J

- A18045

- 18 2018 PA Super 312

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. ** Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v. JEFFREY PETER THOMPSON ,

Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 4087 EDA 2017 Appeal from the Order Entered November 17 , 2017 i n the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County C riminal Division at No(s): CP

- 15

- CR

- 0000964

- 2005 BEFORE: STABILE, J. , STEVENS, P.J.E.* and STRASSBURGER , J.** OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2018 Jeffrey Peter Thompson (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus

. We affirm

. We provide the following background. On October 6, 2006, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea agreement , wherein he pleaded guilty to one count each of second

- degree murder and robbery for murdering sixteen

year - old Gregory Paschall. 1 Appellant was sentenced pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP)

. 2

____________________________________________ 1 Appellant was 37 years old at the time.

2 In exchange for the guilty plea, t he Commonwealth agreed not to pursue the death penalty.J

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Appellant filed pro se his first petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541

- 9546, on October 2, 2009. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a petition to withdraw pursu ant to Commonwealth v. Turner , 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley , 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) ( en banc ). The PCRA court granted counsel’s petition to withdraw and dismissed that p etition as being filed untimely. This Court affirmed t hat decision on January 5, 2011. See Commonwealth v. Thompson , 23 A.3d 1075 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum). On June 20, 2014, Appellant filed a second PCRA petition, which was once again dismissed as being filed untimely. This Court affirmed that decision on July 31, 2015. See Commonwealth v. Thompson , 125 A.3d 466 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum). On October 20, 2017, Appellant filed pro se a petition for writ of habeas
corpus . In that petition, he claimed that his LWOP sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus , 10/20/2017, at 2. Specifically, he relies upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460 (2012)

. Id . In Mill er , the Supreme Court held that the application of LWOP sentences toJ

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individuals who were juveniles at the time they committed homicides was unconstitutional. 3 Miller , 567 U.S. at 479. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus , Appellant recognizes that he was not a juvenile at the time he committed the murder, but argues that he is an adult offender suffering from a mental disability, and is therefore akin to a juvenile, i

. e . , one who is less culpable in committing a crime. Thus, he argues that the Eig hth Amendment prevents him from being sentenced to an LWOP sentence. Accordingly, Appellant requested that the trial court grant him a hearing and find that his “sentence is unconstitutional and his continuing confinement illegal.” Petition for Writ of Ha beas Corpus , 10/20/2017, at 11. On November 14, 2017, the trial court denied Appellant’s pet ition. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
B efore we address Appellant’s claims on ap peal , we consider the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant’s request for relief falls outside the purview of the PCRA. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/29/2018, at 9 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i)) (concluding that because Appellant has not argued that “his sentence was illegal at the time it was imposed” or that “there has been a violation of the Constitution of the Commonwealth or United States which so

____________________________________________ 3 In Montgomery v. Louisiana , 136 S.Ct . 718 (2016), the United States Supreme Court determined that Miller announced a new substantive rule of law that applies retroactively. Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 736.J

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undermined the truth

- determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place,” Appellant’s claims fall outside the purview of the PCRA).

[B]oth the PCRA and the state habeas corpus statute contemplate that the PCRA subsumes the writ of habeas corpus in circumst ances where the PCRA provides a remedy for the claim. ... [W]e have held that the scope of the PCRA eligibility requirements should not be narrowly confined to its specifically enumerated areas of review. Such narrow construction would be inconsistent with the legislative intent to channel post

- conviction claims into the PCRA’s framework, and would instead create a bifurcated system of post

- conviction review where some post

conviction claims are cognizable under the PCRA while others are not. Instead, this Court has broadly interpreted the PCRA eligibility requirements as including within its ambit claims ... regardless of the “truth

- determ ining process” language ... from [s] ection 9543(a)(2)(i). See Commonwealth v. Liebel , [] 825 A.2d 630 ([Pa.] 2003) (holding that claim challenging counsel’s effectiveness for failing to file a petition for allowance of appeal is cognizable under PCRA); Commonwealth ex. rel. Dadario v. Goldberg , [] 773 A.2d 126 ([Pa.] 2001) (holding that claim alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness during the plea bargaining process is cognizable under the PCRA); Commonwealth v. Chester , [] 733 A.2d 1242 ([Pa.] 1999) (holding that claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase of capital case is cognizable under the PCRA); Com monwealth v. Lantzy , [736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999)] (holding that claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file an appeal is cognizable under the PCRA). Commonwealth v. Hackett , 956 A.2d 978, 985

- 86 ( Pa. 2008) (some citations omitted). In other words, the fact that Appellant’s claim he re does not implicate the truth

- determining process does not mean that it could not be subject to the PCRA. Instead, the focus of a court considering a petition is on the remedy being sought by the petitio ner . See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6503(b)J

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(“The writ of habeas corpus shall not be available if a remedy may be had by post
- conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law.”) (emphasis added). In this case, Appellant is seeking a hearing to determine whether his

sen tence should be reduced or he should be discharge d

. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus , 10/20/2017, at 11. Such relief is clearly contemplated by the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S . § 9546(a) (“If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall order appropriate relief and issue supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence or other matters that are necessary and proper.”). Based on the foregoing , we agree with the Commonwealth , see Commonwealth’s Brief at 7, that the PCRA was the proper vehicle to examine this petition

. Thus, we now consider Appellant’s petition as a PCRA petition. Generally, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year from the date a judgment becomes final. There are three exceptions to this time requirement: (1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after

- recognized constitutional right. When a petitioner alleges and proves that one of these exceptions is met, the petition will be considered timely. A PCRA petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date the c laims could have been presented. The timeliness requirements of the PCRA are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely petitions. Commonwealth v. Brandon , 51 A.3d 231, 233

- 34 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations and quotation m arks omitted). Because Appellant’s filing is well

- outside of the one

- year timeframe provided in the PCRA , the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to entertainJ

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App ellant’s petition unless he pleaded and offered proof of one or more of the three statutory excepti ons to the time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b) (1). Appellant failed to do so, and therefore the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s untimely

- filed petition. Based on the foregoing , we affirm the order of the PCRA court. 4 Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/26/2018

____________________________________________ 4 “[W]e may affirm the PCRA court’s decision on any basis.” Commonwealth v. Charleston , 94 A.3d 1012, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2014).