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S. HRG. 112–112 

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 3, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

DAVID M. MORRISS, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

FEBRUARY 3, 2011

Page 

Austin, GEN Lloyd J., III, USA, Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq ......................... 6 

Jeffrey, Hon. James F., U.S. Ambassador to Iraq ................................................. 7 

(III) 

(1) 

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in room 

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Akaka, Nelson, Webb, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, Shaheen, 

Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Wicker, Brown, Portman, Ayotte, 

Collins, and Graham. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Ilona R. Cohen, counsel; Jessica 

L. Kingston, research assistant; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; 

William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional 

staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff 

director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Christian D. 

Brose, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional 

staff member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Christine G. Lang, 

and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator 

Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator 

Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator 

Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Clyde 

Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; 

and Andy Olson, assistant to Senator Graham. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. Welcome first to our 

witnesses, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey and General 

Lloyd Austin, Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF–I). 

Before we begin, I want to extend a warm welcome to the newest 

members of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC): Senator 

Jeanne Shaheen, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, Senator Richard 

Blumenthal on the majority side; and Senator Rob Portman and 

Senator Kelly Ayotte on the minority side. We also welcome back 

2 

Senator John Cornyn, who is rejoining the committee after a brief 

hiatus. 

This committee, as you will soon learn, has a tradition of bipartisanship. It is a long tradition. It is based on our common desire to 

provide our men and women in uniform and their families the support that they need and the support that they deserve. That goal 

makes the work of this committee truly rewarding. 

Senator Reed, Senator Tester, and I recently returned from visiting Iraq. One of my main impressions was that the team of Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin is providing the strong leadership needed to manage the critical transition over the coming year 

leading up to the December 2011 deadline for withdrawal of all 

U.S. military forces from Iraq, a deadline that was set by President 

Bush and Prime Minister Maliki in the November 2008 Security 

Agreement that they entered into. 

I believe that you two gentlemen are the right team to lead that 

transition and on behalf of the committee let me thank you both 

for your service and for the service of the men and women with 

whom you serve. 

Last December, after 8 months of discussions among Iraq’s political leaders, those leaders agreed to form a national unity government. But the agreement was only partial. Iraq still awaits the 

nominations by Prime Minister Maliki to the key cabinet positions 

of Iraq Minister of Defense (MOD), Iraq Minister of Interior (MOI), 

and Iraq Minister of National Security, as well as the resolution of 

issues relating to the powers of the National Council on Higher Priorities to be headed by former Prime Minister Allawi. The pressure 

on the Iraqi Government to fill in those large gaps must continue. 

During our trip to Iraq, we were told that plans are on track for 

the drawdown of U.S. forces and the shift of lead responsibility for 

our many programs from the Department of Defense (DOD) to the 

Department of State (DOS), including training of the Iraqi police. 

To carry out these responsibilities, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad 

anticipates that it will have some 15,000 to 20,000 personnel under 

its authority, including at two consulates, two embassy branch offices, three police training centers, and five Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) locations. This will include thousands of DOS contractors to provide perimeter and movement security as U.S. 

Armed Forces depart. 

Whether this transition is successful will depend in no small part 

on whether DOS is provided the resources that it needs to take on 

and sustain those responsibilities. Congress will need to do its part 

to ensure that DOS has what it needs to do all that it can to help 

secure the hard-fought gains in Iraq that have come at great sacrifice of American lives and treasure. 

Significant security challenges remain in Iraq. Security incidents 

in 2010 were down from 2009 levels, but terrorist groups, including 

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), continue to have the capacity to carry out 

high-profile attacks that kill dozens and wound hundreds of Iraqis. 

Iran remains a highly negative influence, providing support to 

extremist groups. Another security challenge is the instability arising from the unsettled situation in Kirkuk and the boundary dispute in the north. USF–I has worked closely with the Government 

3 

of Iraq and Kurdish security forces to reduce tensions and to facilitate the integration of these forces. 

Our goal is to leave behind an Iraq that is stable. During our 

trip, we heard that in general the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) have 

made major progress and are capable of dealing with internal security threats to the Iraqi people and are leading those operations. 

However, we also heard it will be some time before the Iraq Security Forces can provide for Iraq’s external defense. 

USF–I’s training and advisory mission is focused on train-thetrainer programs as the training mission is transferred to the Iraq 

MOD. USF–I continues to work with Iraq’s MOD and MOI with 

the goal of building their minimum essential capabilities. 

Iraq will continue to need support in building its capabilities to 

meet internal and external threats for years to come. I’m concerned, however, by the latest report from the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), which finds that the development of ISF is at risk from shortfalls in logistics capacity, corruption within the Iraq MOD, and the failure to plan appropriately 

for the maintenance and sustainment of infrastructure and equipment. 

The SIGIR report cites a report by the DOD Office of Inspector 

General (IG) which warns of problems with Iraq’s development of 

its capability to achieve and sustain minimum material readiness 

levels for the ISF, saying that this ‘‘could result in a downward spiral of operational readiness that would put Iraq’s security and stability at risk.’’ 

General Austin, I’m interested in getting your professional military opinion on whether you agree with those assessments. 

One major question is what security relationship the United 

States and Iraq will have once the 2008 Security Agreement expires in December. It is unclear whether the Maliki Government 

will seek any type of continuing U.S. presence after December, 

given the terms of the Security Agreement that provides that all 

of our troops will be removed by this December. Iraq needs to engage with the United States sooner rather than later if such a request is going to be forthcoming. 

The Government of Iraq needs to understand that the days of 

American taxpayers bearing the costs of developing ISF are ending. 

Iraq has significant oil revenue which will continue to increase. According to the latest quarterly report from the SIGIR, Iraq’s efforts 

to attract foreign investment ‘‘continue to bear fruit,’’ in their 

words, and the development of Iraq’s oil fields is making ‘‘better 

than expected progress.’’ 

We should work with the Government of Iraq to make available 

the equipment and training it needs for its long-term security, but 

Iraq should not expect American taxpayers to bear the costs of its 

security needs. 

Finally, an important issue for the Government of Iraq remains 

the security of Christians and other religious minorities. During 

our visit, we met with leaders of Christian communities, which 

have suffered from suicide attacks, targeted killings, kidnappings, 

and other intimidation by violent extremist forces. These communities live in fear and a large number of Christians have either fled 

the country or uprooted to safer regions in northern Iraq. 

4 

The leaders we met, explained with pride, how Iraq has been 

home to some of the earliest Christian communities and Iraqi 

Christians do not want to leave their country in order to feel safe 

and Iraq had a long tradition of religious tolerance. On our visit 

we urged the Government of Iraq to act with great urgency to provide the security necessary to preserve and protect these ancient 

Christians and other religious minority communities. 

Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin, we know from our conversations in Iraq and here that you will continue to keep the safety of the various religious minority communities in Iraq as one of 

your top priorities in your discussions with the Government of Iraq. 

We look forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning and 

again thank you both for your service, as well as those with whom 

you serve. 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me also join you 

in taking this opportunity to welcome the six new members of our 

committee. I’m confident that the work of this body will be enriched and enhanced by their contributions and I join you in stating that our work has been bipartisan and it’s been an honor for 

me to serve with you as ranking chairman of this committee. Our 

bipartisanship is not devoid of passion when we occasionally disagree on an issue. 

I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for joining us today. 

I have had the honor of knowing Ambassador Jeffrey and General 

Austin for many years, two great servants of our country, and on 

behalf of this committee we thank you for your service. Please convey to the brave men and women you lead, both military and civilian, the deep gratitude for their service that is felt by the American 

people and their representatives. 

I’m very happy to have the chance today to focus on Iraq. It 

would have been unthinkable even 2 years ago to say that we 

would reach a point which most Americans, indeed some people in 

Washington, would increasingly forget about Iraq. But that point 

has largely come and, as much as it reflects the dividends of success, especially the success of the surge, we disregard Iraq at great 

peril. 

It’s certainly true that many of the critical indicators in Iraq are 

encouraging. AQI remains significantly weakened. Despite many 

horrific large-scale attacks, especially against Iraq’s Christian communities, overall levels of violence have been relatively low and 

steady compared to recent years. Iraq is increasingly bringing its 

vast oil and gas resources on line. 

The country had a successful democratic election last year and, 

despite a painfully drawn-out period of political wrangling, a new 

government is now mostly formed in Baghdad. As demonstrations 

take place for democracy across the Middle East, I don’t think 

you’ll see those kinds of demonstrations in Iraq because the Iraqi 

people did have a chance to express their political will. 

Yet, despite Iraq’s progress, there remain serious questions about 

whether it will endure and what role our Nation can play and 

should play as Iraq’s partner to reinforce success. The fact is 2011 

5 

will be one of the most consequential years for Iraq and for our 

partnership, a year that will largely shape whether the country 

continues to emerge as an increasingly secure, self-sustaining 

democratic partner of the United States or tragically stumbles, 

sliding back into civil conflict, anarchic violence, and authoritarian 

rule. 

These choices will ultimately be made by Iraqis. Make no mistake, after sacrificing hundreds of billions of American taxpayers’ 

dollars and nearly 4,500 American lives, the United States has an 

enormous stake in Iraq’s success. We have enduring national interests relating to Iraq that must be defended. We still maintain a 

significant capacity to influence events for better or for worse. If, 

God forbid, Iraq’s progress should unravel and the moment of opportunity is squandered, no one should think that the American 

people will be forgiving in holding their leaders accountable for 

that failure. 

The Security Agreement signed by the Bush administration and 

affirmed by the current administration states that all U.S. troops 

will leave Iraq by the end of this year. This means we’re approaching a decisive transition, and I’ll be blunt. I have real concerns 

about whether the proposed civilian-led mission will take the lead 

once our troops are gone and is sufficient to support the Iraqi needs 

and U.S. interests, not because our civilians are not capable professionals, they most certainly are, but because of the huge and unprecedented challenges they face. 

In short, we are asking DOS to take on the mission of the U.S. 

military at a scale never contemplated before, amid still-fragile security conditions. Many of the tasks now performed by U.S. troops 

will transition, at great cost, to civilians and contractors. Some 

such tasks will cease to be performed at all. Many relationships 

with key Iraqi leaders across the country will be hard to maintain 

for security reasons and vital military-led programs, from intelligence fusion to the peacekeeping activities performed along the 

still tense Arab-Kurdish boundaries, will be massively scaled back 

or effectively ended. 

No one should interpret my comments today as a lack of support 

for Iraq and the continued U.S. involvement there. To the contrary, 

failure is not an option in Iraq and we must be prepared to bear 

the cost to ensure success, including the cost of our civilian operations and development programs, and which will be substantial 

however this transition plays out. Congress cannot shortchange 

this mission now. 

What we need, however, is a more forward-looking strategy. The 

new Iraq administration will govern the country for the next 4 

years. What does it need to accomplish by the end of that time to 

set Iraq further down a path of lasting success? How can our two 

governments align our resources in a common plan that consistently advances our shared goal, the emergence of an Iraq that can 

secure itself, govern itself, generate its own wealth, and sustain its 

own development with less and less U.S. assistance. 

Then, having established the optimal ends we seek as well as the 

U.S. presence and programs required to achieve them, how can we 

build the bipartisan support in Congress to sustain a robust comVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:12 Oct 03, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68557 JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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mitment to Iraq, especially a commitment for what will increasingly be a civilian-led mission? 

These are questions worth considering today and in the months 

ahead and I look forward to discussing all these issues today with 

our witnesses. 

I also would like to point out that there is a place in Iraq that 

is inhabited by Iranian refugees called Camp Ashraf, and it has 

been under the protection of American troops. I am concerned 

about the welfare, wellbeing, and security of these people. I hope 

that we can address this issue in a way that would reassure them 

of America’s and Iraq’s commitment to their security. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. We 

also share your concern about Camp Ashraf. 

By agreement to your suggestion, we are going to call on General 

Austin here first. Ambassador Jeffrey will follow. 

General Austin. 

STATEMENT OF GEN LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, COMMANDER, 

U.S. FORCES-IRAQ 

General AUSTIN. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished 

members of SASC, thank you for the opportunity to testify with 

Ambassador Jeffrey this morning. I am indeed fortunate to be 

partnered with Ambassador Jeffrey in one of the most professional 

diplomatic teams that I’ve ever seen. 

I’d also like to thank you for your support to our men and women 

in uniform serving in Iraq and their families here at home. I’d like 

to spend a few minutes to give you my assessment on the current 

security environment and the capabilities of the ISF and outline 

what USF–I is focused on for the remainder of the year. 

The security environment in Iraq has been steadily improving 

over the past few years, most notably during the delay in government from March to December 2010. It was very encouraging to us 

that while Iraq was being served by a caretaker government the 

ISF remained apolitical and performed admirably. They provided 

the Iraqi leaders with the time and the space that was necessary 

for peaceful dialogue and compromise to occur. 

The commendable work on the part of the ISF is paying off. 

Today Iraq has the most inclusive government in her nation’s history and the security environment is the best it has been since 

2003. Security incidents in 2010 were 25 percent lower than those 

in the previous year, and that trend has continued following government formation. 

The security environment continues to improve, but it will remain complex and the threats to Iraq’s stability will remain in 

2012. Sunni extremist groups, like al Qaeda, will continue to target 

the Government of Iraq, the ISF, and Iraqi civilians in order to 

garner media attention and to attempt to demonstrate that the 

government cannot provide security for the Iraqi people. Shia extremist groups likewise will continue to target U.S. personnel and, 

in our absence, the Iraqi Government and its institutions. 

While the ISF have a good capability to confront Sunni and Shia 

extremist groups and provide for internal security, they will have 

gaps in their external defense capabilities in 2012. Iraq will not be 

7 

able to defend its air sovereignty for some time. They will also require continued development on capabilities such as logistics, 

sustainment, intelligence, and more complex training. 

The ISF will continue to develop their capabilities, which will require them to continue receiving modern equipment, conduct training on that equipment, and then conduct unit-level training. USF– 

I and the ISF have just recently begun a collective training initiative which allows entire battalions to go through an intensive 

training cycle. This program provides the Iraqi army with the 

foundational collective training necessary for their units to operate 

and has been made possible by the much improved security environment. This training is a great step forward towards improving 

their proficiency, but they will still require much more comprehensive combined arms training and joint training in order to develop 

an external defense capability. 

With the time that we have remaining, USF–I will continue to 

advise, train, assist, and equip the ISF to narrow some of these capability gaps. We will also work closely with the U.S. Embassy-Iraq 

as we transition from a predominantly military-led to a civilian-led 

effort in Iraq. 

We are dedicated to partnering with our embassy teammates in 

preparing for this important transition. The key to a successful 

transition is the need to fully resource the embassy to perform 

their task and responsibilities. We’re developing the OSC, which 

will fall under the embassy, and the OSC will provide oversight 

over all security cooperation in Iraq and it will assume responsibility for the near-$13 billion worth of Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) programs that we currently have with the Iraqis. It will also 

coordinate International Military Education and Training. This office will work hard and be dedicated to closing any capability gaps 

within the ISF. 

Clearly, there is much work to do, but I am encouraged by the 

progress that Iraq has made over the last few years and I’m confident that Iraq can achieve its full potential if it stays on the path 

that it’s currently on. 

I’d like to close my remarks by recognizing the great men and 

women that are serving in Iraq and their families who are supporting them. While our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and civilians are serving overseas, our families are 

serving here at home, and certainly we would not be where we are 

today without the sacrifices of so many, and without the unwavering support from here at home. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the SASC, thank you once again for 

this opportunity to appear this morning with Ambassador Jeffrey, 

and I stand ready to answer any questions that you may have. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General Austin. 

Ambassador Jeffrey. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. JEFFREY, U.S. AMBASSADOR 

TO IRAQ 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member 

McCain, Senators: Let me join with General Austin in thanking 

you for holding this hearing and inviting us to appear before you 

8 

to discuss the issues associated with the United States transition 

from a military-led to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. 

We face a critical moment now in Iraq, where we’ll either step 

up to the plate, finish the job, and build upon the sacrifices made 

or we will risk core U.S. national security interests, be penny-wise 

and a pound-foolish, and cede the field to al Qaeda and to other 

dangerous regional influences. We have thus, an historic opportunity and a critical window to help Iraq emerge as a strategic 

partner and a force for stability and moderation in a troubled region. We cannot afford to let the gains we have sacrificed so much 

for slip away. 

The President has clearly articulated our vision for partnership 

with Iraq. We seek an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant, with a government that is just, representative, accountable, 

that denies support and safe haven to terrorists, is able to assume 

its rightful place in the community of nations, and contributes to 

the peace and security of the region. 

The U.S. military have performed admirably, but they cannot 

stay in Iraq forever. DOS is ready to take the lead, but we need 

the support and resources to finish the job. We need to have platforms to carry out key transitional missions for the next 3 to 5 

years. These include work throughout the country, especially in key 

areas such as Kirkuk and Mosul, where past experience has shown 

how a small number of Americans can have a great, disproportionate impact in helping to defuse crises and produce long-term 

solutions. 

Our missions also include helping the Iraqis to professionalize 

their police, an absolutely critical component to the country’s longterm stability, as General Austin said, to provide security assistance to help the Iraqis finish the job against al Qaeda and other 

terrorist groups, and to develop a core conventional defense capability. To not finish the job now creates substantial risks of what 

some people call a ‘‘Charlie Wilson’s War moment,’’ with both the 

resurgence of al Qaeda and the empowering of problematic regional 

players. 

Al Qaeda is still capable of devastating attacks that threaten 

Iraq and beyond. Furthermore, gutting our presence in Iraq would 

also provide Iran increased ability to create anxieties in the region 

that could spiral out of control. 

Along with the Iraqis, the United States has paid a dear price 

in this war: over 4,300 deaths, over 3,300 wounded among our military forces and hundreds of embassy casualties as well. As Vice 

President Biden stated during his recent visit, ‘‘It is vital that we 

leave behind an Iraq that is worthy of the sacrifices that so many 

U.S. troops and civilians have made.’’ 

While all U.S. Government work in Iraq is expensive due to the 

security situation, a robust civilian presence represents a significant reduction in expenditures. Between 2010 and 2011, for example, the U.S. military withdrawal reduced the bill for taxpayers by 

about $15 billion, while the increase in DOS’s budget was just $2.5 

billion. While DOS’s 2012 funding needs will naturally increase because of the military-to-civilian transition, the overall U.S. cost will 

continue to decrease dramatically. 

9 

Moreover, U.S. development assistance to Iraq is not open-ended. 

Iraq has vast untapped oil resources, but, due to the devastated oil 

infrastructure, it will be a number of years before Iraq will have 

meaningful new oil revenue for its own budget. 

Performing the military-to-civilian transition in Iraq also will 

demonstrate, more generally, that we can transition security successes in war zones into long-term stability, including for Afghanistan. 

In closing, I would like to thank DOD, U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM), and above all General Austin and his troops for the 

support that they are giving us in this mission. I would also like 

to express my admiration and humility in the face of the commitment and sacrifice we see every day in Iraq on the part of our civilian staffs, military members, and our Iraqi partners as they risk 

their lives for a cause which they believe in, the Iraq I have just 

finished describing. 

I thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

We will be happy to answer any questions the committee may have 

and look forward to working hand in hand with you and other Congressional colleagues. 

Mr. Chairman, at this time, we’d like to submit our joint written 

statement for the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record. 

[The joint prepared statement of Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JAMES F. JEFFREY AND GEN LLOYD

J. AUSTIN, USA 

WHY IRAQ IS IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES

A stable Iraq will play a critical role in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives 

in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. Iraq’s strategic importance is based 

on a number of factors. Iraq plays a central role in the Arab and Muslim worlds 

and hosts Shi’a Islam’s holiest sites. Iraq has a diverse, multi-sectarian and multiethnic population. Geographically, Iraq is strategically positioned between major regional players, including Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Syria. 

Iraq represents the frontier between the Arab and Persian worlds. Because it is endowed with a significant portion of the world’s oil reserves, Iraq will play an increasingly influential role in the global economy. We must remember that for most 

of its modern history, Iraq has been aligned with our adversaries, a threat to our 

friends and interests, and a destabilizing force in the region and world. 

We now face an historic opportunity—and a critical window—to help Iraq emerge 

as a strategic partner and a force for stability and moderation in a troubled region. 

An enduring Iraqi-U.S. partnership will be critical in enabling Iraq to be that positive force. It is in our national interest to fully support that partnership. We cannot 

afford to let the gains we have sacrificed so much for slip away before they are cemented. 

U.S. Interests 

The United States has important national interests in the greater Middle East. 

These include the unity and security of Iraq as well as continued development of 

its democratic institutions and its reintegration into the region. U.S. national interests related to Iraq are: regional nonproliferation; counterterrorism cooperation; access to energy; and integration of the region into global markets. 

ADMINISTRATION POLICY

U.S. policy is set by President Obama’s 2009 speech at Camp Lejeune, which reaffirmed the 2008 Security Agreement, calling for the withdrawal of U.S. forces by 

December 31, 2011, and the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, which lays out 

a long-term strategic relationship between the United States and Iraq in the fields 

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dent’s policy is to promote security and prosperity in Iraq, transition responsibility 

for security to the Iraqis, and cultivate an enduring strategic relationship with Iraq 

based on mutual interests and mutual respect. 

In so doing we seek an Iraq, as described in the Camp Lejeune speech and the 

May 2010 National Security Strategy, that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant; with 

a government that is just, representative, and accountable; that denies support and 

safe haven to terrorists; is able to assume its rightful place in the community of nations; and contributes to the peace and security of the region. Consistent with this 

policy, President Obama announced the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and combat 

operations in Iraq on August 31, 2010. Prior to the end of combat operations, the 

administration withdrew nearly 100,000 troops, closed or transferred to the Iraqis 

hundred of bases, and moved millions of pieces of equipment out of Iraq. These actions marked a key transition as Iraqis assumed responsibility for their own security. The transitional force of less than 50,000 U.S. troops that remains has a new 

mission to advise, train, assist, and equip the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), protect 

our personnel and property, and participate in counterterrorism operations. As the 

military draws down, civilians—diplomats, aid workers, and advisors—are moving 

into a more prominent role to support Iraq in achieving its political, economic, security, and diplomatic goals. Our success in Iraq will require continuing the strongest 

possible U.S. military and civilian cooperation on the ground during the drawdown. 

CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION AND A LOOK TOWARDS 2012

Despite some predictions to the contrary, security in Iraq improved during the 9- 

month delay in government formation. Security incidents in 2010 were 25 percent 

lower than 2009 due, in large part, to the credible performance of the ISF. They 

were instrumental in creating the space necessary for peaceful dialogue. 

That said, there is still much work to be done. 2011 will be a critical, challenging 

year—one that sets the conditions for Iraq’s continued progress. Security trends are 

good but the environment is complex. Iraq still faces dangerous and determined enemies, each with their own objectives and tactics. 

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is degraded but determined. Recent attacks targeting 

Christians, including a horrific attack October 31 against Our Lady of Salvation 

Church, as well as against Shia pilgrims during the observation of Arba’een demonstrate AQI’s capability to conduct high casualty-producing attacks. However, the 

window of time between AQI attacks has widened while the level of sophistication 

of their attacks has declined. This degradation in capability is largely due to the 

efforts of Iraqi and U.S. Special Operations Forces, working together to maintain 

constant pressure on extremist networks. Additionally, restricting financing and 

command and control capability greatly limits AQI’s ability to conduct signature attacks. While they remain determined, they will not achieve their aim of inciting sectarian conflict—the Iraqi people continue to stand together and reject AQI principles. 

While AQI remains Iraq’s most dangerous enemy, Shia extremist groups continue 

to be a serious threat. Groups such as Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib al-Haq, and the 

Promised Day Brigade have indicated their intention to increase violence against 

U.S. forces and they continue in their attempts to do just that. While they may focus 

on U.S. forces now, we believe they will likely target the Government of Iraq after 

U.S. forces depart. 

We assess Iraq’s security environment will be relatively stable in January 2012 

due to a number of factors. AQI will remain capable of signature attacks but will 

lack public support. The Sunni insurgency will continue to present a low-level 

threat. Shi’a extremists will continue to be funded, trained, and equipped by Iran. 

Violence will be masked by criminality, illicit smuggling, and extortion—a blend of 

extremism and crime. The ISF will be increasingly capable of providing internal security, but will not be capable of providing for external defense. The Army will not 

be capable of conducting combined arms operations due to incomplete fielding of 

modern equipment that will still be arriving as U.S. forces depart. The Navy will 

have limited capability to defend territorial waters and the Air Force will lack the 

capability to maintain air sovereignty. Police will be unable to assume full responsibility for internal security in many regions due to lagging development of capabilities and professionalism, further hampered by poorly defined relationships between 

the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). 

IRAQ SECURITY FORCES GAPS

For the United States to achieve its goals, the Government of Iraq must provide 

for Iraq’s internal security, develop external defense capabilities, and lead and manage its institutions. As Iraq emerges from an extended government formation procVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:12 Oct 03, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68557 JUNE PsN: JUNEB
11 

ess, inter-ministerial conflict, ethno-sectarian tensions, and malign Iranian influence 

will continue to serve as barriers to progress. While U.S. operations through 2011 

will address many of these issues, gaps in capabilities will remain. These gaps include: 

• Counterterrorism operations and intelligence fusion. • Cross-ministerial and interagency intelligence fusion and information 

sharing. 

• Sustainment and logistics. • Combined arms (external defense) • Air sovereignty/air defense. 

FIVE ‘‘Ms’’ OF TRANSITION

At the national strategic level, the transition to a civilianized post-2011 relationship under the Strategic Framework Agreement involves a number of key factors, 

what we call ‘‘the five Ms.’’ These are: new Missions, Money and other resources, 

coordination with Prime Minister Maliki’s government, Months left to complete the 

job, and Management of the whole process. Let us cover each of the ‘‘Ms’’ in more 

detail. 

(1) The New Missions 

The National Security Strategy lays out specific tasks the embassy will have to 

assume from United States Forces-Iraq (USF–I). These include: 

Broader Diplomatic Presence 

2011 will see a huge drop in U.S. presence in Iraq as almost 50,000 troops and 

many tens of thousands of Department of Defense (DOD) contractors depart. USF– 

I and the 16 diplomatic Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) we have now are 

carrying out extraordinary security, political outreach, training, economic, and developmental assistance programs, and giving the embassy, USF–I headquarters, and 

Washington situational awareness over the breadth of Iraq. This presence has been 

instrumental in aiding Iraq in achieving not only its security, but also remarkable 

political and economic progress. But we need a temporary civilian-led presence in 

these areas for a few years to further build on what our military and PRTs have 

done, to diffuse crises, and produce long-term solutions. To this end, civilian engagement with Iraq’s provinces, currently led by PRTs, will consolidate into four strategically-located diplomatic outposts. The Department of State (DOS) will soon inaugurate two consulates—in Erbil and Basra—and two embassy branch offices—in 

Mosul and Kirkuk—as well as utilize the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq 

(OSC–I) offices and police training hubs as secure platforms for assistance throughout Iraq. 

Development Assistance 

Aside from general political engagement and situational awareness, U.S. Government assistance through these platforms and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs will emphasize strengthened provincial governance, 

community and civil society participation, economic reforms to expand the private 

sector economy, respect for the rule of law and human rights, improved delivery of 

key social services, preparations for future elections, and the continued return and 

resettlement of displaced persons. USAID development programs assist Iraqis to use 

their own human and natural resources more effectively and sustainably and coincide with U.S. Government and Iraqi prerogatives laid out in the Strategic Framework Agreement as well as the Iraqi Government’s stated priorities in its own National Development Plan. 

Modernization of Iraqi Security Forces 

As noted above, the ISF are not ready to independently provide for Iraq’s defense 

despite their impressive performance thus far. They need continued U.S. support. 

U.S. Embassy Baghdad will continue the efforts of USF–I to develop the ISF, now 

more than 650,000 strong, through Security and Defense Cooperation and Security 

Assistance activities under the OSC–I. This mission will include advising, training, 

and equipping Iraqi forces, supporting professional military education, and planning 

joint military training exercises. It will allow for continued fulfillment of 336 cases 

of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (valued at $8 billion) and ensure the delivery of 

M1A1 tanks, patrol boats, howitzers, armored personnel carriers, and more. The 

OSC–I will also enable the delivery of an additional 61 cases of FMS (valued at $5 

billion) already requested by the Government of Iraq. It is projected to have a fulltime staff of 157 military and civilian personnel as well as hundreds of case-related 

specialists for FMS at any one time. 

12 

We believe the OSC–I is important to a successful Iraq transition. DOD and DOS 

will work with Congress on requested resources and authorities needed in order to 

support the OSC–I. 

Police Development Program 

We need to help the Iraqis to professionalize their police, an absolutely critical 

component to the country’s long-term stability. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and 

the DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs will oversee a continuing U.S. Government effort to enhance the professionalism of the Iraqi 

police force through advanced mentoring at the ministerial and provincial level and 

through specialized training. The transition to a civilian-led partnership with the 

Iraqi MOI will be a central element of the U.S. support to ISF. This partnership 

will include 190 advisors at 28 advisory locations in 10 provinces, eventually reaching approximately 55 percent of the roughly 287,000 police assigned to the Iraqi Police Service and focused on population centers representing more than 65 percent 

of the Iraqi population. The goal will be to facilitate a professional, competent, and 

self-sufficient MOI that provides security and stability to its citizens and is able to 

effectively counter terrorism and organized crime within 5 years. 

Information-Sharing 

Counterterrorism cooperation is the primary focus of our information-sharing mission. Current information exchange programs in Baghdad will continue, with limited information exchange—including tactical data—at consulates and branch offices. U.S. Embassy Baghdad will also maintain operations and information liaison 

at various headquarters, operation centers, and intelligence fusion cells in four 

major cities in Iraq. 

Logistics 

To support various missions and operating locations in an austere and non-permissive environment, U.S. Embassy Baghdad must take on many logistical functions that USF–I currently provides for its forces, PRTs, and the embassy. These 

include securing sites outside of Baghdad and providing personal security details, 

administering the DOD Logistics Civil Augmentation Program’s life support contract 

for all U.S. personnel in Iraq, managing the supply lines for food, fuel and material, 

operating emergency medical facilities, and running in-country and regional air operations. 

(2) Money and Other Resources 

If DOS is to effectively take the lead from our military colleagues, we need the 

support and resources to finish the job. As Vice President Biden said on November 

20, 2010: While the day will come when Iraq’s vast natural wealth can fully finance 

its security and investment needs, and when its civilian institutions no longer require such intensive support, it has not yet arrived. Iraq has increased its own 

spending in these areas, and with sustained American engagement, it will emerge 

from generations of trauma to become a stable and self-reliant nation. That is why, 

even at this difficult economic time, we are asking Congress to fulfill our budget requests to support America’s continued engagement, including our broader diplomatic 

presence, modernization plan for the Iraqi security forces and financing for a police 

development program. While all U.S. Government work is expensive in Iraq due to 

the security situation, a robust civilian presence represents a significant savings for 

the taxpayers from the bills they have been paying for the past 8 years. Given all 

the United States has sacrificed in Iraq, now is not the time to be pennywise and 

pound-foolish and risk ceding the field to al Qaeda and Iran. One of the hard lessons 

from America’s past experience in Afghanistan right after the Cold War is the necessity of supporting and influencing the transition of war-torn nations from conflict 

to stability to peace and prosperity. 

(3) Months to January 2012 

We have a limited time to successfully implement this transition. DOS will have 

to take over the above mentioned missions, deploy many thousands of additional 

personnel, and expend significant funds to build out various sites, all within less 

than a year. 

(4) Coordination with Prime Minister Maliki’s Government 

The cooperation of the Government of Iraq is essential to achieving the new missions above in the time allotted. Specifically, we are asking that the Government 

of Iraq finalize Land Use Agreements, provide security support with ISF to U.S. diplomatic establishments and activities, and allow for the continuity of current security, aviation, and ground movement operations now provided by USF–I. 

13 

(5) Management 

The U.S. Government must execute this entire program, from budget execution 

through personnel deployments, site construction, and transfer of missions. The 

greatest asset of the operation, and of the embassy in Baghdad, has been the extraordinary support provided by USF–I, U.S. Central Command, and DOD. This 

support, and the closest possible civilian-military cooperation during and after the 

transition, is vital to our success. 

CONCLUSION

To quote the President in his address on the end of combat operations in Iraq on 

August 31, 2010: The Americans who have served in Iraq completed every mission 

they were given. They defeated a regime that had terrorized its people. Together 

with Iraqis and coalition partners who made huge sacrifices of their own, our troops 

fought block by block to help Iraq seize the chance for a better future. They shifted 

tactics to protect the Iraqi people, trained Iraqi Security Forces, and took out terrorist leaders. Because of our troops and civilians—and because of the resilience of 

the Iraqi people—Iraq has the opportunity to embrace a new destiny, even though 

many challenges remain. 

Our overarching goal in this transition is to build a viable partnership that will 

flourish into the future well after our troops have departed, and to honor the many 

thousands of Iraqis and Americans who have given their lives for a greater cause— 

a cause that embraces all of us here as we endure to leave behind an Iraq that is 

worthy of their sacrifice. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senators Portman and Ayotte are with us. We 

welcomed you before very warmly and we repeat that welcome. 

We’re delighted that you’re with the committee, as are other new 

members on the Democratic side. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. We welcome your statement, Ambassador, as to 

what the goals of the Obama administration are in Iraq, and 

maybe most of us share that goal. You talked about stability, security, and self-reliance of an Iraqi state and an Iraqi Government, 

and that is and has been the goal. 

One of the threats to that success, that achievement of that goal, 

to the stability, and security of Iraq, is the failure of the political 

leaders of Iraq to reach conclusions on some critical issues. This 

has always been a problem. We’ve always expressed the importance 

of the political leaders coming together. 

Some of the current political issues that are unresolved include 

the following: An agreement to create a National Council for Higher Policies with real executive power, headed by former Prime Minister Allawi. There’s an agreement that such a council be created, 

but there’s no agreement yet on what the powers of that council 

will be. 

The positions of the Iraq MOD, MOI, and National Security are 

still unfilled. There is no agreement yet on oil policies, specifically 

the division of oil revenues. These are huge issues that remain unresolved and I believe threaten the goals and objectives that we 

have and, hopefully, the Iraqis have for themselves. 

Can you comment on this matter? Is it important that the leaders of Iraq get on with the decisions in those areas, Ambassador? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. We’re going to have a 7-minute round, by the 

way; I usually announce how long the round of questions will be. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. It is vitally important that they finish the 

job of forming the government. They’ve taken most of the steps necessary, but you have outlined several of the remaining issues that 

we’ve been pressing them on and more importantly, they’ve been 

14 

pressing themselves on. We have seen some progress in the last 

several weeks on the National Council and the two sides have basically agreed to everything but the modality of how to select Dr. 

Ayad Allawi. Everybody agrees that he should be selected. 

We think that this should be resolved in the next few days. I was 

in contact with President Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government this morning and the embassy with other people, trying 

to take the temperature of where we are on these steps. There are 

also some names that are floating on compromise candidates for 

both of those ministries that I mentioned. Again, we are encouraged by what we’ve heard over the past several days, but the proof 

is in the pudding and we have to see if they will finish the job. It 

is very important that they finish the job and get on with the business of government. 

On the oil account, two positive developments. As with everything else in Iraq, it moves forward in relatively small steps, Senator, but it does move forward. The Kurds and the other coalition 

parties agreed on a 19-point plan, or on most of the 19-point plan, 

that includes giving priority to a hydrocarbons law and a revenuesharing law. This is vital. 

Meanwhile the central government, Prime Minister Maliki personally, and the Kurdistan Regional Government have agreed on 

an interim step of allowing up to 150,000 barrels of oil from the 

Kurdistan Regional Government to flow out through the Turkish 

pipeline. This is a very significant development and it gives us 

hope that they will continue down that path, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

General Austin, is the withdrawal of our forces by the end of this 

year, as agreed to by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki, 

on track? 

General AUSTIN. Thank you, Senator. It is indeed on track. We 

just recently completed our planning process that will govern the 

rest, the remainder of our activities from now until the end of December. We’ve issued Operations Order 11–01, which prescribes the 

major activities that will be conducted, focused on strengthening 

the ISF, reposturing our forces, and also transitioning responsibilities to the embassy, the Government of Iraq, and CENTCOM. 

We continue to synchronize that plan and we’re also synchronizing the activities of the embassy along with our activities as we 

go about executing the plan. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Is there any indication, I’ll ask this of both of you, that Iraq is 

going to request that any elements of our military forces remain 

beyond December? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. We have received no such request, Senator. We are working with the Iraqis, as the General said, on the 

security elements of our post-2011 presence, which will include a 

large OSC–I element for security cooperation and the police training, which will be a major program. Both of these are under the 

framework of the Strategic Framework Agreement, which was the 

second agreement signed in 2008. It does not have a deadline and 

it calls for a broad cooperation across the spectrum of bilateral relations including, specifically, security. 

15 

We’re working with the Iraqis now on exactly what the components of that would be, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you expect any requests beyond that from 

the Iraqi Government? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. We haven’t yet, sir, and I can’t say what 

they’ll say in the future. 

Chairman LEVIN. We don’t have any indication that such a request is going to be forthcoming as of this time? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. As of this time, there’s no specific request 

on the table, and they will want to see how we will meet their 

training and equipping needs with the program that we set up. 

General AUSTIN. Senator, I echo the Ambassador’s comments. We 

haven’t received any request. Again, I think he covered the entire 

gamut there, so I would not add anything to that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Another threat to the stability, security, and 

the self-reliance of Iraq is Iran. Can you tell us, Ambassador, in 

your view, whether or not Iranian behavior in Iraq represents a 

threat to their stability and to their successful transition to their 

own complete sovereignty? What also is the susceptibility of the 

Government of Iraq to Iranian influence or to their destabilizing efforts? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Senator, as the President has said many 

times, we are concerned with Iranian behavior in the region and 

in pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

Chairman LEVIN. Does that include in Iraq? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. In Iraq specifically, sir, we, first of all, 

have to note that as a neighbor of Iraq’s, a country that suffered 

devastating losses from an invasion by Iraq in 1980, Iran obviously 

has legitimate interests in Iraq. Just like Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, 

and Saudi Arabia do. There is significant trade in the region. There 

is a tremendous amount of religious pilgrimage and the like into 

Iraq. 

Nonetheless, what concerns us about Iran and Iraq begins with 

the support, that we have seen over the years, of armed militias 

who have attacked us and who have attacked the Iraqi Government. This culminated in a series of battles where Prime Minister 

Maliki took them on in 2008, in Basra, Sadr City, and Baghdad. 

We are watching that closely. We are seeing continued signs that 

Iran has not given up its support for these groups, and this is very 

troubling to us. 

In terms of the susceptibility of the Iraqi Government, like any 

government pays attention to its important neighbors, we are absolutely convinced that this is a government that is nationalist in orientation, is fully aware of the threats to its sovereignty, and will 

take the necessary steps to protect it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Just to complete that, they may be concerned 

about their neighbors, but specifically is there a problem that Iran 

creates for Iraq with their current behavior? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Iraq has to face many pressing and longterm problems, some of which you’ve described. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is one of those Iranian behavior? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. It’s not on the short list at this time for 

the Iraqi Government, but they are well aware of the potential for 

trouble. 

16 

Chairman LEVIN. Is it on the long list? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. They’re well aware of the potential for 

trouble, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Gillibrand, you are welcome here. We’re delighted that 

you are here. When we welcomed the new members before I don’t 

believe that you were present, so it’s great to have you here. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As is well known, I’m deeply concerned about this issue of complete U.S. withdrawal. General Austin, I think that we would agree 

that the Battle of Fallujah was one kind of counterinsurgency that 

could even be compared to the Battle of Hue. It was house-tohouse, high casualty, and a high intensity conflict. We fast forward 

to the Battle of Sadr City, which made extensive use of technological capabilities that we’ve developed over the intervening time. 

In the absence of the United States, would the Iraqis have the 

capability that was vital in winning the Battle of Sadr City? 

General AUSTIN. Senator, certainly not. They would have to develop that type of capability over time. The capability that I believe 

you’re referring to is the capability to acquire targets and employ 

precision fires that limit collateral damage. 

Senator MCCAIN. In the words of General Petraeus, ‘‘We made 

them take a knee,’’ right? 

General AUSTIN. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Without the U.S. presence there, it would take 

a long time before Iraq would have the ability to replicate that capability? 

General AUSTIN. It will take some time for them to develop that. 

Senator MCCAIN. The Iraqis are interested in having an air force, 

for obvious reasons. Are they going to be able to build an air force 

without U.S. presence there? 

General AUSTIN. They do have a number of options to both acquire equipment from and ask for training from other nations. 

Senator MCCAIN. So they would have to acquire equipment and 

then get trainers from other nations? 

General AUSTIN. They would. 

Senator MCCAIN. Would you agree, Ambassador Jeffrey, that the 

highest priority of the Iranian government this year is to prevent 

any change to the security agreement with Iraq so as to ensure 

that no U.S. troops will remain in Iraq by January 1, 2012? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Senator, I can’t assess with full accuracy 

Iran’s intentions. 

Senator MCCAIN. My question is, would you agree that it’s the 

Iranian Government’s highest priority? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I would say that it is a significant priority 

of the Iranians to not have U.S. forces on its doorstep. 

Senator MCCAIN. How concerned are you, Ambassador Jeffrey, 

about the violence against U.S. civilian officials that might entail 

or occur after our withdrawal? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Senator, my highest priority as Ambassador is the security and safety of my personnel. My people on a 

given week are the subject of sometimes one, two, or three attacks, 

between indirect fire and typically improvised explosive devices 

17 

(IED). We had an IED against one of our columns 2 days ago. It’s 

a very big concern of ours. Nonetheless, it is a concern we have 

lived with since we started operating in Iraq in 2003. 

Senator MCCAIN. Al Sadr resided in Iran for a period of time, 

came back, and then went back to Iran. Now I understand he’s 

back again. Is that correct? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The latest I heard was that he is back in 

Iran, sir, but it’s very hard for us to keep track of his going back 

and forth. 

Senator MCCAIN. His followers are a key element in the formation of the Maliki Government? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. His followers or his party played a role 

back in the October time-period when the Maliki Government was 

first forming. But at the end of the day, Senator, they received 

660,000 votes out of more than 12 million cast. They have only 39 

seats in the coalition, which is roughly 300 seats total. Their role, 

which is relatively minor in the government, reflects their voting 

power. 

Senator MCCAIN. It also played a key role in the formation of the 

government. When they swung by Maliki, it then enabled Maliki 

to form the government. I’m very concerned about Al-Sadr, his activities, his followers, and his close ties with Iran, the Talaban, and 

others. I’ll just be very blunt, I’m deeply concerned about that. 

I’m also concerned, Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin, the 

Government of Iraq has already released a lot of individuals who 

had been detained by the U.S. military. We hear reports that the 

prime minister has released many more as part of a political negotiation to form a new government, especially with the Sadrists. Do 

you have concern about that, General Austin? 

General AUSTIN. Senator, I am always concerned if—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I mean, it’s happening? These detainees are 

being released? 

General AUSTIN. There are a number of detainees that are routinely released because of lack of evidence or because they may 

have served their sentence. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe that some of those have been released because of the influence of Al-Sadr? 

General AUSTIN. I have no proof to confirm that. 

Senator MCCAIN. Is it your opinion? 

General AUSTIN. Without proof, I would be hesitant to provide an 

opinion on that. 

Senator MCCAIN. In the Kurdish Iraqi areas like Mosul and 

Kirkuk there is a significant U.S. peacekeeping presence. What is 

your degree of concern about the removal of that presence as far 

as igniting some conflicts between the two parties? 

General AUSTIN. Our presence up there has provided a means to 

build confidence and enable the Arab and Kurdish elements to 

work together there. The troops have done a magnificent job of 

working well together. In some areas, tensions still remain, and I 

think that as we remove those combined security locations it has 

to be carefully managed. 

At the end of the day, the issues that are present there need to 

be resolved politically and that may take some time. 

18 

Senator MCCAIN. I hope, Ambassador, you’ll make some representations to the Iraqi Government concerning the situation in 

Camp Ashraf, and I want to thank both of you for your service, and 

may I urge you to continue to make a case for continued U.S. assistance as the Iraqi Government goes through a very difficult and 

challenging transition. There are enormous pressures for cutting 

spending that are going to increase here in Congress, and we’re 

going to have to convince a lot of people of the importance of sustaining and assisting a free and independent Iraq as it makes this 

transition. 

I thank you for your service to the country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for the service of 

your colleagues. As Senator Levin indicated, we were there just a 

few days ago to witness firsthand the progress, but also the challenges. I want to underscore something that Senator McCain said, 

which is absolutely critical. That is, the need to generate bipartisan 

support for an increasingly civilian-led effort. As the mission migrates from DOD and from the DOD budget to the civilian side, 

DOS, and it looks more like foreign aid instead of military aid in 

the field the reality which Senator McCain pointed out, is it’s going 

to be very, very difficult to sustain. 

He’s also pointed out, quite perceptively, if we don’t sustain this 

effort then we have invested a lot of blood, lives, and material in 

an effort that could be lost, that would be a tragedy, as you pointed 

out, Ambassador Jeffrey, in one of those Charlie Wilson moments, 

where we ask goodness gracious, what were we thinking? 

That is a central point and it was very well said by Senator 

McCain. I wanted to emphasize it. 

Ambassador Jeffrey, you pointed out that the rough cost of our 

operations this year in Iraq, is what? Combining military and civilian efforts? Do you have an idea? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. On the civilian side, sir, it’s roughly $2 billion plus. That includes the assistance program, which is roughly 

$0.5 billion or $500,000,000, and we’re beginning to get some of the 

moneys for the police training program. It’s complicated accounting. Then the operations budget is $1.797 billion, sir. So you add 

it all up, it’s somewhere over $2 billion. For the military side, I’d 

have to defer to General Austin. 

Senator REED. General Austin, what’s your rough estimate of 

your operating budget this year? 

General AUSTIN. In fiscal year 2010, Senator, it was $72 billion. 

Senator REED. $72 billion. You have roughly $74 billion we are 

committing annually. When the transition is completed, what’s the 

number that you need, Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. We haven’t quite finalized that for fiscal 

year 2012, Senator. What I can say is the building blocks would be 

where we are now. We would like to take over the ISF training and 

equipping program as a DOS Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 

program. Right now, that’s $1.5 billion. We would ask for less, but 

it would be a significant percentage of the $1.5 billion. 

19 

The police training program is approximately $1 billion a year. 

Taking over some of the operations in the field security and 

logistical missions, but particularly perimeter security and movement security would be on the order of half a billion or more a 

year. If you add all that up, you would get a figure that I would 

rather not add up, but it would be about twice what we are doing 

now. 

Senator REED. Can you add it up, because you’re better at math 

than I am. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. If I had to add it up, it would be over $5 

billion, Senator. 

Senator REED. We’re going essentially from $74 or $78 billion 

down to $5 billion. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. There would be some DOD costs associated with OSC–I, Senator. We don’t quite know how much that 

would be, because they would be doing the security and obviously 

some of the payment of those. But clearly we’re looking at roughly 

a 90 percent reduction. 

Senator REED. We’re looking at a 90 percent reduction, which is 

good news. But the reality is, unless we’re prepared to fund your 

efforts at the tune of $5 to $6 billion a year, then you’re going to 

have a difficult time sustaining the progress that we’ve made; is 

that fair? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I’m not going to sustain the progress that 

we’ve made, at least in supporting the Iraqi Government. 

Senator REED. Unless you have that money, that’s right. 

What percentage is that of DOS’s budget? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. It’s between 5 and 7 percent of DOS’s foreign assistance budget, the moneys that we would have for the 

FMF and for the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), roughly half a billion dollars for Economic Support Fund, 

and then the police training. For the Diplomatic and Consular Programs, if you strip out salaries for our people, the basic operating 

budget, which is pretty big, is almost as high as 30 percent in the 

statistics I’ve seen. 

Senator REED. We’re looking at 30 percent of the budget. This is 

not a nominal figure in DOS. This is a huge amount of money. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. This would be, taken together, probably 

the single biggest program in DOS in fiscal year 2012, Senator. 

Senator REED. Again, let me reiterate. We all understand that 

when programs migrate from DOD over to foreign aid, we keep the 

troops in the field for support, which is a category that’s a lot harder to sell, to be blunt, and we have to make that sale. That’s the 

message that I heard on both sides. 

Let me interject another issue, I saw competition on the DOD 

side between assets for Iraq and assets for Afghanistan. At the 

same time you’re trying to do this in Iraq, your colleagues are trying to pull military forces out in Afghanistan, stand up Afghan 

forces, and turn it over to the civilian mission. 

This is going to be a competition not only for money and your effort, but also for money for Afghanistan’s efforts, which means that 

we have the same dilemma there. Is that an accurate assessment? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Basically, it is, Senator. There is one difference. In a year, I’ll be operating without the U.S. military. My 

20 

colleagues in Afghanistan will not be operating without the U.S. 

military. 

Senator REED. Another point is, when we were there DOD and 

DOS had identified over 1,000 tasks that had to be transitioned or 

accommodated. Some of them have clear DOD fingerprints; clearing travel routes, protecting personnel, et cetera. Others are tasks 

that are subsumed in the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding, local activities, et cetera. 

I must say when you look closely at all these functions and the 

support you’re getting indirectly, the positive spillover benefits 

from the military presence, that the number of $6 billion plus 

you’ve suggested is probably an underestimate. Do you have a reaction to that, Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. As I said, we try not to talk specific figures at this point, but in the order of magnitude of double what 

we’re doing now is what we’ll be looking for in fiscal year 2012. The 

support activities that the military is doing, is very hard to put a 

figure on and how much of that would transfer to us because it’s 

apples and oranges. We have to pay the salaries of our Private Security Details (PSD) while combat troop salaries are in the DOD 

base budget. 

We get extraordinary support, billions of dollars of support, from 

the military every year, everything from Counter Rocket, Artillery, 

and Mortar identification of incoming rockets to logistical support, 

there’s no doubt about it. 

Senator REED. Thank you. My time has expired. Again, gentlemen, thank you for your extraordinary service. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Reed. 

What are PSDs, for the record? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Personal Security Details. These are the 

people who—— 

Chairman LEVIN. ‘‘Private security details,’’ is that what ‘‘PSDs’’ 

means? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Just filling in what the acronym means. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Exactly. But they could be military or they 

could be contractor security. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you both for your service. I think Senator Reed brought up some very good points. The Nation needs to 

understand what’s about to occur here. If you bring all the troops 

home, we all would like that to happen as soon as possible, you 

still have a country that is in a very early stage of development in 

terms of democracy. Would both of you agree with that, that Iraq 

is an infant democracy at best? 

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I would drop the ‘‘at best.’’ I think they’re 

a solid infant democracy, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. We’re going to say they’re in the solid 

infant category. Now, just like with any other infant, you need to 

provide some assistance and nurturing to make sure they grow up 

21 

strong and healthy, and that’s the challenge forward, correct? Take 

it from an infant to a mature democracy? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The Iraqis appreciate our assistance. 

There’s an issue of sovereignty here. 

Senator GRAHAM. No, I’m not saying that we’re going to do it for 

them. We’re going to help them. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Yes, sir, it is in the strategic framework, 

specifically, air political support. We of course support them in election monitoring, in setting up elections, and in many other ways. 

Senator GRAHAM. Does the general population want us to continue to be their partner in some fashion? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The general population wants us to be 

their partner, yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Does the military want us to help train their 

air force, General Austin? 

General AUSTIN. They do, Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. We have an Iraqi navy to develop, too. 

Do they also want us to help them in that regard? 

General AUSTIN. They do. 

Senator GRAHAM. We’re not staying in a place where we’re not 

wanted, is that a fair statement, whatever ‘‘staying’’ means? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. That’s a fair statement, Senator. Most 

polls say that the Iraqi population in general would like to see the 

military presence withdrawn. 

Senator GRAHAM. I understand that. Now, that goes back to what 

is penny-wise and a pound-foolish from an Iraq-American point of 

view. To carry out your mission in 2012 without U.S. military security being provided, we’re basically creating a small DOS army, correct? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I would have a problem with two words, 

Senator, ‘‘creating’’ and ‘‘army,’’ and I’ll explain why. Right now we 

have some 2,700 private security contractors (PSC) and many hundreds of DOS security personnel. That figure will go up significantly, by an order of magnitude. The point I’m trying to make is 

we already have a large number of security personnel operating in 

Iraq under—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it enough to do the job? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. If we get the money to have the additional 

security, it’s enough to do the job. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, let’s talk about that additional security. 

Will it include mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. It will, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Will it include helicopters? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. It’ll include a large number of helicopters, 

Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Will these helicopters be armed? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. They will not be armed, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. But you’re going to have a helicopter fleet. 

You’re going to have an MRAP fleet. If something happens, do you 

have enough capacity to shoot your way out of it, or are you going 

to have to rely on the ISF if you’re up in Kirkuk or Mosul and 

something bad happens? 

22 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Currently, Senator, both the U.S. military 

and my own convoys move with ISF support in the cities. We assume that will continue. 

Senator GRAHAM. How dependent are you today on American 

military security for your movements? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Essentially all movements outside of 

Baghdad, that is all Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) movements, by agreement between the embassy and CENTCOM are 

conducted by USF–I forces. That of course will change when the 

forces go. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. If all movements in Iraq to do your DOS 

and other agency jobs require USF–I to provide security and next 

year they’re gone, who fills that vacuum? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. First of all—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, let me ask this question. Would it be 

wise from an Iraq-U.S. point of view that we not create a complete 

vacuum? Would it make sense, financially or security-wise, to have 

a military footprint left behind if Iraq requests a continuation to 

provide security for DOS officials and others? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. We are always happy to have U.S. military 

security. They’re the best in the world. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

From a professional military point of view, what lies ahead in 

Iraq is the holding and building. Do you believe it makes sense, 

given the security requirements that lie ahead for our DOS officials 

and others to get out and about in Iraq, that it would be wise to 

have an American military contingent in 2012 in Iraq? 

General AUSTIN. Senator, the ISFs have the ability to control the 

internal security in the country currently. They are leading the effort to do that now, and they do need continued work on logistics 

and intelligence capabilities, and so—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you feel comfortable with the ISFs as they 

exist January 1, 2012, to protect the thousands of Americans and 

other people in Iraq trying to provide assistance to that country? 

Can they do the job? Are you comfortable with them being able to 

provide that security? 

General AUSTIN. I think that adequate security will be provided, 

provided the Ambassador is adequately resourced to mitigate—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it your opinion we do not need, from a military point of view, any troops in Iraq in 2012? 

General AUSTIN. Senator, what we’re focused on now is abiding 

by the agreement that—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I know, but you’re advising Congress. You’re 

somebody we respect. You’ve been on the ground a lot. Please put 

on the table what you see as reasonably necessary or an insurance 

policy, for lack of a better word. If you can construct the perfect 

scenario, what would you have that scenario be, regarding military 

involvement in Iraq in 2012 and beyond? 

General AUSTIN. Senator, I would prefer to avoid speculating on 

what we would be able to do and what we could provide, because 

I think the Iraqis would have to make a request and then we 

would, as a matter of policy, our government would have to—— 

Senator GRAHAM. My time is up, but I understand what you’re 

saying. If such a request were made by the Iraqi Government, they 

23 

would love to have some military assistance to help them with the 

boundary disputes, to train their air force, to help develop better 

security for our people and theirs. If such a request was made, 

would you be favorably disposed to say yes? 

General AUSTIN. If that is the policy of the American Government—— 

Senator GRAHAM. No, I’m talking about you. Would you recommend to us to say yes? 

General AUSTIN. Senator, again that’s beyond my pay grade to 

make that recommendation. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Graham. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to welcome Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin to our 

hearing today, thank you for your testimonies today, and your continued efforts to ensure that Iraq becomes a stable, self-sufficient, 

and democratic nation. I also would like to recognize the outstanding men and women you both lead in Iraq, and we appreciate 

their sacrifice and hard work. 

Ambassador Jeffrey, in our transition we’re looking at many 

ways of bringing that about, and in particular the PRTs have been 

in place throughout Iraq since November 2005 and have worked towards building up provincial and local economies. Can you discuss 

the current status of the PRTs as they hand over their mission to 

our consulate office? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Yes, sir. We have gone from a total, including outlier posts, of roughly 30 PRTs down to 16 PRTs right 

now. These are co-located, with the exception of Irbil, with the U.S. 

military. As we discussed, they receive U.S. military security. 

They’re embedded in the U.S. military units. They’re combined 

military-civilian teams focusing on political, development assistance, rule of law, and the like. 

They have been extremely effective in partnering with the U.S. 

military on the delivery of aid, be it CERP, be it our own quick reaction funds, and so forth. What we are going to do is transform, 

if we get permission and the funding, four of those, in Irbil, Mosul, 

Kirkuk, and Basra, into two consulates, in Irbil and Basra. Also, 

two temporary, for a number of years, embassy branch offices in 

Mosul and Kirkuk. This also requires Iraq to approve, at least, the 

embassy branch offices. They have approved the two consulates. 

We also will keep the Baghdad PRT in operation and running out 

of the embassy. We’ll have five. 

Then we’re looking at ways in various other areas, such as 

Diyala and other areas that are important, to conduct fly-ins, to leverage the presence of either the police trainers or the OSC–I to 

develop ‘‘lily pads’’ that I can physically get people and security in, 

so that I can move and have contact with the governmental folks. 

We maintain some of the tremendous contacts and programs that 

we’ve had in places other than the five branches where we will continue to have a significant presence. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. We’d like to continue oversight 

there. 

24 

In October 2010, DOS had over 1,000 employees and 2,700 contractors in Iraq. Current reports indicate that they plan to have 

and hire 7,000 more security contractors. Ambassador Jeffrey, how 

will you ensure that these contracts are fulfilled in an appropriate 

manner, avoiding the types of problems that surfaced under the 

Blackwater security efforts? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Senator, we currently have 2,700 security 

contractors. We’ll increase, for the embassy, to 5,500 personnel. 

Our police training program will require some security as well, let’s 

say the better part of 1,000 more. Then OSC–I working through 

DOD will also have security contractors as well. 

We are very, very concerned about that, given the Blackwater incident in 2007 in downtown Baghdad. DOS, under Under Secretary 

Pat Kennedy, who’s still in the job and watches this closely, wrote 

a report outlining all of the problems that led to that tragic event. 

As a result, we have taken various precautions, modifications, and 

reforms, as have the Iraqis. 

All of these security companies have to be registered with two 

Iraqi ministries. They’re under Iraqi law. We, in addition, have a 

variety of new procedures, tactics, techniques, and procedures as 

we call them or standard operating procedures, that require, for example, a commissioned or full-time DOS security employee to ride 

in every convoy. We have cameras on the vehicles to record everything that goes on. We have Blue Force Trackers to monitor where 

they are. We have done special training in rules of engagement and 

cultural awareness. We have ISFs traveling and coordinating with 

us, and I’m happy to report in thousands of moves in Baghdad and 

in the north in Irbil where we’ve done that since 2007 we have not 

had a serious incident. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

General Austin, the U.S. Government’s presence in Iraq will 

change without question significantly as we draw closer to the end 

of 2011 and we redeploy the remaining military troops. What are 

the future plans for the bases and the facilities? Is any equipment 

going to be handed over to DOS, given to Iraq, or brought back to 

the United States? 

General AUSTIN. Thank you, Senator. Actually, we’ll do some of 

all of that. We will transfer equipment to DOS to help in their future endeavors. As they identify additional requirements, we’ll 

work with the leadership in DOD to make sure that we transition 

or transfer equipment as expeditiously as possible. 

We’re also transitioning or transferring equipment to the ISFs. 

As we’ve drawn down from a much larger footprint than we had, 

over 100,000 personnel, to the footprint that we have today. We 

have 77 bases that we’re operating out of today, but when we 

transitioned in September from combat operations to Operation 

New Dawn, we were at somewhere around 92 bases. As you can 

see, we’ve continued to shrink our footprint somewhat. 

In that process, we have continued to transfer equipment to both 

the Iraqis and, again, identified equipment that should be transferred to the embassy based upon their request. So it’s some of all 

of that, Senator. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka. 

25 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Austin, I want to take another stab at Senator Graham’s 

line of questioning. I realize that you are a military man, that you 

take orders and you don’t speak for yourself. You are under the 

command of the President of the United States as our Commander 

in Chief. We appreciate that, and you’re going to implement the 

policies that you’re directed to implement. 

But I assure you it’s all right for you to come before Congress 

and give opinions as to your best judgment. I think that’s what 

Senator Graham was unable to get from you in his line of questioning. The military troops are going to be gone after January 1, 

2012. We’re going to have a number of American personnel there 

who will still be in harm’s way. So my question is, in your judgment, based upon your expertise, will our American personnel in 

Iraq be as secure without U.S. troops as they would be if troops remained present? 

General AUSTIN. Thank you, Senator. I think Ambassador Jeffrey 

would agree with me when I say this, but because of who I am, I 

always believe that it can be done better with the U.S. military. As 

you pointed out earlier, we are right now focused on achieving the 

objectives that have been laid out with the current Security Agreement that exists between our country and Iraq, and that’s where 

our focus has been. 

Senator WICKER. I understand that there are other considerations, and part of that is what the people of Iraq and the government wants, that they’ve put in place. Could you quantify on a 

scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the security of our American personnel if troops remain, what will be your comfort level about their 

security without troops there? 

General AUSTIN. Senator, I would like to avoid trying to quantify 

any kind of assessment such as that without—— 

Senator WICKER. Clearly your opinion is that our personnel 

would be less safe than if we had troops there. I think that is your 

judgment. You’re going to implement a different policy, but that is 

your judgment; is that not correct, General? 

General AUSTIN. Senator, again because of who I am, I always 

believe that our military adds much value to any situation. I think 

that Ambassador Jeffrey and his team, if adequately resourced, can 

provide for the security of the folks that they’ll have working there. 

It can be done better with our help for sure, because we have a 

long history of doing these types of things. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Then, Mr. Ambassador, let me ask you this. I want to make sure 

that we get your complete testimony. With regard to PSCs, your 

answer to Senator Akaka was: One group of 2,700 security personnel, another group of 5,500, and then you mentioned others, but 

I didn’t get numbers there. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Thank you. If I could take a moment because this is an important point. We have operated with our own 

contract security in Iraq under far worse conditions than we are 

now, when I was there last time in 2004–2005. It was total rock 

and roll. We were in Basra, Hillah, and Kirkuk operating on our 

own. We took casualties, but we did the mission. 

26 

We are continuing to operate in Baghdad and in Irbil with our 

security personnel. They do a very, very good job. They keep our 

people safe. Baghdad is one of the areas where we’ve seen more attacks than most other areas; and we’re prepared to do this 

throughout the country. 

Because the military security, for the places where we’ll still be 

located around the country, is being withdrawn, we have to increase our security forces, both perimeter security around the consulates, embassy branch offices, and movement security, the PSDs. 

Therefore we’re going from, as I said, the current level, which is 

2,700 security contractors and roughly 300 DOS security and support personnel, to some 5,500 contractors, and augmenting somewhat the number of DOS personnel who will be supervising them. 

In addition, the police training program will bring with it some 

additional security personnel. 

Senator WICKER. How many will that be? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I would say the better part of a thousand, 

Senator. But that we need to get back to you on. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Department will provide protective security and static security personnel 

under the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) 

contract for INL–I programs beginning in fiscal year 2011 with anticipated security 

personnel increases in fiscal year 2012. For fiscal year 2011, the staffing plan consisted of 322 WPS static guards at FOB Shield in Baghdad. However, temporarily, 

the DOD TWISS contract will provide static guard services until April 1, 2012, at 

which time 322 WPS static guards will assume operations. In Baghdad, INL will 

have 204 WPS protective security detail (PSD) personnel, 62 WPS PSD personnel 

in Erbil, and 54 WPS PSD personnel in Basra. INL–I’s anticipated security personnel staffing needs in fiscal year 2012 will increase to 291 WPS PSD personnel 

in Baghdad, 103 WPS PSD personnel in Erbil, and 79 WPS PSD personnel in Basra. 

Static Security requirements for Baghdad at FOB Shield are expected to remain the 

same in fiscal year 2012. The total number of anticipated WPS security personnel 

initiating operations in fiscal year 2011 is 320, with an additional increase of 153 

being added in fiscal year 2012 for an overall total of 795 WPS personnel. 

Five DS Special Agents under Regional Security Office (RSO) Baghdad will work 

in direct support of the INL mission in Iraq. These agents will manage security programs that directly relate to INL, and along with other DS personnel, provide operational oversight of WPS contract personnel. DS personnel will not be training providers. Although their primary duty is to manage programs, DS Special Agents are 

fully prepared to serve as agents-in-charge (AIC) of INL PSDs, lead quick response 

force (QRF) operations, conduct security surveys of INL locations and perform other 

security duties as needed. Another important duty of these DS Special Agents will 

be to maintain strong working relationships with their Iraqi Security Force counterparts. 

Depending upon the scope and range of the Police Development Program, up to 

30 DS Security Protective Specialists (SPS) under RSO Baghdad will also be assigned to support INL programs in Iraq. In addition to assisting DS agents in managing security programs, Security Protective Specialists will lead INL PSDs as 

AICs, providing direct operational supervision of WPS personnel. SPS will also staff 

positions requiring unique skill sets such QRF teams. SPS personnel will not be 

training providers. 

Senator WICKER. We have 5,500, then 1,000. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Then—— 

Senator WICKER. Then there’s OSC–I. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. OSC–I, which is the military support element under the embassy, that will be providing security assistance, 

training and equipping, and these FMS cases, they will require security as well. But I don’t have a number on that. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. You mentioned what the population of 

Iraq want with regard to continued U.S. presence. I know at a time 

27 

there was extensive public opinion polling going on of the Iraq people. Mr. Ambassador, is that still the case? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. There is a good number of different polls 

that come out all the time, done by various international agencies, 

private companies, the Iraqis themselves, sir. 

Senator WICKER. Are you privy to that information? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. We see a lot of it, that’s right. 

Senator WICKER. Based on that, the information you have is that 

a substantial majority of the Iraqi people would like the United 

States to continue with a security presence there absent the military; is that correct? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I wouldn’t say a substantial majority, but 

it’s much higher amount wanting a relationship with us, than the 

percent of the population that want to have an American force 

presence. That typically is quite low, between 7 and 20 percent, 

other than in the Kurdish areas, where it’s up about 50 percent or 

higher sometimes. 

Senator WICKER. With regard to the situation that we intend to 

have after January 1, 2012, is there majority support for that? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I would have to check the polls, Senator. 

It’s a tricky question. It was a tricky question when—— 

Senator WICKER. They get tricky even done inside the United 

States. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I know, but—— 

Senator WICKER. It depends on the question. 

Ambassador JEFFREY.—they’re particularly tricky, frankly, in the 

Middle East, where I’ve spent much of my career. They were tricky 

inside Turkey, where in all of these countries, there is a nervousness about countries having too close relations with anybody, including Iran, which does not fare well in any poll in Iraq. Or the 

Sunni Arab countries or Turkey, they’re nervous about relations 

with anybody because all of these countries have had a long history 

of being exploited by neighbors, colonialization and such in the case 

of Iraq. The general reaction of the population is to be wary. 

Nonetheless, as we judge these things, taking that in mind, we 

would say that there is a general positive feeling on the part of the 

population towards relations with the United States in general and 

the program we’ll have after 2012. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, and thank you both for your service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me add my 

appreciation for your service and the men and women in uniform 

who serve, as well as the civilians who serve at the present time. 

I find the discussion about good, better, or best in terms of security there in Iraq as to how we provide it and which will work best. 

The presence, the amount of our presence, and the quality and the 

nature of our presence is an Iraqi decision more than it is ours. 

Having said that, isn’t the question, General, whether or not DOS 

will, with proper resourcing, be able to provide adequate security? 

General AUSTIN. That is one of the important questions, yes, 

Senator. 

28 

Senator NELSON. Yes, we could do it better. We could do the belt 

and suspenders approach. I understand the level of continuing to 

provide even more and I would support and appreciate the fact that 

you’ve pointed out that you feel that the military can do it better. 

You should feel that way. We should all feel that way. 

It’s not about better. It’s about adequate and getting it done sufficiently to protect our presence in Iraq as well. 

Now, let’s get it on the table. Mr. Ambassador, you said Iraq has 

not asked for any continuing U.S. military presence at this time. 

This is a tough question because you don’t have a crystal ball. Do 

you expect that they will ask for some continuing military presence 

after the expiration date? It’s a possibility. Do you expect it? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Again, my crystal ball doesn’t reach that 

far, Senator. I expect them to want to talk more with us about 

their security needs, and how they can be met. This is a country 

with security forces right now of some 650,000 people. They have 

basically beaten an insurgency and they’re doing well against a 

continued but still relatively small resistance, compared to the past 

terrorist threat. 

Senator NELSON. They probably have a reasonable understanding of their capabilities today, and we would hope that they 

would have a reasonable expectation, understanding, and evaluation of their security capabilities at the point of departure. It’s not 

unreasonable to expect that if they’re inadequately resourced in security, that they might want to have some additional help. We’re 

not anticipating that at the present time, but that’s perhaps one of 

the plans that we ought to have in mind. Is that fair? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. As I said, we are already preparing to provide that help with police training, FMS, FMF, and the multitude 

of security and military assistance of various forms that are required. To turn them into a foundational conventional defense force 

that they need to be and where they’re not now, will require a good 

deal of help. 

How that help is construed, whether it can fall into the program 

that we have set out after 2012 or would require something more, 

is something that they haven’t come to us and talked to us about. 

Senator NELSON. This would constitute conditions on the ground 

at the time, is that fair? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. That’s what will drive their decisions on 

talking to us about this, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. In terms of turning over equipment, I’ve always 

been concerned about the fact that we don’t want to be the kind 

of military that we are bought and paid for by a foreign country 

on the one hand. On the other hand, as we transfer equipment are 

we finding ways for them to pay for the costs of that equipment, 

either at the current time or with some future arrangement for 

them to pay us back rather than simply providing equipment and 

leaving it free of charge? General Austin? 

General AUSTIN. Some of the equipment has and will, in fact, be 

paid for, Senator. It depends on the category of the equipment. The 

answer to your question is yes. 

Senator NELSON. I know that some time ago we entered into an 

agreement with Iraq, where, when they were having trouble acquiring equipment because of their own internal inadequacies and 

29 

procedures, we actually acquired it on their behalf with their 

money. My hope is that we will be as careful with the taxpayers’ 

dollars in the transfer of the equipment as we should be. Recognizing that we are paying for a great deal of the war in Iraq. It’s 

a tremendous impact on our budget. It’s not the driving force as to 

whether or not we continue to do what we think is right, but it is 

a factor, and I hope that everybody will be focused on that as we 

create this transition. 

Can you assure me, both of you, that, not out of the goodness of 

our heart, but recognizing the importance to doing this in a good, 

sound economic way that we will try to recover as much of our 

costs in that transfer as possible? Ambassador? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. We have been pressing them to increase 

and they have, Senator. They spend $8 billion a year on their security forces. That has been going up. The percentage of how much 

they put into their equipment purchased externally and how much 

we put into it has been rising in their favor and it will continue 

to do so. This is not a long-term program that we’re envisaging. 

Senator NELSON. General? 

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir. In addition to that, they have about 

$13 billion or so worth of FMS cases that we are processing with 

them. They are not only investing in their own future, but we are 

playing a large part of that. They’re investing in our equipment as 

well. 

Senator NELSON. This could be the third leg of that, to recover 

some of our costs as we make that transfer. It’s consistent with 

where the trend is and we just ought to make sure this is part of 

that trend? 

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. If I could clarify something, Ambassador, in 

answer to Senator Nelson’s question you said the percentage that 

Iraq is paying is rising in their favor. You mean that the percentage that they’re paying is rising or they’re paying more? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. They’re paying more. Of the weapons systems that have been flowing in to them, the percent of the total 

cost that they pay for has been rising consistently for the last several years. 

Chairman LEVIN. When you use the term ‘‘rising in their favor,’’ 

it’s rising in our favor, not in their favor, as far as I think Senator 

Nelson’s point was. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Exactly. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to again commend both Ambassador Jeffrey and General 

Austin for your distinguished service. I want to also thank our men 

and women in the armed forces for their sacrifice and the tremendous progress that we’ve made in Iraq, and also their DOS counterparts and the important work that you do. 

Ambassador, can you think of another circumstance where DOS 

has had the security responsibilities, you said that we will have, 

of approximately at least 5,500 contractors, perhaps another thousand security personnel, and have had success in transitioning 

from a military security basis to that much security responsibility? 

30 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Back in 2004–2005, Senator, when I was 

there, we provided essentially all of our own security for our operations throughout Iraq. It was not as large as this program, but it 

was significant. DOS provides the security for all of our personnel 

in Pakistan. While it’s a somewhat, from other circumstances, an 

unfortunate analogy, but I was involved in the transition on the 

military side when we turned over to the embassy in Saigon with 

a tremendous equipment delivery and security mission in February 

1973. 

Senator AYOTTE. Ambassador, I believe you testified that when 

you were in Iraq previously that it was sort of ‘‘rock and roll’’ in 

terms of what you were dealing with. One of the concerns that I 

have is, obviously, we don’t want to put our personnel in that position again, where those are the circumstances under which they 

are working, and I’m sure you share that concern as well. 

What circumstances do you anticipate that you may recommend 

to your superiors that we approach the Iraqi Government to ask for 

an extension of the military presence past 2011 deadline? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Let me put that a little bit differently, 

Senator. The assumptions I have made that we can do, I would go 

beyond adequate, security that I’m comfortable with putting people 

out there based upon the continuation of the current security 

trends. That is, with attacks down 90 percent from the high point 

back in that era; with the ISFs on the job. They still have some 

areas that need to be improved and that exposes certain weaknesses, but they’re the outer security, we’re the inner security, if 

you will. Most of the time, they fend off most of the threats, particularly the bigger tactical or military threats, and we have to 

worry more about bombs, IEDs, snipers, and that kind of thing, as 

opposed to platoon-sized ambushes. 

If that were to change, if the ISFs no longer could control large 

areas where we’re moving, I would be in a different circumstance 

and would have to consider options at that time, and there are 

many options. Again, I’d like to wait until those circumstances 

arise and I do not expect them to arise at this point. 

Senator AYOTTE. With that many contractors that you’re currently relying on, and relying on additional contractors as this 

transition is made, are you confident that there’s sufficient oversight to address waste, fraud, and abuse with taxpayer dollars that 

are funding those contractors? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Any large program, Senator, and this is already a large program, requires oversight. It requires both people 

on the ground, contracting officer representatives, who follow up. 

We have a very active program at the embassy. We’re under constant supervision, as cited earlier by the chairman, the SIGIR; our 

own IG, military IGs for their side of the operation; and our own 

internal controls and my Deputy Assistant, Ambassador Peter 

Bodde, particularly watches over that. 

Senator AYOTTE. General, a question about our forces in Kuwait. 

They are offering logistical support in Iraq and also Afghanistan at 

this time. Do you anticipate any enhanced force presence in Kuwait 

in case there is an emergency in Iraq from either Iranian aggression or some other form, where security regresses in Iraq? 

31 

General AUSTIN. Actually, Senator, that positioning of forces in 

Kuwait really falls in the domain of the CENTCOM commander, 

General Mattis, and the commander that he has forward on the 

ground there, General Webster. In support of our operations in 

Iraq, I would not want to speculate that we have to increase the 

amount of forces in Kuwait. That is not a part of the plan as we 

look ahead here. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator Webb is next. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin, I’d like to thank you 

and all the people who are working with you during this transitional period as we climb out of a hole that we dug 8 years ago, 

in the view of many people and myself, having come from an enormous strategic blunder. We were worried, and were saying so at 

the time, that this endeavor would harm the country’s economy, 

that it would blow the top off of the price of oil. I recall when Congress voted to go to war in Iraq oil was $24 a barrel. It went up 

to $143 and today it’s about $102. 

We were concerned that this activity would empower rather than 

contain Iran, that it would encourage greater activities of al Qaeda 

in a country where it had not been active to any degree before and 

it had the potential to destabilize the region. Most importantly, 

there were concerns that I shared and wrote about before the invasion, that the invasion of Iraq would create the temptation or the 

possibility of a long-term occupation by the United States in a part 

of the world where we should not be an occupying power. 

This last point has been the underlying premise of a number of 

questions that have been raised today about what’s going to happen to the military presence in Iraq in the immediate future. I 

have read the Status of Forces Agreement and the Strategic 

Framework Agreement. They’re not airtight, as I think you know, 

in terms of the requirement for United States military withdrawal. 

There are people on this committee, and in the Senate, who have 

argued that the United States should remain in Iraq in the same 

sense that it’s remained in Korea, as a projection force. Some arguments were made during the past campaign that we should be 

there for another 50 years. 

There really are two different questions when it comes down to 

whether our military should remain in Iraq. The first is whether 

they are needed in domestic terms, which is what a lot of the discussion has centered on today. The second one, and the most important one, is beyond this transition period should we or are we 

discussing the notion of providing bases in Iraq as a projection 

force that could be used externally from Iraq or in a situation other 

than for the domestic concerns that you’re talking about. 

Ambassador, have you had any discussions of that? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. We haven’t, Senator. To go back to 2008, 

I was involved peripherally in the negotiation of these agreements 

when I worked on the National Security Council and the Iraqis 

made it very clear at that time. It was in black and white in the 

agreement, somewhere between articles 24 and 27, that we are not 

to have permanent bases, we are not to use our presence in Iraq 

32 

to project power of any sort or in any way outside of Iraq. That was 

the explicit understanding that the administration at the highest 

levels, and I was present for these deliberations, went into with 

that agreement. Our presence in Iraq as we move forward from 

2008 to the end of 2011 would be solely to help the ISF and the 

general stability of the country. 

Our belief, Senator, after 20 years of having highs of 500,000 

troops in 1991 and lows of a few tens of thousands of troops with 

Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, was that securing Iraq, making it a relatively peaceful place that didn’t require 

the kind of military commitments, large- or medium-sized, that 

many administrations and both parties have supported for the 20 

years. This was a great security benefit in and of itself. Therefore 

we decided to keep the forces on to finish the fight, if you will, and 

we think we’re pretty close to that by the end of this year. But the 

Iraqis have no intention of having us have bases or project power 

and that’s not our intent at all, sir. 

Senator WEBB. Let me clarify something from what you said or 

get a clarification from you. There has been a lot of discussion this 

week in the previous hearing in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and this one as well, that Iraq is not presently capable of 

providing security against external threats. I assume we are keeping military forces in Iraq to address that issue for some period of 

time, where that is a part of a formula? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Under the current agreement, Senator, we 

are not going to keep military forces in Iraq after 2011. What we 

will do, given the fact that Iraq does not have a foundational conventional defense, external defense capability, it’s just beginning to 

focus on that because its focus has been on internal security, what 

we’re going to do is to continue our training and equipping program, which will be quite extensive. Both FMF and FMS programs 

that they purchase for main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, 155-millimeter self-propelled and towed howitzers, aircraft 

systems, and other platforms, that they can develop this capability. 

We’re going to be there with them, helping them do this in a very 

broad and extensive way, but at this point not with combat troops 

on the ground, sir. 

Senator WEBB. In an advisory capacity, as opposed to with independent units? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. That’s the plan, exactly. 

Senator WEBB. Just so I’ll understand, it’s been some time since 

I’ve read the Strategic Framework Agreement, but there was, and 

I can provide it for the record if necessary, there was loose language in the sense of a further agreement being possible if the 

Iraqi Government, for instance, decided that it needed help beyond 

a period of time. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. In the first agreement, the Security Agreement, Senator, there is an article that says that either side can ask 

to extend it, just like either side can ask to terminate it. In the 

Strategic Framework Agreement, there’s a section on security. 

That’s section 3. Section 10 basically states that additional agreements within the framework of the Strategic Framework Agreement can be set up to do one of the many purposes of the Strategic 

33 

Framework Agreement, that can be culture, it can be energy, and 

it could be security. 

Senator WEBB. Just to clarify the point because my time is up, 

it is your understanding that as of the end of 2011 the formal commitment of the United States, as ground forces per se or combat 

forces per se will have ended and the transition would be into advisory roles, as we’ve been discussing today. Is that correct? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. It is our plan that we will have a security 

relationship, Senator, and quite possibly a follow-on agreement 

under article 10 to talk about how we would do that advisory and 

training function. It would be an advisory and training function 

under title 22 authorities under DOS as a security assistance organization, as opposed to a combatant commander subordinate force, 

sir. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, General. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before Senator Webb departs, I wanted to associate myself with 

his initial remarks. I think the Senator brings an incisive set of impressions and analysis to the decisions leading up to the invasion 

of Iraq. I know I served in the House at the time and asked many 

of those same questions. I know the chairman as well has been 

deeply involved in those considerations. I think at great peril do we 

forget those lessons in the long run. 

Good morning to both of you. Welcome. Thank you again for the 

hospitality that you provided to Senator Whitehouse and myself 

when we were with you in October. General Austin, thank you for 

your in-depth military operations brief and the way in which your 

personnel showed us the country. 

Ambassador Jeffrey, your hard work paid off. We were privy, 

with your assistance, to a series of meetings with political leaders 

across the spectrum in Iraq. I note that your analogy of mixing bitter tea with sugar so that everybody could drink out of the same 

pot of tea in the end prevailed. Congratulations for those successes 

there and for the establishment of a government. 

I also want to acknowledge the partnership that you have. I 

think it models the partnership that Ambassador Ryan Crocker 

and General David Petraeus had preceding you. The jointness that 

we now have in our civilian and military efforts is really key to the 

successes that we want to have. 

I know the immense challenge that we have in front of us. We’re 

discussing that here today. As you’ve explained, the success of the 

transition will be dependent on a number of factors, many of which 

we have little or no control over. Again, we’re engaged and your 

leadership is very, very important. 

If I might specifically move to Al Anbar, we had a chance, General, to travel out to Ramadi and the progress there was significant. In your written testimony, you assess that AQI will remain 

capable of signature attacks, but will lack public support. Are there 

any conditions under which you could imagine that public support 

for AQI would again increase like we saw in those tough days in 

Al Anbar in particular? 

34 

General AUSTIN. I’ll offer my thoughts first and then offer the 

Ambassador the opportunity to provide his thoughts. 

I don’t think so, Senator Udall. I don’t think the people want 

what AQI brings to their country. They had a good look at that a 

while back and a couple of years ago they decided that they wanted 

something different. So AQI does not enjoy the support of the people, and I don’t see them returning to prominence to the degree 

that they were a while back. 

I think that the people have seen better times. They want different things. They want a greater sense of security in the country. 

I don’t see it returning. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I agree with General Austin, sir. 

Senator UDALL. Ambassador, referencing the image you continue 

to share with the Iraqi leadership of bitter tea sweetened, the 

Sadrists are now part of the ruling coalition government. Al Sadr 

himself, I understand, has returned back to Iran after he had a triumphant return to Iraq earlier this year. Is there any significance 

to those developments? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. As a general rule, Senator, at this time in 

Iraq, it’s not just our assessment from the outside, but it’s the assessment of the Iraqis that an inclusive government that brings in 

all of the political actors, including some of the more problematic 

political actors, is a good thing. This too allows inside the government, the coalition, and the parliament people to work out compromises and to move forward. 

In that sense, Iraqis believe, including some that are quite suspicious of the Sadrist movement, that them being in the government is a good thing. Many Iraqis that I talk to also are quite 

pleased that their role in government is not particularly large. I 

think that I’ll just stop there. 

Senator UDALL. Yes. 

We’ve had some conversation this morning, including Senator 

Nelson’s questions to you, about the transfer of equipment, authorities, and missions from the DOD to DOS. I think we all acknowledge there will be some other bumps in the road as the transition 

continues. Can you help us understand if there’s more we could do 

in Congress to help expedite this transition? 

Then I was also thinking in addition, given the eventual likelihood and I think it has to be a certain likelihood, that there will 

be a similar transition in Afghanistan, do you see a need for a set 

of authorities to guide such transition? In other words, from DOD 

to DOS. Ambassador and then maybe the General could add his 

thoughts. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Very briefly and I’ll turn it over to the 

General because there are some authority questions on the DOD 

side. It’s not a question of authorities at this time, Senator. It’s a 

question of the funding. We need the funding. As we talked earlier, 

this will be a substantial part of the DOS budget, but a very small 

part of what we had been paying just a year before overall from 

the Federal budget for Iraq. We’re hoping that people will focus on 

that latter point rather than on the former point, that it’s a big 

chunk of the DOS budget. 

Senator UDALL. If I can interrupt, General, just for 30 seconds— 

Ambassador, that, although the number of 17,000 employees 

35 

sounds large, it’s actually a significant decrease from what was 

85,000 personnel on the ground at one point in Iraq. Is that accurate? Please correct me if I’m misinformed. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The military presence, I’ll leave that to 

General Austin. I can’t give the figures for that. But it obviously 

is many times what the 15,000 and to 10,000 to 20,000 range that 

we’re looking at. 

Senator UDALL. Over that working lunch we had with your team 

that we were actually drawing down quite significantly. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The overall U.S. Government footprint in 

the country will be a dramatic decrease of way more than 90 percent from its highest point. 

Senator UDALL. General Austin? 

General AUSTIN. When we were operating as a coalition force, 

Senator, we had upwards of 160,000 total people in the country. 

We drew down to about 100,000 or so when the United States 

began to provide the majority of the assistance there. 

Then, most recently, we’ve drawn down to a little less than 

50,000. That’s a pretty significant transition over time. 

Back to your question on authorities, we do need additional authorities to fund the renovation and construction associated with 

the standup of the OSC–I. We would look forward to working with 

Congress to be able to obtain those authorities. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you again for your service. I look forward 

to seeing you in country perhaps later this year. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

To Ambassador Jeffrey and to General Austin, thank you for 

your appearance today. As one of the new people on the committee 

and new to the Senate, I want to also thank you and DOD for 

bringing us up to speed as quickly as possible. 

General Austin, I’ll start with you if I may. As a person who 

comes from the State of West Virginia, who is extremely patriotic, 

like this entire Nation, we thank you for your service. 

Sir, at the time of the attack on September 11, we pretty much 

knew that al Qaeda was our enemy and that was our direction of 

force, if you will. Who have you identified as our enemy today that 

we’re fighting in the Middle East, whether it be Afghanistan or 

Iraq? What is the strength of the force of that enemy? 

General AUSTIN. Iraq remains a very complex environment, Senator, and there are a number of elements that play in Iraq that oppose not only our efforts, but, most importantly, the Government 

of Iraq’s efforts. To start with, we’ve spoken of AQI earlier. AQI is 

much diminished in terms of capability if we look at it today versus 

what it was a couple of years ago. Our counterterrorist forces have 

had tremendous impact in reducing the capability of the network. 

We’ve taken a number of their senior leaders off the battlefield 

over time. We’ve reduced their capability to finance themselves, 

and we continue to place pressure on AQI. 

Senator MANCHIN. What’s the number, sir, just for my information, as far as what would be their number of strength? Is it 

10,000, 5,000, 100,000, al Qaeda? 

36 

General AUSTIN. I’ll take that question for the record, sir, because I want to make sure we’re accurate there. But it’s in the several thousands, but certainly not 10,000. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. 

General AUSTIN. Their ability to do what we saw them do in the 

past is somewhat diminished. Having said that, they do have the 

capability to conduct high-profile attacks and we’ve seen that most 

recently during the Arba’een celebration here as we saw Shia pilgrims march down towards Karbala. We expected that AQI would 

try to attack some of the pilgrims and they did. 

There are also other Sunni insurgent elements that are in the 

environment, like Jaysh Rijal Tariqah al-Naqshabandi for example. 

Their focus is currently on U.S. forces. We believe that if we are 

no longer there then they will turn their focus on the Iraqi Government. 

Turning to Shia extremist elements, there are three major elements that we focus on on a daily basis. The first is Khateb 

Hezbollah and the number for Khatib Hezbollah is a couple of 

thousand. Then Asaib Ahl al-Haq, also a couple of thousand. Then 

the Promise Day Brigade, that element has been associated with 

Sadr. 

It remains a complex environment. Each of the elements have 

their own focus. The Shia extremists, for example, are primarily focused on us currently. There’s no question in my mind that if we 

are no longer there they will turn their focus on the Government 

of Iraq. 

Senator MANCHIN. Trying to get a handle on this, the amount of 

forces that we have in the Middle East right now is at what level, 

the amounts? 100,000? 

General AUSTIN. In the entire Middle East? 

Senator MANCHIN. Iraq and Afghanistan. 

General AUSTIN. I think there are about 98,000 troops in Afghanistan. Our current footprint in Iraq is less than 50,000, a little bit 

above 47,000 currently. 

Senator MANCHIN. A little less than 150,000, and we’ve identified 

not that many thousand enemies. 

General AUSTIN. Right. Of course, we have forces in other parts 

of the Middle East. 

Senator MANCHIN. I’m sure of that. It makes it confusing for 

those of us who don’t have the military experience, and us being 

such a technology-based military, why we have such a presence 

with such few enemies identified. 

General AUSTIN. I understand the question, Senator. I would say 

that when you look at the numbers, it could be misleading to compare numbers of friendly forces to suspected numbers of enemy 

forces. You have to really take into account the type of operations, 

the type of warfare that you’re conducting. The types of operations 

that we’re doing in both Iraq and Afghanistan are very, very difficult. 

Currently in Iraq, we are focused primarily on advising, training, 

assisting, and equipping the ISF. We are partnering with them in 

37 

conducting counterterrorist operations, but we shifted our focus 

from combat operations with our conventional forces back on September 1. 

Senator MANCHIN. What differences do you see from the Soviet 

war with Afghanistan and the war that we’re fighting? 

General AUSTIN. I would defer to Dave Petraeus and his leadership to really provide those comments. 

Senator MANCHIN. They had overwhelming forces and superiority, the same as we have overwhelming forces and superiority in 

comparison; correct? 

General AUSTIN. There have been a number of attempts to compare what the Soviets did to what we are doing in Afghanistan. 

Some people would draw parallels and others would not. Again, 

we’re taking a different approach to what we’re doing there in 

terms of protecting the people and working with the people. It’s 

very difficult to make a direct comparison from the Soviets to us. 

Senator MANCHIN. Ambassador Jeffrey, if I may. A tremendous 

amount of resources that have been invested into the war in the 

Middle East by the United States, especially Iraq and Afghanistan, 

that I have heard could be extracted, particularly the oil and development of the oil fields in Iraq. It’s hard for a lot of, especially 

West Virginians, but also Americans to understand. Is there a return for us or any sharing of that, or are we all in with nothing 

in return? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Senator, it’s a good question and it’s a 

question that is both above my pay grade and that every single citizen needs to look at. The logic of what we’ve been doing since 

World War II, and almost everything that I’ve been involved in for 

the last 40 years flows from that, is that if we can maintain international security, freedom of trade, promote democracy, we won’t 

ever have to go through something like what we went through in 

the first half of the last century—World War I, World War II, the 

advent of the nuclear threat. In the long run, while it is indirect, 

that brings tremendous benefits to the American people and to the 

rest of the world. 

It’s not a zero sum game. It’s not that we benefit like Rome benefited at the expense of many of the people on the periphery. Everybody benefits together, the system is stable, and we’re able to deal 

with the threats to it. What we’re doing in the Middle East is dealing with one of the threats to this system that’s been in place for 

the last 60 years, sir. 

Senator MANCHIN. Basically we get, as a country and our general 

fund, no return on the investment we’re making. That’ll be turned 

over to the private sector. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. As I said, Senator, we as a Nation benefit 

tremendously from international security and not having to spend 

15 or 20 percent of our gross domestic product on the military. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have other questions I’ll submit. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Manchin. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to join in thanking both of you and the men and women 

who serve with you for your service. General Austin, many of your 

38 

soldiers and others who serve in our military are from Connecticut 

and have been to Iraq not just once but twice, and some three 

times, in tours of service. I would guess that very rarely in our 

country’s history have few of the total number of people who live 

in this country, our citizens, borne so much of the burden militarily 

for this country. 

To you, Ambassador, my thanks on behalf of Connecticut and our 

country to the members of the foreign service who are in not only 

Iraq but other dangerous places in the world. We have only to look 

at today’s headlines to see how dangerous those places are to civilians as well as the military. 

I want to focus my questions on an area that hasn’t been covered 

and perhaps would seem to be outside this committee’s jurisdiction, 

but I think is very relevant to the transition you’ve been describing. The economic progress of Iraq, which in the long-run, maybe 

even in the short-run, will make possible its funding for the continued protection of its own citizens. 

Perhaps, Ambassador, if you could give us your analysis of the 

progress that’s been made economically, the prognosis for Iraq 

making further progress and thereby funding some of the activities 

we’ve been describing today. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Certainly, Senator. Very briefly, Iraq has 

a population of about 28 million people. It has a per capita income 

of roughly $3,000 per person. This puts it on roughly the level of 

the Republic of the Congo. It is a very poor country today, despite 

it being naturally a rich country, in oil and agriculture, with an 

educated population, because of horrific leadership by Saddam 

Hussein and some of his predecessors over decades of repeated 

wars and internal turmoil. 

The bulk of their economy, over two-thirds, is in the oil extraction. Right now they’re improving, thanks to the help of international oil companies that were brought in about a year and a 

half ago, and we anticipate that oil production will be up perhaps 

as high as 2.6 to 2.8 million barrels. That’s roughly equivalent to 

or a little bit more than Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates and 

a little bit less than Iran. By the end of the year, exports will be 

well over 2 million barrels a day. That’s their main foreign exchange earner. 

The non-oil economy is growing at a rate of about 6 percent to 

8 percent. Over time it will begin to deal with the unemployment 

problem. But right now we have 18 percent unemployment, which 

is obviously very high and has a security dimension as well, because next to unemployment there is an even higher level of underemployment, particularly of young men. This is very worrisome to 

us, and it’s one of the targets of the many programs we’ve done 

through USAID, through the military and CERP. 

In terms of the oil, as I said, the Iraqis have had considerable 

success with the international oil companies in increasing up to 10 

percent the output of these fields. This could go up as high as 6 

to 8 million barrels a day. Some people see even higher, putting it 

almost in the range of Saudi Arabia. 

However, there are major breaks on such developments. First of 

all is the infrastructure. In fact, they will be slowed down, in terms 

of continuing to export their additional production, because they 

39 

have to repair the offshore terminals. That work won’t be complete 

until the end of this year at best. 

Second, they will then have before them major improvements to 

the internal storage tank and pipeline infrastructure that gets the 

oil from the fields to the terminals. They’re going to have to repair 

the northern pipeline that goes to Turkey if they want to get over 

700,000 barrels, and the potential up in the north is quite a bit 

above that. 

That will require an awful lot of their oil earnings to be poured 

back into repairing the infrastructure in order to prime the pump, 

if you will. 

Likewise, the oil companies are on cost-plus contracts basically 

and they’re starting to recover their costs. Much of the increased 

production profits are going to go to covering the costs of the oil 

companies, rather than improving the Iraqi budget. It’s going to be 

a number of years before we see a significant impact on the Iraqi 

budget of these increases. Nonetheless, the very economic activity 

associated with that and the general slow improvement in the 

economy augurs well for the next 5 years if we can get over the 

remaining security and economic problems. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. At what point do you envision that the 

Iraqis themselves would take over a greater share of funding their 

own security? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Right now, they are funding the vast ma- jority of their security, $8 billion a year. The ISF program is about 

$1.5 billion which I think was asked for in the program, and we 

have about a $1 billion police training program. Right now it’s $2.5 

billion plus the cost of the U.S. military being there. 

But within a few years our programs will basically terminate and 

they will be on their own, and we think that they’re in a position 

where they can continue at that level. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. What is the current level of security of the 

Iraq oil fields, its production, and output facilities? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The security is provided by Iraqi forces, on 

the outer perimeter. The inner perimeter is the security companies 

themselves. They, just like us, hire PSCs to do the job. There are 

many of them operating in the private sector there. Also there’s 

overwatch by General Austin’s people in the south, who coordinate 

closely with the oil companies and with the ISFs in terms of intelligence-sharing and improving the capabilities of the Iraqi forces. 

You basically have three separate levels of security, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much, and again my 

thanks to both of you for your service to the country. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

We’ll have a round two for those who want to ask questions. I 

just have a few. 

General Austin, you were reluctant to speculate as to what your 

recommendation be if there were a request from the Iraq government for any military support beyond the December 2011 date. It 

relates to that question, which is asking your personal and professional military view, from a military perspective, as to whether or 

not you agree with the current policy of the administration to remove all U.S. military forces from Iraq by the end of this year? 

40 

General AUSTIN. Senator, the agreement that I think that we’re 

referring to is between our country and the Government of Iraq, 

and that agreement says that unless a request is made by the 

Iraqis to extend the agreement or a request for assistance is made, 

then our mandate is to reposition or reposture all forces. 

We’re on track to do that. Now, certainly if the Iraqis decide that 

they need further assistance and a request is made to our government, then I think Secretary Gates has been clear. He said that we 

would certainly consider that. But that policy is in the domain of 

our leadership and I really would not like to speculate on it. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m not asking you to speculate as to what 

would happen if there’s a request. I am asking for your personal 

professional military view on whether or not you believe that we 

have the correct policy now, which is to remove all of our combat 

troops, from Iraq by the end of this year? 

General AUSTIN. I think that—— 

Chairman LEVIN. That is a question which you are obligated to 

answer under the commitments that you have made to this committee and under our rules. 

General AUSTIN. Right. Thank you, Senator. As I said earlier, I 

do believe that Ambassador Jeffrey and his team can provide adequate security for their elements that they’ll have remaining. I do 

believe also that it can be provided better with the help of U.S. 

forces. I also believe that, as I stated earlier, that the ISFs will 

have gaps in their capabilities to defend themselves in the future. 

Certainly if they request and our government agrees to provide assistance, then certainly I think that is absolutely the right thing 

to do. 

Chairman LEVIN. You say it’s always true that our troops can 

provide better security and I think as a military man that’s understandable. But that’s not my question, whether we can provide better security than contractors can provide. My question is what is 

your personal and professional military view as to whether or not 

our policy is correct to remove all of our forces as provided for in 

that agreement by the end of this year? If you disagree with that 

policy, you better say so right now. 

General AUSTIN. My personal opinion is again I think the Iraqis 

will require further assistance. 

Chairman LEVIN. Military combat assistance on the ground after 

the end of this year? 

General AUSTIN. Assistance to develop their capabilities. 

Chairman LEVIN. That could be training and equipment. 

General AUSTIN. That would be training and equipment. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m asking you beyond that. I’m asking you 

whether or not our decision, President Bush’s decision, implemented by agreement, to remove all of our ground forces by the end 

of this year is the right decision for us to make? Or do you believe 

it’s wrong and we should offer to keep our troops there whether or 

not we get a request? 

General AUSTIN. I think we should only offer to provide assistance if requested by the Iraqi Government, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Then what would your recommendation be if 

there were such a request, right now? 

41 

General AUSTIN. It would be based upon the things that they requested assistance for or with. If that’s training on their counterterrorist forces, combined arms training, training or assistance 

with logistical support or whatever it is, it would be my responsibility to look at what’s being asked for and what we agree to do 

and then provide an assessment to my leadership on what that 

would require in terms of forces. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m going to ask you that question again for the 

record, because I think it’s incumbent on you to give us an answer 

to the question that I ask. I’ll ask it of you for the record, and then 

you can decide whether or not to respond to that question that I 

ask you. Okay? 

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, there’s another unresolved issue, which is 

the future of a group that’s at Camp Ashraf, which is an Iranian 

dissident group. Ambassador, I want to know whether or not you 

believe that the Government of Iraq has the obligation to provide 

adequate protection for these people and whether or not they are 

doing it and whether you are confident, if they are providing adequate protection, that they will continue to do so after December. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. First of all, Mr. Chairman, they do have 

obligations both under international law and in a specific written 

agreement with us from 2008 to both provide adequate humanitarian protection and care of these people and not to force them to 

go to a country where they could legitimately expect to be mistreated. 

The Iraqis generally are providing adequate security and protection for these people. We have had a number of unfortunate incidents. We are on this. The United Nations and we go up there 

every week. We are in constant contact with the Iraqis and we talk 

to them about this all the time. 

Chairman LEVIN. How confident are you that they’re going to 

provide protection after December? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I absolutely think that they’ll continue to 

provide security. I mean, there are no U.S. forces there, Senator, 

and I don’t think that whether we are present or after we’re gone 

will change their position. The international community has certain 

basic expectations of all members of the international community 

and one of them is not to mistreat people who are in these conditions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can you give us a confidence level? Are you 

very confident they’re going to provide protection or somewhat confident? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I’m confident. On a scale of not confident 

to very confident, I’m confident. 

Chairman LEVIN. On a scale? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. As I said, confident would be one level 

below very confident. 

Chairman LEVIN. Alright. 

On the question of violence against religious minorities, we met 

with leaders of the Iraq Christian community. They’re very concerned. You two are very concerned as well, I believe. Give us your 

assessment of the situation, but also whether or not Iraq is training units comprised of religious minorities who can be deployed to 

42 

the areas where they come from and where their respective communities reside in order to provide security? Can you give us an 

answer to both of those questions? 

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir. I’ll take the last question first. The 

prime minister has directed that 500 Iraqi Christians be hired and 

incorporated into the MOI to provide additional assistance in protecting the Christian neighborhoods. 

Chairman LEVIN. Villages and communities? 

General AUSTIN. That’s right, Senator. These 500 will be really 

employed across the country from Mosul to Baghdad and in other 

places. That hiring process is taking place. Initially there were 

some applicants that were above the age limit and the prime minister has come back and offered an age waiver for those applicants. 

We expect to see them on board in about a week or so. 

Chairman LEVIN. Ambassador? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Senator, on my list of things that make me 

optimistic, I would say that the reaction across the board in Iraq 

to the attack on the church on the 31st of October is one of those 

things that make me feel best about the future of Iraq in terms of 

an inclusive society that can deal with violence and can deal with 

diversity. 

Everybody across the board has been magnificent in outreach. 

They followed that up with concrete actions. We have seen, unfortunately, a number of major attacks, particularly by AQI, since 

that time, but no major attack by AQI has been conducted successfully on a Christian facility. AQI would like to do more, but Christian facilities are getting a lot of protection. 

It’s also the sincerity and the depth of the reaction of people from 

all religious groups in Iraq to this. The Christians really are considered a part of the community by all of the other communities 

in Iraq, and that’s a good model for people in other places. 

Chairman LEVIN. I hope that you’ll keep that concern on the 

radar screen, there may be good intent, but they’re also having to 

deal with some people there who have malicious intent. They’re 

going to have to put some resources in there to implement their intent to carry out what you say is their beliefs, that there is a history there of tolerance and participation by the Christian community, that the leadership in Iraq want to protect. They need to have 

the resources in order to carry out that intent because of the threat 

that exists there. 

We will stand adjourned, with thanks again to both of you for 

your testimony and for your service. We hope you’ll pass that along 

to the men and women with whom you work. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN IRAQ

1. Senator LEVIN. General Austin, in your personal and professional military view, 

and from a purely military perspective, if the Government of Iraq requested the continued presence of U.S. military forces, including combat forces, would you recommend the approval of such a request? 

General AUSTIN. Yes, I would recommend approval for a request for U.S. forces 

that would mitigate the most significant gaps in Iraqi military capabilities and address critical missions remaining in Iraq. This could include combat forces for 

counter-terrorism and air sovereignty missions, but would be primarily focused on 

43 

training and stability tasks as well as select enabling functions such as logistics and 

intelligence. My recommendation would ultimately be based on an assessment of the 

operational conditions at the time of the request. The President has been clear on 

the U.S. objectives for Iraq: a sovereign, stable, self reliant Iraq that is just, representative and accountable and that provides neither support nor safe haven to terrorists. I believe that a continued U.S. military presence in Iraq would significantly 

reduce the risk to these objectives. 

SECURITY SERVICES CONTRACTING

2. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Jeffrey, in September 2010, the Department of 

State (DOS) notified eight companies that they could compete for their private security work under the Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract. One of those 

companies was International Development Solutions (IDS), a joint venture that is 

49 percent owned by the company known as Blackwater. In 2007, after the tragic 

shooting at Nisour Square by Blackwater guards, Blackwater was reportedly banned 

from operating in Iraq. Will IDS, which is 49 percent owned by Blackwater, be eligible to compete for DOS security contracts in Iraq? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The WPS contract was competed in accordance with the 

Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). The FAR allows any company to submit a 

proposal in response to an acquisition process based on full and open competition. 

During the evaluation process for the WPS base contract, DOS performed a review 

of all proposals to confirm that they met the minimum criteria established by the 

WPS contract requirements. This review included a process to determine whether 

any companies had been suspended or debarred from the award of Federal contracts; IDS, despite Blackwater’s 49 percent ownership, was determined eligible to 

bid on the base contract and was one of the eight awardees. IDS submitted a proposal for both the Baghdad and Basrah task orders; however, they did not meet the 

licensing requirements and their proposals were not reviewed during the Technical 

Evaluation Panels. 

Each task order awarded under the WPS base contract, including the five in Iraq, 

are evaluated separately and include specific requirements regarding licensing in 

the country where services are being performed. Companies that do not meet the 

minimum mandatory requirements are not eligible for award. Since IDS does not 

currently hold a license to operate in Iraq, it does not meet the minimum mandatory 

requirements for the Iraq task orders. 

On December 17, 2010, USTC Holdings LLC acquired Xe Services and its core 

subsidiaries. As part of the transaction, USTC Holdings will acquire the Xe companies that provide domestic and international training, as well as security services. 

As one of Xe’s core operating subsidiaries, U.S. Training Center was included in this 

transaction and is now owned by USTC Holdings. USTC Holdings will be managed 

by a board appointed by the equity owners, which will include independent, unaffiliated directors. The change in ownership does not have any impact on IDS’s contract 

with DOS. 

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION ACCESS TO INFORMATION

3. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Jeffrey, in its last quarterly report, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) raised concerns regarding the 

DOS’s actions that would have the effect of restricting SIGIR’s access to information 

relating to reconstruction activities in Iraq. The report also lists a number of SIGIR 

requests for information on the status and funding of reconstruction responsibilities 

that DOS has declined to answer, including: 

• The status of life-support contracts to provide support to Provincial Reconstruction Teams, embassy branch offices, consulates and other embassy 

elements carrying out reconstruction activities; and 

• The status of embassy vehicle and equipment requests to support the Police Development Program (PDP), embassy branch offices, and consulates. 

Are you aware of SIGIR’s concerns regarding its access to information regarding 

the DOS’s reconstruction activities? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Yes, we are aware of SIGIR’s concerns. Embassy Baghdad 

has enjoyed a long and collegial relationship with SIGIR. We devote extensive effort 

to answer SIGIR’s questions in a timely and complete manner. We provided over 

300 pages of information in response to the 40 questions on the most recent data 

call and 8 pages of edits and comments to the draft report circulated by SIGIR. Assistant Chief of Mission for Assistance and Transition Ambassador Peter Bodde 

meets weekly with all of the Inspectors General (IGs) in Baghdad. And he ensures 

44 

that the Embassy responds promptly to ensure timely response to SIGIR’s quarterly 

data calls. 

In addition, we have given SIGIR, as well as all the IGs located at Post, unprecedented access to information outside of their data calls. SIGIR participates in our 

Country Team meetings and is granted access to both unclassified and classified 

DOS computer systems, which gives them unlimited access to our internal documents and classified cables. This level of access for an IG organization is simply unparalleled in any other post in the world. We have done this because we recognize, 

respect and appreciate the value of SIGIR’s institutional knowledge. 

As Congress is aware, we are in a period of transition and, as SIGIR noted in 

its October 2010 Quarterly Report, our assistance in Iraq is transitioning from 

largely reconstruction-based to technical assistance and capacity building. 

The 2005 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between SIGIR and the DOS Office 

of the Inspector General (OIG) delineates the jurisdiction of the two oversight organizations to avoid overlap and duplication. That MOA specifically states questions 

dealing with Embassy operations will be addressed by DOS OIG. The Embassy has 

already responded to DOS OIG on transition matters. Because the MOA also directs 

the parties to share information in order to avoid duplication, SIGIR, which has previously sourced the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID) IG reports, in fact, has access to this information. 

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4. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Jeffrey, as these reconstruction activities transition 

from the Department of Defense (DOD) to DOS, would you agree on the continuing 

need for SIGIR to have broad access to information relevant to its ability to carry 

out its responsibilities to monitor that taxpayer funds are used appropriately? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The current DOD-managed reconstruction funds are from 

the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program and the Iraq Security Forces Fund 

(ISFF). While neither of these funds will be transitioned to DOS, civilian assistance 

activities targeted at Iraq’s defense and security, for example, will be funded 

through FMF if provided in the fiscal year 2012 budget. 

DOS will continue to work with the relevant oversight agencies, including the 

GAO, USAID IG and DOS OIG, all of which maintain a permanent presence in the 

U.S. Mission in Baghdad, to ensure oversight of our programming in Iraq, as we 

do in embassies across the world. 

5. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Jeffrey, will you look into these concerns and urge 

DOS to ensure that SIGIR has full access to the information it needs to carry out 

its oversight responsibilities? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. As noted in the response to question three, Embassy Baghdad provides unprecedented access to SIGIR, DOS OIG, GAO, USAID IG, the Wartime Contracting Commission, the House Appropriations Surveys and Investigation 

Committee and visiting congressional delegations and we will continue to do so. We 

share the Committee’s view that oversight is critically important; however, we believe that it is also important to avoid duplicative efforts that could result in wasted 

taxpayer dollars, especially in this budget environment. The MOA signed by DOS 

OIG and SIGIR in January 2005 described this division, which was put in place to 

‘‘avoid duplication of effort, and to minimize disruptions to U.S. Mission and Department programs, operations, and activities.’’ 


203ful11.eps
49 

SIGIR will continue to have access to meetings and to DOS unclassified and classified computer systems. We intend to continue to respond to all questions thoroughly and in a timely fashion, as related to reconstruction activities. 

For other Embassy functions, we will also continue to provide DOS OIG, the 

USAID IG and the GAO with the information they need to carry out their oversight 

activities without overlap. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

STATE DEPARTMENT OVERSIGHT OF THE DYNCORP CONTRACT

6. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, the United States has spent approximately $7.3 billion to train, staff, and equip Iraqi police forces since 2003. In January 2010, the SIGIR found continued weaknesses in DOS’s oversight of the DynCorp 

contract to support police training. As a result of those weaknesses, SIGIR reported 

that more than $2.5 billion was vulnerable to waste and fraud. What, if anything, 

has DOS done to account for the questionable funds already expended on this contract? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. DOS, through the Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), has taken steps to improve programmatic contract 

management and oversight requirements based upon INL’s initiative and in response to recommendations from the oversight community. These improvements include: (1) a comprehensive invoicing review process, (2) a substantial number of rejected invoices, (3) collected refunds, and (4) the increased number of contract oversight personnel. 

In October 2006, the base International Civilian Police (CIVPOL) contracts were 

modified to allow INL to demand repayment for any improper payments identified 

in a reconciliation review conducted in Washington, D.C. This ‘‘provisional payment’’ 

modification allows INL to reconcile 100 percent of all program invoices for the life 

of the task order. INL currently only makes provisional payment after a detailed 

review of invoice documentation is conducted and the valid invoice is certified. INL’s 

tougher management controls have resulted in a significant number of rejected invoices (18 percent) and refunds totaling $28.9 million as of March 1, 2011, for Iraq. 

With the implementation of this modification, the risk to the U.S Government was 

reduced substantially. 

To facilitate the implementation of the management controls, INL significantly increased contract oversight staff. Currently, there are nine In-country Contracting 

Officer’s Representatives (ICORs) deployed in Iraq, and an additional ICOR’s deployment is pending due to the completion of training. INL anticipates increasing 

these staff to a total of 15 ICORs by July 2011. 

7. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, what other steps has DOS taken to 

improve oversight of this contract? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. DOS consistently reviews, adapts, and improves programmatic contract oversight. Other improvements include: (1) using the Quality 

Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASP) for contractor accountability; (2) standard operating procedures with greater specificity for oversight roles and responsibilities; 

and (3) established a comprehensive Invoice Tracking Database. 

To minimize the U.S. government’s risk for fraud and mismanagement, INL instituted the use of the QASP to systematically ensure that the contractor is meeting 

performance-based requirements. The plan details how and when the U.S. government will survey, observe, test, sample, evaluate, and document the contractor’s performance in accordance with the statement of work. By employing the QASP, INL 

and the contractor achieve an understanding of performance expectations and how 

performance will be measured against those expectations. 

ICORs carry out quality assurance responsibilities as specified in the QASP on 

a continuing basis. Also, INL is providing greater specificity in ICOR responsibilities 

as described in the ICOR delegation letters and 14 FAH–2 H–100, the Contracting 

Officer’s Representative (COR) Handbook. INL drafted standard operating procedures for ICORs and is in the process of drawing conclusions resulting from our recent field testing of the draft guidance which covers: Invoice Validation; Receiving 

and Inspection; and COR File Maintenance. INL continues to refine and update this 

guidance based on the field test results. 

INL developed an Invoice Tracking Database in December 2009, which was operational by January 2010. This database currently maintains approximately 4,000 invoices and tracks approval and payment status. This management tool has a feature 

for preventing duplicate invoice submission, cross-referencing with DOS’s Global FiVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:12 Oct 03, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68557 JUNE PsN: JUNEB
50 

nancial Management System (GFMS), calculating statistical results and producing 

weekly savings reports. 

8. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, what metrics have been put in place 

to measure whether the overall police training program is succeeding? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. DOS, through its Bureau of INL has supported USF–I/Iraq 

Training and Advising Mission’s police training mission in Iraq since 2004. Therefore, an explanation of the metrics to measure success of the current police program 

to date is something best answered by DOD. State will assume responsibility for police development in Iraq on October 1, 2011, through its PDP. INL is currently 

working with DOD to draft a robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) program to 

serve as an integral part of INL’s Iraqi rule of law program providing oversight, accountability and transparency. 

INL will begin with an assessment of the current status of the Iraqi criminal justice sector: its police, corrections, and courts system. The assessment will identify 

the sector’s strengths and weaknesses and provide contributory factors. This cleareyed view of Iraq’s criminal justice sector will not only help define key performance 

indicators for INL’s criminal justice program, including its PDP, but it will also 

highlight those areas most in need of assistance. 

Once the assessment is completed and the performance indicators identified, we 

will undertake a baseline study to determine the point against which all subsequent 

programmatic activity will be measured. INL will hire up to four full-time M&E experts who will work at each of its hubs in Iraq to manage daily performance monitoring and conduct more robust periodic evaluation. These M&E professionals will 

report back to Washington, permitting regular, up-to-date monitoring of the INL 

Iraqi PDP. 

9. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, in SIGIR’s January 2010 report, it 

stated that, according to one official: 

‘‘[D]uring most of the period DynCorp was billing for Task Orders 1436, 

0338, and other task orders awarded earlier in the contract, the sole ICOR 

was approving all DynCorp invoices without questioning their accuracy. As 

a result, INL has no confidence in the accuracy of over $1 billion in charges 

and is now performing a 100 percent reconciliation of all INL-funded, Iraqrelated invoices prior to October 2006.’’ 

What is the current number of ICOR for the contract and is there a plan to increase this number further? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The reference in Question 9 above refers to conditions in 

INL up to October 2006. INL made dramatic changes in contract oversight since the 

earlier days of this task order when only one person approved the invoices. Since 

2006, INL established a contract oversight cadre that involves Washington based 

COR, COR support staff, ICORs in the field, and an entire program office to assist 

with contract accountability. 

Currently, we have nine ICORs deployed in Iraq, and an additional ICOR is in 

training whose deployment is pending. INL anticipates increasing these staff to a 

total of 15 ICORs by July 2011. 

10. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, how many personnel are dedicated 

to reviewing questioned and unsupported payments for the DynCorp task orders on 

this contract? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. INL currently has 12 invoice reconciliation experts reviewing Dyncorps task orders. It is in the process of hiring four more; we anticipate all 

four positions will be filled by June 2011. The reconciliation team is responsible for 

both Iraq and Afghanistan invoice reconciliations. 

11. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, are these personnel government or 

contractors? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The Reconciliation Team will be made up of 16 government 

personnel including 7 civil service and 9 personal service contractors. 

12. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, what metrics have been put in place 

to ensure that the government is only paying for legitimate charges? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. As the result of the following oversight processes, INL has 

rejected 18 percent of vendors’ invoices with realized savings of $38 million and the 

recovery of more than $28.9 million in refunds for the period 2004 to the present 

in Iraq. 

51 

ICORs are responsible for the receiving, inspection and acceptance of all the goods 

and materials procured. Before invoices are submitted for payment, ICORs in Iraq 

perform a 100 percent review of contractor purchase requests before the requests 

are submitted for procurement. The contractor claims are validated 100 percent for 

the cost reimbursable services and supplies. The ICORs reconcile current invoices 

in-country using an ‘‘Invoice Check List.’’ Any discrepancies are noted on the check 

list and then forwarded to Washington for further review. 

INL currently utilizes a 14-step process to ensure the U.S. Government is only 

paying for legitimate charges. The steps involved include the following: the invoice 

is sent to the billing office where it is logged in and delivered to the invoice examiner; the invoice is date stamped and validated; the invoice is reviewed and is determined either proper or improper. An acceptance or rejection letter is prepared once 

the determination is made. If the invoice is denied, the vendor is notified; the denied 

invoice is suspended until the vendor submits the correct information. Funds are 

checked in the GFMS for availability; and the invoice is approved and logged out. 

INL currently makes only provisional payment after a detailed review of invoice 

documentation is conducted and the valid invoice is certified. In October 2006, base 

CIVPOL contracts were modified to allow INL to demand repayment for any improper payments later identified in a detailed invoice review conducted in Washington, DC. This process includes rigorous controls over program execution and invoice payments. 

STATE DEPARTMENT TRANSITION STATUS

13. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, in your prepared statement, you 

stated that U.S. Embassy Baghdad was currently taking on the following logistical 

functions: securing sites outside of Baghdad and providing security details, administering the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract for U.S. personnel, managing the supply lines for food, fuel, and material, operating emergency 

medical facilities, and running in-country and regional air operations. 

Please provide an account of the status of transition of each of these functions, 

including the planning, competition, and execution of contracts in support of these 

functions and whether these contracts will be performed by Iraqi companies. How 

many non-Iraqi (United States or third-country national) contractor personnel will 

be required to fulfill these contracts in Iraq? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Security: The static guard contract for Baghdad was awarded in September, 2010. The Baghdad movement security contract, and the static and 

movement security contracts for Basrah, Kirkuk, and Mosul were awarded on February 15th of this year. We plan to award the movement and security contracts for 

Erbil on April 15th. 

LOGCAP IV: The solicitation has been issued and proposals are due in March. 

Aviation: The aviation program contractor personnel are and will continue to be 

hired through INL’s existing aviation operations contract. 

Contract Management: DOS’s Office of Acquisition Management is partnering 

with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to develop a comprehensive, country-wide contract management strategy. DCMA personnel will supplement 

DOS contract management personnel on a reimbursable basis. 

Medical: The medical solicitation was issued February 11 and an award is 

planned for May 20. 

The movement and static security contracts and the LOGCAP IV contract were 

competed only among American companies, though this does not mean that they 

will employ only Americans. As the solicitation for the medical contract has just 

been issued we do not know which companies will bid and whether or not any Iraqi 

companies plan to participate. We do not have a breakdown of U.S., third control 

national, and Iraqi personnel on these contracts because they have either just been 

awarded or have yet to be awarded. 

14. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, who will be responsible for the security for movements outside Baghdad, which is currently conducted by U.S. ForcesIraq (USF–I), after the transition? Please provide an explanation of the expected 

roles and responsibilities of U.S. Government personnel and contractors, and an estimate of the number of contractors beyond those currently in place in Iraq who will 

be required to provide security for movements outside of Baghdad. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The Protective Security Detail (PSD) program in Iraq is the 

responsibility of DOS’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) through Regional Security Office (RSO) Baghdad. PSDs are primarily staffed by DS WPS contract personnel under the operational control of direct-hire DS Special Agents and/or SecuVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:12 Oct 03, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68557 JUNE PsN: JUNEB
52 

rity Protective Specialists (collectively, DS personnel). Contracts for WPS personnel 

must and do meet government of Iraq requirements. 

DOS, DS managed PSD program already operates in Iraq in Baghdad and Erbil, 

and in the 2004–2006 period also operated in Hillah, Mosul, and Basra. After the 

transition this program will extend to sites throughout Iraq under Chief of Mission 

security requirements. 

RSO Baghdad manages all protective security programs at Post, including establishing policies and procedures for PSD movements outside secure areas. DS personnel direct PSD operations, including serving as agents in charge of PSDs operating in the field. WPS contract personnel conduct site advances and secure venues 

prior to the PSD’s arrival, drive armored vehicles, and staff positions in vehicles, 

walking formations, and quick-response force teams. Qualified contractor personnel 

also serve on PSDs as emergency medical technicians. 

Outside of Baghdad, DS plans to use 540 WPS contract personnel to support PSD 

movements in the cities of Erbil, Basra, and Kirkuk. 

15. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, will contractors be driving Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles? Flying helicopters? Please provide an 

estimate of the number of contractors required to operate vehicles which are currently provided by USFI. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Current planning envisions using MRAPs for the secure 

movement of personnel in extremely non-permissive environments. MRAPs also provide enhanced capabilities to extract personnel in emergency situations, conduct 

emergency medical evacuations, and recover ground and air assets. DS direct-hire 

personnel and WPS contractor personnel already programmed for Iraq security operations will be trained to drive and operate MRAPs. Approximately 12 additional personnel working under the new LOGCAP contract for logistical support will be needed to provide the specilized skills and qualifications required for MRAP maintenance, repair, and training. 

Helicopters support a broad range of mission critical operations, including transporting personnel safely throughout Iraq, supporting vital engagement, aid, and assistance programs, and providing emergency response capabilities. It should be 

noted that Embassy Baghdad is already operating an extensive aviation program 

and Embassy aircraft are flown and maintained by contractors. The number of contractors that will be needed to meet expanding mission requirements is not linked 

to USF–I. 

At this time it is estimated that a total of 636 contractor personnel will be needed 

in-country to support future Embassy air operations in Iraq. This total number is 

an increase of approximately 400 personnel over the current staffing. This figure 

will be adjusted as planning continues moving forward and air assets and operations come on line. 

16. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, during the hearing you testified that 

you currently have 2,700 security contractors working in Iraq. You stated after the 

transition that that number will increase to 5,000 in addition to the police training 

mission and the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq. What procedures will the embassy use to vet, hire, and monitor these thousands of private security contractors? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The WPS contract requires all vendors to vet all prospective employees prior to their submission to DOS for consideration. Each vendor has 

its own screening and vetting process, but all must include a criminal background 

check, medical screening, and verification of prior employment. 

Following the completion of contractor vetting, the vendor may nominate an individual for employment under the WPS contract. WPS companies are required to 

submit a biographic review package to the DS program office, including a resume 

with detailed work history and any supporting documentation (e.g., Military DD 214 

or paramedic certification or medical license). The program office then reviews the 

information against the contract requirements for the specific position or labor category. Additionally, the program office reviews its internal records to determine 

whether the prospective employee has an employment history under the previous 

two Worldwide Personal Protective Services contracts (WPPS I and II), or the Baghdad or Kabul Embassy Security Force (BESF/KESF) contracts. Should this review 

determine an individual is ineligible for employment under any of the above contracts the program office denies the biographic review package and the vendor is 

notified. Once the review process is completed and an individual’s experience is determined to meet contract requirements, an approval is sent back to the vendor to 

be included in a follow-on request for a security clearance. 

Following successful biographic review and approval, companies submit forms for 

a Government background investigation to DS. All contractor personnel in Iraq are 

53 

required to possess either a security clearance (Top Secret or Secret, depending on 

position) or a Moderate Risk Public Trust certification, for which investigative 

standards are similar to a Secret security clearance but which does not allow access 

to classified material. Additionally, local nationals are investigated by the Embassy’s Regional Security Office and undergo a polygraph examination as part of their 

vetting process. 

Following the completion of vetting, training, and deployment of PSC personnel, 

DOS employs an active monitoring and oversight program for all PSCs in Iraq. 

Many of the changes and lessons learned under the WPPS II, BESF, or KESF contracts have been incorporated into the new WPS contract, which was awarded in 

September 2010. Some of those oversight controls include: requiring that a directhire DS employee accompany PSDs; hiring additional personnel to provide full-time 

contract oversight; having DS personnel reside in off-site contractor housing facilities; installing video recording and tracking systems in vehicles; strengthening the 

Mission Firearms Policy on the use of force, including the deployment of additional, 

less-than-lethal equipment fielded to minimize the need for deadly force; adding interpreters in the majority of motorcades; and implementing a revised standards of 

conduct policy, including a ban on alcohol. 

Finally, all security contractor firms including those under the WPS contract must 

meet Government of Iraq requirements. 

17. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, under what jurisdiction will employees of the PSCs that are U.S. citizens be under with respect to criminal or civil violations? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. U.S. citizens employed by private security companies in 

Iraq are subject to Iraqi criminal and civil jurisdiction, and will remain so after the 

transition. They may also be under the jurisdiction of the United States, under certain circumstances. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) extends 

extraterritorial jurisdiction to cover DOD employees and contractors, as well as employees and contractors of any other Federal agency, to the extent such employment 

relates to supporting the mission of DOD overseas. Additionally, certain offenses 

enumerated in the U.S. criminal code include provisions extending jurisdiction to 

acts committed outside the United States. 

DOS is fully committed to ensuring that U.S. contractors who are accused of committing serious crimes in Iraq are investigated and, when warranted, fully prosecuted. DOS supports legislation that would clarify U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction 

and extend resources to prosecute such persons for serious crimes committed overseas, in a manner consistent with international law. 

U.S. citizens employed by private security contractors in Iraq may also be subject 

to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts for civil matters, depending on a number of factors 

including the claim at issue and whether the court has personal jurisdiction over 

the individual. 

18. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, under what jurisdiction will employees that are third country nationals (TCN) be under with respect to criminal or civil 

violations? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. TCNs employed by private security companies in Iraq are 

subject to Iraqi criminal and civil jurisdiction, and will remain so after the transition. They may also be subject to the jurisdiction of the state of their nationality, 

depending on the laws of that state. Under certain limited circumstances, TCNs 

may be subject to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States, including 

under the MEJA or by operation of a U.S. statute extending jurisdiction to offenses 

occurring outside the United States. 

TCNs employed by private security companies in Iraq may also be subject to the 

jurisdiction of U.S. courts for civil matters, depending on a number of factors including the claim at issue and whether the court has personal jurisdiction over the individual. 

19. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, will all PSC be citizens of either the 

United States or Iraq? 

Ambassador Jeffrey did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer 

will be retained in committee files. 

20. Senator MCCASKILL. Ambassador Jeffrey, will the PSC be afforded diplomatic 

status? If not, what legal protections will exist to preclude or prohibit Iraqi prosecution of alleged crimes committed by the PSC? 

Ambassador Jeffrey did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer 

will be retained in committee files. 

54 

U.S. MILITARY TRANSITION STATUS

21. Senator MCCASKILL. General Austin, during the hearing you testified that the 

U.S. military is transferring some equipment to the DOS, it is transferring or selling 

some equipment to the Iraq military, and it is returning some equipment to the 

United States. Given the sheer volume and quantities of U.S. military equipment 

remaining in Iraq and the recapitalization efforts being made by the DOD as a result of a decade at war, there must be thorough accountability of all equipment and 

weapons. Concerning the transfer of military equipment to the Iraqi military, what 

office or person decides what is transferred by way of a grant and what equipment 

is sold? 

General AUSTIN. U.S. military equipment is transferred to the Iraqi military via 

three programs: Foreign Military Sales (FMS), ISFF and the U.S. Equipment Transfer to Iraq (USETTI) program. 

USETTI is a program that is in existence as a result of the DOD Report on the 

Transfer of Defense Articles and the Provision of Defense Services to the Militaries 

and Security Forces of Iraq and Afghanistan, submitted to the Senate Committee 

on Armed Services on 5 April 2010. The program authorizes the Secretary of Defense to grant both non-Excess Defense Articles, under section 1234 of both the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, and Excess Defense Articles, under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 with congressional notification completed on 16 June 2010. The Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency is the primary office that decides what is transferred as a grant. 

22. Senator MCCASKILL. General Austin, please provide a list of specific U.S. military documents, directives, or decision papers that are guiding the FMS/Foreign 

Military Financing (FMF) of U.S. military equipment being transferred, sold, granted, or given to the Iraqi Government. 

General AUSTIN. FMS, whether funded by the Government of Iraq or the FMF 

program, are conducted in accordance with DOD 5105.38–M, the Security Assistance Management Manual. This document provides specific and detailed procedures 

to guide both FMS and FMF processes. The FMF program is just beginning in fiscal 

year 12 as a replacement for ISFF activities. The FMS program in Iraq has existed 

since 2005, and has evolved over time as a result of the changing tactical and strategic environment in Iraq. 

The current guiding principles for equipment transferred, sold, granted or given 

to Iraq begin with the Security Agreement and Strategic Framework Agreement 

signed on 17 December 2008. Article 27 of the Security Agreement, Deterrence of 

Security Threats, and Section III of the Security Framework Agreement, Defense 

and Security Cooperation, both provide for mutual cooperation to strengthen the 

Iraqi military and enhance Iraq’s ability to defend its sovereign territory. Article 27 

of the Security Agreement specifically includes ‘‘training, equipping, and arming 

Iraqi security forces’’ as a means for achieving the ability to defend itself from internal and external threats. 

In July 2009, then Multi National Forces-Iraq published ‘‘Iraq: Achieving Stability 

and Enduring Strategic Partnership,’’ providing guidance for resourcing support to 

the Government of Iraq to develop an enduring strategic partnership through security cooperation. The paper provided guidance to achieve the President’s stated goals 

for Iraq: maintain internal security and stability, achieve police primacy, defend 

against external aggression, participate in regional security partnership, and develop an enduring U.S. security partnership. 

The Center for Army Analysis published an analysis in July, 2009, providing recommendations for the size and force structure of the Iraqi security forces. The study 

concluded the Iraqi military required modernized equipment, a mix of mechanized 

and counterinsurgency capable forces, rotary wing and fixed wing attack aircraft, 

and various enablers. 

In August 2009 USF–I provided an information paper for the August 2009 Iraq 

Planning conference: ‘‘Iraqi Security Forces—Predicting the Capabilities and Covering the Gaps,’’ to assist leadership in determining appropriate resources. 

23. Senator MCCASKILL. General Austin, please provide a summary list of the 

U.S. military equipment to be transferred, sold, or granted to the Iraqi military. 

General AUSTIN. Enclosed is a summary list of the U.S. military equipment to be 

sold under the FMS program and transferred/granted under the USETTI program. 

To date we have sold over 152,581 military articles to the Government of Iraq 

with another 1,439 major case articles pending delivery completion over the next 3 

years. Moreover, under the USETTI program we have transferred 6,768 pieces of 

excess (section 516) and non-excess (section 1234) military equipment and will comVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:12 Oct 03, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68557 JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III 

IRAQ SECURITY EXTERNAL THREATS

24. Senator MANCHIN. General Austin, you have said that internal security in 

Iraq is the best it’s been in years, and even though insurgents still carry out attacks 

there, the Iraqi forces do have the abilities to conduct internal defenses, but their 

bigger challenge is in protection against external threats. How do you define or 

identify these external threats or enemies of Iraq? 

General AUSTIN. [Deleted.] 

25. Senator MANCHIN. General Austin, in your opinion, if Iraq cannot stand up 

to external enemies do you envision that if asked, the U.S. military would fill that 

gap going forward, similar to our presence in South Korea? General Austin, if so, 

in your judgment, how many troops and equipment would be needed and for how 

long? 

General AUSTIN. I personally believe that the military partnership model we employ on the Korean Peninsula would not work in Iraq. The U.S. forces deployed to 

the Republic of Korea are arrayed against a known enemy and oppressive regime. 

The threats to Iraqi sovereignty are on the horizon. Unlike Korea, any commitment of U.S. forces would be arrayed against a capability gap existing within the 

Iraqi security forces. The interdependence and scope of these gaps can be a primary 

ignition source for future conflicts in the region. The Iraqi Army will not achieve 


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the full capability to defend against external threats prior to the expiration of the 

Security Agreement. Areas of specific concern are a lack of integrated air defense 

and air sovereignty, logistics and intelligence fusion, and the ability to conduct combined arms training. 

U.S. forces will focus on strengthening the Iraqi security forces. This effort currently includes maneuver training for select Iraqi security forces divisions, and FMS 

cases designed to advise, train, and equip. On our current glide path, a large 

amount of equipment arrives just as the U.S. military departs. There will be no capability for the Iraqi security forces to conduct combined arms training and employment once this equipment is fielded. This is a hindrance to enduring security. 

Equally important are the concerns about Iraq’s ability to employ integrated air 

defense in order to defend air sovereignty. A nation has an inherent right to exercise 

absolute control and authority over the airspace and coastal waters. 85 percent of 

Iraq’s revenue comes from exporting oil. These gaps place risk on Iraq’s ability to 

economically mature. This capability gap can be addressed through our current 

transition plans, but success will be contingent on the continued support of Congress to fund Embassy Baghdad operations over the next 5 years. 

Finally, the adhesive that keeps everything together is sustainment and intelligence fusion capability. The capability to analyze intelligence, to share pertinent 

and actionable information, and then complete the loop with actions against malign 

actors is the foundation for enduring security in Iraq. The security environment required the Iraqi security forces to grow rapidly which has flooded an immature logistics system and forced the Government of Iraq to accelerate sustainment efforts. 

If the Iraqi security forces are going to continue to develop as a security force and 

provide internal security and external defense they will have to improve their logistics capabilities. In order for progress to be solidified over the next 5 to 10 years 

these capabilities must be established and modernized. This is the strategic main 

effort for any U.S. military partnership over the next decade. 

U.S. TROOP LEVELS POST-WITHDRAWAL

26. Senator MANCHIN. Ambassador Jeffrey, what are your thoughts on the full 

scope of the U.S. commitment to Iraq after the troops withdraw? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Today we have a historic opportunity and a critical window 

to help Iraq emerge as a strategic partner and a force for stability and moderation 

in a troubled region. We cannot afford to let the gains we have sacrificed so much 

for slip away. 

President Obama has clearly articulated our vision for partnership with Iraq. We 

seek a country that is sovereign, stable and self-reliant, with a government that is 

just, representative and accountable, that denies support and safe haven to terrorists, is able to assume its rightful place in the community of nations, and contributes to the peace and security of the region. 

The U.S. military has performed admirably, succeeded in an extremely tough mission and sustained heavy losses, but now it is time to reorient relations to their 

proper civilian foundation, based on our bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement. 

We need to have platforms around the country to carry out key transitional missions for the next three to five years. These include stationing political, economic, 

security and other officials in key areas where past experience has shown how a 

small number of Americans, working daily with their Iraqi counterparts, can have 

a disproportionately great impact in helping to defuse crises and produce long-term 

solutions. 

We will also have a robust Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC–I) under 

U.S. Chief of Mission authority, which will build security relationships that develop 

partner military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations and promote specific U.S. interests. In addition, the DOS PDP will play a vital role in helping Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior develop its capabilities in the areas of strategic 

planning, budget execution, improved border enforcement, combating terrorist financing, crime scene exploitation, forensics, and human rights. 

Our foreign assistance programs, led by USAID, focus on traditional economic, political, and cultural cooperation, and private sector development. These programs 

help strengthen institutions, address ethnic and sectarian tensions, and provide economic opportunities for Iraq’s people. USAID’s major focus areas are strengthening 

the agriculture sector, improving health and education, combating corruption, and 

instituting legal and regulatory reform; all essential to create new jobs and grow 

the private sector in Iraq. As Iraq develops its oil resources and increases net revenue, we expect it to augment its contribution to cost sharing, already taking place 

on a number of assistance programs. 

63 

27. Senator MANCHIN. Ambassador Jeffrey, what type of U.S. involvement will be 

necessary in order to keep the peace and make our investments in nation-building 

pay off? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Following the responsible drawdown of U.S. military forces 

at the end of 2011, our involvement in Iraq will transition to a strong civilian engagement with Iraq as envisioned by the Strategic Framework Agreement. The goal 

of this civilian presence is to carry out our key programs and support our strategy 

to transition to a more robust Iraqi capacity; build a long-term economic, political, 

and cultural partnership; and support Iraq’s reintegration into the region and the 

global economy. Key programs during this transition include consulates military assistance programs, rule of law and the development of the Iraqi police force, assistance for refugees and the internally displaced, as well as traditional economic and 

development assistance. All of these build upon our whole-of-government efforts in 

Iraq to date. 

Right now we have a critical window to help Iraq emerge as a strategic partner 

of the United States and a force for stability and moderation in a troubled region. 

However, to achieve these goals, Iraq must overcome some very serious challenges, 

which taken together, have the potential to directly affect our national security interests. A weak, unstable Iraq could attract international terrorists or open the door 

for Iraq to potentially align with destabilizing actors in the region. 

Our programs will help Iraq meet these challenges and moderate these risks. We 

anticipate opening consulates in Erbil and Basrah to engage directly on political and 

economic issues with Iraqis at the regional and local levels. Additionally, our OSC– 

I in the short term will help close gaps in Iraqi security forces capabilities via security assistance and security cooperation activities, and in the long-term will play a 

critical role in building our strategic partnership with Iraq. 

Our foreign assistance strategy in Iraq has evolved over time—shifting from reconstruction to capacity development in order to increasingly enable the Government of Iraq to govern effectively, manage its own reconstruction efforts, and promote economic growth. 

Targeted programs that focus on microfinance, improving the banking and investment climate, liaising with key ministries and local governments to become more 

effective in the delivery essential services, advising the Iraqi parliament on improving its oversight and monitoring capacity, monitoring access to justice for vulnerable 

populations, and other anti-corruption, legal and regulatory reforms. Without such 

assistance, a democratic Iraq will be unable to meet its own citizen’s expectations 

for a sovereign, stable and self-reliant country. 

Our military assistance programs—FMF and International Military Education 

and Training—focus on helping the Iraqis increase the capacity and professionalism 

of their military forces and complement the efforts made to date through U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi military operations and initiatives. These programs are critical to 

the U.S. objective of engaging with Iraq as a strategic regional partner, particularly 

during this period of substantial turmoil in the region, with major implications for 

Gulf security. 

Finally, our rule of law and PDPs address the most important remaining gap in 

Iraq’s internal security—development of a strong and professional police force and 

a judicial system that is effective and impartial. Iraq’s ability to engage in legal reforms and police professionalization will reinforce favorable conditions in which 

Iraq’s private sector can thrive and ameliorate the problems mentioned above. 

We must build on the shared sacrifices of both Americans and Iraqis to continue 

the momentum towards a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq while forming a 

broad and lasting strategic partnership. We cannot afford to let the gains our troops 

have sacrificed so much for in Iraq slip away before they are cemented. 

28. Senator MANCHIN. Ambassador Jeffrey, in 2003, the Bush administration said 

the United States won’t be faced with a huge bill for reconstruction of post-war Iraq, 

in large part because Iraq’s oil wells can be tapped to help defray the costs. Clearly 

this did not occur, with the United States spending billions in Iraq for reconstruction. Iraq is known to have the second largest oil reserves in the world. What is 

the current state of Iraq’s oil industry and revenues, and will their revenues be used 

to support their police forces, education and medical facilities, reconstruction and 

maintenance, and the types of things that can stabilize a country? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The Iraqi Government spends billions of dollars each year 

on security, reconstruction, and development. In 2009, the Iraqi Government spent 

nearly $8 billion on security and roughly $7.8 billion on reconstruction and capital 

investment. Through November 2010, year-to-date Iraqi Government spending was 

$7.5 billion for security and $8.4 billion for reconstruction and capital investment. 

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64 

tion and capital investment. This includes over $5 billion for investment in critical 

areas such as electricity, public works, health, and education. 

The overwhelming majority—nearly 90 percent—of Iraq’s projected income comes 

from oil revenue, and Iraq has the fourth largest proven oil reserves (115 billion 

barrels) in the world behind Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Iran. (In late 2010, the 

Iraqi Government announced an additional 28 billion barrels of reserves, but this 

increase is not yet recognized internationally as proven reserves.) 

Having proven reserves, however, does not translate into the immediate ability 

to produce or export all of that oil. Iraq’s 2010 production average was 2.4 million 

barrels per day, and some industry analysts have predicted that Iraq may exceed 

4 million barrels per day production by 2015. Iraq faces numerous logistical, bureaucratic, and financial constraints to achieving those production levels, however. The 

government must update and build pipeline and export infrastructure, and cover 

significant upfront costs incurred by international oil companies. Furthermore, even 

if Iraq solves its logistical and infrastructure problems, Iraq’s production could be 

limited by market conditions and the potential re-imposition of an Organization of 

the Petroleum Exporting Countries quota. 

Even with increases in production, Iraq may not see significant net revenue increases for 3 to 5 years. The signed contracts state that Iraq must pay international 

oil companies for services rendered and some infrastructure and supplementary 

costs incurred during field development. Covering these costs—tens of billions of dollars—upfront will have the effect of delaying net revenue increases, and thus the 

Iraqi Government’s ability to make significant additions to the non-oil investment 

budget. 

Iraq is still very much a post-conflict developing country facing considerable development, human resource, and fiscal challenges. The Iraqi Government’s fiscal management is improving with each passing year, but its available fiscal resources and 

institutional capacity are not yet adequate enough to meet its citizens’ demands for 

basic services and infrastructure, or to fully achieve its development goals. Nevertheless, we believe the Iraqi Government is fully committed to improving stability 

and prosperity for all Iraqis. With the passage of time and the continued development of Iraq’s oil and gas sector, additional resources will be available that, if properly managed, will help enable Iraq to reach middle-income status over the next decade. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION OVERSIGHT

29. Senator WICKER. Ambassador Jeffrey, Iraq’s financial system is not like our 

own. Many transactions are conducted using cash which has presented some issues 

for us in the past. Specifically there have been numerous cases where money has 

not been appropriately accounted for, it has been embezzled, or it has simply been 

stolen. The SIGIR has investigated such issues and provided accountability since 

2004. But I understand SIGIR is to stand down upon the transition to civilian control of operations in Iraq. How will the DOS ensure taxpayers’ dollars are well spent 

and accounted for? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. DOS OIG and USAID IG have oversight of DOS-managed 

assistance programs. These IGs have experience monitoring traditional assistance 

programs in embassies worldwide. 

SIGIR was established to provide oversight for reconstruction activities in Iraq 

and now that reconstruction is coming to an end, the Embassy will focus on traditional assistance programs and DOS OIG and USAID IG will have jurisdiction. 

GAO also maintains a three person office at the Embassy and has oversight over 

all programming and projects, as directed by Congress. We have provided—and will 

continue to provide—access to our GAO colleagues on all assistance activities in 

Iraq. 

On a related issue, the Embassy will continue to provide capacity development 

programming to address corruption. We have an active program in Iraq, with the 

goal of providing training on anticorruption activities within the Government of 

Iraq. 

30. Senator WICKER. Ambassador Jeffrey, who will provide that accountability in 

the absence of SIGIR? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Mission Baghdad has a long and collegial relationship with 

SIGIR and has appreciated the insights and accountability that the audit team in 

Baghdad has provided over several years. DOS OIG and USAID IG also provided 

65 

oversight over traditional assistance programs in Iraq and a multitude of other 

countries. Both offices have a permanent presence in the United States. Mission. 

Additionally, GAO has—and will continue to have—a three person office at the Embassy. These three agencies will continue to provide oversight. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS

INFORMATION SHARING WITH SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

31. Senator COLLINS. Ambassador Jeffrey and General Austin, the information 

and oversight SIGIR has provided over the last several years has been invaluable 

to my colleagues and I to evaluate the U.S. mission in Iraq. The most recent SIGIR 

quarterly report suggests SIGIR has experienced some challenges in obtaining detailed information from DOD and DOS in the course of fulfilling its congressionally 

mandated requirements. Would you describe your commitment to be forthcoming in 

providing information to SIGIR for adequate reporting of the transition during this 

year? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Embassy Baghdad has a long and collegial relationship 

with SIGIR. We answer SIGIR’s questions in a timely and complete manner. We 

provided over 300 pages of information in response to the 40 questions on the most 

recent data call and 8 pages of edits and comments to the draft report circulated 

by SIGIR. Assistant Chief of Mission for Assistance and Transition, Ambassador 

Peter Bodde, meets weekly with all of the IGs in Baghdad and have a front office 

staff member whose responsibility is to ensure timely response to SIGIR’s quarterly 

data calls. 

In addition, we have given SIGIR, as well as all the IGs located at Post, unprecedented access to information outside of their data calls. SIGIR is included in our 

internal Country Team meetings and is granted access to both unclassified and classified DOS computer systems, which gives them unlimited access to our internal 

documents and classified cables. This level of access for an IG organization is simply 

unparalleled in any other post in the world. We have done this because we value 

SIGIR’s institutional knowledge. 

As Congress is aware, we are in a period of transition and, as SIGIR noted in 

its October 2010 Quarterly Report, our assistance in Iraq is transitioning from 

largely reconstruction-based to technical assistance and capacity building. 

The 2005 MOA between SIGIR and DOS OIG delineates the jurisdiction of the 

two oversight organizations to avoid overlap and duplication. That MOA specifically 

states that questions dealing with Embassy operations will be addressed by DOS 

OIG. The Embassy has already responded to DOS OIG on transition matters. Because the MOA also directs the parties to share information in order to avoid duplication, SIGIR, which has previously sourced GAO and USAID IG reports, in fact, 

has access to this information. 

General AUSTIN. USF–I has enjoyed a strong and effective relationship with 

SIGIR. I fully support the goals of the administration and Congress of ensuring valuable oversight of U.S. operations in Iraq. Oversight is essential to our success and 

SIGIR is a part of the team. My staff dedicates a significant amount of time and 

effort to ensure SIGIR’s requests are supported expeditiously. SIGIR’s Quarterly Report has a compressed timeline which has made it challenging for USF–I to conduct 

a detailed examination of the documents for possible erroneous information. 

The USF–I Inspector General recently met with SIGIR’s Baghdad Embassy team 

to discuss current audit procedures and timelines. USF–I business rules have been 

adjusted to better meet these timelines and help streamline SIGIR’s ability to conduct oversight. 

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

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