### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-15-00051- CV

Trent Lind ig, Appellan t

v. P leasant Hill Rocky Com m uni ty Club, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F B LANCO CO UNTY, 33RD J UDICIAL DI STRICT NO. CV0758 0, H ONO RAB LE J. ALLAN GARRETT, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Trent L indig appea ls th e d i s t ri ct court’s order construing a deed in favor of Pleasant Hill-Rocky Communi ty Club. L indig contends that the court err ed in ruling that a reve rter clause in the deed was not trig g ere d when the proper ty cea sed being used for school purposes. We will affirm the district c ourt’s orde r.
BACK GR OUND

L indig’ s g rea t-g randf

ather , Albert L indig, e x ecute d a deed on September 10, 1927, convey ing a 1.3 acr e parc el of land to “J.C
. Goar , T.E. Patton, Scott Klett, J .J
. Fuc hs and Gus Artzt, th e Bl an co C o u n t y Boa

rd of Trustee s and their succe ssors in office .” The deed rec ited that the proper ty was to be use d for sc hool purposes and c ontained the r ever ter c lause a t issue:
I , Albert L indig, . . . have g rante d, sold, g iven, and convey ed .
. . unto the s aid J .C. Go ar , T
. E
. Patton, Scott Klett, J .J
. Fuc hs and Gus Artzt, the Blanco Count y Boa rd of Trustee s and their suc cessor s in office , the following descr ibed trac t or parc el ofland
. . . ; said above d es cr i b ed t ract or parc el of land shall be used for School

purposes for th e P l ea s ant Hill School District No. 21. But it is understood that in case t h e s ai d School House or any other house which may be built and used for a S ch o o l house is remove d from said land here in descr ibed then the said above descr ibed land shall re vert ba ck to me, my heirs, assig ns or leg al re prese ntatives.
Fr om 1927 until 1952, the proper ty was u s ed as a school. I n Aug ust 1952, the
succe ssor members of the Bla nco County Boa

rd of Trustee s (Aa

ron Posey , Edg ar Heins, J oy ce Goar , C.W
. Fr eer , and Osca

r J ones J r.) executed a d eed and convey ed the proper ty to L ouis L indig (L indig’ s g rea t-g rea t uncle) , Alfre d Br odbeck, Aug ust L udwig , Earne st Petri , L ev i Deike, Emil Ha rtmann, and Walter L udwig and their succe ssors in of fice , as Trustee s of the Pleasant Hill I mprovement Association, to be car ed for “as a Communi ty Center for the bene fit of Pleasant Hill Communi ty in Bla

nco County , Texas.” The Pleasant Hill I mprovement Association, later rena med the Pleasant Hill-Rocky Communi ty Club, took possession of the proper ty in 1952. The 1952 Dee d acknow ledg ed that the proper ty was “for

merly used for school purposes but now no longe r so used” and that there was a reve rsionary interest set forth in the 1927 Dee d. The buil ding once used as a school rema ined on the proper ty
. The Club’s use of the proper ty continued unchalleng ed until 2013, when a commerc ial enter

prise off ere d to rent the school pr operty from L indig. L indig then broug ht actions for trespass t o t ry t itle, quiet title, and decla ratory judgme nt ag ainst the Club, seeking to confirm his owner ship of the proper ty
. The Club, in turn,
asser ted that it was the rig htful owner of the proper ty
. Both parties’ motions for summary judgme nt
wer e denied. They subsequently reque sted that the d i s t ri ct co u rt construe the 1927 Dee d and its
reve rter clause —which the parties ag ree is unambig uous—under T e xa s Ru le of Civil Procedur e 248. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 248 (stating that when jury has been demande d, questions of law shall be hear d
2and deter

mined by the court befor e the trial commence s). After a hear ing, the court found that the Club has curr ent title to the subject proper ty beca use the circ ums t an ce s t h at would trig g er the
reve rter clause have not occur red. The court signe d an order incorpora ting its oral ruling s. The court also signe d an order , pursuant to the part i es ’ agr eement, permitting L indig to seek an immediate appea l of the orde r. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d). This appe al followed.
DISCUSSIO N L indig challeng es t h e d i s t ri ct court’s order in a single issue, arg uing that his
reve rsionary interest in the proper ty beca me a pr esent possessory interest in 1952 when the school
cea sed to operate on the land.
Stand ard of review

The construction of an unambig uous deed and its reve rter clause prese nts a question of law , wh ich we revie w de novo. Luckel v. W hite , 819 S.W .2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991); Cooke

v. Morrison , 404 S.W .3d 100, 111 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); City of Houston

v. Van De Mark , 83 S.W .3d 864, 867 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied)
. The primary duty of a c ourt when c onstruing a n unambig uous deed is to asce rtain t he parties’ i ntent as ex presse d in the four corne rs of the deed. Luckel , 819 S.W .2d at 461. I n apply ing the “four corne rs” rule, we do not look at i solated t erms b u t ra t her consider the instrument as a whole and attempt to harmonize and g ive eff

ect to all of its provisions. Plainsman T r a d i n g C o . v. Crews , 898 S.W .2d 786, 789 (Tex. 1995). We look to the intent that is expressed by the instrument, not the intent that the parties may have failed to express in the instrument. Alford v. Krum , 671 S.W .2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1984),

o verruled on other grounds by L ucke l , 819 S.W .2d at 464. I t is presumed that ever y clause is “to 3have some eff ect; ther efor e, the langua g e of the deed should be int erpr eted so that no provision is rende red meaning less.” Hausser v. Cuellar , 345 S.W .3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied)
. We g ive the lang uag e its plain, g rammatica l meaning un l es s doing so would clea rly defe at the parties’ intentions. Tana Oil & Gas Corp. v. Cernosek , 188 S.W .3d 3 5 4 , 359 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2006, pet. denied)
. We must construe the lang uag e as it is w ritten and cannot alter it by interpolation or substitution. Dahlberg v. H olden , 238 S.W .2d 699, 701 (Tex. 1951). A person convey

ing proper

ty can reta in an interest i n t h e proper ty throug h a
reve rsionary interest

. El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney , 395 S.W .3d 798, 802 (Tex. 2013). A “possibility of reve rter” descr ibes “a future interest reta ined by a g rantor t hat convey s a d et er m i n able fee ; ‘it is the gra ntor’s right t o fee owner ship in the real proper ty reve rting to him i f the condition terminating the deter minable fee occur s.’” Id
. at 801 n.6 (quoting Luckel , 819 S.W .2d at 464). Thus, a g rante e forf eits his inter est in the proper ty and owner ship automatically returns to the g rantor (or his heirs) if the limit ation imposed by the deed is brea ched. See Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glenn W

. Loggins, Inc ., 115 S.W .3d 67, 70-71 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) ; see also El Dorado Land Co. , 395 S.W .3d at 803. No particula r words are require d to
cre ate a possibili ty of reve rter. Bagby v. Bredthauer , 627 S.W .2d 190, 196 n.4 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, no writ). A trespass to try title action is t h e ex cl usive means by which a claimant can d em o n s t ra t e his title to rea l proper ty
. Martin v. Amerman , 133 S.W .3d 262, 267 (Tex. 20 0 4 ) (quoting Tex. Prop. Code § 22.001(a) ). As a g ener al rule, the inst ru m en t co n t ai ning the reve rter clause must be construed most strong ly ag ainst the g rantor, and forf eiture of an estate is disfavore d. Pitts v. Camp Cnty. , 39 S.W .2d 608, 616-17 (Tex. 1931) (conc luding that proper ty should not reve rt

4to g rantor’ s heirs beca use only condition in convey ance that would defe at g rante es’ tit le had not
occur red)
. Lin dig claims a r ever sionary in ter est in the propert y

L indig a rg ues that the re verte r cla use wa s trigg ere d in 1952 w hen the sc hool house
was no longe r being used for school purposes. He relies on sever al ref ere nces in the deed, separ ate from the reve rter clause , stating that the proper ty shall be used “for school purposes only .” L indig arg ues that his interpre tation of the school-purpose restric tion g ives eff ect to the entire deed, and that these g ener al ref

ere nces to purpose compel a deter mination that the reve rter clause was trig g ere d when the pr operty

was no long er use d for sc hool purposes. To support his arg

ument, L indig relies on a 1913 Galveston case construing a simil ar
reve rter clause , Stewart v. Blain. See 159 S.W
. 928, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galve ston 1913, no writ). The deed at issue in Stewart rec ited that the g rantor was convey ing a one-a cre trac t of land to the county judge and his successors in office “for the purpose of ere cting a schoolhouse, for the benef it of the colore d school community No. 4.” Id
. The deed further rec ited that “in the event of the remova l of the schoolhouse there from by said county judge and his succe ssors in office the said
acr e of land shall reve rt back to me or my heirs or assig ns, and this deed shall become there afte r void and inoperative.” Id. County officia ls took possession of t he property under the deed and u s ed it for school purposes for twenty -five y ear s until it was sold, but the school house rema ined on the proper ty afte r the sale. Id
. at 930. I n construing this deed, the Galveston court stated that “the sale and abandonme nt of the land for school purposes was to all intents an d p u rp o s es a remova l of the s choolhouse therefr om; the bui lding may be there y et, but it is not a schoolhouse.” Id . at 931.
5Rely ing on Stewart , L indig contends that his reve rsionary interest was trig g ere d when the proper ty
cea sed being used for

school purposes.
The Club disp utes that the r ever ter clause has been trigger ed

The Club c ontends that the Stewart court incorre ctly based its de cision on what the draf ter of that deed meant to say , rathe r than upon the words actua lly used. I n the Club’s view, the Stewart court went bey ond the express lang uag e of the reve rter clause (“r emoval of the school house from the proper

ty ”) to infer that the g rantor intended an additional trig g er (fa ilure to use the school house as a school) for the reve rsion of the prop erty
. The Club contends that the possibili ty of
reve rter in the 1927 Dee d was not trig g ere d beca use the re v er t er clause ref ers only to remova l of the s chool hous e (“in case the s aid S chool House or any other house w hich may be buil t and used for a School house is remove d from said land
. . . then the said
. . . land shall reve rt ”) , and it is undisputed that the building once used as a school house has never been remove d from the proper ty
. The Club also contends that its interpre tation of the 1927 Dee d is compe l l ed b y the distinct separ ation of the reve rter clause from the clause s containing the “school purposes” lang uag e. Fur ther, the Clu b co ntends that this Dee d must be construed aga inst forf eiture and strictly ag ainst the g rantor—A lbert L indig—who could have tr i ggere d the reve rter clause on failure to use the proper ty for school purposes but did n o t. See Pitts , 39 S.W .2d at 616-17; see also Dicke nson
v. Board of Trustees of Chico Indep. Sch. Dist. , 204 S.W .2d 418, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.—For t Worth 1947, writ ref

’d) (re jecting interpre tation of reve rter clause that would require improvements to become part of rea lty and re vert with land in ca se of a bandonment for

school purposes because “our courts ar e av er s e to forf eitures, and will avoid them unless no other rea sonable construction

6can be place d upon the contra ct”)
. The Club maintains that L indig cannot preva il on hi s trespass

to try title claim and is not entitled to possession of t he property beca use t he school house has not been remove d and t h u s , under the express lang uag e of the 1927 Dee d, the reve rter clause has not been tr igg ere d. We ag ree . The reve rter clause in this 1927 Dee d specifie s only one t ri gger , “in
case the said School House or any other house whi ch may be built and used for a School house is remove d from said land herein descr ibed. .
. .” By contra st, a number of cases address re v er t er cl auses wher e g rantors intended to include a possibili ty of reve rter if the proper ty cea sed b ei n g used for school purposes and their deeds expressed such intent spec ifically
. See, e.g. , Dicke nson , 204 S.W .2d at 420 (1921 deed specifie d “should proper ty here inafter descr ibed cea se to be used for school purposes . . . the said premises shall then and there and wholly and absolutely reve rt to the g rantor” ); Campbell v. Jones , 230 S.W
. 710, 715 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amar illo 1921, no writ) (“if the schoolhouse to be e rec ted on said trac t of land be move d or destroy ed, and the use of that land f or school purposes be perma nently abandone d, then the said land shall re vert to the g rantors” ); Allen

v. Franks , 166 S.W
. 384, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.—For t Worth 1914, writ ref ’d ) (“ wh en t he above descr ibed land ce ases to be use d as school purpose s, the same sha ll rever t to us”). The Tex as S u p reme Court addre ssed a simil ar case wher e a g rantor’ s heirs soug ht construction of a reverte r clause convey ing property to a county for a courthouse and ot her public buildings but providing that the prope rty would reve rt if the county seat we re move d:
I , Wil liam H. Pitt s . . . have g rante d, barg ained, sold a nd convey ed, and do by these prese nts g rant, barg ain, sell and convey unto the said W. R. Ba rnes, presiding J ustice as aforesa id, and his succe ssors in offic e t h e fo l l owing descr ibed l ots or parcels of
7land
. . . as a place for ere cting the courthouse, and any other public buildings which

may be nec essar

y for sa id County

of Camp.

. . . . Neve rtheless, the condition of this convey ance is such that if the county seat should be here afte r remove d to any place in the said county , then, and in that case , this obliga tion shall be null and void, and the proper ty here in convey ed shall reve rt to the said W. H. Pi tts, his heirs or assig ns.
Pitts , 39 S.W .2d at 609-10. The county built a courthouse and other public buildings on the proper ty but abandone d their use more than fifty y ear s y ear later when they beca me insufficient to meet the county ’s nee ds. Id . at 616. Howe ver, the county seat wa s not move d. Id . The g rantor’ s heirs broug ht a trespass- to-try -title suit ag ainst the county and the city , arg uing that t h e proper

ty had
cea sed to be used a s a site for the courthouse a nd other c ounty

buildings and should re vert. The Texas Supreme Court conclude d that the reve rter clause had not been trig g ere d, despite the g ener al purpose lang uag e specify ing that the land be used for county buildings, beca use the only condition that should defe at the g rante es’ title was the remova l of the co u n t y s ea t
. Id
. at 616-17 (stating that g rantor eff ectively decla

red his convey ance to be valid “so long as the county seat of Ca mp [ C] ounty should rema in within the terr itory of that town, as it was the n situated, but that upon its remova l from t h at territory , the proper ty should reve rt to him and his heirs and assig ns”). Id
. The Court held that the heirs had no cause of action ag ainst the county without proof t h at t h e county seat had been remove d from the location wher e it exis ted when the pro p er t y
was conveyed, and until then the county was entitled to unrestric ted possession of the proper ty
. Id
. at 617.

8I n rea ching its decision, the Court quoted from a case in which the g rantor convey ed

proper ty to cer tain colleg e trustees to incorporate and perpe tually opera te a colleg e or instit ution of lear ning under the control of the Trinity Presby tery
. Id
. at 616 (quoting Glen Rose Collegiate Inst.

v. Glen Rose Indep. Sch. Dist. , 125 S
. W
. 3 7 9 , 3 8 2 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1910, writ ref ’d). A
reve rter clause in the deed specifie d that if Trinity failed to: (1) incorporate the Glen Rose Collegia te I nstitut e under Texas law and (2) furnish a principal for the colleg e fre e of char g e to the patrons of the colleg e for five consec utive y ear s, then Trinity would forf eit all rig ht to the colleg e building and g rounds convey ed and same wo u l d reve rt to the g rantor and become a public school building for the community of Sommervell County , Texas. Glen Rose Collegiate Inst. , 125 S.W
. at 380. Both of those i nitial conditions wer e met, but the colleg e was subsequently abandone d, and the school district arg ued t h at fa i l ure to perpe tually maintain the colleg e resulted in forf eiture of the proper

ty
. Id. at 382. The Glen Rose court disag ree d, noting the signific anc e o f the fac t that perpe tually maintaining a colleg e or instit ution of lear ning was g ener ally mentioned in the deed as
a purpose for its execution but “wa s omitted from the only clause providing for an absolute forf eiture of the land g rante d.” Id
. at 380. The Glen Rose court conclude d that the colleg e did not forf eit the proper ty beca use the “only two express conditions of absolute defe asanc e or forf eiture” —failing to incorpora te and failing to furnish a principal for fre e for five consec utive y ea rs
— d i d n o t occur . Id . at 382. Simi larly here , althoug h the convey an ce for school purposes is set forth g ener ally in the deed, t h e re v er t er clause does not terminate the g rante es’ owner ship of the proper ty if it
cea ses being used for school purposes. Rather, the reve rter clause expressly states that it is trig g ere d only if a s chool house is remove d from the land. (“B ut it is understood that in case the said 9School House or any o t h er house which may be built and used for a School house is remove d

from said land here in descr ibed then the said above descr ibed land shall reve rt back t o m e, my heirs, assig ns or leg al repr esenta tives.”). This trig g er complies with th e p l ai n lang uag e of the
reve rter clause an d harmonizes with the four corne rs of the 1927 Dee d beca use remova l of “the said School House or any other house which may be buil t and used for a School house”—i.e ., the school house’s nonexis tence —could be seen as perma nently abandoning the use o f t h e l an d for school purposes. I t is undisputed that the bui lding once used as a school re mains on the proper ty
. Construing the lang uag e in this deed as a whole and g iving eff ect to ever

y clause , we conclude that the re verte r cla

use has not bee n trig g ere d.
CONCLUSION We affir m the district court’s orde r.

___________________________ _______________ J eff Rose, Chief J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Rose, Jus tices Goodwin a nd Field Affir med Filed: Aug ust 28, 2015

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