UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

EGHBAL SAFFARINIA (a/k/a 

“EDDIE SAFFARINIA”), 

Defendant. 

Crim. Action No. 19-216 (EGS) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 Defendant Eghbal Saffarinia (“Mr. Saffarinia”), a former 

Assistant Inspector General for the United States Department of 

Housing and Urban Development’s Office of Inspector General 

(“HUD-OIG”), faces criminal charges arising from alleged 

falsifications and omissions in his annual public financial 

disclosure reports pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 

1978, 5 U.S.C. App. 4 §§ 101-11. Mr. Saffarinia has been charged 

in a seven-count indictment for engaging in a scheme to conceal 

material facts, making false statements, and falsifying records. 

Following the government’s production of approximately 3.5 

million pages with detailed production logs, Mr. Saffarinia 

moves for a bill of particulars. Upon careful consideration of 

the motion, the response, the reply thereto, the applicable law, 

and for the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES 

Defendant’s Motion for Bill of Particulars. 
2 

I. Background 

The following allegations, which Mr. Saffarinia accepts as 

true for this motion and intends to disprove at trial, are drawn 

from the indictment. See Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.’s 

Mot. for Bill of Particulars (“Def.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 14-1 at 3 

n.1.1 Between 2012 and 2017, Mr. Saffarinia served as the 

Assistant Inspector General for Information Technology in HUDOIG, and then as the Assistant Inspector General for Management 

and Technology. Indictment, ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 3. Mr. Saffarinia 

oversaw HUD-OIG’s Office of Management and Technology, which was 

reorganized as HUD-OIG’s Office of Information Technology 

(“IT”). Id. As a member of the Senior Executive Service (“SES”), 

Mr. Saffarinia had a “legal duty” to annually submit public 

financial disclosure reports pursuant to the Ethics in 

Government Act.2 Id. at 2 ¶ 4. Such disclosures were filed using 

 

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the 

filed document. 

2 The Ethics in Government Act “requires government officials, 

including Members of Congress, to file annual disclosure 

statements detailing, with certain exceptions, their income, 

gifts, assets, financial liabilities and securities and 

commercial real estate transactions.” United States v. Oakar, 

111 F.3d 146, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing 5 U.S.C. App. 4 § 

102; United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 

The Act created the Office of Government Ethics (“OGE”) as a 

separate office within the Executive Branch. 5 U.S.C. App. 4 § 

401(a). OGE provides “overall direction of executive branch 

policies related to preventing conflicts of interest on the part 

of officers and employees of any executive agency[.]” Id. § 

402(a). 
3 

the Office of Government Ethics Form 278 (“OGE Form 278”). Id. 

Mr. Saffarinia also served as HUD-OIG’s Head of Contracting 

Activity, overseeing “procurement review and approval processes, 

including IT contracts[.]” Id. at 2 ¶ 5. He was given “access to 

contractor proposal information and source selection 

information[.]” Id. In that position, Mr. Saffarinia had a 

“legal duty under governing regulations,” requiring him to take 

the following actions: 

[1] to disclose actual and potential conflicts 

of interest and [2] to not solicit and accept 

anything of monetary value, including loans, 

from anyone who (a) has or is seeking to obtain 

government business from HUD-OIG, (b) conducts 

activities that are regulated by HUD-OIG, and 

(c) has interests that may be substantially 

affected by the performance or nonperformance 

of [his] official duties. 

Id. at 2-3 ¶ 5. 

Mr. Saffarinia, however, did not disclose the nature of his 

relationship with Person A. Id. at 3-4 ¶ 11-12. Neither did Mr. 

Saffarinia disclose his loans and payments in excess of $10,000 

from Person A and his neighbor. Id. 17 ¶ 75. Mr. Saffarinia, 

Person A, and Person B were friends from college who emigrated 

to the United States from the same country. Id. at 3 ¶ 9. From 

2012 to 2016, Mr. Saffarinia concealed his financial 

relationship with Person A, who was the owner of an IT company 

that contracted with HUD-OIG (“Company A”). See id. at 3 ¶ 6; 3-

4 ¶¶ 11-12. Mr. Saffarinia “steer[ed] government business and 
4 

disclos[ed] confidential government information” to Person A and 

Company A. Id. at 4 ¶ 12. Mr. Saffarinia omitted an $80,000 

promissory note that he owed to Person A in his OGE Forms 278, 

failing to report all liabilities in excess of $10,000 in those 

forms. See id. at 2 ¶ 4; 4 ¶ 12. 

In 2012, Mr. Saffarinia caused Company B to enter into a 

business partnership with Person A and Company A, and Company A 

eventually served as one of Company B’s subcontractors on a 

multi-year, $30 million IT services contract for HUD-OIG. Id. at 

6 ¶ 18. HUD-OIG approved additional funding in the amount of 

$78,000 for Company A’s subcontract with Company B in 2013. Id. 

at 10 ¶ 42. Between 2012 to 2015, Company A received more than 

one million dollars as Company B’s subcontractor. Id. at 9 ¶ 36. 

Mr. Saffarinia gave competitive advantages to Person A and 

Company A for a certain government contract between 2013 and 

2014. Id. at 14 ¶ 61. 

Mr. Saffarinia hired his friend and former business 

partner, Person B, as the head of HUD-OIG’s new predictive 

analytics department. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 7, 9. At Mr. Saffarinia’s 

direction, Person B became the sole member of a technical 

evaluation panel for a government contract. Id. at 16 ¶ 72. For 

that contract, Person B rejected thirteen bid proposals, and 

HUD-OIG awarded it to Person A and Company A. Id. 

From 2013 to 2014, Mr. Saffarinia caused HUD-OIG to 
5 

recompete Company B’s IT service contract, and he caused Company 

C to enter into a business partnership with Company A in order 

for both companies to submit a joint bid for the recompete 

contract. Id. at 11 ¶ 47. Mr. Saffarinia directed his 

subordinate to meet with Person A and the owner of Company C for 

the formation of the partnership and the submission of the joint 

bid. Id. at 12 ¶ 50. HUD-OIG awarded the recompete contract, 

which was worth more than $17 million, to Company C. Id. at 11 ¶ 

47. Company A became a subcontractor for Company C, and Company 

A was expected to receive roughly nine million dollars. Id. 

On June 25, 2019, a federal grand jury returned a 19-page, 

78-paragraph, seven-count indictment charging Mr. Saffarinia 

with concealing material facts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

1001(a)(1) and 2 (“Count I”); making false statements, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(2) and 2 (“Counts II-IV”); and 

falsifying records, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519 and 2 

(“Counts V-VII”). Id. 3-18 ¶¶ 10-78. Count I asserts that Mr. 

Saffarinia “did knowingly and willfully falsify, conceal, and 

cover up by trick, scheme, and device material facts . . . by 

violating his legal duty to disclose a financial relationship 

with Person A, including on his annual OGE Forms 278.” Id. at 4 

¶ 11. Listing Mr. Saffarinia’s 2014, 2015, and 2016 publiclyfiled OGE Forms 278, Counts II through IV assert that Mr. 

Saffarinia “did willfully and knowingly make and caused to be 
6 

made material false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and 

representations in a matter within the jurisdiction of the 

executive branch of the Government of the United States, namely, 

HUD and OGE[.]” Id. at 17 ¶ 76. Finally, Counts V through VII 

list the same three separate OGE forms, alleging that Mr. 

Saffarinia “knowingly concealed, covered up, falsified, and made 

false entries in a record, document, and tangible object” when 

he caused those forms to be filed “with HUD and OGE.” Id. at 18 

¶ 78. 

On June 28, 2019, this Court issued a Standing Order 

requiring the government to produce any evidence in its 

possession that is favorable to Mr. Saffarinia and material to 

either his guilt or punishment. See generally Standing Order, 

ECF No. 11 at 1 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 

(1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972)). 

On the same day, the Court granted the parties’ consent motion 

for a Protective Order governing discovery. See Min. Order of 

June 28, 2019. As early as June 2019, the government produced 

more than one million records to Mr. Saffarinia’s counsel. Gov’t 

Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 2. That production included, among other 

things, virtually all of the investigative case file from the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), interview reports, 

agent notes, and witnesses’ statements pursuant to the Jencks 

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Id. at 2-3. The government’s production, 
7 

while voluminous, was sent to defense counsel in an “organized 

and navigable digital format (specifically, in an electronic, 

‘load ready’ format), with bates-stamping and detailed discovery 

production logs that include[d] all of the metadata for the 

records.” Id. at 3. The government gave Mr. Saffarinia an 

“explicit roadmap” during two reverse proffer sessions in 

February 2018 and June 2019,3 and the parties engaged in further 

discussions and telephone conversations about the charges. Id. 

at 11. Given its continuing discovery obligations, the 

government has provided Mr. Saffarinia with nearly 3.5 million 

pages of discovery. Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 14-1 at 10. 

Dissatisfied, Mr. Saffarinia filed a motion for bill of 

particulars on July 5, 2019. See Def.’s Mot. for Bill of 

Particulars (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 14 at 1. Mr. Saffarinia 

seeks an order compelling the government to produce a bill of 

particulars addressing three points: (1) the legal duties that 

form the basis of the concealment of material facts charged 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 with respect to Count I; (2) the 

“governing regulations” that required Mr. Saffarinia to disclose 

 

3 A “reverse proffer” has been described as a session with the 

government where “the defendant remains silent” and “the 

prosecutor explains how the government would convict the 

defendant at trial and may choose to reveal more information 

than required by the discovery rules.” Stephanos Bibas, 

Incompetent Plea Bargaining & Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 Harv. 

L. Rev. 150, 167 (2012). 
8 

his conflicts of interest as to Count I; and (3) the 

investigation or matter Mr. Saffarinia allegedly impeded, 

impaired, or obstructed under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 with respect to 

Counts V through VII. Id. The government filed its opposition 

brief on July 7, 2019, see Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 1-13, and 

Mr. Saffarinia filed his reply brief on July 11, 2019, see 

Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 16 at 1-10. The motion is ripe and ready 

for the Court’s adjudication. 

II. Legal Standard 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) requires an 

indictment to “be a plain, concise and definite written 

statement of the essential facts constituting the offense 

charged[.]” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1); see also United States v. 

Edmond, 924 F.2d 261, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he function of a 

federal indictment is . . . not how the government plans to go 

about proving [those essential facts].”). Under Rule 7(f), a 

“court may direct the government to file a bill of particulars.” 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f). “A bill of particulars can be used to 

ensure that the charges brought against a defendant are stated 

with enough precision to allow the defendant to understand the 

charges, to prepare a defense, and perhaps also to be protected 

against retrial on the same charges.” United States v. Butler, 

822 F.2d 1191, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “Yet if the indictment is 

sufficiently specific, or if the requested information is 
9 

available in some other form, then a bill of particulars is not 

required.” Id. 

“The determination of whether a bill of particulars is 

necessary ‘rests within the sound discretion of the trial court’ 

and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.” 

United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Butler, 822 F.2d at 1194). “[A] bill of particulars is 

not a discovery tool or a device for allowing the defense to 

preview the government’s evidence.” United States v. Brodie, 326 

F. Supp. 2d 83, 91 (D.D.C. 2004); see also United States v. 

Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1985) (“A bill of 

particulars, unlike discovery, is not intended to provide the 

defendant with the fruits of the government’s investigation.”). 

III. Analysis 

In moving for a bill of particulars, Mr. Saffarinia makes 

four primary arguments. First, Mr. Saffarinia contends that a 

bill of particulars is necessary for him to prepare his defense 

and to prevent unfair surprises at trial. Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 

14-1 at 6. Mr. Saffarinia’s next argument is that the 

obstruction allegations in Counts V through VII are “threadbare” 

and “multiplicitous” because the indictment fails to describe 

the “investigation” or “matter” that he allegedly intended to 

impede, influence, or obstruct. Id. at 7. Mr. Saffarinia points 

out that he is left guessing “whether the ‘matter’ supporting 
10 

the false statements charges differs from the ‘matter’ 

supporting the obstruction charges.” Id. at 8. Next, Mr. 

Saffarinia argues that Count I of the indictment fails to 

explain what “legal duty” triggered his alleged failure to 

disclose information in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1). Id. 

at 9. Mr. Saffarinia’s fourth argument is that the “massive 

discovery” in this case underscores the need for a bill of 

particulars because he will be “left to spend months of valuable 

trial preparation time sifting through millions of pages of 

documents trying to figure out what, exactly, he stands accused 

of.” Id. at 11. 

The government responds that the indictment supplies Mr. 

Saffarinia with the essential facts and elements of the crimes 

charged, and that Mr. Saffarinia’s motion “improperly seeks the 

disclosure of the government’s legal theory and the specific 

acts it will prove at trial in support thereof.” Gov’t Opp’n, 

ECF No. 15 at 4. The government argues that “[t]he indictment’s 

specificity, coupled with the substantial discovery already 

provided (including an early production of Jencks material), is 

more than sufficient to place [Mr. Saffarinia] in a position 

where he understands the charges and can prepare a defense to 

them.” Id. at 5. The government contends that the indictment 

provides Mr. Saffarinia with notice of the matters and 

investigations that he obstructed for the § 1519 charges because 
11 

it names both HUD and OGE as the relevant agencies, it describes 

the OGE forms that he allegedly falsified, and those allegations 

are incorporated in Counts V through VII. Id. at 6. With respect 

to the § 1001 charge, the government contends that the 

indictment indicates that Mr. Saffarinia had a legal duty to 

disclose his relationship with Person A because Mr. Saffarinia 

was a high-ranking HUD-OIG official, the Head of Contracting 

Activity, and an SES member. Id. at 7. The government’s next 

argument is that Mr. Saffarinia’s motion is an attempt to “use a 

bill of particulars as a discovery device and to preview the 

government’s trial theories[.]” Id. at 9. Finally, the 

government argues that Mr. Saffarinia’s requested information 

“is available to [him] through the indictment itself, the 

discovery provided by the government, and the information 

previously furnished to [him] and his counsel[.]” Id. at 12. 

Before turning to the parties’ arguments as to Mr. 

Saffarinia’s three requests, the Court first addresses the 

substantial discovery in this case. 

A. The Government Has Produced Substantial Discovery 

It is undisputed that the discovery in this case is 

voluminous. See, e.g., Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 14-1 at 10-11; Gov’t 

Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 2-3. The government has produced more than 

one million records and 3.5 million pages to Mr. Saffarinia. See

Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 14-1 at 10; see also Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 
12 

15 at 2. In the government’s view, Mr. Saffarinia “will [not] be 

forced to find a proverbial needle in a haystack” because the 

government has provided him with organized and detailed 

discovery production logs, Bates-stamping, and digital 

formatting. Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 2. The government further 

provided Mr. Saffarinia with seven specific categories of 

documents to assist defense counsel with the discovery review. 

Id. at 2-3.4 Mr. Saffarinia neither challenges the government’s 

production nor disputes the government’s efforts to make defense 

counsel’s discovery review manageable. See generally Def.’s 

Reply, ECF No. 16. 

Notwithstanding the pre-indictment negotiations, voluminous 

discovery, and subsequent discussions between the parties in 

this case, the parties had two separate and lengthy reverse 

proffer sessions, Mr. Saffarinia attended one of them, and the 

 

4 The government has produced the following seven categories of 

documents: (1) “Nearly all of the FBI’s investigative case file, 

including interview reports, agent notes, and an early 

production of Jencks material”; (2) “A voluminous amount of 

material from HUD-OIG, including the e-mail accounts for the 

defendant and Persons A and B for the relevant period”; (3) “The 

subpoena returns (with supplements)”; (4) “The defendant’s tax 

returns and financial records”; (5) “A portion of the 

defendant’s administrative records (including ethics training 

and financial disclosure forms and certifications)”; 

(6) “Business and financial records for Person A and Company A, 

and business records for two other vendors (referred to as 

Companies B and C in the indictment)”; and (7) “HUD-OIG contract 

information for the contracts at issue.” Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 15 

at 2-3. 
13 

government explained its theory of the case to Mr. Saffarinia’s 

counsel in each session. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 3; see 

also Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 16 at 8. It is uncontested that both 

sessions and the negotiations covered the following information: 

[1] discussions of key interview reports and 

documents (including references to 

exculpatory information); [2] an analysis of 

the interactions between [Mr. Saffarinia] and 

his associates (Persons A and B); [3] a 

discussion of [Mr. Saffarinia’s] legal 

obligations to disclose information on his 

public financial disclosure forms (OGE Forms 

278); and [4] a summary of the HUD-OIG 

procurement process and the contracts at 

issue. Prior to [the] indictment, the 

government also disclosed its proposed charges 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1519 and, during that 

discussion with [defense] counsel, explained 

how the [Mr. Saffarinia’s] conduct impeded and 

impaired the proper administration of HUD-OIG 

and OGE. 

Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 3. According to the government, 

“[t]he elements of the crimes that the government anticipated 

charging, and the accompanying jurisdictional and legal issues, 

were matters of prolonged oral and written communications 

between the parties.” Id. at 3 n.2. Although Mr. Saffarinia 

takes issue with the government’s statements about the parties’ 

discussions, he argues that the parties’ disagreement is 

“irrelevant.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 16 at 8. Without citing to 

any authority, Mr. Saffarinia contends that “if the government 

did communicate the particulars that Mr. Saffarinia seeks, it 

will suffer no prejudice from repeating its prior disclosures 
14 

here.” Id. at 9 (emphasis in original). 

Contrary to Mr. Saffarinia’s contention, the government 

does not have an obligation to repeat its previous disclosures. 

“A bill of particulars is meant to allow [Mr. Saffarinia] to 

properly prepare for trial, not provide a method to force the 

prosecution to connect every dot in its case.” United States v. 

Han, 280 F. Supp. 3d 144, 149 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Butler, 822 

F.2d at 1193-94). While Mr. Saffarinia may request additional 

information through a bill of particulars, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 

7(f), he may not use it as a discovery mechanism, see United 

States v. Ramirez, 54 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 1999). As Judge 

Huvelle observed in United States v. Brodie, “a bill of 

particulars is not a discovery tool or a device” and the 

government is not “required to prove how or when the [alleged 

crime] was formed, the details of any meeting or when the 

defendant [engaged in the alleged crime].” 326 F. Supp. 2d at 

91. Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals for the 

District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) has made clear 

that a bill of particulars is unwarranted where, as here, “the 

requested information is available in some other form.” Butler, 

822 F.2d at 1193; see also United States v. Sanford Ltd., 841 F. 

Supp. 2d 309, 316 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that “no bill of 

particulars [was] warranted [there] because the superseding 

indictment and other information available to the defendants 
15 

through discovery provide[d] sufficient detail regarding the 

nature and the details of the offenses charged to afford the 

defendants a full and fair opportunity to prepare for and avoid 

surprise at trial”). 

In this case, Mr. Saffarinia’s request for additional 

details about the charges in the indictment—details of which the 

government has already provided to him—is improper. An 

“indictment’s failure to detail the government’s case against 

the defendants alone does not trigger a requirement for the 

government to produce a bill of particulars so long as the 

information requested by the defendants has been made available 

in another form[.]” United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, 153 F. 

Supp. 3d 130, 147–48 (D.D.C. 2015) (denying motion for bill of 

particulars where there were reverse proffers and the government 

provided voluminous discovery to defendants).5 The government 

argues—and the Court agrees—that the information Mr. Saffarinia 

seeks is available in other forms through the discovery in this 

 

5 Mr. Saffarinia attempts to distinguish Mosquera-Murillo from 

this case, arguing that “the defendant in that case had moved 

for the bill [of particulars] a year after the indictment and 

after the government had provided ‘additional clarity as to 

[the] government’s specific allegations.’” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 

16 at 7 n.2 (quoting Mosquera-Murillo, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 148). 

Those facts, however, are of no consequence. In finding that 

there was voluminous discovery, the court in Mosquera-Murillo

relied on the guiding principle in Butler that a bill of 

particular is not required if the requested information is 

available in another form. Mosquera-Murillo, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 

148 (citing Butler, 822 F.2d at 1193-94). 
16 

case. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 9. Given the substantial 

discovery here, the Court therefore finds that Mr. Saffarinia is 

not entitled to a bill of particulars to prepare his defense and 

to avoid any surprises at trial. See Mejia, 448 F.3d at 446 

(concluding that “if the defendants felt ambushed, it was not 

because the government was lying in wait, but because the 

defendants were not looking” at the pretrial witness statements 

provided by the government). 

B. The Indictment and Discovery Provide Mr. Saffarinia 

With Notice of the Matters and Investigations at Issue 

Mr. Saffarinia’s argument—that the government fails to 

identify the investigation or matter underlying the three 

obstruction counts—is unavailing. See Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 14-1 

at 7. With respect to Counts V through VII, “[t]he plain 

language of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 criminalizes a defendant’s efforts 

to obstruct ‘the investigation or proper administration of any 

matter’ within the jurisdiction of [any department or agency of 

the United States, including] the FBI, ‘or in relation to or 

contemplation of any such matter.’” United States v. Moyer, 674 

F.3d 192, 206 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519). “By the 

plain terms of § 1519, knowledge of a pending federal 

investigation or proceeding is not an element of the obstruction 

crime.” United States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 371, 378 (2d Cir. 2011) 

(emphasis added). And “[Section] 1519 does not require the 
17 

existence or likelihood of a federal investigation.” Id. at 379. 

To support its position, the government relies on United 

States v. Knight, No. 12-cr-0367, 2013 WL 3367259, at *4 (E.D. 

Pa. July 3, 2013). See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 6. Knight, a 

decision left unaddressed by Mr. Saffarinia, is persuasive. See

Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 16 at 6-7. In that case, the defendants 

sought additional information about their alleged obstructive 

conduct under § 1519 beyond the allegations in the indictment. 

Knight, 2013 WL 3367259, at *4 (emphasis added). The court found 

that the indictment tracked the language of § 1519. Id. at *5. 

The court explained that “the Government need not provide 

specifics on how the obstructive conduct was intended to impede 

the grand jury or any investigation.” Id. at *4. Because the 

indictment set forth which documents the defendants had 

allegedly falsified and fabricated, the court reasoned that the 

defendants were not entitled to “information regarding 

obstructive conduct beyond what [was] alleged in the 

Indictment[.]” Id. The court found that “[r]eading the 

Indictment as a whole, Defendants [could] reasonably infer how 

their allegedly obstructive conduct impeded the grand jury or an 

investigation into their activities.” Id. 

The same is true here. As the government correctly points 

out, the indictment provides Mr. Saffarinia with notice of the 

matters and investigations at issue, and it incorporates by 
18 

reference the allegations that describe the OGE Forms 278 that 

Mr. Saffarinia allegedly falsified when he submitted those forms 

to the two agencies—HUD and OGE. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 

6. Counts V through VII explicitly set forth the alleged false 

statements and a description of each statement in Mr. 

Saffarinia’s OGE Forms 278 that were submitted on May 12, 2014, 

May 16, 2015, and April 26, 2016, respectively. See Indictment, 

ECF No. 1 at 18 ¶ 78. Furthermore, the government provided Mr. 

Saffarinia with “[n]early all of the FBI’s investigative case 

file, including interview reports, agent notes, and an early 

production of Jencks material.” Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 2. 

Putting aside the discovery and reverse proffer sessions, the 

indictment itself informs Mr. Saffarinia that the three alleged 

false statements in the OGE Forms 278 were the matters that HUD, 

OGE, and the FBI had jurisdiction to investigate. See 

Indictment, ECF No. 1 at 18 ¶ 78. The Court therefore finds that 

Mr. Saffarinia has sufficient information through discovery “to 

permit [him] to conduct his own investigation” regarding any 

additional information about the matters and investigations at 

issue. Smith, 776 F.2d at 1111.6 

 

6 Mr. Saffarinia relies on United States v. Jackson, 926 F. Supp. 

2d 691, 717 (E.D.N.C. 2013) for the proposition that an 

indictment is deficient if it fails to identify the 

investigation or matter that forms the basis of the obstruction 

charges. See Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 14-1 at 8. Jackson is readily 

distinguishable from this case. In that case, the court 
19 

C. The Indictment Sufficiently Apprises Mr. Saffarinia of 

the False Statement Counts 

Mr. Saffarinia’s other argument—that the government fails 

to identify the legal duty and governing regulations underlying 

Count I—is equally unavailing. See Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 14-1 at 

9-10. A violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) predicated on 

concealment, as alleged in the indictment here, requires the 

government to prove that the defendant had a legal duty to 

disclose the concealed information. E.g., United States v. 

Safavian, 528 F.3d 957, 964 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Concealment cases 

in this circuit and others have found a duty to disclose 

material facts on the basis of specific requirements for 

disclosure of specific information.”); United States v. Calhoon, 

 

dismissed two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and 18 U.S.C. § 

1519, finding that “even considering the allegations in the 

indictment as a whole, the government ha[d] failed to 

sufficiently apprise [the defendants] of the [anticipated] 

investigation and official proceeding they [were] alleged to 

have obstructed.” Jackson, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 718. The court 

found that the defendants were provided with “no details as to 

the times and places of the [Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms] 

inspection and investigation, and the nature of the matters 

under inquiry.” Id. at 719. Unlike in Jackson, the government 

here has provided Mr. Saffarinia with details—the FBI’s 

investigative case file and the witnesses’ statements. Gov’t 

Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 2-3. Counts V through VII provide Mr. 

Saffarinia with the OGE Forms 278 that he allegedly falsified, 

the dates when he submitted them, and the agencies that reviewed 

those forms. See Indictment, ECF No. 1 at 18 ¶ 78. In 

considering the indictment as a whole, it is clear that the 

matters and the agencies’ investigations at issue stemmed from 

Mr. Saffarinia’s alleged failures to disclose all of his 

payments and loans in the OGE Forms 278, forming the basis of 

the obstruction allegations. See id. at 4-5 ¶ 13; 18 ¶¶ 77-78. 
20 

97 F.3d 518, 526 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Falsity through concealment 

exists where disclosure of the concealed information is required 

by a statute, government regulation, or form.”). 

Mr. Saffarinia argues that “the government must prove that 

[he] had a ‘duty to disclose material facts on the basis of 

specific requirements for disclosure of specific information.’” 

Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 14-1 at 9 (quoting Safavian, 528 F.3d at 

964). The government does not dispute this statement of the law. 

See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 7-8; see also Def.’s Reply, ECF 

No. 16 at 4. Rather, the government argues that a “plain reading 

of the indictment” indicates that Mr. Saffarinia’s legal duty to 

disclose his financial relationship with Person A arose from his 

position as a high-ranking HUD-OIG official and as an SES 

member. Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 7. The government points out 

that Mr. Saffarinia’s legal duties to disclose derived from his 

role as the Head of Contracting Activity. Id.; see also

Indictment, ECF No. 1 at 2-3 ¶ 5 (alleging that Mr. Saffarinia 

had a “legal duty under governing regulations to disclose actual 

and potential conflicts of interest and to not solicit and 

accept anything of monetary value”). 

In Safavian, a jury found the defendant guilty of 

concealing relevant information from: (1) an ethics officer in 

the course of seeking an ethics opinion; and (2) the General 

Services Administration in the course of that agency’s 
21 

investigation. 528 F.3d at 962-63. Specifically, the defendant 

had requested advice from the ethics officer, but the defendant 

purportedly failed to provide all the information that would 

have been relevant to the officer in rendering his opinion. Id. 

at 964. The defendant also purportedly failed to provide 

complete information to the agency’s investigator with whom he 

voluntarily met. Id. 

On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the defendant’s 

convictions on the concealment counts, holding that the 

government had failed to identify a duty to disclose. Id. at 

965. With respect to the defendant’s failure to provide complete 

information to the ethics officer, the D.C. Circuit noted that 

it was not clear “how th[e] voluntary system” of seeking ethical 

advice – which the defendant was ultimately free to follow or 

disregard – “impose[d] a duty on those seeking ethical advise to 

disclose . . . ‘all relevant information’ upon pain of 

prosecution for violating § 1001(a)(1).” Id. at 964. Instead, 

any duty to disclose must arise from “specific requirements for 

disclosure of specific information” so that the defendant has 

“fair notice . . . of what conduct is forbidden.” Id. (citation 

omitted). The D.C. Circuit also rejected the government’s 

argument that “once one begins speaking when seeking government 

action or in response to questioning, one must disclose all 

relevant facts.” Id. at 965. Noting that there was no 
22 

“regulation or form or statute” that contained such a 

requirement, the D.C. Circuit made clear that nothing in 

“[section] 1001 demands that individuals choose between saying 

everything and saying nothing.” Id. 

 Mr. Saffarinia’s reliance on Safavian is misplaced. The 

government in Safavian argued that the defendant’s duty to 

disclose information was imposed upon him not by statute, 

regulation, or government form, but by “standards of conduct for 

government employees,” which provided fourteen “general 

principles” of behavior. Id. at 964. The D.C. Circuit concluded 

that those standards were “vague” and that the “ethical 

principles” embodied in them did not impose a clear duty on an 

executive employee to disclose information. Id. at 964–65. The 

opposite is true here. 

As the indictment makes clear, Mr. Saffarinia’s duty to 

disclose the required information in the OGE Forms 278 is not 

the result of vague or general principles. See Indictment, ECF 

No. 1 at 4 ¶ 11. Unlike in Safavian, this case involves a 

statute, regulations, and a government form. The statute is the 

Ethics in Government Act; the regulations are the OGE’s 

regulations, 5 C.F.R. § 2634, et seq.; and the government form 

is the OGE Form 278. See id.7 HUD’s website provides that the 

 

7 “The Court takes judicial notice of the official government 

documents and other sources from [HUD’s] government website as 
23 

Ethics in Government Act “requires senior officials in the 

executive, legislative, and judicial branches to file public 

reports of their finances and other interests outside the 

Government.” Financial Disclosure Reports, HUD, 

https://www.hud.gov/program offices/general counsel/Financial Di

sclosure Reports (last visited Oct. 7, 2019). It further 

provides that certain HUD employees, including SES members, must 

file the OGE Forms 278. Id. The OGE Form 278’s instructions 

direct filers to the Ethics in Government Act and 5 C.F.R. § 

2634 to determine what information must be disclosed. See OGE 

Form 278 at 3 § V (“General Instructions”). This form expressly 

provides that “Title I of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 

as amended (the Act), 5 U.S.C. app. § 101 et seq., and 5 C.F.R. 

Part 2634 of the [OGE] regulations require the reporting of this 

information.” Id. at 11. 

Next, Mr. Saffarinia argues that the government fails to 

identify the “governing regulations” in the indictment. Def.’s 

Mem., ECF No. 14-1 at 10. To support his argument, Mr. 

Saffarinia relies on United States v. Madeoy, 652 F. Supp. 371, 

 

‘sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’” 

Humane Soc’y of United States v. Animal & Plant Health 

Inspection Serv., 386 F. Supp. 3d 34, 40 n.2 (D.D.C. 2019) 

(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2)). The OGE Form 278, of which 

the Court takes judicial notice, is publicly available on HUD’s 

website. See OGE Form 278, Executive Branch Personnel Public 

Financial Disclosure Report, HUD, 

https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/OGE_FORM_278_AUTOMATED.PDF. 
24 

374 (D.D.C. 1987), but his reliance on that case is also 

misplaced. In Madeoy, the defendants were charged with 121 

counts, including conspiracy, racketeering, false statements, 

and fraud. Id. at 374. The indictment referenced “more than 700 

pages of the Code of Federal Regulations without specifying 

which regulations [were] at issue.” Id. The court held that 

“[t]here [was] no reason whatever why [those] laws and 

regulations should not [have been] specified by way of a bill of 

particulars—a specification which may well [have been] vital to 

defendants’ abilities to answer [the] charges.” Id. Madeoy, 

however, is factually distinguishable. The holding in that case 

does not require a bill of particulars in every case where an 

indictment does not provide a specific citation to a governing 

regulation. Unlike in the present case, there is no indication 

whether the government in Madeoy provided the defendants with 

substantial discovery or whether the parties participated in 

extensive reverse proffer sessions. See id. at 380 (granting 

defendants’ motion for pretrial discovery). 

It is undisputed that the government has produced 

voluminous discovery in this case. The indictment expressly 

refers to Mr. Saffarinia’s positions as a high-level HUD-OIG 

official and the Head of Contracting Activity, as well as his 

SES membership, which all gave rise to his legal duty to 

disclose the required information in the OGE Form 278. See
25 

Indictment, ECF No. 1 at 2-3 ¶¶ 3-5. The OGE Form 278 itself 

provides specific information about the reporting requirements. 

See OGE Form 278 at 1 § I (“Scope of Disclosure”). Furthermore, 

the indictment tracks the language of § 1001(a), and it provides 

specific information about the three alleged false statements. 

See Indictment, ECF No. 1 at 17 ¶¶ 74-76. The Court therefore 

finds that the indictment provides Mr. Saffarinia with adequate 

notice of the charges against him. See United States v. 

Cisneros, 26 F. Supp. 2d 24, 50 (D.D.C. 1998) (denying motion 

for bill of particulars where “[t]he lengthy [i]ndictment 

include[d] not only a recitation of the statute but specific 

information, including the times, places and activities which 

constitute the unlawful activity”).8

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES 

Defendant’s Motion for Bill of Particulars. A separate Order 

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

United States District Judge 

October 10, 2019 

 

8 Having found that Mr. Saffarinia is not entitled to a bill of 

particulars, the Court need not address the government’s 

argument that Mr. Saffarinia’s motion seeks to “lock the 

government in on its legal theory, well in advance of trial, and 

obtain a road map or laundry list of the documents and evidence 

the government intend to introduce at trial.” Gov’t Opp’n, ECF 

No. 15 at 9.