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58–036 PDF 2011

S. Hrg. 111–1082 

NOMINATION OF JOHN S. PISTOLE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 17, 2010 

NOMINATION OF JOHN S. PISTOLE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

KRISTINE V. LAM, Professional Staff Member 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Professional Staff Member 

ELYSE F. GREENWALD, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JENNIFER L. TARR, Minority Counsel 

LUKE P. BELLOCCI, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 2 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 14 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 19 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 21 

WITNESS 

THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 2010 

John S. Pistole to be Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 23 

Biographical and financial information .......................................................... 26 

Responses to pre-hearing questions ................................................................ 35 

Letter from the Office of Government Ethics ................................................. 70 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record ..................................... 71 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF JOHN S. PISTOLE 

THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:59 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, and Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. Welcome 

to everybody. Today the Committee takes up the nomination of 

John Pistole to be the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security in 

charge of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), known 

as TSA to many millions of Americans. Mr. Pistole, welcome, and 

thanks for your willingness to serve. 

Mr. Pistole has been nominated to administer an agency of almost 50,000 employees with a $7 billion annual budget whose mission, of course, is to protect the safety of passengers and cargo 

traveling by road, rail, or air. This is an agency that, given its strategic importance to our homeland security, has gone far too long 

without permanent leadership. 

This nominee is the Administration’s third nominee for the post. 

I hope and believe this third try will be the charm, so this Committee plans to vote on your nomination as soon as possible, probably sometime next week. I also hope the Senate confirms you 

quickly so that TSA’s workforce can get the leadership that it really needs and deserves. 

Mr. Pistole has 27 years of experience in law enforcement, intelligence, and counterterrorism as a Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) special agent, inspector, assistant director of operations, assistant director of counterterrorism, and, for the past 5 years, as 

FBI Deputy Director, second only, of course, to Director Bob 

Mueller. 

In rising in this way through the FBI ranks, you have had important management responsibilities directing the day-to-day operations of an agency of 34,000 employees, 56 field offices around the 

country, and a budget of $8 billion. And, of course, that experience 

should serve you well, if confirmed, to lead TSA. Your work with 

State and local law enforcement and with international law enforcement and intelligence officials adds, I think, further to your 

qualifications to head this agency. 

2 

If you are confirmed as TSA Administrator, you will be taking 

charge of an agency that has made enormous strides, in my opinion, in the last 8 years to strengthen the security of the commercial 

aviation sector. But it is an agency that still faces important, not 

fully met challenges, including improving the security of other 

forms of transportation here in America, particularly mass transit 

and rail. 

I was pleased by the Administration’s proposed budget for fiscal 

year 2011, which adds $900 million to key aviation security programs, including money for more whole-body imaging machines 

and the personnel needed to operate them. And, remember, we 

were all focused on that need after the Christmas Day terrorist attack on the plane over Detroit. 

We know from hard experience that attacking commercial aviation remains a goal of our Islamist terrorist enemies. That is why 

the next TSA Administrator must ensure the smooth operation of 

a program known as Secure Flight, TSA’s program to match passenger names against watchlists, and the development and implementation of new screening technologies as they arise. 

While the aviation sector remains a target, as I said, other forms 

of transportation must also be better protected because we know 

they have been targets in other countries in the world. TSA, I 

think, could do a better job to ensure that the Transit Security 

Grant Program is fair and effective as it works with State and local 

authorities to secure mass transportation systems and, of course, 

generally that we do a better job at securing our rail and bus systems. 

But bottom line, Mr. Pistole, you have been a superb public servant, in my opinion, and while others have left for the private sector, you continue to devote your career to keeping our country safe. 

I presume that is your family behind you, and this means that you 

have overridden their desire to go out into the private sector, if 

your family is anything like mine. But I want to thank you for your 

service and willingness to take on this critically important new assignment. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I want to join you 

in welcoming Mr. Pistole to the Committee. He is an individual 

who is well known to this Committee. We have had the privilege 

of working with him closely over the past many years. 

The attempted bombings on Christmas Day of 2009 and just last 

month in Times Square remind us that terrorists remain committed to attacking our Nation. TSA performs a critical role in protecting us from these attacks. 

Following the Times Square bombing attempt, the suspect 

boarded a flight destined for the Middle East after his name was 

added to the No-Fly List. This suspected terrorist was literally 

minutes away from escaping through a gap in our aviation security 

system. At the time, airlines were required to update their No-Fly 

Lists only once every 24 hours; TSA has now ordered that this lag 

time be reduced to 2 hours in response to this very incident. 

3 

But TSA could do more. Indeed, TSA should be directly responsible for comparing passenger names against the No-Fly List. Currently, TSA performs this role only for domestic flights. Although 

TSA has said that it will have Secure Flight implemented for all 

international flights by the end of this year, the new leader of the 

TSA must ensure that this goal is met. 

As demonstrated by the failed Christmas Day bombing attempt, 

our passenger checkpoint screening technology needs to constantly 

be improved to thwart terrorists’ latest tactics. To that end, TSA 

plans to install 1,000 Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines in American airports by the end of fiscal year 2011. TSA announced its latest procurement of these machines last month, purchasing another 300 machines, bringing the total to close to 500. 

I know that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is also 

reviewing Automatic Target Recognition (ATR), the auto-detection 

software for these imaging machines. ATR identifies potentially 

threatening objects on a person going through AIT screening and 

eliminates the need for a second TSA employee to review the passenger’s image in a separate room. This has the obvious benefits 

of addressing legitimate privacy concerns with this technology, reducing the space needed in airports, and lowering the installation 

and operational costs to the government and, thus, to taxpayers. 

I have observed the auto-detection technology in action in Amsterdam earlier this year. Dutch security officials expressed confidence in the technology’s ability to detect concealed explosives of 

the nature used by the Christmas Day bomber. The next TSA Administrator should pursue this important advancement for the imaging program. 

Because foreign governments must be our partners in improving 

aviation security, TSA also must continue its international outreach, which has, to be fair, accelerated in recent months. This 

should include increased information sharing with foreign governments, which is uneven right now, and with air carriers about individuals who warrant more scrutiny in the screening process. 

But as the Chairman correctly has pointed out, aviation is not 

the only sector of transportation that merits TSA’s vigilant efforts. 

The agency’s mission extends to other modes of transportation, including our mass transit system. We have to be careful about focusing all of our resources on terrorist threats to aviation alone, as the 

threat clearly does not stop there. 

Mr. Pistole’s nearly three decades of service with the FBI, including more than 5 years as Deputy Director, demonstrate significant 

law enforcement experience and leadership. He also has substantial experience in the management of law enforcement officers. If 

he is confirmed as the new TSA Administrator, these skills should 

serve him well in an agency that performs a law enforcement function. I look forward to discussing these and other issues with our 

nominee today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Mr. Pistole has filed responses to a biographical and financial 

questionnaire, answered pre-hearing questions submitted by the 

Committee, and had his financial statements reviewed by the Office of Government Ethics. Without objection, this information will 

be made part of the hearing record, with the exception of the finanVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 17, 2011 Jkt 058036 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\58036.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
4 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole appears in the Appendix on page 23. 

cial data, which are on file and available for public inspection in 

the Committee offices. 

Mr. Pistole, as I think you know, our Committee rules require 

that all witnesses at nomination hearings give their testimony 

under oath, so I would ask you to please stand now and raise your 

right hand. Do you swear the testimony that you are about to give 

to this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 

but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I do. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Please be seated. 

We would be happy to hear an opening statement if you have 

any and introductions if you would like of the long-suffering people 

behind you. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN S. PISTOLE 1 TO BE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. PISTOLE. Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I appreciate the opportunity to appear as the nominee for the Assistant 

Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration. I am honored by the President’s call to service and by Secretary 

Napolitano’s support. 

And with your kind indulgence, I would like to recognize my 

wife, Kathy, of nearly 31 years, and our daughters, Lauren and 

Jennifer, and thank them for their unwavering love and support. 

Also some family friends who are with us today, so I appreciate 

them being here. 

I would also like to express my appreciation to not only the men 

and women of the FBI that I have had the privilege of working 

with, but all those in Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement and the U.S. intelligence community, with whom I have had 

the privilege to work since becoming an FBI agent in 1983. And I 

would be remiss if I did not acknowledge our international partners 

without whose help we would be unable to fully address global terrorist threats which may impact the homeland. And to the men 

and women of TSA, I would like to say that I am eager to join your 

ranks and work with you in securing our Nation’s transportation 

systems. 

I also appreciate the outstanding work Gale Rossides has done 

these last 18 months as Acting Administrator, along with all the 

senior staff who run the business of TSA every day. I would also 

just note the outstanding work that the Committee staff and the 

DHS and TSA staff have done to prepare for this hearing. 

As we know, since its creation after September 11, 2001, TSA 

has played a vital role in helping protect our national security. 

Never has that responsibility been more critical than today, noting, 

as you have, all the attacks and attempts we have seen in the last 

year, both here and abroad. Given these threats, it is critical that 

TSA be a risk-based, intelligence-driven agency that anticipates 

threats and works closely with all of our partners to defeat the 

threats as part of a multilayered security discipline. Leadership in 

5 

these areas, specifically national security and counterterrorism, are 

familiar territory for me in my nearly 27-year career with the FBI. 

For example, in 1999, I helped lead the investigation and recovery efforts of Egypt Air Flight 990 after it crashed off the coast of 

New England, killing over 230 people. In May 2003, I led an FBI 

team to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, investigating the al Qaeda-affiliated, 

vehicle-borne bombings of three Western housing compounds in 

which 40 individuals were killed, including eight Americans. And 

as you have noted, for the last 5 years, I have served as the Deputy 

Director of the FBI, overseeing all FBI efforts to protect the homeland. 

These experiences and the years I spent as a street agent in Minneapolis and New York, particularly on a FBI-New York Police Department Organized Crime Task Force, and also as a field supervisor in Indianapolis, an Assistant Special Agent in Charge in Boston, in addition to other areas, the great State of Maine, an inspector leading and conducting audits and evaluation of FBI offices, 

and an instructor at our FBI Academy and at the International 

Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest—all of these have taught 

me the critically important lessons of developing key partnerships 

designed to protect our citizens from those who would cause us 

harm. 

My familiarity with and respect for field operations is combined 

with years in senior management. I understand complex organizations and am dedicated to leading TSA to the next level. 

Like the FBI, TSA relies upon a dedicated workforce, including 

over 47,000 Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) at airports 

throughout the Nation. They are TSA’s field officers, the front lines 

in a layered network protecting our aviation sector. If confirmed, 

I will dedicate myself to supporting all of TSA’s workforce and ensuring the highest standards of professionalism achieved through 

multiple disciplines such as comprehensive training, mentoring, 

and opportunity for professional development. 

I will also assess TSA’s non-aviation surface transportation efforts in concert with other Federal agencies and State and local authorities. I will engage and work in close collaboration with all 

stakeholders, including other government agencies, private industry, our international partners, and, of course, the traveling public. 

Finally, throughout my FBI career, I have focused on the need 

to identify those who wish to do us harm while protecting individual civil rights and civil liberties. We should be judged not only 

by our ability to defend our Nation from terrorism, but also by our 

commitment to protect and defend the rights and freedoms we all 

enjoy. 

If confirmed, I look forward to a close working relationship with 

this Committee and Congress overall. I would be honored to serve 

with the dedicated men and women of TSA, and I applaud the challenging work they do each and every day. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, I thank you again for 

the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to 

your questions. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Pistole, for 

that excellent opening statement. I am going to start my questioning with the standard three questions we ask all nominees. 

6 

First, is there anything you are aware of in your background that 

might present a conflict of interest with the duties of the office to 

which you have been nominated? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Second, do you know of anything, personal or otherwise, that would in any way prevent you from fully 

and honorably discharging the responsibilities of the office to which 

you have been nominated? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And, third, do you agree without reservation to respond to any reasonable summons to appear and testify 

before any duly constituted committee of Congress if you are confirmed? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I am not going to add, ‘‘Will you comply 

with subpoenas issued by this Committee?’’ 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let us start the serious questioning. 

Because of our reliance as a Nation on the domestic and global 

transportation networks to move goods and people, as I said in my 

opening statement, the transportation sector obviously continues to 

be a potential target for terrorist attacks. I wanted to ask you what 

your top priorities for TSA are if you are confirmed to be its next 

director? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The first priority is to 

ensure that TSA has the latest intelligence to inform the individuals to perform the operations that TSA is charged with, and by 

that I mean to ensure that as a threat- and risk-based intelligence 

agency, it not only is able to pull information from the entire U.S. 

intelligence community and our foreign partners, but that information is being pushed on a daily, if not hourly, basis. That is the top 

priority. The second—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is really interesting. Excuse me for 

stopping you there. In other words, because we think of the TSA 

basically as, you might say, a reactive organization or an organization that checks people as they get on planes, or screens cargo. But 

you are suggesting something else. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. My perspective on it is that 

TSA is one component in a much larger continuum, which should 

start, I would suggest, for example, as the Najibullah Zazi investigation did out of Denver and New York. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Informed by the intelligence on the front end so 

hopefully the plots are disrupted before people ever get to screening. For example, in the Zazi case, obviously there was a thorough 

investigation that was predicated on excellent information sharing 

not only within the United States, but internationally. And so by 

the time Zazi and his two co-conspirators were ready to construct 

the backpack devices to go in the New York City subways, the plot 

was disrupted. So it never got to the screening part. So in that continuum, TSA plays a critical part obviously in that screening. If 

nothing has been developed, such as with Mr. Shahzad from Times 

Square, if he had been going on a flight, but then also, for example, 

even if somebody does get through screening somehow, we have the 

7 

Federal air marshals on the flights, we have the hardened cockpits, 

and all those other things. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. So do you think now that there is an 

inadequate link between TSA and the intelligence community? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I do not know that, but if confirmed, that will be 

the first thing that I look at when responding to your priorities. 

The second priority is to look at the workforce development 

issues. Again, you mentioned over 50,000 employees, a lot of moving parts, a lot of people dedicated to doing the mission each and 

every day, as I mentioned. I want to ensure that I can work with 

all the employees of TSA to hear their concerns, hear their issues, 

and make sure that they have the tools, the techniques, the training, and technology to do the best job possible. So those are the top 

two priorities. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I do not know whether you said this at 

the Commerce Committee hearing or to somebody else somewhere, 

but I have heard that you are thinking about spending a day or 

two as a TSA employee or a TSO. 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is correct. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Tell me about what you are thinking. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, because I have been an FBI agent for nearly 

27 years, I do not have, I think, a sense of appreciation for what 

the TSOs or the Federal air marshals or the behavior detection officers do. So if confirmed, I plan to spend some time doing those jobs 

just to get a sense—I have read the job descriptions online, seen 

the printed material to know what the job requirements are, the 

ability to do those jobs. So in order to really be fully informed, I 

plan to do that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is great. I think obviously the TSOs 

and all the TSA employees will appreciate that. The morale seems 

good as we go through the line, but maybe I would see otherwise. 

I do remember one time about 6 months ago I went through the 

line, and one of the TSOs followed me and said, in a very respectful 

way, that he felt that the regional management was not listening 

to the TSOs in terms of some of their thoughts about how to better 

do the job. 

Obviously we have come a long way post-September 11, 2001, 

and this agency has developed and grown very rapidly, and there 

is a certain amount of fixed hardware there now. But you have 

enough law enforcement, preventive, and administrative background that I hope you will approach this as if you can imagine 

nothing existed and figure out how you would best fulfill the mission that TSA has, and then maybe you can come back to reality 

and adjust it in some way. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously one of my 

jobs as the Deputy Director of the FBI is helping run the business 

of the FBI every day, making sure that we are being good stewards 

of the taxpayers’ dollars and making sure that we are allocating 

our resources to where the threats are. And that is exactly the 

management philosophy I intend to take to TSA, if I am confirmed. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I wanted to ask you a quick question in 

my remaining time in this round about rail and transit security, 

and it does take me back to the Zazi case and obviously the attacks 

in London, Madrid, and Mumbai on mass transit. What is your 

8 

general assessment, given your FBI experience, of the threat to rail 

and transit systems, including buses, in the United States today? 

And what do you think we can do in these non-aviation areas of 

transportation, on which millions of Americans travel every day, to 

better secure them? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I think as you have noted, there are a number of 

threats based on what we have seen since Madrid in 2004 and in 

London in 2005 and in Mumbai in 2007 and a number of other attacks in India, and then in Moscow 2 months ago with the two female suicide bombers in the subway. 

Clearly, we know from intelligence that al Qaeda and other related terrorist groups have an interest in attacking soft targets. 

Obviously, the success of September 11, 2001, emboldened them, 

but we know that as we harden targets, they look for softer targets, 

and clearly rail and, as we know from Israel, buses, at least 

there—in fact, tomorrow is the eighth anniversary of attacks on 

June 18 or 19, 2010, where over 60 people were killed and 100 injured in bus attacks in Israel. We know that they will look for soft 

targets, and so if confirmed, one of the things I want to do is ensure that a very comprehensive rail and surface transportation 

threat assessment is completed—there have been portions of that 

done—and ensure that, again, we are putting our resources where 

the threats are, recognizing we cannot be all things to all people 

at all times, all places, but that we are allocating resources based 

on risk. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. I hope you will make 

that a priority. It is one, as I said to you when we talked before, 

that concerns me. I know that the conventional wisdom is that we 

could never practically apply the same kind of screening techniques 

to people getting on trains or buses that we do to people getting 

on planes. But I hope you will push that envelope a little bit, at 

least to explore it, because I know other countries have moved forward on some of that. Some of it costs money, and that is something to consider. But I think we should ask you as the new TSA 

Administrator just to view it as a security problem and a challenge. 

If you have some fresh ideas about how to better secure rail and 

bus transportation before an attack as opposed to after, then please 

come forward and let us know, and we want to work with you on 

it. Thank you. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pistole, I want to ask you a series of questions related to the 

FBI’s use of National Security Letters and what are called ‘‘exigent 

circumstances letters.’’ The Inspector General (IG) at the Department of Justice issued three reports between 2007 and 2010 that 

were critical of FBI management for abuses of this authority. Now, 

as I understand it, National Security Letters are essentially administrative subpoenas that are used to collect some limited types of 

information in terrorism investigations. 

The FBI, after September 11, 2001, adopted a practice of sending 

exigent circumstances letters, which were supposed to be used in 

emergency situations, and they are supposed to be followed up with 

a National Security Letter. These exigent circumstances letters 

were not authorized by law, and some of them were not followed 

9 

up by a National Security Letter. The IG found problems in roughly half of the 4,400 cases that were reviewed, indicating at least a 

technical violation of the law. So with that background, let me ask 

you some questions since you were Deputy Director during part of 

that period. 

First, did you personally have any involvement in the approval 

or the issuance of exigent circumstances letters? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. 

Senator COLLINS. When did you first become aware of the use of 

these letters? 

Mr. PISTOLE. During the course of the first Inspector General report when they notified the senior leadership of the FBI. 

Senator COLLINS. Although the IG found fault with many levels 

of management at the FBI for allowing this practice, was there any 

finding of individual wrongdoing on your part? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. What actions, once you became aware of this 

problem and the IG’s reports, did you take to remedy the practices? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I took three steps, the first being to issue an immediate directive to both the Counterterrorism Division and all 56 

field offices to immediately cease and desist the use of the exigent 

circumstances letters. Exigent letters is what we called them. 

Second, we instituted a rigorous process and protocol review and 

implemented a new policy for redundant layers of review that we 

did not have by the Chief Division Counsel of each office and then 

the Special Agent in Charge of each of our field offices. 

And then, third, we instituted a rigorous inspection review on a 

periodic basis for all 56 offices and the Counterterrorism Division 

in particular to assess whether they were in compliance with the 

new protocols that we put in place. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Let me turn to a different issue. As those of us who travel a 

great deal know, there have been times when TSA has rushed the 

deployment of new screening technologies only to later recognize 

that they have not worked very well. For example the ‘‘puffer’’ machines that we had in Washington were here for several months 

and then ended up having so many problems that they were pulled 

from operation. This costs a lot of money every time technology is 

rushed before there is thorough operational testing. I am told that 

in this case, the puffer machines worked wonderfully well in a sterile laboratory environment, but did not work well in the real-life 

environment of an airport. 

The Government Accountability Office has been very critical of 

TSA for not doing sufficient operational testing before deployment. 

Given the agency’s very mixed record with screening technology deployment, what steps will you take to ensure that there is operational testing before we make a major investment? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, Senator, obviously on any major deployment 

of technology, personnel systems, information technology (IT) systems, there needs to be a thorough and rigorous testing, and not 

just in the lab, as you mentioned, but in reality, to account for all 

the challenges that would be encountered. So if confirmed, I would 

pledge to work with the Committee, but particularly to institute 

that type of review, to do a deep dive on anything that is currently 

10 

planned or anything for future planning to ensure that type of testing is done, that things are not rushed out because of some urgency 

that is driven by other than operational necessity, and that there 

is rigorous adherence to the process and protocols that should be 

in place. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

In other cases, it appears that DHS is not quick enough to adopt 

new technologies. I mentioned in my opening statement and in my 

office when we had our meeting that when I went to Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam, I saw the new technology that has been implemented there in the wake of the Christmas Day bomber. And I was 

very impressed with the software because it took an element of 

human judgment out of the equation in a useful way by scanning 

the body for hidden materials or problematic concealments in a 

way that the officials in Amsterdam told me they were confident 

would have detected the concealed explosives on Abdulmutallab. It 

also avoided a lot of the privacy issues that have been problematic 

with full-body imaging. I was astounded that the Dutch seemed to 

be so far ahead of us. 

What can we do to ensure that we are aware of the best technology and share information with our foreign partners? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. I am very interested in that 

technology, to learn more about it, and if confirmed, I would like 

to use the opportunity, based on my extensive experience in international law enforcement security services and activity and the 

great work that has already been done both at TSA and the DHS 

Science and Technology Directorate, to make an assessment fairly 

early on as to the propriety of that equipment, the pros and cons, 

and making sure that the operational testing is done sufficiently to 

assess if this is the best technology that is available today and if 

it is helping to not only assess for today but inform for future 

threats, trying to anticipate what those threats may be, as opposed 

to building technologies for yesterday’s threats. 

Senator COLLINS. Exactly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Maybe we will 

do one more quick round. 

I am also going to go back to the December 25, 2009, attack since 

the Committee, as a result of activities in the Abdulmutallab case, 

has been reviewing the processes the Federal Government employs 

in developing and utilizing the numerous terrorism watchlists. 

And, of course, this has been something I know you have been involved in through the Terrorism Screening Center in the FBI, but 

now will be in TSA. 

Over 400,000 individuals have been identified as known or suspected terrorists—and I know they get to this in various ways—on 

the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) list, but only a small subset of those people currently meet the standard of the Selectee List, 

which means that they are taken out of line and they face enhanced physical screening and other measures at our airports. 

I think that we need to expand the number of people that we 

subject to that secondary screening, perhaps the entire TSDB 

watchlist. I understand that may be a substantial change and entail additional responsibilities. But to me, the risk of allowing 

someone on the watchlist to board a plane without being subjected 

11 

to at least a secondary physical screening for a bomb or weapons 

concealed or anything else is really intolerable. And I am thinking 

about this in terms of public credibility. God forbid if such a person 

ends up carrying out an attack on a plane, the public’s confidence 

in our screening systems would be severely compromised. 

I know in your response to the Committee’s pre-hearing questions you assured the Committee that you would work to identify 

and utilize an appropriate larger subset of the Terrorism Screening 

Database. I wanted to ask you, to the extent you have thought 

about it, what criteria you think you will use as you review this 

matter to determine the travelers appearing in the broader database who should be subjected to, as I say, at least enhanced physical screening? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, there are a 

number of factors involved. One of the key factors, as I see it from 

my FBI experience, and which I would take, if confirmed, to TSA, 

is what specific information do we have, obviously, about the identity of the individual, making sure not only to have as full a name 

as possible, but a plus-one identifier, if at all possible, which is one 

of the things we look for on the Selectee or No-Fly Lists to make 

sure that we do not have a high number of false positives, the Bill 

Smiths of the world or whatever, if we do not have that plus-one 

identifier. 

Coupled with that, though, is the general requirement of there 

being some derogatory information about the individual to ensure 

that this is not what we call a poison pen, that somebody has just 

written in about a business competitor or a jilted lover or all these 

things—and we see these all the time, obviously, in the line of business I am in. So is there some derogatory information that can be 

ideally independently corroborated, which is usually not the case. 

But you make a good point about ensuring and erring on the side 

of preventing things from happening, and the more we can do— 

there are obviously redress procedures for people who should not 

be on there. So if confirmed, I would look forward to digging into 

that more and seeing it from the TSA side of things rather than 

the FBI side. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that, and I stress it again because as you know, anytime anything happens there are immediate 

investigations done by the media, by Congress, and by the agency 

itself. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I am familiar with that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You sure are. [Laughter.] 

And it is just hard to explain why somebody who did enough to 

get onto that screening list—maybe part of what you are saying is 

that there ought to be a filter before a person gets on that list, or 

even on a lesser list, but if that person got on and carried out an 

attack, it would be hard to explain to people why we did not stop 

it. 

In 2009, I know that there were disputes between the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI about how much information to share with State and local law enforcement officials about 

ongoing investigations, including the Najibullah Zazi and David 

Headley cases. I gather that the FBI was reluctant to share information about the investigations, and DHS was more inclined, even 

12 

pushing to share the information, given the belief that heightened 

awareness might have raised the vigilance of State and local law 

enforcement officials and perhaps led them to uncover related 

plots. 

As an example, I want to ask you what steps have the FBI and 

DHS taken to come to a better understanding, if any, about how 

to share information with State and local law enforcement officials 

related to ongoing investigations. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So the first part of that is that there is a dynamic 

tension between how much to share, with whom, and at what 

point. And, obviously, within DHS’s enabling legislation, they are 

required to share with State, local, and tribal law enforcement officials, something that the FBI has been in the business of doing for 

over 100 years now. 

Part of the challenge is—and it really comes down to a case-bycase determination, but, for example, Deputy Secretary of DHS 

Jane Lute, the former Deputy Attorney General, Mike Leiter from 

NCTC, and I sat down during this time frame you are talking 

about, between Zazi and then Christmas Day, to try to find the 

best way forward on that case-by-case determination, noting that 

there are a number of people, as you say, that may benefit from 

that information. For example, with Zazi, are there other people 

out there acquiring hydrogen peroxide or just peroxide from beauty 

supply stores that we would like to be informed about? We have 

a number of trip wires between FBI and DHS across the country 

on things like that, and ammonium nitrate fertilizer, large purchases, things like that, which we rely on the cooperation of the 

American people to help inform us. 

The challenge then becomes at what point, again, do we say that 

there should be broad dissemination for people who may or may 

not have a need to know versus the compromise of an ongoing investigation as we see from time to time where the FBI will share, 

for example, with all 106 Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and at some 

point, the information gets out in the media, so there is something 

that happens as a result of that. 

So the agreement that we have worked out is to ensure that the 

Secretary, Deputy, and others have the information on an ongoing 

basis, but then that we work very closely before there is a broad 

dissemination of sensitive ongoing operational information. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. It is a balance. TSA is a very 

different kind of agency in its relations with State and local law enforcement officials. Or is it? How do you contemplate those relationships? 

Mr. PISTOLE. As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, I see TSA as being 

one of those multiple layers of security that has obviously tremendous interaction with, for example, the almost 2 million Americans 

or people traveling in the United States every day by aviation. It 

is a different relationship than the FBI has, for example, on the 

trip wires, reaching out to the private sector, or DHS has in terms 

of trying to have intelligence information provided. 

But that being said, the behavior detection officers, the TSOs, 

and the Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) all have opportunities to observe and to pass on information, which may be of intelligence 

13 

value. So I want to make sure that is happening as opposed to information just being one-off and nothing being done with it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Pistole, I remember a couple 

of years ago the head of the sea port in Portland, Maine, showing 

me an array of identification (ID) cards and special credentials that 

he was required to have in order to access the port that he directed 

every day. It included a Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) card, but it included many other kinds of credentials. 

Many commercial truck drivers have to comply with multiple 

credentialing and background check programs, which includes the 

TWIC card and a hazardous materials endorsement threat assessment. There are all these different and overlapping credentials. 

Now, the programs are important because we want to know who 

is getting access to sensitive areas, and we want to control that. 

But there does appear to be quite a bit of duplication, and that involves additional costs, and it is time-consuming. 

What would you do as head of TSA to take a look at those credentials to see if there is a way to harmonize them, to combine 

them, to avoid some of the duplication that now occurs? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator Collins. Obviously, all these 

forms of ID are designed for the good purpose of trying to keep people from doing bad things, and part of it, obviously, is designed to 

look at the possible insider threat, somebody who may obtain employment with bad intent or who already has employment and has 

access to the port in Portland or elsewhere and then is co-opted 

and encouraged to do something bad. So the intent is good. 

If confirmed, what I would pledge to do is a deep dive on all the 

types of identification, including the TWIC, and to assess what is 

the best business model for moving forward to have the effectiveness and efficiency to achieve the outcomes that they are designed 

for. 

So I do not know at this point whether that redundancy can be 

eliminated or not, but I pledge to look into it. 

Senator COLLINS. The final issue that I want to raise with you 

is one that we have also discussed in my office, but I want to get 

on the record, and that has to do with the issue of collective bargaining. As you know, currently the law gives TSA the authority 

to shift resources and to implement new procedures at will. And 

that authority is important because it allows TSA to respond to 

emergencies and changing circumstances. It allows TSA to make 

the best use of its workforce, and we have seen the concrete benefits of this authority, both in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 

and the thwarted airline bombing plot that originated in Great 

Britain in 2006. In both cases, TSA was able to change the nature 

of its employees’ work and even the location of that work very 

quickly, without having to go through any kind of collective bargaining procedure. 

It has also been very useful to TSA when it has not been a terrorist plot but it has been a blizzard, for example. That happened 

in December 2006. 

I believe that we need to ensure that TSA employees have a 

process for appealing adverse actions, and I suggested to the AdVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 17, 2011 Jkt 058036 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\58036.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
14 

ministration that the way to do this is to formalize a process where 

the Merit Systems Protection Board would hear and rule on adverse actions so you can protect employees from perhaps an unfair 

or arbitrary development or action by a supervisor that was not 

warranted without giving full collective bargaining rights. 

What are your views on the issue of collective bargaining rights 

for TSA employees? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Obviously, Senator, there are a lot of complex 

issues inherent in everything that you have just noted. That being 

said, Secretary Napolitano has asked that I conduct a review and 

assessment, and that is what I am planning to do. 

Based on my experience in the FBI, where we did not have 

unions or collective bargaining or anything, I need to obtain more 

information. That is part of listening to all the stakeholders, to 

hear what the issues are—you have articulated a number of 

them—and to then be able to make that assessment. 

One of the things I am focused on and will continue to focus on 

is making sure that the security and safety of the American people 

are not adversely affected by anything that would come out of these 

discussions. 

Senator COLLINS. That does have to be the priority, and I think 

it is also important to remember that we are dealing with a law 

enforcement function here. So your experience with the FBI is directly relevant. 

We have seen public service employees be members of unions 

and collectively bargaining without it impairing their ability to 

carry out their duties. But I am very concerned about preserving 

what I believe to be absolutely essential flexibility, and I think the 

fact that the FBI does not have collective bargaining is telling. 

Let me just in a final comment say that I was particularly 

pleased when the President posted your nomination because it 

showed that the President understood the value of having someone 

with a law enforcement background in this critical position. So I do 

think that was an appropriate move by the President. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. I also want to apologize to you because had I 

not asked that last question, we might have adjourned the hearing 

before Senator Carper came. [Laughter.] 

Senator COLLINS. And goodness knows what he is going to ask 

you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. And my apologies. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

There is part of Senator Carper, our dear and beloved friend and 

colleague, that is like a force of nature, so we never quite know 

how he is going to begin. In any case, we always welcome him and 

look forward to his participation. 

With that, Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. I am so glad to be here. [Laughter.] 

And we are glad that you are here, too, and that you are willing 

to take a shot at this. There is an old saying: ‘‘The third time is 

a charm.’’ In your case we sure hope so. 

15 

I presume when the President and his folks were prevailing on 

you to be willing to have your name submitted, somebody somewhere along the line must have raised why they felt our first two 

nominees did not make it through and why the Administration 

thought that you just might. What kind of encouragement did they 

give you that you just might make it through? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, Senator—— 

Senator CARPER. What is different about you? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I do not know about the first two candidates. They 

did not talk to me about that. But they obviously talked about my 

background and the fact that I have the leadership and management experience and all those things that they thought would be 

beneficial for the Administrator position. 

Senator CARPER. When you came to visit me, I asked you if your 

wife knew you were doing this, and you said yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I replied affirmatively, and she would testify under 

oath to that. So, yes. [Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. You say she testified under oath? 

Mr. PISTOLE. She would. 

Senator CARPER. How about your kids? Do they know? 

Mr. PISTOLE. They know also, yes, and they are all in agreement. 

Senator CARPER. That is good. It is nice to see you all. Thanks 

for your willingness to continue to share your husband and your 

dad with the people of our country. 

When you and I met, one of the things I raised with you—and 

I have raised this, I think, in an earlier hearing of our Committee—is the issue of behavior pre-screening, which the Israelis 

are particularly adept at, as folks come into airports and are checking in, getting their tickets, checking their luggage, and going 

through security. And not just Israel. A couple of other countries 

are pretty good. I think Great Britian is pretty good at this sort 

of thing as well. But these officials will try to identify and prevent 

the bad guys, as you know, from boarding aircraft by watching the 

way that they behave before they get to the gate. And the airports 

position well-trained personnel throughout their terminals, including, I guess even in some cases, outside of their terminals, to 

maybe politely ask questions and to watch facial expressions, 

watch body language, and watch speech patterns. 

What are your thoughts on our current behavior detection capabilities within U.S. airports? And would you make it a priority to 

continue to enhance these behavior screening programs? 

Mr. PISTOLE. In response to your latter question, Senator, yes, I 

would enhance those efforts. I have not had a detailed briefing on 

the current capabilities, outcomes, but I know from my experience 

at the FBI, where we have a Behavioral Analysis Unit at the FBI 

Academy at Quantico, that there is a lot that can be gleaned from 

assessing somebody by their behavior. And so I want to look into 

that. I am a strong supporter of the possibilities, recognizing the 

Israeli model, as you mentioned, as probably the premier one, and 

also recognizing that there is a scalability issue there between one 

major airport and the relatively low number of air travelers every 

day versus the nearly 2 million at over 450 airports here in the 

United States every day. So recognizing those challenges, I am a 

supporter and look forward to reviewing it in more detail. 

16 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

If confirmed, you are going to be responsible for leading a workforce, I think, of over 50,000 security officers, inspectors, and air 

marshals whose job it is to protect our Nation’s transportation systems from criminal and terrorism threats. Can you just take a moment and share with us some lessons learned that you plan on 

bringing to the job that you found successful in your 35 years of 

Federal service? We would like to hear that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure, Senator. Thank you. There are several. One, 

with such a large workforce, there has to be obviously some matrix 

management in terms of regional management of offices and people. So I see that as very similar to what the FBI currently has 

with our 34,000 employees in 56 field offices and 76 offices overseas. Those individuals are responsible for their area of responsibility, obviously, but they have a direct reporting to FBI headquarters, which is what I currently do. And it is headquarters-driven so you do not have all these different independent operators out 

there. And so everybody has to have some consistency, uniformity, 

and predictability in how they go about their business, and so I am 

currently the rating official, the person in charge for the heads of 

all of our 56 offices and an additional 12 or so senior executives at 

FBI headquarters. So I have experience in knowing how to run the 

business, if you will, and plan to do the same thing, if confirmed, 

at TSA. 

Senator CARPER. In closing, please share with us your basic leadership principles that you try to subscribe to. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Sure. It really comes down to a couple basic things, 

and that is, trying to empower people with the tools and in many 

cases technology to do their job, to obviously praise in public, reprimand in private, doing things that encourage people to live up to 

their potential, and as part of that, for TSA, I hope to take what 

I see at the FBI in my 27 years of experience there in terms of 

really having a strong sense of mission and commitment to duty. 

And I see TSA being similarly situated in terms of having the national security mission on this continuum that I was speaking with 

the Chairman and Ranking Member earlier about. There is intelligence on the one end that hopefully will interdict the plot before 

it ever gets to screeners or behavior detection officers or canines or 

any of those issues, but to ensure that they are empowered to do 

their work. So it is really trying to identify the best people, surround myself with those people, and then turn them loose and let 

them do their jobs. 

Senator CARPER. Great. Any questions we did not ask you that 

you think maybe we should have? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No, Senator. Thank you, though. [Laughter.] 

I did hesitate just briefly there. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. I look forward to meeting your family. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Carper. 

Did you ever try that last question on somebody you were interrogating? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Many times, Mr. Chairman. And sometimes they 

will respond, so you never know. [Laughter.] 

17 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is most interesting. 

Thank you very much for appearing before the Committee today 

and for your responsive answers to our questions. While we teased 

before about your family, really we appreciate, both from your wife 

and your children, their support of your career and your willingness to take on this latest assignment as we appreciate your willingness to do so. 

We are going to try to move this through as quickly as we can. 

Our goal is to make sure you get confirmed before we break for the 

July 4th recess. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So hopefully we will get you out of the 

Committee sometime next week and then passed on the floor as 

soon thereafter as possible. And so far I do not know whether it 

is your qualities or just people are generally intimidated by a Deputy FBI Director, but I have not heard much opposition yet. Have 

you, Senator Collins? 

Senator COLLINS. No. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is always possible, but you deserve to 

have unanimous support, and I hope that is what you will have. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you want to say anything more, Senator Collins? 

Senator COLLINS. No. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection, the record will be kept 

open until the close of business tomorrow for the submission of any 

written questions or statements. I thank everyone who has been 

here. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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