United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued October 6, 2020 

Decided December 29, 2020 

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 19-3461 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

BECKY L. PETERSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of 

Wisconsin. 

No. 3:18CR00102-001 

James D. Peterson, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R

Becky Peterson1 and her boyfriend both pleaded guilty to conspiring to 

distribute over 50 grams of methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), 846, and 

each received a sentence of 66 months’ imprisonment. Peterson challenges her sentence 

as procedurally unsound. She argues that the district court wrongly thought itself 

1 Careful readers will note that the defendant’s surname is the same as the 

district judge’s. They are not related.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19-3461 Page 2 

obligated under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) to impose the same sentence on her as it did on 

her co-defendant. By focusing on parity with his sentence, she argues, the court 

misunderstood § 3553(a)(6)’s command to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities 

between similarly situated offenders nationally and overlooked important differences 

between their cases. If that is what the district court had done, then she would have a 

point. But reading the record as a whole, we are satisfied that the district court did not 

make such an error. Instead, it understood its discretion and adequately explained, on 

the basis of an individualized assessment of the factors under § 3553(a), why Peterson 

deserved the same term of imprisonment as her boyfriend. We therefore affirm. 

I 

Becky Peterson and her boyfriend, Mark Moore, lived together on Moore’s farm 

in Wisconsin, where they used and sold methamphetamine. In late 2016, law 

enforcement became interested in their activities. Informants reported that meth was 

“always available” at the farm in the morning and that Peterson “ran the show.” Moore 

obtained the meth from a source in Minnesota, they said, while Peterson set the prices, 

packaged the product, and gave it to Moore to sell. 

Over the next two years, undercover officers watched the farm, where they often 

saw Peterson. There they bought meth—first just a few grams at a time, but later in 

amounts of 10 to 15 grams. They normally dealt with Moore. Moore once told the 

officers that Peterson would be angry that he had sold them larger amounts, which did 

not generate as much profit as smaller transactions. Peterson herself sold the officers 3.5 

grams of meth and confirmed to an officer that she “set the prices.”

In June 2018, officers stopped the sales. They arrested Moore at the farm and 

seized drugs, cash, and several guns. Separately, they arrested Peterson while she was 

camping. In post-arrest statements, Peterson confessed that she and Moore had been 

selling meth for two years: Moore traveled to Minnesota monthly to get it, and she 

packaged it for sale one ounce (about 28 grams) at a time. She estimated that she made 

$500 each month from her own sales but did not know their total profits because they 

each sold to different customers and she did not handle the cash. Moore corroborated 

that the two both used and sold the meth that he bought from their supplier. 

After a grand jury indicted them on several drug-related charges, Peterson and 

Moore agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute over 50 grams of 

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) and § 846. In December 2018, 

the First Step Act became law, Pub. L. 115, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). It rendered Peterson 

potentially eligible for the safety-valve provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which removes 

the effect of a mandatory minimum sentence. Peterson was permitted to withdraw and 
No. 19-3461 Page 3 

re-enter her plea so that she could make an additional proffer to the government about 

her actions and seek safety-valve eligibility.

The presentence investigation reports came next. Probation services attributed 

between 150 and 500 grams of “Ice” methamphetamine to Peterson. Based on that 

quantity, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(4), it calculated a total offense level of 29. 

Combined with her criminal history category of II (representing two drug convictions 

and one conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon), this yielded a guidelines range 

of 97 to 121 months in prison. The PSR noted that Peterson’s offense carried a statutory 

minimum of 60 months in prison, but observed that, based on her proffer about the 

details of the offense and her identification of the drug source, she was eligible for 

safety-valve consideration. Moore, by contrast, was not similarly eligible, because he 

did not identify his suppliers. Based on his offense level of 33 (higher because he sold 

more meth and handled the guns) and criminal history category of I, his guideline 

range was 135 to 168 months in prison. 

The court proceeded to sentencing. Peterson accepted the PSR’s guidelines 

calculations and factual account. The government conceded that Peterson met the 

safety-valve requirements but nonetheless asked for a within-guidelines sentence.

Peterson countered that she should receive a sentence of probation for several reasons. 

First, she professed shame over her crime and said that she was committed to sobriety. 

In her sentencing memorandum, she also argued that, because Moore handled the guns, 

the money, and suppliers in the conspiracy, and never treated her as an equal, she was 

not as culpable as he was and deserved a shorter sentence. Finally, she urged that her 

age (63) and poor health (she has rheumatoid arthritis and was repeatedly hospitalized 

during pre-trial detention) adequately deterred her from future criminal conduct, and 

so a prison term would accomplish nothing beyond undue retribution.

The district court rejected Peterson’s arguments and sentenced her and Moore to

identical, below-guidelines terms of 66 months in prison. It acknowledged that Peterson 

had shown remorse and that, because she had cooperated with law enforcement, it was 

authorized to sentence her below the 60-month statutory minimum for her offense. But 

it also observed that she had conspired with Moore to sell large quantities of meth for a 

long time. Citing section 3553(a)(6)’s command to avoid “unwarranted sentence 

disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 

similar conduct,” the court also explained that, in its view, Peterson was not less 

culpable than Moore, despite his gun possession and greater sales of meth:
No. 19-3461 Page 4 

So of course Mr. Moore had the guns. The greater quantity was sold to 

undercover officers by Mr. Moore. ... You have your boasts of controlling 

the operation. ... 

The bottom line is that I don’t really see a great—I don’t see a reason to 

make huge distinctions between the relative culpability. The two of you 

were in a long-term relationship. You lived at the same place. It seems 

apparent to me that you were both pretty much aware of what was going 

on and it really was a jointly-undertaken activity. So I think it would be 

wrong to really make a big deal about the fact that Mr. Moore, like a lot of 

guys that live in Wisconsin, had guns and he took guns in trade. ... I think 

you both are kind of in this together and so, you know, “one for all, all for 

one” kind of situation. 

Finally, the court was unconvinced that probation would be sufficient to 

deter Peterson from committing more crimes, given her personal history: 

So I did say with Mr. Moore that I didn’t think he was likely to reoffend. 

I don’t quite have the same confidence with you because you’ve got the 

criminal record and 50 years of substance abuse. And so I’m cautiously 

optimistic that this would be your last criminal conviction, but I’m not 

super confident of it because you’ve been troubled before. 

So the bottom line here is your age and your health issues are a 

consideration, but they’re not really a free pass to commit serious crimes. 

So the takeaway here is that applying appropriate punishment, hoping it 

provides a specific deterrence to you to make you not commit crimes, to 

protect the public from what you have done and what you might do and 

to achieve parity with the treatment of Mr. Moore, I’m giving you the 

same sentence, which is 66 months.

II

On appeal, Peterson contends that the district court procedurally erred in 

sentencing her to the same term as Moore. We review challenges to sentencing 

procedure de novo. United States v. Gill, 889 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2018). Ordinarily an 

argument that the court imposed an overly long sentence without good reason is an 

attack on the sentence’s substantive reasonableness. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 

892 F.3d 273, 278–79 (7th Cir. 2018). But Peterson insists that the district court 

misinterpreted § 3553(a)(6)’s procedural command to avoid “unwarranted sentence 

disparities” by improperly focusing on achieving parity with Moore rather than with 
No. 19-3461 Page 5 

similarly situated defendants nationwide. For support she relies on cases stating that 

§ 3553(a)(6) is primarily concerned with sentencing disparities on a national scale, not 

between co-defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Grigsby, 692 F.3d 778, 792 (7th Cir. 

2012); United States v. Scott, 631 F.3d 401, 405 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Pisman, 

443 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 2006). And, she asserts, the court relied on non-existent 

similarities between her and Moore, overlooked significant differences between them, 

and failed to assess her personal circumstances individually as § 3553(a) requires. 

Accepting Peterson’s word that she is raising a procedural challenge, we 

conclude that the district court did not err in this respect. The procedures are familiar. A 

sentencing judge must: (1) correctly calculate the applicable guidelines range; (2) give 

meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors and any nonroutine sentencing 

arguments raised by the defense; and (3) state the factors on which the sentence is 

based. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007). A sentencing court makes a 

procedural mistake if it fails to heed § 3553(a)(6)’s command to avoid unwarranted 

sentencing disparities. Gill, 889 F.3d at 377–78. But if the court “correctly calculated and 

carefully reviewed the Guidelines range, then [it] necessarily gave significant weight 

and consideration to the need to avoid unwarranted disparities” and complied with 

§ 3553(a)(6). Gall, 552 U.S. at 54; United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 908 (7th Cir. 2009). 

The district court followed this framework. With respect to step one, the parties 

do not dispute that it correctly calculated and meaningfully considered Peterson’s 

guidelines range. That was all that § 3553(a)(6) required. See Grigsby, 692 F.3d at 792. 

Next, as required by step two, the court evaluated Peterson’s arguments about her 

personal characteristics (her age, health, and drug use), her criminal history (she had 

recidivated twice), and her role in the conspiracy (where she “boast[s]” of controlling 

the operation). Finally, for purposes of step three, the court identified the § 3553(a) 

factors on which it relied in sentencing Peterson to a 66-month term in prison, rather 

than probation or a lower number of months. This sentence was necessary, it explained, 

to achieve the goals of specific deterrence and protecting the community, given her 

recidivism and 50 years of drug abuse, as well as achieving parity with her “jointly” 

culpable codefendant.

Regarding this last point about parity, Peterson argues incorrectly that a district 

court may never consider the sentence of a comparable co-defendant in evaluating 

potential sentencing disparities. Gall, 552 U.S. at 55–56. We recently clarified that, 

despite language in cases such as Scott (cited by Peterson) implying that sentencing 

disparities matter chiefly across judges and districts, “[a] district court is entitled, if it 

wishes, to apply the rule against unwarranted disparities to co-defendants’ sentences.” 
No. 19-3461 Page 6 

Solomon, 892 F.3d at 278. In short, although the court is not required to make a 

comparison between co-defendants, it is authorized to do so.

Here, in assessing Peterson and Moore, the district judge reasonably decided that 

they should receive comparable sentences. Peterson points to distinctions between 

herself and Moore that she believes are significant. She observes that, unlike her, Moore 

possessed multiple weapons, handled most of the sales (a point reflected in his higher 

guidelines range), and did not cooperate with law enforcement. But the district court 

adequately justified its conclusion that these distinctions did not require a lower 

sentence for Peterson. It explained that Moore’s possession of guns and greater

participation in sales were not more serious aggravators than Peterson’s actions: she 

bragged that she set the prices and “ran the show.” And although a defendant’s 

cooperation with the government may warrant a lower sentence relative to a codefendant, United States v. Orlando, 819 F.3d 1016, 1026 (7th Cir. 2016), a court can 

choose how much weight to accord cooperation. United States v. Knox, 573 F.3d 441, 453 

(7th Cir. 2009). In Peterson’s case, the court acknowledged that her cooperation 

qualified her for a sentence that, under the safety-valve provision, fell below the 60-

month statutory minimum term in prison for her offense. But it permissibly decided 

against that much of a downward shift from the advisory range because it believed that 

she “jointly” undertook the meth operation with Moore, and unlike Moore, was more 

likely to re-offend given her lengthy drug history and past troubles with the law. 

Because the district court did not procedurally err, we do not address the 

government’s argument that, under 18 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), the quantity of drugs 

attributed to Peterson prohibited the district court from sentencing her to probation. 

AFFIRMED