52998 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 166 / Tuesday, August 27, 2013 / Notices 

1 In calculating this percentage, the FAA relies on 

the standard model developed by the 30th Space 

Wing from observation of Mission Flight Control 

Officer response times to initiate flight destruction 

of a malfunctioning launch vehicle. The 30th Space 

Wing uses this standard time for its analysis. 

2The FAA assumes the standard model 

developed by the 30th Space Wing from observation 

of Mission Flight Control Officer response times to 

initiate flight destruction of a malfunctioning 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Waiver to Space Exploration 

Technologies Corporation of 

Acceptable Risk Limit for Launch 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of waiver. 

SUMMARY: This notice concerns a 

petition for waiver submitted to the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

by Space Exploration Technologies 

Corporation (SpaceX) to waive a limit 

that the risk to the public from the 

launch of an expendable launch vehicle 

not exceed an expected average number 

of 0.00003 casualties (Ec ≤ 30 × 10¥6) 

from far field blast overpressure. The 

FAA grants the petition, but limits 

collective risk to an expected average 

number of 0.0001 casualties. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

waiver, contact Charles P. Brinkman, 

Licensing Program Lead, Commercial 

Space Transportation—Licensing and 

Evaluation Division, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone: (202) 267–7715; email: 

Phil.Brinkman@faa.gov. For legal 

questions concerning this waiver, 

contact Laura Montgomery, Manager, 

Space Law Branch, AGC–250, Office of 

the Chief Counsel, Regulations Division, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–3150; email: Laura.Montgomery@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background 

On July 10, 2013, SpaceX submitted a 

petition to the FAA’s Office of 

Commercial Space Transportation (AST) 

requesting a waiver for a launch from 

Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) of a 

Falcon 9 Version 1.1 (v1.1) launch 

vehicle carrying, a Canadian scientific 

and research satellite called Cassiope, 

and several small secondary payloads. 

SpaceX requested a waiver of 14 CFR 

417.107(b)(1), which prohibits the 

launch of an expendable launch vehicle 

if the total expected average number of 

casualties (Ec) for the launch exceeds 

0.00003 for risk from far field blast 

overpressure. 

The FAA licenses the launch of a 

launch vehicle and reentry of a reentry 

vehicle under authority granted to the 

Secretary of Transportation in the 

Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, 

as amended and re-codified by 51 U.S.C. 

Subtitle V, chapter 509 (Chapter 509), 

and delegated to the FAA Administrator 

and the Associate Administrator for 

Commercial Space Transportation, who 

exercises licensing authority under 

Chapter 509. 

SpaceX is a private commercial space 

flight company. It has initiated activities 

with the U.S. Air Force’s EELV Program 

to become a certified launch service 

provider for National Security space 

missions. In addition, SpaceX launches 

commercial payloads such as Cassiope. 

This petition for waiver addresses an 

upcoming flight that SpaceX plans to 

undertake transporting the Cassiope 

satellite and several small secondary 

payloads to earth orbit. This will be the 

first launch by SpaceX from VAFB. It 

will also be the first flight of the Falcon 

9 v1.1 vehicle, which is larger and has 

greater thrust and payload capacity than 

SpaceX’s Falcon 9 vehicle. SpaceX’s 

Falcon 9 v1.1 launch vehicle will 

launch from VAFB and place the 

Cassiope satellite into a near-polar orbit. 

The launch vehicle will also carry five 

secondary payloads to the same orbit. 

The first stage will coast after stage 

separation, and then perform an 

experimental burn with three engines to 

reduce the entry velocity just prior to 

entry. Prior to landing in the water, it 

will perform a second experimental 

burn with one engine to impact the 

water with minimal velocity. The 

second stage will coast and then 

perform an experimental burn to 

depletion. 

The preliminary calculation of Ec for 

far field blast overpressure shows that 

the launch would exceed the 0.00003 

limit imposed by section 417.107(b)(1) 

under anticipated weather conditions 

for a daytime launch in September. 

Atmospheric conditions at the launch 

site during the anticipated time of 

launch increase the far field blast 

overpressure risk. The presence of 

inversion layers at VAFB is common, 

and results in the reflection of shock 

waves from an explosion. This 

reflection of shock waves can cause 

greater damage than would otherwise be 

caused without the reflection from the 

inversion layer. Chances of 

advantageous weather conditions during 

the day in September that would allow 

a launch that meets the FAA’s risk 

requirements are virtually zero percent.1

The Falcon 9 v1.1 is a new launch 

vehicle. The U.S. Air Force has 

determined that its overall failure 

probability is nearly fifty percent for 

each of the first two launches. AST has 

determined that the Air Force’s 

calculation of probability of failure 

satisfies the requirements in part 417. 

Weather conditions during the day in 

September are likely to be unfavorable 

and delays may last for days. SpaceX, 

therefore, seeks a waiver of this risk 

requirement. 

Waiver Criteria 

Chapter 509 allows the FAA to waive 

a license requirement if the waiver (1) 

will not jeopardize public health and 

safety, safety of property; (2) will not 

jeopardize national security and foreign 

policy interests of the United States; and 

(3) will be in the public interest. 51 

U.S.C. 50905(b)(3) (2011); 14 CFR 

404.5(b) (2011). 

Sections 417.107(b)(1) Waiver Petition 

Section 417.107(b)(1) prohibits the 

launch of a launch vehicle if the Ec for 

the flight exceeds 0.00003 for any of the 

following three risks: (1) Impacting inert 

and impacting explosive debris, (2) 

toxic release, and (3) far field blast 

overpressure. For reasons described 

below, the FAA waives the restrictions 

in section 417.107(b)(1) to allow SpaceX 

to conduct a flight with the Ec resulting 

from far field blast overpressure 

exceeding 0.00003 as long as total Ec for 

the three hazards combined does not 

exceed 0.0001. The FAA is not waiving 

the Ec requirement for impacting inert 

and impacting explosive debris or for 

toxic release. 

Launch of the Falcon 9 Vehicle 

The FAA waives the far field 

overpressure risk requirement of section 

417.107(b)(1) because the Falcon 9 v1.1 

launch will not jeopardize public health 

and safety or safety of property, a 

national security or foreign policy 

interest of the United States, and is in 

the public interest. 

i. Public Health and Safety and Safety 

of Property 

The Falcon 9 v1.1 launch is the first 

launch of the v1.1 vehicle, and the first 

SpaceX launch from VAFB. Although 

the risk from far field blast overpressure 

is likely to exceed 0.00003, the 

estimated risks for debris and toxic 

release are very low. Based on 

preliminary calculations performed by 

the U.S. Air Force for SpaceX, the 

collective risk to the public from the 

Falcon 9 v1.1 launch will be less than 

0.0001 approximately forty percent of 

the time during September.2 NASA, the 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 166 / Tuesday, August 27, 2013 / Notices 52999 

launch vehicle. The 30th Space Wing uses this 

standard time for its analysis. 

U.S. Air Force and other U.S. National 

Test ranges use 0.0001 as the expected 

casualty limit across all three hazards as 

their criterion See U.S. Air Force 

Instruction 91–217, Space Safety and 

Mishap Prevention Program (2010); 

NASA Procedural Requirements 8715.5 

Rev A, Range Flight Safety Program 

(2010); Range Commanders Council 

(RCC) Standard 321–10, Common Risk 

Criteria Standards for National Test 

Ranges (2010). If the Falcon 9 v1.1’s 

collective risk were to exceed 0.0001 

expected casualties, SpaceX would not 

launch until conditions improved 

sufficiently for the risk of the launch to 

satisfy the limits allowed by the waiver. 

The increase in the Ec for the first 

launch of the Falcon 9 v1.1 vehicle from 

VAFB is largely attributable to two 

factors. First, the launch will take place 

from VAFB. VAFB is located in 

California, and frequently experiences 

unique weather conditions that 

exacerbate far field blast overpressure 

from a launch. An inversion layer, an 

atmospheric region with a warmer 

temperature than the region below, is 

common much of the year at VAFB. The 

presence of an inversion layer could 

increase damage caused by an explosion 

because an inversion layer may reflect 

the shock wave from an explosion back 

towards the ground. By reflecting the 

shock wave back towards the ground, 

surrounding buildings, and particularly 

glass windows, may experience greater 

pressure, which could cause greater 

glass breakage. Second, the estimated 

probability of failure to the Falcon 9 

v1.1 is high because it is a new launch 

vehicle. There is no way to reduce this 

estimated failure probability, which is 

derived from the historically high 

number of launch failures in new 

vehicles. This probability of failure is 

one of the most critical variables in the 

Ec calculations. 

This waiver for the risk from far field 

blast overpressure is consistent with the 

Air Force total risk threshold for Ec of 

100 × 10¥6 for risks from debris, toxic 

release, and far field blast overpressure 

combined. The current Ec requirement 

for U.S. Government launches from U.S. 

National Test Ranges is 0.0001, which, 

because it comprises debris, toxics, and 

overpressure, means that the federal 

launch ranges permit the risk 

attributable to overpressure to exceed 

the FAA’s risk threshold. See Air Force 

Instruction 91–217, Space Safety and 

Mishap Prevention Program (2010). The 

U.S. Air Force approved a government 

launch of a Titan, where the risk ranged 

from 145 to 317 in a million. Dept. of 

the Air Force Memorandum, Overflight 

Risk Exceedance Waiver for Titan IV B– 

30 Mission, (Apr. 4, 2005). Additionally, 

the FAA granted a waiver on April 17, 

2012, for risk from debris up to 

0.000130 for a Falcon 9 launch from 

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. 

Waiver of Acceptable Risk Restriction 

for Launch and Reentry, Notice of 

Waiver, 77 FR 24556 (April 24, 2012). 

Again, risk was largely a result of a 

relatively high failure probability that is 

unavoidably attached to a new launch 

vehicle. Based on the fact that risk will 

remain very low, and will be limited to 

the requirement for government 

launches (Ec of less than 0.0001), 

granting a waiver in this case would not 

jeopardize public health and safety or 

safety of property. 

ii. National Security and Foreign Policy 

Implications 

The FAA has identified no national 

security or foreign policy implications 

associated with granting this waiver. 

iii. Public Interest 

The waiver is consistent with the 

public interest goals of Chapter 509. 

Three of the public policy goals of 

Chapter 509 are: (1) To promote 

economic growth and entrepreneurial 

activity through use of the space 

environment; (2) to encourage the 

United States private sector to provide 

launch and reentry vehicles and 

associated services; and (3) to facilitate 

the strengthening and expansion of the 

United States space transportation 

infrastructure to support the full range 

of United States space-related activities. 

See 51 U.S.C. 50901(b)(1), (2), (4). 

With a requirement that Ec be less 

than 0.00003 for far field blast 

overpressure, launch availability for the 

Western Range is estimated to be 

virtually zero percent due to 

atmospheric conditions at the launch 

site and the high failure probability 

necessarily assigned to a new launch 

vehicle. This would certainly make the 

launch site impractical for commercial 

launches, at least of new launch 

vehicles. Granting a limited waiver for 

risk from far field blast overpressure as 

long as the risk for all three risks does 

not exceed 100 × 10¥6 increases launch 

availability for the first launch of Falcon 

9 v1.1 at VAFB to approximately forty 

percent for September, depending on 

detailed analytical assumptions 

concerning flight termination action. 

VAFB is the most suitable U.S. launch 

facility for supporting the launches of 

satellites by large vehicles into polar 

orbits. Granting this waiver makes 

VAFB a viable site for commercial 

launches, helping to sustain the launch 

capacity for U.S. launch providers, 

thereby supporting the industrial base 

and lowering overall launch costs for 

commercial customers and the U.S. 

Government. 

Additionally, the proposed launch is 

consistent with the principles and goals 

of the 2010 National Space Policy, 

which emphasizes the importance of 

developing a robust domestic 

commercial space transportation 

industry and acquiring commercial 

space services to meet United States 

Government requirements. The 

development of commercial launch 

service providers is crucial because, as 

noted in the 2010 National Space 

Policy, United States access to space 

depends in the first instance on launch 

capabilities. To that end, SpaceX has 

applied to the U.S. Air Force’s EELV 

Program to become a certified launch 

service provider for National Security 

space missions. In accordance with the 

Air Force’s approved New Entrant 

Certification Guide, SpaceX is required 

to demonstrate its compliance with 

EELV program requirements, including 

successfully demonstrating launches of 

the launch vehicle being proposed for 

certification. In the certification 

approach being taken under the New 

Entrant Certification Guide, SpaceX is 

required to successfully launch three 

Falcon 9 launch vehicles, the first of 

which is planned to be the Cassiope 

mission from VAFB. Each flight of the 

Falcon 9 builds heritage for this vehicle, 

which will be used by the United States 

Government. NASA has already 

contracted with SpaceX for Cargo 

Resupply Services missions from 

CCAFS using Falcon 9 v1.1. 

Accordingly, proceeding with the 

proposed launch is in the public 

interest. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on August 19, 

2013. 

Kenneth Wong, 

Licensing and Evaluation Division Manager, 

Commercial Space Transportation. 

[FR Doc. 2013–20726 Filed 8–26–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Highway Administration 

Notice of Final Federal Agency Actions 

on Proposed Highway in Indiana 

AGENCY: Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of Limitation on Claims 

for Judicial Review of Actions by FHWA 

and United States Fish and Wildlife 

Service (USFWS), DOI. 


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