NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-1915

__________

NONSO ONYEKWULUJE,

Appellant

v.

UR MENDOZA JADDOU, Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services; MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States Attorney General

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-23-cv-00412)

District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 7, 2024

Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed February 21, 2024)

___________

OPINION*

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PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Nonso Onyekwuluje appeals pro se from an order that rejected his request that the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania compel the United 

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to declare him a United States 

citizen. We will affirm. 

Onyekwuluje’s complaint alleged that he entered the United States in 1981 with a 

student visa and became a lawful permanent resident two years later. (ECF 2, at 2.) He 

further claimed that his “citizenship application” was “approved” by an officer of the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in June 1989.1 (Id.) Although 

Onyekwuluje asserted that the agency had his correct address, as evidenced by his receipt 

of a “renewed green card” in 1991, he did not receive a notice to appear in federal court 

for an oath ceremony, which the immigration officer had told him to expect. (Id.) In 

1993, the INS notified Onyekwuluje that it recommended that the federal court deny his 

petition for naturalization for lack of prosecution. (Id.) Onyekwuluje asserted that he did 

not receive that notice because it was sent to old address. (Id.) Later, Onyekwuluje

learned through a Freedom of Information Act request that “no order was entered by any 

Federal Court to deny [his] application for citizenship for lack of prosecution.” (Id. at 3.) 

1 The Government explains that this allegation “likely refers to the INS’s approval of an 

Application to File Petition for Naturalization (Form N-400).” Gov’t’s Br., 6 n.2. That 

application “was a necessary precursor to filing a petition” for naturalization, which 

would have been adjudicated by a court. Id.
3

In 2023, Onyekwuluje filed a pro se complaint in the District Court, seeking to 

compel USCIS to “complete his citizenship process and officially declare him a citizen of 

the United States and provide him with a certificate of naturalization.”2 (ECF 2, at 4.) 

The District Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, holding “that ‘[t]he sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the 

United States is conferred upon the Attorney General.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1421.” (ECF 4, at 9.) 

The District Court also explained that, even if it had jurisdiction, Onyekwuluje was not 

entitled to relief because he was convicted in 1993 of federal drug offenses, which 

rendered him ineligible for naturalization.3 (Id. at 11-12.) Onyekwuluje timely appealed. 

(ECF 6.) 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and may affirm on any basis 

supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam). 

2 Onyekwuluje filed a miscellaneous action seeking essentially the same relief in 2017. 

He failed to pursue that action, however, and the District Court terminated it in 2022, 

instructing Onyekwuluje to file a civil action. Onyekwuluje v. Sessions, E.D. Pa. No. 

2:17-mc-00135 (order entered Nov. 3, 2022). 

3 Onyekwuluje was convicted of importing heroin, conspiracy to import heroin, and 

aiding and abetting. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 963, 952(a), 960(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. He was 

sentenced to 145 months of imprisonment. We affirmed. See United States v. 

Onyekwuluje, 60 F.3d 818 (3d Cir. 1995) (table). 
4

To be eligible for naturalization an individual must show, among other things, that 

he is “a person of good moral character.” 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 316.2(a)(7), 

316.10.

4

 An individual cannot be found to be of good moral character if he has been 

convicted of an aggravated felony or has been confined in a penal institution for 180 days 

or more as the result of a conviction. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(7) & (f)(8). Onyekwuluje 

contends that the good moral character requirement applies only to the five-year period 

preceding the filing of the citizenship application. Therefore, Onyekwuluje asserts, 

because he submitted his application in 1989, his 1993 drug convictions and resulting 

incarceration do not act as a bar to a finding of good moral character. Appellant’s Br., 4. 

Onyekwuluje is mistaken. An applicant for citizenship must be of good moral character 

“for the five years immediately preceding the date of the filing of the application for 

naturalization until the time [he] takes the oath of allegiance.” United States v. Teng Jiao 

Zhou, 815 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2016); see also 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(1) (stating that the 

good moral character requirement “includes the period between the examination and the 

administration of the oath of allegiance”); Boatswain v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 413, 416-17

(2d Cir. 2005). Onyekwuluje was convicted of an aggravated felony and served more 

4 We note that a “good moral character” requirement for naturalization existed at the time 

that Onyekwuluje submitted his application. See In re Haniatakis, 376 F.2d 728, 729 (3d 

Cir. 1967). In addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7) (1988) precluded a finding of good moral 

character where the alien had been confined, as a result of conviction, to a penal 

institution for an aggregate period of 180 days or more during the period for which he is 

required to establish good moral character.
5

than 180 days of imprisonment before taking the oath of allegiance. See United States v. 

Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 952(a) constitutes an aggravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). 

Therefore, he cannot demonstrate that he is “a person of good moral character” for the 

purpose of naturalization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7) & (f)(8). 

There is also no merit to Onyekwuluje’s claim that his aggravated felony 

conviction should be “excused” because “[h]e has been [a person] of good moral 

character [for] well over 20 years now.” Appellant’s Br., 4-5. In support of this 

argument, Onyekwuluje cites 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(a), which provides that an alien convicted 

of an aggravated felony who previously has been ordered removed generally is not 

eligible to seek readmission for 20 years. That provision, however, has no bearing on 

Onyekwuluje’s eligibility for citizenship which, as explained above, is governed by a 

good moral character requirement that applies until he takes the oath of allegiance. 

We also agree that Onyekwuluje did not state a plausible due process or equitable 

estoppel claim. Because Onyekwuluje has not taken the oath, he does not have a 

cognizable interest in the grant of his naturalization application. See Duran-Pichardo v. 

Att’y Gen., 695 F.3d 282, 285-86 (3d Cir. 2012). In addition, a “delay in processing a 

naturalization application does not give rise to an estoppel claim.” Id. at 285 n.7 (citing

Mudric v. Att’y Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 2006)). Indeed, courts generally cannot 

grant naturalization based on equitable considerations or by estoppel. See Koszelnik v. 
6

Sec’y Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 828 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2016). And “even if [we] did 

agree that barring [Onyekwuluje] from naturalization was a harsh penalty, we lack equity 

powers to override statutory requirements and grant [him] citizenship.” Id.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.