NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GLG FARMS LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

BRANDT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, LTD.,

Defendant-Cross-Appellant

______________________ 

2017-1937, 2017-1973

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of North Dakota in No. 4:14-cv-00153-RRE-ARS, 

Chief Judge Ralph R. Erickson.

______________________ 

Decided: August 2, 2018

______________________ 

CHAD E. ZIEGLER, Neustel Law Offices, Ltd., Fargo, 

ND, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

MICHAEL S. NEUSTEL. 

 ANN G. SCHOEN, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Cincinnati, 

OH, argued for defendant-cross-appellant. Also represented by WILLIAM S. MORRISS. 

______________________ 

Before O’MALLEY, MAYER, and REYNA, Circuit Judges. 
2 GLG FARMS LLC v. BRANDT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge. 

 Plaintiff-appellant GLG Farms LLC appeals a district 

court’s summary judgment ruling that defendant-crossappellant Brandt Agricultural Products, Ltd. does not 

infringe GLG Farms’ U.S. Patent No. 7,708,131 (“’131 

patent”). See GLG Farms LLC v. Brandt Agric. Prods. 

Ltd., No. 4:14-cv-153, 2017 WL 6210909 (D.N.D. Mar. 29, 

2017). Brandt, for its part, conditionally cross-appeals on 

alternative noninfringement grounds, arguing that the 

court erred by not construing certain claim terms. We 

conclude that the district court’s summary judgment 

ruling is predicated on a construction of the central claim 

term in dispute that is correct in relevant part. Accordingly, we affirm that ruling and dismiss Brandt’s conditional cross-appeal as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The ’131 Patent and the Accused Products

GLG Farms’ ’131 patent is directed to a drive kit for 

use with a “swing auger.” A swing auger is a piece of 

agricultural equipment used to unload grain from a truck 

into a silo. It generally comprises a moveable hopper, 

which collects the grain; a main auger, which lifts the 

grain up to the silo; and a swing auger connected thereto, 

which pivots about a near-vertical axis and transports the 

grain from the hopper to the main auger. According to 

the ’131 patent, prior art augers required the operator “to 

manually manipulate the swing auger into the desired 

positions,” which was difficult to do. ’131 patent, col. 1, ll. 

31–33.

The ’131 patent purports to solve this problem by 

providing a remote-control drive kit comprising twin drive 

motor assemblies affixed to the hopper. The hopper itself 

has a “base wall” that interconnects two “end walls” and 

defines the hopper’s “side edges” at right angles thereto. 

Id. col. 1, ll. 60–63. Each drive assembly is arranged for 
GLG FARMS LLC v. BRANDT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 3

mounting on the base wall of the hopper, adjacent to a 

side edge, and contains one or more wheels driven by an 

electric motor. Id. col. 1, l. 66 to col. 2, l. 7. 

Claim 1 of the ’131 patent is representative and recites the auger assembly described above in which the 

drive assemblies are “arranged for mounting on the base 

wall adjacent the [first/second] side edge of the hopper”: 

1. An auger assembly comprising:

a main auger;

a swing auger connected to the main auger for pivotal swing movement about a 

generally upstanding axis of the main auger so that the swing auger can swing 

from a retracted position along side the 

main auger to an extended position at 

right angles to the main auger;

a hopper connected to an outer end of said 

swing auger, the hopper having a pair of 

end walls and a base wall interconnecting 

the end walls and defining first and second side edges at right angles to the end 

walls;

and a drive kit for attachment to the hopper for driving movement of the hopper 

comprising:

a first drive assembly arranged for 

mounting on the base wall adjacent the first side edge of the hopper; 

and a second drive assembly arranged for mounting on the base 

wall adjacent the second side edge 

of the hopper; 
4 GLG FARMS LLC v. BRANDT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

each drive assembly including at 

least one ground wheel and an 

electric drive motor for driving 

said at least one ground wheel 

about its axis so as to drive movement of the hopper.

Id. at 4:22–42 (emphases added). 

Brandt manufactures and sells auger equipment, 

including the HP and XL “Swing Away” augers, each of 

which is equipped with an “EZSwing” brand moving 

system. These products contain a main auger, a swing 

auger, and a hopper, and have their drive assemblies 

mounted to the outside of the hopper’s end walls. See, 

e.g., J.A. 2002–05.

B. Procedural History

In December 2014, GLG Farms filed suit against 

Brandt in the U.S. District Court for the District of North 

Dakota, alleging that Brandt’s augers infringe the ’131 

patent. In its Markman order, the court construed the 

claim term “arranged for mounting on the base wall 

adjacent the [first/second] side edge of the hopper” to 

mean “arranged for mounting on the base wall on the 

[first/second] side edge of the hopper between the end 

walls.” See J.A. 590–93 (emphases added). In other 

words, the court read the claims to require that the drive 

assemblies be mounted “on” the side edges of the base 

wall and “between” the end walls.

Both parties moved for summary judgment on the 

issue of infringement. The district court granted judgment in favor of Brandt, finding that the accused products 

do not infringe, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, in view of the court’s construction. GLG Farms, 

2017 WL 6210909, at *3–6. In particular, the court found 

that the accused products, which have their drive assem-
GLG FARMS LLC v. BRANDT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 5

blies mounted outside the end walls, do not meet the 

“arranged” claim limitation. Id.

GLG Farms appealed, and Brandt conditionally crossappealed.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

GLG Farms argues that the district court’s noninfringement determination is predicated on an incorrect 

construction of the “arranged” claim term, and that, under 

the proper construction, summary judgment of noninfringement should have been denied. We address these

arguments below. 

A. The District Court Correctly Construed the Claims to 

Require that the Drive Assemblies Be Mounted 

Between the End Walls

“We review a district court’s ultimate claim constructions de novo and any underlying factual determinations 

involving extrinsic evidence for clear error.” David Netzer 

Consulting Eng’r LLC v. Shell Oil Co., 824 F.3d 989, 993 

(Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, 

Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841–42 (2015)).

 

1 On April 4, 2018, we heard oral argument, which 

was interrupted by external noise audible through the 

courtroom’s speakers. Two days later, we issued an 

opinion summarily affirming the district court’s decision 

under Federal Circuit Rule 36. See GLG Farms LLC v. 

Brandt Agric. Prods., Ltd., 718 F. App’x 975 (Fed. Cir. 

2018) (per curiam). GLG Farms thereafter filed a petition 

for panel rehearing, arguing that the noise during oral 

argument disrupted its presentation. See Dkt. 48. We 

granted GLG’s petition, vacated our summary affirmance, 

and reheard oral argument on July 12, 2018. See Dkts. 

51, 54.
6 GLG FARMS LLC v. BRANDT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

Here, the district court construed the claim term 

“arranged for mounting on the base wall adjacent the 

[first/second] side edge of the hopper” to mean “arranged 

for mounting on the base wall on the [first/second] side 

edge of the hopper between the end walls.” J.A. 590–93. 

The court thus imposed a requirement that the drive 

assemblies be located on the side edges, as opposed to 

merely adjacent thereto, and between the end walls, as 

opposed to outside thereof.

As an initial matter, we note that the parties agree 

that the district court erred by replacing the phrase 

“adjacent the [first/second] side edge” with the phrase “on

the [first/second] side edge.” According to the parties, the 

word “adjacent” encompasses both “on” and “near” in this 

particular context. See Oral Arg. at 36:16–38:10, GLG 

Farms LLC v. Brandt Agric. Prods., Ltd. (No. 2017-1937), 

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=

2017-1937_7122018.mp3. 

We nevertheless agree with the court’s construction 

insofar as it requires the drive assemblies to be mounted 

between the end walls. The ’131 patent discloses a single 

embodiment which the patent consistently describes as 

having its drive assemblies and wheels located on the 

base wall between the end walls. See, e.g., ’131 patent, 

Abstract (“Each drive assembly is mounted approximately 

midway across the base wall . . . .”), fig.2 (depicting drive 

wheels mounted between the end walls), col. 3, ll. 61–65 

(stating that the wheels can be moved “along the inclined 

wall” of the base wall). These disclosures stand in stark 

contrast to the patent’s depiction of the prior art, which 

shows that the only wheels on the hopper are mounted to

the outside of the end walls. See id. fig.1, col. 2, ll. 36–37; 

see also id. col. 3, ll. 18–20 (“In the prior art, a pair of 

front wheels 54 and a pair of rear wheels 56 are rotatably 

attached to end walls 70 and 72 of the hopper . . . .”). This 

contrast suggests that the claimed invention differs from 
GLG FARMS LLC v. BRANDT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 7

the prior art at least because its drive assemblies are 

located between the end walls.2

While we have “expressly rejected the contention that, 

if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims 

of the patent must be construed as being limited to that 

embodiment,” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 

F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004), we have also held that, 

“[w]hen a patent . . . describes the features of the ‘present 

invention’ as a whole, this description limits the scope of 

the invention,” Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. AGA Med. 

Corp., 717 F.3d 929, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Verizon 

Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 

1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). This is precisely what the ’131 

patent does here. In particular, the specification states

that “[t]he arrangement of the present invention is shown 

in Figs. 2, 3 and 4,” and that, “[i]n this arrangement at a 

position between the end walls there is provided a hopper 

drive assembly for moving the hopper in a direction 

parallel to the end walls and the wheels thereon.” ’131 

patent, col. 3, ll. 25–38 (emphases added); see also id. col. 

2, ll. 38–40 (stating that Figure 2 shows a swing auger 

with “two drive assemblies of the present invention” 

(emphasis added)). The ’131 patent therefore disclaims 

an embodiment in which the drive assemblies are not 

mounted between the end walls.

GLG Farms asserts that the ’131 patent’s depiction of 

the drive assemblies between the end walls pertains only 

 

2 Additionally, the ’131 patent specification cites to 

a prior art patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,191,889 (“Heley”), see 

’131 patent, col. 1, ll. 33–35, which itself shows the drive 

assemblies mounted on the outside of the end walls, see 

Heley, fig.8. By citing to Heley, the applicant presumably 

knew about Heley’s drive-assembly configuration. And 

yet, the applicant chose to depict a different configuration 

as embodying the claimed invention.
8 GLG FARMS LLC v. BRANDT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

to embodiments in which there are no undriven support 

wheels. According to GLG Farms, the ’131 patent leaves 

open the possibility that, when there are such wheels, the 

drive assemblies can be mounted on the outside of the end 

walls to provide greater stability. But, other than pointing to a passage in the ’131 patent stating that undriven 

wheels can be added to the end walls, see ’131 patent, col. 

3, ll. 38–39, GLG Farms does not direct us to any intrinsic 

support for its argument, and we find none. In fact, the 

passage to which GLG Farms points supports our reading. By stating that undriven wheels can be added “on 

the end walls,” but providing no analogous statement for 

the driven wheels, the ’131 patent suggests that the drive 

assemblies cannot be mounted on the end walls, and must 

instead be mounted between those walls.

While there is some language in the specification that 

refers to a preferred embodiment, see, e.g., id. at col. 2, ll. 

24–30, 34–35, when read in its entirety, the specification 

leads us to the conclusion we reach here. We therefore 

affirm the district court’s construction of the claims 

requiring the drive assemblies to be mounted between the 

end walls. 

B. The District Court Properly Granted 

Summary Judgement of Noninfringement

“We review a grant of summary judgment under the 

law of the regional circuit.” Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp, 

877 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The Eighth Circuit reviews a grant of 

summary judgment de novo. Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 

713, 716 (8th Cir. 2000).

We agree with the district court that the accused 

products do not literally infringe the ’131 patent under 

the correct construction of the “arranged” claim term. As 

described above, the ’131 patent claims require that the 

drive assemblies be mounted between the end walls. The 

accused products, by contrast, have drive assemblies that 
GLG FARMS LLC v. BRANDT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 9

are mounted outside the end walls. The products therefore do not literally infringe.

We also agree with the district court that the accused 

products do not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. 

“While infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a 

question of fact, ‘[w]here the evidence is such that no 

reasonable jury could determine two elements to be 

equivalent, district courts are obliged to grant partial or 

complete summary judgment.’” Advanced Steel Recovery, 

LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc., 808 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 

2015) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 

Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997)). Critically, “the 

range of equivalents cannot be divorced from the scope of 

the claims.” Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, 

Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 

Indeed, “by defining the claim in a way that clearly exclude[s] certain subject matter,” a patent may “implicitly 

disclaim[] the subject matter that was excluded and 

thereby bar[] the patentee from asserting infringement 

under the doctrine of equivalents.” SciMed Life Sys., Inc. 

v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 

1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

Here, as described above, the applicant disclaimed an 

embodiment in which the drive assemblies are mounted 

outside the end walls. GLG Farms may not recapture 

that claim scope via the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 

1345 (“Having specifically identified, criticized, and 

disclaimed the dual lumen configuration, the patentee 

cannot now invoke the doctrine of equivalents to embrace 

a structure that was specifically excluded from the 

claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Additionally, the claims do not merit a scope of equivalence that embraces a configuration in which the drive 

assemblies are attached to the end walls rather than on

the base wall. The plain language of the claims clearly 

requires that the drive assemblies be mounted “on the 
10 GLG FARMS LLC v. BRANDT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

base wall,” see ’131 patent, col. 4, ll. 35–38, and the specification is replete with examples consistent with this 

requirement, see, e.g., id. Abstract, col. 1, l. 66 to col. 2, l. 

2. The patent also distinguishes the location of the drive 

assemblies in the claimed invention from that in the prior 

art, where the assemblies are “attached to end walls.” Id. 

col. 3, ll. 18–21. GLG Farms’ broad scope of equivalence 

would “effectively eliminate that [claim] element in its 

entirety,” Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29, and must 

therefore be rejected.

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s grant of summary 

judgment of noninfringement, which renders moot 

Brandt’s conditional cross-appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

We have considered GLG Farms’ remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. We affirm the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Brandt and 

dismiss Brandt’s conditional cross-appeal as moot.

AFFIRMED AS TO CASE NO. 17-1937, 

DISMISSED AS TO CASE NO. 17-1973

COSTS

No costs.