J-S46022-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: BABY BOY G.

APPEAL OF: C.M. & A.M.,

Petitioners

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 9 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2016-4124

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 07, 2017

Appellants, C.A.M. (“Adoptive Father”) and A.L.M., (“Adoptive Mother”) 

(collectively, “Adoptive Parents” or “Petitioners”), appeal from the order 

entered on December 16, 2016, denying their petition to confirm the 

consent to the adoption of Baby Boy G. (“Child”) executed by Child’s birth 

mother, J.G., (“Mother”), on January 25, 2016, based on the finding that 

Mother timely revoked her consent in writing pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2711(c) and (d) of the Adoption Act. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the procedural history of this appeal as follows.

The first docketed activity in this matter was the [Adoptive 

Parents’] report of intention to adopt, filed on March 4, 2016, 

stating their desire to adopt “Baby Boy [G.],” born to [Mother] 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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[in December of 2015]. On March 16, 2016, the [Adoptive 

Parents] filed a petition to confirm consent and a petition for 

adoption. The petition to confirm consent recites that [Mother] 

had signed a consent of biological parent to adoption on January 

25, 2016, and that the identity of the birth father is unknown, as 

set forth in [] Mother’s Affidavit also signed by [Mother] on 

January 25, 2016. Both the consent to adoption and affidavit 

were attached to the petition to confirm consent.

A scheduling request was filed on behalf of the [Adoptive 

Parents] on March 31, 2016, and the petition to confirm consent 

and petition for adoption were set for hearing on May 24, 2016. 

Given that the birth father was unknown, the court permitted 

service on the birth father by publication by order entered of 

record on March 31, 2016.

The [Adoptive Parents] and their counsel appeared in court at 

the time of the May 24, 2016 hearing. . . . [Mother] appeared 

as well. [Mother] was not represented by counsel. [Mother] had 

not filed any objections of record, but appeared at the hearing to 

object to the petition to confirm consent. At that time, [Mother] 

alleged she had been coerced and unduly pressured into signing 

the consent to adopt. She appeared to the court to be in a state 

of agitation and distress. Given her allegations and overall 

appearance, and the fact that she was unrepresented, the court 

continued the hearing on the petition to confirm consent to 

permit [Mother] the opportunity to secure legal counsel. The 

court thereafter granted a request by [Mother] for 

court[-]appointed counsel, and appointed Barbara Topinka, 

Esquire, to represent her. A guardian ad litem was appointed to 

represent the best interests of [] [C]hild.

By Order filed June 16, 2016, the hearing on the petition to 

confirm consent was rescheduled for September 1, 2016, the 

first date the schedules of all involved could accommodate. 

Following a pre-hearing conference on August 29, 2016, the 

hearing was rescheduled for December 8, 2016 at the request of 

counsel for [Mother], (who contemplated withdraw[al] at that 

time), and over objection of the [Adoptive Parents]. In follow-up 

to the discussion at the pre-hearing conference, Attorney 

Topinka filed a motion to withdraw as [Mother’s] counsel on 

September 1, 2016, which was granted by the court. Substitute 

counsel was appointed for [Mother] by order dated September 
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16, 2016 appointing Attorney Charles Kroboth, Esquire, to 

represent her.

At the hearing on December 8, 2016, [Mother], through her 

counsel, challenged the consent to adoption on two grounds: (1) 

she had timely revoked the consent within the thirty[-]day 

period provided under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2101, 

et seq.; and, (2) the consent had been secured in the first 

instance through fraud, duress and coercion. As to the latter 

ground for relief, [Mother] made an oral motion asking the court 

to permit her to raise the challenge to the validity of the consent 

nunc pro tunc, as [Mother] conceded that she had not petitioned 

the court within sixty days of signing the consent as required by 

the Adoption Act. The court deferred ruling on the nunc pro tunc

motion at that time and permitted presentation of evidence on 

all issues.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/17, at 1-2 (superfluous capitalization omitted).

The trial court set forth the factual background of this appeal, as 

developed at the hearing on December 8, 2016, as follows.

. . . Although the evidence was presented on the revocation and 

fraud/duress issues in bifurcated fashion, as will become evident 

from the following discussion, portions of the testimony on the 

fraud and duress issue were also relevant to the issue of whether 

[Mother] timely revoked her consent to adoption.

In support of their prima facie burden on their petition to confirm 

consent, the [Adoptive Parents] presented their original petition 

to confirm consent and accompanying exhibits, which included a 

consent of biological parent to adoption signed by [Mother] on 

January 25, 2016 (Exh. A), and [] Mother’s Affidavit as to the 

identity of the biological father (Exh. B). The [Adoptive Parents] 

also presented proof of service by publication on the putative 

birth father. Based on this evidence, the [Adoptive Parents] 

requested entry of an order confirming the consent to adoption 

and terminating the parental rights of [] [M]other and father.

In opposition to the petition to confirm consent, [Mother] 

testified on her own behalf as to the steps she took to revoke 

the consent and the circumstances attendant to these events. 

[Mother] testified that she began to have doubts about her 
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decision to place [Child] for adoption shortly after signing the 

adoption paperwork at the hospital. (Tr., 12-8-16 Hearing, at 

24). [Child] was born premature and was admitted to the NICU 

for care immediately after birth. [Child] remained in the hospital 

approximately seven or eight weeks, until mid-February of 2016. 

(Id. at 24-26). [Mother] testified that she had informed 

“everyone," including nurses at the hospital, the [Adoptive 

Parents], and her own lawyer, Denise Bierly, Esquire, that she 

did not want to sign the consent to adoption and other 

paperwork until after [Child] was discharged from the hospital. 

She testified that she was pressured into signing the documents, 

including the consent, and that she knew it was a mistake soon 

after signing. (Id. at 40-41).

[Mother] testified that, within a couple of days after [Child] was 

released from the hospital, she began contacting Attorney Bierly 

by telephone and text message about revoking her consent. In 

mid-February, she ultimately spoke with either Attorney Bierly or 

her assistant, Meshia Calhoun,2 who advised her she would have 

to send a written revocation to the law office to revoke her 

consent. [Mother] testified she was advised by Attorney Bierly’s 

office that, if she sent the revocation to the office, Attorney 

Bierly would contact the [Adoptive Parents’] attorney, Justin 

Miller, Esquire, to advise him of her intent to revoke. (Id. at 25-

29). This was confirmed by Attorney Bierly, as further noted 

below.

[Mother] testified that she typed a revocation letter, signed it, 

put it in an envelope and sent it to Attorney Bierly via United 

States mail. (Id. at 28-32). [Mother] did not keep a copy of the 

letter or send the letter by certified mail, trusting that sending 

the letter to her attorney as advised to do would be sufficient. 

(Id.). Although [Mother] could not identify the particular date 

she mailed the revocation letter, she testified that she mailed it 

to Attorney Bierly before expiration of the thirty[-]day revocation 

period. She was certain of this timing because she sent a 

follow-up text message to Attorney Bierly stating she had sent 

her the revocation letter in the mail, and that text message was 

sent before expiration of the thirty days.3 As noted below, 

Attorney Bierly, who was called by the [Adoptive Parents] to 

testify regarding [Mother’s] allegations of fraud and duress, 

acknowledged receiving the text message from [Mother] on 

February 23, 2016. The thirty days to revoke after [Mother] 

signed the consent to adoption expired on February 24, 2016. 
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[Mother] also testified that she had been in communication with 

Ms. Calhoun about the revocation.

In rebuttal, the [Adoptive Parents] presented testimony from 

Meshia Calhoun to prove the revocation letter was never 

received at Attorney Bierly’s law office. Ms. Calhoun testified to 

the procedures for cataloguing mail at the law office, and 

testified there had never been an occasion when an anticipated 

piece of mail had not reached the office. (Tr. 12-8-16 Hearing, 

at 53-56). Ms. Calhoun also initially testified that she had not 

received any communications from [Mother] about the 

revocation, but later acknowledged an email message shown to 

her on cross examination that clearly showed communication 

from [Mother] to Ms. Calhoun on March 4, 2016[,] in which 

[Mother] states that she sent the revocation “last week.” (Id. at 

57-59). [Mother] also states in the email that she had been 

trying to reach Attorney Bierly, who refused to accept her calls.4 

Ms. Calhoun acknowledged having received the email and 

thought she had forwarded it to Attorney Bierly. She did not 

recall having any discussion of it with Attorney Bierly. Id. 

[Mother] received a letter from Attorney Bierly in early March of 

2016 in which Attorney Bierly informed [Mother] she would no 

longer represent her. The letter was dated March 5, 2016; the 

date of [Mother’s] receipt is not clear. (Id. at 34, 37). Neither 

party admitted the actual letter into evidence. The 

circumstances involving the withdraw[al] letter are further noted 

below.

In addition to the above, [Mother] testified she had spoken with 

[Adoptive Father], before she sent the revocation letter to 

Attorney Bierly. She said [Adoptive Father] called her after 

learning from Attorney Miller that she was planning to revoke 

her consent. [Mother] told him yes, but said very little else. 

She testified that she was not on good terms with the [Adoptive 

Parents] as of that point in time.

[Mother] was questioned regarding why she did not take further 

action when Attorney Bierly stopped communicating with her 

after she mailed the revocation and then withdrew as her 

counsel. [Mother] testified that she was very stressed and felt 

no one was listening to her or hearing her, and she believed she 

had taken all the steps necessary to revoke her consent. She 

testified she did not have money to hire a lawyer for 

representation and did not know what to do. She appeared at 
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the initial hearing on the petition to confirm consent to bring the 

issue (and the issue regarding her allegations of fraud and 

duress) before the court.5 (Id. at 102).

The [Adoptive Parents] also presented testimony from Christine 

Millinder, Register of Wills and Clerk of the Centre County 

Orphan[s’] Court. Ms. Millinder testified about receiving a phone 

call from [Mother] on March 4, 2016. She said [Mother] told her 

she would be sending a revocation to the court. (Tr. 12-8-16 

Hearing, at 49-52). [Mother] acknowledges this conversation. 

(Id. at 45-46). It is undisputed that [Mother] did not send a 

revocation letter directly to the court.

Both parties also presented testimony as to the fraud, duress 

and coercion allegations.6 By way of summary, [Mother] 

testified that she was under substantial pressure due to the 

premature birth of [Child] after unanticipated complications with 

her pregnancy. At birth, [Child] was taken to the NICU. He was 

not discharged from the hospital until approximately seven to 

eight weeks after birth. [Mother] went to the hospital to see 

[Child] every day during this time, and she pumped breast milk 

for [Child]. (Tr. 12-8-16 Hearing at 68-80, 100). She testified 

she made it very clear to hospital nursing staff, to the [Adoptive 

Parents] as the putative adoptive parents, to the adoption 

agency, and to her own lawyer, Attorney Bierly, that she did not 

want to sign the adoption paperwork until [Child] was released 

from the hospital. She testified about comments by nursing staff 

and others that made her feel pressured into proceeding with

signing the paperwork before she was ready. She said she felt 

unduly pressured by the [Adoptive Parents], and that one of the 

attending nurses was relieved from her assignment because of 

inappropriate involvement in the matter. (Id[.] at 85-93). 

[Mother] also testified she was taking prescription medications, 

suggesting that she was confused and vulnerable as a result. 

(See id. at 85). She did not present any medical testimony on 

these issues, or corroborating evidence regarding the nurse she 

believes was reassigned. She concedes she met with Attorney 

Bierly and Ms. Calhoun on January 25, 2016, before [Child] was 

released from the hospital, and that she signed the documents 

on that date. As noted above, she testified that she regretted 

her decision fairly immediately.

The [Adoptive Parents] presented testimony from: (i) Abigail 

Davis, the owner and director of the adoption agency that 
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facilitated the adoption plan; (ii) Attorney Bierly; and, (iii) 

Patricia Hackman, a counselor recommended to [Mother] in the 

course of these events. The [Adoptive Parents] did not testify. 

Portions of the testimony most pertinent to the issue of 

revocation of [Mother’s] consent to adoption are summarized 

below.

Ms. Davis appeared by telephone. Her testimony was seemingly 

based on vague recollection and incomplete notes made at some 

point after the underlying events occurred. (See Tr. 12-8-16 

Hearing, at 135, 140, 142). Her testimony was also inconsistent 

with that of other witnesses on several points. For example, Ms. 

Davis stated that she had a three[-]hour telephone conversation 

with [Mother] on February 29, 2016, in which [Mother] told her 

she had threatened to revoke her consent but that she never 

actually wrote or sent the letter. (Id. at 133). [Mother] denied 

ever having a three[-]hour conversation with Ms. Davis, and 

denied ever telling Ms. Davis she had not written or sent the 

revocation. (Id. at 189-90). When pressed on the issue, Ms. 

Davis testified that her notes did not reflect whether the “letter” 

she recalled speaking with [Mother] about was a letter to be sent 

to Attorney Bierly or a letter to be sent directly to the Orphan[s’] 

Court. (Id. at 136-37). Ms. Davis also testified that she had 

arranged for the counselor, Patricia Hackman, to meet with

[Mother] and that this occurred by the end of December shortly 

after [Child] was born. (Id. at 138). Testimony of other 

witnesses, including Ms. Hackman and Attorney Bierly, was that 

Attorney Bierly made the arrangements for counseling with Ms. 

Hackman and that this occurred at the end of January. In all, 

the court did not find Ms. Davis’ testimony in this case to be very 

reliable. 

Attorney Bierly’s testimony established that she was retained by 

the adoption agency to represent [Mother] on a flat fee basis, 

which would be paid regardless of the outcome of the adoption. 

(Id. at 155). Attorney Bierly’s first contact with [Mother] was 

after [Child] birth. She first met [Mother] in person on January 

25, 2016, the day the consent to adoption and other papers 

were signed. Attorney Bierly testified that she had waited for 

[Mother] to say she was ready to sign before arranging the 

meeting for January 25. (Id. at 158). Prior to that, she 

arranged counseling with Ms. Hackman in response to what she 

perceived to be typical expressions of concern attendant to 

adoptions. (Id. at 156-57).
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On January 25, 2016, the day [Mother] signed the consent to 

adoption, Attorney Bierly reviewed the revocation process from 

the second page of the consent document with her, telling her 

she would need to mail a revocation either to her office or the 

Centre County Orphan[s’] Court clerk within thirty days if she 

wished to revoke her consent. (Id. at 160-61, 170-71). 

Attorney Bierly went over this with [Mother] on other occasions 

as well, including an occasion in mid-February of 2016 when 

[Mother] called and asked her how to revoke the consent. (Id.

at 162; 171-72). According to Attorney Bierly, she again 

advised [Mother] to mail the revocation to her on that occasion, 

and also told her she would immediately inform the [Adoptive 

Parents’] legal counsel of [Mother’s] decision. (Id. at 172). 

Attorney Bierly testified she received a text from [Mother] on 

February 23, 2016 - a day before expiration of the revocation 

period - telling her [Mother] had already sent her the revocation. 

Attorney Bierly also testified that she never received the 

revocation in the mail. (Id. at 162).

Attorney Bierly sent a letter withdrawing her representation of 

[Mother] on March 5, 2016 due to a breakdown in their 

relationship, including allegations by [Mother] that Attorney 

Bierly had stolen [Child]. (Id. at 162-63). [Attorney] Bierly did 

not provide [Mother] information about any remaining legal 

avenues to challenge the consent to adoption at that time. (Id.

at 172-73).

Testimony from Patricia Hackman established that she was 

contacted by Attorney Bierly on January 29, 2016 to offer 

counseling to [Mother]. (Id. at 179). Ms. Hackman and 

[Mother] met for the first time on January 31, 2016. They 

discussed various concerns [Mother] had, including concerns 

about her son and about finances. (Id. at 179-81). Ms. 

Hackman testified that [Mother] called her on February 22, 2016 

and told her she wanted to revoke her consent. Ms. Hackman 

had a copy of the consent to adoption signed by [Mother], and 

she and [Mother] together reviewed, over the telephone, the 

paragraph explaining how to revoke. (Id. at 182, 187). 

[Mother] informed Ms. Hackman she was going to proceed with 

sending the revocation in accordance with the instructions on the 

consent to adoption. (Id. at 184-85).

___________________________________________________
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2 Ms. Calhoun was also referenced during the course of the 

hearing as Meshia “Barton.”

3 Testimony from [Mother] and Attorney Bierly demonstrated 

that text messaging was a typical form of communication 

between the two during their attorney-client relationship. (See 

e.g., Tr. 12-8-16 Hearing, at 29, 172).

4 The email actually states that Attorney Bierly hung up on 

[Mother] twice. (Tr. 12-8-16 Hearing, at 58-59). The record is 

unclear as to the level or substance of any conversation that 

occurred. Attorney Bierly’s testimony suggested that friction had 

developed between her and [Mother] sometime between 

mid-February and early March.

5 The [Adoptive Parents’] petition to confirm consent was filed on 

March 4, 2016, a day before Attorney Bierly sent the letter 

withdrawing as [Mother’s] counsel. 

6 As noted above, the court did not rule on those allegations 

after determining that [Mother] had validly revoked her consent 

within thirty days as permitted by the Adoption Act.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/17, at 3-8 (footnotes in original; superfluous 

capitalization omitted).

The trial court explained its decision as follows:

At the conclusion of the evidence, the court directed the parties 

to submit memoranda outlining their positions and supporting 

legal authority by December 12, 2016. Both parties complied 

with this directive.

On consideration of the evidence and the arguments of counsel, 

the court entered an Order on December 16, 2016 denying the 

[Adoptive Parents’] petition to confirm consent, having 

concluded [Mother] had timely revoked her consent under the 

Adoption Act. In light of this conclusion, the court did not rule 

on the issues involving [Mother’s] challenge to the validity of the 

consent based on fraud and duress.
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The [Adoptive Parents] filed a notice of appeal and statement of 

[errors] complained of on appeal on December 28, 2016,1raising 

nine bases of alleged error.

__________________________________________________

1 The court also notes that [Adoptive Parents] filed a petition for 

involuntary termination of parental rights [of] Mother on 

December 12, 2016. Prior to [Adoptive Parents’] appeal, the 

petition for involuntary termination was scheduled for hearing on 

April 6, 2017.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/17, at 1-3 (footnote in original; superfluous 

capitalization omitted).

In their brief on appeal, Adoptive Parents raise the following issues:

1. Whether the court erred and abused its discretion in denying 

[Adoptive Parents’] petition to confirm consent?

2. Whether the court committed an error of law and/or abused 

its discretion by failing to shift the burden to [Mother] after 

[Adoptive Parents] presented overwhelming evidence to rebut 

the presumption that [Mother] had mailed her revocation?

3. Whether the court erred and abused its discretion by holding 

that [Mother’s] testimony was credible?

4. Whether the court erred and abused its discretion by 

determining [Mother] properly revoked her consent to adoption 

despite overwhelming evidence and testimony to the contrary?

5. Whether the court erred and abused its discretion by holding 

that any corroborating evidence or testimony was sufficient to 

support its finding that [Mother] had mailed a written 

revocation of her consent?

6. Whether the court committed an error and abused its 

discretion in determining the [Mother] met the applicable 

burden of proof to show, absent a physical writing, that she had 

revoked her consent to adoption?
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7. Whether the court committed an error of law by accepting a 

revocation of consent not executed in accordance with the 

statutory requirements of 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2711?

8. Whether the court erred and abused its discretion in failing 

to enforce the contract established by the consent to adoption 

executed by [Mother]?

9. Upon receipt and review of the transcript of the hearing 

[Adoptive Parents] will not pursue the ninth issue raised in their 

[Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) Statement.

Adoptive Parents’ Brief, at 6-8. 

Adoptive Parents summarize their argument as follows:

The Adoption Act provides specific provisions for revoking a 

consent to adoption. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2711(c). Revocations must 

be in writing. Id. Revocation requires compliance with the 

statute; mere intent to revoke is not sufficient. In the case at 

bar, [Mother] did not establish that she ever put her wish to 

revoke her consent in writing.

If service of a revocation of consent is attempted via the postal 

system, the Mailbox Rule applies. The presumption of mailing is 

rebuttable. In the case at bar, [Adoptive Parents] presented 

overwhelming evidence that [Mother] did not execute a valid 

revocation of her consent to adoption.

The plain meaning of the Adoption Act does not allow revocation 

of consent by text message. The trial court’s attempt to create 

new law by finding otherwise is incompatible with the plain 

meaning of the statute and should be reversed.

Id. at 12.

With regard to our standard of review from a decree of the Orphans’ 

Court, we have stated: 

When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans’ Court, this 

Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error 

and the court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence. 

Because the Orphans’ Court sits as the fact-finder, it determines 
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the credibility of the witnesses, and on review, we will not 

reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that 

discretion.

Appeal of: J.T.M., 845 A.2d 861, 863 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citation 

omitted).

Regarding the definition of an abuse of discretion, this Court has 

stated:

[a]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in 

reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, 

or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either 

manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill will, discretion has been abused.

Bulgarelli v. Bulgarelli, 934 A.2d 107, 111 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quotation 

omitted).

Our Supreme Court has explained that, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 

now found at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711, the consent of a natural parent whose 

parental rights have not already been terminated is necessary to effect an 

adoption. In the Matter of the Adoption of Christopher P., 389 A.2d 94, 

97 (Pa. 1978) citing Singer Adoption Case, 326 A.2d 275, 277-278 (Pa. 

1974). The consent to the adoption must be intelligent, voluntary and 

deliberate. Id. Further, the consent must be clear and unequivocal. Id.

Section 2711 of the Adoption Act provides, in pertinent part, as 

follows: 

§ 2711. Consents necessary to adoption
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(a) General rule.—Except as otherwise provided in this 

part, consent to an adoption shall be required of the 

following:

* * *

(3) The parents or surviving parent of an adoptee 

who has not reached the age of 18 years.

* * *

(c) Validity of consent.—No consent shall be valid if it 

was executed prior to or within 72 hours after the birth of 

the child. A putative father may execute a consent at any 

time after receiving notice of the expected or actual birth 

of the child. Any consent given outside this

Commonwealth shall be valid for purposes of this section if 

it was given in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction 

where it was executed. A consent to an adoption may 

only be revoked as set forth in this subsection. The 

revocation of a consent shall be in writing and shall be 

served upon the agency or adult to whom the child was 

relinquished. The following apply:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3):

* * *

(ii) For a consent to an adoption executed by a 

birth-mother, the consent is irrevocable more 

than 30 days after the execution of the 

consent.

(2) An individual may not waive the revocation period 

under paragraph (1).

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the following 

apply:

(i) An individual who executed a consent to an 

adoption may challenge the validity of the consent 

only by filing a petition alleging fraud or duress 

within the earlier of the following time frames:

(A) Sixty days after the birth of the child 

or the execution of the consent, whichever 

occurs later.
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(B) Thirty days after the entry of the 

adoption decree.

(ii) A consent to an adoption may be 

invalidated only if the alleged fraud or duress 

under subparagraph (i) is proven by:

(A) a preponderance of the evidence in 

the case of consent by a person 21 years of 

age or younger; or

(B) clear and convincing evidence in all 

other cases.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711 (a)(3), (c)(1)(ii), (c)(2), and (c)(3) (emphasis added).

Section 2711(d) sets forth the contents of a parent’s consent to 

adoption and for a revocation of the consent as follows:

(d) Contents of consent.—

(1) The consent of a parent of an adoptee under 18 years of age 

shall set forth the name, age and marital status of the parent, 

the relationship of the consenter to the child, the name of the 

other parent or parents of the child and the following:

I hereby voluntarily and unconditionally consent to the adoption 

of the above named child.

I understand that by signing this consent I indicate my intent to 

permanently give up all rights to this child.

I understand such child will be placed for adoption.

I understand I may revoke this consent to permanently 

give up all rights to this child by placing the revocation in 

writing and serving it upon the agency or adult to whom 

the child was relinquished.

* * *

If I am the birth mother of the child, I understand that 

this consent to an adoption is irrevocable unless I revoke 

it within 30 days after executing it by delivering a written 
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revocation to (insert the name and address of the agency 

coordinating the adoption) or (insert the name and 

address of an attorney who represents the individual 

relinquishing parental rights or prospective adoptive 

parent of the child) or (insert the court of the county in 

which the voluntary relinquishment form was or will be 

filed).

I have read and understand the above and I am signing it as a 

free and voluntary act.

(2) The consent shall include the date and place of its execution 

and name and addresses and signatures of at least two persons 

who witnessed its execution and their relationship to the

consenter.

23 Pa.C.S.A. 2711(d) (emphasis added).

In In re Adoption of J.A.S., 939 A.2d. 403, 408-409 (Pa. Super. 

2007), this Court applied the time constraints outlined in Section 2711(c) 

strictly and held that a person could not assail the validity of his or her 

assent before the trial court unless he or she first satisfied the relevant time 

limitations as a threshold matter. Specifically, we reasoned,

[t]he statute does not explicitly state it is subject to strict 

construction; but it does plainly provide for time constraints to 

revoke and/or challenge the validity of a consent to adoption. 

The practical consequence of the court’s [contrary] interpretation 

effectively permitted [b]irth mother to challenge the validity of 

her consent to adoption at any time, based upon the existence of 

a technical omission in the form of the initial consent. This lack 

of finality is exactly the mischief the legislature intended to 

remedy with the revision to Section 2711 of the Adoption Act in 

2004, the purpose of which was to afford finality to the adoption 

process. Hence[,] the statute renders a consent to adoption 

irrevocable more than thirty (30) days after execution. See 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(1)(ii). Additionally, the statute precludes a 

challenge to the validity of the consent to adoption after sixty 

(60) days following the birth of the child or the execution of the 

consent, whichever occurs later, and only upon the grounds of 
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fraud or duress. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(3)(i)(A). Thus, the 

unambiguous language of the statute required the [trial] court in 

this case to consider the timeliness of [b]irth mother’s petition to 

revoke and/or challenge the validity of her consent before it 

considered the merits of her claim. Contrary to the court’s 

interpretation, the threshold act that triggers these provisions of 

Section 2711 is the timely filing of the petition to revoke and/or 

challenge the validity of the consent to adoption. Whether 

[b]irth mother’s consent to adoption was valid could be 

addressed only if her petition had been timely filed. Essentially, 

the untimeliness of [b]irth mother’s petition precluded the court 

from addressing the issue of validity.

Id. (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, pursuant to In re Adoption of J.A.S., 

the trial court must first review the timeliness of a birth parent’s petition to 

revoke a consent to adoption prior to addressing whether the consent is 

valid. 

Herein, Mother signed her consent to the adoption of Child on January 

25, 2016, thus, pursuant to Section 2711(c)(1)(ii), Mother had an unfettered 

ability to revoke this agreement until February 24, 2016. The trial court 

found that Mother revoked her consent, in writing, within the thirty-day 

statutory period. Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/17, at 14; see In re Adoption 

of J.A.S., 939 A.2d at 408-409.

Adoptive Parents divide their issues into groups, discussing issues 1, 2, 

4, and 5 together, issues 2 and 3 together,1and issues 6, 7, and 8 together. 

For ease of our disposition, we will first address the issues in the order that

____________________________________________

1 The trial court similarly addressed the issues in groups, but addressed 

issue 3 separately.
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the trial court addressed them, and then address Adoptive Parents’ 

challenges to the resolution of each group of issues. 

Initially, the trial court addressed Adoptive Parents’ issue 3, as follows.

A. Assertion of Error No. 3 (credibility)

In paragraph 3 of their concise statement, Petitioners contend 

the [c]ourt erred and abused its discretion in determining that . . 

. [Mother’s] testimony was credible. The [trial court] addresses 

this assertion of error first, as the issue of credibility also 

permeates the majority of the allegations of error raised by 

[Adoptive Parents]. It is well-established that credibility 

determinations are solely within the province of the trier of fact. 

See e.g., In re Adoption of B.G.S., 614 A.2d 1161, 1168 (Pa. 

Super. 1992). Whether to accept all, some, or none of a 

witnesses’ testimony is a question for the factfinder. Id. at 

1169. As the finder of fact in this matter, the [trial court] 

concluded after listening to [Mother’s] testimony, observing her 

conduct and demeanor, and considering all of the evidence 

presented at the December 8[, 2016] hearing, that [Mother’s] 

testimony was credible. The [trial court’s] determination in this 

regard was not an abuse of discretion, and [Adoptive Parents’] 

assertion of error No. 3 lacks merit.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/17, at 10. 

The trial court had before it testimony from Mother that she had sent 

to Attorney Bierly, via United States mail, a typed revocation letter that she 

had signed, and put in an envelope. N.T., 12/8/16, at 28-32. Mother 

testified that she did not keep a copy of the letter or send the letter by 

certified mail because she trusted that sending the letter to her attorney, as 

she had been advised to do, would be sufficient. Id. The trial court found 

that, although Mother could not identify the particular date she mailed the 

revocation letter, she testified that she mailed it to Attorney Bierly before 
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expiration of the thirty-day revocation period. Id. at 29; Trial Court 

Opinion, 1/30/17, at 4. The trial court was satisfied that Mother was truthful 

in her testimony. After a careful review of the record, we find no abuse of 

the trial court’s discretion in its credibility determination, as it was within the 

trial court’s province to determine which witnesses’ testimony it found 

credible. Appeal of: J.T.M., 845 A.2d at 863. While Adoptive Parents 

argue that the trial court abused its discretion in finding Mother’s testimony 

that she properly revoked her consent to the adoption in a written letter sent 

to Attorney Bierly, they cannot request this Court to make a factual 

determination that reverses the fact-finding of the trial court that was based 

on competent testimony of record. 

Next, the trial court addressed Adoptive Parents’ challenges to the 

validity of Mother’s revocation as follows:

B. Assertions of Error No’s. [sic] 1, 2, 4, and 5

These assertions of error all challenge the court’s conclusion that 

[Mother] validly revoked her consent in accordance with the 

Adoption Act, and challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support that conclusion. At paragraph 2 of their concise 

statement, the [Adoptive Parents] assert the court erred by 

“failing to shift the burden to [Mother] after [Adoptive Parents] 

presented overwhelming evidence to rebut the presumption that 

[Mother] had mailed her revocation.” (See Pet’s. Concise 

Statem., at p. 2). In paragraph 5, [Adoptive Parents] assert 

that the court abused its discretion in finding that corroborating 

evidence was sufficient to support its finding that [Mother] 

mailed a written revocation of consent. (Id.).

As an initial point, the court did not base its conclusion that 

[Mother] mailed a written revocation to Attorney Bierly on a 

presumption; the conclusion was reached after considering the 
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testimony of the witnesses, including [Mother], and the evidence 

introduced at the hearing. [Mother] testified that she wrote a 

letter of revocation, signed it, and sent it to Attorney Bierly’s 

office by United States mail. (Tr. 12-8-16 Hearing, at 28-32). 

She testified that she took these steps before expiration of the 

thirty[-]day revocation period, and that she was certain of the 

timing based on a confirming text message she sent to Attorney 

Bierly. (Id.). She testified that she had various follow-up 

communications in an attempt to further discuss the revocation 

she mailed to Attorney Bierly. (Id. at 25, 32, 48)[.] The court 

found [Mother’s] testimony to be credible.

[Mother] also testified that she contacted Attorney Bierly’s office 

before sending the written revocation and asked how to go about 

revoking her consent, informing Attorney Bierly she wanted to 

do so. She was advised to send a written revocation to Attorney 

Bierly, and that Attorney Bierly would advise the [Adoptive 

Parents’] counsel of her intent to revoke her consent to 

adoption. (Id. at 27-28, 171-72). [Mother] testified she 

believed Attorney Bierly had informed Attorney Miller, who in 

turn advised the [Adoptive Parents], of her intent to revoke; she 

testified that [Adoptive Father] called her and stated he was told 

she intended to revoke the consent to adoption. (Id. at 33-34). 

The court concluded that [Mother’s] testimony on these matters 

was credible. Furthermore, the court notes that [Adoptive 

Parents] did not present any testimony to rebut the evidence 

that they had actual notice of [Mother’s] intent to revoke her 

consent in the timeframe shortly before she sent the written 

revocation to Attorney Bierly.

The court also concluded that [Adoptive Parents’] evidence 

tended to corroborate the testimony of [Mother] that she had 

mailed a written revocation to Attorney Bierly. Specifically, the 

testimony from Ms. Calhoun established that [Mother] sent an 

email to Ms. Calhoun on March 4, 2016 stating that she sent her 

revocation letter in a week before, and that she had repeatedly 

tried to contact Attorney Bierly about it to no avail. The email 

also referenced a text message sent to Attorney Bierly advising 

her that the revocation letter had been sent. (Tr. 12-8-16 

Hearing, at 58-59, and Resp. Exh. 1). Although Ms. Calhoun 

testified that the revocation letter sent by U.S. mail had not 

been received by Attorney Bierly’s office, this testimony does not 

refute the testimony that the revocation letter was written, 

signed, and mailed. Similarly, Ms. Millinder’s testimony about 
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the phone conversation with [Mother] on March 4, 2016 is not 

inconsistent with [Mother’s] testimony about her actions. The 

court concluded that the evidence overall was corroborative of 

[Mother’s] testimony that she timely mailed the revocation letter 

to Attorney Bierly; the court disagrees with [Adoptive Parents] 

that this conclusion constituted an error or abuse of discretion.

In addition to the above, portions of the evidence presented with 

respect to the issue of fraud and duress are also corroborative of 

[Mother’s] testimony. In her testimony, Attorney Bierly 

acknowledged that she received [Mother’s] text message stating 

that she already sent the revocation letter to Attorney Bierly. 

According to her testimony, Attorney Bierly received that text 

message on February 23, 2016, the day before the thirty[-]day 

period to revoke the consent to adoption expired. Attorney 

Bierly also testified that [Mother] told her in mid-February of her 

desire to revoke the consent to adoption, and that she informed 

[Mother] to send her the written revocation by mail and that she 

would notify the [Adoptive Parents’] attorney of [Mother’s] plan 

to revoke. (Id. 161-62, 171-72). The court found this 

testimony to be consistent with [Mother’s] testimony of the 

events, and with her testimony that she acted in accordance 

with instructions given to her on how to revoke the consent.

Petitioners also assert, in paragraphs 1 and 4 of their concise 

statement, that the court erred and abused its discretion in 

denying their petition to confirm consent, and determining that 

[Mother] properly revoked her consent to adoption “despite 

overwhelming evidence and testimony to the contrary.” (See

Pet’s. Concise Statem., ¶¶ 2, 4). The evidentiary challenge 

seems to be the same issue raised by paragraphs 2, 3, and 5, 

addressed above. As to the more broadly phrased issue(s) in 

paragraphs 1 and 4 of [Adoptive Parents’] concise statement, 

the court assumes [Adoptive Parents] take issue with the 

manner in which [Mother] sent the revocation and in which they 

learned of it. In their memorandum submitted after the 

December 8, 2016 hearing, the [Adoptive Parents] argue that, 

assuming, arguendo, [Mother] actually mailed [Attorney] Bierly 

a written letter of revocation, [Mother] did not serve her written 

revocation on them in the manner required for service of original 

process under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 403, and, 

therefore, she failed to comply with the statutory requirements 

for a valid revocation. (See Pet’s. Memo., at pp. 2-3).
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As a threshold matter, the court is not persuaded that the 

requirement in section 2711 of the Adoption Act that a 

revocation of consent be “served” was intended by the General 

Assembly to mean that the party effectuating such service would 

have to comply with the procedural rules pertaining to service of 

original process. The procedural rules governing service of 

process apply to civil actions pending in the courts of common 

pleas. See Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Proc., Intro. Cmt., 

(“Adoption of Rules of Civil Procedure.”) The rules governing 

service of original process are intended to ensure that the court 

has jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil action. See Trexler 

v. McDonald’s Corp., 118 A.3d 408, 412 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

Notably, nothing in the Adoption Act requires that a parent 

seeking to revoke a consent to adoption file an action with the 

court. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. 2711(c)-(d). Had the legislature 

intended to invoke all of the rules attendant to service of original 

process in civil actions, one would expect, at the very least, that 

the Adoption Act would include express language requiring a 

party seeking to revoke consent to adoption to commence a 

court action. Given that no court action is required, the rules 

governing service of process over a defendant would have no 

application.

Moreover, section 2711(d)(1) sets forth mandatory language to 

be included in a consent to adoption, which also advises the 

consenting party how to go about revoking a consent to adoption 

within the permissible thirty[-]day window. With respect to birth 

mothers, the statutorily prescribed language is as follows:

If I am the birth mother of the child, I understand 

that this consent to an adoption is irrevocable unless 

I revoke it within 30 days after executing it by 

delivering a written revocation to (insert the name 

and address of the agency coordinating the 

adoption) or (insert the name and address of an 

attorney who represents the individual relinquishing 

parental rights or prospective adoptive parent of the 

child) or (insert the court of the county in which the 

voluntary relinquishment form was or will be filed).

Id. This mandatory language provides three acceptable sources 

to which a birth mother may deliver a written revocation.
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The [c]ourt notes that section 2711(d)(1) also includes language 

that the consenting party understands that he or she “may 

revoke the consent . . . by placing the revocation in writing 

and serving it upon the agency or adult to whom the child was 

relinquished,” (id.), and that the consent form is required to 

include that language as well. See id. Although this perhaps 

creates some degree of ambiguity, the express directive in the 

statutorily required language to birth mothers wishing to revoke 

is clear: the written revocation must be delivered to one of the 

three acceptable sources, which include the attorney for a birth 

mother relinquishing parental rights. See id.

In the case at bar, in accordance with the statutory mandate of 

section 2711(d)(1), the consent to adoption signed by [Mother] 

advised her as follows:

E. . . . If I am the BIRTH mother of the child, I 

understand that this consent to an adoption is 

irrevocable unless I revoke it within 30 days after 

executing it by delivering a written revocation to 

Denise M. Bierly, Esquire, 486 Nimitz Avenue, State 

College, PA 16801, or The Court of Common Pleas of 

Centre County, Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court 

Division, Bellefonte, PA 16823[.]

This directive is consistent with the advice given to [Mother] by 

[Attorney] Bierly when [Mother] contacted her in mid-February 

stating she wanted to exercise her right to revoke her consent. 

(See Tr. 12-8-16 Hearing, at 161-62).

As discussed above, [Mother] testified that she wrote a 

revocation letter and mailed it to her attorney, [Attorney] Bierly, 

by sending it first class mail, and that she did so before the 

thirty[-]day revocation period expired. She then followed that 

with a text message to Attorney Bierly, sent the day before the 

end of the revocation period, stating that she had sent her the 

revocation. The court found this testimony to be credible and to 

be supported by the other credible evidence. Thus, [Mother] 

took every step required of her to revoke her consent to 

adoption, and she did so within the thirty[-]day time period for 

revoking. In addition, she alerted numerous individuals to the 

fact that she was doing so, and the record establishes that legal 

counsel for the [Adoptive Parents] was so advised, and that at 
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least [Adoptive Father] was actually aware of her intent to 

revoke.

Under the circumstances of this case, even assuming the mailed 

revocation letter was never received by Attorney Bierly, the 

court cannot conclude that the statutory requirements for 

revocation were not met. The court concludes that mailing the 

written revocation to Attorney Bierly was sufficient.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/17, at 10-14 (superfluous capitalization omitted).2

Thus, the trial court found that Mother properly revoked her consent to 

adoption in writing pursuant to section 2711(c) and (d) of the Adoption Act. 

Again, we agree with the trial court that Adoptive Parents’ foregoing 

arguments depend upon credibility determinations made in the province of 

the trial court. After a careful review of the record, we find no abuse of the 

trial court’s discretion in its credibility determination. Appeal of: J.T.M., 

845 A.2d at 863.

____________________________________________

2

 The trial court also stated that it found persuasive the argument raised by 

Mother’s counsel that, even if the act of mailing the revocation would not be 

sufficient, absent receipt by of the written revocation letter by Attorney 

Bierly, the text message admittedly received by Attorney Bierly one day 

before expiration of the revocation period, stating that a written revocation 

had already been sent to her, would be sufficient for valid written revocation 

under the factual circumstances of this case. We agree with the trial court’s 

reasoning to the extent that the text message, which Attorney Bierly did not 

deny receiving, should have alerted Attorney Bierly to the fact that she was 

missing Mother’s letter from her delivered mail. With this finding, we need 

not rule on Adoptive Parents’ assertion that the trial court inappropriately 

found Mother’s text message to her counsel, itself, was the writing that 

conveyed her revocation.
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Next, we review Adoptive Parents’ challenge to the trial court’s ruling 

that Mother did not produce a written revocation of consent at the hearing. 

The trial court set forth its analysis of this issue as follows: 

C. Petitioners’ Assertion of Error No. 6-8

In paragraphs 6 and 7 their concise statement, [Adoptive 

Parents] take issue with the fact that [Mother] did not produce a 

written revocation of consent at the hearing. In paragraph 8, 

[Adoptive Parents] assert that the court abused its discretion by 

failing to enforce the contract established by [Mother’s] executed 

consent to adoption.

As set forth above, the court concluded, based on all of the 

evidence, that [Mother] did, in fact, send a written revocation 

letter to Attorney Bierly by U.S. mail before expiration of the 

thirty[-]day revocation period. [Adoptive Parents] challenged 

the veracity of that testimony, but did not object to [Mother’s] 

testimony about the contents of the revocation letter at the 

hearing. The court found [Mother’s] testimony and the other 

corroborating evidence discussed above to be credible evidence 

that a written revocation letter had been delivered as required. 

The court believes that these findings were well within the 

court’s discretion, and do not constitute error of law or an abuse 

of discretion.

[Adoptive Parents’] assertion that the court failed to enforce the 

contract established by [Mother’s] executed consent to adoption 

is novel, in that this was not an argument raised at the time of 

the hearing. The court concludes that this argument is without 

merit, in that the court concludes that [Mother] did follow the 

steps outlined in the consent to adoption document for 

revocation by birth mothers. As noted above, the court also 

finds that [Adoptive Parents] were aware, before expiration of 

the thirty days, that [Mother] intended to revoke her consent.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/17, at 14-15 (superfluous capitalization omitted).

Again, we agree with the trial court that Adoptive Parents’ foregoing 

arguments depend upon credibility determinations made in the province of 
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the trial court. After a careful review of the record, we find no abuse of the 

trial court’s discretion in its credibility determination. Appeal of: J.T.M., 

845 A.2d at 863.

Finally, the trial court stated the reasoning for its decision as follows:

On a concluding note, although it is regrettable that [Mother’s] 

revocation of consent to adoption was not addressed sooner by 

all involved, all parties were aware, prior to expiration of the 

thirty[-]day revocation period, that [Mother] intended to revoke 

her consent to adoption, and at least [Mother’s] counsel was 

aware that she claimed to have done so. [Mother], at that point 

unrepresented by counsel and without the means to afford an 

attorney, appeared at the first opportunity to object at the 

hearing scheduled on the Adoptive Parents’ petition to confirm 

consent. 

This is not a case in which a birth mother delayed finality in the 

adoption process by belated attempts to revoke a consent to 

adoption. To the contrary, it is a case in which the birth mother

took the very actions she was instructed to take to revoke her 

consent, and did so in a timely manner, but her actions were 

unacknowledged and, ultimately, ignored.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/17, at 15-16 (superfluous capitalization omitted).

We find that the trial court did not commit any legal error or abuse its 

discretion in denying Adoptive Parents’ petition to confirm consent, finding 

credible Mother’s testimony that she timely revoked her consent to adoption 

by mailing a written letter of revocation to her counsel, in conformance with 

Section 2711(c) and (d) of the Adoption Act. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 

court order. 

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/7/2017