No. 07-320 

IN THE 

Supreme Court of the United States 

JACK DAVIS, 

Appellant, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Appellee. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

BRIEF FOR DEMOCRACY 21, 

THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, BRENNAN 

CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, 

AND PUBLIC CITIZEN, INC. AS AMICI CURIAE IN 

SUPPORT OF APPELLEE 

ROGER M. WITTEN

SHANE T. STANSBURY

JULIA M. LIPEZ

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

 HALE AND DORR LLP

399 Park Avenue 

New York, NY 10022 

(212) 230-8800 

SETH P. WAXMAN

 Counsel of Record

RANDOLPH D. MOSS

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING 

 HALE AND DORR LLP

1875 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 

Washington, DC 20006 

(202) 663-6000 

Additional Counsel Listed On Inside Cover
DONALD J. SIMON

SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, 

 SACHSE, ENDRESON & 

 PERRY, LLP 

1425 K Street, N.W. 

Suite 600 

Washington, DC 20005 

(202) 682-0240 

FRED WERTHEIMER

DEMOCRACY 21 

1875 I Street, N.W. 

Suite 500 

Washington, DC 20006 

(202) 429-2008 

J. GERALD HEBERT

PAUL S. RYAN

TARA MALLOY

THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL

 CENTER

1640 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

Suite 660 

Washington, DC 20036 

(202) 736-2200 

DEBORAH GOLDBERG

LAURA MACCLEERY

CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY

BRENNAN CENTER FOR 

 JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF

 LAW

161 Avenue of the Americas 

12th Floor 

New York, NY 10013 

(212) 998-6025 

SCOTT L. NELSON

PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION

 GROUP

1600 20th Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20009 

(202) 588-1000 
(i) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........................................iii 

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ................................1 

STATEMENT .....................................................................3 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.........................................6 

ARGUMENT.......................................................................7 

I. SECTION 319 DOES NOT RESTRAIN SPEECH.............7 

A. Section 319 Expands The Opportunity 

For Speech And Does Not Limit A 

Candidate’s Expenditures ...................................7 

B. Section 319’s Notification Requirements Do Not Burden Speech...........................14 

II. ANY ATTACK ON PUBLIC FUNDING IN THIS 

CASE IS MISPLACED...................................................17 

III. CONGRESS’S DECISION TO ADJUST CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR OPPONENTS OF 

CANDIDATES WHO CHOOSE TO SPEND 

LARGE SUMS OF PERSONAL WEALTH IS 

CONSISTENT WITH THE VALUES SERVED 

BY BCRA’S CONTRIBUTION LIMITS ........................22 

A. This Court Has Consistently Upheld 

Congressional Judgment Regarding 

Contribution Limit Levels.................................22 

B. Congress’s Decision To Adjust Contribution Limits For Opponents Of Millionaire Candidates Does Not Impugn 

The General Validity Of Contribution 

Limits, And This Court Has Not Been 

Asked To Hold Otherwise .................................23 
ii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued 

Page 

CONCLUSION .................................................................27 
iii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

CASES 

Page(s) 

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 

(2002) ..............................................................................9 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .......................passim

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)........................25 

Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st 

Cir. 2000)....................................................18, 19, 21, 22 

Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994) ...............19 

Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988)............................25 

Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998)................19 

Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, No. 06-

cv-1030 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2008)..............................19 

Jackson v. Leake, 476 F. Supp. 2d 515 

(E.D.N.C. 2006), argued on appeal sub 

nom. Duke v. Leake, No. 07-1454 (4th Cir. 

Dec. 7, 2007).................................................................20 

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)..................passim

Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 

U.S. 241 (1974) ......................................................10, 11 

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 

528 U.S. 377 (2000) ...............................................23, 25 

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities 

Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986)...........................11, 12 

Republican National Committee v. FEC, 487 

F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d mem., 445 

U.S. 955 (1980) ............................................................18 

Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 (1987)...........25 
iv 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued 

Page 

Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 

1996) .......................................................................19, 21 

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 

U.S. 180 (1997) ............................................................25 

Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26 (1st 

Cir. 1993)................................................................19, 21 

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 

2 U.S.C. 

§ 432(e)(1) ....................................................................16 

§ 434(b).........................................................................16 

§ 441a-1 ..........................................................................7 

§ 441a-1(a)(1) .............................................................3, 4 

§ 441a-1(a)(2) ...........................................................4, 12 

§ 441a-1(a)(3) ...........................................................4, 13 

§ 441a-1(b)................................................................4, 14 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-952 .........................................20 

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 106.355...................................................20 

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1125(9)..........................18 

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 10A.25(10)..........................................18 

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-1604........................................20 

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 11.50(2)(i)..............................................20 

11 C.F.R. 

§ 104.3...........................................................................16 

§ 400.31(e)(1) ...............................................................15 

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS 

S. 2412, 110th Cong. (2007)...............................................21 

H.R. 776, 110th Cong. (2007)............................................21 

144 Cong. Rec. H3780 (daily ed. May 22, 1998) .............24 
v 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued 

Page 

147 Cong. Rec. S2537 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) .............13 

147 Cong. Rec. S2538 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) .............13 

147 Cong. Rec. S2540 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) .............13 

148 Cong. Rec. S2142 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) .............24 

OTHER AUTHORITIES 

Breyer, Stephen, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 245 (2002)...........................13 

Center for Responsive Politics, Millionaire 

Candidates, http://www.opensecrets.org/big 

picture/millioniares.asp?Cycle=2002; http:// 

www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/millionaires. 

asp?Cycle=2004; http://www.opensecrets.org/ 

bigpicture/millionaires.asp?Cycle=2006..................10 

Steen, Jennifer A., Self-Financed Candidates 

and the “Millionaires’ Amendment,” in 

The Election After Reform: Money, Politics, and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 

Act (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2006)........................10, 26 
IN THE 

Supreme Court of the United States 

No. 07-320 

JACK DAVIS, 

Appellant, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Appellee. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1

 

Democracy 21 is a non-profit, non-partisan policy 

organization that works to eliminate the undue influence of big money in American politics and to ensure 

the integrity and fairness of our democracy. It supports campaign finance and other political reforms, 

conducts public education efforts to accomplish these 

goals, participates in litigation involving the constitu-

 1

 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief and 

their letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. No counsel 

for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel 

or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the 

preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than 

amici curiae, their members, or their counsel made a monetary 

contribution to its preparation or submission. 
2 

tionality and interpretation of campaign finance laws, 

and engages in efforts to help ensure that campaign finance laws are effectively and properly enforced and 

implemented. Democracy 21 has participated as counsel or amicus curiae in a number of cases before this 

Court involving the constitutionality of the campaign 

finance laws. 

The Campaign Legal Center (“CLC”) is a nonpartisan, non-profit organization that works in the area 

of campaign finance, voting rights, and election law, 

generating public policy proposals and participating in 

state and federal court litigation throughout the nation. 

The CLC’s work has focused on constitutional campaign finance disclosure and regulation, campaign finance enforcement, voting rights, and governmental 

integrity laws. The CLC also works with Congress to 

promote campaign finance and lobbying reform, and to 

strengthen federal ethics rules and enforcement. The 

CLC has served as co-counsel for parties or amici curiae in a number of cases before this Court. 

The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of 

Law is a non-partisan institute dedicated to a vision of 

effective and inclusive democracy. The Brennan Center’s Campaign Finance Project promotes reforms to 

ensure that our elections embody the fundamental 

principle of political equality underlying the Constitution. Through legislative efforts and litigation, the 

Brennan Center actively supports strong federal campaign finance laws that meet constitutional standards 

and encourage broad candidate participation in federal 

elections. 

Public Citizen, Inc., is a non-profit, membership 

advocacy organization that appears before Congress, 

administrative agencies, and the courts on a wide range 
3 

of issues. Prominent among Public Citizen’s concerns is 

combating the corruption, and appearance of corruption, of our political processes that can result from unfettered infusions of private funds into political campaigns. Public Citizen therefore seeks to enact and defend workable, balanced, and constitutional campaign 

finance reform legislation such as the provision of the 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) that is at 

issue here. Public Citizen has advocated, and continues 

to advocate, campaign finance legislation (including 

public funding legislation) before Congress, and Public 

Citizen and its attorneys have been involved in various 

capacities, including as amicus curiae and counsel, in a 

large number of litigated cases involving the constitutionality of such legislation. 

Each of the amici advocated the enactment of 

BCRA, and each has participated in the defense of the 

statute in the lower courts and in cases previously before this Court involving BCRA’s constitutionality. 

Amici therefore have a substantial interest in the issues presented by this case. 

STATEMENT 

This case involves a facial constitutional challenge 

to Section 319 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 

(“BCRA”), part of the so-called “Millionaires’ Amendment.” If certain conditions are met, Section 319 raises 

the usually-applicable limits on contributions a candidate for the United States House of Representatives 

may accept when his or her opponent contributes more 

than $350,000 in personal funds to his own campaign. 

See 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a)(1)(A)-(B). In these circumstances, Section 319 also relaxes the statutory limits on 

how much a political party may spend in coordination 

with a candidate whose opponent is self-financed above 
4 

$350,000. See id. § 441a-1(a)(1)(C). To implement these 

rules, Section 319 also establishes reporting requirements for both self-financing candidates and their opponents. See id. § 441a-1(b). 

If a self-financing candidate chooses to spend more 

than $350,000 in personal funds, Section 319 requires an 

opposing candidate to calculate the “opposition personal funds amount” (“OPFA”) for purposes of determining whether he or she is eligible to proceed under 

the alternative rules. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a)(2). The 

OPFA formula compares the total “expenditures from 

personal funds” by each candidate, which is defined to 

include not only each candidate’s personal expenditures, but also his or her “gross receipts advantage.” A 

candidate’s gross receipts advantage is calculated, in 

turn, by comparing 50 percent of the aggregate contributions raised by each candidate during the year prior 

to the election. Id. An opposing candidate may qualify 

for the alternative rules only if, according to the OPFA 

formula, the self-financing candidate’s expenditures 

from personal funds exceed his or her own by more 

than $350,000. Id. § 441a-1(a)(1). Section 319 caps the 

amount of increased contributions that any candidate 

may receive at 100 percent of the amount of the total 

OPFA disparity between the candidates. Id. § 441a1(a)(3)(ii). 

In the 2004 election cycle, following passage of Section 319, of all opponents of self-financed candidates 

who triggered the Millionaires’ Amendment, only 13 

raised more than 10 percent of their total campaign 

funds from increased contribution limits. J.A. 84. In 

addition, candidate reports filed with the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) indicate that, in total, selffinanced candidates who triggered the Millionaires’ 

Amendment spent more than $144 million of their own 
5 

funds in 2004 and 2006. J.A. 89. By comparison, their 

opponents collectively raised a total of only $8.6 million 

in increased contributions under Section 319. Id. 

Appellant, a candidate for the House of Representatives, notified the FEC of his intent to spend $1 million in personal funds during the general election campaign in 2006 (J.A. 103) and filed suit against the FEC 

in federal district court. Appellant argued that, on its 

face, Section 319 violates both the First Amendment 

and the equal protection component of the Due Process 

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In particular, Appellant—who has twice run self-financed campaigns for 

Congress since enactment of the challenged statute—

argued that Section 319 impermissibly chilled his 

speech and would have the effect of deterring selffinancing candidates from running for the House of 

Representatives because it conferred a benefit on their 

opponents. 

A three-judge district court rejected Appellant’s 

argument, finding that Section 319 does not burden 

speech because it “places no restrictions on a candidate’s ability to spend unlimited amounts of his personal wealth to communicate his message to voters, nor 

does it reduce the amount of money he is able to raise 

from contributors.” J.S. App. 9a. Similarly, the district 

court found that Section 319 does not confer an unfair 

competitive advantage on the opponents of selffinancing candidates, as any disadvantage the Appellant may feel he suffers “is the result of the candidate’s 

choice to fund his campaign from one of several permissible funding sources.” J.S. App. 11a. The court rejected Appellant’s equal protection argument because 

he had failed to show that Section 319 treats similarly 

situated persons differently. J.S. App. 17a. 
6 

On appeal, the Appellee asserts that the case is 

moot and that Appellant lacks standing. See Mot. to 

Dismiss or Affirm 12-14; Appellee Br. 18-28. This 

amicus brief addresses only Appellant’s First Amendment allegations. 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

Section 319 expands, and does not restrict, the opportunities for speech in the political process. On its 

face, the provision places no restriction on expenditures 

by candidates who choose to self-finance their political 

campaigns. Instead, Section 319 relaxes, in some circumstances, otherwise applicable contribution and coordinated-expenditure rules with regard to opponents 

of self-financing candidates who spend more than 

$350,000 from personal funds. Appellant’s contention 

that Section 319 chills speech is not supported by the 

record. 

Section 319’s notification requirements also comport with the First Amendment. They are no more 

burdensome than other requirements under existing 

law, including those this Court upheld in McConnell v. 

FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 

Appellant wrongly criticizes the district court’s 

analogy to lower court decisions upholding various 

state public funding provisions. Amici James Madison 

Center for Free Speech and Citizens United, however, 

go further, urging this Court to offer essentially advisory opinions on issues not presented in this case. This 

Court should reject that request. The lower courts 

have been consistent in their application of this Court’s 

holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which 

approved of Congress’s approach to providing public 

funding for presidential campaigns. Moreover, public 
7 

funding mechanisms involve a unique set of governmental interests that should be evaluated on their own 

terms and in the context of the specific statutory incentives used. 

Finally, the fact that Section 319 relaxes certain 

contribution limits in no way impugns the general validity of the anti-corruption rationale supporting campaign contribution limits—a rationale long approved of 

by this Court. In enacting Section 319, Congress carefully balanced its interest in preventing corruption with 

its concerns that non-wealthy candidates were being 

driven from the political process. This Court should, as 

has been its custom, defer to Congress’s reasoned 

judgment in this field. 

ARGUMENT 

I. SECTION 319 DOES NOT RESTRAIN SPEECH 

A. Section 319 Expands The Opportunity For 

Speech And Does Not Limit A Candidate’s 

Expenditures 

By its terms, Section 319 expands, and does not restrict, the exercise of political speech. When one candidate for the House of Representatives spends more 

than $350,000 from personal funds, that candidate’s opponent may, in some circumstances and subject to limits: (1) receive contributions from individuals up to 

three times the normal $2,300-per-election limit for 

each donor; (2) receive contributions from individuals 

who have reached the otherwise applicable statutory 

limit for aggregate campaign donations; and (3) coordinate expenditures with a political party above normally 

applicable limits. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1. As the district 

court recognized, Section 319 neither deprives the selffinancing candidate of funds nor divests the candidate 

of any other potential benefit. Rather, it relaxes, in 
8 

limited circumstances, restrictions placed on the selffinancing candidate’s opponents. 

Appellant mistakenly equates Section 319 to the 

expenditure caps that this Court invalidated in Buckley 

v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See, e.g., Appellant Br. 21 

(describing Section 319 as “Congress’s second attempt 

to regulate personal spending”). In Buckley, this Court 

upheld the Federal Election Campaign Act’s (“FECA”) 

limits on contributions to candidates for federal office, 

but invalidated FECA’s expenditure limits, including a 

cap on the amount a candidate could spend from his or 

her own personal funds. 424 U.S. at 13-59. The Court 

observed that FECA’s expenditure limits represented 

“substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints 

on the quantity and diversity of political speech” and 

had the effect of “restrict[ing] the quantity of campaign 

speech by individuals, groups, and candidates.” Id. at 

19, 38. Addressing the cap on candidates’ personal expenditures, the Court noted the importance of allowing 

candidates to have the “unfettered opportunity to make 

their views known,” and concluded that the expenditure limits “clearly and directly” interfered with a candidate’s ability to engage in protected First Amendment expression. Id. at 52-53. 

Section 319 operates in precisely the opposite manner. Rather than imposing a ceiling on the amount a 

candidate (or anyone else) may spend, Section 319 relaxes certain contribution and coordinated-expenditure 

limits that would otherwise apply to the opponent of a 

candidate who self-finances beyond the $350,000 

threshold. Every candidate remains free to spend as 

much as he or she pleases, without limit. The framework that Congress has created thus allows each candidate the “unfettered opportunity” to make his or her 

views known according to whatever fundraising strat-
9 

egy the candidate deems most advantageous. Buckley, 

424 U.S. at 52. 

Appellant contends that Section 319 nevertheless 

has the effect of limiting personal expenditures to less 

than $350,000 because self-financing candidates will not 

want to confer a benefit on their opponents. But there 

is no proof in the record that Section 319 has chilled 

any candidate expenditures or speech—much less the 

“substantial” quantity of speech required to sustain a 

facial challenge. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 

535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). In fact, as Appellant readily 

acknowledges, his own past practices show that candidates can—and do—choose to exceed the $350,000 

threshold. Appellant Br. 43 n.17. Following the enactment of The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 

(“BCRA”), Appellant had three choices going into the 

2004 and 2006 elections: 1) forgo self-financing altogether and rely exclusively on contributions; 2) supplement such contributions with up to $350,000 of his 

own money; or 3) spend more than $350,000 of his own 

money with the knowledge that his opponent could 

benefit from alternative rules as a result. Appellant 

chose the third option on both occasions (see J.S. App. 

13a), revealing that, whatever the benefits conferred on 

his opponent, Section 319 neither deterred Appellant 

from self-financing above $350,000 nor had the effect of 

capping his own expenditures on his speech. 

There is no evidence in the record to support a finding of any chilling effect on other similarly situated candidates. Amici Gene DeRossett and J. Edgar Broyhill 

II, both candidates for the House of Representatives in 

2004, speculate that Section 319 “may well” have had an 

impact on the number of self-financing candidates, see 

Br. of Amici DeRossett and Broyhill 13, but both exceeded the $350,000 threshold in their own respective 
10 

congressional races. See Def. FEC’s Exs. Submitted In 

Supp. Of Its Mot. For Summ. J. & In Opp. To Pl.’s Mot. 

For Summ. J., Ex. 9, Attach. 1, at 1. Indeed, the lone 

study these candidates cite for this proposition undercuts their assertion. See Jennifer A. Steen, SelfFinanced Candidates and the “Millionaires’ Amendment,” in The Election After Reform: Money, Politics, 

and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 204, 205 

(Michael J. Malbin ed., 2006) (concluding there is “no 

way to know exactly how the Millionaires’ Amendment 

changed the course of the 2004 elections” given the 

multiple variables involved and that at best it had a 

“limited” impact). 

What evidence does exist supports the opposite 

conclusion. Public sources show, for example, that the 

number of candidates who used more than $1,000,000 of 

their own funds increased from 2002 to 2006.2

 

Appellant and his amici contend that Section 319 

burdens candidate speech in the same manner as the 

“right-of-reply” provision struck down in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See

Appellant Br. 42-43; Br. of Amici DeRossett and Broy-

 2

 See Center for Responsive Politics, Millionaire Candidates, 

http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/millionaires.asp?cycle=2002; 

http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/millionaires.asp?cycle=2004; 

http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/millionaires.asp?cycle=2006. 

Furthermore, in many cases a candidate who trips Section 319’s 

trigger may not even face increased spending in response. In the 

2004 congressional election, 93 candidates between the primary 

and general elections were eligible to raise money under increased 

contribution limits; 37 of them did not report a single contribution 

in excess of $2,000. Steen, Self-Financed Candidates, 210-211. 
11 

hill 10-11. But Tornillo, a “compelled access” case,3 is 

inapposite. The statute there provided that if a newspaper assailed a candidate’s character or record, the 

candidate could require the newspaper to print a reply 

of equal prominence. This Court held that, by compelling newspapers to disseminate the views of speakers 

with whom they did not agree, the statute deterred 

newspapers from speaking in the first instance. 418 

U.S. at 257-258. The Court also concluded that the 

statute directly interfered with “editorial control and 

judgment” by forcing a newspaper to tailor its speech 

to opposing agendas, and to respond to candidates’ arguments where the newspaper might prefer to remain 

silent. Id. at 258. 

Section 319 is altogether different. Section 319 

does not compel a self-financing candidate to say—or 

not say—anything; nor does it require a self-financing 

candidate to spend his or her own resources to accommodate the speech of an opponent. Decisions about 

whether and how much to self-finance are within the 

complete control of each individual candidate based on 

a choice about what strategy will be most advantageous. Unlike the newspaper editor facing a right-ofreply mandate, a candidate considering whether to 

spend more than $350,000 in personal funds faces no 

prospect of having to provide (and pay for) a forum for 

an opponent’s message or to compromise his or her own 

message. Finally, as discussed, there is no evidence 

 3

 See also, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. 

Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1986) (invalidating a statute requiring 

a utility company to include with its monthly bills a newsletter 

published by a consumer group that had been critical of the utility’s ratemaking practices because the regulation provided benefits to speakers on the basis of their viewpoint). 
12 

demonstrating that Appellant, his amici, or others have 

been chilled by operation of Section 319. 

In the end, Appellant’s challenge is not about a 

limit on his speech, but rather about his concern that an 

opponent might have funds available to engage in more

speech by taking advantage of Section 319. But there is 

no constitutional right to outspend an opponent or to 

engage in more speech relative to another speaker. See

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 475 

U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (observing that there is no “right to be 

free from vigorous debate”). Where the Court has encountered direct expenditure limits, such as those at 

issue in Buckley, the Court has struck them down not 

to preserve or strengthen a candidate’s relative position in a political race, but to protect the candidate’s 

“right to engage in the discussion of public issues and 

vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election 

and the election of other candidates.” 424 U.S. at 52. 

Section 319 protects that right by leaving a selffinancing candidate unfettered while expanding the 

overall opportunities for speech in the electoral process. 

Section 319, moreover, is tailored to reduce any 

risk that it would give an opponent of a self-financing 

candidate an unfair advantage. For example, Section 

319 requires a candidate seeking to take advantage of 

its alternative rules to calculate his or her “opposition 

personal funds amount” (“OPFA”). That formula incorporates 50 percent of the aggregate receipts raised 

by each candidate during the year prior to an election, 2 

U.S.C. § 441a-1(a)(2), thereby reducing the relative advantages of incumbents, who are less likely to selffinance. See, e.g., Def. FEC’s Exs., Ex. 9, Attach. 1, at 

1-2 (indicating that of the more than 60 candidates for 

congressional office who self-financed above the Millionaires’ Amendment’s thresholds in 2004 and 2006, 
13 

only 2 were incumbents). Moreover, Section 319 caps 

the amount of increased contributions a candidate may 

receive at 100 percent of the OPFA disparity between 

the candidates. Id. § 441a-1(a)(3)(ii). 

In sum, Section 319 expands the overall opportunities for speech while preserving the ability of candidates who choose to fund their own campaigns to spend 

as much money as they like and to choose the financing 

avenues that best serve their interests. As Senator 

DeWine explained during the debate over the provision: “This amendment is truly about the [F]irst 

[A]mendment—it is about free speech—and it is about 

allowing candidates to have the opportunity to take 

their ideas into the marketplace, to broadcast them, to 

be able to pay for the commercials, and to have their 

exchange of ideas in that political marketplace that our 

Founding Fathers deemed so very important.” 147 

Cong. Rec. S2537 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001); see also id. 

at S2538 (“[T]he wealthy candidate, again, is not punished, is not inhibited, is not discouraged from putting 

in his or her own money.”); id. at S2540 (statement of 

Sen. Durbin) (“[Without the Millionaires’ Amendment, 

t]he voters lose. If the system works as it is supposed 

to, you have a choice on election day. In order to have a 

choice, you have information about all candidates. That 

means you have an information source not only from a 

wealthy candidate but from someone who is not so 

wealthy.”). Section 319 therefore, in the tradition of 

other campaign finance laws, serves to promote “open 

public political discussion” and participation in the political process.4

 

 4

 Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. 

L. Rev. 245, 253 (2002) (explaining that campaign finance laws 
14 

B. Section 319’s Notification Requirements Do 

Not Burden Speech 

Section 319 requires self-financing candidates for 

the House of Representatives to file: (1) a declaration 

of intent within 15 days of becoming a candidate that 

discloses the amount in personal funds in excess of 

$350,000 that the candidate intends to spend; (2) an initial notification within 24 hours of spending more than 

$350,000 of personal funds; and (3) additional notifications within 24 hours following each aggregate expenditure over $10,000. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(b). These notification requirements, which are essential to the implementation and enforcement of Section 319’s substantive 

requirements, operate in tandem with other, similar 

provisions in FECA. 

Appellant claims that Section 319’s notification requirements impose a “substantial burden” on his political expression. But these requirements are no more 

burdensome than similar requirements that have been 

upheld by this Court. In particular, as the district 

court recognized, the 24-hour notification requirements 

 

“further the kind of open public political discussion that the First 

Amendment also seeks to encourage, not simply as an end, but also 

as a means to achieve a workable democracy”); see also Buckley, 

424 U.S. at 92-93 & n.127 (noting that “[l]egislation to enhance . . . 

First Amendment values is the rule, not the exception” and Congress’s establishment of taxpayer funding of presidential campaigns was an “effort not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but 

rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a selfgoverning people”); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 140 (2003) 

(upholding BCRA’s primary soft money restrictions and noting 

that “the restriction . . . tends to increase the dissemination of information by forcing parties, candidates, and officeholders to solicit from a wider array of potential donors”). 
15 

for spending over $350,000 and additional aggregate 

expenditures over $10,000 resemble the 24-hour reporting requirements in BCRA Section 201 that this Court 

upheld in McConnell v. FEC. See 540 U.S. 93, 194-195 

(2003) (upholding BCRA Section 201 reporting requirements, which impose a 24-hour deadline for disclosure of expenditures relating to “electioneering communications” totaling more than $10,000 in a calendar 

year); id. at 321 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 

and Scalia, J., concurring on the constitutionality of 

BCRA’s basic disclosure provision).5

 

Appellant asserts that Section 319’s primary flaw 

lies not in the timing but rather in the “unilateral disclosure of sensitive campaign strategy.” Appellant Br. 

40. But neither Appellant nor his amici can point to any 

such “sensitive” information that would not otherwise 

be disclosed under existing law by every candidate.6 

 5

 Amici James Madison Center for Free Speech and Citizens 

United mistakenly claim that strict scrutiny applies to Section 

319’s disclosure provisions, despite their acknowledgment that 

such a standard was not applied to the more detailed disclosure 

provisions at issue in McConnell. See Br. of Amici James Madison 

Center for Free Speech and Citizens United 16 (arguing that strict 

scrutiny should apply and that “nothing can properly be read into 

McConnell’s use of ‘important’” when describing the state interests that led the Buckley Court to uphold FECA’s disclosure requirements). Nothing here requires this Court to apply a different 

level of scrutiny in this case than it did in reviewing other disclosure provisions of BCRA. 

6

 Indeed, the expenditure information required by a selffinancing candidate under the 24-hour reporting rules is no more 

“sensitive” or “strategic” than the information required of his opponent. See 11 C.F.R. § 400.31(e)(1)(ii) (requiring opposing candidate to notify his political party and the FEC of OPFA within 24 

hours if he has received increased individual contributions and in-
16 

See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b); 11 C.F.R. § 104.3 (requiring periodic, detailed reports of expenditures). Indeed, given 

that Section 319 requires disclosure only of the amount 

of money spent by the candidate himself, and not the 

names of supporters or the uses of such funds, the information required is less “sensitive” and less likely to 

curb or influence a candidate’s political speech than 

other provisions this Court has upheld. See, e.g.,

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194-195 (explaining that Section 

201 requires disclosure of “all persons sharing the costs 

of the [electioneering communications] disbursements” 

and, where applicable, “all persons who contributed 

$1,000 or more” to a segregated account or individual 

making the disbursement (emphasis added)). 

Appellant describes Section 319’s declaration of intent requirement, which must be filed within 15 days of 

announcing one’s candidacy, as “particularly burdensome.” But advance filings are nothing new to candidates. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 432(e)(1) (imposing 15-day 

deadline for candidates to designate campaign committee). In McConnell, this Court upheld an advance notice provision that was, if anything, more revealing of a 

candidate’s strategy than Section 319. Section 201 of 

BCRA, the amendment to FECA Section 304, requires 

disclosure of executory contracts for communications 

that have not necessarily aired, which has the effect of 

revealing information such as where political ads will 

be run and by whom. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 199-

201. Section 319, by contrast, reveals only an early intention by a self-financing candidate to spend more 

than $350,000 of personal funds. It says nothing else 

 

creased coordinated party expenditures equal to 100 percent of 

OPFA). 
17 

about a candidate’s strategy or the content of his or her 

message. Thus, there is no reason to believe that Section 319 imposes a greater burden on speech than Section 201, which this Court concluded does “not prevent 

anyone from speaking.” Id. at 201 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

II. ANY ATTACK ON PUBLIC FUNDING IN THIS CASE IS 

MISPLACED 

In concluding that Section 319 does not impermissibly burden speech, the district court drew an analogy 

to lower court decisions that reviewed various state 

public funding schemes. J.S. App. 9a-13a. Although 

Appellant contends that the district court’s analogy 

does not fit, he does not take issue with public funding 

in general, nor does he argue against the public funding 

provisions in those cases, which trigger higher expenditure and contribution limits or higher funding amounts 

when a non-participating candidate spends above a 

threshold amount; to the contrary, he acknowledges

their constitutionality. Appellant Br. 54-55; J.S. 11-12. 

Amici James Madison Center for Free Speech and 

Citizens United, on the other hand, depart from Appellant’s position and encourage this Court to take the extraordinary step of addressing in this case the constitutional foundation of these lower court decisions. See Br. 

of Amici James Madison Center for Free Speech and 

Citizens United 26-28. This Court should reject the extraordinary request to comment on cases that are not 

before the Court and that involve statutes substantively different from Section 319. Whatever the value 

of the district court’s analogy, no party here has asked 

the Court to delve into an area of the law where the 

lower courts are in substantial agreement. 
18 

In Buckley, this Court approved of conditioning acceptance of public funds for presidential campaigns on 

an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified 

expenditure limits. The Court reasoned that, “[j]ust as 

a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo 

private fundraising and accept public funding.” 424 

U.S. at 57 n.65.7

 

Relying on Buckley, a decision that Appellant does 

not challenge,8

 lower courts have overwhelmingly sustained state public funding provisions that contain various incentives for candidates to accept public funding,9

 7

 See also Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 

283-284 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (holding Presidential Election Campaign Funding Act was constitutional because “[e]ach candidate remains free” to choose the method of 

campaign financing most advantageous to speech). 

8

 See, e.g., Appellant Br. 54 (acknowledging that the district 

court, relying on Buckley, “correctly noted that a public funding 

system does not pose an unconstitutional burden where the disadvantage is the result of the candidate’s choice to fund his campaign 

from one of several permissible funding sources” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

9

 Public funding legislation takes a number of forms. Under 

some schemes, candidates are provided additional public funds in 

the event a high-spending non-participating opponent exceeds certain expenditure or contribution amounts, or when independent 

expenditures occur. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A 

§ 1125(9). In other variations, expenditure and contribution limits 

are relaxed or eliminated when the spending of non-participating 

candidates passes a threshold amount. Thus, rather than providing participating candidates with more public money, this model 

simply allows a publicly-financed candidate greater opportunity to 

raise and spend private money. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. 

§ 10A.25(10). 
19 

concluding that those provisions do not coerce candidates into sacrificing their First Amendment rights to 

free expression. See Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 

451, 464 (1st Cir. 2000) (upholding Maine Clean Election 

Act, which contains a triggering provision providing 

increased public funding to participating candidates 

when spending of non-participating candidates exceeds 

threshold); Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 948-949 (6th 

Cir. 1998) (upholding Kentucky public funding law that 

provided participating candidates with two-for-one 

matching funds and lifted the applicable expenditure 

and contribution limits in the event the spending of a 

non-participating candidate exceeded a triggering 

amount); Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1549-

1552 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding Minnesota public funding law waiving expenditure limits for publicly-financed 

candidates when a non-participating candidate exceeds 

a triggering amount of contributions and expenditures);10 Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 30, 39 

(1st Cir. 1993) (upholding Rhode Island’s “contribution 

 10 In Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994), the 

Eighth Circuit invalidated a Minnesota provision that increased 

spending limits and the amount of public funds available to a candidate opposing a non-publicly-financed candidate when an independent expenditure was made on behalf of the non-financed candidate. The Eighth Circuit in Rosenstiel attempted to distinguish 

this earlier, seemingly contradictory holding. 101 F.3d at 1555. At 

most, Day’s holding is limited to public financing schemes that provide candidates with additional public funds based on independent 

expenditures not within the candidate’s control. See, e.g., Daggett, 

205 F.3d at 464 n.25 (“We recognize that there may be a difference 

between expenditures by a candidate and those by a noncandidate, but nonetheless agree that the continuing vitality of 

Day is open to question.”). 
20 

cap gap” provisions, which entitle publicly-financed 

candidates to contribution limits double those of nonfinanced candidates); Order, Green Party of Conn. v. 

Garfield, No. 06-cv-1030, at 56-58 (D.Conn. Mar. 20, 

2008) (dismissing challenge to triggering provisions of 

Connecticut public funding law, which provide for the 

release of additional public funds if a participating candidate is outspent by a non-participating candidate or 

by any other non-candidate or organization); Jackson v.

Leake, 476 F. Supp. 2d 515, 519, 530 (E.D.N.C. 2006), 

argued on appeal sub nom. Duke v. Leake, No. 07-1454 

(4th Cir. Dec. 7, 2007) (upholding a North Carolina public funding law for judicial elections that provides public 

“rescue funds” for participating candidates in the event 

contributions or expenditures of a non-participating 

candidate, independent or otherwise, exceed a specified 

triggering amount).11 These cases are instructive for 

 11 These represent only some of the many state public funding 

schemes on the books. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-952 

(providing increased public funds to participating candidates when 

the expenditures of a non-participating candidate exceed a certain 

triggering amount); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 106.355 (relieving a participating candidate from expenditure limits if non-participating opponent exceeds expenditure limits applicable to publicly-financed 

candidates, and continuing to provide matching funds to participating candidates); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann.. § 32-1604 (conditioning the 

receipt of public funds by participating candidate on required expenditure minimums by non-participating candidate); Wis. Stat. 

Ann. § 11.50(2)(i) (providing that participating candidate who accepts a public grant is not bound by contribution and disbursement 

limits if he faces an opponent who has not accepted a grant, unless 

the opponent files an affidavit of compliance with the limitations). 

While not yet law, Congress is also considering bills to reform 

the existing presidential public financing laws in order to increase 

the speech of presidential candidates through public financing 

mechanisms that provide additional incentives for candidates to 
21 

the reason given by the district court: they hold that as 

long as candidates can choose how to fund their campaigns and a government benefit does not force a candidate to curtail his or her speech, triggering provisions 

like those reviewed in these cases are constitutional. 

But public funding mechanisms also involve a 

unique set of governmental interests that must be 

evaluated on their own terms and in the context of the 

specific statutory incentives used. In Buckley, this 

Court explained several of the core values served by 

public funding. Reviewing Congress’s effort to provide 

optional funding for presidential elections, the Court 

observed that FECA’s public funding scheme represented an effort “to use public money to facilitate and 

enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.” 

424 U.S. at 92-93. The Court further recognized that 

public funding helps “eliminat[e] the improper influence 

of large private contributions” and “reliev[es] . . . candidates from the rigors of soliciting private contributions.”12 Id. at 96. Taking into account these varying 

 

participate. The “Presidential Funding Act of 2007” provides additional public funds and increases the expenditure limit for presidential candidates participating in public funding who are opposed 

by non-participating candidates when the non-participating candidate receives contributions or makes expenditures in an aggregate 

amount greater than 120 percent of the applicable expenditure 

limit. See S. 2412, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 776, 110th Cong. 

(2007). 

12 The lower courts have echoed the importance of these values 

in upholding state public financing laws. See, e.g. Daggett, 205 F.3d 

at 450 (noting the “state’s interest in curbing the power of money in 

politics”); Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1553 (noting the “compelling” governmental interest of “promot[ing] a reduction in the possibility for 

corruption that may arise from large campaign contributions and a 
22 

compelling governmental interests, courts have reviewed public funding laws with an eye toward ensuring that the incentives used involve “a roughly proportionate mix of benefits and detriments.” Daggett, 205 

F.3d at 472. 

Accordingly, this case presents no occasion for the 

Court to consider or to address a remarkably consistent 

set of lower court decisions rejecting challenges to state 

public financing schemes that differ from Section 319. 

III. CONGRESS’S DECISION TO ADJUST CONTRIBUTION 

LIMITS FOR OPPONENTS OF CANDIDATES WHO 

CHOOSE TO SPEND LARGE SUMS OF PERSONAL 

WEALTH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE VALUES SERVED 

BY BCRA’S CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 

A. This Court Has Consistently Upheld Congressional Judgment Regarding Contribution 

Limit Levels 

This Court has consistently sustained the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption as 

constitutionally sufficient justifications for contribution 

 

diminution in the time candidates spend raising campaign contributions, thereby increasing the time available for discussion of the issues and campaigning”); Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 39 (noting that “the 

state possesses a valid interest in having candidates accept public 

financing because such programs ‘facilitate communication by candidates with the electorate,’ free candidates from the pressures of 

fundraising, and, relatedly, tend to combat corruption”) (citing

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91). This Court also identified in Buckley two 

interests specific to public financing schemes that distinguish between major and minor party candidates: protecting the public fisc 

by “not funding hopeless candidates with large sums of public 

money” and protecting the electoral process by not providing “artificial incentives to splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism.” 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95-96 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
23 

limits. Appellant acknowledges as much, stating in his 

brief, “Congress originally imposed contribution limits 

in election campaigns to address concerns about the 

appearance and actuality that large campaign donations 

could unduly influence politicians.” Appellant Br. 24 

(citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-28). In Buckley, this 

Court concluded: “It is unnecessary to look beyond 

[FECA]’s primary purpose to limit the actuality and 

appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation.” 424 U.S. at 26; see also Nixon v. 

Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000) (“[T]he 

prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption [is] . . . a constitutionally sufficient justification” for 

contribution limits. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

This Court has also consistently deferred to Congress’s expert judgment in the crafting of these provisions, concluding, “[i]f it is satisfied that some limit on 

contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to 

probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as 

well as $1,000.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 397 

(“[T]he issue in later [contribution limit] cases cannot 

be truncated to a narrow question about the power of 

the dollar, but must go to the power to mount a campaign with all the dollars likely to be forthcoming. 

[T]he dictates of the First Amendment are not mere 

functions of the Consumer Price Index.”). 
24 

B. Congress’s Decision To Adjust Contribution 

Limits For Opponents Of Millionaire Candidates Does Not Impugn The General Validity 

Of Contribution Limits, And This Court Has 

Not Been Asked To Hold Otherwise 

Appellant contends that Section 319 is inconsistent 

with the anti-corruption rationale, arguing that “Section 319 [is] an avenue for more private money to enter 

the system” and that it “likely increases the amount 

and influence of contributed funds in an election.” Appellant Br. 54. But Appellant ignores the fact that in 

enacting Section 319, Congress balanced the need to 

combat corruption and its appearance with concerns 

that wealthy, self-financing candidates were driving 

candidates with fewer personal resources from the political arena. As Senator McCain explained on the floor 

of the Senate: 

Congress has concluded that contributions in 

excess of $2,000 present a risk of actual and 

apparent corruption. Section [319] does not 

take issue with this conclusion. In this limited 

context, however, Congress has concluded that 

the contribution limits—despite their fundamental importance in fighting actual and apparent corruption—should be relaxed to mitigate the countervailing risk that they will unfairly favor those who are willing, and able, to 

spend a small fortune of their own money to 

win election. 

148 Cong. Rec. S2142 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002); see also 

144 Cong. Rec. H3780 (daily ed. May 22, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bennett) (“[T]his year, we have the lowest interest among 18 and 19-year old people in this 

country in government, in politics, and in public policy 
25 

than we have had in the last 30 years. There is a reason 

for that. The reason for that is that young people, in 

particular, feel disconnected from the system. They 

feel that this is a pay-as-you-go system. Unless they 

have money to get involved in this political process, 

they cannot be part of it.”). 

This Court has never suggested that Congress is 

foreclosed from adjusting statutory contribution limits 

for particular elections in order to accommodate competing governmental interests. See McConnell, 540 

U.S. at 137 (“The less rigorous standard of review we 

have applied to contribution limits (Buckley’s ‘closely 

drawn’ scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress’ 

ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an 

area in which it enjoys particular expertise. It also 

provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate 

and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political 

process.”); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 

522, 525-526 (1987) (“[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will 

or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice.”). 

Indeed, in areas where legislators possess particular 

expertise, this Court has time and again provided Congress and the states’ legislatures with leeway to balance competing interests. See Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 

402-403 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Where a legislature 

has significantly greater institutional expertise, as, for 

example, in the field of election regulation, the Court in 

practice defers to empirical legislative judgments.”) 

(citing, inter alia, Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485-

488 (1988) (balancing rights of privacy and expression); 

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 192-194 

(1997) (recognizing the speech interests of both viewers 
26 

and cable operators); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 

198-211 (1992) (plurality opinion) (weighing First 

Amendment rights against electoral integrity necessary for right to vote)). For example, in Buckley, this 

Court considered a requirement that candidates 

achieve 5 percent of the popular vote to qualify for general election public funding. In crafting this percentage 

requirement, Congress balanced the competing interests of “protect[ing] the public fisc and not foster[ing] 

factionalism.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 103. “[T]he choice 

of the percentage requirement that best accommodates 

the[se] competing interests,” this Court held, “was for 

Congress to make.” Id. 

Appellant further argues that Congress’s willingness to raise contribution limits in this context indicates 

that Section 319 is an incumbent-protection provision 

that provides “informational and financial benefits to 

the opponents of candidates who personally spend more 

than $350,000 on their campaign.” Appellant Br. 22. 

This argument is not borne out by the statute itself or 

by the record. The statute addresses the fundraising 

advantage an incumbent might have through the calculation of OPFA. Indeed, available data from the 2004 

election shows that in a substantial number of races 

where an incumbent faced a millionaire candidate 

whose spending surpassed the trigger amount, the 

trigger was not actually activated because the incumbent’s OPFA amounts offset the self-financing. Steen, 

Self-Financed Candidates, 209. 

Finally, Appellant contends that Congress raised 

contribution limits in Section 319 based on an impermissible rationale, that of “level[ing] the playing field” 

between millionaire and non-millionaire candidates. 

See Appellant Br. 34-36. While it is true that leveling 

the playing field is not a constitutionally sufficient in-
27 

terest in the context of expenditure limits, Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 48-49, it is legitimate for Congress to take steps 

to ensure that its anti-corruption measures do not have 

the unintended effect of tilting the field even more in 

favor of wealthy candidates. In particular, Section 319 

is a legitimate effort to balance the ability of candidates 

to compete under special and uncommon circumstances 

with a general interest in reducing corruption and the 

appearance of corruption. 

Section 319 therefore exemplifies Congress’s proper 

use of its expertise to devise a system of campaign financing that best serves multiple public policy goals. 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the three-judge district court, accordingly, should be affirmed. 

Respectfully submitted. 

ROGER M. WITTEN

SHANE T. STANSBURY

JULIA M. LIPEZ

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

 HALE AND DORR LLP

399 Park Avenue 

New York, NY 10022 

(212) 230-8800 

SETH P. WAXMAN

 Counsel of Record

RANDOLPH D. MOSS

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

 HALE AND DORR LLP

1875 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 

Washington, DC 20006 

(202) 663-6000 
DONALD J. SIMON

SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, 

 SACHSE, ENDRESON & 

 PERRY, LLP 

1425 K Street, N.W. 

Suite 600 

Washington, DC 20005 

(202) 682-0240 

FRED WERTHEIMER

DEMOCRACY 21 

1875 I Street, N.W. 

Suite 500 

Washington, DC 20006 

(202) 429-2008 

J. GERALD HEBERT

PAUL S. RYAN

TARA MALLOY

THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL

 CENTER

1640 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

Suite 660 

Washington, DC 20036 

(202) 736-2200 

DEBORAH GOLDBERG

LAURA MACCLEERY

CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY

BRENNAN CENTER FOR

 JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF

 LAW

161 Avenue of the Americas 

12th Floor 

New York, NY 10013 

(212) 998-6025 

SCOTT L. NELSON

PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION

 GROUP

1600 20th Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20009 

(202) 588-1000 

MARCH 2008