UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE REYNOLD EVANS, SR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 97-6149

NEEL WRIGHT; BRIEN CAMPBELL;

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.

James C. Fox, District Judge.

(CA-96-114-7-F)

Submitted: July 2, 1998

Decided: July 21, 1998

Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and

HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

George Reynold Evans, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth F. Parsons,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

George Evans appeals the district court's order denying relief on

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. Evans claims that Neel

Wright and Brien Campbell, employees of the North Carolina Department of Correction, Division of Adult Probation and Parole, and the

State of North Carolina violated his civil rights in managing his four

groups of state probation cases. Evans claims that Wright violated his

civil rights when he set the Group I.A cases for hearing when Evans

refused to sign the authorization papers, and that Wright caused him

to lose his appeal. Next, Evans alleges that Wright violated his civil

rights when Wright reported to the district court Evans' violations of

the terms and conditions of his probation in the Group I.B, II, and IV

cases. Last, Evans avers that Wright violated his civil rights when he

proposed to dismiss the violation reports in the Group IV cases and

transfer them to intensive probation.

We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion adopting the Defendants' memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment and find no reversible error. We conclude that the

district court properly dismissed the State of North Carolina because

it was not a "person" under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Next we find that the district

court correctly dismissed Campbell, concluding that Evans failed to

establish that Campbell could be held liable in a supervisory capacity

for Wright's actions. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir.

1994) (finding supervisory liability under § 1983 under limited circumstances). Finally, we determine that the district court properly dismissed the claim against Wright because Evans' conclusory

allegations failed to establish that Wright violated any of his constitutional rights. The record establishes that in supervising Evans' probation in the four groups of cases, transferring some of his cases to

intensive probation, and reporting Evans' probation violations to the

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court, Wright's actions did not amount to a violation of Evans' constitutional rights. See Inmates v. Owen, 561 F.2d 560, 562 (4th Cir.

1977). The record evidences that Evans pleaded guilty to the Group

I.A cases before Wright was involved in the cases, and that the district

court, not Wright, would not let Evans appeal his sentences in his

Group I.A cases. Next, the state court found that Wright was not

responsible for the transmittal of the Group I.B cases to superior

court. Further, Evans' claim that Wright intimidated him into accepting intensive probation is unsupported. Additionally, the record

reveals that Wright cited probation violations because Evans violated

the terms and conditions of his probation. Thus, because Evans failed

to establish that Wright violated his constitutional rights, the district

court properly granted summary judgment for Wright. Accordingly,

we affirm the decision of the district court. Evans v. Wright, No. CA96-114-7-F (E.D.N.C., Dec. 30, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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