In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-2934 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

FERNANDO ALVAREZ-CARVAJAL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 18-cr-30183 — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 12, 2021 — DECIDED JUNE 24, 2021 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. 

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted defendant-appellant Fernando Alvarez-Carvajal of conspiracy to distribute 

methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin for his role in an 

interstate drug-trafficking operation. In calculating AlvarezCarvajal’s advisory sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”), the district court applied a twolevel enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) based on a 

finding that Alvarez-Carvajal maintained a premises for the 
2 No. 20-2934 

purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. The district court applied another enhancement that 

further increased his total offense level by two levels under 

U.S.S.G § 3C1.1 based on a finding that Alvarez-Carvajal obstructed justice through his testimony at trial. On appeal, Alvarez-Carvajal challenges the application of both enhancements to his sentence. We now affirm the district court. 

I. Background 

A. Offense Conduct 

In 2016, a narcotics investigation by the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (“FBI”) identified Edward Opoku Akwaboah, 

known as “Teddy,” as “a wholesale distributor” of drugs 

throughout the United States, including in the Madison 

County area of southern Illinois. Teddy lived in Los Angeles 

and supplied local distributors with drugs delivered through 

the U.S. Postal Service. In 2018, the FBI used a confidential informant to conduct multiple controlled drug purchases from 

Teddy via the Postal Service. To further the investigation, the 

FBI obtained court authorization to intercept the phone calls 

and text messages of individuals it believed were involved in 

the drug-distribution conspiracy. Through the various wiretaps, the investigating agents learned that Jesus Alvarez-Duarte, known as “Porky,” was supplying drugs to Teddy from 

Mexico. The investigation further revealed that Alvarez-Carvajal, Porky’s father, served as a drug and cash courier in this 

operation, as did Porky’s brother, Luis Alvarez-Duarte. The 

two men delivered drugs to and picked up money from 

Teddy’s home. Additionally, the organization used AlvarezCarvajal’s Bank of America account to move drug proceeds. 
No. 20-2934 3

A federal grand jury indicted Alvarez-Carvajal and five 

codefendants on charges related to the drug-distribution conspiracy. The sole count against Alvarez-Carvajal charged him, 

and the other defendants, with conspiracy to distribute and 

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) 

and 846. The indictment also alleged that the conspiracy involved a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine 

amounting to at least 500 grams. Alvarez-Carvajal pleaded 

not guilty and proceeded to trial. 

B. Trial 

At trial, Alvarez-Carvajal testified on his own behalf 

through an interpreter. He admitted that he knew Teddy and 

that he had been to Teddy’s house. Alvarez-Carvajal denied, 

however, ever delivering drugs to or picking up drugs or 

drug money from Teddy, or storing drugs at his home, where 

Luis also resided. Rather, Alvarez-Carvajal testified that 

Teddy gave him money to help Porky during his time in jail 

and again when Porky was kidnapped in Mexico. AlvarezCarvajal added that Teddy once gave him money to help with 

bills. He asserted that none of the money Teddy gave him was 

“drug money.” Alvarez-Carvajal further testified that he 

never provided his Bank of America account information to 

Teddy or gave anyone permission to use the account to deposit drug proceeds. Finally, Alvarez-Carvajal denied selling 

drugs or arranging for the sale of drugs to his coworkers. 

On cross-examination, Alvarez-Carvajal acknowledged 

that he knew Porky and Teddy were drug dealers. He also 

testified that he knew of Porky’s agreement to distribute 

drugs and the debt Porky owed to his supplier. He further 

testified that he paid $9,000 toward that drug debt. Alvarez-
4 No. 20-2934 

Carvajal denied, however, any intentional involvement in the 

drug-distribution conspiracy. 

Alvarez-Carvajal’s testimony notably conflicted with that 

of several other witnesses at trial. Teddy and Luis testified as 

cooperating witnesses for the government and described Alvarez-Carvajal’s significant involvement in the conspiracy. 

They both testified that Alvarez-Carvajal delivered drugs to 

and picked up money from Teddy on Porky’s behalf when 

Luis was “not available” to do so. They also explained that the 

organization stored drugs and drug money at Alvarez-Carvajal’s home, and that Luis and Alvarez-Carvajal sold small 

amounts of methamphetamine on the side. Finally, Teddy 

and Luis testified that as the conspiracy progressed, the coconspirators decided to have buyers deposit money into Alvarez-Carvajal’s Bank of America account to facilitate the efficient transfer of drug proceeds to Porky. Luis added that Alvarez-Carvajal “was aware” that the organization “would be 

using his account for drug money” and withdrew money 

from the account to pay off some of the debt that he, Luis, and 

Porky owed to their supplier. FBI Agent Jill Carson-Kuhl, a 

forensic accountant, corroborated this testimony when she 

testified that she had tracked multiple drug payments to Alvarez-Carvajal’s Bank of America account, and that AlvarezCarvajal would withdraw large quantities of cash from the account following the transfers—indicating that the organization used Alvarez-Carvajal’s account to funnel drug proceeds. 

The jury found Alvarez-Carvajal guilty of conspiracy to 

distribute controlled substances, as charged in Count 1 of the 

indictment. Relevant on appeal, the jury did not find that Alvarez-Carvajal had testified falsely, and no perjury charges 

were brought against Alvarez-Carvajal. 
No. 20-2934 5

C. Sentencing 

1. Presentence Investigation Report 

Following Alvarez-Carvajal’s conviction, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report 

(“PSR”) that calculated his advisory Guidelines sentencing 

range. The PSR determined a base offense level of 38 but recommended a pair of offense-level enhancements. First, the 

PSR recommended a two-offense-level increase under 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) because Alvarez-Carvajal “stored and 

allowed [methamphetamine] to be stored at his residence.” 

Second, the PSR recommended an additional two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice because Alvarez-Carvajal “testified falsely at trial indicating 

that the monies he received from [Teddy] w[ere] for a legitimate purpose of putting money on [Porky’s] jail account.” 

With the inclusion of these sentence enhancements, the PSR 

concluded that Alvarez-Carvajal’s total offense level was 42. 

Based on that total offense level and a criminal history category of I, the PSR recommended a Guidelines range of 360 

months’ to life imprisonment. 

Alvarez-Carvajal filed objections to the PSR. He primarily 

objected to the application of the sentence enhancements under §§ 2D1.1(b)(12) and 3C1.1. He argued that no evidence in 

the record established that he distributed controlled substances from his residence, that the jury did not find him 

guilty of perjury or make any finding that he testified falsely, 

and that he should not be punished with the obstruction of 

justice enhancement for exercising his constitutional right to 

testify at trial. Alvarez-Carvajal asserted that without these 

enhancements, his total offense level would have been 38, 
6 No. 20-2934 

resulting in a lower Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months’ 

imprisonment. 

In response to these objections, the Probation Office prepared an addendum to the PSR. The addendum stated that 

the drug-premises enhancement should apply because Alvarez-Carvajal “owned the home and paid the mortgage and 

stored pound-quantities of [methamphetamine] at the residence.” The addendum also stated that the enhancement for 

obstruction of justice should apply because Alvarez-Carvajal 

“falsely testified that he received money from [Teddy] for the 

legitimate purpose of putting money on [Porky’s] jail account, 

suggesting that the money was not for payment of illicit drugs 

or in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 

The government also filed a response to Alvarez-Carvajal’s objections. In addition to adopting the arguments advanced by the Probation Office in the addendum, the government argued that the drug-premises enhancement should apply, pointing to Luis’s testimony that Alvarez-Carvajal stored 

methamphetamine and drug proceeds in the home, sold 

methamphetamine stored in the home to his coworkers, and 

conducted a drug transaction with a member of the drug-distribution organization at the home. The government also argued that the obstruction enhancement should apply because 

Alvarez-Carvajal testified untruthfully under oath about several material matters—all centering on his involvement in the 

drug-distribution conspiracy. 

2. Sentencing Hearing 

At Alvarez-Carvajal’s sentencing hearing, the district 

court heard argument regarding the objections to the PSR. 

Addressing first the objection to the obstruction 
No. 20-2934 7

enhancement, Alvarez-Carvajal argued that the jury had “not 

convict[ed] him of perjury” or found that he lied. The government responded that Alvarez-Carvajal “testified untruthfully 

about several material matters, not just the money.” The district court then stated that it would adopt the probation officer’s recommendation and apply the § 3C1.1 enhancement 

for obstruction of justice. 

The district court next heard argument regarding AlvarezCarvajal’s objection to the drug-premises enhancement. Alvarez-Carvajal argued that the enhancement applies when the 

manufacture or distribution of controlled substances represented a “primary purpose[] or principal use of [the] house, 

rather than [an] incidental or collateral use of the premises.” 

Alvarez-Carvajal noted that he had lived in the home with his 

family for fifteen years and that the evidence at trial established that he stored drugs at the home only “on a few occasions”—therefore any drug-distribution activities amounted 

only to an incidental use. Relying on United States v. Sanchez, 

810 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2016), the government emphasized the 

significance of drug-distribution activities based on trial testimony that Alvarez-Carvajal owned the home and “regularly 

stored drugs at the house.” The district court again concluded 

that it would adopt the probation officer’s recommendation 

and apply the § 2D1.1(b)(12) drug-premises enhancement. 

Having overruled Alvarez-Carvajal’s objections, the district court adopted the PSR’s advisory Guidelines range of 360 

months to life in prison. After hearing the parties’ final arguments and considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a), the district court imposed a 240-month sentence—

significantly below Alvarez-Carvajal’s Guidelines range. The 

court also sentenced Alvarez-Carvajal to five years of 
8 No. 20-2934 

supervised release and imposed a $500 fine and a $100 special 

assessment. In reaching this sentence, the district court not 

only noted that “if I have miscalculated the guidelines, I 

would impose the same sentence,” but also elaborated that 

“360 months is greater than necessary, ... ten years isn’t sufficient, but the 20 years is for all of those reasons” the court had 

explained. 

This appeal followed. 

II. Discussion 

Alavarez-Carvajal appeals his sentence, arguing that the 

district court erred when it applied the obstruction of justice 

and drug-premises enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 3C1.1 

and 2D1.1(b)(12), respectively. He argues that the district 

court did not make the independent findings required to apply each enhancement. He also argues that the evidence adduced at trial and sentencing did not support the application 

of the enhancements because that evidence did not show that 

he testified falsely or that drug-distribution activities constituted a primary use of his home. We agree that the district 

court did not make separate and distinct findings regarding 

the enhancements. We need not determine whether the district court erred, however, because we conclude that any error 

in calculating Alvarez-Carvajal’s total offense level and resulting Guidelines range was harmless. 

“In a criminal-sentencing case, a finding of harmless error 

‘removes the pointless step of returning to the district court 

when we are convinced that the sentence the judge imposes 

will be identical to the one we remanded.’” United States v. 

Clark, 906 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States 

v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009)). “To prove harmless 
No. 20-2934 9

error, the government must be able to show that the [sentencing] error ‘did not affect the district court’s selection of the 

sentence imposed.’” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 667 (quoting United 

States v. Anderson, 517 F.3d 953, 965 (7th Cir. 2008)). “For example, we have found harmless error when the sentencing 

court ‘expresse[s] [its] determination to impose the same sentence even if [it] had gotten the calculations wrong.’” United 

States v. Elder, 900 F.3d 491, 503 (7th Cir. 2018) (alterations in 

original) (quoting Abbas, 560 F.3d at 667). A “conclusory comment tossed in for good measure,” however, will not suffice. 

See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 667. 

Here, the district court made clear that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of its Guidelines calculation. After considering the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) and announcing the 240-month sentence, the district 

court stated, “[n]ow, if I have miscalculated the guidelines I 

would impose the same sentence. So, I’d just say that I think 

360 months is greater than necessary, I think ten years isn’t 

sufficient, but the 20 years is for all of those reasons.” Given 

this “detailed explanation of the basis for the parallel result,” 

see Abbas, 560 F.3d at 667, which the district court made after 

thorough consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, we conclude 

that any error in calculating Alvarez-Carvajal’s total offense 

level had no effect on the sentence imposed and was therefore 

harmless. 

In reaching this conclusion, we find Alvarez-Carvajal’s argument to the contrary unavailing. He contends that the district court made clear at the sentencing hearing and in its written statement of reasons that it intended to impose a belowGuidelines sentence. According to Alvarez-Carvajal, however, because the district court erred in calculating his total 
10 No. 20-2934 

offense level, the 240-month sentence it imposed fell within 

his correct Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months—based on 

a total offense level of 38 instead of 42—rather than below that 

range. This argument, however, mischaracterizes the district 

court’s oral and written findings. The district court did not 

tether Alvarez-Carvajal’s sentence to an upward or downward variance from a particular Guidelines range. For example, in its written statement of reasons the court found that “a 

sentence of 240 months is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the goals of sentencing” and that “anything 

more than a twenty year term of imprisonment would be 

greater than necessary to meet the objectives of sentencing.” 

The district court made similar findings at the sentencing 

hearing. This record makes clear “that the district court 

thought the [twenty-year] sentence it chose,” rather than a below-Guidelines sentence in general, “was appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range.” See Molina-Martinez v. 

United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016). We can thus conclude that any errors in Alvarez-Carvajal’s advisory Guidelines range were harmless. 

That said, we clarify that we will not accept a district 

court’s sentencing decision based simply on some general observation from the district judge disclaiming reliance on the 

court’s Guidelines calculation. Best practice calls for explicit 

findings as to the enhancements under §§ 3C1.1 and 

2D1.1(b)(12). See United States v. Chychula, 757 F.3d 615, 619 

(7th Cir. 2014) (“When applying the [§ 3C1.1] obstruction enhancement based on perjury, the district court should make a 

finding as to all the factual predicates necessary for a finding 

of perjury: false testimony, materiality, and willful intent.” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States 

v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 
No. 20-2934 11

(explaining that “for § 2D1.1(b)(12) to apply, manufacturing 

or distributing a controlled substance must be a ‘primary or 

principal’ use for the premises,” rather than an “incidental or 

collateral” one) (first quoting § 2D1.1, cmt. n.17; and then 

quoting Sanchez, 810 F.3d at 497)). While we conclude that any 

errors in this case were harmless, we again caution that “more 

detail is always better than less in sentencing findings.” 

United States v. Burke, 148 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1998). District 

courts should continue to follow our caselaw requiring specific findings for the perjury-based obstruction enhancement 

and the drug-premises enhancement. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM Alvarez-Carvajal’s sentence. 
12 No. 20-2934

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. The district court 

wisely looked past the Sentencing Guidelines, exercised judgment and discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and made clear 

that any asserted errors in the guideline calculations would 

be harmless. I therefore join Judge Flaum’s opinion for the 

court. 

I write separately because the district court’s abbreviated 

treatment of the two-level enhancement for maintaining a 

premises for the purpose of drug trafficking under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(12) reflects a troubling trend in our case law. The 

Guideline provides: “If the defendant maintained a premises 

for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled 

substance, increase by 2 levels.” The Sentencing Commission’s commentary provides important guidance in applying 

“for the purpose.” As most relevant here, it teaches: 

Manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance need not be the sole purpose for which 

the premises was maintained, but must be one 

of the defendant’s primary or principal uses for 

the premises, rather than one of the defendant’s 

incidental or collateral uses for the premises. In 

making this determination, the court should 

consider how frequently the premises was used 

by the defendant for manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance and how frequently the premises was used by the defendant 

for lawful purposes. 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.17 (emphases added). 

If we distinguish, as instructed, between primary and 

principal uses on one hand and incidental and collateral uses 
No. 20-2934 13

on the other, it should be obvious that the enhancement 

should not apply here. Mr. Alvarez-Carvajal used his home 

as, well, a home—except for a few isolated drug sales, his occasional use of a drawer in the garage to store less desirable 

methamphetamine that was difficult for his co-conspirators to 

sell, and his son’s use of a drawer in his room to store cash. 

Mr. Alvarez-Carvajal also worked two jobs; drug proceeds 

were not his only source of income. 

We have decided cases that properly affirmed application 

of the enhancement to homes. See, e.g., United States v. FloresOlague, 717 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 2013) (defendant engaged 

in years of daily drug sales out of his home); United States v. 

Sanchez, 710 F.3d 724, 731–32 (7th Cir. 2013), judgment vacated on other grounds, 571 U.S. 801 (2013) (defendant regularly received and stored “massive” quantities of drugs, such 

as up to 40 kilograms of cocaine at a time, at home, and drug 

trafficking was his only source of income). The problem is that 

in other cases, we have allowed the government to move the 

goalposts, affirming applications of this enhancement in cases 

with weaker evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 874 

F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 2017) (defendant sold drugs out of his 

home eight times, with seven transactions within two 

months); United States v. Winfield, 846 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 

2017) (defendant engaged in four drug transactions out of his 

home over twelve weeks). The government persuaded the 

district court here that Contreras, in particular, supported applying the enhancement in this case.

Contreras and Winfield may go beyond the outer limit for 

this “stash house” enhancement, but they are at best at that 

outer limit. In both cases there was stronger evidence for the 
14 No. 20-2934

enhancement than was present here. In Contreras, the government also presented evidence that drugs were regularly 

shipped to and stored at the defendant’s home, that he accepted payment for drugs at his home, and that co-defendants 

met at his home to settle a narcotics debt. 874 F.3d at 284. In 

Winfield, the four controlled buys turned up evidence that the 

premises were used much more frequently and extensively 

for drug trafficking, and the defendant had no other source of 

income. 846 F.3d at 243. 

In this case, by contrast, the occasional and relatively circumscribed drug activity that occurred at Mr. Alvarez-Carvajal’s residence cannot convert an otherwise normal home into 

a “drug den” or “stash house” given the Commission’s guidance that courts must distinguish between “primary or principal uses” and “incidental or collateral” ones. To be sure, this 

can be a tricky question when a defendant repeatedly and 

consistently uses his residence for drug trafficking, as “the 

amount of lawful activity in a home is all but certain to exceed 

the amount of illegal activity.” Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284. But 

we should not let a few tempting borderline cases lead us to 

overcorrect, resulting in unnecessarily harsh prison terms. 

See generally Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 Yale L.J. 

Online 109, 109–10 (2012) (explaining processes that can contribute to one-way ratchet in development of case law). Sentencing courts would do well to stay focused on the text of the 

Guideline and its commentary. And a sentencing court must 

always consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 

can, as in this case, forestall appellate review of a dispute over 

this enhancement by explaining whether the guideline issue 

affected its final decision. See, e.g., Bridges v. United States, 991 

F.3d 793, 809 (7th Cir. 2021).