IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER and

DEMOCRACY 21,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

 Defendant,

RIGHT TO RISE SUPER PAC, INC. 

 Proposed Intervenor-Defendant.

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Case No. 1:20-cv-00730

Hon. Christopher R. Cooper

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INTERVENOR-DEFENDANT RIGHT TO RISE SUPER PAC, INC.’S REPLY IN 

SUPPORT OF INTERVENOR-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.........................................................................................................II

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1

ARGUMENT................................................................................................................................. 2

I. Plaintiffs have not suffered an informational injury.............................................. 2

A. Despite their best efforts to rewrite the standard, Plaintiffs have not 

been deprived of information that must be disclosed under a 

statute. ........................................................................................................ 2

B. Plaintiffs’ generic claim that the information sought would be 

“helpful” is insufficient to obtain Article III standing............................... 6

II. The Commission’s lack of public action does not bestow Plaintiffs with 

standing either........................................................................................................ 7

A. “Delay” cases do not confer Article III standing without an 

independent, concrete, injury..................................................................... 8

B. The Commission’s delay alone does not cause an informational 

injury.......................................................................................................... 9

C. The Commission has no obligation to take action on Plaintiffs’ 

Complaints. .............................................................................................. 11

III. Plaintiffs have not suffered a distinct organizational injury sufficient to 

confer standing..................................................................................................... 13

IV. Plaintiffs concede their APA claim, which is otherwise precluded by 

FECA. .................................................................................................................. 16

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................ 17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................... 18

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc’y v. USDA, 946 F.3d 615 (D.C. Cir. 2020)......................................... 11

Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987)............................................................ 14

ASPCA v. Feld Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ............................................................. 14

Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988)............................................................................ 16

Campaign Legal Center v. FEC, 245 F.Supp.3d 119 (D.D.C. 2017)............................................ 9

*Campaign Legal Center v. FEC, No. 18-cv-0053-TSC, 2020 WL 27355902 (D.D.C. May 

26, 2020) ...................................................................................................................... 8, 16, 17

Campaign Legal Center v. FEC, No. 19-cv-02336-JEB, 2020 WL 2996592 (D.D.C. June 

4, 2020) (“CLC II”)........................................................................................................ 3, 4, 17

Carey v. FEC, No. 11-259 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011) ...................................................................... 3

*Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ..................................................... 2, 6, 8

CREW v Am. Action Network, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019) (“AAN”) ................................... 6

CREW v. DOJ, 846 F.3d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2017).......................................................................... 16

CREW v. FEC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 113 (D.D.C. 2015).................................................................... 17

CREW v. FEC, 243 F. Supp. 3d 91 (D.D.C. 2017)...................................................................... 17

*CREW v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337 (D.C. Cir. 2007)............................................................................ 7

CREW v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, IRS, 21 F. Supp. 3d 25 (D.D.C. 2014)............................... 2

Dinkel v. MedStar Health, Inc., 880 F.Supp.2d 49 (D.D.C. 2012).............................................. 16

Doe 1 v. FEC, 920 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2019)............................................................................. 10

*Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 

371 (D.C. Cir. 2017).................................................................................................... 9, 14, 15

Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props, Inc., 633 F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ...................................... 13

*FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998)............................................................................................ 2, 6

Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905 (D.C. Cir. 2015)........................................ 14

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 15 Filed 07/24/20 Page 3 of 23
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*Free Speech for People v. FEC, No. 19-CV-1722 (APM), 2020 WL 999205 (D.D.C. Mar. 

2, 2020) .................................................................................................................................... 5

Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 824 F.3d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ..................................................... 2

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).............................................................. 14

Hopkins v. Women's Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 284 F.Supp.2d 15 (D.D.C.2003), 

aff'd, 98 Fed.Appx. 8 (D.C.Cir.2004) .................................................................................... 16

*Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2003) .................................. 2, 6, 9, 12

Lewis v. District of Columbia, No. 10–5275, 2011 WL 321711 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 2, 2011).......... 16

Nat'l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ............................ 14

Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996)................................................................................ 17

PETA v. USDA, 797 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .................................................................. 14, 15

Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005)............................................................... 16

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) ............................................................................. 8

Stockman v. FEC, 138 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 1998).......................................................................... 12

Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009)............................................................... 8

Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2001).................................................................... 3

Westar Energy Inc. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 473 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2007) .................. 13

Statutes

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A)........................................................................................................... 9, 11

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(5)................................................................................................................. 9, 11

5 U.S.C. § 704.............................................................................................................................. 16

28 U.S.C. § 2462.......................................................................................................................... 12

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(B)(ii) .......................................................................................... 9, 10, 11

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)............................................................................................................... 16

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A).................................................................................................. passim

52 U.S.C. § 30125(e)(1)................................................................................................................. 4

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Other Authorities

11 C.F.R. § 111.20....................................................................................................................... 10

11 C.F.R. § 111.20(a)............................................................................................................. 10, 11

FEC Directive No. 68 .................................................................................................................. 12

FEC Statement on Carey v. FEC................................................................................................... 3

MUR 6928 (Rick Santorum)........................................................................................................ 13

MUR 7314 (National Rifle Association, et al.)............................................................................ 12

MUR 7494 (John Culberson, et al.) ............................................................................................ 12

Miscellaneous

Alex Leary and Adam C. Smith, Jeb Bush Exploits Non-Candidate Status to Rewrite 

Campaign Finance Playbook, Tampa Bay Times (Mar. 1, 2015)........................................... 6

Alex Leary, Jeb Bush Gave Campaign $388,000 of His Own Money for ‘Testing the 

Waters’ Before He Was Official, Tampa Bay Times (July 15, 2015)...................................... 5

Jeb 2016 Inc., 2015 July Quarterly Report .................................................................................... 5

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INTRODUCTION

Right to Rise Super PAC, Inc., was set up in January of 2015 by allies of Governor Jeb 

Bush to help convince the Governor to run for President by demonstrating potential financial 

support if he decided to run, and then to independently support Governor Bush if he did run. From 

Right to Rise’s creation through today, the organization has always publicly reported all 

contributions and expenditures as the law requires. In the spring of 2015, when Right to Rise was 

raising funds, Governor Bush was by all accounts testing-the-waters to decide whether to run for 

President, as was reported by hundreds if not thousands of news sources at the time. Governor 

Bush personally paid for any travel or activities that qualified as “testing-the-waters” activities, 

and such expenses were publicly reported on the Bush for President campaign’s first FEC report

in accordance with the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).

While Right to Rise vehemently denies Plaintiffs’ hyperbolic claim that Governor Bush 

and Intervenor Right to Rise engaged in some sort of “unprecedented scheme to circumvent federal 

law,” that determination is legal in nature and for the Federal Election Commission alone to make. 

The over $80 million of spending at question here has already been publicly reported on Right to 

Rise’s FEC reports, and even if Plaintiffs succeed here, no new information will be disclosed. 

Right to Rise demonstrated in its initial brief that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Commission’s

handling of its administrative complaints under FECA should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 

and, alternatively, in part for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs lack standing because they have not 

suffered a legally cognizable injury and seek no information that would be useful in their voting, 

and FECA precludes Plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) claim. Because Plaintiffs 

have not carried their burden on either of these issues, this Court should dismiss the complaint for 

lack of standing, and dismiss Plaintiffs’ APA claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted.

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ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs have not suffered an informational injury.

As Right to Rise explained in its Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving 

three elements to establish Article III standing: (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 824 F.3d 1033, 1040-41 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Plaintiffs’ claimed 

injury is informational. But to survive a motion to dismiss, that theory requires Plaintiffs to show: 

(1) they have been “directly deprived of information that must be disclosed under a statute,” CREW 

v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, IRS, 21 F. Supp. 3d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 2014); and (2) the information 

would be helpful to the plaintiff’s informed participation in the political process. In the context of 

FECA cases, courts have repeatedly held that “helpful” means helpful in voting. Common Cause 

v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1997); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998); Judicial Watch, 

Inc. v. FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41, 46 (D.D.C. 2003). Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy either 

requirement of the informational-injury inquiry.

A. Despite their best efforts to rewrite the standard, Plaintiffs have not been 

deprived of information that must be disclosed under a statute.

Plaintiffs concede “[t]he law is settled” that a denial of access to information satisfies the 

injury in fact requirement only if the information sought is required to be disclosed by statute. Pl.’s 

Mem. in Opp’n to RTR’s Mot. to Dismiss at 14 (Docket No. 13) (“Opp’n”). So Plaintiffs try to 

water down that standard, arguing that the inquiry is not just whether the information must be 

disclosed by statute, but also whether the information disclosed by Right to Rise under FECA 

would “look different if Plaintiffs were successful in their suit.” Opp’n at 16 (cleaned up). And 

what Plaintiffs mean is that Right to Rise’s FEC disclosures would look different if Plaintiffs 

prevailed on their administrative complaints pending before the Commission. Such an outcome 

requires the Commission to make a legal determination, i.e., that Governor Bush was a candidate 

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as defined by FECA during the relevant time, and that as a candidate he impermissible established, 

financed, directed, maintained, or controlled Right to Rise in violation of FECA. But the 

Commission has made no such legal determination. And it is well settled that a plaintiff may not 

allege an informational injury if, as here, it merely seeks a legal determination. Wertheimer v. FEC, 

268 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 2001). As it stands, Right to Rise and Governor Bush have 

made all the disclosures FECA required, and Plaintiffs’ theory is legally irrelevant to the 

informational injury analysis.

What’s more, an adverse Commission legal determination would not change the expenditures Right to Rise has already disclosed; such a determination would merely render those 

expenditures unlawful. That is what distinguishes this case from the one on which Plaintiffs rely, 

CLC v. FEC, No. 19-cv-02336-JEB, 2020 WL 2996592 (D.D.C. June 4, 2020) (“CLC II”). The

information at issue in CLC II related to certain expenses paid for through the overhead account 

of Correct the Record, which is a hybrid, or Carey, political committee. Id. at *3. Hybrid 

committees maintain three bank accounts: a “soft” money independent expenditure account which 

can raise unlimited amounts and is not subject to federal contribution limits; a “hard” money 

federal account subject to federal contribution limits; and an overhead account for certain expenses 

such as staff salary, rent, and other overhead costs. FEC Statement on Carey v. FEC (2011 (Oct. 

6, 2011), Fed. Election Comm’n, https://fec.gov/updates/fec-statement-on-carey-v-fec/; see also

Carey v. FEC, No. 11-259 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011) (Stipulated Order and Consent Judgement).

The CLC II plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to know what payments from the overhead 

account would be considered a coordinated expenditure in the event the Commission determined 

Correct the Record and Hillary for America violated coordination regulations under FECA. See 

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Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Correct the Record’s and Hillary for America’s Amended Motion to 

Dismiss, 1:19-cv-02336-JEB, (Mar. 5, 2020) at 17 ¶ 1.

In other words, the CLC II plaintiffs needed to know specifically which expenditures were 

attributable to the hard and soft money accounts. That was the basis for the court’s holding that 

they had standing. CLC II, 2020 WL 2996592, at *6. In contrast here, Plaintiffs’ theory is that all

of Right to Rise’s spending must be treated as coordinated, positing that Right to Rise was 

“established” by candidate Bush and his agents. Indeed, Plaintiffs have stated—and Right to Rise 

agrees—that Right to Rise was a single-candidate super PAC set up solely to independently

support Governor Bush if he ran for President. Opp’n at 7. As a matter of law, then, if the 

Commission were to determine that Right to Rise was in fact “established” by Governor Bush and 

his agents, and accept Plaintiffs’ underlying assumption that there is no temporal limitation to the 

term “candidate” as FECA defines that term,

1 then every single expenditure made by Right to Rise 

would be coordinated per se and treated as a violation of federal contribution limits. So, the 

information of Right to Rise’s expenditures would not change an iota. It would simply be treated

per se as an in-kind contribution to Bush’s campaign committee.

To answer the same question posed in CLC II—“Would these disclosures look different if 

CLC was successful in this suit?”—the answer is no. The information publicly disclosed would be 

the same, it would just be reported in an additional spot—on the Bush campaign’s FEC reports. 

 1 As Plaintiffs acknowledge in their Response, the “soft money” prohibition in Section 30125(e)(1)

applies to an entity established by one or more “candidates or individuals holding Federal office.” 

Opp’n at 7. Plaintiffs also state that Right to Rise Super PAC was established in January of 2015, 

and that Governor Bush became a candidate for Federal office in June of 2015. Consequently, at 

the time of Right to Rise Super PAC’s establishment, Governor Bush was neither a candidate nor 

an individual holding federal office. Plaintiff’s theory requires an expansive definition of the term 

candidate—including the six-month period prior to triggering candidacy—that the Commission 

has never adopted and is the sort of required legal determination that underlies this action 

purporting to be about disclosure.

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As a result, Plaintiffs lack no information that would help them because no additional information 

exists that could be disclosed. CLC II is of no help to Plaintiffs here. See also Free Speech for 

People v. FEC, No. 19-CV-1722 (APM), 2020 WL 999205, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2020) (rejecting 

a similar informational injury theory where “Plaintiff already knows the information FECA 

requires be disclosed [but] Plaintiff simply wants the same information from a different source—

an FEC investigation and a finding of an election law violation. Such a desire does not support an 

informational injury.”).

Plaintiffs also allege that Governor Bush violated testing-the-waters restrictions by failing 

to report certain expenditures. But there is no evidence to support this speculative legal—not 

factual—allegation, which the Commission has presumably reviewed and does not have a quorum 

to support. To be sure, there is a certain category of expenses that must be treated by a potential 

candidate for federal office as testing-the-waters expenses (e.g., fundraising, polling, travel). But

Right to Rise did not pay for any of this type of expense for Governor Bush. Right to Rise paid for 

expenses related to Governor Bush’s appearance as a special guest at its own fundraisers, as is 

required by FECA whether Bush was testing-the-waters or an announced candidate, because the 

benefit ran to Right to Rise.

To the extent Governor Bush engaged in testing-the-waters activity in the spring of 2015 

as he decided whether to run, he paid for such activities pursuant to Commission regulations and

reported that spending as testing-the-waters activity on his campaign’s first FEC report. Jeb 2016 

Inc., 2015 July Quarterly Report (Form 3x) (current version filed Jan. 31, 2016) (showing 

$388,720.15 of in-kind contributions from Governor Bush to Jeb 2016); See also Alex Leary, Jeb 

Bush Gave Campaign $388,000 of His Own Money for ‘Testing the Waters’ Before He Was 

Official, Tampa Bay Times (July 15, 2015) (“Jeb 2016’s first report affirms what we have publicly 

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stated over the past few months that if Governor Bush engaged in any testing-the-waters activities 

that they would be paid for appropriately, and that if Governor Bush decided to run for office that 

any testing-the-waters expenses would be reported at the required time," spokeswoman Kristy 

Campbell said.); Alex Leary and Adam C. Smith, Jeb Bush Exploits Non-Candidate Status to 

Rewrite Campaign Finance Playbook, Tampa Bay Times (Mar. 1, 2015) (“Supporters of Gov. 

Bush wanted to make sure there would be resources available should he decide to move forward 

with a run,” [spokeswoman Kristy] Campbell said. “We are taking a conservative approach to all

of Gov. Bush’s activities.”). Governor Bush disclosed all of his spending for the purpose of testingthe-waters on his campaign’s first FEC report. Consequently, there is again nothing different that 

would be publicly disclosed if Plaintiffs were successful in this suit. Plaintiffs have failed to show 

an informational injury and lack Article III standing.

B. Plaintiffs’ generic claim that the information sought would be “helpful” is 

insufficient to obtain Article III standing.

In addition to demonstrating they were deprived of information that must be disclosed 

under a statute, Plaintiffs must also show that the information would be helpful in voting. While 

Courts have repeatedly held that “helpful” in the context of FECA means helpful in voting, e.g., 

Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418; Akins, 524 U.S. at 21; Judicial Watch, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 

46, the D.C. Circuit recently held that “[t]he helpfulness of the information does not depend on the 

plaintiff’s status as a voter.” CREW v Am. Action Network, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2019)

(“AAN”). Plaintiffs read AAN as eviscerating the “helps with voting requirement,” and claim that 

they have demonstrated an injury in fact because “there is no reason to doubt that the disclosures 

they seek would further their efforts to defend and implement campaign finance reform.” Opp’n 

at 28 (cleaned up). But Plaintiffs overstate the effect of AAN.

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AAN was limited to its facts, which involved a 501(c)(4) organization which did not 

publicly disclose any of its donors. The plaintiff in that case—a 501(c)(3) organization—could 

neither vote nor participate in political activity, so the plaintiff pled that it intended to use the 

information sought in the lawsuit (which was not otherwise public) to “look for correlations 

between . . . spending on independent campaign activity that . . . benefits a candidate, and that 

member’s subsequent congressional activities[.]” AAN, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 13. That sort of 

“helpfulness” is not possible here. Governor Bush suspended his presidential campaign more than 

four years ago and has not sought public office since. Plaintiffs cannot possibly seek “correlations 

between . . . spending on independent campaign activity” that benefited Governor Bush as a 

candidate and “subsequent [public office] activities” taken by Governor Bush as did the plaintiff 

in AAN. And allowing Plaintiffs to proceed merely on the grounds the information sought might 

help them field calls from reporters is unfounded—all the information Plaintiffs purportedly seek 

has already been disclosed pursuant to FECA. See CREW v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 

2007) (concluding that plaintiff lacked standing to seek information regarding the precise value of 

an alleged in-kind contribution because the “precise value—if that could be determined—would 

add only a trifle to the store of information about the transaction already publicly available,” and 

because FECA did not require the disclosure of the information sought by Plaintiff). Because there 

is no more information Plaintiffs can acquire, much less information that satisfies the requirement 

of helpfulness, the Court should dismiss the Complaint in its entirety because Plaintiffs lack 

standing.

II. The Commission’s lack of public action does not bestow Plaintiffs with standing

either.

The Commission’s delay does not inflict any unique or independent informational injury 

sufficient to grant standing to Plaintiffs for an undeniable reason: Plaintiffs have no legal right 

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under any statute or regulation to the information that they seek. So Plaintiffs try to create a new 

standing theory from whole cloth that this Court should reject.

A. “Delay” cases do not confer Article III standing without an independent, 

concrete, injury.

The D.C. Circuit’s decisions uniformly hold that § 30109(a)(8)(A) “does not confer 

standing; it confers a right to sue upon parties who otherwise already have standing.” Common 

Cause, 108 F.3d, 419. This conforms to the unambiguous rule that “Article III standing requires a 

concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 

1540, 1549 (2016). Accord Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009)

(“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the 

deprivation . . . is insufficient to create Article III standing.”).

In direct contradiction with this precedent, Plaintiffs propose an entirely novel 

interpretation of standing requirements in § 30109(a)(8)(A) actions. They say that bringing an 

action challenging the Commission’s failure to act within 120 days should confer standing 

“because of the unique informational deficits arising in a delay suit.” Opp’n at 33. In other words, 

delay actions should be treated differently than actions challenging the Commission’s dismissal of 

a Complaint even though (1) the right to both actions arise under the exact same statutory 

subsection, 52 USC § 30109(a)(8)(A), and (2) this Court has never before made such a distinction.

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ new standing theory, courts in this Circuit have expressly held in 

other delay suits that plaintiffs must have an independent basis for standing. In fact, another court 

in this District made that exact determination against Plaintiff CLC only two months ago. CLC v. 

FEC, No. 18-cv-0053-TSC, 2020 WL 2735590, at *2 (D.D.C. May 26, 2020) (disagreeing with 

the very argument made by CLC in this suit, holding: “§ 30109(a)(8)(A) – which governs both 

types of challenges – does not confer standing.”); accord Judicial Watch, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d at

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48 (D.D.C. 2003) (“The [D.C. Circuit] made clear that while the FEC’s failure [to] act within the 

120-day period of [§ 30109(a)(8)(A)] conferred a right to sue, it did not also confer standing.”). 

There is no legal authority supporting Plaintiffs’ theory that “FEC inaction is distinct from an 

unlawful FEC dismissal for constitutional standing purposes.” Opp’n at 32. Therefore, Plaintiffs 

must have suffered a separate and concrete informational injury to maintain this suit, an 

information injury they cannot prove.

B. The Commission’s delay alone does not cause an informational injury.

The Commission’s delay alone does not cause an informational injury because Plaintiffs 

have no legal right to the information they seek. As discussed above, to “[t]o carry its burden of 

demonstrating a sufficiently concrete and particularized informational injury, the plaintiff must 

show that . . . it has been deprived of information that, on its interpretation, a statute requires the 

government or a third party to disclose to it...” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory 

Comm’n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Pointing to a number of 

statutes, regulations, and prior decisions, Plaintiffs try to: (1) broadly define the breadth of 

information the Commission must disclose regarding a § 30109(a)(8)(A) action, and (2) argue that 

the duty to disclose arises even where the Commission has not yet taken any action at all. But 

every disclosure requirement imposed upon the Commission, by statute or regulation, only arises 

when the Commission takes certain defined actions. If such action(s) have not yet taken place, the 

Commission has no disclosure obligation and the public has no legal right to that information. CLC 

v. FEC, 245 F.Supp.3d 119, 125 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[A] plaintiff does not suffer an injury in fact if 

it seeks only information that the applicable statute does not require to be disclosed.”).

Importantly, the statutes and regulations requiring the Commission’s disclosure are not 

particularly expansive. For example, under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(B)(ii), FECA requires the 

Commission to disclose certain information only if it (1) reaches a “conciliation agreement” with 

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the respondent; or (2) “determin[es] that a person has not violated” the law. Similarly, 11 C.F.R. 

§ 111.20(a) requires the Commission to make public (1) “a finding of no reason to believe or no 

probable cause to believe” a violation has been committed; or (2) any other finding that “terminates 

its proceedings.” Finally, FOIA compels the Commission to make public all final opinions and 

orders, in addition to commissioner voting records in its proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A), 

(a)(5). Plaintiffs do not identify any other applicable disclosure provisions, and each of the abovereferenced statutes and regulations apply only if the requisite agreement, opinion, order, or finding 

has been reached—none of which has occurred as it relates to MUR 6927.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs fail to identify any precedent supporting their new theory that 

agency delay alone causes an informational injury. For instance, in Plaintiffs’ chief legal 

authority—Doe 1 v. FEC, 920 F.3d 866, 870-71 (D.C. Cir. 2019)—the Commission accepted a 

conciliation agreement, closed the file, and announced it would release documents to the public. 

Certain parties objected to the release because those parties would be named publicly. Id. at 869. 

They argued that the Commission could only release the information identified at 52 U.S.C. § 

30109 (a)(4)(B)(ii). Id. The Court disagreed, declaring that the Commission had the power to 

disclose more than the governing Act alone required (i.e., by enacting the broader 11 C.F.R. § 

111.20). Id. at 870-871. The Court stated “FECA’s provisions at issue here have been held to 

authorize public disclosure of information, as the agency may determine to be proper upon a 

balancing of the public interests involved.” Id. at 871. (emphasis added).

In other words, the Commission in Doe 1 came to a final agreement, its obligation to 

disclose was triggered, and it explicitly weighed the balance of interests to determine whether 

disclosure was appropriate. In contrast here, the Commission has, to Right to Rise’s knowledge, 

reached no final decision or agreement and, as a result, no obligation to disclose information has 

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been triggered under any applicable statute or regulation. That renders Doe 1 inapposite. Doe I

states only that when the Commission does reach a determination, it may disclose more 

information than what is expressly provided for under FECA.

Similarly, Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc’y v. USDA, 946 F.3d 615, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2020), also 

shows that delay alone is not enough—an informational injury requires an actual statutory 

violation. There, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs, two animal rights entities, had standing to bring 

suit under the APA because the United States Department of Agriculture’s (“USDA”) failure to 

promulgate standards for the humane treatment of birds caused the plaintiffs a concrete 

informational injury. Id. But Congress had specifically mandated that the USDA issue standards 

for birds when it had amended the Animal Welfare Act eighteen years prior. Id. at 616-617. As a 

result, the USDA’s failure to comply with the statutory amendment caused a direct, injurious 

impact on the two animal rights agencies dedicated to bird welfare because they were deprived of 

congressionally required information. Id. at 619.

Here, the Commission has not triggered the mandatory disclosure of information under any 

legal authority. The Commission and Intervenor have not entered into a conciliation agreement. 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(B)(ii). The Commission has not yet communicated a determination that 

Intervenor did not violate the law. Id. It apparently has not yet made “a finding of no reason to 

believe or no probable cause to believe.” 11 C.F.R. § 111.20(a). It has not reached any final opinion 

or final order, nor has it otherwise terminated the proceedings. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A), (a)(5). 

Absent the occurrence of these triggering events, Plaintiffs have no legal right to the information 

they seek and cannot have suffered an informational injury. Their new standing theory fails.

C. The Commission has no obligation to take action on Plaintiffs’ Complaints.

The law does not require the Commission to take action on Plaintiffs’ administrative 

complaints. While FECA does create a cause of action for complainants after 120 days of inaction, 

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FECA explicitly does not require that the Commission follow any mandatory action or disclosure 

timelines. Filing a delay action under § 30109(a)(8)(A) does not impose any statutory obligation 

on the Commission to promptly respond or take action. While it is literally true that “nothing in 

FECA or the FEC’s longstanding enforcement rules and policies permits the Commission to 

simply hold a matter open in perpetuity,” nothing in those same rules or policies prevents them 

from doing so, either. Opp’n at 37. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Stockman v. FEC, the Commission 

has the power “to conduct investigations and hearings expeditiously,” but FECA “does not create 

a deadline in which the FEC must act.” 138 F.3d 144, 152 (5th Cir.1998) (cited approvingly by 

Judicial Watch, Inc., 293 F.Supp.2d at 48). Plaintiffs cannot create from thin air statutory 

obligations for Commission action or disclosure of information.

2

Plaintiffs’ theory that delay alone causes a unique informational injury also lacks any 

factual support. When deciding whether there exists reason to believe that a respondent violated 

FECA, the Office of General Counsel looks only at the available record to determine whether an 

investigation is warranted. See First General Counsel’s Report at 3, MUR 7314 (National Rifle 

Association, et al.) (“In consideration of the Complaint and the available record, there is 

insufficient information in the record before the Commission to support a reasonable inference 

that [Respondents] may have violated [FECA].”) (emphasis added); Statement of Reasons of Vice 

Chairman Matthew S. Petersen and Caroline C. Hunter at 12, Note 79, MUR 6928 (Richard John 

 2 Plaintiffs also argue, erroneously, that the five-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462

applies only to criminal FECA violations. Opp’n at 33 n. 10. But § 2462’s plain text indicates 

that it applies to all FECA enforcement proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (limitations period 

applicable to any “action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or 

forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise”). Accord First General Counsel’s Report at 8, MUR 7494 (John 

Culberson, et al.) (relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2462 to find that some allegations in the complaint 

against the Respondent were outside the statute of limitations); FEC Directive No. 68 (explaining 

the Commission’s Office of General Counsel’s procedures for matters approaching the five year 

statute of limitations).

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“Rick” Santorum, et. al.) (“On several occasions, we have explained our concern with augmenting 

the record with outside information not provided in the complaint or response. This practice is 

unfair to respondents, and risks threatening the legitimacy of the Commission’s conclusions”) 

(citing Westar Energy Inc. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 473 F.3d 1239, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2007))

(emphasis added). In other words, Plaintiffs are wrong when they say they have been deprived of 

“investigatory information” due to the Commission’s delay.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ Response fails to acknowledge a simple fact that undermines any 

supposed informational injury due to delay: Plaintiffs will eventually gain the right to view certain

information under FECA. As Plaintiffs aptly note, the Commission has a “carefully balanced 

enforcement regime” intended to “prescribe transparency in connection with closed enforcement 

matters to foster openness and accountability, and to enable judicial review.” Opp’n at 37-38. 

(emphasis added). While the Commission’s procedure in this action has stretched longer than the 

typical matter, and has already pushed past two election cycles (2016 and 2018), any disclosure at 

this point is too late to impact the 2020 election cycle, and the Commission will eventually close 

this matter. At that moment, the very same information will become available to Plaintiffs that 

they would have received if the Commission had promptly dismissed this action four years ago,

or at some point in the intervening years. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ insistence that delay actions cause 

unique informational injuries is wrong. An informational injury does not arise solely because a 

Plaintiff wants information sooner than the law requires. Plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed.

III. Plaintiffs have not suffered a distinct organizational injury sufficient to confer 

standing.

As organizations, Plaintiffs must prove that the entities themselves have suffered an injury 

to satisfy organizational standing. See Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props, Inc., 633 F.3d 1136, 1138 

(D.C. Cir. 2011). There are two requirements for organizational standing: (1) the agency action or 

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omission must injure the organization’s interest, and (2) the organization must have used its 

resources to counteract that harm. PETA v. USDA, 797 F.3d 1087, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In other 

words, “[t]he organization must allege that discrete programmatic concerns are being directly and 

adversely affected by the defendant’s actions.” Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 92 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987).

Plaintiffs’ basis for organizational standing fails because the Commission’s delay has not 

caused any concrete injury. An organization wishing to prove standing in its own right “must allege 

a ‘concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities’ that is ‘more than simply a 

setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.’” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 

U.S. 363, 379 (1982). This Circuit “has distinguished between organizations that allege that their 

activities have been impeded from those that merely allege that their mission has been 

compromised.” Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2015). To that 

end, “an organization does not suffer an injury in fact where it ‘expend[s] resources to educate its 

members and others’ unless doing so subjects the organization to ‘operational costs beyond those 

normally expended.’ ” Id. at 920 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat'l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. 

United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Most critically, a plaintiff “cannot ground 

organizational injury on a non-existent interest.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 878 F.3d at 379; see 

also ASPCA v. Feld Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[A]n organization's abstract 

concern with a subject that could be affected by an adjudication does not substitute for the concrete 

injury required by Art. III.”). Therefore, an organizational plaintiff alleging only an informational 

injury must demonstrate a legally recognized interest in that information. Id.

Here, there is no question that Plaintiffs allege an exclusively informational injury for the 

purposes of organizational standing. See Opp’n at 39 (“The Commission’s failure to act on the 

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allegations here has forced plaintiffs to divert resources from other planned organizational needs 

to research and fill in the missing disclosure information they seek in the complaints”) (emphasis 

added); Id. (“This informational deprivation has harmed plaintiffs’ public education efforts and 

strained several other key programmatic activities central to their mission.”) (emphasis added); Id.

at 40 (“Moreover, the FEC’s inaction has also directly harmed plaintiffs’ watchdog activities by 

depriving plaintiffs of information they need to conduct their regulatory practice before the FEC 

and other agencies.”).

As explained in Section II, supra, Plaintiffs cannot have suffered an informational injury 

because they have no legal right to the information they seek. So Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. is 

controlling. There, the plaintiff organization alleged it suffered a concrete organizational injury 

where the defendant failed to produce a privacy impact assessment pursuant to Section 208 of the 

E-Government Act before taking certain actions. 878 F.3d at 378-79. The Court determined that 

the plaintiff could not have suffered a concrete injury for the purposes of organizational standing 

because the plaintiff did not have any legal right to the information it sought. Id. (“EPIC’s sole 

theory of organizational injury is that the defendant’s failure to produce a privacy impact 

assessment injures its interest in using the information contained in the assessment. . . . As we have 

discussed, however, section 208 ... does not confer any such informational interest on EPIC.”). 

Likewise, Plaintiffs lack a legal right to any information under FECA until a triggering event takes 

place.

Plaintiffs’ reliance on PETA is misplaced. Unlike the situation here or in Elec. Privacy Info. 

Ctr., the plaintiff in PETA had an express statutory right to the information it sought. PETA, 797 

F.3d 1087, 1090. Congress expressly mandated that the USDA promulgate standards for the 

humane treatment of birds. Id. In fact, “the USDA had repeatedly set, missed, and then rescheduled 

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deadlines for the publication of proposed bird-specific regulations.” Id. at 1091. Conversely, the 

Commission has no statutory or congressional obligation to take action on Plaintiffs’ underlying 

Complaints whatsoever, let alone pursuant to any timelines or deadlines.

Considering the above, Plaintiffs cannot have organizational standing based on an 

informational injury because they have no legal right to the information they seek.

IV. Plaintiffs concede their APA claim, which is otherwise precluded by FECA.

Plaintiffs fail to meaningfully respond to Right to Rise’s argument that FECA precludes

Plaintiffs’ APA claim. “[W]here a party fails to respond to arguments in opposition papers, the 

Court may treat those specific arguments as conceded.” Dinkel v. MedStar Health, Inc., 880 

F.Supp.2d 49, 58 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Hopkins v. Women's Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 

284 F.Supp.2d 15, 25 (D.D.C.2003), aff'd, 98 Fed.Appx. 8 (D.C.Cir.2004); Lewis v. District of 

Columbia, No. 10–5275, 2011 WL 321711, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 2, 2011) (per curiam). 

“Furthermore, ‘[i]t is not enough to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving 

the [C]ourt to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones. . 

. .[A] litigant has the obligation to spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever 

hold its peace.’” Dinkel, 880 F.Supp.2d at 58 (citing Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200 n. 

1 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Yet Plaintiffs rely on a single footnote at the end of their Brief to address Right 

to Rise’s contention that the APA cannot apply. Opp’n at 43 n 11. This barebones response 

embodies the tenuous support for Plaintiffs’ argument, and the Court should consider it conceded.

In any event, courts in this Circuit consistently hold that “52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A)

provides the exclusive mechanism for judicial review.” CLC, 2020 WL 2735590, at *2 (emphasis 

added). The APA “does not provide additional judicial remedies in situations where the Congress 

has provided special and adequate review procedures.” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 

903 (1988); see 5 U.S.C. § 704; CREW v. DOJ, 846 F.3d 1235, 1244–45 (D.C. Cir. 2017). This 

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Circuit has noted that § 30109(a)(8)(A) contains “as specific a mandate as one can imagine.” Perot 

v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and at least three courts in this District have held that 

§ 30109(a)(8)(A) precludes an APA claim that challenges the dismissal of a complaint. See CLC, 

2020 WL 2735590, at *2; CREW v. FEC, 243 F. Supp. 3d 91, 104 (D.D.C. 2017) (FECA provides 

an adequate remedy so there is no parallel claim for relief under the APA); CREW v. FEC, 164 F. 

Supp. 3d 113, 120–121 (D.D.C. 2015) (“This [§ 30109(a)(8) judicial review mechanism] precludes 

review of FEC enforcement decisions under the APA.”).

Plaintiffs’ single footnote citation actually supports Right to Rise’s position. In CLC II,

2020 WL 2996592 at *14, the Court recognized the broad preclusive effect of FECA but noted 

that CLC was specifically challenging the implementation of a regulation. Id. at *15. Because 

“FECA has no provisions governing judicial review of regulations, . . . an action challenging its 

implementing regulations should be brought under the judicial review provisions of the [APA]” 

Id. (citing Perot, 97 F.3d at 560). In contrast here, Plaintiffs are challenging the Commission’s 

delay regarding a § 30109(a)(8)(A) action, not the implementation of any specific regulation. So 

the CLC II exception for litigation involving regulations does not apply, and CLC II’s holding 

regarding FECA’s preclusive effect remains. Plaintiffs’ APA claim should be dismissed with 

prejudice.

CONCLUSION

Right to Rise respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion and dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

complaint with prejudice in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to an absence of 

Article III standing under well-established D.C. Circuit precedent regarding claims of 

informational injury. In addition, the Court should dismiss Count II, the APA claim, for failure to 

state a claim. 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 15 Filed 07/24/20 Page 22 of 23
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Dated: July 24, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, 

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

/s/ Charles R. Spies

Charles R. Spies, Bar ID: 989020

Jessica G. Brouckaert*

1825 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20006

Telephone: (202) 466-5964

Facsimile: (844) 670-6009

cspies@dickinsonwright.com

jbrouckaert@dickinsonwright.com

Robert L. Avers, Bar ID #MI0083

350 S. Main Street, Ste 300

Ann Arbor, MI 48104

(734) 623-1672

ravers@dickinsonwright.com

John J. Bursch*

Bursch Law PLLC

9339 Cherry Valley Ave. SE, #78

Caledonia, MI 49316

(616) 450-4235

jbursch@burschlaw.com

Attorneys for Proposed Defendant-Intervenor

*Pending Admission

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 24, 2020, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

document to be served upon all counsel of record registered with the Court’s ECF system, by 

electronic service via the Court’s ECF transmission facilities.

/s/ Robert L. Avers

Robert L. Avers, Bar ID #MI0083

350 S. Main Street, Ste 300

Ann Arbor, MI 48104

(734) 623-1672

ravers@dickinsonwright.com

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 15 Filed 07/24/20 Page 23 of 23