1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

 ) 

REPUBLICAN PARTY OF ) 

LOUISIANA, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) Civ. No. 15-1241 (CRC) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) ANSWER 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S 

ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 

Defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) submits this Answer 

to plaintiffs’ Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Docket No. 1). Any 

allegation not specifically responded to below, including allegations that appear in headings, is 

denied. The Commission responds as follows: 

1. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of legal claims in their own 

Complaint, to which no response is required. 

2. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ conclusions of law, to which no response is 

required. To the extent a response is required: Deny that this Court has jurisdiction under the 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(1), 116 

Stat. 81, 113-14, because plaintiffs’ claims are neither substantial nor justiciable under that 

special review provision. Deny that BCRA §§ 403(a)(4) and (d)(2) are applicable. Admit that 

the paragraph accurately quotes from the statute, with identified alterations and omissions, 

except that plaintiffs have substituted the word “elect” for “elects” in the first quotation and the 

word “this” for “the” in both the first and the second quotations. 

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3. Deny that this Court has jurisdiction under BCRA § 403 because plaintiffs’ claims 

are neither substantial nor justiciable. Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes BCRA § 403, 

with certain provisions omitted and replaced by ellipses. 

4. Admit that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Deny that 28 

U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 grant the Court jurisdiction. Deny that this Court has jurisdiction under 

BCRA § 403 because plaintiffs’ claims are neither substantial nor justiciable. 

5. Admit that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). Deny that this Court 

has jurisdiction under BCRA § 403 because plaintiffs’ claims are neither substantial nor 

justiciable. 

6. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ conclusions of law, to which no response is 

required. To the extent a response is required: The Commission is without knowledge or 

information sufficient to admit or deny the first sentence of this paragraph. As to the second 

sentence, admit that Republican Party of Louisiana (“LAGOP”) has registered with the 

Commission as a “State Committee” under 52 U.S.C. § 30101(15) (as well as 11 C.F.R. 

100.14(a)), and a “Party committee” at the “State . . . level” under 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(e)(4) (rather 

than 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(d)(4), an apparently mistaken citation by plaintiffs). Admit that 11 

C.F.R. § 300.30(c), cited in plaintiffs’ accompanying footnote 1, does refer to political party 

“organizations,” a term Commission regulations do use in some places to refer to entities which 

are not “political committees” under the Act. See also 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(d) (defining a 

“disbursement” as including payments by both a “political committee” and “an organization that 

is not a political committee”). 11 C.F.R. § 300.30(c) sets out the scope of 11 C.F.R. §§ 300.30-

37, the post-BCRA regulations that apply to state, district and local party committees and 

organizations, but does not restate the definitions of “political committee” or “party committee,” 

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as plaintiffs’ footnote could be read to suggest. The Commission is without knowledge or 

information sufficient to admit or deny the third and fourth sentences of this paragraph. 

7. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ conclusions of law, to which no response is 

required. To the extent a response is required: The Commission is without knowledge or 

information sufficient to admit or deny this paragraph, other than to admit that the Jefferson 

Parish Republican Executive Committee has not registered with the Commission as a “political 

committee,” and to note that Plaintiffs apparently were mistaken in their citation to the 

regulatory definition of a “Party committee.” That definition is at 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(e)(4) rather 

than 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(d)(4). 

8. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ conclusions of law, to which no response is 

required. To the extent a response is required: The Commission is without knowledge or 

information sufficient to admit or deny this paragraph. 

9. Admit that the Commission is the independent agency of the United States 

government with statutory authority over the administration, interpretation, and civil 

enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30146 (“FECA”), 

including BCRA. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30106(b)(1), 30107(a)(7)-(8), 30109, 30111(a)(8). 

10. The footnote accompanying the heading that precedes this paragraph 

characterizes a section of plaintiffs’ own complaint, to which no response is required, and quotes 

the transcript of an oral argument, which speaks for itself. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ 

characterizations of a judicial decision and conclusions of law, to which no response is required. 

To the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted omissions and alterations, 

this paragraph accurately quotes the per curiam district court opinion in McConnell v. FEC, 251 

F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003), which speaks for itself. 

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11. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of a judicial decision and 

conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: 

Admit that this paragraph accurately quotes the per curiam district court opinion in McConnell, 

251 F. Supp. 2d at 198 n.13, which speaks for itself, except that the first citation in the passage is 

not “106.5(a)(1)(i) (1991),” but rather “106.5(a)(2)(i) (1991).” 

12. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of a judicial decision and 

conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: 

Admit that, other than the noted omissions and alterations, this paragraph accurately quotes the 

per curiam district court opinion in McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 198, except in three respects: 

1) the word “the” should appear between “disclose” and “details”; 2) the words “including 

donors” should be bracketed as they do not appear in the quote; and 3) the word “exempt” should 

be “exempted.” 

13. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of a judicial decision and an 

FEC Advisory Opinion, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: 

Admit that this paragraph appears to characterize the Commission’s Advisory Opinion 1995-25 

(RNC), which speaks for itself. Admit that this paragraph accurately quotes Advisory Opinion 

1995-25 (RNC), except that the words “as made” are omitted between “considered” and “in 

connection.” 

14. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of an FEC Advisory Opinion, 

to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit that Republican 

and Democratic parties, at national and state levels, ran purported “issue” advertisements that 

featured federal candidates after the issuance of Advisory Opinion 1995-25 (RNC). Admit that 

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this paragraph accurately quotes the per curiam district court opinion in McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 

2d at 199-200, which speaks for itself. 

15. This paragraph and its accompanying footnote contain plaintiffs’ characterizations 

of BCRA, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Deny, to the 

extent the paragraph alleges that Congress (a) defined federal election activity to include all 

“voter mobilization, party promotion, and issue advocacy”; (b) banned state and local 

committees from using any nonfederal funds for federal election activity; (c) prohibited state and 

local committees from allocating fundraising costs when raising nonfederal funds jointly with 

federal funds that are to be used for federal election activity, 11 C.F.R. § 300.32(a)(3); and (d) 

required reporting of all federal election activity. Admit that federal election activity may not be 

allocated pursuant to 11 C.F.R. § 106.7(b). Admit the statement in footnote four that some 

allocation between Levin funds and federal funds is permissible pursuant to 11 C.F.R. § 300.33. 

The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the footnote’s 

statements regarding plaintiffs’ conduct. Deny that the use of Levin funds is unduly complex, 

burdensome, or restrictive. 

16. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30101(20), which speaks for itself. 

17. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30101(21)-(24), which speak for themselves. 

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18. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes 11 C.F.R. § 

100.25, which speaks for itself. 

19. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the block quotation in the paragraph accurately 

quotes 11 C.F.R. § 100.26, which speaks for itself. Admit that the “general public political 

advertising” portion of the public communication definition does “not include communications 

over the Internet, except for communications placed for a fee on another person’s Web site.” 

The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the footnote’s 

statements regarding plaintiffs’ conduct. 

20. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the block quotation in the paragraph accurately 

quotes 11 C.F.R. § 100.27, which speaks for itself, except that the words “substantially similar” 

should be italicized. Admit that the definition of mass mailing “does not include electronic mail 

or Internet communications transmitted over telephone lines.” 

21. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the block quotation in the paragraph accurately 

quotes 11 C.F.R. § 100.28, which speaks for itself, except that the words “substantially similar” 

should be italicized. Admit that the definition of telephone bank “does not include electronic 

mail or Internet communications transmitted over telephone lines.” 

22. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(b)(3) speaks for itself. Regarding 

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plaintiffs’ use of “[non-Internet]” in their characterization of the regulation, admit that section 

100.24(b)(3) incorporates “Public communication” as that term is used in 11 C.F.R. § 100.26. 

23. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes 11 C.F.R. § 

100.24(a)(1), which speaks for itself. 

24. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the block quotation in the paragraph accurately 

quotes 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(2), which speaks for itself. Deny plaintiffs’ broad statement that 

the regulation “includes Internet communications,” because there is a de minimis exception to 

the scope of “Federal election activity” for certain online voter registration activities. See 11 

C.F.R. § 100.24(c)(7). 

25. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the block quotation in the paragraph accurately 

quotes 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(3), which speaks for itself. Deny plaintiffs’ broad statement that 

the regulation “includes Internet communications,” because there is a de minimis exception to 

the scope of “Federal election activity” for certain online voter information activities. See 11 

C.F.R. § 100.24(c)(7). 

26. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the block quotation in the paragraph accurately 

quotes 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(4), which speaks for itself. The Commission is without knowledge 

or information sufficient to admit or deny the reference to unspecified “Internet communications 

to ‘acquir[e] information about potential voters.’” 

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27. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes 11 C.F.R. § 

100.24(b)-(c), which speak for themselves. 

28. Admit that the FEC publishes on its website the time frames when political party 

conduct is considered “Federal election activity” under 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(1) for each state. 

29. Admit. 

30. Admit. 

31. Admit. 

32. This paragraph and the heading that precedes it contain conclusions of law, to 

which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit that the block 

quotation in the paragraph accurately quotes 52 U.S.C. § 30125(b)(1), which speaks for itself. 

Deny that the limit at BCRA § 101(a) is a “ban.” 

33. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes the FEC’s Local 

Party Activity Brochure (Oct. 2006, updated Jan. 2015 

(http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/local_party_activity_brochure.pdf), which speaks for itself. 

34. This paragraph and the heading that precedes it contain conclusions of law, to 

which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit that the block 

quotation in the paragraph accurately quotes 52 U.S.C. § 30125(c), which speaks for itself. 

However, the text is misleading to the extent it implies that FEC regulations require a single 

method of paying fundraising costs when in fact section 300.32(a)(3) permits state and local 

committees to allocate fundraising costs when raising nonfederal funds jointly with federal funds 

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that are to be used for federal election activity, 11 C.F.R. § 300.32(a)(3), and permits the raising 

of Levin funds with Levin funds, 11 C.F.R. § 300.32(a)(4). 

35. This paragraph and the heading that precedes it contain conclusions of law, to 

which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Deny the statement in the 

footnote that “[a]ll federal election activity must be funded from a federal account registered and 

reporting as a ‘political committee,’” as well as the implication in the text that all political party 

organizations are “political committees” under FECA and must report monthly to the FEC. See 

11 C.F.R. § 300.36 (describing “recordkeeping” requirements for a state and local committee 

“that is not a political committee” but makes disbursements for federal election activity, not 

reporting requirements); FEC, Prohibited and Excessive Contributions: Non-Federal Funds or 

Soft Money, 67 Fed. Reg. 49064, 49103-04 (July 29, 2002) (“2002 Soft Money Rules”) 

(recognizing that “a political party organization that is not a political committee” does not “have 

reporting requirements under BCRA”); FEC, Local Party Activity (Oct. 2006, updated Jan. 

2015), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/locparty.shtml (“Local Party Brochure”) (explaining 

how “local party organizations not registered with the FEC” pay for federal election activity). 

Admit that, other than the noted alterations, the block quotation in the paragraph accurately 

quotes 52 U.S.C. § 30104(e), which speaks for itself. 

36. This paragraph and the heading that precedes it contain conclusions of law, to 

which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the 

many noted alterations and omissions, the paragraph accurately quotes 11 C.F.R. § 

300.30(b)(3)(iii) and 11 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(3)(iv), which speak for themselves. However, the 

paragraph and its accompanying footnote are inaccurate to the extent that they suggest that 

committees are required to use federal accounts. To the contrary, 11 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(1) 

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allows numerous types of nonfederal accounts, 11 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(2) allows for Levin 

accounts, and 11 C.F.R. §§ 300.30(b)(3)(iii)(B) and (b)(4) permit allocation accounts, but all of 

these types of accounts are omitted from the quote and described as “not applicable” or “not at 

issue.” Furthermore, the quote from 11 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(3)(iv) is misleading because: 1) that 

section only applies to payments made from a federal account, 2) the section does not define “in 

connection with,” despite the plaintiffs’ suggestion that it does, 3) the quotation omits the last 

part of the provision, which discusses transfer of nonfederal account money to the federal 

account, and 4) the quotation misrepresents the regulation by suggesting that it requires parties to 

pay for federal election activity from a federal account. Lastly, the accompanying footnote is 

misleading both because the reasonable accounting method described in 11 C.F.R. § 102.5(b)(2) 

is not limited to the use of Levin funds, but can be used by state and local party organizations 

that are not “political committees” under FECA, and because the footnote ignores the allocation 

accounts discussed at 11 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(4), which can contain federal and nonfederal funds. 

37. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted omissions, the paragraph 

accurately quotes 11 C.F.R. § 300.30(c) (with the exception of omitting the word “paragraphs” 

before “(c)(1)”) and 11 C.F.R. § 300.30(c)(1) (with the exception of adding the words “which 

must be” to the beginning of the quotation), which speak for themselves. The block quotation in 

this paragraph is inaccurate to the extent it suggests that the entire quotation is discussing all 

three alternative ways to use a federal account, when in fact the language quoted after the second 

ellipsis applies only to the first such option under 11 C.F.R. § 300.30(c)(1). Moreover, section 

300.30(c)(1) does not define “federal account”; that term is defined at section 300.30(b)(3), a 

provision that does not use the “treated as a separate political committee” language or reference 

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mandatory monthly reporting as required under section 300.30(c)(1) for organizations choosing 

the federal-only option. See also 11 C.F.R. § 300.36(a) (describing reasonable accounting 

method for records of federal funds by non-political committees making disbursements for 

federal election activity; this section does not require such party organizations that are not 

“political committees” to file reports with the Commission). Deny that Levin accounts are “not 

at issue here.” 

38. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: This paragraph is inaccurate, for reasons similar to those 

discussed in the response to No. 37, above, to the extent that it states that monthly reporting is 

required for any party organization engaged in federal election activity. See 11 C.F.R. § 

300.36(c) (describing what entities must file reports); 2002 Soft Money Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. at 

49103-04 (discussing how section 300.36 treats two types of entities — political committees 

under section 300.36(b) and non-political committees under § 300.36(a) — and noting that, 

under section 300.36(a), a state or local party organization “that has not qualified as a political 

committee” has no reporting requirements). 

39. This paragraph and its accompanying footnote contain conclusions of law, to 

which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Deny for a number of 

reasons, including the following. First, a “brief exhortation” incidental to a communication is 

not defined as federal election activity. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.24(a)(2)(ii), (a)(3)(ii); see also FEC, 

Definition of Federal Election Activity, 75 Fed. Reg. 55257, 55261-62 (Sept. 10, 2010) 

(explaining that the voter registration exception applies regardless of medium and would include 

a brief incidental exhortation in an email); id. at 55264 (same, for get-out-the-vote exception). 

Second, the quotation from the Explanation and Justification is edited so as to completely change 

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the meaning. The full quotation explains that (1) non-de minimis costs for enumerated activity 

and (2) de minimis costs for non-enumerated activities must be paid for with Federal funds “or a 

mix of Federal and Levin funds, as appropriate.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 55266. Deny the statement in 

accompanying footnote 9. See infra ¶ 62. 

40. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes 52 U.S.C. § 

30101(4)(A), which speaks for itself. 

41. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes 52 U.S.C. § 

30101(4)(C), which speaks for itself. 

42. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Deny, to the extent that the paragraph fails to state that only 

the federally-allocable portion of these exempt payments counts towards the $5,000 threshold in 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)(C). See 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.140, 100.147(b), 100.149(b); Local Party 

Brochure at 2. Admit that the paragraph otherwise accurately quotes portions of 52 U.S.C. § 

30101(8)(B), which speaks for itself. 

43. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted omissions and alterations, the 

paragraph accurately quotes an earlier version of the FEC’s Local Party Activity brochure (Oct. 

2006, updated Jan. 2013), 

http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/local_party_activity_brochure.pdf, which speaks for itself. 

44. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted omissions and alterations, the 

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paragraph accurately quotes an earlier version of the FEC’s Local Party Activity Brochure (Oct. 

2006, updated Jan. 2013), 

http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/local_party_activity_brochure.pdf, which speaks for itself. 

45. The first sentence of this paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no 

response is required. To the extent a response is required: Deny to the extent that the sentence 

suggests that allocation is prohibited for all federal election activity, because allocation can be 

made between federal funds and Levin funds for certain federal election activity pursuant to 11 

C.F.R. § 300.33. Admit that the sentence otherwise accurately quotes 11 C.F.R. § 106.7(b), 

which speaks for itself. The second sentence of this paragraph contains plaintiffs’ 

characterizations of legal claims in their own Complaint, to which no response is required. 

46. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes 11 C.F.R. 

§ 106.7(c), which speaks for itself. 

47. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes 11 C.F.R. § 

106.7(d)(1), which speaks for itself, in explaining the rules for compensated time, except that all 

three quoted sections omit the word “on” between the words “or” and “activities.” 

48. This paragraph and its accompanying footnote contain conclusions of law, to 

which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph 

appears to accurately state the allocation percentages listed in 11 C.F.R. § 106.7(d)(2), which 

speaks for itself. 

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49. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph appears to accurately state the 

allocation percentages listed in 11 C.F.R. § 106.7(d)(3), which speaks for itself. 

50. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes 11 C.F.R. § 

106.7(d)(4), which speaks for itself. 

51. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted alterations, the paragraph 

accurately quotes 11 C.F.R. § 106.7(e), which speaks for itself. However, the paragraph is 

misleading to the extent that it fails to note that allocation between federal and Levin funds is 

permissible for federal election activity pursuant to 11 C.F.R. § 106.7(e)(3). 

52. This paragraph and the heading that precede it contain conclusions of law, to 

which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the 

noted alterations, the paragraph accurately quotes 52 U.S.C. § 30125(a), (e), and (f)(1), which 

speak for themselves. 

53. Admit the first sentence of this paragraph. Admit that the second sentence 

characterizes and quotes from a summary on the FEC website; that summary contains 

conclusions of law, to which no response is required. The third sentence contains plaintiffs’ 

characterizations of a judicial decision and conclusions of law, to which no response is required. 

To the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted omission, the paragraph 

accurately quotes language from 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(2)(i)(A) and (3)(i)(A), which speak for 

themselves, except that the first letter of “encouraging” should be capitalized, and admit that the 

FEC revised the cited regulatory definitions in accord with the cited judicial decision. 

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54. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of the 2002 Soft Money 

Rules, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit that the 

paragraph accurately quotes the FEC’s Explanation and Justification of its soft money 

regulations, which speaks for itself. 

55. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of Shays v. FEC, 337 F. 

Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and FEC, Definition of Federal 

Election Activity, 71 Fed. Reg. 8926 (Feb. 22, 2006), to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted alterations and omissions, the 

paragraph accurately quotes language from the above Explanation and Justification, which 

speaks for itself. 

56. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 

914 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Shays III”), to which no response is required. To the extent a response is 

required: Admit that the paragraph appears to paraphrase a portion of the opinion. 

57. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of FEC, Definition of Federal 

Election Activity, 75 Fed. Reg. 55257 (Sep. 10, 2010), to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted omission, the paragraph 

accurately quotes the Commission’s Explanation and Justification of its federal election activity 

regulations, which speaks for itself. 

58. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of FEC, Definition of Federal 

Election Activity, 75 Fed. Reg. 55257 (Sep. 10, 2010), to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required: This paragraph misleadingly omits language directly preceding the 

quoted language in that Commission Explanation and Justification for the promulgated 

regulations, which explains McConnell’s rationale for holding that restricting funding of Federal 

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election activity is constitutional, namely that the provisions were “likely necessary to prevent 

‘corrupting activity from shifting wholesale to state committees and thereby eviscerating [the 

Act].’” Id. at 55258 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 165-66 (2003)). The Commission 

otherwise admits that, with the noted alterations, the paragraph accurately quotes that 

Commission Explanation and Justification, which speaks for itself. 

59. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of FEC, Definition of Federal 

Election Activity, 75 Fed. Reg. 55257 (Sep. 10, 2010), to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required: The paragraph mischaracterizes the Commission’s rulemaking by 

stating that the FEC “reiterated” the rationale of its 2006 Explanation and Justification, when in 

fact the FEC merely recounted that aspect of the prior rule’s rationale, which Shays had rejected. 

The Commission otherwise admits that, with the noted alterations and omissions, the paragraph 

accurately quotes that FEC Explanation and Justification for its promulgated regulations, which 

speaks for itself. 

60. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of FEC, Definition of Federal 

Election Activity, 75 Fed. Reg. 55257 (Sep. 10, 2010) and a comment received by the FEC from 

the Democratic National Committee, to which no response is required. To the extent a response 

is required: Deny the paragraph’s implication that the Commission’s decision not to explicitly 

exclude Internet communications from the definition of Federal election activity was 

inappropriate. See FEC, Definition of Federal Election Activity, 75 Fed. Reg. 55257, 55261, 

55263 (Sept. 10, 2010). Admit that, other than the noted alterations and omissions, the 

paragraph accurately quotes the cited FEC Explanation and Justification and a comment received 

by the FEC, which speak for themselves. 

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61. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of FEC, Internet 

Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18589 (Apr. 12, 2006), to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted omissions, the paragraph 

accurately quotes language from the above Explanation and Justification, which speaks for itself. 

62. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of FEC, Internet 

Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18589 (Apr. 12, 2006), to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted alterations and omissions, the 

paragraph accurately quotes language from the above FEC Explanation and Justification, which 

speaks for itself. However, this paragraph is misleading to the extent it suggests that in the first 

block quotation, the FEC was explaining the new rule it adopted in 2006. In fact, the first block 

quotation is about the rationale for the prior FEC rule, which had excluded all Internet activities 

from the definition of “public communication.” Moreover, the sentence in between the two 

block quotations is misleading, because the quoted language is about the effect of characterizing 

certain communications as “public communications,” not as federal election activity. Lastly, the 

second block quotation predates the exemption of certain activity on a state/local committee's 

own website under the de minimis federal election activity exemptions. See Definition of 

Federal Election Activity, 75 Fed. Reg. at 55265. 

63. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted alterations and omissions, this 

paragraph accurately quotes language from 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(2)(i)(A) and (3)(i)(A), which 

speak for themselves. 

64. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted alterations and omissions, the 

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18 

first sentence of this paragraph accurately quotes language from 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(2)(ii) and 

(3)(ii), which speak for themselves. Admit that the second sentence of this paragraph accurately 

quotes from FEC, Definition of Federal Election Activity, 75 Fed. Reg. 55257 (Sept. 10, 2010), 

which also speaks for itself. 

65. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of an FEC Explanation and 

Justification for promulgating a regulation, to which no response is required. To the extent a 

response is required: Admit that neither 11 C.F.R. § 100.24 nor FEC, Definition of Federal 

Election Activity, 75 Fed. Reg. 55257 (Sep. 10, 2010) define “encouraging or urging.” The 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking cited merely showed that the proposed rules used examples that 

were similar to those adopted in the final rule (in lieu of a definition), and these examples include 

use of the word “urging.” See FEC, Definition of Federal Election Activity, 74 Fed. Reg. 53674, 

53680 (Oct. 20, 2009); see also Definition of Federal Election Activity, 75 Fed. Reg. at 55261 

(explaining that the final rule is reorganized, compared to the proposed one, but 

“[n]otwithstanding this change in form, the new definition covers the same universe of activities 

as the definition proposed in the NPRM”). 

66. The first three sentences of this paragraph contain conclusions of law and 

plaintiffs’ characterizations of FEC regulations and the per curiam opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, 

424 U.S. 1 (1975), to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: The 

assertion in the first sentence that “encouraging or urging” means “exhorting” is unsupported by 

the quoted language or citations. The assertion in the second sentence that Buckley’s express 

advocacy construction is a constitutional imperative in the exemption from the definition of 

Federal election activity is similarly unsupported by any of the cited sources. Therefore, the 

third sentence, which combines the unsupported propositions in the previous two sentences, has 

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no basis in the case law or regulations. The fourth sentence is plaintiffs’ explanation of their 

own Complaint, to which no response is required. 

67. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of the transcript of an FEC 

rulemaking hearing, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: 

Admit that this paragraph accurately quotes portions of the transcript of the FEC’s December 16, 

2009 rulemaking hearing, which speaks for itself. 

68. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of the transcript of an FEC 

rulemaking hearing, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: 

Admit that, other than the noted alterations and omissions, this paragraph accurately quotes 

portions of the transcript of the FEC’s December 16, 2009 rulemaking hearing, which speaks for 

itself. 

69. The heading preceding this paragraph contains apparent characterizations of an 

audio recording which speaks for itself. Admit that, other than the noted alterations and 

omissions, the first sentence accurately quotes the press release, which speaks for itself, except 

that in the press release there is no quotation mark after “forum.” Admit the second sentence. 

70. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of testimony given at the 

FEC’s June 4, 2014 public forum, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is 

required: Admit that the FEC heard numerous witnesses express a variety of opinions at the June 

2014 forum, including as to the rules related to federal election activity, and that the Commission 

has not made any regulatory changes as a result of those comments. 

71. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of testimony given at the 

FEC’s June 4, 2014 public forum, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is 

required: Admit that this paragraph accurately quotes testimony from the FEC’s June 2014 

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forum, which speaks for itself. The Commission notes that, immediately after the quote in the 

paragraph’s last sentence, Mr. Martin stated that “[t]he recent McCutcheon decision and the 

recent lawsuit by Jim Bopp to strike down individual limits to parties is not the direction our 

party would advocate.” Audio at 8:09, http://www.fec.gov/audio/2014/20140604_FORUM.mp3. 

The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the statements 

in the fifth, sixth, and seventh sentences of this paragraph, except that the Recommendations 

document identified was distributed at the June 2014 FEC forum. 

72. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of testimony given at the 

FEC’s June 4, 2014 public forum, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is 

required: Admit that, other than the noted alterations and omissions, this paragraph accurately 

quotes testimony from the FEC’s June 2014 public forum, which speaks for itself. 

73. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of a document created by the 

Committee on Campaign Finance Reform, to which no response is required. To the extent a 

response is required: Admit that this paragraph is generally accurate in quoting portions of the 

Committee on Campaign Finance Reform’s “Legislative Recommendations for Campaign 

Finance Reform,” which speaks for itself. 

74. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the first sentence of this paragraph. The second sentence contains plaintiffs’ characterization of 

their own Complaint, to which no response is required. 

75. The Commission admits that LAGOP has reported having a federal account and 

engaging in federal election activity, but the Commission is otherwise without knowledge or 

information sufficient to admit or deny the first, third, and fourth sentences of this paragraph. 

The Commission is also without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the second 

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sentence of this paragraph, except that the sentence is denied to the extent that it suggests that 

LAGOP is unlawfully burdened by BCRA or unable to allocate Levin funds for use with all 

federal election activity. 

76. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph, except that it is denied to the extent that it suggests that local parties are 

unlawfully burdened by BCRA or required to become a reporting political committee to engage 

in federal election activity. 

77. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph. 

78. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph. 

79. Admit that 11 C.F.R. § 109.20 defines what “coordinated” means generally under 

the Commission’s regulations, and that 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 defines specifically what 

“coordinated communications” are. The FEC notes that these regulations speak for themselves. 

80. This paragraph and its accompanying footnote contain plaintiffs’ characterizations 

of FEC regulations, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: 

Admit that, other than the noted alterations and omissions, this paragraph and its footnote 

accurately quote 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.21, 109.30, 109.37, and 100.16, which speak for themselves. 

However, the Commission notes that an unregistered party organization can coordinate under 11 

C.F.R. § 109.37 if it is authorized to do so by the national or state committee. See 11 C.F.R. § 

109.33 (assignment of party coordination authority). In addition, the paragraph implies that a 

registered party committee like LAGOP can only coordinate under 11 C.F.R. § 109.37, when in 

fact it may also be permitted to coordinate under 11 C.F.R. § 109.21, for example in primary 

Case 1:15-cv-01241-CRC Document 19 Filed 10/13/15 Page 21 of 35
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elections. The Commission admits that Jefferson Parish Republican Parish Executive Committee 

and Orleans Parish Republican Executive Committee are not registered with the FEC. 

81. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterization of 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a), to 

which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the 

noted omissions, this paragraph accurately quotes 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a), which speaks for itself. 

82. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterization of 11 C.F.R. § 109.37, to 

which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the 

noted omissions, this paragraph accurately quotes language from 11 C.F.R. § 109.37, which 

speaks for itself. 

83. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterization of FEC regulations, which 

speak for themselves, and no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit 

that the definitions of “public communication” in 11 C.F.R. § 100.26 and “electioneering 

communication” in 11 C.F.R. § 100.29 exclude “communications over the Internet,” except that 

section 100.26 does not exclude “communications placed for a fee on another person’s Web 

site.” 

84. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the first sentence of this paragraph. The second sentence contains conclusions of law, to which 

no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted 

alteration, this paragraph accurately quotes a portion of the 2002 Soft Money Rules, a document 

which speaks for itself. The Commission is otherwise without knowledge or information 

sufficient to admit or deny the second sentence. The third sentence contains plaintiffs’ 

characterization of their own Complaint, to which no response is required. 

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85. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph or its accompanying footnotes to the extent that they discuss the planned future 

activities of LAGOP. The paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future 

activity and plaintiffs’ characterization of an FEC regulation, to which no response is required. 

Both footnote 15 and the sentence it accompanies are legal conclusions to which no response is 

required. To the extent a response is required: The Commission notes that “state election 

materials” may constitute federal election activity, because providing such information may fall 

within the definition of federal election activity and is exempted only if posted on a committee's 

own website pursuant to the de minimis exemption at 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(c)(7) (not 11 C.F.R. § 

100.25(c)(7), as cited in this paragraph). The Commission admits that the material described in 

the paragraph is posted on LAGOP’s website and that the paragraph accurately quotes the 

website, which speaks for itself. 

86. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity and plaintiffs’ 

characterization of an FEC regulation, to which no response is required. The FEC notes that 

plaintiffs’ citation to 11 C.F.R. § 100.25(c)(7) is incorrect, as no such subsection exists. 

Plaintiffs appear to be intending to cite 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(c)(7). 

87. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity and plaintiffs’ 

characterization of 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(c)(7), to which no response is required. 

Case 1:15-cv-01241-CRC Document 19 Filed 10/13/15 Page 23 of 35
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88. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity and plaintiffs’ 

characterization of 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.25, 100.26, and 100.27, to which no response is required. 

89. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity and plaintiffs’ 

characterization of 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.25 and 100.26, to which no response is required. 

90. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity, to which no 

response is required. 

91. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity and plaintiffs’ 

characterization of 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.25, 100.26, and 100.27, to which no response is required. 

92. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity and plaintiffs’ 

characterization of 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.25, 100.26, and 100.27, to which no response is required. 

93. Admit the first sentence. The Commission is without knowledge or information 

sufficient to admit or deny the remainder of this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the 

planned future activities of LAGOP. The paragraph also contains legal conclusions about 

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25 

hypothetical future activity and plaintiffs’ characterization of 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.25, 100.26, and 

100.27, to which no response is required. 

94. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. This 

paragraph contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity and plaintiffs’ 

characterization of 11 C.F.R. § 100.24, to which no response is required. To the extent a 

response is required: Admit that this paragraph accurately quotes language from 11 C.F.R. § 

100.24, which speaks for itself. 

95. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The last 

sentence consists of a legal conclusion, to which no response is required. 

96. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity and plaintiffs’ 

characterization of 11 C.F.R. § 100.24, to which no response is required. To the extent a 

response is required: Admit that this paragraph accurately quotes 11 C.F.R. § 100.24, which 

speaks for itself. Deny that any FEC regulations lack a “constitutional justification.” 

97. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. This 

paragraph also contains plaintiffs’ characterization of 11 C.F.R. § 100.25, to which no response 

is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit that this paragraph accurately quotes 11 

C.F.R. § 100.25, which speaks for itself. The last sentence contains plaintiffs’ characterization 

of their own Complaint, to which no response is required. 

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26 

98. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity and plaintiffs’ 

characterization of 11 C.F.R. § 100.26, to which no response is required. 

99. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph. 

100. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph. 

101. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. This 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions and plaintiffs’ characterization of 11 C.F.R. § 100.24, 

to which no response is required. The last sentence contains plaintiffs’ characterization of their 

own Complaint, to which no response is required. 

102. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent it discusses the past desires of LAGOP or the policies of Senator 

Mary Landrieu. Admit that Senator Landrieu was a federal candidate in 2014. 

103. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity, to which no 

response is required. 

104. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The 

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paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity, to which no 

response is required.

105. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. The 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions about hypothetical future activity, to which no 

response is required.

106. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of LAGOP. This 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions and plaintiffs’ characterization of an FEC regulation, 

to which no response is required. The FEC notes that plaintiffs’ citation at the end of the 

paragraph should read “11 C.F.R. § 106.7(d)(1),” rather than “11 C.F.R. § 106.7(1)(d).” 

107. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of the plaintiffs. The 

bullet points in this paragraph are legal conclusions, to which no response is required. To the 

extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted alterations and omissions, this 

paragraph accurately quotes portions of FECA. 

108. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the factual allegations in this paragraph. This paragraph also contains legal conclusions, to 

which no response is required. 

109. The first sentence of this paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterization of legal 

claims in their own Complaint, to which no response is required. The Commission is without 

knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the factual allegations in the second and 

third sentences, which also contain legal conclusions, to which no response is required. 

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110. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of plaintiffs. This 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions, to which no response is required. 

111. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the factual allegations in this paragraph. This paragraph also contains legal conclusions, to 

which no response is required. 

112. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

this paragraph to the extent that it discusses the planned future activities of plaintiffs. This 

paragraph also contains legal conclusions, to which no response is required. 

113. The first sentence of this paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of legal 

claims in their own Complaint, to which no response is required. The rest of the first sentence 

contains legal conclusions, to which no response is required. Deny the second sentence of this 

paragraph. 

114. The Commission is without knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the first sentence of this paragraph. Deny the second sentence of this paragraph. The third 

sentence contains conclusions of law, including speculation about this Court’s jurisdiction over 

this case well into the future, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is 

required: Admit that this sentence appears to characterize a portion of FEC v. Wisconsin Right 

to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 461-63 (2007), which speaks for itself. 

115. Admit that plaintiffs will face a credible threat of civil enforcement proceedings if 

they engage in activities in violation of FECA. Deny that plaintiffs will face a credible threat of 

criminal prosecution absent the required knowing and willful intent. 

116. Deny. 

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117. Deny the heading preceding this paragraph. This paragraph re-alleges and 

incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-116 of plaintiffs’ Complaint, 

and the Commission therefore incorporates by reference its responses to those paragraphs. 

118. The first sentence of this paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of legal 

claims in their own Complaint, to which no response is required. The second sentence of this 

paragraph and the accompanying footnote contain legal conclusions and apparent quotations 

from Commission regulations, to which no response is required. The Commission is without 

knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the third sentence of this paragraph. 

119. The first sentence of this paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of legal 

claims in their own Complaint, to which no response is required. The Commission is without 

knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the factual allegations in the second 

sentence of this paragraph or the footnote accompanying the first sentence. The second sentence 

also contains legal conclusions regarding hypothetical future activity and plaintiffs’ 

characterization of 11 C.F.R. § 100.24, to which no response is required. 

120. Deny that “the challenged provisions burden core political speech and 

association” and deny the last sentence. The remainder of the paragraph contains conclusions of 

law, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Admit that this 

paragraph appears to characterize a portion of the plurality opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 

S. Ct. 1434 (2014), which speaks for itself. Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes from the 

opinion in McCutcheon. 

121. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that this paragraph appears to characterize portions of 

the majority opinion in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and the plurality and 

Case 1:15-cv-01241-CRC Document 19 Filed 10/13/15 Page 29 of 35
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dissenting opinions in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, which speak for themselves. Admit 

that the paragraph quotes portions of the opinions in McCutcheon, but deny that their 

rearrangement and combination here state accurate legal holdings. 

122. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that this paragraph appears to characterize portions of 

the majority opinion in Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, and the plurality opinion in McCutcheon, 

134 S. Ct. 1434, which speak for themselves. Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes from 

the plurality opinion in McCutcheon. 

123. Deny the first sentence. Admit that the Explanation and Justifications 

accompanying FEC rulemakings in 2002 and 2006 stated that “mere encouragement” would be 

excluded from the definitions of “voter registration activity” and “get-out-the-vote activity,” but 

deny that the Commission did so because they are “so lacking in quid-pro-quo risk.” 

124. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted alteration, this paragraph 

quotes from the majority opinions in Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, and Buckley, 424 U.S. 1. 

Deny the implication that the risk of corruption is not present with respect to contributions to 

political parties. 

125. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted alteration, this paragraph 

quotes portions of the plurality opinion in McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434, but deny that their 

rearrangement and combination here state accurate legal holdings. 

126. The first sentence of this paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no 

response is required. The second sentence of this paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations 

Case 1:15-cv-01241-CRC Document 19 Filed 10/13/15 Page 30 of 35
31 

of an FEC Explanation and Justification, to which no response is required. To the extent a 

response is required: The paragraph mischaracterizes the Commission’s two rulemakings by 

indicating that they reached the same conclusion when in fact the 2010 rulemaking quote merely 

recounted that aspect of the 2006 rulemaking that Shays III, 528 F.3d 914 had rejected. 

127. The first sentence and block quote contain plaintiffs’ characterizations of an FEC 

Explanation and Justification of a regulation, to which no response is required. To the extent a 

response is required: Admit that, other than the noted alteration, the block quotation quotes from 

67 Fed. Reg. at 49072. But see Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 70-71 (rejecting the idea that no 

Internet communications could be included in the definition of public communication), aff’d, 414 

F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The last three sentences of the paragraph contain conclusions of law, 

to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: Plaintiffs accurately 

quote portions of 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.24 and 100.26. Deny that the described activities lack quidpro-quo risk. 

128. Deny. 

129. Deny. 

130. Deny the heading preceding this paragraph. This paragraph re-alleges and 

incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-129 of plaintiffs’ Complaint, 

and the Commission therefore incorporates by reference its responses to those paragraphs. 

131. The first sentence of this paragraph and its accompanying footnote contain 

plaintiffs’ characterizations of legal claims in their own Complaint, to which no response is 

required. The second sentence of this paragraph contains conclusions of law and plaintiffs’ 

characterization of FEC regulations, to which no response is required. To the extent a response 

Case 1:15-cv-01241-CRC Document 19 Filed 10/13/15 Page 31 of 35
32 

is required, plaintiffs have mistakenly cited the definition of “public communication” as 11 

C.F.R. § 100.25, when the correct cite is 11 C.F.R. § 100.26. 

132. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of legal claims in their own 

Complaint, to which no response is required. The Commission is without knowledge or 

information sufficient to admit or deny the statements in the paragraph to the extent that they 

discuss the planned future activities of plaintiffs. This paragraph also contains legal conclusions, 

to which no response is required. 

133. The first sentence of the paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no 

response is required. Deny the second sentence. 

134. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that this paragraph appears to characterize portions of 

the majority opinion in Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, and the plurality and dissenting opinions 

in McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434, which speak for themselves. Admit that the paragraph quotes 

portions of the opinions in McCutcheon, but deny that their rearrangement and combination here 

state accurate legal holdings. 

135. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that this paragraph appears to characterize portions of 

the majority opinion in Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 and the plurality opinion in McCutcheon, 

134 S. Ct. 1434, which speak for themselves. Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes from 

the plurality opinion in McCutcheon. 

136. Deny the first sentence of this paragraph. The remainder of this paragraph 

contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is 

required: Admit that this paragraph appears to characterize portions of the opinions in Colorado 

Case 1:15-cv-01241-CRC Document 19 Filed 10/13/15 Page 32 of 35
33 

Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 839 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Colo. 1993); Colorado 

Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); and Citizens United, 

558 U.S. 310, and accurately quotes from that last opinion. 

137. Deny the first sentence of this paragraph and deny that plaintiffs’ proposed 

activities pose no quid-pro-quo risk. The second through fourth sentences of this paragraph 

contain legal conclusions, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required: 

Admit that this paragraph appears to characterize the Commission’s FEC Statement on Carey v. 

FEC: Reporting Guidance for Political Committees that Maintain a Non-Contribution Account

(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2011/20111006postcarey.shtml. The last sentence 

of the paragraph characterizes plaintiffs’ claims, to which no response is required, and to the 

extent the sentence discusses plaintiffs’ planned future activities, the Commission is without 

knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the sentence. 

138. Deny. 

139. Deny the heading preceding this paragraph. This paragraph re-alleges and 

incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-138 of plaintiffs’ Complaint, 

and the Commission therefore incorporates by reference its responses to those paragraphs. 

140. This paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of legal claims in their own 

Complaint, to which no response is required. 

141. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that 11 C.F.R. § 100.24, which speaks for itself, 

includes activity independent from federal candidates in the definition of “federal election 

activity.” 

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142. The first sentence of the paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no 

response is required. Deny the second sentence. 

143. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that this paragraph appears to characterize portions of 

the majority opinion in Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, and the plurality and dissenting opinions 

in McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434, which speak for themselves. Admit that the paragraph quotes 

from the opinions in McCutcheon, but deny that their rearrangement and combination here state 

accurate legal holdings 

144. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that this paragraph appears to characterize portions of 

the majority opinion in Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, and the plurality opinion in McCutcheon, 

134 S. Ct. 1434, which speak for themselves. Admit that the paragraph accurately quotes from 

the plurality opinion in McCutcheon. 

145. The first sentence of this paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no 

response is required. Deny the second sentence of this paragraph. 

146. This paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To 

the extent a response is required: Admit that, other than the noted alteration, this paragraph 

accurately quotes from the majority opinion in Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. Deny that federal 

election activity by political parties is like the independent expenditures at issue in that case. 

147. The first sentence of this paragraph contains conclusions of law, to which no 

response is required. Deny the remainder of the paragraph. 

148. Deny. 

149. Deny. 

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150. Deny the heading preceding this paragraph. This paragraph re-alleges and 

incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-149 of plaintiffs’ Complaint, 

and the Commission therefore incorporates by reference its responses to those paragraphs. 

151. The first sentence of this paragraph contains plaintiffs’ characterizations of legal 

claims in their own Complaint, to which no response is required. The second and third sentences 

of this paragraph contain conclusions of law, to which no response is required. To the extent a 

response is required: Admit that this paragraph characterizes portions of the majority opinion in

Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, the plurality opinion in McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434, and 

opinions in McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, which speak for themselves, and that the paragraph 

accurately quotes an opinion in McConnell. Deny the last sentence of the paragraph. 

152. Deny. 

Prayer for Relief

1-12. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief requested or to any other relief. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Daniel A. Petalas (D.C. Bar No. 467908) 

Acting General Counsel 

dpetalas@fec.gov 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Deputy General Counsel — Law 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

Harry J. Summers

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

October 13, 2015 

/s/ Seth Nesin 

Seth Nesin 

Attorney 

snesin@fec.gov 

Greg J. Mueller (D.C. Bar No. 462840) 

Attorney 

gmueller@fec.gov 

Charles Kitcher (D.C. Bar No. 986226) 

Attorney 

ckitcher@fec.gov 

 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

Case 1:15-cv-01241-CRC Document 19 Filed 10/13/15 Page 35 of 35