C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS

AN GE LCA L L ERO S, Ap pe lla nt, V. TH E ST AT E O F TE XA S, Appellee
. § § § § § § § No . 0 8- 09 -0 02 31 -C R

Appea l from the 243rd District Court of El Pa so County , T e xas (TC# 20080D02628)

O P I N I O N Ang el Calleros wa s convicted of theft of pr operty

valued at $1,500 or more, but less than $2 0, 00 0. Ap pe lla

nt w a s se nte nc e d to 24 months ’ c on fi ne me nt a nd fi ne d $ 6, 00 0. In h is s ole iss ue on a pp e a l, A pp e lla nt c ha lle ng e s h is c onvic tio n o n th e ba sis that th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly insufficient to support it beca use the State fa iled to prove that Hoy Fox Toy ota had a

g reater right to possession of the stolen proper ty than Appellant did. On Dec ember

29, 2007, Mrs. Ofe lia Gallar do and her husband, Mr. Ar

mando Gallar do,
acc ompanied by

Mrs. Gallar do’s sister, Mrs. Esper anza Villeg as, we nt to Hoy Fox Toy ota to buy
a c ar. Mr s. Ga lla

rd o f ound a 20 05 To y ota

XAthat sh e wa

nte d, and the Ga lla rd os ne g oti ate d w ith Appellant, a H oy

Fox Toy ota salesman. T he Ga llardos agree d to purcha se the c ar f or $8,995, and g ave A

ppellant $6,000 in cash f

or a down pay

ment. The only

documentations Appe llant tender ed to the Ga llardos for the purcha se of this vehicle wer e piec es of pa per on which he indicated in his handwr iting the ve hicle’s sticke r price at $14,995, the sale price at $11,995 plus-2-

tax, t itle, and license fee s, and the fina l reduc ed pric e at $8,995 with a down pay ment of $6,000. When the Gallar dos picked up the Toyota XA, ther e wa s a lock box or a containe r attac hed to the
v e h i c l e ’ s k e y. Meanwhile, on J anuar

y 7, 2008, Appellant sig ned a voluntar y separ ation of employ

ment with Hoy Fox Toy ota, citingpersona l rea sons for doingso. This happene d befor e Mrs. Ga llardo
an d M r s . V il le g a s c ame b a c k to th e d e a le r s h ip to in qu ir e a b o u t t h e v e h ic le ’ s lo c k

b o x. A f e w d ay s a ft e r t akin gpo sse ssi on of the To y ota

XA , M rs . G a lla

rd o s e nt M rs . V ill e g a s to Ho y F ox To y ota

to h ave the de a le rs hip re mov e the loc k b ox that w a s atta c he d to the ke y be c a us e it m a de sta

rt ingthe ve hic le dif

fi c ult . M rs . V ill e g a s w e nt b a c k to the de a le rs hip and me t w ith Ms. Elvia Rubio, Hoy

Fox Toy ota’s fina

nce ma nag er. A ccor ding to Ms. Rubio, if a vehic le had been le g itimately

sold, this container would not still be attached to the ke y when it was r elea sed to the customer. More over, a fter c heckingthe Hoy Fox Toy ota sales da

tabase , Ms. Rubio failed to find any

rec ord of the T oy ota XA’ s sale. L ater that day , Mrs. Gallar do went to Hoy Fox Toy ota, and a fter spe akingto Ms. Rubi o, she under stood that somebody stole the $6,000 down pay ment she had pr eviously

made. A f

ew da y s later, howe ver, H oy

Fox Toy ota informed the Gallar dos that it would honor the orig inal deal, a nd would sell them the Toyota XA f or the $8,995 price plus tax , title, and license f ees, a nd that it would credit them the $6,000 down pa y me nt t he y ha d g ive n App e lla

nt, de sp ite the fa c t th at App e lla nt n e ve r t ur ne d th is s um o ve r t o the dea lership. In the re worke d ag ree ment, in addition to the $8,995 base price , the Gallar dos also ag ree d to purcha se a ve hicle ser vice a g ree ment and g ap insuranc e for their Toyota XA. On June 3, 20 08 , th e State of Te xas f ile d a n in dic tme nt f

or the ft of pr op e rt y a g a ins t Appellant. The indictment alleg ed that Appe llant unlawfully appropr iated U.S. cur

renc y valuedThe orig inal indictment alleg ed that Appe llant stole the $6,000 from Ms. Elvia Rubio or 1 Hoy Fox Toy ota. B efor e trial, the State a bandoned the alleg ation of Ms. Rubio as an owne r, and proce eded only

on the alleg ation of Hoy

Fox Toy ota as the owner of the stolen money . The rec ord shows that af

ter obtainingthe trial cour t’s permission, the prosec utor crosse d out Ms. Rub io’ s a lle g atio n in the or ig ina l in dic tme nt, but th e ind ic tme nt i n th e Cle rk ’s Re c or d f a ils to refle ct this chang e. -3- at$ 1 , 5 0 0 o r

m o r e , b u tl e s s th an$ 2 0 , 0 0 0 , “ w i th o u tth e e f f e c t i v e c o n s e n to f

th e o w n e r , n am e l y, EL VIA RUBI O or HO Y FO X TOYO TA, with intent to deprive sa id owner of said proper

ty .” 1 At the jury

trial, afte r the State re sted, Appellant moved f or an instruc ted ver dict on the basis that the re wa s a

la c k o f e vid e nc e that th e mon e y be lon g e d to Ho y

F ox To y ota , th e name d v ic timin the indictment, but the trial court de nied this moti on. At the end of trial, the jury

found Appellant guilty

of the off ense a nd assessed punishment at twenty -four months’ confineme nt with a fine of

$6,000. Appellant filed his notice of appea l on Aug ust 7, 2009. In h is s ole iss ue , App e lla

nt c ha lle ng e s th e le g a l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e su

pp or tin ghis
c onvic tio n. Ap pe lla

nt a rgue s th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt b e c a

us e the State fa ile d to prove that at the time of the a lleg ed off ense, H oy Fox Toy ota had a

g reater right to possession of the $6 ,0 00 do wn

pa y me nt t ha n h e did . Wh e n r e vie wi ngthe e vid e nc e su bmi tte d at tr ia l to de te rm ine its le g a l su ff

ic ie nc y , th is C ourt

e xami ne s a ll e vid e nc e , b oth pr op e rl y and imp ro pe rl y admitted, in a light most favor able to the ve rdict to deter mine whether

any rational trier

of fa ct could find the e ssential elements of the alleg ed off ense be y ond a re asonable doubt. Miramontes
v . S tate , 225 S.W .3d 132, 139-40 (Te x .App.--E l Paso 2005, no pet.). L eg al suffic iency of the evidenc e should be a ssessed by the eleme nts of the par

ticular off ense a s indicated by

the hy pothetically

corr ect jury

char g e for

the ca se. Ma lik

v . S tate , 953 S.W .2d 234, 239-40 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). In our re view, we are not to re-e x amine the e vidence , imposing our own-4-

judgme nt as to whether

g uilt has been prope rly

established beyond a re asonable doubt; rather, w e
are only to assess if both the explicit and impl icit findings by the trier of

fac t are rational. Lyon v. Sta te , 885 S.W .2d 506, 516-17 (Te x .App.--E l Paso 1994, pet. ref ’d). Evide ntiary

inconsistencies
are resolved in f

avor of the ver dict. Ma tso n v . S

tate , 819 S.W .2d 839, 843 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). This standar d of re view is applica ble to both direct a

nd circ umstantial evidence case s. Ga rc ia v . S

tate , 871 S.W .2d 279, 280 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1994, no pet.) . “The trier of fac t, not the appe llate cour

t, is free to acc ept or re

ject all or a

ny portion of any

witness’s testimony .” Be lto n v . S

tate , 900 S.W .2d 886, 897 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1995, pet. r ef’ d). Ac cording ly , a jury ’s finding s of fa ct in a cr iminal procee ding a re g iven substantial defe renc e. Le y v a v . S tate , 840 S.W .2d 757, 759 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1992, pet. r ef’ d). At trial, Appellant a

rgued that bec ause Ms. Rubio initially testified that Mrs. Ga llardo’s $6,000 down pay

ment belong ed to Mrs. Ga llardo, and be cause there was no c ontrac t and no dea l betwee n Mrs. Gallar do and Hoy Fox Toy ota when A

ppellant took the sum, Mrs. Gallar do was the owner of the sum. On appe al, Appellant a g ain complains that the State fa iled to prove the
owner ship alleg ation in the indictment, specifica lly that the State fa iled to prove that Hoy Fox Toy ota was the owner

of the stolen $6,000. In Appellant’s br ief, he cited to the Reporte r’s Record in a

rguing that beca

use Ms. Rubio testified she had told Mrs. Gallar do that they did not have a deal, that the pa

perw ork betwe en Appe llant and Mrs. Ga llardo wa s bog us, that Hoy Fox Toy ota eve ntually

honored the “no dea l” and took the $6,000 loss, and that Hoy Fox did not have any rec ord indicatingthat the $6,000 was turne d into any one at the de aler ship, the $6,000 belong ed to Mrs. Ga llardo, and not Hoy Fox Toy ota. The State make s two arguments in response to Appe llant’s sole issue. I t first argues that-5-

the name of

the owner

of stolen prope rty

is not a substantive element of a theft off ense suc h that it i s n ot r e qu ir e d to be inc lud e d in the hy po the tic a lly

c or re c t jury c ha rg e in a pr os e c uti on

fo r t he ft , and so any

failure on the par

t of the State to prove the name a lleg ed in the cha rg ing instrument a s the owner does not rende r the e vidence leg ally insufficient to support Appe llant’s conviction for theft. The State’ s second a rgument is that even if the na me of the owner a lleg ed in the indictment is a substantive element of the theft off ense that must be included in the hy po the tic a lly

c or re c t jury c ha rg e and pr ov e d b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t, t

he e vid e nc e in t

his
case was leg ally

sufficie nt to support the jury ’s implicit finding that Hoy Fox Toy ota was the
owner of the stolen $6,000. In this case, the indictment a lleg ed that the owne r of the sa id stolen property was Hoy Fox Toy ota. Reg ardle ss of the State’s a rgument with respec t to the owner’ s name a s alleg ed in the indictment, we conc lude the evide nce in this ca se wa s leg ally sufficie nt to support the jury ’s implicit conclusion that Hoy Fox Toy ota had a

g reater right to possession of the $6,000 than Ap pe lla nt. Se c tio n 3 1. 03 (a ) o f t

he Te xas P e na l Co de se ts o ut t he of fe ns e of the ft : Ape rs on

c omm its theft if he unla

wfully appropr iates prope rty

with the intent to deprive the owner of the prope rty . T EX .P EN .C ODE ANN . § 31.03(a) (West 2011). Thef t of proper

ty is a state jail fe lony

if the value of the prope rty

stolen is $1,500 or more but less than $20,000. T EX .P EN ..C ODE ANN . § 3 1. 03 (e )( 4) . U nd e r t

he Te xas P e na l Co de , “ owne r” is d e fi ne d a s “ a pe rs on wh o . . . ha s ti tle to the prope rty , possession of the prope rty , whether lawful or not, or

a g reater right to possession of the prope rty

than the ac tor [.] ” T EX .P EN .C ODE ANN . § 1.07(a) (35)( A)(West 2011). “ Possession” is defined a s “ac tual car e, custody , control or mana g ement” ove r the prope rty . Id . at § 1.07(39).Acc ordingto Hoy Fox Toy ota proc edure s, all car salesmen a

re e x pecte d to clear

a 2 customer’ s counterof

fer s with the manag er. -6- T h e r e f o r e , an y p e r s o nw h o h a s a g r e at e r r i g h tth anth e d e f

e n d an tt o th e a c tu a l c ar e , c u s t o dy, control, or mana g ement of the proper ty can be alleg ed as the owner . Ale x an de r v . S

tate , 753 S.W .2d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). The “greater right to possession” method of proving
owner ship can a

pply to all offense s and fa ctual setting s. Id . at 392-93. At tr ia l, M s. Rub io t e sti fi e d th at in Janu ary 20 08 , M rs . V ill e g a s c ame to h e r a nd a sk e d to have the Toy ota XA’ s lock box remove d. Acc ordingto Ms. Rubi o, if a Hoy Fox Toy ota ca

r salesman leg itimately

sold a vehicle , this container would ne ver be attache d afte r the sale . When Ms. Rubio went into t he Hoy Fox Toy ota databa se to retr ieve data re g ardingthis deal, she
c on c lud e d s ome thi ngwa s amis s b e c a us e the sy ste m di d n ot i nc lud e a sa le s r e c or d o f t

he To y ota XA . O nc e sh e dis c ov e re d th at th e re wa s a pr ob le m and

no tif ie d M rs . V ill e g a s a

bo ut i t, Mr s. Vi lle g a s f

e tc he d M rs . G a lla

rd o a nd br ou g ht h e r t o th e de a le rs hip that a ft e rn oo n. Ms. Rub io then aske d Mrs. Gallar do to bring her a ny paper work she ha d with respec t to this vehicle. When the sisters came bac k with the rec eipts, they also informed Ms. Rubio that Appellant wa s the
sa le sma n invo lve d in

the ins tant t

ra ns a c tio n. Up on

ob ta ini ngthe re c e ipt s, Ms. Rub io immediately

noticed somethingwas wr ongbeca use the doc umentations were on plain piece s of paper and not on company

letterhe ads, and the y

did not contain the manag er’ s signature. 2 Another r ed fla gthat arose in Ms. Rubi o’s mind was that the c ost of the vehicle was ove r $1,200 be low wh at th e de a le rs hip pa id f or it, and a c c or din gto M s. Rub io, se lli ngat a los s r are ly
occur red at Hoy

Fox Toy ota, par

ticularly not without a manag er’ s signature or pr oper authorization by

manag ement. Ms. Rubio testified that Hoy Fox Toy ota’s ca

r salesme n wer e-7-

ty pically not allowed to re duce the sales pric e without a mana g er’ s signature. I f a sa lesman
rec eives a down pay

ment from a c ustomer, the prope r proc edure for him is to take it to the fi na nc e de pa rtme nt at th e de a le rs hip to g e t a re c e ipt wi th t he c omp any ’s inf

or matio n, and

ob ta in manag ement’s sig nature to show it rece ived the pay ment. Ms. Rubio t estified it was not prope r proce dure f

or a sa lesman to take posse ssion of the pay ment for himself. In this inst ance , there was nothingin Hoy

Fox Toy ota’s data

base showinga re ceipt beingissued to anyone, including Ap pe lla nt, fo r t he Ga lla rd os ’ $ 6, 00 0 d own p ay

me nt. Mo re ov e r, wh e n M s. Rub io atte mpt e d to contac t Appellant re g ardingthis transaction, she discove red that Appellant had a lrea dy quit the de a le rs hip ’s e mpl oy

me nt. On the first da

y of trial, Ms. Rubio testified as follows: “And whe n Itold [ Mrs. Gallar do] that we pr etty

much didn’t have a dea l, we didn’t have a contr act, a nd then espe cially

afte r see ing that paper work, I told her there ’s no way

that this is happening, be cause there ’s -- it’s not our pa pe rw or k. ” Whe n a sk e d b y

tr ia l c ouns e l w he the r H oy F ox To y ota

ho no re d th is p art ic ula

r d e a l, Ms. Rubio t estified that it did, and that it took a $6,000 loss in doing so. On cr oss-examination by defe ndant’s counse l, Ms. Rubi o testified that when she was not able to find any rec ord reg ardingthe sale of

the Toyota XA, she told the Gallardos that ther e wa s no contrac t and no deal, a nd beca use there was no c ontrac t, the missing money belong ed to the Ga llardos; not Hoy Fox Toy ota. On the se cond day of trial, howe ver, the following exchang e occ urre d betwee n Ms. Rubio and the State’s counsel upon r edire ct examination: Q. At the point in tim e at whic h the money came into the hands of the defe ndant, at that instant, who did the money belongto? A. To the dea lership.-8-

Q. An d why

do y ou say that? A. A customer pur chase d a vehic le and the mone y was turne d in to our salesman.

. . . Q. Did it belong to Ms. Of elia any longe r? A. No, sir. Q. Ok ay . A nd

why no t? A. Be cause it was g iven to our employ ee. Q. An d whe re sh ou ld t he mon e y have g on e at th at po int ? A. He should have taken the c ustomer to financ e so that money could be re c e ipt e d a

nd do the pr op e r –

the pr op e r d oc ume ntatio n w itha re c e ipt
. Q. Okay . So is i t fair to say it should have g one into the hands of the deale rship? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did it come into the hands of the de aler ship? A. No, sir. Q. Now, y esterda

y when you wer e testifying in c ross-examination Ibelieve y ou said something dif

fer ent alongthe lines of ther e wa s no contrac t and the re fo re it w a sn ’t

the de a le rs hip ’s mon e y . A m I re me mbe ri ngthat r ig ht? A. Yes, sir. Q. Ok ay . Wa s th at c or re c t? A. No. Q. Ok ay . D id you

me an to sa

y that? A
. N o tr e a l l y. Q. Okay . Why

was it that y ou said what you said?-9-

A. B e c a

us e Iwa s n e rv ou s. L ater , when a sked by

the State’s counse l as to who the $6,000 belong ed to “[a]t the moment the money

came into the defe ndant’s hands . . .,” Ms. Rubio responded: “To the deale rship beca

use he’ s our employ ee.” B a se d o n th e e vid e nc e , th e jur y c ou ld h ave re a so na

bly c on c lud e d th at H oy

F ox To y ota was the owner of

the $6,000 down pay

ment, as def

ined under

the Penal Code, such that Appellant’s a

ppropriation of, or

exercise of

control over , the $6,000 without the deale rship’s consent wa s unlawful. SeeT EX .P EN .C ODE ANN . § 1. 07 (a )( 35 )( A) ; So wde rs v . S tate , 693 S.W .2d 44 8, 45 1- 52 (T e x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 85 )( ho ldi ngthat th e c ounty tr e a sure r h a d a

g re ate r r ig ht t o possession of ce rtain tax revenue than did appellant, who w as employ ed by the county

tax office
as a c lerk a

nd who pocke ted the re venue instea d of turningit over to the county trea surer , beca use the money

passed into the county ’s possession as soon as it came into the appellant’ s po sse ssi on ). Vi e we d in

the light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he ve rd ic t, w e c on c lud e a ratio na l jury

c ou ld have de termined be y ond a re asonable doubt that Hoy Fox Toy ota was the owner of the $6,000, with a g reater right to possession of the $6,000 than Appellant. Ac cording ly , the evidenc e wa s leg ally sufficie nt to support the jury ’s ver dict. I ssue One is ove rruled. Ha vin gov e rr

ule d App e lla

nt’ s so le iss ue , w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.
August 3, 2011 DAVI D WEL L I NGTONCHEW, C hief Just ice B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d R i v e r a , JJ. (Do Not Publish)