U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Multiple Fatality Highrise 

Condominium Fire

Clearwater, Florida

USFA-TR-148/June 2002

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) develops reports on selected major fires throughout the 

country. The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary 

criterion for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In 

some cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious 

enough to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports 

are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by Varley- Campbell and 

Associations, Incorporated (Miami and Chicago), its staff and consultants, who are under contract to 

assist the Fire Administration in carrying out the Fire Reports Program.

The U.S. Fire Administration greatly appreciates the cooperation received from the Clearwater, Florida 

Fire and Rescue Department.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report and the photographs, in color, are available on the 

Administration’s Web site at http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Multiple Fatality

Highrise Condominium Fire

Clearwater, Florida

Investigated by: J. Gordon Routley

Thomas H. Miller, P.E.

This is Report 148 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted 

by Varley-Campbell and Associates, Inc./TriData Corporation under 

contract EME-97-0506 to the U.S. Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Homeland Security

U.S. Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

TAble oF ConTenTS

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE COMMUNITY AND FIRE DEPARTMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE BUILDING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

BUILDING CODES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

FIRE PROTECTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

THE INCIDENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

INVESTIGATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

APPENDICES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Appendix A: Photographs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Appendix B: Diagrams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

1

Multiple Fatality

High-Rise Condominium Fire

Clearwater, Florida

June 28, 2002

Investigated by: John Lee Cook, Jr. and Thomas H. Miller, P.E.

Local Contacts Rowland E. Herald, Fire Chief

Terry S. Welker, Deputy Chief

Randy Hinder, Fire Marshal

Clearwater Fire Department

610 Franklin Street

Clearwater, Florida 33756

John Lee, President

Local 1158, Clearwater Firefighters Association

International Association of Firefighters

806 Lakeview Road

Clearwater, Florida 33756

O

At approximately 05:00 hours on the morning of June 28, 2002, a fire started in the kitchen of a 

condominium located on the southwest corner of the fifth floor of an eleven story residential highrise, built of fire resistive construction. The adult occupant of the unit attempted to fight the fire with 

portable fire extinguishers and an occupant use fire hose from the building’s standpipe system before 

notifying the fire department or activating the building’s fire alarm system, which was monitored by 

a central station fire alarm service.

The delayed alarm resulted in the death of two occupants of the building and injury to five Clearwater 

firefighters, which included serious burns to one firefighter that required over three months of 

recovery. Challenges encountered by arriving firefighters included lack of knowledge of a working 

fire by the first engine company due to communication difficulties, a shutoff standpipe riser, an outof-service hydrant on the south side of the building, and deviation from standard operating guides 

for alarms in high-rise structures. After addressing these initial difficulties, the operation recovered 

and the firefighters extinguished the fire with a combined exterior and interior attack. Three alarms 

were called because of the injured firefighters; the need to search and evacuate a large building with 

a wide occupant age range and evacuation capabilities; and the early problems encountered with 

insufficient fire flow to extinguish the fire.
2 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

KeY ISSUeS

Issues Comments

Alarm System When the first units arrived on the scene, an evacuation was not evident in spite of multiple 

alarm activations within the building. The occupancy had a history of unwanted and false 

alarms (seven in a sixteen month period) that may have caused some residents to ignore 

the alarm and may account for their failure to promptly evacuate the building. 

Communications The countywide trunked 800 MHz radio system uses a dispatch channel and tactical channels for units assigned to an incident. Some information about the upgraded alarm may not 

have reached the first engine company. Units operating at the incident were initially operating on a single tactical channel. The size and complexity of the incident resulted in too much 

traffic for one channel. Units were canceling each other’s radio messages and the inability to 

communicate created confusion and frustration.

Construction The fire resistive construction limited both the spread of the fire and the amount of damage 

sustained by the building. Doors to the individual condominiums on the fifth floor exceeded 

building code requirements and the majority of them were closed when the fire occurred. 

The doors held the fire in the hallway and prevented the fire from spreading into the 

individual units.

Center Loaded Corridor The condominiums were arranged to open into a single interior corridor with stairs at each 

end and elevators near the middle. Smoke filling the corridor prevented occupants on the 

fire floor from safely evacuating, especially those at the west end.

Delayed Alarm The occupant in the unit where the fire started attempted to fight the fire, delaying the notification of the fire department by approximately seventeen minutes. He had also propped 

open the door, which allowed the fire and smoke to extend into the hallway.

Elevators At least three crews used the elevator to gain access directly to the fire floor, which resulted 

in one crew becoming temporarily trapped in the elevator.

Fire Suppression Systems The building was not equipped with automatic sprinklers. There was a Class III Standpipe 

System and fire pump. The center standpipe riser valve was closed at the time of the fire 

stopping water flow to the riser.

Personnel Protective Clothing Five firefighters were injured in this incident, including three that were possibly caught in a 

flashover. While they were burned, all of them survived because they had all of their protective clothing on, including their SCBAs. One of the firefighters was rescued when her PASS 

device actuated and her fellow firefighters were able to find her in dense smoke by following 

the sound of the alarm.

Pre-Incident Planning Major target hazards, which include high-rise residential occupancies, should be preplanned. It is critical for fire crews to know in advance the location of fire protection systems, 

stairwells, utilities, etc.

Time of Day The fire occurred during the early morning hours when the majority of occupants can be 

expected to be asleep, which may delay their awareness that there is a fire and has the 

potential to create a significant rescue problem.
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 3

THe CoMMUnITY AnD FIRe DePARTMenT

Clearwater is situated on the Pinellas Peninsula, midway on Florida’s west coast. The City is located 

directly on the Gulf of Mexico twenty miles west of Tampa and twenty miles north of Saint Petersburg. 

First settled in 1841, the community was incorporated on May 27, 1915. When the area, first 

known as Pinellas Point, was settled it was included as a portion of western Hillsborough County. 

As Clearwater, Largo, St. Petersburg, and other communities grew, the clamor for independence also 

grew because it was a daylong trip to travel to the county courthouse in Tampa. In response to the 

desires of the local residents, the Florida Legislature created Pinellas County on Jan. 1, 1912 and 

designated Clearwater as the county seat.

The population continued to steadily climb and after World War II, a number of soldiers who had 

trained in the community, returned there to live and the Philadelphia Philly’s professional baseball 

team began spring training in Clearwater in the 1940s. Currently, there are approximately 109,000 

permanent residents and an additional 20,000 winter residents. According to the 2000 Census, 

Clearwater has the highest percentage of residents age sixty-five and older for cities with populations 

greater than 100,000. The City’s land area is 26.7 square miles and the City limits also include 8.6 

square miles of water.

The Fire Department was organized in 1911 and currently operates seven fire stations with an eighth 

station scheduled to be built in the near future. With an authorized strength of 192 career employees 

(field and line: 162; fire prevention and public education: 12; and administration and support: 18), the 

department provides fire suppression and EMS first responder services at the ALS level. Pinellas County 

provides EMS transport service. Firefighters staff seven engine companies; two truck companies, six rescues (three with transport capability), and one heavy rescue company. Additionally, two fire command 

officers (District Chiefs) and one EMS Supervisor (Rescue Lieutenant) supervise each shift.

Firefighters are deployed in three platoons and work a series of rotating twenty-four shifts, which 

averages fifty-six hours per week. Minimum daily staffing is forty-four firefighters. The annual operating budget is $16 million. The Department responded to 21,500 alarms in 2001 (80% EMS); 

conducted 1,210 inspections, and made 13,000 public education contacts.

THe bUIlDInG

Constructed in 1974, the Dolphin Cove Condominium building is located at 255 Dolphin Point 

Road in the Island Estates area of Clearwater. The eleven-story building was built of fire resistive 

construction, which consists of eight to ten inch concrete block walls with six-inch concrete floors 

and ceilings and a flat, built-up roof. The first floor consists of a central lobby, an office, several public 

rooms, storage units, and covered parking; while floors two through eleven contain 134 dwelling 

units. There are thirteen units on floors two, seven, eight, nine, ten, and eleven and fourteen units on 

floors three, four, five, and six. 

The interior of floors two through eleven consists of a T-shaped floor plan in a rectangular building, 

with two elevators and a laundry room in the center of the building on the short “T” leg. The main 

hallway is approximately 180 feet long and the corridors are constructed of drywall on metal studs 

with a one-hour fire rating. Doors to the units on the fifth floor exceeded the twenty-minute fire 

resistance rating required by code. A stairwell is located at each end (east and west) of the hallways 

and they are enclosed in concrete blocks with a two-hour rating. The u-return stairs are constructed 

with concrete steps and the stairwells discharge directly to the exterior of the building.
4 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The streets of Dolphin Point bound the site on the north, Dory Passage on south, and Larboard Way 

on the east. There is parking along the two long sides of the building and there is no fire apparatus 

access to the west end because of a pool and marina.

B

The most recent inspection of the building by the Clearwater Fire Prevention Bureau was January 23, 

2002. At that time, the manager had been served notice to retrofit the building with an automatic 

fire sprinkler system due to recent legislative changes. The Florida Legislature adopted Statewide 

Building and Fire Prevention Codes based on the 2000 editions of the National Fire Protection 

Association Standard Numbers 1 and 101. The Building Code had an effective date of January 1, 

2000 and is similar to the Standard Building Code. The Fire Prevention Code had an effective date 

of January 1, 2002 and requires the installation of automatic fire sprinkler systems in all existing 

high-rise structures greater than seventy-five feet in height. In May 2003, the Florida Fire Prevention 

Code was modified to allow condominium associations to exempt themselves from the automatic 

sprinkler system retrofit by a two-thirds vote of the association membership. However, the condominium association cannot exempt out from retrofitting automatic sprinklers in the common areas 

of the building. Building retrofits must be completed no later than 2014.

FIRe PRoTeCTIon

The unit of origin (#501) is located on the southwest corner of the fifth floor adjacent to the west 

stairwell with an occupant use hose cabinet located next to the unit’s door. The unit consisted of two 

bedrooms, one of which had been converted into a home office, two baths, a kitchen, and living area. 

The unit also had an exterior sliding glass door with a small balcony about twelve inches deep.

Fire protection in the building consisted of the following:

• Class III Standpipe with three eight-inch diameter risers

• 2-1/2-inch, valved hose outlets located in the stairwells on each floor

• Three interior hose cabinets equipped with 1-1/2-inch hose; one each in the hall by the 

door to the stairwell and one in the center of the building near the elevator lobby

• Three 5-lb. 3A40BC rated fire extinguishers on each floor located in the hose cabinets

• Main 1,000 gpm at 90 psi rated fire pump and jockey pump; free standing fire department 

connection on north side of building with adjacent fire hydrant

• Central station monitored, fire alarm system that is zoned by floor, but does not sound a 

general alarm throughout the building

• Three smoke detectors in the corridor on each floor

• Manual pull stations at each stairway entrance door and near the elevator lobby on each floor

• Alarm control panel located in the second floor fire pump room

• Annunciator panel located in the first floor main lobby entrance

• Single station smoke detectors in each unit to alert the occupant

• Emergency diesel engine driven generator
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 5

The control valves for the fire pump and standpipe system were monitored for position, except for 

the valve controlling the water supply to the center riser. For some reason the monitor for this valve 

was not connected to the fire alarm system. The control valve that was closed was approximately 

fourteen feet from the ground and not readily visible.

Clearwater has adopted an ordinance regulating the number of unwanted and false fire alarms that a 

building can have annually and the owner can be fined after three unexplained fire alarms. Currently, 

this ordinance is not being enforced as it is being rewritten.

THe InCIDenT

During the early morning hours of Friday June 28, 2002, the male occupant, age 57, of Unit 501 

awoke to the smell of smoke and to the sounds of crackling from a fire. He told investigators that he 

regularly slept in the living room on a day bed and that when he woke up, he observed a small fire 

on the electric stovetop in the kitchen. The occupant did not use the stovetop and at the time of the 

fire, combustible materials were stored on top of the burners. It is believed that one of the electric 

burners was accidentally turned on and heat from the burner ignited the stored material. According 

to his statement to investigators, rather than calling 9-1-1 or manually activating the building fire 

alarm system, he attempted to smother the flames by repeatedly wetting towels. Investigators believe 

that the approximate time when these events began was 05:05 hours.

The man stated that he woke up his daughter, age 14, and told her to go next door (#502) and wake 

up his mother, to call 9-1-1, and then for both of them to leave the building. As he attempted to 

extinguish the fire, a male occupant, age 40, from unit #504 came to his aid with a fire extinguisher. 

When the extinguisher failed to put the fire out, they secured and emptied three additional extinguishers, all without success and there are indications another fire extinguisher was being secured as 

the fire department units were on the fire floor. Each floor had three fire extinguishers located one 

in each occupant use fire hose cabinet. The use of four extinguishers by the two men attempting to 

fight the fire suggested that they had to travel to and from the ends of the fire floor and to the floor 

above or below the fire to acquire all the extinguishers used.

Upon exhausting the fire extinguishers, they attempted to deploy the 1-1/2-inch hose line located 

in the hallway standpipe cabinet next to Unit #501 and adjacent to the doorway to the west stairwell. Apparently, however, they did not get all of the hose out of the semiautomatic hose rack in the 

cabinet and did not understand how to clear the fire hose from the rack, as a result they could not get 

water to flow from the nozzle. The post-fire investigation revealed that the riser in the west stairwell 

that fed the hose cabinet was operational.

At 05:21 hours, the alarm company that supervised the building’s fire alarm system notified the 

Pinellas County 9-1-1 Center that they had received a fire alarm actuation from the Dolphin Cove 

Condominiums located in Clearwater at 255 Dolphin Point Road. At 05:22 hours, Clearwater Station 

46 was dispatched by the County Communications Center to investigate the automatic fire alarm 

activation. As Station 46 prepared to respond with their engine and rescue, the alarm was upgraded 

to smoke in a structure because of the numerous 9-1-1 calls that the 9-1-1 Center was receiving 

reporting the presence of smoke in the building.

When the alarm was upgraded, the Engine, Truck, Rescue, and District Chief from Station 45 were 

dispatched as well as Engine 44, Rescue 47, Truck 48, Squad 49, District 48, and the EMS Supervisor 

from Station 48. A total of twenty-eight firefighters, including chief officers, responded on the first 

alarm. All of the first alarm companies arrived within sixteen minutes of being dispatched.
6 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Rescue 46; staffed by two paramedics, and Engine 45, with a crew of four firefighters were the first 

two units to report at the location. The companies arrived almost simultaneously at 05:27 hours, 

five minutes after being dispatched, but approximately seventeen minutes after the fire is believed 

to have been first discovered by the occupant of the unit. Rescue 46 entered the parking lot on the 

south side of the building and reported thick smoke coming from the southwest corner of the building (Unit #501). Engine 45 arrived on the north (front entrance) side of the building and reported 

nothing visible from their vantage point. Engine 45 partially heard Rescue 46’s size-up reporting 

smoke visible and requested a repeat of the information but did not receive one. Rescue 45, with two 

paramedics on board, and District 45 arrived within the next minute. District 45 assumed command 

of the incident. District 45 was staffed by a Lieutenant acting as District Chief. The Clearwater Fire 

Department does not have a Captain’s rank.

The pump operator for Engine 45 laid to the freestanding fire department connection (FDC) for 

the standpipe system on the north side of the building. A fire hydrant is located adjacent to the FDC 

to allow the fire department to supplement the standpipe system. Engine 45’s driver hooked to 

the hydrant and began to pump the lines to FDC, thinking that interior hose lines would soon be 

deployed on the fire. The engine crew carried in a high-rise hose pack with 100 feet of 1-3/4-inch 

hose, a nozzle, Halligan tool, axe, gated wye, and assorted adaptors.

Engine 45’s Lieutenant and two firefighters, along with the two paramedics from Rescue 45, entered 

the lobby from the north and were met by an individual thought to be a maintenance worker. The 

man had unlocked the lobby doors as well as the door to the west stairwell and he told the firefighters that the alarm was coming from the fifth floor. But gave no indication of the presence of smoke 

or a fire on the floor. Later, it was determined that the individual was actually the homeowners’ 

association president. A check of the annunciator panel confirmed that an alarm had actuated on the 

fifth floor. The alarm most likely was from the smoke detectors in the corridor.

The initial dispatch to a fire alarm investigation, absence of visible flames or smoke by Engine 45, the 

fact that no one was observed to be evacuating the building, and the casual attitude of the individual 

that greeted them at the door, led these firefighters to decide to take an elevator to the fifth floor 

to investigate rather than walk up five flights of stairs even though the Department’s SOGs dictated 

that elevators should not be used if a fire was below the sixth floor. Before entering the elevator, the 

Lieutenant secured the building keys from the lock box.

As the crew exited the elevator onto the fifth floor, they encountered whitish to gray colored smoke 

that was banked down approximately three-fourths of the way from the ceiling. Visibility was reported 

to still be relatively good at that point, however. Firefighters encountered a number of residents 

coming out of their condos and told them to return to their units, close their doors, and wait for the 

firefighters to come after them.

Due to the smoky conditions of the fifth Floor, the Lieutenant radioed Command and requested a 

second alarm. Communications transmitted the second alarm at 05:31 hours. The firefighters then 

turned to the east from the elevator lobby, located the standpipe cabinet on the north wall, and a firefighter connected the high-rise hose pack to the 1-1/2-inch outlet. The smoke propagation did not 

readily suggest the location of the fire and the other firefighters were searching to the east stairwell to 

locate the seat of the fire. Conditions in the hallway rapidly deteriorated with increasing temperature 

and reduction in visibility.
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 7

Meanwhile, Rescue 46’s crew attempted to enter the east stairwell through the first floor discharge 

door but found that the door was locked, so they entered the lobby on the south side of the building. 

They took an elevator to the fifth floor and were confronted with the smoky conditions. Firefighters 

stated that they originally intended to stop below the fire and get off on the fourth floor, but could 

hear cries for help, so they elected to get off on the fifth floor to help evacuate the residents.

Interior operations attempted a number of times to update command about their situation with 

limited success. The heavy volume of radio traffic and possible interference caused by the building 

construction, made communications difficult and in some cases impossible. Meanwhile, Rescue 46’s 

crew arrived on the fifth floor and, hearing cries for help, began search and rescue efforts, directing 

and leading residents to the east stairwell. Engine and Rescue 45 were also assisting occupants to the 

east stairwell.

Truck 45, with a crew of three, arrived at 05:30 hours and set up the truck on the southwest corner 

and raised their tower to the fifth floor to assist with rescue and suppression efforts. While in the 

east stairwell, Engine 45’s Lieutenant met a man on the fourth floor with a fire extinguisher who 

informed him that the fire was in the opposite end of the hallway. He asked the man to escort the 

occupants that the firefighters had taken to the stairwell out of the building. Then he returned to the 

fifth floor hallway and was informed that there was no water in the center standpipe. At the same 

time, Engine 46 was attempting to lay a water supply line to Truck 45 on the south side of the building and was reporting that the fire hydrant on the southwest corner of the building was inoperable. 

The hydrant had been damaged four days earlier and was out of service, but that fact had not been 

passed on to the fire department.

Unable to locate the fire and believing that there was a water supply problem inside and outside the 

building, interior operations abandoned all efforts to extinguish the fire and redirected all of their 

efforts toward search and rescue. During this time, Engine 45’s crew encountered a male resident 

in the hallway and attempted to lead him to safety, but somehow became separated. They began to 

search for him again.

By 05:35 hours, visibility had decreased to zero; as thick, black smoke completely filled the hallway. 

Firefighters from Station 45 and Rescue 46 reported that they could hear each other, but could not 

see one another and are believed to have actually passed each other in the hallway completely undetected by the other. Rescue 46’s crew located the female occupant of Unit #502, age 81, at approximately 05:39 hours and was attempting to lead her to safety near the elevator lobby.

Engine 45’s Lieutenant notified Command that it was too hot and interior crews were beginning to 

withdraw from the floor. At approximately 05:41 hours, it is believed that a flashover1

 occurred in 

Unit #501 and that a rollover2

 occurred in the hallway enveloping the two civilians and three firefighters. While there is some disagreement as to the fire phenomenon that occurred in the hallway, 

the limited amount of combustibles on the walls and floor, including the carpet, were consumed 

from the west stairwell to the elevator lobby in the center of the building. The eastern portion of the 

hallway was heat and smoke damaged, but not as severely.

1 Flashover is the sudden transition from local burning to wide spread burning of all exposed combustibles in a room. 

After flashover, flames often project from open doors or windows.

2Rollover is the travel of visible flames through the upper gas layer in a room or corridor. The flames are usually not 

constant and may extend and recede several times.
8 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Regardless of the phenomenon that occurred, the event resulted in burns and injuries to three fighters and the death of a male occupant, age 75. Additionally, in an attempt to escape the flames, the 

female resident with Rescue 46’s crew apparently knocked a female firefighter from Rescue 46 down 

and became separated from the firefighters.

Following the flashover in the unit of origin, an immediate search was undertaken for the two civilians known to have been in the hallway and any firefighter that might have been injured. When the 

flashover occurred, one firefighter was in the elevator lobby. Although burned and disoriented, he 

escaped in the direction of the east stairwell, where firefighters found him. He was escorted to the 

stairwell and taken outside the building by a civilian. As firefighters returned to the hallway to continue their search efforts, they could hear a PASS device actuating. The source of the alarm was found, 

and the downed female firefighter was found by another firefighter, who took her into Unit #506. 

While both firefighters were burned, one was able to signal fellow firefighters operating outside of 

the building, and both were rescued by an aerial device.

The deceased, male occupant of Unit #506 was found in the elevator lobby. Firefighters were unable 

to detect a pulse, noted extensive burns, and determined he was obviously deceased. Therefore, they 

left him there to search for other victims.

Engine 46 attempted to lay a supply line, but as was previously mentioned, they laid to a damaged 

hydrant. When Engine 44 arrived at 05:36 hours, they laid a line in from the east and supplied Truck 

45 with water. Truck 45 was joined on the building’s south side by Trucks 48 & 41 (Largo). These 

companies eventually worked the exterior of the building and rescued a number of civilians and 

injured firefighters.

Truck Company 48, with a crew of three firefighters, arrived at 05:35 hours. When they heard the 

report that firefighters were possibly trapped on the fifth floor in an elevator following the flashover, 

they attempted to enter the east stairwell to attempt a rescue, but found the door to be locked. They 

also discovered that the keys were missing from the lock box, having been removed by Engine 45. 

Therefore, they took the elevator to the fifth floor, but became trapped for a short time due to the 

warping of the elevator doors by the intense heat on the fire floor. They were able to force their way 

out of the car and onto the fifth floor.

Truck 48’s crew found the missing female resident from Unit #502 and determined that she was 

still alive. They first removed her to Unit #511 and she was subsequently taken out of the building 

via a stairwell by firefighters. She was transported to Tampa General Hospital where she died the next 

morning, June 29th of smoke inhalation and burns over forty-three percent of her body.

Squad 49, with a crew of three, arrived at 05:36 hours. Upon hearing that firefighters were down 

on the fifth floor, advanced a 1-3/4-inch hand line from 3rd floor standpipe in the west stairwell. 

When they reached the fifth floor, they found an injured firefighter at the floor landing and left a 

crewmember to treat him. As they advanced their line on to the fifth floor they found that the fire 

was out and discovered water entering from the exterior of the condominium to the hallway. The 

two company members searched the hallway to the elevators and found the deceased victim by the 

elevator and removed him to the west stairwell. While doing so, they noticed that the elevator was 

partially open and that the doors were partially melted from the heat. The elevator is believed to 

be the one that Truck 48 forced open and part of the damage may have been from that effort. After 

removing the victim, they went to rehab. After their rest period they went to the 6th floor; but one 

of their firefighters felt light headed, left the building and was transported to Morton Plant Hospital 

for treatment for heat exhaustion.
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 9

Figure One: Chronology of Events

Time Event

05:05 Approximate time of ignition in Unit 501

05:10 Neighbor reports hearing fire alarm from Dolphin Cove Condo, however, it is not clear whether or not this was 

the building alarm system or an individual smoke detector within a condo unit

05:21 Alarm company notifies Pinellas 9-1-1 center of alarm activation

05:22 Clearwater FD dispatched to an alarm activation, which is quickly upgraded to a report of smoke in the structure

05:22 Occupant in Unit 505 notifies 9-1-1 Center that the hall is full of smoke

05:24 Occupant from Unit 501 reports fire in kitchen, call was placed from Unit 502

05:27 Rescue 46 on-location and reports thick smoke showing from the southwest corner, but no evacuation in 

progress

05:28 Engine 45 on location and reports nothing showing; Firefighters enter the building

05:30 Engine 45’s crew enters fire floor, finds smoke, and asks Command for a Second Alarm

05:31 Pinellas County 9-1-1 Center transmits the second alarm

05:36 Firefighters report that the interior center standpipe is inoperable

05:39 Companies on fire floor indicate conditions have deteriorated and that it is “too hot”

05:41 Possible flashover occurs

05:42 Dispatch provides twenty minute notification

05:43 Report of firefighters trapped in elevator on fifth floor and that a fire hydrant is not functioning

05:55 Fire department suppression operations begin

05:59 Third Alarm requested by Command

06:02 Dispatch provides forty-minute notification

06:03 Injured firefighters rescued from fifth floor

06:06 Fire is under control

12:20 In-service

Figure Two: List of Injuries

Victim Status Unit Nature of Injuries

Female, age 58 Occupant #807 Smoke inhalation, transported

Female, age 60 Occupant #904 Smoke inhalation, undetermined

Female, age 80 Occupant #803 Rescued by tower ladder; transported as precaution

Male, age 57 Occupant #501* Shock, burns

Male, age 74 Occupant #511 Had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Smoke inhalation; woke 

up by fire alarm; signaled with flashlight, rescued from balcony;

Male, 33 Firefighter Heat exhaustion, transported

Male, 36 Firefighter Burns; transported

Male, 38 Firefighter Dehydration, heat exhaustion; transported

Male, 47 Firefighter Burns, transported

Female, 50 Firefighter R46 Burns, transported

* Unit of origin
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Command was transferred to District 48, who set up a command post on the south side of the 

building. A tactical worksheet was not used to track company locations or to map out the operation 

reportedly because of the volume of radio traffic and the lack of an assistant for the IC. When the 

Operations Chief arrived, he assisted the District 48 Chief. Working together, they attempted to assert 

command via radio, but were thwarted by heavy radio traffic and the confusion that was present 

during the earlier stages of the incident. Through combined efforts they were able to establish a more 

controlled operating environment through face-to-face communication. Command assigned the east 

stairwell for use in occupant evacuation and placed a firefighter there to coordinate efforts. He 

assigned the other stairwell to suppression efforts. A separate radio frequency was secured for EMS 

operations. He also requested two additional truck companies before requesting the third alarm, but 

they were never dispatched by the communications center.

Clearwater’s EMS Supervisor assumed EMS command and requested ambulances to transport the 

injured civilians and firefighters. The EMS Lieutenant supervised the triage and transportation 

activities.

The second alarm brought in Engine 47 and companies from the Town of Bellaire; Bellaire Bluff; and 

Largo. A total of eleven personnel responded on the second alarm and arrived within twenty-minutes 

of the initial alarm. The third alarm brought in Engine 48 and companies from Seminole, Dunedin 

and additional companies from Largo. Approximately fifty-two firefighters and four command officers were required to bring the fire under control and they used seven engines, four trucks, four 

rescues, and three squads.

Ten ambulances from the County EMS service were dispatched to the incident and eight were used 

to transport patients to area hospitals. Each ambulance was staffed by two crewmembers. A County 

EMS ambulance supervisor was also dispatched to the scene to assist with the triage, treatment, and 

transportation of the victims. A helicopter with a crew of three was also used at the scene for the 

more critical patients. 

Level II staging was established in the parking lot of the Island Estates Mall located one block away 

from the fire. The Rehab unit from Station 48 also responded to the incident and was staffed by an 

off-duty firefighter. Shift change occurred at 08:00 hours and the on-coming shift relieved the crews 

at the incident scene.

The fire was extinguished by using 5-inch supply lines and 1-3/4-inch hand lines. Once Truck 

45 was able to establish a water supply, the crew extended a hand line from the platform into the 

interior of the fifth floor via Unit #504 and knocked down the fire in Unit #501 from the inside 

hallway, driving the heat and smoke out of the sliding glass door and windows. The fire was declared 

to be under control 05:52 hours, thirty-minutes into the incident. Following secondary search, salvage and overhaul efforts, the final company returned to service at 12:20 hours, nearly seven hours 

after the initial alarm.

The blaze caused approximately $1 million in damage. The majority of the destruction was contained 

to the unit of origin and the fifth floor hallway. There was significant water damage on the fourth 

floor as well, particularly immediately below the fire in Unit #401. Firefighters also forced the doors 

on the sixth floor in order to search and evacuate residents. After the fire, the majority of the fifth 

floor was renovated and the entire structure has been retrofitted with automatic sprinklers. In addition, a new fire detection and alarm notification system has been installed throughout the building.
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 11

InVeSTIGATIon

Officials from the Clearwater Fire and Police Departments and the Florida State Fire Marshal’s Office, 

which is charged with the investigation of all fire where a fatality occurs, investigated the fire. They 

were assisted in their efforts by investigators from the Palm Harbor Fire Department who used their 

K-9 to check for the presence accelerants. The medical examiner also ruled that the two deaths were 

accidental and caused by smoke inhalation.

Investigators concluded that the fire was accidental and caused by the burner on the right front of 

the electric stove located in the kitchen of Unit #501 being left in the on position, which ignited 

combustibles that were present on the stovetop.

The male occupant of Unit #501 reported that he did not have any insurance. He told investigators 

that he had four glasses of wine before going to bed and voluntarily submitted a blood sample to 

determine if he was intoxicated. His results were above that which would have allowed him to operate an automobile. He denied using the stove, and stated that it had not used in three years. He and 

his daughter are alleged to have their meals with his mother, in Unit #502. His mother also owned 

Unit #501 and he rented the unit from her. He lived there with his daughter, age 14.

The protective clothing worn by the three burned firefighters was submitted to independent third 

party tests in order to determine if the equipment worn met current NFPA standards. The test concluded that all of the equipment met or exceeded the standards.

The three SCBA worn by the burned firefighters were inspected by an authorized service center for 

the manufacturer and were found to be fully functional except for one unit with a torn hose. The 

SCBA was determined to have been functional up until the point the hose was torn during the suppression operations.

The weather at the time of the fire was not a contributing factor. The temperature was 80 degrees 

Fahrenheit, the sky was clear, and the winds were calm. The absence of a breeze, no doubt, prevented 

the spread of the fire when the exterior sliding glass door and windows were either opened or failed 

due to heat.

SUMMARY

The most significant fire damage was contained to the unit of origin and about half of the common corridor with the accompanying loss of two lives and injuries to five firefighters. The outcome 

could have been much worse in both property damage and death and injuries to occupants and 

firefighters.

The occupants’ decision to fight the fire before notifying the Clearwater Fire Department and their 

fellow occupants of the working fire placed everyone at greater risk of death and injury. The delayed 

alarm allowed the fire to reach flashover intensity and the blocked open condo entrance door allowed 

the spread of heat, smoke, and fire into the common corridor creating deadly conditions. With the 

center standpipe riser shutoff, the first firefighters on the fire floor were left without an immediate 

means to suppress the fire and protect themselves and the other occupants. These firefighters did not 

follow department SOG’s when they used elevators to travel directly to the floor where the fire alarm 

originated. The first in company was routinely investigating a smoke condition and was unaware of 

a working fire apparently because they did not hear reports from other arriving units due to communication difficulties.
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Although, the fire was successfully suppressed with a hose line through the balcony door, this tactical 

operation could have injured interior sector firefighters. However in this instance, interior firefighters were in safe locations before the exterior hose line was applied. As well, had the fire been on a 

floor above the reach of an exterior hose line, the interior suppression effort would likely have taken 

longer, been more difficult, and would have required substantially greater suppression and rescue 

resources.

LE

1. Prompt notification of a fire in progress is essential.

The resident attempted to fight the fire for nineteen minutes before his daughter called 9-1-1 

from next door. Two minutes earlier, the alarm company and the resident of Unit #505 contacted 

the 9-1-1 Center. The delayed alarm, no doubt, significantly contributed to the fire loss and 

allowed conditions to develop that resulted in the flashover. Ultimately, the incident progressed 

to a third-alarm assignment because of the delayed alarm of the fire, problems encountered 

with the standpipe and fire hydrant, need to attend to the injuries to the initial fire suppression 

personnel and occupants, and the subsequent search and evacuation of the building. The staffing 

levels of the initial responding units would likely have been sufficient had the fire department 

been notified in a timely manner of a working fire and had they not encountered the inoperable standpipe and the out-of-service hydrant which caused the initial units to delay operations 

while attempting to establish reliable water supplies in support of both interior and exterior 

operations. The building’s compartmentation and fire resistive construction also played a major 

role in limiting further damage, fatalities, and injuries.

2 Appropriate management systems must be in place and followed.

During the early stages of the fire, freelancing occurred and established procedures were not 

explicitly followed. High-rise fires are generally best attacked from the stairwells by connecting 

to the standpipe system below the fire. Elevators should be used only when it is conclusively 

known that they are safe to operate. Staging personnel and equipment below the fire is critical 

as are a strong incident management system, accountability, and prohibition against mixing an 

interior and exterior attack with firefighters and residents in harms way. Ensuring an adequate 

air supply to firefighters on the fire floor is also critical.

Personal accountability systems should include periodic notification as to the amount of time 

that has elapsed since the firefighters arrived on the scene. Critical benchmarks include the 

ten-minute mark and the twenty-minute mark. Flashover often occurs within ten minutes and 

lightweight structural components often will fail with ten minutes of exposure to flames. At the 

twenty-minute mark, firefighters will be typically using up their initial SCBA bottle and will 

need to exit the building for another bottle. It is easy to overlook these mileposts without a 

system of automatic notification. The Pinellas County 9-1-1 Center provided the twenty minute 

notification and a forty minute one (see Figure One).

3 Communications must convey important information to all units and require that it be 

acknowledged and be of sufficient capacity for the task.

The upgraded alarm may not have reached the first due company who still believed they were on 

an alarm investigation when they traveled to the fire floor. In addition, information regarding 

the floor and unit number of the fire’s location received by the 9-1-1 Center was not promptly 
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 13

passed along to the responding fire companies. Critical information about fire conditions on 

arrival should be repeated by communications to all companies and acknowledged by companies at the scene. Management of the communications system is also of paramount importance. 

During multiple alarms, the competition for radio airtime often results in units canceling out 

each other’s message, which can lead to confusion and frustration. Each major function and 

division should be assigned a separate tactical channel and adequate support must be given to 

the incident commander to ensure that all of the channels are properly monitored. The incident 

commander reported that the Communications Center would provide information received 

from 9-1-1 telephone calls over the tactical channel disrupting fire ground communications.

4. Establish an adequate and reliable water supply early in the incident.

Much has been said and written about the dead hydrant and closed standpipe valve. Engine 

45’s operator did in fact, however, establish an adequate and reliable water supply that would 

have been sufficient to control and extinguish the fire had procedures been properly followed 

by making an attack from the stairwells. Both the east and west standpipe risers were functional 

at the time of the alarm. The fire was ultimately extinguished, however, by the creation of an 

exterior standpipe via Truck 45’s waterway.

5. When staffing levels are less than desirable, an aggressive interior attack is often the 

best option.

During the early stages of most incidents, staffing is limited until the full alarm assignment 

is assembled on the scene and working. Even then, very few departments have the staffing to 

both suppress a fire and perform the ancillary, but critical functions of search, rescue, ventilation, property conservation, and forcible entry at a high-rise fire. Often, the best strategy is to 

protect the occupants in place and mount an aggressive extinguishment effort. Given that the 

unit of origin was in the southwest corner of the structure adjacent to a stairwell would seem 

to have made this approach an even more viable option. In this instance, water was not put on 

the fire for approximately twenty-eight minutes, well after conditions lead to a flashover, which 

ultimately resulted in two fatalities and ten injuries.

Evidence from the post fire investigation indicates that the concrete ceilings and floors held the 

fire to the fifth floor and that the interior corridor doors did a superior job of confining the fire 

to the unit of origin and the hallway. Had the occupant left his condo and closed the door when 

the fire was discovered the outcome might well have been different. The two civilians likely 

might not have died had they either evacuated when they first heard the alarm or had remained 

in their condos.

6. Mayday!

After the flashover and it became known that a number of firefighters were missing, the only 

radio messages that were transmitted simply indicated that some firefighters were down. Yet, no 

one knew exactly where they were due to the heavy smoke and intense heat in the fifth floor 

corridor. When an event of this magnitude and severity occurs, a procedure should be in place 

(and followed) that prompts someone to issue the Mayday distress call. The procedure should 

cause the cessation of all but emergency radio traffic and should prompt an accountability check 

to determine who is missing. Once the number of missing firefighters is ascertained, a rescue 

effort can begin. Fortunately, in this instance all of the lost firefighters were quickly found and 

all were rescued.
14

APPenDICeS

Appendix A: Photographs

Appendix B: Diagrams
15

APPenDIX A

Photographs

The following photos were provided by the Clearwater Fire Department:

#1 View of southwest corner of building; note location of Truck 45 and open sliding glass door 

of Unit 501 (area of origin) and extension up exterior face of building

#2 View of southeast corner

#3 Note occupants on 10th floor balconies. This provides indication of the narrow depth of balcony landings.

#4 View of damage to fifth floor hallway.

#5 View of FD line attached to standpipe connection near west stairwell.

#6 Representative occupancy door to condo units. This unit is three floors below unit of origin 

and is equipped with automatic door closure.

#7 Door to Unit demonstrating how well the doors held.

#8 Smoke penetration around door into unit on fifth floor.

#9 Stove and hood in Unit #501, note door opening into hallway right hand portion of picture. 

Photo shows metal studs, typical of interior construction.

#10 Area of origin, kitchen of Unit #501.

#11 Note top of photo: shows concrete floor typical of building construction.

#12 Interior view of kitchen showing extent of damage.

#13 View of interior of kitchen and ceiling.

#14 Control valve to central standpipe riser found to be closed during fire.

#15 Two discharged 5-lb. ABC extinguishers and 11/2-inch house line found outside Unit 501.

#16 Hydrant that failed to operate during fire; note parts in background.

#17 Electrically powered fire pump rate at 1,000 gpm at 90 psi.

#18 Alarm panel located in second floor mechanical room.

#19 Extent of damage to fifth floor hallway.

#20 Damage to hallway east of elevators, note less damage midpoint to floor.

#21 Fifth floor elevator lobby

#22 Fifth floor elevator doors and call buttons
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-2

2. View of southeast corner

1. View of southwest corner of building; note location of Truck 45 and open sliding glass door of

Unit 501 (area of origin) and extension up exterior face of building
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 17

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-3

3. Note occupants on 10th floor balconies. This provides indication of the narrow depth of balcony landings.
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-3

4. View of damage to fifth floor hallway.
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 19

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-5

5. View of FD line attached to standpipe connection near west stairwell.
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-6

6. Representative occupancy door to condo units. This unit is three floors below unit of origin and is

equipped with automatic door closure.
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 21

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-7

8. Smoke penetration around door into unit on fifth floor.

7. Door to Unit demonstrating how well the doors held
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-8

9. Stove and hood in Unit 501, note door opening into hallway right hand portion of picture. Photo

shows metal studs, typical of interior construction.
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 23

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-9

10. Area of origin, kitchen of Unit #501.

11. Note top of photo: shows concrete floor typical of building construction.
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-10

13. View of interior of kitchen and ceiling.

12. Interior view of kitchen showing extent of damage.
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 25

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-11

15. Two discharged 5-lb. ABC extinguishers and 1-1/2-inch house line found outside Unit 501.

14. Control valve to central standpipe riser found to be closed during fire.
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-12

16. Hydrant that failed to operate during fire; note parts in background.
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 27

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-13

17. Electrically powered fire pump rate at 1,000 gpm at 90 psi.
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-14

18. Alarm panel located in second floor mechanical room.
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 29

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-15

19. Extent of damage to fifth floor hallway.
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-16

20. Damage to hallway east of elevators, note less damage midpoint to floor.
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 31

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-17

21. Fifth floor elevator lobby
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

Page A-18

22. Fifth floor elevator doors and call buttons
33

APPenDIX b

Diagrams

1. Clearwater Fire and Rescue

2. Area Plan

3. Apparatus Positions

4. Floor Plans
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix b (continued)

Clearwater Fire & Rescue

Lines of

Authority

Functional

Guidance

DEPUTY

CHIEF - Admin

Personnel &

Projects Div

Financial

Mgt Div

Life Safety

& Prev Div EMS Division Ops Division Safety & Empl Dev Div

DEPUTY

CHIEF - Ops

FIRE CHIEF

Admin

Analyst Payroll Pers Tech Shop Supply

Intern

Staff

Asst

Staff

Asst

Emer

Mgt

Asst Ch

Prevn

Arson

 Invstg

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

Insp Investg Pub Ed

Staff Asst

DC 45 LRs DC 48

Training

Coor

1. Clearwater Fire and Rescue

Page B-2
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 35

Appendix b (continued)

251

279

202

205

200

200

255

255

400

223 51

31

20

ISLAND

ESTATES MALL

DOLPHIN POINT

POINT

SKIFF

ISLAND

LARBOARD

ISLAND

MEMORIAL CSWY

S. R. 60

WAY

WAY

WAY

LEEWARD ISLAND

ISLAND

MIDWAY

DORY

WINDWARD PASSAGE

DOLPHIN PASSAGE

COVE

240

VILLAGE ON

ISLAND ESTATES

CAMDEN

BLDG

HIGH & DRY

MARINA

PP 267-14

ISLAND YACHT

HARBOR

ROSS

YACHT

MARINE

SCIENCE

CENTER

FLAGSHIP

RESTAURANT

HORIZON

HOUSE

PP 267-3

WINDWARD

TOWER

PP 267-4

CLIPPER

COVE

MARINA

WAY

PP 267-6

DEARBORN

TOWERS

PP 267-7

105

113

121

311

324

401

1

24

27 6

25

23 10

18

11 2

3

4 12 21

20

7

8

9

22

5

26

14

15 16

17

118

44

212

36

400

 = FIRE HYDRANT

2. Area Plan

Page B-3
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix b (continued)

251

202

205

200

200

255

255

400

223

ISLAND

ESTATES MALL

DOLPHIN POINT

E45

R44 IC T45 T48 T4

E46

POINT

SKIFF

ISLAND

LARBOARD

WAY

WAY

DORY

WINDWARD PASSAGE

PASSAGE

240

VILLAGE ON

ISLAND ESTATES

CAMDEN

BLDG

HIGH & DRY

MARINA

PP 267-14

ISLAND YACHT

HARBOR

CLIPPER

COVE

MARINA

WAY

105

113

121

STAGING

AREA

3-STORY

TOWN

 HOME

 COMPLEX

240 WINWARD

APT #501

3. Apparatus Positions

Page B-4
USFA-TR-148/June 2002 37

Appendix b (continued)

_13

_01

TENANT

STORAGE

MEETING

ROOM

_02 _03 _04 _05 _06 _07 _08

_12 _11 _10 _09

LAUNDRY

ELEC

UNIT OF ORIGIN 1-1/2" HOSE CABINETS

TYPICAL FLOOR PLAN

1st FLOOR

EL

LOCK BOX

HYDRANT FIRE DEPT. CONNECTION

PARKING

EL

EL

EL

OFFICE

ENTRANCE

LOBBY

4. Floor Plans

Page B-5