkley Industries, LLC 

13309 West Palo Verde Dr. 

PO Box 579 

Litchfield Park, AZ 85340 

Frontera Equipment Sales 

2300 East Expressway 83 N 

Donna, TX 78537 

2 

Barkley and Frontera have not filed a response to the Complaint and Notice, although such 

responses were due on September 26,2006, pursuant to Commission Rules 201.16 and 2 10.13(a). 

In addition, Barkley and Frontera failed to respond to written discovery (requests for production of 

documents and interrogatories) served by Caterpiller; which responses were due September 21,2006. 

Motion at 2; Exs. B and C to Motion 582-002. Furthermore, Barkley and Frontera failed to submit 

a discovery statement pursuant to Order No. 5 which issued on October 18,2006. 

On October 23,2006, Complainant Caterpillar Inc. (“Caterpillar”) filed a motion for (1) an 

order requiring Respondents Barkley and Frontera to show cause why each should not be found in 

default for failure to respond to the Complaint and Notice of Investigation, as prescribed in 19 C.F.R. 

tj 210.13; and (2) upon failure of either Barkley or Frontera to show such cause, to issue an initial 

determination finding such Respondents in default [Motion Docket No. 582-0021. Caterpillar later 

asked that if the Commission finds that any or all of the Respondents are in default, the Commission 

immediately enter an exclusion order and a cease and desist order again each of the Respondents 

found in default. Motion 582-002 p. 1. 

On November 2,2006, Commission Investigative Staff (“Staff”) filed a response supporting 

the motion in part. Specifically, Staff submits that pursuant to Commission Rule 210.16(a)(l) an 

order to show cause why Barkley and Frontera should not be held in default is appropriate. However, 

Staff submits that if Barkley and Frontera were to be found in default, Caterpillar’s request for the 

immediate entry of exclusion orders and cease and desist orders against Barkely and Frontera should 

be rejected, because there are other active respondents in this case and limited remedial orders should 

not be issued seriatim prior to the final determination by the Commission. Staff Response to Motion 

582-002 at 3-4. 
3 

On November 3,2006, I issued Order No. 6 in which I required Barkley and Frontera to show 

cause why they should not be found in default by November 23,2006. I also ordered Barkley and 

Frontera to serve discovery statements, as required by Order No. 5, on the Judge and the other parties, 

accompanied by a pleading stating why such a late statement should be accepted by November 14, 

2006. Neither Barkley nor Frontera responded to the show cause order or served discovery 

statements . 

111. DISCUSSION 

Commission Rule 21 O.l6(a)( 1) provides that a respondent shall be found in default if it fails 

to respond to the complaint and notice of investigation in the manner prescribed in Commission Rules 

210.13 or 210.59(c), or otherwise fails to answer the complaint and notice, and fails to show cause 

why it should not be found in default. 19 C.F.R. 0 210.16(a)(l). Under Commission Rule 

2 lO.l6(b)( l), a party may file a motion for an order to show cause why a respondent should not be 

held in default for failing to respond to the complaint. If the respondent ultimately fails to make the 

necessary showing, the judge shall issue an initial determination finding the respondent in default for 

failing to respond to the complaint and notice. 19 C.F.R. 0 2 lO.l6(b)( 1). Further, a default may be 

entered against a party that fails to obey a discovery order issued by the Administrative Law Judge. 

- See 19 C.F.R. 0 210.33(b). 

Respondents Barkley and Frontera have not responded to the Complaint or Notice. They have 

also not complied with my orders, specifically Orders Nos. 5 and 6. Therefore, I am finding 

Respondents Barkley and Frontera in default pursuant to Commission Rules 21 O.l6(a) and 2 10.33(b). 

Pursuant to Commission Rule 2 lO.l6(c), a party found in default shall be deemed to have waived its 

right to appear, to be served with documents, and to contest the allegations at issue in the 
4 

investigation. Upon a finding of default, the Commission may issue an exclusion order, a cease and 

desist order, or both, against the defaulting respondents after considering the effect of such an order 

upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the U.S. economy, and the production 

of like or directly competitive articles in the United States. 19 C.F.R. 9 2 lO.l6(c). However, I agree 

with Staff that Caterpillar has not shown why the immediate entry of an exclusion order and cease 

and desist order against Barkley and Frontera is necessary. Therefore, I am not recommending that 

these issue at this time. 

Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. 0 210.42(h)(3), this initial determination shall become the 

determination of the Commission 30 days after its date of service unless the Commission within 

those 30 days shall have ordered review of this ID, or certain issues herein, pursuant to 19 C.F.R. 

9 210.43(d) or 5 210.44. 

SO ORDERED. 

. 

XA&J&d/,$* 

Robert L. Barton, Jr. 

Administrative Law Judge 
CERTAIN HYDRAULIC EXCAVATORS AND COMPONENTS THEREOF 

Inv. No. 337-TA-582 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Marilyn R. Abbott, hereby certify that the attached ORDER was served upon, Rett 

Snotherly, Esq., Commission Investigative Attorney, and the following parties via first class 

mail and air mail where necessary on December 1 ,2006. 

A 

lb6ariyyn R. dbott, Secretary . 

U.S. International Trade Commission 

500 E Street, S.W., Room 112A 

Washington, D.C. 20436 

FOR COMPLAINANT CATERPILLAR, INC.: 

Cecilia H. Gonzalez, Esq. 

Thomas Burns, Esq. 

Mark L. Whitaker, Esq. 

Margaret D. Macdonald, Esq. 

HOWREY LLP 

1299 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20004 

FOR RESPONDENTS MUSSELMAN CONSTRUCTION CO., dba, MUSSELMAN 

RENTALS AND SALES, DEANCO AUCTION COMPANY OF MISSISSIPPI, INC., 

TRACTORLAND EQUIPMENT CO., INC., PACIFIC RIM MACHINERY, INC., 

PETROWSKY AUCTIONEERS, INC., RITCHIE BROS. AUCTIONEERS INC., AND 

RITCHIE BROS. AUCTIONEERS (AMERICA) INC.: 

Jennifer K. Gershberg, Esq. 

Victor M. Wigman, Esq. 

Leslie J. Polt, Esq. 

Susan B. Flohr, Esq. 

Michael D. White, Esq. 

Denise C. Lane-White, Esq. 

Michael R. Strand, Esq. 

Jason W. Staib, Esq. 

BLANK ROME LLP 

600 New Hampshire Ave., NW 

Washington, D.C. 20037 
CERTAIN HYDRAULIC EXCAVATORS AND COMPONENTS THEREOF 

Inv. No. 337-TA-582 

Kenneth L. Bressler, Esq. 

BLANK ROME LLP 

The Chrysler Building 

405 Lexington Ave. 

New York, NY 10174-0208 

FOR RESPONDENTS ALEX LYON & SON SALES MANAGERS, DOM-EX LLC, 

HOSS EQUIPMENT CO., KUHN EQUIPMENT SALES, MMS EQUIPMENT SALES 

LLC, PRIMA INTERNATIONAL TRADING, SOUTHWESTERN MACHINERY OF 

FLORIDA, UNITED EQUIPMENT COMPANY, WORLD TRACTOR & EQUIPMENT 

COMPANY, LLC, WORLDWIDE MACHINERY, INC., AND YODER & FREY 

AUCTIONEERS: 

Lyle B. Vander Schaaf, Esq. 

Joseph H. Heckendorn, Esq. 

Corey L. Norton, Esq. 

Kelly A. Slater, Esq. 

BRYAN CAVE LLP 

700 Thirteenth Street, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

FOR RESPONDENT KEY EQUIPMENT, LLC.: 

John F. Gaebler, Esq. 

GODFREY & KAHN, S.C. 

780 North Water Street 

Milwaukee, WI 53202 

RESPONDENTS: 

Barkley Industries, LLC 

13309 West Palo Verde Dr. 

P.O. Box 579 

Litchfield Park, AR 85340 

Frontera Equipment Sales 

2300 East Expressway 83 N 

Donna, TX 78537 
CERTAIN HYDRAULIC EXCAVATORS AND COMPONENTS THEREOF 

Inv. No. 337-TA-582 

PUBLIC MAILING LIST 

Sherry Robinson 

8891 Gander Creek Drive 

Miamisburg, OH 45342 

LEXIS - NEXIS 

Ronnita Green 

Thomson West 

1100 - 13'h Street NW 

Suite 200 

Washington, D.C. 20005