Daniel A. Petalas, Acting General Counsel (dpetalas@fec.gov) 

Lisa J. Stevenson, Deputy General Counsel – Law (lstevenson@fec.gov) 

Kevin Deeley, Acting Associate General Counsel (kdeeley@fec.gov) 

Harry J. Summers, Assistant General Counsel (hsummers@fec.gov) 

Kevin P. Hancock, Attorney (khancock@fec.gov) 

FOR THE PLAINTIFF 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 

_______________________________________ 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

 ) Case No. 2:15-cv-00439-DB 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 

 v. ) MOTION FOR PARTIAL 

 ) JUDGMENT OR TO STRIKE 

JEREMY JOHNSON, ) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

 ) 

 Defendant. ) District Judge Dee Benson 

 ) 

PLAINTIFF FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S REPLY IN SUPPORT 

OF ITS MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS OR 

IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 

 

 Plaintiff Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) has moved under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for partial judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative 

under Rule 12(f) to strike nine of the purported defenses that defendant Jeremy Johnson has 

pleaded in his answer. The FEC showed that Johnson’s defenses cannot succeed as a matter of 

law, are insufficiently pleaded, are not actually affirmative defenses, or suffer some combination 

of these defects. In response, Johnson claims that he is “not required to plead facts” and instead 

can open the doors to discovery by simply pleading “truism[s]” based on things he “suspects” in 

hopes of finding a factual basis for his speculation. Rule 8, however, requires even a defendant 

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2

to plead enough facts to suggest that discovery will result in evidence of the allegation — and 

that was true even before the Supreme Court strengthened the pleading standard in Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Johnson’s conclusory allegations fall short of any 

pleading standard, and in the rare instances in which Johnson has pleaded facts, the defenses 

cannot succeed as a matter of law even assuming those facts were true. Johnson also claims that 

even those defenses that he admits are faulty should nonetheless remain in the case absent 

prejudice. But Rule 12(c) does not require a showing of prejudice, the Tenth Circuit has not 

required prejudice for a successful Rule 12(f) motion, and in any event, the FEC would in fact 

suffer prejudice if Johnson’s defenses remain. Those baseless defenses seem designed to justify 

distracting and burdensome discovery into Johnson’s indiscriminate accusations of government 

wrongdoing. In fact, Johnson asserts that he is the victim of wrongdoing by no less than three 

government entities and an appointed receiver involved in at least three different litigations, but 

the FEC is not involved in any case but this one. Granting the FEC’s motion will prevent 

prejudice to the agency and conserve judicial resources by canceling the extravagant sideshow 

that Johnson appears to be planning. 

I. ARGUMENT 

 A. Johnson Has Misstated the Standard of Review 

 The parties agree that this Court may strike an affirmative defense that cannot succeed as 

a matter of law and fact. (See FEC’s Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings or in the Alternative to 

Strike Affirmative Defenses (“FEC Br.”) at 3 (Docket No. 22); Def.’s Mem. Opposing Pl.’s 

“Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings or to Strike Affirmative Defenses” (“Def.’s Br.”) at 1-2 

(Docket No. 26).) This is the same familiar standard that courts routinely apply to motions to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 31 Filed 01/11/16 Page 2 of 12
3

1138, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is 

treated as a motion to dismiss.”); Westar Energy, Inc. v. Lake, No. 05-4116, 2007 WL 977556, at 

*5 (D. Kan. Mar. 30, 2007) (unpublished) (“A motion to strike an affirmative defense is 

evaluated under the materially same legal standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”) As Johnson 

acknowledges, to survive a motion to dismiss one “must plead ‘enough fact to raise a reasonable 

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ of the allegation.” (Def.’s Br. at 3 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).) Defenses must be sufficiently pleaded, because “[i]f a defendant 

cannot articulate the reasons that affirmative defenses apply to a dispute, it is costly, wasteful, 

and unnecessary to force plaintiffs to conduct discovery into those defenses.” Dodson v. Munirs 

Co., No. CIV. S-13-0399, 2013 WL 3146818, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2013) (unpublished). 

 Nevertheless, Johnson incorrectly claims that he is “not required to plead facts in a 

defense.” (Def.’s Br. at 7.) Instead, he insists that he can bootstrap his way into discovery by 

pleading “truism[s]” and things he “suspects.” (Id. at 8.) Rule 8, however, does not allow this. 

First, Johnson does not dispute that Twombly’s heightened pleading standard applies to claims 

for relief. (Id. at 2-3.) Some of Johnson’s purported affirmative defenses are actually claims for 

relief, as the FEC has pointed out (see FEC Br. at 8 n.1 (Sixth Defense), 12 n.5 (Fifth Defense)) 

and as Johnson has admitted in response (see Def.’s Br at 6 (admitting that the First Defense is 

“the basis for one item requested in Defendant’s prayer for relief”), 8-9 (admitting that the Fifth 

Defense will require ”an appropriate motion”)). Second, to the extent Johnson has pleaded any 

actual affirmative defenses, Rule 8 requires that they contain more than mere conclusory 

allegations regardless of whether Twombly applies. Even before Twombly strengthened Rule 8’s 

pleading requirement in 2007, defendants asserting affirmative defenses were still required to 

“do more than simply make allegations” and plead “a short and plain statement of the facts.” 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 31 Filed 01/11/16 Page 3 of 12
4

Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615, 618 (D. Kan. 2006) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In any event, “most courts hold[] that the more rigorous 

Twombly/Iqbal standard does apply to affirmative defenses.” Constr. Indus. Laborers Pension 

Fund v. Explosive Contractors, Inc., No. 12-2624-EFM, 2013 WL 3984371, at *1 & n.9 (D. 

Kan. Aug. 1, 2013) (unpublished) (citing cases).1

 

 Johnson cannot save his deficient defenses by claiming that the FEC would not be 

prejudiced if they remained in his answer. Prejudice is not required for a Rule 12(c) motion for 

judgment on the pleadings. See FDIC ex rel. Heritage Bank & Trust v. Lowe, 809 F. Supp. 856, 

857-59 (D. Utah 1992) (dismissing affirmative defenses under Rule 12(c) without requiring 

prejudice). And under Rule 12(f), “the Tenth Circuit has not included prejudice among the 

elements a litigant must show to prevail on a motion to strike.” Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 

598 (D.N.M. 2011) (citing Burrell v. Armijo, 603 F.3d 825, 836 (10th Cir. 2010)). Indeed, courts 

have held that prejudice is not required because “Rule 12(f) says nothing about a showing of 

prejudice and allows a court to strike material sua sponte.” See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Ramirez, 

176 F.3d 481, 1999 WL 273241, at *2 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision). 

 In any event, the FEC would be prejudiced if Johnson were permitted to derail this 

litigation with pointless, burdensome discovery into his scattershot accusations of government 

wrongdoing. In fact, the very “purpose of Rule 12(f) . . . is to minimize delay, prejudice and 

confusion by narrowing the issues for discovery and trial.” United States v. Badger, No. 2:10-

CV-00935, 2013 WL 1309165, at *4 (D. Utah Mar. 31, 2013) (unpublished; emphasis added). If 

Johnson’s defenses remain, he will likely use them to shift the focus of this proceeding away 

                                                           

1

 In addition to Rule 8’s pleading requirement, Johnson’s alleged selective prosecution 

defense (Sixth Defense) and conciliation defense (Eighth Defense) each carry their own special, 

enhanced pleading burdens (see FEC Br. at 5, 10), which Johnson does not even argue he can 

satisfy, see infra pp. 5-7. 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 31 Filed 01/11/16 Page 4 of 12
5

from Johnson’s serious violations of federal law. Furthermore, unnecessary discovery regarding 

his defenses “may disclose the Government’s prosecutorial strategy” and “will divert 

prosecutors’ resources,” as well as the Court’s. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 

(1996) (explaining need for a heightened pleading burden for selective prosecution claims).2

 

 B. Johnson’s Response Confirms That He Has Inadequately Pleaded Selective 

Prosecution (Sixth Defense) 

 

 Johnson has failed to offer any valid reason why the Court should not strike his 

conclusory selective prosecution defense. Johnson admits that the FEC’s exercise of 

prosecutorial discretion is entitled to a presumption of regularity. (Def.’s Br. at 9; cf. FEC Br. at 

4-5.) And Johnson does not dispute that the Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit have said that as a 

result, to even obtain discovery on a claim of selective prosecution, a defendant must satisfy “a 

substantially more ‘demanding’ pleading burden.” Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 

1214 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465); see Def.’s Br. at 9-10. Under that 

burden, Johnson must present “some evidence” tending to show that he was (1) singled out for 

prosecution while others similarly situated were not; and (2) prosecuted based on race, religion, 

or the desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights. (See FEC Br. at 6 (quoting 

Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468).) Johnson’s Sixth Defense falls far short. (Id. at 6-8.) 

 Johnson has further highlighted the insufficiency of his Sixth Defense by pointing out 

that the FEC has moved to add a co-defendant to this action, John Swallow (Def.’s Br. at 10 n.8), 

who made illegal contributions in the names of others along with Johnson (see Docket No. 25). 

As the FEC’s proposed Amended Complaint details, the FEC’s enforcement proceedings against 

                                                           

2

 Unnecessary discovery disputes under Rule 26 would not be an adequate substitute for an 

order striking insufficient defenses, as Johnson suggests (see Def.’s Br. at 4-5), since even 

discovery that is indisputably relevant to an insufficient defense creates pointless burdens. 

Granting the FEC’s motion will spare the Court from having to resolve needless discovery 

disputes. 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 31 Filed 01/11/16 Page 5 of 12
6

Swallow started a year and a half ago, at the same time as Johnson’s. (Proposed Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 50, 59 (Docket No. 25-1).) Johnson’s proceedings ended sooner in part because Swallow 

agreed to toll the statute of limitations for a total of 204 days. (Id. ¶¶ 62, 64-65.) Johnson does 

not dispute that the FEC has been prosecuting Swallow and yet he asks this Court to ignore it 

(Def.’s Br. at 10 n.8), as if that would change the fact that, either way, Johnson’s answer does not 

“allege that a similarly situated individual of a different class could have been but was not 

prosecuted for an offense for which Plaintiff was prosecuted,” as it must. Haskett v. Flanders, 

No. 13-CV-03392, 2015 WL 128156, at *7 (D. Colo. Jan. 8, 2015) (unpublished). 

 C. Johnson’s Response Confirms That His Failure-to-Attempt-to-Conciliate 

Defense Fails as a Matter of Law (Eighth Defense ¶ 51) 

 Johnson has failed to adequately rebut the FEC’s showing that his failure-to-attempt-toconciliate defense fails as a matter of law. (See FEC Br. at 8-11; Def.’s Br. at 13-15.) Johnson 

does not dispute that for the FEC to satisfy its duty to attempt to conciliate, it need only have (1) 

informed Johnson about the specific allegations against him; and (2) tried to engage Johnson in 

some form of written or oral discussion to give him an opportunity to remedy his alleged offense. 

(FEC Br. at 9 (citing Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, --- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1649, 1655-56 

(2015).) Johnson also does not dispute that the Supreme Court in Mach Mining said that an 

agency can clear this low bar by providing “‘a sworn affidavit from the [agency] stating that it 

has performed the obligations’ required ‘but that its efforts have failed.’” (Id. at 10 (quoting 135 

S. Ct. at 1656).) Johnson further does not contest that under Mach Mining, fact finding is not 

available unless in response the defendant is able to provide “‘credible evidence of its own . . . 

indicating that the [agency] did not provide the requisite information about the charge or attempt 

to engage in a discussion about conciliating the claim.’” (Id. (quoting 135 S. Ct. at 1656).) 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 31 Filed 01/11/16 Page 6 of 12
7

 The FEC provided the required declaration. (See Docket No. 22-2.) Johnson does not 

claim that the FEC’s declaration fails to meet the Mach Mining standard. The FEC also pointed 

out that a declaration is ultimately unnecessary since Johnson’s answer admits allegations in the 

Complaint that establish that the Mach Mining standard has been met. (FEC Br. at 10.) Johnson 

does not dispute this either. In addition, Johnson has provided no evidence (let alone “credible 

evidence”) indicating that the FEC did not meet that standard, as required to trigger discovery. 

 The Court should therefore reject Johnson’s claimed need to nevertheless take pointless 

discovery of “contemporaneous oral conversations.” (Def.’s Br. at 14.) Johnson bases this need 

on his brief’s opaque speculation that there could have been “misrepresentations” about, among 

other things, the statute of limitations. (Id.) Johnson does not explain what the FEC’s 

knowledge about the statute of limitations at the time it filed the Complaint has to do with 

conciliation. (See id.) Even if true, his claim would not change the FEC’s unrebutted showing 

and Johnson’s admissions that the FEC met Mach Mining’s two requirements. Also, Johnson’s 

hypothetical reveals his desire to discover what the FEC “knew” regarding its legal strategy 

(Def.’s Br. at 14), despite Mach Mining’s pointed instruction that courts are not to assess an 

agency’s “strategic decisions” in conciliation, 135 S. Ct. at 1654-55. Finally, if the FEC had not 

informed Johnson about the allegations against him or failed to give him an opportunity to 

discuss those allegations, the person in the best position to know that would be Johnson himself 

— but he has provided no affidavit or other evidence. 

 D. Johnson’s Response Confirms That His Disqualification Defense Fails as a 

Matter of Law (Fifth Defense) 

 The Commission has established that Johnson’s Fifth Defense cannot succeed as a matter 

of law. Johnson admits that the Fifth Defense is not actually an affirmative defense and thus will 

require its own separate motion for relief. (Def.’s Br. at 8-9; cf. FEC Br. at 12 n.5.) It cannot 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 31 Filed 01/11/16 Page 7 of 12
8

succeed, however (whether styled as a motion or a defense), since Johnson does not dispute the 

FEC’s observation that he has pleaded no valid factual basis for disqualification even taking as 

true his false assertion that the FEC reviewed his privileged communications. (See FEC Br. at 

12.) Finally, consistent with Johnson’s incorrect view that he need not plead facts, he candidly 

admits that the Fifth Defense is nothing but a “truism” based on something he “suspects.” 

(Def.’s Br. at 8.) However, something more than Johnson’s mere speculation is required to 

trigger time- and resource-consuming discovery. See supra pp. 3-4. 

 E. Johnson’s Response Confirms That His Defense Alleging That He Cannot 

Defend Himself Fails as a Matter of Law (Fourth Defense) 

 

 Johnson’s Fourth Defense also cannot succeed as a matter of law. That defense states 

that Johnson’s due process rights have been violated because he is “unable to access funds with 

which to meaningfully defend himself.” (Answer 2 (Docket No. 17).) Johnson, however, is in 

fact represented by counsel and does not claim otherwise. His defense fails on that basis alone. 

 Even if Johnson lacked counsel, he concedes that in “general” there is no right to an 

attorney in a civil action. (Def.’s Br. at 8.) Johnson, however, then attempts to create a new due 

process right to civil representation in cases where “the Plaintiff itself — the United States 

government — wrongfully seized” the defendant’s funds for a lawyer. (Id.) But Johnson 

provides no citation for this purported right; he just reassures the Court that it “would certainly 

seem to qualify.” (Id.) Even if this were the law, the plaintiff in this case — the FEC — did not 

seize Johnson’s assets, wrongfully or otherwise. The United States District Court for the District 

of Nevada ordered Johnson’s assets seized. Before that court, Johnson is a defendant in an 

action brought by the Federal Trade Commission alleging that Johnson “operate[d] a farreaching Internet enterprise that deceptively enrolls unwitting consumers into memberships for 

products or services and then repeatedly charges [them].” Compl. ¶ 4, FTC v. Johnson, No. 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 31 Filed 01/11/16 Page 8 of 12
9

2:10-cv-02203 (D. Nev. Dec. 21, 2010) (Docket No. 1). The district court froze Johnson’s assets 

and appointed a receiver because it found good cause to believe that Johnson had violated the 

law, would continue to violate the law, and might attempt to dispose of or conceal his assets, 

thereby thwarting the court’s ability to “grant effective final relief for consumers.” Prelim. 

Injunction Ord. ¶¶ 4-6, FTC v. Johnson, No. 2:10-cv-02203 (D. Nev. Feb. 10, 2011) (Docket No. 

130). Johnson offers no reason why that court’s conclusion was “wrongful[]” or why he should 

be able to relitigate the issue in this unrelated case.3 

 F. Johnson’s Response Confirms That His Statute of Limitations Defense Fails 

as a Matter of Law (Seventh Defense) 

 The Court should dismiss Johnson’s statute of limitations defense since it cannot succeed 

as a matter of law. The applicable limitations period is five years. 28 U.S.C. § 2462. During his 

administrative enforcement proceedings, Johnson agreed to toll the limitations period for 30 

days. (Compl. ¶ 52; Answer ¶ 52.) And as the FEC explained in its opening brief, it requests 

legal relief only for Johnson’s illegal acts that occurred on or after May 20, 2010, which is five 

years and 30 days prior to the filing of the Complaint. (FEC Br. at 14 n.6.) In response, Johnson 

does not claim that the Commission has incorrectly calculated the running of the limitations 

period. (See Def.’s Br. at 10-13.) Nor does Johnson claim that his alleged violations occurred 

before that date. (See id.) His conclusory and insufficiently pleaded Seventh Defense makes no 

such factual claims either. (See Answer 2.) It should therefore be dismissed. 

                                                           

3

 The FEC notes that underlying many of Johnson’s defenses is a faulty assumption that 

the FEC is responsible for all of the various alleged wrongdoing he believes assorted parts of the 

executive and judicial branches have committed against him. However, “[g]overnment agencies 

do not merge into a monolith; the United States is an altogether different party from either the 

F.B.I. or the Department of Justice.” Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1982). 

Also, as the FEC has detailed in previous filings, Congress created the FEC as an independent 

and nonpartisan agency to prevent any politically motivated civil enforcement of federal 

campaign finance law. (See Docket Nos. 4, 14.) 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 31 Filed 01/11/16 Page 9 of 12
10

 Johnson claims that the Court should require the Commission to amend the Complaint to 

state more specifically the dates upon which Johnson violated the law. (Def.’s Br. at 10-11 & 

n.9.) Under Rule 8, however, the FEC’s Complaint has pleaded more than sufficient factual 

detail, and Johnson does not and could not contend otherwise. In support of his misguided effort 

to impose additional burdens on the FEC, Johnson also needlessly demands that the FEC 

“include a copy of or quote from the tolling agreement” in its complaint to “prove the scope of 

that agreement” (id. at 11 & n.10) — even though Johnson’s answer already admits that on “May 

15, 2015, Johnson signed an agreement tolling the statute of limitations for 30 days” (Compl. 

¶ 52; Answer ¶ 52).4

 Johnson’s limitations claims are thus entirely without merit. 

 G. Johnson’s Response Confirms That His Evidentiary Arguments Regarding 

an Array of Alleged Government Wrongdoing Are Not Affirmative Defenses 

(First, Second, and Third Defenses) 

 In its opening brief (FEC Br. at 14), the FEC explained that a court may strike a 

purported affirmative defense that is either (1) a mere denial of elements of the plaintiff’s claim, 

or (2) a collateral claim that would “not act to preclude a defendant’s liability” even if 

successful. Barnes v. AT&T Pension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 

1174-75 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking, under Rule 12(f), ten false affirmative defenses). Johnson 

does not dispute that courts can and have struck purported defenses on this basis. (Def.’s Br. at 

5-7.) He also concedes that his First, Second, and Third Defenses are evidentiary arguments 

(id.), as the FEC had pointed out (FEC Br. at 14-15). Those defenses should thus be stricken. 

 The FEC need not show prejudice under Rule 12(c) or 12(f) for the Court to strike these 

defenses, see supra p. 4, as Johnson claims. In any case, these defenses are not benign, as 

                                                           

4

 Because the FEC no longer seeks equitable relief for the illegal contributions Johnson 

made to Mark Shurtleff’s campaign in 2009 (see Redline of Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73, 75 

(Docket No. 25-2)), Johnson’s arguments regarding whether the statute of limitations applies to 

equitable relief are moot (see Def.’s Br. at 11-13). 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 31 Filed 01/11/16 Page 10 of 12
11

Johnson asserts, since they could open the door to needless and wasteful discovery and threaten 

to focus this litigation on Johnson’s indiscriminate allegations of government wrongdoing 

instead of his lawbreaking, the subject of the pending complaint. See supra pp. 2, 4-5. 

 H. Johnson Admits That His Failure to State a Claim Defense Is Redundant 

(Tenth Defense) 

 Finally, the Court should also strike Johnson’s Tenth Defense. By its terms, Rule 12(f) 

allows the court to strike any “redundant” matter. Johnson relies upon cases stating that pleading 

failure to state a claim as an affirmative defense is “‘redundant.’” (Def.’s Br. at 16 (quoting 

Simon v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 849 F. Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).) Although some 

courts have nevertheless declined to strike the defense absent prejudice (see id.), other courts 

have struck the defense regardless (see FEC Br. at 16). This Court should follow the latter 

approach since Rule 12(f) says nothing about a prejudice requirement, see supra p. 4, while it 

does state that “redundant” material may be removed. 

II. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Commission requests that the Court dismiss or strike the 

answer’s defenses one through seven, ten, and paragraph 51 of defense eight. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Daniel A. Petalas (dpetalas@fec.gov) 

Acting General Counsel 

Lisa J. Stevenson (lstevenson@fec.gov) 

Deputy General Counsel – Law 

Kevin Deeley (kdeeley@fec.gov) 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

Harry J. Summers (hsummers@fec.gov) 

Assistant General Counsel 

/s/ Kevin P. Hancock 

Kevin P. Hancock (khancock@fec.gov) 

Attorney 

 FOR THE PLAINTIFF 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

January 11, 2016 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 31 Filed 01/11/16 Page 11 of 12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I hereby certify that on January 11, 2016, I electronically filed Plaintiff Federal Election 

Commission’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings or in the 

Alternative to Strike Affirmative Defenses with the Clerk of the United States District Court for 

the District of Utah by using the Court’s CM/ECF system, which sent notification of such filing 

to the following counsel: 

Karra J. Porter, Esq. 

Scott T. Evans, Esq. 

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 

Karra.Porter@chrisjen.com 

Scott.Evans@chrisjen.com 

Attorneys for Defendant Jeremy Johnson 

Scott C. Williams, Esq. 

scwlegal@gmail.com 

Attorney for Interested Third-Party John Swallow 

/s/ Kevin P. Hancock 

Kevin P. Hancock (khancock@fec.gov) 

Attorney 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 31 Filed 01/11/16 Page 12 of 12