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66–174PDF 2011

OVERVIEW OF SECURITY ISSUES IN

EUROPE AND EURASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 5, 2011

Serial No. 112–44

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State ................................................................................................. 8

Mr. Mark Koumans, Deputy Assistant Secretary-International Affairs, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security ..................................................................... 23

Gary J. Schmitt, Ph.D., resident scholar and director of Advanced Strategic 

Studies, American Enterprise Institute ............................................................. 40

Ms. Sally McNamara, senior policy analyst, European Affairs, Margaret 

Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation ................................. 54

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

The Honorable Daniel Benjamin: Prepared statement ........................................ 11

Mr. Mark Koumans: Prepared statement .............................................................. 25

Gary J. Schmitt, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 43

Ms. Sally McNamara: Prepared statement ........................................................... 57

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 78

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 79

Questions submitted for the record to the Honorable Daniel Benjamin and 

Mr. Mark Koumans by the Honorable Dan Burton .......................................... 80

Questions submitted for the record to the Honorable Daniel Benjamin and 

Mr. Mark Koumans by the Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas ............................................................................. 85

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OVERVIEW OF SECURITY ISSUES IN EUROPE 

AND EURASIA 

THURSDAY, MAY 5, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. BURTON. First of all, welcome to everybody. We are going to 

be starting here pretty close to on time. I think some of my Democrat colleagues found out that we were getting out early today, and 

I think they have all hit the airports. So I hope they show up, and 

we may have a few more of my Republican colleagues be here. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to provide subcommittee members with a broad overview of security issues in Europe and Eurasia. Terrorism remains the biggest threat to the collective security 

of the transatlantic community. As a result, the goal of this hearing 

is to assess the status of cooperation between the United States 

and the countries and organizations within the jurisdiction of this 

subcommittee in regards to counterterrorism. 

Last Sunday night, the world learned that an elite American unit 

had killed Osama bin Laden. This is a strategic victory for the 

United States, our European allies, and the rest of the free world. 

I would like to personally congratulate the Bush and Obama administrations, including the witnesses here before us, today, as 

well as the intelligence community, our diplomats and law enforcement; but most importantly, I would like to thank all of our men 

and women in uniform, especially those in the Unit 6 that did such 

a great job under great stress. 

Great risk and relentless resolve on their part produced this 

great victory. 

The events of last Sunday inevitably remind us of the tragedy of 

September the 11th, 2001. Those we lost that day remain in our 

hearts and our minds. However, we must also recognize that due 

to the vigilance of the American troops, law enforcement officers, 

and ordinary citizens, the mass murderer behind the attacks of 

9/11 was unable to strike the United States again before we got 

him. 

We may never know all of the details about the operation which 

led to the death of bin Laden. We do know that civilian and military elements of the United States Government worked with international partners, for years, to track him down. We are here to 

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learn more about, and to encourage, such counterterrorism cooperation. Specifically, we seek to strengthen ongoing efforts with our 

European and Eurasian allies, including the sharing of information, resources and successful practices. 

Counterterrorism cooperation is working in Afghanistan. Our European allies have made and continue to make significant contributions to the International Security and Assistance Force. Our Eurasian and Central Asian partners also assist, either by deploying 

troops or allowing the transport of essential supplies through their 

territory, as part of the Northern Distribution Network. 

I was pleased to read this week that Kazakhstan ratified an 

agreement that formalizes the arrangements, under which thousands of flights have crossed Kazakh airspace since 2001. Such contributions are essential and must continue. Our mission in Afghanistan is not yet complete. 

Counterterrorism cooperation with our European and Eurasian 

allies must be global in scope. Today, I am interested in hearing 

how the United States is working with European and Eurasian allies to address the threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, former Al Shahaab on the Horn of Africa, as well as other 

goofs that may be operating within this subcommittee’s jurisdiction, including the Caucasus and Central Asia. 

The United States can learn from the approaches taken by our 

European allies. I am particularly interested in how our allies approach counterterrorism and share successful practices. For instance, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have implemented programs that work with communities to counter 

radicalization. It would be helpful to understand how officials from 

the Department of Homeland Security, posted at our Embassies in 

capitals throughout Europe and Eurasia, can bring such innovative 

practices here, to Washington. So I am hoping you will address 

that when we hear your testimony. 

Terrorism threatens not only our lives but our way of life. I hope 

that our witnesses will describe the administration’s efforts and the 

efforts of our European and Eurasian partners to balance security 

concerns with the need of robust transatlantic trade and tourism. 

Trade with Europe and Eurasia is vital to the American economy 

and supports hundreds of thousands of American jobs across all 50 

States. This trade must continue. Thus, I look forward to hearing 

about initiatives such as the Visa Waiver Program that seek to provide access to the United States and American markets in return 

for commonsense precautions. 

I am in favor of expanding this program to include additional 

qualifying European partners as well as historic allies such as Taiwan. And I was just in Taipei recently, and they made the case 

that we ought to recognize them for this program. 

To foster trade, the United States has assigned our hopes to several additional elements with our European and Eurasian partners. 

For example, negotiations continue with the European Union on a 

renewed passenger name record agreement. It is my hope that such 

an agreement will deepen mutual trust and bolster confidence 

across the Atlantic. Our common security and prosperity depend on 

us working together. 

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And finally, we must look at terrorism in the context of events 

that are taking place in the Middle East, North Africa, which some 

have called the ‘‘Arab Spring.’’ Al-Qaeda’s role in these uprisings 

has been nominal so far. Instead, the American ideals of freedom, 

democracy, and opportunity have inspired many. 

However, I am concerned that these uprisings could create an 

opening—and I hope you’ll address this—an opening for radical 

groups such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood to increase influence or even acquire a base in the region, a country from which 

they could threaten the United States, Israel, and our European allies across the Mediterranean. 

It is important to understand that these radical groups do not 

have to convert people to their twisted version of Islam in order to 

gain support. Instead, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood have a 

record of mobilizing resources collected abroad to provide goods and 

services, food aid, and medical care to those who would otherwise 

not have access to such necessities. 

The United States and our European allies must take action 

against such a strategy. We have a tendency to think of this Arab 

Spring as one event; however, the situation in each of these countries is different. The events in Libya have not mirrored those in 

Egypt, and Syria presents different challenges then Yemen. 

I am interested in the witnesses’ assessment of what we are 

doing to support moderate democratic forces in each country. I am 

also interested in how these uprisings, each individually, impact 

the United States counterterrorism strategy and cooperation with 

European and Eurasian allies. 

The death of Osama bin Laden marked a major victory. But let 

us be clear: The fight is far from over. The United States and our 

allies must stay committed to the counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan and around the world. This subcommittee will do what 

it can to help. We will continue to focus on terrorism, and we will 

examine it from all angles. And we will be traveling extensively 

throughout Europe to find out what our allies feel about all of 

these issues. 

I want to thank our witnesses and members for participating in 

this hearing, and I look forward to a productive discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Now, my minority member is not here, so I will recognize Mr. Poe of Texas for his remarks. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Like many Americans, I am worried that Pakistan is not as good 

a friend as we think they are, at least as much as they claim they 

are a friend of the United States. Capturing Osama bin Laden was 

a great moment in not only our history, but world history. But it 

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I, too, want to commend those that were involved in this operation, the President, for making the decision to go and take out 

Osama bin Laden in his compound, all of the intelligence agencies, 

and especially, the Navy SEALs. Osama bin Laden has met his 

maker, and I appreciate the Navy SEALs for arranging the meeting. 

Let’s look at the facts. Bin Laden was hiding in a city just miles 

from the capital city of Pakistan. His house was a massive million 

dollar compound, eight times the size of surrounding houses, had 

15-foot high walls, had barbed wire. Once in, we can now see that 

the compound had been built especially for Osama bin Laden and 

his hideaway or hideout. 

And perhaps the worst thing of all, the compound was just a 

stone’s throw away from the West Point of Pakistan. It would be 

like John Dillinger living across the street from the FBI building 

down the street, and the FBI not knowing about it. It is very perplexing that Pakistan claims they were unaware. Even the administration shares those suspicions. The CIA Director, Leon Panetta, 

asserted that Pakistan had not done enough to bring Osama bin 

Laden to justice; now saying that ‘‘There is total mistrust between 

the United States and Pakistan.’’ Those are strong words from the 

person who is the CIA director. 

John Brennan, the Deputy National Security Adviser for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, said it is inconceivable that 

Osama bin Laden had not a support system to help him inside of 

Pakistan. 

And, also, a year ago, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, following a trip to Pakistan, said in an interview with Fox News that 

elements within the Pakistani State know the whereabouts of the 

al-Qaeda chief. 

So it seems to me that Pakistan was totally incompetent in their 

security operations, or they knew of the location of Osama bin 

Laden and hid him out. If Pakistan was active in helping Osama 

bin Laden hide from us, I certainly don’t think that we should be 

giving them $3 billion of American aid. It doesn’t seem to make us 

any safer to give American money to a country that may be playing 

both sides of the field. 

I have introduced the Pakistan Foreign Aid Accountability Act 

which freezes any foreign aid to Pakistan until the Secretary of 

State can certify to Congress that Pakistan was not aware of bin 

Laden’s location. In other words, did Pakistan give bin Laden sanctuary? They have the opportunity to make their case or not make 

it before we give them any more money. 

America just wants some answers. Where do we stand, where 

does Pakistan stand with the United States? President Bush stated 

in his joint session to Congress after 9/11, to our allies, that you 

are either with us or you are with the terrorists. And I would like 

to know where Pakistan is in that group. There is no middle 

ground. 

I would also like to know what is going on with the MEK Foreign 

Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation. Over 230 days ago, a 

Federal court ruled the State Department did not give the MEK 

due process when it decided to keep the MEK on the FTO list. The 

law states that reviews are to take place within 180 days should 

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a group appeal its designation. It has been past 120 days. It is now 

230 days. 

During this time, the MEK has been attacked by the Iraqi military. UNAMI has confirmed that the Iraqi soldiers killed 34 residents at Camp Ashraf—34 residents, I might add, that have yet to 

be buried—yet to be buried because the Iraqis refuse to allow them 

to be buried. High-ranking public officials in the Iraqi regime repeatedly cite the U.S. terrorist designation as their justification for 

treating the residents of Camp Ashraf so harshly. 

Two battalions that invaded on April 8th are still in Camp 

Ashraf. Iraqi troops will not let residents bury the dead, as I mentioned. They also won’t let anyone come in for regular visits. U.S. 

representatives have not instigated an investigation. The U.N. has 

not instigated an investigation. And, of course, Iraq has not. Of 

course we wouldn’t expect those people responsible for the action 

to instigate an investigation. 

And, all of this to me, seems to be compounded and made more 

difficult because the State Department just won’t take a position on 

the MEK. It is like we say in Texas, it is time to fish or cut bait. 

Either keep them on the list or take them off the list, but make 

a decision. Of course, I think the evidence points to the fact that 

they should be taken off the list. But this delay, delay, delay, not 

being able to make a decision for whatever reasons, is, I think, a 

problem that the State Department can resolve, and it is within 

the State Department’s power to resolve that matter. 

So those are some questions and concerns that I have, and I 

would hope that these can be answered. I have introduced H. Res. 

60, which urges the Secretary of State to take the MEK off the 

FTO list. We have 65 bipartisan colleagues, who agree with that, 

and who have signed on as cosponsors. I would hope the State Department can make a decision before this bill gets before this committee and on the House floor. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the rest of my time. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me state to my witnesses before I yield to my 

colleague from Arkansas, I know that you are here to talk about 

Europe and Eurasia, and Pakistan and the issues that were just 

raised by my colleague are under the Middle East Subcommittee’s 

purview. But, I hope you will address those issues, because I share 

his concern about everything he said, and I agree with all of them. 

So as much as is humanly possible, I hope that you will include 

those in your thoughts and remarks when we get to the questions. 

With that, I will yield to Mr. Griffin, my old buddy from Arkansas. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I want to say thank you for holding this hearing, and 

thank you to the witnesses for coming. 

I think that this topic is as relevant, or more relevant than ever, 

in the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden. 

What I am particularly interested in—and maybe I can get to follow up with some questions, but I want to throw this out there so 

the witnesses will maybe be able to address this in the context of 

the other questions—is the impact that a leaderless al-Qaeda has 

on the disparate terror cells that are spread throughout the EuroVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:58 Aug 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EE\050511\66174 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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pean continent and what, if any, changes we might see in terms 

of an increased threat or decreased threat. 

I could make the case, in the absence of one leader, that there 

could be an increased threat and increased independence of the disparate groups that are on the European continent. So I just ask 

you to keep that in mind. And, if you could address that, I would 

appreciate it. 

Thank you. I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Now we will hear from my colleague from Ohio, Ms. 

Schmidt. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. In the interest of time, I am going to pass. 

Mr. BURTON. She yields back her time. Let me introduce our witnesses here today. 

I want to thank you both for being here and thank you for your 

patience. 

Daniel Benjamin was sworn in as Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State with the rank of Ambassador at 

Large on May 28, 2009. From 1994 to 1999, Mr. Benjamin served 

on the National Security Council staff, and in 1994 to 1997 he 

served as foreign policy speechwriter and special assistant to President Clinton. Before entering the government, Mr. Benjamin was 

a foreign correspondent for Time Magazine and the Wall Street 

Journal. 

That must have been an interesting switch when you went from 

Time Magazine to the Wall Street Journal. Someday, I would like 

to talk to you about that. 

Mark Koumans is Deputy Assistant Secretary for International 

Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Koumans is 

responsible for coordinating the department’s international programs and policy to achieve the Secretary’s international strategic 

objectives. Mr. Koumans has previously served as director for European and multilateral affairs in the Department of Homeland Security, Office of International Affairs, from June 2007 to August 

2008. Prior to joining DHS in June 2007, Mr. Koumans served for 

17 years in the U.S. Foreign Service. 

So welcome to you both, and we will recognize you, Ambassador 

Benjamin. If your statement is going to be excessively long, we will 

accept it for the record but we will give you as much time as we 

think is reasonable. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL BENJAMIN, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Thank you very much, Chairman Burton 

and distinguished members of the committee. I have submitted testimony for the record that provides additional detail of the U.S. 

counterterrorism cooperation with Europe and Eurasia. 

I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

today. And, I must say, it is a great pleasure to testify during the 

week when the United States has achieved a historic success 

against al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden’s death is a victory for the 

United States and for all human beings who seek to live in peace, 

security and dignity. 

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And, sir, you mentioned my service on the National Security 

Council for the last 2 years of that time. I was director for 

transnational threats and was there when bin Laden issued his famous fatwa calling for the deaths of Americans everywhere, and 

when our Embassies were blown up. So, for me, this has great personal significance. 

I should underscore, though, that this is by no means the end of 

our effort against al-Qaeda. While we have dealt a blow to alQaeda’s leadership, much of its activity has devolved to its affiliates and much more work remains to be done. 

But as we approach the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, we 

should recognize that one of the unsung success stories of the period since that dark day has been the creation of an extraordinary 

global alliance against terror, one that operates out of the headlines, but reliably, closely, and effectively to protect our citizens 

and innocents around the world. 

In the critical areas of intelligence and law enforcement, governments have joined together time and again, and prevented real attacks, including ones planned against planes crossing the Atlantic 

and public transportation systems worldwide. 

Our European allies have responded extremely positively to this 

week’s development. And, in a public statement, the European 

Union paid tribute to our determination and underlined the close 

cooperation between the EU and the U.S. in counterterrorism efforts. 

But various statements by European governments also noted 

that al-Qaeda remains a serious threat. Europe very much remains 

a focus of terrorist plots. And, over the past year, we saw several 

attempted attacks by al-Qaeda and affiliated extremists in Denmark, a first-ever suicide bombing in Scandinavia, and separatists 

group bombings on the Moscow metro and in the Russian North 

Caucuses. 

Our counterterrorism work with Europe spans the globe. We 

work with our NATO partners and ISAF on stability operations in 

support of the Government of Afghanistan. We have been working 

with our European allies, and others, in the Friends of Yemen process, and we are increasing our coordination with France and other 

European partners to constrain the environment, in which alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb operates, by strengthening governance in northern Mali and the capabilities of other regional partners. Such work helps us deny safe haven to terrorists, which is 

absolutely vital. 

To deal with the terrorist threat and identify individuals, who 

are preparing to commit violence, information sharing is absolutely 

essential. The United States and the EU are committed to fostering 

information sharing in cooperation in the prevention, investigation, 

and prosecution of terrorism-related offenses. We work on these 

issues through the United States Treasury’s Terrorist Finance 

Tracking Program, the Department of Homeland Security’s Passenger Name Record program, and Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 6, known as HSPD–6. 

There have been some concerns raised in Europe about these 

programs. But we know that our approaches to protecting privacy 

have more similarities than differences, and, we share a strong 

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commitment to protecting civil liberties. I am confident that with 

goodwill on both sides and the common sense of resolve, we can 

achieve the common goals we seek. 

Another crucial aspect of our CT cooperation is our bilateral 

work with key partners to build CT capacity of other nations 

around the world. Our European allies from Russia in the east to 

the United Kingdom in the west, and from Italy in the south to the 

Netherlands and Denmark in the north, share our views on implementing strategic counterterrorism policies that focus on building 

the capacity of foreign partners and countering violent extremism 

to stem terrorist recruitment. 

While al-Qaeda and its affiliates are our highest priority in our 

CT diplomatic engagement, Hamas and Hezbollah also remain a 

major focus. We have been and will continue to work through bilateral channels to press our European allies to take more aggressive 

action to crack down on Hamas and Hezbollah’s fundraising at both 

the EU and member state levels, and I have made this a personal 

priority. 

In conclusion, the magnitude and breadth of the terrorist challenge makes clear that no country or organization can defeat it 

alone and the United States will, indeed we must, continue to work 

closely with our partners around the world, especially our capable 

and willing European allies, to identify areas where further work 

remains to be done and how we can further collaborate ever more 

effectively. Only through such cooperation can we succeed. 

Thank you. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Benjamin follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. And now we will hear from Secretary Koumans. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MARK KOUMANS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY-INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. KOUMANS. Good afternoon, Chairman Burton and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department of Homeland Security’s cooperation with Europe. 

First, like you, I would like to acknowledge the achievement of 

this past week. As Secretary Napolitano said, the death of Osama 

bin Laden is an important success not only for the United States 

but for the entire world. 

I would like to recognize the statements of support from Europe, 

including the EU Commission President Barroso and counterterrorism coordinator de Kerchove. 

But we all agree, as we have all said this afternoon, that bin 

Laden’s death is not the end of our security efforts. Al-Qaeda and 

other organizations will continue to plan attacks here and abroad, 

and so we must remain vigilant. Security is more of a shared responsibility than ever before. 

Preventing terrorism is DHs’ core mission and one that forms 

part of its other key missions of securing borders, enforcing immigration laws, safeguarding cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to 

disasters. In order to succeed, the Department must work with its 

international partners. The attempted terrorist attacks on Christmas Day in 2009 and the printer bombs in October 2010 underscored the interdependence of our homeland security with international security. 

Terrorists and criminals look for vulnerabilities in international 

networks to carry out their attacks. 

I would like to highlight three points. 

The first is that DHS works with our European allies to prevent 

terrorist attacks. 

Second, DHS and its European partners cooperate in particular 

to prevent terrorist travel. 

Third, the Visa Waiver Program provides incentives to maintain 

high security standards and deepen cooperation with the United 

States. 

My first point concerns how DHS works with our European partners to secure the flow of travel and trade. To that end, DHS has 

nearly 400 employees in Europe, working daily with governments, 

the traveling public, the aviation industry, cargo shippers and others. It is DHs’ goal to expedite legitimate travel and trade, both of 

which are critical to the U.S. economy, while preventing the flow 

of illicit goods and people and investigating illegal activity. 

Much of this DHS cooperation takes place at the operational 

level, investigating transnational crimes, combating human and 

drug trafficking, screening U.S.-bound maritime cargo containers, 

conducting maritime port assessments, assessing airports and air 

carriers, conducting passenger screening, enforcing U.S. customs 

and immigration regulations, and investigating cybercrimes. 

On my second point, terrorist travel represents one of the greatest threats to European and U.S. security, and therefore, detection 

24

and disruption are key goals. Every week, there are more than 

2,500 flights between Europe and the United States. DHS analyzes 

travel and passenger data and shares information with our European partners in order to identify both known and unknown potential terrorists. DHS has a number of programs to address this 

threat. 

Under the immigration advisory program, DHS posts officers at 

foreign airports to work with airlines and foreign officials to identify high-risk and improperly documented travelers before they 

board aircraft bound for the U.S. 

Another example is DHS collection and analysis of passenger 

name records, or PNR data. In recent years PNR data has been 

pivotal in cracking the cases of Mumbai plotter David Headley, 

New York City subway bomb plotter Najibullah, and Time Square 

bomber Faisal Shahzad. I just note in passing that we just passed 

the 1-year anniversary May 1st, coincidentally the same day of 

Osama bin Laden’s demise. 

Last year approximately one quarter of those individuals denied 

entry to the United States for having ties to terrorism were initially identified through the analysis of PNR. Presently, we are negotiating a new agreement with the EU to govern DHs’ use of PNR 

to avoid a potential conflict with the European privacy law. 

I should emphasize that DHS is not negotiating for the collection 

of PNR, which is required by U.S. law, but to ensure a stable and 

secure legal environment under which it is transferred. Our goal is 

to improve security while reassuring our allies of our commitment 

to protect individual privacy. Since December, we have held six negotiating sessions. And we hope to conclude these talks in the coming weeks or months. 

I will now turn to my third topic, the Visa Waiver Program. 

Since 1986, this program has allowed eligible citizens to travel to 

the U.S. for business or tourism without first obtaining a visa. The 

36 current visa waiver countries are among our closest international partners. Thirty visa waiver countries are in Europe. By 

statute, these countries develop a security partnership with the 

U.S., and DHS conducts regular detailed reviews of each country. 

These reviews focus on U.S. law enforcement, national security, 

and immigration interests, and incentivize these countries to continue to share information vital to our national security. 

Chairman Burton and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I look forward to working with you as we continue to 

explore opportunities to advance our cooperation with European 

partners. I will submit longer testimony officially for the record. I 

thank you again for this opportunity to testify. 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Koumans follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Before I get to my questions, I would like to just 

once again stress that I just got back from Taipei, Taiwan, and 

they have been a great ally for a long time and they should be a 

top candidate, I would hope, for the Visa Waiver Program. And I 

hope you and the Department will look seriously at that. 

The first question I have is after bin Laden’s death there may 

be some changes in attitudes around the world. And with our continued commitment to freedom in the Middle East, Afghanistan 

and elsewhere, and stopping al-Qaeda and the Taliban, do you 

think that the attitudes of our allies that have been working with 

us in those areas in those endeavors will change? Will they remain 

as committed as they have been, or do we expect any change, or 

have we seen any change? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that our expectation is that our allies will retain the 

same sense of urgency, the same sense of mission that has characterized the cooperation we have had for many years now. 

If you look at the statements from any number of different European leaders, they were quite clear that this is a milestone achievement, but it is by no means the end of the threat. They all experienced the heightened threat environment in the fall. Germany arrested three terrorists in the midst of a conspiracy just a few days 

ago. I think there is a widely shared understanding among the governments of Europe that this threat is by no means over. 

Mr. BURTON. So you anticipate the commitment to Afghanistan 

will remain just as strong as ever? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. As you know, there have been a number 

of different statements about troop levels and things like that in 

Afghanistan in particular, but overall, we note that our European 

allies have supplied a large number of troops, a large number of 

teams for training police and other parts of the Afghan Government. And we certainly hope that they will continue to do so. I 

don’t think that this event is going to, in itself, trigger any kind 

of sea change. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. 

One of the concerns I have involves the Middle East. I was senior 

Republican on the Middle East the previous 2 years. And as my 

colleague from Texas was alluding to a few minutes ago, we are 

concerned about what is going on in the Middle East. And what I 

would like to ask both of you is, our allies in Europe, Europe and 

Eurasia, what is their attitude and what are they going to be doing 

from your perspective to help us make sure that the entire northern tier of Africa, as well as the Persian Gulf, doesn’t go up in 

smoke. 

In particular, I am very concerned and I would like to know the 

attitude of our European and Eurasian allies—I am very concerned 

who is going to take over in Egypt, who is going to take over in 

Libya should Muammar Gaddafi be gone, what is going to happen 

in Syria? All of these areas that will affect the entire world are in 

the Middle East, and they are supplying energy in large part for 

many of the countries in Europe and Eurasia. 

So I know this is a pretty broad question, but I would like to 

know what your assessment is, both of your assessment is, about 

34

what is going to happen in those countries and what you project 

in the future. 

I mean, if Egypt goes to the radical elements, like the Muslim 

Brotherhood, if Syria goes from Assad to a radical element governing that country, if Muammar Ghadafi leaves and radical elements connected to al-Qaeda—and we know they are there—were 

to be able to take over that country, what would that mean, and 

what are we doing to stop it, and what are our allies trying to do 

to help us in that endeavor? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. As you said, Mr. Chairman, it is a very 

broad question, but let me take a quick stab at it. 

Our allies are every bit as concerned as we are about the fate 

of the region. We are all, of course, stunned by the rapidity with 

which we have seen change come to the region. There is a broadly 

shared desire to see Egypt, Tunisia, and such other countries as 

hang in he balance, evolve in a democratic way that meets the aspirations of their people. 

As you know, we have very close cooperation with the Europeans 

on what is going on in Libya. We have coordinated closely in terms 

of our assistance and our messaging to Tunisia and Egypt, and we 

have also coordinated closely, for example, on our outrage at the 

intolerable crackdown that has occurred in Syria. And this is just 

a sampling of our coordination. It is by no means meant to be exhaustive. 

I would say that we are working together to ensure that we do 

see the kind of Middle East emerge that we would like to see. We 

are, of course, all concerned that terrorists will try to exploit this 

moment because, although the Arab Spring, as you mentioned, has 

been in its own way a strategic blow to al-Qaeda and its adherents 

because it showed they were not part of the revolutionary movement, they were not part of the story there, and in fact, the events 

themselves demonstrated the falseness of one of their core beliefs, 

which is that only violence would change these countries, we view 

these as being very, very positive developments. 

But that said, terrorists will try to insert themselves wherever 

they see an opportunity. And as there are some distracted security 

services in the region, and border security may not be what it once 

was, they may see this as a moment of opportunity. 

As you can imagine, we are working closely through diplomatic, 

intelligence, law enforcement and military channels to do what we 

can to ensure that the region maintains its security and to ensure 

that terrorists do not have an opportunity to exploit this moment. 

It is still very early days, but I think we are still optimistic about 

the trajectory of the region. 

Mr. BURTON. I am about to yield to my colleague from Texas because I have used a lot of time already, but I would just like to 

urge Homeland Security and the State Department to do everything, along with our allies, as humanly possible to make sure that 

we don’t have radical elements take over in Egypt, Syria, or some 

of those other countries. 

I understand and I think we all acknowledge that we have had 

some repressive administrations over there. Mubarak was very difficult in Egypt; in Syria, Assad, there has been a lot of repression 

there. Throughout the entire northern tier of Africa and even in 

35

the Persian Gulf we have had those problems. But the one thing 

I don’t think the world can tolerate or live with is several more 

Irans popping up on the northern tier of Africa and in the Persian 

Gulf, because we might not be able to get enough energy, since we 

are not drilling here in America, we might not be able to get 

enough energy to turn the lights on. So this is a very important 

issue, and I would just like to urge you to make this a top priority. 

And with that, I will yield to my colleague from Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will follow up on my opening comments. 

Now that Osama bin Laden is dead, who would you rank as the 

number one terrorist group in the world opposing the United 

States? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, sir, undoubtedly al-Qaeda remains 

the foremost terrorist threat we face, operating either from the alQaeda core base in the Pakistan/Afghanistan region or through its 

affiliates in Yemen, in northeastern Africa and then northwestern 

Africa. So as the President has said, as many others have said, this 

is a historic achievement, but this is by no means the end of the 

story. If anything, I think it demonstrates our determination to 

continue to remove al-Qaeda threats that we face. 

Mr. POE. I agree that the death of Osama bin Laden shows other 

terrorists that the United States is resilient and will do whatever 

we can, for as long as it takes, to make sure we are safe. 

CIA Director Panetta made the comment that there is a mutual 

distrust between Pakistan and the United States now that we have 

found him harbored in the country for so long. Do you share that 

opinion, Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, the late Ambassador Richard 

Holbrooke, the Secretary of State, the President, have all said on 

numerous occasions that there has been a trust deficit between our 

countries that we are working hard to overcome. As John Brennan 

said, we are also going to look at the question of what systems 

there were to support Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, and to 

make it possible for him to live there unmolested for such a long 

time. 

Do think, though, that it is important to emphasize, as the Secretary said this morning, that our relationship with Pakistan, 

while it occasionally has its challenges, is a productive one; that 

more terrorists have been apprehended or killed in Pakistan than 

anywhere else, and that this collaboration between our countries 

has been absolutely vital to degrading the al-Qaeda threat over 

quite a number of years. So it is a complicated picture, but it is 

a vital relationship and we need to keep working on it. 

Mr. POE. I understand it is complicated but my question is do 

you believe that the Pakistani Government knew that Osama bin 

Laden was in their country? That is just a simple yes or no. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I believe that they thought there was a 

good chance that he was somewhere in Pakistan. I can’t imagine, 

given all of the focus on fighting extremism, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, that they didn’t think, or that 

they were certain he was not in their country. Whether or not they 

knew he was in Abbottabad, I think that probably came as a much 

greater surprise to them. 

36

Mr. POE. Of course, the United States didn’t notify Pakistan that 

we were coming in to take him out, and they have now objected 

and said that strained our relationship. So my own opinion, they 

knew or they are totally incompetent in their intelligence field. 

Let me switch gears a minute and ask you a couple of questions 

about MEK. Every time we get together I ask you about the MEK, 

and I hope that we get some answers someday. 

Is the State Department going to take them off the list and if 

they are, when? And if not, when? When are you all going to make 

a decision? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Sir, I am afraid the answer is the same 

one as when we saw each other a couple of weeks ago. We are 

working as expeditiously as possible to complete the review that 

the U.S. Court of Appeals ordered. As recently as April 6th we received new material from MEK counsel, and we are reviewing it, 

and just as fast as we can, we are going to get a recommendation 

package to the Secretary and have a decision made. 

Mr. POE. 6 months? A year? Do you have any idea? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I can’t give you a certain date, but I can 

tell you it will be less than 6 months, considerably less, I hope. 

Mr. POE. As a follow-up, I have attended, as many members 

have, all of the classified briefings that I am aware of on this issue. 

Has any new information come to surface in the last 2 months that 

would help Members of Congress on this issue, classified or not? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. As I mentioned, sir, we have received 

new information as recently as last month from the MEK itself. 

And so we are reviewing that information and seeing if it helps in 

our deliberations. 

Mr. POE. All right. I will yield back the remainder of my time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. I apologize, I missed part of your question, Mr. Poe. 

Did you ask about what our State Department is doing to urge that 

those people who have not been buried would be dealt with? Are 

you aware of what he asked earlier on? I mean, if those people 

were killed some time ago and for whatever reason they are not 

being taken care of properly, it seems since we are a strong supporter of Iraq and the Iraqi Government, we ought to be doing everything we can to make sure that is taken care of immediately. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I fully agree, and as soon as I get back 

to the Department I will check with my various colleagues. 

Mr. BURTON. Would you let me and Mr. Poe and others on the 

subcommittee know about that? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Certainly. 

Mr. BURTON. I yield to my colleague from Arkansas, Mr. Griffin. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. I want to shift gears and talk about Russia some. 

On the Judiciary Committee, we have looked into the issue of piracy, and a lot of that, it seems, stems from illegal activities in 

Russia, some by organized crime. And when I look at some of the 

official cooperation with European countries on terrorism and law 

enforcement and the many different areas that we cooperate with 

our European allies, I often see Russia included in some of those 

agreements and relationships. That sends a signal that Russia is 

helpful and a partner on a lot of these issues. 

37

I would just like to get your take on—both of you—on the issue 

of Russia; how reliable are they on issues like piracy and have they 

cooperated with us? And then, I would like you to also address the 

role of organized crime in Russia. We are not hearing as much 

about it as we did maybe 5 years ago, I think it is fair to say, just 

in terms of press coverage. I don’t know if that is because it has 

become so routine or maybe it has decreased. 

If you could comment on the role of organized crime in Russian 

society today, and how that impacts, if at all, the official Russian 

Government’s cooperation with us on counterterrorism and things 

like piracy. I would welcome your comments on that. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Thank you very much, sir. 

I confess that within the Counterterrorism Office we have limited 

engagement on the issue of piracy and the issue of organized crime. 

I would be happy to get a response to you on that and to have the 

appropriate officials brief you on that. 

I will say that we have not detected any impact in our cooperation on counterterrorism from those issues. And in the course of 

what is a very close relationship with the Russians on counterterrorism, I think that we would certainly be able to discern. I will 

say that the counterterrorism cooperation was a bright spot in the 

U.S.-Russian relationship before the administration came into office and it has continued to be. And I think we have actually deepened our cooperation with the Russians on counterterrorism as 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Koumans can discuss as well. We have 

done a lot of work with them on aviation security and we are developing some agreements in that area,0 which we hope will come to 

fruition soon. 

And we cooperated closely on issues such as designating either 

al-Qaeda members or al-Qaeda-related terrorists and Taliban members at the U.N. under the 1267 regime. And we have also had a 

vigorous exchange of information on a wide range of important subjects of mutual interest, including radicalization, for example, in 

Central Asia. So I think it is a very good relationship and one 

where we are continually looking for ways to deepen it to the benefit of all of our citizens. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Have you seen any identifiable limits on Russia’s 

willingness to cooperate on counterterrorism? Is there any threat 

to the United States, where they have been unwilling to show the 

cooperation that they have shown, for example, on al-Qaeda? Or 

have they been a partner in a sense that we have gotten to know 

other European allies as partners? Is there an asterisk by Russia? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. No. I certainly wouldn’t say there is an 

asterisk. I have to say that I have an excellent relationship with 

my counterpart in Russia, Presidential Envoy Anatoly Dobrynin, 

who is a first-class leader in this area and widely recognized as 

such. 

I wouldn’t say there is an asterisk, but I would just reiterate that 

some of our relationships in Western Europe go back many, many 

decades, and obviously in a historical perspective we are still building the relationship with the Russian Republic, day by day. But I 

am quite pleased with the progress and I have every hope for a 

continued success in this. Let me put it this way: I haven’t come 

up against any hard walls. 

38

Mr. GRIFFIN. Do we have time for the Secretary to answer? 

Mr. KOUMANS. Thank you, Congressman Griffin. 

I will echo everything that Ambassador Benjamin said, both with 

respect to not having encountered any brick walls, and also the 

great depth of our partnerships in Western Europe vis-a`-vis the obviously more recent partnership with Russia. 

But that said, we have made some significant strides. We have 

put some additional ideas in front of the Russians. I can mention 

one of them in this setting and two additional ones I could mention 

in a classified setting. 

But the one I can mention here, it concerns multimodal transportation. The others concern transportation as well. Obviously, an important part of the Department’s mandate having to do with securing the supply chain, securing aviation, securing airports, but also 

bridges, tunnels—it is a multimodal agreement—and sharing lessons learned and doing what we can to work more closely together 

in that field. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. One thing that you might want to comment—I am 

getting ready to yield to Mr. Bilirakis and then I will go to Mr. 

Deutch—is Georgia. I met with the Georgian Ambassador just a 

couple of days ago. And there are Russian troops, as you know, on 

Georgian soil. They are building barracks and they are bringing 

their families in. And you might consider giving us an update on 

that and what the long-term prognosis is, because the people in 

Georgia are very concerned about that in the future. 

With that, I will yield to Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Secretary Koumans, thank you of course for your service. In your 

testimony you noted that every week there are more than 2,500 

flights between the United States and Europe, and that DHS data 

show that the suspected terrorists on U.S. watchlists have tried to 

use European airports as a point of departure for the United 

States. And I apologize if you already covered this. 

Additionally, you note that DHS and its European partners 

maintain an effective partnership in terms of sharing information 

between governments. 

What alarms me is the pushback we seem to be getting from the 

EU regarding the sharing of personal data. 

Clearly the U.S. leads the world in its commitment to protecting 

individual privacy and civil liberties. Why does the EU believe that 

the sharing of data regarding suspected terrorists is a breach of 

privacy rights? And why will it take weeks or months to reach an 

agreement on passenger name records? Seems like a long time to 

me. If you can answer that question, I’d appreciate it. 

Mr. KOUMANS. I will try my best, Mr. Congressman. And as 

someone who has been involved in these negotiations in the previous iterations in 2006, 2007, I can share some of the sentiment. 

But it is important to recognize that we are dealing with the two 

different legal regimes, two different governmental structures, parliamentary structure, our three parts of government. They have 

privacy laws that differ from ours in some respects, despite the fact 

that the underlying foundation, as you said, is quite similar and 

there is much more that unites us than divides us. 

39

But there are distinctions. There are differences that are very 

important to them. And so they would like to go through and consider every aspect of the agreement carefully: How long the data 

is retained; what sort of data we collect; what it is used for; for 

what sort of crimes. It is a very detailed discussion and one that 

we look forward to concluding. And we are confident that we are 

quite close to an agreement. And I think that in the coming, as I 

say, months we will resolve it. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Ambassador, would you like to comment? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I think that really covers it. I would note 

that we have a new set of players, in a sense. We are not directly 

negotiating with the European Parliament but nonetheless, we are 

dealing with a new EU that is—in some ways has to explore all 

of these different issues and satisfy itself in a way that the pre-Lisbon EU did not. So it is an important period of mutual education, 

if you will. 

And I share Secretary Koumans’ optimism that we will get there 

soon. I really do think that a lot of this is about learning how we 

do much the same thing in very different ways. And so I don’t see 

this as a subject of great friction, but rather as an inevitable process to very large political unions working their way through some 

challenges. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

My next question is for Secretary Koumans. 

I am heartened to know that DHS keeps in close touch with the 

EU regarding countering radicalization and extremism, especially 

as it relates to the Balkans, particularly Albania. As you know, Albania is a hub of narcotrafficking, arms trafficking and human 

trafficking. Even Albania’s Deputy Foreign Minister recently stated 

that Tirana, Albania, is close to being the most corrupt capital of 

the world. 

What has DHS done specifically within Albania to make it less 

of a haven for nefarious activities that could affect the security of 

the rest of Europe and the United States? 

Mr. KOUMANS. Thank you, Congressman Bilirakis. 

With respect to Albania—well, I should preface my remarks by 

saying that everywhere the Department of Homeland Security operates internationally, we work in partnership with the Department of State and under Chief of Mission authority if we are not 

under combatant commander authority, which—and Chief of Mission authority being the case in about 99 percent of our postings 

overseas. 

Countries such as Albania that do not have nonstop flights to the 

United States, where we do not have a large volume of trade, we 

are particularly dependent on the Department of State for our engagement. All of our training and technical assistance and capacity 

building we would do would be in concert with and funded by either the Department of State or the Department of Defense. And 

it has been—the engagement in Albania has been through the 

International Law Enforcement Academy, ILEA, in Bucharest. 

There has been a certain amount of training and capacity building 

that has taken place. I don’t have the statistics at my fingertips 

but I am happy to take that question and provide that. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Please provide that information to me. 

40

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, thank you very much for being here today. 

We appreciate your testimony and the questions you answered so 

forthrightly. We will probably have another hearing on this subject 

down the road. I looked at the map of Europe and Eurasia the 

other day and there are huge questions that need to be addressed. 

So I look forward to hearing from you again in the future. Thank 

you very much for being here. 

We will now have our next panel of witnesses. We have Gary 

Schmitt. 

Thank you again, gentlemen. We appreciate it. 

Gary Schmitt is the director of the program on Advanced Strategic Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, and the director 

of AEI’s program on American citizenship. Dr. Schmitt is a former 

staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He 

was the executive director of the President’s Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board during President Ronald Reagan’s second term. Dr. 

Schmitt’s work focuses on longer-term strategic issues that will affect America’s security at home and its ability to lead abroad. 

And our other panelist is Sally McNamara. She is a senior policy 

analyst in European affairs at The Heritage Foundation’s Margaret 

Thatcher Center for Freedom. Ms. McNamara joined Heritage in 

2006 and concentrates on American relations with the European 

Union and European countries, with particular focus on economic 

reform policy, trade issues, and the war on terrorism. She also analyzes NATO’s evolving role in post-Cold War Europe. And before 

coming to America in 2004, Ms. McNamara served as chief parliamentary aid to Roger Helmer, a member of the European Parliament in Brussels. 

And maybe down the road you can give us some advice, because 

we are going to be going to Brussels and you will have to tell us 

what we can expect and what we should look for when we get 

there. 

With that, I will yield to Dr. Schmitt for his opening comments. 

STATEMENT OF GARY J. SCHMITT, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR 

AND DIRECTOR OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. SCHMITT. If I can begin by offering my advice, you should eat 

the mussels. 

Mr. BURTON. Eat the mussels in Brussels. Very poetic. I don’t 

like mussels, but it is very poetic nonetheless. 

Mr. SCHMITT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

testify today. 

The question I will be addressing is whether there are major 

strategic differences between how the U.S. and its closest European 

allies handle the threat of Islamist terrorism. 

Admittedly, this is a broad topic and so I am more than happy, 

after Sally and I finish, to talk about other topics in more detail 

as you wish. My testimony is largely derived from studies that I 

commissioned at AEI and which resulted in a volume published 

last summer entitled, ‘‘Safety, Liberty and Islamist Terrorism: 

American and European Approaches to Domestic Counterterrorism.’’

41

There were two principal reasons I undertook the study. First, I 

wanted to see if there were lessons to be learned from the way 

other democracies, especially those that had dealt with terrorism in 

the past, were handling the new jihadist threat. 

My second goal was to examine the criticism that America’s response to terrorism was overly militaristic, while Europe’s was 

grounded in a more moderate paradigm, often shorthanded as the 

rule of law approach. 

On the first, somewhat to my surprise, the value of comparing 

our respective approaches of our allies with the U.S. provided few 

lessons learned when it came to policies and practices. The reasons 

for this are many: Differences in legal system, different national 

histories, different constitutional structures and differences in the 

perceived threat. 

With that said, two points stood out to me. The first is that in 

each European country I looked at, it was clear that as a threat 

grew, substantial adjustments were made by each government to 

overcome what we in the U.S. refer to as ‘‘the wall’’ between intelligence and law enforcement. 

The second thing that stood out is that the U.S. is relatively 

atypical in not having a separate domestic intelligence agency. 

Now on the second broader issue, whether the U.S. or European 

allies have widely divergent approaches to counterterrorism, I 

found this argument to be at best simplistic. First, there is the simple fact that each of our major allies has military forces deployed 

in Afghanistan with the explicit purpose to prevent that country 

from becoming once again a safe haven for terrorism. 

In the case of France, for example, it has deployed its military 

in counterterrorist operations outside of France on at least three 

occasions over the past 11⁄2 years. Even the Germans, perhaps the 

most reluctant ally to engage in offensive operations in Afghanistan, contributed special operation forces to help remove the 

Taliban from power in the wake of 9/11. And over the past year, 

Berlin has eliminated many of the caveats that it once had in place 

to prevent German forces from engaging in offensive operations as 

part of its current Afghan mission. 

So while there is certainly a difference in the scale of what we 

do militarily compared with our allies, it is not the case that they 

have only a law-enforcement approach to counterterrorism. 

Next, while it is certainly true that Europe has addressed the 

problem of terrorism principally through law enforcement, it is 

equally important to understand that the laws and practices that 

they rely on are more expansive than those often found here in the 

United States. In short, they don’t treat terrorism as just another 

crime. 

Without going into detail here, I would argue that when one 

looks at the laws related to speech, electronic surveillance, data 

sharing, preventive arrests, the monitoring of mosques, the overall 

approach of Europe is as aggressive or more aggressive than that 

of the United States. Even Germany, which is perhaps the least 

forward leaning in its counterterrorism laws, has utilized ethnic 

profiling and data mining. 

Moreover, Spain, U.K., and France all allow detention of terror 

suspects for days of interrogation before being required to bring 

42

formal charges. Indeed, in the case of Britain, suspected terrorists, 

if for one reason or another cannot be put on trial or sent back 

packing to another country, may be put under a form of house arrest for up to 2 years at a time. 

Let me conclude by noting that France, arguably with Europe’s 

most effective domestic counterterrorist effort, that system rests on 

France’s investigative magistrates. This is an office that combines 

an array of powers, intelligence, investigative and prosecutorial, all 

in one person. 

The only American office that bears some resemblance is that of 

an independent counsel. But unlike an independent counsel, whose 

mandate is tied to a particular case and hence limited in time, the 

investigative magistrates who handle terrorism in France stay in 

their position for years, building up expertise and discretionary 

power that few Americans would be comfortable with. 

My point finally is not to suggest that these are laws, practices 

or institutions that the U.S. should adopt; rather, simply to note 

that when we think about our own response to 9/11, we should recognize that the United States is not an outlier in comparison with 

our Democratic allies. Indeed, since 9/11, we are all in the business 

of preemption. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schmitt follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Dr. Schmitt. 

Ms. McNamara. 

STATEMENT OF MS. SALLY MCNAMARA, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, MARGARET THATCHER CENTER 

FOR FREEDOM, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the 

committee, with your agreement, I request that my prepared testimony be entered for the record and I just make brief remarks to 

you today. 

Mr. BURTON. Without objection. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, America needs allies to win the war on terrorism. 

Many of America’s strongest allies in this fight are in Europe, first 

among them, the United Kingdom. But in addition to individual 

nation states, the EU is also a partner of significance to the United 

States. 

Before 9/11, just 6 of the EU’s then 15 members recognized terrorism as a special offense. After 9/11, EU member states agreed 

on a common definition of terrorism, which denies terrorists the 

sanctuary of border hopping to another member state where terrorism was not previously regarded as a special offense. 

Most importantly, the EU has also produced a list of persons 

groups, and entities whose financial assets will be frozen and to 

whom financial services are denied. This has proved to be one the 

EU’s most valuable contributions to counterterrorism to date, as it 

has denied terrorists the freedom to operate and to raise funds in 

Europe. 

The EU has also constituted several new offenses in order to confront homegrown terrorism: Namely, the criminalization of the 

public provocation to commit a terrorist offense; recruitment for 

terrorism; and training of terrorists. 

However, the EU has also advanced several unnecessary programs and institutions, including Europol, Eurojust, SitCen and 

the European Arrest Warrant. These programs divert the 

antiterrorism resources of EU members states away from what 

they really should be doing. 

Furthermore, the EU has pushed a radical human rights agenda 

that has weakened rather than strengthened members’ counterterrorism efforts. For example, British judges have refused to enforce 

control orders as mandated under the UK’s 2000 Terrorism Act on 

the grounds that 18-hour curfews may breach the European convention on human rights. 

The U.S. should be especially weary of the EU’s radical political 

agenda in this regard because of the way EU spends money inside 

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vance, among other things, ratification of the Rome Statute and 

membership on the International Criminal Court, your abolition of 

the death penalty, international legal norms, the closing of Guantanamo Bay, and U.S. detention and rendition policies. 

After 9/11, there was an unprecedented display of transatlantic 

solidarity, but since then, the EU–U.S. counterterrorism relationship has been marked as much by confrontation as it has by cooperation. The EU has attempted to frustrate key U.S. counterterror policies, including the Passenger Name Records Agreement, the 

Terrorist Finance Tracking program, which is also known as the 

SWIFT agreement, and U.S. renditions policy. 

In terms of the PNR agreement, the European Parliament has 

now forced the U.S. to enter into negotiations on a fourth iteration. 

My testimony today is that the European Parliament should stop 

its nonsense and approve the existing deal, from 2007, without 

modification. 

With regard to SWIFT, the program, which is essentially a datasharing program for the purposes of tracking terrorist financing, 

has been a major success. Spain has admitted that as a result of 

a SWIFT lead passed to them by the Americans, they were able to 

prevent a terrorist attack in Barcelona. 

However, MEPs have forced concessions on this program, too, 

which has limited its usefulness. 

The EU does understand that frustrating the flow of money is a 

powerful weapon against terrorism. If the EU and the U.S. list you 

as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, you are cut out of the world’s 

biggest financial markets, which is why it is impossible to understand the EU’s refusal to proscribe Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Europe’s willingness to turn a blind eye to 

Hezbollah’s activities in Europe is unconscionable. Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, has even stated that without 

European support, and I quote him, ‘‘our funding, moral, political 

and material support would dry up.’’

With regard to detention and renditions policy, I am sure the 

honorable members here today remember the European Parliament’s 2006 witch hunt investigation when Poland and Romania 

were threatened with an unprecedented loss of voting rights within 

the European Council if they were found guilty of hosting CIA facilities. No statement has been issued to clarify the EU’s position 

on this in light of reports that these sites could have been used to 

find information involved in the successful operation against 

Osama Bin Laden this month. 

All this is to say that bilateral relationships, especially in terms 

of intelligence sharing and conducting operations, are more important than ever. The Anglo-American relationship stands out in particular for the remarkable ease with which intelligence officers operate together, a fact that has been publicly acknowledged by successive Presidents and Prime Ministers. 

To achieve a more cooperative EU–U.S. relationship on counterterrorism, therefore, I would recommend the following policies to 

the European Union, which you may want to bear in mind on your 

trip. The European Parliament should approve the 2007 EU–U.S. 

PNR agreement without modification. The current EU–U.S. negotiations to adopt an umbrella agreement on data sharing should 

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simply accept U.S. data privacy standards as adequate. I agree 

with the Honorable Member Bilirakis on that. 

The EU should also add Hezbollah to its list of Foreign Terrorist 

Organizations and EU member states should exclude foreign-born 

individuals, who engage in any terrorist activities. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. McNamara follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Now, you are with the Margaret Thatcher——

Ms. MCNAMARA. Center for Freedom. 

Mr. BURTON. Boy, they picked the right one for that job, I will 

tell you. You are a tiger. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Margaret Thatcher would be proud. 

I had a whole bunch of questions, but I was mesmerized by some 

of the things that you said. 

First of all, it is very interesting; you think that if the EU was 

more cooperative in trying to cut off funds to Hezbollah, that we 

could have that operation or that organization dry up because they 

have said so themselves. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. I don’t think that we could end Hezbollah, but 

we could make things incredibly difficult for them. They use Europe as a logistical base. They use it as a staging point, and the 

United States has passed legislation requesting, time and again, 

that the European Union list Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. 

That needs to happen, and it needs to happen sooner rather than 

later. We have seen no fruits of any sort of engagement, except the 

fact that Europe is nothing more than, as they say themselves, a 

political, a moral and fundraising base. 

Mr. BURTON. Wow. 

I want you to make notes on everything this young lady said, because when I go to Brussels, I want your statement. I am certainly 

going to utilize some of that. 

Let me ask you a couple of other questions and you can comment 

too, Dr. Schmitt, if you would like. One of the things that concerns 

me is what I asked the first panel, and that is across the northern 

tier in Africa and in the Persian Gulf area, we see the rise of the 

‘‘freedom movement,’’ the ‘‘Arab Spring’’ movement. 

I would like your take on that and how that will—what will the 

end result be if all of these uprisings are successful? 

I am very concerned, I know that Muammar Ghadafi has been 

a tyrant for a long time, but we took him off the terrorist list a few 

years ago. And now, we are participating with France and England 

in running him out of office. There is a major civil war going on 

over there. 

In Egypt, we have seen a big change. Mubarak is gone, and we 

are looking forward to elections in, I believe, September and later 

on in the year. 

We see changes possibly in Syria and elsewhere. 

My big concern, as you heard from the first panel, is what are 

we going to have in the future. Because I am very concerned that 

more radical elements may be on the horizon. I don’t know what 

we could do to predict that or to completely eliminate that possibility, but I would like to have your ideas on how we should deal 

with this unusual state of affairs that are taking place all throughout that region right now. And as I said before, it is not just because of security and stability in the Middle East; it is because of 

the energy needs of the United States. We are so dependent, at 

least in large part, on energy from the Middle East. And if we see 

radical elements take over in Syria, and ultimately, possibly in Jordan, in Egypt, in Libya and across that area, and then we also 

69

have some problems in Yemen, as you know, big problems in 

Yemen, and in the Persian Gulf, Oman and elsewhere. I would like 

to know what you think, from your think tanks’ perspective, what 

we can expect and what we should be doing to stop the possibility 

of radical elements taking over. I know that is a big, big question, 

but it is one I think is extremely important. 

Mr. SCHMITT. That is a big question and a question whose response from a lot of these countries will vary from different circumstances. We will have different players and different ways of 

influencing outcomes in each country. But I am——

Mr. BURTON. Let me interrupt. We have been told by our intelligence people al-Qaeda is in Libya. People, who have fought in Afghanistan that are al-Qaeda, are now in some leadership positions 

with some of those units and tribes in Libya. And in Egypt, the 

Muslim Brotherhood is an organization that in the past has been 

looked upon as a radical organization. The same thing is true over 

in Syria; they are concerned about that. 

So you do have large radical elements in those areas. They may 

be different in some respects, but I think we, as Americans, ought 

to have some idea of where we are heading, especially if we are 

talking about giving support to the rebels in Libya and the democratic movement in Egypt and possibly supporting movements in 

these other countries as well. 

Mr. SCHMITT. I would say——

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me, we get one view from the State Department and from Homeland Security; this is the American Government’s position. But you folks are experts in think tanks that work 

on this all the time, and I would like to have your candid observations in this area. 

Mr. SCHMITT. Well, to start, I am quite worried that the ‘‘Arab 

Spring’’ is going to turn into an ‘‘Arab winter,’’ and I mean that in 

the worst possible way, which is precisely the point you are making. I have had a number of conversations with friends in European governments and the European Union about their plans and 

what they want to try to accomplish in wake of all these revolutions. And what you get from them is mostly, ‘‘We know that we 

basically had all these failed policies for the last 10 years, including our Neighborhood Policy.’’ So then you ask them, ‘‘Well, what 

are you going to do now?’’ and they have no answer. 

So there is a passivity on the part of Europe and our European 

allies about exactly how to handle the situation. They are still trying to figure out what kind of policies we are going to implement, 

so that is not a good sign. 

On the American end, I would say that I think, to be frank, the 

administration has something of a hands-off approach to what is 

going on, out of the fear that they will look like they are being 

American ‘‘colonialists,’’ so to speak. 

I don’t think that is the way to handle the situation. If you want 

to prevent the worst from happening, you have to get involved. It 

doesn’t mean you will always succeed, but I do know if you are not 

deeply involved in trying to move things forward in the right way, 

you won’t succeed. You won’t have the success that you want. And 

you wind up with radical elements actually. Because they are more 

70

organized and more ruthless, they will wind up being the dominant 

figures in these revolutions as we move on. 

So I think we are actually in a quite dangerous period, where we 

have on-going revolutions but both the United States and our allies 

are acting way too passively when it comes to these changes. 

Mr. BURTON. Ms. McNamara. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. I absolutely agree with my friend, Dr. Schmitt. 

American leadership matters. I think there has been this idea that 

if America takes a back seat, it won’t look like a colonialist. Well, 

I am afraid there is a difference between taking a back seat and 

looking weak. 

Europe, I think, can only succeed if America is involved, and I 

think American leadership is desperately needed in the region. 

With regard to Libya, I think Libya is a key test, because if 

Libya goes the right way, I think it will provide an example. 

I do agree, sadly, that I don’t think we have entirely our eye on 

the ball. 

We have seen recently President Obama, President Sarkozy and 

Prime Minister Cameron put out a big paper saying, Ghadafi absolutely has to go. 

Well, okay, I agree. How are we going to do it? 

And I don’t think that is entirely clear to us. I would like to see 

a stronger objective. I would like to see greater American involvement. 

One thing that I am not in a position to comment on and you 

may know yourself, surely we have intelligence on Libya and the 

opposition in Libya. We have been there for a number of years now. 

We have had a failed engagement strategy, but the result of that 

is that we probably have a lot of Western involvement and a lot 

of Western intelligence. We probably know something about the opposition, even if we don’t know everything about them. 

We need to start looking now; who do we think is in our best interest? Who are the Libyan people going to support? I don’t know 

this is a civil war. It looks to me as if Ghadafi is just massacring 

his own people. I think Libya will be a key test case, and that is 

why I would like to see greater involvement. 

Finally, the EU has comprehensively failed. A few years ago, we 

had a lot of excitement around this thing called ‘‘the Mediterranean 

Union.’’ It was hailed as one of the EU’s greatest strategies that 

was going to engage North Africa, and make it more democratic. 

There was going to be great energy projects. We were going to import solar power. I mean, some of the stuff we were saying was ludicrous. As it happened, we spent a lot of money and not seen any 

results. 

David Cameron has recently asked the European Union to look 

at its entire aid program, look where the money is going and what 

effect it has. The provisional reports that are coming back state 

that their aid projects are absolutely horrific. Where they are not 

spent corruptly, they are spent badly, and it is highly ineffective 

in terms of what we want to do: Promote our values, relieve poverty, that sort of thing. So I think the EU needs to take a root and 

branch look at its aid policies and change them. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Bilirakis. 

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Mr. BURTON. I may have another question or two after my colleague. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Yeah, I am not going to be long. 

Mr. BURTON. Take your time. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. 

I want to pose the same questions that I posed to the previous 

panel. Maybe I can ask Ms. McNamara first. Again, on the EU 

dragging its feet and sharing the data as it relates to the passengers’ name records, can you elaborate on that, please? 

Ms. MCNAMARA. In my longer testimony, I have outlined what 

happened and the different iterations we have been through, and 

it looks almost like a fairytale. The Europeans want this. The 

Americans agree, even though they think it will limit the program. 

And the Europeans once again say, not good enough. 

Originally, America asked for 38 pieces of data. You have now 

said, okay, give us 19. This is mandated by U.S. law that this information has to be provided in advance, that is why, in my view, it 

happened. So good one for doing that. But the Europeans don’t like 

this program. A Polish MEP came to Heritage in late February last 

year. Under the Lisbon Treaty, new powers granted to the European Parliament saw them immediately strike down the third 

iteration of the PNR agreement. And he said, ‘‘When the European 

Parliament did this, there was whooping and cheering in the chamber.’’ He said, ‘‘I had thought we had won the World Cup or something.’’ And he said, ‘‘All I heard was, ‘We have got those Americans,’ as though it was ‘a them and us.’ And the ‘us’ isn’t the terrorists; the ‘us’ is the Americans.’’

The most absurd part about this, we act as if we are trying to 

just protect Americans. We are not. We are trying to protect people 

in the EU, too. We are trying to protect the crew, the staff pilots. 

If al-Qaeda is intent on crashing the plane, as we saw awfully in 

Pennsylvania, if they can’t manage to get their target; they will 

crash it wherever, and kill as many people as possible. This is 

about protecting European people as well as Americans. 

I think this is about being muscular for the European Parliament. I worked in the European Parliament for 3 years, and I 

can tell you, I never experienced anti-Americanism like it in my entire life. I think this is about the European Parliament being juvenile. They have got these new powers, and they want to use them. 

I think that the PNR agreement that we have in place, I think it 

should be not only agreed; I think it should be extended for another 

7 years. 

I would like to see more pieces of information, but that probably 

won’t happen. The agreement we have got, we have testimony that 

it will suffice. We even have the EU Foreign Minister saying on 

record, before she was appointed, that this is a vital program. She 

testified in the House of Lords that the PNR agreement was a vital 

program. And now, all of a sudden, we are seeing pushback on it. 

I think it’s wrong. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Dr. Schmitt. 

Mr. SCHMITT. Sally is absolutely right about the new EU Parliament exercising its muscles since the Lisbon Treaty. I think one 

of the things that we sometimes don’t appreciate is the degree to 

72

which there has been sort of very fundamental changes in EU governing structures with the Lisbon Treaty. It is called a treaty, but 

it is in fact very much a constitutional agreement. 

I would also say that along with the Parliament, that one of the 

difficulties we have is with the European Court of Human Rights, 

another body which is relatively independent and not responsible 

directly to home governments. And it has produced a lot of decisions which are very problematic when it comes to security. 

I do know that, if I was in government now, it would be a very 

complex thing to handle. I mean, we do have, I think it is fair to 

say, very good bilateral relations with a lot of countries, even countries that we were very much in disagreement with over Iraq and 

other matters, but when it came to intelligence sharing and security matters behind the curtain, they were very cooperative. 

The EU element really does make this a much more complex 

game. Whether the EU Parliament matures or not, that is an open 

question. But right now it is a very difficult obstacle in getting 

these security matters accomplished. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. I am sorry, there are a couple of things that I 

forgot that I would like to say. 

You recently, a few years ago, added new countries to the Visa 

Waiver Program. I think the Visa Waiver Program is a fantastic 

thing. Not least of all, it is a public diplomacy thing. Familiarity 

breeds favorability. When people come to the United States, they 

find they love Americans. They are great. They want to come back. 

They want to spend money. Everyone is a winner. 

However, the part of having all these flights coming in, you need 

information, and you need to stop the bad guys from coming. And 

so, when you upgraded the Visa Waiver Program, you upgraded the 

security requirements, and it has been very, very successful. 

At the time, I remember, I held a public program, and we hosted 

the Honorable Richard Barth. The EU was in the audience, and a 

commission official stood up and said, we might take member 

states to court because they have no right to be giving the Americans this information; it is up to the EU how much information 

they get. 

The EU again is trying to supernationalize visa policy. Because, 

I think Dr. Schmitt is right, at a nation state level, it works pretty 

well; the EU is a complicating factor. 

Now, one warning I will give here—I am afraid the EU might 

have actually listened to Heritage Foundation for once. For a number of years, I have recommended that there should be an umbrella 

agreement in terms of respecting American data standards—data 

transfer as good standards, that Europeans can accept that the 

way the Americans treat data is good enough. The EU and U.S. is 

now negotiating that umbrella agreement. 

However, I am very afraid that that umbrella agreement is going 

to turn into the EU trying to limit future agreements. Instead of 

it just being a generic agreement saying that we accept that America has good ways of treating data, they are going to say, only if 

it is limited to being held for a certain amount of days, narrowly 

providing the scope that you can request information. 

73

I am afraid that this umbrella agreement will be a shopping list 

of restrictions, rather than something that makes these agreements 

easier, and I would caution you to be very careful on that. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Schmitt. 

Mr. SCHMITT. I apologize, but just one big larger point, which is 

that, if a bomb, God forbid, goes off in London, it is not the EU 

Parliament that is held responsible. It is the members of Parliament of the United Kingdom. And I think that is a really fundamental distinction and problem, which is that you have members 

of a governing body in the EU Parliament who are elected on all 

kinds of grounds but rarely on protecting the citizens of a particular country. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, one more question? 

Mr. BURTON. Sure. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Again, the question with regard to Albania, what do you suppose 

the Department of State and DHS are doing to make a dent in 

stamping out the human trafficking, the narcotrafficking and the 

arms trafficking that characterize the economy in countries, such 

as Albania? 

Mr. SCHMITT. I really don’t have the expertise to be able to answer that with any specificity. 

My suspicion is that this is something they have given over to 

the European Union to take responsibility for since basically the 

Europeans face the brunt of it. Doesn’t mean that we don’t have 

responsibility, but if I had to guess, given the resources, I would 

say that is probably something they are looking for Brussels to address less than we are. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Ms. McNamara, would you like to comment? 

Ms. MCNAMARA. The European Union does actively deal with Albania. 

I spend the vast majority of my time talking about what the EU 

shouldn’t be doing. So let me change that and talk about what the 

EU should be doing. The EU should have a sensible neighborhood 

strategy. The one thing where I think the EU could be helpful is 

in its Eastern neighborhood and in the Balkans. And, I would like 

to see them focusing more of their aid and more of their attention 

and more of their energy on that area of the world, instead of having this idea that they are going to have a unified Middle East policy and Catherine Ashton is going to save the world. Lord help us, 

it is not going to happen. So I would like to see them have a more 

proactive strategy in the Balkans. 

In terms of where the United States can work, I think NATO is 

going to be a superb format for this. What we have found is that 

countries, who have got into NATO, and Albania is a recent member of NATO, they generally do very well inside the alliance, because they pick up best practices; they liaise with their colleagues. 

It is a very easy way of sharing information, of saying, hey, we 

don’t like this, you better do something about it, without making 

it an official diplomatic hoopla. So I definitely think you should use 

your channels within NATO to advance that, all of the allies and 

especially the United States. 

74

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much, thanks for the testimony. 

Appreciate it. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. My colleague and I are going to visit Greek Cyprus 

and Turkey before too long, and we will probably have some questions for you down the road. 

One of the troubling things, at least it troubles me, that you just 

indicated, was that the EU seems to want to usurp some of the intelligence capabilities or the dissemination of intelligence information to the United States or between the United States and these 

countries. That is troubling because, as you said before, we have 

had a pretty good working relationship with most of those European countries regarding intelligence gathering. Is this a problem 

that is going to increase? Is it going to be more difficult to get intelligence data because of the EU? I was not aware of this kind of 

problem until today. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. It would be an overstatement for me to say to 

you that the European countries aren’t going to give you information because of the EU. Let’s face it, as Dr. Schmitt said, it is the 

governments of these countries who have to protect their citizens. 

Mr. BURTON. Sure. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. And so ultimately I think intelligence services 

are working pretty well. 

In terms of the EU trying to limit that, it is definitely the case. 

They have stated their outright goal is to have one judicial system 

in Europe. Now that might sound great, but in reality, it is not 

going to happen. Could you imagine if you, Mexico and Canada, all 

of a sudden, tomorrow, said, we are going to have one judicial system? Most people would think it is quite nuts. There is a reason 

why you have differences. It is the same in Europe. So the EU has 

institutionalized things. 

We have this thing called SitCen. We have Europol. We have 

Eurojust, all of these things, which most British people don’t even 

know about; these are trying to get in on the intelligence game. 

And I think that is hugely problematic. 

Now, one thing I will say to you, the EU occasionally operates 

with the height of hypocrisy, and the European Arrest Warrant is 

one of those things. We have had a yearlong investigation by the 

European Parliament over U.S. rendition practices. Oh, the Americans are breaking the law; they are doing this, and they are doing 

that. 

The European Arrest Warrant means that one member state, 

let’s take Greece, for example, can request from Britain any person 

be extradited to Greece without a single bit of prima facie evidence. 

Does this happen? You betcha; 1,800 British citizens have been 

rendered to countries around Europe from Britain in the last years. 

We were told that this was an antiterrorism measure; it is not. The 

vast majority of those people, who are being rendered to other European countries, are extradited because they left a gas station 

without paying the bill. Now, I know gas prices are high, but it 

ain’t a reason for extradition, let’s face it. 

Mr. BURTON. 1,800 you said. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. 1,800, I believe, is the latest number. 

Mr. BURTON. That is because of the EU’s policies? 

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Ms. MCNAMARA. Absolutely, 100 percent, the European Arrest 

Warrant. It was a flagship project by the European Union, meant 

to be about terrorism, and it has not been about terrorism. Scotland Yard has said, complying with all of these warrants, finding 

the people, sending them over, all of that sort of thing, it has taken 

our resources up. That is what I was testifying about diverting the 

resources, the key resources from member states to do ridiculous 

things like this. I would rather the U.K. be using its antiterrorism 

resources to look at who is preaching hate, to render terrorists; not 

to get people who haven’t paid their bill at a petrol station. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just ask both of you this question, what in 

your opinion should we do as far as intelligence-gathering capability—take the CIA or FBI or DIA—what should we be doing to 

make sure that there is complete cooperation between the European countries that are at risk, just like we are, and not have to 

worry about there being an impediment to getting that intelligence 

information? I guess maybe I am not making the question clear. 

I am really concerned, after hearing what you said today, that 

information that we might need in order to stop somebody like bin 

Laden, or one of his minions, from perpetrating another attack on 

England, France, United States, wherever they happen to be, that 

we might be at risk of not being able to stop that because there 

is an impediment to this sharing of information. So if you could 

just give me a reassuring answer that our intelligence sharing will 

overcome these impediments. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. My number one recommendation would be to 

maintain your bilateral alliances. 

Mr. BURTON. With individual countries? 

Ms. MCNAMARA. With individual countries. 

Mr. BURTON. And not go through the EU? 

Ms. MCNAMARA. With all due respect to President Obama, when 

he first came into office, I think he found a lot of enthusiasm for 

the EU. He thought this, you know, is a great multilateral alliance, 

and I think he has slowly realized over time, you know what, sometimes it is best to go through your bilateral alliances. 

In my view, the vast majority of time, for things like intelligence, 

which is so important, you must maintain those strong alliances. 

And there is a way of doing that; Poland is a perfect example. Poland is such a strong ally. I met a Polish guy a few weeks ago who 

said to me, can you tell me, Sally, why is it okay for 2,000 Polish 

soldiers to be fighting alongside the Americans in Afghanistan 

where they don’t need a visa, but we need a visa to get into the 

United States, when the guys in the Czech Republic next to us, 

they can just get in on visa waiver? 

These things are often interlinked. I think VWP is good public 

diplomacy. I think it is good to maintain your strong bilateral alliances. And also, Members of Congress, you have a fantastic position here. I would not be afraid to push back with the European 

Parliament. What they have done over the Passenger Name Record 

agreement has endangered a key counterterrorism policy. And I 

think you have every right to be angry about that. And you have 

parliamentarians on your side, particularly the European Conservatives and Reformist Group. It is a new inter parliamentary groupVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:58 Aug 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EE\050511\66174 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ing in the European Parliament. And they are some of the most 

pro-American groups. 

Mr. BURTON. Can you give me some information on that or give 

it to my staff so we have that? 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Absolutely. 

Mr. BURTON. Dr. Schmitt. 

Mr. SCHMITT. My impression from, again, when I was doing research on the book that we published last year and I held extensive 

discussions with intelligence and security officials in London and 

Berlin and Madrid and Paris, my impression was that the cooperation at the bilateral level was still very high and that there—this 

doesn’t make it easier, but there is a considerable amount of rhetoric that points in one direction when operationally things are 

going quite well in another direction. 

So there is a little bit, as Sally was saying, hypocrisy and what 

public officials will say, but in fact what they are actually doing on 

the ground——

Mr. BURTON. Let me end up by saying this, if you at your various 

organizations come up with any information that would lead to you 

believing that there is an impediment to the United States getting 

intelligence data that we need or our allies need, would you let this 

subcommittee know? Because we would immediately contact Homeland Security and the State Department to make sure that they 

knew that we were concerned about this. 

Mr. SCHMITT. If I could just add one little thing; one of the problems we found after 9/11 was that the European Union was a security risk in the sense that, the borders are so open between the 

member states, there was a need, in fact, to work with the EU to 

sort of strengthen their capacity to exchange information and so 

there wouldn’t be this sort of hole in the system where people had 

safe havens and could move around in ways that were a security 

risk. 

I think it has been clear that we think there are real problems 

in the European Union’s handling of some of these things, particularly in the Parliament and the court. On the other hand, there is 

a need to work with them precisely because the EU is not going 

to go away. 

Mr. BURTON. Okay. I want to thank both of you for your testimony. It has been very enlightening and invigorating. 

I would like to say for the record that Representative Meeks and 

Engel, who are minority members of the committee, would have 

been here, but they are with the President at Ground Zero in New 

York, so they extend their apologies. 

Once again, thanks for being here, and we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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