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[Senate Report 109-345]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                       Calendar No. 625
109th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session                                                     109-345

======================================================================

 
                  WASTEWATER TREATMENT WORKS SECURITY 
                              ACT OF 2006

                                _______
                                

               September 21, 2006.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Inhofe, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 2781]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Environment and Public Works, to which was 
referred a bill (S. 2781) to amend the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act to enhance the security of wastewater treatment 
works, having considered the same reports favorably thereon 
with an amendment and recommends that the bill, as amended, do 
pass.

                    General Statement and Background

    The nation's 16,000 publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) 
serve more than 200 million people, or 70 percent of the U.S. 
population. POTWs consist of not just the treatment plant but 
100,000 major pumping stations, 600,000 sanitary sewers and 
more than 200,000 miles of storm sewers. The sewer systems 
could provide an underground network through which terrorists 
could access and damage the business and population centers of 
most of the nation's major cities. A terrorist could also 
impair the wastewater treatment process possibly resulting in 
the release of toxic chemicals including chlorine gas as well 
as cause harm to the computerized control systems, pump 
stations and other parts of the facility. Damage to a 
wastewater treatment plant could result in significant loss of 
life, environmental damage, and the contamination of surface 
and groundwater/drinking water supplies.
    In 1998, President Bill Clinton issued Presidential 
Directive 63 designating the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) as the lead agency responsible for overseeing the 
security of POTWs. Following the tragic events of September 11, 
2001, much more focus was placed on securing the nation's 
infrastructure from a terrorist attack. Congress created the 
Department of Homeland Security in 2002 and in December 2003, 
President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
7 reiterating that the EPA is the lead Agency for the drinking 
water and wastewater sector.
    In this capacity, the EPA has provided $10 million since 
2002 to address the security needs of the wastewater sector. 
These funds were used to fund the development and dissemination 
of several risk assessment methodologies to assist treatment 
works in assessing their vulnerabilities, including the VSAT 
developed by the National Association of Clean Water Agencies. 
In addition, EPA worked with Sandia National Laboratories and 
the Water Environment Federation to provide training to the 
owners and operators of wastewater utilities on vulnerability 
assessments and how to mitigate those vulnerabilities. The 
Water Environment Federation and the American Society of Civil 
Engineers are working with EPA to carry out the Water Security 
Enhancement project which is a series of security guidance 
documents and voluntary security design standards. In 2003, EPA 
established the Water Security Division to focus on security at 
water and wastewater utilities.
    EPA assisted in the creation of the Water Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (WaterISAC) which is operated by 
the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA). The 
Agency has provided $6 million for the operation of the 
WaterISAC through which security related information is 
provided to water and wastewater utilities for a nominal fee. 
The WaterISAC can send urgent threat information to utilities 
and is available 24 hours per day. Further, EPA and the DHS use 
the Water Security Channel to provide free information to 
utilities through a password-protected website. Another means 
of sharing information developed after 
9/11 is the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). HSIN 
critical sector is intended to enhance the protection, 
preparedness and crisis communication and coordination 
capabilities of the nation's 17 critical information sectors, 
including wastewater utilities. DHS is in the process of 
developing an HSIN for water and water utilities.
    DHS has several initiatives underway through which it has 
addressed security of wastewater utilities. Through its Buffer 
Zone Protection program, DHS provides grants to reduce specific 
vulnerabilities at critical infrastructure or key resources by 
assisting local law enforcement to develop a plan for 
preventative and protective measures to make an attack by 
terrorists more difficult. As of October 2005, DHS had reviewed 
the security at 14 wastewater facilities. Further, DHS has 
visited several wastewater utilities under its Site Assistance 
Visits program during which it identifies vulnerabilities and 
reviews mitigation options.
    In August 2005, the Nation was challenged by the Hurricanes 
Rita and Katrina. Hundreds of wastewater utilities incurred 
significant damage during the hurricanes. In 2006, the Water 
Environment Federation (WEF) released a report entitled, 
``Assessment of Reconstruction Costs and Debt Management for 
Wastewater Utilities Affected by Hurricane Katrina.'' This 
report found that the effects of Hurricane Katrina on 
wastewater facilities in Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi 
approaches $1.4 billion, and the cost to repair and rebuild is 
estimated to be $1.2 billion. The report also estimated a 
reduction in revenue for affected utilities at about $163 
million. In February 2006, several national water associations 
issued a statement in which they committed to promoting mutual 
aid agreements which proved critical in assisting some 
utilities after the Gulf Coast hurricanes. The State of Florida 
has used mutual aid agreements with great success to help 
utilities immediately impacted by natural disasters.
    The Government Accountability Office has released two 
reports regarding security at POTWs. In its January 2005 
report, GAO asked experts in the water profession to identify 
key vulnerabilities at POTWs and where Federal funds should be 
spent if such funds were made available to POTWs to secure 
their facilities. Ranking the key vulnerabilities from highest 
to lowest, the experts found the treatment works' collection 
systems network of sewers; the treatment chemicals; certain key 
components of the main treatment facility; pumping stations; 
and the control systems (SCADA) \1\ to be the most at-risk. 
Those areas identified as needing Federal funds if such funds 
are made available include alternative treatment approaches, 
improved collaboration among States and cities, completing 
vulnerability assessments, expanded training opportunities for 
POTW operators, improving national communication efforts 
between utilities and key entities responsible for homeland 
security and hardening of physical assets, among others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Government Accountability Office. ``Wastewater Facilities 
Experts' Views on How Federal Funds should be Spent to Improve 
Security,'' January, 2005. Page 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In March 2006, the Government Accountability Office issued 
a report on security measures taken by wastewater utilities. 
The GAO's survey of the largest 206 facilities found that many 
had made significant security improvements. According to the 
survey, 74 percent of the facilities completed a vulnerability 
assessment, were in the process of completing a survey or had 
one underway.\2\ Of the 206 who responded, 149 had vehicle 
gates; 174 had security fences; 160 had redundant power 
sources; 133 had redundant pumping devices or collection bypass 
systems, [the following numbers reflect changes made before and 
after Sept 11] 138 facilities have instituted safeguards for 
onsite delivery of materials and 112 have additional site 
lighting.\3\ The GAO report clearly indicates that much 
progress has been made at the nation's largest treatment works. 
However, the Office also found an area very much in need of 
assistance. Most of the large utilities had not taken steps to 
secure their collection systems from intruders or harmful 
substances. There are significant obstacles to securing these 
systems that can extend for miles underneath major cities.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Government Accountability Office. ``Securing Wastewater 
Facilities, Utilities Have Made Important Upgrades But Further 
Improvements to Key System Components May be limited by Costs and Other 
Constraints.'' March 2006. page 14
    \3\ GAO, 2006. Appendix II, page 33 et seq.
    \4\ GAO, 2006. page 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     Objectives of the Legislation

    S. 2781 provides a financial incentive to POTWs that have 
not completed a vulnerability assessment to move forward with 
development and implementation of an assessment, and provides 
resources to those who have completed their assessments to 
address needs identified in those assessments. It authorizes 
EPA to continue working with nonprofit organizations to improve 
and distribute vulnerability assessment tools and provide 
technical assistance to small utilities as they seek to 
identify and meet their security needs. The bill also 
authorizes research for the potential threats to a POTW's 
collection system and how best to protect against those 
threats.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1. Short title

    This section provides that the Act may be cited as the 
``Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2006''.

Sec. 2. Wastewater Treatment Works Security

    (a) Definition of Vulnerability Assessment

                                SUMMARY

    Creates a new section 222 of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act and defines several terms including a disruption of 
service event, emergency response plan, site security plan and 
vulnerability assessment. A disruption of service event (DSE) 
means a natural disaster or event, or a terrorist attack or 
other intentional act that substantially disrupts the ability 
of a treatment works to provide safe and reliable conveyance 
and treatment of wastewater; disposal of effluent or storage of 
any potentially hazardous chemical used to treat wastewater; 
damages critical treatment works infrastructure; results in a 
substantial harmful effect on the environment; or otherwise 
poses a significant threat to the public health or safety as a 
result of damage to the treatment works.
    An Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is defined as a plan or 
set of plans developed by or in cooperation with a treatment 
works that may include the procedures the treatment works will 
use when a disruption of service event occurs including 
procedures for ensuring continued service and protection of the 
public health and environment. The plan may include a 
discussion of the means by which the POTW will provide 
information to the surrounding affected communities as well as 
the means by which the POTW will limit contamination of public 
water supplies; address contaminants entering the treatment 
works or its collection system; secure backup power generation; 
and any additional means of collecting or treating wastewater. 
The ERP may include plans conducted in accordance with other 
Federal statutes that address the elements of an ERP under this 
statute, or ones that are in existence on thedate of enactment 
that are modified to fit the requirements of this statute.
    The bill defines a Site Security Plan as a plan to 
implement, to the maximum extent practicable, changes at a 
treatment works based on information contained in the 
vulnerability assessment.
    Finally, this section defines a vulnerability assessment 
(VA) as an assessment of the vulnerability of a treatment works 
to a disruption of service event. The VA may include a 
characterization of the treatment works, including its mission 
and objective, its customer base, the facilities that comprise 
the treatment works, including the collection system, the 
pumping station, the power supply, electronic and computer 
systems, and chemical containers. It further includes any 
processes at the treatment works and the assets necessary to 
achieve the treatment works' objectives. The VA may also 
include an identification and prioritization of adverse 
consequences to avoid at the treatment works, including 
substantial disruptions of service; economic impacts; loss of 
life; and negative health consequences for staff at the 
treatment works. The VA may include an identification of 
adverse consequences to the public health and safety and the 
environment and natural resources and a determination of 
critical assets of the treatment works that may be subject to a 
disruption of service event, including pumping stations, power 
sources, electronic and computer systems and disinfection 
processes. Finally, the VA may include an analysis of the 
qualitative probability of a disruption of service event, 
whether the disruption of service event is the result of a 
natural or an intentional occurrence, an evaluation of existing 
countermeasures relating to the treatment works, and an 
analysis of current risk relating to the treatment works and 
the development of a prioritized plan for risk reduction at the 
treatment works.

                               DISCUSSION

    A disruption of service event is intended to cover both 
intentional acts of harm and natural disasters. In order to 
protect a facility against a disruption of service event, a 
POTW would begin with a vulnerability assessment designed to 
identify those aspects of the facility most likely to suffer 
harm during an event and most likely to cause harm to the 
surrounding community. The POTW could also develop a site 
security plan which implements the findings of the 
vulnerability assessment including how the POTW will address 
the vulnerabilities identified in the VA. An ERP is a critical 
element the importance of which was highlighted after the Gulf 
Coast Hurricanes. An ERP details how a POTW will respond to an 
event, including how the surrounding community would be 
notified of such an event and how to respond to any harm caused 
by it.

    (b) Grants for Vulnerability Assessments and Security Enhancements

                                SUMMARY

    Authorizes the Administrator to provide grants to a State, 
municipality, intermunicipal or interstate agency, or privately 
owned utility that principally treats municipal wastewater to 
conduct a vulnerability assessment of a publicly owned 
treatment works; to implement security enhancements described 
in subsection (c)(1); for the development, expansion, or 
upgrading of emergency response plans and for the voluntary 
creation or membership in a mutual aid and emergency 
preparedness agreement; and for the voluntary creation by a 
State or network of treatment works of, or voluntary 
participation by a treatment works in, a mutual aid and 
emergency network preparedness agreement developed in 
accordance with the National Incident Management System 
established pursuant to Presidential directive number 5 of the 
Department of Homeland Security.

                               DISCUSSION

    Authorizes grants to conduct vulnerability assessments and 
address a need identified in the assessment. Grants can also be 
used for the development, expansion or upgrading of an 
emergency response plan and site security plan as well as for 
the voluntary creation or membership in a mutual aid and 
emergency preparedness agreement. More attention became focused 
on mutual aid agreements after the Gulf Coast Hurricanes. 
Florida has had mutual aid agreements in place for years. These 
are agreements between water and wastewater utilities to assist 
each other in the event of a natural disaster or terrorist 
event.\5\ Fellow utility operators are among those best 
qualified to assist another POTW in restoring service and 
responding to a crisis at the facility after a disruption of 
service event. While these are locally and State driven 
agreements, S. 2781 would make eligible for funding the 
creation of such agreements if the local or State stakeholders 
determine these agreements are in their best interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ American Water Works Association. ``Utilities Helping 
Utilities: An Act Plan for Mutual Aid and Assistance Networks for Water 
and Wastewater Utilities,'' March 2006. Page 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (c) Grants for Security Enhancements

                                SUMMARY

    Paragraph (1) requires an applicant to certify to the EPA 
that it has conducted a vulnerability assessment and that the 
need for which it is seeking funding was identified in the 
assessment. Upon receiving this certification, the EPA may 
provide grants to the applicant for specific purposes listed in 
paragraph (2).
    Paragraph (2) establishes a list of security needs for 
which an applicant may receive funding.
    Paragraph (3) prohibits funds from being used for personnel 
costs and the operation and maintenance of facilities, 
equipment or systems. It further prohibits the Administrator 
from requiring an applicant to provide the Administrator with a 
copy of a vulnerability assessment as a condition of applying 
for or receiving a grant under this section. This section 
establishes procedures by which the Administrator can ensure 
that the POTW is in full compliance with all applicable Federal 
grant requirements. The Administrator shall work with 
appropriate law enforcement personnel to incorporate protection 
of sensitive information into existing protocols for protection 
of such information. It establishes penalties under the Act 
ifthe Administrator or his designee knowingly or recklessly reveals the 
contents of a vulnerability assessment.
    Paragraph (4) reiterates that it is a Federal crime under 
Section 309(c)(4) of the Clean Water Act to falsely certify 
information to the Federal Government.
    Paragraph (5) protects vulnerability assessments certified 
to the Administrator under this Act from disclosure under 
Federal, State and local Freedom of Information Acts or similar 
statutes.

                               DISCUSSION

    A treatment works must certify to EPA that it has conducted 
an assessment and that one of the enhancements listed in 
Paragraph (2) is included in the assessment. The bill provides 
several provisions to ensure that the information contained in 
an assessment is secure while also providing the Federal 
Government with the ability to ensure full compliance with 
applicable Federal laws. In order to minimize access to and 
exposure of the assessments, the bill prohibits the 
Administrator from requesting a copy of the document. However, 
the Administrator may visit the facility to view the assessment 
to ensure that it has been done and that the POTW is in full 
compliance with Federal rules applicable to grant recipients. 
If the POTW certified that it had completed an assessment and 
in fact did not, the owner or operator can be charged with 
falsely certifying information and subject to penalties under 
the criminal code (18 USC 1001) and the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (33 USC 1319). Further, EPA must work with the 
appropriate law enforcement agencies to incorporate into 
existing protocols the protection of sensitive information 
obtained by viewing an assessment. It also establishes 
penalties if the Administrator or his designees recklessly or 
knowingly reveals information obtained through the inspection 
of an assessment. However, nothing in this section would impose 
any penalties on a POTW operator who shares information with 
appropriate local and State officials.
    This section also exempts the information contained in a 
vulnerability assessment from the Federal Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) as well as relevant State and local 
laws. The committee recognizes that information pertaining to 
the vulnerability of a source to terrorism, and the 
countermeasures adopted to reduce that vulnerability, is among 
the most sensitive that any facility can generate. The 
committee also recognizes the need for the public to know 
whether a local facility has complied with the law; therefore, 
the FOIA exemption does not apply to the information in a 
certification filed under this Act. This subsection also 
respects the needs of State and local governments to obtain 
information that they need to coordinate with the Federal 
Government and facilities, by enabling State and local 
officials designated by the Secretary to obtain protected 
information, without concern that they might have to disclose 
it under their own laws or ordinances.
    Most security enhancements not related to personnel or 
operations and maintenance can be funded through this section, 
including those identified by the GAO as priorities such as 
hardening facilities like collection systems, securing pumping 
stations and switching treatment technologies. A 2005 GAO 
report indicated the need for Federal funds to assist those 
treatment works interested in switching technologies. Chlorine 
is by far the most effective disinfectant available and it is 
the least expensive. During these times of aging systems, 
growing Federal regulations and limited resources, cost is an 
important consideration. While utilities have reported a broad 
range of costs associated with the change from chlorine to 
liquid bleach or other approaches, the GAO reported that 
Washington, DC.'s treatment works, Blue Plains, spent $12.5 
million to change technologies.\6\ Officials with Blue Plains 
confirmed the numbers in the GAO report. San Jose, CA spent $5 
million to switch from gaseous chlorine to sodium hypochlorite. 
A utility may also identify means to secure chlorine tanks and 
reduce the amount of material stored onsite, thereby reducing 
potential threats. It is worth noting that wastewater treatment 
utilities are often owned and operated by municipal 
governments. These costs are not insignificant particularly if 
a utility identifies through the Vulnerability assessment and 
site security plan the means to secure chlorine tanks and 
reduce the amount stored onsite sufficient that the facility, 
determines any threat has been mitigated. The decision to 
switch is made at the local level with full consideration of 
all factors including the costs, risks posed by transporting 
alternative substances and the vicinity of manufacturing 
facilities. POTWs are already undergoing these evaluations. 
Currently, 116 of the 206 largest POTWs do not use gaseous 
chlorine. According to the GAO report, another 20 plan to 
switch to a technology other than chlorine. Those who continue 
to use chlorine have taken steps to ensure the chlorine is 
secure.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ GAO, 2005. page 40.
    \7\ GAO, 2006. page 47.
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    (d) Grant Amounts

                                SUMMARY

    Paragraph (1) establishes a Federal-local cost share of 75 
percent--25 percent.
    Paragraph (2) limits the size of any one applicant to 
$100,000 per facility.

                               DISCUSSION

    Because securing our Nation's infrastructure against 
terrorism is a partnership between Federal, State and local 
Government, this section authorizes a Federal-local cost share. 
In order to ensure that funds are widely distributed and not 
absorbed by a few large systems, grants are limited to 
$100,000.

    (e) Technical Assistance for Small Publicly Owned Treatment Works

                                SUMMARY

    Paragraph (1) defines a small publicly owned treatment 
works as a population of fewer than 10,000 individuals.
    Paragraph (2) authorizes the Administrator to, in 
coordination with the States, provide technical assistance to 
small treatment works in assessing and addressing their 
security needs.
    Paragraph (3) allows the Administrator to provide grants to 
nonprofit organizations to assist in accomplishing the purposes 
of this section.

                               DISCUSSION

    It is critical that small systems, which often have fewer 
resources at their disposal, have the same level of protection 
as large systems. Subsection (e) authorizes a technical 
assistance program for treatment works serving less than 10,000 
people. Technical guidance may include the conduct of a 
vulnerability assessment, emergency response plan, or site 
security plan, training, technical assistance programs and 
preliminary engineering evaluations. The Administrator may 
provide grants to nonprofit organizations with expertise in 
assisting small systems.

    (f) Refinement of Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for Publicly 
        Owned Treatment Works

                                SUMMARY

    Authorizes grants to nonprofit organizations to improve 
vulnerability assessment methodologies and tools for publicly 
owned treatment works at no cost to the treatment works.

                               DISCUSSION

    Authorizes the Administrator to provide grants to nonprofit 
organizations to improve vulnerability assessment methodologies 
and tools for publicly owned treatment works, including those 
that are part of a combined public wastewater treatment and 
water supply system. The grants may be used to develop and 
distribute assessment software upgrades, improve and enhance 
critical technical and user support functions, expand libraries 
of information addressing threats and countermeasures, and 
implementing user training initiatives. These services are to 
be provided at no cost to the participants/recipients.

    (g) Training Grants

                                SUMMARY

    Paragraph (1) authorizes the Administrator to provide 
grants to nonprofit organizations to be used in accordance with 
paragraph (2) to implement a comprehensive training program for 
treatment works or privately owned utilities that principally 
treat municipal wastewater.
    Paragraph (2) provides for the eligible activities that a 
grant may be used for including development and implementation 
of a training program that will assist treatment works in 
conducting vulnerability assessments, developing emergency 
response plans, and identifying security enhancements. A grant 
may also be used to develop and disseminate to treatment works 
information on best practices for emergency response plans and 
security enhancements, including operational adjustments and 
design practices.
    Paragraph (3) states that this training and technical 
assistance provided pursuant to a grant under paragraph (1) 
shall be provided at no cost to the recipients of the 
assistance.

                               DISCUSSION

    This section authorizes the Administrator to provide grants 
to non-profit organizations to develop and implement training 
programs for wastewater treatment works to help them conduct 
vulnerability assessments and develop emergency response plans. 
It would also support training designed to help wastewater 
treatment plants identify needed security enhancements based on 
their vulnerability assessments and emergency response plans.
    Training programs currently offered by non-profit 
organizations that assist wastewater treatment plants in 
assessing their vulnerabilities and developing emergency 
response plans have been effective in helping many utilities 
address security and emergency preparedness issues. As part of 
comprehensive legislation aimed at providing wastewater 
utilities the financial resources necessary to undertake 
security and emergency preparedness, a strong training 
component gives further incentive for wastewater utilities to 
move forward in this area.

    (h) Authorization of Appropriations

                         SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

    Authorizes $200 million for use in making grants to conduct 
vulnerability assessments and implement security enhancements 
under subsection (b); $15 million for technical assistance for 
small systems; and $1 million annually over 5 years for 
refinement of vulnerability assessment methodology.

Sec. 3. Research and review

    Creates a new section 223 of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA).

    (a) Definition of Collection System

                         SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

    Amends title II of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
by adding a definition of ``collection system'' as meaning the 
underground network of sewers, including sanitary and storm 
water collection lines.

    (b) Research and Review

                                SUMMARY

    Authorizes the Administrator, in consultation with 
appropriate Federal agencies, to research and review, or enter 
into a contract or cooperative agreement for the conduct of 
research and review, into (1) the means of providing 
alternative processes to convey, treat, and dispose of 
wastewater if a disruption of service event occurs; (2) the 
means by which the collection system of a treatment works could 
be used to convey hazardous chemicals or substances (including 
explosive devices) including a comprehensive analysis of the 
types of hazardous chemicals, substances, and explosive devices 
that could be placed in the collection system; and how the 
system could be secured in response to an intentional harmful 
act; (3) methods of monitoring the collection system of a 
treatment worksfor hazardous chemicals or substances, including 
explosive devices, and unauthorized entry into the collection system of 
a treatment works; and (4) treatment technologies, including the 
affordability, effectiveness, and limitations of each treatment 
technology.

                               DISCUSSION

    Each POTW has a collection system that consists of the 
pipes used to carry wastewater from homes and businesses to the 
treatment works. These pipes are often large enough for an 
individual to stand in and they provide an underground roadway 
beneath most major cities. In its January 2005 report, 42 of 
the 50 experts on GAO's panel identified the collection system 
as the most vulnerable asset of a POTW. However, there remain 
many questions and obstacles on how to effectively secure a 
collection system. This bill authorizes a research program to 
identify how a collection system could be used in a terrorist 
attack, how to identify potential chemicals or explosives that 
could be placed in a collection system, and how best to 
mitigate against these risks. It also directs EPA to examine 
the various POTW treatment technologies to determine their 
affordability and effectiveness.

    (c) Authorization of Appropriations

                         SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

    Authorization of appropriations--authorizes $5 million a 
year for fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

                          Legislative History

    During the 107th Congress, Senators Robert Smith and James 
Jeffords introduced S. 1608, which sought to provide grants to 
drinking water and wastewater facilities to meet immediate 
security needs. Senators Jeffords and Smith also introduced S. 
1593 which authorized the EPA to provide funds to research 
institutions to research technologies and processes that 
address physical and cyber threats to water supply systems, 
including POTWs. The committee reported the bills on December 
10, 2001 and modified versions were incorporated into H.R. 
3448, the Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response 
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188), which was signed into law on June 
12, 2002.
    During the 107th Congress, the House passed by voice vote, 
H.R. 5169, the Wastewater Treatment Works Security and Safety 
Act.
    During the 108th Congress, on February 2, 2003, Congressmen 
Don Young, James Oberstar, Jerry Costello and John Duncan re-
introduced H.R. 5169 as H.R. 866, the Wastewater Treatment 
Works Security Act. The House Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure reported the bill on March 11, 2003 by voice 
vote. The House of Representatives then passed the bill on May 
8, 2003, by a vote of 413-2.
    Senator Inhofe and Senator Crapo introduced the Senate 
companion to H.R. 866 on May 12, 2003. The Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works reported S. 1039 by a vote of 13 
to 6 on May 15, 2003.
    On May 10, 2006, Senator Inhofe introduced S. 2781, which 
was cosponsored by Senators Chafee and Murkowski. The bill was 
read twice and referred to the Senate Committee on Environment 
and Public Works. S. 2781 included S. 1039 from the 108th 
Congress with modifications. The committee met on May 23, 2006 
to consider the bill. S. 2781 was ordered favorably reported, 
as amended, by voice vote.

                             Rollcall Votes

    The Committee on Environment and Public Works met to 
consider S. 2781 on May 23, 2006. An amendment was offered by 
Senator Inhofe to add a definition of site security plan, add a 
training program for POTWs, and combine two eligibilities under 
subsection (c). The amendment was approved by voice vote. 
Senator Jeffords offered a complete substitute amendment. 
Senator Voinovich made a motion to table the Jeffords 
amendment. The motion passed by a rollcall vote of 10 to 8, 
with Senators Inhofe, Warner, Bond, Voinovich, Chafee, 
Murkowski, Thune, DeMint, Isakson, and Vitter voting aye and 
Jeffords, Baucus, Lieberman, Boxer, Carper, Clinton, 
Lautenberg, and Obama voting nay.
    Senator Boxer then made a motion to table S. 2781. The 
motion failed by a roll call vote of 8 to 10 with Senators 
Jeffords, Baucus, Lieberman, Boxer, Carper, Clinton, 
Lautenberg, and Obama voting aye and Senators Inhofe, Warner, 
Bond, Voinovich, Chafee, Murkowski, Thune, DeMint, Isakson, and 
Vitter voting nay. S. 2781 was passed by a voice vote.

                      Regulatory Impact Statement

    In compliance with section 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the committee finds that S. 2781 
does not create any additional regulatory burdens, nor will it 
cause any adverse impact on the personal privacy of 
individuals.

                          Mandates Assessment

    In compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(Public Law 104-4), the committee finds that S. 2781 would not 
impose Federal intergovernmental unfunded mandates on State, 
local, or tribal governments.

                          Cost of Legislation

    Section 403 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act requires that a statement of the cost of the 
reported bill, prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, be 
included in the report. That statement follows:
                              ----------                              

S. 2781, Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2006, As ordered 
        reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
        Works on May 23, 2006

Summary

    CBO estimates that implementing S. 2781 would cost about 
$245 million over the next 5 years, assuming appropriation of 
the authorized amounts. The funds would be used by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to make grants to States, 
municipalities,or intermunicipal or interstate agencies to 
conduct vulnerability assessments at publicly owned wastewater 
treatment facilities and to undertake security enhancements at such 
facilities. In addition, the funds would be used by EPA to provide 
technical assistance to small publicly owned treatment facilities, such 
as training and engineering evaluations of security measures, and to 
make grants to nonprofit organizations to conduct self-assessments of 
security vulnerabilities. This legislation also would authorize funding 
to support EPA's research related to alternative processes to treat and 
dispose of wastewater in the event of a disaster.
    Enacting S. 2781 could affect direct spending and receipts 
because the bill would provide for penalties against any 
individual who recklessly reveals information contained in 
vulnerability assessments of wastewater treatment facilities. 
CBO expects that penalties collected under the bill would not 
be significant because violations of this provision would be 
rare.
    S. 2781 contains an intergovernmental mandate as defined in 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA); CBO estimates, 
however, that the costs of complying with that mandate would 
not exceed the threshold established in that act ($64 million, 
adjusted annually for inflation). S. 2781 contains no new 
private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA.

Estimated Cost to the Federal Government

    For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be 
enacted near the end of 2006. CBO estimates that implementing 
the bill would cost $245 million over the 2007-2011 period, 
assuming appropriation of the amounts authorized for each year. 
Those estimated outlays are based on historical patterns for 
similar activities. The estimated budgetary impact of S. 2781 
is shown in the following table. The costs of this legislation 
fall within budget function 300 (natural resources and 
environment).

                 By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   2007    2008    2009    2010    2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO
          APPROPRIATION
Grants for Wastewater Treatment
 Security.......................
    Authorization Level.........     200       0       0       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........      10     100      55      30       5
EPA Technical Assistance........
    Authorization Level.........      15       0       0       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........       3       8       4       0       0
Grants for Small Publicly Owned
 Treatment Facilities...........
    Authorization Level.........       1       1       1       1       1
    Estimated Outlays...........       1       1       1       1       1
EPA Research on Wastewater
 Treatment......................
    Authorization Level.........       5       5       5       5       5
    Estimated Outlays...........       5       5       5       5       5
Total Proposed Changes..........
    Authorization Level.........     221       6       6       6       6
    Estimated Outlays...........      19     114      65      36      11
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Estimated Impact On State, Local, And Tribal Governments

    S. 2781 contains an intergovernmental mandates as defined 
in UMRA because it would preempt the application of State and 
local laws providing for public access to information from 
vulnerability assessments of wastewater treatment facilities. 
That preemption constitutes an intergovernmental mandate as 
defined in UMRA, however, CBO estimates that complying with the 
mandate would not impose significant costs on State, local, or 
tribal governments; any costs would be well below the threshold 
established in that act ($64 million, adjusted annually for 
inflation).
    The bill also would authorize grants that would benefit 
State and local governments that conduct vulnerability 
assessments and implement security enhancements of wastewater 
treatment facilities. Any costs they might incur, including 
matching funds, would result from complying with conditions for 
receiving Federal assistance.

Estimated Impact On The Private Sector

    S. 2781 contains no new private sector mandates as defined 
in UMRA.
    Estimate Prepared By: Federal Costs: Susanne S. Mehlman; 
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Lisa Ramirez-
Branum; Impact on the Private Sector: Amy Petz.
    Estimate Approved By: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS JEFFORDS, BAUCUS, LIEBERMAN, BOXER, 
                 CARPER, CLINTON, LAUTENBERG and OBAMA

General Statement
    In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, it is crucial that we as a Nation take every reasonable 
action we can to prevent terrorism, create effective response 
and recovery mechanisms, and find ways to minimize any impacts 
should an event occur. The Congress has a key role in 
facilitating these actions by establishing authorities for 
government agencies, establishing the legal framework in which 
homeland security improvements will occur, and appropriating 
adequate funding for the homeland security mission. Protecting 
our Nation's critical infrastructure is a major piece of our 
homeland security strategy.
    The water sector has been identified as an element in our 
nation's critical infrastructure since the issuance of 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), issued by 
President Clinton in May 1998, which was the first major 
governmental action focused on reducing the vulnerability of 
our nation's critical infrastructure.
    The security needs are significant in the water and 
wastewater sectors. There are over 16,000 publicly owned 
treatment works in the United States, serving more than 200 
million people or 70 percent of the U.S. population. 
Approximately 1,600 are located near large metropolitan areas. 
These industrial facilities use large quantities of toxic 
chemicals, such as chlorine, in their treatment and 
disinfection processes, and their collection systems run 
beneath every city and town in America. Chlorine is the most 
commonly used method of disinfection for wastewater treatment. 
Chlorine is a very corrosive, hazardous chemical that is fatal 
in large concentrations. It can also burn the eyes, lungs, and 
skin. It is stored as a liquid after being cooled. When 
released, it quickly turns to gas, stays close to the ground, 
and spreads rapidly. One Department of Homeland Security 
planning scenario estimates that a chlorine tank explosion 
could result in 17,500 deaths, 10,000 severe injuries, and 
100,000 hospitalizations.\1\ In addition, a January 2005 report 
by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) determined that 
the release of chlorine is the second highest security risk at 
wastewater facilities after damage to sewer collection 
systems.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Planning Scenarios Executive Summaries. The Homeland Security 
Council. July 2004
    \2\ Government Accountability Office. ``Wastewater Facilities: 
Experts Views On How Federal Funds Should Be Spent To Improve 
Security'' (GAO-05-165) January 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are also serious public health risks associated with 
a disruption or service failure at a wastewater treatment 
plant. Treatment works clean wastewater that comes from our 
toilets, showers, and sewers and send it back into our rivers, 
streams, lakes, and oceans. Those same bodies of water are our 
drinking water sources. Without proper treatment, we could see 
the public health effects of the same type of water-borne 
disease outbreaks such as cholera that we saw in Iraq in 2003 
due to the failure of wastewater treatment plants.
    In recent years in this country, we have seen firsthand the 
impact that a cessation of operations at a drinking water or 
wastewater plant can have. In Cleveland, Ohio, after the August 
2003 blackout, several sewage treatment plants discharged at 
least 60 million gallons of sewage into the Cuyahoga River, 
Lake Erie, and their tributaries after the power outage caused 
the plants pumps and blowers to cease operations. Raw sewage 
bypassed the treatment process and entered receiving waters 
untreated. The plants have no back-up power systems. Five 
Cleveland beaches were closed to swimming to protect against 
water-borne disease. Cleveland's water system also suffered a 
hit when 1.5 million customers lost water or water pressure due 
to power failures at four water plants. The city was under a 
boil water notice for 4 days. In Detroit, Michigan, after the 
blackout in August 2003 caused the city's water treatment 
plants to cease operations, the city was under a boil-water 
advisory for almost a week.
    More recently, we saw the impact of a natural disaster on 
water infrastructure. A couple of days after Hurricane Katrina 
in August 2005, EPA estimated that more than 1,220 drinking 
water and 200 wastewater facilities in Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Alabama were affected by flooding. One third of the sewage 
treatment systems in Mississippi were destroyed or very 
severely damaged and a month following the event, 22 sewage 
plants in Louisiana, serving more than a half a million 
customers, were not operating or operating with difficulty. In 
2006, the Water Environment Federation (WEF) released a report 
entitled, ``Assessment of Reconstruction Costs and Debt 
Management for Wastewater Utilities Affected by Hurricane 
Katrina.'' This report found that the effects of Hurricane 
Katrina on wastewater facilities in Alabama, Louisiana and 
Mississippi approaches $1.4 billion, and the cost to repair and 
rebuild is estimated to be $1.2 billion. The report also 
estimated a reduction in revenue for affected utilities at 
about $163 million. In the aftermath of Katrina, we believe 
that a vulnerability assessment, site security plan and 
emergency response plan would be extremely useful to the 
Federal Government and local authorities in evaluating a 
wastewater plant's ability to provide the required level of 
treatment and the scope of repairs necessary to restore the 
plant.
    We believe that the Congress should take the risk to 
wastewater treatment plants seriously. Unfortunately, we 
believe that S. 2781, the Wastewater Treatment Works Security 
Act, as reported out of committee, provides security for our 
nation's wastewater infrastructure in name only.
Background
    Almost immediately after September 11, 2001, the Committee 
on Environment and Public Works began working with the water 
and wastewater industries and the EPA to ensure that the 
nation's water infrastructure was adequately protected. The 
committee met with key members of the EPA's security team to 
review the status of our nation's water infrastructure. Several 
short-term actions had already been taken. Based on the 
recommendations of PDD-63, the EPA and its industry partner, 
the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA), had 
already established a communication system: the water 
infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), 
designed to provide real-time threat assessment data to water 
utilities throughout the Nation.
    Through this partnership, the EPA and AMWA, in cooperation 
with Sandia National Laboratory, developed an assessment tool 
that individual water utilities can use to assess their 
facilities for potential physical and cyber threats. The 
committee endorsed the concept of vulnerability assessments 
with bi-partisan action early in the debate on homeland 
security. On October 11, 2001, Senators Jeffords (I-VT), Smith 
(R-NH), Graham (D-FL), and Crapo (R-ID) sent a letter to the 
President with Representatives Tauzin (R-LA), Dingell (D-MI), 
Gillmor (R-OH), and Pallone (D-NJ) requesting that the 
President use a portion of discretionary funds to provide 
assistance for these assessments to water utilities. No 
response was received.
    Legislative action quickly followed. During the 107th 
Congress, Senator Jeffords (I-VT) and Senator Smith (R-NH), at 
that time the chair and ranking member of the committee, 
introduced S. 1593, the Water Infrastructure Security and 
Research Development Act, which authorized the U.S. EPA to 
provide funding to support research projects on critical 
infrastructure protection for water supply systems. The two 
leaders of the committee also introduced S. 1608, which sought 
to provide grants to drinking water and wastewater facilities 
to meet immediate security needs.
    S. 1593, the Water Infrastructure Security and Research 
Development Act, sought to complement the ongoing work at EPA 
and in the water industry by focusing on mid- to long-term 
actions designed to enhance our current water security 
capabilities. The bill authorized $12 million over 5 years to 
continue ongoing work called for by PDD-63, conduct research to 
assess potential threats to our water supply system, and 
develop solutions to safeguard our water systems against those 
threats. Projects were intended to address both water and 
wastewater security needs. S. 1608 focused on short term 
security needs such as re-keying of doors and locks or 
installation and maintenance of fencing, gating, or lighting. 
The committee reported both bills on December 10, 2001.
    The provisions of S. 1593 and S. 1608 were modified and 
incorporated into H.R. 3448, the Public Health and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188), which was 
signed into law on June 12, 2002. This Act requires that all 
community water systems serving a population greater than 3,300 
people conduct a vulnerability assessment and prepare an 
emergency response plan that incorporates the results of the 
vulnerability assessment. The Act establishes specific 
deadlines and requires that the vulnerability assessments be 
submitted to the EPA. It includes extensive information 
protection requirements at the Agency. The Act authorizes $160 
million for fiscal year 2002 and such sums as necessary for 
fiscal years 2003 through 2005 for these purposes and to 
address basic security enhancements. Finally, the Act requires 
the Administrator to review and disseminate information to the 
drinking water industry on current and future methods of 
prevention of, detection of, and response to contaminant and 
supply disruption. Despite the fact that the original Senate 
bills addressed both water and wastewater needs, the provisions 
of H.R. 3448 were modified to address drinking water facilities 
only due to jurisdictional concerns raised by a House 
committee.
    Under the authorities provided by P.L. 107-188, EPA 
continued its work with AMWA to refine and operate the ISAC. 
EPA provided $51 million in funding to water utilities in 
fiscal year 2002, and the Agency partnered with numerous 
industry associations to develop vulnerability assessment and 
emergency response plan tools and training tailored for 
specific applications. EPA has also worked to protect 
wastewater treatment works in accordance with the EPA Strategic 
Plan for Homeland Security, issued in September 2002. Since 
September 11, 2001, EPA has provided $1.1 million to the 
Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (AMSA) to develop 
a wastewater security vulnerability assessment tool. That tool 
is now available to individual treatment works.
    After the Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness 
Response Act of 2002 was enacted without addressing wastewater 
security, Senator Jeffords introduced S. 3037, the Wastewater 
Treatment Works Security and Safety Act, on October 3, 2002. S. 
3037 mirrors the original provisions of S. 1593 and S. 1608 as 
well as the modified provisions for drinking water in H.R. 
3448. The legislation requires all wastewater utilities to 
conduct vulnerability assessments and to develop or modify 
emergency response plans to incorporate the results of the 
vulnerability assessments. It requires that these documents be 
presented to the EPA for review, and it includes significant 
security measures designed to protect this information from 
unauthorized disclosure. It authorizes $185 million for 
assistance in completing vulnerability assessments, for 
immediate security improvements, and for assistance to small 
treatment works. It authorizes $15 million for research to 
identify threats, detection methods, and response actions. AMSA 
endorsed S. 3037 on October 1, 2002. During the 107th Congress, 
the House passed a wastewater security bill, H.R. 5169, the 
Wastewater Treatment Works Security and Safety Act. Due to 
significant differences over the treatment of vulnerability 
assessments in each bill, the House and the Senate were unable 
to reach agreement on this issue during the 107th Congress.
    In the 108th Congress, on April 3, 2003, Senators Jeffords 
(I-VT), Graham (D-FL), Lieberman (D-CT), and Lautenberg (D-NJ) 
introduced the Wastewater Treatment Works Security and Safety 
Act, S. 779. On May 12, 2003, Senators James Inhofe (R-OK) and 
Mike Crapo (R-ID) introduced S. 1039, also entitled the 
Wastewater Treatment Works Security and Safety Act. The 
committee considered and passed S. 1039 on May 15, 2003.
    In the 109th Congress, on November 10, 2005, Senators 
Jeffords (I-VT), Lautenberg (D-NJ), Boxer (D-CA) and Obama (D-
IL) introduced S. 1995, the Wastewater Treatment Works Security 
Act of 2005. The bill requires all wastewater facilities to 
conduct vulnerability assessments and to develop or modify site 
security and emergency response plans to incorporate the 
results of the vulnerability assessments. Treatment works must 
certify that alternative approaches, such as using smaller 
quantities or replacing substances of concern, were considered 
in preparing their site security plans. It requires that these 
documents be submitted to EPA for review and approval and it 
includes significant security measures to protect this 
information from unauthorized disclosure. Additionally, the 
bill authorizes $225 million for assistance in 
completingvulnerability assessments, site security plans, and emergency 
response plans; for implementing these plans and security enhancements; 
for immediate security improvements; and for technical assistance in 
carrying out these activities. The bill also authorizes $5 million in 
grants for technical assistance to small treatment works and $5 million 
in grants for improving vulnerability assessments and tools. Finally, 
it authorizes $15 million for research and review to identify threats, 
detection methods and response actions at treatment works.
    On May 19, 2006, Senator Biden (D-DE) with Senators 
Jeffords (I-VT) and Boxer (D-CA) introduced S. 2855, the 
Community Water Treatment Hazards Reduction Act. This bill 
would significantly reduce the threat of attack on our nation's 
wastewater and drinking water facilities. In introducing the 
bill, Senator Biden cited the fact that there are about 100 
facilities that store sufficient quantities of chlorine and 
other toxic chemicals to threaten between 100,000 and 1,000,000 
citizens. The bill would cost about $125 million per year, over 
5 years, and would require the EPA to prioritize these 
facilities on the basis of risk. Upon notification of 
designation as a high risk water facility, such facilities that 
serve more than 10,000 people will conduct an options 
feasibility study of the costs and benefits related to 
inherently safer technologies (IST) and select an IST where 
feasible. Beginning with the first tier of high risk 
facilities, the EPA will award grants, and subject to grant 
availability, issue orders to facilitate the transition to the 
selected IST. Facilities that transition to the use of one or 
more IST after September 11, 2001 but before enactment of this 
legislation, and would qualify as a high consequence water 
facility under this bill, would be allowed to participate in 
the grant program. Water facilities that serve less than 10,000 
individuals can opt in if they desire and be eligible for grant 
funding to transition to the use of one or more ISTs.
    On May 10, 2006, Senators Inhofe (R-OK), Chafee (R-RI) and 
Murkowski (R-AK) introduced S. 2781, the Wastewater Treatment 
Works Security Act. The committee considered and passed S. 2781 
on May 23, 2006. We believe that S. 2781, as it passed the 
committee, does not fulfill our responsibility to provide the 
American people with the level of security that is required for 
our wastewater treatment works.

Discussion

    On May 23, 2006, the Committee on Environment and Public 
Works met to consider S. 2781. Senator Jeffords (I-VT) offered 
an amendment to S. 2781 that would have required wastewater 
facilities to conduct a vulnerability assessment, prepare or 
modify an emergency response plan and site security plan 
incorporating the results of the vulnerability assessment, and 
submit these documents to the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency for review and approval. The amendment includes 
significant security measures to protect this information from 
unauthorized disclosure. The amendment authorizes $225 million 
for assistance in completing vulnerability assessments, site 
security plans, and emergency response plans; for implementing 
these plans and security enhancements; for immediate security 
improvements; and for technical assistance in carrying out 
these activities. The amendment also authorizes $5 million in 
grants for technical assistance to small treatment works and $5 
million in grants for improving vulnerability assessments and 
tools. Finally, it authorizes $15 million for research and 
review to identify threats, detection methods and response 
actions at treatment works. The amendment also incorporates the 
provisions of S. 2855 discussed above. Specifically, the 
amendment would also require EPA to prioritize wastewater and 
drinking water facilities on the basis of risk. Upon 
notification of designation as a high risk water facility, such 
facilities that serve more than 10,000 people will conduct an 
options feasibility study of the costs and benefits related to 
inherently safer technologies (IST) and select an IST where 
feasible. Beginning with the first tier of high risk 
facilities, the EPA will award grants, and subject to grant 
availability, issue orders to facilitate the transition to the 
selected IST. Facilities that transition to the use of one or 
more IST after September 11, 2001 but before enactment of this 
legislation, and would qualify as a high consequence water 
facility under this amendment, would be allowed to participate 
in the grant program. Water facilities that serve less than 
10,000 individuals can opt in if they desire and be eligible 
for grant funding to transition to the use of one or more ISTs. 
Grant funding in the amount of $125 million, over 5 years, is 
authorized for the amendment's IST provisions.
    Senator Voinovich (R-OH) offered a motion to table the 
amendment and it passed by roll call vote with Senators Inhofe 
(R-OK), Warner (R-VA), Thune (R-SD), Murkowski (R-AK), Isakson 
(R-GA), Vitter (R-LA), Voinovich (R-OH), Bond (R-MO), Chafee 
(R-RI), and DeMint (R-SC) voting aye, and Senators Jeffords (I-
VT), Boxer (D-CA), Lieberman (D-CT), Obama (D-IL), Clinton (D-
NY), Baucus (D-MT), Lautenberg (D-NJ), and Carper (D-DE) voting 
nay. Senator Boxer then made a motion to table S. 2781 which 
failed by roll call vote, with 10 Republicans voting nay, 1 
Independent voting aye, and 7 Democrats voting aye. S. 2781 was 
passed by voice vote and reported out of committee.
    Without the modifications that were included in the 
Jeffords amendment, we believe that S. 2781 as passed by the 
committee provides security to wastewater treatment works in 
name only. First, S. 2781 does not require the completion of 
vulnerability assessments, site security plans or emergency 
response plans. We believe that conducting a vulnerability 
assessment, addressing the security needs it identifies, and 
incorporating the results into a facility's emergency response 
plan and preparing a site security plan are the most basic 
actions that must be taken in each sector of our nation's 
critical infrastructure. The need for these mandatory security 
plans is supported by the findings of two recent GAO reports on 
wastewater security. In January 2005, GAO released a report 
(``Wastewater Facilities: Experts' Views on How Federal Funds 
Should Be Spent to Improve Security,'' GAO-05-165) that 
highlights the vulnerability of our nation's wastewater systems 
and recommends that we take action to protect them now. The 
report ranks the release of chlorine as the second highest 
security risk after damage to sewer collection systems. In 
March 2006, GAO issued another report on security measures 
taken by wastewater facilities (``Securing Wastewater 
Facilities: Utilities Have MadeImportant Upgrades but Further 
Improvements to Key System Components May Be Limited by Costs and Other 
Constraints,'' GAO-06-390). GAO surveyed 206 large wastewater 
facilities to determine how many facilities have completed 
vulnerability assessments and made security improvements. The 
Majority's Report discusses this GAO report and states that 74 percent 
of the facilities surveyed have completed a vulnerability assessment, 
were in the process of completing some type of security assessment, or 
had one underway. However, it fails to mention that GAO found that 41 
percent of the facilities still use chlorine gas for water disinfection 
and only half have actually completed vulnerability assessments. GAO's 
most troubling finding is that few wastewater facilities have addressed 
the number one vulnerability identified by the GAO in 2005-collection 
systems security.
    Even if facilities complete their assessments and plans, S. 
2781 does not require that these documents be submitted to the 
EPA for review and approval, or that they be available to the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for purposes of 
prioritizing and coordinating infrastructure protection 
efforts. We believe that this is a serious obstacle in the 
DHS's ability to perform its mission. We believe that providing 
the results of a facility's vulnerability assessment and its 
site security and emergency response plans to the Federal 
Government is a vital step both to ensure that such assessments 
are completed and implemented in critical infrastructure 
sectors and to ensure that the Federal Government has all of 
the information it requires to secure the Nation against a 
potential terrorist attack. In addition, elected officials in 
Congress have a Constitutional oversight role over Federal 
agencies and the laws they implement. Under S. 2781, Congress 
will not be accountable to the public for the purpose or 
implementation of this law--Congress will not be able to 
request or access information from the Federal agencies because 
the agencies will not have such information.
    Under S. 2781 as reported, it is unclear where DHS will get 
the information they require to complete its national 
vulnerability assessment and make resource allocation decisions 
that will increase the level of security in our Nation. It is 
clear that DHS is likely to receive partial information 
covering only the subset of the wastewater treatment industry 
that voluntarily chooses to complete a vulnerability assessment 
and that voluntarily chooses to share the information they 
collect with DHS. In fact, under the bill, the EPA is 
prohibited from requesting a copy of the vulnerability 
assessment from the wastewater facility, but may visit the 
facility to view the assessment and ensure that one has been 
completed. This is likely to make it extremely difficult for 
the Federal Government, including DHS, to seek this information 
for any purpose. Without the best, most up-to-date, accurate 
information available, DHS will be unable to fully perform its 
mission.
    We also disagree with the treatment of information that 
could be submitted under S. 2781. While we agree that 
vulnerability assessments and security plans are likely to 
contain some sensitive information that merits special 
protection against public disclosure, S. 2781 goes too far and 
would prevent disclosure of even general documents that contain 
any information derived from these plans, even if they do not 
reference any particular facility or vulnerability, and even if 
they do not contain any information that is actually sensitive. 
The result would be to impose secrecy on many of the agency's 
general administrative and policy documents relating to 
wastewater security, seriously impeding oversight and 
accountability of the program.
    Second, S. 2781 does not require the consideration of, or 
transition to, safer technologies. In our view, this is 
irresponsible given what we know about available alternatives. 
In April 2006, the Center for American Progress conducted a 
survey of 1,800 chemical plants, including wastewater plants, 
that no longer report using extremely hazardous substances 
under the Federal Risk Management Planning program.\3\ The 
survey determined that facilities across the country have 
switched to safer alternatives from a variety of hazardous 
chemicals, producing dramatic security and safety benefits at a 
reasonable cost. Some of the report's findings regarding 
wastewater facilities include: 114 wastewater facilities 
reported switching to less acutely hazardous treatment 
chemicals. These facilities generally replaced chlorine gas 
with liquid chlorine bleach or ultraviolet light and, as a 
result of these changes, millions of people are no longer at 
risk of being exposed to toxic gas from these facilities. For 
example, the following wastewater plants switched from chlorine 
gas to liquid bleach and prevented the risk of exposure to 
toxic gas to the following populations: Blue Plains Wastewater 
Treatment Plant, Washington, DC, 1.7 million people; Mill Creek 
Wastewater Treatment Plant, Cincinnati, Ohio, 860,000 people; 
City of Wilmington Water Pollution Control, Wilmington, 
Delaware, 560,000 people; and Middlesex County Utilities 
Authority, Sayreville, New Jersey, 10.7 million people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Paul Orum, Center for American Progress. Preventing Toxic 
Terrorism How Some Chemical Facilities are Removing Danger to American 
Communities (April 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, S. 2781 also sets up a distinct, and vastly 
different set of rules for wastewater facilities than drinking 
water facilities, 40 percent of which are co-located, according 
to GAO. This simply does not make sense. Congress has a duty to 
provide for the security of our Nation. S. 2781 simply does 
not. Five years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 this gap in our nation's security is reckless. The 
Majority Report notes that cost is an important consideration 
in switching technologies and states the costs expended by two 
wastewater plants to switch from chlorine to sodium 
hypochlorite: the Blue Plains treatment plant in Washington, 
D.C., spent $12.5 million and a facility in San Jose, 
California, spent $5 million. The cost of switching to a safer 
treatment chemical or technology is not prohibitive. We 
disagree with the Majority regarding the conversion cost at the 
Blue Plains plant. According to the report, ``Eliminating 
Hometown Hazards Cutting Chemical Risks at Wastewater Treatment 
Facilities'' by Environmental Defense, the Blue Plains facility 
spent $500,000 in construction costs to switch.\4\ This 
information was provided by Mike Marcotte, chief engineer at 
the plant at the time of the conversion. Additional capital 
expenditures were made at this plant that included upgrades to 
the liquid bleach facilities. Half of the respondents, that 
responded and provided cost estimates, to the survey conducted 
by the Center for American Progress reported spending less than 
$100,000 to switch to safer alternatives and 87 percent spent 
less than $1 million. For instance, the City of Wilmington, 
Delaware Water Pollution Control facility spent $160,000 to 
switch from chlorine gas to liquid bleach.\5\ We believe that 
the wastewater industry should not be exempt from taking basic 
precautions to evaluate and address its security needs. 
Therefore, we believe that S. 2781 as reported from committee 
fails to ensure that even the most basic steps toward a higher 
level of security in the nation's critical infrastructure 
sectors are taken.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Carol Andress, Environmental Defense. Eliminating Hometown 
Hazards Cutting Chemical Risks at Wastewater Treatment Facilities 
(2003)
    \5\ --Cong. Rec. S4805 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Joseph Biden).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We believe that the Federal Government has a responsibility 
to protect the American people. Without the provisions in the 
Jeffords amendment, we believe that S. 2781 does not fulfill 
this responsibility. If S. 2781 is implemented as it passed the 
committee, the Federal Government will not know if wastewater 
facilities will voluntarily conduct a vulnerability assessment, 
if they will voluntarily implement the security needs 
identified, if the most vulnerable facilities will switch to 
less hazardous materials for use in treatment, or if they will 
incorporate the results into their emergency response plans, 
and there will be no way of finding out. We believe that S. 
2781 fails to take responsible, basic steps to protect our 
wastewater infrastructure security from terrorist attack, 
putting Americans at risk.
                                   Jim Jeffords.
                                   Joe Lieberman.
                                   Frank R. Lautenberg.
                                   Barbara Boxer.
                                   Tom Carper.
                                   Hillary Rodham Clinton.
                                   Max Baucus.
                                   Barack Obama.

                        Changes in Existing Law

    In compliance with section 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill 
as reported are shown as follows: Existing law proposed to be 
omitted is enclosed in [black brackets], new matter is printed 
in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown 
in roman:
                              ----------                              

FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          TITLE II--GRANTS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF TREATMENT WORKS

    SEC. 201. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 221. SEWER OVERFLOW CONTROL GRANTS.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 222. WASTEWATER TREATMENT WORKS SECURITY.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Disruption of service event.--The term 
        `disruption of service event' means a natural disaster 
        or event, or a terrorist attack or other intentional 
        act, that--
                  (A) substantially disrupts the ability of a 
                treatment works to provide safe and reliable--
                          (i) conveyance and treatment of 
                        wastewater;
                          (ii) disposal of effluent; or
                          (iii) storage of any potentially 
                        hazardous chemical used to treat 
                        wastewater;
                  (B) damages critical infrastructure 
                associated with a treatment works;
                  (C) has a substantial adverse effect on the 
                environment as a result of harm caused to a 
                treatment works; or
                  (D) otherwise poses a significant threat to 
                public health or safety as a result of harm 
                caused to a treatment works.
          (2) Emergency response plan.--
                  (A) In general.--The term `emergency response 
                plan' means a plan or set of plans developed by 
                or in cooperation with a treatment works that 
                may include the procedures the treatment works 
                will use when a disruption of service event 
                occurs, including procedures for ensuring 
                continued service and protection of the public 
                health and environment.
                  (B) Inclusions.--The term `emergency response 
                plan' includes a plan or set of plans that may 
                describe, for a case in which a disruption of 
                service event occurs--
                          (i) the means by which a publicly 
                        owned treatment works will provide 
                        information regarding risks to--
                                  (I) the media;
                                  (II) municipal emergency 
                                personnel;
                                  (III) health officials;
                                  (IV) the general public;
                                  (V) Federal and State 
                                environmental authorities; and
                                  (VI) other potentially 
                                impacted water utilities;
                          (ii) the means by which a publicly 
                        owned treatment works will limit 
                        contamination of public water supplies, 
                        including temporary treatment and other 
                        mitigation measures;
                          (iii) the means by which a publicly 
                        owned treatment works will address 
                        contaminants entering the treatment 
                        works or its collection system, 
                        including any contaminants added by 
                        emergency response personnel in 
                        responding to a natural disaster or 
                        terrorist event;
                          (iv) the means by which a publicly 
                        owned treatment works will secure 
                        backup generation if a loss of power 
                        accompanies the disruption of service 
                        event; or
                          (v) any additional means of 
                        collecting or treating wastewater.
                  (C) Certain other plans.--The term `emergency 
                response plan' may include--
                          (i) an emergency response plan 
                        conducted in accordance with a Federal 
                        statute that addresses each element 
                        identified under subparagraphs (A) and 
                        (B); and
                          (ii) an emergency response plan in 
                        existence on the date of enactment of 
                        this section that is modified to 
                        include each element identified under 
                        subparagraphs (A) and (B).
          (3) Site security plan.--The term `site security 
        plan' means a plan to implement, to the maximum extent 
        practicable, changes at a treatment works based on 
        information in a vulnerability assessment to address 
        risks posed by a disruption of service event.
          (4) Vulnerability assessment.--
                  (A) In general.--The term `vulnerability 
                assessment' means an assessment of the 
                vulnerability of a treatment works to a 
                disruption of service event.
                  (B) Inclusions.--The term `vulnerability 
                assessment' may include--
                          (i) a characterization of the 
                        treatment works, including, with 
                        respect to the treatment works--
                                  (I) mission and objective;
                                  (II) customer base;
                                  (III) the facilities that 
                                comprise the treatment works, 
                                including--
                                          (aa) the collection 
                                        system;
                                          (bb) the pumping 
                                        station;
                                          (cc) the power 
                                        supply;
                                          (dd) electronic and 
                                        computer systems; and
                                          (ee) chemical 
                                        containers;
                                  (IV) processes; and
                                  (V) assets for achieving 
                                treatment works objectives;
                          (ii) an identification and 
                        prioritization of adverse consequences 
                        to avoid at the treatment works, 
                        including--
                                  (I) substantial disruptions 
                                of service;
                                  (II) economic impacts;
                                  (III) loss of life; and
                                  (IV) negative health 
                                consequences for staff at the 
                                treatment works;
                          (iii) an identification of adverse 
                        consequences to the public health and 
                        safety and the environment and natural 
                        resources;
                          (iv) a determination of critical 
                        assets of the treatment works that may 
                        be subject to a disruption of service 
                        event, including--
                                  (I) pumping stations;
                                  (II) power sources;
                                  (III) electronic and computer 
                                systems; and
                                  (IV) disinfection processes;
                          (v) an assessment of--
                                  (I) the qualitative 
                                probability of a disruption of 
                                service event; and
                                  (II) whether the disruption 
                                of service event is the result 
                                of a natural or an intentional 
                                occurrence;
                          (vi) an evaluation of existing 
                        countermeasures relating to the 
                        treatment works; and
                          (vii) an analysis of current risk 
                        relating to the treatment works and the 
                        development of a prioritized plan for 
                        risk reduction at the treatment works.
  (b) Grants for Vulnerability Assessments and Security 
Enhancements.--The Administrator may provide grants to any 
State, municipality, intermunicipal or interstate agency, or 
privately owned utility that principally treats municipal 
wastewater--
          (1) to conduct a vulnerability assessment of a 
        publicly owned treatment works;
          (2) to implement security enhancements described in 
        subsection (c)(1) and other security enhancements to 
        reduce vulnerabilities identified in a vulnerability 
        assessment;
          (3) for the development, expansion, or upgrading of 
        an emergency response plan and site security plan; and
          (4) for the voluntary creation by a State or network 
        of treatment works of, or voluntary participation by a 
        treatment works in, a mutual aid and emergency network 
        preparedness agreement developed in accordance with the 
        National Incident Management System established 
        pursuant to presidential directive number 5 of the 
        Department of Homeland Security.
  (c) Grants for Security Enhancements.--
          (1) Preapproved security enhancements.--On 
        certification by a State, municipality, intermunicipal 
        or interstate agency, or privately owned utility that 
        principally treats municipal wastewater that a 
        vulnerability assessment has been completed for a 
        treatment works, and that the security enhancement for 
        which assistance is sought is for the purpose of 
        reducing vulnerabilities of the treatment works 
        identified in the vulnerability assessment, the 
        Administrator may provide grants to the State, 
        municipality, intermunicipal or interstate agency, or 
        privately owned utility under subsection (b)(2) for 1 
        or more of the uses described in paragraph (2).
          (2) Uses of grant funds.--The uses referred to in 
        paragraph (1) include--
                  (A) the purchase and installation of 
                equipment for materials and activities relating 
                to access control, intrusion prevention and 
                delay, and detection of intruders and hazardous 
                or dangerous substances, including--
                          (i) barriers, fencing, and gates;
                          (ii) security lighting and cameras;
                          (iii) metal grates, wire mesh, and 
                        outfall entry barriers;
                          (iv) securing of manhole covers and 
                        fill and vent pipes;
                          (v) installation and rekeying of 
                        doors and locks; and
                          (vi) smoke, chemical, and explosive 
                        mixture detection systems;
                  (B) the conduct of an activity to improve the 
                security for electronic, computer, or other 
                automated systems and remote security systems, 
                including--
                          (i) controlling access to those 
                        systems;
                          (ii) intrusion detection and 
                        prevention; and
                          (iii) system backup;
                  (C) participation in a training program, and 
                the purchase of training manuals and guidance 
                material, relating to security; and
                  (D) the conduct of security screening of 
                employees or contractor support services.
          (3) Limitations.--
                  (A) Use of funds.--A grant provided under 
                subsection (b) shall not be used for--
                          (i) payment of personnel costs; or
                          (ii) operation or maintenance of 
                        facilities, equipment, or systems.
                  (B) Disclosure of vulnerability assessment.--
                          (i) In general.--Except as provided 
                        in clause (ii), as a condition of 
                        applying for or receiving a grant under 
                        this subsection, the Administrator may 
                        not require an applicant to provide the 
                        Administrator with a copy of a 
                        vulnerability assessment.
                          (ii) Exception.--To ensure compliance 
                        with any applicable Federal grant 
                        requirement, the Administrator or a 
                        designee of the Administrator--
                                  (I) may request and view a 
                                copy of a vulnerability 
                                assessment associated with a 
                                grant under this section; but
                                  (II) shall not take 
                                possession or control of the 
                                copy.
                  (C) Responsibility of administrator.--Not 
                later than December 31, 2006, the 
                Administrator, in consultation with appropriate 
                Federal law enforcement and intelligence 
                officials, shall incorporate into existing 
                protocols for protection of sensitive 
                information a method by which the Administrator 
                will protect from unauthorized disclosure 
                vulnerability assessment information viewed by 
                the Administrator or a designee of the 
                Administrator pursuant to subparagraph (B)(ii).
                  (D) Penalties.--
                          (i) In general.--Except as provided 
                        in clause (ii), any individual who 
                        views a vulnerability assessment, a 
                        reproduction of a vulnerability 
                        assessment, or any information derived 
                        from a vulnerability assessment, 
                        pursuant to subparagraph (B)(ii) and 
                        who knowingly or recklessly reveals the 
                        vulnerability assessment, reproduction, 
                        or information other than to the 
                        Administrator or an individual 
                        designated by the Administrator, or for 
                        use in an administrative or judicial 
                        proceeding to impose a penalty for 
                        failure to comply with this section, 
                        shall, on conviction--
                                  (I) be imprisoned for not 
                                more than 1 year or fined in 
                                accordance with chapter 227 of 
                                title 18, United States Code, 
                                as applicable to class A 
                                misdemeanors, or both; and
                                  (II) be removed from Federal 
                                office or employment.
                          (ii) Exception.--Notwithstanding 
                        clause (i), a designee of the 
                        Administrator who is an officer or 
                        employee of the United States may 
                        discuss with any State or local 
                        government official the contents of a 
                        vulnerability assessment viewed under 
                        this paragraph.
                  (E) Effect of paragraph.--Nothing in this 
                paragraph authorizes any person to withhold any 
                information from Congress or any committee or 
                subcommittee of Congress.
          (4) False certifications.--An applicant that 
        knowingly submits to the Administrator a false 
        certification or material statement under this 
        subsection shall be subject to a criminal penalty under 
        section 309(c)(4).
          (5) Exemption under foia and related laws.--Except 
        for information in a certification under this 
        subsection identifying the system for which the 
        certification is submitted and the date of 
        certification of the system, all information contained 
        in a vulnerability assessment certified by an applicant 
        or derived from a vulnerability assessment under this 
        section shall be exempt from the disclosure 
        requirements under--
                  (A) section 552 of title 5, United States 
                Code (commonly known as the `Freedom of 
                Information Act'); and
                  (B) any State or local law providing for 
                public access to information.
  (d) Grant Amounts.--
          (1) Federal share.--The Federal share of the cost of 
        an activity funded by a grant under subsection (b) 
        shall not exceed 50 percent, as determined by the 
        Administrator.
          (2) Maximum amount.--The total amount of grants made 
        under subsection (b) for any publicly owned treatment 
        works shall not exceed $100,000, as determined by the 
        Administrator.
  (e) Technical Assistance for Small Publicly Owned Treatment 
Works.--
          (1) Definition of small publicly owned treatment 
        works.--In this subsection, the term `small publicly 
        owned treatment works' means a publicly owned treatment 
        works that services a population of fewer than 10,000 
        individuals.
          (2) Security assessment and planning assistance.--
                  (A) In general.--The Administrator, in 
                coordination with the States, may provide 
                technical guidance and assistance to small 
                publicly owned treatment works for--
                          (i) the conduct of a vulnerability 
                        assessment, emergency response plan, or 
                        site security plan; and
                          (ii) the implementation of security 
                        enhancements to reduce vulnerabilities 
                        identified in a vulnerability 
                        assessment.
                  (B) Inclusions.--Technical guidance and 
                assistance provided under subparagraph (A) may 
                include technical assistance programs, 
                training, and preliminary engineering 
                evaluations.
          (3) Participation by nonprofit organizations.--The 
        Administrator may provide grants to nonprofit 
        organizations to assist in accomplishing the purposes 
        of this subsection.
  (f) Refinement of Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for 
Publicly Owned Treatment Works.--
          (1) Grants.--The Administrator may provide to 
        nonprofit organizations 1 or more grants to be used in 
        improving vulnerability self-assessment methodologies 
        and tools for publicly owned treatment works, including 
        publicly owned treatment works that are part of a 
        combined public wastewater treatment and water supply 
        system.
          (2) Eligible activities.--A grant provided under this 
        subsection may be used--
                  (A) to develop and distribute vulnerability 
                self-assessment methodology software upgrades;
                  (B) to improve and enhance critical technical 
                and user support functions;
                  (C) to expand libraries of information 
                addressing threats and countermeasures; and
                  (D) to implement user training initiatives.
          (3) Cost.--A service described in paragraph (2) that 
        is funded by a grant under this subsection shall be 
        provided at no cost to the recipients of the service.
  (g) Training Grants.--
          (1) In general.--The Administrator may provide grants 
        to nonprofit organizations to be used in accordance 
        with paragraph (2) to implement a comprehensive 
        training program for treatment works or privately owned 
        utilities that principally treat municipal wastewater.
          (2) Eligible activities.--A grant provided under 
        paragraph (1) may be used--
                  (A) to develop and implement a training 
                program to assist treatment works in--
                          (i) conducting vulnerability 
                        assessments using vulnerability self-
                        assessment methodology software;
                          (ii) developing emergency response 
                        plans; and
                          (iii) identifying security 
                        enhancements, including operational 
                        adjustments and design practices; and
                  (B) to develop and disseminate to treatment 
                works information on best practices for 
                emergency response plans and security 
                enhancements, including operational adjustments 
                and design practices.
          (3) Cost.--Training and technical assistance provided 
        pursuant to a grant under paragraph (1) shall be 
        provided at no cost to the recipients of the 
        assistance.
  (h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to 
be appropriated--
          (1) $200,000,000 for use in making grants under 
        subsection (b), to remain available until expended;
          (2) $15,000,000 for use in providing assistance under 
        subsections (e) and (g); and
          (3) to carry out subsection (f), $1,000,000 for each 
        of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

SEC. 223. RESEARCH AND REVIEW OF COLLECTION SYSTEMS AND TREATMENT 
                    WORKS.

  (a) Definition of Collection System.--In this section, the 
term `collection system' means the underground network of 
sewers, including sanitary and storm water collection lines.
  (b) Research and Review.--The Administrator, in consultation 
with appropriate Federal agencies, shall conduct research and a 
review, or enter into a contract or cooperative agreement for 
the conduct of research and a review, of--
          (1) means of providing alternative processes to 
        convey, treat, and dispose of wastewater if a 
        disruption of service event (as defined in section 222) 
        occurs;
          (2) the means by which the collection system of a 
        treatment works could--
                  (A) be used to convey hazardous chemicals or 
                substances (including explosive devices), 
                including a comprehensive analysis of the types 
                of hazardous chemicals, substances, and 
                explosive devices that could be placed in the 
                collection system; and
                  (B) be secured in response to an intentional 
                harmful act;
          (3) methods for monitoring--
                  (A) the collection system of a treatment 
                works for hazardous chemicals or substances, 
                including explosive devices; and
                  (B) unauthorized entry into the collection 
                system of a treatment works; and
          (4) treatment technologies, including the 
        affordability, effectiveness, and limitations of each 
        treatment technology.
  (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to 
be appropriated to carry out this section $5,000,000 for each 
of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

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