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EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE

REFORM ACT OF 2005

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, THE INTERNET, 

AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

H.R. 435

MAY 23, 2006

Serial No. 109–126

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin, Chairman 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida

PHILIP G. KIKO, General Counsel-Chief of Staff 

PERRY H. APELBAUM, Minority Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, THE INTERNET, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

LAMAR SMITH, Texas, Chairman

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California

BLAINE MERRITT, Chief Counsel 

DAVID WHITNEY, Counsel 

JOE KEELEY, Counsel 

RYAN VISCO, Counsel 

SHANNA WINTERS, Minority Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

MAY 23, 2006

OPENING STATEMENT 

Page 

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property .................................................................................................... 1

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Courts, the 

Internet, and Intellectual Property .................................................................... 2

WITNESSES 

Mr. Ryan W. Bounds, Chief of Staff, Office of Legal Policy, Department 

of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6

Mr. Michael Farris, J.D., Chairman and General Counsel, Home School Legal 

Defense Association 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 16

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17

Mr. Jonathan Hiatt, General Counsel, American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organizations, AFL-CIO 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 21

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 23

Mr. James M. Knott, Sr., President and Chairman of the Board, Riverdale 

Mills Corporation 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 34

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 35

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Courts, the 

Internet, and Intellectual Property .................................................................... 45

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary .......... 47

Statement of the Honorable Edwin Meese III, Ronald Reagan Distinguished 

Fellow in Public Policy and Chairman, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, The Heritage Foundation .............................................................................. 49

News Alert from the National Association of Manufacturers .............................. 55

A Dear Colleague from the United States Senate on Organizations supporting 

the Equal Access to Justice Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 435/S. 2017 ................. 56

Statement of the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, Chairman, U.S. House 

of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business ................. 59

Supplemental Statement of the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, Chairman, 

U.S. House of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business ........................................................................................................................ 83

Letter from Colby M. May, Director, American Center for Law & Justice 

to the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business ...................................... 90

Page

IV

Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director LaShawn Warren, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberities Union .................................................................. 91

Letter from Richard Lessner, Ph.D., Executive Director, The American Conservative Union to the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business ........................... 92

Letter from Richard Haught, D.D.S., President and James B. Bramson, 

D.D.S., Executive Director, American Dental Association to the Honorable 

Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business .................................................................................... 93

Letter from Michael D. Maves, MD, MBA, American Medical Association 

to the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Representatives, and 

Chairman, Committee on Small Business ......................................................... 95

Letter to Susan Steinman, Linda Lipsen, Daniel Cohen, Association of Trial 

Lawyers of America from the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House 

of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business ................. 96

Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President, Government Affairs, 

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of American to the Honorable 

Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Represetatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business .................................................................................... 97

Letter from the Honorable Edwin Meese III, Ronald Reagan Distinguished 

Fellow in Public Policy and Chairman, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, The Heritage Foundation to the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. 

House of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business ..... 98

Letter from J. Michael Smith, Esq., President, National Center for Home 

Education to the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business ........................................ 99

Letter from Jim Covington III, Director of Legislative Affairs, Illinois State 

Bar Association to the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business ........................... 100

Letter from Wade Henderson, Executive Director and Nancy Zirkin, Deputy 

Director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to the Honorable 

Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business and the Honorable Earl Blumenauer, Member 

of Congress, U.S. House of Representatives ...................................................... 101

Letter from Hilary O. Shelton, Director, Washington Bureau, National 

Assosication for the Advancement of Colored People to the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee 

on Small Business and the Honorable Earl Blumenauer, Member of Congress, U.S. House fo Representatives ................................................................. 103

Letter from John Engler, President and CEO, the National Assosciation of 

Manufacturers to the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business ........................... 105

Letter from Dan Danner, Senior Vice President, Federal Public Policy, The 

National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) to the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee 

on Small Business ................................................................................................ 106

Letter from Drew Caputo, Senior Attorney, The Natural Resources Defense 

Counsel to the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business and the Earl 

Blumenauer, Member of Congress, U.S. House of Representatives ................ 107

Letter from Patrick Gallagher, Director of Environmental Law, Sierra Club 

to the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Representatives, and 

Chairman, Committee on Small Business and the Honorable Earl 

Blumenauer, Member of Congress, U.S. House of Represenatives .................. 108

Letter from the Small Business Equal Access to Justice Coalition to the 

Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Judiciary Committee .................................................................................................................... 109

Letter from J. William Lauderback, Executive Vice President, The American 

Conservative Union to the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House 

of Representatives, and Chairman, Committee on Small Business ................. 111

Letter from Caroline Fredrickson, Director, LaShawn Warren, Legislative 

Counsel, American Civil Liberities Union, to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives, House Judiciary 

Committee and the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, Ranking Member, House Judiciary Committee .................................................................................................................... 113

Page

V

Letter from the Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, U.S. House of Representatives and Chairman, Committee on Small Business and the Honorable 

Earl Blumenauer, Member of Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, 

the Honorable Olympia Snowe, Chair, Committee on Small Business and 

Entrepreneurship, United States Senate, and the Honorable Russell Feingold, United States Senate to the Honorable Arlen Specter, Senate Judiciary and the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House 

Judiciary Committee ............................................................................................ 115

Statement of the Honorable Earl Blumenauer, Member of Congress, U.S. 

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 119

(1)

EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE

REFORM ACT OF 2005

TUESDAY, MAY 23, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, THE INTERNET, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:07 p.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Lamar Smith 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The Committee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property will come to order 

I believe all of our witnesses are here. I am going to recognize 

myself for an opening statement, then the Ranking Member. And 

all other Members’ opening statements will, without objection, be 

made a part of the record. 

During the debates that preceded the Constitution’s ratification, 

James Madison wrote in the Federalist Number 51: 

‘‘In framing a government which is to be administered by men 

over men, the great difficulty lies in this,—you must first enable 

the government to control the governed; and in the next place 

oblige it to control itself. 

Today, our Subcommittee will examine the effectiveness of a law, 

the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980, known as EAJA, which 

was enacted by Congress for the purpose of getting the Federal 

Government to control itself. 

The legislative purpose behind EAJA was characterized in the 

2004 case of Scarborough versus Principi. Writing for the Court, 

Justice Ginsburg stated: 

‘‘Congress enacted EAJA in 1980 to eliminate the barriers that 

prohibit small businesses and individuals from securing vindication 

of their rights in civil actions and administrative proceedings 

brought by or against the Federal Government. . . .[Its] aim was 

to ensure that certain individuals [and] organizations will not be 

deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unjustified 

governmental action because of the expense involved.’’ The purpose of EAJA was to shift the expense of defending 

against unreasonable or overzealous government conduct from the 

backs of individuals and small entities to the Federal Government, 

which, in some cases, had initiated and pursued the wrongful action. 

According to an estimate by the Congressional Research Service, 

there are approximately 200 fee shifting statutes that Congress has 

2

enacted as exceptions to the general rule that each litigant in a 

lawsuit ought to bear the expense of their own legal fees. 

While EAJA’s purpose is similar to other fee shifting statutes, its 

precise language, unique restrictions, and historical application 

have caused many to conclude that the law offers a ‘‘false hope’’ of 

recovery to the vast majority of citizens who are harmed by unreasonable Federal action. 

Despite initial estimates by the Department of Justice that its 

enactment would lead to a $500 million liability over its first 3 

years, a 1998 GAO report could only substantiate $3.9 million in 

costs over that period and a $34 million expense over the first 13 

years that the law was on the books. 

When combined with concerns that EAJA has been interpreted 

in a manner that is inconsistent with Congress original intent, this 

record has caused a large number of diverse organizations to unite 

in a call for reform. 

Organizations as ideologically diverse as the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Conservative Union, the American 

Trial Lawyers Association, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 

have endorsed efforts to amend EAJA. 

EAJA was enacted to ensure that agencies of the Federal Government take seriously Mr. Madison’s imperative that the Government ought to be obliged to control itself. However, not everyone 

agrees that reforms are warranted, and that is why this hearing 

will be of special interest. 

That concludes my opening remarks. And the gentleman from 

California, Mr. Berman, is recognized for his. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling the hearing. 

While this issue has come up before the Subcommittee in the 

past, we once again have an opportunity to engage in fresh discussions. Congress enacted the Equal Access to Justice Act in 1980 as 

a means of ensuring both individuals and organizations the right 

to effective counsel in vindicating important civil rights and civil 

liberties protections. 

Congress presumably sought to achieve three interconnected 

goals through the EAJA: one, to provide an incentive for private 

parties to contest government overreach; two, to deter subsequent 

government wrongdoing, and; finally, to provide more complete 

compensation for citizens injured by government action. 

Since in most suits the government is the deep pocket and can 

marshal more resources in litigation than most private non-institutional parties, private parties may not be able to afford protracted 

litigation against the government. 

The goal of the Equal Access to Justice Act was to make the justice system more accessible to individuals of modest means, small 

businesses, and nonprofit organizations, by allowing the recovery of 

their attorney fees when they prevail in disputes with the Federal 

Government. 

The ability to obtain attorneys fees is most often found in civil 

rights, environmental protection and consumer protection statues 

in order to help equalize contests between the Federal Government 

and private parties. But the Equal Access to Justice Act does not 

3

function in exactly the same way as those fee shifting provisions 

do. 

Prevailing here in litigation does not automatically result in an 

award of attorneys fees. We will hear more about those criteria and 

how we are changing those criteria, I would think, in the hearing. 

Although this act has been an important step in providing access 

to counsel, concerns have been raised regarding the substantial justification defense. Although I also have heard concerns raised about 

removing the substantial justification defense. I look forward to 

hearing more about that in this hearing. The hourly cap rate on attorneys fees of $125, and what constitutes a small business. Even though EAJA has arguably approved the accessibility of the justice system for small parties, we 

should discuss whether potential barriers remain and what 

changes, if any, should be made to the mechanism used to determine the recovery of fees. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like also to thank the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, and the gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff, 

for being in attendance today at this hearing. I, furthermore, want 

to recognize the gentleman who actually wrote the legislation on 

which we are having the hearing today and that is the gentleman 

from Illinois, Mr. Manzullo, for stopping by and joining us as well. 

And I may well be asking questions on his behalf when we get 

to that point. But I appreciate his initiative and his leadership in 

regard to writing this legislation and seeing it to the point where 

we are now having a hearing on it. 

Before we hear from our witnesses today I would like to invite 

you to stand and be sworn in if you would. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. SMITH. Our first witness is Ryan Bounds, chief of staff in the 

Office of Legal Policy at the Department of Justice. In that capacity, he assists the Assistant Attorney General for legal policy in developing and coordinating the Department’s views on potential improvements in the civil justice system. 

Before joining the Office of Legal Policy in 2004, Mr. Bounds 

served as an associate at a law firm and as a clerk to a circuit 

court judge. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Stanford University 

and a JD from Yale Law School. 

Our second witness is Michael Farris, who is chairman and general counsel to the Home School Legal Defense Association, an organization with 80,000 member families that he founded in 1983. 

Mr. Farris is a Constitutional lawyer with extensive appellate experience in the U.S. Supreme Court, seven U.S. circuit courts of appeal, and 10 State supreme courts. He is a prolific author who has 

written extensively on Constitutional law issues. 

Mr. Farris is an honors graduate of Gonzaga University School 

of Law. He received his BA degree in political science from Western 

Washington State College, now known as Western Washington 

University. 

Our next witness is Jonathan Hiatt, who is the general counsel 

of the AFL-CIO, a position in which he has served for 10 years. 

Prior to that, Mr. Hiatt served as the general counsel of the Service 

4

Employees International Union, and as a partner in a Boston-based 

union-side labor law firm. 

Mr. Hiatt is a graduate of Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California Berkeley, and Harvard College. 

Our final witness is James Knott, who is the President and CEO 

of Riverdale Mills Corporation. Riverdale Mills Corporation is in 

Northbridge, Massachusetts. 

Mr. Knott also serves on the board of directors of the National 

Association of Manufacturers. He studied mechanical engineering 

at Northeastern University and has an economics degree from Harvard. 

In addition, he has studied at the Harvard Business School, the 

Army War College, and was earlier this month awarded an honorary doctorate of science by the University of Maine. 

Mr. Knott will relate to the Members of the Subcommittee his 

own experience with an agency of the Federal Government that 

targeted him and his business based upon an anonymous tip, an 

experience that led to a criminal indictment and the threat of a 

$1.5 million penalty and 6 years in jail. 

Welcome to you all. We have your written statements, and without objection your entire written statements will be made a part of 

the record. But please limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes. 

And Mr. Bounds we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF RYAN BOUNDS, CHIEF OF STAFF, OFFICE OF 

LEGAL POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. BOUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, 

and other Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for allowing 

me to testify before you today with respect to the Justice Department’s views on H.R. 435, the Equal Access to Justice Reform Act. 

The Department of Justice opposes this bill. Before explaining 

why, I would like to emphasize that the Department shares the desire of H.R. 435’s proponents to reduce the burden that excessive 

litigation and unjust enforcement actions impose on small businesses and individuals and on the courts. 

Unfortunately, H.R. 435 will not advance this purpose. Indeed, 

the enactment of H.R. 435 would create perverse incentives for 

small businesses, non-profit organizations and individuals to file 

and to prolong lawsuits and for government agencies that are sued 

to adhere to rather than reconsider their positions in close cases. 

By expanding the number of parties who can recover attorneys 

fees under the act and the amount of fees that can be recovered, 

the bill would obviously make litigation with the government 

cheaper and more frequent. H.R. 435 would thus generate more 

litigation, not less, between the government on the one hand and 

small businesses, non-profit organizations, and individuals on the 

other. 

Ultimately, such reliance on lawsuits to guide government policymaking and enforcement decisions substitutes litigation for the political process, a policy that the Justice Department does not support. 

H.R. 435 will induce unwise litigation in more subtle ways as 

well. The bill requires the government to pay attorneys fees to a 

prevailing party even when the government’s action is substanVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:15 Sep 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\COURTS\052306\27743.000 HJUD2 PsN: 27743
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tially justified. Therefore, eligible parties will have a fairly good 

prospect of recovering attorneys fees in close cases, such as those 

involving new statutes or the application of existing law in novel 

situations. 

In such cases, eligible parties and the government will make 

equally informed predictions of judicial resolution of the issue, but 

eligible parties will have simple incentives to pursue litigation. 

They do not have to reimburse the government for its costs if they 

lose, and they have individualized stakes in the outcome. 

The Department strongly opposes this change not only because 

it would increase litigation, but because it does not reflect the reality that enforcing the law often requires making judgment calls 

in close cases. Where a government agency is required to pay attorneys fees in a substantial proportion of such cases, those agencies 

would simply be deterred from making close calls at all. The government would, at the margin, be relatively timid in enforcing the 

law, and private parties would exploit that timidity. For this very 

reason, Congress provided for a substantial justification defense 

under EAJA in the first place, noting that an automatic fee shifting 

rule would have a ‘‘chilling’’ effect on proper government enforcement efforts. 

To appreciate the perils of timidity, consider immigration enforcement. The Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to detain and to remove illegal aliens in the United States has generated more than 13,000 court cases in the last fiscal year as aliens 

sought to remain at large in the United States. 

The government loses some proportion of these cases even when 

its actions are substantially justified. This happened, for instance, 

in a 2001 case in which the government sought to remove an illegal 

alien who was revealed in classified evidence to have been involved 

in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. The alien successfully challenged the reliance on the classified evidence. By making 

the government pay attorneys fees in circumstances like these, 

which the government did not have to pay under EAJA as it is currently drafted, H.R. 435 will either discourage attempts at robust 

enforcement of immigration laws or divert resources from enforcement to paying for aliens’ attorneys. 

Neither result is consistent with seeking either to prevent illegal 

immigration or to combat terrorism. Every time as a deterrent for 

best law enforcement, H.R. 435 will induce agencies to stick to positions they would otherwise abandon in order to avoid liability for 

attorneys fees. This result stems from the bill’s expansion of the 

definition of a prevailing party entitled to fees to include any party 

whose claims against the government are catalysts for voluntary or 

unilateral changes in policies that the parties sought. 

If changing policy would be a part of the agency’s assessment, to 

be legally compelled, the agency will avoid making the change and 

paying potentially exorbitant attorneys fees. Instead, the agency 

will successfully conclude litigation and then change its policy for 

free. 

H.R. 435 would thus chill legitimate enforcement activity, encourage and prolong litigation with the government, and impose 

huge costs on agency budgets. The Department of Justice strongly 

opposes this legislation. 

6

In the end, political responsive oversight by the President and 

the Congress can more effectively restrain governmental overzealousness and intransigence in litigation and attorneys fees. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present the Department’s views 

on H.R. 435, and I am ready and willing to answer whatever questions you may have. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Bounds. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bounds follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RYAN W. BOUNDS


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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Farris. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL FARRIS, J.D., CHAIRMAN AND GENERAL COUNSEL, HOME SCHOOL LEGAL DEFENSE ASSOCIATION 

Mr. FARRIS. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Berman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify on 

H.R. 435, the Equal Access to Justice Reform Act of 2005. 

I am here today to speak in strong support of this bill. The Home 

School Legal Defense Association normally litigates against State 

and local governments. We often make claims under section 1988 

for attorneys fees when the State and local officials have violated 

either the Constitution or the civil rights statutes of the United 

States. 

We have never made an EAJA claim, and so, we appear today 

not in self-interest of any sort, but simply out of principle that the 

justice of the situation requires the Federal Government to essentially follow the same rules that State and local governments are 

expected to follow under section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act. 

This bill is about small parties having a chance in court against 

the Federal Government. It is about small parties having a chance 

to protect and defend their legal rights when they are violated by 

the Federal Government. This act is designed to fix the good intentions of the EAJA, but I would submit that the current law is terribly flawed. 

The reason it is flawed is basically in the use of the substantially 

justified rule, which imposes an artificial barrier on the ability to 

collect attorneys fees. Most people would say the common sense of 

the situation is, if you prove that the government has violated the 

law of the United States or the Constitution of the United States, 

the Federal Government simply ought to pay for the attorney fees 

of the prevailing party. That is not the case under this substantially justified rule. 

The intentions of the officials are weighed, and it imposes a barrier that is simply not in place in the case of State and local litigation. The ‘‘parade of horribles’’ that we hear against this legislation 

and the rare cases that are offered for justification for opposing 

this legislation would be true in principle, at least, in State and 

local governments as well. The State and local governments would 

be bankrupted in their ability to have legitimate law enforced, activities have been curtailed, or we simply make the State or local 

governments pay attorneys fees when it is proven that they violate 

the law or the Constitution of the United States. 

Just plain equity ought to say that the Federal Government 

ought to obey the same rules that it imposes on State and local 

governments. There is no moral justification for this Congress to 

impose a rule in State and local governments, that it is not willing 

to follow for itself. 

Now, State and local governments have to not only pay attorney 

fees whenever the other side is the prevailing party, they have to 

pay at market rates. The $125-an-hour rate for attorneys may have 

been the market rate at one point in time, or is a general approximation, but it is simply not the case anymore. You would not be 

able to pay in most law firms a brand new lawyer fresh out of law 

17

school at that rate, much less someone who has 20 or 30 years of 

experience. 

Again, it is one more burden upon the Federal Government 

shouldering its responsibilities when it has violated the law. Also, 

rather than encouraging litigation, this bill would discourage the 

ongoing pursuit of litigation when it is obvious who should win and 

who should lose. If the Federal Government is willing to say, okay, 

we violated the law, we are going to give you a consent decree or 

something like that, the incentive right now is to continue the case 

on to litigation, not take the consent decree because you lose your 

ability to recover attorney fees for all of the hundreds and perhaps 

thousands of hours that you have invested in the case. 

This promotes settlement. This promotes getting rid of the cases 

clogging our courts. And so the definition of prevailing party needs 

to be shifted so that the plaintiffs have an incentive to settle up 

their case and to get on with their life rather than simply litigating 

to the end for the sole reason of being able to recover their attorney 

fees. 

The thing that strikes me most of all is if there is this ‘‘parade 

of horribles’’ what it indicates is not that the Federal Government 

is going to have to pay all of these attorney’s fees, but there is an 

epidemic of illegal activity on the part of the Federal Government, 

that we are violating, our government is violating the Constitution 

of the United States, or the laws of the United States so often that 

we have to worry about how many millions of dollars in attorneys 

fees we are going to have to pay. 

I think that the incentive should be on the part, as the Chairman 

correctly read, from James Madison, the government, first of all, 

needs to obey the law. When it does not, it should have to pay the 

attorneys fees of those who have suffered in that illegal activity. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Farris. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farris follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. FARRIS

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Berman, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

My name is Michael P. Farris. Thank you for inviting me testify on H.R. 435, the 

Equal Access to Justice Reform Act of 2005. I am here today to speak in strong support of this bill. 

For the record, I founded and continue to serve as Chairman for the Home School 

Legal Defense Association (HSLDA), the largest home schooling organization in the 

nation. We represent over 80,000 member families, with approximately 320,000 children. We are informally affiliated with dozens of other home schooling organizations. It is estimated that there are over two million children being homeschooled 

in this country today. I am also the founding President of Patrick Henry College, 

where I teach constitutional law. Today, I speak only on behalf of HSLDA, a 501 

(c)(4) organization. 

This bill is about small parties having a chance in court against the Federal Government. It is about small parties having a chance to protect and defend their legal 

rights when they are violated by the Federal Government. The Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980 (EAJA) was designed with that purpose, but it is terribly flawed. 

H.R. 435 would fix it. 

The ability to pursue justice and fairness is not a partisan issue. Nor is this bill 

partisan. In fact, HSLDA is just one of many groups from across the political spectrum giving its strong support to this bill—groups ranging from the American Civil 

Liberties Union and Sierra Club to the Heritage Foundation and American Conservative Union to what appears to be the entire business community. The breadth and 

diversity of this support is rare, but not unique. 

18

In the early 1990s, I had the honor to be the co-chairman of the drafting committee for the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, which helped draft and 

pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). That Coalition was as 

broad as the present EAJA Coalition and had many of the same participants. It was 

gratifying to work side-by-side with attorneys from organizations I often face as opponents in the courtroom. While we disagreed and still disagree on the outcome of 

many cases, we share an unwavering commitment to the principle that the free exercise of religion should be treated as a fundamental freedom. 

We also share an unwavering commitment to the ability to assert and defend and 

protect such fundamental freedoms in the courts. That’s why we incorporated into 

the RFRA the Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988 (‘‘Section 1988’’), the primary fee-shifting statute against State and local governments, 

which allows prevailing parties under the RFRA to recover their attorneys’ fees at 

the end of the case. 

The Constitution serves as a restraint on government, not private parties. It protects some rights explicitly from government infringement. Other rights it protects 

implicitly by restraining the powers of the government. Many statutes serve similar 

purposes. When rights guaranteed by the Constitution and such statutes are infringed, the infringer always is the government. The party filing pleadings or taking 

action against you is the government. The party across the aisle in the courtroom 

is the government. The party threatening your freedoms is the government. 

Freedom means little if there is no real way to stop the government from violating 

the higher laws designed to restrain its power. But ordinary Americans cannot resist the government for very long. With its skilled litigators and virtually unlimited 

resources, the government can outlast most litigants. There must be a leveling 

mechanism that gives a small party at least a prayer against the government in 

court. 

Section 1988 was among the first of such leveling mechanisms. Congress passed 

it 1976 to protect people from violations of federal law by state and local governments. For 30 years, Section 1988 has provided attorney fee recovery against state 

and local governments in cases where those governments were proven to have violated the Federal Constitution or Federal statutes. For 30 years, it has provided a 

chance to withstand illegal action by State and local governments. For 30 years, it 

has been accepted by the state and local governments and administered by the 

courts without a fuss. As an example of federal policy, it stands as a model. It 

works. 

The way it works is simple. Section 1988 and similar ‘‘prevailing party fee-shifting 

statutes,’’ including EAJA, encourage competent attorneys to take good cases, meritorious cases, against the government on a contingency-fee basis—i.e., by providing 

legal services throughout the case at no cost to the client in the hopes of recovering 

legal fees at the end of the hopefully-successful case. The calculation that every attorney must make at the outset is this: Can I afford to represent this client who 

is being pursued wrongfully by the government but cannot come close to paying my 

hourly rates or monthly bills, especially when I know that 1) the government can 

expend great resources and drag out the case, 2) there is no guarantee I’ll win in 

the end and therefore ever recover any of my fees, 3) the government will manage 

to get any fee award reduced well below the fees I actually incur, and 4) I’ll have 

to carry any hope of fee recovery for potentially many years. 

Such fee recovery statutes encourage only appropriate litigation. Few attorneys in 

their right minds would take such a case unless they were reasonably confident of 

winning in the end, becoming eligible to attempt to collect at least part of his fees. 

Therefore, such statutes provide hope for parties who suffer actual wrongs at the 

hands of the government, they bring accountability to erring government officials, 

and they help refine public policy through useful adjudication. No such statute ever 

inspires the filing of a frivolous claim or defense, or even a ‘‘close’’ or marginal one. 

In the vast majority of cases, the case is not filed unless it has considerable merit—

that is, where the government is pretty clearly wrong and acting illegally. Otherwise, it is rarely worth the risk in terms of time and treasure. Most attorneys have 

to earn a living and can afford to take very few cases pro bono-especially lengthy, 

complex cases against the government. They need a chance to get paid. 

Thus, the cases and defenses encouraged by such statutes are precisely the kind 

of cases that everyone would agree should be brought. 

And Congress did agree. Just four years after passing Section 1988, Congress 

passed the EAJA to serve as a fee recovery counterpart applicable to the Federal 

Government—where the federal law violator was the Federal Government. Under 

the EAJA, the Federal Government would be held to account for its violations of 

the federal Constitution and federal laws, much as the State and local governments 

have been held to account under Section 1988. But EAJA is very different. 

19

Under Section 1988, a prevailing party against a State or local government recovers attorneys’ fees in any case where the party succeeds in an important respect. 

When that party ‘‘prevails,’’ it becomes eligible for attorney fee recovery and submits 

a fee application documenting the legal services provided. The courts determine the 

amount of fees to be awarded, based on what the court determines to be reasonable 

in the case and based on local market rates that the court determines to be appropriate for the kind and quality of legal services provided. 

Under Section 1988, there is no escape clause that enables the State or local government to avoid paying attorneys fees to the prevailing party. There is no size 

standard for eligible parties. There is no rate cap on the hourly rates for the legal 

services provided. 

Under the EAJA, there is each of these and many other unjustifiable differences. 

First, EAJA has size standards. EAJA applies only to small parties defined as 

small businesses with up to 500 employees and a net worth of up to $7,000,000, 

nonprofit charitable organizations with up to 500 employees, and individuals with 

a net worth of up to $2,000,000. But H.R. 435 takes no issue with EAJA having 

size standards (applying only to small parties). Nor do I. 

Second, EAJA contains an escape clause for the Federal Government even after 

it loses a case, having been proven to have violated Federal law. It’s called ‘‘substantial justification.’’ Prevailing small parties must argue in their fee applications—

after winning their case—that the legal position taken by the Federal Agency in the 

case was not ‘‘substantially justified.’’

In other words, the prevailing small party must win again. While the burden of 

proof may technically be on the Federal agency to show that its position was indeed 

substantially justified, in reality it is the prevailing small party that must overcome 

this hurdle. Regardless, the ‘‘substantial justification’’ defense initiates in every case 

a second, lengthy series of legal proceedings that rehash the merits of the case. 

A few minutes of electronic research of cases involving the EAJA confirm what 

many in this hearing room already know. That is, in a great many cases, after years 

of litigating and following multiple appeals, a party that has won a final judgment 

in its favor is still determined ineligible for fee recovery on the theory that the Federal Government’s position, although proven illegal, was not so unreasonable or abusive as to be ‘‘not substantially justified.’’

Third, EAJA contains a cap on hourly rates for legal services of $125. Indexed for 

inflation, many courts now award up to $150 per hour. Such a rate—whether $125 

or $150 or something in between—is far below market rates, especially for complex 

and usually contingent litigation against the federal government. In the major legal 

markets where such litigation often occurs such as New York, Boston, Washington, 

Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, the typical hourly rates range from $200 to 

$750. The EAJA rate will not pay for the most recent law school graduate, let alone 

an experienced attorney. 

This rate cap represents a significant disincentive to qualified attorneys to take 

good cases against the federal government. Perhaps because it is so counterproductive, this kind of rate cap has no counterpart in fee shifting against state and 

local governments under Section 1988, which employs a ‘‘reasonable hourly’’ or 

‘‘market’’ rate. Indeed, EAJA itself employs a ‘‘market’’ rate. EAJA states that ‘‘the 

amount of fees awarded under this section shall be based upon prevailing market 

rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished.’’ But then it caps this rate 

by way of exception: ‘‘except that . . . attorney or agent fees shall not be awarded 

in excess of $125 per hour.’’ H.R. 435 simply would remove that exception, which 

leads to absurd results. 

Let me give just one example. In a case called Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140 

(9th Cir. 2001), where social security claimants prevailed against both the federal 

Social Security Administration and relevant state agencies, the court awarded market rates under Section 1988 against the state agencies but had to award much 

lower rates under EAJA against the federal agency—for the same federal law violations in the same case. This cap is a big disadvantage for small parties in disputes 

with Federal agencies. 

Thus, at the outset, the attorney must know whether the client is being pursued 

by the Federal Government or by a State or local government. If the violation of 

Federal law is by a State or local government, the attorney stands a good chance 

of recovering his fees under Section 1988. If the very same Federal law violation 

is by the Federal Government, he stands a very good chance of receiving nothing 

or very little at the end of a long case even if he wins it completely. 

Put yourself in this attorney’s shoes. In a typical situation, a client comes in with 

a very sympathetic case and very little financial resources. The attorney listens long 

enough to determine that the client’s rights under the Constitution very likely were 

20

violated. But the government agency involved is Federal. This means several things 

to the attorney. 

First, the Federal Government has more resources than any other government, 

can maintain the case for years, and is filled with competent attorneys who sometimes seek to win at any cost. Federal attorneys often worry about reputation and 

career advancement, as do their private sector counterparts. They also often seek 

to ‘‘make law’’ or create precedents quickly, which often means pressing cases rapidly against those who cannot hire entire law firms to fight back. 

Second, the Federal Government, even at the end of a long case that it has soundly lost, will almost never concede liability for attorneys’ fees. Under EAJA, it certainly will claim that its position, although proven illegal, was substantially justified. This will prolong the litigation by many months or even years, requiring the 

attorney to re-litigate the merits of the case and carry his hope for eventual fee recovery that much longer. 

Third, the attorney knows that, even if he can overcome the substantial justification defense, EAJA will cap his hourly rate at $125 (or $150)—which happens to 

be just half of his regular hourly rate. Which means that, even if he soundly wins, 

not once but twice (on the merits and again during fee recovery phase), he will get, 

at the very most, half the fees he incurred. 

Fourth, he knows that in every fee recovery case under any fee recovery statute 

the government always objects to most services provided—e.g., there were many attorneys involved who spent too much time on this service or that one. He knows 

the government will seek, and the court will agree, to strike any legal services not 

directly related to the winning claims or defenses—even though the attorney was 

obliged, ethically and in good faith, to assert all reasonable claims and defenses on 

the behalf of the client (and not just the ones that hindsight will reveal to have been 

winners). He knows he will get ‘‘nickeled and dimed’’ to death—and this is his best 

case scenario. 

And this ignores the possibility that the Federal Government will concede the 

case before a judge can rule on the merits, which will deprive the attorney of any 

fee recovery at all. After years of litigating a case, the Federal Government may decide to throw in the towel and drop its enforcement action against the client, repeal 

or modify a regulatory action that had burdened the client, or otherwise provide the 

relief sought by the client. The government may do this for many reasons. Maybe 

it has grown weary of the case or moved beyond it in terms of office agenda or policy. Maybe it has become convinced of its error. Or maybe it expects to lose and 

wishes to avoid the embarrassment of an adverse court judgment and/or payment 

of attorneys’ fees. Under current court precedents, the attorney recovers nothing, 

even if he was working the case for many years and even if he clearly was succeeding and would have won a court judgment in time. 

In sum, the attorney knows that, if he’s very lucky, some years later and probably 

without recovering any interest for lost time, he will get about one-third of the fees 

he incurred years earlier from a case he thoroughly and completely won. Again, this 

is his best case scenario. 

Contrast the very same case against a State or local government. Under Section 

1988, if he wins, he will recover his fees at the going market rate—which in the 

real world is usually the rate he routinely charges his paying clients—i.e., the rate 

the market will bear for an attorney of his skills providing certain services in the 

particular location. No substantial justification defense. No rate cap. No Federal 

Government resources to fight indefinitely. No other nonsense under EAJA. 

Because the case would be against the Federal Government, in our scenario, the 

attorney gives his regrets to the prospective client and tries to encourage him and 

give him a referral. Thus, a case that definitely should be brought, could be brought, 

only if the wrongdoer was a State or local government, not the Federal Government. 

This happens all the time. 

And it is complete nonsense. Section 1988 has worked very well for 30 years. It 

has been administered fairly and without fuss and it has not bankrupted any State 

or local treasuries. Nor has it caused any severe hardships on State or local treasuries. There is no reason for EAJA to retain these counterproductive differences. 

The same Federal legislature (Congress) that passed that passed Section 1988 

passed the EAJA only four years later. But Congress filled EAJA with new and 

unique exceptions and loopholes, making it much harder for litigants to recover fees 

against the Federal Government. This results in gross disincentives for small parties to attempt to resist illegal Federal actions. It results in gross disparity in accountability to Federal law among the different levels of government in the United 

States, giving the Federal Government a pass. And it should be remedied now. 

21

I therefore urge this Committee, and this Congress, to act swiftly to pass H.R. 

435, the Equal Access to Justice Reform Act. Thank you for you time and consideration of this important matter.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Hiatt. 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN HIATT, GENERAL COUNSEL, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL 

ORGANIZATIONS, AFL-CIO 

Mr. HIATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member. I am 

Jonathan Hiatt on behalf of the AFL-CIO. We oppose this bill as 

currently drafted. We believe it would seriously weaken enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act, of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, of the Fair Labor Standards Act, of the Mine 

Safety Health Act and other labor and employment laws, but also 

housing laws, consumer protection laws, environmental and other 

laws that are enacted to promote the public welfare. 

Our written testimony focuses on two major sets of concerns: 

One, the elimination of the requirement that to be eligible for the 

award of attorney fees, a prevailing party has to show that the government’s position was not substantially justified, and the other, 

the size requirement, increasing of the size requirement for eligibility as a so-called small business, the increase which would effectively bring 98 percent of all U.S. firms within that definition. 

I want to focus primarily on the first of these concerns concerning the substantially justified standard. This standard applies 

in two distinct sets of circumstances, and I think it is very important to make that destinction especially in connection with the 

other—with the points that the other witnesses have made. The 

first is where the government is a defendant, that is where a private party is claiming that the government has engaged in wrongdoing or has violated—has acted illegally by denying a benefit or 

violating a Federal right, and the second is where the government 

is acting as a public prosecutor where the government has brought 

an action against a private party to enforce a Federal law, and the 

private party has prevailed. 

Those two sets of circumstances involve very different sets of concerns, and removing the substantially justified standard would impact the two types of cases in very different ways. 

In the first, where the private party is the plaintiff and the government is found to have acted illegally, making attorneys fees 

automatically available to the prevailing party would penalize the 

government for wrongful conduct, would deter future misconduct, 

would make it easier for plaintiff’s rights who have been violated 

to gain access, and we do not disagree with the NAACP, with the 

Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, with the ACLU, with prior 

witnesses who believe that that change may very well serve a salutary public purpose. But in the second case, where the government 

is the public prosecutor, you have a situation somewhat different 

from 1988, and the case of a State and local government law, there 

is no issue of the government having acted illegally, no issue of the 

government having violated private parties’ rights. To the contrary, 

to where the government brings an action that is substantially justified, it is doing exactly what Congress intended. 

22

In the case of the National Labor Relations Act, for example, the 

Board’s General Counsel brings an unfair labor practice complaint 

only if he or she believes that there has been reasonable cause to 

believe that the law has been violated. The same with the Fair 

Housing Act, with the Americans with Disabilities Act, with the 

Agriculture Fair Practices Act, with various whistleblower laws 

and so on. 

So, perversely, the premise of this proposed law is that agencies 

enforcement responsibilities like the NLRB should be deterred even 

where there is a substantial justification for believing that the law 

has been violated. 

And indeed the result, we believe, would be a very loud message 

to agencies only to bring complaints where they are absolutely certain to prevail and would have many of the effects that Mr. Bounds 

described. 

For example, the impact on the Department of Labor in bringing 

minimum wage or overtime actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act or fiduciary duty violation actions under ERISA would be 

subdued, and not just in labor and employment laws, but where 

there is substantial justification to believe that companies are putting unsafe products on store shelves, or where the SEC was substantially justified in believing that a company is bilking its investors, or where EPA is substantially justified in believing that a 

company has violated pollution regulations. 

Those are not the kinds of situations where automatic attorney’s 

fees should go to the prevailing party unless the government is 

found to not have had substantial justification in bringing its action. 

Meanwhile, it is hardly as if—and I hope that the Committee 

will keep this in mind—that it is hardly as if that Federal agencies 

are currently being overly aggressive in the enforcement of regulatory statutes. If anything, we believe the current problem is one 

of underenforcement. Since we submitted our written testimony, 

five more miners died—six more miners have died under a statute 

that is so weak in its enforcement that the average violation for serious and substantial violations is $156 and where there has been 

a reduction of 190 full-time inspectors in the last 5 years. 

Lastly, with respect to the definition of small business, as I mentioned at the beginning, the notion that somehow extending special 

relief to small businesses defined in a way that would bring 98 percent of all firms in the United States within that definition, we believe, is not what Congress must have in mind; and moreover, we 

have cited in our written testimony a good deal of evidence showing 

the disproportionate violations that take place in small business 

and ask that the Committee be mindful of that. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Hiatt. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hiatt follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JON HIATT


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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Knott. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES M. KNOTT, SR., PRESIDENT AND 

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, RIVERDALE MILLS CORPORATION 

Mr. KNOTT. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith and Members of 

the Subcommittee. I thank you for the opportunity to testify before 

you today on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers 

about the need for H.R. 435, the Equal Access to Justice Reform 

Act of 2005. H.R. 435 would update and improve the Equal Access 

to Justice Act. 

My name is James M. Knott, Sr. I am the Founder and President 

of Riverdale Mills Corporation. In addition, I serve on the board of 

directors of the NAM, and I have been in the manufacturing business in Massachusetts since October 1, 1956. 

The National Association of Manufacturers is the Nation’s largest industrial trade association, representing small and large manufacturers in every industrial sector and in all 50 States. Through 

its direct membership and affiliate organization—the Council of 

Manufacturing Associations, the Employer Association Group and 

the State Associations Group—it represents more than 100,000 

manufacturers. 

I believe my story demonstrates why a small company needs the 

protections of the EAJA when it challenges the Goliath called the 

United States government. 

Simply put, the government has a lot of resources and is loathe 

to admit to mistakes when it takes action against a company. The 

history of the EAJA shows that government takes a very dim view 

of granting requests for reimbursement and thus it has been underutilized. 

I came here today to tell you about what the EPA did to my company, Riverdale Mills Corporation, founded in 1979 in an abandoned mill building in the economically depressed town of 

Northbridge, Massachusetts. 

However, telling you about that event in which the EPA falsified 

evidence to get me indicted for a felony that carried the penalty of 

a $1.5 million fine and 6 years of my life in jail would take much 

longer than the 5 minutes I can speak here today. Therefore, what 

I would like to do today is to ask you to go to the Riverdale Mills 

Corporation Web site at www.riverdale.com and look at ‘‘news.’’

There you can see a 60-Minute show about how the EPA people falsified the evidence with which to put me out of business. 

The fact that the evidence was falsified was proven in Worcester 

Federal court, and the U.S. Justice Department asked the judge to 

dismiss the case. I sued the EPA for falsifying the evidence and severely damaging the company. The judge found in my favor and 

awarded me and my company damages of only about 20 percent of 

the actual out-of-pocket costs. 

However, in my case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately determined that neither my company nor I were eligible for 

reimbursement under the Hyde amendment, overturning the ruling 

of the district court that my company was entitled to reimbursement. The Hyde amendment is a special provision dealing with 

criminal rather than civil prosecutions and sets a higher standard 

for reimbursement. 

35

Since the Supreme Court of the United States denied my case in 

a writ of certiorari, I will not use that forum to argue the First Circuit Court’s decision was in error. But I think it is very important 

for the Subcommittee to learn what a small business faces when 

a U.S. Government agency decides that it is going to go after a 

company on charges even when they emanated from an anonymous 

tip and there was no true basis for prosecution. 

When I bought the abandoned mill to manufacture plastic-coated 

zinc-galvanized welded wire mesh to be used to make traps for the 

New England lobster fishing industry, the only habitable portion of 

the mill was 20,000 square feet. 

Today, after adding nine additions, it is about 372,000 square 

feet and employs about 100 people. Twenty to 25 percent of its 

products are shipped out of the U.S.A. To Canada, Europe and 

South America. 

As you will see in the 60-Minute show, on the 7th of November, 

1997, 21 EPA personnel swarmed into my offices, many of them 

with pistols holstered on their hips and they announced they were 

going to do a search and seizure. They seized about 7 and a half 

feet of documents, 95 percent of which had nothing whatsoever to 

do with the Riverdale Mill wastewater treatment plant, as they 

were authorized to seize. 

I see that it is time to stop, and I would be delighted to answer 

any questions that you might have. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Knott. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Knott follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES M. KNOTT, SR. 

Chairman Smith and members of the subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and 

Intellectual Property, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on 

behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) about the need for H.R. 

435, the Equal Access to Justice Reform Act of 20005. H.R. 435 would update and 

improve the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). My name is James Knott, Sr., and 

I am president and chief executive officer of Riverdale Mills Corporation. In addition, I serve on the Board of Directors of the NAM and have been in the manufacturing business in Massachusetts since October 21, 1956. 

The National Association of Manufacturers is the nation’s largest industrial trade 

association representing small and large manufacturers in every industrial sector 

and in all 50 states. Through its direct membership and affiliate organizations—the 

Council of Manufacturing Associations, the Employer Association Group and the 

State Associations Group—it represents more than a hundred thousand manufacturers. 

I believe that my story demonstrates why a small company needs the protections 

of the EAJA when it challenges the Goliath of the United States government. Simply put, the government has a lot of resources, and is loathe to admit to mistakes 

when it takes action against a company. The history of the EAJA shows that the 

government takes a very dim view of granting requests for reimbursement and thus 

it has been underutilized. 

In my case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately determined that neither 

I nor my company were eligible for reimbursement under the Hyde Amendment. It 

is important to note, however, that this decision overturned the ruling of the District Court that my company was entitled to reimbursement, although even that 

award was far below my company’s out-of-pocket expenses. The Hyde Amendment 

is a special provision dealing with criminal rather than civil prosecutions and sets 

a higher standard for reimbursement. Since the Supreme Court of the United States 

denied my case a writ of certiorari, I will not use this forum to argue the First Circuit’s decision was in error. But, I think it is very important for the subcommittee 

to learn what a small business faces when the U.S. government decides that it is 

going to go after a company on charges, even when they emanated from an anonymous tip and where there is no true basis for prosecution. 

36

I started a manufacturing business called Coatings Engineering Corporation, the 

day after I was honorably discharged from the United States Army where I served 

two years of active duty in Oklahoma, Texas and Louisiana as the Motor Officer 

in the 91st Armored Field Artillery Battalion. As the Battalion Motor Officer, a position normally filled by a Major, not a Second Lieutenant, I received a Meritorious 

Service medal for having 365 of the best-maintained wheeled and tracked vehicles 

in the 1st Armored Division. 

The building I started the business in was built in 1858 on the Charles River in 

South Natick, Massachusetts. It had fallen into serious disrepair, in need of windows, doors and patches on the roof to stop rainwater from flooding its interior. All 

of those things were done, the business boomed and, six years later I sold the growing and successful business to a large manufacturer of wire fencing headquartered 

in Georgetown Connecticut, The Gilbert & Bennett Manufacturing Company. I managed it for them for 16 years, and in 1978 I decided it was time to start over; I 

bought an abandoned mill building, originally built in 1852, which straddled the 

Blackstone River in the village of Riverdale, part of the Town of Northbridge, an 

economically-depressed area, about 13 miles Southeast of Worcester, Massachusetts. 

I bought the abandoned mill to manufacture plastic-coated, zinc-galvanized, welded-wire-mesh, to be used to make traps for the New England lobster fishing industry. The only habitable part of the mill was about 20,000 square feet; it was there 

that I designed and built the machinery to make the product and I began producing 

it in 1980. Today, after adding nine additions to the mill it now is about 372,000 

square feet in area and employs about 100 people; 20 to 25% of its products are 

shipped out of the USA to Canada, Europe and South America. 

On the 7th of November 1997, I was sitting in my office at the mill talking on 

the telephone, when a local patrolman walked into the lobby followed by a man in 

a black jacket with the word POLICE on its back in large white letters. Within a 

few seconds the lobby was filled with 21 similarly attired men, many of them carrying pistols holstered on their belts. 

I got off the telephone, went out into the lobby and said, ‘‘What’s going on here?’’ One of the EPA people detached himself from the group and said, ‘‘We are looking 

for James Knott.’’ I said, ‘‘I am James Knott, what are you doing?’’ The EPA person 

said, ‘‘We are here to do a search and seizure.’’ I said, ‘‘Show me the warrant authorizing you to do this.’’ The EPA ‘‘CID (Criminal Investigation Division)’’ agent 

said, ‘‘We will leave you a copy when we leave.’’ I said, ‘‘If you don’t show me the 

warrant right now, I will call the police and have you removed from these premises.’’ Reluctantly, the agent gave me the warrant. I read it and learned that the 

EPA people had been authorized to search the premises and seize documents related 

to the operation of the Riverdale Mills Corporation Wastewater Treatment Plant. 

Seven hours later, the EPA people left the plant taking about seven feet of documents with them, only about 5% of which had anything whatsoever to do with the 

Wastewater Treatment Plant. Nine months later, on the 12th of August 1998, the 

indictment, with penalties of a $1.5 million fine and six years of my life in jail, was 

issued. 

I knew without any doubt that I had never discharged any acidic wastewaters to 

the publicly-owned sewer, but the problem was how to prove it and how could I bear 

the expenditure of time and money it would take. The first step was to examine 

logbooks kept by EPA inspectors who had tested wastewater discharges 17 days before the invasion. I hired a retired FBI Agent who was a handwriting expert and 

we went to the EPA offices in Boston. The retired FBI Agent was able to show me 

that the EPA inspectors who had tested the wastewaters 17 days before the invasion had found all of the discharges to the publicly-owned sewer to be the perfectly 

neutral pH of 7—neither acidic nor caustic. One of the 7’s had been altered to a 

4 and a number of other 7’s had been altered to 2’s with a ballpoint pen that embossed the alterations through the pages they were on and engraved them into the 

following pages. 

The next step was to confront the EPA inspector in whose logbook the numbers 

had been altered on the stand, in court in front of a judge. The EPA inspector admitted the numbers had been altered and the judge ruled that that falsified evidence could not be used by the EPA in their case against me and Riverdale Mills 

Corporation. Without evidence that the Rivers Protection Act had been violated, the 

U.S. Justice Department asked the judge to dismiss the case and the judge complied. 

The out-of-pocket cost to prove that corruption existed in the EPA and also in the 

US Justice Department—where no one observed the very obvious fact that numbers 

had been altered—cost me about $218,000, which is a substantial part of the annual 

profits with which Riverdale Mills has expanded its production facilities, provided 

new jobs and paid taxes to the local, state and federal governments. With the limitaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:15 Sep 26, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\COURTS\052306\27743.000 HJUD2 PsN: 27743
37

tions of the EAJA as it now exists, the district court awarded my company fees of 

only $68,726, which was ultimately overturned by the First Circuit. 

This is why it is very important that the ‘‘Equal Access to Justice Reform Act of 

2005’’ become law. The ability of small businessmen like me to be compensated for 

the costs of protecting themselves and their businesses from the attack of overzealous bureaucrats. That’s why I think that the provision that would charge EAJA 

awards to the budget of the agency that took the action, rather than the general 

treasury, is very important. Right now, the agencies themselves are not punished 

when they are so egregiously overzealous that EAJA compensation requests are 

granted. Award amounts, where warranted of course, also need to be raised. 

The NAM will be submitting additional and more detailed comments about the 

provisions of H.R. 435 for the record. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee for your time and 

attention to this matter. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have 

for me.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Bounds, let me direct my first question to you. 

And say that the Department of Justice may not have the most 

credibility on this particular issue. As you know, they opposed the 

original EAJA bill saying that the cost would be excessive. I think 

they projected that the cost would be $500 million for the first 3 

years. The cost probably was closer to 1 percent of that than to 

what the DOJ estimated. 

Furthermore, it would be a rare government agency indeed who 

would encourage lawsuits against them and then have to pay attorneys’ fees. So I understand all of that. 

However, I wanted to give you an opportunity to redeem yourself 

when it comes to credibility and just focus on one aspect of the bill 

at hand, and that is the attorney’s fees. Attorneys’ fees have only 

been raised once in 25 years. They are now capped at $125 an 

hour, as I recall. 

Don’t you think that you might support an increase in the cost 

or the amount of attorney’s fees? And not getting into the other 

issues, but doesn’t that sound like an improvement that could be 

made to the system, that if you are going to have these lawsuits, 

and if we do not change anything else, that we should at least 

change that? 

Mr. BOUNDS. Thank you. 

First, I would like to respond to the question by underscoring 

that the presumptive cap of $125 under the statute is regularly deviated from under——

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned that in your testimony. I am aware 

of that. 

But sometimes it is not, and in the case of Mr. Knott, for instance, his attorneys’ fees were limited because of that statute. So 

why don’t we go on and say, raise the cap so that everyone—there 

would be no doubt, you don’t have to ask for a special consideration 

by the court. 

Mr. BOUNDS. Well, the Department of Justice is delighted to comment on legislative proposals as they are made by Members of Congress or circulated by the Committee. 

The Department does not think that the attorney fees are necessarily too low now because of the court’s capacity and agencies’

capacities to deviate from the fee cap in particular cases when the 

circumstances would merit. 

To the extent that there are specific proposals to raise the cap, 

those obviously would have to be considered on a case-by-case 

38

basis. Obviously, there would be no effective cap if the cap were 

raised to cover, you know, Manhattan law firms. 

Mr. SMITH. But certainly we could raise the fees by a certain 

amount, and then that would enable individuals who might be 

bringing the lawsuit to at least get what they consider to be very 

competent counsel and not be deterred from doing that. 

Mr. BOUNDS. I understand the appeal of raising the cap. As I 

say, the Department would be delighted to consider the merits of 

any potential that——

Mr. SMITH. Which is to say that you cannot say anything more 

right now. 

Mr. BOUNDS. I am not myself authorized to do so. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Bounds. 

Mr. Farris, Mr. Hiatt mentioned in his written testimony two different classes of EAJA cases, one involved violation of a right; the 

other one involved enforcement action. And he concludes that automatic attorney fees are appropriate in the first instance, that is, 

where someone has obtained a judgment against the Federal Government for violation of their rights, but not in the second case involving enforcement actions. 

What do you think of that distinction. 

Mr. FARRIS. Well, I think it is too easy to become a plaintiff, 

rather than a defendant, to raise exactly the same arguments. 

Bringing declaratory judgment, if I had an agency that was threatening my client with an enforcement action, I would bring a declaratory judgment action wherever it was permitted and simply be the 

plaintiff, so that I could win attorneys’ fees and beat them to court, 

in effect. There is no substantial difference at the end of the day. 

The question is, did the government violate the law? Did the government violate the Constitution? And wherever that is true, 

whether plaintiff or defendant, commonsense justice says that the 

government ought to pay. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Farris. 

Mr. Hiatt, you heard Mr. Knott’s testimony, which I think is 

pretty compelling. And what I wanted to ask you, if you have a situation like this where the government apparently falsified the evidence, they actually changed the numbers—I think it was changing 

2s to 9s or 9s to 2s, something like that—if this was a civil case, 

doesn’t that cry out for automatic recovery of attorney fees? Don’t 

you think that is a compelling case where attorneys’ fees should be 

awarded? 

Mr. HIATT. Well, I think if this were a civil case, you would not 

need automatic award of attorney fees, because it would be so 

clear, if the facts are as Mr. Knott describes them, and I have no 

reason to doubt that there was no substantial justification for the 

action; that would be sufficient. And that is exactly the right; that 

should be the standard. 

Mr. Knott says that under a special provision, and I am not familiar with the details of the Hyde amendment, but under the special provisions of that, you have an exception where apparently 

even the substantial justifications standard does not apply. 

I am very sympathetic if the facts are as they are, but I do not 

think that that in any way detracts from——

39

Mr. SMITH. You just do not want to expand, you do not want to 

eliminate the defense or increase the number of eligible plaintiffs 

to 98 percent of all businesses? 

Mr. HIATT. Well, to think if it is going to deter the government—

and, respectfully, I do not really think the cost being any different 

from Mr. Bound’s estimate is the issue as much as it is how much 

of a deterrent will it be for the government to have to worry about 

costs. 

Mr. SMITH. I am going to squeeze in one question if other Members do not mind. But, Mr. Hiatt, before I get to that last question, 

would you have any objection to raising the cap on attorney fees? 

Mr. HIATT. We have absolutely no objection to the provisions of 

the bill, as I understand it right now, requiring the Attorney General to study and report to Congress about how effective the act 

has been or whether the rate cap should be changed. We are quite 

open to hearing more about that. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay, great. 

Mr. Knott, thank you for your personal experience. Boy, do I regret you had to go through that—the threats to you, the threats to 

your freedom, the cost to you all. I mean, that is where you almost 

believe there ought to be double or triple damages when the government acts in that kind of almost malicious manner; and maybe 

I should stop there. 

But, nevertheless, my question is this. Do you know of any instances where people have failed to bring lawsuits just because of 

the cost? And has that been a deterrent, and is that another argument for the bill itself? 

Mr. KNOTT. I know of many cases where they have avoided these 

things. I was offered—you know, would I like to settle this case? 

And I said, I do not want to settle it, I want to settle you. And that 

is what I embarked upon. 

When, in the Hyde amendment, the lawyers’ fees were capped at 

$75 an hour, I haven’t been able to find many of those lawyers. 

What that meant was, I had to do three-quarters of the work for 

them, you know, in order to get the job done. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Knott. 

Mr. Bounds, would you get back to us? And I know that you are 

limited in what you can say today, but would you get back to us 

specifically on the issue of increasing the cap on attorney fees and 

see if the Department of Justice might revisit that issue for us. 

Mr. BOUNDS. I will see what I can find out. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Bounds. 

[The Department of Justice did not provide the Subcommittee 

with a response to this inquiry, as was requested, prior to the closing of the Hearing Record] 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman, is recognized for his questions. 

Mr. BERMAN. While you are at it, Mr. Bounds, could you get back 

to us on what the cap is on paying private lawyers to represent defendants in criminal cases where the Federal public defenders office is conflicted out? I am curious whether we are looking at rates 

or just some rates here. Thank you. 

40

[The Department of Justice did not provide the Subcommittee 

with a response to this inquiry, as was requested, prior to the closing of the Hearing Record] 

Mr. BERMAN. The problem—it is very interesting, the interplay 

here. I am focused on this substantial justification issue because, 

Mr. Farris, you said—first of all, your arguments basically are not 

about small versus big, they are about government versus individuals, or companies or non-profit associations who might be suing 

or being sued by the government. 

But this is an effort to incentivize the smaller guy both to defend 

and to bring lawsuits. But you do in the context of the big government versus the small guy—but in the National Labor Relations 

Board case, in spite of the fact that—I am not sure what Mr. 

Hiatt’s basis is for thinking that this will dilute the otherwise vigorous enforcement of that act, as I am unaware of the vigorous enforcement of that act. But in any event, it is sometimes about an 

even smaller party going to the government to pursue enforcement 

of that person’s legal rights against a company that might be small, 

but is a lot larger and is a lot more able to handle the cost of litigation than the individual. 

So an individual, the National Labor Relations Board’s General 

Counsel does not go out there just issuing unfair labor practice 

complaints; it is because some worker came to the National Labor 

Relations Board or one of their regional offices saying that he was 

fired because he had joined a union or that other rights protected 

by that law were violated by that employer. 

Now the General Counsel decides whether or not what this guy 

says is true, and if he thinks it is true and he has a substantial 

basis for thinking it is true and there is a substantial basis for 

thinking that that conduct violated the law, the General Counsel 

brings this unfair labor practice complaint on behalf of this single 

individual; and the employer fights it, and maybe the employer 

prevails at the end. 

But a court determines that they were not out on an abusive 

witch hunt, or this was not a frivolous complaint, it was a close 

question and they lost. 

Why shouldn’t that—why isn’t what Mr. Bounds talks about, albeit in the context of immigration cases, true that that General 

Counsel, now thinking that, particularly the way this bill works, 

the costs of it are going to come out of the budget for the National 

Labor Relations Board, is going to think twice about taking anything which is a close question because he is going to end up facing 

his agency with attorneys’ fees burden. And in the end the small 

guy will really get hurt because they will have no agency to go to, 

even though we created these agencies to protect that guy against 

the abuse of his rights. 

Mr. FARRIS. Mr. Berman, I understand the logical difference between the plaintiff case that I typically am involved with and the 

situation that you are describing here. I do not think that the proposed distinction of being the plaintiff or defendant really is the 

right distinction, and so through some other means of accomplishing some objective there. 

Mr. BERMAN. I agree. I am not sure I like the analysis that says 

do it one way but not the other way. 

41

Mr. FARRIS. Right. 

Mr. BERMAN. But my point wasn’t, who was plaintiff and defendant; my point is, who is really the small guy and who is going to 

get shafted as a result of this. It is one thing to have an overzealous government but it is another thing to be hurting the even 

smaller party. 

Mr. FARRIS.I think that the government should do what is right 

in every circumstance. 

If it has to pay attorney fees for doing what it thinks is right, 

you are not going to have an absolutely perfect system, whichever 

way you go, and basically we have to decide as a matter of principle, whether or not the government pays attorney fees when it 

has wronged someone. 

I don’t favor personally the small or big rule. I do not think it 

should matter. I think the principle is the same, and the government should act on behalf of all of the citizens whether it is a small 

group or a large group and should vigorously enforce the law that 

is before it. 

But when it is found that the government has behaved illegally, 

I think the government should pay, period. 

Mr. BERMAN. These words, ‘‘found that the government has behaved illegally,’’ I mean, if that is—if that is true, I do—I think I 

have great sympathy for what you are saying. But the fact that a 

particular enforcement case and a close question before an independent judge is found against the government does not mean the 

government acted illegally, and in a weird way the substantial justification test is sort of a term of art in a process that decides 

whether the government was acting in good faith or not. 

Mr. FARRIS.Let me give you an example. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Farris, please be quick. I want to have time for 

Mr. Forbes to ask questions. 

Mr. FARRIS. I will not respond to that. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, is recognized for his 

questions. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you for 

being here today. 

My comment and question is a little bit bigger in scope than just 

this bill. Mr. Farris mentioned something that I think is important, 

that we forget when it is the government we are interested in 

doing what is right, not always just what is legal. 

And, Mr. Bounds, you talked to us about political oversight. That 

is why I am here today. This may not be a perfect bill, but I am 

groping for, really my question is not the close calls that you have 

talked about, but what I am worried about is what I see oftentimes 

as unfair balance of power and sheer heavy-handedness that the 

government brings. 

I mean, I could bring a notebook of cases that I have actually 

seen, but three of them I am going to do real quick, and they are 

not all ones that would be pertinent to this legislation. 

I watched a young man, just a short period of time ago, late 20’s; 

the government came at him, and they acknowledged because they 

thought his father was wealthy, they had seven lawyers coming at 

him. It cost him $1.4 million to defend. At the end, he has to reach 

42

a plea agreement because they threaten to go after his father and 

his mother if he did not do it, and he to this day doesn’t think that 

he was guilty. 

In the late 1990’s, DOJ—and this was before your time maybe—

but they went after hospitals across the country for coding violations. And if you remember, this was an enforcement situation. But 

they sent out to the hospitals demand letters that basically said, 

if you do not pay this amount of money, we are coming after you 

for treble damages and attorneys’ fees, and we are going to get you 

the PR for your hospital. 

I bet you 80 percent of the hospitals that got those letters paid 

them and did not feel they were liable because of the unfair balance they felt they had to go against. 

Mr. Berman raised an excellent point when he talked about, 

sometimes you have a small guy going after a corporation. I 

watched that enforcement action go against a small Dunkin Donuts 

franchise owner, mom-and-pop operation. I watched him go in 

three times where the government just continued the case each 

time. 

He looks at me finally and says, How can I do this? How can I 

possibly stand up? And the government even looks at him and 

says, We know you have done nothing wrong, but we want you to 

reach a settlement anyway. 

And the question I have for you is, you mentioned in your testimony the negative consequences of this bill would not be offset by 

any significant improvements in EAJA. 

What will get significant improvements in what the Justice Department is doing, one? And are you doing anything internally to 

adjust that balance of power when you see situations like Mr. 

Knott talked about, you see these situations where you know the 

government is going at it with just absolutely unfair, unequal balance against some of these? 

What are your suggestions? What are you guys doing internally 

so we do not have to take this kind of action? Because that is what 

the political oversight is. If you cannot police yourself, we have got 

to do it. What are you doing? 

Mr. BOUNDS. Well, I want to assure the Committee that when 

cases involving excessive force or overbearing prosecutions or miscarriage of the law come to the attention of the Attorney General 

and the leadership of the Department, those cases are taken very 

seriously; and obviously there is a managerial function, a supervising prosecutor in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices around the country 

as well as within the Department of Justice offices. 

And that is this entire point of my testimony, which is that is 

how it should function. You will never have an attorney fee shifting 

statute that is going to overcome the disparity between a single individual and the government. So the management of these cases 

has to be a political oversight, which means the President and the 

Congress, and the members of the Cabinet have to police the actions of the government in particular cases. 

And so to the extent that any specific case comes to someone’s 

attention, it would be reviewed and remedies would be sought. But 

without any specific case, I really cannot——

43

Mr. FORBES. But just to understand, that is what we are here 

today trying to do, to do that oversight. And my time is running 

out too. 

But the question I would ask you, do you have any reports or 

anything that you can get back to us of what efforts you have been 

making in DOJ to do that policing effort that you are talking 

about, and maybe give us a list of, you know, what remedies that 

you have put out and how you have tried to stop it. 

I would be interested to see how many cases you guys have 

looked at and what you have done over the last year or so, if you 

could do that. 

Mr. BOUNDS. I would be happy to look into it. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[The Department of Justice did not provide the Subcommittee 

with a response to this inquiry, as was requested, prior to the closing of the Hearing Record] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Forbes. 

We, as you just heard, have had some votes called. In fact, we 

have six votes coming up, and we will need to head over to the 

House floor. Thank you all for your testimony. It has been very 

helpful, very instructive, and perhaps there will be some ways, as 

we have discussed today, that we can have some reforms at least 

to the process. 

Thank you all. 

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(45)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

THE HONORABLE HOWARD L. BERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, THE

INTERNET, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY


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THE HONORABLE JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE

STATE OF MICHIGAN AND RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY


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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWIN MEESE III, RONALD REAGAN DISTINGUISHED

FELLOW IN PUBLIC POLICY AND CHAIRMAN, CENTER FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL

STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION


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NEWS ALERT FROM THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS


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A DEAR COLLEAGUE FROM THE UNITED STATES SENATE ON ORGANIZATIONS

SUPPORTING THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 2005, H.R. 435/S. 2017


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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, CHAIRMAN, U.S. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS


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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, CHAIRMAN, 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS


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LETTER FROM COLBY M. MAY, DIRECTOR, AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW & JUSTICE TO

THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, CHAIRMAN, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS


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LETTER FROM LAURA W. MURPHY, DIRECTOR LASHAWN WARREN, LEGISLATIVE

COUNSEL, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERITIES UNION


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LETTER FROM RICHARD LESSNER, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE UNION TO THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS


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LETTER FROM RICHARD HAUGHT, D.D.S., PRESIDENT AND JAMES B. BRAMSON, D.D.S., 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION TO THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE

ON SMALL BUSINESS


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LETTER FROM MICHAEL D. MAVES, MD, MBA, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION TO

THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND

CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS


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LETTER TO SUSAN STEINMAN, LINDA LIPSEN, DANIEL COHEN, ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL

LAWYERS OF AMERICA FROM THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS


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LETTER FROM R. BRUCE JOSTEN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN TO THE HONORABLE

DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESETATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS


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LETTER FROM THE HONORABLE EDWIN MEESE III, RONALD REAGAN DISTINGUISHED

FELLOW IN PUBLIC POLICY AND CHAIRMAN, CENTER FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL

STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION TO THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS


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LETTER FROM J. MICHAEL SMITH, ESQ., PRESIDENT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HOME

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LETTER FROM JIM COVINGTON III, DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, ILLINOIS

STATE BAR ASSOCIATION TO THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS


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LETTER FROM WADE HENDERSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND NANCY ZIRKIN, DEPUTY

DIRECTOR OF THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS TO THE HONORABLE

DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS AND THE HONORABLE EARL BLUMENAUER, MEMBER OF

CONGRESS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


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LETTER FROM HILARY O. SHELTON, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON BUREAU, NATIONAL

ASSOSICATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE TO THE HONORABLE

DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS AND THE HONORABLE EARL BLUMENAUER, MEMBER OF

CONGRESS, U.S. HOUSE FO REPRESENTATIVES


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LETTER FROM JOHN ENGLER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE NATIONAL ASSOSCIATION OF

MANUFACTURERS TO THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS


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LETTER FROM DAN DANNER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, FEDERAL PUBLIC POLICY, THE

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS (NFIB) TO THE HONORABLE

DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS


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LETTER FROM DREW CAPUTO, SENIOR ATTORNEY, THE NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNSEL TO THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS AND THE EARL

BLUMENAUER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


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LETTER FROM PATRICK GALLAGHER, DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, SIERRA

CLUB TO THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS AND THE HONORABLE

EARL BLUMENAUER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENATIVES


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LETTER FROM THE SMALL BUSINESS EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE COALITION TO THE

HONORABLE F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., CHAIRMAN, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE


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LETTER FROM J. WILLIAM LAUDERBACK, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, THE AMERICAN

CONSERVATIVE UNION TO THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS


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LETTER FROM CAROLINE FREDRICKSON, DIRECTOR, LASHAWN WARREN, LEGISLATIVE

COUNSEL, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERITIES UNION, TO THE HONORABLE F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., CHAIRMAN, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE JUDICIARY

COMMITTEE AND THE HONORABLE JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, RANKING MEMBER, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE


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LETTER FROM THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS AND THE HONORABLE EARL

BLUMENAUER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE

HONORABLE OLYMPIA SNOWE, CHAIR, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, UNITED STATES SENATE, AND THE HONORABLE RUSSELL FEINGOLD, 

UNITED STATES SENATE TO THE HONORABLE ARLEN SPECTER, SENATE JUDICIARY

AND THE HONORABLE F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., CHAIRMAN, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE


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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EARL BLUMENAUER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, U.S. 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


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