Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1707-JT-1505 | December 29, 2017 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Nancy A. McCaslin

McCaslin & McCaslin

Elkhart, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Evan Matthew Comer

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re The Matter of The 

Termination of Parent-Child 

Relationship of:

I.B. (Minor Child)

and

J.B. (Father)

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

December 29, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A03-1707-JT-1505

Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Michel A. 

Christofeno, Judge

The Honorable Deborah 

Domine, Magistrate 

Trial Court Cause No.

20C01-1701-JT-8

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1707-JT-1505 | December 29, 2017 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary and Issue

[1] J.B. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights 

to his child, I.B. (“Child”). Father raises one issue for our review, which we 

restate as whether the juvenile court’s termination order is supported by clear 

and convincing evidence. Concluding clear and convincing evidence supports 

the juvenile court’s order, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on April 29, 2015, to Father and J.U. (“Mother”). On May 14, 

2015, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Child from 

Mother’s care after Child tested positive for cocaine. Mother admitted to using 

cocaine before she learned of her pregnancy and several times during her 

pregnancy.1 On May 15, 2015, the DCS filed a petition alleging Child to be a 

child in need of services (“CHINS”). The juvenile court adjudicated Child to 

be a CHINS on May 26, 2015, and placed Child with Father. The juvenile 

court’s dispositional order required Father to enroll in and complete individual 

therapy, an addictions assessment, home-based case management, and a 

psychological evaluation. Father did not complete the home-based case 

management, individual therapy, or a psychological evaluation.

 

1 Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights and does not participate in this appeal.
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[3] In August of 2015, Father was arrested for public intoxication and Child was 

removed from his custody.2 The DCS sought to place Child with her paternal 

grandmother in Michigan through the Interstate Compact for the Placement of 

Children (“ICPC”). However, the Michigan Department of Child Protective 

Services denied Child’s placement with paternal grandmother because Father 

lived with paternal grandmother, paternal grandmother did not submit required 

medical documentation, and two additional children already resided with her in 

her home. The juvenile court then ordered Child to be placed in foster care. 

The DCS further recommended Father complete a substance abuse assessment.

[4] On February 1, 2017, the DCS filed its verified petition for the involuntary 

termination of Father’s parental rights. The juvenile court held an evidentiary 

hearing over two days, on May 17 and June 2, 2017. Regina Hauptli, the Court 

Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”), testified about Father’s ability to be a 

parent to Child:

The concerns are that there’s never been any stability, there’s no 

– there hasn’t been any consistency in the past several months. 

[Father] hasn’t followed through with treatment, what was court 

ordered. He is on probation in Michigan, which doesn’t allow 

him to come to Indiana unless he follows procedures. He has 

warrants out here in Indiana. He’s just not stable for [Child].

 

2

Father’s criminal history includes convictions for driving under the influence in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, and 

2014. In 2016, Father pleaded guilty in Michigan to operating a vehicle while intoxicated, possession of 

cocaine, and resisting arrest.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1707-JT-1505 | December 29, 2017 Page 4 of 10

Transcript, Volume III at 38. DCS family case manager Laura Stapleton 

testified Father missed thirty-five of the ninety visits offered with Child. Father 

did not testify or present any evidence at the hearings.

[5] Following the hearings, the juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights

concluding there is a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child 

relationship poses a threat to Child’s well-being and the conditions that led to 

Child’s removal from and placement outside the home would not be remedied. 

The juvenile court made the following findings of fact and conclusions thereon:

c. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

led to the removal of [Child] will not be remedied.

* * *

ii. Neither the past or present CASA, nor the DCS 

case manager testified that they would recommend 

placement of [Child] with [Father] at the time of the 

termination hearing.

iii. At the time of the termination hearing [Father] was 

living with his mother in Michigan, even though 

placement of [Child] with her grandmother had been 

denied twice through the ICPC . . . [and Father] had 

unstable employment, he had no license to drive, two 

warrants for his arrest and he was on probation in the state 

of Michigan.

iv. [A]ccording to the DCS case manager, Laura 

Stapleton, [Father] had completed none of the services 
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offered to address the parenting concerns resulting in 

[Child’s] removal from the home.

* * *

vi. Case manager Stapleton described that [Father] has 

not been consistent in participating in court ordered 

individual therapy, was not consistent in following the 

recommendations of his addictions assessment, he did not 

fully comply with case management, and he never 

completed the psychological evaluation . . . . [Father] was 

never consistent in visits with [Child].

vii. [Father] has exhibited an unwillingness to cooperate 

with services offered and the case manager and CASAs are 

not recommending [Child] return to [Father’s] care 

because all three opined that conditions have not changed.

viii. [Father’s] pattern of unwillingness to cooperate with 

services . . . and conditions that continue to be unchanged 

support a finding that there is a reasonable probability that 

conditions will not change . . . .

Appealed Order at 6-7. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right 

of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 

1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). However, the law provides for the termination of that 

right when parents are unwilling or unable to meet their parental 

responsibilities. In re Bester, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). The termination 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1707-JT-1505 | December 29, 2017 Page 6 of 10

of parental rights is not intended to punish parents, but to protect their children.

In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied

534 U.S. 1161 (2002).

[7] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not weigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. 

Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support 

the judgment. Id. Where a juvenile court has entered findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon, we will not set aside the juvenile court’s findings or 

judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). 

In determining whether the court’s decision to terminate the parent-child 

relationship is clearly erroneous, we review the juvenile court’s judgment to 

determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings 

and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id. at 1229-30.

[8] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

* * *

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child . . . .
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Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by 

clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2.

[9] Father does not challenge any of the juvenile court’s findings of fact, only 

whether the DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the termination of his 

parental rights. Specifically, he contends the evidence is insufficient to show (1) 

a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal or the 

reasons for placement outside Father’s home will not be remedied; (2) a 

reasonable probability a continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to Child’s well-being; and (3) termination of Father’s parental rights is in 

Child’s best interest.

[10] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal or 

placement outside the home will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step 

analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). First, we identify the 

conditions that led to a child’s removal or placement outside the home; and

second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those 

conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. The second step requires juvenile 

courts to judge a parent’s fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, 

taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing any 

recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether 

there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. Habitual 

conduct may include a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, 

history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing 

and employment. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 
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(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The juvenile court may also consider 

services offered to the parent by the DCS and the parent’s response to those 

services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. Id. 

[11] The DCS removed Child from Father’s care following his arrest for public 

intoxication, which was his seventh alcohol-related arrest. In the twenty 

months following Child’s removal, Father completed none of the services 

offered by the DCS to address the concerns resulting in Child’s removal from 

his care. See In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 210 (noting a parent’s unwillingness to 

remedy parenting problems and to cooperate with social services, along with 

unchanged conditions, supports a finding there is a reasonable probability 

conditions will not change). Moreover, at the time of the termination hearing, 

Father was on probation in Michigan and had two outstanding warrants for 

arrest in Indiana. Father also missed over one-third of his ninety opportunities 

to visit and spend time with Child. Although we disagree with the DCS’ 

classification of Father’s housing situation as unstable, as it appears he has lived 

with his mother for some time now, the Michigan Department of Child 

Protective Services denied Child’s placement at paternal grandmother’s home 

citing, among other things, Father’s presence there and concern for paternal 

grandmother’s ability to parent Child and two additional children. 

[12] Father had almost two years to complete the services offered by the DCS in 

order to remedy the concerns that led to Child’s removal. Rather than complete 

them, Father remained inconsistent and failed to establish any meaningful 

relationship with Child. Father’s unwillingness to complete these services, his 
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encounters with law enforcement, outstanding warrants for his arrest, and the 

numerous missed visitations with Child lead to the conclusion the issues 

resulting in Child’s removal from his care will not be remedied. The juvenile 

court did not clearly err in concluding the evidence shows a reasonable 

probability the conditions resulting in the Child’s removal will not be 

remedied.

3

[13] Father also contends DCS failed to prove termination was in Child’s best 

interest. “In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the [juvenile] 

court is required to look beyond the factors identified by the DCS and look to 

the totality of the evidence.” In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2009).

The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before 

terminating the parent-child relationship. Recommendations of 

the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to 

evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be 

remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.

In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted), trans. 

denied.

 

3 We note that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) is written in the disjunctive, the DCS is required 

to establish by clear and convincing evidence only one of the requirements of subsection (B). In re A.K., 924 

N.E.2d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. Father also argues there is insufficient evidence to 

show a reasonable probability a continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child’s wellbeing; however, having concluded there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusion the 

conditions will not be remedied, we need not address this argument.
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[14] As noted above, there is sufficient evidence that the conditions resulting in 

Child’s removal will not be remedied. In addition, both the CASA and the 

DCS case manager opined it would be in Child’s best interest for Father’s 

parental rights to be terminated. See Tr., Vol. II at 213, 233. Accordingly, this 

is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in 

Child’s best interests. See id.

[15] Further, we note “[p]ermanency is a central consideration in determining the 

best interests of a child.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1159. Here, Child has been in 

foster care for a majority of her life and her foster parents intend to adopt her. 

We therefore conclude the DCS established by clear and convincing evidence 

that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of Child.

Conclusion

[16] The DCS established by clear and convincing evidence the elements necessary 

to support the termination of Father’s parental rights. The judgment of the 

juvenile court terminating Father’s parental rights is affirmed.

[17] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.