BACKGROUND PAPER

U.S. Air and Ground

Conventional Forces for NATO:

Air Defense Issues

March 1978

Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

U.S. AIR AND GROUND CONVENTIONAL FORCES FOR NATO:

AIR DEFENSE ISSUES

The Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

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i il...
PREFACE

The defense budget that the Congress will consider for

fiscal year 1979 emphasizes the improvement of U.S. air and

ground conventional forces for NATO. The effectiveness of these

forces is closely related to the capabilities of our NATO allies.

Therefore, the allies' contribution to NATO's defense should be

considered in making decisions on U.S. conventional forces.

This paper discusses NATO's air defenses. It evaluates U.S.

and allied capabilities in this area and presents options for U.S.

decisions on procurement of air defense systems. The paper is

part of a CBO series on the U.S. military role in NATO. Other

papers in this series are Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military

Balance (December 1977), U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces

for NATO: Overview (January1978),andtwocompanion background

papers, Firepower Issues and Mobility and Logistics Issues.

This series was undertaken at the request of the Senate Budget

Committee. In accordance with the Congressional Budget Office's

mandate to provide objective analysis, this report offers no

recommendations.

This paper was prepared by Marshall Hoyler of CBO's National

Security and International Affairs Division, under the supervision

of John E. Koehler and James R. Blaker. The author is indebted to

Nancy Bearg, who served as a consultant. The author also gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Sheila Fifer, Andrew

Hamilton, Daniel Huck, G. Philip Hughes, John Shewmaker, Peggy

Weeks, and Dov Zakheim. Cost analysis was provided by Edward

Swoboda of CBO's Budget Analysis Division. Several drafts were

typed by Connie Leonard. The manuscript was edited by Patricia

Johnston and prepared for publication by Nancy Swope.

Alice Rivlin

Director

March 1978

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CONTENTS

PREFACE iii

SUMMARY ix

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1

Air Defense Defined 1

The Nature of the Threat 4

CHAPTER II. AN OVERVIEW OF AIR DEFENSE

IN THE CENTRAL REGION 9

Air Defense Command Relationships

for the Central Region 9

Coverage of Central Region Airspace 9

CHAPTER III. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE MAKEUP OF

AIR DEFENSES IN THE CENTRAL REGION 13

Airborne (or Airborne-Related)

Air Defense Programs 14

Ground-Based Air Defense Systems 18

Conclusions 23

CHAPTER IV. OPTIONS 25

Option I: Providing Aircraft to

Augment Allied Defenses 30

Option II: Providing Air Defenses

for an Additional U.S. Corps to

Reinforce Allied Sectors 33

Option III: Modernizing Air Defenses

for Smaller U.S. NATO Forces 34

APPENDIX A. U.S. AND ALLIED AIR DEFENSE PROGRAMS ... . 39

APPENDIX B. THE RATIONALE FOR A VIS'j 4LLY GUIDED

ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN .. . 59

GLOSSARY 61

ABBREVIATIONS 63

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TABLES

TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF NATO'S CURRENT AND

FUTURE AIR DEFENSE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT,

BY GENERATION 16

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 26

TABLE 3. COSTS OF OPTIONS IN COMPARISON TO

CURRENT AIR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT 29

TABLE A-l. CURRENTLY DEPLOYED SHORAD SYSTEMS 40

TABLE A-2. PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF

CURRENTLY DEPLOYED SHORAD SYSTEMS 42

FIGURE

FIGURE 1. CORPS SECTORS OF MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY

IN NATO'S CENTRAL REGION 2

VII

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SUMMARY

Investment in air defense will cost about $22.5 billion over

the next five years if current programs remain unchanged. " Different mixes of ground-based and airborne air defenses explored in

this paper could lead either to savings of $2.6 billion between

fiscal years 1979 and 1983 or to added costs of $2.0 billion

over the same five-year period, when compared to the costs of

maintaining current policy. Savings would follow if improvements

were restricted to enhancing the air defenses of U.S. forces;

increased costs would result from an effort to enhance the allies'

air defenses as well.

The primary justification for air defense forces, and for

U.S. conventional ground and air forces in general, is the defense

of NATO's Central Region (that is, West Germany) against a possible attack by the Warsaw Pact. Thus, improvements in these

forces are made on the presumption that they will strengthen

NATO's defenses against the Warsaw Pact.

Regardless of the improvements that are made in U.S. forces,

however, the overall strength of NATO's defenses will depend to a

large extent upon the Western European allies. England, Belgium,

Holland, and West Germany provide about three-fourths of NATO's

ground and air forces in Central Europe. The ground units from

these countries are stationed in, and responsible for defending,

northern Germany—the area of the Central Region with the most

favorable terrain for a Warsaw Pact attack.

Yet, the allies' defenses in northern Germany are weaker,

in terms of logistical and firepower capabilities, than those

of the U.S. and German sectors to the south. This endangers

the defense of Western Europe, since a successful attack in

the north could outflank U.S. and German forces in southern

Germany and collapse NATO's defenses before major reinforcements could arrive. Thus, Congressional decisions on the U.S.

contribution to NATO's defense in general, and on air defense

in particular, should be made not only in light of the threat

posed by the Warsaw Pact, but also in view of the allies' present

capabilities and the improvements that are expected to be made to

their forces in the future.

IX
THE WARSAW PACT THREAT

Arguments for improving NATO's air defenses are based primarily on improvements in Warsaw Pact air forces over the past

decade. The Pact has increased the number of its aircraft that

can attack ground targets and has introduced aircraft that can

carry larger payloads over greater distances than those formerly

deployed.

The Pact's overall air attack capabilities, however, are still

considerably inferior to NATO's, and air-delivered firepower remains small compared to what the Pact could deliver with artillery

and rockets. In addition, the Pact's capability to deliver

ordnance accurately in close support of ground troops or in

conditions of low visibility is not impressive and is not expected

to improve much over the next decade.

Despite these limitations, Warsaw Pact air forces endanger

NATO, since they could rapidly exploit any weaknesses in NATO's

defenses that might appear in battle. Furthermore, Pact aircraft

could be concentrated in support of a Pact ground attack. In that

situation, even though Pact air power migtit add only marginally

to the Pact's overall firepower capabilities at the front, the

addition could be very significant. When combined with the power

of a Pact offensive against weaknesses in NATO's defenses on the

ground, the Pact's air power might permit a Pact attack to

succeed. Thus, NATO's air defenses are key not only to limiting

the effectiveness of the Pact's air power, but to providing for a

viable overall defense as well.

THE MISSION AND STRUCTURE OF NATO AIR DEFENSES

Air defenses restrict enemy air power from impeding friendly

operations. Passive air defenses (such as hardening, dispersing,

and concealing potential targets) make targets more difficult to

detect and destroy. Active air defenses (such as fighters,

anti-aircraft guns, and surface-to-air missiles) destroy aircraft

or cause them to fail in their missions in other ways. Since most

of the procurement programs currently before the Congress involve

active systems, they are the primary subject of this paper.

Active Air Defenses

NATO active air defense systems in the Central Region pose a

series of challenges to attacking Warsaw Pact aircraft: detection
by early warning radars, attack by long-range surface-to-air

missiles (SAMs) and fighter aircraft, and the threat of shortrange SAMs and anti-aircraft (AA) guns. These systems are to some

extent deployed so that an attempt to exploit the weaknesses of

one system would expose an attacker to another danger. Also,

because it is difficult to predict where a Warsaw Pact attack

might occur, most NATO active air defense assets in the Central

Region are controlled by a single allied commander, even in

peacetime. This allows rapid and efficient response to a sudden

attack.

There are, however, important differences in how NATO members

defend their rear areas. Several countries contribute to a belt

of long-range SAMs deployed along the inter-German border. But

unlike the United States, the allies typically do not deploy their

Hawk SAMs in depth. In allied sectors, therefore, enemy aircraft

would not be threatened by SAMs once they had penetrated the belt.

Attackers would, however, face heavier anti-aircraft gunfire in

allied sectors, since the allies deploy more AA systems than the

United States does.

Because ground-based air defense in Germany is composed of

different kinds of systems whose relative effectiveness in combat

is not precisely measurable, it is hard to predict areas of

possible weakness. Allied and U.S. fighters provide one means

of coping with this uncertainty and of offsetting possible flaws

in the ground-based deployment s.-u Fighters are highly mobile, and

the centralized control system permits them to be sent where they

are most needed.

FUTURE CHANGES

Although problems exist with NATO's currently deployed air

defense systems, its air defenses are likely to become stronger in

the future.

Allied Programs

The Germans, Belgians, and Dutch are acquiring large numbers

of self-propelled, radar-guided anti-aircraft guns. In addition,

the German and French armies are procuring a short-range, radarguided SAM, called Roland. The Belgian and Dutch air forces plan

to buy the F-16, a fighter with excellent potential for visualrange, air-to-air combat. The German air force is replacing its

XI

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F-104s with F-4F Phantoms and is modifying this aircraft to

enhance its capability. The British plan to procure an air

defense variant of the Tornado fighter-bomber and arm it with the

radar-guided Skyflash missile, thus providing this aircraft with

all-weather potential.

U.S. Programs

The United States plans to replace its Nike-Hercules and

Hawk missile batteries in Europe with the expensive Patriot SAM.

Patriot is superior to Nike-Hercules, but its cost-effectiveness

as a replacement for Hawk is less clear. Changes in U.S. shortrange air defense systems have also been proposed. Acquisition of

the all-weather Roland SAM has begun, and development funds for

a new self-propelled, all-weather anti-aircraft gun have been

requested.

Other changes involve airborne or airborne-related air

defense systems. One such change, already implemented to a large

extent, is the acquisition of the E-3A AWACS aircraft, an early

warning radar aircraft that may assist in managing air battles.

The United States also plans to buy F-15 and F-16 fighters.

Finally, the United States is building facilities to shelter

planes on the ground and to permit reinforcement aircraft from the

United States to be dispersed to allied bases in time of war.

OPTIONS _!/

While NATO's air defenses are getting better, the Congress

still must determine the direction for further U.S. improvements.

Since successful air defense in NATO depends on allied capabilities, one basis for deciding among U.S. air defense procurement programs should be an explicit judgment about how such programs would complement allied efforts.

I/ These options correspond to ones specified in Congressional

Budget Office, U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for

NATO: Ove rvi ew (January 1978). The options presented in

the Overview paper include procurement of firepower and

logistical capabilities as well as those needed for air

defense; the options in this paper are restricted to air

defense systems.

XII
The United States contributes to NATO's defenses in three

general ways: augmenting the allied ability to defend their

sectors; reinforcing NATO with U.S. ground forces located outside

of Europe; and defending the U.S. sectors in southern Germany.

Decisions on air defense can be viewed in this framework, suggesting the options below. The air defense procurement packages

proposed under each option illustrate the implications of decisions to emphasize one of these roles; they are not necessarily

cost-effective.

Several systems are common to all three options. Among the

most important of these are:

o Partial deployment of Patriot and retention of Hawk,

because of procurement savings and the improved effectiveness of Patriot in comparison to the currently deployed

Nike-Hercules SAMs.

o Procurement of large numbers of relatively inexpensive

anti-aircraft guns, rather than a smaller number of

more costly all-weather systems, because of the Pact's

poor all-weather ground attack capability and the proven

effectiveness of large numbers of guns.

o Continued procurement of the Roland SAM, because of the

effectiveness of its radar guidance in hedging against

unexpectedly swift improvements in Pact all-weather ground

attack capability.

The costs of the three options are summarized in the table

that follows.

Option I. Providing Aircraft to Augment Allied Defenses

One role the United States now plays in NATO is providing

aircraft that can offset possible weaknesses of allied forces

in northern Germany. The Congress may decide that the United

States should enhance its capabilities to perform this role by

providing additional air defense aircraft. The mobility and

inherent flexibility of these aircraft would enable them to

assist either U.S. forces or those of its allies, depending on

where the needs were greatest.

Additional air defense aircraft would perform two important

tasks. One would be to defend the A-10 ground attack aircraft,

Xlll

T
COSTS OF OPTIONS IN COMPARISON TO CURRENT AIR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT:

BY FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT DOLLARS

Option 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Current DoD Program 4,420 5,120 5,060 4,060 3,650

Option I:

Providing Aircraft to

Augment Allied Defenses

With Additional

F-16 Procurement 0 440 430 530 630

With Employment of

Navy and Marine Air 30 30 35 20 25

Option II:

Providing Air Defenses

for an Additional U.S.

Corps to Reinforce

Allied Sectors

With Additional

F-16 Procurement 0 440 430 100 200

With Employment of

Navy and Marine Air 30 15 20 5 5

•Option III:

Modernizing Air Defenses

for Smaller U.S. Forces 0 -460 -1,160 -460 -520

NOTE: All three options include $109 million to cover procurement

of 1,000 Rheinmetall AA guns with ammunition for use in

Europe. This sum is not included in the figures above.

xiv
a major element in this option. 2J Another would be compensating

for the lack of in-depth Hawk SAMs in allied rear areas.

These missions can be performed in two ways. If only Air

Force assets were used, the addition of two F-16 wings might be

sufficient. This alternative would imply an investment of roughly

$2 billion over currently planned spending over the next five

fiscal years. A much less expensive alternative would involve

bringing fighters and attack aircraft from two Navy carrier

air wings and one Marine wing into the Central Region. Such a

decision would require that some materiel needed for wartime

operations be prepositioned at existing European airfields. This

alternative would add only $140 million to currently planned

spending over the same five-year period.

Option II. Providing Air Defenses for an Additional U.S. Corps

to Reinforce Allied Sectors

A second role the United States currently plays in NATO

involves the capability to reinforce the Central Region with

ground forces from the United States. A decision to enhance this

role would probably imply prepositioning of materiel for an

additional U.S. corps in northern Germany.

This means of reinforcement would increase the number of

AA guns and short-range SAMs available in northern Germany and

reduce the need for A-lOs. Consequently, fewer F-16s would

be needed than in Option I. Accordingly, this option would cut

one wing of F-16s from the number proposed in Option I. One wing

more than currently planned would remain, however, on the grounds

that the addition of a U.S. corps in northern Germany would not

offset the lack of in-depth Hawks there.

Procurement of an additional wing of F-16s would cost about

$1.17 billion over the next five fiscal years. Again, the addition of one wing of F-l6s would not be necessary if provisions

were made to use Navy and/or Marine assets instead. Such provisions would cost about $75 million over the same five-year

2/ The Overview paper in this series suggests adding two wings

of these specialized ground attack aircraft to the force;

defending them would create an additional possible demand on

NATO fighter resources.

xv
period. Thus, the cosst of this option could vary greatly,

depending on how U.S. capabilities to defend northern Germany with

fighters were enhanced.

Option III. Modernizing Air Defenses for Smaller U.S. NATO Forces

The Congress might, for a number of reasons, wish to reverse

the trends toward increased spending on U.S. forces for NATO

and an increased U.S. role in the alliance. One means of doing

this would be to delete three divisions that have been added

to Army ground forces since fiscal year 1974, but to continue

modernization of the equipment used by the other 13 divisions in

the Army. This policy would amount to a decision to emphasize

the third role the United States now plays in NATO: defense

of the U.S. sectors in southern Germany.

Under this option, current Air Force procurement plans

could be changed considerably. Since U.S. fighters in the Central

Region are under centralized NATO command, many of them could be

dispatched to augment the allies' defenses should they prove

weaker in time of war. Procurement of additional U.S. fighters

might therefore be a means of reinforcing the defenses of northern

Germany more than those of U.S. sectors. As a result, this option

proposes a cut of one wing each in F-15 and F-16 procurement from

present Defense Department plans. Such a cut would yield savings

of $2.6 billion over the next five fiscal years.

xvi
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Investment in air defense will cost about $22.5 billion over

the next five years if current forces and funding levels remain

unchanged. The primary justification for these costs is not air

defense of the continental United States, but rather improvement

of the U.S. capability to help defend Western Europe, especially

NATO's Central Region in West Germany.

Regardless of improvements made in U.S. forces, however,

the overall strength of NATO's defenses will depend largely

upon the Western European allies. They provide the bulk of

NATO's forces in Europe and are responsible for the defense of

northern Germany—the area of the Central Region that is thought

to have the most favorable terrain for an attack by the Warsaw

Pact (see Figure 1). Therefore, decisions about air defense

procurement should not be made simply in light of the capabilities of the air forces of the Soviet Union and its allies

in the Warsaw Pact. These decisions should also be based on an

examination of the air defense capabilities of NATO allies in

the Central Region and of the relation between their capabilities

and those of the United States. This paper discusses each of

these topics. I/

AIR DEFENSE DEFINED

In the context of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war, air defense can be

defined as the reduction of the ability of Warsaw Pact air power

to impede NATO operations. It is fundamental to a successful NATO

response to an attack by Warsaw Pact forces. 2f

I/ This paper is one of four in the CBO series on U.S. Air

and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO. The other papers

include an Overview budget issue paper and two background

papers on Firepower Issues and Mobility and Logistics Issues.

j2/ The air defense mission is a subset of a larger mission the

Air Force calls counterair, which also covers offensive

warfare against Warsaw Pact aircraft and related facilities

24-760 O - 78 - 3

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Figure 1.

Corps Sectors of Military Responsibility in NATO's Central Region

WEST

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SCHLESWK3-

HOLSTEIN

SOURCE: Adapted from Richard Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO (Washington, D.C.:

The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 31 and also from U.S. Army materials,

a/ NORTHAG (Northern Army Group) and CENTAG (Central Army Group) are the two subdivisions of NATO

forces in West Germany. The line dividing the two runs from Belgium through West Germany, just south of Bonn,

and into East Germany.
Air defense is accomplished with passive and active systems.

Passive air defense makes targets harder to find and destroy.

It has been very effective historically, and it is also relatively

cheap. One reason for this is that passive defenses tend to be

"one-time" investments. Passive measures include dispersal,

concealment, and "hardening" (that is, fortification) of potential

targets.

Active air defenses destroy aircraft or cause them to fail

in their missions in other ways. Active airborne systems include

combat aircraft, their missiles, and early warning aircraft;

active ground-based systems include radars, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and anti-aircraft (AA) guns.

Active air defense systems are the primary subject of this

paper because they form the bulk of the procurement programs now

before the Congress. This does not necessarily mean that it is

correct to assume that active systems are more important than passive ones or that active systems can improve NATO's air defenses

more than passive ones can. Current Defense Department spending

priorities, however, do reflect these assumptions.

Air defense does not necessarily imply destruction of

enemy aircraft. For example, the following ways of reducing

the effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact air effort would constitute

successful air defense:

o Forcing enemy aircraft to fly faster, higher, or lower

than preferred, 3/ thereby dropping their ordnance with

in and over Warsaw Pact territory. This paper will not

address the whole spectrum of counterair; its primary focus

will be on systems that are justified for inclusion in the

budget on grounds that they enhance NATO's air defenses.

Therefore, this paper discusses primarily defensive systems

and the employment of aircraft (which can be both offensive

and defensive) in defensive roles in and over NATO territory.

3/ Unless the enemy can launch precision-guided munitions from

above AA gun range, air defense can be enhanced if AA guns

force attacking aircraft to fly a few thousand feet higher.

(The North Vietnamese significantly reduced the accuracy of

some U.S. bombing attacks by deploying large numbers of AA

guns which forced just such an increase in release altitude.)
less accuracy, and cutting the distances at which they

can attack targets by increasing their fuel consumption. 47

o Forcing enemy aircraft to abort their missions or to

devote scarce aircraft resources to countermeasures

against air defense systems. _5_/

o Denying enemy aircraft lucrative targets by sheltering

NATO aircraft and by hardening and camouflaging other

critical targets.

o Jamming the radars of enemy aircraft.

These means of reducing enemy effectiveness would be most relevant

when the enemy was seeking a quick decision in a short war;

attrition of enemy aircraft and pilots would become a progressively more important aspect of air defense as conflict was

prolonged.

THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

NATO air defense systems are needed to counter large numbers

of Warsaw Pact aircraft that are increasingly capable of performing ground attack missions. An overview of this threat is

provided here; supporting detail is supplied in Appendix B.

kj To achieve maximum fuel efficiency and therefore maximum

range for attacking NATO targets, Pact aircraft would have

to fly to and from the target at high altitude and go low

only for ordnance delivery. Therefore, they would have to

sacrifice either range or payload if NATO's radars, SAMs,

and fighters force them to fly the entire mission at low

altitude.

5J For example, "the 5,000 to 6,000 AA positions in North Vietnam

forced the Americans to devote 25 percent of their missions

to neutralizing these positions and 25 percent to electronic

warfare, leaving only 50 percent of the aircraft available for

other operations." (Peter Bogart, "The Vulnerability of the

Manned Airborne Weapon System," International Defense Review,

No. 6 (1977), p. 1066.)
Between 2,7CO and 3,000 Pact tactical aircraft are now

estimated to be deployed in Central Europe. Soviet planes are

assigned to Frontal Aviation, which includes about 1,000 tactical aircraft based in the western Soviet Union and is responsible for supporting ground forces in combat. About 500 mediumrange bombers are also based there and could be used against

targets in the Central Region.

Over 1,500 of the Pact inventory in Central Europe are either

multirole fighters capable of ground attack or aircraft specifically designed for this mission. The Soviet Union also has

deployed around 300 Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters, which some see

as a serious threat to NATO tank forces. These figures represent

considerable change since 1968, when air-to-air fighters outnumbered ground attack aircraft by about 2 to 1 and when the

overall Pact aircraft inventory was 11 percent smaller. The

increase in force size has been accompanied by qualitative

improvements. More advanced aircraft with greater range and

payload capabilities have been added.

Although the Pact air threat to NATO is increasing, it

has important limitations. The amount of ordnance that the Pact

Frontal Aviation force could deliver in a given period of time

is extremely small in comparison to the tonnage that could be

delivered by Pact ground forces 6/ along the forward edge of the

battle area. 7/ The amount of ordnance the Pact air forces could

deliver would become markedly smaller during the bad weather

frequently experienced in the Central Region. 8/ This is because

6/ It is also very small in comparison to the tonnage deliverable by the numerically smaller NATO air forces. See Congressional Budget Office, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact

Military Balance, Budget Issue Paper (December 1977), p. 37.

II The services use the acronym "FEBA" to refer to this swath of

territory in which enemy and friendly troops are in contact. This paper will hereafter use the term "front."

8/ Compared to ground-based systems, aircraft can hit more

distant targets and can be massed against a given portion

of the front more quickly. Nevertheless, it is important

to examine in detail the threat posed by Pact aircraft to

NATO units near the front, because the Army plans to make

substantial investments in all-weather air defense systems

that are earmarked to be used there.

"IT
1

Pact capability for all-weather ground attack is not impressive

and seems likely to show only limited improvement in the next

decade. Nevertheless, because clear weather means a proportionally greater increase in NATO firepower potential than in

Pact firepower potential, there is reason to believe that the

Pact would not choose to launch an attack under such conditions.

If so, the clear-weather scenario on which official plans seem to

be based is somewhat implausible, and the probable dimensions of

the air threat are to that extent overestimated.

The Pact air forces have problems even in clear weather.

Many observers believe that Pact fixed-wing aircraft have little

capability to score hits on small, hard, dispersed targets, such

as tanks. The skill of Soviet pilots may also be deficient. They

"spend only about 60 percent as much time in training as U.S.

pilots." 9/ Also, they may not be able to operate well with

their Warsaw Pact counterparts. 10/ In addition, Warsaw Pact

"tactics and strategy are often stereotyped, the control system

is frequently rigid, and initiative at lower levels of command is

proscribed." ll/ Finally, the Pact maintenance system seems

considerably less capable than that of NATO forces, suggesting

that Pact wartime sortie rates would be lower than those NATO

could achieve with a substantially smaller force. 12/

Many who have studied Soviet doctrine believe that, if the

Soviets were to attack Western European territory conventionally,

Warsaw Pact air power would be used as follows. First, the Pact

would try to clear corridors in the NATO air defense system by

attacking NATO SAM sites. Next, they would attack high-value

targets important to NATO's response, such as airfields, nuclear

9/ Robert P. Berman, Soviet Air Power in Transition (Washington,

~ D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 57.

10/ Clarence Robinson quotes U.S. officers in Europe: "We do not

know the degree the Russians can rely on Pact forces . . .

[or] . . . their ability to communicate with them in a

standard language. (See "Increasing Soviet Offensive Threat

Spurs Stronger Europe Air Arm," Aviation Week and Space

Technology (August 1, 1977), p. 46.)

U/ Ibid.

12/ Berman, Soviet Air Power in Transition, p. 58.
weapons storage sites, and command and control centers. After

the initial attacks, surviving aircraft could turn to support of

attacking ground forces, though some attacks on high-value targets

would probably continue.

All these actions would take place in concert with ground

attacks, for Soviet doctrine sees tactical air power as a supplement to, not a substitute for, its ground forces. Thus,

in the event of a conflict, Soviet air attacks might well be

concentrated against NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) area

(see Figure 1). Terrain there favors the kind of armored resources and tactics used by Pact ground forces, and the allied

forces stationed in NORTHAG are weaker in firepower and in the

ability to sustain intense combat than the U.S. forces stationed

in southern Germany. 13/ Thus, in the context of a major ground

attack against NORTHAG, Pact air attacks might play a critical

role, despite their limited ability to deliver large tonnages of

ordnance against NATO targets. The marginal destruction brought

about by Pact air power, when added to the power of a Pact ground

offensive, might permit the Warsaw Pact to break through NATO's

defenses in the north before NATO could reinforce that region,

thereby outflanking U.S. forces in southern Germany.

13/ For extensive discussion of these issues, see Congressional

Budget Office, U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for

NATO: Overview, Budget Is sue Paper (January 1978) and the

companion background papers, Firepower Issues and Mobility

and Logistics Issues.

"TWIT—IT

CHAPTER II. AN OVERVIEW OF AIR DEFENSE IN THE CENTRAL REGION

Since the Warsaw Pact air force is highly mobile, likely

avenues of approach to specific targets are not easy to predict.

As a result, both NATO air defense command relationships and the

way systems are deployed to defend NATO airspace must be ready to

respond to an attack wherever it might occur. Each of these

aspects of Central Region air defense is discussed below.

AIR DEFENSE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE CENTRAL REGION

A Warsaw Pact air attack could be mounted with very little

warning. This means there could be little time for NATO air

defense organizations to shift from command relationships acceptable in peacetime to those required for combat. Thertsfore, the

Commander of Allied Air Forces Central Europe (ComAAFCE) has

peacetime operational control of some of member nations' assets,

namely air defense fighters, SAMs, and fixed and mobile radar. In

wartime, he has command of all remaining allied tactical air

assets as well.

The two commands immediately subordinate to ComAAFCE are

termed Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAFs). Ij ComAAFCE can

allocate aircraft from one ATAF to the other, depending on his

assessment of where the need is greatest. Thus, the mobility

advantage technically possible with aircraft is not constrained or

frustrated by allied command arrangements, and NATO air defense

assets are more truly an alliance resource than are its other

military capabilities.

COVERAGE OF CENTRAL REGION AIRSPACE

Air defense over the Central Region is best envisioned as

Warsaw Pact pilots might see it—from east to west and from low

!/ The northern part of the Central Region is covered by 2 ATAF;

the southern part is covered by 4 ATAF. The division between

them corresponds to the division between NORTHAG and CENTAG,

illustrated in Figure 1.

24-760 O - 78 - 4

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to high altitudes. From this perspective, NATO's overall air

defenses appear formidable.

Warsaw Pact aircraft would face detection by NATO early

warning systems even before they reached NATO territory. Next,

they would face fighters and long-range SAMs that provide area

coverage. Most of these SAMs are deployed in a belt that runs

from north to south in the Central Region and threaten Pact aircraft at all but very low altitudes. As a result, Pact attackers

might try to fly below the airspace covered by these SAMs.

Failing that, they must either attack SAM sites, outmaneuver the

missiles, or overwhelm the SAM belt by massing aircraft at some

point or by jamming the SAMs1 radars.

If a Pact pilot successfully avoided destruction by SAMs

in the belt, the challenges he would face would depend upon where

he went next. In the vicinity of the front, he would have to

continue to fly at very low altitudes to avoid long-range SAMs.

Doing so, however, would expose him to AA guns and short-range

SAMs under the tactical control of the ground forces.

If he moved further into NATO territory, he would be likely

to encounter two kinds of defenses. Point defense systems would

consist of short-range SAMs, AA guns, hardened sites, and camouflage deployed to protect specific targets. Area defense systems

would vary according to whether he was flying over a U.S. or an

allied sector. If he was over a U.S. sector, he might be engaged

by both aircraft and long-range SAMs, unless he continued to fly

very low. This is because the United States deploys some of its

long-range Hawk SAMs in depth, while typically the allies do not.

Therefore, if the Pact penetrator moved further into allied

territory, the only area air defense system that could challenge

him would be fighters.

Clearly, an attacking Pact pilot would face a redundant NATO

air defense network. Two points about this redundancy should be

noted. It means an attacker would have to worry about NATO's

air defenses throughout his mission; if an enemy pilot slipped

through,the forward air defense, he would be likely to meet

resistance from additional systems. It also means that a Pact

pilot's efforts to exploit the weaknesses of one system would be

likely to expose him to other systems. If he flew low to avoid

radar and SAMs, he would move within the range of AA guns. If he

flew at medium altitudes using measures to evade long-range SAMs,

he would become more exposed to radar detection and fighter

interception, , , .

10
Although NATO's air defenses are formidable, they are not

impenetrable. This is important because the components of NATO's

air defenses are interdependent. For example, successful penetration of NATO's SAM belt in any sector could make NATO assets

in other sectors more vulnerable to attack. Thus, a relative

weakness in the SAM belt could contribute to a weakness overall,

in that longer-range Pact aircraft could attack through such

weaker areas.

In view of the interdependence of NATO air defenses, it is

important to note that there are clear differences in approach

between the air defenses of the United States and those of its

allies. U.S. deployment of some Hawk SAMs in depth is one example

of such differences. 2j This may imply that U.S. sectors enjoy

stronger air defenses than those of allied sectors. This conclusion is not clear, however, because the allies seem to place

greater reliance on anti-aircraft guns in their sectors than

the United States does in its sectors. Because of the proven

effectiveness of AA guns in the air defense role, this fact may

mean that targets in the rear of the allies' sectors are better

protected than those in the rear of U.S. sectors.

Existing differences between the air defenses of the United

States and its allies do not necessarily imply that either is

relatively weak. Two things are clear, however. First, a Pact

attack would seek to exploit any weaknesses that emerged because

of these differences. Air attackers would be especially able to

do this because of the speed with which aircraft can be oriented

against defenders' weaknesses. Second, if the Congress is to

make sound decisions about air defense procurement, it must be

aware of these differences. For this reason, the following

chapter provides a more detailed discussion of present and future

differences between U.S. and allied air defenses.

2/ The U.S. sectors have not only the protection of a northto-south belt composed of a series of Nike-Hercules SAM sites

and, further forward, a series of Hawk sites, but also the

protection of a number of Hawk units deployed in depth, east

to west. In general, the NATO allies do not have this protection in depth. Instead, they have only a belt defense,

running roughly north to south and comprised of a series of

Nike-Hercules sites to cover medium to high altitudes and,

further forward, a series of Hawk sites to cover low to medium

altitudes. (An exception to this generalization is the fact

that some Dutch Hawks are deployed in Holland.)

11
1
CHAPTER III. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE MAKEUP OF AIR DEFENSES IN

THE CENTRAL REGION

The previous chapters highlighted important aspects of the

context in which Congressional choices will be made regarding air

defenses for the Central Region. The Warsaw Pact's improved

offensive air forces could make a critical difference in an attack

on northern Germany, in part because allied sectors that cover

that area ^nay have weaker air defenses than those of the U.S.

sectors in southern Germany. Possible weaknesses of this kind are

directly relevant to U.S. procurement decisions for two reasons:

(1) a weakness in one sector's air defenses can lead to weaknesses

elsewhere; and (2) through Central Region command arrangements,

highly mobile U.S. fighters will be sent wherever the need is

greatest.

These "possible weaknesses" result from important differences

both in how the United States and its allies provide for air

defense over their assigned sectors of the Central Region and in

the assets they contribute to the common defense. This chapter

outlines what these differences are and how they might be changed

in the future. It does so briefly; additional details about many

of these topics are supplied in Appendix A.

This discussion divides air defense systems into two categories: ground-based air defense systems (for example, antiaircraft guns), and airborne air defense systems (for example,

fighters) and associated facilities. This division is convenient

in a discussion of differences between the United States and

its allies. In the case of ground-based systems, national differences in approaches to air defense and in the weapons used are

probably quite significant for the defense of individual sectors.

Because of the limited mobility of ground-based systems, a sector

cannot be strengthened rapidly once a war begins. In the case

of fighters, by contrast, such national differences are less

important for an individual sector's defense, since command of

these highly mobile assets is centralized. Airborne radars

and passive defenses for NATO fighters are similarly alliance

resources. The following section illustrates, however, that

national differences with respect to aircraft and associated

facilities are important to overall alliance capability.

13
1

AIRBORNE (OR AIRBORNE-RELATED) AIR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Shelters and Basing

Two important airborne-related programs, shelters and basing,

provide passive defenses for U.S. aircraft. Through these programs, however, U.S. budget outlays tend to enhance the allies'

air defense as well as that of the U.S. forces. Collocated

operating bases (COBs)—allied bases with facilities for the use

of U.S. planes that would deploy from the United States to Europe

in a crisis—have a payoff both to the United States and to its

allies. For the United States, they permit dispersed basing of

U.S. planes, which is one means of passive defense. For the

allies, these facilities can be used both in peacetime and, in the

possibly critical early days of a European war, until the arrival

of U.S. aircraft. Shelters built at U.S. main operating bases are

less likely to be directly useful to allied air forces than those

built at COBs. Such shelters, however, provide protection for

U.S. fighters that do directly enhance allies' air defense.

Aircraft

Although aircraft are an alliance resource, there are some

important differences among the.kinds of planes that the United

States and the allies contribute to NATO's defenses. The U.S.

contribution is significant both in terms of numbers and in

terms of capability. The U.S. inventory of air defense aircraft

in Europe is almost one-third that of the total inventory of NATO

countries committed to Central Region defense. I/ This proportion understates the potential U.S. contribution, however, since

it does not count the large number of U.S. air defense fighters

based in the United States that could quickly move to Europe in a

crisis. If these were counted, it would increase the American

contribution to the Central Region fighter inventory to over half

of the total.

In other words, U.S. air defense aircraft based in Europe

provide approximately one-third . of the total peacetime .air

defense aircraft inventory in Europe of the United States,

Britain, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. If French

air "defense aircraft are added to this total, the U.S. contribution becomes less than one-fourth.

14
There are also differences in the sophistication of the aircraft that are contributed. For example, of the airborne radars

now provided only by the United States and Great Britain, the U.S.

contribution is more advanced. The British Royal Air Force currently employs Shackleton aircraft to perform radar surveillance

of possible avenues of approach over the North and Norwegian Seas,

and is procuring Nimrod jet aircraft to replace the propellerdriven Shackletons. Because of the limited capabilities of the

Nimrod1s radar, however, it only functions efficiently over water.

In contrast, the U.S. E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System

(AWACS) aircraft is advertised as having considerable "look-down"

surveillance capability over land. In addition, the AWACS is supposed to provide a backup command post for tactical air battles.

As Table 1 suggests, U.S. air defense fighters are also

generally more sophisticated than those of the NATO allies.

Several NATO countries currently depend on American-designed

aircraft—including the F-4 Phantom and F-104 Starfighter—as well

as planes of national manufacture, but most of the latter are

of earlier generations than the F-4s and F-15s provided by the

United States.

The current gap between the more modern U.S. fighter assets

in Europe and those of the NATO allies will close in the future

as the fourth-generation F-16 fighters enter the inventories

of the Belgian and Dutch air forces. This aircraft has a ground

attack capability. In addition, it has excellent close-in,

air-to-air combat potential and can be assigned an air defense

mission. For this role, the F-16's armament consists of a 20 mm.

cannon and infrared (heat-seeking) Sidewinder missiles. The F-16

lacks the ability to employ radar missiles and does not have the

all-weather and beyond-visual-range capabilities that radar

missiles imply. 2/ The F-16 is, however, considerably smaller

2/ The fact that the F-16 does not have radar missiles is not

necessarily a drawback. In the chaos of European air battles

following the initial attacks, visual recognition of aircraft

would often be required. This is one reason why it is not

advisable for every NATO fighter to have a beyond-visualrange -capability. Another reason is that fighters with radar

missile capabilities (like the F-15) are considerably more

expensive than visual-range fighters (like the F-16) but

may not get to exercise fully these capabilities because of

problems in identifying friendly and enemy aircraft.

15
TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF NATO'S CURRENT AND FUTURE AIR DEFENSE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT,

BY GENERATION a/

Second Third Generation Fourth

Country Generation Early Middle Late Generation

United F-4E bj F-15 b/

States F-16 cj

Great Lightning Phantom FG1, Tornado

Britain FGR2 b/, d/ , ADV b/, c/

France Mirage IIIC Mirage F-l b/ Mirage

2000 b/, £/

Federal

Republic of

Germany F-4F

Belgium F-104 F-16 cj

Denmark F-104 F-16 cj

The

Netherlands F-104 F-16 c/

a/ "Generation" is a crude way of expressing levels of sophistication and/or the

age of a particular aircraft design. It is not necessarily a good measure of

capability; historically, more "sophisticated" systems have often been proven to

be inferior to simpler ones in combat.

J>7 These aircraft carry avionics permitting them to employ radar missiles, which

can engage targets at night or in bad weather and beyond visual range. Problems

with current identification of friend-or-foe (IFF) systems, however, mean that

this capability may be of limited value in wartime. IFF problems may necessitate

reestablishment of visual identification rules-of-engagement to avoid shooting

down friendly aircraft.

£/ These aircraft types are planned acquisitions that have not yet joined the force.

The only plane that may not do so is the Tornado ADV; its high development costs

will be difficult to amortize over the planned production run of .165 aircraft.

AJ This aircraft is similar to the U.S. Phantom, but is equipped with different

engines.

16
than the F-4 and the new U.S. F-15 air superiority fighter, and

small size is a distinct advantage in air-to-air combat.

The West German Air Force has already procured most (if

not all) of the 86 F-4F Phantom aircraft that will comprise its

air defense fighter force until the 1990s. 3/ There are plans,

however, to enhance the capabilities of this force fay modifying

the planes to permit use of the AIM-9L Sidewinder missile. (This

is a more recent version of the infrared Sidewinder IB missile

currently in service with German F-4s.) At present, there are no

plans to adapt the German F-4 to take a radar missile such as the

U.S. Sparrow.

The British Royal Air Force also plans to modernize its air

defense fighter force. Its choice for this purpose is an air

defense variant (ADV) of the multinationally developed Tornado

aircraft. This aircraft will be armed with both Skyflash (a

radar missile) and Sidewinder. The British reportedly plan to

buy 165 of the Tornado ADV, and some of these planes may be

available for defense of the Central Region.

Thus, in the early 1980s, the air defense fighters of NATO's

members may show somewhat less variation in sophistication,

generation, and type than is now the case. And, overall, NATO's

air defense fighter assets will be even more formidable than

they are now. Both the U.S. F-15 and the British Tornado ADV will

reportedly have radars that can pick out low-flying aircraft from

the clutter of radar returns from the ground and then guide

missiles to destroy them. While no missile presently deployed

with NATO is sufficiently effective for the "look-down/shoot-down"

role, such a missile may be available for U.S. aircraft in the

1980s. 4/ NATO air defenses could also be greatly enhanced if

arrangements were made to use U.S. fighter and attack aircraft

3/ CBO estimate based on information about aircraft procurement

~ and assignment given in "World Air Forces 1977," Flight International (July 2, 1977), p. 45.

4/ The United States is developing an "advanced monopulse seeker"

~ to enable a future version of the AIM-7 Sparrow missile to be

used in such a role with the F-15. (The British claim that

their Skyflash missile is effective in the look-down/shootdown mode; some U.S. specialists are skeptical of this claim,

however.)

17

24-760 O - 78 - 5
from Navy carriers in overhaul and from Marine wings not engaged

in combat as part of a division-wing team. The fighters could,

for example, provide air defense directly, while the attack

aircraft could free the multipurpose F-16s for air defense missions. The use of U.S. Navy and Marine air assets would probably

require the prepositioning of equipment near existing European

airfields but, if accomplished, could add dramatically to NATO's

overall fighter capabilities.

Despite the changes described above, there will continue

to be differences among allied contributions. The United States

is likely to be the only contributor of something like the F-15—

a highly sophisticated, expensive aircraft designed specifically

for an air superiority role. In terms of numbers, the United

States will continue to contribute roughly one-quarter to onethird of NATO's air defense fighters during peacetime and more

than one-half in the event of a conflict.

GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

In making decisions about air defense procurement, the

Congress should be mindful of the differences between U.S. and

allied ground-based systems. As noted above, such differences

may imply weaknesses in particular sectors. Weaknesses in particular sectors can contribute to weaknesses in alliance air

defenses elsewhere. In addition, some of the allies' choices

regarding ground-based systems suggest alternatives—like large

numbers of AA guns—that the United States could consider choosing

as well.

In discussing ground-based systems, it is convenient to

distinguish between long- and short-range systems. The U.S.

forces in Europe and most of their NATO allies have committed

themselves to the same kind of long-range ground-based air defense

systems but employ some of them differently. In terms of shortrange ground-based systems, however, the variations between the

United States and its NATO allies stem more from the different

weapons each nation emphasizes than from doctrine or the manner in

which weapons are used. These differences will remain if present

procurement plans are not changed, although there will be greater

standardization among NATO members with respect to particular

short-range systems.

18
Long-Range Systems

This designation actually covers two different kinds of

systems: ground-based radars and medium-to-high and low-to-medium

altitude SAMs. _5_/

The mainstay of the medium-to-high altitude SAM network in

Germany is the Nike-Hercules missile. This missile can intercept

aircraft as high as 100,000 feet and has a range of 140 kilometers

(km.). Nike-Hercules units are presently in operation with the

Belgianj German, and Dutch Air Forces and with the U.S. Army. 6/

Official observers believe Nike-Hercules has serious shortcomings.

The Hawk missile defends against invading aircraft and

operates from the point where it is masked by ground clutter (the

"radar horizon") up to around 50,000 feet. It is more mobile than

Nike-Hercules and has a range of around 40 km. Hawk is presently

deployed in two versions, Basic and Improved. Most of the NATO

countries that deploy this system are moving toward the Improved

version.

There are differences, however, in how Kawk is used in

Europe. One possible inadequacy, noted earlier, is that Hawk

is typically not deployed in depth in the northern part of the

Central Region. According to Senators Sam Nunn and Dewey Bartlett, another problem is a shortage of reload supplies of U.S.

Hawk missiles. 7/ If American forces are short of adequate reload

5/ Since the radars are not important to the discussion of

options in the next chapter, information on them is contained

in Appendix A.

6/ The British contribution to SAM deployments in northern

Germany is the Bloodhound missile, an older, radar-guided SAM

with longer range than that of the Hawk. This system is not

discussed in the text because it is to be withdrawn in the

near future; in addition, it is used for airbase defense,

rather than in the allies' SAM belt.

TJ NATO and the New Soviet Threat, Report of Senator Sam Nunn

and Senator Dewey F. Bartlett to the Senate Committee on

Armed Services, 95:1 (January 24, 1977), p. 15.

19
supplies, the Europeans are likely to be short as well. This

would be consistent with allied policies on the size of stocks of

ammunition of other kinds.

The Army wants to remedy present flaws in Hercules and Hawk

deployments by replacing both systems with the very expensive

Patriot missile. The principal mission of this system, like that

of Nike-Hercules, is denying Pact aircraft the option of operating

at medium and high altitudes. The Patriot, however, is supposed

to be capable of intercepting aircraft at low altitudes as well.

Patriot's potential contribution to overall alliance air

defense capability depends on whether it can perform as claimed

and on how it is deployed. Two issues are important with respect

to its deployment. One is whether nations that, procure Patriot

choose to use it for their entire long-range SAM system or rather

to undertake a partial deployment of Patriot, replacing NikeHercules but leaving Improved Hawk missiles in place. The other

issue is whether the allies (and especially the Germans) decide to

deploy Patriot at all.

If only the United States procures Patriot, air defense over

the U.S. sectors should be stronger than before. This could

mean that air defense fighters that would otherwise be allocated

to the U.S. sector might be free to protect allies! sectors.

Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) Systems

SHORAD systems discussed here have maximum effective ranges

between one and seven kilometers. A variety of such systems are

deployed in the Central Region. An overview of SHORAD weapons,

which is provided below, is important to understanding the mixes

of systems proposed as options in Chapter IV.

Anti-Aircraft (AA) Guns. Allied armed forces rely on AA guns

to a greater extent than does the United States. 8/ This fact is

important because large numbers of. AA guns can make a tremendous

87 The Germans, for example, have almost 3,000 such guns, or

roughly one gun for every 115 personnel in their army during

peacetime. The United States has around 100 anti-aircraft

guns in the Central Region, or only about one gun for every

2,000 U.S. Army troops stationed there.
contribution . to

 5the .defense of Aground assets, especially when

deployed inconjunctionwith SAM systems like Hawk. These guns

need not destroy enemy aircraft to make such a contribution. By

simply 'forcing Pact pilots to fly higher and faster, and distracting them in the performance of their missions, AA guns can

significantly reduce the effectiveness of enemy air power. Nevertheless, large numbers of guns were the principal means by which

high-performance aircraft were shot down in recent wars. 9/

There are significant differences between U.S. and allied AA

guns currently deployed iri Europe, aside from the inadequate

numbers of U.S. systems. The standard U.S. system is the Vulcan

20 mm. cannon, a visually guided, self-propelled AA gun that

is supposed to protect combat units near the front. The Vulcan is

a poor system to use in this role because of its lightly armored

chassis, unsatisfactory fire control system, and poor capacity to

engage Pact attack helicopters. By contrast, the allies deploy a

wide variety of anti-aircraft guns that seem to be of better

quality overall. Those that are self-propelled frequently have

better armored mounts.

Sho-rC-Range- SAMs. Two kinds of short.-range SAMs are now in

the inventories ,of NATO countries. Several countries deploy

shoulder-fired SAMs: the United States and West Germany use the

U.S.-designed, infrared Redeye missile, while Great Britain and

Canada use the BritishTdesigned, radio command-guided Blowpipe.

The United States intends to use Jiedeye for defense of maneuver

and fire-support units; the allies probably intend to use these

systems in the same way. Vehicle-launched SAMs are also deployed.

The United States uses the infrared Chaparral; the British deploy

the radar-guided Rapier; and the French possess the radar-guided

Roland.

9/ AA guns accounted for 83 percent ,of the 919 aircraft shot

down over North Vietnam between August 4, 1964 and October

29, 1969. Similarly, "the great majority" of Israeli aircraft losses during the Yom«Kippur War were caused by the

Soviet-designed ZSU 23-4 self-propelled AA gun. The presence

of SAMs contributed to these,! losses, since planes sometimes

flew within gun range in!order to avoid SAMs. (See "The

Vulnerability of 'the Manned Airborne Weapon System," International Defense Review, No. 6 (1977), p. 1066; "Evolution

in Air Defense Requirements," International Defense Rgview,

No. 3 (1974), p. 313.) ,

21
Planned Changes in SHORAD Systems. In the future, some of the

current diversity in approaches to short-range air defense and in

the systems used will probably be eliminated. Both the United

States and its allies intend to procure different versions of

a new 35 mm. all-weather gun. 10/ These guns are to be mounted on

a tank chassis to permit them to be used at the front. Thus,

although U.S. and allied gun deployments may remain different

overall, they will increasingly rely on some standard systems.

The United States and its allies are also moving toward use

of standardized short-range SAMS, ll/ Like most other infrared

missiles currently deployed, the U.S. Chaparral is not useful in

conditions of low visibility or bad weather. Consequently, the

United States plans to procure a radar-guided, short-range SAM

called Roland that is also entering the inventories of the French

and German armies. Present Defense Department plans call for

deploying the Roland in rear areas only; the U.S. Army wants to

10/ The 35 mm. cannon and its ammunition reportedly comprise a

highly effective AA weapon. In view of the poor all-weather

capability of the Warsaw Pact air forces, however, the

decision to buy these guns instead of a simpler 35 mm. selfpropelled AA gun system is questionable. At a unit cost

of around $3 million, these guns are extremely expensive.

Roughly half of this cost is due to a radar-aiming system

required for the gun's low-visibility/all-weather capability.

Since, for some time to come, Pact jet aircraft of the types

presently deployed are unlikely to pose much of a threat to

front-line units in bad weather, the view that NATO forces

need an all-weather gun for defense against such aircraft

is debatable. Indeed, it may be that NATO should emphasize

clear-weather systems, since they are cheap enough to deploy in large numbers and since Pact air forces are most

capable of effectively attacking ground forces in clear

weather.

ll/ Two possible exceptions to this generalization arise from

the fact that the United States is developing a replacement,

called Stinger, for the Redeye shoulder-fired SAM and is

phasing in an improved version of the Chaparral vehiclelaunched SAM. The Germans presently deploy Redeye; whether

they will replace it with Stinger remains to be seen. There

is no indication that any Central Region allies intend to

procure the "Improved Chaparral." :

22
increase the number of systems procured in order to deploy some

Roland launchers closer to the front. If adopted, the Army's plan

would double the cost of procuring the Roland system.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis in this chapter leads to two conclusions regarding the Central Region's air defense. First, there appears to

be a convergence by NATO members on some of the weapons each

contributes to the alliance's air defense and on the manner in

which they are employed. This is particularly noticeable in the

case of fighters. Some variations will remain, but NATO's fighter

force in the 1980s will probably be more uniform in sophistication

and capability than it is today. This is also true of certain

categories of SHORAD systems.

Second, the planned changes in U,.S. and allied systems mean

that NATO is getting stronger, and this strength, to an extent,

simplifies the problem of providing air defense for the Central

Region. Improved deployments of ground-based systems will enhance

the defenses of particular sectors; fighters hedge against the

possibility that ground-based air defenses in northern Germany

would prove inadequate in the face of a Pact air attack; and

AWACS, COBs, and shelters should enhance fighters' efficiency.

Unfortunately, the conclusions just stated do not bear

clear-cut implications for Congressional choices regarding air

defense. The Congress must, however, decide to buy some combination of type and quantity of air defense systems this year.

Of course, any of an infinite number of such combinations could be

chosen. To make this decision more manageable, it is important to

have some framework for choice. The following chapter proposes

such a framework.

23

CHAPTER IV. OPTIONS

Although this paper primarily addresses U.S. air defense

procurement issues, it has discussed the allies' air defense

systems and plans in considerable detail. This emphasis follows from the facts that U.S. air defense systems are primarily

intended to enhance U.S. capability to defend the Central Region

and that this defense is accomplished in conjunction with other

NATO countries. For these reasons, Congressional decisions about

which systems to buy depend in large part on how the Congress

wants to structure the overall role that the United States will

play in NATO. Accordingly, the roles currently played by the

United States provide a useful framework for structuring choices

regarding the procurement of air defense weapons systems.

The United States now plays three distinct roles in defense

of the Central Region. Like several other NATO countries, the

United States is assigned specific sectors of the front to defend

and deploys ground forces and necessary support in order to

perform this mission. As noted earlier, the U.S. sectors are

located in southern Germany, which is not thought to be the most

likely avenue of a Warsaw Pact attack.

The United States is also committed to augmenting the defenses of northern Germany with aircraft, should the need arise.

This role necessarily results from the facts that the United

States would contribute a large number of aircraft in time of

war and that these planes would be under the command of Allied Air

Forces Central Europe.

Finally, the United States is committed to reinforcing NATO

with additional ground forces. These forces would be sent to

bolster that part of the Central Region where the threat was

greatest in time of war. Thus, it is likely that they would

be sent to northern Germany.

The budget options specified below each represent air defense

procurement consistent with fulfilling one of the roles described

above. Each option is summarized in Table 2.

25
TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF OPTIONS

Current

Defense Department

System Program

F-15 6 wings

F-16 12 wings

Collocated Operating The number completed and the rate

Bases (COBs) of establishment are classified.

Roland, Stinger, Improved Continued development and initial

Chaparral, and Sparrow with procurement

Advanced Monopulse Seeker

Patriot Continued development and initial

procurement

Anti-Aircraft Guns Possible interim buy of 171 German

35 mm. radar-guided AA guns mounted

on a tank chassis, followed by development and initial procurement

of a more sophisticated U.S. version of an AA gun of the same type

(Continued)

a/ In 1983, the COBs program will still be incomplete and unable—despite

the F-15 and F-16 cuts proposed here—to accommodate all U.S. Air Force

fighters that could be employed in defense of the Central Region. Therefore, no cut in the COBs program is proposed here, despite the F-15/F-16

cuts.

26
TABLE 2. (CONTINUED)

Option I:

Providing Aircraft

to Augment

Allied Defense

Option II:

Providing Air Defenses

for an Additional

U.S. Corps

Option III:

Modernizing

Air Defenses

for Smaller U.S.

Ground Force s

6 wings 6 wings 5 wings

14 wings (or 12 wings plus

facilities to permit the

use of approximately 180

Navy/Marine aircraft)

13 wings (or 12 wings plus

facilities to permit the

use of approximately 90

Navy/Marine aircraft)

11 wings

Establishment of additional

COBs or similar facilities

at European civil airfields

to accommodate two more F-16

wings or approximately 180

Navy/Marine aircraft

Same as Option I, but

sized to accommodate one

more F-16 wing or approximately 90 Navy/Marine

aircraft.

Current

program a/

Current program Current program Current program,

with a decreased

total buy, for

savings after

1983

Current program but no

procurement after 1983 _b/

Same as Option I Same as Option I

Purchase of 1,000 Rheinmetall 20 mm. guns, and

development/procurement of

a clear-weather 35 mm. gun,

for savings against the

Defense Department program

after 1983

Same as Option I Same as Option I

b/ Procurement of Patriot beyond fiscal year 1983 is not required if Hawk is

~~ retained and Patriot is deployed only to replace Nike-Hercules.

27
Two points should be noted about these options. First, the

procurement proposals associated with them are not necessarily the

most cost-effective. They are, however, good illustrations of the

kinds of procurement decisions that would emphasize a particular

U.S. role in NATO. Second, while several of the same types of air

defense eystems are proposed for each option, the quantities of

the total programs change from option to option.

The rationale for the changes in airborne air defense will

be described later, as each option is discussed. The rationale

for the ground-based systems common to all options, however, can

be conveniently explained here.

Each option is structured on the assumption of "partial"

deployment of Patriot (that is, Patriot deployed only in replacement of Nike-Hercules, with Hawk retained). The rationale for

this change in Defense Department plans would be cost savings.

These savings do not show up, however, in CBO's cost estimates

shown in Table 3. JL/

Continued procurement of Roland is incorporated in all three

options. None of the options, however, provides for a program as

large as the one that the Army has requested. 2J Such procurement

would seem advisable only if Pact air forces develop a more

significant capability to attack U.S. combat units near the front

in bad weather. If Pact air forces do develop such a capability,

there will be adequate opportunity later for decisions to keep the

Roland production line open.

JY CBO's estimates of savings are based on changes from a baseline defined by projections of Defense Department spending

over fiscal years 1979-1983. No savings show up as a result

of buying the relatively small number of Patriot SAMs needed

for a "partial" deployment in CBO's options, because the 1979^

1983 projection provides for procurement of roughly the same

number of missiles. In other words, savings from partial deployment would occur after fiscal year 1983, in years for

which data are not available with which to make a savings

estimate.

2J As a result, acquisition of the Improved Chaparral is continued under all options, for use by active Army units. Such

acquisition is consistent with current DoD policy that does

not endorse the Army's request for additional Roland systems

for use at the front.

28
TABLE 3. COSTS OF OPTIONS IN COMPARISON TO CURRENT AIR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT:

BY FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT DOLLARS

Option 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

Current DoD Program 4,420 5,120 5,060 4,060 3,650

Option I:

Providing Aircraft to

Augment Allied Defenses

With Additional

F-16 Procurement

With Employment of

Navy and Marine Air 30

440

30

430

35

530

20

630

25

Option II:

Providing Air Defenses

for an Additional U.S.

Corps to Reinforce

Allied Sectors

With Additional

F-16 Procurement

With Employment of

Navy and Marine Air 30

440

15

430

20

100 200

Option III:

Modernizing Air Defenses

for Smaller U.S. Forces a/ -460 -1,160 -460 -520

NOTE: All three options include $109 million to cover procurement of 1,000

Rheinmetall AA guns with ammunition for use in Europe. This sum is

not included in the figures above.

aj The savings displayed in this option result from the cut of one wing of

F-15s and one wing of F-16s in comparison to present DoD plans, described on pp. 34-35. The deletion of three- Army divisions would result

in savings on air defense systems that accompany such units. These

savings would accrue after fiscal year 1983, however, and are not

displayed in this table.

29
Two changes from official plans for AA gun procurement are

part of all three options. These changes are motivated' principally by the improved air defense that results from deployment of

large numbers of guns. The first change involves the development

and acquisition of a relatively simple, visually-guided AA gun instead of the Army's proposed all-weather DIVAD (Division Air Defense) gun for use with U.S. forces at the front. An additional

rationale for this change is that Pact jets do not now seriously

threaten such units in low-visibility conditions and seem unlikely

to do so in the foreseeable future. The option of acquiring more

Roland systems already represents one way to hedge against unexpectedly swift Pact progress in low visibility/all-weather ground

attack capability. In clear weather, however, Pact jets can

attack such units, and they are likely to become increasingly

capable of doing so. In addition, there is reason to believe that

visually-guided AA guns can effectively engage Pact attack helicopters. These considerations make investment in larger numbers

of a simpler gun seem a more appropriate means of enhancing the

air defenses of U.S. ground forces near the front.

The second change from official plans is acquisition of the

Rheinmetall 20 mm. AA gun that recently entered service with the

German and Norwegian armies,. At a unit cost of roughly $74,000,

this weapon is extremely cheap and can be acquired in relatively

large numbers. The Vietnam and Yom Kippur wars demonstrated

the effectiveness of deploying a large number of guns in conjunction with SAM systems. Thus, large numbers of this gun would

complement present U.S. Hawk SAM deployments in a way that fewer

DIVAD guns could not. Finally, acquisition of the gun would

constitute an instance of U.S. acquisition of systems produced by

our allies to match their purchases of U.S. systems (the "two-way

street" in weapons acquisition) and a step toward NATO standardization overall. For illustrative purposes, a buy of 1,000 guns is

included in each option discussed below.

OPTION I. PROVIDING AIRCRAFT TO AUGMENT ALLIED DEFENSES

The Congress may decide that the United States should enhance

its capabilities to offset possible weaknesses of allied forces

in northern Germany. It may wish to do this, however, without a

visible and dramatic increase in the U.S. role in NATO. If so,

a reasonable policy to consider is one that would change current

Defense Department plans in order to provide additional aircraft

for NATO. Because of their mobility and inherent flexibility,

they could help the United States or its allies, depending on

where the greatest needs materialized.

30
If the Congress chose to provide additional air defense

aircraft, these planes would have two important functions to

perform. One would be defense of the A-10. (The Firepower and

Overview papers in this series suggest provision of two wings of

the A-10, a specialized ground-attack aircraft, in addition to

the aircraft already proposed by the Department of Defense as

a means of enhancing NATO firepower capabilities in northern

Germany. Since the A-10 is expected to be very effective against

Pact armor and will probably threaten Pact ground-based air

defense systems at the front as well, Pact fighters might be used

against the A-10. Therefore, adding A-lOs to the force could

possibly create an additional demand on NATO fighter resources.)

Another mission would be coverage of the allies' rear areas to

make up for the lack of in-depth Hawk SAMs. 3J

The missions just described can be performed in either of

two ways. If only Air Force assets were used, two additional F-16

wings might do the job. 4/ Alternatively, arrangements could be

3/ Of course, the F-16s would not be a perfect replacement.

Fighters and SAMs have different: capabilities, and one can

substitute only imperfectly for the other.

4/ The F-16 is proposed here rather than the F-15 because it

is considerably cheaper.. This is important for two reasons.

First, two wings of F-16s can be procured for roughly the same

cost as one wing of F-15s. This is important because the

rationale for additional aircraft in this option involves

their capability to perform missions at widely separated

points over the Central Region. (One multipurpose F-15 might

be as good or better than two F-16s, but it cannot fly over

both the front and the allies' rear areas at the same time.)

Second, the F-15's potential advantage over the F-16 associated with the F-15's radar missile capability might not be

realized in a European war. Such missiles may not be usable

in Central Region air battles after the initial wave of Pact

air attacks because enemy and friendly aircraft would be

intermingled in Central Region airspace. In such circumstances, the inadequacy of currently available electronic

means for identification of friend or foe (IFF) might well

mean that visual rules of engagement would be imposed. Such

rules might reduce the potential of the F-15 so much that it

would be hard to justify buying F-15s rather than the less

costly F-16 as a means of enlarging U.S. fighter inventories.

31
1

made to bring fighters and attack aircraft into the Central

Region from two Navy air wings associated with carriers in overhaul and one Marine wing from a division—wing team not engaged

in combat. Navy and Marine aircraft could enhance A-10 protection and defend the allies' rear areas directly through provision of nearly 100 F-14 and F-4 interceptors employed in an

air defense role. The ground-attack aircraft might indirectly

enhance air defense by freeing U.S. and allied multipurpose

F-16s to perform air defense missions and by tying down Pact

air-to-air fighters that might otherwise be free to attack A-lOs.

These arrangements would involve developing additional collocated operating bases and prepositioning some materiel needed for

wartime operations at those bases.

It is possible that a proposal to augment Central Region

air defenses by preparing to use Navy and Marine aircraft would

encounter resistance from these services. (Naval doctrine calls

for operation from carriers; Marine doctrine envisions Marine

aircraft being used in support of Marine ground units.) As

a result, this option is costed on the assumption that two additional wings of F-16s are procured. It should be noted, however, that such a purchase involves $1.9 billion in procurement

and operating costs that would be saved if provisions were made

for Navy and Marine aircraft to operate in Europe. In other

words, this option would add roughly $2 billion to currently

planned air defense investment if additional F-16s were procured,

but would add only $140 million if Navy and Marine assets were

used instead.

This option (and the others) includes continued development

of the AIM-7F Sparrow missile with Advanced Monopulse Seeker.

This missile holds open the possibility that the look-down/

shoot-down potential of the F-15 radar might be realized. If

so, the F-15s that are procured will represent a more substantial

hedge against Pact aircraft that attempt low-flying penetration

and are able to evade other defenses.

Although NATO AWACS is a flexible airborne asset, it is

not included in this option. For reasons outlined on pp. 56-57,

this program does not seem critical to effective defense of the

Central Region. If the Congress wishes to enhance NATO air

defense capabilities on the flanks, it may want to consider NATO

AWACS. Such enhancements, however, are not the focus of this

option.

32
OPTION II. PROVIDING AIR DEFENSES FOR AN ADDITIONAL U.S. CORPS TO

REINFORCE ALLIED SECTORS

The Overview paper in this series stated that U.S. capa~

bilities to reinforce the allies in northern Germany could be

enhanced by changing Defense Department procurement plans so as

to permit prepositioning of materiel for a IKS. Army corps there.

Such an enhancement would have two important consequences for air

defense system requirements.

The first consequence would be the enhanced ground-based air

defense that would follow from deployment of the SHORAD assets of

three divisions and a supporting corps organization. Even if the

United States chose not to procure more clear-weather AA guns

and proceeded with current plans to procure a smaller number of

expensive all-weather guns, the number of self-propelled AA guns

in northern Germany would be sharply increased. The number of

short-range SAMs would be increased even more sharply because the

allies do not rely on such systems to the same extent that U.S.

forces do. As a result of these changes, the effectiveness and

survivability of Pact attacking aircraft could be significantly

reduced.

The second consequence would probably be even more significant. A U.S. corps in northern Germany would greatly enhance

NATO's ground-based firepower capabilities. As a result, fewer

A-lOs would be needed to reinforce northern Germany under this

option. 5J Fewer F-16s would therefore be .needed to defend the

A-10. Accordingly, this option would cut one wing of F-16s from

the number proposed in Option I. One wing would remain, on

grounds that inserting a U.S. corps would not offset the lack

of in-depth Hawks.

Again, procurement of an additional wing of F-16s would

not be required if Navy and/or Marine assets were used instead.

Procurement of even one F-16 wing is a much more expensive way

to enhance U.S. capabilities to defend northern Germany with

fighters.

5/ For a fuller discussion o:f this issue, see Congressional

~~ Budget Office, U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for

NATO: Overview, Budget Issue Paper(January1978)and

the companion background paper, Firepower Issues.

33
The costs of this option are shown in Table 3. Procuring

and operating an additional F-16 wing would cost approximately

$1.1.7 billion; the alternative course of providing facilities to

permit use of Navy and Marine aircraft in the Central Region

would cost roughly $75 million. The costs of the ground-based

air defense systems that would be prepositioned with the other

equipment for a U.S. corps in northern Germany are not shown in

Table 3 because the proposals made in this option do not imply

cost changes in current Defense Department plans for air defense

investment through fiscal year 1983.

OPTION III. MODERNIZING AIR DEFENSES FOR SMALLER U.S. NATO FORCES

The Congress may, for a number of reasons, wish to reverse

the trends toward increased spending on U.S. forces for NATO

and an increased U.S. role in the alliance. 6/ One means toward

this end would involve deletion of three divisions that have been

added to Army ground forces since fiscal year 1974 but continued

modernization of the equipment used by the other 13 divisions in

the Army. This policy would amount to a decision to emphasize the

third role of U.S. forces in NATO: defense of the U.S. sectors in

southern Germany.

Under this option, current Air Force procurement plans would

be changed considerably. Part of the rationale for this change

involves uncertainties already noted: it is not known where a

Pact attack would occur, and it is not clear whether allied air

defenses in northern Germany are in fact stronger than those in

U.S. sectors to the south. Another part of the rationale involves

the present place of U.S. air defense fighters in the organization of AAFCE. 7/ In wartime, these fighters would be sent by

the Commander of AAFCE to wherever he saw the greatest need.

Taken together, these considerations suggest that acquisition of

the Defense Department's planned number of fighters would as

likely be a means of strengthening the allies as a means of

defending the U.S. sectors. Therefore, the Congress may not wish

to emphasize procurement of fighters if it intends to restrict

6/ For a discussion of possible rationales for this decision, see

Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Air and Ground Conventional

Forces for NATO: Overview, p. 39.

7/ Allied Air Forces Central Europe, defined in Chapter II.

34
improvements in NATO to ones that would enhance the defense of

U.S. sectors. In that case, resources might be directed to

procurement of ground-based systems instead. For illustrative

purposes, this option would reduce the purchase of F-15s and

F-16s by one wing each. 8J

The ground-based air defense systems that were described

at the beginning of this chapter are all included in this option.

Modernization of the equipment of only 13 divisions is involved

here, however, because smaller total programs for AA guns and

the Improved Chaparral and Stinger SAMs would be required by

Option III. This means that savings would be realized after

fiscal year 1983, since production lines for these items could be

shut down sooner. Savings will not show up before then, however,

because the production projected in the 1979-1983 Five-Year

Defense Plan is necessary for modernization of air defense systems

for both a 13-division and 16-division force. Consequently, the

savings associated with this option over the next five fiscal

years would result from the aircraft reductions described above,

for a total savings of $2.6 billion.

8/ No accompanying cuts in the collocated operating base program

are proposed here, for reasons outlined in the footnote to

m i ^ /•» f\ f' Table 2, p. 26.

35

APPENDIXE S

APPENDIX A. U.S. AND ALLIED AIR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

This appendix provides background information and supporting

detail not included in the body of the paper. It organizes the

discussion of U.S . and allied air defense programs somewhat

differently from the text. Two headings below are familiar: the

section on "Ground-Based Systems" describes long-range surfaceto-air missiles (SAMs) and short-range air defense (SHORAD)

systems; and the section on " Airborne and Airborne-Related

Systems" discusses the shelter and collocated operating bases

(COBs) programs, the possibility of using Navy and Marine aircraft

in Europe, and certain aspects of U.S. and allied fighter forces.

The section on "Central Region Early Warning Systems," however,

includes both ground-based and airborne radars.

GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS

Short~Range Air Defense Systems

Currently deployed U.S. and allied SHORAD systems are listed

in Tables A-l and A-2. Since the significance of some of the

characteristics listed in Table A-2 is not obvious, they are

discussed below.

Desirable characteristics in a SHORAD system include:

o Ability to hit maneuvering, multiple targets that are

using jamming devices.

o Integral IFF Capability. This is a means of automatic

identification of friend or foe (IFF). A reliable IFF

capability would permit friendly aircraft to operate more

freely in support of ground troops and would permit air

defense systems to engage targets without waiting iEor

visual identification. I/ i

'_!/ A truly secure and reliable IFF system is apparently not operational with NATO forces. For a more detailed discussion of

such devices, see Julian S. Lake, "Is That You, Charlie?" Military Electronics/Countermeasures (December/January 1977/78).

39
TABLE A-l. CURRENTLY DEPLOYED SHORAD SYSTEMS a/

System

(Nation of Origin)

System Type

(Range) b/

Assigned

Mission c/

Redeye

(United States)

Blowpipe

(Great Britain)

Chaparral

(United States)

Short-range SAM

(3 km.)

Short-range SAM

(unavailable)

Short-range SAM

(5 km.)

U.S.—self-defense for frontline units, artillery units,

and Chaparral/Vulcan units;

allies—probably similar.

Probably similar to Redeye;

certainly infantry selfdefense .

Defense of relatively static

high-value targets in rear

areas.

Roland

(France/

Federal

Republic

of Germany)

Short-range SAM

(6. km.)

French and German—defense of

combat elements near the front;

U.S.—defense of rear areas,

perhaps areas nearer the front

as well.

Rapier

(Great Britain)

Short-range SAM

(5+ km.)

Airbase defense and probably

defense of high-value rear

area assets.

Bofors L/70 (Sweden),

Rheinmetall Rh-202

(Federal Republic of

Germany), or similar

20 mm. to 40 mm. gun

Vulcan

(United States)

Oerlikon KCB

(Switzerland)

Short-range gun

(3 km.)

Short-range gun

(2 km.)

Short-range gun

(3 km.) .

Probably defense of high-value

targets in rear areas.

Defense of combat units in

mobile operations at the front;

defense of static high—value

targets in rear areas.

Probably defense of maneuver

units.

(Continued)

j»/ This table is not exhaustive, but does describe the most important SHORAD systems now

deployed by NATO countries.

b/ Sources for range systems: Bofors L/70, Redeye, and Rapier ("Evolution in Air Defense

Requirements," International Defense Review, No. 3 (1978), pp. 313, 316); Chaparral and

Vulcan (U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Employment (Field Manual 44-1, 1976), p. 3-1).

40
TABLE A-l. (CONTINUED)

Forces

Deploying

Means of

Mobility

Target

Detection

System

Guidance

United States,

Federal Republic

of Germany

Manpack Visual Infrared

Great Britain,

Canada

United States

France currently;

in the future,

United States and

Federal Republic

of Germany

Great Britain

Manpack

Lightly armored tracked

vehicle

French—tank chassis;

German—armored fighting

vehicle chassis; U.S.—

wheeled vehicle if procured for rear areas

only, otherwise tracked

chassis

Towed

Visual

Visual, but Chaparral

can operate with a

forward-area alerting

radar (FAAR)

Visual in daylight/

clear-weather version;

radar in low visibility

Visual or radar

Radio command,

with optical

tracking

Infrared

Radar

Visual or radar

Great Britain,

Canada, France,

Federal Republic

of Germany, the

Netherlands

United States,

Belgium

Towed

Lightly armored tracked

vehicle; towed version

with airborne units

Visual or radar

Visual

Visual, some

models with

laser rangefinders

Visual (rangefinding radar

only)

France

(and perhaps

Great Britain)

Self-propelled. French—

on light tank chassis;

British gun—on tracked

armored fighting vehicle

mount

French—radar;

British- -visual

French—radar;

British—visual

c/ Entries pertaining to allied missions are not necessarily official doctrine; in many

cases, they represent a CBO estimate based on available evidence.

41
TABLE A-2. PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF CURRENTLY DEPLOYED SHORAD SYSTEMS

Judgmental Estimates

of Performance at the Front

System Reported IFF

(Nation of Origin) Capability

Redeye No

(United States)

Blowpipe Yes

(Great Britain)

Chaparral No

(United States)

Roland N/A aj

(France/

Federal

Republic

of Germany)

Rapier Yes

(Great Britain)

Bofors L/70 (Sweden), No

Rheinmetall Rh-202

(Federal Republic of

Germany), or similar

20 mm. to 40 mm. gun

Vulcan No

(United States)

Oerlikon KCB No

(Switzerland)

Dual

Capability Survivability

No Fair

No Fair

No Poor

No Fair

No Poor

Yes Poor

Yes Fair

to

Poor

Yes Fair (British)

Good (French)

Ability to Defeat

Pact Helicopters

Fair

Fair

Fair

Fair

Fair

Good

Fair

(range

limitations)

Very Good

a/ Not available.

42
o Dual Capability. This is the ability to engage both

ground and aerial targets. It is primarily characteristic

of anti-aircraft (AA) guns and is desirable because AA

weapons might be employed against enemy aircraft for only

a small proportion of their time in combat. For the rest

of the time, AA weapons without dual capability would be a

burden rather than an asset to combat units.

o Survivability. Assessing this attribute is a matter of

rough judgment, based on a system's mobility, armor

protection, dual capability, arid size (hence, its ability

to hide and/or use terrain for protection from enemy

fire).

o Ability to Defeat Pact Helicopters. This is important

because attack" helicopters are reported to be a serious

threat to NATO units at the front. Here again, assessment

is a matter of judgment, based in part on a system's

mobility and range.

The last three characteristics are primarily relevant to

performance at the front. Many SHORAD systems, however, are not

now intended for use there, in part because they are unlikely to

survive in that environment. They are also needed to provide

low-altitude air defense coverage in critical areas behind the

front. High-value targets such as airfields and nuclear weapons

storage sites are examples of such critical areas; additional

systems are placed around them to engage aircraft that could evade

SAMs and fighters. Another example of a high-value target is the

area around a SAM site—termed its "dead zone"—in which the SAM

cannot destroy enemy aircraft. 2J Short-range SAMs (or guns) are

needed to cover this area in order to protect the long-range SAMs

and thus the security of whatever else is being protected.

SHORAD systems currently deployed with active U.S. forces

have several shortcomings. Redeye, a man-portable, infrared SAM,

lacks IFF. It also has problems in engaging jets because of their

their high speed and maneuverability and because of Redeye's small

warhead. Chaparral, a vehicle-launched, infrared SAM, is more

lethal. Its relatively light armor, however, makes it less likely

This "dead zone" is characteristic of all SAMs. It exists

for various technical reasons.

43
to survive in action near the front. In addition, the opticalaiming feature of both Chaparral and Redeye limits their usefulness at night and in bad weather. 3J Vulcan, a visually guided

anti-aircraft gun mounted on a tracked chassis, is also lightly

armored. Its fire control system is unsatisfactory, making it

difficult to hit high-speed airborne targets. In addition, there

is reason to believe that Vulcan would do poorly in protecting

U.S. tanks against Pact attack helicopters that might launch

antitank missiles while beyond the Vulcan's effective range. 4/

Proposed Changes in U.S. and Allied SHORAD Systems. As

noted in the text, the United States and its allies are moving

toward greater standardization with respect to certain categories

of SAMs and AA guns.

The Dutch, Belgian, and German armies are planning to buy a

version of a newly developed 35 mm. self-propelled anti-aircraft

gun. Its primary mission will be the defense of combat units

along the front, 5/ but it may also be used for air defense in

Belgium. 6J

The German and Belgian version of this gun, known as Gepard or Flakpanzer, is mounted on the chassis of the German Leopard

3/ Pact air forces have greatly reduced capabilities under such

conditions. Appendix B describes why the Pact's relatively

scarce all-weather ground attack aircraft are more likely to

be used against rear-area targets than against targets near

the front. Thus, Chaparral/Redeye's optical-aiming feature

is only a shortcoming when employed to protect rear-area

targets that are likely to be attacked at night or in bad

weather.

4/ The Mi-24 Hind-A helicopter can carry four Swatter antitank

guided missiles. The Swatter is reported to have a range of

2,500 meters, (See "An Analysis of Soviet Artillery Development," International Defense Review, No. 6 (1977), p. 1059.)

By comparison^ Army manuals report a range of 2,000 meters

for Vulcan, against airborne targets.

5_/ Jane's Weapons Systems, 1976, p. 97.

_6/ "Germans Weighing Alternative Patriot Acquisition Techniques,"

Aviation Week and Space Technology (August 29, 1977), p. 48.
tank. It can be aimed optically or by radar. The radar system

enables the Flakpanzer to be capable of all-weather operation. TJ

The German Army has ordered 450 Gepards, and the Belgians have

ordered 55.

The Dutch version of the same system, known as Cheetah,

is identical to Gepard except for the installation of a different

radar. The Dutch Army has ordered 95 Cheetahs.

The U.S. Army has shown considerable interest in buying a

fleet of 171 Flankpanzers. j8/ In addition, the Army is currently

considering selection of the appropriate version of an all-weather

AA gun system for use with ground troops near the front. (The

system's acronym is DIVAD, for Division Air Defense).

The model and contractor for the DIVAD gun have not been

selected, although the Army is committed to using the M-48 tank's

chassis. As a result, it is difficult to be very precise about

the system's cost. Projected data on yearly purchases, however,

indicate a unit cost of between $3.3 million and $4.8 million.

The proposed DIVAD gun will be more capable than the existing

Vulcan gun in several respects. It will have a longer range

that will enable it to engage both jets and attack helicopters

that threaten U.S. tanks. It will also have radar fire control,

so that it can be used in low-visibility conditions. This requirement is a major reason for the extremely high cost of the

gun. It is also supposed to be equipped with an integral IFF

capability. Mounting the gun on the M-48 chassis will afford

the crew greater protection for operations near the front and

will permit the gun to keep up with tanks on the move in combat.

Alternatives to the DIVAD gun were discussed in the text.

Most of the important features of these alternatives were stated

there as well. It is important, however, to discuss a possible

objection to the Rheinmetall Rh-202 20 mm. gun. This objection

TJ Radar also provides information on a target's range. A

system employing range-only radar, however, would be considerably simpler than that of the Flakpanzer.

8/ "Pentagon Picks Firms to Develop Air Defense Gun," The Wall

Street Journal (November 30, 1977), p. 4.

45
concerns the idea that deploying the Rh-202 gun in large numbers

would imply large operating costs, since large numbers of personnel would be required. In fact, however, such personnel

costs need not be incurred. The Rh-202 gun costs only about

$74,000 per unit, so it is extremely inexpensive. In addition, it

can be operated by one man. It would therefore seem reasonable to

issue the Rh-202 gun to units whose personnel would operate it

only during air raids, rather than on a full-time basis. For

example, some members of Patriot units are presently slated to use

Stinger SAMs to protect the Patriot against aircraft that are too

close to be successfully engaged by the Patriot itself. These men

could operate the Rh-202 instead. Large numbers of rear-area

support troops—for example, those assigned to the Kaiserslauten

logistics complex—could also be trained to use this weapon.

The second standardized SHORAD system that the United States

and some allies intend to acquire is the Roland. This is a

vehicle-launched, radar-guided SAM that reportedly possesses

all-weather capability. Each nation employing Roland intends to

mount the weapon on a different chassis. In addition, indirect

evidence suggests that the U.S. system may be different from the

French-German Roland in other important respects. The Roland

missile is, however, supposed to be usable by all three nations'

launchers.

An important difference between the U.S. Roland and that of

the French and Germans involves its mission. The allies intend to

use Roland in defense of combat elements near the front _9/; the

U.S. Defense Department plans to use it for defense of high-value

assets in rear areas, such as airbases. The U.S. Army has shown

interest in using Roland nearer the front as well, to replace

the Chaparral missile system. If approved, this additional

role would nearly double the cost of the Roland system. 10/

The United States is making some other changes to its inventory of SHORAD systems that will not involve standardized weapons.

These changes were noted briefly in the text and are worth

discussing in more detail here.

9/ "Roland," International Defense Review, No. 2 (1975), p. 202.

_10/ The principal reason for this increase in cost is that about

twice as many firing vehicles and missiles would have to be

procured.

46
One of these weapons is the Stinger. This is a man-portable,

shoulder-fired SAM, designed as the successor to Redeye. Stinger

is said to be more capable than Redeye; it can engage oncoming

aircraft and is not limited to the "tail-chase" mode. Also,

Stinger reportedly possesses an IFF capability.

The second weapon is the Improved Chaparral. This is a

follow-on system to the Chaparral missile described in Table A-l.

It has a newer infrared seeker and an improved warhead and fuse.

The Improved Chaparral is also intended to have an IFF capability.

If Roland is deployed near the front lines as well as in rear

areas, Improved Chaparral may be supplied to reserve units. If

Roland is not deployed near the front, Improved Chaparral may be

the standard SHORAD SAM for use there.

Long-Range SAMs

Most of the important information about these systems was

covered in the text. Some other issues, however, merit brief

discussion.

Hawk. It was noted in the text that most NATO countries

that deploy Basic Hawks in the Central Region are moving toward

deployment of the Improved version. Improved Hawk differs from

Basic Hawk in several ways. It has an enhanced Electronic

Counter Countermeasures (ECCM) capability and is claimed to be

more reliable and easier to maintain. It also possesses an

automatic data-processing unit that will be capable of handling

difficult tasks that were formerly performed by operators.

Nike-Hercules. Two points about the Nike-Hercules are worth

noting. First, it is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

The putative advantage of this capability is that it would complicate the problem of planning a Pact air attack. (Mass aircraft

formations are more vulnerable to nuclear warheads than to conventional ones. Therefore, possession of a nuclear Hercules might

give pause to any Pact planner who was otherwise attracted to

using such formations.) Many observers believe, however, that the

Hercules' nuclear capability will not have this result because it

is doubtful that the United States would use it.

Second, and quite apart from the merits or flaws of its

nuclear capability, Nike-Hercules has serious shortcomings.

47
For example, Hercules is very limited in the number of threat

aircraft it can track and engage. 11/ In addition, indirect

evidence suggests that Hercules would do very poorly against

aircraft that employed evasive maneuvers.

Patriot. It was noted in the text that the Patriot missile

(formerly called SAM-D) is a very expensive replacement for

both the Nike-Hercules and Improved Hawk missiles. This observation was based on the fact that its program cost in fiscal

year 1979 is expected to be $295.7 million and its costs from

fiscal year 1979 until completion will be about $4.8 billion.

This compares with a total program cost of $1.6 billion for

the Roland, the next most costly Army air defense procurement

program.

Several points about Patriot's advertised capabilities are

worth noting. It is designed to engage a number of targets

simultaneously. Some observers claim that it will also be useful

against highly maneuverable aircraft. 12/ According to the Army,

a full deployment of Patriot will require less manpower than would

be needed for the Nike-Hercules and Hawk SAMs that Patriot would

replace. In addition, Patriot is reported to be able to "maintain

its effectiveness despite intense electronic jamming." 13/

Two other characteristics of Patriot deserve mention. First,

a Patriot firing platoon will be capable only of sector coverage.

In other words, it will riot be able to give itself 360-degree

protection. 14/ For such all-aspect preparedness, a number of

firing platoons would have to be deployed together.

A second characteristic of Patriot (and other SAMs) is its

"dead zone." SAM radars are limited by terrain, and the missiles

III "Germans Weighing Alternative Patriot Acquisition Techniques," Aviation Week and Space Technology, p. 48.

12/ Jane's Weapons Systems, 1977, p. 86.

13/ Ibid.

14/ This limitation results from Patriot's otherwise technically

impressive phased-array radar. Hawk's radar is in most

respects inferior to Patriot's, but it does provide 360-

degree coverage.

48
cannot engage targets at close range. Therefore, Patriot cannot

protect itself against close-in threats. As a result, other

SAMs or some type of gun will have to be deployed to protect

Patriot. The Army intends to use Stinger for this purpose,

and will man it with personnel assigned to the Patriot batteries .

AIRBORNE (AND AIRBORNE-RELATED) SYSTEMS

Aircraft Shelters

For several years, the United States has been engaged in

a program of building hardened aircraft shelters to protect

aircraft on the ground from enemy air attack. This program

is very important, judging from recent experience in the Middle

East. In the 1967 Middle East war, for example, the Israeli

Air Force was able to destroy a large percentage of the Egyptian

Air Force on the ground because the Egyptian aircraft were not

sheltered. In contrast, the Arabs sheltered their planes in the

1973 war, and very few were knocked out on the ground.

The United States is eligible for NATO infrastructure funding

for shelter construction for 70 percent of its aircraft based

in Europe or committed to be transferred to Europe within a

certain number of days after mobilization. The United States

has already appropriated funds for construction of shelters,

and it expects to be reimbursed for part of this expense by

NATO. In fiscal year 1978, $60 million was appropriated for this

purpose.

The United States has not, however, embarked on a shelter

program for its Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

aircraft. This is hard to explain, since the AWACS will probably be based in England in time of war and Air Force authorities apparently believe that aircraft on the ground there are

vulnerable to Soviet attack. (Shelters are being constructed

in England for U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers.) In addition,

at a unit cost of $77 million, the AWACS is an extremely expensive aircraft. Finally, the Air Force gives glowing accounts

of the system's capabilities and of the contribution it might

make to Central Region air defense. In view of these facts,

it is unclear why the AWACS is not an intended candidate for

sheltering.

49

T
Collocated Operating Bases

For several years, the United States has been negotiating

with allied governments to establish collocated operating bases

(COBs) in Europe. As noted in the text, COBs are allied airbases

at which aircraft reinforcements from the United States would

be stationed in time of war. The purpose of the COB program

is to take advantage of excess capacity at allied airbases in

order to permit dispersed basing of U.S. aircraft. (Dispersal is

an important means of passive air defense for these planes.)

Establishment of a COB begins with an agreement between the

United States and one of the allies. This is followed by construction of facilities that will be needed for U.S. planes to

share the base—for example, aircraft shelters, ammunition and

fuel storage facilities, and paved areas for taxiways and parking.

Under the terms of a COB agreement, allied forces can always

use these facilities ir peacetime and can use them in time of war

until U.S. planes arrive. If an attack came with little or no

warning, many aircraft normally based in the United States would

not be in Europe at the beginning a war; hence, completed COB

facilities would represent a significant enhancement of allied

capabilities in this possibly critical period. At a minimum, they

would complicate the task of Pact attackers. For example, if the

allies had provided shelters for all their aircraft, Pact aircraft

would likely attack some empty U.S. shelters, since Pact pilots

would not know which shelters contained planes. If, on the other

hand, allied air forces did not build enough shelters for their

aircraft, then shelters that the United States built at COBs could

protect allied planes. In addition, other facilities built by the

United States could conceivably permit operation of the base even

if enemy attack destroyed allied facilities of the same type.

Although the allies will benefit from the COB program, they

do not directly contribute to construction costs or to operating

costs in peacetime. 15/ As a result, accelerated U.S. funding

15/ Shelter construction is an exception to this generalization.

As noted above, some of the shelters to be used by U.S. aircraft from the United States are eligible for NATO infrastructure funding to cover construction costs. The current

infrastructure fund has, however, obligated nearly all its

resources through 1979. A new fund must be negotiated before

financial support is available from this quarter.

50
of COBs would both enhance allied passive air defenses and

augment U.S. capabilities to offset allied weaknesses with

aircraft.

Prepositioned Materials to Permit Use of Navy and Marine Aircraft

Navy and Marine tactical air forces possess impressive

fighter and ground attack capabilities. Most of the Navy's

aircraft are organized into multimission carrier air wings.

A typical wing includes 24 F-4s/F-14s, 24 A-7s, and between

9 and 12 A-6s. 16/

The F-4 Phantom and the F-14 Tomcat are useful for air

superiority and air intercept missions and have a ground-attack

capability as well. The F-14, which is replacing the F-4, is a

highly sophisticated interceptor that can track and fire longrange radar missiles at several enemy aircraft simultaneously.

The A-7 Corsair II is a light attack aircraft optimized for visual

strike and interdiction missions. The A-6 Intruder is a medium

attack aircraft capable of all-weather operation.

The active air resources of the Marine Corps include more

than 140 F-4s, more than 90 A-4s, and more than 60 A-6s. 17/

Marine F-4s and A-6s are similar to Navy aircraft of this type;

Marine A-4s are small, fast, and highly maneuverable light attack

aircraft.

All of these aircraft could help with Central Region air

defense. F-4s and F-14s could do so directly, if used in the

air-to-air role. A-4s, A-6s, and A-7s could do so indirectly,

by freeing multipurpose aircraft like the F-16 to perform air

defense rather than ground-attack missions.

The Navy now operates these aircraft from carriers. The

Marine Corps would probably do likewise in time of war, until

its ground forces were landed in a combat theater. Since as

many as one-third of the Navy's 13 carriers could be in overhaul

16/ A typical wing also includes around 30 additional aircraft

of other types.

17/ The Marines also have some 900 aircraft of other types,

including helicopters.

51
at the start of a war, it might be possible to use some of the

fighters normally aboard these carriers in the early days of

the air battle in Europe. It should also be possible to use

some Marine aircraft in the same way. 18/ For these Navy and

Marine aircraft to be operated from existing European airfields on

short notice, necessary support and repair facilities should be

prepositioned there.

The Marines presently have such facilities in readily movable

form, as part of their "short airfield for tactical support"

(SATS) capability. Additional sets of these facilities could

be procured for Navy/ Marine Corps use and prepositioned at

particular European airfields. Such measures would reduce both

the need for airlift assets and the time required to make Navy and

Marine air units operational in Europe in the event of war. 19/

Once such facilities were purchased, decisions would have to

be made about where to preposition them. There are at least two

conceptual alternatives. One would be to negotiate with the

allies for the establishment of additional COBs. Another would

18/ The Marine Corps cannot undertake the division-sized landing

operations that its air wings are structured to support on a

few days' notice. It can only do so a few weeks after Marine

resources—and Navy amphibious lift—are marshalled for that

purpose. Even so, Navy amphibious assets can lift only

about 1-1/3 of the Marines' three divisions. Therefore, the

resources of at least one Marine air wing ought to be available for any European war that is not preceded both by long

warning and the commitment of substantial Marine air resources to other contingencies. Accordingly, it would seem

reasonable to consider the possibility of using one-third of

the particular Marine aircraft types noted above in Europe.

Such use would give the Commander of AAFCE an additional 41

F-4s, 30 A-4s, and 20 A-6s.

19/ Provision of such facilities is a necessary condition if Navy

aircraft are to make a contribution in Europe. It is not,

however, a sufficient condition. For example, "naval air

units would have to exercise in the European land-based environment if they were to be useful when called." (Tactical

Air Warfare, Hearings before the Task Force on National

Security and International Affairs, House Committee on the

Budget, 95:1 (June 1977), p. 32.)

52
be to plan to operate Navy and Marine Corps planes from European

civil airfields. Since, in either case, the United States would

probably want to construct the facilities—shelters, additional

taxiways, etc.—that usually accompany COBs, the costs of both

alternatives should be roughly comparable. Construction of these

facilities at a civil airfield, however, would probably not enhance the passive air defenses of allied forces as much as would

emplacing them at COBs.

Background Notes on NATO Fighters

Allied Fighters. Several points made in the text about

allied fighter forces are worth amplifying here. It was noted

in Chapter III that the allies deploy a number of aircraft of

national manufacture. These include 20 of the relatively old

Lightning aircraft deployed with Britain's Royal Air Force

and 15 Mirage IIIC and 90 Mirage F-l aircraft in service with

the French air force. It was also noted that Belgium and the

Netherlands intend to acquire the F-16 for use in the Central

Region. Belgium plans to procure 116 F~16s, and the Netherlands, 48.

Chapter III also stated that the British Tornado ADV "may

be available" for defense of the Central Region. This prediction was not made more forcefully for an important reason.

The development of this type of aircraft will doubtless be very

expensive, and development costs will be difficult to amortize over the production run of 165 aircraft. As a result,

Great Britain may well decide against production of the Tornado ADV.

U.S. Fighters. The F-15 was described in the text as a

highly sophisticated aircraft, designed specifically for the air

superiority mission. Additional details about this system are

worth noting here. The F-15 is being procured to counter low-,

medium-, and high-altitude threats under all-weather day or night

conditions, but it is also capable of performing ground-attack

missions. The F-15 carries both infrared and radar missiles.

Thus, some of its advertised superiority to the F-16 depends on

the quality of IFF systems that will permit its radar missiles to

be used beyond visual range. Nevertheless, the F-15 is superior

in range, maneuverability, speed, and sophistication to the

F-4, which it is replacing. In addition, the F-15 is likely to

be more difficult to spot visually because its engines do not

emit smoke.

53

It'
CENTRAL REGION EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

Ground-Based Radars

Early warning is in part provided for NATO by its NADGE

(NATO Air Defense Ground Environment) system. This consists of

some 80 fixed-site radar stations, stretching from northern Norway

to eastern Turkey. 20/ There are some serious flaws in the

NADGE system, however. Its stations are immobile, and many of

them are highly visible, sitting on the tops of hills in large

cleared areas. For these reasons, they might be vulnerable to

air attack. Finally, NADGE radars provide only line-of-sight

coverage, so that aircraft flying at low altitudes can penetrate

the system undetected.

Warning of attacking aircraft in the Central Region is also

provided by a recently developed system of mobile radars, termed

the German Low Level Reporting System (LLRS). Apparently, these

radars will be located in both northern and southern Germany, and

will provide somewhat earlier warning of low-flying intruders than

is given by the NADGE radars.

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

As noted in the text, AWACS is an airborne early warning

radar. According to the Air Force, AWACS has the capability to

detect and track enemy aircraft, relay the information to air and

ground commanders, and assist in managing air battles. The

Defense Department plans to procure 34 AWACS for use in the United

States, Europe, and wherever else the United States might be

involved in hostilities or imminent hostilities. Funds have been

appropriated through fiscal year 1978 for 22 AWACS.

The AWACS seems to be an improvement over ground-based

radars. Since elements of the Pact ground attack air force

20/ There are some gaps in the system, notably over Switzerland,

the eastern Mediterranean, and Iceland. (See "Evolution in

Air Defense Requirements," International Defense Review,

No. 3 (1974), p. 314.) For additional information on the

NADGE system, see Congressional Budget Office, The U.S. Sea

Control Mission: Forces, Capabilities, and Requirements,

Background Paper (June 1977), pp. 12-13.

54
might try low-altitude penetration, and since ground-based radars

often cannot detect such intrusion, it is important to have

a system that can direct NATO fighters toward low-flying Pact

penetrators. Air Force sources state that AWACS is able to do

this because of its capability to look down and detect low-flying

aircraft. Proponents also claim that AWACS would be important at

the outset of a war in detecting where the initial air attack

would occur, especially if warning time was short and an attack

would have to be countered with limited resources.

If its proponents' arguments are valid, the presence of

AWACS in a NATO war could be a significant contribution to overall

NATO air defense. Procurement of the AWACS beyond the 22 already

purchased might not, however, bear greatly on overall Central

Region air defense capability. The Air Force believes that 19

operational AWACS would be adequate to meet vital U.S. interests

in Europe, and it apparently places first priority on deployments

there. 21/ As noted earlier, the United States has already

appropriated funds for 22 AWACS, and Britain plans to buy 11

Nimrod airborne early warning aircraft. Since the Air Force says

it needs 19 AWACS for Europe but funds for 22 have already been

appropriated by the Congress, a decision to procure additional

U.S. AWACS should probably be made in the context of its missions

outside of the Central Region.

NATO Airborne Early Warning and Command System (AEW&C)

The NATO AEW&C aircraft is often called NATO AWACS because

it is a modified version of the U.S. AWACS. The NATO Defense

Ministers accepted the military requirement for the NATO AWACS

in December 1976, but no final procurement decision has been

made. Original plans for NATO AWACS procurement called for a

force of 27 aircraft, in addition to the AWACS that the United

States would supply. Later, when the British decided to purchase

11 Nimrods, the total requirement for NATO AWACS was reduced

to 18.

21 / Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement,

Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve,

and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings before the Senate

Committee on Armed Services, 95:1 (March 1977), Part 5,

p. 3401.

55

TTIF
All NATO military members, including the United States,

are involved in procuring NATO AWACS, although at different levels

of financial participation. The U.S. share of the program was

originally set at 27 percent, the largest share. The British

withdrew from financial participation when they decided to purchase Nimrod. The U.S. share of the revised program has not yet

been determined, but it is likely to be about one-third. This

cost would be in addition to the funds the United States has

already appropriated for AWACS.

Funds were requested by the Defense Department in fiscal year

1978 for research and development on NATO AWACS. The Defense

Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1978 included $15.7 million

for this purpose, with the stipulation that the funds not be

obligated or expended until at least one NATO country entered into

a contract to purchase AWACS. The conference report accompanying

this legislation also suggested that NATO be required to pay a

surcharge on prior research, and development costs. 22/

The reservations expressed by the Congress about proceeding

with NATO AWACS procurement have been matched by caution abroad.

Important elements within the German government, which would be

the principal European contributor to the system, seem unenthusiastic. The German Air Force is concerned that as many as 120

NATO fighters would have to be committed to the defense of the

AWACS. More generally, the German military apparently believes

that the AWACS will give six or seven minutes' more warning of

an impending attack, but doubts that this is worth its high cost.

Other German officials have expressed only qualified support

for the system. For example, Defense Minister Leber favors the

program only if the main operating base for the system would

be located in Germany. Other German officials do not want to

proceed with procuring NATO AWACS unless German expenditures

would be matched by comparable levels of U.S. spending on German

weapons systems.

If the Congress had not already appropriated funds for

procuring 22 U.S. AWACS aircraft, the significance of NATO AWACS

for Central Region air defense would be greater than it is.

22/ Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978,

Conference Report of the House and Senate Committees on

Appropriations, House Report No. 95-565, 95:1 (August 1977),

p. 48.

56
According to the Air Force, AWACS would overcome some air defense

deficiencies and enhance the effectiveness of other air defense

systems. If the allies did not proceed with NATO AWACS, however,

but U.S. AWACS were made available for use in a war in the Central

Region, a gaping deficiency in overall air defense would not

result. Instead, lack of NATO AWACS would likely mean only a

diminished ability to continue AWACS operations at the same rate

if any U.S. aircraft were destroyed. 23/

Some of its proponents characterize NATO AWACS as an example

of a joint solution to an alliance problem. It may be, however,

that the effort—a substantial financial undertaking for the

United States and the alliance—is being made in an area where

U.S. initiative and the U.S. defense budget have already solved

the greatest part of the problem.

23/ AWACS proponents make another argument for NATO AWACS that

goes beyond the needs of the Central Region. This argument

posits that there are also requirements for AWACS on the

flanks. If so, the U.S. purchase would be insufficient to

meet all the requirements, and NATO AWACS would be important

to overall alliance defense.

57

APPENDIX B. THE RATIONALE FOR A VISUALLY GUIDED ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN

Each of the budget options in Chapter IV proposed a visually

guided, clear-weather capable gun, similar to the 35 mm. tank

chassis-mounted DIVAD system, but without the all-weather capability associated with the letter's radar guidance. This proposal

was based on two points.

The first point was that such a visually guided gun might

successfully defend front-line forces against Pact attack helicopters as effectively as a more expensive, radar-guided weapon.

This observation is based on three considerations:

o Any improvement resulting from radar guidance could be

eroded, if not negated, by the tactics used by Pact

helicopters; that is, by flying close to the surface of

the earth, these helicopters could offset the advantages

in detecting or engaging targets that might otherwise be

provided by radar guidance.

o Pact helicopters rely on visual guidance to direct antitank missiles to their targets and, in doing so, the

helicopters expose themselves to visually guided fire

from the ground. Army manuals state that the helicopter

would be "extremely vulnerable" during this period.

o Since the simpler anti-aircraft gun is less expensive to

produce, more of these weapons could be deployed for the

same cost. Therefore, the overall defense against Pact

helicopters might well be enhanced.

The second point was that systems capable of engaging Pact

fixed-wing aircraft in bad weather might not be needed at the

front. This observation is based on the Pact's limited allweather capabilities, both now and in the foreseeable future. I/

\l This argument assumes that recent Soviet aircraft production

rates will remain about the same and that the Pact will not

quickly develop and deploy a new aircraft type that would be

effective in all-weather ground attacks.

59
1LLL

Four all-weather jets are now in service with Pact forces.

These are the TU-16 Badger (a very old medium-range jet bomber),

the TU-22 Blinder (a supersonic bomber and maritime patrol aircraft), the Backfire (a supersonic bomber designed for long-range

missions), and the SU-19 Fencer (a swing-wing fighter bomber

sometimes compared to the U.S. F-lll). Of these aircraft, only

the Fencer is assigned to Frontal Aviation, the organization

charged with supporting Pact ground forces directly. One hundredfifty Fencers are now in service (representing about 4 percent

of the present Frontal Aviation inventory in Central Europe and

the western Soviet Union); 600 Fencers (representing around 13

percent of the total projected inventory) are expected to be in

service by 1985.

The Fencer is a highly capable aircraft. Even if all Fencer

sorties were flown against NATO forces at the front, however,

they would add relatively little to total Pact firepower potential

there. Most Pact firepower at the front would be provided by

artillery and tanks, and Fencer sorties would probably not be as

effective as these systems against the small, dispersed targets

presented by NATO's front-line forces. The Fencer could be

effective against distant, less mobile targets, however. Therefore, scarce Fencer resources would probably be directed against

high-value targets in NATO's rear areas and not used extensively

in ground-attack roles at the front. In other words, if the

Army's objective is to reduce the firepower to which its forces

could be subjected in bad weather, Pact jets would be a relatively

small part of the problem. Yet, as noted in the text, a major

reason the Army presents for making extremely costly investments

in all-weather capabilities for its DIVAD gun is defense against

Pact jets.

60
GLOSSARY

Active Air Defense: The use of measures that destroy enemy

aircraft or reduce their ability to accomplish their missions by

threatening such destruction.

Blowpipe: British shoulder-fired, radio-command guided, shortrange SAM.

Central Region: The part of NATO's defenses that stands behind

WestGermany's border with East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Chaparral: U.S. vehicle-launched, heat-seeking, short-range

SAM.

Collocated Operating Base: An allied air force base at which

facilities are constructed to permit operation of U.S. fighters

in time of war.

F-4: See Phantom.

F-15; A highly sophisticated U.S. air superiority fighter, armed

with Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles. The former give it allweather, beyond-visual-range potential.

F-16: A small U.S. multipurpose fighter, armed with Sidewinder

missiles and a 20 mm. cannon. It has excellent potential for

visual-range, air-to-air combat.

Fencer: NATO code name for the Soviet: SU-19 all-weather, ground

attack aircraft.

Hawk: U.S. SAM, intended for use at low and medium altitudes.

Presently deployed by Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the

United States.

Hind: NATO code name for the Mi-24 Soviet attack helicopter.

NADGE: NATO air defense network linking nine European countries.

Includes about 80 radar sites and electronic transmission facilities.

61

""TTH1
Nike-Hercules: U.S. long-range SAM, intended for use at medium

and high altitudes. Presently deployed by Germany, Belgium,

the Netherlands, and the United States.

NORTHAG; Northern Army Group. A subdivision of NATO forces in

West Germany including Belgian, British, Dutch, and West German

corps sectors.

Passive Air Defense; Preparation of potential targets so that

they are harder for enemy aircraft to find or destroy.

Patriot: U.S. SAM, intended for coverage of low, medium, and

high altitudes. Presently under development.

Phantom: U.S. supersonic, multipurpose fighter in service with

the British, German, and U.S. Air Forces. Family designation is

F-4, although British models are designated FG-1 and FGR-2.

Phoenix: U.S. Navy long-range, radar-guided, air-to-air missile.

Family designation is AIM-54.

Rapier: British, short-range, radio-command guided SAM.

Redeye: U.S. shoulder-fired, heat-seeking SAM.

Roland: Franco-German designed SAM, currently produced in the

United States as well as Europe, to be deployed with the French,

German, and U.S. armies.

Sidewinder; U.S. heat-seeking, air-to-air missile. Family

designation is AIM-9; particular models are distinguished by

letters that follow (e.g., AIM-9L).

Skyflash: British, radar-guided, air-to-air missile. It uses

the airframe, motor, and warhead of the U.S. AIM-7E Sparrow,

but is equipped with a different autopilot, seeker, and fuse.

Sparrow: U.S. radar-guided, air-to-air missile. Family designation is AIM-7; particular models are distinguished by letters

that follow (e.g., AIM-7F),,

Stinger: U.S. shoulder-fired, heat-seeking SAM. Currently under

development as a replacement for Redeye.

Vulcan.: U.S. 20 mm. multibarrel AA cannon, deployed on selfpropelled and towed mounts,.

62
ABBREVIATIONS

AA: Anti-aircraft.

AAFCE: Allied Air Forces Central Europe.

ADV: Air Defense Variant.

AIM: Air Intercept Missile.

AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System.

CENTAG: Central Army Group.

COB: Collocated Operating Base.

LLRS: Low Level Reporting System.

NADGE: NATO Air Defense Ground Environment.

NORTHAG: Northern Army Group.

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile.

SHORAD: Short-Range Air Defense.

63

o