SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

January 26, 2011 

LETTER FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES FORCES-IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Iraqi Government Support for the Iraq International Academy (SIGIR 11-009) 

This letter is to bring to your attention the concerns of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) about Iraqi government support for a U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I) project 

to develop an executive-level educational facility for the Iraqi Security Forces and other 

branches of the Government of Iraq (GOI). When completed, the facility will also serve as a 

regional center of excellence for officials from other countries. The project, known as the Iraqi 

International Academy (IIA), is a $26 million project funded by the Iraq Security Forces Fund 

(ISFF), and managed by that part of USF-I’s Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission assigned to 

assist the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (ITAM-MOD). SIGIR is concerned about the lack of GOI 

commitment to maintain and sustain the academy upon completion and believes that further 

efforts to furnish and equip the IIA should be reconsidered. The Iraqi government has sufficient 

resources to furnish and equip the facility, and its commitment to the project is best shown by 

giving them this responsibility. The $12 million in funding the U.S. has set aside for furnishings 

and equipment is better spent elsewhere. 

Background 

In early 2009, the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq1, the U.S. Embassy 

Baghdad, and the GOI held discussions on the need for an Iraqi academy for English language 

training. According to correspondence about these discussions, the three parties believed that an 

academy was needed to consolidate the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior English 

language teaching sites, and to develop a unified curriculum. At the time, the cost was estimated 

to be more than $20 million. According to ITAM-MOD officials, MOD officials were eager to 

start the project, and in April 2009, the concept was presented to the Prime Minister’s office to 

review the proposed project. In May 2009, the Prime Minister approved the concept and 

requested the Council of Ministers form a committee to discuss the feasibility of the IIA. 

The MOD selected for the school a site adjacent to the international zone that it believed would 

enable Coalition support, be close to the Iraqi government command structure, and provide room 

for expansion, if necessary. The Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan awarded the 

contract, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region District (GRD) manages the 

contract. GRD concluded that renovating existing structures would be a more cost efficient 

approach than attempting to build the entire facility from scratch. In July 2009, the Prime 

Minister’s office authorized MOD to pay 225 million Iraqi Dinars to families currently living on 

 

1

 This command was part of the Multi-National Force–Iraq and both of these commands were subsumed into the 

U.S. Forces–Iraq on January 1, 2010. 
2 

the site to relocate. In addition, the Prime Minister directed that the Iraqi Security Forces secure 

the area. 

In January 2010, ITAM-MOD expanded its vision of the academy to that of a regional 

educational institute similar to the George C. Marshall Center in Germany.2

 The expanded IIA 

initiative would offer instruction in security studies (e.g., international relations, diplomacy, 

capability planning), public administration (e.g., strategic logistics, budgeting, management, and 

leadership), and academic and executive-level English. The anticipated attendees are current and 

future GOI military and civilian leaders equivalent to Lieutenant Colonel and above and 

government officials from neighboring countries with which Iraq has a strategic interest. In 

addition, it is planned that the IIA will provide a centralized location and state-of-the art facilities 

for GOI conferences and executive seminars. 

ITAM-MOD has held talks with other U.S. and international academic institutions seeking 

advice on curriculum, assistance in faculty selection and development, and the possibility of 

guest faculty support. For example, the U.S. National Defense University and the U.S. Near East 

South Asia Center for Strategic Studies are collaborating on developing a curriculum for the IIA, 

and the George C. Marshall Center has tentatively agreed to assist in developing student/faculty 

policies. 

The project consists of two phases: 1) construction and 2) furnishing and equipping. A 

construction contract was awarded on September 20, 2009, for $11,710,000. Three contract 

modifications have increased costs to $13,437,822. As of November 1, 2010, GRD has paid the 

contractor $3.24 million, and an estimated 24% of the work has been completed. The second 

phase, furnishing and equipping, is estimated to cost $12 million. However, to date ITAM-MOD 

has not requested funding, and requirements have not been discussed with the GOI.3

 ITAMMOD has stated that funds will not be obligated until March 2011. According to ITAM-MOD 

officials, the IIA is a turnkey project and as such, cost estimates do not include any funding for 

operating, maintaining, or sustaining the facility once it is completed and turned over to the GOI. 

The current plan is that all construction will be finished and the buildings equipped by 

September 2011 for the official opening. At completion, the campus will include three 

classroom buildings; an administrative office building for faculty and staff; a full-service dining 

facility; billeting for nearly 200 personnel; and a state-of-the-art student center with a large 

auditorium, coffee shop, library, and research center (see Figure 1 for the artist design of the IIA, 

and see Figure 2 for an example of a building containing classrooms). 

 

2

 The Marshall Center works to create a more stable security environment among the nations of North America, 

Europe, and Eurasia by advancing democratic institutions and relationships, especially in the field of defense; 

promoting active, peaceful security cooperation; and enhancing enduring partnerships. 3

 ITAM-MOD provided us a preliminary list of equipment. Some planned equipment includes 94 flat-screen 

televisions for student use at a cost of $86,200, translation equipment costing $750,000, computer equipment costing 

$842,200, and class room furniture costing $518,300. 
3 

Figure 1—Artist’s Design of IIA

Source: USF-I/ITAM/MOD. 

Figure 2—Classrooms 

Source: USF-I/ITAM/MOD, SIGIR IIA Site Visit 11/19/2010. 

SIGIR’s reporting objective was to provide information on the Government of Iraq’s 

commitment to maintaining and sustaining the IIA. 
4 

GOI Does Not Have Plans To Fund IIA 

As discussed, ITAM-MOD officials told SIGIR that the IIA will be turned over to the GOI upon 

completion, and it has no plans to provide further financial support. However, SIGIR’s 

interviews with Iraqi Ministry of Defense officials found that the GOI also has no plan to fund 

the operation of the IIA after it opens in September 2011. 

SIGIR interviewed three senior Iraqi officials in the MOD to discuss operating and maintaining 

the IIA. All of the MOD officials interviewed stated that they had discussed the concept of the 

IIA with ITAM and agreed that the GOI needed such an educational institution. However, they 

informed us that the ITAM-MOD had not raised the issue of Iraqi financial support with them 

and, as one official stated, he simply assumed the United States would fund the operation of the 

IIA for at least one year. 

Iraqi officials also pointed to other reasons why funding of the IIA remained uncertain. One 

official stated that he knew the Iraqis would have to take responsibility for the IIA at some point 

in the future, and had requested that ITAM-MOD provide him data on the estimated cost of 

maintaining the physical structure, the number and types of faculty that would be needed, and the 

types of equipment the U.S. planned to provide. This information was needed to develop 

operating, maintenance, and sustainment costs. He said, however, that he never received a 

response. He also said that GOI had not designated a lead Ministry for the IIA and that it was 

unlikely that any Ministry would step up and request funding under its budget until the GOI did 

so. 

ITAM-MOD Did Not Address Need for GOI Commitment 

ITAM-MOD’s planning documents discussed its vision for the IIA but did not address the future 

operating and sustainment costs, or the need to obtain a commitment from the GOI. ITAMMOD officials told us that its efforts to obtain a financial support commitment to date have been 

unsuccessful. 

SIGIR reviewed ITAM-MOD correspondence with the MOD and internal GOI memos and 

letters between 2009 and 2010 and did not find any instances where ITAM-MOD raised the issue 

of the GOI’s future responsibilities for the IIA. GOI memoranda and letters during the spring of 

2009 affirmed its support for developing an English language institute but none addressed the 

GOI’s responsibilities for operating or funding the IIA. A June 2009 letter from the Prime 

Minister’s office to the Multi-National Force–Iraq (Multi-National Force–Iraq was the 

predecessor organization to USF–I) reiterated GOI support of the English language institute and 

stated that the IIA would be funded by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense “in 

collaboration” with the GOI. The letter did not, however, elaborate on what such collaboration 

entailed or if the GOI envisioned that it would have to fully support the IIA. 

The Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan, who awarded the construction contract, and 

GRD, who managed the construction contract, also said that sustainment was not a contract 

requirement. According to both agencies, it would be up to ITAM-MOD to ensure that the GOI 

received the training necessary to run the equipment and maintain the buildings, and had 

sufficient money budgeted to do so. 
5 

ITAM-MOD officials said they recognize that the lack of a GOI commitment to fund the IIA is a 

problem. They agreed they should have addressed this issue earlier and are attempting to catch 

up at this time. Additionally, they said that the seven-month delay in forming a new government 

has inhibited their efforts to obtain GOI support because the GOI has not decided which Ministry 

will be responsible. ITAM-MOD stated they will continue to work with their GOI counterparts 

to resolve this issue. 

Prior SIGIR Reports and USF-I Guidance Have Identified a Need 

for Advance GOI Commitments 

SIGIR has issued a number of prior reports that discuss host country buy-in as an essential 

element to a project’s long-term success. Moreover, USF-I guidance on using Money as a 

Weapons System has also identified the need to obtain host government commitment to sustain 

projects before initiating activities. 

In SIGIR’s book Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience4, we reported that for 

many Iraq reconstruction projects, there was a lack of sufficient Iraqi participation in deciding 

how or what to reconstruct and ensuring that projects could be maintained afterwards. Detailed 

joint planning with Iraqi officials—perhaps the most important prerequisite for success after 

security—only improved over time. 

SIGIR’s audits also provided examples of problems caused by a failure to obtain advance 

commitment from the GOI. These reports address projects to develop a commercial and 

economic zone at the Baghdad Airport, the Taji National Maintenance Depot, and the Global 

Maintenance and Supply Services contract.5 

 The $35.5 million Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) effort involved 46 projects to 

create an economic zone at the airport. SIGIR found that about $16.1 million (46%) was 

used for 24 projects that were not being maintained or used. In one project, a business 

center, the GOI had removed computer equipment and furniture that the U.S. had 

purchased. In another project, the U.S. spent $2.8 million to renovate and equip a cargo 

terminal that SIGIR found in a state of disrepair. For example, large metal doors that the 

U.S. had repaired were damaged to the point that they were not operational. Also, 

equipment the U.S. had purchased had never been used or was damaged. 

 The Taji National Maintenance Depot contract was a $350 million contract to procure 

and install maintenance equipment in the Taji Depot, train Iraqi soldiers and civilians in 

depot maintenance and operations, initiate operations, and then transition the depot to 

Iraqi control. The review found, however, that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense had not 

fully supported the training required by the contract, and at the conclusion of the contract 

only about 50% of the soldiers on average were trained and present for duty. As a result, 

 

4

 Government Printing Office, February 2009. 

5

 See Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Projects at Baghdad Airport Provided Some Benefits, but 

Waste and Management Problems Occurred, SIGIR 10-013, 4/26/2010; Developing a Depot Maintenance 

Capability at Taji Hampered by Numerous Problems, SIGIR 09-027, 7/30/2009; and Security Forces Logistics 

Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems, SIGIR 09-014, 4/26/2009. 
6 

the objectives for achieving Iraqi military depot maintenance capability fell far short of 

the initial contract goals. 

 The Global Maintenance and Supply Services contract similarly supported an effort to 

develop an independent organizational and intermediate-level maintenance capability 

within the Iraqi Army. However, the contractor was not able to accomplish much of the 

training required by the contract because the Iraqi Army did not provide enough, if any, 

soldiers for training. In that report, SIGIR recommended that the officer in charge 

negotiate an agreement with the Ministry of Defense for transitioning maintenance 

responsibilities to the Iraqi Army. This agreement should identify each party’s role and 

responsibilities, and identify a time line for achieving this goal. SIGIR also identified a 

lesson learned, that working closely with host-country government officials is essential in 

developing reconstruction projects and programs that can and will be accepted and 

maintained. When agreements cannot be reached, assessing the risk of increased costs 

and the failure to achieve objectives should be an integral part of the program 

management decision-making process in any similar force-development initiatives, such 

as in Afghanistan. 

The need for advance commitment is also discussed in USF-I’s guidance for CERP projects, 

Money as a Weapons System (MAAWS). As early as 2009 USF-I directed that commanders 

address host government commitment to sustain and maintain projects before CERP projects are 

begun. The November 2009 edition states that commanders must document project 

sustainment/operating costs and, when those costs are equal to or greater than $50,000, the 

MAAWS directs commanders to prepare a memorandum of agreement and obtain the signature 

of the applicable GOI official acknowledging responsibility, as well as commitment, to budget 

for and execute the agreement. The MAAWS goes on to state that if the GOI official is not 

willing to fund operating costs or maintain the investment,. the commanders are not to fund the 

project. While this guidance applies only to CERP projects, such guidance is clearly appropriate 

for projects paid out of other foreign assistance or Iraq reconstruction funding. 
7 

Conclusions 

ITAM-MOD worked with its MOD counterparts to obtain host-country buy-in for the IIA. 

Although GOI officials have consistently stated their support for the IIA, no bilateral agreements 

were negotiated or signed and, at this point, it is unclear if the GOI will budget for the operations 

and maintenance of the IIA upon completion. Without such an agreement, U.S. funds spent on 

construction are at risk of being wasted, as are the funds planned to equip and furnish the facility. 

Facility construction is already underway and scheduled to be completed by the summer of 2011. 

This $13.4 million in U.S. funds to build the facility will account for more than half of the 

estimated costs of constructing and equipping the campus. The Iraqi government has sufficient 

resources to furnish and equip the facility without U.S. assistance, and its willingness to take on 

this responsibility will demonstrate its commitment to the project without putting further U.S. 

funds at risk. The $12 million in funding set aside for furnishings and equipment is better spent 

elsewhere. 

Recommendation 

SIGIR recommends that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, direct the Commanding 

General, United States Forces–Iraq take no further action to purchase furniture and equipment 

for the IIA, and inform the GOI that it is their responsibility to do so. 

Lessons Learned 

As Iraq’s ability to function as a sovereign nation improves, a written and signed bilateral 

agreement between the U.S. and Iraq should be a prerequisite for development assistance 

projects to ensure that U.S. funds are not wasted. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

The U.S. Central Command provided a written response to our report in which the Command 

stated it agreed with the recommendation but with a comment. The comment proposed 

rewording of the recommendation to state the “Commander, U.S. Central Command, advise the 

Commanding General, U.S. Forces–Iraq formally obtain GOI commitment via ITAM-MOD to 

maintain and sustain the project once completed before providing the additional $12M for 

equipment and furnishings.” In a subsequent conversation, the Command Inspector General 

point of contact stated that they believed that this wording met the intent of our recommendation 

but provided the USF-I Commanding General the authority to make such a decision based on his 

assessment of conditions in the field. Their formal comments are published in their entirety in 

Appendix D. 

We applaud the Command’s recognition of the need to obtain host government support for 

operating the Academy but do not believe the revised recommendation fully meets the intent of 

our recommendation. As we discussed in our conclusion, U.S. construction funding accounts for 

more than half of total project costs, and the best way the GOI can demonstrate its commitment 

to the Academy is by purchasing Academy equipment and furnishings. In so doing the GOI 

would be more likely to guard and use the items rather than removing or not using them as they 
8 

have done in the past with U.S.-purchased equipment. Additionally, the GOI would be in a 

position to decide whether the potential benefits of planned equipment purchases, such as the 94 

flat-screen televisions the USF-I plans to buy at a cost of more than $86,000, outweigh their 

costs. Overall, the proposed U.S. Central Command recommendation could result in the USF-I 

simply delaying their purchase of these items, which was not the intent of our recommendation. 

- - - - 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the draft 

report, please contact Joan S. Hlinka, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

(Washington, DC), (703) 604-0945/ joan.hlinka@sigir.mil or Nancee Needham, Deputy 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits–Iraq, (240) 553-0581 Ext.3793/ 

nancee.needham@iraq.centcom.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: U.S. Secretary of State 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

U.S. Secretary of Defense 
9 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

Scope and Methodology 

In October 2010, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated Project 

1022 to examine the United States Forces–Iraq (USF-I), Iraqi Training and Advisory MissionMinistry of Defense (ITAM-MOD) project to establish the Iraqi International Academy (IIA). 

SIGIR’s reporting objective was to provide information on the Government of Iraq’s 

commitment to maintaining and sustaining the IIA. This audit was performed by SIGIR under 

the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and 

responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. SIGIR conducted 

its work during October through December 2010 in Baghdad, Iraq. 

To accomplish our objective, we visited or held discussions with officials involved in the 

development and oversight of the IIA, and reviewed and analyzed financial, contract and project 

documents, and data from the USF-I, the Deputy Commanding General, Advising and Training, 

ITAM-MOD, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region District, and the Joint Contracting 

Command–Iraq/Afghanistan. To obtain the GOI perspective on the future of the IIA, we met 

with MOD officials who were involved in its development. We also toured the IIA construction 

site on November 19, 2010. The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

We did not use computer-processed data in this report. 

Internal Controls 

We reviewed USF-I’s steps to ensure Iraqi Security Forces Funds would not be wasted. The 

results of this review are presented in the body of the report. 

Prior Coverage 

We reviewed the following reports and documents for this audit:

SIGIR 

Developing a Depot Maintenance Capability at Taji Hampered by Numerous Problems, SIGIR 

09-027, 7/30/2009.

Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight 

Problems, SIGIR 09-014, 4/26/2009. 
10 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Projects at Baghdad Airport Provided Some 

Benefits, but Waste and Management Problems Occurred, SIGIR 10-013, 4/26/2010. 

Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, Government Printing Office, February 

2009.

Department of Defense Inspector General 

Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the 

Iraq Security Forces, SPO-2011-001, 11/17/2010. 

 
11 

Appendix B—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

GOI Government of Iraq 

GRD U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region District 

IIA Iraqi International Academy 

ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund 

ITAM-MOD Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission–Ministry of Defense 

MAAWS Money as a Weapons System 

MOD Ministry of Defense 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USF-I United States Forces–Iraq 

 
12 

Appendix C—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of Glenn D. Furbish, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Randy Gentry 

Arthur Granger 

Wilson D. Haigler 

Nancee Needham 

 
13 

Appendix D—Management Comments 

 
14 

Appendix E—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

 oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

 advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

 deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

 information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

 Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

 Phone: 703-602-4063 

 Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone 703-428-1059 

Email hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Deborah Horan 

Director of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0817 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil