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i 

65–803 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–32] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE 

DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 31, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 31, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request for Missile Defense Programs .................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 31, 2011 ...................................................................................... 33 

THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2011 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 3 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Ahern, David G., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Portfolio Systems 

Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics ............................................................................................. 9 

Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense .................................................................................. 11 

O’Reilly, LTG Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency ...................... 6 

Roberts, Dr. Bradley H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Nuclear 

and Missile Defense Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense ....................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Ahern, David G. ................................................................................................ 72 

Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael ................................................................................. 85 

O’Reilly, LTG Patrick J. ................................................................................... 57 

Roberts, Dr. Bradley H. ................................................................................... 42 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta ...................................................................................... 40 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 95 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 110 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 109 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 101 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 99 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 31, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. I call to order the meeting of the subcommittee. 

And I would like to extend a warm welcome to our four distinguished witnesses here today to discuss the fiscal year 2012 budget 

request for missile defense programs: Dr. Bradley Roberts, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense 

Policy; Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly, Director of the Missile 

Defense Agency; and Dr. David Ahern, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Portfolio Systems Acquisition; Dr. Michael Gilmore, 

Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. 

Members have several issues that they want to address, and we 

have votes that are actually pending, so I am hopeful that we can 

get through my opening statement and the statement of the witnesses before we actually depart for votes. And then perhaps we 

can return for the questioning portion. 

First, I am deeply concerned about the Ground-Based Midcourse 

Defense system in Alaska and California, GMD. The back-to-back 

flight test failures this past year raise doubts about the reliability 

and effectiveness of this capability. I had the opportunity to talk 

with General O’Reilly yesterday. I appreciate his efforts to establish a rigorous failure review and mitigation process. However, I 

question the Administration’s long-term commitment to getting it 

right. 

While I understand there are some changes to the program this 

year, I have also observed the funding for GMD plummet over the 

past few years. In fiscal year 2010, the President’s budget request 

slashed it by $445 million. Last year we saw a restoration of some 

funds, but then again this year the program was cut by $185 million. Furthermore, the out-year spending profile for GMD is $1 billion less than was projected a year ago. 

With these levels of cuts, it is clear that something will be broke 

or something won’t get done. I worry that these test failures may 
2 

be a harbinger of further setbacks if we don’t make GMD a priority 

and devote the resources necessary to make it right. After all, what 

is at stake: GMD is currently the only missile defense system that 

protects the United States homeland from long-range ballistic attacks, and we have to get it right. 

General O’Reilly, I know you are committed to that. 

Second, a year ago, I was highly critical of the Administration for 

the lack of information it was providing to Congress on the Phased 

Adaptive Approach for missile defense in Europe. In the past several months, we have seen significant improvement and engagement with our committee, and I want to commend our witnesses 

for that. 

Last month, while in Brussels, I had the opportunity to meet 

with Admiral Stavridis and other NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and European Command officials to discuss progress in 

PAA [Phased Adaptive Approach] implementation. I have also met 

with NATO parliamentarians and was pleased to see how far the 

missile defense discussion in Europe had advanced from just 3 

years ago. 

No doubt, there is significant work ahead that I would ask our 

witnesses to discuss today. 

On the policy front, a near-term decision must be made on where 

to locate a forward-based X-band radar. Charting a path forward 

with Russia while also protecting our interests will continue to be 

challenging. 

On the programmatic front, there is a substantial amount of development and testing required to ensure new systems and technologies planned for the PAA are proven. There are still considerable technology risks, reduction activities that must be accomplished in the—excuse me—technology risk-reduction activities 

that must be accomplished in the Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block 

IIA and the Block IIB programs, both of which are key to protecting Europe and the United States. 

Some of us also remain concerned about the Department’s hedging strategy for defense of the homeland in case the long-range 

threat comes earlier or technical issues arise in the development of 

a new SM–3 interceptor. I came away from our PAA hearing last 

December believing that the Department’s hedging strategy was 

hollow. Since then, I understand the Department has worked in 

earnest to develop the strategy, and I hope our witnesses can discuss some of this. 

Third, the budget request contains approximately $400 million in 

2012 and another $400 million in 2013 for the Medium Extended 

Area Defense System, MEADS, a joint U.S.-German-Italian missile 

defense system that the Department does not plan to continue beyond design and development due to cost and schedule overruns. 

I understand the Government’s contract termination obligations, 

but spending $800 million in this budget environment on a program that is not going forward into production doesn’t make a 

whole lot of sense. These resources could be better spent on other 

missile defense priorities. And is the Department looking at other 

options to lower this liability? 

Fourth, we need to continue to invest in innovative science and 

technology. Last year, our committee expressed bipartisan concern 
3 

that the budget request for directed energy research appeared insufficient to maintain the Airborne Laser Testbed aircraft, conduct 

flight experiments, and fund technology maturation of innovative 

directed energy concepts. This year, the budget request is less than 

last year’s, which only heightens my concern that MDA [Missile 

Defense Agency] and the scientists and engineers it leverages lack 

the resources to make major advancements in this technology area. 

On a final note, I would like to thank Dr. Roberts and General 

O’Reilly for their participation in this committee’s ‘‘101’’ briefings. 

These sessions have provided Members with a greater understanding of the complex issues and programs that are within our 

subject matter jurisdiction of this subcommittee and, ultimately, 

they improve our ability to have effective oversight. 

I want to thank you again, each of our witnesses, for their service and for being with us today. And I look forward to your testimony. 

With that, I will turn to my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez, for 

any opening comments she might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Chairman Turner. 

I would like to once again welcome everybody: Dr. Gilmore, Mr. 

Ahern, Dr. Roberts, General O’Reilly. Thanks for being before us 

again today. 

I am interested in hearing about how the budget request supports plans to strengthen the hedge for homeland defense beyond 

the deployed interceptors that we have in California and Alaska, 

including plans at Fort Greely to mothball Missile Field 1 and adding a hedge of eight available silos at Missile Field 2, and also the 

upgrades to the Clear Radar, plans to locate an interceptor communication system on the east coast, and preparations toward Phase 

4 of the Phased Adaptive Approach. 

I know that, General O’Reilly, we have spoken several times this 

week, and I hope that the committee will get a good sense of where 

you all are with respect to these things I just mentioned. 

I also look forward to hearing about the implementation of the 

PAA this year and about preparations as we move beyond Phase 

1. I know you said we were on track, but maybe we can get a little 

bit more information on that. And I would like to specifically address three important issues. 

First, the cost. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated that, 

‘‘commitment to new capabilities must be sustainable over the long 

term.’’ And in the context of the current budget environment, I 

would like to hear more about savings and management improvements resulting from efficiencies and, also, what the plans are for 

most efficiently closing out the MEADS program without wasting 

what I believe is nearly about a billion dollars of taxpayer money, 

if I read the report correctly. 

And, second, on testing, BMDR [Ballistic Missile Defense Review] 

made the commitment that, before new capabilities are deployed, 
4 

they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic 

conditions. So I would like to hear about how the budget request 

supports effective testing to help us achieve mature and reliable 

technologies, including plans in the Integrated Master Test Plan 

for operational realistic testing. 

And, third, I would like to thank the Administration for strengthening the international cooperation with our allies. I know that 

Chairman Turner was out in Europe this past week. I didn’t have 

an opportunity to go, but I did hear good reports back. And I heard 

that especially our NATO allies were all on board and happy with 

the PAA and the process that we are going through. And, beyond 

cooperation with NATO and Israel and Japan and our other allies, 

I am pleased that we continue to keep informed on plans as you 

work through with some of the issues and try to engage Russia on 

missile defense. 

So, preserving strategic stability is essential to U.S. and international security as we develop a defense against the threats from 

Iran and North Korea, in particular. And I am open to hearing 

what you all have to say. And I am sure our committee has many 

questions. 

So thank you again for being before us. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. TURNER. We will now ask each of our witnesses to summarize their written statement in about a 5-minute oral statement. 

Dr. Roberts, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF DR. BRADLEY H. ROBERTS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Dr. ROBERTS. Thank you, Chairman Turner, Ranking Member 

Sanchez, and additional members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you also for the opportunity to participate in the BMD 

[ballistic missile defense] 101 sessions. We also found that helpful 

from our perspective in terms of reaching out to you and creating 

a common foundation of information. 

My written statement begins with a review of the scope, findings, 

and conclusions of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review issued now 

a year ago. I won’t repeat these here. Clearly, over the last year, 

our focus has shifted from policy development to policy implementation. And, in our dialogue with you, four issues have emerged. 

And I would like to touch briefly on each of those in turn. 

The first issue relates to the commitment in the Missile Defense 

Review to continue to closely monitor developments in the threat, 

and to assess our priorities in the light of new information. And although the unclassified nature of this hearing constrains our discussion of this particular topic, it is clear that we have had a lot 

of new information over the last year that confirms the basic intelligence community finding that the threat is continuing to develop, 

both quantitatively and qualitatively. And it has reinforced our 

principal conclusion that we need a balanced approach that continues to improve the defense of the homeland while, at the same 

time, accelerating regional protection. 
5 

The second main topic of continuing discussion between us has 

been about defense of the homeland. The Ballistic Missile Defense 

Review expressed two principal commitments: The first, to continue 

to improve the GMD system in order to ensure that we maintain 

our ‘‘currently advantageous position’’ vis-a`-vis the threats that 

might emerge from states like North Korea and Iran to conduct 

limited strikes on the United States. And our second commitment 

was to be well-hedged against the possibility that those threats 

might emerge in a way and with a speed, quantitatively and qualitatively, that requires some significant shift in our posture. 

All of us today have provided testimony with details about the 

commitments that we are making in support of strengthening, continuing to improve the GMD system. We have a lot of ongoing activity in this area and some additional initiatives beginning this 

year that we have proposed. And our conclusion is that the cumulative effect of these commitments is to ensure that we will maintain the advantageous position we have vis-a`-vis first-generation 

threats. 

The hedge we have also made a commitment to, as you know, not 

just as something we might do in the future but something we are 

doing now. We committed to the additional silos, both the completion of Missile Field 2 and the mothballing rather than decommissioning of the residual capabilities in Missile Field 1. And this puts 

us in a position to increase by 50 percent, if we were to choose to 

do so, the number of deployed GBIs [ground-based interceptors] in 

light of additional threat information. 

We have also committed to assess in detail this basic hedge posture and to bring additional information forward. I believe you met 

with Dr. Jim Miller a month ago, and he expressed our commitment to bring to you, as soon as we had been to the Secretary, additional information in this area. 

The third continuing topic of discussion between us has been 

about implementation of the Phased Adaptive Approach. And the 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review, of course, expressed this as a 

global approach, meaning an approach that would be pursued in 

each region. We elaborated in detail in the review the approach to 

Europe. And, as you know, the progress in the interim year has 

been, we think, strong, with both a ramp-up in the investments in 

the needed capabilities and working politically with our partners, 

whether multilaterally in NATO or bilaterally in the other regions, 

to strengthen our postures. 

The fourth issue I would like to touch briefly is the commitment 

expressed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review to strengthen 

international cooperation. And this is a global intent and one that 

we are realizing through our collaborations with our allies and 

partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. But, of course, 

the sensitive and important question today is about cooperation 

with Russia. We believe in the potential benefits for our national 

security, for the national security of our NATO allies, and also for 

Russia of cooperation in this area. 

We are mindful that there are many challenges associated with 

this objective. We reject cooperation that would in any way limit 

our defenses. And you have heard the President say that NATO 
6 

will defend NATO, Russia will defend Russia, and we will try and 

reinforce each other’s defenses cooperatively. 

We will not compromise essential technologies. There is no discussion of providing hit-to-kill technology as a part of our cooperative activities with Russia. We have made clear that cooperation 

will require a successful conclusion of a Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement, as originally proposed and pursued by the 

Bush administration. And, of course, we are mindful of the fact 

that any classified information that might be discussed with Russia 

or any other international partner is subject to national disclosure 

policy. 

As you know, we are pursuing two primary pathways of cooperation with Russia, the first bilaterally and the second in the NATO 

context. Bilaterally, our principal focus is on joint analysis in order 

to better understand what capabilities we might bring to the table 

at this time. And, clearly, from Russia’s perspective, what they 

bring to the table at this time is only sensor information. And we 

are looking also bilaterally at, then, what might be possible in the 

way of exchanging data without compromising its integrity. 

In the NATO context, we are working to explore the possibility 

of a cooperative system for the common defense of the European 

space. We have resumed our theater missile defense cooperation 

with Russia that had been pursued under the Bush administration. 

And we are also developing a joint analysis process there to support the NATO process. 

So that is a quick review of our four key areas, I think, of continuing dialogue with the committee. And I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Roberts can be found in the Appendix on page 42.] 

Mr. TURNER. General O’Reilly. 

STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK J. O’REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

General O’REILLY. Good afternoon, Chairman Turner, Ranking 

Member Sanchez, other distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today 

on the Missile Defense Agency’s $8.6 billion fiscal year 2012 budget 

request. 

We continue to enhance today’s Ballistic Missile Defense System, 

which is capable of protecting our homeland from limited ICBM 

[intercontinental ballistic missile] attacks to countering the growing proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missiles that 

threaten our deployed Armed Forces, allies, and friends. 

By the end of 2012, we plan to complete the initial fielding of the 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, or GMD, for homeland 

defense; deliver the first Theater High Altitude Area Defense, or 

THAAD, units to the Army; and test the next generation of Aegis 

missile for the Navy for regional defense. Our objective is, by the 

end of this decade, to enhance our current initial capabilities to 

achieve very robust missile defense against all ranges of threat 

missiles. 

Like the rest of the Department of Defense, our fiscal year 2012 

budget request was based on the assumption of approval of the fis-
7 

cal year 2011 President’s budget request. However, the impact of 

operating under a continuing resolution at the fiscal year 2010 

budget level is significant for the Missile Defense Agency since our 

fiscal year 2011 request was $486 million more than our fiscal year 

2010 budget, including a $324 million increase for homeland defense. 

We have had significant accomplishments over the last year, including conducting 8 out of 8 planned flight tests, with 13 successful target flights; the first flight of a 2-stage ground-based interceptor; the third successful missile intercept by the Japanese Aegis 

program; a successful low-altitude intercept by the THAAD system. 

We started production of the THAAD Batteries 3 and 4. And we 

emplaced the thirtieth GBI; upgraded 2 additional GBIs; completed 

the upgrade of the early-warning radar in Thule, Greenland, to a 

missile defense radar; converted 2 Aegis ships, thus increasing our 

fleet to 20 operationally configured ballistic missile defense ships. 

We delivered 25 SM–3 IA interceptors and demonstrated the 

ability for 2 space tracking and surveillance satellites to provide 

high-fidelity missile tracks. And, with our Airborne Laser Testbed, 

we destroyed two boosting missiles in flight. We have demonstrated 

command and control interoperability with the NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System on multiple occasions. And we supported Israel’s successful intercept of a separating threat missile off the coast of California earlier this month. 

Today, MDA’s top priority is to confirm the root cause of the recent GBI flight test failure, verify the resolution of the problem, 

and successfully repeat the previous flight test. While the failure 

review board has only produced preliminary results, it is clear 

more ground testing and additional non-intercept flight tests of an 

upgraded GBI Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, or EKV, will be required before the next intercept. 

For fiscal year 2012, we are requesting funding for the completion of the construction of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 

Missile Field 2; a second fire control node at Fort Greely, Alaska; 

the construction of a missile communication system on the east 

coast of the United States; placing Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely 

in a storage mode for possible upgrade for operational use in the 

future; procuring five new ground-based interceptors; upgrading existing ground-based interceptors; and upgrading the early-warning 

radar in Clear, Alaska. 

Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a 

medium ICBM raid size launched from current regional threats. 

We closely monitor intelligence assessments with the intelligence 

community. And if this capability is deemed to be insufficient, we 

are developing options to increase the capacity of operational GBIs 

and accelerate the delivery of new sensors and interceptor capabilities. The Department is committed to brief Congress soon on our 

hedge strategy to mitigate against uncertainties in threat estimates. 

Our execution of the European Phased Adaptive Approach is on 

track for meeting the timelines outlined by the President in September 2009. 

For Phase 1, our initial capability against short-, medium-, and 

intermediate-range threats in Europe, our first Aegis ballistic mis-
8 

sile ship deployment, the USS Monterey, is on station. The latest 

command and control system upgrades are being installed in the 

European Command. And the AN/TPY–2 forward-based radar will 

be available in August for deployment by the end of this year. Finally, a major test verifying the readiness of the EPAA [European 

Phased Adaptive Approach] Phase 1 against an intermediate-range 

ballistic missile will be conducted next month in the Pacific. 

For Phase 2, our enhanced capability against medium-range ballistic missiles by 2015, the first flight test of the next-generation 

Aegis missile interceptor, the SM–3 IB, will occur this summer. 

And the associated upgrade to the Aegis fire control system is on 

track for certification by the Navy in 2012. 

The design of the adaptation of the Aegis system for land basing, 

called Aegis Ashore, began last summer, with manufacturing beginning in fiscal year 2012. The Aegis Ashore site will be installed 

in Hawaii in 2013 and flight tested in 2014. And installation of the 

second Aegis Ashore system in Romania is also on track to occur 

in 2014, for full operation by 2015. 

For Phase 3 of our enhanced capability against intermediaterange ballistic missiles by 2018, the SM–3 Block IIA interceptor is 

completing its preliminary design this year in support of flight testing in 2015 and deployment in 2018. The airborne infrared sensor 

for early missile tracking will begin flight testing of the next-generation sensor in 2012 and is on track for deployment of a missile 

defense sensor pod that could attach to any aircraft by 2016. Due 

to the fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution, the first flight of the 

Precision Tracking Space System satellite has now been delayed to 

2016, and six more satellites, though, would then be on schedule 

for placement on orbit by 2018. 

For Phase 4, or medium- and intermediate-range and ICBM 

early-intercept capability in Europe by 2020, we have completed 

the Government system studies and will award interceptor concept 

design contracts to three industry teams within the next week. 

Even though the SM–3 IIB requirements are less stringent than on 

other missile defense interceptors, we are allocating more time to 

develop the SM–3 IIB than the average time it has taken to develop other similar missile defense interceptors in order to ensure 

low development risk. While not necessary for the defense of the 

United States against limited attacks by early-generation ICBMs, 

the SM–3 IIB will greatly reduce the cost of homeland defense and 

will be effective against larger raid sizes of more sophisticated 

ICBMs from today’s regional missile threats. 

We are pursuing advanced technologies for applications beyond 

PAA Phase 4, such as our partnership with Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory to develop new laser technologies which offer 

great potential for high-efficiency compact and lightweight high-energy lasers for a variety of missions of interest to the Missile Defense Agency and the Department of Defense. 

Finally, Missile Defense Agency also continues to engage in missile defense projects, studies, and analysis with over 40 countries. 

In conclusion, our fiscal year 2012 budget funds the deployment 

of the initial missile defense capability and the creation of an international network of integrated ballistic missile defense capabilities 

that are flexible, survivable, affordable, and tolerant of uncertain-
9 

ties of intelligence estimates of both nation-state extremist ballistic 

missile and non-nation-state extremist ballistic missile threats. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering the 

committee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of General O’Reilly can be found in the 

Appendix on page 57.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. 

I believe our witnesses are aware that votes have been called. So, 

at this point, we will stand in recess, and we will return after 

votes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. TURNER. I call the committee back together. 

Mr. Ahern. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. AHERN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PORTFOLIO SYSTEMS ACQUISITION, 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS 

Mr. AHERN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez, members 

of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. 

I want to begin by addressing the Department’s recent decision 

regarding MEADS. Beginning in the 1990s, MEADS is a groundbased air and terminal ballistic defense capability that would replace existing Patriot systems in the U.S. and Germany and the 

Nike Hercules system in Italy. 

In 2004, the MEADS partner nations—Germany, Italy, and the 

United States—signed a memorandum of understanding for a cooperative design and development, or D&D, phase that anticipated 

readiness for production beginning in 110 months, or about 2014. 

However, the NATO MEADS Management Agency program restructure proposal presented to the board of directors in November 

2010 indicated that MEADS D&D would require 30 additional 

months beyond the original 110-month plan. Further, it would require nearly a billion dollars more of U.S. investment during fiscal 

year 2012 to 2017. And production would not begin earlier than 

2018, with the first U.S. fielding around 2020. 

As we built the fiscal 2012 budget, the Department was fully cognizant of the MEADS updated estimates for cost and schedule, and 

we were also informed by an independent cost estimate of the D&D 

phase by the Department’s Cost Assessment and Performance 

Evaluation Office. 

With those estimates in hand, the U.S. considered three potential 

courses of action: Terminate immediately; continue development 

within the funding limits set by the MOU [memorandum of understanding] that entered into force; and complete the planned D&D 

phase by adding additional funding and allowing additional time. 

The Department has decided the best course of action is to continue the D&D phase up to the previously agreed MOU cost ceiling. 

However, the U.S. will not pursue procurement and production 

of MEADS. The Department believes the implementation of a 

proof-of-concept program using the remaining D&D funds contributed by the three nations is the best option for the following reasons: Funding MEADS up to the existing MOU ceiling enables all 
10 

partners to harvest technology from the large investment made to 

date. The U.S. cannot afford to purchase MEADS and make required upgrades to Patriot concurrently over the next two decades. 

The U.S. can achieve some of the capabilities that MEADS provides 

using existing assets. Our air and missile defense portfolio is based 

on integrating and fielding a diverse set of elements to provide expanded coverage against a wide range of threats. So, while we accept some risks due to the MEADS decision, the U.S. is still able 

to achieve some of the capabilities that MEADS was to provide. 

The U.S. remains concerned with the overall track record of the 

program. The proof-of-concept effort will use the remaining D&D 

MOU funding in 2011 to 2013 to complete prototypes, demonstrate 

and document the capabilities of major system elements, and complete limited system integration. This work would allow Germany 

and Italy to continue MEADS development and production efforts 

after the current MOU funding is expended, if they so desire. The 

same options would be available to the United States should U.S. 

air defense plans change. 

While the MEADS program of record performance might ordinarily make it a candidate for cancellation, terminating the program now, just after successful completion of the MEADS critical 

design review, would force the nations to devote significant funding 

to contractor termination costs instead of using this funding to 

bring development to a viable level of maturity. 

Turning now to the Missile Defense Executive Board, I testified 

before this subcommittee 2 years ago describing the Board’s structure, operation, and activities. The MDEB [Missile Defense Executive Board] was established in 2007 to recommend and oversee implementation of strategic policies and plans, program priorities, 

and investment options to protect our Nation and its allies from 

missile attack. The USD(AT&L) [Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics] has maintained the MDEB 

structure and operation in essentially the same form since its inception. 

A notable MDEB achievement has been the creation of a Life 

Cycle Management Process. It has had a significant impact on the 

preparation and execution of MDA’s plans and budgets. The LCMP 

[Life Cycle Management Plan] provides for the participation of the 

MDA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, STRATCOM [United 

States Strategic Command], other combatant commanders, the JCS 

[Joint Chiefs of Staff], and the military departments in an annual 

process to identify capability and support requirements, balance resources and technical capabilities, and prepare a BMDS [Ballistic 

Missile Defense System] program and budget. For the last 2 years, 

the Department has executed the LCMP to derive comprehensive 

Department involvement and influence on the MDA’s plans and 

budgets. 

A key element which provides a foundation for the LCMP is an 

input derived from the Strategic Command’s Warfighter Involvement Process. An output of this process is a Missile Defense 

Prioritized Capability List that documents operator capability requests and is reviewed and endorsed by the MDEB. The MDA provides a formal response which, in turn, facilitates MDEB assessment of MDA program plans against desired capabilities. 
11 

Recent MDEB activities have included reviews of fiscal year 2012 

MDA budget request, evaluation of operation and support funding 

responsibilities, force structure recommendations such as an addition of a TPY–2 radar to the BMDS acquisition planning. 

One oversight focus area is the Department’s assessment of 

BMDS elements’ maturity for production and lead service operation. The Department’s current criteria for missile defense element production include: An assessment of the depth and breadth 

of preparation; performance validated by testing results; funding to 

support the program plans; and an executable plan for operation 

and support. MDA, in conjunction with the designated lead military department, makes a recommendation for a production decision. USD(AT&L) is responsible for the review and decision. 

The Department is ensuring proper management oversight of 

this complex portfolio through its effective utilization of the MDEB. 

We are taking prudent steps to transition individual elements to 

lead military departments at the appropriate time for operation 

and support. In that regard, the MDEB just agreed to guidelines 

for MDA and the military departments regarding funding responsibilities for BMDS element’s development, operation, and support. 

Continued operation between the MDA, OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], the military departments, the Joint Staff, and 

COCOMs [combatant commands] are critical to long-term success 

of the BMDS. 

I am grateful to the members of this committee for your support 

of the Defense Department’s missile defense programs and look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ahern can be found in the Appendix on page 72.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Gilmore. 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Dr. GILMORE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez, members of the committee, I will very briefly summarize my written 

statement. 

In my view, General O’Reilly has brought outstanding rigor to 

missile defense testing through his implementation of the Integrated Master Test Plan, or IMTP. My office and I, myself, are substantively involved throughout the 6-month development and review process that the general is using to develop and update the 

IMTP. 

The IMTP remains focused on conducting the live testing needed 

to demonstrate Ballistic Missile Defense System performance under 

selected critical engagement conditions and to collect the other empirical data required to rigorously accredit the models and simulations that will be used to assess the system’s performance against 

the broad range of scenarios that could be encountered in realworld operations. And so another benefit here that the general has 

brought to his approach to missile defense testing is to tie the testing very rigorously and tightly to the development of the models 

and simulations and to their rigorous accreditation. 
12 

The IMTP now includes operational testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, and the first such test is now scheduled for 

the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012. And it will demonstrate, 

among other capabilities, layered defenses, shot coordination, and 

the negation of a small raid. Those are all important capabilities 

to demonstrate. 

General O’Reilly has summarized the testing that has occurred 

over the past year and that is planned in the near term. And, as 

he mentioned, there were two unsuccessful intercepts conducted 

using the ground-based interceptors of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system equipped with Capability Enhancement II 

kill vehicles. Each of those tests failed—each of those intercepts 

failed for different reasons. And the reason for the failure of the 

second intercept remains under investigation. 

I think it is inevitable that the rigorous test regime General 

O’Reilly is executing will inevitably result in such failures. And 

those failures, although they may be perceived negatively, also provide information that is absolutely critical to assuring that the missile defense system will actually work if it is ever needed. And the 

failures also demonstrate why live-fire testing of the system, with 

all of the complexity and expense that it entails, is absolutely necessary. 

The testing conducted during the past year has provided valuable information, although, because of the unsuccessful intercepts, 

not quite as much as we had hoped for. For example, there were 

supposed to be intercepts conducted against target complexes, including associated objects in the intercepts that failed. 

And, although we have gotten additional very useful information, 

in my annual report I have not changed my assessment this year 

relative to last year in terms of demonstrated capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. I use a six-point scale to do that, 

ranging from one, where capabilities are estimated using engineering analysis and laboratory testing, to six, where capabilities are 

verified across the full range of scenarios and conditions possible 

in real-world operations using a combination of rigorous flight testing and rigorously accredited ground testing models and simulations. 

So, a one to six scale. On that scale, Patriot has demonstrated 

level six against short-range ballistic missiles. That is not to say 

that Patriot meets all of its requirements, but it has been rigorously tested across a broad range of conditions and scenarios. 

Aegis, with the so-called build 3.6.1, I assess at level five against 

short-range ballistic missiles and the lower end of the range capable of medium-range ballistic missiles. I assess Aegis 3.6.1 at level 

four against the upper end of the range possible for medium-range 

ballistic missiles and the lower end of intermediate-range ballistic 

missiles because it has yet to actually be tested against such 

threats. 

Although, as General O’Reilly pointed out, next month we will 

conduct a test against an IRBM [intermediate-range ballistic missile] at 3,700-kilometers range. That will incorporate a queue from 

a forward-based AN/TPY–2 radar and, possibly, launch on remote 

of the Aegis interceptor. And those are all important capabilities to 
13 

demonstrate to support implementation of the Phased Adaptive Approach, Phase 1, to defense of Europe. 

I assess that at level four against short-range ballistic missiles, 

and that is because it has been tested only against simple shortrange ballistic missiles. And the limitations on testing in THAAD 

up to this point are, in part, due to the target failures that occurred 

last year. Otherwise, we would have tested against—if the target 

that failed to ignite upon launch from the C–17, if that had not 

failed, we would have been able to do a test against a more complex SRBM [short-range ballistic missile]. But, so far, we have only 

tested against simple short-range ballistic missiles and have not 

tested other advanced capabilities of THAAD. And it is at level 

three against medium-range ballistic missiles because it hasn’t yet 

been tested against those. 

And then, finally, I assess the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 

system at level three because it has been tested only against 

IRBMs. The first ICBM test is now scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal 2017 in simple threat presentations with no silos, no 

simultaneous engagements, and many of the models are not accredited. 

Thank you. That concludes my remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore can be found in the Appendix on page 85.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Well, we have very good attendance at this meeting today, and 

I know Members have a great deal of questions. So I am going to 

start by trying to combine several questions that I have. And then, 

General O’Reilly, I am going to start with a series of them that relate to GMD. 

There was acknowledgement, in both my comments and yours, of 

the two GMD flight tests that failed to achieve intercept. And it is 

our only missile-defense system that protects the U.S. homeland 

from long-range ballistic missile attacks. And, as you acknowledge 

and, certainly, we all believe, we have to get this right. 

Also, in looking at the issue of acquisition, MDA plans to require 

a total of 52 GBIs to support the system’s availability and reliability until 2032. Of these 52 GBIs, 30 are operational in Alaska 

and California, and 16 are designated for flight tests from fiscal 

year 2010 through fiscal year 2020. This leaves only six GBIs available for spares and testing from 2020 to 2032. Already, two of these 

six spares may be consumed to compensate for the failed flight test 

in 2010. 

Then, also, the GMD program has, as I said in my opening comments, seen sizeable budget cuts in the past 3 years. In fiscal year 

2010, it was reduced by $525 million. The fiscal year 2011 request 

restored $300 million of this, but under the current continuing resolution, MDA is spending $291 million less than it anticipated in 

fiscal year 2011. The fiscal year 2012 budget request further reduces the GMD program by $185 million. 

Also, a few changes to the GMD program are reflected in this 

year’s budget request. They include a decision to mothball Missile 

Field 1 in Alaska instead of decommissioning it, and beginning a 

preliminary design work to locate an interceptor communications 

terminal at an east coast site by 2015. 
14 

So, combining those, would you please speak to the issue of the 

failures and its impact on our GMD program; your acquisition pace 

and issues that we might need to address there for adequacy; the 

reductions in funding and their effect overall on the program at the 

same time that it is having these challenges from the failures; and 

if you would also address the issues of the changes resulting in the 

status for Missile Field 1. 

Thank you, General. 

General O’REILLY. Thank you, sir. 

First of all, for the failure of the GMD system, we have two 

versions of the GMD missile. The first version is called Capability 

Enhancement I, and it is the kill vehicle that has performed five 

times on flight. It has done very well: Three intercept attempts, 

and it has intercepted three times. Those are flights out of—the 

target out of Kodiak, Alaska, and the intercept out of Vandenberg. 

That roughly equates to the geometry of a launch out of North 

Korea and an intercept coming out of Fort Greely, Alaska. 

For those type of scenarios and for that system, the CE–I [Capability Enhancement I], we remain to have confidence in the system 

based on the data we have seen. 

However, we started a second version of the missile kill vehicle 

in 2005 based on obsolescence reasons—parts, manufacturers, and 

so forth not producing parts anymore in the electronic systems that 

we needed. And, therefore, we redesigned the system, upgraded it, 

and actually gave it greater sensitivity and greater capability. 

However, it failed on the first flight test due to a quality control 

problem we identified in the plant. We corrected that quality control problem, and, in the second flight, it didn’t happen. 

However, we did have a failure at the very end of the second 

flight. And we have a failure review board that has been formed. 

It is working diligently. It combines industry, academia, the best 

of Government, FFRDCs [federally funded research and development centers], national labs. They are completing their analysis. 

Right now, it looks like we have a very good idea of what the failure mode was. But that is not enough. I need to have it verified 

and demonstrated, which they will do through testing across the 

summer. 

But that is not enough. We really need to have the industry 

team, the GMD team, demonstrate to us they have corrected it. So 

I have requested in this budget support for a flight test which tests 

the missile very rigorously without an intercept, but the purpose 

of it is to verify the resolution of these issues. And then, as I said, 

we will have another flight test next year. 

What that effectively does is, it has delayed our flight test program that Dr. Gilmore referred to for accrediting our models and 

simulations by approximately a year. And we will continue to update the committee as we go through this testing and verify that 

we have, in fact, corrected the issue. 

That is for Capability Enhancement II. Most of the missiles 

which are deployed today are the earlier version which, again, we 

haven’t had those issues with. 

As far as the number of 52 GBIs, which was our original calculation, there are several assumptions we used which we now deem 

no longer valid. First of all, we did not take into account the last 
15 

two flight tests have been failures. I just mentioned another flight 

test that originally wasn’t envisioned. And we are going to repeat 

the last flight test. So right there are—indicates four GBIs that we 

hadn’t accounted to before. 

I propose that the best way to make this decision is, as we do 

these tests over the next year, we determine what in fact is the 

failure, make the corrections, as I said, and then go back into production and make a decision based on that reliability information— 

again, what is the acquisition objective for the GBIs and whether 

it should be adjusted and what is that adjustment. 

I would propose that that would be appropriate for the fiscal year 

2013 budget so that the timelines of the decisions I just said would 

be in effect. However, we have proposed five new GBIs for this 

year. So the production lines will be up, they will be operating. And 

it is clear to me that there will be some increased number of GBIs 

that will be necessary. 

As far as the budget cuts, most of the GMD system, over the last 

several years, has been investing in infrastructure. And we will 

complete Missile Field 2, the power plant power distribution, other 

upgrades, over fiscal year 2012. And that is one reason why you 

see a reduction in the budget after that, because, from then on, the 

investments is not into the infrastructure of the system; it is into 

testing and upgrades to the GMD system or procuring, which will 

be in our follow-on budget, additional GBIs. 

However, I would point out that, inside that GMD budget, the 

operations and support funding, it is an R&D [research and development]-funded program, but the money to go to those type of activities has increased, which is indicative of a program which is 

fielded and operating. 

The impact as a CRA [continuing resolution authority], as I said, 

is significant to GMD because that particular program was to receive $324 million more this year. It is exacerbated by the timing 

of the CRA that we are under right now. Normally, at this time 

of year, that is when we have the most significant hiring of the 

construction crews in Alaska. If we don’t hire them over the next 

several weeks, they have opportunities further north in the oil 

fields. And we have become very adept at managing workloads, our 

contractor team has, in Alaska. And if we don’t fund the hiring of 

these folks over the next several weeks, it will have a major impact 

in the summer construction season, which is where we do 90 percent of our annual construction. 

So if this continuing resolution goes beyond the current date of 

8 April, we then will face some significant setbacks to the construction schedule to complete that infrastructure. And I would propose 

to come back and repropose that funding for the following year so 

that we can, in fact, complete the infrastructure that I was referring to. 

Mr. TURNER. General, the SM–3 Block IIB, an interceptor, is 

planned for deployment by 2020 to improve protection of the U.S. 

homeland against potential ICBM attack as part of Phase 3 of the 

Phased Adaptive Approach. The fiscal year 2012 budget request 

provides an additional $1.7 billion to the SM–3 Block IIB development program across the Future Years Defense Program, the 

FYDP. 
16 

Will the SM–3 Block IIB design be optimized for ICBM intercept 

capabilities? 

General O’REILLY. It will be optimized to intercept missiles early 

in flight. And, if I may, to better answer that question more precisely, in early parts of flight, there is not a significant amount of 

distinguishment between an intermediate-range ballistic missile, or 

an ICBM. So the original design of this and the original concept 

was against intermediate-range ballistic missiles, 5,500 kilometers 

or less. And when we look to have effective capability for that 

range of missile, it became apparent that it would work. The capability doesn’t fall off when you increase the interceptor velocity. 

So, sir, its design space is to maximize its performance from a 

medium-range ballistic missile to an ICBM, not to an ICBM that 

is greater than on the order of 12,000 or more kilometers. It would 

not be effective against the very largest ICBMs, but it would be effective against ICBMs that are traveling at velocities that we are 

concerned about and distances we are concerned about for countries in the Middle East and Northeast Asia. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Obviously, I would like to have an additional 

conversation with you about that, because the intent of 2020 and 

Phase 3 and then even 4 of the Phased Adaptive Approach is protecting the homeland. So I would just like to have an additional 

discussion about that subsequent to the hearing. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Roberts, the Administration’s decision in 2009 

to adopt a Phased Adaptive Approach for missile defense in Europe 

was based in part on an assessment that the longer-range threat 

from Iran was slower to develop than previously estimated. 

We just had Secretary Gates in today to talk about Libya; and 

in discussing Libya with him, we asked—I asked the question of, 

and what do they—in their discussions on engaging Libya, what 

were their concerns as to what the effect might be on Iran and our 

efforts for nuclear nonproliferation? Is there a prospect that it 

could make them go faster in their quest? And he said, ‘‘I don’t 

think they could be going any faster.’’ Which would lead me—that 

is certainly a statement of intent, which certainly gives everyone 

the concern that the threat from Iran could develop much faster 

than what the Phased Adaptive Approach is designed to respond 

to. 

What is your current thought of how the threat is emerging and 

prospective gaps between the Phased Adaptive Approach and—recognizing, of course, our ground-based system, but just focusing on 

the issue of the Phased Adaptive Approach, trying to respond to a 

threat from Iran, what are your thoughts on the emergence of that 

threat and the potential gap? 

Dr. ROBERTS. To be clear about your question, Phased Adaptive 

is, of course, focused on the defense of the regions. With, in the 

case of Europe, the addition of the Phase 4 capability that would 

offer some protection against intercontinental threats, but also improve protection in the early intercept mode against IRBMs. And 

the question we face in anticipating Iranian threats is how they 

might mature in a way that threatens both Europe more rapidly 

than PAA, and the American homeland in a way that would overwhelm our current posture. It is an interrelated question. 
17 

Without venturing into classified information, I think our fundamental view is that the regional threat from Iranian ballistic missiles is rapidly growing quantitatively and quantitatively, and that 

the threat from the intercontinental capability remains difficult to 

predict, precisely when and how it might emerge. 

And I think that is about all there is to say about the threat at 

the unclassified level from Iran. 

How does that measure up against the posture that we are trying to put in place? In the case of the regional protection posture, 

we are putting into the field as rapidly as we can the capabilities 

that MDA has been developing. And there we are in a race between 

their quantitative and qualitative improvements and our quantitative and qualitative improvements, and our phased approach is 

intended to take the advantage, as early as possible, for our own 

proven capabilities for the defense of Europe. 

In terms of the protection of the American homeland, what we 

are trying to hedge against is something quite specific and not general. Let me begin with a quick summary of our baseline of homeland defense capability, because it is not just the interceptors in 

being today. It is the improvements that we expect over the coming 

two decades with the additional enhancements to the capabilities 

of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system and the addition in 

the out-years in the second decade of the SM–3 IIB. It is a complementary set of tools that will apply to the defense of the homeland over this time. 

In addition, we have in place the hedge, such as it now exists, 

to increase from 30 to 44 the number of deployed GBIs in the case 

of a more rapid emergence of an Iranian threat between where we 

are today and 2020 when, presumably, we will have the SM–3 IIB 

to help supplement the defense of the homeland. 

The need is not to be hedged against an initial ICBM capability 

from Iran or some other country. We are already well-hedged 

against that position. We have 30 deployed interceptors. Against— 

we have used the shorthand to distinguish first-generation threats 

from second-generation threats. First-generation threats being initial capabilities from proliferators in the intercontinental range 

with unsophisticated countermeasures. Second-generation threats 

would be in quantity sufficient to overwhelm the GMD system or 

advanced countermeasures or both. And our basic hedge concern is 

to be well prepared for the possibility that there might be a more 

rapid emergence of that second-generation threat than we are 

ready to meet because SM–3 IIBs are not yet in place. 

Now, that involves some discussions of how confident you are in 

the intelligence that tells you that something is coming—low, moderate, or high—and how much risk you are willing to accept in the 

period—how much risk you are willing to except about the possibility of an emergent second-generation threat. 

I’m sorry to dance around a subject that has a lot of classified 

information in it, but I hope is that addresses the thrust of your 

question. 

Mr. TURNER. You did a very good job of shepherding through 

that, and I will take, since we are talking about missile defense, 

your asking about the thrust of the question as a very bad pun. 

We will go to Ms. Sanchez. 
18 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, again gentlemen. 

Let’s see, Mr. Ahern, you said—you were talking about MEADS, 

and you said something to the extent of stopping the program, the 

costs versus completing it versus paying out the closing costs on 

the contracts that you have. Can you get back to us—we don’t have 

to have it here unless you have it off the top of your head—what 

that calculation is just for the record, since you brought it up? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, ma’am. The phrase I used is that we would be, 

if we went into that scenario—my notes are here—but essentially 

that there has been an extensive amount of money—that is about 

what I said—on termination costs if we went in that direction. 

The calculation that we have right now is that the remaining 

funding in the MOU, and that liability that we are into, and I want 

to be sure to explain that carefully. There was an original commitment written into the MOU of about $4 billion U.S. equivalent dollars shared between the three allies. Our share was $58 million, 

about $2.5 billion over that period, 110 months, that I mentioned 

earlier. 

The way that it is written, if you withdraw from the MOU, then 

you are liable potentially to termination liability up to the level of 

your commitment under the MOU. 

Currently, we have put in—and the numbers are about right— about $1.5 billion. So our remaining commitment to the MOU, 

therefore, our maximum termination liability, is about $800 million. $846 million, at some point, was the number that we had 

used. 

Now, the other side of the coin is what do we—we have asked 

for $800 million in fiscal year 2012 and 2013 to continue to fund 

the MOU. So the point I was trying to make is that in balancing— 

to make a decision going forward, that the four reasons that I said 

going forward, one of the ways that was thought about is, if it is 

about the same amount of money—and this is my Dave Ahern 

paraphrasing—if it is about the $800 million to go forward and be 

able to get into the demonstration, show the prototyping, the capability of this system, that is a better use of that funding than it 

would be to unilaterally terminate, where you don’t come away 

with anything at all. 

Does that answer your question? That is what I was trying to do. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes, absolutely. I was trying to figure out what the 

magnitude of that was. Okay. 

And, Dr. Gilmore, you said at one point, you had a phrase where 

you spoke about General O’Reilly’s system testing or the way he set 

up his tests; and you said something to the effect of ‘‘it would almost lead to failures because it was such strict testing’’ or—— 

Dr. GILMORE. I said that rigorous testing will probably inevitably 

lead to some failures. They wouldn’t be unexpected. 

The same thing is true of missile defense systems that is true of 

all defense systems, which is these are some of the most complex 

systems that human beings try to build and get to work. And so 

when you test these systems—and this is true not just in missile 

defense interceptors and kill vehicles. It is true of Joint Strike 

Fighters. It is true of advanced anti-radiation guided missiles. It is 

true of virtually every program that I have to write a test report 
19 

about. When you test them realistically under operational conditions where they are first stressed to the max or much more than 

they have been in developmental testing, inevitably you find problems and there are failures. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So the more rigorous or calibrated you are trying 

to get to, there are more. 

Dr. GILMORE. Actually, the rigorous testing can be less calibrated. It can be under conditions which are unexpected and, 

therefore, more stressful. But, in any event, if you test rigorously 

under operational conditions you will probably encounter failures, 

and that is true of missile defense interceptors as it is true of other 

defense systems. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you for that. 

Because I am coming back to a question for you, General 

O’Reilly. We had an earlier conversation when I spoke to you about 

having spoken to somebody else, and one of the comments that 

group made was that we might be a little bit less of a risk-taker 

in this arena. 

Can you speak a little to where you are calibrating how much 

risk we should be taking? Because in some of the other systems 

that I was talking to you about with this group, they were having 

some quantum leaps, if you will, forward in theirs, and ours is 

more doggedly coming along. What is your sense of just how calibrated or how stringent you—or rigorous you are making the tests? 

General O’REILLY. Ma’am, the way we are setting up our tests 

I do believe are representative. And I do work with Dr. Gilmore 

and the services operational test community, but I do believe they 

are representative of an actual scenario that the Ground-Based 

Midcourse Defense system, for example, could see. So my philosophy to testing for the agency is we need to assure it is going to 

work in combat; and, therefore, if there is a problem, I would rather find out now and fix it than, obviously, find out later. And I also 

have to report to the combatant commanders why they should have 

confidence that in battle these systems will work. 

So we do stress it. We do ensure that we understand the minimum performance. For example, these flight tests I have done recently are very long in flight. And the reason we are doing that is 

to replicate the longest flight we could possibly have for defending 

the United States, for example, from Fort Greely, Alaska. And, 

again, our philosophy is we want to assure they work; and we also 

want to find out, if they don’t work, let’s find out now. We have 

an opportunity to fix them. Which is what we are doing in the 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense program. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you for that. 

Another really subjective sort of question I have with you is how 

do you balance the need for ensuring an operationally effective missile defense with the pressure to deploy the missile defense systems 

quickly? And how does schedule and employment pressures, you 

know, that are obviously aimed at that—again, going back to this 

question of, you know, maybe we are lagging behind because we 

are being so risk-averse or more particular. And would the pressures that you see sometimes of people pushing, would they lead 

you to do shortcuts? How do you balance that? Because you are 
20 

really our guy trying to figure this out with respect to testing everything and working everything and getting the schedule on. 

General O’REILLY. Ma’am, I believe the key to handling those situations where you are under a lot of pressure to deploy something 

and there is a great need—and we recognize, for example, against 

regional missile defense, we are outgunned in about every region 

of the world today. I think the need to balance that pressure versus 

verifying and making sure the system works correctly is—the approach should be to determine up front what is that criteria before 

you get in those high-pressure situations. 

And, again, I greatly appreciate the help of the operational test 

community. We define in our Integrated Master Test Plan up front 

what is our purpose of testing, what is the success and failure criteria, and we do that early in the process, even in some cases years 

before we actually conduct the test. Therefore, once the test is done 

and we are looking at the results, that is not really the time to determine what is deemed a successful test or not. 

Then, if we have a system that is not mature to the point that 

we had originally set up criteria for, at that point we go to the combatant commander and the operational test community and 

STRATCOM, prepare a document of what capabilities have we 

verified the system does have and what are the limitations that it 

has. And then the combatant commander has to make a determination. Does he want to accept those limitations or not accept the capability until we mature it further? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Thank you. 

Dr. Roberts, can you talk to us a little bit about how consultations are proceeding with Russia? Or would you rather do that off 

record? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Well, the details should be done in a different 

venue, because the state of discussions is sensitive. 

In general, we see strong Russian leadership interest in moving 

forward with missile defense cooperation with the United States 

and NATO, reflected in presidential and prime ministerial statements. We see supporting activities in the various ministries 

aligned with the senior-level commitment. We see some concerns 

on their side akin to the concerns we have. We are concerned about 

sharing classified information; they are concerned about sharing 

classified information. They are concerned about some of their technology. 

But I think the short answer would be we perceive that they are 

approaching this cooperative effort in a constructive and pragmatic 

way and with some realistic expectations about what we might be 

able to accomplish. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

I will yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. We appreciate what you 

do. I have got two little 2-year-old twins, so I especially appreciate 

what you do. 

General O’Reilly, I hope the question has not already been asked. 

We get divided in our attentions here. 
21 

But the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system in Alaska and 

California is essentially all we have to defend the homeland from 

long-range missile attacks. And it has been my estimate, and I am 

going to ask you about it, the stockpile of these GBIs is dangerously low. And so I guess I would ask you just to refresh our 

memories on what the present stockpile is. And in your personal 

opinion—I will put you in a bad spot here, if you don’t mind. In 

your personal opinion, not wearing your MDA hat, is the number 

of available GBIs sufficient, or do we need more? And coupled with 

that question, how will the $2.4 billion reduction in the Future 

Years Defense Program affect our GMD effectiveness? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we built the current acquisition objective, 

we call it, the quantity of how many of an acquisition item we believe we need to procure, including testing and development. And 

for GBIs today the number is 52. Thirty will be deployed. The others will be put into a pool which—again, the way our approach is 

to reliability of the GBI system is we continually learn about this 

system over time so we want to have a pool of interceptors that we 

can rotate through, which is not unusual to do with missiles. We 

do it with PATRIOT and plan to do it with THAAD and we do it 

with Aegis. You put them back into a depot, you test them, you 

take components out, you fire them off, and you keep improving 

your knowledge of how they are aging over time. So there is a calculation of how many missiles are necessary for that. 

We do not have a lot of data that you would normally have before 

you field a system just due to the urgency, as you say, the need, 

because the GMD system is our only homeland defense system. So 

we put prototypes—they are more akin to prototypes than production representative missiles in the field. We watch them very carefully, and we have assessed that we needed 16 for flight testing 

and ground testing. And, as has been said before, that leaves you 

six for testing in 2020. 

Well, there are some assumptions that we made at the time that 

have since no longer been valid. And that is we didn’t anticipate 

the two flight test failures we have had. We also didn’t anticipate 

my request for another flight to verify it works and then we are 

going to repeat the test. So right there are four GBIs we hadn’t anticipated. 

I believe over the next year it would be prudent to reassess the 

number of GBIs we ought to be buying. For our fiscal year 2012 

budget, we are requesting five new GBIs. So the production lines 

will start, and that will commit the contractors probably to their 

limit—close to their limit to what they can do. That would be more 

GBIs than we have produced at one time in the past in one lot. 

And so we believe we are going to sufficiently start the production line and, over the next year, I would recommend between now 

and the fiscal year 2013 budget submit, the Department reassess 

the total number we need to procure and then include that in the 

fiscal year 2013 President’s budget. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir. 

I will try to throw another question at you right quick. Related 

to directed energy, I know that the Airborne Laser test scheduled 

for last night had to be canceled, but, given what we have learned 

from the Airborne Laser program, do you foresee any near- or me-
22 

dium-term applications for directed energy weapons in the ballistic 

missile defense architecture at this point or anything new? 

And, secondly, can you tell us a little bit about the DDR&E [Director, Defense Research and Engineering] report on the directed 

energy technologies? 

General O’REILLY. We have supported the effort of that study, 

DDR&E study, so I can talk from a point of view of us providing 

information to them. But the bottom line is that there are many 

applications of directed energy. Unfortunately, for this venue right 

here, they are highly effective. Most of them are classified. 

I can tell you that last year twice, both against liquid-fueled systems that are very hard to shoot down—the lethality mechanisms 

was the theory they would be hard to shoot down—and solid-rocket 

motors, we have shot both of them down with our laser system at 

great ranges; and the destruction actually occurred much faster 

than we theoretically thought it would occur. 

So there are some lethality effects that are greater than our theory had indicated. The bottom line is, it is extremely promising. We 

have effectively tracked and intercepted while a missile is boosting, 

which is ultimately where you would want to be in missile defense. 

Then you would never know how far the missile—whether it was 

an IRBM or ICBM—because you killed it while it was still boosting. Tremendous cost-effectiveness of having that ability. And we 

have demonstrated for the first time empirically over the last year 

our capabilities which allow us to upgrade our theory and our models and simulations. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General O’Reilly, a couple of questions with regards to SM–3 Block IIA. It is a co-development program between the U.S. and Japan. And in a letter to the 

Japanese Ministry of Defense you noted the project is rapidly approaching key milestones, that, absent a production agreement 

with the Government of Japan, the U.S. will assume it will produce 

the missiles in the United States. And I am curious as to what decisions you believe—MDA believes you need from the Japanese 

Ministry of Defense to move this from development to production 

with the Japanese; and if that does not happen, then what does 

happen to SM–3 Block IIA? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the SM–3 Block IIA, we have a commitment to utilize that weapons system. It is Phase Three of the 

Phased Adaptive Approach for the deployment of missile defense in 

Europe. As the President has stated, the SM–3 IIA will be part of 

that configuration. Therefore, it is my responsibility to ensure it is 

brought to production and produced. 

Our current agreements with the Japanese Government are more 

based on timelines; and so by 2015, the current agreement is, that 

is when we would end our cooperative development of the SM–3 

IIA. 

It is not that they have decided not to finish the development 

with us, nor have they decided to participate in production of it. 

They haven’t announced that they have made those decisions. My 

point in the letter was that in our budget process it would be very 

helpful if we understood their commitment, and we extended the 
23 

cooperative development and also made the agreements early on 

how we would produce it and how we would conduct work share 

and so forth. 

Short of that information, I must assume that I have to put 

something in there to ensure—to submit to Congress the resources 

needed to deliver the SM–3 IIA by 2018. And so what I have done 

in the out-year budget, without having a commitment from the 

Japanese Government, has assumed that the United States will 

finish the development and production. 

It was done only to have a comprehensive budget submission. It 

was not meant that we do not desire it. In fact, we would; and we 

have had great success with the Japanese. It is just that it would 

be very helpful for our budgetary purposes to understand what 

their intentions are for completing the development and to going 

into production. I, frankly, would imagine that after they—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Do you anticipate, then, meeting a time? Obviously, 

everything is down in Japan, and we are sensitive to that. But on 

this issue do you anticipate sometime this year meeting with them 

to try to find out what their intentions are? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we have several meetings planned this 

year to discuss this, and the sooner the better for us. But, obviously, we are very sensitive to the situation they are in. But they 

have not delayed our upcoming meeting that will occur in the next 

two months on this topic. 

So that is where we stand on it, sir. And I may defer to OSD Policy, too, because they work this from the policy side. 

Mr. LARSEN. Go ahead, Mr. Roberts. That is fine. 

Dr. ROBERTS. Well, I would only add that we have every reason 

to expect continued strong partnership from Japan on this matter. 

Their commitment is clear, even if the terms of the next agreement 

are not yet finalized; and we think they are an excellent model of 

burden sharing with our allies in this area. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Gilmore, in your testimony—in your written 

testimony, you noted on the—back to the GMD and interceptors— 

you said because the number of GMD interceptors available for 

testing is limited and additional targets must be purchased to support this repeat testing, the FTG–11 has been eliminated. The 

point is that additional targets must be purchased, and we have 

heard this from General O’Reilly as well. 

Putting that together—this is actually a question for Mr. Ahern, 

from MDEB’s perspective, is this on your—is this yet on your 

radar? Or it has to be worked for the 2013 and then comes to you? 

Secretary AHERN. That is correct, sir. I have not seen that come 

forward, the additional. But I understood what General O’Reilly indicated, and I expect that we will see it coming forward in 2013. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will take a second round later. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General O’Reilly, I want to the build on a question or two that 

Representative Franks asked a moment ago. Is the funding for directed energy what it should be, given what we continue to learn 

about the greater and greater applications for directed energy? 
24 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I am a strong supporter of development 

of directed energy. I believe we have shown over the last year that 

it does have lethal effects, as we have desired. The Missile Defense 

Agency probably has the greatest application of high-energy megawatt-plus class lasers, so we are unique in that area. But at much 

lower energies, we have significant applications in missile defense 

to assist our interceptors if we have directed energy. 

But for these—it is still in research and development in a large 

part, especially the next generation. We would like to see powerful 

lasers like we are working with Lawrence Livermore National Labs 

that is about the size of this table, rather than a 747, that would 

have tremendous lethality. And to achieve, that I believe the best 

way is almost like the approach I answered for test criteria. We establish technical milestones, and we establish a steady funding 

level. And until they hit that technical milestone, we keep a steady 

funding level that adds stability to the research team and, once 

they achieve it, then a decision is made to move to a higher funding level where you can then start applying that technology. 

Where they are in this program—and we are prepared to move 

rapidly once they have achieved milestones. These are significant 

milestones associated that they are working right now with the efficiency of these lasers. Once they reach the type of efficiencies 

they are trying to achieve, which is greater we have ever seen before—and I do believe they are achievable; it just has to be demonstrated—then I believe that is the best strategy for justifying additional funding to apply that capability. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Are we at least doing that initial stable R&D type 

of funding in the proposed budget? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, in the proposed budget, we are. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Secondly, I have heard that the Standard 

Missile-3 Block IIB program described as a high schedule risk. Do 

you see this as an important problem? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, when we laid out the SM–3 IIB program, 

we looked at interceptors that are much more complex than this 

one. 

If I may say, trying to intercept a missile in boost phase has 

some big advantages and actually is a more simplistic missile. The 

target you are trying to hit is very hot. You just finished boosting, 

and the accelerations of it—it is very clear to find it, to track it. 

And we have other classified requirements that are not applicable 

at the front end of a missile kill chain. 

So the bottom line is, we don’t believe the criteria are as great 

on this missile as it is on the, say, PAC–3 [Patriot Advanced Capability–3] or THAAD or Aegis. Yet we added time to the average development time, and we went back and looked at how long it takes 

to build missiles of this class. And so for this missile, from the beginning of product development to making a milestone decision for 

production, is 51⁄2 years, which is longer than what the average is 

for a typical missile. So we do believe we have put margin, schedule margin, into the development of this missile. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you very much. 

And my last question for you is I was recently informed that the 

defense efficiency initiatives will be cutting 1,000 positions from 

the Missile Defense Agency over the next 2 years. What parts of 
25 

the agency are these cuts coming from? And can your agency absorb such a huge cut without an impact to the missile defense mission? 

General O’REILLY. We were part of that process to determine 

what the efficiency goals were. Our input was along that line, and 

the majority of that is in the area of our contractor support for 

Government functions, the supporting functions. And it is a different way of contracting is what we have taken into mind. Instead 

of taking a path like we have in the past where we augment our 

staff, everybody inside the agency determines how many more technical support contractors they need, and we go out and procure for 

that number. We have turned it around, and we have made it competitive, and we will announce what are the tasks that need to be 

accomplished. And then we let the contractors come back to us and 

propose—industry to tell us how many people it would take, rather 

than we predetermining how many people. 

We are about 50 percent through this new contracting process 

over the last year. The savings we have already identified for this 

year alone, over $100 million, where the actual proposals that we 

accepted was less than what the Government estimate was under 

the previous contracting approach. 

So we believe the competition that has been added to this—we 

also are awarding larger contracts in this area. So instead of having a whole series of small contracts—we had over 400 for this 

agency—we are now pursuing 40 larger contracts which then have 

their own efficiencies because the Government does not have oversight over 400 contracts so there is the reduction on the Government side. 

But most of that goal for the reduction of effectively a thousand 

full-time equivalent personnel is achieved through this new contracting approach of letting industry tell us and bid competitively 

on how much it would take in order to meet the tasks that we 

have. 

Mr. LAMBORN. General, as a final follow-up, you have explained 

the process very well, but do you think any of the missions of MDA 

will be compromised? 

General O’REILLY. No, we have determined up front what are the 

tasks that need to be done in order to accomplish our mission, and 

we are set out to contract to all of those tasks. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you, and thank you all for being 

here. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General O’Reilly, you addressed—and I am discovering what it is 

like to be a freshman, seems like all of my questions have been 

asked in one shape, form, or fashion, so I am modifying a little bit. 

But you addressed the impact of a continuing resolution. As you 

know, we in the House and the Senate are facing a logjam of sorts 

with respect to CR [continuing resolution] versus a budget for the 

remainder of this year. Which is the lesser of the evils to you: Continuing throughout the remainder of the year on a CR basis, sporadic 3 or 4 weeks at a time or, if push comes to shove, having a 

partial Government shutdown of 2 or 3 weeks, something of that 
26 

nature, which may be required to force the parties to pass a budget 

for the remainder of this year? Which is easier for you? 

General O’REILLY. I am sure everybody is anticipating my answer of what Congress should do. 

Mr. BROOKS. Not what Congress should do, but which is easier 

for you to operate under? Which is the lesser of the evils? 

General O’REILLY. I think between shutting down the Government and continuing contracting in a very inefficient way, I would 

rather continue the contracting in a very inefficient way. But, if I 

could, there are some impacts there that I would just like to clarify 

and make sure that I have represented correctly. 

It is not only the Government operations but, obviously, all of the 

contracts out there. Especially as we proposed the Phased Adaptive 

Approach, there are a lot of new starts in this budget that we are 

not allowed to turn on. 

And there are particular issues such as the National Defense Authorization Act in December authorized my agency to procure Iron 

Dome, the system that the Israelis have developed for short-range 

defense, $205 million. Even though the President has committed 

and it is in the authorization act, it is a new start for me, and so 

I can’t even execute what the authorization act has asked me to do. 

So it is that and it is the impacts to the workforce; trying to determine new contracts and things, whether or not they are going 

to be hired or laid off. It is buying material. We can’t commit legally to buying material because we don’t have the follow-on funding. As I said, up in Alaska we are missing at a critical time for 

hiring our construction workforce. It is extremely difficult, and it 

is extremely inefficient to operate this way, even though I said that 

would be better for me than stopping and not movingly forward at 

all with any of my—the work that the Government has asked me 

to execute. 

Mr. BROOKS. So even if the Government shutdown was 2 to 3 

weeks, something relatively short, sometime in April, you would 

prefer to have a CR off and on for the remainder of the year rather 

than risk a 2- to 3-week shutdown? That would be easier for you 

to operate under? 

General O’REILLY. That is the worst of two evils, but at least we 

are accomplishing some work. If we completely shut down, then 

there are a lot of also inefficiencies associated with that, with having to terminate and start up activities. 

Mr. BROOKS. Do you have a judgment as to whether you would 

qualify as an essential function and thereby MDA be exempt from 

the shutdown? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, there are functions that we do that are in 

direct support of the combatant commanders; and it would affect, 

for example, our homeland defense system. We need to continue 

that operation and the oversight and the Government participation 

of GMD. And it is an operational system, and there are many others at the regional level that I would deem are in direct support 

of combat operations or ongoing military operations. 

Mr. BROOKS. The GMD program, as you know, has seen sizable 

budget cuts in the past 3 years; and the fiscal year budget request 

further reduces the GMD program by $185 million. How are these 
27 

reductions impacting GMD operations, sustainment, and any modernization activities? 

General O’REILLY. During this period of time, the operations aspects are actually increasing over time in that budget. What those 

budget reductions primarily reflect is the completion of a lot of construction up at Fort Greely that was originally intended, and now 

that work has come to an end. 

However, we are starting new work. The upgrade of the Clear radar, for example, that is about $200 million. That is for the purpose of enhancing the homeland defense. So there are a lot of other 

activities that are being initiated which, in fact, support homeland 

defense but are not part of the GMD program. 

But for O&S [Operations and Support], we are increasing over 

time because we have a greater operation—as more assets become 

operational, so does the need to maintain the system. But, primarily, those reductions were associated with power plants and 

other infrastructure, which we are now completing. 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. I am just about out of time, but in view of 

the most recent tests that were unsuccessful, does the fiscal year 

2012 budget request still reflect your funding requirements for 

GMD? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, they do. But some of that funding—some 

of the activity we will have to defer and accomplish in future budget requests. 

Specifically, we have stopped the production of the enhanced kill 

vehicles as this time so that—because we don’t know exactly what 

the solution is. We want to verify the solution and the correction 

and then upgrade those kill vehicles, make those corrections, and 

then continue the production line. So we do have a stop of about— 

for seven kill vehicles that are currently in production at this time. 

And because we are not completing it, there is a reduction in our 

need, our funding; and we are using that funding in order to support these other activities to return to flight testing. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, General O’Reilly and the other members of the panel; and, Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my 

time. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General O’Reilly and Dr. Gilmore, what do you consider will be 

the most demanding developments in terms of technology improvements that are required for the PAA Phase 2 and 4—I’m sorry— 

Phase 2 through 4? 

Dr. GILMORE. To some extent the most demanding technologies 

and the most demanding capabilities for Phase 2 through 4 are 

common to all of missile defense. First of all, you have to demonstrate that you can actually discriminate if the threat comes 

with countermeasures. Because, if you can’t, that is obviously a 

problem; you won’t be able to intercept what you need to intercept. 

That is a problem as you move towards trying to negate longerrange threats in particular. And as we move into later phases of 

the Phased Adaptive Approach, that could become a greater problem as time goes by. 

Another thing that has to be demonstrated is the capability to 

do Engage-on-Remote. So you have forward-based sensors and for-
28 

ward-based radars that are doing the tracking which then provide 

that information over communications net and through the Battle 

Management Command and Control system to the actual platform 

that will launch an interceptor. And that intercept will sometimes 

have to occur outside the field of view of the radar that might be 

organic to the intercept platform. That is another important capability that has to be demonstrated in order to realize all of the protection that would be provided by the Phased Adaptive Approach. 

Those are just two things that come to mind, but, General 

O’Reilly, if you care to say something else? 

General O’REILLY. Ma’am, I believe the individual development 

of the individual components—the sensors, the command and control processors, the missiles—they are not inherently more difficult 

to develop than ones we are developing and have successfully developed today. I believe the real challenge in 2, 3, and 4 is each 

time we move to a new level of capability with missile defense they 

become more—those capabilities become more interdependent on 

each other so that we can—the Aegis ship, for example, in Phase 

2 doesn’t need to see the missile before we go ahead and launch 

a missile because we are relying on some other radar. So it is the 

integration. 

And just to give an idea, in the next two years the operational 

tests, for example, that Dr. Gilmore has referred to earlier, it is actually going to have two medium-range missiles in the air simultaneously, an Aegis ship in a position to shoot it down. But if it does 

not, THAAD has to be right behind it to be ready to shoot it down, 

and we are going to shoot another missile at THAAD simultaneously during that period of time that it has to worry about. And 

just when it is most difficult, we are going to launch a third missile 

so that a PATRIOT system underneath it has to operate with all 

the effects of the other intercepts. 

So as we continue to become more and more complex, operate 

live fire testing is important, but the accreditation of our models 

and SIMS [simulations] so that we have confidence in them is 

going to become more important. All of this is geared toward the 

complexities. 

Phase 3, we are now reaching out twice the range we were before. So not only do you have more complex scenarios, but they are 

spread out over a greater period of time. 

But Phase 4 actually becomes easier. Because if you are going 

to—it is just like our laser interceptions last year of a boosting missile. The targets don’t cost very much because there is no target— 

there is no payload because we are trying to destroy it early in the 

flight. Or, if it is, it is a simplistic payload. And the range infrastructure, all of that is much smaller because the entire flight from 

which we are trying to destroy the missile occurs in 2 or 3 minutes, 

rather than 30 minutes, over a much smaller piece of land. 

So that capability of the SM–3 IIB will actually drive us to more 

cost-effective missile defense and more cost-effective testing and deployment. So I believe the challenge is for Phase 2 and 3 primarily 

to demonstrate all of the integration which is necessary. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Larsen. 
29 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ahern, with regards to—is it ‘‘ME–ADS’’ or ‘‘MEADS’’? How 

do we pronounce that? 

Mr. AHERN. ‘‘ME–ADS’’ is the way I do it, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. I’ll use ‘‘ME–ADS’’ so we will be talking the same 

language. At least we will start off talking on the same page here. 

From the staff memo, it says the penalty on the termination is $846 million. Is that about right? 

Mr. AHERN. That is what I was trying to describe earlier. That 

is the subtraction between our original MOU commitment and 

what we have already provided. And that is about the right number today, yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. And then the 2012 and 2013 budgets anticipate about $104 million—— 

Mr. AHERN. $804. 

Mr. LARSEN. $804 million. So a difference of about $42 million 

between terminating it today and what we plan on spending over 

the next two budget cycles; is that about right? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, the maximum termination liability, $846 million, and that is just based on a snapshot in time. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Mr. AHERN. And then the request for the budget is based on our 

MOU commitment for 2012 and 2013. So, within that range, yes, 

sir, those numbers are correct. 

Mr. LARSEN. When does the MOU commitment end and the 

threat of a termination penalty end with it? 

Mr. AHERN. I am not an attorney, but I am going to tell you my 

understanding is, when the money has expired, then the MOU is 

over. I think I have the MOU available. I will take the question 

for the record, but I want—this is an opportunity to do this. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 95.] 

Mr. AHERN. We have no obligation to put more money into the 

MEADS program after we have executed 2012 and 2013. So, from 

the standpoint of are you worried that I will be back again asking 

for money in 2014 or 2015 for MEADS, no, sir. It would require an 

amendment to that MOU in order to be able to put more money 

into it. We have no intention of amending that MOU. Had we decided to go forward with what I described in my opening statement 

as the third option of adding the additional funding, that would 

have required an amendment. 

So I think that my right answer to your question is, there is no 

termination liability when the last dollar on the last contract is expended. 

Mr. LARSEN. If you planned to come up here in 2014 and ask for 

more money I would make sure that the chair, or whoever it was, 

didn’t invite you so you couldn’t come up here and ask for more 

money because—I am half joking, but it just seems that, between 

the penalty and what we put in the budget, it is almost the same. 

I am just trying to understand better the decisionmaking process 

to get us to this point. 

But I think you have also—just one issue, when does this end? 

We haven’t really delved into MEADS too much over the last several years as much as we have done other parts of the Missile De-
30 

fense Agency budget, and it might be worth us maybe doing a look 

back on MEADS a little bit on this side of the microphone. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. I am not sure—I think—I am not sure 

where the question is, but I think that the effort going forward, 

how the decision was made, as I described—tried to describe, it 

was that going through the rationale of our commitment to our allies, what we had accomplished, what we had expected to accomplish, the affordability aspect of it. Because were we to commit to 

continuing—there was that billion dollar bill plus, really, implicit 

in Dave Ahern’s mind, if you are going to do that you really have 

to commit to production. And we were not ready to do that. There 

was a recognition of the risk. 

So I think that is all wrapped up there. And it is a fact our maximum termination liability is within reason, with small estimating, 

whatever percentage that is, of what our obligation to the contract 

is. But I don’t think that was—it was not what I was thinking of, 

anyway. And I am not the decisionmaker, but I was certainly involved in it. It was those four reasons: You are close; you have got 

the CDR [Critical Design Review]; you have got allies; do what you 

can, but recognize that you are not going to go any farther. 

So I won’t be up here in 2014, sir. And then also you are taking 

some risk with the rest of the portfolio. 

Mr. LARSEN. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, what I understand 

from the decision that MDEB has made with regard to MEADS, 

though, is we go forward for the next 2 years on this and then we 

end up with a prototype that provides a set of capabilities that 

could be used for something else later. Is that what I gathered from 

your written testimony at least? 

Mr. AHERN. Sir, let me make one correction. The MDEB had 

nothing to do with the decision on MEADS. That is a straightforward Army, OSD, going forward to up the SECDEF [Secretary 

of Defense] decision. 

But at the end of the 21⁄2 years we will have demonstrated if the 

plan works as we expected. And that is part of my job, is to ensure 

that we do. We will have the fire control radar. We will have shot 

a couple of live shots with the MSE [Missile Segment Enhancement] missiles. We will have used the command and control system. We will have done, as Dr. Gilmore mentioned in one of the 

other systems, an Engage-on-Remote. So there are some realistic, 

focused achievements in the ‘‘system of systems’’ kind of aspect for 

MEADS to demonstrate that it is—that the concept is proven. 

And then there will be technologies. Our technologies—this is a 

big phased array—or not that big—but phased array antennas, mobile, lightweight, in X band and in UHF band, and they are modern 

electronic. 

So it is both a system of systems and a technology that will have 

been demonstrated available not only to the United States but also 

to Germany and Italy. 

Mr. LARSEN. And one more question, Mr. Chairman. 

This is for Dr. Roberts and has to do the Phased Adaptive Approach, whether it is EPAA or APAA or the regional aspect of this, 

and having to do with the numbers of destroyer platforms that you 

anticipate will be available. Can you talk to us a little bit about 

coordination of your policy shop with the U.S. Navy and how you 
31 

anticipate having the adequate number of Aegis destroyer platforms to implement this? Plus knowing full well we have a lot of 

other things our destroyers need to do? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The missing voice today on this panel is the Joint 

Staff. And Admiral Macy, I believe, is on foreign travel and is not 

available today. 

But, fundamentally, the answer to that question comes from 

them, meaning the Joint Staff is responsible for adjudicating competing requests from combatant commanders for scarce resources. 

And our function has been to set some policy goals, support the development of an acquisition strategy that grows capability as rapidly as we can afford, and to provide what policy context is needed 

for the Joint Staff to adjudicate these competing demands. 

And I think that is—it is fundamentally a responsibility of the 

Joint Staff. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. We will follow up with them. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, gentlemen. I want to thank you for your 

dedication and your expertise. 

I want to personally thank Dr. Roberts and General O’Reilly for 

your work with the committee, both in the 101 sessions and in the 

private briefings that we have had and the classified briefings. I 

can tell you that, you know, this is substantial progress that has 

been made from our hearings a couple of years ago. I think certainly our European allies were all very impressed with what has 

occurred and what has been achieved there and their support for 

the Phased Adaptive Approach. 

I appreciate you working cooperatively with the committee, and 

I think what this has allowed us to do is to hone in on what the 

remaining items are, what the to-do list is, those items where we 

might need to exchange additional information. But I do greatly appreciate the way and the manner in which you are working with 

the committee and the members, and I think it really helps. By the 

time we get to this committee hearing, a lot of the questions that 

we have, a whole lot of background has been exchanged between 

us, and that really helps. So thank you very much. 

With that, we will be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 31, 2011 

(95) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. AHERN. Per the MEADS Design and Development (D&D) MOU (Memorandum of Understanding), Section 19.9, and absent a unanimous decision by the 

Partner nations to terminate the D&D effort early, the MOU will remain in effect 

until the successful completion of the D&D project or September 2016, whichever 

comes first. 

The termination liability is tied to our overall MOU funding commitment. Section 

V of the MOU states that the total program phase cost ceiling is $4 Billion equivalent U.S. dollars (EUSD) (in 2004 dollars) and that each Participant will contribute 

its equitable share of the full costs of the MEADS project. The U.S. cost share of 

the MOU cooperative program is 58%, for a ceiling of $2.324B EUSD (2004 dollars). 

In February 2011 (the time of the President’s FY12 budget announcement), the remaining MOU funding commitment for the U.S. was $846 million. Since February, 

the U.S. provided the remaining FY11 funding for the program per our MOU commitment. The U.S. obligation toward cooperative MOU program costs for NATO 

MEADS Management Agency in FY 12 and FY 13 are $350M and $338M, respectively, totaling $688M. The remainder of the U.S. FY 12 and FY 13 budget amount, 

which is approximately $116M, is required for U.S.-specific MEADS work—including Government Furnished Property (GFP) obligations under the MOU—implemented through the US Army National Program Office. 

In the event of a unilateral MOU withdrawal by a Partner nation, the remaining 

partners would have 6 months to determine whether to terminate or to restructure 

the contract and proceed. Should the remaining nations proceed, the withdrawing 

nation would be responsible for restructure costs up to their MOU obligation limits 

(up to $804M for the United States, as noted above). Should the remaining Partners 

choose to terminate NATO MEADS Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) contracts, 

contract termination costs would be based on a termination proposal from the prime 

contractor as well as any related U.S. GFP termination costs. Because our MEADS 

Partner nations have made it clear that they have no interest in pursuing termination, NAMEADSMA has not requested detailed contract termination proposals. 

Contract termination costs (and related government termination costs) in a contract 

termination scenario would be driven by existing obligations like long-lead item procurements and orders, targets, test and integration infrastructure, and other contract costs (leases, support contractors, etc). In a unilateral withdrawal, the withdrawing nation would be liable for termination or restructure costs up to the MOU 

commitment ceiling. [See page 29.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 31, 2011 

(99) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. On March 10, 2011, Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher was 

in Moscow to propose the establishment of a ‘‘Missile Defense Data Processing Center’’ that would synthesize U.S./NATO and Russian sensor data. Can you describe 

this concept in more detail and describe what data and technology would be shared 

and how they would be shared? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation with Russia is an Administration priority. To this end, we are pursuing BMD cooperation in the following three separate, but related, bilateral tracks: 

Defense Relations Working Group: Defense Secretary Gates and Defense Minister 

Serduykov established this working group to further practical cooperation in a number of areas, including missile defense. 

International Security and Arms Control: Under Secretary Tauscher and Deputy 

Foreign Minister Ryabkov are engaged in a dialogue that includes such topics as 

strategic stability. 

Military Cooperation Working Group: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Mullen and Chief of the General Staff Makarov meet periodically to discuss a range 

of cooperative efforts including missile defense. 

We are also pursuing multilateral BMD cooperation with Russia through the 

NATO–Russia Council (NRC). The effort in the NRC is synchronized with our bilateral efforts. 

I am prepared to provide more details in a classified setting on the specific proposals we have made to Russia and the outlook for progress in these areas. 

Mr. TURNER. The November 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration expressed NATO’s 

desire to work with Russia on missile defense: ‘‘We are actively pursuing cooperation with Russia on missile defence, including through the resumption of theatre 

missile defence exercises.’’ Describe the scope of any missile defense exercises that 

are being considered, and what systems or capabilities Russia would have to provide 

to make these exercises equitable and beneficial for both parties? 

Dr. ROBERTS. NATO and Russia agreed to resume theater missile defense cooperation that is likely to include exercises. The NATO–Russia Council (NRC) Missile Defense Working Group is establishing a program of work that will include a 

joint analysis and exercise proposals. 

The scope of missile defense exercises will be determined within the NRC Missile 

Defense Working Group, but our view is that the exercises should have a greater 

scope and scale than previous exercises, which focused on tactical missile defense 

cooperation. 

Mr. TURNER. A few changes to the GMD program are reflected in this year’s budget request. These include a decision to ‘‘mothball’’ Missile Field 1 in Alaska instead 

of decommissioning it, and beginning preliminary design work to locate an interceptor communications terminal at an East Coast site by 2015. Why did MDA make 

these changes—is there a specific development which motivated MDA to adopt these 

changes? Is MDA considering other changes to the GMD system to improve its reliability and operational effectiveness, or to enhance its ability to protect the U.S. 

homeland against evolving threats? 

General O’REILLY. In coordination with OSD Policy, MDA decided to place Missile 

Field 1 in a non-operational state (‘‘mothball’’) instead of permanently decommissioning the missile field. While in a mothball status, the 6 silos in missile field 1 

can be hardened and reactivated in two years at a cost of approximately $200M as 

a hedge against any future change in threat to the Homeland. There are no current 

threats dictating the need, nor plans to reactivate MF–1 in the future; however, we 

determined preserving the asset in a non-operational status was prudent over destruction based in uncertainties inherent in threat estimates. 

MDA is adding an East Coast interceptor communication terminal (IDT) to provide additional and redundant communication with GBIs launched from Fort 

Greely, AK, and Vandenberg AFB, CA. These additional communication opportunities allow additional GBI updates from sensors to improve performance against 

threats to the eastern United States from the Middle East. MDA originally planned 
100 

to install an East Coast IDT in 2004, but delayed it while focusing on a 3rd GMD 

site in Europe. We concur with the previously identified need and are proceeding 

with its installation. 

The GMD’s reliability and operational effectiveness continue to improve through 

upgrades to existing GBI components and system software. Our ongoing GBI upgrade program replaces older items with new higher-reliability components to enhance mission readiness. Our ongoing stockpile reliability program evaluates system 

components throughout their service life to identify any negative trends needing correction. Also, we are improving the GMD’s ability to utilize additional sensor data 

and better discriminate threat objects during flight. Finally, we continue to develop 

the 2-stage GBI. After last year’s successful initial flight test, we plan to conduct 

an intercept with a two-stage GBI as a potential hedge to allow for a longer intercept window of time if ICBMs were launch against the United States from Northeast Asia or the Middle East. 

Mr. TURNER. The SM–3 Block IIB interceptor is planned for deployment by 2020 

to improve protection of the U.S. homeland against potential ICBM attack as part 

of Phase 3 of the EPAA. The FY12 budget request provides an additional $1.7 billion to the SM–3 Block IIB development program across the Future Years Defense 

Program (FYDP). Can you describe the key technology risk areas associated with 

the SM–3 Block IIB and MDA’s plans for retiring that risk? 

General O’REILLY. The SM–3 Block IIB will counter short, medium, intermediate, 

and long range threats, including ICBMs, earlier in their trajectories than is currently possible. We are focusing SM–3 Block IIB design on enhancements over existing SM–3 variants including increasing interceptor velocity, improving the ability of 

the kill vehicle to maneuver, and increasing the range at which the kill vehicle seeker can discern the threat. The SM–3 Block IIB will leverage existing and planned 

Aegis Weapon System and Mk41 Vertical Launching System interfaces. Today, we 

are executing a two-pronged strategy to achieve capability goals and plan for the 

product development phase. In early April, MDA awarded three Concept Definition 

and Program Planning contracts (Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon). Each 

contractor will conduct missile trade studies to define SM–3 Block IIB concepts, 

challenges, and associated program plans. Concept definition products will include 

detailed performance characterizations, technology maturity assessments, and demonstration of key technologies. In addition, we are executing technology risk reduction efforts to mature key interceptor components that increase performance and potentially reduce cost. Specifically, we are investing now with multiple vendors in kill 

vehicle divert and attitude control systems, upper stage propulsion, advanced seekers, and lighter weight structures and materials to reduce inert mass. 

Mr. TURNER. The SM–3 Block IIA interceptor also requires the maturation of key 

technologies. An additional $19 million was provided in the FY12 budget to do this, 

but no additional funds were added to the FYDP. Are you confident that the funds 

in the FYDP are sufficient to complete development and start testing and production of the SM–3 Block IIA interceptor? Please provide any fact-of life revisions to 

the FYDP funding profile and schedule, including changes in any milestones, since 

the release of the FY12 budget request. 

General O’REILLY. The funds requested in the FYDP for the SM–3 Block IIA missile are sufficient to complete development and start testing and production. The 

SM–3 Block IIA development plan is currently under review to determine the lowest 

risk development approach to achieve a 2018 deployment. While the overall development timeline remains the same, the sequencing and timelines associated with 

flight testing in 2015–2017 may be adjusted based on results of ground and early 

testing in 2014 and 2015. Production plans remain as requested in PB12. 

Mr. TURNER. Former MDA Executive Director, Mr. David Altwegg, said there is 

a ‘‘big-time quality problem’’ and ‘‘a lack of attention to detail’’ across the board for 

systems delivered to MDA. Recent examples include the air-launched target intended for a THAAD intercept test and the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) on 

the ground-based interceptor (GBI). Is MDA considering changes to its contracts to 

create stronger defect or quality control clauses and increase contractor liability for 

poor performance? 

General O’REILLY. MDA is currently developing a defect clause to increase contractor liability for poor performance. MDA is looking at the fee and the profit that 

we are providing our contractors and evaluating our ability to go beyond the scope 

that we currently have defined in our award fees for quality control and extending 

it to a much greater pool of award fee money, to include even past awarded money. 

This will enable the government to be compensated for egregious errors in quality 

control. 
101 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you think the ICBM threat from Iran and North Korea is developing more quickly than anticipated and do you think the current hedging policy 

is adequate to respond to the threat to our homeland and the threat to our deployed 

troops and allies, and why? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Regional actors such as North Korea and Iran continue to develop 

long-range missiles that could threaten the United States. Although there is some 

uncertainty about when and how this type of ICBM threat to the U.S. homeland 

will mature, the United States already possesses a capacity to counter the projected 

ICBM threats from these States. 

In order to maintain this advantageous position, the Administration is taking several steps to maintain and improve the protection of the homeland from the potential ICBM threat posed by Iran and North Korea. These steps include the continued 

procurement of ground-based interceptors (GBIs); the procurement and deployment 

of additional sensors; and upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle Management, 

and Communications (C2BMC) system. 

In addition to these improvements, the United States must also be well hedged 

against the possibility of rapid threat developments or delays in U.S. technological 

advances. The Administration has already taken the following decisions to strengthen the U.S. hedge posture: 

• The construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, Alaska, including a 14-silo 

configuration to accommodate a contingency deployment of eight additional 

GBIs, if needed; 

• Six GBI silos at Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely are being mothballed instead of 

decommissioned, allowing their return to service within two years, if necessary; 

and 

• The development and assessment of a two-stage GBI, which will continue to 

preserve future deployment options. 

The Administration is considering additional steps to strengthen the U.S. hedge 

posture. We are studying threat developments, future capabilities, and deployment 

options for a range of scenarios. In addition, we are evaluating the deployment 

timelines associated with fielding additional capabilities, with an eye to enabling 

rapid responses to triggering events. Our objective is to enable aggregate improvements that increase probability of kill, raid capacity, and battle space. This work 

involves a significant amount of classified information from both the Intelligence 

Community and the system developers. We have committed to brief the Committee 

on the results of this work in a classified setting once it is complete. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Preserving strategic stability with Russia and China is important 

as we defend ourselves against the threats posed by the nuclear programs in Iran 

and North Korea. Are there any plans to engage China? What are the risks of not 

engaging Russia and China? 

Dr. ROBERTS. It is important to engage Russia and China on strategic issues, including missile defense, to further our understanding, develop trust, and avoid misunderstandings that can lead to dangerous miscalculations. 

The Administration is committed to substantive and sustained dialogue with 

China, with the goals of enhancing confidence, improving transparency, and reducing mistrust on strategic security issues. 

We are pursuing a broad agenda with Russia focused on shared early warning of 

missile launches, technical cooperation, and even operational cooperation. Cooperation with Russia could offer some important tangible benefits for the United 

States—and also Russia. Cooperation is also the best means for Russia to gain an 

understanding of our ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans and programs in order 

to build confidence that our European missile defenses neither target Russia, nor 

pose a threat to Russia’s strategic forces. 

As we pursue missile defense discussions with Russia and China, the Administration will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Could you outline what savings were derived from efficiencies? 

Have these reductions increased the risk for any program or impacted your ability 

to respond to requirements? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) did not have any program adjustments; these were efficiencies to purchase same program scope with fewer dollars. The efficiencies were generated from changes with respect to manufacturing 

process efficiencies, savings through competition of major contracts and consolidation of tests to achieve objectives with fewer events. 
102 

MDA implemented a more efficient approach to the Airborne Infrared program to 

focus on development and integration of the sensor package and software that would 

enable the capability. 

Additionally, with a more efficient acquisition strategy, MDA was able to revise 

the cost of the AN/TPY–2 radars. MDA also reduced the Aegis 5.1 Aegis Weapons 

System cost by aligning the schedule to the Navy’s Advanced Capability Build 

(ACB) 16 effort. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The March 2011 GAO report on missile defense notes that after 14 

years of development and $5 billion, the Airborne Laser achieved its first successful 

short-range intercept in February 2010, though a second intercept during that test 

did not occur due to the laser shutting down prematurely. Could you outline the 

challenges stemming from the second part of this February 2010 test and the subsequent failed tests in September and October 2010, and explain what has delayed 

the March 2010 test? Should we remain optimistic about this program? 

Dr. ROBERTS. In February 2010, the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) successfully 

shot down a threat-representative short-range ballistic missile; however, the second 

intercept during this same flight did not end in destruction of the missile. The 

ALTB successfully engaged the missile, a Terrier Black Brant, but the safety abort 

system functioned as designed and shut down the laser early upon detecting stray 

light in its internal sensors. Chemical contamination within the laser caused this 

stray light. Although destruction of the second target did not occur, numerous other 

test objectives were accomplished for this mission: engaging multiple targets in the 

same mission; delivering a high-energy laser (HEL) beam to the boosted target; and 

demonstrating acquisition, track, and pointing of high- and low-power lasers. 

During testing in September/October 2010, the ALTB experienced two additional 

technical problems that resulted in unsuccessful engagements. In the first mission, 

a software issue in the beam-control system steered the high-energy laser slightly 

off center. The ALTB safety abort system worked as designed, detected this shift, 

and shut down the laser. The second technical problem was a micro-switch failure 

in a laser subsystem, which prevented a successful mission test. The laser incorrectly reported it was not ready, and a safety-default aborted the engagement. The 

failure investigation determined the cause to be a single micro-switch on an iodine 

valve that incorrectly reported a closed-valve condition. Both technical problems 

have been corrected. 

As a prototype, non-operational test bed, the ALTB incorporates cutting-edge technology and systems that can be challenging to maintain and operate. The program 

upholds stringent 

Go/No-Go criteria that ensure air and ground crew safety and minimize failed 

launch attempts. Meeting these criteria, coupled with range availability and weather, delayed the March 2011 test. 

The ALTB employs and incorporates highly advanced technologies and is credited 

with numerous groundbreaking directed energy capability demonstrations. These activities are carried out according to the highest safety standards to ensure that a 

catastrophic mishap does not occur. As such, some delays are to be expected. However, the ALTB continues to collect Science and Technology data in accordance with 

a plan developed by the Department of Defense to support the development of future airborne ballistic missile defense systems. The Department annually evaluates 

the contribution of ALTB to the development of directed-energy technologies as part 

of the annual budget development process. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you think the ICBM threat from Iran and North Korea is developing more quickly than anticipated and do you think the current hedging policy 

is adequate to respond to the threat to our homeland and the threat to our deployed 

troops and allies, and why? 

General O’REILLY. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

subcommittee files]. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. After two GMD flight test failures in a row, why should we have 

confidence that the GMD system can defend the United States? 

General O’REILLY. There are two versions of the GMD interceptor. The two most 

recent flight test failures involved a new version of the GMD EKV, called the Capability Enhancement II (CEII) EKV. 

Today there are 20 operational Capability Enhancement I (CEI) EKVs in the emplaced fleet. In its last three flight tests, the CEI has intercepted three times in a 

row. These CEI flight tests were conducted against appropriate threat scenarios. 

Based on current intelligence, the CEI fleet of interceptors are sufficient while 

MDA addresses and corrects the deficiencies associated with the CEII EKVs. 
103 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How do you balance the need for ensuring an operationally effective 

missile defense with the pressure to deploy missile defense systems quickly? Will 

scheduling and deployment pressures lead to short-cuts in testing? 

General O’REILLY. The Missile Defense Agency follows a comprehensive, systems 

engineering approach in developing and testing ballistic missile defense capabilities. 

The Agency remains committed to the testing processes and program decisions 

based on rigorous engineering analysis of test data, as described in the Integrated 

Master Test Plan jointly developed by MDA, Operational Test Agency and DOT&E. 

The specific data required for comprehensive testing of the BMDS has been identified and is updated in our Integrated Master Test Plan every six months to ensure 

that scheduling and deployment pressures will not lead to shortcuts in testing. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How many successful operationally realistic GMD tests have we 

had? (How many included countermeasures and have we designed a test scenario 

that envisioned more than one incoming ICBM?) 

General O’REILLY. We have conducted three successful operationally realistic 

GMD intercept tests against first generation ICBMs, Flight Test Ground-based Interceptor (FTG)–02, FTG–03a, FTG–05. On FTG–02 and FTG–03a, there were no 

countermeasures, and on FTG–05, the planned countermeasures did not deploy. All 

future GMD intercept tests include countermeasures of increasing complexity. FTG– 

06b in FY13 is the next planned intercept with countermeasures. 

The Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) currently plans for 2 operational tests, 

Flight Test Operational (FTO)–02 and –03. FTO–03 will demonstrate a multiple simultaneous engagement (MSE) of one ICBM threat with countermeasures and one 

IRBM threat with countermeasures. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are you doing to ensure that if poor performance by the contractor results in test failures, cost liability is shouldered by the contractor, not 

MDA? Are you ensuring that this clause is improved and rectified in future contracts? 

General O’REILLY. MDA is currently developing a defect clause to increase contractor liability for poor performance. MDA is looking at the fee and the profit that 

we are providing our contractors and evaluating our ability to go beyond the scope 

that we currently have defined in our award fees for quality control and extending 

it to a much greater pool of award fee money, to include even past awarded money. 

This will enable the government to be compensated for egregious errors in quality 

control. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Can you describe how the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) will 

ensure that we mature technologies based on operational testing? What is the value 

of operational effectiveness for deployment? 

General O’REILLY. The IMTP contains both developmental and operational tests. 

Through the collaborative efforts of test designs, test objectives (described as Critical Engagement Conditions (CEC) and Empirical Measurement Events (EME)), 

tests are constructed and data is gathered to determine a technology’s maturity, system design achievement, and to validate models. The data acquired through ground 

and flight tests allows MDA, DOT&E, the OTAs, and Combatant Commanders 

(COCOMs) to assess the system performance, effectiveness, and suitability of the capabilities prior to making procurement or deployment decisions. The current IMTP, 

v11.1 has a total of 73 CECs and 61 EMEs that shape the design of flight and 

ground testing programs; and inform system assessments and the maturity of technologies. This IMTP also includes a series of element (ie: Aegis, THAAD, etc) operational tests and BMDS system level operational tests (ie: FTO–01) that the Operational Test Agencies use to formulate their assessment of system maturity. The 

Operational Test Agencies are fully engaged in the development, and execution of 

the IMTP and they, with the Director, MDA, approve each version of the IMTP. 

Operational effectiveness is defined as the overall degree of mission accomplishment of a system when used by representative personnel in the environment 

planned or expected for operational employment of the system considering organization, doctrine, tactics, survivability, vulnerability, and threat. The Operational Test 

Agencies (OTA) use data collected from flight and ground testing to make a statement of operational effectiveness after MDA determines that the deploying system 

is functioning within its technical design specifications. MDA bases its technical declaration upon a series of hardware-in-the-loop ground tests (integrated and distributed), operational flight tests, and a final system integration and check-out event 

(SICO) upon deployment. The Services or Combatant Commanders use both the 

technical declaration and operational effectiveness assessments in their determinations to accept and deploy weapon systems. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the cost of a GMD intercept test? 

General O’REILLY. Each flight test is unique. The results and findings from previous flight tests are reviewed and adjustments to testing scenarios adopted as re-
104 

quired. Overall, MDA builds on the successes of each flight test, and future tests 

are designed to be more complex. Following is a breakdown of MDA’s most recent 

GM tests. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The current acquisition plans envision an inventory of 52 GBIs. 

This includes 30 deployed GBIs, 16 for tests, and 6 for spares. Should you need additional GBIs for additional tests or other requirements, when would this decision 

have to be made? How long will the GBI production line remain warm? Would the 

costs necessarily increase if we wait, and by how much? 

General O’REILLY. The Department has the option of purchasing additional GBIs 

on the upcoming GMD Development and Sustainment Contract (DSC) to meet testing or operational requirements through 2016 without incurring a production break 

of our unique component suppliers. The GBI supplier base will remain warm 

through 2016. First and second- Tier suppliers will remain warm beyond that time 

through a combination of new manufacturing and GBI upgrades. MDA does not anticipate a cost increase beyond the current GM program plan for purchasing additional GBIs if the decision is made prior to 2016. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Given the impacts of the continuing resolution, is the FY12 budget 

request adequate? 

General O’REILLY. The MDA budget for 2011 through 2015 is based on the missile 

defense priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR. MDA is 

in a position to execute planned PB11 activities. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Could you outline what savings were derived from efficiencies? 

Have these reductions increased the risk for any program or impacted your ability 

to respond to requirements? 

General O’REILLY. MDA did not have any program adjustments; these were efficiencies to purchase same program scope with fewer dollars. The efficiencies were 

generated from changes with respect to manufacturing process efficiencies, savings 

through competition of major contracts and consolidation of tests to achieve objectives with fewer events. 

MDA implemented a more efficient approach to the Airborne Infrared program to 

focus on development and integration of the sensor package and software that would 

enable the capability. Additionally, with a more efficient acquisition strategy, MDA 

was able to revise the cost of the AN/TPY–2 radars. MDA also reduced the Aegis 

5.1 Aegis Weapons System cost by aligning the schedule to the Navy’s Advanced Capability Build (ACB) 16 effort. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What risk is there of a production gap between the end of production of SM3–IA missiles and SM3–IB missiles? 

General O’REILLY. FY11 Congressional funding actions have reduced the risk of 

a production gap between the loss of the SM–3 Block IA unique vendors and the 

start of the SM–3 Block IB production line. The Missile Defense Agency intends to 

procure up to 30 additional SM–3 Block IA missiles in FY11 for delivery in FY13. 

An updated PB12 SM–3 Buy/Delivery Plan is attached. [See page 105.] 
105 
106 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are you confident that we will get assurances from the Japanese 

that they can provide the capabilities and meet the production timelines for manufacturing the SM3–IIA missile? 

General O’REILLY. The U.S. and Japanese governments are engaged in a series 

of discussions on SM–3 Blk-IIA production requirements. The U.S. has made it clear 

we expect each side to meet the other’s production requirements; that position is understood by Japan. We intend to continue these bilateral discussions with the expectation of reaching agreement on a set of production principles later this year that 

would form the basis of future formal government to government production agreements. 

Japanese industry is planning to meet future production demand. For example, 

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries made capital investment to increase its capability to 

produce nosecones in its Komaki Plant. Additional machinery can be easily procured 

to meet production obligations. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Aerospace 

Takasago Plant has excess floor space to build second and third stage rocket motors 

that can be used to meet production requirements. 

We are confident that these measures by the joint U.S.-Japan government-industry teams will result in the ability to meet future production timelines. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The March 2011 GAO report on missile defense notes that after 14 

years of development and $5 billion, the Airborne Laser achieved its first successful 

short-range intercept in February 2010, though a second intercept during that test 

did not occur due to the laser shutting down prematurely. Could you outline the 

challenges stemming from the second part of this February 2010 test and the subsequent failed tests in September and October 2010, and explain what has delayed 

the March 2010 test? Should we remain optimistic about this program? 

General O’REILLY. On February 3, 2010, the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) successfully shot down a solid propellant Terrier Black Brant (TBB). On February 11, 

2010, the ALTB successfully shot down a threat-representative liquid propellant ballistic missile. The ALTB subsequently engaged an additional TBB on February 11, 

2010, but the safety abort system functioned as designed and shutdown the laser 

early upon detecting stray light in its internal sensors. Chemical contamination 

within the laser caused this stray light. 

In September 2010, ALTB experienced two other technical issues that resulted in 

unsuccessful engagements. In the first mission, a software issue in the beam control 

system steered the high energy laser slightly off center. The ALTB safety abort system worked as designed, detected this shift and shut down the laser. A micro-switch 

failure in a laser subsystem prevented a successful mission in October 2010. The 

laser incorrectly reported it was not ready and a safety-default aborted the engagement. The failure investigation determined the cause to be a single micro-switch on 

an iodine valve that incorrectly reported a closed-valve condition. Both issues have 

been corrected. 

As a prototype, non-operational test bed, the ALTB incorporates cutting-edge technology and systems that can be challenging to maintain and operate. The program 

upholds stringent Go/No Go criteria that ensure air and ground crew safety and 

minimize failed launch attempts. Meeting these criteria, coupled with range availability and weather delayed the March 2011 test. 

The ALTB employs and incorporates highly advanced technologies and is credited 

with numerous groundbreaking directed energy capability demonstrations. For example, in the past 9 months, ALTB has had 14 successful non-intercept flight tests 

where unprecedented high energy laser atmospheric propagation data has been collected to greatly enhance our confidence in previously theoretical models and simulations. One test verified that ALTB can deposit lethal energy of more than twice 

the range previously demonstrated in the February 2010 shoot downs. These activities are carried out with the highest safety standards to ensure that a catastrophic 

mishap does not occur. As such, some delays are to be expected. However, ALTB 

continues to collect Science and Technology data in accordance with a plan developed by the Department of Defense to support the development of future airborne 

ballistic missile defense systems. The Department annually evaluates the contribution of ALTB to the development of directed energy technologies as part of our annual budget development process. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The current acquisition plans envision an inventory of 52 GBIs. 

This includes 30 deployed GBIs, 16 for tests, and 6 for spares. Should you need additional GBIs for additional tests or other requirements, when would this decision 

have to be made? How long will the GBI production line remain warm? Would the 

costs necessarily increase if we wait, and by how much? 

Mr. AHERN. The Department has the option of purchasing additional GBIs on the 

upcoming GMD Development and Sustainment Contract (DSC), expected to be 
107 

awarded in November 2011, to meet testing or operational requirements through 

2016 without incurring a production break of our unique component suppliers. 

The GBI supplier base will remain warm through 2016. First and second-Tier 

suppliers will remain warm beyond that time through a combination of new manufacturing and GBI upgrades. 

We do not anticipate a cost increase beyond the current GM program plan for purchasing additional GBIs if the decision is made prior to 2016. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Could you outline what savings were derived from efficiencies? 

Have these reductions increased the risk for any program or impacted your ability 

to respond to requirements? 

Mr. AHERN. The efficiencies savings ($332.3 million in Fiscal Year 2012) were generated as a result of a variety of actions aimed at improving performance, such as 

freezing civilian manpower, changes with respect to manufacturing processes, savings through competition of major contracts, and consolidation of testing events to 

achieve multiple objectives with fewer events. The MDA did not have any program 

adjustments that would impact risk levels; these were efficiencies that will allow the 

purchase of the same program scope with fewer dollars. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How do you balance the need for ensuring an operationally effective 

missile defense with the pressure to deploy missile defense systems quickly? Will 

scheduling and deployment pressures lead to short-cuts in testing? 

Dr. GILMORE. Balancing adequate testing with the pressures of operational need 

is continually a challenge. This is especially true with the highly complex Ballistic 

Missile Defense System (BMDS) and its key interceptor elements: Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD), Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). The decision either to field early or 

to first perform adequate testing involves evaluation of many competing and complex risks. GMD was fielded early, Aegis BMD initial capability was fielded after 

a substantial number of flight tests, including an operational evaluation by the 

Navy, and THAAD will undergo an initial operational test and evaluation later this 

year to support a full-rate production decision. Dedicated testing of follow-on Aegis 

BMD capability supporting the President’s Phased Adaptive Approach for the Defense of Europe is defined in the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) that General 

O’Reilly and I approved recently. The first such test was conducted last month and 

was successful. The IMTP includes dedicated operational testing. If successfully executed, the IMTP will provide information sufficient to support rigorous quantitative 

estimates of BMDS performance. 

My office will continue to work closely with the MDA, the Combatant Commands, 

and the BMDS Operational Test Team. The default fielding strategy is to assure 

that system capabilities are adequately demonstrated by realistic testing prior to 

transitioning those systems to the acquiring services. The Department’s leadership 

continually evaluates the information available from testing of BMDS performance 

as it decides how to respond to the evolving threat. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Dr. Gilmore, you stated in your written testimony that the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) is, for the most part, ‘‘success oriented’’ and ‘‘does 

not incorporate explicitly repeat, or backup, tests that could be used to compensate 

for unsuccessful tests.’’ 

The GMD test track record counts 7 failures out of 15 tests since 1999. This is 

difficult technology. Do you think there is enough flexibility in the plan to account 

for potential future failures? Does it adequately minimize cost and schedule delays 

that would result from potential future failed or canceled tests? 

Dr. GILMORE. In the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), each test is designed 

to collect data for verification, validation and accreditation of models and simulations. These data elements are defined as either Critical Engagement Conditions 

(CECs) or Empirical Measurement Events (EMEs). The IMTP is revised every six 

months. When a test failure occurs, preventing collection of planned CECs/EMEs, 

the IMTP revision process, in which my office participates, reviews the current test 

program for opportunities to collect the CECs/EMEs using other tests or to add new 

tests, as necessary. This was the case with the recent failure during FTG–06. FTG– 

06a was planned and incorporated in a revised IMTP. When FTG–06a failed, the 

GMD flight test program was revised again in the IMTP General O’Reilly and I recently approved. 

No test plan as complex as the IMTP has ever been executed exactly as planned. 

There are always unforeseen system responses and failures that occur and require 

adjustments to the test plan. If such problems do not arise, it likely means that the 

testing being conducted is not robust. The delays in collecting data caused by test 

failures could vary from several months to more than one year depending upon 

many details including the BMDS element involved in the test and the targets used 
108 

in the test. Costs and schedule delays are accommodated in part by the six-month 

revision process currently used to update the IMTP. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How many successful operationally realistic GMD tests have we 

had? (How many included countermeasures and have we designed a test scenario 

that envisioned more than one incoming ICBM?) 

Dr. GILMORE. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and my office jointly published 

operational realism flight test criteria in 2005 as required by the Fiscal Year 2005 

National Defense Authorization Act. There are nine criteria: Operationally-Representative Interceptor; Threat-Representative Target; Complex Countermeasures; 

Operational Sensor(s); Operational Fire Control Software; Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures (TTPs); Warfighter Participation; Unannounced Target Launch; and 

End-to-End Test. 

Every Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) flight test since then has demonstrated at least some of the nine operational realism criteria. No test has yet 

demonstrated all nine criteria. FTG–05, conducted in December 2008, was the most 

operationally realistic test of GMD conducted to date, demonstrating at least partial 

operational realism for eight of the nine criteria. Although simple countermeasures 

were planned for FTG–05, a malfunction prevented deployment. The targets for both 

FTG–06 and FTG–06a successfully deployed simple countermeasures but the GMD 

kill vehicles malfunctioned before they could complete their intercepts in the countermeasures environments. 

No GMD tests against a true intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) have yet 

been conducted. A multiple simultaneous engagement of two ICBM targets by two 

GMD interceptors launched from Vandenberg AFB, California, is currently under 

consideration for inclusion in the third operational flight test, FTO–03, included in 

the Integrated Master Test Plan that General O’Reilly and I recently approved. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Can you describe how the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) will 

ensure that we mature technologies based on operational testing? What is the value 

of operational effectiveness for deployment? 

Dr. GILMORE. Operational test and evaluation will provide the Combatant Commanders with definitive understanding of the warfighting capabilities the BMDS 

provides, as well as the capabilities it does not provide. The test program defined 

in the IMTP was constructed so as to collect Verification, Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A) data for the models and simulations that may be used to support evaluations of the BMDS, while also demonstrating progressive capability of the BMDS 

and its associated elements through increasingly complex testing. Nearly every 

flight test has both developmental and operational test objectives. There are also 

three designated operational flight tests of the BMDS and an initial operational test 

and evaluation of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The 

IMTP is a rigorous plan for obtaining the test information needed to assess element 

and BMDS performance quantitatively. If the Missile Defense Agency can execute 

the IMTP, the data needed to validate models and perform rigorous quantitative assessments will become available. 

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans for and my office assesses each test 

against the operational realism criteria developed and submitted to Congress in 

2005. I will ensure appropriate operational testing is accomplished in compliance 

with Title 10 USC. This testing is scheduled for THAAD later this year and was 

accomplished by the Navy for the initial Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense capability. 

Ultimately, the number of purely operational tests conducted will depend upon a 

number of considerations including: capability demonstrated in the developmental 

test programs; estimated or demonstrated performance and reliability of the various 

missile components; experience with other similar missile systems; and availability 

of operational assets for testing or for replacement on operational status if missiles 

are expended during reliability testing. In the case of the BMDS, the entire test program—developmental testing, combined developmental/operational testing, and 

operational testing—will be required and used to determine operational effectiveness, suitability and survivability. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The March 2011 GAO report on missile defense notes that after 14 

years of development and $5 billion, the Airborne Laser achieved its first successful 

short-range intercept in February 2010, though a second intercept during that test 

did not occur due to the laser shutting down prematurely. Could you outline the 

challenges stemming from the second part of this February 2010 test and the subsequent failed tests in September and October 2010, and explain what has delayed 

the March 2010 test? Should we remain optimistic about this program? 

Dr. GILMORE. The problems incurred during Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) 

flight tests subsequent to the February 2010 lethality demonstration demonstrate 

the challenge of developing and fielding a reliable system as complex as the ALTB. 

Not only must the ALTB demonstrate lethality under realistic conditions and threat 
109 

scenarios, it must also demonstrate that it can be depended upon to operate successfully when required. I discuss many of these issues in my Assessment of Operational 

Effectiveness, Suitability, and Survivability of the Airborne Laser which I submitted 

to Congress in January 2010. Currently, the ALTB is not an operational system and 

a substantial amount of additional work and funding would be required to make it 

an operational system. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. Space is an integral part of the Missile Defense Agency, we have 

read much in the press and media over the past several months regarding the performance and success being demonstrated by the Space Tracking and Surveillance 

System (STSS) satellites. Can you discuss the specifics of what these two satellites 

have accomplished to date? 

General O’REILLY. The two Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) Demonstrator satellites were launched in September 2009. From September 2009 to January 2011, the satellites accomplished their Early on Orbit Test (EOT) period, involving system functionality testing and payload/subsystem initialization and calibration activities. 

During the EOT period, the satellites also supported seven BMDS flight tests 

demonstrating the ability to track missiles with both the acquisition and track sensors, conduct an acquisition sensor to track sensor handover of a missile in flight, 

track aircraft in afterburner, and track resident space objects (satellites). The calibration and system functionality test results showed the satellites are performing 

at or better than system specifications. 

Since the completion of EOT, STSS activity has focused on expanding the performance envelope of the BMDS system and reducing risk for the follow-on operational capability, the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS). In March 2011 during FTM–16, STSS demonstrated for the first time, space based sensor tracking of 

a missile flight from start to finish. STSS observed the target missile from launch 

through reentry and collected valuable data for Aegis BMD, PTSS and the Standard 

Missile-3 (SM–3), Block IIB programs. One week later, in FTX–16, STSS demonstrated stereo tracking from birth to death, again collecting valuable data. These 

tests serve to reduce risk for the Aegis Launch on Remote and Aegis Engage on Remote campaigns. These campaigns will demonstrate the functionality of the BMDS 

space layer integrated with the Aegis weapons system and extend Aegis coverage 

beyond the ship based radar envelope. 

In April 2011, STSS participated in a flight test (FTM–15). This associated test 

demonstrated the functions required of an operational BMDS space layer system. 

At the time of the target launch, both STSS satellites (SV1 and SV2) were out of 

view over the horizon. The STSS ground system received a cue from the Enterprise 

Sensors Lab formed from a TPY–2 radar track of the outbound target via C2BMC 

X–Lab. This emulates PTSS receiving a cue from SBIRS GEO. This cue was passed 

via the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) to STSS space vehicle 2 (SV2) 

which processed the cue and acquired and tracked the target. When SV1 was able 

to view the target, the cue was passed through SV2 to SV1 across the STSS communication crosslink and SV1 acquired and tracked the target. SV1 remained out of 

AFSCN ground contact for the entire duration of the test, and SV1 track information was passed back through SV2 to the ground mission data processor which 

formed a stereo track of the target. This stereo track was used to cue a simulated 

interceptor launch from an Aegis system simulator prior to the target missile entering the Aegis radar system coverage (Launch on Remote). At the time of the actual 

intercept, SV2 was out of view, and SV1 observed the successful intercept. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The FY12 budget request includes funds for a program called Precision Tracking Space System or PTSS. It appears that the MDA is moving forward 

with yet another clean sheet design for the Space Layer within the Ballistic Missile 

Defense System and doing so without fully completing the STSS tests and Knowledge Points. Can you explain the rational for this approach, and why the need to 

have such a system initiated via government labs and not within industry? 

General O’REILLY. The Space Tracking and Surveillance System—Demonstration 

(STSS–D) completed all the tests necessary to demonstrate System Stereo Track 

Fully Calibrated Performance Knowledge Point (KP) and satisfy design requirements for PTSS. 

The STSS–D design uses a Space-Based Infrared System, Low Earth Orbit 

(SBIRS–Low) heritage gimbaled sensor design. The PTSS incorporates a Northern 

Hemisphere staring sensor which is far less complex, takes advantage of other Bal-
110 

listic Missile Defense System (BMDS) functionality, and is expected to be more cost 

effective than the STSS–D gimbaled sensor. 

STSS–D demonstrated the first ever cradle-to-grave tracking from space in a series of flight tests (FTX–16, FTM–15 and FTM–16). These tests exercised the entire 

BMDS kill chain for the first time. The STSS–D also demonstrated launch-on and 

engage-on track accuracy in flight tests FTX–16 and FTM–15. STSS–D is a pathfinder for how PTSS will close the fire control loop with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense from space. PTSS will take advantage of technical and design lessons learned 

from the STSS–D. 

PTSS is to be developed as an integrated part of the BMDS. This will require extensive participation of all elements as the preliminary design is developed. PTSS 

development phase will have involvement of Federally Funded Research Laboratories (Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Naval 

Research Laboratory, Space Dynamics Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory); 

dedicated Service Cells of the Air Force and Navy; and an industry-partnered Integrated System Engineering Team (Ball Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Orbital Sciences and Raytheon). These PTSS stakeholders will develop a non-proprietary, government-owned design and intellectual property to enable full and open competition for industry to produce the PTSS. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The FY12 budget request includes funds for a program called Precision Tracking Space System or PTSS. It appears that the MDA is moving forward 

with yet another clean sheet design for the Space Layer within the Ballistic Missile 

Defense System and doing so without fully completing the STSS tests and Knowledge Points. Can you explain the rational for this approach, and why the need to 

have such a system initiated via government labs and not within industry? 

Mr. AHERN. The Space Tracking and Surveillance System—Demonstration (STSS– 

D) completed all the tests necessary to demonstrate System Stereo Track Fully Calibrated Performance Knowledge Point (KP) and satisfy design requirements for 

PTSS. 

The STSS–D design uses a Space-Based Infrared System, Low Earth Orbit 

(SBIRS–Low) heritage gimbaled sensor design. The PTSS incorporates a Northern 

Hemisphere staring sensor which is far less complex, takes advantage of other Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) functionality, and is expected to be more cost 

effective than the STSS–D gimbaled sensor. 

STSS–D demonstrated the first ever cradle-to-grave tracking from space in a series of flight tests (FTX–16, FTM–15 and FTM–16). These tests exercised the entire 

BMDS kill chain for the first time. The STSS–D also demonstrated launch-on and 

engage-on track accuracy in flight tests FTX–16 and FTM–15. STSS–D is a pathfinder for how PTSS will close the fire control loop with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense from space. PTSS will take advantage of technical and design lessons learned 

from the STSS–D. 

PTSS is to be developed as an integrated part of the BMDS. This will require extensive participation of all elements as the preliminary design is developed. PTSS 

development phase will have involvement of Federally Funded Research Laboratories (Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Naval 

Research Laboratory, Space Dynamics Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory); 

dedicated Service Cells of the Air Force and Navy; and an industry-partnered Integrated System Engineering Team (Ball Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Orbital Sciences and Raytheon). These PTSS stakeholders will develop a non-proprietary, government-owned design and intellectual property to enable full and open competition for industry to produce the PTSS. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. BROOKS. Last month, Director of National Intelligence Clapper testified that 

Iran’s long range ballistic missile program was more advanced than previously estimated—with Iran perhaps having a missile capable of reaching the USA in the 2015 

to 2020 timeframe. The Administration’s decision in 2009 to adopt a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense in Europe was based, in part, on an assessment that Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles were developing more 

rapidly than previously projected, while the longer-range missile threat had been 

slower to develop than previously estimated. 

What trends in Iranian ballistic missile developments have you seen over the last 

two years that might change this assessment? Has the threat changed and to what 

degree? 
111 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Intelligence Community continues to assess and evaluate Iranian progress toward achieving ICBM and nuclear capabilities that could threaten 

the U.S. homeland. 

A key factor in the decision to adopt the European Phased Adaptive Approach was 

that although Iran and other regional actors have not yet acquired or deployed 

ICBMs, the threat from shorter-range missiles has developed very quickly. For example, Iran already has hundreds of ballistic missiles that threaten its neighbors 

and U.S. forces, and it is actively developing and testing ballistic missiles that can 

reach beyond its neighbors and further into Europe. This capability poses a clear 

and present danger to U.S. deployed forces, Allies, and partners. Over the past two 

years, we have seen this trend continue. 

It is important to remember that our current ballistic missile defense posture already protects us from the potential emergence of an Iranian ICBM threat. The initial long-range threat from Iran would likely be ICBMs that are few in number. In 

order to maintain this advantageous position, the Administration is taking several 

steps to improve the protection of the homeland from the potential ICBM threat 

posed by Iran and North Korea. These steps include the continued procurement of 

ground-based interceptors (GBIs); the deployment of additional sensors; and upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications system. 

Improvements to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system will better 

protect us against future ICBM threats, whether from Iran, North Korea, or other 

regional actors. 

Mr. BROOKS. As discussed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a hedging 

strategy would provide a robust defense of the U.S. homeland in case the Iranian 

long-range threat comes earlier or the later models of the SM–3 interceptor experience technical development problems. When Dr. Miller testified before the subcommittee last month, he discussed ongoing work within the Department to complete its hedging strategy. At what point do you believe a decision would be necessary if a hedge is to be employed and what criteria would be used to make such 

a decision? Does the FY12 budget request fund continued development and test of 

the two-stage ground-based interceptor (GBI)? Are other hedging options beyond the 

two-stage GBI being considered? Can you describe those options and the timeframes 

in which they may be available? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The current ballistic missile defense posture for the United States 

protects against ICBMs that might be deployed by States like North Korea or Iran. 

Improvements to the existing sensors and software, in addition to the procurement 

of additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs) and radars, will continue this protection against future ICBM threats from States like North Korea and Iran. 

In addition to these improvements, the United States must also be well hedged 

against the possibility of rapid threat developments or delays in U.S. technological 

advances. The Administration has already taken the following decisions to strengthen the U.S. hedge posture: 

• The construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, Alaska, including a 14-silo 

configuration to accommodate a contingency deployment of eight additional 

GBIs, if needed; 

• Six GBI silos at Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely are being mothballed instead of 

decommissioned, allowing their return to service within two years, if necessary; 

and 

• The development and assessment of a two-stage GBI, which will continue to 

preserve future deployment options. 

The Administration is considering additional steps to strengthen the U.S. hedge 

posture. We are studying threat developments, future capabilities, and deployment 

options for a range of scenarios. In addition, we are evaluating the deployment 

timelines associated with fielding additional capabilities, with an eye to enabling 

rapid responses to triggering events. Our objective is to enable aggregate improvements that increase probability of kill, raid capacity, and battle space. This work 

involves a significant amount of classified information from both the Intelligence 

Community and the system developers. We have committed to brief the Committee 

on the results of this work in a classified setting once it is complete. 

Mr. BROOKS. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for Patriot in 

the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are required by the Army, and 

when, to operate and sustain the legacy Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of 

these funded in the FY12 request? Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade 

Patriot’s capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and production? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The U.S. Army can achieve some of the capabilities that MEADS 

would provide using existing assets. Because air and missile defense (AMD) systems 
112 

are relatively few in number and high in demand, the U.S. AMD portfolio is based 

on the concept of integrating and fielding a diverse set of elements to provide expanded coverage against a wide range of threats. Our first priority in AMD is the 

Phased Adapted Approach (PAA) in Europe, which includes systems like THAAD, 

TPY–2, and AEGIS to counter the ballistic missile threat. The portfolio must also 

address threats in Southwest Asia and the Pacific with these ballistic missile defense systems, as well as other air defense systems such as Patriot and Joint Land 

Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS). 

The United States is willing to accept some risk in our air defense portfolio in 

the near term in order to increase investments in new capabilities that our soldiers 

can use today to counter threats in Forward Operating Bases in Afghanistan, such 

as capabilities to counter rockets, artillery, and mortars (C–RAM). By fielding a diverse set of systems, and integrating them, the United States is able to achieve 

some of the capabilities using existing assets, such as 360- degree coverage and extended range air defense, that MEADS is designed to provide. 

The U.S. Army has budgeted for fact-of-life upgrades to Patriot units necessary 

to keep these systems viable and up-to-date. The U.S. Army and the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense will conduct a thorough review of the air and missile defense 

portfolio as we do each year in light of budgets, capability needs, and the program 

changes made in the FY 2012 budget to ensure our programs are delivering what 

the warfighter needs. In addition, we will evaluate the results of the MEADS Proof 

of Concept to determine if MEADS elements could contribute to the U.S. air and 

missile defense architectures. 

Mr. BROOKS. This committee has heard testimony that MEADS technology will be 

‘‘harvested’’ and ‘‘put on the shelf’’ for integration into a future system or systems. 

What technologies can be ‘‘harvested’’ from MEADS for a future system(s)? 

How much will it cost to integrate these harvested technologies into a future system? Has a cost-benefit analysis been performed to show that it save money and 

increase capability to harvest technology for integration into Patriot or other systems versus completing and fielding MEADS? If so, can you provide that analysis 

to the Committee? If not, why not? And what did you base your decision to not procure MEADS upon? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The U.S. Army is developing plans to integrate sensor and interceptor components from U.S. Army air and missile defense systems like Patriot, 

JLENS, and Sentinel into the U.S. Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense 

(IAMD) network. This effort, when complete and fielded with the U.S. Army Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), will mitigate some risks to meeting the 

validated Patriot/MEADS Combined Program requirements, and will allow the 

United States to employ more flexible and effective air and missile defense task 

force configurations. Given the decision to not procure MEADS, the U.S. Army and 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will investigate whether additional upgrades to enhance Patriot against evolving threats are needed. In addition, the U.S. 

Army and OSD will evaluate technologies demonstrated during the MEADS Proof 

of Concept effort to determine if key elements like the lightweight launcher or the 

360-degree radars could be included in the evolving IAMD network to mitigate 

shortfalls in the Patriot/MEADS requirement. Details on the full scope of the Proof 

of Concept effort are being worked, but already we can say the Proof of Concept will 

mature technologies related to the delivery of: two lightweight launchers; two, 360- 

degree X-band fire control radars; three tactical operations centers; one prototype 

360-degree UHF-band surveillance radar; ground testing; and two intercept flight 

tests. Complete system design and performance documentation will also be delivered 

to the participating nations. Beyond the demonstrated hardware and design documentation, a number of advanced technologies will be matured for harvesting under 

the Proof of Concept, including: 360-degree Patriot Missile Segment Enhancement 

engagement solution logic and algorithms; X-band exciter design and performance 

data; improved launcher electronics and near-vertical launch design/performance 

data; power and cooling technologies for rotating phased-array radars; techniques 

and algorithms for track fusion from multi-spectral (UHF and X-band) sensors; advanced prognostic and diagnostics logistics; and design for reduced personnel requirements. 

Because the U.S. Army has chosen to integrate all U.S. Army air and missile defense components via the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS), the MEADS command and control element, the Battle Management, 

Command, Control Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (BMC4I), in development for the MEADS program, is now a redundant capability for the United 

States. Although the United States no longer needs to field a MEADS-unique command and control element, the MEADS partner nations, Germany and Italy, still 

desire the BMC4I. The U.S. Army and OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evalua-
113 

tion (CAPE) assessed whether the MEADS BMC4I could meet the U.S. Army IAMD 

requirements in August 2007 and found: ‘‘Use of the MEADS Tactical Operating 

Center (TOC) as an interim solution for IAMD would . . . require significant investment in ‘U.S. only’ software and hardware that could not be carried over to the final 

IAMD configuration.’’ Subsequent independent reviews of MEADS in 2008 and 2009 

supported the position that the MEADS BMC4I should not be procured and that the 

United States should continue the move to integration of the range of disparate sensor and shooter elements within the Army IAMD/IBCS architecture. 

The total U.S. cost commitment for the Design and Development (D & D) program 

is $2.3B, of which the United States has funded $1.5B to date; the remaining U.S. 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) commitment, which will enable the Proof of 

Concept, is $804M. It is important to recognize the costs that the United States will 

avoid by its decision not to produce MEADS and to agree with its partners to limit 

the development to the Proof of Concept. The OSD CAPE estimates that an additional $1.16B of U.S. funding would be required to complete the D&D effort as originally contemplated. By restructuring to a Proof of Concept, the United States avoids 

this additional cost, which is on top of the U.S. MOU funding commitment of $804M 

already programmed for MEADS. Moreover, an additional $800M would be required 

to complete U.S.-unique national certification, operational testing requirements, and 

integration into U.S. air and missile defense architectures. Finally, roughly $1.2B 

that was programmed in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for MEADS 

procurement is no longer required. 

Given the high costs, the United States cannot afford to purchase MEADS and 

make required upgrades to Patriot concurrently over the next two decades. The 

costs of completing MEADS development and procuring MEADS to replace Patriot 

eventually would also require a significant concurrent investment in Patriot 

sustainment and modernization over the next two decades. Together, these costs are 

unaffordable in the current DoD budget environment. 

Mr. BROOKS. In a recent Washington Times article, it was reported that the Russian government is interested in acquiring our ‘‘hit-to-kill’’ technology. In your opinion, what would be the impact of Russia acquiring ‘‘hit-to-kill’’ technology? 

In the event of such a technology transfer, are you confidant that measures could 

be taken to ensure the technology is not proliferated to foreign powers who may use 

it to defeat our current and future missile defense systems? 

Dr. ROBERTS. There has been no discussion of sharing hit-to-kill technology with 

Russia, and there is no intention to do so. 

We are keenly aware of the risks of sharing sensitive U.S. technology and information. To safeguard this information, we are working to conclude a Defense Technology Cooperation (DTC) Agreement with Russia. This agreement would provide 

the legal framework for undertaking cooperative efforts, and would contain annexes 

that address the sharing of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) as well as 

Classified Information. But this on its own would not constitute authorization to 

provide Classified Information to Russia. Any exchange of Classified Information 

with Russia would still be subject to an extensive review process under U.S. National Disclosure Policy, as is the case with other partners. 

Mr. BROOKS. Last month, Director of National Intelligence Clapper testified that 

Iran’s long range ballistic missile program was more advanced than previously estimated—with Iran perhaps having a missile capable of reaching the USA in the 2015 

to 2020 timeframe. The Administration’s decision in 2009 to adopt a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense in Europe was based, in part, on an assessment that Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles were developing more 

rapidly than previously projected, while the longer-range missile threat had been 

slower to develop than previously estimated. 

What trends in Iranian ballistic missile developments have you seen over the last 

two years that might change this assessment? Has the threat changed and to what 

degree? 

General O’REILLY. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

subcommittee files]. 

Mr. BROOKS. As discussed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a hedging 

strategy would provide a robust defense of the U.S. homeland in case the Iranian 

long-range threat comes earlier or the later models of the SM–3 interceptor experience technical development problems. When Dr. Miller testified before the subcommittee last month, he discussed ongoing work within the Department to complete its hedging strategy. 

At what point do you believe a decision would be necessary if a hedge is to be 

employed and what criteria would be used to make such a decision? Does the FY12 

budget request fund continued development and test of the two-stage ground-based 
114 

interceptor (GBI)? Are other hedging options beyond the two-stage GBI being considered? Can you describe those options and the timeframes in which they may be 

available? 

General O’REILLY. Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against 

a medium ICBM raid size launched from current regional threats. The FY12 budget 

funds continued development and test of the two-stage GBI as we prepare for an 

intercept mission in 2014. Completing GMD missile field 2 with 8 spare silos and 

placing missile field 1 in a mode where its 6 additional silos can be hardened and 

made operational within two years are two examples of developing greater homeland defense capability if a credible ICBM threat emerges from Iran before 2020. 

As Dr. Roberts stated in his testimony, the Defense Department is reviewing what 

more needs to be done to ensure the hedge posture is sufficient to deal with the 

possible threat developments in the time frame before 2020 and what are the intelligence data required to employ a hedge. And the Department is committed to bringing that work forward as soon as the Secretary is satisfied that it is complete. 

Mr. BROOKS. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for Patriot in 

the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are required by the Army, and 

when, to operate and sustain the legacy Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of 

these funded in the FY12 request? Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade 

Patriot’s capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and production? 

General O’REILLY. The Army currently has program support and budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to Army’s senior leadership on questions pertaining to costs associated with this program. 

Mr. BROOKS. This committee has heard testimony that MEADS technology will be 

‘‘harvested’’ and ‘‘put on the shelf’’ for integration into a future system or systems. 

What technologies can be ‘‘harvested’’ from MEADS for a future system(s)? 

How much will it cost to integrate these harvested technologies into a future system? Has a cost-benefit analysis been performed to show that it save money and 

increase capability to harvest technology for integration into Patriot or other systems versus completing and fielding MEADS? If so, can you provide that analysis 

to the Committee? If not, why not? And what did you base your decision to not procure MEADS upon? 

General O’REILLY. The Army currently has program support and budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to Army’s senior leadership on questions pertaining to cost associated with this program. 

Mr. BROOKS. In a recent Washington Times article, it was reported that the Russian government is interested in acquiring our ‘‘hit-to-kill’’ technology. In your opinion, what would be the impact of Russia acquiring ‘‘hit-to-kill’’ technology? 

In the event of such a technology transfer, are you confidant that measures could 

be taken to ensure the technology is not proliferated to foreign powers who may use 

it to defeat our current and future missile defense systems? 

General O’REILLY. The US government has not offered to share ‘hit-to-kill’ technology with the Russian Federation. More broadly, in accordance with U.S. National 

Disclosure Policy, decisions to disclose U.S. classified military information to a foreign government or international organization are based on a determination that 

the recipient has both the capability and intent to protect the information equivalent to that of the U.S. Government. 

Mr. BROOKS. Last month, Director of National Intelligence Clapper testified that 

Iran’s long range ballistic missile program was more advanced than previously estimated—with Iran perhaps having a missile capable of reaching the USA in the 2015 

to 2020 timeframe. The Administration’s decision in 2009 to adopt a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense in Europe was based, in part, on an assessment that Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles were developing more 

rapidly than previously projected, while the longer-range missile threat had been 

slower to develop than previously estimated. 

What trends in Iranian ballistic missile developments have you seen over the last 

two years that might change this assessment? Has the threat changed and to what 

degree? 

Mr. AHERN. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files]. 

Mr. BROOKS. As discussed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a hedging 

strategy would provide a robust defense of the U.S. homeland in case the Iranian 

long-range threat comes earlier or the later models of the SM–3 interceptor experience technical development problems. When Dr. Miller testified before the subcommittee last month, he discussed ongoing work within the Department to complete its hedging strategy. 
115 

At what point do you believe a decision would be necessary if a hedge is to be 

employed and what criteria would be used to make such a decision? Does the FY12 

budget request fund continued development and test of the two-stage ground-based 

interceptor (GBI)? Are other hedging options beyond the two-stage GBI being considered? Can you describe those options and the timeframes in which they may be 

available? 

Mr. AHERN. The current ballistic missile defense posture for the United States 

protects against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that might be deployed 

by States like North Korea or Iran. Improvements to the existing sensors and software, in addition to the procurement of additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs) 

and radars, will continue this protection against future ICBM threats from States 

like North Korea and Iran. The timing and criteria for decisions on hedge strategy 

changes will depend on development of the threat. Should a significant departure 

from the current hedge strategy be required, the details and timing would be briefed 

to Congress in a classified setting. 

Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a medium ICBM 

raid size launched from current regional threats. The FY12 budget funds will continue development and test of the two-stage GBI as we prepare for an intercept mission in 2014. Completing GMD missile field 2 with 8 spare silos and placing missile 

field 1 in a mode where its 6 additional silos can be hardened and made operational 

within two years are two examples of developing greater homeland defense capability should a credible ICBM threat emerges from Iran before 2020. 

The Administration is considering additional steps to strengthen the U.S. hedge 

posture. We are studying threat developments, future capabilities, and deployment 

options for a range of scenarios. In addition, we are evaluating the deployment 

timelines associated with fielding additional capabilities, in order to enable rapid responses to triggering events. Our objective is to enable aggregate improvements that 

increase probability of kill, raid capacity, and battle space. This work involves a significant amount of classified information from both the Intelligence Community and 

the system developers. We have committed to brief the Committee on the results 

of this work in a classified setting once it is complete. 

Mr. BROOKS. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for Patriot in 

the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are required by the Army, and 

when, to operate and sustain the legacy Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of 

these funded in the FY12 request? Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade 

Patriot’s capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and production? 

Mr. AHERN. The U.S. Army can achieve some of the capabilities that MEADS 

would provide using existing assets. Because air and missile defense (AMD) systems 

are relatively few in number and high in demand, the U.S. AMD portfolio is based 

on the concept of integrating and fielding a diverse set of elements to provide expanded coverage against a wide range of threats. 

The Army FY12 budget includes funding for fact-of-life upgrades to Patriot units 

necessary to keep these systems viable and up-to-date. The Army is preparing for 

their 2011 Capability Portfolio Review (CPR) on Air and Missile Defense which will 

be conducted over the summer. The Army CPR and subsequent Office of the Secretary of Defense-level Program Issue team reviews will update and validate 2010 

assessments on Ballistic Missile Defense, Counter-Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars, 

and Air Defense that led to program budget decisions, including the decision to restructure development and not procure MEADS. The summer reviews will also 

evaluate the impacts of the FY12 budget decisions and investigate ways to mitigate 

any risks or long-term capability gaps created by the MEADS decision, to include 

evaluation of MEADS sensor and launcher elements. In addition, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in conjunction with the Army is performing a military utility 

assessment of MEADS elements (as well as other combinations of Army missile defense capabilities) to evaluate the contribution of MEADS elements to the nation’s 

missile defense capabilities. Finally, the reviews will assess other (non-Army or 

MDA) sensor development efforts within the Department where potential for 

leveraging the MEADS radars exists. One outcome will be a DoD-level business case 

evaluation to determine if harvested elements from MEADS provide cost-effective 

capability enhancements in air surveillance and/or air and missile defense when integrated into existing architectures. This business case evaluation will include an 

assessment of the benefits of a competitive environment for mobile, ground-based 

air and missile capability. 

Mr. BROOKS. This committee has heard testimony that MEADS technology will be 

‘‘harvested’’ and ‘‘put on the shelf’’ for integration into a future system or systems. 

What technologies can be ‘‘harvested’’ from MEADS for a future system(s)? 
116 

How much will it cost to integrate these harvested technologies into a future system? Has a cost-benefit analysis been performed to show that it save money and 

increase capability to harvest technology for integration into Patriot or other systems versus completing and fielding MEADS? If so, can you provide that analysis 

to the Committee? If not, why not? And what did you base your decision to not procure MEADS upon? 

Mr. AHERN. By pursuing the MEADS Proof of Concept, the U.S. gets the opportunity to harvest technologies for future, and potentially near-term integration into 

air and missile defense systems. Our Partners have told us that they intend to continue with the program. By honoring our MEADS commitment, we will be supporting our Partners in building their air and missile defense capacity, which will 

allow NATO to contribute more air and missile defense capabilities when needed, 

easing the strain on our forces and freeing resources for other priorities. Conversely, 

limiting the remaining funding for MEADS would have serious negative effects on 

U.S. and Partner air and missile defense capability. 

Details on the full scope of the Proof of Concept effort are being worked, but already we can say the Proof of Concept will mature advanced air and missile defense 

technologies related to the delivery of: 2 lightweight, near-vertical launchers, 2 rotating, 360-degree X-band fire control radars, 3 mobile tactical operations centers, 

1 prototype 360-degree UHF-band surveillance radar, verification ground testing, 

and 2 intercept flight tests with the next-generation PAC–3 Missile Segment Enhancement missile. Complete system design and performance documentation will 

also be delivered to the Nations. Beyond the demonstrated hardware and design 

documentation, a number of advanced technologies will be matured for harvesting 

under the Proof of Concept. These include: 360-degree PATRIOT Missile Segment 

Enhancement engagement solution logic and algorithms; X-band exciter design and 

performance data; improved launcher electronics and near-vertical launch design/ 

performance data; power and cooling technologies for rotating phased-array radars; 

techniques and algorithms for track fusion from multi-spectral (UHF and X-band) 

sensors; advanced prognostic and diagnostics logistics; and design for reduced personnel requirements. 

The Army is preparing for their 2011 Capability Portfolio Review (CPR) on Air 

and Missile Defense which will be conducted over the summer. The Army CPR and 

subsequent OSD-level Program Issue team reviews will update and validate 2010 

assessments on Ballistic Missile Defense, Counter-Rockets, Artillery, and Mortars, 

and Air Defense that led to program budget decisions, including the decision to restructure development and not procure MEADS. The summer reviews will also 

evaluate the impacts of the FY12 budget decisions and investigate ways to mitigate 

any risks or long-term capability gaps created by the MEADS decision, to include 

evaluation of MEADS sensor and launcher elements. In addition, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in conjunction with the Army is performing a military utility 

assessment of MEADS elements (as well as other combinations of Army missile defense capabilities) to evaluate the contribution of MEADS elements to the nation’s 

missile defense capabilities. Finally, the reviews will assess other (non-Army or 

MDA) sensor development efforts within the Department where potential for 

leveraging the MEADS radars exists. One outcome will be a DoD-level business case 

evaluation to determine if harvested elements from MEADS provide cost-effective 

capability enhancements in air surveillance and/or air and missile defense when integrated into existing architectures. This business case evaluation will include an 

assessment of the benefits of a competitive environment for mobile, ground-based 

air and missile capability. 

The successful August 2010 MEADS Critical Design Review that the MEADS rotating sensor elements are highly capable and that the mature designs represent 

a significant advance in current capabilities. Based on the maturity of MEADS system development efforts and completion of the envisioned Proof of Concept efforts, 

the Department is confident MEADS components will provide attractive options 

with respect to fielding future DoD air and missile defense capabilities if demonstration and testing is completed in the Proof of Concept. Those MEADS elements of 

most interest to the U.S., the Fire Control and Surveillance Radars, and the lightweight launcher, are very near the end of the non-recurring engineering and development phase and ready for demonstration (Proof of Concept) that would easily lead 

to low rate initial production, additional testing, and fielding if a requirement is 

generated from assessments described above. 

MEADS is designed to provide continuous, medium-range 360-degree air and missile defense coverage. This capability, a Joint Staff validated requirement, is nonexistent in the U.S.’s land-based air defense portfolio. The Department will seek innovative ways to leverage the components developed under the MEADS program to 

meet this requirement, without having to pay to replace the proven Patriot system 
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battalion-for-battalion. Such replacement would be cost prohibitive and given advances in the Army’s Integrated Battle Command System, with its ability to integrate disparate components like radars, launchers, and interceptors from a variety 

of vendors, it is no longer necessary. We can now plan to modernize and augment 

our capabilities with next-generation elements as needed. The MEADS high-performance X-band fire control and UHF-band long-range surveillance and lightweight 

launcher with Patriot Advanced Capability–3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC– 

3 MSE) missiles could provide that added capability at a significantly reduced cost, 

adding continuous 360-degree coverage and longer-range intercepts, while requiring 

reduced strategic lift, less personnel, and more robust logistics. 

In summary, there are four reasons why the U.S. believes refocusing the MEADS 

program to a proof of concept and forgoing full production was the right choice for 

all the MEADS partners: 1) As described above, funding MEADS up to the agreed 

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) cost ceiling enables partners to harvest technology from large investment to date; 2) the U.S cannot afford to purchase MEADS 

and make required upgrades to Patriot concurrently over the next two decades. The 

costs of completing MEADS development and procuring MEADS to eventually replace Patriot would also require a significant concurrent investment in Patriot 

sustainment and modernization over the next two decades. Together, these costs are 

unaffordable; 3) as described above, the U.S. can achieve some of the capabilities 

that MEADS provides using existing assets; 4) the U.S. remains concerned with the 

overall track record of the program and the risks of moving to full scale production 

of a MEADS system. 

Mr. BROOKS. In a recent Washington Times article, it was reported that the Russian government is interested in acquiring our ‘‘hit-to-kill’’ technology. In your opinion, what would be the impact of Russia acquiring ‘‘hit-to-kill’’ technology? 

In the event of such a technology transfer, are you confident that measures could 

be taken to ensure the technology is not proliferated to foreign powers who may use 

it to defeat our current and future missile defense systems? 

Mr. AHERN. The US government has not offered to share ‘hit-to-kill’ technology 

with the Russian Federation. More broadly, in accordance with U.S. National Disclosure Policy, decisions to disclose U.S. classified military information to a foreign 

government or international organization are based on a determination that the recipient has both the capability and intent to protect the information equivalent to 

that of the U.S. Government. 

Mr. BROOKS. Last month, Director of National Intelligence Clapper testified that 

Iran’s long range ballistic missile program was more advanced than previously estimated—with Iran perhaps having a missile capable of reaching the USA in the 2015 

to 2020 timeframe. The Administration’s decision in 2009 to adopt a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense in Europe was based, in part, on an assessment that Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles were developing more 

rapidly than previously projected, while the longer-range missile threat had been 

slower to develop than previously estimated. 

What trends in Iranian ballistic missile developments have you seen over the last 

two years that might change this assessment? Has the threat changed and to what 

degree? 

Dr. GILMORE. My knowledge of recent trends in Iranian ballistic missile developments is consistent with Director Clapper’s assessment. However, threat estimates 

and trends are best addressed by the intelligence communities. 

Mr. BROOKS. As discussed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a hedging 

strategy would provide a robust defense of the U.S. homeland in case the Iranian 

long-range threat comes earlier or the later models of the SM–3 interceptor experience technical development problems. When Dr. Miller testified before the subcommittee last month, he discussed ongoing work within the Department to complete its hedging strategy. 

At what point do you believe a decision would be necessary if a hedge is to be 

employed and what criteria would be used to make such a decision? Does the FY12 

budget request fund continued development and test of the two-stage ground-based 

interceptor (GBI)? Are other hedging options beyond the two-stage GBI being considered? Can you describe those options and the timeframes in which they may be 

available? 

Dr. GILMORE. The Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) that General O’Reilly and 

I recently approved includes two intercept flight tests using the two-stage GroundBased Interceptor (GBI), the first against an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 

(IRBM) target and the second against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 

target. 
118 

Each flight test will demonstrate the ability of the two-stage GBI to boost the 

Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) to a position from which it can successfully 

complete an intercept of the IRBM or ICBM. Once the EKV is separated from the 

two-stage GBI, final intercept and kill performance is independent of the GBI used 

(two-stage or three-stage) and is demonstrated on every Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense flight test. Each time a three-stage GBI is tested, essentially all of the 

hardware used in the two-stage GBI is also tested; only the software to support the 

two-stage fly out performance is different. Including operational testing, the IMTP 

contains 9 more tests of three-stage GBIs through Fiscal Year 2021. 

Hedging options to be pursued and associated decision criteria are determined by 

the Secretary of Defense and by offices other than DOT&E. 

Mr. BROOKS. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for Patriot in 

the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are required by the Army, and 

when, to operate and sustain the legacy Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of 

these funded in the FY12 request? Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade 

Patriot’s capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and production? 

Dr. GILMORE. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are conducting a Joint Capabilities Mix 

Study to determine future requirements for air and missile defense systems, including the Patriot system. Based upon the study’s recommendations and other considerations, the Department’s senior leadership will determine how best to proceed. 

Questions regarding program costs are best directed to the USD(AT&L) and the Director, CAPE. 

Mr. BROOKS. This committee has heard testimony that MEADS technology will be 

‘‘harvested’’ and ‘‘put on the shelf’’ for integration into a future system or systems. 

What technologies can be ‘‘harvested’’ from MEADS for a future system(s)? 

How much will it cost to integrate these harvested technologies into a future system? Has a cost-benefit analysis been performed to show that it save money and 

increase capability to harvest technology for integration into Patriot or other systems versus completing and fielding MEADS? If so, can you provide that analysis 

to the Committee? If not, why not? And what did you base your decision to not procure MEADS upon? 

Dr. GILMORE. Please refer to my answer above. Once the required capabilities are 

determined, it should be possible to develop a cost estimate for developing and/or 

integrating them. Questions regarding program costs and whether or not a cost-benefit analysis has been conducted are best directed to the USD(AT&L). DOT&E has 

played no role in decisions made regarding MEADS. 

Mr. BROOKS. In a recent Washington Times article, it was reported that the Russian government is interested in acquiring our ‘‘hit-to-kill’’ technology. In your opinion, what would be the impact of Russia acquiring ‘‘hit-to-kill’’ technology? 

In the event of such a technology transfer, are you confidant that measures could 

be taken to ensure the technology is not proliferated to foreign powers who may use 

it to defeat our current and future missile defense systems? 

Dr. GILMORE. Our ‘‘hit-to-kill’’ technologies are being developed by the United 

States only as a defensive capability to counter offensive ballistic missiles. Russian 

interest in this technology would be of concern if that interest was rooted in acquiring a counter-countermeasure capability to defeat our kill vehicles in flight. 

Issues of non-proliferation are best addressed by the OUSD(Policy). 

Æ