ORAL ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED

No. 18-5239

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER & DEMOCRACY 21,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant-Appellee.

F8, ELI PUBLISHING, AND STEVEN J. LUND,

Intervenors-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia, No. 1:16-cv-00752-TNM

Before the Honorable Trevor McFadden

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER AND DEMOCRACY 21

Fred Wertheimer

DEMOCRACY 21

2000 Massachusetts Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20036 

(202) 429-2008

Donald J. Simon

SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE

ENDRESON & PERRY, LLP

1425 K Street, NW, Ste. 600

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 682-0240

Paul M. Smith 

Tara Malloy

Megan P. McAllen 

Mark P. Gaber

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14th Street NW, Ste. 400

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-2200

mmcallen@campaignlegalcenter.org

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................iv

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................... vii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................................................................1

ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................2

I. APPELLANTS HAVE STANDING....................................................................2

A. The dismissals have deprived CLC and Democracy 21 of information 

required to be disclosed under FECA..............................................................3

B. CLC and Democracy 21 are harmed by their inability to access the 

information ......................................................................................................5

II. APPELLEES’ CLAIMS OF UNREVIEWABILITY FAIL.................................8

A. The demand that CREW be treated as a self-executing “magic words” 

limitation on judicial review is unsustainable .................................................9

1. CREW does not bar review of dismissals founded on legal error.........9

2. Appellees identify no basis for the dismissals unconnected to 

“legal and constitutional” notice concerns..........................................11

3. The Commission’s demands for unbounded prosecutorial 

discretion would vitiate FECA’s judicial review provision and 

heighten concerns about agency abdication........................................13

B. The Commission did not dismiss the political committee claims as an 

exercise of prosecutorial discretion ...............................................................16

C. The controlling Commissioners’ new “legal standard” is ripe for review 

and contrary to law ........................................................................................17

III. THE DISMISSALS WERE CONTRARY TO LAW .......................................19

A. Dismissal of the straw-donor claims was contrary to law.............................20

1. The statute is not ambiguous...............................................................20

2. Commission guidance addressing closely held corporations did not 

“confuse” application of section 30122 ..............................................23

3. The “inadequate notice” theory is refuted by the record ....................24

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4. The “dispute” regarding the controlling Commissioners’ new

standard does not signify statutory ambiguity ....................................25

B. Failing to address the political committee allegations was arbitrary and 

capricious on its face .....................................................................................27

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................29

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.......................................................................30

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................31

ADDENDUM ...........................................................................................................--

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

*Authorities upon which appellants principally rely are marked with an asterisk

Cases: Page

Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)......................................9, 11

Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008)................................................19

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)................................................................ 4-5, 29

Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995).................................9

Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 892 F.3d 434 (D.C. 

Cir. 2018) (“CREW”)............................................................................. 1, 8, 9, 10

Common Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1988)...................................15, 16

Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 831 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 

1987) (“DCCC”)..................................................................................9, 12, 14

Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election 

Integrity, 878 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“EPIC”)..........................................7, 8

Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 922 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 2019)...................................... 2-3

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 306 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2002)................................................3

*FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) ...................................................................3, 6, 9

FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).....................................21

Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 824 F.3d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2016).............................3, 7

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).....................................................12, 13, 15

Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016)......................21

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)...................................................................21

Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ..................................................6

Nader v. FEC, 725 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2013)...........................................................9

NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)....................................................................20

Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986).......................................................19

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 

Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983)............................................................................18

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People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. USDA, 797 F.3d 1087 

(D.C. Cir. 2015)....................................................................................................8

Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) .............................................................6

United States v. O’Donnell, 608 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010)........................................5

Unity08 v. FEC, 596 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 2010)........................................................9

Van Hollen v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2016)..........................................21, 22

Federal Statutes:

52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)(A)..........................................................................................28

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i)..................................................................................6, 22

52 U.S.C. § 30101(11).......................................................................................20, 22

52 U.S.C. § 30102................................................................................................4, 16

52 U.S.C. § 30103................................................................................................4, 16

52 U.S.C. § 30104................................................................................................4, 16

52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(2)(E)......................................................................................22

52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(2)(F) ......................................................................................22

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(5)(B) .....................................................................................18

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(5)(C) .....................................................................................18

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)...................................................................................2, 9, 14

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) .....................................................................................19

52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(D).....................................................................................18

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2)...........................................................................................24

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8)...........................................................................................24

52 U.S.C. § 30118....................................................................................................23

*52 U.S.C. § 30122......................... 1, 4, 5, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29

Federal Regulations and Administrative Materials:

11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(10)..................................................................................21, 22

11 C.F.R. § 110.1(e).................................................................................................24

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11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b) ..................................................................................................4

W Spann/Conard Resp., MUR 6485 (Oct. 3, 2011), https://www.fec.gov/

files/legal/murs/6485/17044423850.pdf.............................................................25

Miscellaneous Resources:

S. Rep. No. 93-689 (1974).........................................................................................5

FEC Mem. in Opp’n to Mots. to Dismiss, FEC v. Johnson, No. 2:15-cv00439-DB, 2017 WL 8224819 (D. Utah Nov. 17, 2017).....................................5

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AOB Appellants’ Opening Brief

BCRA Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act

CLC Campaign Legal Center

CREW Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington

FEC Federal Election Commission

FECA Federal Election Campaign Act

LLC Limited Liability Company

MUR Matter Under Review

OGC FEC Office of General Counsel

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

For almost fifty years, the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) has 

prohibited making contributions “in the name of another.” 52 U.S.C. § 30122. Faced 

with several “crystal clear” schemes to launder contributions through corporate 

entities to conceal the true contributors, JA 169, three FEC Commissioners balked 

at enforcing this longstanding straw-donor prohibition, asserting that closely held 

corporations, such as respondents to the three administrative complaints here, lacked 

sufficient “notice” of the law’s applicability, and a new “legal interpretation” of this 

longstanding prohibition was necessary before it could be fairly applied. JA 159-60. 

On the merits, their “insufficient notice” rationale is contrary to FECA’s 

unambiguous language and purposes, and flatly contradicted by the administrative

records in these three matters (or “MURs”).

Perhaps for that reason, the FEC and Intervenors-Appellees F8 LLC et al.

(“F8”) are focused above all on insulating the dismissals from judicial scrutiny. But 

both concede, as they must, that dismissals based on interpretations of law remain 

reviewable following Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 892 F.3d 

434, 441 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“CREW”). And they still cannot identify any

grounds for the dismissals other than the controlling Commissioners’ legal

conclusion that finding “reason to believe” would give rise to constitutional notice 

concerns, much less show that this determination was something committed to the 

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agency’s absolute discretion—although they strain to do so, resorting to post hoc

guesswork about what the Commissioners “effectively” meant and speculating about 

“abstract” “agency considerations” underlying the dismissals. FEC Br. 18, 39.

This Court should decline the Appellees’ invitation to shield the Commission 

from the accountability that FECA requires. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8). 

ARGUMENT

I. APPELLANTS HAVE STANDING.

The FEC’s revived challenge to the standing of Appellants Campaign Legal 

Center (“CLC”) and Democracy 21 just duplicates the same arguments that were

rejected below. Appellants extensively briefed their claims of informational and 

organizational injury in the district court, and supported their standing with detailed 

factual affidavits1—reproduced in an Addendum here—which Judge Bates

thoroughly considered and sustained based on a careful review of this Court’s 

precedents.

“The law is settled that ‘a denial of access to information’ qualifies as an 

injury in fact ‘where a statute (on the claimants’ reading) requires that the 

information be publicly disclosed and there is no reason to doubt their claim that the 

information would help them.’” Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 922 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. 

 1 See CLC v. FEC, No. 16-cv-752 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2016), Dkt. 18 (Opp’n to FEC 

Mot. to Dismiss); Dkt. 18-1 (Ryan Decl.); Dkt. 18-2 (Wertheimer Decl.); see also

Pls.’ Summ. J. Mem. at 18-19, Dkt. 30. 

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Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 

824 F.3d 1033, 1040-41 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 306 F.3d 1144, 1148 

(D.C. Cir. 2002); and FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998)).

The district court was satisfied that CLC and Democracy 21 met this test:

“‘[g]iven [their] goals and organizational activities, there is no reason to doubt’ that 

[Appellants] suffered an injury in fact when they were denied information 

concerning the contributions identified in these three administrative complaints.” 

JA 42. The Commission provides no basis for reversing this holding.

A. The dismissals have deprived CLC and Democracy 21 of information 

required to be disclosed under FECA.

The FEC argued below that Appellants possessed “the very information they 

could possibly obtain,” but the district court found otherwise with respect to three of 

the five MURs. JA 41 (“[I]t is clear that the Commission’s General Counsel 

[“OGC”] did not believe it knew the entire story about the contributions identified 

in these three administrative complaints.”). Nothing has changed since then.

The FEC nevertheless reasserts, without elaboration, that “much of the 

potential information” Appellants seek is “already public.” FEC Br. 20. This is 

demonstrably contradicted by the record.

Specialty Group and Kingston Pike, for example, were formed by William S. 

Rose, Jr. in the weeks before the 2012 elections, shortly before making a series of 

contributions totaling more than $12 million. JA 255-56. The entities were 

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concededly “funded with private capital,” JA 257, but there is nothing in the record, 

or anywhere else, that suggests either generated $12 million in revenue during the 

six days between their formation and Specialty Group’s first contribution, nor did 

respondents “identify the source of the ‘private capital,’” explain “what, if anything, 

the sources of the capital received in exchange for their funds,” or “state 

who . . . decided that the funds would be contributed to FreedomWorks.” JA 257-58, 

262. As OGC concluded, “the facts are disputed.” JA 267. 

And, although Appellants and OGC have highlighted Steven J. Lund’s 

apparent connection to F8 LLC (and his acknowledged connection to Eli 

Publishing), OGC only recommended finding “reason to believe” that F8 was “not 

the true source of the $1 million contribution,” JA 20 (Compl. ¶ 37), and specifically 

left open the possible role of “Unknown Respondents” in connection with that entity. 

Id. (Compl. ¶ 39). See also JA 122 (recommending an investigation “to determine 

whether others played a role in funding th[e] contributions [from F8 and Eli 

Publishing]”) (emphasis added).

Nor is Appellants’ informational injury solely contingent on their political 

committee allegations, as the Commission suggests. FEC Br. 20. FECA and 

Commission regulations affirmatively require complete and accurate disclosure of

the true sources of funds contributed to influence federal elections. See, e.g., 52 

U.S.C. §§ 30102, 30103, 30104, 30122; 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b). And the straw-donor 

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allegations here center on FECA provisions aimed at providing “the electorate with 

information as to where political campaign money comes from . . . to aid the voters 

in evaluating those who seek federal office.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67

(1976).

As the Commission and courts have repeatedly acknowledged, section 30122 

“promotes full disclosure of the actual source of political contributions.” JA 260; 

United States v. O’Donnell, 608 F.3d 546, 553-54 (9th Cir. 2010). The implication 

that violations of FECA’s straw-donor prohibition cannot give rise to a cognizable 

informational injury is at odds with the statute’s text, purpose, and history—not to 

mention with the Commission’s consistent acknowledgment over many decades that 

the provision’s essential purpose is disclosure. See Appellants’ Opening Br. 

(“AOB”) 40-42.2

B. CLC and Democracy 21 are harmed by their inability to access the 

information.

Article III standing requirements do not, as the FEC asserts, categorically limit 

cognizable informational injuries to voters or “participa[nts] in the political 

process.” FEC Br. 20.

 2 See also, e.g., S.  Rep. No. 93-689, at 2 (1974) (noting FECA was initially 

“predicated upon the principle of public disclosure”); FEC Mem. in Opp’n to Mots. 

to Dismiss, FEC v. Johnson, No. 2:15-cv-00439-DB, 2017 WL 8224819 (D. Utah 

Nov. 17, 2017) (confirming that section 30122 “promotes the important and longrecognized government interests in disclosure of the true sources and amounts of 

campaign contributions”). 

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As a threshold matter, this argument properly sounds in prudential, not 

constitutional, standing. The FEC disclaims any prudential standing argument, but 

the zone-of-interests test “is not a demanding one” and Appellants easily clear that 

bar as well. Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

For Article III purposes, as the lower court correctly held, there is no support 

for the claim that informational injury must bear on “personal voting” to be 

cognizable under FECA, and “all other proffered uses [of information allegedly 

withheld] are legally insufficient.” JA 44. Moreover, by definition, any information 

required to be disclosed under FECA is “related” to or “useful” to voting. See, e.g., 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i) (defining “contribution” as “any gift” made “for the 

purpose of influencing any election”) (emphasis added). The FEC cannot seriously 

claim that the identities of donors giving as much as $12 million to influence 

elections is not “useful” to informed voting. 

Instead, the Commission maintains that Appellants need themselves be voters 

or “political participants.” Governing precedent rejects this contention. FEC Br. 21-

22. Akins, for example, “found nothing in [FECA] that suggests Congress intended 

to exclude voters from the benefits of these provisions, or otherwise to restrict 

standing.” 524 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added). Nor does FECA command uniquely 

narrow standards for informational injury. See Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 90 (D.C. 

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Cir. 2005) (rejecting claim “that campaign finance laws require unique standing 

rules”).

Therefore, “[l]ike the plaintiffs in Friends of Animals, [Appellants] here have 

proposed valid uses, related to their organizational missions, for the information that 

they seek.” JA 44. As recognized below, Appellants “are engaged in a number of 

campaign-finance related activities—including public education, litigation, 

administrative proceedings, and legislative reform efforts—where the sought-after 

information would likely prove useful.” JA 42. See Wertheimer Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 11; 

Ryan Decl. ¶¶ 7, 12-15, 18-21, 31-32. Appellants have “established their 

informational standing”: the dismissals “deprived [them] of information to which 

they are entitled by statute,” and they have shown “that the information would be 

helpful to them.” Id.

Tellingly, the Commission cannot articulate how the information Appellants

seek is in any way disconnected from “the type of harm Congress sought to prevent” 

by enacting these disclosure provisions. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential 

Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 

(“EPIC”). Nor has the Commission “explained why this Court should demand a 

more specific showing from plaintiffs under this Act, which is built around extensive 

disclosure requirements, than the D.C. Circuit has required under the Endangered 

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Species Act, where the reporting requirements are merely ‘secondary.’” JA 44 

(emphasis added).

Finally, Appellants have not abandoned organizational standing. See FEC Br. 

19 n.1. Appellants demonstrated both elements of organizational standing below, by 

showing that the dismissals “injured the organization[s’] interest[s]”—specifically, 

their informational interests—and that each organization “used its resources to 

counteract that harm.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. USDA, 797 

F.3d 1087, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2015). See Ryan Decl. ¶¶ 13-15, 25-26, 31-32; see also

JA 12-14 (Compl. ¶¶ 11-16).

3

II. APPELLEES’ CLAIMS OF UNREVIEWABILITY FAIL.

Appellees advance an all-embracing principle of unreviewability that would 

cover any FEC dismissal decision that invokes the words “prosecutorial discretion”; 

can be retrospectively recast as based on “litigation risk”; or roots its statutory 

interpretations in an analysis of judicial precedent and the Constitution. This extends

CREW well past its breaking point.

 3 The underlying harm in this case is informational with respect to either claimed 

basis for standing, and in similar circumstances, this Court has “not engaged in a 

separate analysis of informational and organizational injury.” EPIC, 878 F.3d at 381 

(Williams, J., concurring). But insofar as their theory of standing necessitates 

demonstrating that CLC and Democracy 21 “used [their] resources to counteract” 

the informational harm, they have done so. See Ryan Decl. ¶¶ 13-15, 25-26, 31-32.

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A. The demand that CREW be treated as a self-executing “magic words” 

limitation on judicial review is unsustainable.

1. CREW does not bar review of dismissals founded on legal error.

According to the Commission, CREW created a rule of reflexive 

unreviewability for any dismissal decision that contains the words “prosecutorial 

discretion” because “this panel cannot overrule precedent.” FEC Br. 25. But neither 

could the panel in CREW, which is why the decision must be read in harmony with 

Akins and other decisions. See AOB 18-19, 26-29. If a dismissal is premised on legal 

error, this Court retains the ability to say so.

The Commission’s uncompromising approach to its own discretion following 

CREW is out of step with numerous relevant authorities—most notably, as 

Appellants have explained, the en banc and Supreme Court decisions in Akins. See 

AOB 26-29 (citing, inter alia, Akins, 524 U.S. at 26; Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 

734 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 11 (1998); 

Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Democratic 

Cong. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 831 F.2d 1131, 1133-34 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(“DCCC”)). Elsewhere, too, this Court has recognized that section 30109(a)(8) 

“creates a cause of action of considerable breadth.” Nader v. FEC, 725 F.3d 226, 

228 (D.C. Cir. 2013); cf. Unity08 v. FEC, 596 F.3d 861, 866-67 (D.C. Cir. 2010)

(noting FECA’s express authorization of preenforcement review in two 

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“exceptionally compelling” circumstances—including suits under section 

30109(a)(8) “about violations . . . on which the Commission has failed to act”).

In any event, however much CREW is ultimately understood to have 

transformed the reviewability of FEC non-enforcement decisions, it still would not 

preclude review here. CREW recognized that “[t]he interpretation an agency gives 

to a statute is not committed to the agency’s unreviewable discretion.” 892 F.3d at 

441 n.11. And, as Appellants have explained, these dismissals were premised on 

legal determinations; CREW does not apply. See AOB 19-23. 

The dismissal in CREW rested on very different facts and was justified on the 

basis of multiple discretionary factors. The administrative complaint there was 

dismissed only after a unanimous reason-to-believe vote and a difficult investigation 

into a single, “defunct” association that obstructed OGC’s efforts at every turn. 892 

F.3d at 438. See AOB 23-26. Here, by contrast, there were no such logistical 

obstacles to justify a discretionary dismissal—only legal concerns raised by the 

controlling Commissioners.

In an effort to nevertheless escape the review that CREW expressly reserved

for legal determinations, the Commission here characterizes the controlling 

Commissioners’ constitutional analysis as non-legal. FEC Br. 29-30, 36-37. 

Intervenors likewise argue that an “exercise of discretion” based on the controlling 

Commissioners’ belief that non-enforcement was “compelled” under their “review 

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of the legal landscape” and constitutional rights is per se immunized from judicial 

review. F8 Br. 28. Otherwise put, dismissals based on interpretations of FECA are 

reviewable; dismissals based on interpretations of FECA given “the legal landscape” 

and the Constitution are not.

This is absolutely backwards. The FEC cites no case holding an agency’s

analysis of the Constitution or judicial precedent unreviewable, as indeed, this Court 

has warned that an agency may receive no deference at all in this area. See, e.g., 

Akins, 101 F.3d at 740; see also AOB 17, 38. The FEC, by discussing at length the 

degree to which the Commissioners’ constitutional analysis warrants deference, 

FEC Br. 36-37, tacitly admits this principle: the only question is the standard of 

review for an agency’s interpretations of case law, not whether review is available 

in the first instance.

2. Appellees identify no basis for the dismissals unconnected to “legal 

and constitutional” notice concerns.

The linchpin of the Commissioners’ “discretionary” analysis was their legally 

and factually unsupportable conclusion that five distinct administrative complaints 

required dismissal because all respondents lacked notice of a clear statutory 

prohibition.

Of course, the FEC now strains to expand the “notice” rationale—which was

entirely based on constitutional and legal considerations—into a wide-ranging 

examination of “the many variables” that conceivably could have undergirded the 

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FEC’s exercise of discretion. FEC Br. 27. This post hoc attempt to manufacture 

additional “discretionary” bases for the dismissals unconnected to the notice 

rationale do not succeed; moreover, they “come too late and from the wrong source.” 

DCCC, 831 F.2d at 1135 n.6. 

This is especially the case because the “new” discretionary bases the FEC 

identifies are drawn from the controlling Commissioners’ 240-word quotation of a 

passage from Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)—which appears in a footnote 

to their Statement without any corresponding discussion of how or whether it applies

to these complaints. JA 159 n.69. According to Appellees, this token reference to

Heckler amounts to a discretionary judgment about the FEC’s “enforcement 

priorities” and policy goals. F8 Br. 17; FEC Br. 26-32. See also FEC Summ. J. Reply

at 4-5, Dkt. 41 (quoting Heckler as exclusive evidence that the controlling 

Commissioners analyzed “‘whether agency resources are better spent on this 

violation or another [and] whether the particular enforcement action requested best 

fits the agency’s overall policies’”). But simply repeating that the controlling 

Commissioners “did consider the Chaney factors,” FEC Br. 27, cannot make it so.

The FEC demurs by accusing Appellants of “assert[ing] that the controlling 

Commissioners did not actually exercise prosecutorial discretion because they did 

not use certain words.” FEC Br. 26. This is pure projection: Appellants have 

cautioned against according talismanic effect to any mere use of the words 

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“prosecutorial discretion” or “Heckler.” See, e.g., AOB 13, 18, 26-29, 36. They have 

certainly never “demand[ed]” particular “buzzwords” (FEC Br. 27) to differentiate 

reviewable from unreviewable dismissals. The controlling Commissioners simply 

referenced no factors other than legal and constitutional notice concerns to justify 

their votes against reason to believe.

Intervenors take a slightly different tack, suggesting the “‘factors which are 

peculiarly within’ the agency’s expertise” identified in Heckler—“(1) ‘whether a 

violation has occurred’; (2) ‘whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts’; and 

(3) ‘whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s 

overall policies’”—“involve reliance on propositions of law.” F8 Br. 28-29 (quoting

Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831). Even if that were true, Intervenors do not contend that 

these dismissals considered, much less rested on, any of those grounds. It defieslogic 

to argue that because the discretionary factors cited in Heckler supposedly involved

“propositions of law,” it follows that these dismissals—which also involved 

propositions of law—must also have rested on factors “peculiarly within” the 

agency’s expertise. 

3. The Commission’s demands for unbounded prosecutorial discretion 

would vitiate FECA’s judicial review provision and heighten 

concerns about agency abdication. 

Both Appellees ascribe to Appellants various arguments about FECA’s 

enforcement scheme that they have not pressed. In particular, Appellees attempt to 

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elide the distinction between judicial review for legal error under section 

30109(a)(8) and FECA’s limited private right of action; the latter is not directly 

implicated here, so there is no danger of “transfer[ring] prosecutorial discretion to 

individual complainants” or “plac[ing] the enforcement of the campaign finance 

laws in the hands of potentially politically-motivated complainants.” F8 Br. 20; see 

also FEC Br. 30-31 (conflating arguments of Amicus and Appellants to suggest 

Appellants have advanced a view under which “split votes” must “routinely serve as 

springboards” to citizen suits). Recognizing the availability of judicial review for 

dismissals based on legal error does not empower “partisan activists to pursue their 

own enforcement priorities.” F8 Br. 6. It prevents the Commission from dismissing 

complaints based on erroneous interpretations of law.

As both Appellees also emphasize, “FECA’s enforcement structure is built 

around bipartisan consensus.” F8 Br. 20; see also FEC Br. 30. But neither explains 

why that should justify treating a dismissal founded on the legal views of a partisan 

bloc of three Commissioners as automatically unreviewable if the decision is 

couched in discretionary terms.4

 4 Incredibly, the FEC suggests that according absolute unreviewability to nonmajority dismissals invoking “discretion”—as opposed to reserving it for decisions 

that garner four votes—would be more consonant with the statutory scheme, FEC 

Br. 30, even though this Court has explicitly “resist[ed] confining the judicial check 

to cases in which . . . the Commission ‘act[s] on the merits.’” DCCC, 831 F.2d at 

1134 (declining to “immunize” deadlock dismissal from review under Heckler).

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FECA’s entire enforcement regime is structured to prevent non-majority blocs 

from entrenching their incorrect interpretations of law. Although these 

interpretations “would not be binding legal precedent,” Common Cause v. FEC, 842 

F.2d 436, 449 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1988), as a practical matter, deadlock “decisions” do

constrain future enforcement and the conduct of regulated parties: here, by signaling

that there will be no liability unless the controlling Commissioners’ standard is met. 

Even if the Commission later chose to depart from this interpretation, any respondent 

would have a potent defense to enforcement. When the controlling view is infected 

with legal error about FECA’s substantive requirements, according it absolute 

immunity would crystallize those errors ever afterward. 

This concern is exacerbated when there is reason to believe the Commission 

has abdicated its enforcement mandate, a charge Appellants have raised and 

documented repeatedly in this litigation. See, e.g., AOB 33 n.3 (observing that FEC’s 

citation to “a lone enforcement case involving straw donors . . . does not suffice to 

defeat concerns about agency abdication”); id. at 44 & n.7 (noting Commission’s 

apparent intent to “give every regulated class one bite of the apple before it will 

enforce the law” and its continuing refusal to enforce section 30122); id. at 50-52 

(explaining that controlling Commissioners’ notice theory was fabricated to avoid 

enforcement). Indeed, abdication concerns are evident in the Commission’s entire 

posture toward these matters. By declining to pursue five distinct enforcement 

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complaints based on the contrived need for “public guidance,” and then withholding 

that “guidance” for more than four years, the controlling Commissioners effectively 

sanctioned ongoing straw-donor violations through multiple subsequent election 

cycles. See AOB 33 & n.3; JA 169-70. 

The FEC counters that it has “continued to pursue” enforcement in “similar” 

cases, but points to a grand total of three MURs—none of which involve comparable

legal or factual situations. FEC Br. 31. Even though MUR 6920 (American 

Conservative Union (“ACU”)) did involve a similar theory of liability under section 

30122 and the FEC took action against that corporate respondent, it did so for

“conduct [that occurred] prior to the decision here,” FEC Br. 31—which meant that 

ACU also lacked “notice of the governing norm.” JA 148. These cases only 

demonstrate how inconsistent the FEC’s regulation of straw donors has been. See

AOB 33 n.3, 44 n.7. The whole point of judicial review for FEC dismissals is to 

guard against such arbitrariness. Common Cause, 842 F.2d at 449 (recognizing that 

“meaningful” review avoids the “possibility that similarly situated parties may not 

be treated evenhandedly”).

B. The Commission did not dismiss the political committee claims as an 

exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 

The controlling Commissioners at no point even suggested they were 

dismissing the alleged violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30102, 30103, and 30104 on

discretionary grounds. They simply chose “not [to] discuss” them, because “OGC 

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did not recommend that we find reason to believe” on those claims. JA 152 n.36.

However, the Commission now contends (at 39) that the “political committee claims 

were effectively also dismissed as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.” How the 

FEC divines—three years later—that these were the “effective” grounds upon which 

the controlling Commissioners proceeded is unexplained. Regardless, this was not 

the reason they gave, and cannot be the basis for withholding review. 

C. The controlling Commissioners’ new “legal standard” is ripe for review 

and contrary to law. 

For obvious reasons, the FEC has not characterized the announcement of a 

new “intent” standard for application of section 30122 as a matter committed to its 

unfettered discretion. Instead, it tries to shield this part of the controlling 

Commissioners’ decision from judicial scrutiny on ripeness grounds. 

But the formulation of an intent standard was essential to the controlling 

Commissioners’ reasoning. See AOB 30-33. The FEC now attempts to decouple 

their “intent” standard from their “fair notice” rationale. But it does not dispute that 

one major reason provided by the controlling Commissioners for their refusal to

proceed was their belief that section 30122, as written, did not adequately notify

corporations about what it proscribed, and therefore had the potential to “chill” 

constitutionally protected activity. FEC Br. 54.

Appellees also have no answer for Appellants’ contention that they have 

suffered injury from the controlling Commissioners’ standard because, as a result, 

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they have been denied disclosure in connection to these three straw-donor 

complaints. See AOB 32. The FEC assures that a Commission vote against reason 

to believe “under the proposed standard in a future matter” would be reviewable, 

FEC Br. 55, but that possibility hardly ameliorates Appellants’ current informational 

injury. 

Withholding review of the standard would cut to the very heart of Congress’s 

intent when it created informational rights under FECA. Although the FEC now 

equivocates about the degree to which section 30122 directly requires reporting, 

FEC Br. 55, there is no serious dispute that the straw-donor prohibition was enacted 

to ensure disclosure of campaign spending—to say nothing of the obvious

informational purposes underlying the political committee provisions. See supra

Part I. Courts have recognized congressional purpose as a factor in ripeness analysis 

when delay would frustrate that purpose. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State 

Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 202 (1983).

On the merits, the control group’s “subjective intent” standard is contrary to 

law because it has no basis in FECA and is not compelled by the First Amendment. 

The text of section 30122 contains no intent requirement, as the FEC is forced to 

acknowledge (at 58). Elsewhere FECA sets forth an alternative enforcement regime 

for “knowing and willful” violations, providing for higher civil fines and potential 

criminal prosecution. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(5)(B)-(C), (d)(1)(D). The Commission 

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spills much ink arguing that these stepped-up provisions do not suggest that section 

30122 was intended to operate without a scienter requirement, but it is a fundamental 

principle of statutory interpretation that Congress means what it says—or in the case 

of section 30122, what it does not say. This Court should reject the invitation “to 

create ambiguity where the statute’s text and structure suggest none.” Ali v. Fed. 

Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 227 (2008).

III. THE DISMISSALS WERE CONTRARY TO LAW.

The parties agree that when the FEC dismisses an enforcement complaint 

based upon interpretations of FECA, it is reviewed under a “contrary to law” 

standard, 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C), that looks to whether the dismissal (1) rests 

on an impermissible interpretation of law, or (2) is “arbitrary or capricious, or an 

abuse of discretion.” Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The parties 

diverge, however, on the treatment of the controlling Commissioners’ constitutional 

arguments and interpretations of case law—where Appellees claim that dismissals 

justified on the basis of constitutional considerations, if called “discretionary,” must 

escape judicial scrutiny entirely. But as already explained, AOB 37-39, these

dismissals were based entirely on legal questions well within the courts’ relative 

expertise, and should be reviewed de novo.

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A. Dismissal of the straw-donor claims was contrary to law.

The FEC’s chief complaint is that Appellants spend too much time on the 

“reductive” proposition that section 30122 is unambiguous. FEC Br. 40. But it fails 

to acknowledge why this would be: the controlling Commissioners justified their 

dismissals based entirely on their “insufficient legal notice” theory, so the law’s 

clarity is central to the defensibility of their decision-making. 

1. The statute is not ambiguous.

The controlling Commissioners recognized that the straw donor prohibition 

specifically covers “partnerships, corporations and other organizations,” JA 153 

(emphasis added), and that “closely held corporations and corporate LLCs may be

considered straw donors in violation of section 30122.” JA 154, 158. 

Nevertheless, the FEC now characterizessection 30122 as ambiguous because 

it is “doubtful” that “Congress anticipated corporations . . . making contributions.” 

FEC Br. 42. However, “the best evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text.” 

NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012). And FECA, on its face, prohibits straw 

donors in the form of a “corporation . . . or any other organization.” 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30101(11) (emphasis added). Indeed, the FEC admitted below that Congress likely 

would not “have wished to exempt corporations from the prohibition on straw 

donors.” FEC Summ. J. Mem. at 26, Dkt. 34. 

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The Commission has no basis for even turning to congressional intent. “If the 

statutory language is unambiguous,” the “inquiry” into legislative purpose “ceases.”

Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016). But even 

if the statute were unclear, the FEC’s speculative arguments about congressional 

intent are repudiated by the legislative history. As Appellants have explained, AOB

42 n.6, Congress was well aware of the possibility of corporate contributions, and

engaged in a massive legislative undertaking, culminating in the Bipartisan 

Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), to halt the millions of dollars in corporate 

“soft money” donated to federal party committees in the 1990s.5

 

The FEC’s final attempt to bolster its theory of statutory ambiguity is a 

strained analogy between this case and Van Hollen v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486 (2016).

The latter challenged an FEC rule, 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(10), that narrowed federal 

disclosure requirements for corporations and unions newly permitted to fund certain 

“electioneering communications” following FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 

551 U.S. 449 (2007). The statute required “persons” funding these communications 

 5 The FEC tries to erase the entire soft-money experience, arguing (at 43) that the 

massive corporate donations to federal party committees were not “‘contributions’ 

under FECA because they were not ‘hard money.’” Whether the FEC then or now 

classifies soft-money donations as “contributions” is irrelevant to the underlying 

point, which is that Congress certainly was aware of large-scale corporate campaign 

giving before BCRA. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122-23 (2003); see also id. 

at 123 (noting that a “literal reading” of FECA would have always required “hard 

money” limits on all party donations).

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to disclose all “contributors who contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or 

more,” 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(2)(E)-(F), but the FEC rule required corporations and

unions to report only “contributors” who gave “for the purpose of furthering 

electioneering communications.” 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(10) (emphasis added).

Van Hollen upheld the rule at Chevron Step Two, but only after finding that 

Congress’s use of the terms “contributors” and “contributed” was unclear. 811 F.3d 

at 491. FECA defines “contribution” as something given “for the purpose of 

influencing any election for Federal office,” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i), but the FEC 

concluded that it was uncertain whether all persons who contributed to a 

corporation—“such as shareholders who have acquired stock” or “customers who 

have purchased the corporation’s products or services”—met this definition. 811 

F.3d at 495.

The FEC suggests that Van Hollen is analogous because it too was concerned 

with the scope of the term “person” under FECA, and whether or how it covered 

“corporations,” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(11). This distorts the decision. Van Hollen found 

no ambiguity in the definition of “person,” nor did the Commission argue that 

corporations should be exempt from disclosure on that basis.

Instead, the FEC was defending a rule defining the “contributors” to a 

corporation—a term the Court specifically found unclear in this context, and thus 

interpreted as an “implicit delegation” to the FEC. 811 F.3d at 497. There is no such 

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“statutory gap” here. Id. Van Hollen certainly did not suggest that mere speculation 

about congressional “expectations” would render an unambiguous statutory 

provision so unclear that it failed to give notice to the “persons” it clearly covered. 

2. Commission guidance addressing closely held corporations did not 

“confuse” application of section 30122. 

The FEC does not seriously contest the statute’s clarity. The crux of its 

defense is that “[e]ven if Section 30122 [w]as [c]lear,” the FEC’s administrative 

guidance on the attribution of corporate contributions may have “reasonably . . . 

confused” these respondents. FEC Br. 44; JA 421. 

But the FEC concedes that none of the administrative guidance cited by the 

controlling Commissioners concerned straw donors or the application of section 

30122. Instead, as Appellants have discussed, AOB 47-50, these authorities

concerned the default rules for attributing corporate contributions to their original 

source for the purposes of applying the corporate contribution ban at 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30118. See JA 155-57. Neither Appellee explains how this guidance, given that it

is all off point, could possibly support the theory that respondents were “confused” 

about the scope of section 30122. 

The FEC also denies that these authorities concerned only “default” rules, 

arguing that “a corporate contribution or expenditure was not just ‘typically’ 

attributed to the corporation under Commission authorities, but rather it was 

attributed to the corporation even when an individual was its true source.” FEC Br. 

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46. This argument is equally misplaced. Even assuming the attribution rules did 

function as more than a “default,” they were still relevant only in cases involving 

violations of the corporate contribution ban.

Indeed, accepting the FEC’s argument would have destabilizing implications 

for the efficacy of the straw-donor ban, because contributions from most types of 

entities are subject to similar default attribution rules, including partnerships, 11 

C.F.R. § 110.1(e), and political commitees, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2), (8). If the 

existence of such default rules truly casts doubt on the applicability of section 30122, 

any entity engaged in a straw-donor scheme could also be “confused” about the 

provision’s reach. A reading of the law that would unravel the entire statutory 

scheme is not defensible.

3. The “inadequate notice” theory is refuted by the record.

Neither Appellee contends that any respondents raised notice concerns in 

response to these three admininistrative complaints. AOB 50. Indeed, the only record 

evidence the FEC raises to support this “notice” theory comes from MUR 6485 (W 

Spann), which is not before this Court. Reliance on evidence from a different case

to establish what respondents here actually knew or did not know is inherently

arbitrary and capricious. 

The FEC asserts that Edward Conard, respondent in MUR 6485, received a 

legal opinion from Ropes & Gray concluding that he could “create an entity for the 

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sole purpose of making a [contribution] . . . [which] would not require full public 

disclosure of his name.’” FEC Br. 47 (citing JA 149 & n.8). However, as the FEC

fails to mention, the opinion also acknowledged that “the FEC might seek to look 

through the contributing entity to the underlying contributor.” W Spann/Conard 

Resp., Cohen Decl. ¶ 8, MUR 6485 (Oct. 3, 2011), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/

murs/6485/17044423850.pdf. A fair reading of this opinion could not lead the 

reasonable person to believe that laundering a contribution through a corporation 

was a lawful way to avoid disclosure; on the contrary, it explicitly warned Conard 

that the FEC might pierce the corporate veil to ascertain “the underlying 

contributor.” 

Regardless, the administrative respondents here cannot—and did not—rely 

on confidential legal advice that someone else received. 

4. The “dispute” regarding the controlling Commissioners’ new 

standard does not signify statutory ambiguity.

The FEC also attempts to manufacture a “lack of pre-existing clarity” by 

pointing to a “dispute” between the controlling and dissenting Commissioners 

regarding the proper standard for applying section 30122 to corporate straw donors. 

FEC Br. 49. 

But this “dispute” is entirely of the controlling Commissioners’ making. They 

were the only ones—not the dissenting Commissioners, JA 165, 170—who believed 

that applying the law as written would be “manifestly unfair” without the addition 

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of a narrowing “intent” standard, JA 154, 158-59. The FEC’s argument about what 

this purported “debate” signifies is utterly circular, boiling down to the claim that 

statute was unclear because the controlling group “debated” its clarity. 

Appellees fare no better when they argue that legal ambiguity can be inferred 

from what they characterize as OGC’s evolving approach to enforcing section 

30122. FEC Br. 49-50; F8 Br. 36. The Commission claims OGC first focused on 

whether the true donor exercised “direction and control” over the corporate straw 

donor, but then “clarified” that the analysis should consider “whether a source 

transmitted property to another with the purpose that it be used to make or reimburse 

a contribution.” FEC Br. 49. But insofar as OGC mentioned “direction and control” 

at all, it was irrelevant to the outcome in these MURs: OGC recommended finding 

reason to believe without regard or reference to who “controlled or directed” the 

corporate contributions from Eli Publishing, F8, Specialty Group, and Kingston. JA 

116-18, 261-64; see also MUR 6485 at 21 (Suppl.), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/

murs/6485/16044390492.pdf (OGC’s “revised” analysis expressly “d[id] not alter 

[OGC’s] stated conclusions” as to W Spann).

Indeed, Appellants’ administrative complaints did not rely on a “direction and 

control” theory, but instead focused on how the corporate respondents had not 

generated sufficient commercial revenue—or any revenue—to cover their milliondollar campaign contributions. See, e.g., JA 117-18; JA 261-64. In the relevant time 

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period, the corporate respondents had no significant sources of revenue outside of 

funds received from the unknown true donors, and conducted little or no business 

beyond serving as conduits for campaign contributions. AOB 6-9; JA 117-118; see 

also F8 Br. 37 n.8 (noting only that F8 and Eli Publishing “were not . . . created for 

the purpose of the contributions” but again sidestepping whether they served as 

conduits). These were not “difficult case[s].” JA 165.

The controlling Commissioners’ fixation on formulating a new standard to 

address all imaginable complications in the application of section 30122 to 

corporations—none of which were actually presented in these three MURs—was a 

red herring. Perhaps this “debate” would be relevant to some hypothetical, more 

difficult case. But it was not necessary to resolve these three administrative 

complaints. 

B. Failing to address the political committee allegations was arbitrary and 

capricious on its face. 

Appellees’ only justification for the controlling Commissioners’ failure to 

consider the political committee allegations is that “OGC did not recommend” a

reason-to-believe finding “with respect to [these] allegations,” FEC Br. 52; F8 Br. 

40, and the Commissioners were entitled to rest on that advice. 

This argument elides key language from OGC’s recommendations. OGC did 

not recommend finding no reason to believe, JA 152 n.36, but instead counseled the 

Commission to “take no action at this time” asto those allegations. JA 109 (emphasis 

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added). Its recommendation was only that the Commissioners investigate the strawdonor allegations before—not to the exclusion of—the political committee claims. 

JA 121. The Commission cannot excuse its failure to consider the political 

committee status of respondents based upon an OGC recommendation that did not 

advise against doing so.

Because the controlling Commissioners declined to consider whether the 

respondent corporations were straw donors, they were obligated to analyze whether 

appellants’ alternative theory of violation merited an investigation. The FEC now

proposes a new justification for their failure, arguing that “the record lacked a basis 

to find reason to believe that the corporate respondents were political committees.” 

FEC Br. 52. This explanation appeared in neither OGC’s recommendations nor the 

controlling Statement of Reasons. 

Moreover, the claim is wrong. Both F8 LLC and Specialty Group made 

million-dollar contributions to federal super PACs and appeared to have campaign 

activity as their sole purpose in the relevant period. JA 117-18, 257-58. Specialty 

Group was also admittedly funded “in part for ‘political purposes.’” JA 251. Eli 

Publishing’s scant sales revenue of $72,000 in 2011 and $70,000 in 2012 was 

eclipsed by its $1 million contribution. JA 110. The record readily supported finding 

that the corporate respondents were “political committees,” because they (1) had 

received/made “contributions” or “expenditures” of $1,000 or more, 52 U.S.C. 

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§ 30101(4)(A), and (2) had a “major purpose” of influencing the “nomination or 

election of a candidate,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79. If the controlling Commissioners 

were sincerely concerned about the “novelty” of enforcing section 30122 against 

corporate straw donors, taking the political committee route would have been a wellestablished way to ensure public disclosure of the true sources of these campaign 

contributions.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons and those stated in Appellants’ Opening Brief, the district 

court’s ruling should be reversed. 

Dated: September 4, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Megan P. McAllen

Fred Wertheimer 

DEMOCRACY 21

2000 Massachusetts Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 355-9600

Donald J. Simon 

SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE,

 ENDRESON & PERRY, LLP

1425 K St. NW, Suite 600

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 682-0240

Paul M. Smith

Tara Malloy 

Megan P. McAllen

Mark P. Gaber

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14th St. NW, Suite 400

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-2200

E-mail: mmcallen@campaignlegalcenter.org

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This response complies with the word limit of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(ii) 

because it contains 6,450 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. 

R. App. P. 32(f) and Circuit Rule 32(e)(1). 

This filing complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 

32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this 

response has been prepared using Microsoft Office Word 2016 in Times New 

Roman 14-point font.

/s/ Megan P. McAllen

Megan P. McAllen

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 4, 2019, I electronically filed this Reply

Brief with the Clerk of Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the District 

of Columbia Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system, thereby serving all 

persons required to be served. 

I further certify that I caused the required copies of the Reply Brief to be filed 

with the Clerk of the Court.

/s/ Megan P. McAllen

Megan P. McAllen

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ADDENDUM

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ADDENDUM – TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration of Paul S. Ryan [Dkt. 18-1]

No. 1:16-cv-00752 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2016).........................................................1a

Declaration of Fred Wertheimer [Dkt. 18-2]

No. 1:16-cv-00752 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2016).......................................................11a

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Political Money Report 7 /21/16 - Super PA Cs raise big bucks in 2016, Trump campaign s... Page 1 of 4 

Subscribe Share""" Past Issues Trans 

Platforms show that both parties could not be 

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View in browser 

WERTHEIMER'S 

POLITICAL 

MONEY REPORT 

July 21, 2016 

A NOTE FROM FRED 

In the 2016 election, super PACs have already raised almost a billion dollars for use 

in presidential and congressional races and are on track to far exceed the amount 

raised by super PACs in the 2012 election. Forty-nine percent of the $936 million 

came from just 100 donors, according to Open Secrets. Ordinary Americans look at 

the role of super PACs in our elections and they see Washington rigged to benefit 

the wealthiest people in the country. Super PACs are a byproduct of the Supreme 

Court's decision in Citizens United that struck down the ban on corporate 

independent expenditures in federal elections. The Supreme Court majority either did 

not know or did not care about the massive flow of huge, influence-buying 

contributions this decision would unleash on our political system. There are ways 

however to challenge the existence of super PACs. A new Supreme Court majority 

could reverse lower court decisions that struck down the $5,000 per year limit on 

contributions to independent spending federal PACs. This would for all practical 

purposes shut down super PACs. As well, the Stop Super PAC-Candidate 

Coordination Act introduced by Rep. Price and Senator Leahy would shut down the 

super PACs that only support one candidate and were used to support most 2016 

presidential candidates. 

"GOP's moneyed class finds its place in new Trump world," says the 

New York Times. Lobbyists and donors mingled at many parties around 

Cleveland this week. "While some of the party's elite donors have shunned Mr. 

Trump's coronation this week, they are still paying for it." A top lobbyist noted 

that while Trump is talking about changing Washington and the lobbying 

world, "The political and influence class is going on as before." Read more 

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Trump campaign gives its blessing to super PACs. POLITICO said that 

the Trump campaign signaled at the convention that it has dropped its 

opposition to the major pro-Trump P ACs. At a meeting of major donors 

organized by Rebuilding America PAC, a slideshow featured a quote from Mike 

Pence saying "Supporting Rebuild America Now is one of the best ways to stop 

Hillary Clinton and elect Donald Trump." Pence's staff said he was considering 

attending future fundraising events for the group. Read more 

"Voters have a right to know who is paying for a political campaign 

before they go to the polls," said FEC Commissioner Ann Ravel in a LA 

Times op-ed. Ravel says that states can take the lead in advocating for stronger 

campaign finance laws. "Curbing dark money will someday get a national 

solution. In the meantime, local and state measures to increase transparency 

can make an impact." Read more 

"On campaign finance, Republicans and Democrats could not be 

farther apart," says the Huffing ton Post. The Republican Party platform 

introduced Monday in Cleveland calls for rolling back all contribution limits, 

less disclosure and the repeal of McCain-Feingold limits on soft money. 

Meanwhile, the Democratic platform calls for a constitutional amendment to 

overturn Citizens United and Buckley v Valeo and endorses creating a public 

financing system for federal elections and increased disclosure for outside 

groups. Read more 

Clinton campaign "rolling out the red carpet" for donors at 

the Philadelphia convention. Individuals that have raised more than 

$ioo,ooo are being treated to an exclusive week of events, including receptions, 

briefings with campaign staffers and an exclusive party with Bill Clinton. Read 

more 

Trump's children begin fundraising for their dad. Donald Trump Jr. is 

headlining his first solo fundraiser next week in Texas. "For Republican donors 

who have little positive to say about Trump, the children are a safe topic" said 

AP. A top Republican donor said he "can't argue that the kids are phenomenal." 

Read more 

What will happen to Pence's campaign cash? The latest campaign 

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finance data shows that Gov. Mike Pence has more than $7 million in his 

gubernatorial campaign bank account. He cannot transfer it directly to the 

Trump campaign, but he is legally allowed to transfer it to a super PAC. He 

could also just keep the money in his state account. Read more 

2016 FACT OF THE DAY 

Trump and the RNC raised $52 million in June, but that is still less than the $68 

million Clinton and the DNC collected in June. Read more 

IN THE STATES 

WI: Koch backed groups have pulled more than $2 million in ad buys they had 

bought for Sen. Ron Johnson. Read more 

MO: Missouri is one of the few states that has no limits on 

campaign contributions. So far in the gubernatorial primary, three out of the 

four Republican candidates have received more than $1 million from 

an individual or family. Read more 

MD: The husband of Amie Haeber who is currently running for Congress in 

Maryland has donated more than $2 million to a pro-Haeber super PAC. Read 

more 

CA: The state's top political watchdog is introducing a proposal to crack down 

on lobbyists by giving state regulators the power to require suspected lobbyists 

to reveal if they are being paid to influence government decisions. Read more 

By: Fred Wertheimer (@FredWertheirner) & Kathryn Beard (@KathrynBeard) 

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Copyright© 2016 Political Money Report, All rights reserved. 

Democracy 21 

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WERTHEIMER'S 

POLITICAL 

MONEY REPORT 

June 16, 2016 

A NOTE FROM FRED 

The Center for Responsive Politics reports that outside groups have already 

spent $400 million to influence the 2016 elections. That is increase of 175 percent 

over the nearly $146 million outside groups had spent by June of 2012. If that rate of 

increase were to continue to the November general election, the amount of outside 

spending would reach $1.8 billion in the 2016 federal elections. 

This is just one example of how completely broken our campaign finance system is 

as a result primarily of disastrous Supreme Court decisions by the Roberts Court. 

Another example: since the Citizens United decision in 2010, more than $500 million 

dollars in secret money has been spent by nonprofit groups to influence federal 

elections. Secret money is the most dangerous money in American politics. It allows 

large donors and officeholders to exchange money for political favors in secret 

without any means to hold the donors and officeholders accountable for illegal 

activity. Polls show that citizens overwhelmingly reject the current campaign finance 

system. To avoid an even more disaffected and cynical public than what exists today, 

the next Congress must act to reform and fix the system. 

Jimmy Carter endorses public financing as a campaign finance solution. 

In an interview at the Clinton Global Initiative, former President Carter said, 

"Another thing we could do is go back to presidential campaigns just using 

public funds for the general election." "Personally, I would like to see public 

funds used for all elections - Congress, U.S. Senate, governor and president." 

When Carter ran for president in 1976, he received $20 million in public 

financing. Read more. 

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Exhibit B

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Trump's relationship with the RNC sours and is "plagued by distrust, 

power struggles and strategic differences." Sources told POLITICO that the 

RNC feels Trump's campaign is trying to take control over the two Trump/RNC 

fundraising committees. As well, the RNC gave Trump a list of more than 20 

top donors to call regarding fundraising and Trump only called three of them. 

The Trump campaign meanwhile has "deep skepticism" about the RNC's 

commitment to the candidate. Read more. 

Clinton launches first general-election ad buy. The campaign has 

purchased TV ad time in seven states including Florida, Ohio and Virginia. The 

ads released for preview showed Clinton attacking numerous Trump statements 

and painting him as "extreme, unqualified and perhaps unhinged." Read 

more. 

Another big sponsor backs away from Republican convention. 

Sources say billionaire hedge-fund manager Paul Singer will not donate to or 

attend the convention in Cleveland. Singer gave $1 million to the convention in 

2012, but so far this election cycle, has spent millions trying to prevent Trump 

from winning the nomination. Last week, a spokesman said David Koch would 

also not be funding or attending the convention. Read more. 

House votes to make dark money darker. The House approved a bill 

Tuesday that would open the door to illegal foreign influence in U.S. elections. 

The bill by Rep. Peter Roskam exempts non-profit groups from disclosing the 

names of their donors to the IRS. Democracy 21 and other reform groups sent 

a letter to the House earlier this week warning that the bill would eliminate the 

only protection the government has to prevent foreign interests from illegally 

funneling money into elections. Read more. 

Another new anti-Trump super PAC forms. The former leader of the 

"Draft Biden" effort launched a new super PAC aimed at stopping Trump, but 

not supporting Clinton. The Keep America Great super PAC is focused on 

attracting supporters of Bernie Sanders and "disaffected Republicans". The 

groups founder Jon Cooper says the new PAC is designed to attract voters who 

are not enamored with Clinton, but who are against Trump. Read more. 

Polarized House committee voted Wednesday to censure IRS 

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commissioner. The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee 

voted 23 to 15 along party lines to censure Commissioner Koskinen. Democracy 

21 and other groups sent a letter to the committee earlier this week attacking 

the case as "meritless" and said, "There is no justification for taking 

unwarranted action ... to punish Commissioner Koskinen." Fred challenged 

as "irresponsible" the Koskinen attack by Republican committee 

members. Read more. 

2016 FACT OF THE DAY 

$400 million - The amount that outside groups have spent so far in the 2016 

election. This amount "dwarfs the amount spent by this point in the 2012 election," 

according to The Center for Responsive Politics. Read more. 

IN THE STATES 

NY: "New York legislators back alcohol at brunch. But ethics reform? Hopes 

are fading," says a headline in the New York Times. The NY legislative session 

ends today, but major proposals like limiting the corrupting influence of money 

in politics and ethics reforms remain unresolved. Read more. 

CA: The Los Angeles Times looks at the political rise and fall of the Calderon 

brothers. Former State Senator Ron Calderon was sentenced this week to mail 

fraud after he accepted bribes from undercover FBI agents and a corrupt 

hospital executive. His brother Tom Calderon, a former state assemblyman, was 

charged with money laundering after attempting to cover up his brother's 

bribes. Read more. 

By: Fred Wertheimer (@FredWertheimer) & Kathryn Beard (@KathrynBeard) 

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Copyright© 2016 Political Money Report, All rights reserved. 

·~ Democracy 21 

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Subscribe Share ... Past Issues Trans 

"Hillblazers" raise big bucks View in browser 

WERTHEIMER1S 

POLITICAL 

MONEY REPORT 

May 27, 2016 

A NOTE FROM FRED 

As we approach the end of the primary season, here are a couple of money-inpolitics lessons we have learned midpoint in the elections: 

There has never been a national election with so much political money coming 

from so many billionaires and multimillionaires. As of May, the top ten donors 

and their spouses have given a total of more than $100 million to super PACs for the 

2016 election, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. Twenty-eight 

donors and their spouses each have given at least $2.5 million. To put this in 

perspective, the average family of four earns $54,000 per year. This extraordinary 

flow of huge contributions is providing the Super Rich with magnified influence over 

elections and corrupting influence over government decisions. It is also creating deep 

cynicism among the American people about their interests being fairly represented in 

Washington. 

Meanwhile, Donald Trump has leaped into the big money chase, going in the 

blink of an eye from self-described "Mr. Can't-Be-Bought" to self-defined "Mr. 

Puppet." During the primaries, self-financing Donald Trump repeatedly pointed out 

he couldn't be bought by big donors. He attacked his primary opponents for their 

super PACs, saying that when donors give huge contributions to Jeb Bush for 

example, "they have him just like a puppet," and that "[Bush will] do whatever they 

want." Trump now has super PACs fighting over which one will be his "official" proTrump super PAC and he is raising huge contributions for a Trump/RNC joint 

fundraising committee. "Mr. Can't-Be-Bought" has left the building and "Mr. Puppet" 

has arrived. 

To read more lessons learned, read mv op-ed for the Hufflnqton Post. 

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Drama over RNC/Trump fundraising deal as Reuters reports that 

Donald Trump fired his national political director over disagreements over the 

RNC deal. Trump alledgedly told staffers that political director Rick Wiley 

"should be fired" for leaving out Nevada from the 11 states included in the RNC 

agreement. Read more from Reuters. As well, CNN reports that "discord is 

already brewing" between the Trump campaign and the RNC. A GOP donor 

reports that Trump donors plan to meet to discuss if the RNC has Trump's best 

interests at heart. They are concerned that the fundraising deal could "fill the 

RNC's coffers but leave far less to benefit" Trump. Read more from CNN 

Sanders and Clinton spend big in California. Both campaigns announced 

that they are spending additional money in ad buys in the state before its 

primary on June ?th. The Sanders' campaign announced a new ad buy of 

around $2 million and Clinton soon followed with a new ad featuring Morgan 

Freeman and labor leaders. Read more 

Trump seeks support of energy industry. "Trump is seeking to make 

inroads with the fossil fuel industry as he moves into the general election." 

Trump spoke Thursday at a North Dakota petroleum convention. Prominent 

coal industry exec Bob Murray already supports Trump and after meeting with 

him said, "He's got his head on right." Other industry leaders like T.Boone 

Pickens have said they will fundraise for Trump. Read more 

Clinton's best defense - campaign finance reform. According to Eliza 

Newlin Carney at the American Propsect, "Clinton has overlooked her most 

potent tool for fighting back: her own sweeping democracy reform platform." 

Carney cites Clinton's appeals to Wall Street donors and coordination with big 

money outside groups as contributing to her image as untrustworthy. A better 

approach would be to embrace her reform platform where she pledged to match 

small contributions with public funds and "pull back the curtain on secret 

money." Read more 

Public financing system worked, but needs reforms. The Atlantic looks 

at the history of the public financing system for elections. Fred says, "The 

bottom line is this system did exactly what it was supposed to do for more than 

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two decades. The system was not perfect, but it allowed candidates to run 

competitive races for office. It kept candidates away from private-influence 

money. It worked." However, Congress has failed to modernize the system and 

reforms are needed. Read more 

Clinton network of "Hillblazers" raises big bucks. Since the beginning 

of this year, the Clinton campaign has added 125 major donors to her 

"Hillblazers" list of supporters that raised at least $100,000. As of the end of 

April, the "Hillblazers" had raised a combined $41 million. The donors are 

spread across the country, but many are based in New York or California. Read 

more 

2016 FACT OF THE DAY 

60 percent - The percentage of campaign contributions to local D.C. elected officials 

that came from corporations and out-of-D.C. donors, according to a new report from 

U.S. PIRG. Read more 

IN THE STATES 

NY: NY Jets Owner Woody Johnson announced that he is one of the six finance 

vice chairmen at the RNC that are focused on fundraising for Trump. Read 

more 

NY: POLITICO reports that Mayor Bill de Blasio took an "unusually personal 

role in raising money for a nonprofit group backing his political agenda," 

according to those who received fundraising appeals from de Blasio. The 

nonprofit group Campaign for One New York is under investigation regarding 

if donors received preferential treatment from de Blasio and his aides. Read 

more 

FL: Republican U.S. Senate candidate Carlos Beruffhas spent more than $3 

million on ads statewide. Beruff is largely self-funding his campaign. Read 

more 

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SC: SC House members amended a bill Thursday to require non-profit 

organizations to reveal the source of the money that they spend on elections. 

Read more 

By: Fred Wertheimer (@FredWertheimer) & Kathryn Beard (@KathrynBeardl 

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rfi. ,_-1Democracy 21 

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Wertheimer for Huffington Post: Eight Lessons We've 

Learned About Money in Politics This Election 

May 26, 2016 All Press Releases, Featured Articles, Homepage, Press Releases 

The Huffington Post 

Eight Lessons We've Learned 

About Money in Politics This 

Election 

By: Fred Wertheimer 

May 26, 2016 

As we approach the end of the primary season, here are eight money-in-politics lessons we have learned 

midpoint in the elections. 

1. The Supreme Court majority did not have a clue about what it was doing in the Mccutcheon case. 

In the Mccutcheon case, Supreme Court Justices labeled the examples presented to the Court by Democracy 

21 and others "divorced from reality'' and ''wild hypotheticals." These examples accurately predicted the outcome 

if the Court struck down the aggregate limit on individual contributions to party committees. Now, huge single 

checks are being written to joint fundraising committees created by Clinton and Trump, and their respective 

parties. The $33,400 limit on individual contributions to a national party for campaign use is being eviscerated 

and the presidency is on the auction block. The "wild hypotheticals" were correct and the Supreme Court was 

"divorced from reality.'' 

2. There has never been a national election with so much political money coming from so many 

billionaires and multimillionaires. 

As of May, the top ten donors and their spouses have given a total of more than $100 million to super PACs for 

the 2016 election, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, Twenty-eight donors and their spouses each 

have given at least $2.5 million. The top donor, a hedge fund CEO, has given $16.6 million. To put this in 

perspective, the average family of four earns $54,000 per year. This extraordinary flow of huge contributions is 

providing the Super Rich with magnified influence over elections and corrupting influence over government 

decisions. It is also creating deep cynicism among the American people about their interests being fairly 

represented in Washington. 

3. Donald Trump went in the blink of an eye from self-described "Mr. Can't-Be-Bought" to self-denned 

"Mr. Puppet." 

During the primaries, self-financing Donald Trump repeatedly pointed out he couldn't be bought by big donors. 

He attacked his primary opponents for their super PACs, saying that when donors give huge contributions to Jeb 

Bush for example, "they have him just like a puppet,'' and that "[Bush will] do whatever they want." Trump now 

has super PACs fighting over which one will be his "official" pro-Trump super PAC and he is raising huge 

LOOKING FOR SOMETHING? 

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For Soliciting Foreign Money to Fund His Campaign 

Fred Wertheimer for SCOTUS Blog on McDonnell 

decision 

View All Press Releases 

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Wertheimer for Buffington Post: Eight Lessons We've Learned About Money in Politics ... Page 2of3 

contributions for a Trump/RNC joint fundraising committee. "Mr. Can't-Be-Boughf' has left the building and "Mr. 

Puppet" has anived. 

4. Sometimes 11coordination" is not "coordination." 

Campaign finance law prohibits coordination between an outside spending group, like a super PAC, and a 

federal candidate. Correct the Record is a super PAC focused on refuting claims made about Hillary Clinton. 

Using a dubious scheme devised by the super PAC and Clinton's campaign lawyer, Correct the Record is openly 

and explicitly coordinating its activities with the Clinton campaign, claiming the right to do so because it is 

operating online. This effort means the Clinton campaign can control the spending of unlimited contributions 

made to Correct the Record and circumvent the $2, 700 candidate contribution limit. So much for the ban on 

coordinated expenditures. 

S. The gulf is huge between the American people and Clinton and Trump when It comes to big money in 

our politics. 

Citizens overwhelmingly object to big money rigging Washington. Meanwhile, Clinton and Trump are vacuuming 

up every big contribution they can find. The Clinton/ONG joint fundraising committee has raised $60 million and 

the pro-Clinton Super PAC has raised $76 million from big donors. Trump meanwhile is racing to play catch up. 

He has announced plans to raise $1 billion for the general election after self-financing most of his primary 

expenditures. This will include many big donor contributions. Clinton and Trump have refused to learn the 

lessons of history and they are raising \he same kind of big contributions that were responsible for the Watergate 

and soft money campaign finance scandals. 

6. The best laid plans sometimes go awry as the Koch brothers found out in the 2016 election. 

The Koch brothers and their network originally planned to spend an unheard of $889 million during this election 

cycle to finance their long-term goal of a Republican takeover of Washington. With Donald Trump, a candidate 

they have voiced strong objections too, being the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, their dream is 

apparently gone. So too is the $889 million campaign. The Koch brothers are now focusing their financial 

activities on helping Republicans keep control of the Senate. Koch groups have already spent $12 million in five 

Senate races and have reserved an additional $30 million more in ad buys later this year in Senate races. 

7. The Sanders campaign has demonstrated once more the potential of the Internet to dramatically 

Increase the role of small contributions In financing campaigns. 

In his 2008 and 2012 presidential campaigns, Obama raised an historic amount online - more than $1 billion 

from more than eight million donors. Bernie Sanders has followed this model, As of May, sixty-two percent of the 

$206 million raised by Sanders has come from small contributions, according to the Center for Responsive 

Politics. The challenge ahead involves making technologic breakthroughs so that raising large sums of small 

contributions online becomes the rule, not the exception The Internet and social media have revolutionized our 

society and can also revolutionize the way our campaigns are financed - dramatically increasing the role of small 

contributions in campaigns and greatly diluting the impact of big money. 

8. Campaigns, political operatives and campaign finance lawyers have become more brazen than ever in 

flouting the campaign finance laws. 

The law prohibits candidates from "directly or indirectly'' controlling a super PAC, but Jeb Bush had his longtime 

political strategist run the pro-Bush super PAC. Donors have illegally been hiding their contributions from the 

public by giving them to super PACs in the name of LLC corporations. Trump strategists say they plan to pay for 

campaign staff from an RNC account that is restricted by law to being used only to pay for buildings. As a 

Republican campaign finance lawyer recently stated, "We are in an environment in which there has been virtually 

no enforcement of the campaign finance laws ... " When laws aren't enforced, you don't have laws. 

We are halfway through the 2016 national elections and the onslaught of political money from billionaires and 

multimillionaires will continue and increase. This is not the way our democracy is meant to work or the way our 

country is meant to be governed. 

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Fred Wertheimer Op-ed for the Huffington Post on 

Fixing the Presidential Public Financing System 

April 20, 2016 All Press Releases, Featured Articles, Homepage, Press Releases, Wertheimer Op-eds 

The Huffington Post 

A Cure for a Political Disaster: Fixing the 

Presidential Public Financing System 

By: Fred Wertheimer 

April 20, 2016 

The current system of financing presidential elections is a political disaster. And the American people are paying 

the price. 

According to Open Secrets, super PACs supporting presidential candidates have raised $416 million as of March 

21. These funds were provided primarily by the Super Rich. 

Altogether, super PACs have raised $607 million to support federal candidates in the 2016 election, with more 

than 40 percent of this total coming '1rom just 50 mega-donors and their relatives," according to The Washington 

Post. That amounts to $1 .2 million per donor. 

Welcome to the home of the oligarchs and the land of the billionaires. 

The corrupt system we have today stems from the existence of dual financing systems for federal elections. It 

provides enonmous advantages to the wealthy and the policies they support. 

One system, created by Congress, includes disclosure of all money raised for campaigns and limits on 

contributions to candidates and parties. The second system, created by the Supreme Court, includes unlimited 

contributions spent by outside groups and dark money laundered through "social welfare" nonprofits. 

The Supreme Court's system has allowed billionaires and millionaires to play an unprecedented and dangerous 

role in American politics, Individual-candidate super PACs are serving as vehicles for these mega-donors to 

make unlimited contributions to support a presidential candidate and circumvent the $2,700 candidate 

contribution limit. The contribution limit was enacted to prevent corruption. 

Conservative Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner, seen by many as the most influential jurist outside the 

Supreme Court, captured the enonmous damage done by the Court's financing system. Judge Posner stated, 

"Our political system is pervasively corrupt due to our Supreme Court taking away campaign-contribution 

restrictions on the basis of the First Amendment." 

The unfolding presidential election illustrates the problems created for our political system. 

The Republican primary is essentially a two person race. Billionaire Donald Trump is competing against Senator 

Ted Cruz who is heavily backed by billionaires. The Democratic primary is also a two person race. Hillary 

Clinton. supported by wealthy donors financing a pro-Clinton super PAC, is competing against Senator Bernie 

Sanders, the exception in the race who is repeating President Barack Obama's historic breakthrough in online 

small donor fundraising. 

LOOKING FOR SOMETHING? 

Searoh 

RECENT PRESS RELEASES 

Watchdog Groups Call on DOJ to Investigate Trump 

Campaign 

Refonm Groups Applaud House Democrats 

Comprehensive Refonm Package to Fix Political System 

Hillary Clinton Super PAC Accepted $200,000 in Illegal 

Contributions from Government Contractor 

Refonm Group File Complaint Against Donald Trump 

For Soliciting Foreign Money to Fund His Campaign 

Fred Wertheimer for SCOTUS Blog on McDonnell 

decision 

View All Press Releases 

http://www.democracy21.org/money-in-politics/press-releases-money-in-politics/fred-werth... 8/1/2016 

Exhibit E

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Fred Wertheimer Op-ed for the Huffington Post on Fixing the Presidential Public Financi ... Page 2of3 

Waiting in the wings for the general election are super PACs and their mega-donors who will spend untold 

millions of dollars to support the major party nominees. The mega-donors who support the winner will be first in 

line to influence the new administration. 

There was a time when we had a presidential campaign finance system that wor1<ed for the American people, not 

for the Super Rich. 

Created in 197 4, the presidential public financing system was used by almost all major party presidential 

candidates from 1976 through 1996. The system provided for competitive races while minimizing the role of big 

money in financing the presidential candidate campaigns. 

Under the system, Republicans and Democrats each won the presidency three limes; incumbents and 

challengers each won three times. 

Washington Post columnist E.J Dionne wrote in 2006, "The public financing of presidential campaigns, instituted 

in response to the Watergate scandals of the earty 1970s, was that rare reform that accomplished exactly what it 

was supposed to achieve." 

The presidential system eventually broke down, however, because Congress never allowed it to be updated and 

modernized. As a result, while the costs of running for president skyrocketed, the overall spending limit for 

participating candidates only increased by incremental cost of living adjustments. 

Today, the presidential public financing system is defunct and needs lo be repaired to again serve the interests 

of the American people. 

The Empower Act, introduced by Senator Tom Udall (S.1176) and Representatives David Price and Chris Van 

Hollen (H.R. 2143), would create a revitalized, effective system. 

Modeled on the successful New York City public financing system, the legislation would provide multiple public 

funds to match small contributions at a 6 to 1 ratio. Instead of participating candidates agreeing to spending limits 

that are impossible to calculate today because of unlimited outside money, candidates are required to abide by 

substantially lower contribution limits. 

A repaired presidential public financing system would dramatically increase the amount of clean resources 

available to participating candidates and thereby greatly dilute the importance and impact of outside spending 

groups and their mega-donors. 

A fixed system also would empower ordinary Americans in the political process by making their small 

contributions much more important and valuable to presidential candidates. And candidates would have an 

alternative way to finance their presidential campaigns without becoming obligated to big money funders. 

The presidential election in 2016 is taking place in a corrupt campaign finance system. We need to ensure this 

does not happen again. 

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Copyright c 2013 Democracy21 All rights reserved. 

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Fred Wertheimer statement: FEC Reports Confirm Billionaires and Millionaires Playing ... Page 1 of2 

Democracy 21 

HOME LEGISLATNE ACTION PUBLIC FINANCING MONEY IN POLITICS INSIDE THE COURTS ARCHNES ABOUT US DONATE 

Fred Wertheimer statement: FEC Reports Confirm 

Billionaires and Millionaires Playing Dominant Role in 

Presidential Campaigns 

August 1, 2015 All Press Releases, Press Releases 

The FEC reports filed by individual-candidate Super PACs confirm that billionaires and millionaires have become 

the dominant players in financing the 2016 presidential campaigns. 

The FEC reports also reveal that individual-candidate Super PACs are in the process of replacing candidate 

committees in the financing of the 2016 presidential campaigns. As of June 30, individual-candidate Super PACs 

supporting Republican presidential candidates had raised at least four limes the amount raised by the 

Republican candidate committees. 

Meanwhile, huge contributions from the wealthiest individuals in the country are flooding the presidential 

campaigns - the kind of contributions that can result in corruption and the appearance of corruption. 

At least 25 individuals gave or raised $1 million each for the Super PAC supporting Jeb Bush, according to the 

Wall Street Jovmal. The largest conlribulion reportedly came from billionaire Mike Fernandez who gave $3 

million. And then there is one billionaire, Donald Trump, who has decided that the best presidential candidate to 

finance is Donald Trump. 

The 2016 presidential candidates and their individual-candidate Super PACs are wiping out the nation's anticorruplion candidate contribution limits, In doing so, the presidential candidates and the Super PAC supporting 

them are creating the kind of system that the Supreme Court has described as an inherently corrupt system. 

As the 2016 campaign unfolds, the American people are watching the perversion of the American presidency 

take place before their eyes. 

LOOKING FOR SOMETHING? 

Seamh 

RECENT PRESS RELEASES 

Watchdog Groups Call on DOJ to Investigate Trump 

Campaign 

Reform Groups Applaud House Democrats 

Comprehensive Reform Package to Fix Political System 

Hillary Clinton Super PAC Accapted $200,000 in Illegal 

Contributions from Government Contractor 

Reform Group File Complaint Against Donald Trump 

For Soliciting Foreign Money to Fund His Campaign 

Fred Wertheimer for SCOTUS Blog on McDonnell 

decision 

View All Press Releases 

GET IN TOUCH OUR WORK ABOUT US STAY CONNECTED DO YOUR PART TO 

SUPPORT US 

Democracy 21 

2000 Massachusetts Ave, NW 

Washington, DC 20036 

Phone: (202) 355.9600 

Email: info@democracy21.org 

Legislative Action 

Public Financing 

Money in Politics 

Inside the Courts 

Our Mission 

Our Team 

Board of Directors 

Contact Us 

Facebook 

Twitter 

Email 

Support Democracy 21 today 

and become a part of making 

Democracy wor1< for all 

Americans. 

DONATE 

http://www.democracy21.org/money-in-politics/press-releases-money-in-politics/fred-werth. .. 8/1/2016 

Exhibit F

Case 1:16-cv-00752-JDB Document 18-2 Filed 08/02/16 Page 24 of 24

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